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The Italian Left, 1944 - 1978:
Patterns of Cooperation, Conflict and Compromise

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Introduction: Some Remarks on the Present Situation

Any critical survey proposing to analyse certain specific features of Italian politics inevitably must begin with a short glance at the general state of the Italian nation.

Here we should be careful not to give too much weight to those alarmist or defeatist reports currently abounding in the international press which tend to depict Italy as a doomed country, a fathomless swamp of corruption and mismanagement, fatally poisoned by communist machinations and red guerilla terrorism, so irremediably sapped and demoralized that either economic collapse or a political catastrophe (or both) seem to be waiting for her just around the corner. This is, of course, a travesty of the real situation which appears to be considerably less decrepit and much more complex.

The picture we get by soberly assessing the available economic data as well as relevant political and socio-psychological factors can be described as surprisingly balanced, although not devoid of many ambiguities. While prospects for a new upswing are generally promising, it is equally true, however, that much still depends on the present minority cabinet's ability to solve some extremely serious, pressing problems, particularly in the fields of internal security, reorganization of the economy's large public sector, economic assistance programs for the southern regions, reduction of unemployment (with two million unemployed concentrated mainly in the South), anti-inflation measures, and reorganization of the entire public education system. Other urgent tasks include the modernization of the cumbersome, inefficient, partly corrupt administrative apparatus, and the general enforcement of several important reform laws (on regional and local autonomies, on controlled abortion etc.) which have encountered heavy obstruction within some of the sectors di-

rectly concerned, not to mention the imperative retrenchment of the country's permanent dependence on massive fuel, commodity and food imports.

All things considered, Italy has nevertheless a fair chance finally to emerge from that profound crisis of her entire institutional system which originated in the late sixties - if not earlier -, and came to invest the whole range of her political as well as social, economic and cultural structures. Her pace of economic recovery is impressive with growth rates sometimes doubling those of comparable industrialized countries in the West. Moreover, it should be remembered that for 1960-75 Italy's GNP increases amounted to a real per capita growth by roughly 71% (lean years included), while the Soviet Union's analogous achievements did not exceed 68% during the same period. Great efforts are being made to contain the rate of inflation which reached nearly 19% in 1976, below 14,5% in 1978, while a further reduction to levels under 11% is being contemplated for the period 1979-81, in keeping with envisaged GNP increases averaging 4% yearly for the same span of time.

As for the onslaught of organized violence perpetrated by disaffected elements belonging to very different social and political groups on a broad scale, it is still rampant. As a matter of fact, within the 15 weeks between March 16, when Aldo Moro, president of the christian-democrats' National Council, was abducted by a Red Brigade killer squad, and June 30 the record of major terrorist misdeeds included: 3 assassinations (with Moro among the victims); 27 cases of heavy injuries inflicted to individual persons by armed attack; 103 additional cases of physical assaults on individual persons; more than 200 incendiary and bomb-laying actions against various buildings and other objects. Obviously the security and police forces, challenged while undergoing a gruelling check-up and reorganization process, were unable to cope with the

sudden upsurge of terrorist operations which after a slow and fumbling start in 1969 had expanded to become a sustained, large-scale offensive only in 1977.

But whatever the guerilla leaders' objectives may have been, the main result turned out to be a very broad solidarization embracing the vast majority of all components of Italy's socalled "political class" which, first of all, drove the communists much closer than ever before towards the christian-democrats in their joint condemnation of political violence in general and Red Brigade terrorism in particular. The climax of the Moro tragedy produced an almost comprehensive national consensus, unparalleled in Italy's post-war history. By this gruesome experience most parties as well as trade unions, mass media as well as individual citizens were induced to close ranks and rally to the defense of the established order of representative democracy. In the course of the discussion about possible legislative or administrative counter-measures even communist spokesmen never hesitated to emphasize their party's unqualified commitment to the principles of the rule of law.

As a matter of fact, it should be recognized that the Italian political establishment, in spite of all its evident weaknesses, glaring defects, and striking incongruities proved to possess much more stamina and coherence than expected. Faced with the challenge of the Moro abduction and the ensuing difficult choices, all of the major political parties and their leadership groups have shown a considerable measure of public-mindedness and a strong sense of joint responsibility for the common cause.

Upon closer examination this consociative spirit has become manifest even earlier, in response to a long sequence of critical situations which started in June 1976, after the general elections, with the elaboration of a new government formula acceptable to the communists, went on with the breakdown of premier Andreotti's six-party

government platform in January 1978, and led up to president Leone's forced resignation, on charges of personal enrichment in office, last June. The fact that Leone was replaced, finally, as head of state by the old-guard socialist, Resistenza veteran and anti-clerical free-thinker Sandro Pertini with an overwhelming majority of roughly 83 percent of the electors' assembly total vote, seems to indicate an increased availability, also among the Democrazía Cristiana, for solutions dictated primarily by the national interest, at the expense of narrower party preferences.

Thus, on the whole, there is evidence enough for a renascent public-mindedness combined with democratic solidarity and cooperativeness across ideological barriers and party distinctions. The Italian institutional system has resisted relatively well both to strong internal pressures and to disturbing, sometimes disrupting outside influences. For the international environment cannot be left unheeded altogether when it is easy enough to discover certain external causes of domestic economic recession, to establish very close connexions between the Vietnam war and the rise of rabid students' and youth rebellions in Italy and many other West European countries, or else to perceive evident links existing between Italy's native terrorist groups and a variety of foreign or transnational terrorist activities.

It should be noted, however, that Italy's interdependence is working both ways. Her own vigorous efforts undertaken to open up a new period of economic prosperity have been efficaciously favoured by IMF support and corresonding European Community partnership assistance. Much more could be done, though, to secure a sustained, Community supported drive aimed at the economic reconstruction and readjustment of Italy's southern regions.

But there are also several other foreign connexions to be mentioned which constantly arouse considerable anxiety among Italian political leaders independently of party affiliations. It often happens that these "scares" exert a

very marked influence on political attitudes and decisions particularly within the Italian left. Thus both the Communist and the Socialist Parties have always been eager to denounce the bad habit attributable to some of their countrymen to solicit American political interference or even stronger forms of superpower intervention whenever they become afraid of a possible communist bid for government participation.

