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(1) Akinyemi, A.B.: "Indigenous security arrangements in third world conflict areas"

(2) Blechman, Barry: "The scope and limits of military power in third world conflict"

(3) Chubin, Shahram: "The United States and Third World"

(4) Conant, Melvin: "Oil resources and conflict: the likely contingencies"

(5) Feldman, Shai: "Outside guarantees and regional security"

(6) Hackett, John: "Protecting oil supplies: the military requirements"

(7) Hoffmann, Stanley: "Security in an age of turbulence: means of response"

(8) Hottinger, Arnold: "Internal change and regional conflict: the case of the Gulf"

(9) Lagorio, Lelio: "Third World conflict and international security"

(10) Nacht, Michael: "Internal change and political stability in developing countries"

(11) Perlman, Robert: "Resource requirements, dependencies and vulnerabilities for the industrialized states"

(12) Schlesinger, James R.: "Implications of Third World conflict for international security in the 1980's"

(13) Steinbach, Udo: "Sources of Third World conflict"

(14) Wanandi, Jusuf: "Third World conflict and international security: a Third World perspective"

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THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE 5

REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

(i)

INDIGENOUS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AREAS

by

A. B. Akinyemi

Committee 5: Regional Security Arrangements

INDIGENOUS SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AREAS

A. B. Akinyemi

Concern with and the search for individual (personal, group and state) security within a collectivity or community (group, state and international) are probably coterminous with the founding of the collectivity: at least that is the implication of the Hobbesian perception of society. Even those who do not go as far as Hobbes still agree that one of the raisons d'être of any government is the need to establish and then to maintain security. Therefore, on one level of analysis, a discussion of the interface of the conflicts of the Third World and general international security is to be expected whenever there is general concern with international security.

However, on another level of analysis, it can be argued that, outside diplomatic niceties or the dictates of scholastic inclusivity, there are cogent reasons why the concept of regional security has become of strategic significance. These reasons all centre around the fact that conflicts on the periphery are posing a direct and increasing threat to the stability of the centre of the international system.

First, conflicts between states in the Third World often attract support from competing superpowers and, at times, this competing support develops to an intensity sufficient to generate direct confrontation between them.

Second, security crises in the Third World often arise from direct superpower or major power intervention. This kind of intervention is often anticipatory or pre-emptive in the sense that one power sometimes intervenes for fear that another may intervene and thereby reap what it deems to be the benefits of intervention. While this kind of intervention has ideological overtones - as in Shaba I and Shaba II - it could also occur within the same ideological camp - as in Gabon (1964) and the New Hebrides (1980).

Third, access to resources is more often than not used as a justification for intervention even though the justification is based on false premises as was shown by the United States policy towards Angola. This policy - part of the general US policy towards Southern Africa - was (and still is) based on the premise that African radical regimes in Southern Africa will be inimical to Western strategic interests. Yet Cuban troops are guarding Mobil Corporation Oil exploration from US-backed insurgents - oil meant for the United

States market. This need for access to resources, cheap or otherwise, and hence intervention as a means to secure or maintain that access, is likely to become more dominant as the international system becomes more dominated by the politics of the scarcity of raw materials.

In essence then, the international system is confronted with conflict and instability on the periphery that threatens the whole system and not just the sub-system of the periphery as Henry Kissinger believed or would have liked.[1]

From the above, one could easily conclude that conflict and instability in the Third World are the creation of the superpowers. That would be wrong. All that is implied above is that superpower intervention exacerbates existing or incipient conflicts with the result that they come to pose security threats to the stability of the international system. That adversaries in Third World conflicts have cogent reasons of their own, no more or less irrational than those in the First and Second Worlds, should be conceded.

Should we then be concerned with only a regional security system designed to prevent or contain the spillover effect to the international system of Third World conflicts? Or should the concern be extended to securing security systems that will resolve the Third World conflicts?

In assessing the performance of Third World regional security systems, one should guard against using different yardsticks from those applied to security systems in the core of the international system. Obviously it is relevant to enquire whether the various security systems of the First and Second Worlds have solved or have only contained the conflicts of those worlds. The ideological and power confrontation between the East and the West in Europe remains unresolved. The British Ulster problem, the Canada/Quebec problem, and the Walloon/French conflict in Belgium all remain unresolved. Of course, one is not insinuating that the three worlds have identical problems although the external factor fuelling these crises makes them similar to those in the Third World in many essential details.

Be that as it may, the fact remains that, whether in order to prevent the spillover effect or out of genuine concern to deal with Third World conflicts, there is a proposition that regional security systems may serve a useful role in achieving these objectives. This will be discussed at greater length later.

At this stage the following questions arise: What kind of regional security systems have the Third World experimented with? How successful have these experiments been? And how relevant to the strategic problems of the 1980s are these security systems?

THE INTER-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Concern for regional security in the Americas and the idea for some kind of a regional military force date back to the independence of several of these American states from Spain. This is perfectly understandable since commitment to the development of Pan-Americanism featured as a plank in the drive for independence.(2)

Concrete steps towards the institutionalization of security arrangements were taken at the 1945 Pan-American Conference at which the Act of Chapultepec was signed. This spelt out measures to be taken to repel an aggressor:

> "Recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions, breaking of diplomatic relations, breaking of consular relations, breaking of postal, telegraphic, telephone, radio telephoning relations, interruption of economic, commercial and financial relations. Use of armed force to prevent or repel aggression". (3)

At the same Conference, there was also a call for a treaty which would embody the measures which were put into the Act. This Treaty was signed in 1947 in Rio de Janeiro and became the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance. This Treaty is basically military in nature in the sense that it embodies the concept of individual and collective self-defence by the American States.
It therefore comes as no surprise that the member states of the Inter-American system thought they needed to establish another organization to complement the military nature of the Rio Treaty. This was the Organization of American States (OAS) whose Charter was signed at Bogota on April 30, 1948. The OAS is basically non-military in character and is more comprehensive in the sense that it embodies the principles and the values which the American states feel ought to govern their relationship. In fact, so complementary is the Charter of the OAS to the Rio Treaty that the Charter has only a single provision (in Article 44) for the establishment of military machinery. An advisory defence committee was established to advise the organ of consultation on problems of military co-operation that could arise in connection with the application of existing special treaties on collective security.
Other organizations set up under the Charter which are relevant are:

- The Inter-American Peace Committee;
- The Council of the OAS;
- The meetings of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which serve as the organ of consultation which was established under the Rio Treaty.

In essence then, these two documents, the Rio Treaty and the Charter of
the OAS, together embody the political, economic and security values of the
Inter-American system.

The Rio Treaty embodies basically the two concepts of self-defence: the
individual and the collective. In fact, the Rio concept of collective self-
defence could also be further sub-divided into two parts in the sense that the
Rio Treaty does not define collective self-defence only in the sense of
security measures taken by the Organization. The Rio Treaty allows signatories
to the Treaty to pick which of the other signatories to the Treaty may be
called upon to help them in moments of aggression. In other words, collective
is defined in two senses: collective taken to mean acts under the Rio Treaty
by the signatories as a collectivity to repel aggression on one of the sign-
atories; and acts taken by any combination of the signatories to repel
aggression on one of the member states. The Rio Treaty was built around the
concept that an armed attack against one American state would be considered an
attack against all American states.

The totality of these provisions may of course give the impression of a
tight regional security system but in fact Article 20 of the Rio Treaty, by
making it non-obligatory for any state to contribute troops in any collective
security action, basically reduces the security aspect to a voluntary one.
It thereby weakens the system in that a decision of the Organ of Consultation
that an attack on one of its members requires collective military action by
the Organization, even though taken by a 2/3rds majority as demanded by the
Treaty, is not binding on any state. Any state could legally therefore refuse
to carry out such an obligation.

The non-obligatory nature of the Rio Treaty and the essentially pacific
nature of the Charter of the OAS reflect by and large the lack of consensus
among members states of the Inter-American system as regards three security
issues. The first is whether a distinction should be made between aggression
from within the system and aggression from outside. In other words, there
were some who believed that conflicts within the Inter-American system should
not be regarded as aggression since it was felt that the use of force to
defeat aggression within the system may in fact create more problems than it
would solve whereas aggression by a state outside the system could be dealt
with more easily on military terms.

Others felt that there was no reason to make such a distinction. This lack of consensus during the negotiations over the Rio Treaty led to the compromise that the security obligations ofthe Treaty were in fact non-obligatory, and that there was to be no distinction between aggression from outside or inside the system. Secondly, there was another division as to whether there should be a permanent military organization or whether it should be ad hoc. Those who favoured a permanent military organization were influenced by the success of the Inter-American Defence Board which had no legislative authority but was simply an adviser on security matters to the OAS. However, this Board, set up in 1942, performed well precisely because of the nature of the international environment, namely the Second World War. At the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace in 1945, there were proposals from several states that the Board should be made permanent. However, this was opposed for fear that a permanent organ would tend to militarise the Inter-American system.[4] The compromise between these two schools of thought resulted in the designing of an Organic Pact which provided for an Inter-American Defence Council to advise on military cooperation as well as on any collective measures contemplated under the Rio Treaty.

How well has this system fared?[5]

First, the Organization has been rather creative and flexible in the use of military personnel for activities ranging from observation through peacekeeping to something close to enforcement in the cases of the Dominican Republic and the Cuban crisis. Second, at each stage the Organization has always shied away from any legal interpretation of the kind of military operation which it was undertaking. Underlining this has been the voluntary nature of the contributions to the forces involved and the fact that the forces were supposed to operate in consultation and in conjunction with either the parties to the dispute or, in the case of the Dominican Republic, with the semblance of a central authority. In other words, apart from the case of Cuba, the Organization has been very careful to ensure that operations did not really amount to a violation of the territorial integrity or the sovereignty of the parties to the dispute. Third, with the exception of the Cuban case, the parties to disputes had been prepared to cooperate with the Organization in implementing the objectives of any of the operations. Fourth, as the example of Cuba showed, the success of the OAS was due at least in part to the ideological consensus that has operated within the system. It was also due - and this the Cuban case showed clearly - to the fact that the looming presence of the US with sufficient capability to impose its will on the Inter-American system probably circumscribed effectively the readiness of any of the member

states to prove obstinate within the conflict resolution procedure laid down by the Organization. Cuba, with a different ideological system and with the backing of another superpower, was the closest that an American state has come to defying the Organization. Fifth, although it has been suggested that the presence of the US within the Inter-American system with the ability to protect the region militarily is perhaps the reason why the American states themselves are not too keen on setting up a fixed and permanent military instrument for conflict resolution,[6] an additional explanation could be that it is the fear that the US may not only dominate the permanent organization but in fact may use it in ways which the Latin American States may not like that has led them to oppose the setting up of a permanent security organization. That is why they always resorted to ad hoc military instruments in order to resolve their conflicts. It also may explain why even the military instrument which they use lacks compulsion. Finally, attention should be drawn to the fact that, apart from the Dominican crisis which perhaps should be distinguished from others on the grounds that the US intervened unilaterally to curtail communist influence, the Inter-American security system deals neither with civil war nor with domestic insurrection. Recent events in El Salvador, Bolivia and Nicaragua seem to confirm the view that the inter-American system, while not totally oblivious to the problems created by insurrection and civil wars, has taken the position that, unless there are charges that these are externally instigated, they are internal affairs of member states and therefore none of the business of the Organization itself. An exception to this is the issue of human rights. The OAS has, as one of its specialized agencies, a seven-man Inter-American commission which reports on violations of Human Rights. Again this has been done under pressure from the US and it cannot therefore be regarded as a consensual value of the Inter-American system.

There are two categories of conflicts which are likely to create instability in the region which the OAS has not coped with. The first category is essentially domestic but has international ramifications. This is the formation of national liberation movements or guerrilla movements which are committed to the overthrow of Central Governments through revolutionary violence. Many of them derive support from one another and from other revolutionary groups in other parts of the world.[7] Their strength, whether they succeed in overthrowing governments or not, constitutes a trend that is tending to undermine one of the factors identified earlier as contributing to the success of conflict resolution in the inter-American system: ideological consensus. With this consensus undermined, there is no guarantee that the system will be able to produce positive results.

The second category of conflict concerns confrontation over disputed territories such as Argentina-Chile, Peru-Bolivia, Peru-Chile, Bolivia-Chile and Peru-Ecuador. These disputes date back to the independence of these states from Spain. Several of the states involved in these disputes have chronic economic problems which could easily tempt the governments into military confrontation as a way of diverting attention from serious domestic problems.

Reference has already been made to the peculiar status of the US in the inter-American system. It is a member of the OAS, a signatory to most of the regional Agreements and an active participant in, if not the instigator of, most of the security operations carried out in the Americas. And yet, up to the 1970s, the threat of external intervention was synonymous with the US in the minds of most of the elites in the region - a reputation that was well-deserved. However, in the aftermath of Vietnam, the US has withdrawn from direct military intervention in the affairs of the other American States. But it would be wrong to regard this new posture as being entirely due to the post-Vietnam syndrome. Other regional centres of power - Brazil, Mexico and Argentina - have shown a willingness to defy the US over certain issues. Brazil has refused to defer to the US over its nuclear deal with West Germany and over domestic human rights.[8] If this emergence of regional powers is coupled with the recent coup d'état in Bolivia, carried out against the express wishes of the US, then US intervention in Latin America may be becoming a thing of the past. This conclusion is strengthened by another factor: as the Soviet Union has matched the strategic capability of the US, any act of US intervention in the American region can be matched by Soviet intervention elsewhere in the world - a development which the US would not wish to encourage.[9]

The gradual evolution of regional powers in the inter-American system has not been without benefit. A recent study has suggested that "the major inhibiting factor to conflict in the region is Brazilian hegemony .."[10] and that it is the uninstitutionalized pressure from Brazil that has prevented the territorial disputes identified above from boiling over.

This development is not taking place in isolation. Along with it is the development of nuclear technology in the region.

The Treaty of Tlateloco provides for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. It was signed by twenty nations in 1967 after intensive negotiations lasting just over three years. Its objective is the complete military denuclearization of the Latin American area, and its provisions are much more extensive than those embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty adopted by the UN General Assembly which came into force in 1970.

Important in this regard is the expressly stated intention that no permission will be granted for nuclear weapon bases. One of the accompanying protocols to the Treaty embodied in it a pledge by nuclear weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against parties to the Treaty, a pledge which the Soviet Union has refused to sign. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have so far refused to be parties to the Treaty.

THE ASIAN EXPERIENCE

Of all the Regions in the Third World, no region is more varied in terms of culture, population and political development than Asia. Also none are more bedevilled by the rivalry among the US, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The region is a group of distinct and heterogeneous communities, character-ised by great differences in political, social and economic structures, cultural ethos and ruling elite philosophies. Regional cooperation is in-herently determined by (and affected by) the fundamental splits between communism and capitalism and between pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet communists. Internally the states in this region are plagued by rampant religious and ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, the smaller states fear the larger.

India, Pakistan and Indonesia are not only jealous of their independence but also seek to exclude at least the two superpowers who are not indigenous to the area - the Soviet Union and the US. The former indigenous powers could then be in a position to exercise regional leadership. One therefore begins to understand why it has not been possible to set up a regional organ-ization whether with political or security objectives. The differences in ideology and foreign policy objectives are so wide that no single regional organization can be prescribed for the whole of Asia.

The Historical Background

In 1944, Australia and New Zealand signed an agreement (ANZAC) for the defence of the Southwest Pacific region. In 1951, the same two countries joined the US in a Pacific Security Treaty (the ANZUS Pact) which was basically a mutual defence pact. In 1954, the US, Britain, France, New Zealand, Australia, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) as a collective defence treaty against "communist aggression".[11] In 1966, 9 non-Communist States - Australia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and South Vietnam - formed The Asian and Pacific Council to foster "greater cooperation and solidarity among the free Asian and Pacific countries".[12] However, by 1969, the Council had started to face the realities of power in Asia by dropping its confrontational attitude towards the Communist countries.

In 1961, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand formed the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) for economic, administrative and cultural cooperation. Differences between Philippines and Malaysia led to the dissolution of that Association in 1967.

Maphilindo, a confederation of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia, on which agreement was reached in 1963, foundered in the confrontations between Malaya and Indonesia and between Malaya and the Philippines.

In 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) primarily to increase regional cooperation. Even though ASEAN set its objectives as economic, the intrusion of security matters was evident from the very beginning in its reference to the temporary nature of all foreign bases in Southeast Asia in the Bangkok Declaration that established ASEAN. That security considerations were just below the surface in the minds of some of its members, especially Malaya, is evident in the various pronouncements of Malayan leaders. [13]

Under the ASEAN Pact, the emphasis is on bilateral arrangements to deal with the problems of subversion, and foreign infiltration according to section E of the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord.

Some of the most notable bilateral security arrangements among member states include:

- The Sawasdi-Salam Agreement of 1965 between Malaysia and Thailand. In this the right of hot pursuit was granted to each other's forces to chase communist insurgents across borders for no more than five miles;

- the Indonesia and Philippines Border Patrol Agreement in November 1974, an agreement which included provision for combined naval exercises.

- The Indonesia-Malaysia Agreement to cooperate on arms production with the objective of standardizing the armaments of ASEAN countries.

- The security agreement between Singapore and Malaysia.

The Present Confusion in Southeast Asia

There are four operative factors that can be distilled from the experience in collectivity in SE Asia. First, the post-World War II security perceptions of Asia can be divided into two phases:

- A phase of containment of Sino-Soviet influence when curtailing communism was the objective;

- a phase of coming to terms with the reality of Chinese power and status in Asia when most of the existing security/political organizations faded into irrelevance.

Second, just as in the Inter-American system, the US at times alone and at times in conjunction with other Western European powers, was the prime mover behind most of the Organizations. By the middle of the 1960s, when the experience of the Vietnam war had started to demonstrate the limit to US power in Asia, the US became less visible and less directly involved in establishing these organizations.

Third, India has not been involved in any of these organizations. Even if the absence of China were understandable, in the sense that some of the organizations were directed against her, the absence of India denies them credibility.

Fourth, none of these organizations is representative of the region in the sense of covering the totality of the interests in it. There are two reasons for this. The first is a problem of definition. What constitutes a region? The whole of Asia or part of it? Even the outer boundary of what constitutes Southeast Asia is not definite. SEATO and ASEAN both used the same geographical expression and yet do not cover the same area. The second problem is that there are four distinct interests which cannot be accommodated under the same security umbrella:

- Pro-West interests;

- pro-Soviet interests;

- pro-Chinese interests;

- the Neutralist interests.

Since at the moment there is a vague understanding that to be pro-Western is to be pro-Chinese, there are still three more or less irreconcilable groups.

On present evidence, ASEAN will probably continue to function as a pro-Western organization which may eventually include Australia and New Zealand. It will continue to be tolerated by the Chinese as long as the Chinese-American understanding lasts.

By contrast, the Soviet Union is trying to set up an "Asian Collective Security Arrangement" to curtail Western and Chinese interests in Asia.

Superimposed on all of these is the nuclear factor. At present, Asia has one nuclear power, China, and two nuclear-threshold powers, India and Pakistan. India represents the neutralist tendencies in Asia - a posture that might be strengthened rather than weakened by the acquisition of the nuclear bomb. Pakistan is more likely to team up with the loose Chinese/Western alliance.

The enigma is Japan, a powerful economic force that has so far shied away from any political involvement in Asia. Beyond developing a limited military capability to defend herself, there is no evidence yet to suggest that Japan is ready to become involved again in the quicksands of Asian politics.

THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

Pan-Africanism, the prevailing ideology embodying African continental consciousness, has gone through three phases. The first was when Africans in the diaspora developed "Black Consciousness" which excluded the Arab North Africans. The second was the Africanization of Pan-Africanism when the Blacks in the diaspora were excluded and the North African Arabs were included. Pan-Africanism then became a value system for African inter-state relations. The third phase, which is now emerging, is almost a return to the first phase with modifications.[14]

The second phase of Pan-Africanism, the one that is relevant for the purposes of this paper, led to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, the Charter of which enjoined member states to settle their disputes through peaceful negotiation. Article 2a of the Charter provided for a Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration which is charged with the responsibility for settling inter-state disputes but the Commission had no automatic jurisdiction over state disputes. Parties to the disputes must submit voluntarily to OAU jurisdiction. African states showed a preference for an ad hoc Peace Committee made up of a number of Heads of State with the result that the Commission is now defunct.[15]

Article 20 of the Charter provides for a Defence Commission which was supposed to plan for cooperation among African States for the defence of the continent. This was the watered-down compromise arising out of deep and wide-spread opposition to Nkrumah's proposal for an African High Command. This Commission, however, has been dormant until quite recently.

Africa, in the post-independence period, has been faced by two kinds of conflicts. The first is that of boundary disputes, and the second is that of civil wars. It is a generally mistaken belief that Africa is bursting with territorial disputes and one of the social science clichés is the artificiality of African boundaries. Yet, apart from Australia and New Zealand, there is no boundary in the world that is not artificial. Furthermore, out of a possible one hundred and fifty potential boundary disputes in Africa, less than ten have resulted in military conflicts and, of these ten, only two are South of the Sahara. The OAU's position has been the adoption of the legal doctrine, uti possidites - the inviolability of colonial boundaries.

The second set of problems has been with civil wars, sometimes involving seccessionist tendencies. There have been six of these: Zaire, Nigeria, Chad, Angola, Sudan and Ethiopia, out of the 49 members of the OAU. Superimposed on these two problems has been the problem of intervention by external forces.

In assessing the performance of the OAU as a machinery to promote the security interests of African states, the impression is generally held that the Organization has been ineffective. It has not prevented interstate disputes erupting (especially disputes affecting boundaries) and, because the Organization lacks the machinery for enforcement, interstate disputes are allowed to drag on, thus leaving room for foreign intervention.

However, the greatest strength of the OAU has been its ability to contain territorial disputes and civil wars through the articulation of an African position. When the OAU recognized the MPLA government in Angola, supported Nigeria in the Nigerian/Biafran war, supported Ethiopia in the Ogaden and Eritrean wars, supported Mauritania against the irredentist claims of Morocco and refused to condemn the Soviet Union in Angola, the OAU was not able to convince the non-African powers who were opposed to these decisions. Yet the OAU denied any legitimacy to the policies of non-African powers since the OAU could claim that it did indeed represent an African point of view and hence that any anti-OAU position was anti-African. This denied legitimacy to the attempts to transfer East-West conflicts to Africa. Without the OAU, it is quite possible that the Western powers might have intervened directly and openly in the Angolan, Nigerian and Ethiopian crises under the guise of containing communism.

The OAU will nevertheless remain largely ineffective as a security organization so long as it cannot enforce its decisions and so long as it is unable to prevent foreign powers from intervening in African problems at will. The ability of the OAU to provide adequate security arrangements for the continent is further eroded by the allegiances of member states to foreign

military powers. African countries do not share a common concern for the
activities of outside military powers in Africa. Those countries that do
accept defence arrangements with Western powers consider the presence of
Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia as constituting a serious threat to peace
in Africa. Others believe, as aptly put by President Nyerere of Tanzania,
that the Cuban troops are in those countries "at the request of the legitimate
and recognised governments concerned for reasons which are well known and
completely understandable".[16]

How then is the OAU to reconcile these two attitudes? There/is consensus
that foreign intervention of any kind should be discouraged but that when such
intervention is at the invitation of a legitimate government and in the absence
of an African defence arrangement, it must be tolerated. However immediate
withdrawal of outside forces must be demanded as soon as they have served
their purpose.[17] The ideal would be the creation of an African defence
force and there has been a great deal of discussion on the formation of
various types of security arrangements in Africa. The OAU has indeed a
Defence Commission but it does not meet regularly and, while proposals for the
formation of an African High Command have been bandied around for a long time,
nothing has come of them.

The matter came to a head at the OAU meeting of Heads of State in Liberia
when the Organization charged the Council of Ministers and the Executive
Secretary to convene a meeting of the Technical Commission composed of Foreign,
Defence, Finance and Economic Ministers as well as the Chiefs of Staff to
examine the proposals which were tabled by Senegal and Togo on a Pan-African
Defence Force. The Assembly of Heads of States further accepted in principle
the establishment of a joint African Defence Force. The call for this was
made primarily to counter an initiative which was launched by France in 1977
after the first Shaba invasion and the ensuing French Moroccan intervention.
A Franco-African summit was held in Dakar which was attended by all the
Franco-phone African countries, except the Cameroons, and by other non-
francophone countries like Mauritius and the Seychelles. This meeting
worried most Africans both because it endorsed the French/Moroccan inter-
vention in Shaba and because President Senghor of Senegal submitted to it a
proposal for the establishment of a Common African Military force, designed
specifically to block Soviet intervention in Africa. France was to provide
the logistic backing for such a force. In May 1978, another Franco-African
summit (held in Paris) gave priority to security problems in Africa. This
time endorsement was given to the second French intervention in Shaba. At

the UN Special Session on Disarmament, France again called for the creation of an African Peacekeeping Corps and indicated her willingness to train such a force. In June 1978 France called a five-nation meeting, attended by France, the US, Belgium, Great Britain and Germany, to discuss African security and economic relations. It was as a reaction to this sustained French propaganda offensive to develop a Western-inspired intervention force that the OAU, meeting in Khartoum in 1978, rejected the idea of any African intervention force not formed by the OAU and called for the reactivation of the OAU Defence Commission to consider the establishment of a force under the direction of the OAU. The then Nigerian Head of State, General Obasanjo, described the concept of collective security directed from outside Africa as "an instrument of neo-colonialism and an insult to the dignity and spirit of Africans."[18] The Assistant Secretary General of the OAU hinted that the proposed Pan-African force would not be a standing force, but would consist of an arrangement whereby threatened states could call for the assistance of the troops of OAU member states similar to the bilateral arrangements that already exist between some of them.

In spite of the apparent unanimity on the need for some form of Pan-African defence arrangement, there remains a lack of consensus both as to the enemies against whom the force might be used and also as to the uses to which the force will be put. The questions posed are usually whether the force will be a Peacekeeping force fashioned along UN lines or something more positive and whether the force will be permanent or not. There are certainly problems attending the setting up of such a force. Because the armed forces of the African countries are established on different patterns, any joint venture might fail as a result of confusion. Furthermore there is no "dominant power" militarily and economically powerful enough to lead, yet without clear leadership there is no certainty that most countries would meet their obligations.[19] Judging from the poor response of most African countries to, for example, the Liberation Committee Fund, one can predict that, unless their interests are directly affected, most countries will not in the event respond positively. Lastly, the supply of arms to member states contributing to a defence force could be cut off and the operation sabotaged if it was not seen to be acting in the interests of the supplier. This is most pertinent since no black African country produces arms and Africans remember the refusal of Great Britain and the US to supply the arms which had been ordered by Nigeria during her civil war. However, in spite of these problems, the decade of the 1980s is likely to

witness more serious efforts designed to set up some form of Pan-African security force, especially since most African countries feel very exposed to the dangers of foreign intervention. Even at the sub-regional level, the member states of ECOWAS (Economic Co-operative Organization of West African States) have been actively discussing the formation of an ECOWAS defence force. The meeting of defence ministers of ECOWAS, held earlier this year in Lomé, Togo, could not agree whether to recommend a standing force or one to be formed on demand. Despite this, agreement is probably not far away.

CONCLUSION

Regional security systems in the Third World vary from the institutionalized forms found in America and Africa to the very loose and partial arrangements of South-East Asia.

The American and African experiences have been relatively more successful than the Asian. All three regions are now in a state of transition within an international system that is also in a state of transition.[20] All have been the victims of intervention. However, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it is conceivable that a practical code of conduct against intervention by major powers might be developed. In the case of America and Africa, the middle powers - Brazil, Argentina and Nigeria - may have the military and economic capability to raise the costs of intervention from outside to unacceptable levels. This is to be welcomed. France, for example, has shown more readiness than other major powers to intervene in Africa to protect her economic interests. Yet Nigeria, which is opposed to such intervention/now has French funds invested in the Nigerian economy greater than the total of all French investments in her former territories. A threat to these investments in Nigeria could have a salutary effect on French interventionist tendencies.

In Asia, the regional consensus found in America and Africa is absent. China and the Soviet Union have mutually exclusive regional interests. Vietnam, India, Pakistan and Indonesia are all middle powers which have seriously to be reckoned with while Japan remains an enigma. The 1980s are likely to see the continuance of conflicts in Asia and there is no prospect of a regional security system to cope with them.

While there are factors common to all three regions, it is clear from this brief survey that there are sufficient differences to caution against generalizations. Conflict within the inter-American system arose through the intervention of the US. Yet, paradoxically, it has been this intervention, coupled with ideological consensus, which has provided some measure of stability on the continent.

In Africa, on the other hand, there has been no dominant regional power. With the exception of France, the former colonial powers have reconciled themselves to the independence of the African states. The interventionist activities of France have not led to major conflicts because they have for the most part been geared towards maintaining existing regimes in power. Instability has been minimized by the OAU and its readiness to legitimize positions based on the principles of its Charter as evidenced by its opposition to Morocco over the Western Sahara, and to Somalia over the Ogaden, by its support frr Nigeria during the Nigerian-Biafran civil war and its recognition of the MPLA in Angola. The OAU has also supported Ethiopia against Eritrean demands for independence.

In Asia, the interests of the US, the Soviet Union and China interact and the readiness of these powers to intervene militarily (whether directly or through intermediaries) has been a source of instability. Lack of an ideological consensus has been another factor contributing to instability.

There are changes taking place in all three regions. One is the lessening of US military influence in Asia and America. Another is the development of regional powers which may lead to a diminution of foreign intervention - as in Africa and South America. Both Africa and South America are also involved in establishing regional security systems of a kind around their respective middle powers - Brazil and, at least in the case of the ECOWAS sub-region, Nigeria. The ideological consensus in South America is tending to break down. In Africa, unity, fostered by the struggle against apartheid coupled with widespread pragmatism, is likely to diminish ideological struggle in Africa still further. The struggle for influence in Asia has not reached its peak although the 1980s may witness the Asian states coming to terms with the dominant presence of China.

Any system in transition tends to create some measure of instability as individuals and states react to new uncertainties. These three regional systems are now in transition as they try to evolve new institutions to cope with the inter-state problems. Some measure of instability is therefore to be expected but instability will not be resolved by external intervention. On the contrary, the cost of external intervention is likely to be raised substantially (if not to prohibitive levels) by the development of regional security systems.

FOOTNOTES

1. See John G. Stoessinger, Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power, Norton & Co. Inc., New York, 1976, pp. 155-174

2. See James R. Jose, An Inter-American Peace Force within the Framework of the Organisation of American States: Advantages, Impediments, Implications, Scarecrow Press Inc., Metuchen, N.J., 1970.

3. Ibid. p. 33.

4. The term is used ostensibly because militarized conflicts have been a marked feature of the Inter-American system from the beginning. See Stephen M. Gorman, "Present Threats to Peace in South America: The Territorial Dimensions of Conflict", Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. 33 (1), Summer 1979 p. 58.

5. Jose, op.cit. pp. 43-47 and 61-65. These crises are the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1948 Costa Rica/Nicaraguan Crisis, the 1955 Costa Rica/Nicaraguan Crisis, the Honduran/Nicaraguan Crisis of 1957, the 1959 Crisis between Panama and Cuba, the problem between Venezuela and Cuba in 1963-64 and the Dominican Crisis of 1965.

6. Jose, op.cit. p. 106.

7. See D. Carlton and C. Schaerf (eds), International Terrorism and World Security, John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York, 1975.

8. Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Latin America: Not-so-special", Foreign Policy, No. 32, Fall 1978, p. 113.

9. There is a development of the concept of a "code of conduct" for superpower behaviour in the Third World in "Soviet Geopolitical Momentum: Myth or Menace?", The Defence Monitor, Vol. IX No. 1, January 1980. Part of this code ought to be an awareness of this kind of linkage.

10. Gorman, op.cit. p. 65. See also Serge d'Adesky, "Brazil's Rise to Dominance in Latin America", The Fletcher Forum, Vol. 3 No. 2 of Summer 1979, pp. 46-65.

11. Keesing's Publications, Treaties and Alliances of the World, Charles Scribner's Publications, New York, 1974, p. 196.

12. Ibid. p. 205.

13. See Shee Poon-Kim, "A Decade of ASEAN, 1967-1977", ASEAN Survey, August 1977, Vol. XVII, No. 8, p. 754.

14. See A.B. Akinyemi, "Nigeria and Overseas Africans: The Limit of National Interest", unpublished paper presented at a conference on Nigeria's African Policy in the 1980s organized jointly by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, in Jos, Nigeria, August 25-28, 1980.

15. All members of the Commission have returned to their respective countries and have been assigned to other national jobs after years of inactivity.

16. Keesing's Contemporary Archives: No. 29130, August 11, 1978.

17. See O.O. Obasanjo, "Who will Determine Africa's Destiny?", speech delivered to Heads-of-State at the 1978 summit of the OAU.

18. Keesing's Contemporary Archives: No. 29259, October 13, 1978.

19. For a contrary view stating that Nigeria can be the dominant power in Africa see the speech by Lt-General T.Y. Danjuma, Nigeria's former Chief of Army Staff, "In search of the Enemy", delivered at a seminar on African High Command at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in 1978.

20. For the relationship between the evolution of Middle Powers and an international system in transition see A.B. Akinyemi, "The International Power System and The Emergence of the Threshold Powers" an unpublished paper delivered at the inaugural conference of the World Association of International Relations scholars held in Athens, 1979.

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THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE 3

THE UTILITY OF MILITARY POWER

(i) THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF MILITARY
POWER IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICT

by

Barry Blechman

Committee 3: The Utility of Military Power

THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF MILITARY
POWER IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICT

Barry Blechman

Assessing the utility of military power in the third world is compli-
cated by a number of factors: uncertain data, vague public statements of
objectives, methodological shortcomings are all debilitating. Most
importantly, however, we lack a commonly understood standard by which to
measure.

One could assess utility narrowly on the basis of the immediate
operational objectives of the decision-makers who chose to make use of
military strength. Take the Soviet intervention in Angola in 1975, for
example. With the aid of naval forces, Cuban combat troops, and their own
logistical services, Soviet decision-makers sought to insure the victory
of the MPLA in the then-raging Angolan civil war, to defeat the factions
backed by the West, and to cause the South African troops that had inter-
vened in the conflict to withdraw. On the basis of these operational
objectives, one would conclude that Soviet military power had been useful -
the Western-supported UNITA and FNL factions were defeated, the South
Africans retreated, and the MPLA now constitutes the official Angolan
government. Of course, such assessments are perishable with time; there
continues to be lively conflict in Angola, at least in the south, in which
South African forces at times intervene, and which requires the continuing
presence of Cuban troops and Soviet advisers to insure the MPLA's continued
success. So, Soviet operational objectives were attained, but for how long?

Moreover, in judging the utility of military power, one should pass
beyond the strictly subjective criteria of the decision-makers' own purposes
to a more comprehensive and objective assessment. Interventions, like the
Soviet intervention in Angola, have consequences which should influence
judgements, if not of the immediate utility of military power, at least of
the longer-term wisdom of its use.

For example, looking again at the Soviets' Angolan adventure, one
might list the following consequences on the positive side:

- Continued Angolan dependence on Soviet and Cuban military assistance
    for its security has resulted in the accretion of Soviet political
    influence with the Angolan government. For example, Angola was

one of the very few non-Warsaw Pact nations to vote against UN
condemnation of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

- This influence has resulted in more tangible benefits as well,
  including, intermittently, staging rights for Soviet reconnaissance
  aircraft flying between bases in the Murmansk area and Cuba.

- More broadly, Soviet willingness to aid a nationalist movement
  under attack by South African forces seems to have had certain
  positive benefits in terms of African perceptions of the Soviets'
  willingness and capability to aid in the continuing struggle for
  African liberation.

- Less tangibly and even more broadly, Angola was the first of several
  incidents that helped to create perceptions among political leaders
  throughout the world of Soviet military competence and decisiveness
  which, over the long term, could cause some individuals to think
  twice before taking positions that conceivably could precipitate
  new Soviet interventions. This reputation for military competence
  could be a decisive factor in crises; perhaps more importantly,
  some believe, it could subtly influence countless decisions of a
  more routine character.

The Soviet intervention in Angola was not without its negative con-
sequences, however. Among them:

- Soviet political influence in Angola has not been sufficient to
  prevent sporadic political flirtations between Angola and the West,
  nor mutually beneficial economic relations. To take the most
  obvious example, among their other chores, Cuban troops help to
  protect the Gulf Oil Company's efforts to exploit Angola's petroleum
  resources in the Cabinda area.

- As for tangible Soviet military gains in Angola, these have been
  rather limited and compare unfavourably even to only the direct
  costs of the operation. This may change, and may have as much to
  do with Soviet preferences as Angolan choices, but so far the Soviet
  armed forces have given far more than they have received in Angola.

- In Africa more generally, the influence acquired by opposing South
  African forces may have been offset, to a certain extent, by
  concerns raised as to Soviet interventionary propensities. Much
  as most African leaders may have applauded Soviet assistance to
  defeat South African forces, this demonstration of the new global
  reach of Soviet armed forces could only have raised trepidation in
  the hearts of many.

- Finally, looking at the global arena, it seems evident that the Soviet intervention in Angola had a marked negative effect on US-Soviet relations and initiated a political process in the United States which has all but destroyed any hopes Soviet leaders might have harboured for economic and political gains as a result of US-Soviet cooperation. It will be recalled that the Angolan intervention, because of its effect on Republican party politics in 1976, caused the then-Ford Administration to defer conclusion of the Vladivostok strategic arms limitation accord. This process was replayed among a bi-partisan political constituency later in the 1970s, causing the Carter Administration to continue to delay the conclusion of SALT, and otherwise contributing to a broad deterioration in US-Soviet relations.

Many other costs and benefits of the Angolan intervention could be described. How does one assess the balance? On the whole, was it "useful" for the Soviets to make use of their military power in Angola in 1975? The answer, of course, depends on the relative value assigned to each consequence. Was the Soviets' greater reputation for military competence more or less important than the incremental degradation in US-Soviet relations? Obviously, individuals differ in such judgements.

Moreover, any such judgement is susceptible to change as events continue to unfold, and is coloured vividly by events that already have ensued. Isolating the consequences for US-Soviet relations of the Angolan intervention alone, abstracting its effects from subsequent Soviet interventions, like that on the Horn of Africa, is an extraordinarily difficult task. In essence, one must look at the stream of history and ask, if this one incident had not occurred, what might have ensued? And would that alternative future have been better or worse, both from the perspective of the nation making use of military power, and from the perspective of the overall interests of mankind?

These obviously are not questions that I would propose to address today; we will have to settle for something less. Within the past several years, a number of empirical studies have been completed which described and assessed the post-war history of US and Soviet military operations.[*]

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* Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (The Brookings Institution, 1978); Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell (eds.), Soviet Naval Diplomacy (Pergamon Press, 1979); and Stephen S. Kaplan, Mailed Fist, Velvet Glove (The Brookings Institution, forthcoming). All three studies owe a considerable debt to the pioneering work of Alexander George. See: Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (Columbia University Press, 1974); and Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Little Brown, 1971).

Among other issues, these studies have addressed the question of the utility of military power in the third world. What I propose is to briefly highlight the major features of these military operations, to discuss what seem to have been the determinants of their successes and failures, and to draw some implications of these findings for future policies of the Western alliance.

THE RECORD

There literally have been hundreds of incidents since 1945 in which external powers sought to influence the outcomes of events in what we now call the third world through the use of military power. The history of these incidents seems to divide rather neatly into three phases.

From 1945 through 1956, relatively few such incidents occurred, but often involved sizeable military operations. The 1950 invasion of South Korea, for example, prompted a significant use of American armed forces, but led to a decline in American involvements elsewhere as both the demands of the war on military resources and the subsequent adverse political reaction caused US decision-makers to consider new commitments only reluctantly. Britain, France, and other Western nations also contributed military units to the Korean conflict, of course, and, in addition, utilized their armed forces in various colonial wars in Southeast Asia and Africa. Soviet armed forces, on the other hand, were only rarely seen outside of Europe during this period. A few incidents in China soon after the war, a possible supporting role in the Korean conflict, and the brief occupation of Azerbaijan were the only incidents of Soviet military deployments in what is now the third world until the late-1950s.

During the second phase, from 1957 through 1966, there was both a sharp rise in Western activism and the first stirrings of Soviet involvement. US armed forces figured in a sharply rising number of incidents each year, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean. This trend peaked in 1965 when, repeating the pattern of the 1950s, the beginnings of a massive American military involvement - this time in Indochina - resulted first in a reluctance to commit military resources elsewhere and, subsequently, in a political deterrent against new involvements overseas.

The armed forces of the other Western powers were also heavily involved in the third world for most of this phase. To name only a few examples, the French fought in North Africa until 1963, the British (and Dutch) confronted Mr Sukarno's Indonesia until 1965, and British forces were seen fairly often in support of various regimes in the Middle East. Even after

independence was granted to many nations in Africa, British, French and
Belgian troops were used to influence, and sometimes to determine the
outcome of local political conflicts. The French, particularly, seem to
have defined a special role for themselves in this regard. According to
then-Information Minister Alain Peyrefitte, French armed forces intervened
in Africa on twelve occasions between 1960 and 1964, a trend which seemed
to be gathering momentum until an awkward incident in Gabon led to
temporary respite in French activism.[*]

The Soviets experimented with the use of military power in the third
world during this phase. The Kaplan study identified sixteen incidents
during the period, in such widely disparate locations as the Congo, the
Levant, and Southeast Asia. No real muscle was applied in these incidents,
however, and for the most part the activity constituted futile attempts to
demonstrate that, like the United States, the Soviet Union was a great
power to be reckoned with throughout the globe.

The post-1966 phase has been marked by a relative decline in American
and other Western interventions in the third world, and a much greater
frequency of Soviet military activity. The United States, of course, was
not entirely quiescent during this period; aside from the war in Southeast
Asia, there were several major deployments of US military forces, parti-
cularly in connection with events in the Middle East. US armed forces also
were used in less dramatic ways to underscore changing American relations
with a number of states in Africa and Southwest Asia, particularly in the
vicinity of the Persian Gulf. Still, it was not until 1976 that the
Vietnam-induced restraint on American military activism began to ease, and
then only gradually until the twin shocks of Teheran and Kabul in late 1979.

Other Western powers also tended to remain aloof militarily from events
in the third world. There were isolated incidents, such as the use of
Belgian troopers in Zaire's Shaba Province in 1978, or German commandos to
rescue a hijacked Lufthansa aircraft in Mogadiscio in 1977, but such events
provide little more than interesting footnotes. The one exception remains
the French, particularly in Africa. Since the mid-1960s, French forces have
been involved in actions to maintain order in Chad, to restore order in
Shaba, to preserve political authority in Mauretania, and, most recently,
to install a new government in the Central African Empire. The French
have made plain that they intend to continue such activities as necessary

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[*] Cited in Pierre Lellouche and Dominique Moisi, "French Policy in Africa:
A Lonely Battle Against Destabilization", INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, III
(Spring 1979), pp. 108-33.

to protect French interests and the interests of the friends of France.

The Soviets, too, have made it clear that they perceive continuing utility in the use of military power in the third world. The June 1967 Middle East War seems to have marked a turning point in Soviet policy; Kaplan identifies more than 50 incidents of Soviet military involvement in the third world since that date. Initiation of this new activism coincided with a significant change in Soviet politico-military doctrine. It is at roughly this time that the Soviets seem to have concluded that superpower military competition, confrontation, and even conflict was possible in the third world without excessive danger of escalation to nuclear war.

Afghanistan aside, the Soviets have concentrated their military activity in two areas. They have been heavily involved in the Middle East, particularly as concerns the Arab-Israeli conflict, and those disputes among Arab nations and sub-national groups in which there appeared to be significant risk that the United States might become involved, such as the 1970 Jordanian Civil War. The Soviets also have been quite active in Africa. In addition to their substantial operations in Angola and Ethiopia, they have utilized naval ship visits and other forms of seemingly benevolent military activity to influence political developments and military conflicts in the Western Sahara, Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ghana, and elsewhere. The deployment of some Soviet forces to Cuba, at least on an intermittent basis, and Soviet support for Vietnamese operations against Cambodia and China, round out the picture.

A new interventionist power also emerged during this period. Cuban military forces continue to be heavily engaged in the Angolan and Ethiopian conflicts and, at various times, have been reported to have been deployed on the Golan Heights in support of Syria and on the Arabian peninsula in support of South Yemen. The Cubans also maintain advisory military missions in many additional nations. The Cuban presence in Africa dates back to the earliest days of the revolutionary regime, and results at least as much from their own revolutionary fervour as from Soviet attempts to use Cuban troops for Soviet purposes; it is misleading to term the Cubans "Soviet proxies". Indeed, a case can be made that Fidel Castro led, rather than followed, the Soviets into a policy of military activism in Africa.

What did the external powers hope to accomplish in these incidents? Typically, several specific objectives at once, which generally could be catalogued as either to influence the outcome of political conflict within a target nation, to protect the interests of a client state in conflict

with a local rival, or to signal an interest in a local situation for the purpose of influencing the global competition among the great powers.

Importantly, only in very few incidents, such as the April 1980 American attempt to free the hostages in Teheran, could the objectives of the military operation be secured directly by the armed force itself. In most of the incidents, the purposes of the external power's military activity could only be served indirectly; that is, the operational goal of the use of military power was to persuade a foreign decision-maker to take some action (or not to take some action) which, in turn, would result in achievement of the external power's fundamental objective. We refer to these indirect applications of military power as "political" uses of force. In these "political" incidents, armies may have marched, and fleets may have sailed, but when all was said and done, the utility of the entire enterprise depended on the impact of the military operation on the minds of very few individuals. This is a key point in determining the utility of military power in the third world. It means, of course, that the individual psychology of the targeted decision-maker(s) - his or her goals, prejudices, and values, to say nothing of strength of character - will have major effect on the consequences of the entire operation.

What types of military forces are most often used in these incidents? Generally, they involve only small units of military force; major deployments are rare. Most often, the forces involved are naval forces. The Navy took part in four out of every five incidents in which the United States intervened in the third world since 1945, for example. The navy has been the pre-eminent instrument of Moscow's military diplomacy in the third world as well. Indeed, it was only after a continuous Soviet naval presence had been established in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the South Atlantic that relatively frequent Soviet military involvement in these regions began to take place.

This reliance on naval forces results from several factors. For one, ships can be moved at less cost and with less logistical difficulty than can ground-based units. Additionally, of the military services, only navies traditionally think of diplomatic operations as part of their mission, and thus train for such contingencies. And, most importantly, the employment of naval forces in these situations is less difficult politically than would be the movement of ground-based forces, as it implies less of a commitment. This is also a key factor which bears significantly on the question of utility.

What did the armed forces of external powers actually do in these situations? Very little. In most cases, they established a presence - moved closer to the scene of conflict or increased their alert status - as to inject the fact of the external power's interest and potential capability into the deliberations of local policy makers. Only in proportionately few incidents did the external power's armed forces actually engage in combat or forms of military activity other than manoeuvre,

Finally, we might note that, on the whole, the United States and the Soviet Union have tended to stay out of each other's way in these incidents; confrontations were rare. Of the several hundred incidents in which US military forces played some role since 1945, the Soviets were involved in only one-third. More often than not, when they did become involved, it took the form of diplomacy and political rhetoric. Soviet military forces - even only the threat of Soviet military intervention - was a factor in less than one-half of the incidents with any Soviet involvement, or one-sixth of the total US incidents. Of the far fewer number of incidents in which Soviet military forces were involved, the United States played some part in two-thirds.

Most importantly, with the exception of the "Linebacker" operation in Vietnam in 1972, every major confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the third world has resulted from their mutual entrapment in situations initiated by others. Although in each of these cases both superpowers made sizeable military deployments, the probability of deliberate, violent conflict between them was probably never very great. Each has seemed to recognize that although they were involved in an intricate and significant minuet, it could be extremely dangerous directly to provoke the other, and that it was always important to retain the flexibility to permit each other a graceful exit. This fact, too, bears importantly on the question of utility.

DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESS

It is evident that decision-makers in many nations believe that military power is often an effective way to secure their objectives in the third world. This perception is supported by the findings of the three studies mentioned previously. It should be emphasised, however, that it is also evident that the payoff from these military activities tends to decline over time. Even viewed from the narrow perspective of the decision-makers' own operational objectives, favourable outcomes become less likely as time passes beyond the initial application of military power.

Moreover, the relative effectiveness of military power in the third world varies markedly with a variety of factors. For one, it is essential to distinguish between incidents in which military power is applied primarily to secure objectives directly through military means and those "political" incidents in which the operational objective of the military activity is to cause others to take decisions that, in turn, would secure the mission's primary purposes.

It seems clear that in incidents involving the direct application of military power, the decisive factor is the sufficiency of the quantity, and appropriateness of the character of the armed forces applied to the problem. If the forces used by the external power are adequate to the task in sheer military terms, if they are applied with some finesse, and if luck doesn't intervene significantly on the other side, then the immediate objectives of the nation intervening in this way are likely to be obtained. As a general rule, this would seem to mean that the direct military operations which are most likely to succeed are those with narrowly defined objectives that can be accomplished rapidly and decisively with relatively small forces.

There are longer-term consequences of such direct military operations as well, which, on the whole, are probably beneficial. In an anarchic international system such as ours, a reputation for military competence and decisiveness is an important good. Not that such a reputation will deter all assaults on a nation's interests, but, to some extent, such a reputation can cause responsible decision-makers in opposing nations to think twice before taking actions which they believe may provoke a new use of military power. One need not belabour the complement of this rule: Continued evidence of military incompetence or indecisiveness can result in others taking liberties with the interests of the faltering military power.

Of course, one cannot wield military power indefinitely, even success-fully, without suffering some adverse consequences. Profligate uses of military power, unjustified by reasonable assessments of real interests, can create adverse political effects, as the French discovered after a number of successful interventions in Africa in the 1960s and as the Soviets may now be learning. Still, on the whole, assuming that military interventions are not too frequent, and that minimum necessary force is applied, it would seem to be beneficial in the long term, as well as in terms of the operational objectives of decision-makers, to be able to utilise military power in the third world in direct defence of legitimate interests.

As noted, however, the more common interventionary incident is of the "political" type. This means that the utility of whatever military activity is undertaken, in the first instance, will be determined by the judgments of one, or at most a handful of individuals. Let us say, for example, that instead of seeking to free the hostages directly through a commando raid, the United States had decided to use military power against Iran in April 1980, but chose to apply it indirectly - to threaten, or actually to inflict punishment on Iran so as to persuade the Iranian authorities to release the hostages. Assuming that the Soviet Union steered clear of the situation militarily, the US clearly would have had little difficulty applying sufficient military power to destroy whatever it believed to be necessary in Iran. But a question would still remain, quite apart from the potential longer-term consequences of such an action: Would such military activity have been successful when judged by the operational objective of American decision-makers (i.e., to free the hostages)? Would the Ayatollah Khomeini have been persuaded to release the hostages if Iran's petroleum industry had been destroyed? If Iranian ports had been blockaded? If the Iranian armed forces had been decimated? If Iranian holy places had been targeted? If his own life and the lives of his closest associates had been jeopardised? These are imponderables; yet, it is obvious that the character of the particular individual in authority can have a major impact on the utility of military force when applied indirectly, for "political" purposes.

These idiosyncrasies aside, there are certain broad generalisations concerning the utility of military power in the third world which, while not necessarily valid in any particular situation, do provide some guidance as to likely outcomes.

1. Indirect applications of military power are more likely to be effective when the specific operational objectives of the external power fit closely with previously established patterns of policy. When the objectives deviate significantly from historic expressions of the intervenor's interests, "political" applications of military force are less likely to be successful; prior expressions of interests include formal treaty commitments, statements by high-level officials over considerable periods of continuous, routine deployments of military forces, and prior applications of military power in similar situations. Essentially, what seems to happen is that the messages meant to be transmitted through the activity of military forces will be received with more or less credibility depending on the policy context from which they arise. When the military activity seeks to articulate a new commitment, for example, there may be a tendency on the part of its targets to be sceptical of the external power's seriousness

and, therefore, a greater reluctance on their part to take the desired
actions. On the other hand, when the external power's military activity
seeks only to signal a reminder of historic commitments, targets are more
likely to find the threatened action credible and, therefore, the military
demonstration is more likely to achieve its purpose. For example, all
other things being equal, reinforcement of the US Sixth Fleet to deter a
threat posed to Israel is more likely to achieve its desired end that
would such a reinforcement to deter a threat posed, say, to Egypt. Such
US actions in support of Israel are well-rehearsed and therefore credible,
while Egypt is only recently an ally. This is not to say that it would be
impossible for the United States to utilise military power effectively,
and indirectly, in defence of Egypt - only that it would be more difficult
and therefore would require more dramatic military actions.

    2. Credibility of transmitted messages can also be lesser or greater
depending on the character of the military action itself - what Thomas
Schelling has called "the idiom of action."* All else being equal, the
more firm the commitment expressed by the military activity, the more
likely is the activity to be effective. For example, the insertion of
ground forces (or land-based air units) into a situation, which is more
difficult politically for an external power, would be more likely to lead
to the achievement of the external power's operation objectives than would
be the movement of naval forces alone. The fact that the external decision-
maker is willing to bear the political costs associated with putting troops
on the ground in an area of conflict indicates the seriousness with which
he views the situation and thus strengthens the credibility of the commit-
ments which the "political" use of military force is designed to signal.
Conversely, in other situations the external power may not value the stakes
high enough to warrant such political costs, in which case the application
of naval power makes perfect sense.

    Similarly, when the military forces of the external power actually
do something beyond establishing a presence, they are more likely to be
effective. Engagement in operations of one sort or another seem to express
firmer commitments than do military preparations without specific purposes.

    An implication that the external power might be willing to run the
risk of nuclear war may also help to establish credibility. Historically,
in those cases when US strategic nuclear forces were involved in third world
operations, American operational objectives have been more likely to be
achieved. It would appear that a willingness to imply a risk of nuclear
war signals that a greater seriousness is attached to the situation and
thus strengthens the credibility of the messages being transmitted.

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* Thomas C. Schelling, <u>Arms and Influence</u> (Yale University Press, 1966).

However, most of these incidents occurred during the period of American nuclear superiority; the potential utility of a demonstrated willingness to manipulate nuclear risks in an age of strategic parity requires further consideration. Moreover, the longer term consequences of such actions, to say nothing of the risks involved, should contain enthusiasm for use of this means of strengthening credibility.

3. Finally, utility seems to be related to the nature of the objectives of the intervening power. There is a very simple rule to keep in mind. All other things being equal, when the objective is to alter a target nation's existing behaviour, a "political" use of military power is less likely to be effective than when the objective is to reinforce existing behaviour. This is true whether the military activity is coercive in nature (i.e., whether it is designed to compel a real change in the target's behaviour or to deter a threatened change) or supportive in nature (i.e., whether it is designed to induce a new action by an ally or to persuade the ally to continue some existing activity). The reasons for this should be clear: First, individuals, in both their personal and public lives, typically face the known risks and benefits of existing behaviour with greater equanimity than they view the uncertain risks and benefits of an altered state of affairs; "political" uses of military power, in the end, succeed or fail depending on the decisions of few individuals. Second, political leaders cannot afford to be seen to be responding to the desires of foreign powers, particularly when the blandishments of that power take the form of military threats. Few, if any political leaders, whether in authoritarian or democratic political systems, can long survive when they must moderate their nation's behaviour in response to the public demands of external powers. Thus, in one sense, at least as concerns indirect applications of military power, utility can be strengthened to the degree that the external power's objectives are congruent with preservation of the status quo.