Another subject of much concern is the possibility of a major change in Belgrade's foreign policy after Tito's demise. In the case that Yugoslavia should accept some form of closer association with the Warsaw Pact, the PCI leadership certainly would feel obliged to reconsider the whole inventory of their own positions regarding NATO, Italy's security interests in the Mediterranean area, and her defense commitments in general. The most likely consequence for the PCI would be to retract its present qualified commitment to NATO loyalty in exchange for a new course promoting a policy of nonalignment for Italy, similar to that practiced by president Tito during the preceding period.

The third incubus causing permanent apprehension is the prospect of yet another, but more serious oil crisis which could bring Italy's economy to a standstill within less than a month as other energy resources are almost entirely lacking. There is some speculation positing that such an oil blockade could, at the same time, create an extremely explosive revolutionary situation in the country at large. Some PCI spokesmen tend to suggest, in this context, that their own party's openly pro-Arab and anti-Israeli stance consistently kept up over the years is mainly motivated by Italy's natural and legitimate national (oil) interests, and not in the least subservient to any Soviet foreign policy objectives or commitments.

Another rather disquieting pointer of the same scenario indicates that one of the presumable consequences resulting from a future crippling crude oil shortage would be a very profound radicalization of the entire Italian left wing line-up together with large sections of the labour movement. Such developments would be no doubt accompanied by

rather sweeping personnel changes affecting the upper and intermediate levels of the various hierarchies, and it can be safely predicted that only a minority of contemporary PCI or PSI top representatives, eventually, would be considered sufficiently radical for reconfirmation in their present party functions.

Leftist Pluralism - Italian Style

It was Aldo Moro, the late president of the Democrazia Cristiana's National Council, who ventured to predict that the heavy electoral defeats suffered by his party in May 1974 (failure of the anti-divorce referendum) and in June 1975 (regional and provincial elections) were bound to open up a "third phase" not only of the DC's own destiny but of the entire nation's postwar history (P 21.7.75). As for the marked swing to the left which became manifest in all social strata after the severe oil shock experienced in winter 1973/74, he obviously did not deem it a purely accidental, transitory change of mood, but rather believed it to express a profound and enduring alteration of the overall climate. This judgment he felt confirmed by the outcome of the general elections held in June 1976 when the communists obtained their all-time record score of 34.4 percent of the vote thus reaching a figure only 4.4 points below the DC's result (38.8%). The global share polled by the entire left - social-democrats (PSDI) included - amounted to roughly 50 percent of the total vote; in 1975 the left had even achieved a corresponding aggregate share of 51.3 percent.

The "first phase" mentioned by Moro covered the reconstruction years between 1944 and 1947. It was the period of "three-party cooperation" during which the christian-democrats led by De Gasperi, the socialists (under the party label PSIUP = Partito Socialista di Unità Proletaria) led by Nenni, and the communists (PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano) had joined forces to solve a number of basic normalization problems, often in coalition with additional political parties or movements of minor importance. To abolish the

monarchy, to conclude a peace treaty, to work out and put into force a new republican constitution - these pressing priority tasks had been carried out in common when the year 1948 opened. In spite of numerous clearly visible ideological and conceptional divergencies, often sharply disputed among the three parties, they performed the work to be done, on the whole, with much reasonableness and a high sense of responsability, equally to be attributed to the christian-democratic as well as to the communist and socialist top representatives.

It was early during this period that Togliatti(in contradiction to expectations harboured by many leftist elements) induced his party leadership to discard the "Greek perspective", which meant in fact a decision not to mobilize the estimated 170.000 left-wing "partigiani" available for social-revolutionary action in Italy. Extremely exportant was, moreover, the agreement to adopt a generous solution for the problem of regulating the relationship between the young Republic and the Vatican by simply including the Lateran Treaties of 1929 into paragraph 7 of the new constitution. Beyond that Italy had to face the fact that for the powers of the anti-axis alliance she still remained an occupied "enemy country" with no chance to get rid of that status but by accepting a peace diktat generally felt to be unfair and humiliating, particularly in view of the "resistenza" background of most of the component parties of Italy's constituent assembly. The peace treaty signed in Paris on February 10, 1947 obtained a large majority in the assembly when presented for ratification on July, 31 (although this vote had been tied to a preceding protest resolution), and on December 15, 1947 the withdrawal of all Anglo-Saxon occupation forces from Italian territory was officially completed.

Although the last "three-party cabinet" foundered in May 1947 the exclusion of communists and socialists from government responsibility did not mean the immediate termination of any kind of cooperation which continued, on the contrary, within the constituent assembly until January 31, 1948. Apparently De Gasperi personally made some attempts to defer

the ousting of the left-wing parties as long as possible, but had to give way to strong pressures stemming partly from the ranks of his own party, and partly from representatives of the Vatican and the U.S.A. (P.Scoppola). The Cold War had already begun to dominate the international dimension of East-West relations, and meanwhile the Italian communists, too, had embarked upon obstruction tactics and a policy of minatory muscle-flexing. Thus it appears to be of utmost significance that the Italian constituent assembly, presided by U. Terracini, a communist, worked on without giving much attention to these developments up to the moment they had successfully finished their job. The new constitution was passed on December 22, 1947 with 453 affirmative against 62 negative votes. It was the only one in Western Europe approved with the solid block vote of all communist assembly members, before it came into effect on January 1, 1948.

There is some evidence that initially the principal leaders of the three major parties were not much inclined to apply the logic of the Cold War immediately and automatically also to domestic affairs in a more or less stereotype manner; but circumstances soon proved to be overpowering. None of them could definitely free himself from their conditioning impact. Upon termination of "three-party cooperation" in May 1947 this decision was accepted by communists and socialists without any resistance, and possibly some of the party leaders involved may have believed it to impose only a transitory change of the government formula. If this was the case such illusions were quickly to be dispelled.