This brings us to a special subset of these indirect, or "political" applications of military power in the third world - the incidents in which both superpowers have intervened in third world conflict situations. In some ways these are the most interesting incidents, just as they appear to be the most dangerous.

Over the years, the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union have been involved simultaneously in a sufficient number of incidents in the third world that certain patterns of behaviour are now clear. While their military activities in these local conflicts ostensibly were directed at one another and, perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent, at their respective

clients and clients' adversaries, in a sense they played to a much larger gallery. Both superpowers, at times, seem to have felt compelled to take part in situations in which they perceived very little in the way of substantive interest because of their belief that to behave otherwise could have had adverse political impact on their relations and standings with nations throughout the world. In short, there is a presumed consequence of inaction in certain situations on the global competition for political influence between the United States and the USSR. As a result, quite apart from whatever specific operational objectives each may have harboured vis-à-vis the participants in the local situation, in these incidents both the United States and the Soviet Union also had to avoid threatening three overriding objectives:

- to avoid the development of situations in which the risk of nuclear war might become significant;

- to avoid the appearance of being limited significantly by the actions of its rival;

- to appear successful in defence of its own client's interests.

More often than not, both superpowers seem to have been able to emerge from these incidents with each of these fundamental interests secured, a fact which attests to their complementary perspectives as well as to the existence of certain tacit mutual understandings about appropriate behaviour.

James M. McConnell has termed these understandings, which he has inferred from the empirical behaviour of the United States and the Soviet Union in a large number of incidents, "the rules of the game". Adherence to these "rules" makes it possible for each superpower to make its necessary political impact without excessive risk. Most importantly, the "rules" determine for any specific situation the latitude which each nation will have for military action, or to threaten military action.

While commonly cited, neither overall military capabilities not tactically-relevant military strength account for the actual outcomes of these superpower confrontations; latitude is not determined by the military balance. Indeed, for the most part, at least in their third world naval confrontations, the US and the USSR seem to have deployed forces which, considering their differing missions, had roughly equivalent capabilities.

As McConnell puts it,

> "The proper forces deployed in the proper place at the proper
> times are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
> /success/... and beyond a certain level - the level it turns
> out, of mutual credibility - force competition at the local
> level does not drive the competition as a whole."[*]

This squares with the findings (or non-findings) of my own study that
there is no significant relationship between relative effectiveness in
these types of situations and either the overall strategic nuclear balance
or the size of the forces explicitly deployed to the scene of the conflict.

A second factor commonly cited, native resolve, also fails upon close
examination to explain why in one situation the United States will act
with greater latitude while in another the Soviets will dominate.
Historically, the achievement of dominance is too inconsistent to be
related to the native resolve or toughness of American and Russian leaders.

Rather, a third factor appears to be decisive - each superpower's
perception of the stakes involved in the situation. In turn, this seems
to consist of two components: The inherent value ascribed to the specific
interests in question, and the fact of possession. A close study of
actual confrontations in the third world shows that time after time the
superpower which dominated the situation, the one which assumed the
greatest latitude in its behaviour, was the one whose client was defending
the strategic status quo, the one whose client was on the strategic
defensive because interests in its possession were being challenged.
Thus, for example, in the 1970 Jordanian crisis, the Soviets deployed
substantial forces in the Mediterranean in support of Syria, but more or
less stood by while the United States - together with Israel - dominated
the situation in defence of Jordan, which had been attacked. Conversely,
during the 1969/70 war of attrition on the Suez Canal, the United States
acquiesced to the deployment of major Soviet air defence units in defence
of Egyptian territory against Israeli incursions, limiting its support
of Israel to fierce rhetoric, naval gestures, and aircraft sales.

This is not to say that the more passive superpower, the one whose
client is attempting to breach the strategic status quo, plays no meaning-
ful role in the situation; the fact of the second superpower's involvement
tends to limit the freedom-of-action of the first superpower's armed forces.

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* Dismukes and McConnell, op.cit., p. 243.

When the US and the USSR have both deployed forces in third world situations, they always have played these quite distinct roles. The intervenor whose client was on the strategic defensive has tended to dominate the situation, as its client was in possession of the interests being challenged, and it thus perceived a much greater latitude for action. The second superpower served as an armed bystander, to limit the threat thereby posed to its own client, which otherwise would be open-ended, and thus to prevent a reversal of the situation such that the status quo ante would then be threatened from the previously defensive position. In this sense, both superpowers have acted as guarantors of the status quo, mutually assuring that neither was in a position to breach previous understandings of international equilibrium.

Obviously, all this is too orderly, rational, and static; reality is more complicated. Respective definitions of what actually constitutes the status quo may change either as a result of small acts of local origin that do not precipitate confrontations or because of more decisive actions; thus, at times there may be uncertainty as to what constitutes proper behaviour by each of the guarantors of the status quo. Moreover, numerous factors - including the misperceptions of decision-makers in Washington and Moscow, to say nothing of those in local capitals, can complicate decisions. There are dangers in these situations, as well as opportunities for political impact.

Still, there does appear to be a mutually acceptable definition of what is, and what is not appropriate superpower behaviour in third world confrontations which has stood substantial tests. McConnell sums up the situation well,

> The realistic aim of both sides, then, is not to maximize gains but to reduce losses. The patron threatening intervention is limiting the losses of his own client against the other client; the countering patron is limiting the scope of the threat to his client by the other patron. The patrons do not neutralize each other, either politically or militarily... each has a role to play... and each makes a political impact; this is no zero-sum game.*

The utility, then, of the superpowers' military activity in third world situations in which both participate, simply put, can be seen to exist on two levels: First, such activity can serve to protect the specific interests of client states and, presumably, thereby, whatever values caused the superpower to seek or to accept such a patron/client relationship to begin with. Second, use of the armed forces serves to

* Dismukes and McConnell, p. 277.

demonstrate to a global audience the strength and resolve of each super-
power, and thus the value of their patronship, thereby contributing to
their continuing quest for political influence throughout the world. So
long as the United States and the Soviet Union continue to attribute great
importance to this competition, then the use of their military forces in
the third world will continue to be seen as inherently important, regard-
less of the substantive interests at stake in specific situations.

Indeed, there recently has been an empirical test of this proposition.
For much of its first term, the Carter Administration deliberately
refrained from military confrontations with the Soviet Union in Africa,
not so much because of moralistic concerns, as has so often - if erroneously -
been noted, as because of a belief that it was a serious mistake to permit
the dictates of East-West competition to dominate US policies vis-à-vis
the third world. Take the Soviet and Cuban intervention on the Horn of
Africa in 1977-78, for example. In this case, the Soviet client -
Ethiopia - was on the strategic defensive; the USSR clearly had the
greater latitude for action. In a pure competitive model, the US would
have come to the aid of Somalia. The standard response which the US
could have made, would have been to deploy naval forces to the region,
but to stand by passively, thus appearing to have been preventing the
Soviets and their client, once defended successfully, from reversing
the situation and threatening Somalia. However, to have done so would
have been to place the United States in association with a nation whose
actions had been strongly condemned by virtually all other African states.
Moreover, this would have occurred at a time of, and would have adversely
affected, delicate, secret negotiations through which the US was seeking,
with the cooperation of the front-line states, to bring about a peaceful
resolution of the Rhodesian situation. Thus, a deliberate decision was
made to decline the standard superpower role, with the expectation of
thus strengthening the US position vis-à-vis other African issues.

Similar decisions were taken at other times, as concerns military
sales, for example. In the end, though, the political consequences of
this refusal to play the superpower game overwhelmed such a deliberate
reordering of priorities. Domestically, the Administration came under
heavy fire for not "standing up" to the Soviets. And internationally,
non-African nations with whom the United States valued close relations,
such as China, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, expressed concern about the
apparent free hand thus given to Soviet military power in the third
world. As a result, well before the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,
the US was shifting back toward a more active confrontational stance.

This experience thus confirms the basic judgment that situations like the conflict on the Horn constitute necessary opportunities to make local and global political impacts, and that a refusal to participate can have significant adverse political consequences. Whether this confirmation resulted from immutable factors intrinsic to the international system or from specific debilities of the Carter Administration is a moot point. The fact remains that the experiment has been tried and, having been tried once and failed, is unlikely to be tried again soon. In the future, both superpowers will continue not only to see utility in the exercise of military power in the third world for direct purposes but, additionally, will perceive the necessity of mutual participation with armed force in a wide range of situations for indirect, or political objectives.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The West brings considerable advantages to the continuing struggle with the Soviet Union for influence in the third world. Whether as a model for economic development or as an ideal of how to organise society, the Soviet Union has failed; the inhumanity, inefficiency, and stultifying bureaucracy of the Soviet state is widely recognised. The West, on the other hand, has much to offer the people of the third world: Automobiles, electronics, markets, capital, dynamic political models, organisational skills, blue jeans, TV programmes, music, technology, agricultural know-how; whatever people of the third world need or crave, is more likely to be found, in greater quantity and higher quality, in the West.

There is but one instrument of policy in which the Soviet Union has a comparative advantage, the acquisition and utilisation of military power. In the contemporary world, only an authoritarian society like that of the USSR can allocate resources to the armed forces with contempt for the competing needs of its people; and only an authoritarian society can make use of that power without taking careful account of the desires of its own citizens.

It is, thus, to the West's advantage to seek to define the terms of competition such that its military aspects are de-emphasised. This is not always possible, and when such occasions arise, the West can and must compete effectively. It is crucial to maintain at least a rough balance of military power. And, at times, it is necessary for Western nations to employ their military forces in confrontations with the USSR or to defend interests in third world situations unrelated to the competition with the Soviet Union. Still, to rely too heavily on military power in the third

world, to permit the Soviet Union to define the terms of the competition
such that the armed forces gain an increasingly important role, would be
a strategic blunder that played to the Soviets' one comparative strength.
Neither in abstract terms nor in terms of the relative advantages of
Western societies, can Western armed forces be expected to serve more
than temporary, marginal, and largely cost-minimising functions in the
third world.

The exercise of Western military power in the third world cannot
substitute for the development and implementation of broader and longer-
term strategies, strategies which orchestrate a variety of policy
instruments in ways that both take advantage of the strengths of the
industrial democracies and reflect realistic assessments of contemporary
political and economic conditions in the developing world. The West must
come to a hard-headed understanding of what its real interests are in
the third world, and then articulate those interests with sufficient
credibility, backed up with sufficient military strength in-being, so
that situations which may require the actual exercise of military power
arise more and more infrequently.

Obviously, this is not always possible. The world is not orderly.
At times, perceptions of interests change. At other times, local political
and economic realities are transformed. At times, great powers neglect
their military strength. At other times, villains or, worse, fools rise
to high office and pointlessely challenge existing arrangements. Any of
these can lead to situations which demand the exercise of military power;
the fact that such a situation has arisen, though, signifies a failure of
policy. Military power can be used to attain certain specific operational
objectives in these situations but, in effect, the exercise of military
power can only buy time such that the problems which led to the policy
failure can be understood and solved, and new policies adopted which can
lead to renewed security for Western interests over the longer term.

In utilising military strength, decision-makers should be quite
clear about these limitations. Military strength can be used directly
by external powers to accomplish certain specific operational objectives -
to recover seized assets, for example, or to topple tyrannical governments.
In general, however, external military power cannot maintain unpopular
governments in office in the third world over sustained periods of time.

Military power can also be used indirectly to persuade third world
policy makers to take steps which lead to the achievement of certain
operational objectives. But here, too, what can be accomplished is
generally limited in scope and perishable with time. Military power can

be used to remind third world policy makers of historic Western interests
and commitments relatively easily, but only with difficulty can it be
used to articulate and make credible new commitments. Military power can
be used relatively easily to defend the status quo and retard change in
existing patterns of behaviour, but only with difficulty can it be used
to compel sustained or significant changes in the behaviour of nations.
Military power can also be used as part of the competition with the
Soviet Union in the third world, but here, for the most part, its objectives,
realistically, can only be to avoid the adverse consequences of unrestricted
Soviet activity. In the continuing minuet of superpower competition,
confrontations in the third world raise plenty of risks but few opportunities.
Neither the Soviets' nor the West's' basic positions vis-à-vis the third
world have been permanently affected by the confrontations which have
punctuated post-war history.

Whatever its objectives, the exercise of military power in the third
world can be done with greater or lesser skill. It is exceedingly
important that the character of the action taken fit the character of the
objective and the importance of the interests involved. If, for example,
Western decision-makers see no real gain in a situation, but merely wish
to avoid the appearance of a free hand for the USSR, then the military
operation in question should be quite ambiguous. In such a situation,
one can afford to pay greater attention to minimising the risks implicit
in any East-West confrontation and, thus, should tailor the military
operation to maintain maximum flexibility. In other circumstances,
however, the West's interest may be compelling. In these cases, the
idiom of the military action itself should aim to remove any possible
ambiguity about the seriousness of the commitments made.

One way to signal resolve, of course, is to stress the risk of
nuclear war, as was done by the United States during the 1973 Middle
East crisis. There will be more and more temptation to take this route,
so long as the balance of conventional military power continues to erode.
This is a temptation to avoid; the risks are great, and there are
alternative ways to make commitments credible. Greater attention might
be paid to the use of land-based air power as an instrument of diplomacy,
for example, as the United States has done recently in deploying squadrons
of F-4 Phantoms to Egypt for temporary "training" missions. Moreover,
the actual operations undertaken by the military forces intervening in a
situation can have much to say about the credibility of the positions
taken. More care might be taken to insure that these activities reflect
a certain seriousness of purpose.

A final word - The preceding has referred to the "West", which raises a number of interesting points. It has been suggested, for example, that the members of NATO coordinate their policies in the third world more closely and, specifically, that they undertake to cooperate to a greater extent in the exercise of military power in the third world. While a respectable argument can be made for this position, in my view it would be a mistake. While we remain close allies, and have much to gain by mutual cooperation in many areas, the industrialised democracies remain sovereign nations with differing perspectives on the world and, at times, differing interests. These differences have, perhaps, become all too apparent in recent years. NATO faces many problems in coordinating its policies in its central zone of responsibility; to expand that zone can only place undue burdens on the alliance, making more difficult those things that need doing in Europe and the North Atlantic.

Rather, it is probably wise to re-emphasise the benefits of specialised areas of interest. The former colonial powers have residual ties of various sorts with many nations in the third world. If they are willing to assume special responsibilities for the protection of "Western" interests in these areas, they would have the advantage of being able to coordinate potential military operations with their many political and economic levers of influence. The United States also has special ties with a great many nations throughout the third world and in these areas the US can be expected to assume a preeminent role, as it also can be expected to do in those situations which require significant military deployments to counter Soviet military activity.

In short, the members of NATO of course should avoid stepping on each other's interests, should keep one another well informed, and should loosely coordinate on an ad hoc basis as appropriate, but they should not seek to extend to the rest of the globe the type of close cooperation that characterises their political and military relations pertaining to Europe.

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THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE 4

THE MAJOR POWERS AND THE THIRD WORLD:
MOTIVES, OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES

(ii)   THE UNITED STATES

by

Shahram Chubin

Committee 4:   The Major Powers and the Third World:
Motives, Objectives and Policies
THE   UNITED   STATES
Shahram Chubin

INTRODUCTION

It would be convenient if the persistent debate after Vietnam as to US policy towards the Third World could be summarized into two schools. It cannot. Books with titles like "Nation or Empire", "Primacy or World Order" capture the flavour of the debate but only that. For while the former argues for military power and limited involvement, the latter depreciates the centrality of military power and remains broadly internationalist. It would also be easy to argue that the US is in a transition from uncertainty after a military defeat to a more traditional crusading activism. But this too would be an over-simplification. Elements of the historical experience remain, seen in an occasional burst of mission, of optimism, but gone are the days when the US believed itself impervious to developments elsewhere, and was convinced of the automatic relevance of its values, of its model, for other states. Gone too is the desire to remake the world in its own image; damage-limitation now prevails over universalism. Entangling alliances are now shunned not merely because of the risks of all alliances, but also because of doubts whether the US in fact has anything to contribute in regions which it finds complicated to understand and onerous to deal with. This self-doubt extends to the use of military force, to the widespread nagging doubt as to whether it can in fact wield it at all - particularly in situations of ambiguity where goals are unclear, victory hard to define and success elusive. It is supremely ironical that the US was endowed in the early post-war period with a nuclear superiority (and, putatively, extended deterrence), with pacts and with allies, bases and access at a time when the USSR had only a primitive deterrent, minimal global reach and few allies in the Third World. In the 1970s, by contrast, when US (Western) vulnerability in the Third World is substantial, it finds its nuclear superiority negated, its base-structure shrunk, the Third World restive and conflict-prone and the USSR able to project power globally. Now at a time of real vulnerability and global interdependence the environment is both more complex and threatening. The choice between a global policy and a more limited policy remains but the latter cannot now (as earlier) be confined to Europe and Japan (as Kennan would like) or merely add Israel and the Gulf to Europe and Japan (as Tucker would like). It now requires a much clearer definition of US interests short- and long-term, a more differentiated set of responses and an avoidance of the

ubiquitous "either/or" so characteristic of the highly charged US political (and academic) debate. Central to this is a recognition of the continuing (though limited) role of power, an accurate assessment of the USSR, definition of key interests and regions (and a recognition of important linkages amongst them), and a sense of what is expected of allies and sought in the Third World or hoped for from it.

The Post-War Experience

The US first real encounter with the Third World came at a time when its perspective was shaped by rivalry with the USSR. This influenced American response to developments in what quickly became both the stake and the arena of the competition. Also influential were American ideals and values which the US cherished and wished to impart to the world community. The continuing interaction between these ideals and the political realities of the cold war forms a skein in US policies toward the Third World which is not easy to place in neat phases. In common with all major declarations of US foreign policy, the Truman Doctrine reflected "the inherent rationale ... and tne tendency to offer an all-inclusive explanation and justification for a single fixed course of action."[1] President Truman declared "It must be the policy of the US to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures ... to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes."[2] The Truman Doctrine came to be viewed as an American commitment to the 'defence of freedom' throughout the world. But, cast in universalistic mould, it "made flexibility difficult for subsequent crises."[3] Yet if it was rigid in its rhetoric it was surely not necessarily so in its practice. There was nothing inherently indiscriminate or militaristic about its application in policy. But in its translation to the Third World it failed. Partly no doubt this was due to the inapplicability of the European model (on which it was based) to developing areas which lacked cohesion, identity and often indigenous political traditions. Partly also the concept of "free peoples" was ambiguous in areas where there was no tradition of free expression or assembly. Inevitably choices had to be made between

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(1) Kenneth Thompson, British Journal of International Studies, 1980, p.122.
(2) Truman Doctrine, March 12, 1947.
(3) Thompson, pp. 121-122.

ideals and interests, between support for free regimes and support for anti-Communist regimes, and inevitably the symoblism of the latter could be manipulated by authoritarian regimes to attract US attention and aid. A further ambiguity lay within the Doctrine itself: did support for "free peoples to work out their own <u>destinies in their own way</u>" (emphasis added) include the right to revolution, to adopt radical regimes and even Marxist governments? An extraordinary mixture of optimism, naiveté and arrogance underlay the American approach to the Third World. These elements were compounded in the belief that American values and experience could be transplanted to other countries, that economic and political development were mutually supportive and would lead to democracy, stability (and hence security) and that with this benign view of modernization there would arise no real tension between ideals and self-interest. The belief that "all good things go together"[1] was tested early and often. The myth of the American "revolutionary" experience in practice was reflected in a bias for reform and gradualism over revolutionary change – which incidentally found echoes in the cold-war interest in the status quo and orderly change. The preference for regimes that dispersed rather than concentrated power (again reflecting its own model) clashed with the needs of these states to accumulate and create centralized power: the outcome was often a choice between authoritarian regimes of the left or the right. Again the exigencies of the cold war, of the zero-sum competition, tilted toward the non-Marxist.

This over-simplifies the period for what is striking about it in retrospect is how multidimensional US policies were in practice. The competition and alternation between the 'cold war' approach to the Third World and the 'explicitly democratic' – which sought to foster democratic regimes rather than anti-Communist regimes /and punished military coups in Latin America, for example, in the Kennedy era _/ is striking. So too in the light of post-Vietnam revisionism is the US non-intervention policy in the 1960s towards a number of regimes that were Marxist or anti-Western starting with China, Sekou Touré in Guinea, Nasser's Egypt, and Tito's Yugoslavia.[2] There was nothing inevitably indiscriminate about the application of the Truman doctrine in policy. The limits to US power also were already appreciated: "there cannot be an American solution to every problem".[3] The recognition that democracy could not flourish without

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(1) See Thomas Packenham's excellent study, <u>Liberal America and the Third World</u>. Princeton University Press, N.J., 1973.

(2) Even in the case of Castro, President Kennedy was ambivalent, seeing him at times in the Bolivar tradition.

(3) John F. Kennedy, November 1961 speech in Seattle.

indigenous roots, that development was a complex process that entailed
regression as well as advances and that it might well accentuate instability
and insecurity, and that US preferences for liberal domocratic regimes
might often have to be subordinated to geopolitical necessities (and that
in these circumstances the US should promote a tolerance for diversity)
were all ideas far advanced by the mid-1960s.

From Vietnam to Carter

Containment in practice if not in theory was expanded into a doctrine
of international order which led in turn to imperial and imperialistic
intervention.[1] The "Free World" came to mean not 'free' but those states
open to US influence, representing a 'degeneration of the crusading spirit
into imperial realism'[2] with a resultant uneasy conscience among Americans.
Nevertheless, although it was globalized (by Korea) and militarized (after
European rearmament), it was universal more in rhetoric than in application.
It remained defensive, accepting spheres of influence, faits accomplis,
and grey areas. Certainly it did not merely constitute a military concept,
the assurance of physical security, so much as an approach that sought to
maintain as wide an area as open as possible to US influence. But it did
require discrimination in application and not the acceptance of custodian-
ship everywhere. Vietnam, as Aron observed, represented "the growing
tendency to substitute symbol for reality in the discrimination of interests
and issues."[3] Vietnam of course fed this 'uneasy conscience' and it
shattered a consensus on foreign policy which has yet to be rebuilt.

In its aftermath the crisis of conscience was aggravated; defeat
fed doubts about the morality of US intentions, and about the universal
applicability of its values and traditions, and the validity of its
global role. The trend toward withdrawal, already evident in declining
involvement and abstention rather than activism, accelerated. "Come
home America!" was a cry which reflected this; and a wide variety of
distinguished scholars - for example Robert Tucker, George Kennan,
and Arthur Schlesinger Jr.-argued for 'selective involvement' to reduce
interests to a central core and for a more detached international posture.
A weariness stemming from carrying the common burdens that had been
assumed and the risks that had been accepted, prevailed together with a

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(1) Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London
1975, p.302 (on whom I lean in this section).

(2) Ibid., p. 306.

(3) Ibid., p. 312.

sense of unrequited effort. A determination arose never to repeat this mistake. Not surprisingly the unattractiveness of many of the regimes being defended looked more stark in this perspective; they appeared hardly worth the effort. Diversity now became an escape from commitment. Only the obvious, natural, allies could henceforth expect assistance. In the Third World these were Israel, Japan and possibly Australia. Henceforth contingencies must be 'pure'. Vietnam also widely called into question other assumptions: it demonstrated the strength of indigenous nationalisms, the relevance of factors other than raw military power, the dangers of putting 'local' issues into East/West matrices and the dangers of incremental involvement. It is small wonder then that, in the aftermath of Vietnam, the US attitude toward the Third World was conditioned by a debate that bore its scars, and that generated much fervour but little clarity as to this core of strategic interest and the criteria for and scope of involvement, or the appropriate instruments for influence.

Reinforcing an inclination to interpret the world through the Vietnam analogy [1] /which saw the emergence of such reassuring phrases as "they can't drink it" (the oil): and "they have nowhere else to go."_/ was the emergence of world order theorists. [2] These scholars, generally internationalists, argued for global involvement but a prudent acceptance of set-backs, and an acceptance of power as entanglement, as bargaining. They noted that the new international system was characterized by less hierarchy and more complexity and by the prevalence of denials over gains. They questioned the centrality of military power, noting how the traditional agenda of security had narrowed, while the larger 'security' issues of global management had expanded requiring other instruments of influence. By pointing to the increasing complexity of the global agenda, in which multiple and shifting coalitions formed according to the 'issue area' (e.g. the Law of the Sea and nuclear proliferation), they underscored the blurring of traditional distinctions between ally and foe. Their distinctive contribution to policy was to indicate a conception of world order not merely dependent on a balance of power but on a discrete evaluation of events divorced from the centrality of the East/West rivalry. Their failure was to indicate in any precise fashion how choices between the longer-run systemic goals could be reconciled with pressing short-term needs,

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(1) As indeed the Truman Doctrine reflected the belief stemming from the 1930s that aggression must be stopped in its tracks lest its hinger grow by what it feeds on.

(2) Particularly Stanley Hoffmann, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane.

how the two agendas in practice could be divorced, and how manageable such concepts were for policy.[1]

They were nonetheless extremely influential because they reinforced a tendency to interpret the international system in a novel way - one that subordinated the requirements of military power and the importance of the rivalry with the USSR to a vision of world order that called for the American strength in ideals,purpose, and restraint. Like the world order theorists, the Carter Administration sought to distinguish itself from its predecessors. Where Kissinger had sought balance of power, the Carter Administration sought 'world order'; where Kissinger emphasized the East/West conflict and loyalty to allies in the Third World, they would emphasize diversity, pluralism and human rights. Where Kissinger had used flattery, arms sales and the co-option of regional 'influentials', the Carter Administration would eschew these instruments in favour of a policy more 'responsive' to regional concerns.

Kissinger,while presiding over the recession of American absolute power had sought to use detente and linkage to induce restraint on the part of the USSR in third areas and to reassure allies by providing arms. He judged regional developments (whether in the Middle East in 1969-1970 or in 1973, or in the Indian Subcontinent in 1971) by their impact on the international balance of power and on maintaining the credibility of the US as a major power. In this framework, Third World allies were important and should be cultivated by providing them with incentives for identification with the West; adversaries should be punished to reduce their incentives for repeating hostile acts. In the Nixon-Kissinger era there was no doubt which came first as between immediate security concerns and world-order goals or between close alignment on security questions and on the type of government the ally represented. When their were clashes, security interest prevailed over ideals.

The Carter Administration came to office convinced anew of the relevance of the American experience. Confusing moral posturing with policy, it identified a "tide of freedom" moving in the direction of democracy and human rights. Determined not to be "irrelevant", it sought to align itself with this benign wave and to adjust to it. Whether there is in fact such a tide is immaterial for what became clear was that

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(1) Stanley Hoffmann's criticism of the Carter Administration on the
     first points (New York Review of Books) Jan. 30, 1980. p.24 and of
     Kissinger on the complexity of his foreign policy, in Primacy or
     World Order, McCgaw Hill, NY, 1978 p. 79, therefore seems curious.

little thought had been given to the possibility that conflicts could emerge
not only between US security and world-order interests, but also between
US interests and the Third World. Freedom from "an inordinate fear of
Communism" did not guarantee freedom from clashes of interest. Adjustments
between ideals and self-interest might still be necessary. In practice
the Carter Administration has turned out to be the mirror image of its
predecessor: where the latter had sought substance, the Carter Administration
has stress/rhetoric (in Africa and in the North-South dialogue); where its
predecessor detected "linkage" everywhere and saw security threats in the
most remote regions (for example in Chile or Angola), the Carter
Administration denies that 'credibility' is ever affected; where their
predecessors emphasized consistency and nuance, the Carter Administration
has made a fetish of incoherence and oscillation.

Geopolitics and Regionalism as Approaches to the Third World

The differences between the Carter Administration and the preceding
Republican Administration were perhaps less basic than often appeared but,
like the parallel polarization in academia between geopolitical and
regionalist approaches to the Third World, the emphases were quite
different. The 'debate' about the merits of these two approaches is
important because it contains what promises to be a continuing divergence
in perspective about the sources of Third World instability and the
appropriate responses to that instability.[1]

The primary difference between the two schools lies in their differing
assessments of the centrality of the competition with the USSR and the
role of force. While the geopoliticians continue to see the world in
these terms, the regionalists point to the expanded agenda of world
affairs and to multipolarity, complexity and diversity. The one there-
fore focuses on Soviet power, the importance of regional balances and
allies and on immediate US interests. The other, more relaxed about
military power, seeks to avoid open-ended involvements while pursuing
long-run world-order interests. The geopolitician seeks to cultivate and
reward allies, stressing American dependability and credibility, the
regionalist emphasizes the compatibility of allies with US values

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(1) The 'schools' being discussed subsume a wide variety of views but
they seem to fall essentially into two groups - those that emphasize
the competition with the USSR and the role of military power, and
those who argue that regional politics condition the local environment
and stress the existence of factors other than military power and
rivalry with the USSR.

(or lack of compatibility), and advocates dissociation.[1] The former fears an eroding balance, divided allies and set-backs that reverberate to its global disadvantage, the latter fears entanglement, irrelevance and unthinking linkage. The geopolitician sees the risks of war increasing because of uncertainties created by regional retreat; the regionalist, seeking a more limited definition of security, cringes at machismo and at indiscriminate talk of 'credibility'. The one looks to military security, strong leadership and resilience as the key to world order, the other sees it nurtured by adjustment, restraint, bargaining, and moral example. These views lead to quite different assessments of the function of military power and of its relationship to the exploitation of Third World conflicts. The geopoliticians assert the continuing and inescapable centrality of military power and they stress its importance in deterring the USSR. They demand American leadership of the allies and seek to reassure friendly states in the Third World. It follows that regional military balances are therefore seen as especially critical both because strategic parity encourages probing[2] and because the US is reluctant to become directly involved in defending her interests. In short, military power still determines the risk calculus of opportunistic exploitation of Third World instabilities. The regionalists on the contrary are impressed by the limited utility of military power (which they expect that the USSR too will also eventually understand), and they see regional successes as determined less by power than by local political conditions. The "prevailing local winds"[3] are the principal determinant of influence; the trick of diplomacy is to adjust to them and thus inhibit Soviet advances. The regionalists focus on the constraints operating on Soviet power (which, they emphasize, is one-dimensional), on the intractability of many problems to solution by military power, on the strength of indigenous nationalisms and on the costs of alignment with Third World states which face multiple threats and invariably fail to meet minimal standards on human rights.

If the geopoliticians fear disorder arising from American ambivalence toward power, the regionalists are anxious not to seek military solutions to political problems. The willingness of the regionalists to recognize diversity and complexity allow them to be more detached about regional

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(1) e.g. Peter Jay: "Regionalism as Geopolitics," in Foreign Affairs ("America and the World 1979" ed), 1980. p. 488.

(2) See Kissinger, Dallas speech, March 22, 1976.

(3) Jay, op. cit. p. 511.

disorder and they argue that one must learn to understand the causes of radical anti-Westernism lest reflexively it be equated with pro-Communist or pro-Soviet.[1] A corollary of this is the quest for the 'pure' contingency. Since so many issues in the third world have historical or local causes, only the most massive, blatent, 'purely external' and tangible threats should, according to them, be met by military responses and then preferably by regional states acting collectively. The regional approach of this school emphasizes the multilateral over the bilateral, the longer-term over the immediate. In its view, for example, arms sales should be seen in this perspective rather than as a tool of bilateral relations. Negotiations with the Soviet Union on restricting conventional arms sales (CALT) or on limiting naval deployments in the Indian Ocean should be judged not by their effect on allies, access, or balances but on atmosphere.

The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Two Approaches

The geopolitical school (with its emphasis on power and on the centrality of rivalry with the USSR) has justly been accused of excessive simplification of a complicated set of international relationships. Its most indefatigable critic has noted that it "neglects local circumstance", makes each crisis a test of resolve, sees credibility in the most limited stake, counts on a linkage which cannot work, and has no "substantial conception of world order" other than a military balance.[2] It follows that this school tends to ignore the widening agenda of issues on international affairs and "to see in the West's relations with the South a particular theatre of struggle with the East".[3] Its strengths however are equally clear. By defining security narrowly, it concentrates attention on interests and threats to those interests. It views the relationship with the USSR as central and foresees no early release from a sustained global competition for influence. It therefore values its allies and seeks to reward both them and those states in the Third World which are inclined toward the West while punishing those that are hostile. Without rejecting the new hierarchies, it chooses as its priority the political-security area in which military power is the abiding dominant

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(1) Curiously this sensible attitude sometimes becomes transformed into a masochism that sees a correlation between the "authentic nationalism" of a group and the degree to which it is anti-Western. This lack of faith in Western values has often been evinced by liberals who prefer not to support "moderates" in the Third World because they are unrepresentative'.

(2) Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order, op cit, pp. 14-28.

(3) Hedley Bull, "Kissinger: The Primacy of Geopolitics", International Affairs, Summer 1980, p. 486.

feature. It is therefore less concerned with the values of its partners in the Third World than with their orientations. It is more sensitive to the limited range of choice in this respect, recognizing that authoritarian regimes are not _always_ able to be improved upon. It does not equate change with progress. In a choice between immediate interests and abstract values, the former predominate. In its concept of international relations this school provides the basis for a consistent policy.

The regionalist is usually allied with the world-order school. Their important contribution has been in sensitizing policy-makers to the fact that interdependence has made more difficult the achievement of clear-cut solutions, that bargaining based on a variety of forms of power is the prevalent form of negotiation, that leadership requires consensus, and that long-term interests and values need to be integrated into today's policies. In noting that traditional distinctions between ally and adversary have been blurred by shifting coalitions (so that today's partner can be tomorrow's competitor), the world-order school has warned against undifferentiated or over-simple responses. By refusing always to view regional disputes in East/West terms, and by espousing a positive political philosophy to combat both Marxism and the stigma of colonialism, the West, with its tolerance for diversity and its multiple sources of power, will be (in this view) in a stronger position in the Third World. Rather than reliance solely on a balance of military power, this argues for a global engagement that is at once tolerant, multi-levelled and humane.

The palpable weakness of this line of thinking is in its consequences not in its intentions. In seeking to avoid the automatic absorption of issues into the East/West matrix, it provides little illumination as to the range of choice or the bargains to be struck. Foreign policy ideally always reflects 'values' but the issue often is how far values should dictate policy. The high level of generality of this school, while helpful in describing the system and its constituent parts, the new structural dimensions, and in its sensitivity to trends, furnishes no guide to policy, no criteria for discriminating among interests when they clash, or for selecting time-frames in response. For example, when do regional issues become global issues? When Western issues are directly or tangibly affected? Or by the degree of outside power involvement? All regional conflicts are not tests of Superpower credibility and strength but some are - was the Middle East in 1973? Was Angola in 1975? Was Ethiopia in 1977? Few issues are purely

regional (witness Afghanistan and the Gulf, the Middle East and the Gulf,
or the Horn and the Gulf) - how then can responses be 'regional'? Which
"prevailing winds" should the West catch in areas where there are several
and where no dominant conflict exists (as in Southern Africa and Palestine)?
How does 'dissociation' affect a great power's reputation in a region
(as in Iran in 1978) and how can influence be furthered without involvement?
Is the challenge from the Third World primarily one that can be rectified
by policy (as some have argued [1]) or is it a traditional claim for a
redistribution of power and status in the international system which
should be met as such?[2] There is little allowance in this school for
the possibility of a direct clash of interest with the Third World itself.
While so richly evoking the mixed relations of today, the factor of military
power, a basic ingredient of those relations, has been systematically
under-estimated by this school. The residual value of power, of the
'traditional agenda' is starkly evident. The relationship between the
Soviet exploitation of regional opportunities, their incidence, and the
military balance persists and may grow. If outside powers cannot appreciably
reduce these opportunities within various regions (as seems likely), one
response is to increase the risks and costs of such exploitation. By under-
stating the importance of military power in the Third World - both for the
local state and its outside partners [3] - this school has contributed to a
basic confusion in which issues are put in 'either/or' terms in which
diplomacy and force are treated as separable/policy is seen as either
geopolitical or regional. The result has been to provide the United States
with equally reckless choices - abstention /̲often with the alibi that
regional conditions are murky ̲/ or threats of massive intervention which are
neither credible nor - in most cases - useful.

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(1) See for example Tom Farer, "The US and the Third World: A Basis for
    Accomodation", Foreign Affairs, October 1975.

(2) See Robert Tucker, "America in Decline: The Foreign Policy of 'Maturity'"
    in Foreign Affairs, (America and the World 1979 ed), Jan 1980., and
    The Inequality of Nations, Basic Books, NY, 1977.

(3) For example by supporting restrictions on the sales of arms, by arguing
    against Western involvement, by arguing against interventionary forces,
    by denying the need for proximate bases, and by urging regional arms
    control agreements that in the case of the Indian Ocean inhibit the sea-
    power of the distant state - the US - while preserving Soviet land-based
    air superiority.

In the final analysis however the differences of the two schools relate to their assessment of the Soviet Union. Divorced from Soviet power and intervention, most of the issues in the Third World would be manageable and shifts in internal politics or even alignments would then be marginal to the real world balance of power - or so argues the geopolitician. The careful balancing of Soviet power, the containment of Soviet influence, and the nurturing of Soviet restraint in these areas therefore become critical lest a shift in a key area like the Gulf tilt the world balance in a direction adverse to the West. Third World policy can therefore never lose sight of the East-West competition. The regionalist is less dramatic; he argues for looking at issues in third areas on their own merits; he has more confidence in the West's inherent strengths and pays more attention to Soviet vulner-abilities. Mistaken Western policies rather than Soviet opportunism is the principal danger seen by the regionalist. A more benign and comprehensive view of the West's long-term interests in world order encourages him to advocate benevolent global engagement.

The Carter Administration came to office with a desire to forge a new consensus in American foreign policy and to infuse it with new values for a new era. It failed to do so because it neglected to identify or elaborate any core of security interests. In place of anti-Communism, it emphasized functional issues but in the process it failed to elucidate any conception of the role of the USSR (and East/West rivalry) in Third World affairs. Thus liberated from power politics /"we have rejected the proposition that /¯power_7 ought to be the central dimension of American foreign policy" [1] _7 it understated the conditions under which military power remained central or even pertinent to the conduct of diplomacy outside of Europe. It also over-estimated the degree to which a generalized approach to the Third World could yield specific dividends in terms of concrete interests (e.g. access). By seeking to avoid indiscriminate activism, it understated the occasional risks of inaction.

The Environment of the 1980s

The tests of the US leadership in its policies toward the Third World in the 1980s will be to reconcile the tendencies toward universal formulae with the inevitable ad hoc responses, and to integrate responses which incorporate both immediate considerations of power politics (where appropriate) with more diffuse (though real) interests in world order. The primary requisites for this are, first, the restoration of Consensus on core security interests, next a sense of realism as to what to expect in the Third World and finally

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(1) Z.Brzezinski: Address to the Baltimore Council on Foreign Relations, May 9, 1980.

an understanding of what can be done to advance American (and Western) interests. No simple formulae are useful here. Some regions are plainly more 'strategic' than others. In some of these the military instrument will remain an extremely important tool of influence (whether to deter, to reassure or to buy time). Doctrinaire regionalism that seeks to disaggregate the world into 'regions' - not because they are in fact autonomous but because they would relieve the 'burdensof empire' - i.e. regionalism as a convenience - is unproductive. Even if possible theoretically in practice it would be impossible to pursue a series of divergent or contradictory regional policies. A global 'policy' (or overall strategy) is a prerequisite both in the sense of an appeal to certain principles /not simply as American idealists from Wilson to Carter have recognized as a means of achieving a domestic consensus for US world involvement_7 and also because the security and military infrastructure required in an interdependent world must be global. Military capabilities including interventionary forces and seapower are essential. There is thus a need for a global policy which allows for differentiation among regions and between issues. This would take into account both the United States stake in a world order which she is determined to influence and variations in the intensity of her interests in different regions.

The advent of strategic nuclear parity ended any possibility of extending nuclear deterrence beyond Europe and Japan. It may have made the world safe for conventional wars in third areas but it was the combination of lengthened Soviet military reach and instabilities in these regions that made outside intervention feasible. In the next decade it appears increasingly likely that crises between the superpowers in the Third World will turn in the final analysis on perceptions of the state of the central strategic balance obtaining at the time.[1] In areas adjacent to the USSR the dividends accruing to perceptions of its power will yield dividends. As Defense Secretary Brown recently acknowledged"Even when Soviet pressure is political, its foundation is Soviet military power".[2] Proximity, persistence and power tailored to local circumstance (together with fewer domestic constraints) enhance Soviet diplomacy in may parts of Asia, and may substitute for its liabilities in other spheres. At a minimum, improved mobility provides the Soviet Union with options that it has increasingly exercised thus ending a

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(1) For some reflexions on this theme, see Philip Windsor, "The Future of Strategic Studies" (unpublished) 1980.

(2) Secretary Brown's remarks at the West Point Graduation Ceremony, 28 May, 1980.

monopoly of two decades of uninhibited US intervention. The continuing deterioration of East/West relations will lead to more extensive competition. Greater capabilities for intervention may increase the opportunities for intervention but in an environment increasingly complex and demanding.

For a variety of reasons, the Third World[1] states are undergoing and will continue to undergo a series of pressures, shocks and challenges that will test both their capabilities to survive as nation-states and to do so effectively in the face of popular demands. Crises of identity, integration, legitimacy, and the redistribution of wealth (within and among states), sectarian disputes, secessionist movements and regional conflicts will all test fragile state structures and regional stability. Even with its many differences, the Third World has demonstrated great solidarity in its attitude toward the richer states. Partly from a sense of sheer frustration at the intractability of their own problems, partly at annoyance at the power, privilege and often perceived hypocrisy of the Western states, a degree of basic anti-Westernism exists in these states.[2] Envy mingles with contempt as they survey, for example, Western technology and the breakdown of the family. The upshot of this is an unwillingness to choose between the West and East, and a rather strict evaluation of both blocs by reference to their own priorities and values (whether with regard to a settlement of Palestine, the issue of apartheid, less restrictive tariff barriers or a desire to be "taken seriously").

Their foreign policy too is dictated by their own concerns; they may be status-quo or revisionist with reference to specific regional issues yet this is bound to affect the judgement (and interests) of the two rival superpowers. With intensified rivalry between the two blocs, the pressures on these states for alignment may increase yet their own prevailing inclination increasingly is to escape such a characterization. Even where the trend toward non-alignment if latent is genuine, as in the Persian Gulf, its impact on the two superpowers' interests is unlikely to be the same.

(1) Of course this discussion homogenizes a highly variegated group of states. Some are new, others are old. Some are city-states, others of continental dimension. Some were colonized, others remained independent; some are well-integrated, others heterogeneous. They vary in levels of economic development and differ in foreign orientation and strategic significance. What they have in common are economies that are not yet well diversified, weak political institutions and, usually, non-democratic political systems. They share however an antipathy to colonialism and a desire for reform of the international economic order.

(2) Witness for example the contempt most of these states have for Khomeini but the relish with which they watch the US humiliated.

The diffusion of weapons to the Third World has enlarged the scope of
regional wars. A myriad of existing tensions, historical rivalries, specific
territorial disputes, tribal animosities and resource conflicts have resulted
in persistent conflicts in Africa and Asia in particular. In the past five
years these conflicts have become increasingly internationalized (for example,
in Cyprus, Angola, Lebanon, Ethiopia, North and South Yemen, Namibia and
Cambodia-Vietnam). There is every reason to expect these conflicts to persist
in the 1980s providing pretexts for intervention and opportunities to score
marginal unilateral gains. There is no clear evidence either that a refusal
to sell arms to countries in these regions would substantially affect the
incidence of conflict, or that the suppliers of arms gain any material
leverage by providing them.

In the early post-war era it was commonly supposed that the fragile
international system could not withstand the shocks of war in the nuclear
age. This supposition turned out not to be true. Global security has turned
out to be less brittle than was once believed. Yet intensified competition,
global military capabilities and beckoning local circumstances provide
opportunities for gain and raise the spectre that heightened risks of nuclear
confrontation might originate in a crisis in the Third World. To avoid the
risks of competitive intervention or inadvertent involvement /being pulled
into local crises by regional partners _7 will require both a careful
delineation of core interests and their clear communication to the other side.

The Superpowers and the Third World

For two decades every US President has sought a dialogue with the USSR
to limit the risks of competition in the Third World and to broaden areas of
common agreement in this regard. Both powers have nevertheless risked
extending their competition into regions which they thus consequently
polarized,and then became committed to maintaining or defending the allies
thus acquired. Similarly local conflicts have tended to involve them when
regional states appealed to them for assistance to redress an imbalance. In
the 1960s this competition was limited - there was little polarization in
crises which arose then in Africa or the Indian Subcontinent or in the
Middle East. By the 1970s the issues could no longer be decided by the
local state acting alone; in 1971 (in the Subcontinent) and 1973 (in the
Middle East) superpower interests became involved but, although they could
not prevent war, they could still contain it and assist in its termination.
The increased involvement of the superpowers in these conflicts superimposed

a set of new considerations on them which complicated their settlement.[1]
In the Middle East the contrast was stark between the degree of superpower
involvement in 1973 and in 1956, 1967 and 1970. In the Subcontinent, the US
attitude toward India in 1971 inevitably took into account both its Friend-
ship Treaty with the USSR and the impact on Sino-US relations. But while
these two regions have now lost their autonomy and must interact both with
the interests of the superpowers and China, they have at least furnished the
superpowers with some valuable experience in communicating during crises and
certain minimal rules of behaviour have emerged. This is not yet the case
in other regions, most notably in the Persian Gulf where interests overlap.

The desire to encourage Soviet co-operation in third areas has led to
two approaches which are not mutually exclusive. The first, linkage, which
sought to induce acceptance of US rules as to what constitutes acceptable
behaviour, has largely failed. Whether it was conceptually flawed or
operationally impossible is beside the point. Perhaps it was both. There is
some truth in the argument that it was sought as a soft means of covering up
the decline in US military power and willingness to take risks.[2] A second
approach, favoured by some, is to invite Soviet restraint by acknowledging
its interests and giving it a stake in peace through participation in co-
management of regions. An advocate of this in the Persian Gulf has blithely
equated US-Soviet interests in the region and argued that Soviet inclusion
there and recognition of its 'legitimate' interests will diminish its
incentives to act as the 'spoiler' from outside.[3]

The difficulty with regional security as a means of managing great power
competition in a sensitive zone like the Gulf is that there exist asymmetrical
vulnerabilities and military capabilities in a region which is itself
unstable and hence exploitable. As a substitute for a superpower military
balance it is seriously flawed. Yet the creation of a military balance
requires a rectification of the asymmetries which currently exist. This in
turn argues against 'including' the USSR equally as a partner before her

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(1) Kissinger's perspective was almost totally East/West on the Middle East
    issue, quite divorced from the merits of the case. He wished to reward
    pro-Western states and give others incentives for imitating them. He
    interpreted regional outcomes purely in terms of the respective credib-
    ilities of the superpowers. He thus could not tolerate 'a victory for
    Soviet arms'. Whether this is a valid approach here remains doubtful.

(2) See Robert Tucker, "The Crisis in the West", op. cit.,

(3) Stanley Hoffmann, New York Review of Books, 17 July, 1980.

demonstrable advantages have been offset. In short, if it is not to ratify Soviet preponderance (as in the "Soviet Asian Security" formula), regional security on the Asian periphery must be based on military power and not act as a substitute for it.

Another variant of regional security would seek agreement among local states to conform to certain minimal standards of conduct /‾non-subversion, and the denial to outsiders of military bases_7 or to co-operation in areas of common concern. This seeks to address the local pressures that might stimulate invitations to great powers to intervene. This approach is useful in areas such as ASEAN where superpower rivalry is minimal, and could be extended to parts of Africa. In contested areas however its value is limited for its success is ultimately dependent on a balance of power between the blocs, and the willingness of one to check an infringement by the other.

Regional security as an approach to keep local conflicts local is likely to work best in areas marginal to great power competition. In areas of intense rivalry its value will be in providing a forum for settlement of minor disputes which do not infringe outside powers'interest.[1] Military co-operation between states with complementary assets (one perhaps having money, the other manpower) can be useful in meeting local security threats directly without involving outside powers. But regional security as an alternative to a military balance of power in order to secure Soviet restraint appears least productive in contested areas precisely because it is based on the view that revisionist states can be made conservative by acknowledging rather than inhibiting their goals. Particularly in Asia where Soviet proximity enhances access and claims to 'legitimate' interests, it will be difficult to disentangle regional events from the broader competition or to divorce these from the prevailing balance(s) of power.

Nothing in the record of Soviet foreign policy to date indicates an acceptance of Western notions of orderly change and non-exploitation of instabilities. The lack of consensus both among Western allies and within the United States as to the core of irreducible interests in the Third World and as to the nature of the appropriate responses to the murky nature of instabilities there (and to Soviet behaviour towards them) is unlikely to change in the 1980s. United States policy therefore must be to intensify dialogue and consultations with the USSR while making quite clear by actions the extent to which America is prepared to enforce the rules it advocates. The achievement of agreements with her allies both with regard to goals and to the division of responsibilities for their attainment would greatly reduce

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(1) Such as the minor rectification of a border dispute in the Persian Gulf.

the American sense of weariness and provide alternative means of response which would be at once less disruptive and less likely to stimulate escalation.

US Policy in the 1980s

(a) The Differentiation of Regions

This paper has so far argued that the US has been torn between doctrines of universalist involvement and reliance on narrow security interests served by military power on the one hand and abstention, value judgements and world order on the other.

It will not be easy in the 1980s to bring together these strands, to reconcile values and security interests, to defend without entering open-ended far-flung commitments, to shape the environment without indiscriminate involvement and to influence without becoming entangled.

What should be the criteria by which the US assesses developments in the Third World? No particularly original suggestions are here put forward. As noted earlier, some consensus on a core of vital interests is important. Differentiation of interests among regions may be the most simple approach bearing in mind that no region will remain unimportant in an interdependent world, that no regions will be alike and that the question of _degree_ will be important, e.g. massive genocide or Soviet intervention in the most peripheral region will dictate interest, while much smaller tremors in more strategic regions will excite similar concern. By delineating those regions in which US (and allied) security interests are most directly involved, it will be much easier to formulate appropriate responses. In the case of choice between a direct security interest (for example strengthening a partner's defence) and contributing to a more general interest (preventing the proliferation of arms) the latter would have to take second place. In the most sensitive regions the presumption must be that the US will respond if necessary militarily - in the event of a direct threat to its interests. The sensitivity of the region would determine the threshold of US 'tolerance,' of instability and external intervention. Yet it has to be admitted that American 'credibility' will continue to matter for a reputation for loyalty and steadfastness is far cheaper to maintain than to restore. Willingness to commit limited forces early may well postpone or obviate entirely the requirement for larger forces. Symbolic commitment, such as the deployment of seapower or diplomatic decisiveness, may go a long way but only as far as the resolve they are intended to communicate is believed.

Responses to developments should be based on the following criteria:

- The degree to which important US interests are directly threatened (this allows for non-Communist threats).

- The impact on US credibility (a derivative interest) and this would have
  to include various factors such as the degree of US commitment to a state
  (or region) and the historical relationship.

- The _degree_ of Soviet involvement (treaty commitment, financial assistance,
  arms supplies, airlift, advisers etc.)

Differentiation by region does not argue for a doctrinaire regionalism that
treats regions discretely in an era of increasing interconnections and
decreasing autonomy. It does however seek to identify those few regions (the
Gulf, the Middle East and Korea) where US security is directly affected, and
those where, whether due to distance or to lack of interest or to relative
disconnection from the strategic balance (for example Latin America or
Southern Africa), interests are less vital and less immediately subject to
threat. This approach facilitates the choice of response to another dilemma -
the tension that often arises between security interests which require allies,
bases and access, _/ often with regional states that are pariahs such as South
Africa or Israel and, now, Somalia and Oman _/ and America's more general
interests in North-South dialogue. In supporting South Africa as an anti-
Soviet force it has in fact facilitated Soviet-Cuban advances in Africa. In
cases of tension between these two sets of interests, an approach that
recognises Southern Africa as a theatre of secondary security interest would
argue for a more relaxed approach to Soviet military threats and the cultivation
of regional states and the OAU. Only in the case of massive Soviet involvement
here would a US response be necessary, otherwise treating the issue on its
merits rather than in East/West terms would make sense. The policy instruments
too would be different. There would need to be more emphasis on economic
assistance to ease the problems of adjustment. The situation is quite different
in the Persian Gulf. To treat Afghanistan as a South-East Asia dispute and
to wait for regional states to take the lead would be folly. Direct US
interests are potentially at risk and only concrete responses will communicate
the seriousness of the US on this issue.

In this case, the unwillingness to counter the Soviet invasion with
substantial military assistance to the Afghan guerrillas suggests a desire to
avoid taking risks. There are a number of arguments why arming the
guerrillas would be unwise (Pakistan is too fragile, India matters, this is
not the place to draw the line etc) but America's unwillingness to act
makes one wonder whether she can ever pose as a credible ally in the future
and whether any regional context will be so 'pure' that it does not provide
an alibi for inaction. Commitment has not in this case been persuasively
communicated.

Clearly interests in the Gulf are of such sensitivity that all three of the criteria noted above come into play. A threat to US interests does not have to come from the USSR. Regional states are quite capable of creating an atmosphere of turmoil, instability and crisis. The tolerance for the export of revolutions or the practice of brinkmanship is necessarily limited in a region where a superpower collision is always possible. In less delicate regions coups, changes in foreign orientations, and inter-state conflicts might affect US interests without directly constituting a threat to American security. This may be due to distance, to substantial regional autonomy or to a history of disconnection from the main area of superpower competition. It is for example difficult to imagine large-scale Soviet involvement in Latin America or South Africa that would not elicit a _local_ response before it affected US interests. To be effective at this distance such interventions have to be on a scale that are virtually self-defeating. Here there is a _de facto_ decoupling rather than decoupling reached by agreement between the superpowers.

Direct, vital interests need not mean direct involvement. In the Persian Gulf Kissinger argued that the risks of selling arms to strengthen regional allies were less than the risks of regional turmoil requiring but not facilitating a US presence. He was also correct in noting that in this part of the world perceptions of power matter and that military force remains an instrument indispensable to the defence of national interests. In the Gulf and the Middle East in particular, military interventions may become necessary to maintain or restore regional balances. These interventions cannot create political stability, build institutions or enhance the legitimacy of the rulers, but they can deny a "free ride" to forces opposed to US interests. They can also reassure/and deter the USSR. Force will buy time but not much else. Preventive diplomacy and involvement will be needed to ensure that the time is well used. Although US interests will require more involvement than many would like, this need not mean unilateralism. There is much to be said for the multilateralizing presence of the Western alliance to demonstrate shared interests. Encouraging regional co-operation between Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is also important not only because of its potential contribution to meet local security threats but also because such co-operation could reduce the escalatory risks inherent in interventionary responses from outside the region.

Vital interests cannot be defended by detachment and dissociation but nor should they be defended by embracing the status quo or unattractive regimes. What is required is an enhanced reputation for decisiveness and credibility in defence of the region and the sense of a diplomacy that is

persistent, selective and modulated. Style is important here. Fluctuations
are unhelpful, news-leaks are damaging to local partners and rhetorical
doctrines are uninspiring. Against the plethora of potential threats to US
interests (invasions, subversion, coups or defence treaties with the USSR),
the US has no tidy prescription but it should seek to make clear what it will
find unacceptable and what it will do when American interests are seen to be
at risk.

The Persian Gulf has merited the most discussion because it is the most
obvious case even if it is the least typical of US interests in the Third
World. As argued here, in Latin and Central America[1] and Southern Central
Africa the US can afford a much more relaxed approach to developments. In
North Africa, US and allied interests are virtually indistinguishable and so
require no particular US involvement. Even in the Caribbean an epidemic of
internal political transformations does not imply any shift in the immediacy
of a threat to US security, although it is politically distasteful. The
proximity and overwhelming power of the US in the region should allow much
greater tolerance of uncertainty than in regions where power is more distant,
fragile and dependent more on will than on circumstances. In this region (as
in others) the United States' inclination to encourage the formation of
centre-parties may prove to be a chimera.[2] A sense of what is practically
possible in the existing political context rather than fanciful idealism
is required. Rolf Dahrendorf's distinction between the promotion of the role
of law and minimum human rights on the one hand and political democracy on
the other (the latter being hard to promote in countries with no tradition
of democracy) has much to recommend it as an operational principle. In
this connection a more realistic means of differentiating among Third World
leaders is essential. There are some who hold genuine grievancies against
the West for specific Western policies. There are others who, as Kissinger
has remarked, derive their legitimacy from their anti-Westernism; Mugabe
should not be confused with Khomeini.

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(1) In Latin America the US can accept a Brazil-Argentina preponderance and
     the continued insulation of the continent from the strategic balance
     (despite growing political and economic ties with Africa and Europe).
     Due to the region's autonomy, the longer period of independent statehood
     and mutual interaction and the relative paucity of contemporary inter-
     state conflicts, South America appears somewhat detached from the forces
     affecting other parts of the Third World.

(2) On the difficulties in El Salvador see: "Oligarchs and officers"
     William Leo Grande, and Carla Anne Robbins, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1980.

The most difficult cases in the Third World will be those in which US
interests are involved only indirectly but in which decoupling is difficult.
The Indian Subcontinent, where a regionally preponderant state is in competition
with a Communist neighbour (China) that continues its rivalry with the USSR,
raises several types of problems. Should the US in seeking to take India
seriously welcome its regional hegemony even if that is followed by policies
that complicate US access to the Indian Ocean? Should promotion of India
to the Security Council or an embargo on nuclear materials be the response to
her nuclear status? Should the US differentiate between her policies towards
India and Pakistan on nuclear proliferation and on arms sales? If regionalism
is in fact good geopolitics, how should US policies treat the India-China
rivalry? The relationship between the international policies of the
Subcontinent and the Gulf further complicates the issue of good regionalism.

In South-East Asia the US shift in the 1970s from imperial power to an
offshore presence and subdued diplomacy saw a parallel interest in the opening
of ties with the ASEAN states. Yet Vietnam's regional ambitions and its
alliance with the USSR (together with large-scale economic assistance) have,
by bringing in China and raising the possibility of a Sino-Soviet clash,
transformed a purely regional issue into one affecting international security.
The degree of involvement and the timing of the Soviet commitment to Vietnam
have all the markings of a proxy war although Vietnam (like Cuba) clearly
has its own motives. To what extent the US can rely on the regional responses
of China and the ASEAN states to deter Vietnam and the Soviet Union is
unclear. At some point America's interests become involved not due in this
case to a question of credibility vis-à-vis Thailand or ASEAN but due to the
consequences of allowing large-scale Soviet supported military actions to
occur unchallenged. There is not all that much that the US can do to
'encourage' regional co-operation within ASEAN. The ASEAN states have
certain interests in common but retain their individual priorities which tend
to prevent a common military response. Encouragement by the US will only
add credibility to charges by Hanoi and Moscow that ASEAN is a US-sponsored
pact. Detachment in this part of the world has been practised; whether it
can be continued depends on the course of relations between the major
Communist powers.

US interests are entangled in South Korea at least in part due to
Japanese security perceptions. To a surprising degree, the Carter Administr-
ation has pursued its commitment to human rights and political liberalization
even at a time of future political uncertainty in the Korean peninsula.
American leverage over Seoul is strong both because of a large military

presence and because of an assessment that South Korea has 'nowhere else to go'. This pressure has yet to yield tangible results but recent events may bring things to a head. The best that can be expected is the exchange of one authoritarian regime for another, but US leverage in this instance would have been appreciably diminished if the initial inclination to withdraw US troops had been acted upon. Here involvement yields some leverage but with uncertain results. In the future Japan's slow military build-up and increasing influence in the Korean peninsula may come to substitute for that of the US, allowing for a scaling-down of the US presence and a more indirect commitment. China's influence on North Korea will be important. Here, too, the possibility of multilateralization is worth exploring.

Finally the case of the Middle East. There are no good reasons for assuming that the inclusion of the USSR in negotiations on a settlement would generate reasonableness or compromise, unless it is first demonstrated that an arrangement can be arrived at without Soviet participation. Where the "hard-nosed" approach is weakest however is in assuming that the vicious circle can be broken only by Soviet or Arab-rejectionist compromise. US pressure on Israel will be necessary as will American inducements, security assistance and guarantees. Greater Soviet involvement <u>at that juncture</u> would probably be necessary. Appropriate outside power guarantees should be no more risky than continued stalemate and occasional wars. Since there is a substantial consensus on continued US interest in the issue, US guarantees appear quite feasible here. While a 'reasonable' settlement of the issue of Palestine would undoubtedly improve US relations with the Arab world, it is not a panacea for stability in the Gulf. Those who advocate it as part of a Gulf policy are correct; those who see in it a substitute or pre-requisite for a Gulf policy are deluding themselves. Nevertheless the interconnections between the two regions are marked and must be taken into account. Kissinger's attempts to separate the issue of Palestine from Gulf security - initially successful - foundered with the Saudi rejection of the Camp David formula put forward by the Carter Administration. This was in part a reaction to the Iranian Revolution. Whether making a virtue out of necessity or not, some in the West now advocate a positive diplomacy which uses this interconnection.

(b) <u>The Pursuit of an Overarching Policy</u>

The emphasis on key regions derives from an acceptance of their importance to US security. The containment of Soviet power and anti-Western radicalism and the shoring up of military balances will here assume priority. Yet although the dispersal of power to new states has increased the attractiveness of regional approaches to security, interdependence has at the same

time created new links between regions thus decreasing their autonomy or isolation. A US policy that focuses on only one or two key regions is unlikely to work. Regional security, like the protection solely of physical security, cannot be a sufficient goal for a great power. The development of an environment that is moderate and favourable to diversity will be an essential ingredient of US security policies towards the Third World. The exercise of influence and the allocation of resources will be essential for world order precisely because the international system cannot ultimately remain unaffected by persistent conflicts, growing radicalism or the recourse to the nuclear option. Whether one foresees 'chaotic fragmentation' in the Third-World or 'transitional crises' bordering on anarchy (combined with a North-South struggle) or a widening agenda of world-order issues of increasing complexity, the US will hold aloof only at the cost of diminished influence in affecting the kind of milieu in which she has to exist. Those who argue for limited commitments or for confrontation or for 'opposition' to the Third World cannot escape the fact that the days of continental, hemispheric or even Atlantic security have passed. The choice is between influencing an interdependent environment or adjusting to it.

Yet there is a strong current in the US which, for various reasons, seeks to limit commitments and undertake minimal expenditures abroad. Some urge domestic priorities, seeing little useful in what the US, even with the best of intentions, can actually accomplish abroad. Some see the challenge of the South as political and urge a response in traditional terms where appropriate but others prefer the US to affect a studied indifference to the South as a whole. (Many of the latter are also sceptical about the optimism of the Pearson and Brandt Commission reports which concluded that the interests of the West and the Third World are in fact reconcilable if not identical). Some within the US argue for an insulation of US-Soviet relations from the turmoil of the Third World. They (like many Europeans) fear that the linkage of instabilities will tend to jeopardize progress in concrete areas of mutual interest (such as detente in Europe or arms control). Yet linkage, whether specifically invoked or not, exists. Unrestrained competition in third areas is bound to affect the climate of domestic opinion and consequently US-Soviet relations. It is unavoidable that connections will be made between detente and actions in regions which are regarded as contrary to American interests.

The mood within the US is one of frustration expressed in occasional rhetorical militance combined with a continuing and deep antipathy to interventions that might repeat the Vietnam experience, and a reluctance

to invest resources in an 'ungrateful' and even competitive Third World.
This makes the achievement of a consensus on what less tangible goals to
promote even harder. Contradictions abound. The Carter Administration has
self-consciously both promoted the idea of basic reform of the international
economic order and followed its predecessors' attempts at co-opting the
potentially influential through a 'graduation' strategy.[1] Neither have
succeeded and a concrete policy toward the South has still to emerge from a
government that is ostensibly sympathetic to fundamental rather than to
cosmetic changes. The declining contribution of American official foreign
aid (0.19% of GNP compared with 0.52% for the UK) is indicative as is the
concentration of 85% of its total security assistance to the states of the
eastern Mediterranean. It reflects not a declining concern for the South
but the pressure of competing demands. It also reflects pessimism about the
scope of influence and a belief that, if there are problems, they stem not
from an unequal international economy but from the domestic structure of
states unwilling to make the necessary reforms. This in turn has led to a
"basic human needs" approach. There is little enthusiasm for trade
liberalization and commodity agreements, and considerable resentment that
past US contributions have been construed by some dependencia theorists as
selfish attempts by the United States to perpetuate its hegemony and to
distort economies of the recipient countries. But there is even less enthusiasm
for intervention to secure access to resources - with the exception of oil.
Only to secure oil could intervention realistically be contemplated and
then not to affect price but to prevent complete, irreversible, denial -
presumed to be through Soviet control.

Torn between the facts of interdependence (and the costs and frustrations
of involvement) on the one hand, and the desire to attend to domestic
priorities and to gain breathing space on the other, the US is unable either
to opt out or to fashion an effective policy for participation. The passing
of an international order based on US military and political primacy[2] has
been paralleled in the economic arena. Economically, Third World states can
now assert their independence, and they can bargain for capital, technology
and expertise elsewhere (from Japan or from Europe and from within the Third
World itself). The potential disequilibrium between US global political
commitments and her economic resource base which was obscured in the 1960s

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(1) For various approaches see Roger D. Hansen Beyond the North-South
    Stalemate. N.Y. McGraw Hill: (Council on Foreign Relations), 1979.
    See also his "North-South Policy - What's the Problem," Foreign
    Affairs, Summer 1980.

(2) For a discussion of the inter-relationship between US political supremacy
    and its economic position see Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational
    Corporation, Macmillan, London, 1976.

(by the growth of multinational corporations and the position of the dollar
as the world's reserve currency)[1] became all too evident by the 1970s. In
different ways both the USSR and OPEC raised the price of the maintaining
commitments while competition from Japan and Europe decreased the US
capacity to pay.[2]

In the Third World, development has brought neither stability nor order.
It may, on the contrary have brought America more assertive neighbours,
commercial competitors and states which in time will directly affect American
security interests through the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Far from
allowing a decrease in US responsibilities and a respite from a troublesome
world, development has made it a more complex world where the simple verities
no longer hold, where the lines of partner and adversary relationships are
ill-defined and where the demands for involvement have grown more imperative.
While the costs of involvement have increased those of non-involvement have
done so even more.

Conclusion

US policy towards the Third World will have to accept both limits on its
ability to determine or impose outcomes and the necessity for seeking to
influence them. The extraordinary diversity of the countries in the Third
World (a label which itself reflects an East-West bias) will ensure that any
policies which assume any great uniformity amongst its members will fail.
The one exception to this is in the reform of the international economic
order where even limited gestures far outweigh rhetoric. The US will not
find any convenient universal doctrine to replace that of anti-Communism.
Policy toward the Third World will inevitably differ from region to region.
But the principles on which it should be based - respect for diversity,
compassion for suffering and a reputation for steadfastness - should inform
policy everywhere. Once it is recognized that the aim of policy is the defence
of interest and that respect not popularity will be conducive to this, it
may become clear that there is no need for a particularly positive doctrine
at all. The reduction of security interests to an irreducible core should
facilitate the creation of a consensus behind them. But without a sustained
commitment to issues that do not yet constitute direct threats, that core
will tend to increase.

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(1) Ibid p. 150.

(2) Ibid p. 218.

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THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE 2

RESOURCES AND CONFLICT

(ii)   OIL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT:
THE LIKELY CONTINGENCIES

by

Melvin Conant

Committee 2: Resources and Conflict

OIL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT:
THE LIKELY CONTINGENCIES

Melvin Conant

Three explicit propositions should guide us:

(1) There is no prospect that over the next twenty years oil will be significantly less important a commercial fuel than it is today; access to oil will remain a vital interest of industrial and developing societies generally.

(2) It is highly probable that over that same period most of the industrial world, at least, will still lack domestic oil resources sufficient to meet demand. Hence, industrial nations and many LDCs will continue to require imported oil.

(3) It is likely that the Middle East will remain the most prolific oil exporting region of the world. While opinions differ as to the prospect of finding elsewhere additional, immense reserves, nothing presently discussed will rival the role of the Middle East.

With these propositions in mind, the two critical questions facing present and prospective oil importers are: (1) what is likely to be the volume of oil placed in international trade by the producers? Will it be adequate? (2) will that oil be supplied continuously and at a price within the capacity of importing countries to pay through the customary processes of international trade?

As for the first, until recent years there was a widely held belief that a rising demand for oil could be met by increasing production - it always had been; it always would. We know now that there are most serious doubts about this assumption. We cannot be certain how much oil can yet be produced from existing fields or their possible extensions. We have not been discovering very large fields outside the Middle East. We have not seen a massive effort launched to exploit the unconventional crude deposits of Canada and Venezuela nor the shale of the United States. In recent years, we have been drawing down upon oil capital, withdrawing more oil than we have been discovering. If there is no present nor near-term need to panic, we admit to a deepening apprehension.

We cannot trust the beguiling concept of vast "undiscovered" reserves; we do not know enough to do so. If only because we can't afford to be imprudent about the future, we must be concerned about the sufficiency and continuity of supply. Additionally, of course, we have reason to be worried because the oil producers say we should be.

Our concern is greater because we have not exploited alternative energy options - coal, gas, nuclear - on such a scale and pace as to suggest the eventual transition from oil can be orderly or, if not that, then at least capable of being dealt with and accomplished without alarm.

Moreover, we are confronted by a new phenomenon in international oil supply. The volume of oil to be made available will be determined to some extent by technical considerations (a conservative extraction rate) and partly by a producer's decision as to whether its domestic and foreign political, economic and security objectives are best met by producing at what is called the "maximum sustainable capacity" or at something less - the "preferred producing rate".

The latter will be defined by a mix of interests and concerns including a producer's conclusion as to whether oil should be "banked" - left in the ground - in anticipation of a later higher value. Not all producers will have the option to choose between these two rates. Those desperate for revenue will have no alternative. Interestingly, those producers which can choose to limit production drastically are mainly in the Gulf - and are the largest contributors to oil in world trade: Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and, eventually, again Iran. We are uneasy as to how these producers will come to decide on the volume, individually or perhaps even collectively, and whether the objectives they pursue may complicate importers' crucial needs for continuous supply, in dependable volume, at what we still describe as a "reasonable price".

Future Requirements

International oil is currently supplied (one-half from the Gulf) at about 29 MMB/D. A number of observers warn that this volume is unlikely to be much larger in the years to come even though the volumetric needs of importers will grow (while the percentage share of oil in their national energy budgets may be declining). We list among them present importers and those other countries, such as the producers themselves whose own oil needs will grow, the USSR, probably China and, of course, the non-oil LDCs. If supply is to be short - for whatever reasons - then competition for oil, especially Middle East oil, can only become more intense.

What we ought to anticipate is a moderate, rising GNP, and an increased
minimum oil requirement, over the next decade, of imports from 29 MMB/D to
a possible 36-38. This assumes an OECD GNP annual growth rate of some 2.5
percent and a non-oil LCD growth rate of around 5 percent. It allows for
the USSR to be importing about 1 MMB/D by the mid-eighties. Higher growth
rates (with a .7 GNP/energy ratio) and a higher USSR import level would
quickly raise the requirement possibly to a range putting international oil
demand between 39 MMB/D and the low forties.

If we find the preferred production rate is still at 29-30 MMB/D, the
importers and the producers will be in deep trouble.

Threats and Uncertainties

One aspect of supply which is central to our concerns is the possibility
that through the use of the "oil weapon", imports to a country or group of
countries would be reduced below that minimum level essential to the
functioning of their societies. What this level is for a particular
country is difficult to define but in terms of general world supply, my
guess is that 26 MMB/D represents the "crisis zone". Unless there were
compelling reasons to believe reduced supply was a short-term phenomenon,
an importing government or governments might conclude it had no alternative
but to use force to restore supply.

What do we mean? Who in the alliances would have the requisite
political will to act, and the military means to accomplish the purpose?
Would damage to oil facilities likely be so extensive as to negate the
effort? What if the USSR were to react with a move of its own confronting
the alliance member or members with an ultimatum? We have no convincing
answers to these questions - but still might not be dissuaded from action
if the emergency were of compelling proportions. The point is that
producers ought not to believe their actions would, in the end, be
unopposed militarily because we did not find sufficient prospect for
success to justify the use of force. We might conclude there was no
alternative.

We do not need to dwell further on this extreme case of conflict and
access to oil.

While we can avoid these "worst case" scenarios, the observation holds that competition for available oil is certain to be the most likely condition. The competition is far more than commercial for governments of both exporting and importing countries are now fully involved and are engaging many of the instruments and powers available to them to secure supply. The involvement of governments insures the "politicisation" of oil; their intervention is due also to the inability of most industrial states and many LDCs to pay for oil through the ordinary processes of trade. Special deals are struck, special arrangements concluded.

The uneasiness in world oil today stems in large part from this "politicisation" of oil, but also in large measure because the observance of contracts is no longer believed by producers to be a necessary condition to the sale of oil. The importing nations, severally and collectively are to blame for not having insisted all along that the altogether peaceful transfer of power from the companies to the producing governments - itself an extraordinary circumstances - still implied assurance of performance under agreements freely concluded. We are paying a hideous price for that lapse in rectitude; it corrodes all relationships and will be all the more likely to end in a confrontation the longer it is allowed to be ignored.

These are several of the causes of the tension found in international oil. There are many others, but those which might involve conflict are usually found in the Middle East,* in the actions of regional states whose difficulties with each other may have very little to do with oil per se but come to involve it, or in the actions of external powers in the region for which access to oil may be the prime cause for conflict. What might be the causes of such conflict? How might they come to a head and to what effect?

Foremost among these is the Arab-Israeli dispute. While Arab hostility toward Israel seems unremitting and general, we think we can sometimes distinguish between Arab states' rhetoric and commitments and willingness to act. We can, however, take little comfort from these distinctions because there is probably no other issue so likely to inflame the region than that of the issue of Israel. Yet we need not assume that each producer would use its oil weapons uniformly; the record suggests this will not be so.

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* Confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia, or eventually between Japan and China for access to Southeast Asia oil, are other possible causes for conflict. Another example is the possibility of a Norwegian-USSR confrontation over petroleum resources off the Norwegian northern coast.

What makes the current situation more difficult to deal with - as compared
to 1967 and 1973-74 - is Israeli and Arab possession of a medium-range
missile capability which permits either side a pre-emptive attack; in the
case of Israel, the question always arises as to whether its targets would
now include the truly vital gathering facilities and terminals through
which Gulf supply passes. However desultory some producers' use of the
"oil weapon" might be, an Israeli attack on these crucial installations
could precipitate a most significant crisis in oil supply.

These facilities are, of course, liable to terrorist attack from
almost any direction (even to be made to appear as an Israeli initiative)
and are vulnerable to local dissidents' action. Or the terrorists could
sow confusion and great uncertainty by mining only a few VLCCs. On
balance, however, it seems less likely - but never too difficult - for
Arab terrorists to maim their own side, so to speak.

Other causes of conflict would include Iran and Iraq, whose deeply-
seated antipathy to each other raises the spectre of a modern form of
tribal warfare which cares little for boundaries and for whom the cost
may not be in oil but the territorial expansion of one at the expense of
the other. Whatever injury might be visited upon oil facilities would be
accidental, as it were, not necessarily deliberate. Its cost to importing
nations would be no less. But it seems possible that such conflicts,
including Iraq and Kuwait, Bahrein, Iraq and Syria, etc., need not be
considered as having the same near-certain effect upon supply of an Arab-
Israeli exchange.

Similarly, the use of surrogate forces by the Soviet Union (or the
use of them by an Arab state acting against another) need not involve the
destruction of key facilities; in fact, there would probably be considerable
restraint to see this did not happen. A coup within an Arab state would
also not necessarily endanger facilities and thus reduce supply; the oil
policies of a new regime might well have that effect.

In short, if one can set aside the wild, emotional response which
could wreck almost any facility, the possibility of armed conflict greatly
affecting supply seems less than that the political oil policies of a key
producer, such as Saudi Arabia, might cut back on exports and thus be the
cause of very considerable concern over supply. It is to this latter cause
of oil shortage that our greater attention should be given.

Soviet Requirements and the Consequences

There are other actors in this drama than the states of the region; most particularly, there is the Soviet Union. How may its own approaching need for imports (either for its own account or for East Europe) affect Soviet policies and actions in the Middle East? Will its needs increase the probability of conflict? We know much less about the extent and timing of Soviet needs for imported oil than those who argue for one assessment or another are likely to admit. Nevertheless, we have to assume certain matters, as a matter of prudence.

First, any Soviet leadership would be greatly disturbed by its loss of energy autarchy; the implications for strategic vulnerability would be assessed with great care.

Second, the Soviets will have time within which to make their moves. Imported oil may not be a crucial need for some years to come. Precipitate action to secure supply would seem to be a relatively unattractive option at this time. This does not preclude the USSR taking advantage of the confusion in Iran for reasons other than the Soviet's anticipated oil needs. The point that the importing industrial world has managed without Iranian supply (thanks in part to Saudi Arabia) may persuade the Kremlin that it could move in Iran with less risk than before. The difficulty which the United States would have in projecting military power into the region, is always the unknown. But in terms of access to someone else's oil as distinct from improving upon the USSR's vantage point to influence world supply, the USSR may not believe it must act in a confrontational manner for the former reason alone.

There are three main options open to the USSR - each with its particular advantages and disadvantages:

(1) Intensify efforts to develop domestic energy resources; limit the internal consumption of oil;

(2) Forge a "special relationship" with a producer state, comparable to what it may have hoped to obtain with Iraq and Libya, which would give the USSR preferential access to oil (there are possibilities outside the Middle East for additional supply: Mexico, Norway). The USSR could employ political and economic tactics to secure such arrangements, or use military aid or military force.

(3) Obtain its needs from the international "market" despite the foreign exchange costs involved.

Only Option (2) would raise the possibility of conflict, but unless there was strong armed opposition to a USSR move, damage to facilities would seem not to be a primary concern. The effect of Option (2) or (3) on international supply might be the same - in either case we have to adjust, and/or producers have to reckon in setting their preferred production rates on a certain Soviet claim for a share of foreign oil.

There may, therefore, be less potential for actual conflict over oil as a result of new Soviet needs unless the obtaining of supply is associated with a great strategic interest (such as a Soviet presence at the Hormuz Strait or keeping the United States out of Iran, etc.). The chance may be slim that Soviet import needs will in themselves generate conflict.

Relations Among Allies

Access to oil will, as noted, profoundly affect the relationship among allies as each importer seeks to obtain its normal supply. These are not likely to result in conflict - except perhaps between Greece and Turkey. The United States may not have been among the first to acknowledge the extraordinary importance of adequate and continuous supply to allies. But the centrality of this matter ought to be evident by now. No European state, save the United Kingdom and Norway, can accept a major, sustained loss in supply. However unlikely it may seem that supply could be cut for more than a month by reason of concerted producers' actions, the appalling consequences, if it should last longer, cause importing states to look to their energy defences, especially as they also anticipate a general situation of tight supply.

The International Energy Agency, created in large part to help member nations cope with emergency shortfalls, is a distinct improvement over its predecessor: the OECD Oil Committee. But the same lack of political will and discipline which enervated the Oil Committee may haunt the IEA if a crisis occurs. Too many of its key members already speak as if this were the case, and, in suspecting, they rob the IEA of its potential. Additionally, however, the loss in flexibility of the international oil giants to "manage" supply in an emergency is a new and troubling factor for which there is no remedy. Nor has the IEA yet been fully charged to examine the steps necessary whereby available oil can be allocated in a general situation in which supply is inadequate without its cause being a producer's use of oil as a "weapon".

The IEA cannot deal with the propensity of importing states to try and arrange for preferential access to another's oil (although in a sense it was created to help avoid the necessity of importers following the US example with Saudi Arabia and Iran). It is the unrelenting search for assured supply which characterises so much of the oil strategies of France, Germany, Italy and Japan. We have no apparent means for coping with this phenomenon, and are greatly in need of them.

With these tendencies in mind, is there something too facile in European discussions of the need to become more involved with Arab producers as a whole, with the implication that something can be agreed to which improves upon Europe's supply? Is it the view that the Community can so order its oil affairs as to make unnecessary the search for preferential arrangements by its leading importers? Will a European "initiative" proceed without careful regard for the oil needs of the United States or Japan? Is it Europe's view that these initiatives can take place and not risk impairing its alliance relationship with the United States?

Conclusion

Conflict within the Third World is not a cause of major concern about adequate and continuous oil supply - or so this author would contend. Supply is most likely to be at stake in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Nor is armed conflict likely to be a consequence of a Soviet pursuit of oil for its own or Eastern Europe's account; but supply could quickly be a casualty if some great strategic interest were engaged - such as a projection of Soviet power into a position controlling supply to the industrial world. Nor is conflict likely to be a feature of the competition for access to oil waged by importing states (with the previously mentioned exception of Greece and Turkey). Competition? Yes. Divisive in its effects? Certainly. Conflict? Improbable.

The United States, and its NATO allies and Japan, are alert now to the stress within their relationship of their different degrees of dependence upon imported oil in general and from the Middle East in particular. The United States relies upon imported oil to a lesser extent than almost any of its allies: Norway, the United Kingdom and Canada being the fortunate exceptions.

Because we cannot afford another spectacle of some European members of NATO forbidding the United States overflight rights as in 1973-74, largely because of their genuine concern over Arab resentment leading probably to lower supply, it is now urgent that members of NATO and Japan reshape their defence commitments, re-define their roles and responsibilities and agree as to what each expects of the other in the matter of defence of oil supply, especially in the Middle East and its approaches. In doing so, the competition amongst them for supply might moderate.

If the most likely pervasive and subversive consequences of competition - not conflict - will come within NATO and will include Japan, they could gravely impair confidence in our mutual political, economic, financial and military relationships. How may this situation be addressed? Only by ceasing to append to "oil" a discrete significance which causes its pursuit to be considered an action outside the basic purposes and institutions of free world alliances can the present disarray be dealt with. Once oil is placed within the context of a nation's overall foreign policy, it will then be considered in the totality of that nation's relationships with others. Only three oil importing nations need to act in this manner - Germany, Japan and the United States (they import one half of all oil in world trade) - to help allay competition amongst European importers and Japanese and thereby moderate the race for preferential supply.

In short, we should probably be particularly worried about the corrosive effects upon our alliances of the competition amongst us for supply.

5

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THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE 5

REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

(ii)   OUTSIDE GUARANTEES AND REGIONAL
SECURITY

by

Shai Feldman

This paper addresses the likely effects of superpower security
guarantees to Third World countries in the 1980s. Our main focus will
be on the desirability of such guarantees from the standpoint of over-
all system and subsystem stability in the Third World. The paper is
intended as a "think piece" about the near future, rather than an
extensive historical survey of past experiences. We shall deduce from
the past about the future; our focus, however, is on the ways to
address the problems confronting us today - problems that are likely
to appear and reappear with greater urgency in the coming decade.

A final introductory note concerns the definition of the problem.
The questions stated above involve some narrowing-down of the more
general question of the likely effects of any "outside", or "third-
party" guarantees on regional stability. The amendment will be
justified later. We will see why only the Superpowers are likely to
meet the prerequisites of credible and effective guarantees to ⁺Third
World countries. However, we shall also address the desirable division
of labour between the Superpowers and other medium powers in the
operationalization of such guarantees.

Our inquiry will begin with a theoretical discussion of the
likely effects of superpower guarantees, assuming that they are
perfectly credible. We shall then proceed to qualify our propositions
by considering the causes and extent to which "in the real world" such
guarantees are likely to deviate from this perfect model. We shall
then discuss the effects of such deviations on the ability to attain
regional stability through external guarantees.

The Function of Guarantees

The term "security guarantee" implies a form of politico-military
alliance. Security guarantees are a subset of alliances. The former
are distinct primarily in two manners: First whereas an alliance can
be formed between two or more states irrespective of the distribution
of power between them, a guarantee implies an asymmetry in capabilities
between the parties. The guarantor will invariably be more powerful
than its clients and will sometimes bear a disproportionate part of
the costs of the alliance. This led Robert Rothstein to note that
"in substance, multilateral alliances like the Southeast Asia Treaty

Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) really constitute unilateral great-power guarantees" (Rothstein, 70:354). The second distinct characteristic of guarantees is that whereas alliances may be both defensive and offensive in goals and character, a guarantee clearly implies a defensive alliance. The guarantor promises to come to its client's rescue only in the event that the latter is attacked. Often, however, the object of the guarantee is not the integrity of a specific client state, but rather the fulfillment of a peace treaty, international agreement, or some other form of regional accommodation. (Dowty, 74:19). In this latter case, the guarantee retains an equally defensive character: the guarantor appears as the guardian of the status quo by promising to utilize his capabilities against whoever is found in violation of the terms of the treaty, agreement, or regional accommodation.

Superpower security guarantees to regional clients should increase regional stability and reduce the likelihood of regional wars by both deterring potential violators of the peace and mitigating various causes of regional wars. The deterrent role of guarantees requires little elaboration. From the standpoint of the client state, the main purpose of the exercise is to combine its power with that of the guarantor "in order to deter actual or potential enemies, or to defeat actual attacks" (Evron, 80:4). If the guarantees are credible, regional rivals will have to think more than twice before attacking the client state. Fear that the attack will force the guarantor to intervene on his client's behalf is likely to deter the potential offender from embarking upon such an enterprise. Thus guarantees are likely to have a dampening effect on regional violence: many a war which could not otherwise be deterred is averted because of the deterrent effect of external guarantees.

External guarantees may reduce the likelihood of war not only by deterring potential violators directly, but also by mitigating various causes of war. The latter connection requires greater elaboration. Kenneth Waltz, in a landmark inquiry, found war to be caused primarily by the anarchic nature of the international system. Anarchy causes war due to its permissive aspect, as will as to its insecurity-breeding aspect. Waltz stressed the permissive aspect by pointing out that since the international system is composed of many sovereign states and lacks a superior agent capable of enforcing laws among them, war is always possible. Because the condition of anarchy allows each state to judge its "grievances and ambitions" according to the dictates of its own objective and subjective interests, "conflict, sometimes leading

to war, is bound to occur" (Waltz, 54:159). In a state of anarchy, Waltz further points out, there is no automatic harmony. A state may use force to attain its goals "if, after assessing the prospects of success, it values these goals more than it values the pleasures of peace." Since in anarchy each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state may at any time use force to implement its policies.

The injection of superpower security guarantees into Third World regions can be expected to mitigate the effects of this cause of war. With the introduction of such guarantees and the capabilities needed to make them credible, various regional subsystems are transformed into less anarchic and more hierarchic structures. Before initiating a war, a local state has to do more than simply "judge its own grievances and ambitions." It must also take into account the desires of its guarantors. Thus, Egypt in the early 70s and Syria today must take into account the Soviet Union's reluctance to endorse a military solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel was unable to bring about the surrender of the Egyptian Third Army at the end of the 1973 war because the United States would not let her. Not surprisingly, the present regime in Somalia calculates that accepting a strong American military presence would limit her ability to pursue a military effort in the Ogaden (Burt, July 17, 1980). Superpower presence leaves local rivals less freedom to initiate war. Thus, from the standpoint of regional stability, superpower guarantees can be expected to have a positive war-limiting effect.

The second consequence of international anarchy is that states are in a constant state of insecurity because they fear that war may be waged against them at any time. Fear of war confronts states with what John Herz calls a "security dilemma" (Herz, 1950). As Waltz points out, since in the anarchic realm any state may at any time use force, "all states must constantly be ready either to counter force with force or to pay the costs of weakness" (Waltz, 54:159-160).

Once awarded   security guarantees, states can be expected to feel more secure. Knowledge that a Superpower would come to their aid if attacked provides them with an assurance that they will be better able to defeat attackers. Assessing the deterrent effect of the guarantee upon potential challengers has the further effect of persuading the client state that it is less likely to be attacked. As security is less threatened, states feel less propelled to fight wars with the aim of improving their security: "As states become safer,

international conflict diminishes dramatically" (Van Evera, 79:4).

Another cause of war has been the periodic advantages of pre-emption, prevention and the offence over the defence. In the absence of a single authority with a monopoly of force and capable of providing and guaranteeing security, each state is moved to take self-help measures to enhance its security. The launching of pre-emptive and preventive wars is among such measures.

In turn, whether or not states will either fear pre-emption or decide to embark upon such a strategy themselves is largely a function of the relative attractiveness of the offence over the defence. The greater the advantages of offence over defence, the more likely are states to feel insecure and initiate offensive action. When the defence has the advantage, the opposite is the case. If the defence has enough of an advantage "not only will the security dilemma cease to inhibit status quo states from cooperating, but aggression will be next to impossible, thus rendering international anarchy relatively unimportant. If states cannot conquer each other, then the lack of sovereignty, although it presents problems of collective goods, no longer forces states to devote their primary attention to self-preservation" (Jervis, 78:187-188).

Local rivals will be less inclined to preempt each other once they are protected by external guarantees. Under such conditions pre-emption will not make much sense because even if a temporary advantage over the local rival is gained, one remains vulnerable to intervention by the latter's external guarantor. In a similar fashion, superpower security guarantees reduce the incentives for preventive war. Since the likelihood of both are a function of the advantage of the offence over the defence, and since superpower security guarantees essentially constitute the advantage of "defense through diplomacy" (Van Evera, 79:2), the odds that either type of war would be initiated in a region tied by a network of effective external guarantees is much reduced.

Another frequent cause of war has been the face that security is often mutually exclusive. The capability of other states to project threats also serves to provide them with security. Hence, "many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others. (Thus)... one state's gain in security often inadvertently threatens others" (Jervis, 71:169-170). Since this is true for each state from its own perspective, and since all states resist any effort to diminish their security, it is almost inevitable

that the general quest for security often leads to war. Thus war becomes more likely to the extent that security is mutually exclusive. As Henry Kissinger pointed out with respect to the nineteenth century, absolute security for one state implied absolute insecurity for its adversaries (Kissinger 73:2). Aron's view is similar: "Security based on strength is a mirage; if one side feels safe from attack, the other will feel at the mercy of the enemy" (Aron, 65:212).

Because defensive capability can be easily converted to offensive capability, the general quest for security increases each particular state's "security dilemma". To the extent that what states do to increase their security is additive (e.g., if two armoured divisions provide twice as much security as one does) and to the extent that these achievements are convertible (e.g., tank divisions can have an offensive as well as a defensive role,) each state's quest for security presents its neighbours with grave threats. Since the latter are likely to resist such threats, the very quest for security may lead to war.

Indeed, when resources are additive and convertible, war often takes place not over security itself, but rather over those resources that add to security. As BRodie has pointed out, states often interpret "their requirements for security expansively, and the objects sought in its name often become in themselves the causes of conflict" (Brodie, 59:224). For example, "In order to protect themselves, states often seek to control, or at least to neutralize, areas on their borders. But attempts to establish buffer zones can alarm others who have stakes there, who fear that undesirable precedents will be set, or who believe that their own vulnerability will be increased. When buffers are sought in areas empty of great powers, expansion tends to feed on itself in order to protect what is acquired, as was often noted by those who opposed colonial expansion" (Jervis, 78:169). Expanding one's buffer zones necessarily places one's forces in greater proximity to other states' centres, thus threatening them. Threatened states take preventive action and this may lead to war.

External security guarantees may decrease the odds of war by making regional security less mutually exclusive. When a state's security is based on indigenous military capabilities that can have both defensive and offensive roles, it often threatens the security of others. However, when its security is based instead on external guarantees, it does not pose such a threat to others. When states are less dependent for their security on their own deeds, and are similarly less affected by the deeds of their regional rivals, they become less

inclined to take self-help measures to improve their security. The odds that wars will be fought over resources that may add to security are hence lower in a region whose states base their safety on external guarantees. War caused by attempts to escape the "security dilemma" are thus less likely to occur.

A final cause of war mitigated by external security guarantees is the effect of optimistic misperceptions. Within the realm of systemic pessimism injected by the anarchic nature of the international system, states are often driven to momentary optimistic misperceptions of the distribution of power. They may perceive what seems to be an opportunity to increase their security by expansion or defeat of the enemy and rush to exploit it before the distribution alters to their disadvantage. Thus many preemptive or preventive wars are the outcomes of momentary miscalculations of the distribution of power.

Formal and perfectly credible external guarantees lower the odds of war by reducing the likelihood that the behaviour of third parties will be optimistically misperceived. As the obligations of the external powers are stipulated in the terms of the guarantees, there is less room for imagination as to what they are likely to do or avoid doing in the event that war erupts. The likelihood that one regional rival will attack the other, basing his expectations of victory on the assessment that his victim's allies would not become involved, is far lower when the defensive alliance is formalized and well-publicized.

The stabilizing effect of reduced uncertainty through the formalization of external obligations is felt far beyond the regions and states to which these obligations apply. Reduced odds that external powers' behaviour in different regions be misperceived is beneficial also from the standpoint of great-power relations, and hence, from that of the entire international system. An external power may move to affect outcomes in a region under the assumption that other external powers would not be significantly affected and would therefore refrain from intervening. The assumption may turn out to be mistaken, leading to a direct clash between the great powers over regional outcomes. Indeed, this may occur even if the power conducting the initial intervention has only limited interests in the region and would have avoided intervening if it had calculated beforehand that its intervention would lead others to intervene as well. Thus, an unintended confrontation between the powers, with possible adverse consequences throughout the International system, may occur despite both powers' best wishes. When sufficient uncertainty surrounds their regional interests and obligations,

a bloody great-power feud may result from their respective roles in distant and relatively unimportant regions. In our own era, when such feuds may theoretically escalate to the unleashing of arsenals of unlimited destructive capabilities, it becomes imperative that miscalculations of this type be avoided. When external obligations are formalized, thus delineating clearly the regional responsibilities and interests of the external powers, the odds of such miscalculations occurring are significantly reduced.

The discussion so far has revolved around the theoretical role of external guarantees in maintaining regional security. However, just as important is their role in achieving peace. Security guarantees may be more important as bargaining chips in the negotiations leading to regional accommodations than in maintaining regional stability once such accommodations are reached. As external guarantees make states feel more secure and hence less in need of initiating war to improve their security, they also make states more forthcoming in the establishment of the initial state of peace. By providing states with alternative modes of security, external guarantees may allow for greater flexibility on issues that require compromise for regional accommodation to be reached. For example, since 1967, external guarantees of Israel's security have often been proposed as an alternative to the security provided by the occupied territories as buffers (Evron, 80:4, 6). Indeed, it was in the process of negotiating the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty and in order to propel Israel's withdrawal from its southern buffer (Sinai) that the United States agreed to provide her client with a quasi-guarantee in the form of "The American-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement" of March 1979. The Memorandum does not include an unambiguous under-taking to actually intervene militarily in case of an attack on Israel, as is included in other defence treaties. However, it does refer obliquely to such a possibility in the statement that "...if a violation of the Treaty of Peace is deemed to threaten the security of Israel. . . the United States will be prepared to consider, on an urgent basis, such measures as the strengthening of the United States presence in the area, the providing of emergency supplies to Israel, and the exercise of maritime rights in order to put an end to the violation" (Evron, 80:31). As such, the Memorandum may serve as a possible model for superpower guarantees in the 1980s.

The Reality of Guaranties

The preceeding analysis may lead one to conclude that superpower
security guarantees to Third World regions are highly desirable. Such
a conclusion, however, would be premature. Very rarely do external
guarantees conform to our theoretical assumption of perfect reliability
and credibility. "There is only one chance in three that the protector
will come to the aid of its ally in wartime, and then only at the
discretion of the protector" (Pelcovits, 76:21). More often than not,
outside guarantees fall short of expectations, thus leaving both
guarantor and clients extremely discontented. The shortcomings of
external guarantees "in the real world" will be examined with special
emphasis on those that may plague superpower guarantees in the 1980s.

The deterrent effect of superpower guarantees is a function of
their credibility. The threat to intervene in the event that the client
is attacked must be perceived as credible if a client's local rival or
another external power is to be deterred from attacking. The
credibility of guarantees, in turn, is a function of the guarantor's
capability and will. If the guarantee is to provide effective
deterrence by either denial or punishment, the guarantor must be able
to muster the forces required to punish the violator or deny him his
objectives. In other words, the guarantor must either be able to
station sufficient forces in whatever regions or states are placed
under his security umbrella, or he must have impressive "force
projection capabilities". Intentions are no less important. The
guarantor must demonstrate not only that he is capable of effective
denial and punishment, but also that he is willing to bear the costs
and consequences of fulfilling his obligations. Of course, intentions
and the availability of appropriate instruments interact. The
acquisition of tools for effective action signals intentions; the
two reinforce each other to produce credibility.

Why has the reality of external guarantees so often fallen short
of expectations? Why have they turned out so frequently to lack
credibility? There are a number of reasons for such periodic disap-
pointments: First, not always are external guarantees backed up with
the capabilities required to make them credible. Alan Dowty stresses
that in many cases of guarantees that failed to meet expectations
"the weakness of the guarantor as against the threatening state was the
cause of failure" (Dowty, 74:13). This problem has always plagued the
credibility of big powers' guarantees against possible aggressive action
by other big powers. However, the Superpowers now face unprecedented

problems in trying to meet threats presented by their clients' local
rivals as well. Only a century ago, some regions of the world were
sufficiently unarmed that the mere appearance of a foreign gunboat
could tip the local balance decisively. This is no longer the case.
States in various regions are now armed to their teeth. Therefore,
a guarantor's attempt to intervene against a client's local rival, let
alone an attempt to halt an attack by another power, requires that
the guarantor be able to project enormous forces over a great distance.
For example, an American effort to intervene against an Iraqi attack
on Saudi Arabia now requires that the potent armed forces of Iraq
be countered. The latter comprise 12 ground forces divisions, of which
four are armoured divisions and two are mechanized. They include 2,200
tanks, of which 1,000 are of very high quality; 2,500 armoured personnel
carriers; 1,700 pieces of artillery; 12 surface-to-surface ('Scud')
missile launchers; 450 combat aircraft; 40 attack helicopters; 185
transport helicopters; and a Navy consisting of 37 ships, of which 26
are missile or torpedo boats (Raviv, 79:15-16). Likewise, an American
guarantee to Somalia would require that American forces be capable of
confronting the armed forces of Ethiopia which now comprise 14 infantry
divisions, including 12 tank battalions; two paratroop brigades; and
30 artillery battalions. These units utilize over 700 tanks, over 600
armoured personnel carriers, hundreds of artillery pieces, anti-tank
and anti-air defence systems, etc. (IISS, 79:49-50). Far more than a
gunboat would now be needed in order to tip a local balance. Moreover,
the high attrition rates involved in current weapon technology is
likely to present a particular strain on the long logistics tail of the
intervening guarantor. As modern forceshhave become increasingly dependent
upon logistics, the vulnerability of the guarantor multiplies. In addition,
the modern battle-field is armour intensive. Consequently, the guarantor's
intervention requires the transport of extremely heavy equipment. The
difficulties of effective force projection are thus multiplied. The
credibility of the guarantor is significantly affected if he is unable
to meet the demands of a modern battle conducted in distant lands. The
ability to stabilize various regions with credible external guarantees
is thus reduced.

The prognosis in this sphere for credible American guarantees in
the early 1980s is not encouraging. After many delays, the United States
seems to have finally launched the construction of a 100,000-man Rapid
Deployment Force (Newsweek, July 14, 1980). However, it remains to be
seen what precise composition this force will assume. The American Navy,
neglected for many years, now finds itself unable to sustain a large-scale

transport operation of the kind required for intervention in distant regions. It lacks over-all tonnage and is short on manpower (Schiff, July 25, 1980). In addition, it remains to be seen whether the R.D.F.'s order-of-battle will be suited for armour-intensive warfare. Currently, American carrier air power is not configured with anti-tank weapons. Anti-armour ordnance must become standard Navy and Marine equipment if intervention forces are to fulfill their expected role. In 1976, America's quick intervention forces, the Marine Division as well as the 82nd Airborne Division, were still entirely lacking in tanks, A.P.C.s, and heavy artillery (Nunn, 78:12). As such, they were unsuitable for the kind of armour-intensive battle one could expect in various regions. Since 1978, some steps have been taken to remedy this deficiency, but not enough. It is not expected that before the second half of the 1980s America will be able to project a mechanized division into the Gulf within one week (Newsweek, July 14, 1980). Until her capabilities correspond more closely to the expected threats, the credibility of America's guarantees is likely to suffer.

A second problem that has often plagued the credibility of guarantees is that of will. Guarantors have not always demonstrated the necessary willingness to bear the costs involved in fulfilling their obligations under various treaties of guarantees. Consequently, their threats were not believed and the guarantees failed in both their deterrent and denial roles.

The problem of establishing credibility through the demonstration of will has two facets. The first is related to capabilities. The development of capabilities that closely correspond to the requirements of a guarantee signals an intention to meet its obligations. Thus, an American base in Oman will clearly signal an intention to fulfill a possible guarantee of free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The connection between capabilities and will may also take on a more general character. The over-all willingness to invest in developing capabilities is an over-all indicator of will. Thus, for example, the current opposition within the United States to support anything beyond registration for possible conscription and the unwillingness of all three presidential candidates to support a general draft may very well be read by potential challengers as indicating a general lack of will to bear the costs of obligations abroad. Thus, its effects on America's capabilities notwithstanding, the lack of enthusiasm for the reinstitution of the draft is likely to adversely affect the credibility of American guarantees.

In democracies, will can be measured by opinion polls which, in turn, can be either ignored or over-interpreted. Consider the data relevant to a possible American guarantee to Israel. N.A. Pelcovits reports that "Opinion surveys since the Yom Kippur War reveal that the American public strongly

opposes any commitment that risks direct American troop involvement in the Middle East. Harris Poll data for Spring 1975 show that while more than half of the public supports arms aid to Israel, only half that number is prepared to send troops to save Israel, even if she appears in danger of destruction. Only twelve percent of Gallop Poll respondents favoured sending troops in such circumstances" (Pelcovits, 76:28).

Will should also be communicated by diplomacy. The guarantor must tell potential challengers what he considers important, and what not. The United States was apparently willing to tolerate Soviet direct or indirect advancements in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, and to observe passively the downfall of the Shah of Iran. It was not willing similarly to tolerate a direct and overt Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, if the Soviets were to be deterred from this invasion, America should have clearly communicated to them by diplomacy that she considers an overt invasion fundamentally different from indirect Soviet advancement. Likewise, guarantees require constant attention. They are unlikely to deter challengers simply by being there. The continued commitment to carry out obligations must be constantly communicated to potential challengers if the latter are to be deterred.

A third problem that often plagues the credibility of guarantees is over-commitment. No power is likely to have either the capability or the will to meet obligations everywhere. By declaring all regions as vital, even a Superpower faces the problem of spreading its capabilities and will too thin. The ability to fulfill obligations suffers, and consequently, so does the credibility of guarantees. Many Europeans objected to America's involvement in Vietnam for fear that it might weaken her ability to react to threats in Europe. Indeed, when Egypt's President Nasser blockaded the Straits of Tiran (Sharm el-Sheikh) in May 1967, America's involvement in Southeast Asia played some role in weakening her ability and will to fulfill her pledge to Israel, of February, 1957, "to exercise the right of free and innocent passage" in Sharm el-Sheikh (Pelcovits, 76:14). The American "guarantee" turned out to lack credibility and Israel was forced to take self-help measures. Every power must determine its priorities and act in accordance with them. In some regions, guarantees will not be credible because others will judge that the region is of insufficient importance to the guarantor and will expect him to ignore the obligations he assumed. Consequently, it should not be expected that superpower guarantees could stabilize all regions, but rather - if at all - only those regions that are of sufficient importance to them. Only in the latter instance are the powers likely to support their guarantees with sufficient will.

A fourth problem involves the nature of the challenges to regional stability. External guarantees often fail to secure regional stability when the threats to stability are a regional rival or domestic upheavals among the region's states. A Superpower is less likely to be concerned about regional outcomes if they do not affect the global balance. Conversely, if a rival Superpower attacks the guarantor's local client in an attempt to affect the regional balance to its benefit, the guarantor is likely to fulfill his obligations. Indeed, most big power guarantees were awarded for precisely such contingencies. Fully 87 of the 104 cases of great power guarantees since 1815, examined by Alan Dowty, were directed at Great Powers; in only 17 cases was the guarantee aimed at a local rival (Dowty, 74:17). A Superpower may also make good on guarantees aimed at a local rival, but this will occur only if the latter is perceived to be closely associated with the rival Superpower or as posing a direct threat to the guarantor's interests. An example of the former occurred in 1950 when the United States identified North Korea with the Soviet Union and China. The ineffectiveness of superpower guarantees when the local violator is neither associated with the rival superpower nor perceived as a direct threat to the guarantor's interests results from the likely lack of will. The odds are that, under such circumstances, the guarantor will be unwilling to bear the costs involved in meeting his obligations. Even greater reluctance can be expected in cases in which both the local client and the local violator are closely associated with the guarantor. In such cases, the latter will do his best to avoid difficult choices.

The ineffectiveness of external guarantees against domestic sources of instability is likely to result from lack of capabilities, not of will. For example, the United States probably does not lack the will to prevent realization of domestic threats to the present regime in Saudi Arabia. However, it capability to act efficiently to meet such threats is probably quite limited. In such cases, the question of timing is crucial. If the guarantor waits too long, intervention becomes either impractical or too expensive. America's behaviour in the case of Iran is a case in point. Once domestic rivals establish themselves firmly in command, external intervention involves prohibitive costs. However, proper understanding as to when external intervention might be effective requires accurate "real time" intelligence regarding the domestic scenes in distant regions. Neither the Soviet Union in the case of Egypt, nor the United States in the case of Iran, has demonstrated impressive capabilities in this sphere.

The preceding analysis constitutes a mixed blessing for the future. The United States is unlikely to provide effective guarantees against domestic instabilities in client states. However, once formally awarded, American

guarantees against Soviet direct attacks are likely to stabilize regions in which the possibility of such attacks may be relevant. This is particularly the case if American vital interests are involved in that region. The Persian Gulf is a case in point. Conversely, external guarantees are unlikely to stabilize regions in which the interests of the Superpowers are more limited, such as in central Africa. At the same time, even in regions that are of considerable importance, American guarantees are unlikely to be credible if the local offenders are sufficiently dissociated from the Soviet Union. As relations between Egypt and the United States improve, the credibility of American guarantees to Israel against Egyptian violations of the 1979 peace treaty will diminish. Should Iraq dissociate herself from the Soviet Union, America may become somewhat less likely to respond to Iraqi activities in the Gulf. Likewise, American guarantees to Pakistan are likely to be effective against the Soviet Union, but not against India (Hale and Bharier, 72:220).

A fifth problem likely to interfere with the effectiveness of guarantees involves the possible existence of competing superpower interests. Guarantees are designed to make local clients secure. Thus, various activities designed to enhance the client's power are consistent with the purpose of the guarantee. However, some of the Superpowers' other foreign policy goals may require quite the opposite. One such competing interest involves the control of nuclear proliferation. Efforts to halt proliferation may propel the guarantor to punish local clients who attempt to develop indigenous nuclear capabilities. These may take the form of bans on military and economic aid. However, such bans contradict the purposes of security guarantees by making the client less secure. In addition, the ban may be dangerously misread by potential challengers. The guarantor's willingness to permit the deterioration of his relations with the client may be read by others to indicate a loss of interest in the region. They may conclude that they can conduct aggression with fairly high odds that the guarantor will not react. Thus, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may have had something to do with America's decision to ban all military and economic aid to Pakistan. The ban was imposed in April 1979 when Pakistan was discovered to have acquired a uranium enrichment plant. America's willingness to permit her relationship with Pakistan to deteriorate over the nuclear issue may have been read by Soviet analysts to indicate that America has lost interest in that region, and consequently, is unlikely to respond vigorously to Soviet aggressive acts there. Thus, the goals embodied in superpower guarantees may collide with other foreign policy goals to the extent that the latter may seriously damage the effectiveness of the guarantees.

An additional cause of diminished credibility involves the nature of the guarantor/s. The odds are that joint bilateral and multilateral guarantees will not be effective. Bilateral guarantees, such as those that could be provided by the two Superpowers in concert, would lack credibility for two reasons: First, their functioning would depend not only on an enduring superpower consensus to the effect that cooperation between them on regional affairs is preferable to confrontation, but also on an enduring common perception and interpretation of regional events. If the former condition is not met, cooperation between the powers will not survive in the face of their conflicting interests; if the latter condition is not met, the guarantees will be meaningless because the guarantors will never be able to agree that a situation warrants the activation of the guarantee. Furthermore, the coordination and consultation mechanisms that joint bilateral guarantees require would make their fulfillment a slow and inefficient process. Each guarantor would retain a veto-power over the other's decision to meet its obligations. Such a system can neither be effective in time of need, nor inspire credibility in times of tranquility.

A second reason why joint bilateral guarantees would be unreliable is that Great Powers demonstrate the requisite will for the fulfillment of guarantees only when they confront one another. Big Powers' interests in various regions are likely to be a function of the extent to which developments there threaten to affect the global distribution of power. Regions that are important enough for events there to affect the global balance are likely to be arenas of big-power competition and conflict, not cooperation. The stakes in such regions would be very high and each power would fear that cooperation could result in a relatively greater gain for the other power/s.

Only in regions that are of secondary importance are the big powers likely to cooperate to the point of awarding joint guarantees. However, in such regions the reliability of the guarantee should be held suspect because the Superpowers are less likely to bear the costs of meeting obligations in regions that are relatively unimportant.

Multilateral guarantees such as those that could be provided by the United Nations are even less reliable. As Aharon Klieman has pointed out, "a broad international framework of guarantees is objectionable on two counts. It would be too unwieldy an instrument; and it fails to take into account the shortcomings of the U.N. organization. The U.N., like its League of Nations predecessor, is too cumbersome to offer aid rapidly. It lacks coercive machinery; its process of decision-making is decentralized and is also subject to great power rivalry. . ." (Klieman, 76:11). The collective will of a body as diffuse as the United Nations can hardly provide

reliable guarantees. A body both lacking in capabilities and unstable in its collective intentions cannot serve as an effective guarantor. Thus, only unilateral guarantees may hold the hope of providing credible security.