With the founding of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) towards the end of September 1947 the Kremlin started a large-scale political offensive which soon led to the communist takeover in Prague in February 1948 while similar plans seem to have failed in Finland. A few days later, in March, the Soviets wrecked the Interallied Control Council for Germany. As it was, these events contributed to provoke an extreme polarization of Italy's public opinion,

and when parliamentary elections were held on April 18, 1948 the Democrazia Cristiana reaped the greatest triumph of its history (48,48 %) gaining the absolute majority of seats in both houses.

This sweeping victory in the 1948 electoral contest was to become the historic basis for the DC's hegemonial rôle which has been the main feature characterizing the "second phase" of Italy's postwar politics. While the Democrazia Cristiana had demonstrated considerable power of aggregation with reference to communists and socialists in the preceding period, it now began to develop comparable capabilities fostering the concatenation, and even amalgamation, of the laizist parties of the upper and lower middle classes (PLI, PRI, PSDI) as well as substantial nonorganized groups of the population cultivating moderately conservative attitudes and convictions. Now the DC progressively expanded its power bastions within all the reaches of the state bureaucracy, of the government-controlled sectors of the economy, of local and provincial administration, thus finally establishing a deeply rooted, far-flung, closely knit system of domination, patronage and clientelar interdependencies. That it proved to be a much less efficient than corruption-engendering system goes without saying. The alliance struck between the ambitious party manager Amintore Fanfani who started a thorough drive for the DC's reorganization in 1954, and empire-builder Enrico Mattei, the president of the gigantic state-owned ENI industrial complex, was of paradigmatic significance.

In spite of all this the DC's availability for a "leftist" political course never completely evaporated. It continued to be a large popular party with a substantial, although not always politically strong wage-earner and trade-unionist wing. For a while a group of reformers led by G. Dossetti who tried to combine social activism and pacifist commitment with the utopian struggle for a truly "catholic society", succeded to gain considerable influence within the party leadership. This group of "integralist left-wingers" was

finally defeated by their more pragmatist and secularist rivals, but many elements of their general program have become integrated into the party's collective consciousness. Similar experiences had been made even earlier in the process of harnessing several catholic mass organizations (ACI, GIAC, GF, ACLI, FUCI etc.) which for some years had been instrumentalized by clerical traditionalists in their endeavours to turn the Democrazia Cristiana into a crusading movement for the Vatican's battle against socialism, liberalism and modernism. The permanent dialectic confrontation with these and similar challenges has contributed much to impede the DC's "embourgeoisement", which at least partially never materialized.

As for the DC's ideology, it can be said to have perpetuated the three key maxims established simultaneously with the party's foundation: It stuck rather consistently to the De Gasperi concept of a party based as much on christian values as it should be characterized by a secular and democratic spirit. Likewise the DC defended its claim to be the only authorized unitarian party for all catholics in Italy. It was quite logic that while upholding this claim it could never renounce the principle of "interclassism" which recognizes the existance of diverging class interests but at the same time postulates the possibility as well as the active commitment to reconcile these divergencies or antagonisms both within the party and the Italian society.

It is remarkable that the DC leadership which earned its greatest triumphs by stressing the anti-communist last-dike function of their party, has never really tried to get the revolutionary left-wing parties outlawed (which did not only include the PCI but also the PSI until the last fifties). Quite to the contrary, the call for an "opening-up to the left" addressed to the Democrazia Cristiana by the PSI since 1953, was taken up immediately by the DC's trade-unionist wing and forthwith remained a constant subject for discussions among christian democrats about alternative coalition policies.

All flirtations with the right, all suggestions to consort with monarchists or neofascists (the MSI had been founded on Dec. 26, 1946) met with massive criticism within the DC's own ranks. In fact, the DC could not afford to justify its hegemonial function exclusively with its anti-communism, but had also to keep up its reputation of having been part of the resistance movement against fascism. This meant that any collusion with the extreme right-wing parties would almost automatically bring up embarrassing disputes concerning the christian-democrats' democratic legitimation. With the downfall of premier Tambroni's cabinet in summer 1960 all such experiments definitely ceased, and in spring 1961 the first local governments relying on "center-left" coalitions were inaugurated which prepared the ground for the subsequent transition from "centrism" to a new "center-left"-course with socialist participation.

This turn to the left was greeted with great hopes for a decrease of tensions in domestic affairs also by parts of the DC membership. But there were many obstacles still to be removed in both camps, before in December 1963 the first genuine "center-left" cabinet could be sworn in - a cabinet headed by Moro as premier and Nenni as vice-premier, while Togliatti lent a hand to facilitate its take-off by dropping some favourable remarks. In reality, the new policy of reform had to be started in a rather unfavourable climate, because it found itself immediately confronted with a twofold crisis of a very serious nature, made up in the first place of an economic recession which was soon to expand into a structural crisis encompassing the entire economic system, and secondly of a general crisis of transformation involving the whole system of traditional moral values as well as social standards and conventions. Both crises were retarded sequels of the vast processes of migration, structural rearrangement, and modernization which had been permitted to develop in rather uncontrolled fashion during the years of Italy's "economic miracle" (1951-63). Almost typically, they reached a stage of dangerous acuity only at the begin-

ning of the following recession period when the pressure of increasing economic difficulties - partly exasperated by the impact of outside influences - pushed them to the point where they suddenly burst into the open with devastating explosiveness.

Domestic developments in Italy were doubtlessly egged on and inspired by certain impulses imported from abroad (sparked e.g. by the Vietnam agitation since 1965; the student riots in West Berlin and Guevara's death in 1967; the Paris May revolt and the Czechoslovakian events in 1968). But the formidable dynamic of the Italian protest and contestation movement was primarily an outgrowth of the endogenous accumulation of social unrest and conflict potentials, of disaffection, dissatisfaction and psychotic anxieties aroused by frightening prospects of a dehumanized future. It should be kept in mind, moreover, that crucial processes of secularization and emancipation were yet to be accomplished in Italy with a vast time lag - in a country whose people historically had remained substantially untouched by the great European experiences of the reformation and enlightenment movements. The anger, indignation and polemics of the new "young" left were hitting with particular acrimony the PCI leadership, too, which obviously was unwilling to make use of the seemingly available revolutionary potential for the overthrow of the established system. In a way, it was the critical attack launched by the ultra-leftist groups against the PCI which for the first time made larger sections of Italian public opinion realize that the communist leaders had no intention at all to destroy the existing constitutional order, but were demonstrating, on the contrary, a definite interest to defend its existence.