In order to secure Western interests world-wide in the future, security guarantees would have to be provided principally by the United States. Guarantees provided instead by Europeans are unlikely to be credible. If they are provided jointly by a number of Western European powers, they are likely to be plagued with the problems normally affecting multilateral guarantees. In addition, such guarantees would probably require that NATO be somehow involved in assuming responsibilities beyond the European theatre – an unlikely prospect. Individual European nations are unlikely to provide effective guarantees because they are increasingly vulnerable to Soviet pressure, as well as to pressure exerted by oil-producing countries. Therefore, client states that are threatened either by the Soviet Union (directly or by proxy) or by the armed forces of a major oil producer, would not be able to rely on European guarantees.

The preceding comments are not meant to imply that European nations should have no role in providing security guarantees. On the contrary, it is difficult to believe that the United States would forever be willing to shoulder all of the costs of securing Western interests in the Third World through guarantees or otherwise. The guarantor should continue to be the least vulnerable unitary actor, i.e., the United States. However, the European nations would have to play a greater role in both funds and labor. Otherwise, Americans would increasingly come to believe that Europe is getting a "free ride", a perception that may lead the US to abandon her responsibilities abroad and retreat to "Fortress America".

The Consequences of Guarantees

The deficient credibility of external guarantees also affects their capacity to mitigate various causes of war. Due to this deficiency, guarantees would not diminish Third World conflict to the extent that our theoretical analysis has led us to expect.

First, with respect to mitigating the effects of regional anarchy: Increased limitations on the ability of the big powers to tip local balances rapidly, affect their political influence. Being increasingly armed themselves, clients more frequently feel that they can ignore the expressed desires of their prime contributors and guarantors. In 1973 Syria ignored Soviet distaste for a military solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in 1976 she ignored an explicit Soviet request – a plea by Gromyko, who made a special trip to Damascus for that purpose – that Syria avoid intervention in the Lebanon. For some time now, Israel has ignored clearly

communicated American preferences on the questions of the Lebanon, the Palestinians, Jerusalem, and Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The guarantor's ability to control his clients is more limited today, and so is his ability to prevent his clients from waging war against one another. As a result, the peaceful effects of external guarantees are limited.

Similarly, the guarantees have only a moderate impace on the insecurity-breeding aspect of international anarchy. Since, under a variety of circumstances, external guarantees are likely to be incredible, they do not provide a solution to the local clients' "security dilemma". Consequently, these clients would need to take self-help measures, including the initiation of war, to increase their changes of survival.

The incentive to wage pre-emptive war would be lower for local rivals tied by a network of external guarantees, but would be higher for the guarantors themselves. Consider, for example, possible US guarantees to the Gulf. America's deficient force projection capabilities is leading her to develop a pre-emptive-tripwire strategy. Should the initiation of a Soviet move towards the oilfields be detected, token American forces are to be flown in. Their purpose would be "getting there firstest with the leastest", thus forcing the Soviets to decide whether their goals are worth the risks involved in a direct armed clash with the United States (Newsweek, July 14, 1980). Irrespective of whether or not the strategy could succeed, it is bound to introduce a considerable degree of instability. The temptation on both sides to pre-empt each other would be enormous. Both sides are likely to lean towards worst-case analysis: ambiguous changes in Soviet disposition of forces along its southern border might be misinterpreted by the CIA to indicate a coming invasion; this, in turn, might lead to a pre-emptive launching of the Rapid Deployment Force; the Soviets would then be forced to counter the American intervention by moving southward; both parties' capacities to avoid a direct clash would be stretched to the limits. Thus, instead of enhancing regional stability by reducing the local rivals' incentives to pre-empt, the guarantor's weak "force projection capabilities" might lead them to employ a pre-emptive strategy of their own, thereby causing a possibly fatal level of regional instability.

Deficiencies in the credibility of external guarantees are also likely to affect the odds that regional "wars through misunderstanding" will occur. Credible guarantees reduce the odds of such wars by making it less likely that third-party behaviour will be mis-assessed. However, guarantees that lack credibility become insufficient indicators of what the guarantors are likely to do in the event that clients are attacked. Under such conditions, local rivals as well as the opposing Superpower may calculate

that the guarantor will avoid implementing the guarantee. The calculation may well turn out to be in error, but meanwhile, war will have already been initiated.

However, the preceding analysis should not lead one to despair with respect to the desirability of superpower guarantees. Despite their somewhat deficient credibility, such guarantees do have a significant deterrent effect upon potential violators of the peace. Neither is their effect in mitigating various causes of war inconsequential. Finally, external guarantees can play a significant role in negotiating regional accommodations: when offered as alternative sources of security, guarantees may allow local rivals to be more flexible on other issues involving their national defence.

Beyond these justifications, there is an additional compelling reason to support the awarding of superpower guarantees in the early 1980s. For some time now, the Superpowers have demonstrated an increasing inability to read correctly each other's foreign and defence policy. The fault lies less in Moscow than in Washington. The Carter Administration seems to have established a record for inconsistent conduct in foreign affairs. This was demonstrated in its treatment of various issues such as the US defence budget, the deployment of the "Neutron Bomb", the pursuit of "Human Rights" abroad, the proliferation of nuclear capabilities to India, Pakistan and elsewhere, the Soviet "brigade" in Cuba, the downfall of the Shah of Iran, the "hostage" crisis, and, finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. When one Superpower demonstrates a continuous inability to establish its own priorities, the other is bound to find it difficult to "read" these altering priorities correctly. The result is that the Soviets are increasingly incapable of predicting what America's next move may be.

In the nuclear era, the Superpowers' inability to "read" each other's foreign and defence policy may have detrimental consequences, not only for the powers themselves, but for innocent Third World bystanders as well. The era is characterized by extremely low odds of a premeditated direct clash between the nuclear powers. However, a nuclear confrontation may well develop through an unintended escalation of conflicts in "grey areas". If the big powers are increasingly unable to predict each other's moves, there is a chance that one of them will base its initiation of regional activities on the mistaken assessment that the other power will not react. The opposing Superpower may, in turn, react forcefully, thereby, throwing both powers into a spiral of reactions and counter-actions. The process may have frightening consequences.

A decision on the part of both Superpowers to grant security guarantees in various parts of the Third World may seem an anachronism. It would imply the establishment of fairly static "spheres of influence" and would therefore be reminiscent of the Cold War. On the other hand, a major decision to award such guarantees would force both powers to establish their priorities, and, once established, to communicate them to each other. In effect, the powers will be induced to conduct a full-scale strategic dialogue between them. This would increase their ability to read each other's intentions and preferences and would reduce the odds that they would clash unintentionally. Since, for the moment, the subject of SALT cannot provide a focus for a Superpower dialogue, it becomes particularly important that an alternative focus for such a dialogue is provided. An effort by both Superpowers to redefine their responsibilities in the Third World - for themselves and for each other - may provide a useful alternative focus for this much needed dialogue.

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THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE 3

THE UTILITY OF MILITARY POWER

(ii)   PROTECTING OIL SUPPLIES: THE
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

by

Sir John Hackett

IISS TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Committee 3:   The Utility of Military Power

PROTECTING   OIL   SUPPLIES: THE

MILITARY   REQUIREMENTS

Sir John Hackett

The reduction to acceptable limits of the uncertainties inherent in continuing reliance upon Gulf oil to meet minimal Western and Japanese requirements is a clear need. The best means of meeting this need are by no means so clear. Options under study include military action. This paper now looks at the military option, chiefly in respect of the Middle East. That area, however, is not the only one of interest in the study of military possibilities and some reference will be made to others.

Though this paper was drawn to a requirement to study _military_ means it cannot be too strongly emphasised that military action can _never_ be rationally undertaken except to identifiable political ends and in an environment in which political factors are of paramount importance. The world has paid dearly for adherence up to the end of World War II to the view then dominant in the major partner of the Western Alliance, that wars are to be won by the military, to whose interests all else must be subordinate, and the resultant situation handed over to the politicians for resolution. At the cost of negligible casualties the Allies could easily have been in Berlin and Prague before the Russians (a Presidential ruling was that Eisenhower must stop on the Elbe and Patton a day's march from Prague and let the Russians in first, since this would bring the fighting in Europe to the earliest end at minimal cost) while Alexander in Italy, with rather more fighting, could have been in Vienna before the Russians if his forces had not been bled for a virtually worthless operation on the Riviera.

Hinc illae lacrimae, and much else besides!

It would now be difficult to imagine a situation in which the possible military options are more highly charged with political complexities than that currently prevailing in the Persian Gulf.

I.   THE GENERAL ASPECT

Oil as a Source of Energy

The importance of oil as a source of energy for the United States, Western Europe and Japan is shown in the following table.

1977	United States	Western Europe	Japan
Oil as percent of total energy consumed	47	55	73
Percent of oil imported	49	96	100
Percent of oil imported from Persian Gulf	34	61	72
Persian Gulf oil as percent to total energy consumed	8	32	53	(1)

It will be seen that nearly half of all energy consumed in the United States comes from oil. Fifty percent of this is imported and one-third of the whole (eight percent of the total energy consumed) is brought from the Persian Gulf. The European need for petroleum from the Middle East is even more pronounced. Most of what is consumed in Europe comes from there. Japan and other industrial centres of East Asia depend more heavily still upon the same source. Soviet Russia currently produces a surplus but in the later eighties she is quite likely to join the customers for Middle East oil.

US Threat Analysis

In his State of the Union speech on 23 January 1980 President Carter declared that the United States would be prepared to use force if necessary to protect its vital interests, including the supply of petroleum. The so-called Carter doctrine (which was backed by the President's Chief Security Adviser) identified the greatest threat to peace in Southwest Asia, and thus to the oil flow, as Soviet military adventurism. On 28 January 1980 Secretary of Defense Brown produced a variant. He saw a greater and possibly more realistic danger in regional turbulence. Whether the USSR was likely to intervene or not, "the threat of violence and the use of force remain widespread."[2] According to this argument the USSR will certainly foment, and may even cause, destabilisation in the area generally but is unlikely to undertake direct military intervention in the Gulf if this would lead to a major military confrontation with the United States.

(1) "Petroleum imports from the Persian Gulf; use of US armed force to ensure supplies". Issue Brief No. 1B 79046, last updated 8 Jan. 1980. Authors: John M. Collins and Clyde R. Mark, page 2.

(2) Brown, quoted Klare, The Nation, 8 March 1980.

Tass reported Georgy Arbatov as saying on 7 April 1980 "... despite the panic-mongering allegations of US propaganda, no one will see Soviet tanks and soldiers on the shores of the Persian Gulf or other warm seas". This can be taken with a pinch of salt. After all, the PDRY took in the greater part of a Soviet division air-lifted there in 1978. Nonetheless it can probably be accepted that among possible threats to stability in the Persian Gulf area direct Russian military intervention is not the most likely.

Types of Threat

The magnitude and duration of military operations to secure the oil flow, wherever these might take place, and the size and nature of the forces necessary to undertake them would depend upon, among other considerations, the choice of areas within which they would be carried out and the types of threat which would be thought to make them necessary.

Three types of threat are distinguishable: domestic disorder; blockade; and intrusion (whether by an independent local power, by a Soviet proxy or by the Soviet Union itself). Under the Brown variant of the Carter doctrine the last would probably be considered the least likely.

United States policy, logically enough, accepts that rapid reaction forces may be used to deter action by others and not merely to respond to it. In December 1979 Brzezinski referred, in a little noticed address to the Chicago Economic Club, to the desirability of being able to respond "quickly, effectively and _even_ _preemptively_" (my emphasis).

Choice of Objective Area

In choosing an area of operations it would first be necessary very clearly to specify the requirement. This can be identified in four degrees.

1. To supply United States needs alone.
2. To supply United States needs plus those of Japan.
3. To supply United States needs plus those of NATO allies.
4. To supply United States needs plus those of NATO allies _and_ Japan.

In order to supply US needs alone, without regard to those of Japan or allies, there are several options open to the US, by no means all of which concern the Persian Gulf.

Venezuela (Maracaibo) and Nigeria could between them meet United States demands (which can be currently estimated as some 7 million barrels a day) if strict conservation were to reduce demand by rather more than one-sixth. Both areas are much closer than the Middle East, and transport does not need to go through choke-points like the Straits of Hormuz. In neither area could more than token resistance be offered by local forces. Threats of Soviet military intervention would be negligible in both.

On the other hand, action here to assure oil supplies would necessitate separate operations 4,500 miles apart, with serious strains on resources and very heavy costs. To explore the political repercussions of any such move lies outside the scope of this paper but these would certainly be severe. Venezuela, for example, is an ally of the US in the Organisation of American States.

Maracaibo and Libya (whose production is one-third greater than that of Nigeria) could satisfy the requirements of the US and some of its allies in addition. Intervention by Soviet naval elements would now become a possibility and there are choke-points at Gibraltar and in the Sicilian narrows.

Politically it may just be possible to extract advantage from Libya's equivocal position in the Arab world, especially where relations with Egypt are concerned.

To guarantee to meet all United States needs plus those of NATO allies and Japan, by US military means, must be regarded as impracticable. To supply US needs together with those of NATO allies or Japan would double the demands on the United States. To supply all three would treble it. Japan might be in a position to help itself by action in Indonesia, for which the US would have to furnish an impressive degree of sea-lift and logistical support. In that event Maracaibo, Nigeria and Libya could meet all US and the balance of Japanese needs, under conditions of strict conservation. The addition of even some of the needs of NATO allies inevitably directs attention to the Middle East, where alone can be found supplies in sufficient quantity to meet all requirements. Here, however, choice of target areas demands very careful thought.

Object of Operations

Such operations could only be said to have succeeded if they satisfied five requirements:

1. To seize the vital oil installations virtually intact.
2. To secure them for weeks, months and even years.
3. To restore wrecked resources rapidly.
4. To operate installations with little or no cooperation from the owners.
5. To guarantee safe passage of petroleum products outwards from the area and supplies inwards to it.

It would be idle to pretend that there are not truly formidable difficulties to be faced here.

For the purpose of this study it is assumed that the ground and air forces actively engaged in the area of operations will be exclusively those of the United States and that the naval forces will be largely so. It can, of course, be assumed that allies will do what they can to help, if only because their own interests are concerned. The assistance of allies, however, is

likely to be offered more by way of taking up the slack in other areas than by furnishing forces in the actual area of operations itself. Nevertheless, some active intervention can be expected, for example from the United Kingdom and probably France and perhaps from other interested countries such as Australia. Allied naval assistance would be indispensable to guarantee safe passge and could almost certainly be counted on. It simplifies this study, however, and is by no means unrealistic, to consider the mission, as far as ground forces and air operations are concerned, in terms of United States forces alone.

For the seizure and securing of vital installations US airborne troops are too few to cover all essential objectives, if there is anything like effective opposition, even with surprise. Amphibious forces are slow, while opportunities for demolition before any forces could arrive would be extensive. The plugging of one hundred wells (there are 775 in Saudi Arabia and 1,040 in Kuwait and the Neutral Zone) would take out more than a million barrels a day. Pipelines (of which there are, for example, some 2,000 or more miles in the Saudi core area) offer relatively unrewarding targets for sabotage. Well-heads, pumping stations, refineries and transshipment points are more promising, particularly where facilities depend on central installations. Taking the Persian Gulf again, as an example, sixty percent of all oil passes through three facilities - those at Ras Tanura and Juaymeh in Saudi Arabia and at Kharg Island off Iran. Eighty percent of all Gulf oil passes through five facilities. The vulnerability of oilfield installations is high, particularly where vital links such as pumping stations are concerned. One electrical power plant supports all pumping operations in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the fire risk is serious. A well-blown pumping station has been known to shut down a pipeline for ninety days with a repair cost of $100m. (Abqaiq, 1977); light oils mixed with volatile materials (in separators or stabilisers, for example) are easy to ignite and hard to extinguish. A big fire in Kuwait's Burgen field burned for two months before being brought under control in the summer of 1978. Burning oil could block beaches and port facilities needed by assault forces. Explosions in loading areas could devastate shore installations. One super-tanker carrying liquified natural gas (LNG) or naphtha, set on fire at a jetty, could do immense damage.

It is, however, possible to exaggerate the dangers and difficulties arising out of demolition. Demolition is an expert's job, demanding specialised personnel and material, neither of which is currently in plentiful supply. It also demands careful planning and early decision-making. Inadequately planned or insufficiently prepared demolition, as every specialist operator (a member of special forces like the SAS, for example) will know, can be abortive or cause only slight and short term damage. Special operations to prevent damage, undertaken in good time by the US, could be of immense value.

Saudi wells, moreover, are mostly of moderate depth and redrilling would not be unsuperably difficult.[1] Damage, nonetheless, cannot fail to be considerable and restoration is likely to be costly and time-consuming. It should be said here that success in an operation to assure the flow of oil would depend above all on two conditions: slight damage to key installations and abstinence by the other superpower from direct armed interference. Neither of these two conditions is impossible.

Structure of an Operation

United States force structure is intended to be capable of meeting one major crisis (say in the NATO area) and one minor crisis at the same time. This is somewhat loosely known as the "war-and-a-half" concept. Whatever forces are to be employed in an operation of the sort considered here will have to be found from those already in being. The force to be used must be tailored to the requirements, from the resources likely to be available at the time, in the context of the "war-and-a-half" concept. This would be the "half" war. Escalation out of it into full and unrestricted war with the Soviet Union is outside the scope of this paper. It should always be prominently borne in mind, however, that the Soviet Union is unlikely to regard escalation into total world conflict with any more enthusiasm than the United States.

The operation would fall into three phases, not always sharply distinguishable one from another but differing in essence. There is, first, pre-hostilities action. This would be intended to bring about the prior creation of an appropriate infra-structure in the theatre to allow rapid deployment from home bases. Under present circumstances the size and nature of the available lift is more important than the size and even the availability of forces and deserves more urgent attention. A demonstrable ability to deploy United States forces rapidly and then sustain them may prove to be the most effective stabilising factor and the best deterrent to intrusion by others. This depends more than anything on pre-hostilities preparation and a demonstable strategic life adequate for the forces required. It will mean also a high degree of prepositioning of equipment.

Phase Two would see the actual establishment of a force in the chosen area, with forward operating bases and assembly and logistical support areas in the region in question.

(1) "Oil imports: a range of policy options". Congressional Research Service, Committee Print 96 IFC 36, 1979.

In Phase Three there would be the requirement for the establishment and conduct of an area defence as far forward as tactically feasible and for the maintenance of the oil flow. This last is likely to be difficult. It will almost certainly involve the reopening of facilities blocked or destroyed or in other ways rendered inoperative. It will also necessitate the security of maritime movement.

The reopening of facilities will make heavy and unusual demands upon US resources, which certainly cannot be met out of those at present available to the military. It is difficult to see how the drafting of conscript civilian personnel from oil producing operations in the United States can be avoided. Moreover, the personnel and material required for reopening obstructed or vitiated facilities, even when these are found will take up a good deal of the maritime transportation also needed for the support of the military operation.

The Three Phases

Phase One, initially, is an almost entirely political operation. The second part of Phase One (the setting up of the lift capability) will take time and be costly.[1]

The force will clearly have to be tailored to the requirement. There is no such thing as a rapid deployment force suitable for any and every task. What is presently available can be quickly summarised. There is the 82nd Airborne Division (strength 15,200); the 101st Airmobile Division (17,900); two Marine Divisions (19,800 each); 600 - 1,000 combat aircraft - fighters, ground-attack aircraft, bombers and other types; 700 cargo-carrying aircraft, including tankers and troop carriers; and two to four aircraft carrier groups, with a command vessel and destroyer escorts. The United States naval presence in the Persian Gulf area has, until last year, consisted of a command and support vessel and two destroyers, though occasional visits were paid by aircraft carriers from the Pacific. It has recently been very considerably increased. There is also a French naval force in the Indian Ocean and a British force has conducted visits to the region. Again until recently these were together considerably greater than the United States presence, though the latter can be more readily increased than the others, or that of the Soviet Union.

In Phase Two, fast deployment is essential. Indeed it is upon speed that the success or failure of the mission is likely to hang. The meeting of this requirement depends, as already noted, on pre-hostilities activity to secure the required presence and facilities in the chosen area to allow a rapid build-up and on the bringing into being of the sea- and air-lift which

(1) See appended Notes 1 and 2.

will be necessary to deploy an adequate force. Of this more will be said later. At this point it is only worth noting that Phase Two may easily merge into Phase Three, with the initial deployment to secure the oil running in parallel with subsequent reinforcement.

II. A TEST CASE

It is now important to the argument to be more precise in the indication of a possible mission, in order to apply useful quantities to its consideration.

A relatively recent study by the US Congressional Research Service chose, for in-depth analysis, what is known as the "Saudi Core" as the most promising target area. "Results reveal the feasibility of applying US armed force in that specific area but readers should recognise that companion studies of alternatives might reach quite different conclusions in many regards".[1] The Saudi Core, as a target area, offers advantages as a focal point of study, and will be so used in this paper.

The Saudi Core consists of four on-shore fields - Abqaiq, Dammam, Ghawar and Qatif - together with Berri, a big off-shore producer. No other complex of comparable size has comparable capabilities. These fields would satisfy all US and most allied requirements from a single centre in a single country. A tight perimeter around all of the vital area would take in about 10,000 square miles, roughly the size of Yorkshire and Lincolnshire together, or twice the size of Connecticut. This would present United States military forces with a not impossible problem, though the occupation of such an area would tie up certainly not less than two and probably four divisions for as long as it was needed.

Crude petroleum from all fields converges on Ras Tanura through a pipe system containing well over two thousand miles of pipe. The area is mostly desert, with virtually non-existent water supplies (though deep drilling would almost certainly yield water), sparse population and climatic conditions which, especially in summer, would tax United States or European troops to the utmost. A military occupation might well also have to take in the Saudi Arabian capital Riyadh, which could be expected to be a source at least of dissidence and perhaps of forceful opposition. The two oil ports at Ras Tanura and Juaymeh constitute the world's foremost oil port facilities. Between them they have a throughput capacity of some 12 million barrels per day.

(1) Committee on International Relations. US Government Print.
     21 Aug 1975. Page 42.

To operate successfully in the Saudi Core area, the United States forces
would need to seize, or at least control, in addition to Riyadh, the follow-
ing elements:

Well-heads and associated facilities in four widely-separated oil
fields, some situated off-shore.

Choke-points at Ain Tar, Abqaiq, Dhahran and Qatif.

The Ras Tanura complex.

The Juaymeh complex.

Dammam port.

Dhahran airbase.

Hormuz Strait.

US Military Resources

It must be emphasised that the Rapid Deployment Force has created no new
troop resources. It is in essence a reorganisation of forces already avail-
able.

Army

Of the seven divisions available in CONUS, after the deduction of forces
with NATO (or other) strings attached to them (such as the requirement in any
situation short of all-out war of a workable rotation base) planners could
use for operations in the Persian Gulf:

82nd Airborne Division

101st Airmobile Division

1 light armoured division

25 Infantry Division, which is the Pacific Reserve in Hawaii.

If NATO needed all those forces which are not only assigned but also
earmarked, and the Pacific Command (PACOM) had to deal with a crisis in, say,
Korea, the US Army could furnish no more than one contingency division. The
favourable case is considered here as the only feasible one for the carrying
out of an operation of this sort.

Marines

Of the existing Marine Amphibious Forces (MAFs), either I (in California),
or II (in North Carolina) but not both could be committed in Southwest Asia
without Presidential and Congressional declaration of a state of emergency
which would enable the activation of IV (Reserve) MAF. The division known as
III MAF with its associated air wing, logistic support and command element, is
the only flexible US ground force in the Western Pacific. Neither I nor II
MAF would be available for sustained operations in the Persian Gulf if trouble

in Europe demanded a division/wing force, or a second division/wing contingent
were required in the West Pacific. This paper assumes the continued avail-
ability of at least one Marine Division/Wing force for sustained operations
in the Persian Gulf, though in the best case a second should be available.

Air

Of the US Air Force 81 fighter-attack squadrons, after subtracting 26
assigned to the European command, the 10 supporting US forces in the Pacific,
the two earmarked (but not assigned) to NATO, the three with strings on them
to support the permanent squadron in Alaska and the requirement for a rotat-
ional base, Tactical Air Force Command (TAFC) could dispose of about 31
squadrons for tasks in the Persian Gulf. This assumes no call on reserves
earmarked for Europe and Alaska and no major crisis in Korea.

Naval Forces

The critical operation element in the naval component of a force for the
Persian Gulf would be aircraft carriers. Fast patrol boats, minesweepers and
anti-submarine resources would be important but the carrier forces would be
critical. Requirements for a maritime lift are referred to later.

Of the twelve fully equipped US carriers (the 13th, the USS Coral Sea,
has at present no air wing) seven are assigned to the Atlantic and five to
the Pacific. Two of the Atlantic carriers are committed to the 6th Fleet in
the Mediterranean although one of these is temporarily in the Indian Ocean.
Two carriers operate with PACOM in the 7th Fleet along the shores of East
Asia. One of these periodically reinforces the American naval presence in
the Indian Ocean and is currently on patrol in those waters. A Fifth Fleet is
a possibility, though this would affect only the distribution and not the
total number of carriers available. A Fifth Fleet could include the two
carriers now in the Indian Ocean supported from Subic Bay in the Philippines
with one deployed forward with facilities at Diego Garcia (which is more than
2,000 miles, it should be remembered, from the head of the Persian Gulf) and
the other held back. A contingency force could under favourable conditions
be raised to the level of three carrier task forces if another were taken
from the Western Pacific. A fourth might be made available if the USS Coral
Sea could be furnished with an air wing.

Factors Affecting the Operation

The chances of achieving surprise, in view of the distances involved and
the certainty that preparations for an assault could not be concealed, must
be reckoned as low. One airborne division would be insufficient to seize all
key points, though the main choke-points in the collecting system - the Ras
Tanura and Juaymeh complexes, Dammam port and Dhahran airfield - could
probably be secured. The closest Marine Division at Okinawa would take

12 to 14 days to reach Ras Tanura after embarking on amphibious vessels.
Half the required sea-lift is normally stationed somewhere in the Pacific but
only one squadron of 8 ships with the 7th Fleet is readily available. The
balance of the 48 ships required for a divisional lift are scattered from the
Marianas to the Mediterranean. The time required to assemble, load and move
a division-sized assault force to the Middle East could be about two months.

As a measure of what is required (though it would be misleading to apply
this as a precise template) the security of one oil well-head would perhaps
be furnished by a five-man fire-team. There are 243 eleven-man rifle squads
in the 82nd Airborne Division. Each contains two such fire-teams. 82nd
could therefore cover 486 of the 544 oil-producing wells in the Saudi Core
area. Fire-teams from the US Army's sole separate airborne battalion, if
this were detached from duty with NATO, could probably secure 54 more. This
would bring the total to 540. These figures are only quoted to show how
tight initial airborne troop security cover would be, with nothing in hand
for more active operations or as a reserve.

Combat Mobility

It has to be conceded at once that the strategic airlift and sea-lift
forces which have been until very recently available (though urgent steps are
now being taken to improve this capability) are barely adequate to support
division-sized airborne and amphibious assaults in the Saudi Core area.

Assault Airlift

To move the essential combat elements of the 82nd Airborne Division
(roughly 11,000 men out of the total of 15,200) the required distance (that is
to say, half way round the world) with a basic load of ammunition and five
days of rations and fuel would, it is thought, use up more than 700 C-141
"equivalent sorties". The operation would take ten to fifteen days from a
standing start although this could be reduced to under seven days if it were
possible to make certain prior preparations. If a parachute assault were
intended the requirement would be for nearly 1,200 equivalent sorties,
including aircraft for heavy dropping. The United States has some 70 C-5As
and 234 C-141s in operational squadrons. It is difficult to estimate what
force would be available for an assault as opposed to a strategic lift.
Some of the 500 C-130 tactical transport aircraft in the regular Air Force
and National Guard could participate in parachute assaults provided the troops
were moved overseas by other means. They would then board the C-130s at
forward mounting bases. Most of the Airborne Division would in any case have
to be airlanded, which means that the Dhahran Air Base, the only suitable
entry point, would have to be seized and secured early on. This should not
however present insuperable difficulties in the face of light opposition.

Assault Sea-Lift

Mention has been made of the requirement for 48 ships to lift one Marine Amphibious Force. These are made up as follows:

Command/control ship (LCC)	1
Amphibious assault ship (LPH)	5
Amphibious transport (LPA)	2
Amphibious transport dock (LPD)	10
Landing ship dock (LSD)	9
Amphibious cargo ship (LKA)	5
Landing ship tank (LST)	15
Amphibious transport submarine (LPSS)	1
	48 (1)

Meeting this requirement would certainly strain US amphibious capabilities, even though these are now being improved. The 48-ship requirement set out above constitutes more than three-quarters of the whole operational inventory of suitable ships available.

Certain elements of heavy non-divisional troops normally expected to operate with an independent corps could be thinned out considerably. In an operation of this sort, for example, heavy armour would not be a critical requirement. To take an even more obvious example, bridge companies would hardly be required. On the other hand construction resources needed for roads and airfields and for other communication requirements would be considerable. Ammunition would probably not be needed to anything like the extent that it was in Vietnam, with a very great saving in cargo weights and bulk. Petrol and water however would be more important. Twelve gallons of water a day per man, for all purposes, would be required and roughly the same quantity of fuel. The climate can be expected to cause a high level of medical casualties.

It can be assumed that a two-division corps set up under considerations such as these would total nearly 80,000 men. If four divisions were to be deployed, the total would double. This assumes, of course, that security could be maintained on a routine basis. Military operations of higher intensity would generate greater requirements.

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(1) "Oil fields as military objectives; a Feasibility Study", prepared for the Special Sub-Committee on Investigation of the Committee on International Relations by the Congressional Research Service. Presented 21 Aug 1975. Page 61.

Air Cover and Air Support

The closest land bases suitable for US Air Force fighters which could conceivably be available (though this can by no means be guaranteed) are in Israel, 1,000 miles from the Saudi core area. That is double the normal unrefuelled 500-mile combat radius of F-4s carrying two 370-gallon wing tanks and typical ordnance loads. Any additional fuel carried externally would reduce payload and loiter time over target areas. Refuelling from aerial tankers is feasible but, to give an idea of the size of this problem, a strike wave of 40 F-4s would take ten tankers to serve them outbound, ten more on their return. Backup to account for aborts and other abnormalities would run the total up to two full squadrons of 25 to 30 tankers. Tankers, moreover, might need fighter cover themselves.

Conditions for aircraft operating from carriers would also be difficult. The Persian Gulf is too congested for carrier operations and it is assumed that the carrier force would have to operate no closer than the Gulf of Oman, some 1,000 miles South-East of Ras Tanura. This would involve inflight refuelling requirements similar to those for aircraft operating from Israel. Most of these difficulties could disappear, or at least diminish, following the establishment of a firm foothold and provision of forward airfields in the area of operations.

Air Defense Forces

On the basis of an allocation of one Hawk surface-to-air missile battalion to each division, with another to cover corps units, between three and five Hawk battalions would be required. There would be further requirement for Vulcan battalions for point defence at the rate of one for every three critical targets, plus one for general support. This would suggest that four Vulcan battalions would be needed for the operation. The main air defence task would be to deter (and if necessary defeat) Soviet and outside Arab air threats. Unless Soviet fighters were moved forward, they would be at the limit of range.

Taking a position somewhere between an optimistic and a pessimistic outlook, it would seem that the requirement for Air Force F-4 aircraft would be two wings of three squadrons each, with two other wings on call. Currently 16 F-4 squadrons are assigned to TAC. This mission would take up 12 of these. Taking rotational and maintenance requirements into consideration, this (75%) is a dangerously high level of employment.

Logistic Air- and Sea-Lift

Military Airlift Command's active force of C-5s and C-141s, backed up be the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), would be tied up from D-day to D + 10 or D + 15 delivering parachute and airlanded assault echelons of one airborne division, together with some corps level support and Air Force elements. No additional division could even begin to deploy by air until at least D + 15, perhaps even later. An Airmobile Division with top priority would take about 20 days thereafter to deploy to the operational area with its organic equipment. This move might be completed by D + 35. The follow-on infantry division would need another 27 days (assuming the aircraft were still available) and so could be fully deployed some time after D + 62.

A Marine Amphibious Force, embarked in the Amphibious Task Force shipping, could begin marshalling in advance of the order to commit the force. Transit time for the lead elements of the force would be about 30 days from the East Coast of the US, or about 21 days from the West Coast. Final elements of the MAF could close the area about six weeks after the alert. Essential back-up for all supporting requirements additional to these assault elements could be expected to be available by about D + 60.

Cargo Requirements

A force of two divisions (one airborne, one marine) on an austere scale would need about 1,760 short tons of supplies daily for its maintenance. The Military Sea-Lift Command (MSC) inventory at present includes six government-owned and 25 government-chartered dry cargo ships, the latter including 14 fast breakbulk ships. The cargo capacity of 5,215 short tons each of these 14 fast breakbulk ships would be inadequate to meet the demands of two divisions. Assuming an average speed of 21 knots it would take 53 days to make the 23,000 mile round trip from Norfolk to Ras Tanura and back, with four days for turnaround at either end. Eighteen such ships would be required to sustain the force.

It is not necessary to take this analysis further (more details can be found in sources referred to) to demonstrate that shipping would be tight. Charter ships from the US Merchant Marine would be essential but it is worth noting that the US Merchant Marine is now half the size it was in the late 1960s and is facing increasing obsolescence.

Protection of Sea Lines of Communication

Although shipping would be at peak vulnerability in the Persian Gulf and adjacent narrow seas, its protection would be less difficult here, where it would be concentrated, than during the long haul (11,000 miles) from the Straits of Hormuz around the Cape of Good Hope to the East Coast of the United States or Europe.

It would not be as easy to block the Straits of Hormuz as is often claimed. The actual Strait itself in terms of navigable water is some 50 km wide. This is wider than the English Channel between Cap Gris Nez and Folkestone. It is not feasible to obstruct this passage by sinking shipping (as it is, for example, in the Suez Canal). The most favourable area for laying mines shows a depth of water between 60 and 80 metres. Elsewhere, in the most commonly used channels, depths are commonly nearer 100 metres. There are alternative channels which could be used by shipping in the event of blockage. Mining would have to be kept topped up and does not in any case present an insuperable problem to available mine-detection and minesweeping equipment. Shore batteries (except in conditions of hostile air dominance which would render them superfluous and the whole operation impossible) could be suppressed with no great difficulty by Fast Patrol Boat and air action.

In 1977 2,500 MBD, or 32.3% of all US oil imports, travelled around South Africa, with 288 tankers (average size 80,000 DWT) at sea at any time. It is outside the constricted areas in the Gulf itself and its vicinity that attrition could be very great, unless convoy protection were provided. The provision of adequate convoy protection from US naval and air resources unaided is impracticable. It is here that allied resources would be indispensable and even then there would be very great difficulties in the face of Soviet submarine or air attack.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

It is not proposed to pursue further, from the mass of material now available in open sources, the illustration of the considerable difficulties that would attend military intervention in the Persian Gulf. The assertion by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger that "it is indeed feasible to conduct military operations in the Persian Gulf" might be thought to have been based on somewhat optimistic assumptions at the time it was made, in January 1975.

Improvements to the posture of readiness have been made since then. Maritime mobility has improved in some respects (for example, the provision of new dry cargo tonnage) but not in others (for example, the decline in numbers and the ageing of the US Merchant Fleet); improvement in forward base facilities and in prepositioning has taken place but the level of forces to be drawn on has not increased.

This is no place for the exploration of political implications. It must be pointed out, however, that the ability of the United States, even with allied support, to intervene in the Persian Gulf for the securing of

oil supplies depends in the very highest degree upon two closely inter-
related factors. The first is that timely action is scarcely possible
without the willingness of countries in the area either, at best, to
accept the basing of American forces on their territories or, as a second
best, to accept the presence in the vicinity of prepositioned material and
amphibious base resources which could be brought into use without the long
delays involved in bringing them from their normal deployment areas. The
key country, of course, is Saudi Arabia. There is little doubt that there
is here a tangible awareness of the value of American support, coupled with
a deep reluctance to ask for it. This reluctance will certainly continue -
and may increase - so long as United States policy is deemed in the Arab
world to be hostile to the interests of the Palestinians. Perhaps after
the Presidential elections in November a more realistic note may creep
into the attitude taken by the US to Arab-Israeli relations.

The second factor is the vital need for the prepositioning, with
appropriate facilities, of troops for early action, and of equipment for
the follow on, together with the provision of adequate air and sea mobility
for the rapid deployment of a main force. Action is proceeding in the
United States for the expeditious creation of an adequate sea-lift, though
whether this is being given the political support which, in the national
interest, it would appear to deserve is questionable. Closely allied to this
consideration is the high importance of the maintenance of a presence in or
close to the Persian Gulf area sufficient to demonstrate the ability and
willingness of the United States and her allies to contribute in an effective
and acceptable fashion to the maintenance of stability in the area. It
cannot be too strongly emphasized that the presence of naval and amphibious
forces in the vicinity is of the utmost importance. It would be wrong to
suggest that nothing is happening in this respect. The United States naval
force which has been maintained in the area since the 1940s and amounted
last year to no more than two destroyers and an amphibious transport dock
ship the "La Salle", converted as a flagship, to which has been added from
time to time a carrier task force from the 7th Fleet for a one month
cruise in the Indian Ocean, has been recently considerably increased. Of
friendly countries it is important to recognize that the French have
clocked up more ship-days of deployment in the Indian Ocean in recent
years than either the United States or the USSR. With base facilities at
Reunion, Mayotte and especially at Djibouti (where there are also 4,500
infantry troops) French naval forces in the Indian Ocean usually consist
of a helicopter-carrier with marines embarked, two or three destroyers and
an occasional submarine, together with assorted minesweepers, landing
craft and support ships. The British squadron of up to four frigates

which deploys to the region periodically is a very welcome and valuable contribution. The Australian Government has also been taking an increasing interest in the maintenance of a naval presence in the area and has been holding joint naval exercises with the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Australia may make naval facilities available to the United States at Cockburn Sound, in South West Australia, and airfields at Learmouth, Pearce and Cocos, of which the last is near enough to be of considerable value.

Finally it should be emphasized that distance is the real enemy. Subic Bay is 6,000 miles from the entrance to the Persian Gulf. Guam is 1,500 miles further off. Norfolk in Virginia, via the Cape of Good Hope, is 11,000 miles away. On Diego Garcia the improvements first proposed in 1972, which made mo more than slow progress until 1976, have now progressed so far that most of what is required is operational. Diego Garcia, however, is 2,300 miles from the head of the Gulf. There is still some possibility of the use of facilities on a visiting basis at Bahrain and United States patrol aircraft now use with advantage the old RAF station on the Omani island of Masirah. Negotiations have been concluded for US facilities in Kenya, in Oman and at Berbera in Somalia. Egypt too will be very important and the acquisition of US base facilities on Egyptian soil cannot be ruled out, though much here will depend on the US attitude to Israel. There are reports that airborne early-warning aircraft have already exercised from Egyptian bases.

There can be no substitute in an emergency for the very early arrival of a military force, even if this were to be no more than relatively small and lightly armed. As General Volney F. Warner, Commander of the United States Readiness Command (of which the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, or RDJTF, at McDill is a part) puts it, the important thing is to get "US combat boots on the ground" - and get them there first. This depends upon being able to get them to where they are wanted very early and as fast as possible. To be able to do this depends upon political considerations which it is not the purpose of this paper to explore.

Note 1

Background to US Rapid Reaction Planning

. . The Kennedy Administration, in which McNamara was Secretary for Defense, faced with a choice on the one hand between stationing forces and material more or less permanently overseas in areas where national interests might be threatened, or maintaining, on the other, a mobile fire-brigade to be sent to trouble spots as required, opted for the latter. Global mobility was to be assured by the provision of the new C-5A transport aircraft and Fast Deployment Logistics (FDL) ships. Involvement in Vietnam damped down enthusiasm for distant interventions in the years that followed, returned the emphasis in   US defence preoccupations to NATO Europe, and increased US dependence on allies (e.g. Iran) for regional security. Brown's "Rapid Deployment Force" (RDF) can now be seen as a resurrection of McNamara's fire-brigade. The new monster transport aircraft (as it is popularly described) the C-X, is only an updated version of the C-5A;[1] the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), upon which the mobility of equipment depends, are little more than facsimiles of McNamara's FDL vessels.

The scenario, too is similar. The fire-brigade troops would be flown in C-5As, (or, when they are in service, C-Xs), to friendly airports near the combat zone, where they would pick up their equipment from the FDL ships (or MPSs) and move to the battlefield.[2] What has changed radically is US Government support. A special defense vote of some $580 billion has been provided to establish the American military base system in the Indian Ocean. US Assistant Secretary of Defense Claytor is reported to have said that the US naval supply shipping at present afloat there "would provide for in-theatre unit equipment and supplies to support a marine brigade of about 12,000 men and several air force fighter squadrons".[3]

The US Navy has also now coming into service new amphibious assault ships (LHA) upon which would be embarked Marines and Harrier VTOL aircraft.

The forces available, out of which the fire-brigade in the early version and the Rapid Deployment Force in the later would be found, have changed little over the years. A recapitulation, in summary, may be helpful. They comprise:

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(1) According to _Army_, July 1980, p. 19, the C-X, even if fully funded, will not be deployable before 1987.

(2) "Have RDF, will travel", Klare, _The Nation_, 8 March 1980.

(3) _The Observer_, 17 August 1980.

82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, NC (15,200: air assault element, 11,000)

101st Airmobile Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky (17,900)

One or two Light Divisions (10,000 to 15,000 each, depending on task and make-up)

One or two Marine Divisions (19,800 each, with its own Fighter/ Attack Aircraft Wing, each forming part of a Marine Amphibious Force)

600 to 1,000 Combat Aircraft

700 (approximately) cargo aircraft: there are 70 C-5As and 234 smaller C-141 transports, plus several hundred KC-134 tankers for in-flight refuelling

Two to four aircraft carrier Groups

Fast Patrol Boats, Minesweepers, anti-submarine warfare craft and a command vessel with an escort of, say, three destroyers.

Note 2

Constraints on US Force Readiness

Probably the most serious overall problem currently facing US defence forces is in respect of manpower, particularly in the Reserves. A principal (though not the only) cause is poor pay. Buying power of military families has since 1973 fallen at least 14% below that of civilian counterparts. Some estimates put the shortfall at between 15% and 25%. There are over 400,000 US Service people and their families whose pay falls below the Federal Minimum Wage. Acceptance standards in recruiting have had in consequence to be reduced but undermanning remains a serious and growing problem. An amendment to the First Concurrent Budget Resolution before Congress for FY 81 proposed the transfer of some $5.1 billion from non-military administrative overheads and the needs of other Departments (this would require no overall increase in the Federal Budget though some redistribution within it) to personnel support for Armed Forces. The President is reported to have told the Speaker that he was strongly opposed to the amendment as "providing for more defense spending than is needed or advisable". The amendment was defeated. President Carter had already twice previously placed limitations on military pay adjustments. In a hand-written note, widely quoted in the Press, the President asked Defense Secretary Brown to stop criticism by top defense men of inadequate pay and lagging readiness.

"When I was in the Navy" the note said "pay was not the major factor". When the President was in the Navy inflation had not been running for some time at about 16%. Meanwhile, strengths continue to fall, particularly in Reserve components.

The US has announced its intention to increase defense spending, in real terms, by 5%. Defense budgeting for FY 81 was done on an assumed inflation rate of 9.3%. The rate at which it has recently been running means that the increase in US military capabilities in FY 81, far from reaching 5%, looks like being little more than 1%.

(Sources: AUSA News, May and June issues, 1980)

Note 3

Sources

In a very wide range of unclassified material of which use has been made in drafting this paper the following deserve especial mention:

(1) "Oilfields as military objectives: a Feasibility Study", prepared for the Special Sub-Committee on Investigation of the Committee on International Relations by the Congressional Research Service. Presented 21 August 1975.

This document, though far from up-to-date, is basic to the study of this topic and quite invaluable.

(2) "Petroleum imports from the Persian Gulf: use of US armed force to ensure supplies". Issue Brief No IB 79046, last updated 8 January 1980. Authors: John M. Collins and Clyde R. Mark.

This offers a summary and considerable updating of source No 1.

(3) Aviation Week, 14 May 1979. "Assuring Mideast oil flow seen difficult".

This offers a shorter summary of item 1.

(4) US Naval War College. Naval Missions Study on Strategic Mobility (NM 15) by Capt. R. D. Grady, USN. October 1979.

This valuable analysis is a useful supplement to 1 and 2.

There has been heavy reliance on sources 1-4 in the drafting of this paper. They are sometimes quoted verbatim in the text but without reference to avoid overloading.

Other useful texts have been:

"Oil imports: a range of policy options". Congressional Research Service, Committee Print 96 IFC 36, 1979.

"US oil: sea routes and minor naval powers". Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest, August 1979.

"Seapower in the Indian Ocean". Lacouture. Proceedings of US Naval Inst., August 1979.

"Have RDF, will travel". Klare. The Nation, 8 March 1980.

"US rapid strike force". Cooley. Christian Science Monitor, 11 April 1980.

"US power and Mideast oil". Interview with Secretary of Defense Brown. US News and World Report, 30 July 1979.

"The oil crisis: is there a military option?" Defense Monitor, December 1979.

"The case against a rapid deployment force". Forsberg. CSM, 3 June 1980.

"Die Strasse von Hormuz ist nur schwer zu sperren". Günther Gillessen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 December 1979.

Statement of Secretary of Defense Brown to the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. Department of Defense News Release, 6 March 1980.

"Threatened US lifeline". George W. Ball. International Herald Tribune, 25 January 1980.

"On Gunboat Diplomacy in the Mideast". William Pfaff. International Herald Tribune, 12 July 1979.

"Trouble in the Atlantic Alliance". James Reston. International Herald Tribune, 28 June 1979.

"US military presence in the Indian Ocean area". Under Secretary Newsom. Department of State Bulletin, April 1980.

"The strategic tremors of upheaval in Iran". Cottrell and Hanks. Strategic Review of US Strategic Institute, Spring 1979.

"Our What-If strategy for Mideast trouble spots". Cameron. Fortune, 7 May 1979.

"Why the new US 'go anywhere' army can't". Mather. Observer, 3 August 1980.

Two important papers on the general threat from Soviet capabilities for military power projection, both by Captain James G. Roche, USN, are:

"The Soviets' Growing Reach: Implications of Comparative Capabilities to Project Military Power". Presented before the European-American Workshop, 25-27 May 1977; and

"Emerging Soviet Global Military Capabilities". 16 June 1980.

They contain useful correctives to widespread tendencies either to over- or to under-estimate, or to mistake the nature of, the threat from the USSR.

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THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

PLENARY SESSION

Sunday, 14 September   Morning

SECURITY IN AN AGE OF TURBULENCE:

MEANS OF RESPONSE

by

Stanley Hoffmann

Plenary Paper

SECURITY IN AN AGE OF TURBULENCE: MEANS OF RESPONSE

Stanley Hoffmann

I

International security is both a relative and an uneven notion. In an "anarchical society" of states that live in a condition of troubled peace or in a "state of war" – depending on whether one takes a more Lockian or a more Hobbesian view of world affairs – there will always be a modicum of insecurity, since not all the actors can be simultaneously secure – as long as we have not reached the unlikely stage of a world without threats and enmities, or the distant stage of a world so well organized that its members are both deprived of and saved from self-help. Moreover, the scope of insecurity is not fixed; the security of the world as a whole is threatened only by some perils, whereas certain regions, or individual members, can be endangered also by threats that do not affect the security of the others.

For the purposes of this paper, I will define international insecurity as the sum of all the factors that can lead to serious confrontations between the major powers (those whose resources and policies are such as to shape the fate of a large number of other actors), to increases in the threat or in the reality of contagious or uncontrollable violence, and to such a deterioration of, or such an increase in the unpredictability of, international economic transactions as to threaten the economic lives of large numbers of countries. I will argue here that there is a likelihood of considerable international insecurity in the 1980s, for reasons described below. I will examine afterwards the general problem of how to cope with it, and finally discuss specific means of response.

The major factors of insecurity in the 1980s are not new. For many years now, the international system has been characterized by three contradictions that breed turbulence. The first is the contradiction between the universal cold war and the growing complexity of the system. It creates a serious dilemma for the superpowers. How far should they go in injecting their rivalry into a region? Non-involvement spares one the risks of confrontation and the costs of economic or military presence. Involvement, however, yields opportunities for influence. The dilemma creates uncertainty – especially as local circumstances or domestic factors may, at times, facilitate or invite the involvement of one superpower and inhibit that of the other. The American attempt, in the '70s, to find a middle way by relying

on regional influentials has been disappointing - they turned out to have clay feet, like the Shah, or to pursue their own interests.

The second is the contradiction between what Raymond Aron once called the "unity of the diplomatic field" - the existence of a single international system - and the multiple heterogeneities of the field. These relate to:

a) the type of actors - they range from people in search of a nation-state (Palestinians, Kurds) to states in quest of a nation (Africa), to nation states, to empires: hence innumerable opportunities for conflict;

b) the regimes and ideologies, despite universal lip service to two principles - self-government and self-determination - which turn out both to have multiple interpretations, and to create insoluble problems;

c) the economic and social systems and levels of economic development (here, heterogeneity has been and will keep growing);

d) the nature of power: one observes a functional fragmentation of international politics, with different games played not only in different regions, but over different "issue-areas" (to borrow the lingo of Nye and Keohane).

As a result, we live in a world marked:

a) by considerable asymmetry between the actors. Very few can be considered "full powers", endowed with a complete panoply of power; many actors have only one dimension of power (for example economic but not military: Saudi Arabia, or vice-versa: Vietnam), or no other power than a good geographical location, or a potentially usable vote in an international or regional organization. Even the two superpowers are asymmetrical, given both the weaknesses of the Soviet economy (despite huge resources) and the USSR's absence (on the whole) from the open international economy;

b) by a double transformation of the international hierarchy. It is being subverted, insofar as the superpowers are often inhibited in the full use of their power by a variety of factors (risks of collision, inability to achieve collusion, inadequacy of their forms of power to local circumstances, ability of their clients to manipulate them) and insofar as states with limited power (cf. Saudi Arabia, or even West Germany) can achieve considerable influence in certain issue-areas. The international hierarchy is also being fragmented, since the "pecking order" varies from issue-area to issue-area;

c) by a contradiction between the principle of sovereignty, which remains the basis of international law and international order, and the restraints which weigh on all the actors and provide the only safety nets in a very dangerous system devoid of common values: the concern for survival and the quest for development and welfare. In the realm of security, this contradiction takes the form of another paradox: the coexistence of stable deterrence at the global level (despite the difference in military arsenals and strategic doctrines between the US and the USSR), and of the search for "usable" nuclear strategies, i.e. for war-fighting rather than purely deterrent strategies, as well as a continuing drift toward nuclear proliferation. In the realm of development and welfare, the contradiction creates two acute problems: the problem of inequality, or the revolt against the international economic system largely created by the leading capitalist powers, and particularly by the US, and the problem of monopoly, or the attempt by developing states endowed with key resources to exploit their advantages. In other words, the international system is characterized by the constant manipulation of the two restraints: it is a permanent and multiple game of chicken.

Until now, international insecurity has been kept at tolerable levels by different factors which have had the same result: to keep separate causes of turbulence from joining, or to prevent trouble in one region or issue-area from spreading to the others. Fragmentation or dissocation prevailed. First, in the superpowers' competition this has taken the form of a sort of division of the world into relatively autonomous subsystems, each one with its own "rules of the game", which depend on the configuration of local forces and on the configuration of the superpowers' forces in the region. The limits of Soviet power, both in the economic realm and until recent years in the military domain, and the stability of the "balance of terror" provided by the chief rivals' strategic nuclear weapons contributed to this fragmentation.

A second kind of dissociation was always more fragile. The distinction between domestic politics and foreign policy has never been rigid in practice, and throughout the 1950s, '60s and '70s, we have witnessed interstate conflicts over a regime, or over the application of self-determination, or over the combination of the two - this is what the wars in Korea and Vietnam were about - as well as domestic revolutions with international repercussions (Cuba, China). But, again, these explosions have been kept separate, and a great deal of domestic turbulence did not provoke international involvement or conflict.

A third dissociation, which lasted through the 1960s, was that between the open international economy and the strategic-diplomatic chessboard: the "two-track" system analyzed some years ago by Richard Cooper. It allowed for a reasonably successful management of the world economy - brilliantly indeed in relations between advanced capitalist states, less so in North-South relations. Deterioration, whose causes began to operate in the late 1960s, set in/the 1970s. However, despite inflation, recession, and the multiple ramifications of the '70s oil crises, a major disaster, comparable to the depression of the 1930s has been avoided.

The problem of the 1980s is the risk of an end of dissociation or fragmentation, for reasons that can be found within each of three realms just mentioned. In the first place, the factors of regional fragmentation of the superpowers' contest are weakening. The key development here is the Soviet ability to project military power abroad; and the Soviet determination to exploit Western weaknesses in the Third World in ways different from and more effective than the earlier Soviet methods that led to serious reversals not only in the Congo in 1960 but later in the Sudan, in Egypt or in Somalia - not to mention China. The Soviet Union, while continuing to support forces more promising than subservient Communist parties in places where these are insignificant, now prefers to help movements whose social goals and method fit within Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy; and the Soviets see to it, when their client gets to power, that his dependence is great enough, and their own presence weighty enough, to prevent a repetition of what had happened in Egypt in July, 1972. Moreover, for reasons best analyzed by Seweryn Bialer,[1] the Soviet Union may, in the '80s, be increasingly tempted to compensate abroad for domestic weaknesses and tensions: declining growth, serious economic inefficiencies, one or two succession periods, a growing need for oil from the outside, changes in the demographic composition of the USSR, may lead to a quest for external triumphs.

Another development dangerous for regional disconnection is the activity of Soviet client states with important military means and ambitions of their own: Cuba, in Africa, and Vietnam, in Southeast Asia. A third development is the new American determination to contain more vigorously than in recent years such advances by Soviet "proxies" and by the Soviet Union. The final threat comes from strategic considerations. Regional fragmentation presupposes either a military balance (as in Europe), or such an imbalance that (as in Latin America) one superpower actually has the field to itself, or a willingness on the part of the rivals to compete primarily by means other than military (or merely by providing arms to local clients). But when both superpowers - or one superpower and the close allies of the other - decide to

compete more vigorously and with armed forces, and when, in addition, there is a regional imbalance in conventional forces, the temptation for the loser to compensate either by exploiting his superiority elsewhere, or by exploiting whatever advantages he may have (or believe he has) in the strategic nuclear realm will be great. In this respect, the gradual shift from the stability of mutual assured destruction, plus some arms control, to the instability of counterforce, war-fighting strategies - likely to be detrimental both to deterrence and to crisis stability - minus arms control, is a last nail in the coffin of regional fragmentation.

In the second place, the collapse of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is likely to become universal. To put it as bluntly as possible, domestic affairs are likely to become the stake of international politics, and intervention the empirical norm. We have almost reached the end of the protracted period of decolonization (only Southern Africa is left). What we now find is a scene marked by the following features. Many states are endowed with artificial borders, and racked by destructive internal communal conflicts between tribes, ethnic groups, religious sects, cultural factions, or by violent clashes between ideological opponents or rival army cliques - or a combination of all of these. In recent weeks, Iran, India, Burma, Zimbabwe, El Salvador, Bolivia, South Korea have been in the news for such reasons. A state with a badly or only partially integrated society or a tyrannical regime is likely to be a target for meddling, either by a great power, or by a neighbour intent on ensuring his security or on expanding his influence by removing a hostile regime, or by exploiting internal dissensions next door. In recent years, Vietnam's move into Cambodia, Tanzania's overthrow of Idi Amin, Somalia's war in Ethiopia, Iraq's operations against Iran and Syria, Libya's probes in Chad, give us a taste of things to come. Finally, revolutions are likely in many places - it is through force that governments and regimes tend to change in the Third World - and many of these carry a risk of either realignment in the global cold war or of withdrawal from a present pro-Western alignment, as in the case of Iran in 1979.

Why should the threat of greater internal fragmentation in Third World countries, and of more inter-state conflicts resulting from it, lead to international rather than to mere regional insecurity? Partly because some of the countries that could be in trouble occupy important strategic positions (Egypt) or provide vital resources (Saudi Arabia); partly because internal factions or external meddlers seek and obtain outside support (think of the Polisario case: the guerrillas have Algerian and Libyan help, Morocco has American assistance); partly because of the way generalized turbulence affects the great powers'

definition of their security. They always tend to oscillate between two poles. The narrow definition practically equates security with survival: national security means the protection of the nation (and of nationals abroad) against physical attack, and the safeguarding of its economic activities from devastating outside blows. This broad definition tends to equate national security and foreign policy, or national interests. This is excessive (and dangerous, either when such interests vastly outrun the nation's power, or when they lead to so formidable an expansion of that power -, in order that they match the interests - as to frighten or threaten other states). And yet an expansive definition, beyond the narrow one, is inevitable, for two reasons. The first is valid for all states, major or not: since the state is represented in world affairs by its regime, the latter will consider its own self-preservation as a matter of national security - a factor that tends to be neglected by authors who write in countries with legitimate and stable governments. Secondly, major actors, almost by definition, project their power abroad in order to provide their physical and economic security with a kind of glacis, and they do so in the two modes distinguished by Arnold Wolfers, when he wrote about possession and milieu goals.[2] They will tend to equate their own national security with that of close allies - of states whose physical and economic survival is deemed indispensable to their own. And they will define as essential to their national security the preservation either of a clientele of states (without whose physical and economic survival they could most probably live), or of international rules and regimes, whose loss would markedly affect their influence and their status. In a sense, the scope of a major actor's definition of his national security depends on two factors. One is his power - the greater it is, the more widely he will throw the net, the more interests will be equated with security, and national security with foreign policy. The other factor is external threats: when they multiply or become sharper, and even if national power is limited, the more extensive the notion of national security tends to become; it expands to meet the threat, rather than the other way round. If we look at the post-war United States, we find that the first half of the 1970s were a kind of golden period in which the definition of the scope of national security relaxed a bit (not all _that_ much, as Allende found out). Earlier, the scope was huge because of American power. Now, it grows again, because of the rise of threats. And also because of the recent dynamics of the superpowers' contest. Many Americans believe that the turbulence in the Third World, and the rise of radical movements hostile to the West there, are partly due to a perception of declining American power or will; and they are determined to reverse the trend. But in the meantime, the Soviet Union has deepened its own involvement, and has to protect its own investment, or act in such a way as to

become a necessary factor in most important disputes and an unavoidable counter-
part for the US.

The third dissociation that is vanishing is that between the economic and
the political track. Here again, there are several reasons. The most obvious
is the international economic crisis. International insecurity is increased
by the persistence of inflation and recession in major industrial countries;
by the brutal politics of oil, which, through the complicated bargains of OPEC,
result in higher prices (partly as a reply to the industrial powers' inflation)
as well as in uncertainty about levels of production; and by the enormous
threat which the rising debt of the oil-importing developing countries creates
for the international financial system. The outcome is domestic tension
everywhere: a weakening of the governments' ability to meet the demands or needs
of citizens, the rise of protectionist pressures, the necessity for many
governments in poor countries to cut back on social expenditures and develop-
ment plans. Another factor is the contribution made by economic development
itself to international disruption, social dislocations and political
turbulence in many Third World countries – particularly in the oil-producing
ones, where sudden wealth has spread corruption, and heightened the tensions
between a crumbling traditional order on one side, and its two very different
kinds of foes – modernizers who often turn to Socialist or Communist models,
and traditionalists intent on restoring threatened values.

If there ever was a line separating economic from political affairs, it
has now been crossed on all sides, and this is likely to continue. Economics
has become a political weapon – not only for those oil-producing "radical
regimes" that want to use higher prices and cuts in production as weapons
against the US or Israel because of the Palestinian issue, but also for the US,
which has resorted to economic warfare both against Idi Amin and, after the
invasion of Afghanistan, against the Soviet Union, and for the international
community as a whole, which used economic sanctions against Ian Smith and may
do so again against South Africa. And economic frustration can have political
consequences: we have seen it, on a small scale, in Britain's recurrent
ultimatums to the EEC, but also on a much more disturbing one, in the Havana
Conference of the non-aligned, and in the success of Castro's speech – centred
on North-South issues – at the UN General Assembly in 1979.

Let us combine these different trends. We obtain the image of a world
that is becoming much more dangerous and unmanageable, because of the inter-
action of two contradictory trends. One is the renewed commitment of the super-
powers to global competition. There are serious disagreements about the nature
of Soviet ambitions, but there can be little doubt about Moscow's determination

to be a world power, about its accumulation of military means (whether for actual use, or , money in the bank, as a guarantee of influence), about its determination to exploit - albeit at low risks - promising opportunities, and about the decline of the inhibitions that the hope for detente's benefits had temporarily induced. And in the Third World, the Soviets have important assets: the ability to turn against the West the very strong anti-racist and anti-imperialist resentments, and to provide liberation movements or national leaders or both with material help and with a kind of (adaptable) model of political control. As for the US, not only does it still have vast assets of its own - in the realm of public and above all private economic assistance to states, most of which cannot afford self-reliance and find the Soviet economic model unattractive - but the cumulative effect of a string of Soviet successes (almost none of which affected by itself the hard core, or the narrow definition, of American national security) has led to the return to a more expansive definition and to the new militancy mentioned above.

The other trend is both a kind of diffusion and pulverization of power. Many states - including Third World ones - are becoming important economic actors, produce and export their own weapons, and in some cases, move toward the production of nuclear weapons. And yet, they suffer from the internal weaknesses already discussed. The collision of the two trends gives one a major reason for pessimism (in addition to the reason provided by mutual misperceptions and internal developments in the two superpowers, both of which are on the verge of troublesome succession periods):the ability of clients or proxies to manipulate superpowers or to provoke confrontations. The biggest peril lies in "grey areas" in which uncertainty exists about the extent of a superpower's commitment to an ally or friend, and about the other's likely response. There, the diversity of the vital national interests of the local players and the existence of the cold war can combine to produce serious miscalculations and "misescalations". And the superpowers, concerned with their credibility, have not sufficiently developed means of avoiding these through consultation and "crisis management". Three parts of the world are candidates for such dangers: the Middle East, where the effects of a protracted political crisis in Iran and of an indecisive war in Afghanistan have now been added to all the other ferments, Southern Africa and East Asia. The combination of antagonistic nationalisms, rival ideologies, imperatives of "face" (or alliance preservation, or balance of power), and domestic instabilities is frightening in all three areas.

To be sure, the danger of "re-connection" is not of the same order all over the world. A more detailed analysis would have to make distinctions between different areas. There will still be a number of sub-systems, each one with

its own dynamics - in Europe, the Americas, Africa, the Middle East, East Asia. But all the signs point to greater turbulence in all of them, except Europe (which does not mean that there will not be serious instability within each half of the Continent); and to a greater risk of escalation of insecurity from one area to others.

<center>II</center>

There is another disturbing element: we have little to learn from past periods of turbulence. I have, at some length, tried to explain elsewhere why previous methods of coping with international insecurity are of little use now, and shall not repeat the arguments here.[3] But it may be worth looking briefly at two specific periods.

The first one was the period of 1870-1914, when the great powers indulged in the scramble for colonies and frequently clashed in what is now called the Third World. Despite Lenin's biassed analysis of imperialism, it was not because of those expeditions and conflicts that the First World War broke out. France had frequently opposed England and Italy, England had opposed Russia, and yet they ended up allies. It was not Franco-German conflicts over Morocco that led to the war. It began at the very core of the European state system, because of the fatal weakness of Austria-Hungary, and of its vulnerability to Slav nationalism. But the precedent of that period does not suggest that Third World turbulence today can be treated lightly. With the exception of a few areas (that were not immediately threatened by the great powers' rivalry in Europe), the economic and strategic importance of the Empires was limited (to be sure, Tirpitz' naval policy worried Britain, but that race was over several years before the war began). Today, several parts of the Third World are very closely tied to the national security (even narrowly defined) of one or the other superpowers, or both: obviously, the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions are areas which, in hostile hands, could threaten the vital interests of the West (and Japan), and which the Soviet Union has a vital interest in keeping from being entirely controlled by, or friendly to, its chief rivals. There are major American interests in Central America (raw materials, communications and the containment of Cuban influence); and very similar ones in mineral-rich parts of Africa. While Southeast Asia may not be intrinsically more important to the superpowers than the Balkans to Germany or England in 1914, each one cannot afford to see its own regional ally or friend - Vietnam or China - defeated or humiliated. Whether or not one agrees with those who, a bit glibly, equate Soviet policy with Imperial Germany's, the comparison between the pre-1914 period and the present is far more frightening than reassuring, as

Miles Kahler has brilliantly shown (particularly when he refers to "the complications introduced by great power rivalry superimposed upon local conflicts", and of foreign policy as a means of escape from domestic insecurity).[4]

The other comparison would be with the post-1945 period - a period of great instability in the Third World, since it was the era of decolonization, marked by major wars and the involvement of both superpowers. However, one of the very sources of turbulence in the 1980s is the decline or disappearance of the reasons why the crisis of decolonization, and other crises in the Third World, were handled reasonably well. The first is, of course, the change in Soviet capabilities: we are no longer in 1946, when Truman could force Stalin to give up his claims on Turkey and his attempt to remain in Northern Iran; as mentioned before, the contrast between the Soviet fiasco in the Congo and the operation in Angola is stark. The second factor is a certain decline in American power - a complex notion, about which one must be careful. In the 1940s and '50s, American military and economic power was far superior to anyone else's, and there is no doubt that it provided a stabilizing backdrop to turbulence. There has been a relative decline due to the rise of other nations' power, often helped by US policies. There has also been - after the Vietnam experience - less of a willingness to use overt or covert force, by comparison with the days of Guatemala, Lebanon, the Congo, or Santo Domingo. This, of course, is reversible. But what is not reversible is the inadequacy of military power to some of the threats - what Robert Art recently called the inherent limits of military power to achieve economic objectives.[5] And there has been a decline in the ability to use another instrument that had figured prominently in the American arsenal of the post-war era: economic assistance, for reasons that are largely internal to the US and could be reversed (see below) but not easily.

However, the most important factor is the third: the diffusion of power to Third World countries. Many now produce their own weapons (or can diversify their sources of supply). They are increasingly striving for control over their natural resources and over the operations of foreign enterprises. The oil-producing countries have domesticated the international oil companies.[6] In other words, these countries are both more capable of creating difficulties by their own actions, and more capable of depriving the instruments of power that the US used in order to police world affairs in the post-war era, of their efficacy. Some believe that the effrontery of the "pygmies" is a direct result of the fall of America's power; they do not understand that the fall is a direct result of the rise of the pygmies. The limits on the usability, or usefulness, of US power, are far more serious than the alleged decline of will or the relative decline in the amounts of power. One of the biggest evolutions since

1945 is a transformation in the nature of power which affects, partly, its ingredients, in the sense that there is an increase both in offensive and in defensive capabilities, which in turn creates new opportunities for conflict (think of oil, or the spread of nuclear technologies). Mainly, however, it affects the conditions of the use of power. It is increasingly delicate, because in a complex world of multiple and diverse actors, it depends so largely on external opportunities which the would-be user of power can try to exploit but may be unable to create - i.e. his own success is at the mercy of chances provided by others - as well as on his own domestic processes and priorities that may alternatively be crippling, or on the contrary dictate unwise exertions of power. Also, the uses of power are increasingly asymmetrical; states that are above all military machines (the USSR, Vietnam) are not likely to look at the scene in the same way as states whose deep involvement in the "economics of interdependence" causes a host of constraints: advanced industrial societies which find themselves cosseted and corseted between inflation and recession, trade expansion and protection, and have narrow margins of manoeuvre, developing countries with limited resources and huge needs, often obliged to accept the drastic dictates of the IMF. From the viewpoint of the US, it all amounts, in the words of one official, to a having both less to offer, and less to threaten with.

This means that we have to face the future without much comfort from the past. The key question is: in a world of multiple instability and insecurity, how can we distinguish between threats and conflicts that are of vital importance, and the others? Here we find two extreme positions, both of which I find unacceptable. The first argues that the only way to fill the gap between proliferating Western or American interests and available power is to redefine the former more stringently, and to return to a strategy aimed exclusively at containing the expansion of the Soviet Union and of its close allies. There are two problems with this. First, it fails to address itself to a multitude of issues which can provoke serious insecurity even in the absence of Soviet intervention (for instance, in international economic affairs) and which, if we ignore them, could provide the Soviets with fine opportunities for exploitation. We would have no other resort than to oppose them, too late, with military means, whereas we might have blocked their efforts or dried up the ponds in which they fish by earlier and much less dangerous actions. In other words, if we neglect such issues as the economic wellbeing of Third World countries, or the treatment of citizens by many of their governments, or festering regional conflicts, we both allow our chief opponent to put himself on the right side of the issues, and condemn ourselves to an excessive

militarization of our policy (about which more later). Secondly, it assumes that any expansion of Soviet (or Cuban, or Vietnamese) influence is necessarily bad for us, and should be checked. Despite the intention of narrowing our notion of security, this would end up extending it to areas or issues of questionable importance, and give in fact to the USSR the ability to determine where and when we shall be engaged - and it is unlikely that the Soviets would choose places and times favourable to us. It is the indiscriminateness of what might be called reflex containment, and the arbitrary separation between the superpowers' contest and all the issues that form the vortex into which they are drawn, as well as the absence of any ultimate vision of world affairs or world order, which makes this approach unrewarding.

A second one suffers not from selective Manichaeism but from an all-inclusive one. It is a conception that has gained popularity on the American Right (old and new), the blessings of Richard Nixon, and letters of nobility from Henry Kissinger.(7) It amounts to a kind of universal linkage. The world is seen as divided between those who represent international stability and the values of moderation (and who, in Kissinger's latest version, include traditional regimes and their "aberration", authoritarian ones), and the radicals who assault the present international structure and whose rule would spread totalitarianism (described as an "aberration" of democracy). Our duty is to resist not only Soviet onslaughts, but radical attempts as well, since there are objective and subjective convergences between the two kinds of threats. Where the first approach suggested that we ignore the domestic make-up of countries and watch only for the Soviets and their allies, this one tells us to look closely at the nature and methods of domestic forces, since these will shape their external behaviour, and to oppose the bad ones uncompromisingly - by force if there is civil turmoil, or by timely reforms that will keep our friends safely in control either before any turbulence begins, or after it has been crushed, or by foreign policies designed to prove that pressure on us does not pay. It is a neo-Metternichian vision, with the advantage of putting us at least verbally into the position of defenders of freedom (since by contrast with totalitarian ones, traditional regimes are deemed restrained, and authoritarian ones are deemed capable of leading to democracy).

The strength of this view is that it points quite accurately to the weakness of the opposite one: the latter implied that only Soviet power threatens our core values, this one states that a world dominated by hostile forces, Soviet or not, would strangle our ability to pursue our interests and to promote our values. But there are formidable flaws here. It turns a distinction that is often one of degree, or of opportunity - "moderates" vs. "radicals" - into

a fundamental divide cast in concrete, and thus gives up rather too willingly opportunities to affect positively the views and behaviour of the radicals, in favour of fighting them all over. Thus it is a recipe for extraordinary over-extension, since it amounts to underwriting "friendly" regimes everywhere and since it would commit our forces not only to the defence of borders against aggression but to the preservation of governments from revolution (had this view been followed, the civil war would go on in Zimbabwe, and Somoza and the Shah would have been kept in place by force - at what cost?). It is, finally, a self-destructive view: by judging every internal or regional conflict not on its merits, but according to the state of play between moderates and radicals or between us and the Soviets, it would provide splendid opportunities for the latter, provoke a major crisis in America's alliances, and undermine Western influence in much of the Third World. It would, for instance, make us treat South Africa as an ally. Despite the attempt to show that such a policy is compatible with our values, it ignores the fact that many "moderate" regimes refuse to reform in time, and since it wants us to desist from "undermining" them by pressuring them, it condones in fact the kind of repression and mis-management which breed radicalism, Soviet influence - and distrust for Western double talk or double standards.

Moreover, it is a view based on some ignorance of recent history. Not only should we be careful about embracing all moderates; but we should remember that not all moderates want to be too closely embraced by us, and that nothing is more capable of radicalizing a regime than a clumsy attempt at forcing it to choose sides. In the Middle East, in the 1950s, "containment failed, not because the remedies used were necessarily inappropriate, but because the diag-nosis of the disease was faulty ... Soviet victories were largely achieved, not in spite of Western regional defensive efforts, but because of them."[8]

A proper approach must not begin from the top - the superpowers' contest - nor try to fit a complex world into a maddening intellectual straitjacket (it is fashionable, in the circles that wish for a more "muscular" America, to deride the dreary preachers of complexity; but history shows that the real threats are the terrible simplifiers). We have to start from the bottom. This entails three imperatives. The first one is to distinguish between those areas that are not of vital interest, either because they are not of major strategic importance or because they contain no important resources, and the others. It is, of course, a relative distinction: no area is totally without significance, and even from a poor and devastated country (Angola) an enemy can move into "friendly" territory (Shaba). But the attempt to let the stakes be determined by the simple fact of a foo's presence or influence, or escalated by the mere

possibility that his victory might have unpleasant side-effects (which might actually be handled or neutralized at low cost anyhow) is a recipe for over-extension.

The second imperative is to distinguish, in the vital areas especially, between different kinds of threats. The key question is: what is unacceptable? What is tolerable? What - in between - is dangerous or unpleasant but bearable under certain conditions? My own list of unacceptables would include outright aggression - a blatant crossing of internationally recognized borders - except in the rare cases where it is a humanitarian intervention (India in Bangladesh, Tanzania in Uganda) - and the military occupation of a country, following such an intervention (Vietnam in Cambodia) or accompanying or following a coup that put a "friendly" leader in power (as in Afghanistan last December). It would also include the cutting of vital economic resources by foreign powers or by terrorists. Such acts are unacceptable whether they are undertaken by the Soviets and their allies, or by others. Dangerous but not unbearable is the coming to power of local forces that are not merely the agents or puppets of Moscow, Havana or Hanoi, yet have received or call for the support of the Soviets or of their allies. We are much too dependent on our own network of clients to be able to apply double standards. And yet Moscow-oriented nationalists are obviously troublesome, especially when the country in question controls resources of essential importance to us.

But this is where the third imperative comes in: while we cannot always align ourselves with forces that have history on their side, to use Peter Jay's formula[9] - many Third World conflicts occur among factions none of which has a safe claim on history - and while we should not "appease" radicals, or condone terror, because of some debatable theory of political or economic development or in the vain hope of coopting our adversary into our own designs, we must start from a clear understanding of the aspirations, ambitions, and problems of the local forces, and we ourselves must understand that their main concerns are not the superpowers' contest, but their own struggles and objectives - their own survival or their own triumph. We need, in other words, to begin by accepting fully one of the long-term effects of decolonization: their desire to be treated as independent forces, not as tools. On the other hand, we ourselves have our interests, which often transcend a given country or region. This is why we must combine respect for the will-to-autonomy and for the force of nationalism, with the need to avoid what I have described as unbearable outcomes, and to make those outcomes I have described as dangerous more rather than less bearable (prevent more Cubas, for instance). This requires a willingness both to influence friends whose policies are suicidal, and to deal with

adversaries whose hostility can still be disarmed. This is precisely why the best way to contain the Soviet Union is neither to throw the radicals into their arms, nor to neglect the issues of security, economic development or human rights which are the Third World countries' or citizens' daily concerns, but to address these issues directly. And the best way to deal with the dangerous demise of the dissociations of the past is not to try to return to them, but to devise the right mix of restrained globalism and careful regionalism.

<div align="center">III</div>

I have neither the space nor the competence to describe here how this mix should look in each area. Instead, I will present some remarks on specific means.

A most important issue is that of the framework for action. The approach I have suggested implicitly rejects two theoretical ones. One is a return to Dullesian pactomania. The experience of the "Northern tier", of CENTO and of SEATO should not be repeated. Incidentally, Soviet experiences with comparable treaties have also been mixed: fine when they strengthened or signalled ties to close allies (Cuba, Vietnam), not so when the ally proved too independent (Egypt, Iraq, and even Afghanistan's Amin). It is, instead, our interest to support existing regional organizations such as ASEAN or the OAU. Military agreements are worth concluding with those who ask for them - unless they also ask for a political price we have an interest in paying (cf. Somalia's war in the Ogaden, or Pakistan's request for guarantees against India). In any case we should not beg others to let themselves be protected by us.

The other unwelcome framework is that which Chinese rhetoric (but not Chinese deeds) often suggests: a Holy anti-Soviet alliance of the US, Western Europe, Japan, and China (plus assorted anti-Soviet Third World states). The reasons why a policy of balance is preferable to a "united front" strategy have been indicated by Robert Scalapino, Allen Whiting, and others.[10] The latter strategy would risk producing unrestrained globalism - by feeding Soviet paranoia (and some legitimate fears as well) and making Soviet cooperation with the West more difficult. It would impose heavy military obligations on the US without commensurate gains in collective strength. Neither Japan nor Western Europe share the enthusiasm of some Americans for the "China card"; and China's military growth may serve interests that are not those of the West, and frighten some of the West's friends in Asia.

The problem of the framework is the problem of the Western alliances - NATO and the US-Japanese security treaty. It is highly unlikely that Japan, even if it plays a more important role in preserving the military balance in

the Western Pacific and in providing economic assistance to Third World
countries, will want to formalize this role, unless a kind of Western
Directorate is set up, of the sort General de Gaulle had proposed to the US in
September, 1958 (but with a different membership). The obstacles to such a
formula remain large. The US is reluctant to endorse it, since it would acknow-
ledge the promotion of powers Washington frequently annoyed by describing their
interests as merely regional to a world role - and to a world role as equals,
whereas Washington periodically exhorted them to transcend their parochialism
only so that they could play their part in a global enterprise defined by
America alone. The problem of membership would remain vexing. The desire of
several likely candidates - Paris, Bonn, Tokyo - to preserve a margin of
distinction, or at least a nuance, between Washington's Soviet policy and their
own, and to exploit (not necessarily for selfish purposes) the fact that they
are sometimes more favourably seen and treated by Third World countries than
the US, is another obstacle.

And yet at least an informal Directorate is indispensable - a political
and strategic equivalent of the economic Summits (the attempt to pile vital
diplomatic and strategic issues on top of the vexing economic ones practically
sank the last one, appropriately held in Venice). A great deal of cooperation
can take place through bilateral diplomatic exchanges, and within the increas-
ingly more coordinated procedures of the Europeans' political cooperation. But
the impulse and general directives will have to come from the top, if one wants
to avoid mutual recriminations, and, in America, a dangerous (albeit partly
unjustified) sense that her allies prefer a division of labour that leaves all
the heavy risks and burdens - the military ones - to Washington. NATO suffers
from four handicaps: the partial absence of France, the total absence of Japan,
more than enough work within its own orbit, and the geographical limitation
of the treaty (an attempt at revising it might open a can of worms). This is
why an institution other than the NATO Council must be established. The days
are gone, when the US could try to provide both the strategy and the means by
itself; it needs the resources of its allies, as well as their own expertise
in these matters. Indeed, Western pluralism is one of our main assets. But
this is another reason for the approach I have suggested: neither the fixation
on the Soviet-American contest, nor the global Manichean view, have much of a
chance to be adopted outside of Washington.

If we turn from the framework to the means, we find at once a heated
controversy concerning the role of military force. The first necessity is to
discard theological cobwebs. The debate, especially in America, has been
described by the champions of a greater emphasis on force as fitting those who

believe that international politics remains what it has always been - a contest
of powers - against those who believe in the growing irrelevance of force. This
is, of course, absurd. Most of those who have stressed the limits of force, or
the difference between available power and useful power, have been very careful
to point out, for instance, the enormous importance of nuclear deterrence or of
regional balance in Europe. And those who write as if they believed that force
is a panacea have been equally careful in keeping to themselves their ideas, if
any, about the specific (rather than generalized) uses and benefits of military
power, or about the precise composition, missions and purposes of the forces
which they call for.

A few points are not in doubt. The presence of American or allied forces
in various parts of the world can play a tripwire function against a Soviet
invasion - in areas that are both close enough to the Soviet Union to make it
difficult for the West to achieve a conventional balance; and important enough
to the West to suggest to the attacked that such an invasion, if it succeeded
in defeating the available Western forces, might trigger nuclear escalation,
or the geographical extension of the conflict to an area where the West enjoys
conventional superiority. It could also deter or defeat an invasion by a Soviet
client. Moreover, a military presence can have a general quieting effect, by
creating among radicals or revolutionaries a fear of Western intervention, or
by giving Western powers the means to help a friendly regime defend itself
against an attempted coup. Showing the flag also has the undoubted virtue of
affecting the balance of perceptions, and thereby possibly the balance of
influence.

However, there are serious limits to force as an instrument of policy.
Not only is it of debatable use if the main threat is not a Soviet invasion or
an attack by a Soviet proxy, but internal instability; but its presence in an
unstable area could aggravate internal turbulence, turn the opposition into a
shrilly anti-American or anti-Western direction, and tempt the Western powers
into using the available force to control events, which might be a fatal
mistake. When domestic strife is the issue, or when the issue is a regime's
threat to deny the West a vital resource, intervention can be both dangerous -
if the use of force should, for instance, lead to the destruction of tankers
and oil fields - and insufficient - prolonged occupation may become necessary.
American or Western bases tend to commit us to the support of the regime that
has granted them - and thus to deprive us of means of influence, while giving
it means of blackmail, yet compromising it further in the eyes of its internal
or external opposition. Ultimately, there is no substitute for sound political,
economic, and social conditions in the area to be defended. Otherwise, military
bases are built on sand.(11)

This is not a condemnation of the American Rapid Deployment Force. A greater air and sealift capacity, a greater ability to patrol the seas (without depleting existing fleets) are necessary. But the main threats to Western security in the Gulf area are likely not to be Soviet or Soviet-sponsored direct attacks. They result from internal instability, corruption or repression, from traditional interstate conflicts, and from the Palestinian issue. To reducing these dangers, external military forces can make only a meagre contribution, and they risk aggravating them. It is of course true that the West has a vital interest in the free flow of oil. But there are two major differences between say, the American commitment to Western Europe and the recent commitment to the Persian Gulf area. In Western Europe, it is a pledge to the defence of people against aggression, and it was given at the request of their governments. In the Middle East, it is a commitment to keep oil flowing to the West, it has serious divisive effects in the area, and it does not resolve the issue of how to react, say, in Saudi Arabia, not to a bungled coup such as that of November 1979, but either to a surgically successful one, or to a revolution, followed — as in Iran — by a decision to reduce oil production, which would make perfect sense from a purely Saudi viewpoint. Also, access to oil is inseparable from the very underlying political conditions in that part of the world — conditions in the oil-producing countries, and the Palestinian issue — which no military pledge can cope with.

Those limits on the usefulness of force suggest, to some, the wisdom of what the French call a politique de Gribouille. If conventional defence fails, we must have credible means of nuclear escalation. But on the one hand, failure in that area risks taking the form not of a fiasco against an advancing army, but of an inability to prevent the coming to power of forces that might, for their own protection, turn to Moscow if they find us hostile, or of an inability to prevent internal turmoil in friendly countries such as Pakistan. To threaten Moscow with nuclear escalation in such cases would not be very credible. And the logic of the argument leads to an increasingly more dangerous arms race: a spread of tactical nuclear capabilities, and a major effort on America's part to give itself a counterforce ability against Soviet missiles and military targets (many of which are close to cities). Should this lead the USSR to protect and increase its own war-fighting ability, and the US react by discarding the anti-ABM treaty and by providing its own land-based missiles with hard point defences (if this becomes technically feasible), the US posture (MX plus such defences) could appear dangerously provocative to Moscow, and America's advantage could be negated by a Soviet ABM effort. This is a recipe for spiralling madness.

There is no perfect solution - no sure way of ever closing the gap between military possibilities in the Third World, and possible threats. This suggests that such threats must be addressed by different methods, all of which could be called preventive diplomacy. Let us return to the notion of a mix of regionalism and globalism. Insofar as the former is concerned, there are three directions to follow. First, there is of course the familiar method of security assistance - arms transfers to friendly governments or to governments that request them.[12] It can be most useful to restore a regional balance or to help a country against subversion supported from abroad, or against internal guerrillas. But it has its own serious dangers: feeding an escalating arms race in a region, making a diplomatic solution more rather than less difficult, helping a regime become more repressive or encouraging it to develop excessive ambitions. Those who see in arms transfers a panacea should remember America's experience in Iran.

Secondly, with respect to interstate conflicts that can be dangerous sources of international insecurity, a variety of diplomatic instruments have to be used, depending on the issue. Wherever possible, the Western powers should encourage regional security arrangements, limited to states in the area and aimed at preserving the members from aggression by external actors - be it the Soviet Union, or Vietnam, or even South Africa, the "cornered wildcat" described by Robert Jaster.[13] But the initiative should come from within the area. Bilateral links such as those that now exist between France and several of her former African colonies ought to be gradually replaced by such regional schemes. The most dangerous interstate conflict involving Third World countries remains the Arab-Israeli one. It is of course true that even after the Palestinian issue is disposed of there will remain multiple sources of intra-Arab conflict. But the Palestinian one is both a major factor of anti-Western Arab (and Islamic) solidarity, and a factor of internal turbulence within Arab countries as well as in Lebanon. Creeping Israeli annexionism only further strengthens the anti-American bent of the PLO, while increasing the pro-PLO fervour of the occupied Palestinians, thus reducing the chances for a "moderate" Jordanian solution. The Camp David process has gone about as far as it can. The dilemma here is that for a European, or a new UN initiative to succeed, it needs a green light from Washington. But as long as the deadlock is not broken in a way that guarantees - at the end of a transitional period - both Palestinian self-determination and mutual recognition between an eventual Palestinian state and Israel, it is absurd for American politicians to expect that Arab states will place themselves under Washington's protection, that the Palestinian issue will not weigh on the politics of oil, or that the Soviets can be "expelled" from the area.

Thirdly, with respect to internal turbulence in Third World countries, it is not enough to ask that the West be associated neither with repression nor with revolution.[14] Only if we clearly dissociate ourselves from repressive regimes, and keep the pressure on them to reform before they explode, is there a chance that the forces in opposition, if they come to power, will remain pro-Western or reasonably "moderate". It is not American "harassment" that provoked the Shah's downfall, or the overthrow of Somoza; but one of the reasons for the different consequences of the two falls is American active dissociation in Somoza's case. To be sure, the degree of possible dissociation varies from place to place. In Saudi Arabia, it may well be very low. But this is where the other imperative comes in - willingness to deal even with a hostile opposition, (both before and after its seizure of power), not to take its initial hostility as final, and to take its own goals and priorities seriously. For the US, which can expect a number of unpleasant changes and challenges in Central and South America, this would entail giving up the attempt at finding third forces or moderate progressives (as in Nicaragua before the Sandinista victory, or in El Salvador) when they do not exist (any more than they did in China in 1946 or in Vietnam) and when the quest only increases polarization and violence. It would also mean formally recognizing the regime in Angola (with which a great deal of cooperation has been possible). For the West as a whole, the strategy suggested here entails continuing pressure on South Africa, and contacts with the Black opposition there - even that part of it that has turned East for armed support. It also means that where American relations with a new regime are bad (as in Iran) it is in the interest of the West that other Western nations try their influence.

I mentioned earlier restrained globalism. In this respect, three directions are essential. One is the consolidation and preservation of a strong international anti-polarization regime, intended through the cooperation of the suppliers, to slow down the rate and limit the degree of nuclear proliferation.[15] Accelerated proliferation, especially among "enemy pairs" of states (India/Pakistan, Israel/Iraq, Argentina/Brazil, etc.) could not fail to increase both local insecurity, given mutual vulnerabilities and underlying political tensions, and to affect adversely the superpowers' contest - since the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the enemy of a great power's client is more likely to incite that great power to shore up the client, than to mutual dissociation by the superpowers, at least in areas of vital importance to them.[16] It will also be essential to devise the anti-proliferation regime in such a way as to protect the legitimate energy needs of the developing countries and their interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear power. A strengthening of the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency - where both suppliers and clients meet - is likely to result from the need to balance these concerns.

The second direction is that of the international economic system. While accelerated economic growth can produce dangerous upheavals in traditional societies, stagnation or actual impoverishment are both sources of internal tension and of anti-Western resentment. The problems discussed in the recent Brandt Report[17] are urgent. They have been postponed by the West, partly because of its own internal economic difficulties, partly because the measures recommended by practically all the specialists of North-South affairs would require painful internal readjustments. Three kinds of measures are needed. The first would be aimed at transferring resources from Northern to Southern states, (especially the poorer ones) so as to promote aggregate growth and industrialization among the latter - for instance through increased development assistance, mechanism (such as STABEX and MINEX in the Lomé conventions) to stabilize export earnings, and above all greater access of developing countries' exports to the markets of the advanced countries, a requirement both for development and for reducing the burden of debt. A second series would be aimed at dealing with the poverty within developing countries, in order to issue the basic needs of the population, particularly in food production. A third series would enlarge the role of the developing countries in the management of international economic regimes - for instance in a new global trade organization, or through a reform of the IMF and the World Bank. For reasons excellently analyzed by Roger Hansen,[18] mere "cooperation" of a handful of developing countries would not work.

The effect of these measures would be to remove, or to reduce, one of the chief sources of collective Third World, anti-Western acrimony; to give to developing countries a stake in the operations of a reformed world economy; and to link their economic growth - particularly through increased trade - to the open international economy, i.e. to the West. The weakening of official economic ties between the nations of the West and the Third World, at least as much as the occasional high-handedness of private Western enterprises in the developing countries, facilitates Soviet influence there.

The third direction is that of Soviet-American relations. They are an indispensable component of any attempt at improving international security. In the past nuclear deterrence has not prevented Soviet attempts at exploiting opportunities in the Third World at levels well below any risk of direct military conflict with the US. In the future, it is likely not only that such Soviet involvements will continue, but that increased Soviet military capabilities will tempt Moscow to export its forces more often - as long, again, as the risk of direct military confrontation with Washington remains low, either because the area is not of vital importance to the West, or because Moscow would have

carefully avoided putting itself in the position of an aggressor, and made it
as difficult as possible for Washington to retaliate in kind (a _fortiori_, to
escalate to the nuclear level - a threat that is credible only when the most
vital interests of the West are threatened by an aggressive Soviet move). It
is futile to expect Moscow to endorse Western notions of stability. The best
that can be hoped for is not an end to competition, but the acceptance by Moscow
of certain restraints in the intensity and means of competition.[19] And it is
equally vain to expect either that the Soviets will accept these voluntarily,
or be forced to do so by containment alone. Preventive diplomacy may go a long
way toward obliging them to restrict the scope of their endeavours. But if it
is the intensity and methods that we try to affect, we shall have to make
efforts to find areas of cooperation.

One of them will have to be arms control, even if it should proceed in
more fragmentary or modest ways than in the past. The relevance of the
strategic balance to the contest in the Third World may only be oblique, but
it is not unimportant. First, instability, or a perception of instability, in
the central balance, may tempt either the side that believes it has an advantage
there to take more risks at a regional level in which it also has an edge, for
purposes of intimidation - or to try to compensate for a regional disadvantage
by threatening to escalate (to be sure, stability at the central level risks
"decoupling" a region from it ; but coupling would be neither credible nor
sensible in case of secondary interests, and remains credible in the sense given
last year by McGeorge Bundy _à propos_ of Europe ("no-one knows that a major
engagement in Europe would escalate to the strategic nuclear level. But the
essential point is the opposite: no-one can possibly know it would not")[20]
when a vital interest is at stake). Secondly, the more the superpowers indulge
their apparent appetite for war-fighting scenarios, the more attractive they
make the possession of nuclear weapons for others. Thirdly, the continuing
nuclear arms race between them weakens the legitimacy and the authority of their
stand against proliferation.

Conventional arms control will undoubtedly have to wait until after local
sources of instability and the opportunities for competitive influence which
local requests for arms provide, have dried out sufficiently - or until enough
states produce what they need (by which time such arms control would come too
late). However, even the conventional arms races fed by the superpowers could
be submitted to restraints resulting from informal understandings aimed at greater
superpower control over the purposes for which the arms can be used, and at
limiting damage and casualties if they are used. Even these understandings
presuppose a greater Western willingness either to deal directly (as was finally

done in Zimbabwe) with forces or countries that have turned to Moscow for support, so as to give them an incentive to moderation, or to accept the Soviet Union as a partner in the search for the solution of regional disputes in which the USSR has a vital interest (and not merely an interest in expanding its influence or in dislodging Western influence). This would obviously not be the case in the Americas, or in Southern Africa. But it is in the areas that lie close to the Soviets' borders.

One of the weaknesses of the two confrontational approaches described earlier is that they provide only for an interminable series of tests - as in the old Achesonian conception - with a vague hope that the adversary, having been checkmated enough, would somehow throw in the towel and behave according to our wishes. Neither the trends in the world, nor his own internal difficulties, are likely to force him to do so. The best chance for a gradual change in his behaviour lies in a combination of containment and cooperation. Even the cooperation is likely to be competitive - in a world of states, each one, whether through conflict, self-reliance, or cooperation, seeks its own advantage. But even the confrontation ought to leave the door open for political solutions, as was achieved in the Cuban missile crisis, and as should be the aim of Western policies in Afghanistan. These may not be popular views today. But nothing is more important for a long-term policy than a sense of perspective, a refusal to accept uncritically intellectual fashions and to yield to sudden bursts of opinion.

The methods sketchily suggested here would encounter not only the resistance of all those whose view of the world is different, but also two formidable obstacles within the West. The first one is economic. Unless Western economies in general and the American one in particular take strong domestic measures to reduce their dependence on Middle East oil, to fight inflation, and to return to steady economic growth, they will face, in case of quite probable turbulence in the Arabian peninsula, an unsavoury choice between economic disaster, should the flow of oil be interrupted or production levels drastically reduced, and the formidable risks and costs of military expedition and occupation. And they will not have the resources needed to provide an economic underpinning for Western policies in the Third World. A willingness not to be outspent in military hardware nor outclassed in military deployments by the Soviets is fine - as long as the effort required does not become a pretext for neglecting the long-term duty to "increase the resources needed to support our diplomacy, a diplomacy designed to reduce the chances our military forces may be needed", in Cyrus Vance's words.[21]

The other obstacle is internal as well. What is necessary is nothing less than a mental revolution: a willingness to discard nostalgia for past golden ages (that seemed not so golden at the time), to stop oscillating, in attitude toward Moscow, from total hostility to excessive hopes, and to abandon condescension toward the Third World. It is a particularly difficult reconversion for Americans, troubled by mixed strategies, more eager for intervention against a foe than capable of steering for reform, or of accommodation with partial or temporary adversaries, more inclined, by the familiar but tricky liberal principle of non-intervention, toward endorsing the status quo, and thus becoming the victims of their clients and the unwilling artisans of their own defeats. But we can neither withdraw from the field, only to re-enter when the Soviets and their allies approach, nor turn the whole world into that artificial division between good and bad guys which produces in crusading spirits such emotional satisfaction, a happy end to all cognitive dissonance, and a formidable release of energy. It is a global contest - but it is a complex one, and not a war. Coping with international insecurity is not a matter of winning against a single foe, or against a deadly brotherhood of evils. It is a Sisyphean task of bringing more restraint, more order, and more justice into a world of turbulence and violence.

FOOT NOTES

1. See <u>Stalin's Successors</u> (Cambridge University Press, 1980).

2. <u>Discord and Collaboration</u> (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), chapter 5.

3. <u>Primacy or World Order</u> (McGraw Hill, 1978), Part 2.

4. "Rumors of war: the 1914 analogy", <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, Winter, 1979-80.

5. "To what ends military power", <u>International Security</u>, Spring, 1980, p. 31.

6. CF. Walter J. Levy, "Oil and the decline of the West", <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, Summer, 1980.

7. Kissinger's view, which can be found in his <u>White House Years</u> (cf. my review, "The World of Dr. Kissinger," <u>NY Review of Books</u>, Dec. 6, 1979) has been laid out even more starkly in his "statement on the geopolitics of oil" before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the US Senate, July 31, 1980.

8. Paul Gabber, "US interests and regional security in the Middle East", in <u>Daedalus</u>, forthcoming (Fall, 1980).

9. "Regionalism as geopolitics", <u>Foreign Affairs, America and the World in 1979</u>, p. 487.

10. See Scalapino's "Asia and the end of the 1970's", <u>Foreign Affairs, America and the World in 1979</u>, and Whiting's "China and the superpowers: toward the year 2000", in <u>Daedalus</u>, forthcoming, (Fall, 1980).

11. See the remarks by Zalmay Khalilzad in "Afghanistan and the crisis in American foreign policy", <u>Survival</u>, Vol. XII, No. 4, July/August, 1980.

12. See Richard Betts, "The tragicomedy of arms trade control", <u>International Security</u>, Summer, 1980.

13. "South Africa's narrowing security options", <u>Adelphi Papers</u>, No. 159.

14. CF. the Atlantic Council's Policy Paper, <u>After Afghanistan - The Longhaul</u>, Washington, March, 1980.

15. See Joseph S. Nye, "Maintaining a non-proliferation regime", in <u>International Organization</u>, Winter, 1980-1, forthcoming.

16. I disagree with Kenneth Waltz's complacent view in a forthcoming <u>Adelphi Paper</u>.

17. <u>North-South</u> (MIT Press, 1980).

18. "North-South policy - what is the problem?", <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, Summer, 1980.

19. For further elaboration, see the author's "Muscle and Brains", <u>Foreign Policy</u>, 37, Winter, 1979-80.

20. <u>Survival</u>, November-December, 1979, p. 271.

21. Harvard Commencement speech, <u>New York Times</u>, June 6, 1980, p. A12.

cumulative impact of successive setbacks for the West, each one of which is not dramatic.

The World seen from Moscow is not more pleasant

The analogy is not with 1938 (Sudetengau = outrages) but with 1914.

The decline of Pax americana has not declined because of decreasing US power but because of the rising of other powers. The American international system was formidable handicap.

safety of borders: accepted by all.

instruments of regionals action
— use of military force
— principle of human rights: OK universal concept ⟩ →?

framework.
— global framework: single strategic system
— non-ratification of SALT II = disaster → arms control

— US - European
— US: enormous nostalgia of past simplicity.
— European → fear of tension → difficult
new intellectual framework.

Elnfield → '60s detente

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THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE 1

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL CONFLICT

(ii)   INTERNAL CHANGE AND REGIONAL CONFLICT:
         THE CASE OF THE GULF

by

Arnold Hottinger

Committee 1:   Internal Development and Regional Conflict

INTERNAL CHANGE AND REGIONAL CONFLICT:

THE CASE OF THE GULF

Arnold Hottinger

Oil Countries – an Atypical Case of Under-Development

The countries of the Gulf cannot be compared to the general run of
developing countries. Practically all are oil-producing countries and this
means that, under present conditions, they have as much money as they can
use, and in many cases more than they can use, to accomplish their
development. While in a "normal" developing country the availability of
money limits development, this is not the case in the Gulf countries. In
the average developing country the capacity to make money on the international
market is in itself a sign of development and an important aim. Not so in
an oil country. Development there means simply building something more or
less useful out of the money available.

This situation has its own dangers. Iran has demonstrated practically
what were previously only theoretical pitfalls. We now can recognise that
there is something which can be called "bad quality development" and that the
question of quality is essential to the development process if it is not to
break down under its own weight. Oil-producing countries are particularly
prone to "bad quality development" whereas non-oil countries lack the money
to go wrong. Whenever the economic quality of their development deteriorates,
they face bankruptcy. The market mechanisms contain certain correctives for
them which do not appear in the case of an oil country. There the money
mechanism is distorted by the nearly limitless availability of oil money.

"Bad quality" in Iranian development could be seen in many areas. In
the economic field non-viable enterprises were propped up by the state for
political reasons or favouritism. In agriculture land reform failed for lack
of efficient follow-up aid to the peasants. Socially the rich were growing
richer and the poor poorer and real trade unions were prohibited and in the
field of ecology cities, water and air became polluted. There was excessive
growth of the cities, most of all Teheran, and ruin of the irrigation system.
Politically too there were mistakes. Liberties were reduced, the role of
Savak increased and existing political structures were destroyed to be re-
placed only by the absolute power of the Shah and his police. The process of

law was undermined by so-called military courts and educational quality (both in local schools and universities) dropped. There was no freedom of intellectual discussion. The net result of the low quality of Iranian development was the Revolution - which has unfortunately prevented any development at all because development in the minds of the Persians, at least in the minds of those who rule at present and those millions who follow them, is associated with all the failures and pains, shortcomings and injustices that "development" is associated with.

In view of the Iranian failure, the first question to be asked with respect to the other oil-rich Gulf states must be: are they also exposed to the consequences of similar "low quality" development? And, if so, how dangerously?

The Small City-States

Each state is different in this respect but, in order to find some more general categories, it is possible to subdivide them into groups where certain generalisations can be made. There are the city-states of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Federation - city-states because they have no peasant population (Bahrain has a little agriculture), their Bedouins having been largely absorbed into the cities. Their capitals are the centres of population and they are dwarf states. They all have oil incomes (Bahrain's is declining). Their small size makes it relatively easy for the rulers (in all cases traditional Bedouin Emirs who have adapted themselves to oil) to identify and to correct incipient signs of "bad quality" development at an early stage. There is certainly corruption, but it is not as monumental as it was in Iran. There are similar problems of political evolution (Kuwait and Bahrain have experimented unsuccessfully with parliaments and closed them again and the Federation seems ready to embark on a similar experiment just now). There are difficulties in turning wealth to productive use and in the distribution of that wealth. The abuse of absolute power and the problems of succession are not absent. The control of foreign workers and immigrants presents some problems and they face external security threats and worry about the loyalty of their professional armies. But all these problems seem to have been identified and can be controlled at relatively early stages.

The development has been of better quality than in the case of Iran, simply because problems show up early and demand correction in a small city-state long before they penetrate into the consciousness of the ruler of an "Empire" such as the Shah's. The rulers of those small city-states are better able to avoid megalomania for it is not easy to be a megalomaniac in a small country. The city-states, especially Kuwait, have evolved a tight pyramid

of privilege and power embracing all the population from the ruling family to the immigrant non-Arab workers at the bottom and comprising many finely graded steps. This helps to avoid the danger of polarity between the privileged and the underprivileged. In Iran 90% of the country's wealth was in the hands of 9% of the population and this was one of the decisive factors underlying the Iranian Revolution. In the city-states a conscious attempt has been made to let the lower classes of their own citizens profit from development. This was mostly done by giving them land to build on, thus permitting them to participate in the real-estate boom (which has been phenomenal). In Bahrain, where the oil income is not sufficient to provide economic cushioning for all, social tensions are stronger but, so far at least, the police have been able to contain them with little trouble.

Foreign workers are a problem everywhere and are very carefully supervised. Politically the Arab workers - Palestinians, Iraqis, Egyptians, Omanis, and Yemenis - are felt to be more dangerous since they tend to participate in political discussions and are in many cases subscribers to some form of pan-Arabism which postulates the sharing of the oil wealth by all Arabs, but they too are under control. Since the Iranian Revolution, the immigrant Iranians and the local Shi'ites have become causes of concern and some trouble-makers have been expelled from Kuwait, Bahrain and the Federation. The other non-Arab foreigners - Pakistanis, Indians, South Koreans and people from South East Asia - are less dangerous since they come only in order to earn money, do not speak Arabic and rarely want to become involved in local politics.

In all these city-states Arab Nationalism, originally fostered by the image and policies of Abdel Nasser and the doctrines of the early Ba'athists, Haraka and similar movements, combines Arab Socialism with strong nationalistic tendencies. It attracts particularly students (upper school pupils and full university students) who tend to have strong links with their contemporaries in the rest of the Arab world. The question of Palestine plays a major part in their thinking. Governments make a careful distinction between helping those Palestinians who want to give priority to "military" action on the Israel borders (Fatah) and suppressing those Palestinians who support ideologies of social change for the whole Arab world (Habash, Hawatme etc).

Iraq and Oman

For Iraq and Oman, development means drawing some of their peasants off the land and into industry, while improving agriculture and the lifestyle of their peasant majorities. If they neglect these tasks they risk the emergence of a dangerous disequilibrium in their development. It is much more difficult to handle this kind of development than to increase the prosperity of an already urbanised population, as in Kuwait and Bahrain. Nevertheless Iraq and Oman seem to be moving forward successfully after initial periods of insecurity and political error. Iraq has been excluded from the Gulf for many decades because the rich Gulf states were afraid of Iraqi radicalism. Kuwait especially has misgivings for it has been claimed at several periods by Iraq and has had frontier clashes with it at other times. Kuwaiti diplomacy has been an active anti-Iraqi force in the whole Gulf but Saddam Hussein has recently recognised that the radical image of his country (which is growing daily richer) impedes the acquisition of any real influence in the Gulf and he has been attempting to change it. He has reduced his collaboration with the Soviet Union (no longer so important, for other industrial powers are only too willing to collaborate with Iraq even in the fields of weapons and nuclear power) and he has increased his contacts with Saudi Arabia. He is also trying to pose as the champion of order in the Gulf who is willing to act against any attempts by the Iranian Revolution to make trouble. Iran and Iraq are now bitter enemies and potential trouble for Iraq can come from the Kurds and the Iraqi Shi'ites (perhaps manipulated by Iran), who together amount to about two-thirds of the population. But - just as in neighbouring Syria - the ruling Ba'ath minority is determined to hold on to power at all costs using, if necessary, the instrument of murder. If terror is the stick, the carrot is participation in the fruits of development. The leadership and the party are well aware of the need for all to share in these fruits including Kurds and Shi'ites, as long as they obey unconditionally. Recently a parliament of a kind has been elected even if this is only intended to rubber stamp decisions taken eslewhere. It could act as a safety valve for political frustration. The internal situation is still tense and any real liberalization would probably lead to a general break-up of the state. A policy of the iron fist in the velvet glove will undoubtedly continue. Iran now serves as a focal point for official aggression as does Israel. Even corruption has been held in check through fear of the leadership and the security apparatus.

For the Gulf, this means that Iraq is about to become a partner of increasing reliability and growing weight. But a certain suspicion of Saddam Hussein and the rest of the leadership will remain for a long time. The "revolutionary" origins and early behaviour of the regime in Iraq and the occasional political murder by Iraqis of exiled adversaries or other Gulf politicians are not reassuring.

Oman has moved forward quite rapidly from a situation of extreme neglect and archaic social, political and economic circumstances. At the same time it has had to fight a rebellion fostered from outside (South Yemen) and indirectly aided by the Soviet Union. The fact that it has managed to overcome these difficulties, partly with oil money and partly with foreign help (British, Iranian and Jordanian) gives the present regime a certain stability and self-confidence. At the same time a rather limited oil income induces some realism. There is not so much money that all the principles of good housekeeping can be thrown to the winds. As long as the Dhofar rebellion does not start up again, the chances for quiet development are not bad. Obviously the rebellion could be re-started if the South Yemenis and the Soviet Union agreed to do so but at present they seem willing to keep things quiet: the Russians for reasons to do with international tactics (digesting Afghanistan, relaunching détente etc); the Southern Yemenis presumably because economic need forces them to seek closer relations with Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia – the Crux of Gulf Politics

This leaves Saudi Arabia in a category of its own. The Kingdom is indeed a unique phenomenon. It is far richer than Iran ever was and has a much smaller population to keep content. It is developing at great speed, and many of the negative aspects of "bad quality development" are apparent – corruption, inflation, lack of viability in economic ventures set up by the state, intellectual confusion, growing divisions between the super-rich and the poor, student discontent, a "brain drain", conspicuous consumption by the state and individuals, unwillingness to do manual work and many more. But there is not as yet a revolutionary atmosphere. Most people seem reasonably content, and the state is spending at a tremendous rate to keep them so. Practically all Saudis can have land and an interest-free loan to develop it. Many of them will be occupied in this way for the next few years. On a higher level the authorities are aware that they have to offer their students managerial positions as soon as they leave the universities (whether Saudi or foreign) in order to keep them content. So they spend huge sums to

build up petrochemical industries to be managed in the future by the
coming Saudi elite. The workers will be foreigners, coming from as far as
South Korea. Few Saudis want to work with their hands and few need to.
How long this can last is uncertain but no end is in sight at present. The
money is lasting and most Saudis appear to be hopeful that they will event-
ually share in the wealth. Few are willing to speculate about whether this
share is fair or not. That will come later when more of them have been
through school.

The rumblings of discontent so far come more from the backward-looking,
nostalgic groups than from the "progressive" part of the population. The so-
called Mecca incident of 1979 was due to traditionalists and fundamentalists
who were angry about the corruption of the rulers and the double standard
which allowed them to break many Islamic rules (against alcohol, prostitution
and gambling) while enforcing these same rules very strictly on the ruled.
Television was also not to their liking. More generally they were probably
confused and frustrated by the increasingly "modern" and "Western" lifestyle
which was brought about by economic development, notwithstanding the care the
authorities had taken to preserve at least the symbols of tradition (e.g.
clothing) and to keep Islam in the foreground as much as possible.

The occupation of the Great Mosque was a rude shock. The main reaction
by the rulers has been to tighten up security even in Islamic circles
(where it had been loose previously) and to impose the details of overt
Islamic life more strictly (obligatory attendance at prayers, Islamic pun-
ishments, shari'a law, more sermons and Koranic readings on the radio and
television etc.). Some political "liberalization" has been hinted at, but
so far not pursued. A consultative assembly and a constitutional statement
have been considered. It is possible that things have gone far enough
already and that the inner tensions are sufficiently strong to render
dangerous any further attempts at liberalization. Free speech in an assembly
of any kind and its publication could destroy the Kingdom. Its foundations
rest on tightly controlled information and privilege for the royal house.
It is basically an "ancien régime" which has not yet been exposed to
enlightenment.