As for the practical response of the DC, PSI and PCI leadership groups to the youth, students' and rejectors' revolt there were no marked difference to be registered regarding their reactions. Opinions diverged widely, however, concerning causes and motivations. The socialists, in particular, were generally more inclined to selfcriticism and opener for sympathetic understanding towards the

"contestation movement", as compared with communists and christian-democrats. At the same time the communists showed an increasingly pronounced availability for cooperation in both houses of parliament with particular emphasis on commission work, a trend incessantly and scathingly denounced by the five communist "Manifesto" rebels who kept their seats in the Chamber of Deputies until 1972. The communist deputies and senators very actively participated in the framing of many important reform measures subsequently passed by parliament.

Finally in fall 1973 when Berlinguer published his design of a "historical compromise" - which in March 1975 was accepted as part of the official party line by the 14th PCI congress - he established a topical connexion between this offer for long-term cooperation with DC and PSI, and the "Chilean experiences" of the Allende era; but on closer examination his proposal appears to be quite intimately related to wellknown traditional preferences of the PCI's strategy of alliances and to rather ancient communist objectives applied to the actual Italian situation. Careful attention should be given to four particular aspects.

1) The proposal openly pleads <u>against</u> the promotion of the "leftist alternative" line (viz <u>against</u> the formation of a new majority without DC participation); it clarified, instead, the communists' unmistakable preference for a pact of cooperation concluded by the three major parties (including the DC), as distinguished from a coalition of the parties of the "classical left" (excluding the DC) which would command only a small parliamentary majority for the backing of government action.
2) The three-party combination envisaged by the proposal suggesting a "historical compromise" is rather obtrusively reminiscent of the period of "three-party cooperation" during the reconstruction and normalization phase in 1944-47.
3) The proposal also reminds of the long-term cooperation pact offered by Togliatti to the DC leadership as early as in July 1944, and of similar efforts undertaken by Togliatti later on (see: address of April 12, 1954;

Bergamo address of March 20, 1963) to interest the "organized catholics" - viz the DC - for a coordinated policy of peace ensurance; Togliatti had become convinced some time before that the "problem of relations between the catholic world and the communist world" constituted the "central problem" of Italy's postwar development, and he repeatedly stated this quite clearly (as e.g. at Bergamo in 1963).

4) The PCI's strategy of alliances as exemplified by the "historical compromise" proposal can be also interpreted as a modernized version of the old "national front strategy", or as a particular Italian version of the "popular front strategy", depending on the categorization of the DC as a "bourgeois" conservative party in the first case or as a "petit-bourgeois" middle-of-the-road reform party in the second instance.

From the standpoint of political strategy the PCI leadership could have numerous motivations for an attempt to resuscitate the "three-party" government coalition which had been so successful during the "first phase" As a junior partner within a DC led cabinet the PCI would find it relatively easy to win full "democratic legitimation" abroad, using their senior associates' prestige and credit to overcome still existing reservations on the side of Italy's Common Market and NATO partners. The psychological effect of an open DC-PCI alliance would also contribute to improve the PCI's image on the domestic scene and facilitate the removal of persistent ideological obstacles precluding so far the communists' access to certain more reticent sections of the working-class electorate (Italian communists sometimes like to point out parallels with the so-called "Wehner strategy" applied by the SPD in West Germany during the "grand-coalition" period of 1966-69). A long-term cooperation pact offers, in addition, the inherent possibility of a gradual shifting of proportional shares in favour of the communist side: Prospects for the PCI would not be bad, if the "historical compromise" were agreed upon as an emergency pact for an extendend period,

finally to become the senior partner of the alliance, backed by a stable majority of electoral votes.

It is wellknown that the main objective of the PCI's strategy of alliances consists, as officially stated, in the establishment of a new hegemony. What it should be is a hegemony of the working people (or the "working class"), supposed to be jointly exercised by an ensemble of the various "popular forces" of communist, socialist and catholic inspiration. The obvious consequence, as indicated by communist spokesmen, would be a remarkably "open" ideological and cultural pluralism with a vaguely "leftist" orientation, tied to a concerted government program proposing profound socio-economic structural reforms. That the PCI leadership, once this objective were realized on the basis of the indispensable prior achievement of a broad popular consensus, could be quite optimistic regarding any future risks of losing political control over this "new historical bloc" due to negative majority votes in parliament or in general elections, needs not to be stressed.

In the final analysis, the outcome would amount to the replacement of the former DC hegemony by a new PCI hegemony. Taking this to be the crucial point, it is quite understandable why the "historical compromise" concept is being rejected by the PSI leadership even more emphatically than by all other parties concerned. The socialists explain this, asserting that in our days they conceive it to be their "historical task" to ensure that "democracy by alternation" must be realized in Italy for the first time through full enforcement of the principle that representative parliamentary democracy requires a regular change of rôles between the parties in government and those temporarily relegated to the duties incumbent upon the opposition (Signorile, Rep. 28.7.78).

In fact, "democracy by alternation" has never formed a tradition in Italy. The bourgeois-liberal monarchy of the founding years knew only one relevant political force which used to remain always in power, namely the party of the

partly more conservative, partly more liberal Constitutionalists. As for the Socialist Party (PSI) founded in 1892, the catholic oppositional People's Party (PPI) established in 1919, and the Communist Party of Italy (PCd'I) which had split off from the PSI in 1921, they were all outsider parties rejecting the state monopolized by the liberal(as well as anti-clerical) upper-class, and struggled against it for different reasons. Mussolini seized power in 1922 by coup d'état, and within four years he had set up the dictatorship of a monopoly party. After the war it was the Democrazia Cristiana which installed a new type of hegemony, has been monopolizing the premiership ever since 1945 and is determined not to surrender as long as there is a chance to defend it.