When revolution comes, perhaps in five or six years, it is most likely
to originate in the Army. There is no other grouping or institution capable
of embracing the whole of this vast desert country. This is why/manipulation
                                                               any
of the present defence establishment, whether Army or National Guard
(Bedouin or White Army) is extremely touchy politically. There is continued
talk about general conscription but this would probably destroy the present

military structures and it might, if mismanaged, easily lead to a
situation of discontent inside a new conscript army. Also, the excessive
number of foreigners in the Saudi Army is a touchy issue. Their presence
and privilege compared to that of the locals (they have to be paid a great
deal to come at all) can cause trouble. It was one of the reasons for the
early break-up of the Iranian Air Force where, for every three Iranians,
one American was employed.

The "quality" of Saudi modernization is clearly not as bad as the
Iranian, but it is bad enough. So far, however, most of the population
does not seem to have become aware of the burdens and drawbacks which the
negative sides of their modernization are inevitably bringing them. Money
allows the state to alleviate many of the dangers. Inflation is a simple
example. It exists, but a generous handout by the government in all directions
alleviates it considerably. There have also been attempts in the last two
years to combat inflation. This has been relaxed for the time being,
apparently in order to stop the grumbling of the businessmen who desire
"booms".

The parallel to Iran is significant in this respect too. There were
times in Iran, basically in the years before the big oil boom of 1975 to 1977,
when the population seemed content, appeared to be satisfied with their
progress (everybody was buying a car) and the Shah was on top of the situation.
When the boom collapsed, the Iranians became aware of the drawbacks of
their "bad quality" development. Saudi Arabia is now at the 1970 to 1974
stage of Iranian development. This could go on indefinitely but it seems
unlikely to do so. More likely is a breakdown, probably precipitating a
military coup, in the next five to seven years.

The danger to Saudi Arabia is the danger to all the Gulf states.
The small states cannot exist without the protective shadow of the conser-
vative "ancien régime" of Riyadh. Iraq might profit by the breakdown of
the royal regime and become the leading power in the Gulf - if at that time
the Gulf continued to exist as a political sub-system much as it is today.
This is uncertain. Upheaval in Iran brings the distinct possibility of
Soviet involvement, whether directly or indirectly via one or more of the
Iranian minorities (Arabs, Kurds, Baluchis). American involvement might
then be inevitable. Then the sub-system would dissolve into confrontation
of the two super-powers.

The External Danger: Iran plus the USSR

The fact that such developments have become possible if not probable already weighs heavily upon Saudi Arabia and the Gulf as a whole. Insecurity is aggravated by the fact, observable even by non-professional strategists, that in the region the US is presently clearly inferior to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless the US is the natural protector of the oil-rich, pro-Western, conservative Gulf regimes (Iraq plays a somewhat different role), and the rulers know it. They have really no choice but to stick to their informal and tacit US alliance. But they know that it is against their interest to advertise this alliance in any way. Demonstrable involvement with the US might mark them as targets for the regionally more powerful USSR but also, and much more dangerously, it might designate them "imperialists" and "reactionaries" to the radical Arab opposition. Palestine plays an important role in this and it will go on playing this role in the future because what nowadays is called a "Palestine settlement" will prove to be a chimera, whether as envisaged by the Camp David Accord or in an alternative form as now mooted by the European powers or in some kind of larger forum involving the Palestinians. It will be unattainable because the Palestinians are not willing to come to a definite peace with Israel, but rather will go on fighting against Israel from whatever state they might be able to secure for themselves in the future. The Gulf (and the rest of the world) will have to go on living with the dead weight of "Palestine" around their necks.

But in the case of Iran all is not lost. An evolution is conceivable (even though unlikely) which could lead to a more or less stable Iranian entity in the future which would continue to shelter the Gulf from direct Soviet involvement. Instead of running blindly after an unattainable peace between Palestine and Israel, Western statesmen should give more serious attention to Iran. To some degree the Middle East and the Gulf have been immunised against the Palestine question by sixty years of polemics. It will always remain a strong talking-point for the Arabs, but it will only be solved by the disappearance of Israel. The developments in Iran are different. The whole Gulf might be rolled up from the East if Iran were to be dominated by the Russians.

Some Questions

Is modernisation destabilising? - The answer must be that it depends on its quality; the worse the quality the more destabilising is modernisation.

Can this destabilisation cross frontiers into neighbouring countries? Definitely yes. Once there is chaos in one state, others will be infected, particularly if that state is a direct neighbour of the Soviet Union.

How can the pressure of modernisation be minimised? - By the establish-
ment of profitable enterprises and an awareness of the social, ecological and
political dangers of "bad quality" development. Modernisation means change
i.e. instability but, if the modernising process is accompanied by open
discussion of every step to enlist the support of as much of the population
as possible, change may be orderly. However, this means relaxation of
censorship. Censorship is the way/leaders seek to control dissent: never-
theless it is a recipe for revolution in the medium or long run. The more
development proceeds, the more vital is it to reduce censorship. This
cannot be done without fostering revolution if it is done too late.
Alternatively the mediaeval order can be maintained for a time, even while
the economy and government bureaucracy are modernised, so long as there is
a surplus of oil money with which to cushion hardships. But eventually the
"ancien régime" will probably crack. A "development dictatorship" can
maintain stability for a considerable period but it is likely that the
country will eventually have to pay for the imposition by a period of chaos
after the dictator has been removed. This is because the kind of progress
achieved will not have received the consent of the ruled.

Where is the next crisis to be expected in the Gulf? - Probably in
Saudi Arabia even if it is still a few years distant. It could be accelerated
and made much more explosive if the present troubles in Iran should lead to
Soviet involvement and consequently to the Gulf becoming a region of super-
power confrontation, whether military or political or both.

How does the West increase the dangers? - It stimulates oil production
and with it conspicuous consumption and the corresponding "bad quality"
development. The West can no longer guarantee regional security. It angers
the Arab world by its inability to solve the Palestine problem in the way
the Arabs would like.

What should be done to avoid destabilisation? - The West - politicians
and businessmen - must become aware of the importance of quality in the
development process. This ought to ensure some self-control and a revulsion
against profiteering, because the medium-term consequences of profiteering
are collective suicide via oil scarcity.

Early and cautious liberalisation and free discussion are essential.
The fear is however that it is already too late in most Gulf countries -
except perhaps in Oman. The West must address itself to the growing crisis
in Iran and in the whole Northern Tier from Turkey to Pakistan and find ways
to manage change. If order in the states in that region breaks down (and
they are, all three of them, not so far from breakdown), the danger to the
Gulf will be very great. Finally the West ought to reduce the irritant of
Palestine in a realistic fashion. To the author Camp David is not a realistic
approach, and any other "little Palestine" solution will only lead to
further struggles and exacerbation of the problem. If it cannot be resolved,
the Palestine problem ought at least to be kept as quiet as possible.
Unsuccessful negotiations and angry debate about it will merely increase the
sense of irritation and impatience.

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

22 ND ANNUAL CONFERENCE

PRESENTATION
BY
THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF ITALY
THE HON. LELIO LAGORIO
ON
"THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY"

STRESA, 11 SEPTEMBER 1980

THIRD WORLD CONFLICT

AND

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Mister Director, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I take great pleasure in conveying the welcome of the Italian Government to the IISS which once again has selected Italy for its important annual conference.

I know I am not stating anything new, but I am glad to say that it is almost impossible in the world to mention security, strategy and politics in general without reference to the IISS, which is considered the most authoritative forum 'for the discussion of international problems. I believe it might be of interest to you to know that in our country all those discussing our military policy always avail themselves of the IISS texts as an authoritative support for their thesis. This depends to a great extent on the validity and realism of many forecasts made on different occasions by your Institute, and on the importance of the themes on which your studies are based.

This will certainly be the case for the subjects selected for this conference. They are of the greatest topical interest insofar as they concern all the critical factors affecting world security. These are subjects which for some time now have been on the international scene, and which, at the moment, have become more serious exasperating the consequences of certain pre-existing conditions.

The first point I feel I could make in this respect is that the western countries have not always perceived timely the dramatic evolution of the situation.

Someone has written, in this regard, that "the Western democracies do not stand out for their foresight". I am afraid this is true but, above all, I fee that more than one reason for the deterioration of the world situation shoul unfortunately be imputed to this shortcoming.

There is an explanation, or a justification for this: in the democratic coun the just and constant pursuit of welfare and progress creates growing "expectations" - individual and collective in nature - and urges and engages ir stitutions and governments in a continuous daily activity, diverting their at tion from the overall wide-ranging long-term strategic problems.

It has happened therefore, that more than once in the last few years, we h to tackle the most serious international problems one by one, in a continge and pragmatic manner!

I do not believe that we can afford attitudes of this kind for a much longer 1 It is necessary instead to carefully observe and.... use imagination, not c to avoid a passive acceptance of events, but to influence them, trying to di the course of international relations from the present phase of sharp confr tion and tension towards a new phase of collaboration and agreements.

On this road of analysis and study your Institute plays an important role; ¡ ticians can fully avail themselves of your researches to update their evalu and make the necessary decisions in time.

The basic goal to aim at is the maintenance of the world balance.

This balance is now more unstable than in the past. As reported by the 4th Theme of your conference, the reduction in the two major powers' capabil ity of influencing and controlling the international scene has brought to be in this situation.

How can we respond?

Our transatlantic allies themselves, aware of this situation, have more than once advocated a more clear-cut European identity and recognized the importance of such a presence on the international scene. The People's Republic of China, although with different evaluations, is urging us in the same direction.

But, if the European contribution has to be concretely appreciable, particularly in the most critical sectors of international conflicts, national efforts alone are not sufficient, although they are precious when they can open a small breach in the wall of mistrust and fears separating the two big fields into which Europe is divided.

A European contribution, resulting from a coordinated action supported by a common integrated will, would be more useful.

This presupposes the birth of the "European Pole", but in the meantime it is desirable that through a closer, open and concrete European dialogue, the sound of the European voice that I believe the world is expecting, be expressed.

From the economic aspect, Europe is already a reality, but its security is still an unknown factor to be tackled. Already in 1950, Churchill asked whether we would be in time.

I believe that we should ask ourselves this question more urgently in the early 80s, but to find at last a concrete reply; it is our responsibility as Europeans - as underlined by the 2nd sub-theme of your conference - to create, patiently and steadily, in the context of European and international security, a connective tissue enabling us to put our efforts together, increasing their value and effectiveness outside our area.

I believe for example that we should develop in a more coordinated, realistic, open and if possible friendly way, the dialogue with the third world countries.

The North-South relations exist, but we must recognize that the East-West tension has often led us to underestimate them, thus making us forget that, when

security is involved, today one cannot but think in terms of global interests.

In fact, for a long time now, the survival problem has come to light.

A survival for which access to resources - 2nd theme of your conference-is undoubtedly now one of the most critical aspects for the western world, whose development cannot be fostered by national resources alone and which there-fore depends largely on the international political context.

Depriving us of resources,or denying our access to them,can in fact be a very effective means to reduce our capability to resist and indeed to exist. A new type of threat is thus born: no more the frontal one which opposed East to West for such a long time, and that we have peacefully faced for thirty years, but an "encirclement" threat. Thus a new dangerous means of indirect strategy is born.

Therefore, it stands from the foregoing that in the future deterrence and detente cannot be sought only vis-à-vis the East. The problem shifts, affects North-South relations, reaches other areas where certain interests of primary ma-gnitude for us are focused.

This new reality poses new questions. It is right that NATO commitments remain unchanged: its defensive and geographically limited nature does not change, but new situations can arise outside the NATO area of responsibility, vis-à-vis which, if the military pact machinery is not valid, the principles of the political Alliance can apply, and lead us to find - for common problems - agreed solutions safeguarding the irrenounceable principles of national sove-reignty, and permit the highest degree of effective and peaceful responses.

It is in this perspective that Italy accepts to increase her contribution to the overall security of the areas closest to us; for these reasons therefore our actions and our attention will turn to the Mediterranean or more precisely to those countries which at their discretion will be ready to consider and appre-ciate the Italian availability to help them.

A more evident Italian presence in this area can in fact constitute a positive element for reducing the tension in the region.

However, security in the third world countries - 1st and 5th theme of the con ference - cannot be based only on the collaborative will of our countries, but will have to rest above all on the political and socio-economic solidity of the individual countries and their possibility and determination to manage their own security; facilitating the achievement of these goals is therefore the the primary commitment of the West as a possible and acknowledged guarantor of the principles of national individual sovereignty, intangibility of frontie non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign countries.

The spontaneous growth of the developing societies should be followed, en- couraged,helped, without interferences, through the cooperation requested of us and that we will be able to provide, within the framework of a clear and balanced general policy.

In such a framework,the different causes for confrontation and tension cannot but decrease, thus giving a concrete thrust to the process of detente which, initiated a long time age, has always proceeded at a slow and uncertain pace and today seems to be deteriorated.

As for as Italy is concerned , I should conclude telling you that the Financial Times was right when it stated : "Italy is has shaken off her defence lethargy". We are considering, more then in the past, the problem of national and collect ive security; we are determined to carry out a more active and responsible role in the development of international policy. In my new capacity of Minister of Defence, I have delivered a long report on these points to the Italian Parlia- ment last June, and from that time the debate on defence problems and the in ternational role of Italy has become more lively in all fora, from parliamentary chambers to the press. Italy is a country which is facing now a lot of difficulties, but I beg you to believe that our Government feels to possess the necessary means to enable Italy to demonstrate to be a more active protagonist than in the past, in the efforts made for the maintenance of security and the strengthening of peace.

THE HON. LELIO LAGORIO – MINISTER OF DEFENCE

Mr. Lagorio was born in Trieste on November 9, 1925. He lives in Florence, is married and has two daughters. His father was an Army Staff Officer.

During the Fascism, when he was attending high school, he was repeatedly warned by the police for his actions of dissent within the school.

After the armistice of September 8, 1943 he collaborated with the National Liberation Committee of the Metalliferous Hills in Tuscany.

He graduated in law and for nine years was assistant to Professor Piero Calamandrei (a world-known jurist and one of the chiefs of anti-fascist Resistance) in the Chair of Comparative Trial Law at the University of Florence. A lawyer and a publicist, he contributes to many newspapers and politics and administration science reviews. He has been the editor of the politics and culture review *"Città e Regione"* since 1975. He is the managing director of the Study Center *"Lo Stato moderno"* an Institute of Research and Debates on State problems.

Enrolled in the Italian Socialist Party, he was Secretary of the Provincial Federation of Florence in the sixties and, later on, Regional Secretary of Tuscany. He has been a member of the Central Committee and the National Directorate of the Socialist Party since 1968 and 1970 respectively. He has been responsible for the socialist policy on defence, justice and public order since 1978. In this position he endeavoured to strengthen the links between military and civil circles and to give his party a socialist mark of European type backed by a modern government policy.

He is very experienced in local administration: from 1960 to 1964 he was vice-president of the Province of Florence and from 1965 to 1969 Deputy Major and Major of Florence. From 1970 to 1978 he was President of the Tuscany Region. On his regional experience he wrote *"A Region to be built"* (1975), *"A President in Tuscany"* (1977), *"A Region in the crisis"* (1979).

President Pertini, "motu proprio" has awarded him the decoration of Knight Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Italy.

As the candidate with most votes in the 14th Florence-Pistoia constituency he became a Member of Parliament as a result of the elections of June 3, 1979.

He has visited almost all European countries, the United States and the Soviet Union. On April 4, 1980 he was appointed Minister for Defence in the 2nd Cossiga Administration.

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Stresa, Italy - 11-14 September, 1980

THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE 1

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL CONFLICT

(i)   INTERNAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL STABILITY
               IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

by

Michael Nacht

IISS TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Committee 1: Internal Development and Regional Conflict

INTERNAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL STABILITY
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Michael Nacht

When Shah Pahlavi was forced to leave Iran in January 1979 two know-
ledgeable and prominent Americans publicly offered strikingly different
interpretations of what had caused his political downfall. Henry Kissinger,
former Secretary of State and a personal friend of the Shah's, argued that
Iran's fundamental problem was a mismatch between economic development and
political modernisation. As Iran experienced the enormous influx of petro-
dollars into its economy as a consequence of the quadrupling of oil prices
after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, forces for economic development were set in
motion that were felt in every corner of the society, forces that were
accompanied by desires for increased political participation that the Shah was
too slow to appreciate. When political demands went unheard, opposition to
the Shah's regime grew. Then, according to Kissinger, mismanagement of the
situation by the Shah, coupled with extraordinary demonstrations of weakness
and vacillation by the United States, led to revolution and the collapse of
authoritarian rule.

George Ball, former Under-Secretary of State, who had been called in by
the Carter Administration in December 1978 to provide an independent assess-
ment of the Iranian situation, saw matters differently. He claimed that the
Shah had a severe case of megalomania that had led to his systematic alien-
ation of most of the key elements in Iranian society. Ball judged that the
principal cause of the Shah's megalomaniacal behaviour was the enormous
quantity of sophisticated weapons Iran had received from the United States
since the early 1970s. By placing great reliance on Iran to be the police-
man of the Gulf, as part of the Nixon policy of using "regional hegemonies"
to protect American interests, the United States had unwittingly, according
to Ball, transformed the Shah from a minor despot to a leader with great-
power aspirations. In the process, the Shah became intoxicated with his own
power, surrounded himself with sycophants, encouraged corruption that became
pervasive, promoted domestic economic and social policies to suit his own
purposes, isolated himself from the crosscurrents developing within Iranian
society and, thereby, sowed the seeds of his own destruction.

Observers of the Iranian scene without political axes to grind or reputations to protect would readily admit that all of the characteristics cited by both Kissinger and Ball were prevalent in Iran. There was rapid and disruptive economic development that, in part, clashed with traditional norms and values. The growth of political participation did not accompany economic progress, and there was little evidence that it was likely to in the near future. The Shah was perceived by many Iranians as a corrupt, autocratic ruler, installed with American initiative, who permitted and even encouraged the use of secret police to root out and torture political opponents. He did have great-power aspirations encouraged by the growth of potent military forces armed with the most advanced American weapons; he was out of touch with sources of dissent in the society; and he was confused and ultimately let down by conflicting advice and declaratory policies offered by high-level US officials. What is far less clear, however, is what was decisive in leading to the Shah's downfall and what was peripheral. What mixture of economic, social, political and military developments really determined the Shah's fate? How, if at all, could the United States have acted more effectively? More importantly for the long term, how does the Iranian illustration of political instability in a developing society relate, if at all, to other manifestations of the same behaviour? Are there common threads between the Iranian case and Somoza's experience in Nicaragua, for example? What can we learn from the demise of Haile Selassie in Ethiopia or even from Castro's success in Cuba twenty years ago? Indeed, are there discernible patterns to political instability in developing countries or is every case sui generis?

Most importantly, what can these historical cases tell us about the future? What is the likelihood of political instability in Turkey,[1] Saudi Arabia, Mexico, the Philippines? What changes in domestic conditions or in the policies of external powers could reduce the probability of instability? And is the reduction of this probability uniformly desirable?

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[1] Turkey is a peculiar case and, arguably, should be omitted from this analysis. In economic terms, as measured by gross national product per capita in US dollars in 1977, it fell near the midpoint among 54 states classified as "middle income countries" by the World Bank. Its GNP per capita is less than that of Mexico, Jamaica, Lebanon, Chile, Panama, Iraq, Iran, Trinidad and Tobago and many other states in this category. But it is primarily a European society, it has a democratic form of government and it is, of course, a member of NATO.

These are enormously important questions for the student of economic and political development, for international business executives, for the citizens and governments of developing countries and for policy makers in the United States, the Soviet Union and other major powers. This paper does not provide the answers to these questions. It does, however, offer a way of structuring the issues and provides a set of propositions that deserve further investigation.

Clarifying Some Concepts

Because the problem of political instability in developing countries is, on its face, one of overwhelming complexity, it is useful to clarify what is relevant to our concerns and what is not. The political systems of the roughly 150 nation-states can be divided into three categories: democracies (about 25); communist states (about 20); and authoritarian states (about 100). More than 90 percent of the "developing countries" of Asia, Africa and Latin America have authoritarian governments which, according to Webster, "relate to or favour a concentration of power in a leader or an elite not constitutionally responsible to the people". There are no provisions for the legal and orderly transition of power in authoritarian governments, and their leaders must, therefore, necessarily rely on force of arms to retain power. This in turn means that any demonstrable sign of discontent or opposition to the ruling elite is in itself a threat to the existing social and political order. Strikes, antigovernment demonstrations, riots, major cabinet shifts and crises, vocal questioning of the ruling political party's legitimacy, and arrests of opposition leaders can all be classified as manifestations of "political instability" in authoritarian states.

But these actions take place all the time in developing countries, and most often the ruling elite rides out the problem without great difficulty. Therefore, "political instability" per se is not the principal focus of our concerns. What is of interest is leadership change that is followed by significant alterations in the domestic and foreign policies of the state. Authoritarian regimes have traditionally been prone to two forms of leadership change. The first, "political revolution", may be defined as a major alteration in government and society usually embodying a departure from the old order and typically carried out with violence. The second, coup d'état or "stroke of state" is the sudden overthrow of an existing government by an individual or small group, usually with only limited violence and sometimes with none at all. The coup d'état most often results in the abrupt replacement of leading government personalities but, unlike a revolution, it generally does not alter basic economic and social policies.

Coups d'état occur with great frequency in developing countries, Latin America in particular. Bolivia, for example, depending on how one counts, has had several hundred coups in its history as a state. But aside from Captain X replacing Colonel Y, very few substantive changes in domestic or foreign policy have followed as a consequence of these government changes. Because of their frequency of occurrence, because they most often affect little of note in social, economic or foreign policy, and because they involve few individuals usually acting with little advance notice, coups d'état are not at the centre of our concerns.

It is the phenomenon of political revolution, carried out over a period of months or even years, that is our main concern. It is this form of extra-legal regime change in developing countries involving the use or threat of force that leads to social transformation and fundamental policy shifts, often adverse to Western interests. It is this form of protracted political upheaval that provides both sufficient data for analysis and time for governments to act and react.

Consider, therefore, the multitude of possible combinations facing the analyst:

A. Manifestations of political instability that fail to lead to social or economic transformations or to extralegal regime changes - the seizure of the mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia; the armed insurrection against the Marcos government in parts of the Philippines; the student strikes against the South Korean military government, are recent examples.

B. Coups d'état that, after significant time delays, lead to major domestic societal changes and foreign policy shifts - the actions subsequently taken well after initial seizure of power by Nasser in Egypt in 1952 and Qaddafi in Libya in 1969 are examples.

C. Major domestic social change and foreign policy shifts without any extralegal regime change - Sadat in Egypt in the 1970s is a prime example.

D. Political instability that leads to extralegal regime changes, social transformation and foreign policy shifts - the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 is the latest illustration, with the Nicaraguan situation after Somoza perhaps not yet fully clarified to be so labelled.

We are not concerned with developed countries, and therefore the experience of the American, French and Russian Revolutions are not likely to be of help in the analysis. We are not concerned with centrally planned economies because the political and economic structure in such states is markedly different from those in authoritarian systems and because, in most cases, they are peculiarly susceptible to the threat of direct Soviet involvement. Hence, present difficulties in Poland and possibly future troubles in Yugoslavia, for example, are outside our purview. We are not concerned with major domestic or foreign policy shifts initiated by standing governments, and therefore the problem of "realignment" is not what we are addressing. We are most directly concerned with A and D above. We wish to know what mixture of characteristics of states in Category D permitted the flourishing of success-ful revolutionary movements and how governments in Category A have been able to weather severe political storms.

Causality, Prediction and the Problem of Multiple Indicators

Students of political revolution have traditionally sought to understand the revolutionary process in different social contexts and, from their analyses, to derive "causes" of revolution. Despite a voluminous literature, however, the explanatory power of the postulated theories remains low and the predictive power virtually non-existent.[2] Intimately connected to the study of revolution has been the effort to examine the process of political modern-isation more generally. Samuel Huntington and others have argued that the process is complex, systemic, global, lengthy, phased, homogenising, irrever-sible and progressive. But even the most intellectually compelling analyses of political modernisation provide little guidance as to how Shah Pahlavi could have avoided his fate or why President Marcos, faced with seemingly similar problems, has withstood successfully assaults on his rule for so long.

Since theorists of revolution and analysts of political modernisation have failed to provide much useful policy guidance, those interested in such matters have resorted to either ad hocracy or to selective comparative impressionism. In the former category are many government officials intimately familiar with a particular society who argue that every case is unique and that there is nothing to be learned from, for example, an examination of the Iranian case that could be of any use in understanding and assessing the internal situation in the Philippines. Since it is obviously the case that

[2] A useful summary of the evolution of this literature may be found in Jack A. Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation", World Politics, April 1980, pp. 425-453.

every state has certain unique features - geographical location, cultural composition of its populace, relations with foreign powers - there is some sense to this perspective. But at the same time policies must be formed on the basis of the most sensible predictions that governments can formulate. "We will do X because we expect Y", and the derivation of the expectation of Y should not be restricted to the characteristics that are sui generis to a particular state. It should be informed by a search for patterns that cut across the multiplicity of modernising societies. Only if a systematic effort to uncover such patterns fails to identify any meaningful conditions of commonality can the emphasis on ad hocracy be sustained.

Recognising intuitively that some common characteristics may be present between states in Categories A and D, some observers have leaped to the use of analogies based largely on astute but nonetheless impressionistic observations.[3] By selecting points of commonality and ignoring crucial differences a case can be built to support many persuasive arguments. But it is largely a political shot in the dark that could hit or miss its target. And this is no way to conduct informed policy analysis.

Moreover, the problem is complicated by the realisation that profiles of countries that have experienced extralegal regime changes are incredibly heterogenous: large and small states; those at the richer and at the poorer ends of the economic spectrum; among populations with varying religious orientations; and in virtually every region of the globe exhibiting a wide variety of topographical features.

Given the difficulties experienced by others in tackling this formidable intellectual problem, certain guidelines emerge.

1. The analysis should aim at producing probability estimates of regime change, given the presence of certain conditions, rather than emphasizing causality. Just as meteorologists do not have to understand fully the interaction of complex atmospheric and environmental conditions to be able to predict the weather with a reasonably high degree of accuracy, students of political instability should seek to identify the conditions that most often accompany regime change and should not focus on the development of an all-encompassing theory that identifies the precise causal relations among a set of complex and dynamic phenomena.

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[3] See, for example, John B. Oakes, "Like the Shah, President Marcos", The New York Times, July 6, 1980.

2. Economic, socio-cultural, political and military indices pertinent to the society and measures of the role of external powers must all be considered potential contributors to the likelihood estimator that any state would experience an extralegal regime change within a specific period of time. Multiple indices rather than a single dominant "issue" or "force" are the focus of the research.

3. Multiple indices of a dynamic rather than a static nature are more likely to be helpful in assessing the likelihood of regime change. It is not the absolute value of the state's GNP or GNP per capita, but trends in these statistics over time and the expectations these trends create among the populace that are important. A population that has long been ruled by a regime widely appreciated to be very corrupt, the norm rather than the exception in many (even most?) developing countries, may be indifferent to corruption as a political grievance unless, because of new-found wealth, the corruption spreads but certain segments of the population remain outside the reward system.

4. A research design is required that examines a wide range of indices for each developing country over a one- or two-decade historical period. Historical breadth is necessary to develop the most statistically robust likelihood estimators.

5. The research effort would benefit from two levels of analysis. Utilizing macrostatistical data and Bayesian probability formulations, quantitative assessments can be generated of the probability of regime change given the presence of certain conditions, based on the historical record (after all, we know which states in the last two decades had extralegal regime changes and which did not). Then utilizing these probabilities we can calculate the future likelihood of regime change if a given set of conditions are present. These probabilistic formulations (not statistical correlation coefficients) can be refined based upon the work from a second level of analysis: detailed case studies of states in Categories A and D. The richness of detail of historical case studies can provide major insights unreachable from the first level of analysis. They can assess the cumulative effects and non-linearities among indices. They can identify catalytic events that, in retrospect, seemed crucial in igniting opposition to the regime in power. And they can assess the roles of external powers in the state's economic, political and military affairs prior to, during and after the regime change.

This is a prodigious research effort barely outlined above.[4] It requires country-specific expertise and reasonably sophisticated data handling and analytic capabilities. It is inherently limited by problems of data quality and availability. There are intellectual minefields in linking results from the two levels of analysis. There are normative problems if, in addition to predicting regime change, the orientation of the work is exclusively to suggest policies designed to thwart social change in developing societies.

Each of these problems needs to be addressed in considerable detail. But the goal of the effort would be to offer the following observation based on the analysis of two decades of historical data and the generation of perhaps a dozen detailed case studies:

> Given that conditions x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4 and x_5 are present in Country X, the probability of political revolution in the next year is P_1 (or, the probabilities may be grouped into qualitative categories such as "virtually certai.", "highly probable", "highly unlikely", etc.)

Probabilistic formulations could be offered for a large number of states. Besides those analysed correctly, the classical two types of statistical error would be committed: some revolutions would occur that were not predicted, and some revolutions would be predicted that would not occur. By constantly updating the data base and refining the probability estimates, improved estimation capabilities should be perfected over time.

Moreover, in a subsequent phase of the research that focused more explicitly on the role of outside powers, it is conceivable that a result of the work could be:

> Given conditions x_1 . . . x_n, the probability of political revolution in Country X in the next year is P_1. But if Country X takes action j_1, thereby eliminating Condition x_1, the probability would be reduced to P_2 (where P_2 is less than P_1).

Should the whole effort fail to identify patterns of conditions leading to regime change and should the correspondingly generated likelihood estimators be consistently of low accuracy, this negative finding would itself be of use. It would reinforce the intuitive notion, held firmly by some, that only country-specific expertise is helpful in tackling this problem.

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[4] For more detail on an ongoing effort that follows these guidelines, see Steven E. Miller, Stephen M. Meyer, and Michael Nacht, "Everything You Ever Wanted to Ask about Patterns of Political Instability in Developing Countries and their Implications for American Policy but Were Afraid to Know", June 1980, mimeo.

Some Preliminary Insights

Researchers of political phenomena should be as agnostic about the
directions in which their research takes them as those in the natural
sciences, although this is an admittedly formidable request that is adhered
to far too infrequently. The research design outlined above is currently
being implemented and no explicit findings have yet been established. But in
an initial phase that has been completed, several preliminary insights have
emerged that are guiding the selection of indices and the structuring of the
case studies. These are summarised below.

1. Ideology of Opposition

A regime is effectively challenged by an opposition movement only
if the opposition can articulate both a set of convincing grievances
against the regime and a body of ideas directed at rectifying these
grievances. Jorge Dominguez, who analysed the Cuban revolution in great
detail, identifies the necessary ingredient as an "ideology of opposition".
In the preliminary work completed to date it has become apparent that an
ideology of opposition can be based on rectifying the trampling of religious
customs and traditional norms, as was the case in Iran; on providing a
preferred economic alternative to existing economic inequities, as was the
case in Nicaragua; on providing a more "just" political alternative to the
present system, as is the case in Taiwan. The major point is that an
opposition movement must be able to make a persuasive case that (a) their
grievances are "valid" within the given social context; and (b) they have
an effective remedy for these grievances.

2. Origin of Regime

A vital tool for opposition groups is to play on the illegitimacy
of the ruling elite. This illegitimacy argument is strengthened greatly
if the leader is not a home-grown product, if he/she was "installed" by
an outside power or if he/she has characteristics clearly alien to
important segments of the populace. A French-speaking, Catholic, urban
elite controlling a Vietnamese-speaking, Buddhist, peasant society in
South Vietnam, for example, did not ease Saigon's problem of winning the
"hearts and minds of the people". This charge of illegitimacy, therefore,
cannot be levelled easily against Sadat in Egypt or the Royal Family in
Saudi Arabia, whereas the case was much easier against Shah Pahlavi (a
"product of the CIA").

3. <u>Economic Performance</u>

There are a large number of indices worthy of detailed study in this category, including the extent of rising inflation rates, the rate of increase in unemployment, fluctuations in food production, and certain measures of income distribution. In several instances (Cuba, for example), a revolutionary movement was greatly strengthened after a period of sustained economic growth had been halted and a significant economic downturn had set in. This behaviour is closely related to the "J Curve" phenomemon identified in the literature on economic development. It would appear that improving economic conditions raise people's expectations greatly. Once the downturn sets in a great sense of disappointment materialises and the credibility of the regime becomes very suspect, providing fine recruitment opportunities for opposition groups.

4. <u>Social/Demographic Indices</u>

Preliminary efforts suggest two important indicators in this category: the growth of urbanisation and the growth of university enrollments. The seeds of several political revolutions are to be found in the large influx of population from rural to urban areas and the tremendous overcrowding that ensues with attendant shortages of housing and jobs. Urban slums are natural breeding grounds for political unrest. The more rapid the rate of urban migration, the greater the likelihood that the existing economic and social structure will be unable to accomodate the demands placed on it. Concomitant growth in university enrollments is important since institutions of higher learning serve as intellectual bases where the ideology of opposition can be formulated, refined and then promoted to target populations.

A third indicator that emerges more selectively is ethnic conflict. Many states are ravaged by cleavages between ethnic groups. But in many instances the clash is between a ruling elite representative of an ethnic majority and a disenfranchised ethnic minority. The opposition of such ethnic minorities most often takes the form of a separatist movement that seeks the establishment of its own ethnically homogeneous sovereign state – as the Ibos in Nigeria, the Basques in Spain, the Croats in Yugoslavia, the Kurds in Iran and Iraq. Such groups far less often pose a statewide challenge to the regime's authority.

5. Corruption

Corruption, that is "impairment of integrity, virtue or moral principle" or "inducement to wrong by bribery or other unlawful or improper means" is certainly very widespread throughout developing societies and is, in and of itself, not a potent force to be levelled against the ruling elite. The corruption argument does become potent under one of several conditions: if the corruption is restricted only to a small circle of friends, relatives and colleagues surrounding the leader and this state of affairs, formerly confidential, becomes widely known to the urban elite; if the corruption is pervasive and well known but then grows suddenly in magnitude with selected groups remaining outside the reward system; or if a ruling elite bases its legitimacy in large measure on religious piety but it then becomes widely perceived and publicised that it is also highly corrupt. Either "selective corruption" or the contrast between professed religious morality and demonstrated economic immorality (the latter seems to be a growing phenomenon in Saudi Arabia) can make the corruption issue an explosive political force.

6. Repression

Repression, like corruption, is pervasive throughout developing societies. Use of secret police, imprisonment of political opposition leaders, methods of torture and cruel and inhumane punishment, and summary executions carried out in secret are the norm in many developing countries. A sudden departure from practices long extant, however, can seemingly promote opposition. If the circle of repression widens, it can generate animosity among groups formerly thought to be "safe" from recrimination or part of the establishment. Easing of repression, especially by a leader under siege, may often encourage opposition movements that the leader is weakening and that their cause is winnable. Indeed, leaders who seemingly ease repressive measures solely to satisfy the demands of other governments, as both Shah Pahlavi and President Somoza did at the urging of the United States, may have weakened rather than strengthened their regimes as a consequence.

7. The Catalytic Event

Just as budding young actors often need a "break" to make it big - the star becomes ill and the understudy steps in and gains stardom - so revolutionary movements usually benefit from an unplanned event that triggers the growth of political opposition. Such a catalytic event can be the imprisonment or execution of an opposition leader; a gross violation of ethical or religious norms by the leader of the regime; or demon-

stration of a spectacular economic extravagance. It is extraordinarily difficult to identify such an event in advance of its occurrence, but in retrospect analyses of the regime change often point to a single excess by the ruling elite as providing the necessary momentum to bring about its own downfall.

8. Behaviour of External Powers

This area has not yet been well explored in the ongoing research effort. But the one crucial contribution that keeps recurring is the provision of arms or even combat forces by an external power to an opposition group. The role of military assistance to contending groups in a domestic political struggle is an important and complex subject the analysis of which deserves quite separate attention. But in preliminary analyses of a few selected cases there is a striking contrast between the Soviet ability to deliver large numbers of high-performance weapons on short notice to contending groups within developing countries and the much slower and less reliable response rate by the United States under similar circumstances. Moreover, the Soviet use of proxy forces and military advisors has been a major determinant of the outcome of some political struggles and has placed the United States at a significant disadvantage in several cases.

There are many additional indices within each category that require further investigation, and it remains to be demonstrated how crucial regional differences are in influencing the pattern of regime change in developing countries. Moreover, the complex pattern of interaction and influence among several of these characteristics has yet to be addressed.

Those engaged in this research retain their agnosticism about where their findings will lead. But their agnosticism is pervaded by optimism that useful predictors will be able to be generated and that both ad hocracy and selective analogising will be fall back positions that in the future at least they will not have to fall back to.

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THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE 2

RESOURCES AND CONFLICT

(i) RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS, DEPENDENCIES
AND VULNERABILITIES FOR THE
INDUSTRIALISED STATES

by

Robert Perlman

IISS   TWENTY-SECOND   ANNUAL   CONFERENCE

Committee 2:   Resources and Conflict

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Robert Perlman

Since the early 1970s there has been a great deal of discussion as well as
a great deal of anxiety in the industrialised countries about the security of
supply of the most important industrial raw materials. It is interesting to
note that there is less worry in the rich countries about supplies of food-
stuffs, which are, after all, ultimately the most important commodities of all.
The developed countries have devised incentive systems and farm support
measures which not only rule out the prospect of any serious shortages but
actually generate regular and embarrassing surpluses. There are political
explanations for this with some implications for minerals policy, which will
be touched on later in this paper.

These worries about raw material supplies are not new, but have recurred
in the industrialised countries over the years. There was general anxiety in
the face of the sharp rises in prices set off by the Korean war in the 1950s.
This generated a spate of reports on the dangers of shortages and measures
for dealing with them. One consequence was a greatly expanded acquisition
programme by the General Services Administration (GSA) in the USA, whose
stockpile of minerals and metals continues to be a major factor in a number
of markets.

Most major industrialised countries have gone through at least one period
when the security of future supplies has been a major source of worry. Most
often the worries have been set off by the running down of the domestic
commercially exploitable reserves of some important non-renewable resource.
Indeed, the present level of concern around the world is at least partly due
to the fact that the last major boom and the oil price rises which marked its
end coincided with a marked decline in the self-sufficiency of the USA, the
biggest consumer of almost everything, whose praiseworthy habit of discussing
its national worries in public has helped focus attention on raw materials
questions.

Other countries less well endowed with minerals than the USA faced similar crises in the past. In the case of the United Kingdom, overseas sources had to be resorted to in the first half of the 19th century. We are so used to this now that it comes as a surprise to learn that until then the United Kingdom was not only self-sufficient in most of the minerals it needed, it was also a significant exporter of minerals, and remained the largest producer of primary copper until the middle of the century. It is scarcely less startling to recall now that until 1955 Japan met 100 percent of its copper and zinc consumption and 80 percent of its lead consumption from domestic mines and scrap sources. Most of the older established metal smelting and refining industries were set up to work local ores, but have developed and survived on overseas materials.

A supply of metal concentrates is clearly a necessity if a metal smelting and refining industry is to stay in business. To gain a clear picture of dependence and vulnerability it is necessary to discuss first how far such supplies - and supplies of other raw materials - are a national necessity, or how far nations will behave as if they are national necessities, then to look at levels of self-sufficiency and finally at general availability.

Most of the attention in previous discussions has been concentrated on assessments of reserves, locations of economic sources and measures for securing supplies. Rather less attention seems to have been given to the primary questions of what makes particular materials important, and whether consuming countries must necessarily remain not only dependent on supplies from particular sources, but in need of direct supplies of particular raw materials at all.

Furthermore, there is a very important distinction to be made between the immediate position and the longer term. It may be possible to reduce vulnerability by developing substitute sources of substitute materials, for instance, but this could take many years, and even when many sources already exist finding immediate supplies is often difficult in a sudden crisis.

Dependence

We recognise what ordinary necessities are, the supplies we need to sustain ordinary life, and our living standards. Industrial processes also have a requirement for particular materials, necessary for their normal functioning. Thus, raw materials needs in an economy fall into two classes:

- Satisfaction of final demand - providing what consumers want: food, fuel, clothes, furniture, shelter, or services (which may depend on machinery, fuel, etc.).

- To enable "economic activity" to be sustained - to enable industries to earn a return by adding value through processing, fabricating and distributing raw materials and their products, including selling them abroad, to pay for more industrial supplies and for consumer goods and services.

The list of materials which may give rise to anxiety varies from country to country, as the list reflects industrial structures as well as final consumer needs. For example, the Japanese economy was built up after the Second World War by a huge expansion of basic industries, with a gradual move downstream to more advanced manufacturing. It remains heavily dependent on its basic industries, and this is reflected in its consumption of raw materials per unit of national output, higher in almost every case than any other country (see Appendix notes).

The list of requirements for a particular country varies over _time_ as well. This is because dependence on a particular raw material is not related to the raw material itself but to the special properties it contains be it energy, strength or the supply of protein. Since these properties are often shared by other raw materials, demand for one or other raw material will alter depending on technical suitability, cost competitiveness and availability. Thus a country's industrial structure changes in response to the availability or relative cost of major raw materials, and this changes its potential _demand._ Changes in structure are usually slow but can be surprisingly fast. The availability of cheap oil supplies from the late 1950s stimulated energy-dependent and petrochemical-dependent industrial expansions and structural changes which very quickly resulted in heavy dependence on oil, exploited so effectively by suppliers since 1973. This comparatively recent development can be reversed, but since the dependence is a result of 20 years of oil-biased capital and consumer investment, the cost of rapid change away from oil is likely to be similar in scale to those past investments.

Energy, and hence oil, presents a special case. Its applications are much more generally diffused through all economics than even such common materials as steel and copper, and it is, moreover, a material consumed by final users and by manufacturing industry, fully in daily uses, rather than embodied in equipment which subsequently has a long useful life. As a result, there is an urgency about immediate supplies of energy not felt in the case of many other raw materials. The dependence is, however, on energy rather than on oil. Oil is convenient, and it used to be cheap, so it became the preferred

energy source during the period of rapid economic development after the Second World War. Other sources have been dominant in the past, notably coal, and change away from oil is already taking place (although perhaps at too slow a rate) in response to prospects of ever higher prices.

Change away from more specific raw materials is also possible, although it may impose special difficulties and high costs in the short term. This can take the form of pure substitution (aluminium for copper wire for telephone cables) and technically-based product change (satellite communications eliminating some cable links altogether) or changes in industrial structure (buying wire rod from overseas integrated copper and aluminium producers instead of operating smelters and casting lines) which will make manufacturers only indirectly dependent on primary materials supplies.

The security of supply can be improved by changes on the production side. High prices call into production orebodies hitherto commercially unattractive, or can justify increased exploration efforts, or can stimulate research and development which makes more of the potential sources commercially attractive. In this way the very price rises which follow from an impending chronic shortage help to correct the market. However, there are often imperfections, and the time taken to bring new sources into production results rather in cycles of surplus and shortage than continuous response, even when a large range of near economic sources are known. One of the difficulties for oil consumers has been the wide difference in production costs between OPEC oil and new wells elsewhere, which permits OPEC producers to add a large element of "producer rent" to their prices.

Directly or indirectly the industrialised countries depend on primary exporters. But then in a sense they have chosen to be dependent. They have chosen, and in some cases have developed, sources of supply for their cheapness and convenience, and have built income-generating industries around these supplies and a particular cost structure. In the short run their industries, their income and hence their living standards are vulnerable to cost rises and supply interruptions. In the long run there may be a prospect of reducing vulnerability through changes in sources, in the materials required or in the industries they rely on for their international income.

Vulnerability

Dependence on foreign sources of supply, however, need not imply vulnerability, so the nature of vulnerability must be considered in the context of raw materials more closely, to see how serious the dangers may be. The vulnerability of the industrialised countries can be summed up in five questions:

- Is there going to be a scramble for world resources?
- Will important materials supplies be controlled by producer cartels?
- Will primary exporters reduce supplies of raw materials and establish their own processing industries?
- Will there be political interference in supplies?
- Will war or disorder or simple technical inadequacies cut off supplies or subject them to frequent interruptions?

Will there be a scramble?

The question raises memories of 19th century "resources" wars, has undertones of fears of exhaustion of resources, and has been asked increasingly in the face of the Soviet Union's rising import requirements in recent years.

Alarmist ideas of a world scraping the bottom of its barrel of resources with increasingly violent conflicts between nations over what remains should certainly be abandoned. Mineral resources do not occur in discrete bodies, but in various forms of concentrations and diffusions in the earth's crust, which become workable sources under certain conditions of demand and with particular assortments of technology. Companies and governments are anxious about their security of supplies and would no doubt like complete control of plentiful low cost sources. However, they no longer assume that they have to fight wars and extend empires to guarantee access. The Japanese Government's reaction to declining self-sufficiency in materials in the 1950s was to stimulate and encourage exploration and investment in new areas. As a result world reserves and supply sources have been added to. Governments elsewhere have since framed policies on similar lines, although on a more modest scale, and some new projects are now beginning under these schemes. The EEC Commission has for a year or so been trying to coordinate and extend the programmes of member governments to improve the security of overseas mineral supplies.

The case of cobalt illustrates how a market can be transformed by new development. The world has for years been dependent on Zaire for about a third of its supplies of this metal, with Australia, Zambia, New Caledonia and the CMEA (COMECON) countries providing much smaller quantities. It is an important alloying element in certain special steels, and is virtually indispensable in the manufacture of small high-powered magnets used in weapons, guidance systems, microphones/loudspeakers and similar applications. Designers have optimised the use of cobalt alloy magnets, and are unable to change designs at short notice. Hence, during shortages, users will certainly scramble for the small amounts of cobalt they need. High prices and the prospects of continued dependence on cobalt have transformed sub-economic

deposits into commercial prospects. Production has expanded in Zambia, and a new mine in Canada will shortly add large quantities to supplies. In the longer run, cobalt by-product recovery from ocean nodules could dwarf the output of all present mines taken together. Indeed, this highlights one of the important developments in the pattern of raw material availability since the Second World War. Sources of supply have been increasing as more and more countries have become first-time producers of minerals and metals.

Despite the _possibilities_ of finding and developing new supply sources, these still have to be realized and, if efforts are pitched at too low a level, there will be insufficient additions to reserves to guarantee supplies to meet projected demand. For a time this could produce shortages through lack of exploration and investment rather than through lack of materials in the ground. The current anxiety is that shortages in the mid 1980s resulting from depressed prices for most non-fuel raw materials and consequent under-investment in new capacity in the second half of the 1970s will be exacerbated by the growing needs of the CMEA (COMECON) countries. From being mainly sellers of raw materials, especially minerals, they have recently become net buyers.

Too little is published or known about the main producer - the USSR - to know whether this will be a permanent position. Certainly it can be expected that the countries of the CMEA (COMECON) will continue to develop industry on lines similar to industries in the West, away from dependence on basic extractive and transformation industries and towards more emphasis on downstream industries. This will result first in a fall in their primary materials and basic metals exports, and later in an import requirement for these. Will they be content to compete with Western countries on purely commercial terms? Will they want to remain dependent on outside sources in the long run? On the supply side there has already been some quasi-commercial involvement by CMEA (COMECON) countries in minerals developments abroad. The Hungarians are giving technical assistance in alumina production to Jamaica and India and to a new development in Greece (where the bauxite has similar characteristics to Hungarian deposits). East Germany has in the past cooperated in the planning and development of African potash deposits, and there are CMEA (COMECON) country technical assistance schemes in other countries in Africa.

But in the short run Soviet purchases of lead and copper, and a decline in Soviet and other CMEA (COMECON) exports of aluminium ingot and other primary metals have helped to keep prices up when they would otherwise be languishing during the present recession. The changed position may be purely

temporary, reflecting slow development of new mines and production difficulties in mines and smelters. The USSR in particular seems constantly short of ordinary production technology, design capacity and skilled labour. Exports of Western technology and equipment may be one way to correct production shortfalls, which would be a double advantage to the West under present conditions.

But to return to the main point, if there is no danger of terminal shortages of raw materials through the exhaustion of resources, which would set off a wild scramble and price rises, are there other causes for concern? More specifically, is there a danger of OPEC-type producer cartels being established, able to restrict supplies and manipulate prices and hence with the power to exert international leverage in that way?

Will there be more cartels?

Cartels are not made effective simply by producers setting up a club and calling out a price. A number of conditions must be met by members of a successful cartel, and they are rarely found together:

- they must control a large proportion of supplies;
- these should include lower cost supplies and any large sources which can be increased at short notice;
- there should be no easily-used substitute, at least in the short to medium term;
- they should have enough feeling of identity of interest to accept disciplined control of output.

OPEC met these conditions, although even its members have protracted arguments about policy, partly because some members (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) have an interest in long-term revenue maximization whereas (in the past at least) others have had an interest in maximizing short-term earnings. OPEC has many imitators, but none has equalled its success. Morocco, holder of the largest reserves of phosphate rock in the world, tried single-handed to transform the phosphate rock market in 1974. It was able to raise prices by exploiting an inelastic market in the short run, but the rise provoked an expansion of production elsewhere and the price soon slumped and remained low for some years.

Unlike either OPEC or Morocco, the metals producers have to contend with scrap-based supplies, which are necessarily present in quantity in established consuming countries and as near perfect a substitute as can be imagined. Few producers enjoy the same obvious cost advantage as OPEC against alternative sources. This is required if demand is to prove as inelastic as oil demand.

Whereas a scramble for resources ends with winners and losers among the consumers, all the consumers are losers when a cartel forces prices up. The effect is to transfer income to the cartel members. If this transfer is very large it acts as a deflationary tax on the consumers' economies, and in the absence of sufficient compensating expenditure by the cartel members, the consumers' economies wind down and require low levels of raw materials supplies. When price rises coincide with recessionary pressures, a supply surplus soon builds up. This happened with oil as the world economy went into recession in 1974-75 and is happening again now.

Although there may be some satisfaction in seeing that economic forces do set limits to the level to which even oil prices can rise, the oil surpluses that have been seen in two recessions are a source of danger because they have led to false conclusions about the long-term supply position. Oil is as near indispensable as any industrial material can be. Its former cheapness and continuing convenience in use has resulted in its wide diffusion through all economies, and lives and industrial processes have been adapted to and become dependent on its availability. Hence demand for oil is virtually "price inelastic" in the short term - a price rise does not result in reduced consumption. However, for much the same reasons, it is highly "income elastic" - consumption rises and falls almost exactly im proportion to changes in national income levels.

The industrial nations can reduce dependence on oil, particularly dependence on OPEC supplies, by developing alternative fuels, alternative oil sources and using different fuel-consuming processes and equipment which either dispense with oil or reduce unit consumption. However, this is an expensive and time-consuming exercise. A start has been made, but the oil surpluses of the mid-1970s and of 1980 and weakening prices have reduced the immediate incentives for pressing on with oil replacement programmes. Yet as soon as economies revive, demand will rise again and restore a sellers' market.

There are no prospects for other raw material cartels with the strength of OPEC because no other commodity or producer group fits the requirements so perfectly. For example, the International Bauxite Associateon (IBA) can co-ordinate members' pricing policies and negotiating terms and thereby improve revenues, but the most significant move in bauxite markets was made by a single producer, Jamaica, which did no more than exploit its special position as local supplier to the US market. Its first bauxite export tax almost precisely matched the difference between the costs of production and transport and the potential c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) price at US bauxite ports of supplies from other sources. In economic terms, Jamaica took (and is taking) the "producer rent" on its exports.

Other IBA members can equally exploit special positions, and the exchange
of ideas among IBA members helps them recognise the market possibilities, but
these fall far short of oil's possibilities, mainly because of the scope for
substitution. This is possible at:

- The raw material stage. The technology of alumina production from
  non-bauxite sources is known and tried (USSR up to the present,
  Germans in Norway in the Second World War, etc.) but expensive by
  comparison and it would, of course, take time.

- The finished metal stage. Aluminium sales have expanded faster than
  economies as a whole through gaining market shares, often on cost
  grounds. It could equally lose on cost grounds.

The aluminium example can be multiplied by reference to most other
materials. However, the absence of conditions for a successful and long-lived
cartel through control of supplies does not mean that producers will not be in
a strong position from time to time during the business cycle through demand
rising faster than supply.

Such demand-induced shortages give producers temporary power which may
seem similar to the power of a strong cartel. This power may be used only to
raise prices, or it may be used for longer lasting effects, such as requiring
assistance in establishing local processing. This general move to more pro-
cessing could have the effect of reducing the availability of raw materials
supplies to dependent processors, irrespective of the total materials output.
How serious a threat will this be?

Local processing by exporters

This is declared policy, and one which is already in evidence in both the
rich primary producers, the LDC primary producers and the USSR. In the short-
to-medium run it will cause difficulties to industrialised countries committed
to a large primary processing sector. These will face rising supply costs,
and ultimately can expect to reduce their scale of operations unless they have
some special skill to offer which is not easily acquired - such as the treat-
ment of difficult metal concentrates, or high rates of recovery of saleable by-
products and elements present in small concentrations.

In the long run, these basic industries could be expected to decline in
the industrialised countries anyway, and the switch to processing at origins
will only speed these changes. Dependence on raw materials will be replaced
by dependence on refined metals, refined petroleum and so on. If processing
at origin is efficient, can be done at low cost and deliveries prove to be
reliable, the consumer countries may be no more vulnerable in future than,

say, European companies currently importing steel from Japan are vulnerable now. The conclusion is obvious: <u>technically experienced companies from the advanced countries should bid to design, install and, if possible, operate the new processing plants, rather than seek to discourage them.</u>

Political Interference

The more serious problem for companies and industrial importing countries to deal with is interference in trade from political motives. Consumers are vulnerable to two kinds of political interference:

- The effects of government ownership of control in primary producing countries.

- The deliberate disruption of supplies by enemies.

Since the 1960s there has been an increasing tendency for governments to take control of national mineral resources. This has disturbed supplies quite accidentally in some cases. New proprietors require time to learn their business, and in the process make some mistakes - miscalculate the effect of changes in tax and equity ownership rules, fail to appreciate the nature of prospecting and exploration and so on. There is also an inevitable decline in total flexibility when a business formerly operated on a worldwide basis is changed into a series of separate national operations. The prospects of profitable new finds are mathematically diminished when exploration work is confined to a single country. There are also short-term effects, summed up with respect to the oil industry in a recent Shell publication:

"One of the strengths of the integrated oil companies was their ability to accommodate the very substantial fluctuations in demand levels in the consuming countries. This flexibility enabled them to fill supply deficits resulting from technical or political problems as well as matching the more predictable seasonal demand variations - worldwide, up to 8 million b/d between summer and winter levels - and the corresponding change in the balance of demand for different oil products".

But apart from the more accidental repercussions, the involvement of governments can also lead to more deliberate interference in supply, or the threat of it, for purely political motives. But again, for permanent political pressure of this sort to be effective, the same conditions have to be met as for a long-lived cartel. So, except for oil, it is only the possible short-term dislocations that governments dependent on foreign sources of supply have to worry about. If these are considered serious enough, one obvious solution is to stockpile. But, as with any insurance policy, the benefits have to be

traded off against the costs of building up and maintaining such a stockpile, though the very existence of the stockpile will reduce the chances of politically motivated disruption occurring in the first place.

This leads on to the sort of supply disturbances which are essentially unpremeditated in origin, but nevertheless can be fairly disruptive in their effects.