Within the DC left-wing, in particular, certain forces (which also included Aldo Moro) are not at all unreceptive for the idea of incorporating the communists once more as full-fledged partners in the government coalition for an extended transitional period - which thus would inaugurate a new "third phase" of Italian postwar politics. They recognize in the communists' readiness to revive the experience of "three-party cooperation" or to participate in an emergency cabinet based on a larger coalition a real chance to secure the PCI's unvoluntary assistance for a large-scale salvaging operation.

If they advocate some form of DC-PCI cooperation they do so for a number of specific purposes: By breaking the PCI's "opposition monopoly" they hope to stop the further growth of communist polling results. Simultaneously they want to prevent what they fear most: the creation of a new parliamentary majority under communist leadership, based mainly on the parties of the "classical" left. Moreover, they want to win time in order to prepare the ground for the restoration of DC supremacy on new foundations (rifondazione della DC) und thus, in the long run, to prevent their own party's collapse. Basically their approach reflects the conviction that even the communists will have to pay tribute, sooner

or later, to the dictates of Italian realities and to the inevitability of adaptation forced upon them by the sharing of joint government responsibilities. In other words - they rely on "trasformismo" as a specific Italian historical experience.

Within the limits of medium-range objectives, political cooperation between the Democrazia Cristiana and the PCI would not encounter unsurmountable obstacles. On the contrary: Convergencies can be easily established, particularly in the fields of social reform, economic planning and investment controls. Here the DC's policy conceptions are based mainly on the catholic social doctrines and - secondly - on a general stance favouring an economic policy mainly bent to accomplish necessary structural reforms, while it does not object against the application of dirigistic methods and shows a declared preference for mixed economy models. Obviously these features can easily be harmonized with the outlines of the PCI's medium range reform program.

Communists and socialists would, of course, enter such a cooperation agreement with the intention to initiate the step-by-step construction of socialism which is conceived as a process consisting of numerous stages and effecting a gradual but eventually quite radical transformation of the entire socio-economic system. The present DC leadership group, however, is guided by a completely different set of priorities. The line to be followed is still the course laid down by Moro during the first half of March ("marzismo egemoniale"). It envisages a period of reform-oriented "leftist" policy (as carried out by the DC and "center-left" governments in 1962-76), this time characterized by communist participation in the coalition and possibly rather soon also in the cabinet - a situation which should be used for systematic efforts to restore the DC's power of aggregation in the direction of the "classical" left-wing parties to maximum strength while parallel endeavours should be concentrated on pushing ahead with the PCI's further integration into both the state and the democratic-parliamentary systems.

That this line of cooperative competition ("confronto") which tries to avoid a frontal struggle ("scontro") could turn out to be quite successful in the Italian environment seems to be suggested by the results of the administrative elections held on May 14, 1978. Not only could the Democrazia Cristiana register considerable gains scoring 5 percentage points over the previous local polls and 3.6 points over the 1976 general election results. Similarly significant, at least, were the heavy PCI losses as compared with the figures for June 1976, amounting to contractions of roughly 9 percentage points, while at the same time the PSI (+ 4.1) and the smaller center parties scored increases (always in comparison with the parliamentary elections). Even a cautious interpretation of the voting data covering nearly one tenth ot the total Italian electorate leads to the conclusion that the seemingly irresistable advance of the Italian Communist Party has come to a halt for the first time after many years of steady progress.

Sources of Strength of the Communist Party

The PCI, counting more than 1.8 million cardholders, is not only the largest but also by far the best organized of Italy's political parties. The DC claims to have almost as many members (1.7-1.8 million), but its organizational framework is much less developed, and also the intercommunication between the leadership group and the basis does not function as reliably as in the communist system. The Socialist Party (PSI) with an organized strength of 434.000 members (March 1978) must be relegated to forth place under this aspect, but as for its electoral strength it continues to hold third place with a considerable margin: In 1976 it polled 9.6 percent of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies and 10.2 percent of the vote for the Senate. Meanwhile the Socialdemocratic Party (PSDI) counts a total of 618.000 cardholders (March 1976); in June 1976, however, it obtained only 3.4 percent of the vote for the

Chamber of Deputies (Senate: 3.1%). The Liberal Party (PLI) has a following of nearly 138.500 adherents (April 1976), while the liberal-leftist Republican Party (PRI) registers roughly 120.000 members (June 1978). The PLI polled 1.3 percent of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies in 1976 (Senate: 1.4%); at the same time the PRI scored 3.1 percent of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies (Senate: 3.1%).

Italy's Communist Party is a many-faced organization. As a party based on the active allegiance of its cardholding members it is a mass party and a party of cadres at the same time. Considering, furthermore, its ideology and the social origins of the majority of its members and basis cadres, it has remained predominantly a workers' and wage-earners' party (this group accounting for over 50% in both cases). On the other hand it has succeeded to attract vast countrywide voters' support, and from this viewpoint can be said to have become a real popular party appealing to voters belonging to all social strata. This applies in particular to the region Emilia Romagna (capital city: Bologna) where it polled 48.52 percent of the vote in the 1976 general elections. In Siena province (Toscana) it scored a 57.5 percent vote, and in seven more provinces (out of a total of 94) its share exceeded the 50 percent mark.

The degree of organizational penetration is also highest in the Emilia Romagna where roughly 25 percent of the party's total membership is concentrated. Another 26.3 percent reside in the Toscana (14.3%) and in Lombardy (12%), while membership consistency is much weaker in most of the other regions, particularly in the southern and northwestern parts of the country.

It proved to be advantageous for the PCI that public opinion does not associate it with the vicissitudes of the Comintern period, but tends to identify it mainly with the resistance fight against fascism in the 1922-45 period. It is common knowledge, moreover, that after 1943 the communists were in fact the motor of the armed guerilla operations directed against Italian fascism and the German occupation forces, and that they incontestably paid the highest toll

of human lives, compared with the other component groups. Although some noncommunist Resistenza brigades participated in the activities, in Italy it was unquestionably the communists who (unlike their French comrades) clearly dominated the movement as organizers and fighters from the very beginning.

For this reason the PCI's Resistenza merits have become a constituent part of the Italian postwar republic's official legend of formation. Indeed, all political parties supporting the constitution manifest unqualified agreement concerning the very important point that the incipience of the democratic republic must be conceived as the result of the joint endeavours contributed by all the Resistenza parties to the overcoming of fascism, attributable substantially to the sacrifices brought by the Resistenza movement. The alternative possibility to credit the victory over fascism and the foundation of the democratic republic, in the first place, to the military liberation of Italy and to subsequent political decisions reached by the Anglo-Saxon powers, has been practically discarded. Even at the time of the PCI's undisguised relapse into abject subservience to the CPSU during the period 1947-56 it never needed to be afraid of complete political isolation on the domestic scene. By permanent reactivation of the Resistenza myths and memories it obviously succeeded also to keep Resistenza solidarity always alive, and generally across party divisions.

Resurrected as a mass party with a new national image and commitment some time before the end of the war, the PCI reached its peak membership figure as early as 1947 with 2.25 million cardholders. According to Togliatti's directives the party had to be present within every stratum or group of the population, and in order to realize this objective it became customary, among other things, to keep the threshold of ideological minimum requirements relatively low. But also within the party's leadership group and among the party officials of the intermediate categories the attachment to the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism was generally much less

dogmatic than its normal application by contemporary French or Spanish functionaries. All these factors assisted the rapid expansion of the PCI after the war which in turn favoured its transformation from a class-concious mass party into a popular party with a large following of steady PCI voters.

Due to the fact that the PCI, as for revolutionary theory, could rely on outstanding authorities of its own like A. Gramsci (1891-1937) and P. Togliatti (1893-1964), it was much easier for Italy's communists than for their French or Spanish comrades to claim for their organization a far-reaching ideological autonomy, and to present it as a social-revolutionary party primarily guided by the national realities and requirements of its mother-country. The assertion of ideological and political autonomy in relation to the CPSU, initiated by Togliatti, has been continued by his successors with remarkable persistence. Thoughts and statements borrowed from Gramsci were often instrumentalized with a view to build up intellectuel fortifications for the protection of subsequent advances towards political emancipation.

When in 1944 Togliatti began to rebuild the PCI on the basis of his concept of the "new party" (partito nuovo) as a nonsectarian mass party committed to a policy focused on national requirements, this concept was already closely connected with the notion of a special Italian way to socialism. After the end of the Cominform period (1947-56) Togliatti used an early opportunity in fall 1956 to define this "Italian way" of socialist construction as a constitutional way, the gradual character of which he took pains to emphasize later (1962). In his "Jalta Memorandum" (1964) he indicated that the PCI leadership intended to seize power in a step-by-step process without previous destruction of the "bourgeois" state.

The conceptional model of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was replaced by the alternative model of the "hegemony of the working class" (or of the working people), adapting for this purpose a specific notion of the hegemony concept, formulated by Gramsci with particular reference

to the industrially advanced western societies. Similarly the conception of the "historical compromise" was developed from Gramsci's theses on the necessity to form "a new historical block" for specific revolutionary purposes. The permanent grappling with concrete problems of the alliances strategy and the active interest to exert practical influence on domestic affairs led the PCI leadership to develop a new attitude regarding constitutionalism, parliamentarism, the liberal-"bourgeois" fundamental rights and the human liberties, which subsequently also found expression in related party documents.

As mentioned before, the Italian CP participated with major contributions in drafting the constitution which was put into effect on January 1, 1948 and is still in force. Later on the party incessantly professed its loyalty towards this fundamental law and the principle that constitutional continuity should never be interrupted. With frequent calls for the defense and the realization of the constitution it even showed a more pronounced concern than the other parties on many occasions. Quite intentionally the PCI concentrates its revolutionary propaganda essentially on the fight for a radical change of socio-economic structures while it never has openly questioned the principles and institutions vouchsafed by the constitution. Its position that the quest for a radical transformation of socio-economic structures is in principle quite compatible with the constitution itself, is shared by several socialist and christian-democratic political leaders (e.g. by G. Andreotti).

During the years when it was excluded from government responsibility in the Roman central administration, the PCI did not lack opportunities of a different kind to demonstrate its capabilities on the municipality, provincial and regional levels for government and coalition partnership, for adaptability as well as for administrative competence. Such occasions have been always considered to be very important tests, and those PCI representatives called upon to face the challenge normally did a good job. Although the communists

did not refrain from establishing a closely knit patronage and clientelar system of their own, communist administrators and public offices controlled by them generally have a good reputation for a minimum rate of corruption, as well as for their particular concern for the citizens' worries. Not unjustly the Italian CP recommends itself as "the party with the clean hands", and over the years this formula has proved to be the most successful of all communist election slogans ever coined.

The PCI was able, indeed, to build up an extremely widespread system of power bastions. At the beginning of 1978 three out of 20 regions (Emilia Romagna, Umbria, Liguria) had a communist president. In three more regions (Piemont, Toscana, Latium) the PCI was senior partner to a PSI led regional government. 49 out of 94 provinces were controlled by left-wing provincial administrations which in 18 cases were headed by a communist president. Communist mayors were in charge not only in Rome, Naples, Turin, Florence and Bologna but also in many other major cities. In 21 of 94 regional or provincial capitals the mayor was a PCI nominee. In 18 additional capital cities the communists belonged to the majority coalition. Today more than 53 percent of Italy's total population live in municipalities ruled by communist mayors or by communist controlled administrative councils. From this viewpoint the PCI has long since achieved participation in the exercise of power of which it succeeded to acquire even a pretty large share.