Supply Interruptions

The accidental disruptions to supply which result from transport breakdowns, technical failures at mines and oil wells, civil disorders, industrial disputes and local wars are as damaging as deliberate interruptions. They are not new to mining, but they may have become more frequent as a result of resort to remote and under-developed mining areas, and the localisation of ownership and management and a consequent lack of access to experienced staff. Production and deliveries from the central African copper mines have been the most frequently disturbed over the last ten years. Indeed fears for copper supplies at the time of the illegal declaration of independence by the white Rhodesians prompted the British Post Office to embark on ambitious and successful pioneering work in the development of aluminium telecommunication cables. The disturbances were neither as serious not as long-lived as the Post Office engineers had feared, but they now depend on a more "reliable" material, with more predictable prices, and can count this as a benefit.

In many countries these disturbances to supplies are regarded both as the most likely and the most damaging prospect for the 1980s. Reports on national exposure have usually concentrated on vulnerability to disruptions resulting from war and civil disturbances. This can fairly be referred to as the "Southern Africa effect" in view of the unanimity with which stockpile reports recommend holding tonnages of minerals, supplies of which are dominated by South Africa - chromite, vanadium, platinum, manganese and so on.

Since disruptions to supply are nothing new to the raw materials industry, the market and the users have learnt to absorb these shocks by maintaining stocks. As long as disturbances are no more frequent or severe than in the past (or than expected), industry and merchants between them could be expected to deal with them, whether the causes of the disturbances are purely technical or political, but not if they are worse than expected.

It is this risk, that the market will not take precautions for very speculative possible disruptions, or will exploit a strong sellers market, which prompts governments to investigate the prospects and scale of disruptions and devise ways of adding to stock levels, so as to iron out price peaks and avoid shortages. However, there is a danger that simply setting up a government stockpile will actually be counter-productive. Companies and

stockholders who would otherwise raise their level of precautionary stocks might actually reduce them and rely on the availability of government stocks in a crisis. Fears of this effect have led to such proposals as the West German government's financing scheme. This requires stocks to be held as an addition to normal stocks by traders and consumers, and gives loans at preferential interest rates for the additional stocks.

In a free market economy it is difficult to recover the extra costs which would be imposed on users by resort to sub-economic sources of minerals while supplies from cheaper sources are available. However, old established industries with political influence (and importance within the economy) may be able to convince their governments of the need to support a domestic minerals procurement programme. With the obvious exceptions of USA, Brazil, USSR, China, the industrial consuming countries are mostly too small to hold a wide range of potential mineral sources, but if they operate in larger economic groupings they may have scope for collective self-sufficiency in a number of minerals.

It will be interesting to see how attitudes will develop in the enlarged EEC. There the great political influence of the agricultural sector has enabled it to achieve a degree of protection and support for sub-economic farms which generates regular gluts, which are difficult to dispose of for a number of reasons.

There are many differences between minerals and food production, of course. Even sub-economic resources are far less evenly distributed around the world than good farm land, and no mining and metals sector in the advanced countries could expect to match the political influence of the agricultural sector. However, the difference between market prices and estimated costs for some sub-economic deposits is no greater than the difference between some of the EEC support prices and world market prices. For general consumers the restricted occurrences of orebodies would at least have the advantage of setting a natural limit to an EEC Minerals Support budget which is lacking in the case of the CAP!

Although nothing as extravagant as the CAP is likely to develop, the mood of protectionism in advanced country industries opposing the drive for industrialisation based on local processing among the primary exporters could extend into mineral production. In closing, we should consider whether the ultimate result of fears of dependence and vulnerability in the developed countries will be not a growth of interdependence through international division of labour, but a more protectionist world dedicating an excessive proportion of labour and income to raw materials, and suffering more frequently from surpluses than from shortages.

Conclusion

In assessing the dependence and vulnerability of the industrial countries, and how conflicts in the Third World could affect them, the following main points should be borne in mind:

- Dependence on imports for raw materials supplies does not amount to vulnerability unless major supply sources are limited and alternative sources or substitute materials are very expensive or difficult to develop.

- The major industrial countries have become increasingly dependent on foreign sources for their raw material supplies, but, other than in oil, this development has not made these countries dramatically more vulnerable than they were one or two decades ago.

- Oil is a special case because it is of such generalised importance in all economies. Dependence on OPEC oil supplies has persisted because industrial structures were built up on cheap oil in the 1950s and 1960s, and oil surpluses in recessions have deterred single-minded development of alternatives.

- As for non-fuel raw materials, short-term disruption to supplies is more likely and more damaging than long-lived squeezes on supplies, but can be insured against by stockpile investment.

- Reducing vulnerability in the long term requires financial and resource-using programmes now. Supplies of some important raw materials are effectively secure because of past development programmes. Development of synthetic materials or changes to the industrial base are usually expensive in the short term but effective in the long term.

- If policies for reducing dependence are pursued too vigorously, the future may be disturbed more often by raw materials surpluses, and waste of productive resources in LDCs, than by shortages. Fears that this could happen are already detectable in discussions on ocean nodule exploitation in negotiating sessions on the Law of the Sea.

APPENDIX

Notes on Commodities

/This Appendix makes use of the term "intensity of use".
This relates the materials consumption of a country to
its national income (Gross Domestic Product or GDP).
The figures used are forecasts for 1985 taken from
"World Demand for Raw Materials in 1985 and 2000", a
report to the US Department of Commerce prepared by
Professor W. Malenbaum and assistants at the Wharton
School of Finance and Commerce, Philadelphia, Pa, USA.
The report uses a GDP unit of US $1,000 million in
constant dollar terms. Estimates for world reserves
are taken from the annual publication of the US Bureau
of Mines, "Mineral Commodity Summaries"./

Iron and Steel

Iron and steel are of great importance to all economies, but iron is
also in poentiful supply. It is one of the most abundant of elements in the
earth's crust. More important for the metal industries, workable commercial
deposits are widely distributed around the world, and the very high intensi-
ties of use should give nobody any cause for alarm. The most dependent of
the rich countries is Japan. It has very little workable resources of its own,
but has no difficulty in acquiring large quantities of high grade ore from
large deposits in Australia and South America. Indeed in this commodity,
Japan's huge requirement has given it great bargaining power. The Chinese
economy requires almost as much iron and steel for each unit of GDP as Japan,
despite their wide differences in total income level. As could be expected
in a country as large as China - and one so far relatively under-developed -
there are large usable iron ore deposits. The shortage, here as in other
Chinese industries, is rather skilled labour and technology than materials.
The high Chinese requirement for steel during the next twenty or thirty
years of industrialization amounts to a heavy dependence on imports, either
of steel or technical assistance and industrial equipment, or both.

The strong emphasis on basic industries which continues to mark the
economies of the USSR and the European members of the CMEA (COMECON) makes
them almost as steel-intensive as China. They are equally unworried about
iron ore supplies, as over 40 percent of explored reserves are within the
Soviet Union's borders, and they are better placed to equip and maintain
their own steel plants. In fact, the chief cause of tension in this sector
is the accusations from Western European steel producers that CMEA (COMECON)
steel is being offered at "dumped" prices in Europe, a sign of the general
over-capacity and over-production in world steel.

IRON and STEEL

Intensity of use per unit of GDP 1985 (thousands of tonnes)

	Iron Ore (Fe content)	Crude Steel
Western Europe	95	135
Japan	180	260
Other developed Countries	125	135
USSR	150	190
Eastern Europe	95	190
Africa	70	75
Asia	60	150
Latin America	80	130
China	175	200
USA	60	100
World	101	148
Poor Countries	95	147
Rich Countries	103	148

Reserves of Iron Ore (Millions of tonnes)

USA	17,272
Australia	17,781
Brazil	27,230
Canada	36,578
India	9,144
USSR	110,750
World Total	258,077

Attempts by iron ore producers to form a united front to extract higher prices for their product, or to oblige consumers to take semi-processed ore, so as to increase import revenues through adding value, have had little success. This has been due mainly to the abundance of good reserves (and mining and shipping capacity) but stagnation in the older steel industries has also contributed to a buyer's market. There is no prospect that either deliberate or accidental interruption of supplies from a particular source would seriously disturb the market or cause embarrassment to any large consumer.

Manganese

The steel industry is the most important consumer of manganese. It is used both as a process chemical (inhibiting steel reoxidation) and as an alloying element (improving strength and other characteristics). Its intensity of use follows roughly that of iron and steel, except that the poorer countries tend to use it more intensively than the rich, and by far the most intensive user is the USSR. This divergence from the steel pattern is explained mainly by price and availability: manganese is relatively cheap, and the processes using it relatively unsophisticated and cheap. The USSR has enormous productive resources. India too is well-endowed.

Commercially exploited resources are unevenly distributed around the world and this is one of the minerals where South Africa and the USSR are together by far the most important suppliers. As in other cases, this makes an effective cartel unlikely, for political reasons, but also subjects supplies to the dangers of a war in Southern Africa, from which the USSR would make immediate commercial gains. However, there are large mines and reserves in Australia, in Brazil and in poorer African countries which could meet some of the shortfall and the vulnerability is strictly short-to-medium-term. Manganese is the predominant constituent of metalliferous ocean nodules, which, it is variously estimated, could supply 260 million to 18,000 million tonnes of manganese. Supplies from the oceans would have such an impact on the market for an already modestly priced product that it will not be worth exploiting the nodules for manganese alone. However, several consortia are keeping the possibility of recovering copper or nickel commercially and these see manganese as a source of additional by-product revenue. Production is highly unlikely before the very end of the 1980s, but is a strong possibility for the 1990s.

In this case dependence is mainly on South African and on some Soviet supplies for the OECD steel industries during the 1980s, with the USSR in a very secure surplus position. Beyond the 1980s there is a group of poorer countries vulnerable to a collapse of earnings from manganese exports. These longer-term considerations are items on the agenda of the discussions on a new Law of the Sea to apply to minerals production. The positions adopted by the participants at these discussions have been entirely predictable and almost entirely a reflexion of their national economic interests - whether they have minerals to sell and whether they depend on imports and have the technology to replace those imports by recovering and treating nodules.

MANGANESE and PLATINUM

Intensity of use per unit of GDP 1985

	Manganese (thousands of tonnes)	Platinum (Troy oz)
Western Europe	4.0	675
Japan	6.0	7300
Other developed Countries	4.2	1450
USSR	10.0)	
Eastern Europe	5.0)	925
Africa	7.5	600
Asia	7.5	800
Latin America	6.0	250
China	7.5	950
USA	1.7	1450
World	5.0	1444
Poor Countries	7.0	629
Rich Countries	4.6	1595

Reserves

	Manganese		Platinum
	(millions of tonnes)		(thousands of tonnes)
Australia	299.4	South Africa	580,000
Brazil	86.2	USSR	200,000
Gabon	149.7		
India	59.0		
South Africa	1996.0		
Socialist Countries	2721.6		
World Total	5443.1		790,000

Chrome Ore

Chrome is an important ingredient in high-performance steel alloys and
stainless steel as well as a decorative plating metal for steel and brass.
Its intensity of use follows closely the worldwide distribution of special
steel production areas, led by Japan, but technical developments have affected
the pattern in the last ten years and the pattern will continue to change. It
is an interesting case for illustrating how technology can, in a sense, sub-
stitute for scarce resources. New developments have enabled steel-makers to

use lower grades of chrome-containing materials and to use lower quantities of chrome metal per unit of special and stainless steel output. This has been a response to the scarcity of high grade chromite supplies, reserves of which are concentrated in South Africa, Zimbabwe and, to a lesser extent, in the USSR.

Large sections of the world steel industry continue to be critically dependent on South African supplies, directly or indirectly (because of the influence on price exercized by South African mines). As chrome is needed in fairly small quantities but is indispensible, chrome ore and ferro-chrome figure on most industrial countries' lists of materials for stockpiling or for supply diversification. The Philippines, as one of the few non-African LDCs with known resources, has attracted new investment and long-term supply contracts from consuming countries. Smaller deposits in Europe are also being developed.

As it is important in the production of high performance steels, chrome is an ingredient in the very industries which have developed in advanced countries as the importance (and profitability) of basic metals industries has declined. For this reason it is quite rightly regarded as of critical importance. Although the figures for intensity of use in the rich countries as a whole have declined, and those for the poorer countries have been rising rapidly, chrome ore remains overwhelmingly a "rich economy" requirement. The figures for intensity of use shown here relate only to chrome ore. If account is taken of trade flows of partly treated ore (ferro-chrome) the values would be closer - Japan is a significant supplier of ferro-chrome to the USA and Western Europe. That is, while Japan is clearly dependent on supplies of ore from South Africa, USSR and Pacific sources for its processing plants and metals industries, USA and other Western metals industries are dependent on the same areas directly and through Japan.

There is wide agreement on the critical importance of chrome ore supplies. The difficulty of diversifying away from heavy dependence on chrome is demonstrated by the fact that the USA, which has made strenuous efforts to diversify and has had a great deal more success in this respect than other countries still has GSA stockpile goals which have not been met in quality terms - GSA holdings are up to targets in tonnage terms, but are partly made up by inferior grade material. Dependence on imports will be inescapable for rich and poor countries alike, and within the 1980s at least there is little prospect that technology will free industrial processes from the need for chrome supplies. Indeed, it is likely that as fast as economies in use can be intro-euced into existing applications, the qualities chrome steels offer will be required in new fields.

CHROME and NICKEL

Intensity of use per unit of GDP 1985 (thousands of tonnes)

	Chrome Ore	Nickel (metal content)
Western Europe	2100	175
Japan	4200	355
Other developed Countries	4100	95
USSR	800)	157
Eastern Europe	3500)	
Africa	750	55
Asia	1000	25
Latin America	700	40
China	1700	- (1)
USA	800	125
World	1702	1492
Poor Countries	1034	n.a.
Rich Countries	1827	n.a.

(1) China's figure included with USSR and Eastern Europe

Reserves (in millions of tonnes)

Chromite		Nickel (metal content)	
Zimbabwe	998	Canada	7.3
South Africa	2268	New Caledonia	13.6
Socialist Countries	21	Other Market Economies	25.4
		Cuba	3.1
		Other Socialist Countries	4.4
World Total	3356		54.4

Nickel

Japan also has by far the highest intensity of nickel use, as a result of a rapid build-up of a nickel-dependent industry which began in the late 1950s (when it was no more intense a user than the average Western European economy). Although this intensity of use is falling slowly (in common with all developed countries), it will remain double the average for West and East Europe and nearly treble that of the USA throughout the 1980s. Nickel-using industries are overwhelmingly concentrated in the rich countries and nickel use plays a very small part in the average less-developed economy.

Of the richer countries only Canada and Australia have large reserves, but the distribution of reserves presents no serious problems to consumers. There are huge (admittedly higher cost) reserves in New Caledonia and other market economy countries, large quantities of nickel in unexplored lateritic deposits and in ocean nodules, all of which could be in production if the price went high enough. The CMEA (COMECON) is also well-endowed, with substantial known reserves in Cuba and the USSR.

Cobalt

Japan again has the highest intensity of use of cobalt and will continue to be a big user in the 1980s and 1990s. Cobalt is used in small quantities in special steel alloys and also, which is a highly specialized use, in alloys for high power magnets which are used particularly in electronics assemblies, weapons and aircraft guidance systems and instruments. Africa has a surprisingly high apparent intensity of use. This is mainly a statistical effect reflecting some local processing of local production. CMEA (COMECON) intensity of use is lower than in Western economies and at much the same level as the LDCs.

Reserves are well-distributed among both Western and CMEA (COMECON) countries. However, cobalt is mostly produced as a by-product of copper (or nickel in a very few areas) and this is dominated by Zaire. The price rose recently because disturbances in the Shaba province of Zaire reduced output and, as small quantities of cobalt fulfil a vital role in special magnet production and production of some aero engine alloys, users were prepared to pay very high prices. The supply crisis was very short-lived. The experience was enough to stimulate by-product recovery rates in Zambia, Canada, etc..

In the long run it is possible that there will be a super-abundance of cobalt resulting from by-product recovery at plants treating ocean nodules for their nickel or copper content.

Tungsten

The pattern of tungsten use is interesting because it shows a response by users and potential users to the supply position. Japanese intensity of use peaked sometime in the early 1960s and is now below that of Western and Eastern Europe, although double the very low figure for the USA. Tungsten is used especially in tool steels, in armament steels and alloys and in electric lamp bulb filaments. In tool steels and tough special steels it can be replaced by other elements, notably molybdenum, and the fullest substitution use of molybdenum here has been achieved by the USA, which is a major source of relatively low cost molybdenum, and Japan. Western European countries have some secure sources of supply, both in Europe itself and in Australia, and have no special access to molybdenum supplies, so that their higher intensity of use is not surprising.

The production and reserve position explains US anxiety to minimize tungsten use. About half of the world's reserves are in China, which accounts for about 40% of current production. Some further reserves are in CMEA (COMECON) countries, but they depend critically on Chinese supplies and also have high intensity of use. Since tungsten is indispensable to the production of armour piercing shells, and certain other military equipment, this dependence makes it perhaps the most highly political metal in the world. Although it does not figure largely in the main exchange between the rich and poor nations, it is the responsibility of a special price stabilization study group with UNCTAD (United Nations Committee on Trade and Development).

Copper

Japan has the highest intensity of use of copper. This intensity grew rapidly in the late 1950s and 1960s, which coincided with the period when it first had to import copper concentrates in large quantities. It peaked in the mid-1960s, whereas US intensity has declined more or less continuously since the Second World War. This is not surprising. There is a high copper content in goods and equipment associated with periods of industrialization, heavy electric equipment, cables, plumbing fittings, all kinds of non-corroding fittings for buildings, machinery and marine equipment. On the other hand these items figure proportionately less and less in an economy already at an advanced stage of development, as Japan is now. Established industries will, however, ensure that Japan maintains higher intensities than other countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

Western Europe continues to have a high copper intensity, which no doubt reflects its strong export-oriented capital equipment industries and their sales successes in LDC markets as well as its domestic consumption. Copper intensity in China is high and on a strongly rising trend. It is not surprising, therefore, to hear of both heavy buying (of metal and concentrates) and the award of several contracts to Western consortia to develop Chinese domestic copper orebodies and related metallurgical plants. Copper has been given a priority not far below that of oil and coal production in China. Ore reserves are reported to be adequate, but mine and smelter development capacity is lacking. These are the items in which China is generally import-dependent. CMEA (COMECON) copper intensity is generally lower than in the OECD. Both Poland and USSR have substantial reserves, but the CMEA (COMECON) as a whole is not self-sufficient.

Reserves are widely distributed. The number of copper mines and prospective mines around the world has grown rapidly in the last twenty years. There has been resort to ever lower grades, which generally implies higher real

COBALT and TUNGSTEN

Intensity of use per unit of GDP 1985 (thousands of tonnes)

	Cobalt Metal	Tungsten Metal
Western Europe	6.2	12
Japan	14.8	10
Other developed countries	8.0	3
USSR	3.2	10
Eastern Europe	5.0	17
Africa	10.5	10
Asia	2.8	5
Latin America	2.8	8
China	2.0	39
USA	6.4	5
World	6.0	9.9
Poor Countries	3.6	14.6
Rich Countries	6.4	9.1

Reserves (thousands of tonnes)

Cobalt		Tungsten	
New Caledonia	272.2	USA	124.7
Philippines	190.5	Australia	77.1
Zaire	453.6	Bolivia	39.5
Zambia	113.4	Canada	215.9
Socialist Countries	317.5	South Korea	45.4
		Turkey	77.1
		Socialist Countries	1270.1 (incl. China)
World Total	1451.5		1995.8

mining costs, but at present grades there are many potentially workable ore-bodies in existing and new areas. Although there will be shortages from time to time, they will reflect lack of investment and mining capacity and not reserve limits. The wide availability of copper, and the large source for meeting production shortfalls represented by large tonnages of recyclable copper scrap, make it unlikely that either a cartel or a political squeeze on consumers would be effective.

COPPER and ZINC

Intensity of use per unit of GDP 1985 (thousands of tonnes)

	Copper	Zinc
Western Europe	2450	1550
Japan	3150	2400
Other developed countries	1900	1650
USSR	1500	1350
Eastern Europe	2200	1750
Africa	350	350
Asia	600	1150
Latin America	1500	1200
China	2200	1350
USA	1550	950
World	1870	1364
Poor Countries	1245	1120
Rich Countries	1985	1406

Reserves (millions of tonnes)

Copper		Zinc	
USA	97	USA	22
Canada	32	Australia	19
Chile	97	Canada	28
Peru	32	Socialist Countries	17
Zaire	24		
Zambia	34		
Poland	13		
USSR	36		
Other Socialist Countries	11		
World Total	498		150

Zinc

The pattern of intensities of zinc is similar to that of copper, but at lower levels. Zinc is encountered in many similar applications, indeed, in the same applications, when both combine as brass. Intensities in the advanced countries have been falling and those in LDCs rising, to the point that they are already close. The USA now has a low apparent intensity. This misrepresents the position in terms of final consumption, but reflects changes in the US industrial structure. In particular, there has been a rapid apparent decline

as a result of the decline of US production of galvanized steel. From being a net exporter the USA is now a net importer. Some of the exports have been lost to local production lines abroad and to Japanese suppliers, who also export to the US. High Japanese zinc consumption and rising LDC consumption have resulted.

Zinc is unusual in that the main reserves are still in advanced countries rather than in LDCs, who, with the exceptions of Mexico and Peru, are not large producers. Demand growth has been slow overall. There is little pressure on resources, so zinc is an unlikely item for conflict over resources, or for concern over import dependence.

Aluminium

Aluminium is one of the most abundant elements in the earth's crust, more abundant even than iron, and widely distributed with the even more plentiful silicon in silicas, clays and sands around the world. However, the only commercial source of alumina (from which aluminium is produced by electrolysis) is bauxite. High grades are, however, plentiful and fairly widely distributed. Aluminium is one of the few materials with a rising intensity of use in all countries, and the trend is still upwards, although at reduced rates, in the 1980s.

Thus reliability of supplies, although almost all the consuming countries import heavily, has been a factor helping aluminium to gain markets and its rising score of intensity of use reflects this. The USA provides by far the biggest market (although Japan scores higher with intensity of use) and its dominating position enabled its main supplier of bauxite, Jamaica, to raise its export prices in the mid-1970s, and to require US customers to refine alumina locally. The prospect of continually rising bauxite prices stimulated US experiments with domestic non-bauxite sources of alumina, but so far the Jamaicans have been skilful in keeping their effective c.i.f. prices (on an alumina equivalent basis) not only below the cost of competing non-bauxite sources, but also below the landed cost of the cheapest alternative alumina (from Australia). The US is now increasingly becoming an alumina importer, rather than an importer of bauxite, although so far bauxite tonnages still predominate.

The high electric power consumption of aluminium smelters has made many Japanese smelters uneconomic since the 1970s oil price rises, and the country has voluntarily increased its dependence on imported aluminium ingot (after being a net exporter on occasions in the past). Under a government-sponsored scheme, a third or more of smelter capacity remains closed despite continued rises in consumption. In contrast to the earlier Japanese campaign in the

copper sector which has given access to copper concentrates from abroad, Japanese industry has invested in overseas alumina refineries and aluminium smelters in areas with secure cheap power to guarantee supplies of ingot at acceptable prices.

Tin

Japan and China lead in intensities of consumption of tin. Rates have fallen rapidly in other advanced countries, mostly probably because of the establishment of tinplate lines abroad and because of a decline in export-oriented production together with improvement in tinplating technology which has permitted a reduction in plating thicknesses. This technological change has been incorporated in tinplate industries in LDCs and shows in their declining intensities.

Tin tends to be a small but indispensable part of the products within which it is incorporated, which has made switching to alternatives difficult. However, aluminium cans, for instance, have taken much of the growth in the packaging market which would otherwise have gone to tinplate, particularly in the USA, which has virtually no tin reserves (but has established a huge GSA holding).

China is a major producer as well as consumer of tin, and is a prospective net exporter. Otherwise tin reserves for market use (rather than own use) are concentrated in South East Asia, South America and Australia. There is not so much a prospect of shortages as of sharply rising prices, even above the high level they have already reached. The lower cost, dredged alluvial deposits worked in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia are thought to be near exhaustion, and higher cost hard rock mining (as in Bolivia and Australia) will have to be resorted to in the 1990s.

Platinum

As a precious metal also used in industry, platinum (and closely related high value minerals including rhodium, palladium, etc.) is odd metal out in this list. It remains important because, to an even greater extent than high-grade chrome ores and manganese, supply is dominated by the USSR and South Africa. It is uniquely highly prized in Japan for jewellery, which accounts for the very high relative intensity of consumption of platinum even by Japanese standards. Otherwise its important industrial uses depend on its inertness and high melting temperature, and its catalytic effects. Used especially in the chemical process industry, which requires catalysts which are especially resistant to chemical reaction, platinum has been a preferred catalyst in motor vehicle converters fitted to comply with pollution control levels. As such part of its use, particularly in the USA, could be dispensed

with at the cost in the short run of higher atmospheric pollution, and in the long run of whatever the higher installation and running costs of alternative pollution control equipment might be.

However, in most other uses it is either indispensable or outstandingly cost effective. One advantage of its chemical inertness is that it can be recovered as scrap, but the scope for developing new sources is limited. Users will concentrate on improving rates of recovery as by-product. Platinum is an extremely rare element, rarely found in quantities worth mining as platinum sources, but occurring in other economic ores, including copper and nickel.

ALUMINIUM and TIN
Intensity of use per unit of GDP 1985 (thousands of tonnes)

	Aluminium	Tin
Western Europe	3,300	60
Japan	5,600	110
Other developed countries	3,200	55
USSR	2,450	25
Eastern Europe	3,750	65
Africa	600	60
Asia	1,500	35
Latin America	1,900	35
China	1,950	90
USA	4,400	35
World	3,397	50
Poor Countries	1,635	52
Rich Countries	3,722	49

Reserves

Bauxite		Tin	
(millions of tonnes)		(thousands of tonnes)	
Australia	6,400	Australia	330
Brazil	2,500	Bolivia	980
Guinea	8,200	Brazil	600
India	1,600	China	1,500
Jamaica	2,000	Indonesia	2,400
Hungary	300	Malaysia	830
USSR	200	Thailand	1,200
Other Socialist Countries	600	USSR	620
World Total	27,000		10,000

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TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE

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THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

PLENARY SESSION

Thursday, 11 September   Introductory Lecture

IMPLICATIONS OF THIRD WORLD CONFLICT FOR

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 1980's

by

James R. Schlesinger

IISS TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Plenary Paper

IMPLICATIONS OF THIRD-WORLD CONFLICT FOR INTER-
NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 1980s

James R. Schlesinger

The theme of the Institute's Annual Conference is conflict
and security in the Third World. To the implicit question that
theme poses about the future, the generic answer is quite simple:
the prospects are for increased turbulence and instability for
the balance of the century. The basic reason is also simple:
the relative decline of American power and, associated with it,
the reduced will of the American people to play a combined role
of international guardian and self-appointed moral preceptor --
in sh ort, the end of Pax Americana. Though the outlines for the
future remain dim, we are in a period of international transition.
The old order changeth, yielding place to the new. The balance
of the century will have an as yet undetermined character reflect-
ing the slow unravelling of a framework of international security
earlier provided by the United States -- partly fortuitously,
partly through deliberate policy -- for a period of thirty years
after the close of World War II. As in many periods of transition,
the seas ahead remain uncharted.

The ultimate outcome will reflect the resolution of
identifiable but presently unmeasurable forces. The first is
the degree of realism among Third World leaders -- and their
willingness to limit ideological posturing in exchange for concrete,
if limited, advantages . Next is the character of th e post-Brezhnev

leadership in the Soviet Union -- whether it will be moderate or aggressive in the use of its new found power position. Third is the orientation of the People's Republic of China -- whether it will continue to lean against the forms of turbulence that can be exploited by its arch rival, the Soviet Union. A fourth element will be the emerging policies of the principal European states -- whether, having discovered that the United States can exhibit the same irresponsibility and parochialism that has characterized their own policies since World War II, they will gradually abandon the Atlantic relationship in the futile quest for a Europe that is simultaneously independent and strong. Finally, and perhaps most significant, will be the future policy of the United States. Will the American people once again acquire a renewed sense of mission -- and of realism -- or will they continue in the slough of preachiness and withdrawal?

For we must bear in mind that, given the realities of power, the evolution of the Third World during this period of transition will be to a large extent determined by forces impinging on it from the outside.

To a considerable degree, the world has become a single strategic stage -- with its separate strategic theaters inevitably linked -- sometimes tightly, sometimes more loosely. The policies of the Chinese People's Republic affect the whole. What occurs in the oil-producing regions of the Middle East will, to a large extent, determine the ultimate outcome. But Middle Eastern developments will, in turn, be significantly affected by the policies -- deliberate or haphazard -- of the United States and the Soviet Union. Even the outcomes in other Third World regions --

the Caribbean, Southern or Eastern Africa, or Southeast Asia --
will to some, if a lesser, extent affect the overall balance.
Yet, it remains almost axiomatic that shifts in the Third World --
attention-grabbing and suggestive of international trends as they
may be -- are unlikely in themselves to be decisive.

II

In order to anticipate the future one must understand the
past -- and the process by which we have arrived at the present.
After World War II developments in the Third World to a large
degree reflected American policies and American predilections.
Initially the United States possessed a nuclear monopoly, and
for a long period remained the world's dominant military power.
Under the aegis of American power, a framework of security was
established in which international trade and investment flourished.
As a consequence there occurred an enormous worldwide expansion
of trade, investment, and income affecting directly many of the
nations of the Third World. That astounding growth of the
international economy, shared in rather unevenly by nations
in the Third World, was based upon that more or less unquestioned
security and upon the exploitation of cheap energy. It is perhaps
unnecessary to add that neither of these prerequisites for
international economic expansion remains fully applicable today.

The oddity was that the American nation never fully understood
or even embraced the international order of which it was the
principal, if unwitting, foundation. International security was

provided by a democratic people whose historical experience precluded a visceral understanding of the meaning of insecurity. For one hundred and fifty years, it had been protected by two oceans and its remoteness from the centers of international conflict. For the next quarter century, after its emergence as the principal world power, America's military position was inherently so powerful that no challenge could be seriously regarded as a direct threat to its own security. Indeed, in the 1960's and 1970's, after the passions of the Cold War had begun to ebb, a generation arose that simply took security for granted -- an inheritance, rather than something that had to be earned anew continuously.

Furthermore, in its long period of gestation, the United States had developed the belief that its institutions and values were a suitable model for all mankind. Sporadically breaking out of its isolation, it exhibited -- as in the two world wars -- a missionary zeal for the redemption of the old world from its wicked habits of power politics. In short, the United States considered itself a secular New Jerusalem, with its varied virtues to be enjoyed either in isolation or in extension to other people.

After World War II, this pent-up idealism burst forth on an industrial world worn down or devastated by war and on a Third World still under Colonial rule and generally economically backward. That American idealism became embroiled in a steady flow of both resources and technology overseas -- to help resuscitate both weakened allies and vanquished foes. It was reflected institutionally in the Marshall Plan, the World Bank, Point Four,

and a host of other examples. For the Third World it was reflected in developmental and technical assistance and a numerous institutions for the provision of multilateral and bilateral assistance. These economic policies must be borne in mind, though I have insufficient time to develop them. Instead, I shall mention some of the major political elements bearing on the Third World.

First, true to the American Revolution and to the precepts of Jeffersonianism, the United States pressed steadily for decolonization. Sometimes those pressures were quite direct, as in the case of the Dutch East Indies, more frequently indirect. As the process of decolonization unfolded, the pressures from the United States diminished; but even at the close of the period, tacit pressures on the remnants of the French and Portuguese empires could readily be discerned. The process of decolonization was recognizably the chief force in shaping the Third World of today.

Middle Eastern nations may boggle at this suggestion, and will insist that Israel is a dramatic and, for them, a most painful episode of Western colonialism imposed after World War II. Even if one were to accept this somewhat strained interpretation for the introduction of an external population in the creation of the new state, the case of Israel does remain unique. The motivation that lay behind it can scarcely be viewed in terms of traditional motives for colonization. It reflected Western feelings of guilt and the desire for restitution after the tragedies in the period of Hitler's rule. If one puts aside this distinctive and controversial case, one can categorically state that the evolution of

the Third World was determined by decolonization, a goal both practical and ethical pursued by the United States after the close of the war.

A second element, pursued intermittently and somewhat fitfully, was pressure for democratization and the enhancement of civil rights. These pressures tended to coincide with Democratic Administrations. Under President Kennedy, the Alianza para el Progreso concentrated on Latin America and foresaw measured progress as the standard for assessing movement toward these political goals. Under President Carter the pressures have become more general and universal, and not so directly concerned with specific time and circumstance.

A third element, the counterpart of domestic reform on the international scene, has been the historic American stress on legality. Subversion or coups might be tolerated, but sending forces across recognized international frontiers was considered unacceptable. This continuing emphasis on the inviolability of international frontiers made the United States the natural, if half-conscious, protector of the independence of national states. It led to both the American involvement in South Korea and the unsuccessful attempt to preserve South Vietnam.

Neither friend nor foe, practiced in the standards of realism, could anticipate or understand either the American tendency to invest such moral enthusiasm into strict legality or the vehemence of American reactions. The British and French (and the Israelis) were nonplussed by what they regarded as the quixotic American response at Suez in 1956. Similarly, the Soviets were quite

unprepared for the vehement American reaction when their forces

crossed the border into Afghanistan in 1979. After all, politically

a far more serious development -- the Taraki Coup in April 1978

that raised the red banner over Afghanistan -- had passed virtually

without comment in the United States. The Soviets might readily

believe that a supplementary action, justified as an extension

of the Brezhnev doctrine, to sustain a socialist state, would

scarcely elicit a reaction so sharply different in kind -- so

plainly at odds with easily recognized "correlation of forces."

No more than our Allies did they recognize the emotional depth

of the American commitment to the sanctity of international

frontiers.

Curiously, this neo-Wilsonian moral enthusiam reached its

apogee with the Carter Administration in 1977. Some might suggest

that it represented a second attempt by a southern Protestant to

redeem this wicked world from its sinful ways. Certainly the

Administration came into office rejecting the (sinful) power

politics embodied, in its view, in the figure of Henry Kissinger.

Other nations apparently had simply lacked the opportunity

to hear the advantages of human rights eloquently extolled by

Americans. That such nations might be more concerned with the

maintenance of order or with political survival was simply ignored.

The Soviets, so the belief apparently ran, had until then simply

been seeking an opportunity to divest themselves of the nuclear

weapons -- in which they had made so vast an investment of national

effort. It was just that nobody had approached them in the right

manner. In the Middle East, the failure to achieve a <u>comprehensive</u>

settlement had simply reflected a prior lack of necessary will and enthusiasm. The disputes between the industrial and underdeveloped worlds reflected not concern about interests or resources but rather a lack of communication.

These neo-Wilsonian impulses shaped the initial responses of the Administration through a series of national setbacks and humiliations, including the fall of the Shah and the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran. They still remain a powerful if temporarily suppressed force -- even after the Soviet movement into Afghanistan.

The policies of the Carter Administration represented simply an extreme manifestation of endemic American beliefs that had, in large degree, shaped the post-war world. Nonetheless, the decline in America's relative position in the world, particularly after the Vietnam War, inevitably meant that the influence of these cherished American views had waned. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Americans were the last to recognize this unavoidable reality.

Americans had long taken security as axiomatic. In part this reflected a widespread American conviction that our international influence reflected less American power than the purity of American motives. And it was, of course, flattering to hear the purity of those motives praised -- so long as America's power was preeminent.

As a world power the United States had oddly but steadily neglected the creation of a necessary base structure with which to exercise its military power worldwide. This reflected its firm belief in national sovereignty and a touching faith that

in times of troubles other nations would adhere to our banner
because of the rightness of the cause -- irrespective of political
risks that they might incur. Especially after the Vietnam War,
America's underfunding of its military establishment, upon which
the security of the Free World depended, became almost a case of
willful negligence. The premise of the political left that the
United States had been too powerful for its own and the world's
good was then put to the test. The outcome is hardly surprising:
as America's strength ebbed, so did her influence.

With the decline of American power, America's moral impulses
were increasingly directed towards those whom it could reach,
namely friendly nations, allies, and dependents. Hostile nations
-- the Cubas and the Soviet Unions -- could turn a deaf ear to
America's exhortations; her associates could do so less readily.
The force of America's crusading impulses as a practical matter
thus were directed against states like Argentina and Brazil, Iran,
and South Korea with whose foreign policies the United States had
no quarrel -- only with their internal arrangements.

As a practical matter, the United States could do little
for Soviet dissidents. By contrast, it could effectively --
if only temporarily -- better the lot of dissidents in Iran.
Needless to say, it was only where the United States was most
effective that it succeeded in inflicting the most grievous
wounds upon herself.

In the practical world of security arrangements, the value
of an American alliance -- once virtually absolute -- became
discounted. Perhaps the most suggestive milestone was the

American response to Brezhnev's provocative warning in November 1978 that the United States should not intervene in Iran. To this direct assault on America's alliance system, there was no Truman-esque response warning against Soviet intrusion, no reiteration of America's fidelity to her ally or reference to the CENTO alliance that the United States had been instrumental in creating. Instead, Secretary Vance meekly responded that the United States had no intention of intervening and, by noting prior Soviet statements of intent, implicitly called on the Soviets to exhibit a similar sense of responsibility. The intent, no doubt, was to reassure the Soviets, but the mild response provided reassurance to few others.

One wishes to avoid exaggeration. This episode clearly lacks the drama of Munich in 1938. Yet, its aftermath offers some remarkable parallels. It was only after the Munich Conference that other nations began to edge away from the protection provided by the Western allies and toward Germany. After September 1938, the Soviet Union abandoned its quest for collective security against Hitler's Germany with the Western allies and began its approach towards accommodation with Germany -- which ultimately resulted in the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Similarly, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary -- and later Slovakia -- edged away from the Western allies and towards Germany. And, similarly once again, since the fall of the Shah, America's partners -- in Europe as well as in the Middle East -- have edged away from the United States in a search for alternative arrangements that would provide security.

And that brings us down to the present day.

III

How should we relate these broader international trends to the specific theme of this conference, the prospects for security and conflict in the Third World? In light of the vast extent and variety of the areas under consideration, generalizations do not come easily. Those generalizations that do come lack concreteness, for they must be distilled from highly distinctive and localized constellations of income levels, resources, rivalries, and power balances. A useful initial observation is that in security matters the term "Third World" is less appropriate than the older term "gray area." The latter provides more accurate imagery, for in these regions questions of security are inherently difficult to define with precision.

Nonetheless, two generalizations do appear relevant. First, the partial dissolution of the security framework provided by the United States for a quarter century after World War II makes the entire world -- at least outside the Soviet Union and its immediate satellites -- far more unstable. There is no longer so effective a natural protector of national independence and of national frontiers. Consequently, one must anticipate a heightened willingness in the years ahead to move across national borders.

The heightened instability which follows the decline of American power is perhaps most marked in the region of the Arabian Gulf, for on that region the rest of the Free World depends for its supply of energy. Yet, that region is also noticeably close to the main sources of Soviet power. Until

quite recently, the dominance of America's strategic nuclear forces
and the clear-cut superiority of American naval and mobility forces
provided adequate deterrence of outside threats to the region.
Now, however, that strategic nuclear superiority has disappeared
and American naval and mobility forces no longer possess the
clear-cut advantages of times past. As a consequence, the region
of the Gulf is susceptible to political-military pressures from
the north to a degree not heretofore known. This heightened
vulnerability, combined with the dependency of the outside world
on Arabian Gulf energy resources, implies both a degree of risk
and a contagion of fear in what has now become the vortex of
international strategic conflict.

Second, the increased insecurity worldwide flowing from the
dissolution of the post-war security framework bears with particular
force on other gray area nations. Few such nations possess great
inherent strength or international weight. Consequently, disruption
within such a country or even its loss to one side or another does
not immediately affect the vital interests of the great powers
or their coalitions. It is a reflection of the grayness of such
areas that even shifts of allegiances will not significantly
affect the overall coloration of the world's political map. It
is this attribute of grayness that allows sharply increased local
insecurity without substantially affecting international political
risks. In the industrial world, by contrast, lines of division
and greater political weight imply far greater risks in the event
of major damage or of bold action.

Quite clearly, if the nations of Western Europe, Japan, or
China were to shift sides this would imply a major, if not decisive,

swing in the equilibrium of power. The eastern frontier of the
Federal Republic is a clearly demarcated and highly sensitive
dividing line. The risks of incursion are consequently enormous.
In the case of Berlin, the demarcation is clear. There is no
grayness. The risks of disturbance are high -- far too high for
any prospective gains. But in the gray areas the risks are low;
incursions, subversion, pressures may occur without any major
impact on the overall balance of power and, consequently, no
great likelihood of their inducing major hostilities. Low risk
is an attribute of grayness, and it helps to explain why heightened
world insecurity will tend to be concentrated in these gray areas.

There is, of course, some limit to the ebb and flow that
might be tolerable. Territory implies the possibility of bases.
It implies the prospective establishment of advance positions as
stepping stones. It provides the potential for geographical
infection -- or falling dominoes. None of these need be fatal.
By contrast, a threat to Europe, Japan, or (for different reasons)
the Arabian Gulf could start a process without limit. In the
face of events prospectively going out of control, all powers
necessarily will remain prudent. That prudence will not inhibit
actions elsewhere in the world.

These two points -- the heightened insecurity flowing from
a weakened international security framework and the concentration
of that insecurity in the gray areas -- provide the necessary
backdrop against which the inner dynamics of Third World countries
may be viewed. The direction and pace of such internal developments

are critically important. For example, despite the climate for

decolonization fostered by the United States after the war, the

timing and nature of independence movements depended primarily upon

indigenous rather than external forces. But after independence,

Third World nations had to face innumerable internal problems that

previously had been subsumed in the cohesion of the independence

movement. Ethnic rivalries, for example, were legion, resulting

in severe internal conflicts. Alternatively, since boundaries had

been determined for the convenience of the colonial powers, the

overlapping of international frontiers by specific ethnic groups

resulted in unresolved and bitter border disputes. Serious internal

disparities of wealth existed -- causing further conflict. Too

frequently the overall impression was of a new state with an

immature political system, great internal divisions, and weak

leadership.

From the standpoint of many Third World nations, a great

advantage of the Pax Americana was that it provided a stable

background against which many of these problems could be temporarily

compromised or worked out relatively benignly. A consequence of

the decline of the international order represented by the Pax

Americana, therefore, is that these internal problems come into

stark relief. They must now be worked out in the face of heightened

competition from other regional contenders -- and in the absence of

an international order that is even clear. Quite obviously, this

is a prescription for unrest. For a time it may seem that a

confrontation of the South with the industrial North can serve as

a substitute for order and a disguise for unrest. But, given the

disparities within the South reflecting particularly the divergent flows of oil revenues, the North-South confrontation becomes a charade that must ultimately break down. Claims against the North cannot for long mask the discontents, tensions, and unrest in the gray areas.

Revising Voltaire, a third generalization may be suggested: in the light of the remarkable differences among regions and of local power balances -- all generalizations are false. The structure of military-political power is far too variegated and each region so differently affected by the international structure of power to attempt anything other than a differentiated treatment of each region. The key ingredients will be proximity to the sources of Soviet or American power, residual influence by European states as in Francophone Africa, and the presence or absence of a locally dominant military power. Very broadly, the Third World can be divided into the Eurasian periphery of the Soviet Union -- with particular notice of the Middle Eastern portions stretching from Turkey to Pakistan and including the Arabian Peninsula, the Western Hemisphere, and other areas visibly less marked by great power influence or threat.

Soviet military power provides a massive threat only to the areas on its periphery. These areas have long been the focus of Russian, and now Soviet, imperial ambitions. The rise of American military power after World War II precluded for many years the furtherance of those ambitions, reflected for example in the forced Soviet withdrawal from Iran in 1946. But the subsequent growth of Soviet military power and, in particular, the development of its

mobility forces have once again created a possibility for the Soviets to contemplate movement towards the Indian Ocean. Unlike Vietnam, there can be little question that the vital interests of the West are engaged in this region. It is the coincidence in this region of the potential for Soviet military action and the existence of vital Free World interests that provide the potential for conflagration. The Middle Eastern region alone provides this potential for an uncontrolled clash between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the unlikely event of a Soviet assault on the oil fields of the Arabian Gulf, the United States would have little choice but to resist with whatever military means were at hand. That is a simple political imperative.

Yet, one must also recognize that the deterrent posture to forestall such a Soviet move is not now adequate. The Soviets may continue to be restrained by political prudence and, perhaps, the belief that time is on their side. But the military forces presently and prospectively in place in the region are not sufficient by themselves adequately to constrain Soviet moves if the Soviet Union were to become more aggressive. Whether there remains sufficient cohesion and trust between the Middle Eastern countries under threat and the United States to arrange for an adequate military deterrent in time remains to be seen. Nonetheless, an appropriate military deterrent in place remains an indispensible ingredient for avoiding collapse in the Middle East. That is the simple military imperative.

In the Western Hemisphere, on the American periphery, conditions are quite different. The United States distinctly remains the dominant military power. Despite the irritations of recent

years, most nations in Latin America retain sufficient fidelity to
the Hemispheric system, as exemplified in the Rio Treaty, and little
desire to see the prevailing tranquillity upset. The most notable
exception is Castro's Cuba, a Soviet satellite, and the ambitions
that Castro represents -- now quite apparently bearing fruit in
Nicaragua. Nonetheless, the reality of American military
superiority in the Caribbean remains accepted by all. Cuban
behavior exists at the sufferance of the United States in the
same manner that prospects for liberalization in Poland depend
on the sufferance of the Soviet Union. Indeed, Castro recognizes
this fundamental reality. His actions over the years since 1962
have been carefully gauged to what he believes various administra-
tions in Washington have been prepared to tolerate.

From the standpoint of this conference, therefore, perhaps
the other regions -- especially Africa and Southeast Asia --
are perhaps the most noteworthy. Since the fundamental interests
of neither power bloc are obviously engaged, there is far greater
latitude for shifting relationships and for the tolerance of
general unrest. These are regions not readily susceptible to
Soviet military action. Despite the growth of Soviet blue-water
naval capabilities and the improvement of her mobility and
intervention forces, they remain generally less capable than the
military forces of the Western world. Whatever the shifts in
the balance of power around the periphery of the Soviet Union,
American naval and air capabilities elsewhere remain generally
superior. The sustaining of Cuban expeditionary forces in Angola,
for example, ultimately remains dependent upon an American dis-
inclination to intervene. Paradoxically, it is the reality of

low potential gains and low risks that makes these regions especially susceptible to a set of low-level military activities.

While the Soviet Union has created an immensely powerful military establishment, that establishment remains notably range-limited. Unless the United States permits its forces to erode far more rapidly than now seems likely, the Soviet Union cannot prudently contemplate military moves in these regions in the absence of invitations from inside.

Political penetration will provide the principal means for acquiring positions of influence. Yet such political penetrations will in the longer run depend on the acquiescence of those in the regions. Since political attitudes are notably susceptible to change, it would be wise to anticipate a pattern of shifting allegiances and shifting confrontations over time. The dramatic reversals of allegiances in the Horn of Africa over the last decade represent one likely model for the longer term.

This appreciation is somewhat modified by the presence or absence in a particular region of a locally dominant military power. Vietnam, South Africa, and Israel come readily to mind. Yet each is subject to special constraints. Israel is limited not only by American pressure but by its sense of siege -- and, one may hope, by the recognition that military victory only intensifies problems of control under conditions demographically unfavorable to her. South Africa is limited by its severe internal problems -- and the recognition that foreign adventures -- if exhausting -- could only intensify its problem of internal control. Vietnam is perhaps less inhibited, yet it too must take

into consideration the presence of China to the north and the American commitments to Thailand. Nonetheless, these local power balances do pose special problems, and the presence of respectable military establishments implies much higher costs for outside intervention.

Yet, taken all together, we may recognize a high degree of fluidity in these gray regions. Considerable leeway for unrest and for trouble-making will continue to exist. The outcome will largely depend upon the sense of realism in the Third World countries. After the first blush of revolutionary fervor, Third World leaders have generally demonstrated a keen understanding of the need for rational calculation. They have recognized the need to maintain associations with the Western nations -- for the latter will remain the principal source of developmental and technical assistance and the principal market for their products. Aside from military equipment, the Soviet Union has persuasively demonstrated that it has remarkably little to offer.

Thus, hopes for economic progress will rest on reasonably friendly relations with the industrial world. But these hopes must also be sustained by some degree of confidence in the adequacy of security arrangements. The Western nations have the capacity to provide the minimum semblance of security arrangements that are necessary. No Third World nation can ignore the realities of power. Therefore, the perception of military capability does remain important. Third World leaders will closely, if quietly, examine which nations possess the

military chips. The Western nations will be obliged to maintain appropriate forces to provide sustenance to their friends and to constrain the ambitions of those who may be hostile.

In the gray areas there will remain great latitude for unrest. But there will also be the knowledge that there may be limits to that general tolerance in the event that gross disturbances are fostered. Unquestionably, direct intervention should be employed very sparingly, if at all. Yet the knowledge that the military capability does exist and might be employed may be the necessary condition for avoiding the descent of particular regions into chaos -- and for the preservation of reasonable chances for economic progress.

For the Third World there is no longer outside insurance against internal irresponsibility. For the West there should be a recognition that neither universal guidelines nor blanket slogans can guide its policies. Its reactions will depend upon particular times and circumstances.

For progress to be maintained, there must be both a minimum of security and a continued association with the industrial world. Neither that association nor economic progress will be much enhanced by continuing illusions and rhetoric regarding a new international economic order or the massive transfer of resources from the industrial to the underdeveloped worlds. Neither is going to occur (aside from the ongoing massive transfer to the oil exporting countries). By and large, resources will flow in accordance with ordinary commercial arrangements based on supply

and demand -- and the creation of a reasonably promising climate
for investment activity. Illusions to the contrary will certainly
not foster economic progress. In all likelihood they would only
add to a climate of unrest which, under the best of circumstances,
will likely remain the hallmark of the gray areas for the balance
of the century.

IV

It is time to draw a few conclusions.

The partial dissolution of the international security frame-
work has not only increased instability worldwide, that instability
and unrest weighs particularly heavily on the Third World. The era
for the relatively benign resolution of disputes ended with the
Pax Americana. The Third World is now more on its own -- to
grapple with its internal tensions. Given the internal dynamics
in the Third World, inevitably the level of unrest will run high.
The degree of success in tamping down the unrest is critically
dependent upon Third World leadership. If there is a willingness
to avoid feeding the flames, if there is a realistic appreciation
of economic opportunities -- however limited -- and a serious
effort to work with the industrial world, then modest economic
progress may continue and some minimal level of security maintained.
Failure to exercise restraint and patiently to cultivate economic
and political ties with the industrial world may result in condi-
tions approaching chaos.

At the outset, I underscored that the world has become a
single strategic stage and that the interlocking theaters affect

one another. The future of the Third World depends not only on its inner dynamics and the quality of leadership but also upon forces impinging from the outside. Whether the ultimate outcome is satisfactory also depends upon whether or not these outside forces are relatively constructive.

The world is now in transition to a new geopolitical equilibrium. The character of that equilibrium will depend upon the future decisions and actions of the more influential players on the international scene.

A major ingredient, needless to say, will be the character of Soviet policy. How will the Soviets utilize their enhanced strength and stature in the world? Will they refrain from the direct employment of their forces in the Third World? This question becomes increasingly important as mobility and logistics improve, and as the reach of those forces expands. If those forces are employed extensively, then the likelihood of chaotic conflict arises.

It is perhaps too much to expect that the Soviets will not continue to subvert or influence Third World governments. Backed up by an increasingly impressive military capability that danger will become steadily more serious. The chief responsibility for resisting such efforts will lie with the Third World nations themselves. To the extent that they collaborate, the likely result will be the spreading of the kinds of troubles observable in Angola or in the Horn of Africa.

A second ingredient is the evolution of European policies and attitudes. Will the major European states allow the drift away from the Atlantic relationship to continue? Given the

realities of Soviet strength, along that path lies neither security
nor long-term independence. A growing division between the two
sides of the Atlantic would encourage further American disengage-
ment from the affairs of the eastern hemisphere. The result would
be further to weaken the existing security framework -- and would
thereby affect the Third World. Moreover, growing competition for
political influence among Western nations would add to Third
World unrest. Augmented unrest would intensify those problems
arising from the further weakening of the international security
framework.

Perhaps the most critical ingredient is the future direction
of American policy. Will the American people, given the inherent
strength of the United States, acquire a new sense of mission and
of responsibility towards the outside world? Would such a renewed
effort be marked by greater realism and lessened expectations
about long-lived gratitude? Or will the United States follow the
path of preachings and injured feelings -- the sour fruit of
the Vietnam era?

It seems likely that American policy will be characterized
by a higher degree of nationalism. A cynic will suggest that
idealism is the luxury of the powerful and secure. American power
and American innocence seem destined to decline together. The
probable result will be a diminished search for the grievances
of others with the concomitant belief that, if only thsoe
grievances can be revealed, they can be satisfied. There would
be more painstaking attention to national interests and greater
indulgence in traditional types of power policies. All in all,

the results may be healthier worldwide than a continuation of high-flown preaching.

Such a change would result in greater clarity in American policy. One can hardly blame others for being confused about American policies, for the United States has contributed to that confusion. When a principal American spokesman can refer to Khomeini as "a kind of saint" or to the Cubans as part of a stabilizing mission in Angola, it is hardly surprising that others are either bewildered by or attempt to exploit this odd combination of guilt and confusion. It was Bismarck who observed that the strong are weak because of their inhibitions. One might even suggest that the United States in this era has been weak because of its illusions -- and from the neuroses that stem from Vietnam.

One final observation on a matter critical for Third World stability. An illusion that has been particularly pernicious has been the hope for instant democratization. The task of dealing with the Third World is more complex than conforming to a checklist developed by the American Civil Liberties Union. Maintaining order in conditions of unrest is not a simple task. Any approach to dealing with the Third World must grapple with the centries-old issue of liberty and order and the need for striking an appropriate <u>balance</u> between the two. It should be self-evident that an appropriate balance between liberty and order necessarily will vary as between one society and another -- and that consideration will always have to be given to local conditions, historical experience, and public attitudes. Yet, this has not been self-evident to many Americans who, at base,

are inclined to believe that social customs akin to American
institutions are not only universally desirable but, more
importantly, universally achievable.

It serves the Third World ill to base policies upon this
fundamental misconception. In the future, the Third World will
be better served by deeper understanding of the relevance to
the Third World of that hoary political issue of reconciling
liberty and order.

13

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THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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SOURCES OF THIRD WORLD CONFLICT

by

Udo Steinbach

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SOURCES OF THIRD WORLD CONFLICT

Udo Steinbach

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the deterioration in East-West relations which accompanied it have clearly shown just how important parts of the Third World are for the development of international relations and for the global balance of power. If there is any substance in the comparison between the present situation in international politics and 1914, it is the fear that a global conflict involving the superpowers could be sparked off by events in a remote corner of the world and that regional political tension could, by means of a largely unpredictable process of escalation, develop into a major international confrontation. The Third World is the scene of numerous conflicts, with a wide variety of antecedent causes and having varying degrees of importance. In this paper, conflict is used in the broadest sense of the term and embraces wars between states, revolutions, and social, political, ethnic and sectarian tensions which, even if they have not developed into open crises, have international implications.