Until quite recently the PCI was in a position to play a double rôle when general elections were upcoming: In those regions, provinces and municipalities administered by communists or left-wing coalitions they conducted a campaign calling for endorsement of the PCI representatives in office, while simultaneously operating country-wide as the only serious opposition party, with a good chance to collect many noncommunist votes of individual protest. A long series of scandals which disclosed corruption, mismanagement or incompetence in sectors under central government responsibility contributed much to drive large numbers of

voters in ever new waves into the communists' arms. On the other hand the PCI did its best to maximize such gains by ensuring that high levels of integrity, correctness and reliability were maintained within its own spheres of responsibility.

As since 1963 the PSI was almost permanently a partner to the central government or the respective government coalition, "leftist" votes of protest were all but monopolized by the PCI. Only with the June 1976 general elections some competition was offered by the newly admitted tickets of the "petit-bourgeois", antisocialist Radical Party (PR = Partito Radicale: 1.07%) and of the ultraleftist association Proletarian Democracy (DP = Democrazia Proletaria: 1.52%) which attracted minor portions of the "leftist" votes of protest. The PCI's total share of the returns amounted, however, to 12.620.509 votes (34.44%).

Another of the PCI's sorces of strength should also be mentioned here, which is rooted in its insistence to be different in comparison with the other parties, and in its determination to preserve this contrast. The Italian CP has emphasized over and again that it does not want to become "a party like the other ones". Basically it presents itself as the only party which could rightly claim to be serious, clean, untainted by corruption, secretive regarding official business, united, undivided by factionism (rivalità di correnti), and therefore the only party really qualified to bring about the encompassing moral renewal supposedly required to banish the threatening catastrophe. Although many Italians seem to be impressed by this line of argumentation, it proved to be double-edged, however, insofar as a party distinguished by such tough discipline and strict moral principles (not unlike those of certain religious or military orders) tends also to produce the opposite effect; and many Italians, indeed, find the PCI's professional rigour rather abnormal (within the Italian "ambiente"), frightening and repulsive.

It is nevertheless worth mentioning that in all cases where the Italian CP favourably compared with the other

parties for the disciplined compactness of its leadership group and central apparatus, this was due, first of all, to its unswerving adherence to the principle of "democratic centralism". In fact, whenever a party spokesman came forward with an official justification for this organizational and functional principle, he regularly stressed that the PCI would stick to it also in view of the many warning examples supplied by the other faction-ridden parties whose bad habits the communists saw no reason to imitate.

Many Italians have become more inclined to vote PCI since it adopted a clearly autonomist attitude in relation to the USSR. This course which Togliatti initiated long before the CP leaderships of France and Spain ventured to follow him, was not immediately recognized as such by Italy's interested public. General awareness of these changes began to spread, however, in 1968 in response to the outspoken protests addressed by the PCI leadership to the USSR and other communist regimes in East Europe, condemning the suppression of the Czechoslovakian communist reform movement. The statements published in those days by the Communist Parties of France and Spain, expressing solidarization with the critical reactions of the PCI leadership to the Czechoslovakian events laid some important foundation stones for what later became known under the label of "Eurocommunism".

Also in objecting against the limitation or violation of human rights and civil liberties in the USSR and other East-European countries, particularly in Czechoslovakia, the PCI leadership once more took the lead, showing their West-European sister parties the way with diplomatic perseverance. Italy's CP was the first one, moreover, to authorize the publication of writings by authors proscribed in the USSR (e.g. Trotsky, Bukharin, Kautsky, Hajek, Šik, Pelikan etc.) within the program of its own publishing house. All these initiatives contributed to strengthen the PCI's democratic credibility in the eyes of many sceptics, and to restore its qualification as a potential coalition partner in the judgment of other parties, in particular of the Socialists.

Today large segments, and possibly the majority of the Italian population, consider the PCI to be a radical-democratic, marxist-inspired, but undogmatic reform party primarily bent upon the strengthening and amelioration of the existing constitutional order. This appraisal appears to have consolidated further when in March 1972 Longo was replaced by Berlinguer as Secretary General of the party. According to data derived from opinion polls Berlinguer belongs at present to the political leaders enjoying by far the greatest confidence among the Italian population. It is very significant, moreover, that in the course of an opinion poll carried out in 1970 roughly 45 percent of the respondents judged the PCI to be "a serious threat" for the Italians' freedom, and stated their belief that agreement with the communists were "impossible", while in 1974 - answering identical questions - only 25 percent of the respondents expressed the same negative opinions.

Problems and Prospects of PCI Strategy

The foremost function of political leadership can be defined normally as the task, to determine - on the basis of a binding general program or a specific political directive - a clear-cut and practicable order of priorities. If the most urgent problems are identified it will be easier to reach the necessary basic choices, subordinated to the respective priorities. Out of these basic elements a "strategic" general conception will have to be composed which is needed as a frame of reference for the day-to-day "tactical" decisions on questions of detail. Within the various compartments of the frame of reference as many options as possible must be left open for the decision-making bodies, in order to establish an optimal relationship between the distinctness of the political perspectives and the necessary scope reserved for operational flexibility.

These rules apply in a particularly stringent manner to program-parties of the PCI type, commanded with general-

staff-techniques by professional political leaders: In a cross-roads or dilemma situation the party's general staff cannot avoid a clear basic choice forever. But every such choice will generate a multitude of secondary consequences, as soon as the inevitable adjustment of the "strategic" general conception has been effected.

Apparently such an extremely important basic choice was forced upon the PCI leadership by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. For the PCI's top representatives the military intervention was nothing else but a great-power move launched by the Kremlin for the sole purpose to replace the disliked, but legitimate and regularly established CP leadership of a socialist brother-country. It was evident for the PCI leadership that in the case of a similar conflict of interests under analogous conditions the Soviet Union could not have been expected to treat the Italian party leaders more respectfully than Dubček and other members of the Czechoslovakian party's leadership group, some of whom were even manhandled.