In any attempt to discover any common denominators amongst the profusion of conflicts, potential conflicts and sources of conflict in the Third World, one is faced with a particular and fundamental problem – bewildering variety. The causes of conflicts in the Third World (in Africa, in the Middle East, in South and South-East Asia and in Latin America) result from cultural, social, economic and political factors of such a specific nature that it is only through generalizing to a very high degree that common features can be determined. Whether operationally useful conclusions can be drawn from these findings for a policy directed towards the Third World may be highly questionable.

It is only comparatively recently that we have become conscious of the problem of regional conflicts and of their sources as vital elements in international politics. This is symptomatic of a steadily increasing interest on the part of the great powers in the Third World as a factor of political importance for East-West relations. Political influence or a military presence in the key regions of the Third World can have a lasting effect on the global balance of power and East-West relations.

How can the sources of regional conflicts be categorized? And under what circumstances can regional conflicts and potential conflicts influence international politics? Moreover, what prospects are there of settling conflicts, eliminating their causes and thus achieving a long-term stabilization of the Third World?

THE CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT

The numerous causes of Third World conflicts might be summarized into four main categories: national fragmentation; inequitable development; cultural clashes; and liberation movements. This may imply greater clarity and precision than is either intended or demonstrable but, for the purposes of analysis, they would appear to be separable.

National fragmentation within the Third World

The structure of the Third World along national lines forms the political framework within which conflicts in the Third World arise and then come to a head. National structures used not to be a part of the political or cultural traditions of either the Middle East or Africa. The concept of "nation", introduced by the colonial powers or by small elites who saw in it the prerequisite for the fulfilment of their own political aspirations, materialized in a way which, in many cases, went against territorial, ethnic, religious, geographical or culturo-historical traditions. During a long historical process characterized by numerous conflicts, the driving forces of nationalism in Europe led to a sort of "land consolidation", in which the national state is largely an expression of "national" pretensions and this has resulted in the inner consolidation of single states. In the Third World, however, the externally-imposed divisions into national states have set going processes in which newly-created "national pretensions" come into conflict with traditional structures. What this means in practice in the Middle East, to take one example, is that the division of the community of Muslims and Arabs into numerous nation states since the First World War has not only, to a large extent, ignored the traditional ethnic and religious groupings but has also resulted in the governments of the various national entities starting to lodge claims which are almost bound to lead to conflict with other countries. The fragmentation within these emerging nation states coincides with the geopolitical fragmentation of the Third World itself - ethnic minorities and sectarian divisions are the consequences of this development, as are many of the conflicts between states as well as the domestic conflicts within particular countries, in particular demands for autonomy.

<u>The Problems of Development</u>

A second and no less fundamental cause of conflicts in the Third World can be summarized under the heading "problems of development". The term covers a whole range of problems of an economic, social and political nature. On the one hand, there is the fact that the majority of the Third World countries are barely capable of reaching a level of economic development where even the basic needs of the population are met. This conflicts with the fact that no government in the Third World can escape the need to pursue the socio-political and politico-economic values and objectives of the industrialized countries. They must try to increase per capita income, provide for a fairer distribution of income and wealth and, at least to some extent, move away from dependence on the industrialized nations. Thus, the Third World becomes the scene of unrest and impatience which causes renewed power and political struggle and intensifies the conflict between rival ideologies.

Yet the problems of development are not only to be found at an economic level. Many of the tensions and conflicts arise from the inability of ruling elites to pay due regard to the demands of individuals, social groups or religious and ethnic communities for greater participation in political life, demands which arise as a result of the process of economic and social transformation, itself a by-product of industrialization. In most cases, such a process of modernization has not been accompanied by a strengthening of appropriate political institutions or by a fairer distribution of social and economic assets in favour of the individuals, groups and communities which comprise the state.

<u>Cultural Clashes</u>

Patterns of conflict are developing at the cultural level also. These have found their most extreme expression in Iran and can only be detected distantly in other parts of the Third World. For the present, it is most clearly expressed by the catchword "re-islamization". Although the emergence of tensions at a cultural level cannot be separated from the main body of development problems, culture and religion do constitute a unique factor as mobilizing elements. The survival of cultural traditions in a rapid process of modernization and the manner in which the masses are mobilized differ from revolutionary processes with a purely social or economic background. Western-style economic rationality, the cultural foundation of the Western course of development and Western civilization are all rejected. Instead, the aim is to revitalize the native culture and to adapt it somewhat to the needs of the modern state. This conflict of cultures is expressed within the country itself in the confrontation between native chauvinism on the one hand and westernized elites on the other. An international dimension

is added to the domestic through the rejection of all external influence and power. However, the experience of developments in Iran teaches us that within a chauvinist movement, new frictions can arise.

Liberation Movements

Although many aspects of liberation movements overlap or border on the first three categories, it may be helpful to introduce liberation movements as a fourth - and thus separate - cause of conflicts in the Third World. Generally speaking, liberation movements aim to remove political frameworks established during the days of colonial rule. They include such diverse aims as the achievement of independence, shaking off the rule of white minorities, breaking away from existing national entities or the instigation of upheavals of a socio-revolutionary nature. A characteristic feature of liberation movements is that they are often supported by a group of Third World countries, the reason being that the objectives and intentions of liberation movements themselves often reflect the unsolved political problems which are characteristic of many parts of the Third World.

THEORY AND REALITY

Categorization of the sources of conflicts in the Third World shows how the elements of conflict are present in and between many Third World states. By looking at actual examples of conflict they can be seen singly or in combination. The pattern of conflict based on nationalism can be seen both in wars between states and in domestic struggles where the government of a country is at war with parts of the population living within the country's boundaries. There have been too many wars between states and too many tense confrontations in the Third World since the end of the Second World War to make it necessary to enumerate them all. In the last decade alone troops occupied part of Kuwait in 1973, there was border conflict between the two Yemens in 1979 and there is a permanent state of tension between Iraq and the new regime in Iran. In Africa, there has been war between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977/78) and the invasion of Uganda by Tanzania. In South-East Asia, the persistent conflict between Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand reflect the fact that the political boundaries left behind by the colonial powers concealed unresolved disputes and cut across ethnic lines.

The internal conflicts arising from nationalism have nearly always been concerned with the problems associated with the integration of ethnic or religious groups. Generally speaking the pattern of states, which has grown up in the Third World during the past decades has not been consolidated. Bangladesh's break from Pakistan was the most profound manifestation of separatism but in the Middle East the problems of ethnic and religious groups

have recently increased. The extreme tensions or open conflicts in Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Lebanon (to mention just the most dramatic cases) have subjected the constellation of nation states in the Middle East to a severe test. Looking at Africa, although the Sudan stands as a rare example of a (so far) successful solution on the basis of autonomy for ethnic groups, in the Horn of Africa an explosive crisis has developed due to ethnic separatism in Ethiopia and to Somali irredentism in the Ogaden. Chad and Zaire are further examples of just how endangered Africa still is by the risk of ethnic conflicts, at times heightened by religious differences. A lack of participation in decision-making, the fact that all do not enjoy equal rights and the absence of autonomy are the main reasons why there have been numerous cases of minority ethnic groups not identifying themselves with the states to which they belong.

To a considerable extent internal conflicts and tensions in Third World countries arise through failures in economic and political development. Putting it briefly some or all of the following phenomena are observable:

- the economy's weakness leads to discontent, provoking "impatient" groups in society to attempt to sieze power;
- weak political institutions are destroyed by rival forces within the state;
- existing socio-political and ideological concepts are called in question and new "revolutionary" ideas are introduced;
- out-of-date, traditional social structures are replaced by the forces of modernization;
- the participation of the various ethnic or regional groups in the economic and political life of the state is neglected, leading to an intensification of tensions.

Latin America offers classic examples of the interaction of economic weakness, structurally flawed political systems and political lability. The most recent evidence for this is supplied by Bolivia. One can also point to examples in the Middle East during the 1950s and 1960s and in Africa the coup d'état in Liberia in April 1980 is only the latest of a whole series of conflicts. The origins of all these are to be found in this "development deficit". One could also add to this list the revolution in Ethiopia, the two coups in Afghanistan (1973 and 1978), the uprising directed against Idi Amin in Uganda and the overthrow of a number of other dictatorial African potentates in the recent past. In many of the examples mentioned the Army was involved because the armed forces enjoy a privileged position due to training and education of their members and because, as one of the relatively few organised bodies, they are in a position to play a decisive role in

countries which have, in many cases, only weak and unstable political systems. Just how severely an economic crisis can upset the fabric even of countries with relatively mature political systems is shown by the current destabilization of Turkey.

The "development problem" intrudes into foreign policy and international politics generally when the attempt is made to export a particular ideology or Weltanschauung as with Nasser's attempt to export his version of Arab socialism to all parts of the Arab world as the necessary prerequisite for the modernization and resurgence of Arab countries. Nasser's disciple, Colonel Ghaddafi, is following in his footsteps, although he is operating with a more limited agenda.

Cultural conflict has arisen as a reaction against a course of development which has too often been based on the Western model. Such conflict has reached a critical stage in the shape of the so-called "re-islamization" and has indeed for the first time broken out into an open conflict in Iran. Islam, with its synthesis of religious beliefs and social organization, offers a political alternative which claims to be able to catch up on the West in the field of development. Certain elements of the conflict which has broken out in Iran can also be observed, in a more or less pronounced form, in many other Islamic countries. The Islamic revival has resulted in the destabilization of large parts of the Middle East and the symptoms of this process can also be seen in Egypt and Syria as well as in the secular state of Turkey.

Liberation movements in the Third World have always attracted by far the most world-wide attention. In addition to the "classical" liberation movements such as the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which were founded in the early 1960s, many other organizations have emerged in the course of the process of decolonization having widely differing aims: numerous movements operate in Ethiopia for the overthrow of "Amharic colonialism" (in other words, the destruction of Ethiopia). Liberation movements in Southern Africa call for the termination of white supremacy; the Polisario are fighting for the independence of what used to be the Spanish Sahara. However, in the main all liberation movements which are directed against the former white colonists, either directly or indirectly, enjoy the vocal and sometimes practical support of a large part of the Third World. In contrast, the movements which aim to destroy particular political structures in the Third World find themselves in an ambiguous position. Polarization within the Third World follows and this can lead in turn to the aggravation of conflict as, for example, in Ethiopia. This is also evident where the political regime has only existed for a very short time as in Morocco's take-over of what used to be the Spanish Sahara.

Generally speaking, however, it remains true that the most obvious agents likely to bring Third World conflict into the international arena are liberation movements.

Nevertheless, conflicts in the Third World can rarely be traced back to a single cause. It is much nearer the truth to say that in most cases the various causes intermingle and are mutually reinforcing. For example, the so-called "Islamic revolution" in Iran grew out of a socially and politically based conflict but it was only after the religious element had been brought in that was possible to mobilize the masses into active opposition against the Shah. In the case of conflicts involving ethnic or sectarian groups the national conflict pattern is often related to shortcomings in the process of development. Nationalist pretensions and interests are only conjured up in order to legitimize the pretensions of a particular party or individual as, for example, in the case of Afghanistan's recurring claims to Pushtunistan or when the armed forces of a country dress up their seizure of power in the cloak of "national interests". Conversely, power politics at the national level are quite often legitimized by demands for social change in other countries; for years, Nasser linked his claim that Egypt should play a special role in the Arab world (with him as leader) with the propagation of the progressive doctrine of Arab socialism. In the conflicts in Indo-China, particularly with regard to Vietnam's policy towards Cambodia, a mixture of aggressive nationalism and ideological justification is apparent.

Attempts to categorize the causes of conflicts - in any case a questionable undertaking - become totally inadequate in the case of such a complicated regional conflict as the Arab-Israeli confrontation. The underlying pattern of conflict reflects, without doubt, the structuralization of the Middle East along national lines which took place after the First World War. The division of the Arab region into nation states and the creation of the state of Israel meant that two mutually exclusive sets of interests had been created. The Islamic view that the "territory of Islam" is indivisible and cannot be subjected to any foreign rule resolves itself into the Palestinians' claim to a state of their own. The undertaking to settle the Jews in the "Promised Land", which forms the basis of Zionism, meant the existence of the state of Israel. As if this were not enough, the internal instability of the majority of the Arab regimes, the causes of which are to be found in their "development problems" in the broad sense of the term as used above, further complicates the issues. On many occasions during the recent past, these regimes have tried to use the fact of the existence of the state of Israel and the Palestinian problem to legitimize their own rule. The Palestinian liberation movements represent an attempt - in view of the inability of the established Arab states to solve the problem in the interest of the Arabs - to undertake to solve the problem on their own.

DARKENING PROSPECTS

The prospects for a long-term stabilization of the Third World are not encouraging. There are a number of symptoms which point to a general deterioration of stability. One is that the number of people who, as a result of bilateral conflicts or domestic violence, have been forced to leave their homes to become refugees has reached an unprecedentedly high level. Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Djibouti, Chad, Uganda, Afghanistan and Pakistan are all involved in more or less serious refugee problems. Palestinian refugees too greatly complicate the politics of the Middle East. On the one hand, this is evidence of the use of more radical methods on the part of some regimes in the Third World when pursuing their own interests or in seeking solutions to existing problems. On the other hand, the flood of refugees brings enormous economic problems for most of the countries which admit them, problems which they cannot solve on their own and which their own precariously balanced economies cannot withstand.

Despite a nominal increase in development aid from the industrialized nations of the West and from the oil-producing countries, investment remains much too small to maintain a rate of development in the whole of the Third World that would "solve" the development problems these countries face or to have a "fundamentally stabilizing effect". Only very few of the developing countries have the resources to reach the stage of "take-off". The majority will remain under-developed. The gap between these countries and the industrialized nations can only grow wider and tensions between many Third World countries are likely to increase.

The high price that the developing countries have to pay for oil is also an indication that the oil-producing nations, despite their belonging - in most cases - to the group of developing countries, are chiefly concerned with furthering their own interests. A sort of "Third World solidarity" aimed at solving the existing development problems appears virtually non-existent. For the foreseeable future, impatience and disappointment will grow, leading to further conflicts.

The inherent and persistent instability of the majority of Third World states has meant the establishment of armed forces of relatively large dimensions to enable regimes to hold on to power, to hold the state together and to defend it against the competing claims of other nations. Perceptions of greater threats at home and from abroad lead to the assumption that in future an ever-increasing share of national expenditure will be spent on armaments. This is true not only of the oil-producing states which can afford the colossal sums involved (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, the Sheikhdoms or Indonesia) but also

of poor countries, such as Ethiopia, Somalia, India or Pakistan. This not only means an increased economic burden but it also heightens the perception of mutual threat with a wide range of political consequences. On the one hand, external threats can be exploited to distract attention away from internal tensions and development problems. This clearly has the effect of further aggravating mutual threat perceptions. On the other hand, an Army always represents a danger to fragile political structures such as exist in the Arabian Peninsula or in Africa. The heavy expenditure by the Shah on the armed forces of Iran was used ultimately as a weighty argument against him for they came to be seen more as an improper waste of money and as an instrument of a hated regime than as contributing to the country's security.

GREAT POWER RIVALRIES

The intervention of the great powers in regional or local conflicts is no new occurrence. The history of the 1950s and 1960s is full of interventions of a direct or indirect nature by the USA and the former colonial powers. Iran (1953), Suez (1956) and Lebanon (1958) form a chain of events which came to a climax in Vietnam. Yet these interventions were never able to stop forces of liberation from gaining power in many parts of the Third World, forces which associate the West with imperialism and colonialism and see in favourable relations with the Soviet Union the chance of pursuing an independent political course or more rapid economic development. By the beginning of the 1970s, the Soviet Union had built up a military capacity (combined with the political will to play the role of a world power) which made it possible for her to safeguard her influence in the Third World by direct means with the help of a variety of political, economic and military tools. It was no accident that it was in the Middle East that the two superpowers first came to face each other directly. The occasion was the fourth Arab-Israeli War in 1973 when the US armed forces were put on alert in order to deter a possible Soviet intervention on the Arab side. The Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola, which settled the power struggle amongst the rival liberation movements in favour of the Marxist MPLA, was the first indication of a new interest by the superpowers in developments in the Third World. Since then, the US – after some years of non-involvement in the Third World as a result of the Vietnam experience – have begun to show considerably more interest in Africa and elsewhere. The analysis of the sources of conflict in the Third World has taken on a new dimension. Superpower rivalry is increasingly affecting what used to be simply regional affairs and the rivalry is likely to intensify the conflicts which already exist. The reverse is true also. Because the superpowers regard the Third World in the context of East-West relations, regional conflict is likely to increase the danger of a deterioration of relations between them because of their involvement.

The rivalry between the superpowers in the Third World varies. It is obviously at its most intense where political or economic interests are deeply involved. It is again no accident that it was in the Middle East that the superpowers first competed for influence. This is easily explained by the geopolitical significance of the region and, especially for the West, its importance for energy supplies. In the "Northern Tier", in the Gulf and in the Arabian Peninsula there are very direct connections between fundamental regional instability and international interest. The potential for conflict is great and the causes likely to be extremely complex. Social and political conflicts, both open and below the surface, are present in Turkey, in Iran and in Pakistan. Border incidents between Iraq and Iran are commonplace and there is a great deal of speculation about the stability of the Arabian Peninsula in view of the increasing strains between economic modernization and social and political conservatism. Through the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has shifted the political and military balance of power in the whole region somewhat in its favour. Any further destabilization of any one of the countries of the "Northern Tier" could indeed result in fundamental changes in the international power balance. The Soviet Union is interested in perpetuating this sense of crisis for it tends to favour the forces which want to abolish the existing political structure in favour of socialist-orientated systems.

In the past there seems to have been some sort of unwritten agreement concerning the spheres of influence of the superpowers in the Third World. According to this, Latin America was just as much a part of the American sphere of influence as the Gulf or Saudi Arabia. Afghanistan, on the other hand, seems to have been treated as if it lay within the Soviet sphere of influence long before the recent invasion. Africa was, to a large extent, an unmarked map. The West has indeed been alarmed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan viewed, as it were, against a backdrop of the Soviet interventions in Angola and Ethiopia, the long-standing Soviet presence in South Yemen and the rapid destabilization of Iran. It would therefore seem that a new era is being ushered in characterized more by rivalry than by accommodation with both sides seeking to increase their influence in areas which they consider are politically and economically vital - no matter where. Therefore it cannot be ruled out that the Soviet Union will make efforts to exploit the growing instability in Latin America in order to expand its influence there.

The Soviet Union has used conflict in parts of the Third World - more than the West - as a means of exerting influence. The growth of Soviet arms deliveries to Africa during the 1970s (and in particular since 1977) is a significant indication of Moscow's determination to increase its influence

over the regimes involved. The Soviet-Union, in following this policy, is prepared not only to accept the conflicts that arise but even to take some risks for they see conflicts as a way to promote the establishment of centralized, socialist-orientated states.

This willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to exploit conflicts in order to increase its influence has increased tension in many parts of the Third World. This is true for practically all of Africa, for the Middle East (where the Soviet Union has intervened in recent years) and for Afghanistan where the internal resistance to the Soviet presence threatens to involve the neighbouring states. In Ethiopia, some Arab states are involved through their support for liberation movements especially in Eritrea. In Indo-China, Vietnam, supported by the Soviet Union, is in conflict with almost all neighbouring countries including the People's Republic of China. Even if one may justifiably ask how long the Soviet Union will be able to pay the high costs of such a policy, there are no reasons to believe that they will now give up what has been, until now, a quite successful strategy.

A BLUEPRINT FOR STABILITY?

Despite the determination of the superpowers to increase their influence over certain countries in the Third World, the forces of change defy, to a considerable degree, the control and direction of external powers. But because almost all internal conflicts in the Third World are between one group seeking to change the status quo and another group fighting to maintain it, the Soviet Union has developed a remarkable degree of flexibility in managing to side with the forces of change. The West, on the other hand, as has become perfectly clear in the case of Iran, tries to collaborate with regimes which are facing growing internal opposition for the sake of the stability of the region. This dilemma is likely to be repeated in Africa, elsewhere in the Middle East and maybe even in Latin America. This raises the question whether the Western concept of stability (in the sense of maintaining the status quo) is, in fact, adequate in view of the structural changes which are bound to take place in the Third World. In the past, the Western nations (and especially America) have tended to focus exclusively on stability as the desirable aim. This has led to efforts to maintain existing and superficially "stable" political systems at the cost of losing influence over alternative political figures and movements.

It is obvious that a military deterrent alone cannot prevent conflicts from breaking out in the Third World. It is much more important to reduce the local and regional tension and so the conflict potential in the Third World. Three long-term prospects are worth considering in this respect: first, it

would be particularly helpful if the regional organizations could be strengthened. For all its weakness, the Arab League, for example, has repeatedly proved during recent years that it enjoys at least a degree of moral authority which has enabled it to influence the management of some conflicts of both an internal and external nature. This is true also of the Organization for African Unity (OAU), for the principles contained in its Charter reduced the tensions which came to the surface when former colonies gained their independence. Many potential boundary disputes have not developed into conflict. In Latin America also, multilateral organizations have enjoyed a fine record. Finally, in South-East Asia ASEAN has demonstrated the stability which can be achieved when states with similar interests work together to reduce conflict.

The second avenue to explore should be guarantees of the independence of the countries of the Third World and non-involvement of external powers. Although there are few grounds for optimism this much is clear: only genuine independence and a "hands-off" attitude on the part of the great powers can put an end to the vicious circle in which local instability brings superpower interference which then increases instability. Such a policy would have to be based on a system of agreements not to intervene and respect for the sovereignty of other states. Only through a reduction in the level of regional tension and perceptions of threat can arms races in the Third World be controlled or reduced.

Finally it is necessary to attend to development needs as a decisive step towards the stabilization of many countries of the Third World. Since it is hardly possible for most of them to develop on their own, it is vitally important that development aid be increased considerably. In the long-term, it is possible that this will prove to be the West's strongest card so far as relations with the Third World are concerned. Development aid should proceed within the context of the North-South dialogue and aim to set up a new world economic order which would give the Third World a fair share of the world's resources and would open up the prospects of comprehensive development.

Realistically one must assume that, for the time being at least, regional conflicts will continue and the West will endeavour to prevent the emergence of changes which are believed to be detrimental to its interests. Nevertheless the West should try to gain a better understanding of internal local and regional factors and acquire a credible capacity to help friendly groups or regimes. The West must realize that its interests are being affected more and more in the Third World. It can no longer afford to stand back and watch the situation deteriorate to its disadvantage while the Soviet Union makes political capital out of the conflicts and tensions which continue to plague the states of the Third World.

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A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE

by

Jusuf Wanandi

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THIRD WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY:
A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE

Jusuf Wanandi

INTRODUCTION

A view from the Third World on the nature of conflicts in it and international security as elucidated in this paper is based on observations and experiences of the Southeast Asian region. Subsequently, an attempt is made to draw relevant conclusions for other regions of the Third World. In those conclusions, suggestions will be made as to the desirability of an international order for the future and the role of the big powers in that order, as seen from the perspective of the Third World.

CONFLICTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

To understand the nature of Southeast Asian conflicts and the problems of its security one has to look at both internal and external dimensions of those problems as well as the links between them. The hypothesis suggested here is that these links becomes stronger with the deterioration in the resilience of the individual Southeast Asian countries. Thus, the greater the threats to security which originate domestically, the greater would be the external threats faced by that country. Sources of domestic instability are political, economic, social, and even cultural and ideological in nature. Therefore, the realm of security in Southeast Asia involves a wide spectrum of affairs and is not solely a military matter in the conventional sense.

The nature and degree of internal conflicts in the Southeast Asian countries depend upon the success of the respective governments in meeting the rising demands and expectations of the population, which means a successful implementation of balanced development, encompassing all aspects of life and taking into consideration national stability and social justice. This task becomes all the more difficult when external forces create an environment which necessitates the respective governments diverting their attentions and resources from implementing the wide range of development programmes.

External threats to the Security of Southeast Asia are considered to be of a secondary nature, in the sense that infiltration and subversion could become effective only when local communist parties or other rebellious groups are present.

To facilitate a closer look at the above problems, the following discussion on Southeast Asia will be confined to the ASEAN countries. Although there exist many differences amongst the ASEAN countries, the following observations hold good for most of them:

- They are concerned with national development with all its side-effects, such as changes in cultural values of the society and unequal distribution of the gains of development;

- the unity of the state and nation is still a problem for most;

- they are concerned with the establishment and development of political and social institutions as well as improvements in the implementation of the rule of law and human rights;

- political succession is a major challenge to the stability and continuity of the state and nation.

Each will be considered in turn.

National Development

A main problem which arises from any development effort is to ensure that it can be sustained so that governments could fulfil their promises. At the same time, it is only through their achievements that governments can maintain their legitimacy.

During the last 10 years the ASEAN countries have been able to achieve high growth rates in their economic development, between 5 to 10% annually. However, recent uncertainties in the international economy may affect performances of the ASEAN countries. Continuous increases in the prices of energy create pressures upon Thailand and the Philippines especially. Still, because of the substantial abundance of natural resources, the situation over the longer term may not be critical. It is likely that short-term measures could overcome these difficulties.

Overall, however, it may be less difficult to sustain high economic growth rates than to deal with the side-effects resulting from the very successes of economic development.

Changes in cultural values which accompany economic development require a search for a new national identity. Ideally, this will incorporate both traditional values and new values coming from abroad. It may take some time to find the proper balance between them. Reform in the educational system could smoothe this process. At present, no ASEAN country has accomplished the process of cultural assimilation. In this period of transition, it is expected that a certain feeling of insecurity will be quite widespread among the population. However, in view of the history of the Southeast Asian people, one can be quite optimistic that this problem can be overcome. Several cultures - Hindu, Sinic, and Islam - have been absorbed in the past.

Development also creates other problems: explosion of demands; over-consumption; and inequalities in the distribution of income. To some extent, they are inherent in the development strategy adopted, namely open economies relying upon market mechanisms.

Governments have launched efforts to correct those defects by:

- Suppressing overconsumption, enhancing national solidarity and fighting corruption. They attempt to control advertisements through television and other mass media as well as other marketing methods. They have also made consistent efforts to eradicate blatant corruption especially by the ruling few;

- the adoption of a progressive tax system, and other social policies, such as increasing public education, public health and public housing, especially for the poor. Thus, even if this group cannot - for the time being - participate directly in economic development, they nevertheless could enjoy many of the fruits of development.

National Unity

The unity of the nation and state becomes a problem because of history. Each ASEAN member country contains many ethnic groups and religious diversities and these tend to have socio-political implications. At present, the Philippines faces problems with her Moslem minorities in the South. Malaysia still faces/with the Malays (45%) and the Chinese population (35%). Singapore is still struggling to build a Singaporean nation. Thailand has many minorities along her borders. Indonesia, too, consists of many ethnic groups.

Nation building thus becomes a necessary task for all ASEAN governments. Through this effort, it is hoped that ethnic or religious minorities could be fully integrated into society. Past experiences have shown that minority groups could easily be exploited by outside forces to create internal unrest and instability with the aim of overthrowing the government.

Religious fanaticism is another disintegrating factor. Initially, the Islamic Revolution of Khomeini in Iran was an inspiration for some Moslems in Southeast Asia. However, having seen the uncertain consequences of this Revolution, its influence has declined. The majority of the Moslem leaders also acknowledge that the situation in Southeast Asia is different from that in Iran and that Islam as practised in Iran is different from that in Southeast Asia. More importantly, they realise that religious elements alone cannot be used as a base for any alternative Government.

The crucial factor determining whether a government maintains the support of the population is the degree to which their demands are fulfilled as well as the extent to which they participate in all aspects of development. The socio-political implications of religious fanaticism can magnify and complicate the problems faced by the governments, but religion alone is not the determining factor in whether to replace the government. This was shown with the Darul Islam case in Indonesia.

Some governments in Southeast Asia have had to take into account the role of Islam in the formulation and implementation of national policies, because the majority of the population are Moslems, especially in Malaysia and Indonesia. Nevertheless, a distinction must be maintained between state affairs and religious affairs, otherwise religion could become a source of disintegration for the pluralistic societies in the ASEAN countries.

National Participation

Political development gives the population a greater sense of participation, and of being involved in the process of policy making.

Yet it cannot be denied that every success creates more diversified demands and greater expectations. Economic gains are not enough. Demands for a genuine rule of law, for political participation, and for a wide spectrum of human and civil rights will continue and grow. It should be noted, however, that in a developing country (as elsewhere) it is important to achieve the proper balance between individual rights and communal rights. This balance depends upon economic achievements, political stability and national unity. The Western model and values cannot be adopted indiscriminately for this would only create new demands which - given the prevailing scarcities and constraints - cannot yet be satisfied.

Nevertheless, it is never too early to embark on the process of establishing political institutions. They provide a mechanism for absorbing or deflecting the side effects of economic development. Political parties are not the only important political institutions. Other social institutions have important functions - labour and farmer unions, youth and women organisations, etc. The mass-media, students and intellectuals have to be given special attention because they are the most vocal groups in the society.

In sum, sound political development adjusted to the stages of economic development is a way to overcome the negative implications of development. Governments, together with the leaders of society, must design and implement a long term political development plan.

The Problems of Succession

Democracy works when the transfer of power can proceed smoothly and constitutionally. The existence of established socio-political institutions tends to guarantee the continuation of development, with the fate of the nation no longer dependent upon a single person.

In the 1980s, all ASEAN countries will be confronted with succession problems. For all their shortcomings, the present leaders of the ASEAN countries have been able to further the development of their respective countries. They have exercised strong leadership from a broad base of popular support.

The existing political institutions, which must manage the smooth transfer of power, have not been tested. It is for this reason that in Southeast Asia today the importance of political institutional building has been widely acknowledged by the leadership, by the political parties and by political organisations at large. It is perhaps the Philippines which give rise to the greatest anxiety.

In solving the internal problems faced by the ASEAN member countries, it would appear that the role of domestic forces is more important than external factors. Although external factors can exert a great pressure in a national crisis, the failure to master the internal situation magnifies and complicates the problems faced by the country as a whole. The military, while important, cannot deal with the complexity of national development encompassing all aspects of life. They can only handle internal and external security threats.

The External Dimensions

To ASEAN today, Vietnam constitutes the most immediate threat to security, because of the direct effects upon Thailand's internal situation resulting from Vietnam's military involvement in Kampuchea. Although an invasion of Thailand by Vietnam is not likely to take place in the short term, the threat to Thailand's borders remains resulting either from hot pursuit against Pol Pot guerrillas or from support given by Vietnam to rebellious groups in Thailand.

In the longer term, the possibility of invasion cannot be discounted because Vietnam's ambitions may go beyond hegemony over Indochina. She may decide to expand her sphere of influence to include the whole of continental Southeast Asia as officially stated by the Lao Dong party. In the short term Vietnam could be unlikely to implement such a plan because she faces great difficulties internally and has suffered drastic set-backs in her economic development. She also faces difficulties in absorbing and integrating the South. The burden of Vietnam's military involvement in Kampuchea is becoming greater as time passes and this may make any involvement with Thailand infeasible. Apart from long lines of communication which must be secured for such an operation, there is no support from within Thailand, largely because the Communist Party of Thailand's orientation is towards China. Pro-Vietnamese factions within Thailand are insignificant.

However, to return to the short term, Vietnam could affect the stability of Thailand. If in hot pursuit the Vietnamese Army were to be confronted by Thai soldiers (as in mid-June 1980) or they over-ran the Thai army along the border or if Vietnam occupied certain parts of Thailand (for example the 16 provinces which have always been a disputed area between Thailand, Kampuchea, and Laos) political pressures on the Government in Bangkok would increase. Instability could arise and the internal situation in Thailand would become much more complex.

Vietnam could also affect Thailand's stability by pushing refugees out of Kampuchea and Laos and into Thailand. Thailand is already heavily burdened by the 600,000 refugees already in the country.

Vietnam is indirectly supported by the Soviet Union through the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of November 1978, which involves logistic support, the provision of intelligence data and political and economic under-pinning. The increased Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia (at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay) is also unsettling.

Because Southeast Asia is the arena for Sino-Soviet competition, an additional complexity is introduced. Both will continuously try to increase their spheres of influence in Southeast Asia through their "proxies".

China's involvement in the Indochina conflict works in two ways. First, she has demonstrated her willingness to apply physical pressures on Vietnam, and in this way she is relieving some of the pressures created by Vietnam upon ASEAN. Second, China could magnify the Sino-Vietnamese conflict to induce the greater involvement of the Soviet Union and drag in the United States and ASEAN as well as by expanding the area of conflict to the region of Southeast Asia as a whole.

The immediate threat to ASEAN, however, remains Vietnam because of the greater Soviet threat which looms behind it. China, on the other hand, despite some convergence of interest with ASEAN because of its role in maintaining a power balance in Southeast Asia, is still considered a potential if remote threat to ASEAN.

The convergence of interest between ASEAN and China, the more moderate attitude of China with regard to domestic and foreign policies, the tendency of the Chinese political leadership to place greater emphasis on government-to-government, rather than party-to-party relations, as well as the understanding of the need to support the efforts of ASEAN countries in solving their overseas Chinese problems, may all have an effect upon, for example, Indonesia's attitude with regard to her diplomatic relations with China. It has been argued that ASEAN would be able to take diplomatic initiatives to influence the situation in Indochina only after Indonesia reestablishes full diplomatic relations with China. At the same time, ASEAN should try to improve relations with Hanoi. Stability in Southeast Asia might be guaranteed if ASEAN were to adopt an active and more balanced relationship with China and Vietnam.

ASEAN's diplomatic initiatives vis-à-vis Vietnam should try to achieve two objectives, namely:

- to convince Vietnam that in order to develop economically she cannot rely solely upon the Soviet Union and COMECON, and that to obtain assistance from the international community she will have to adopt a genuinely cooperative attitude towards ASEAN;

- to convince Vietnam that she must find an acceptable political
  solution in Kampuchea because by military means alone Vietnam
  cannot solve her problems there in the next one to two years.
  Apart from the burden to Vietnam's economy, a prolonged military
  involvement by Vietnam in Kampuchea provides legitimate reasons
  for China to continue to increase her influence over Indochina
  and Southeast Asia as a whole. Moreover, ASEAN must point out
  that this adventure can only lead to the deterioration of
  Vietnam's relations with ASEAN, destroy the Khmer nation, and,
  ultimately, totally isolate Vietnam from the international
  community. The attitude of the international community in the
  United Nations should have reminded Vietnam of this.

A political solution in Kampuchea would, ideally, involve the with-
drawal of Vietnam's troops, a referendum of the Khmer people under the
supervision of the United Nations, and the establishment of popular
government.

One has to admit that the possibility of an immediate political solution
is rather remote. One way or another, the situation on the ground must be
solved first; this may be accomplished either through the nearly complete
destruction of the Pol Pot forces or an increase in their capabilities
which might force the Vietnamese into a position in which they have to
carry increasingly heavier burdens in Kampuchea and this would ultimately
force them to look for a compromise.

The central problem here is to reduce the confrontation between
Vietnam and China. ASEAN could play a diplomatic role here by keeping the
dialogue going with both sides. The increased presence of the Soviet Union
in this region is mainly due to the conflict, and it is still unclear as to
whether the Soviet Union intends to support efforts to solve the conflict
and thus decrease the tensions in the region. It is also unclear whether
under the present circumstances Vietnam could afford to decrease its
dependence from or to loosen its ties with the Soviet Union because of the
pressures from China. As noted earlier, for the first time Vietnam has
announced the possibility of giving permanent facilities to the Soviet
Union in Cam Ranh Bay and at Danang. They have also established a joint
operation for off-shore oil operations. It is important to note that both
Vietnam and the Soviet Union are becoming more and more interested in the
South China Sea and in the islands there.

Diplomatic moves towards a solution in Kampuchea will obviously involve a complicated web of related actions encompassing ASEAN and Vietnam, Vietnam and China, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, the Sino-Soviet relationship, as well as the United States and Japan.

Apart from diplomatic initiatives, ASEAN should also be prepared to respond militarily in the last resort. The military capabilities of the ASEAN countries should be enhanced gradually to the level required by external threats. Cooperation among the ASEAN countries in this field is likely to be strengthened although it will not become a military pact. All the ASEAN countries are aware that a military pact would not be the proper response to the immediate threats they are facing, for most of those originate internally. Rather, they will continue to improve cooperation on a bilateral basis for this is likely to be seen as sufficient for dealing with external threats in the near future. If Thailand faces a real threat along her borders, the other four ASEAN countries could independently provide the necessary assitance, for example by supplying strategic materials such as oil and food.

Enhancing ASEAN's military capabilities will of necessity be gradual, if they are not to create great burdens upon economic and social development. In the short and medium term military improvements will be confined to increasing their capabilities to deal with increased subversion and infiltration. In the longer term, namely 5 to 10 years, they can be stepped-up to face potential threats from outside their borders. In this respect, the US could assist the ASEAN countries in terms of guaranteed and orderly military sales, similar to recent arrangements with Thailand.

ASEAN's efforts to continue with economic development and to increase the extent of economic cooperation also are a necessary response, in addition to the politico-diplomatic and military-security efforts already discussed. Cooperation among the ASEAN countries in the economic field seems to have lost some momentum precisely because of recent events in Indochina which have a direct bearing upon ASEAN's security.

A strong and broad based economic cooperative effort could, in the longer term, guarantee the viability of ASEAN. An enlarged structure of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region could further reinforce ASEAN economic cooperation through increased economic relations with the industrial countries in the region which are their main trading partners and source of capital and technology.

To support ASEAN's efforts as discussed above, ASEAN should attempt to maintain an external environment in which there is a balanced presence of the four major powers - the US, the Soviet Union, the PRC, and Japan - in Southeast Asia. Such a balanced presence should enhance the stability of the Southeast Asian region. To achieve this objective, a particular structure of relationships needs to be established with each of the great powers.

The United States

The US seems to have reversed the trend of disengaging from the Asia-Pacific region following the Vietnam debacle. However, in the near future, it is not to be expected that the US presence will be increased from the minimal level prevailing today. Closer relations between the ASEAN countries and the US Congress are needed. There has been some rekindling of American public interest in Southeast Asia, but this must be strengthened further to support a continued US presence in the region. The US should be encouraged to maintain her military presence in Southeast Asia (at Clark Field and Subic), as well as her presence in the Indian Ocean.

To support ASEAN's efforts to achieve a political solution in Kampuchea and to solve the refugee problem, the US could:

- use her leverage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China so as to prevent them from expanding the Sino-Soviet conflict further into the rest of Southeast Asia;

- lessen the dependence of Vietnam on the Soviet Union by taking a more flexible attitude toward Hanoi.

Increased economic assistance to ASEAN in the form of Overseas Development Aid (ODA) and private investment and greater access of ASEAN manufactured products to the US market would be very important measures to assist ASEAN's resilience and it is important that the United States maintains a workable mechanism of consultations with ASEAN as a group as well as with individual ASEAN countries.

Japan

Japan could assist ASEAN mainly in the economic field, either through investment of capital and technology or through trade. Japan is and will remain the major economic partner of ASEAN. Japan could now afford gradually to increase her political role. She could mediate in the North-South dialogue and support ASEAN's diplomacy towards a peaceful solution in Indochina. Japan should intensify consultations with the ASEAN countries.

With regard to Japan's possible military role, Japan should openly discuss the matter and consult with her friends and allies including the ASEAN countries. Openness on the Japanese side is important to avoiding misinterpretation or even opposition by the countries in the region. Ultimately, Japan will have to move towards greater military involvement, but this should proceed very gradually. Defence of her own homeland and home waters is the first step, but, at a later stage, Japan will have to consider the security of vital sealanes and this could involve an arrangement for a division of labour with the countries in the region, such as ASEAN. ASEAN would not oppose such a development if Japan were to play it gradually, within the defence arrangements with the United States and after consultations with the countries in the region.

China

China can become a balancing factor for Vietnam and the Soviet Union in the Southeast Asian region. To enhance China's credibility vis-à-vis the ASEAN countries, she should prove that she is/trustworthy partner by placing greater reliance on government-to-government relations rather than party-to-party relations. Also she should maintain an unambiguous policy towards the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. China should also restrain herself from fuelling further the conflict in Indochina. To participate in multilateral efforts to maintain stability in Southeast Asia, China must demonstrate that she is genuinely willing to play by the rules of the game of the international community.

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union clearly could contribute to the stability of Southeast Asia by restraining Vietnam from attacking Thailand. The Soviet Union could also create an atmosphere in which Vietnam could coexist with ASEAN. The Soviet presence in Southeast Asia is now a reality but the Soviet Union has yet to prove herself a trustworthy partner. Only recently the Soviet Union has reversed her attitude towards ASEAN, and this may only be tactical. It is also crucial that the Soviet Union demonstrates self-restraint with regard to the Sino-Soviet conflict, for an expansion of the Sino-Soviet conflict into Southeast Asia is most undesirable for ASEAN and it is this that has prompted ASEAN to take a neutral stand as between China and the Soviet Union.

In the longer term, the Soviet Union might come to be regarded as a balancing factor vis-à-vis China. The ASEAN countries, for historical reasons, tend to fear China not only because of the overseas Chinese but because China is the only great power in the region.

Towards A Regional Order

The ASEAN countries desire stability and peace so that they can develop. This is the main challenge faced by the ASEAN countries. Therefore it is in ASEAN's long-term interest to create the basis for regional order in Southeast Asia, a workable order, complied with by all the parties concerned. The existence of regional order implies the absence of any great powers' hegemony and freedom for each country in the region to develop in accordance with its own aspirations and character. The question of whether or not outside powers would accept this proposition becomes irrelevant once all countries in the region become determined to realise the objective of regional order. Adherence to this principle would minimise, if not eliminate, the opportunities for outside intervention and interference with the internal affairs of the region.

It should be stated at the outset that a regional order in Southeast Asia need not perhaps be based on formal written agreements because the idea rests upon the convergence of felt needs of the countries in the region. ASEAN has evolved and grown precisely because it has maintained a high degree of flexibility and has not been shackled by strict rules. The realisation of a regional order, however, depends upon Vietnam's future intentions.

AN ANATOMY OF THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS

Certain features of the Southeast Asian security dimensions might be applicable to other regions of the Third World. Factors which constitute sources of international conflict in the Third World differ from one region to another because of differences in geographic location, strategic position, history, the dynamics of internal developments and natural resource potential. Nonetheless, those factors which are relevant to the internal development of the ASEAN countries are also relevant to other Third World countries. The intensity and complexity of Third World problems differ according to the stages of economic development, the establishment of socio-political institutions, and the degree of national unity. The ASEAN countries are in this respect somewhat ahead of the majority of Third World countries. In terms of the existence of an inter-country mechanism for conflict resolution, ASEAN may be well ahead of other groupings, such as the OAU for Africa, the Arab League, and the smaller (and perhaps more effective) cooperative structures in West and East Africa.

Conflicts in the Third World are basically reflections of internal weaknesses. These weaknesses can be exploited by the big powers for their own interests. Internal weaknesses can be the result of the troublesome process of gradual or sudden decolonisation. Recent examples are Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Those weaknesses could also arise because of political struggles among the various groups whether based on ideological, religious, or ethnic grounds. Ethiopia and Afghanistan provide examples. Internal weaknesses can also be brought about by social revolution, focusing on the problems of change in the country's leadership coupled with an ideological movement such as Islam (in Iran) or leftist socialism (in Nicaragua).

Conflicts among countries of the Third World also arise because of territorial disputes, often dating back to the arbitrarily-drawn boundaries of the colonial period or traditional ethnic rivalries of the pre-colonial period. Many ethnic groups which, for historical reasons, have become separated and are living as minorities in neighbouring countries have found a new urge to unification (irredenta), largely because of their dissatisfaction with the governments of the countries in which they are now living. These problems are often mixed up with internal instability and political struggle and are complicated by the involvement of neighbouring countries. Such situations prevail in Indochina, in East Africa (Ethiopia and Somalia), and in West Asia between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran in connection with the demands of the Baluchis to have their own nation-state.

Third World conflicts involving outside powers which compete on the basis of ideological antagonism may not be of an East-West type alone but involvement of the big powers, either because of challenges created by their global rivalries or because they were invited to become involved by the conflicting parties, tends to worsen the situation. However, the presence of the great powers does not necessarily increase internal or regional conflicts, provided that they agree to maintain regional or international order in the area. In the case of Zimbabwe, the great powers have shown some restraint in involving themselves in the internal conflict. In the Korean Peninsula, all the big powers in the region have an interest in maintaining the existing balance.

National vulnerabilities tend to result from an intermix of unfavourable
internal factors. Because of the complexity of the domestic scene, conflict
resolution in the Third World has become a very delicate and difficult
matter. It has become all the more complicated in areas where the regional
environment is not conducive to solving the problem, and where the East-
West and the East-East conflicts are most pronounced. Given the vulnerabilit-
ies in many Third World areas, it is here where the East-West conflict is
likely to find its outlets, not only for politico-strategic reasons, but
increasingly because of economic interest. The Third World has become a
more vital source of energy and raw materials as well as a market for
industrial countries' products.

As noted, conflicts in the Third World involve the complex interplay
of political, economic, social, cultural and ideological factors and there-
fore they can be resolved by the dynamism of indigenous socio-political
forces, and resolution depends to a large extent on national resilience.
National resilience can be promoted or destroyed by the involvement of
outside powers. The exercise of unreasonable and unnecessary pressures
upon Third World countries or intervention, whether or not undertaken within
the framework of superpower rivalry, will tend to be damaging to national
resilience.

Conflicts among Third World countries have their roots in nationalism
and problems of the survival of the nation-state. They are no longer often
ideologically motivated, and thus major conflicts among communist countries,
as in Indochina, can arise. These conflicts are not only based on political
motives, but include economic interests and the struggle for resources. The
big powers can obviously play either a positive or a negative role in such
conflicts yet interventions by the big powers can only be of limited value,
for three reasons. First, because their capabilities are not always
suited to the resolution of Third World conflicts. Second, because world
opinion will always be against the use of force by a big power in conflict
resolution in the Third World. And, third, because the use of force by the
big powers in local conflicts could escalate into a global confrontation.
It follows that efforts to resolve Third World conflicts should be under-
taken by domestic or regional forces. Outside powers can help the
situation by exercising restraint themselves and by restraining others
from becoming directly involved by example or persuasion. In the process,
it may well be that the big powers are asked to provide assistance but this
could best be given through diplomatic means, humanitarian aid, or economic
assistance.

A more urgent need, however, is to find ways of preventing Third World conflicts from arising. Given the tendencies of East-West rivalry to increase in the years to come, the creation of regional order in Third World areas may be the most profitable avenue to explore. Initiatives should preferably come from the Third World countries themselves. There might be a role for the big powers in helping to maintain regional order in many parts of the Third World. Even intervention can become a subject of negotiations, so long as there is a shared understanding of the circumstances in which such an instrument could be applied (its terms and forms),and so long as this is acceptable to Third World countries, intervention can become a legitimate instrument. Increased East-West conflict, however, may not help in the creation of such an understanding. There are even strong fears that growing East-West conflict will only tend to magnify local and regional conflicts in some parts of the Third World and also encourage new conflicts to arise. Thus, a kind of "detente" is seen as a prerequisite for the creation of stability in the Third World, although it should have a much broader base than before.

The use of military force, the establishment of military alliances and large scale sales of military hardware will neither by themselves prevent Third World conflicts from arising nor will they resolve Third World conflicts. Sound relations between Third World countries and the big powers, in the political and economic fields as well as in the cultural field, are much more profitable avenues to explore. It cannot be denied that a military balance is often a necessity in preventing big power intervention in a particular area or to prevent a Third World country from being invaded by a neighbour but, in the long run, Third World conflicts are unlikely to be solved by military means alone.

EAST-WEST CONFLICTS, THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Recent international tensions seem to encourage a new round of East-West competition, and thus increase the likelihood of conflicts in the Third World, largely because no clearly defined spheres of influence of any one of the superpowers has been established.

Increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union result from charges by both sides that the other party does not abide by the rules of "detente". The United States charges the Soviet Union with continuing its strategic and conventional arms build-up and as having a greater propensity to intervene in Third World areas to upset the global balance. The Soviet Union charges the United States with not fulfilling

her promises in the area of trade and finance and with failing to ratify
the SALT II agreements. The Soviet Union believes that the erratic policies
of the United States are responsible for the emerging misperceptions. Given
the mood of the American public, a new round of arms race seems a far from
remote possibility.

The majority of Third World countries formally adopt a neutral or
"equidistant" attitude with regard to the East-West competition. Basically
and in practice, however, most of them retain more intensive and extensive
relations with Western countries. In the political field, the relationship
is somewhat ambivalent in nature because many are ex-colonies of the West.
In the immediate post-colonial period they strove for complete political
independence, implying an anti-Western attitude, and thus were attracted
initially to the Soviet Union. But the second generation of leaders in
many Third World countries, having been through the various revolutionary
stages of national development, are now more pragmatic and politically
more neutral towards the West. Relations will become even easier if the
Western countries make more effort to understand (and take a less a priori
attitude with regard to) social systems, systems of government, societal
values and the dynamism of changes in the Third World.

Relations in the economic field are already quite extensive. It is
obvious that the West possess great "leverage" vis-à-vis the Third World
in this respect. The need to restructure economic relations, as stipulated
in the Report of the Brandt Commission, is an important task for both sides.
Although the Soviet Union has herself almost nothing to offer in this field,
dissatisfaction on the part of Third World States with their economic
relations with the West can easily be exploited by the Soviet Union for her
own political gain.

The West is also a major source of science and technology for the Third
World. Yet the transfer of science and technology is a delicate matter for
it touches upon the socio-cultural values of the receiving society. This
calls for close cooperation and great understanding between the Third World
and the Western countries.

As stated earlier, relations in the military field are not likely to
be the dominant factor. From the Third World perspective, it is expected
that the United States and her allies will try to maintain a level of
military presence which balances that of the Soviet Union. It is also hoped
that the West could become a "consistent" source of military arms but the old
pattern of military relations, whether in the form of military pacts or in
the form of overseas bases, has become outmoded from the Third World
perspective. Thus, there is a need to find new forms of military cooperation
which are more flexible and respect the sovereignty of Third World countries.

The relationship between the Third World and the West needs broader foundations and this implies, first, that Western countries, (and especially the United States) should formulate more comprehensive, consistent, credible and long term policies towards the Soviet Union because the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union remains the most important factor in maintaining world peace and security. It is a relationship that must be handled with great care and sensitivity for a host of contradictions are embedded in it; the need to cooperate must coexist with inevitable competition. Specifically the conclusion of SALT II and preparations for SALT III are urgent tasks, because they touch upon the main issue in the relationship between the superpowers. There also needs to be arrangements to ensure a balance in conventional weapons and to regulate arms sales to the Third World. Relations in the economic fields should also be promoted with a view to lessening the tensions between the two countries. Lastly, there is a need to seek arrangements through which both sides could support the creation of regional order in the Third World. These would limit the rights of outside powers to intervene and aim to prevent either superpower achieving dominance.

At the same time the United States and her allies in Western Europe and Japan must restructure their relationships to conform to the new realities. The United States is no longer the dominant power that she was, either in political or economic terms, and must share the responsibility with allies which implies a relationship on a more equal footing. Structuring this relationship may not be easy because, at least in the area of defence, both Western Europe and Japan are still dependent upon the United States. This, however, can be circumvented if new mechanisms of consultation could be developed between the United States, Western Europe and Japan. The issues affecting the relationship between these countries has expanded beyond their traditional concerns. For example, the security of the Persian Gulf can no longer be separated from the security of Western Europe and Japan. The EEC and NATO cannot cope with new areas of interest outside Europe. The Summit Meeting in Venice in June 1980, in which political and security matters were both discussed, may indicate a desire to reshape the Western (and Japanese) relationship.

It is equally encouraging to see the emergence of a division of responsibilities between the United States, Western Europe and Japan. France is taking care of the security of French Africa and maintains a fleet in Djibouti. West Germany is providing greater economic assistance to Turkey and Pakistan. Japan is increasing her political role and has supported ASEAN in its efforts to stabilise Southeast Asia.

Overall it can be said that the capabilities of the Western countries
in total are still very credible provided that they can cooperate construct-
ively and can formulate workable policies regarding the division of respons-
ibilities between them in the political and economic fields, in the transfer
of science and technology, and in the military field. Because the division
of labour includes an increased defence commitment by Western Europe and
Japan, the resources of the United States can more readily be diverted to
maintain a power balance in the Persian Gulf.

Lastly, relations between the Third World and the Western world in
various fields must involve more concrete cooperative programmes. To ensure
long-lasting cooperation, mechanisms of dialogue and fora for consultation
must be permanently established. ASEAN, for instance, can be most useful
in this respect for the Southeast Asian Region. Also, the division of labour
amongst the Western countries and Japan must be extended to their relations
with the Third World. The United States cannot alone take care of all the
areas of the world. Furthermore the too obvious presence of the United
States might be disadvantageous in some circumstances.

All this will depend to a large extent upon initiatives originating in
the United States. It is there that adjustments are taking place and they
will affect the processes of decision-making and the American political
dynamic. To cope with these adjustments, the United States needs a more
consistent leadership, a better relationship between the Executive Branch
and the Legislative Branch. Equally important is the performance of the
US economy. In all these respects the allies and friends of the United
States must give support. It should not be forgotten that the United States
has contributed massively to the maintenance of an international order which
has brought relative stability to the world for the last 35 years. In the
years to come the United States will face great challenges, and it is
the interest of all that she can cope with them

The Soviet Union on the other hand does not have the potential to assist
the Third World in their search for prosperity. The Soviet Union is respected
only for her military might. Newly-independent countries may initially be
attracted to the Soviet Union because of the anti-colonialist flavour of
her political propaganda but most Third World countries see the Soviet Union
only as a balancing power when such a balance is considered necessary or as
a source of military hardware.

It is likely that a decrease of US presence and credibility in a particular area could create a situation in which the countries of that area feel the pressure of the Soviet Union directly. Such is the case after the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan. This was seen by most Third World countries as a violation to the sovereignty of an independent, non-aligned, developing country. Whatever the reason that lay behind this action, most Third World countries reacted strongly against it.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Third World does not admit the legitimate presence of the Soviet Union, for the Soviet Union is a superpower which cannot be discounted. It may even be necessary to invite the Soviet Union to join international efforts directed at maintaining some form of regional order in parts of the Third World. The Soviet Union could become a balancing factor in some regions, such as East Asia or Southeast Asia, especially with respect to China.

On the other hand, concerns are expressed in the Third World with regard to the future direction of Soviet global policies. Great uncertainties arise from the fact that the military power of the Soviet Union could be used to obtain distinct advantages, especially in the last half of the 1980s when the Soviet Union is expected to undergo many difficult internal changes perhaps involving radical adjustments in policy whether arising from a change in leadership, from economic stagnation, from resource scarcity, or from demographic shifts which create imbalances in the ethnic composition of her population.

Therefore the Third World argues that all must have the courage to continue to work towards the creation of an environment where detente could work. In such an environment, the Third World could find the opportunity both to develop and to participate in international affairs. The development of national resilience helps to guarantee world stability for it can prevent the East-West conflict from escalating through the exploitation of the national vulnerabilities that exist in many parts of the Third World. Consequently, the Third World could become a stabilising factor for the world as a whole.