(Due to technical and personal complications the final part of the English language version of this paper could not be readied in time for this conference. Participants will get completed copies as soon as possible before the end of September. Wolfgang Berner)

B O L O G N A C O N F E R E N C E

on the West European Left

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Draft paper submitted by:

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The Problem of Western Policy
Towards the West European Communists

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Richard Löwenthal

The Problem of Western Policy

Towards the West European Communists

Contents

Introduction: Defining the Subject

The general theme of this conference is the state of the West European "Left" and the problems posed by its evolution. However, the West European Socialists and Socialdemocrats are themselves a conscious part of the Western community, except for such sections as may at different times and places come under Communist influence. There are therefore no problems of Western (foreign) policy towards the Socialist Left. Foreign policy problems only arise for those Western countries that have no significant Communist party at home - above all for the United States, Britain and West Germany - in dealing with the influence of strong Communist parties in other Western countries.

The most acute form such problems may take, and have taken in recent years, are Communist bids for power, or at least for government participation, in a West European country. A less acute but still significant type of problem might arise if Communists outside the government succeeded, by effective cooperation with other neutralist or nationalist forces, in creating what amounted to a "veto group" against the participation of their country in West European or Atlantic cooperation.

The only serious Communist bid for power in a West European country in recent years occurred in Portugal in 1974/75, in the wake of the overthrow of the rightwing dictatorship by a revolutionary military junta including strong pro-Communist influence. As this attempt has failed and the danger no longer exists, it will not be discussed in this paper. By contrast, serious efforts for government participation have been undertaken by the "Eurocommunist" parties of France and Italy, and the Italian attempt has achieved partial success and may yet be crowned with full success. The French attempt has failed for the time being, but the French Communists have the continued potential of an anti-Atlantic and anti-European veto group in cooperation with the Gaullists.

It should also at least be mentioned that the official Greek Communist party led by Florakis, which is not Eurocommunist but unconditionally loyal to Moscow, has at least some prospect of eventually forming a similar veto group with the "Panhellenic Socialist Party" of A. Papandreou (which is not affiliated to the Socialist International) and smaller groups.

A. Assumptions Concerning the Nature and Policy of the "Eurocommunist" Parties

Any discussion of Western policy towards those West European Communist parties that may acquire government influence in a foreseeable time must rest on an analysis of the roots and the degree of their "Eurocommunist" transformation. As that analysis has been assigned to other contributions, it cannot be undertaken in detail in the present paper. Instead, a summary of the results of such an analysis as the present writer would see them will be presented so as to clarify the assumptions underlying his views on Western policy.

I believe that the "Eurocommunist" transformation of a number of Communist parties in a number of advanced industrial countries, including those of Italy, France, and Spain as well as Japan, is due to three main causes:

1. The prolonged existence of Communist mass parties in a number of modern, increasingly prosperous countries, in persistently non-revolutionary situations and - except until recently in Spain - in democratic conditions has produced a growing integration of the masses of Communist members and followers into non-Communist societies. This has presented the Communist parties with the choice of either becoming an increasingly effective participant in the process of democratic decision of these countries by accepting its rules and overcoming their isolation, or losing their mass following and becoming sterile sects.

2. The gradual weakening of the international authority of the Soviet Union and the CPSU, first by the long-term effects of the crisis of de-Stalinization and then by the Sino-Soviet schism, has enabled Communist parties outside the Soviet bloc under able and ambitious leaders to acquire increasing ideological and strategic autonomy. The fruit of that autonomy

has been, in a number of cases, the rejection of the model of the Soviet and East European regimes for advanced countries with democratic traditions, as well as a number of particular criticism of specific actions and policies of those regimes.

3. While the growth of East-West "détente" in the course of the past decade has enabled the Communists in some Western countries to overcome their traditional isolation as the "party of the enemy" in the Cold War and to find partners for tactical cooperation, the economic crisis of inflation plus recession has in the last few years strengthened the general attraction of the Left opposition in countries with conservative governments, enabling the Communist parties to benefit in different degrees from country to country.

The formal commitment of the "Eurocommunist" parties to the rejection of single-party rule and the acceptance of pluralistic democracy with all civil rights, notably the right of opposition to a government including Communists and to its overthrow in free elections, must be seen in the light of those three causes: It has become acceptable or even desirable to the majority of Communist followers and cadres due to their increasing integration in their existing social and political systems; it has become possible despite the resistance of Soviet ideological spokesmen due to the decline of Soviet authority; it has become urgent as a precondition for winning allies for "progressive" government coalitions.

On this basis, I make the following assumptions about the present policy goals of the West European Communist parties and their possible collision with Western interests:

1. No West European Communist party at present has either serious prospects or indeed, since the Portuguese Communist defeat of 1975, serious intentions of "taking power" by the "peaceful road" on the model of post-war Eastern Europe, let alone by a violent road.

2. Several West European Communist parties have seriously endeavoured for some years to join coalition governments by means of mass mobilization and electoral propaganda combined with inter-party diplomacy, in the hope of occupying important positions in the state apparatus and influencing both domestic and foreign policy.

3. In situations in which democratic institutions were only emerging, as in Spain, or appeared to be in increasing danger, as in Italy, the consistent attitude of the Italian and Spanish Communist parties has been a responsible concern for the creation and stability of democracy as the best condition for their activity. On the other hand, not only have the Moscow-oriented Portuguese Communists tried to prevent the establishment of parliamentary democracy, but the "Eurocommunist" French CP has taken an attitude of irresponsible demagoguery, regardless of the consequences for democracy.

4. While the "Eurocommunist" parties are no longer under effective Soviet control, they retain an important sense of fundamental solidarity with the Soviet Union as "the country of the October revolution" or "the first socialist country". This does not make them accept Soviet leadership in their own affairs and does not prevent them from criticizing the Soviet and East European regimes on specific issues, including such vital and sensitive issues as the 1968 intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia; individual "Eurocommunists" have even gone so far as to doubt the socialist character of the Soviet Union. But it remains important, in degrees varying from country to country, for the direction of their influence on the foreign and defense policies of their governments if they should join them.

5. All "Eurocommunist" parties, even those who have otherwise moved farthest from Leninist doctrine, still cling to Lenin's formula of "democratic centralism" in principle,

while practicing it with different degrees of rigidity or flexibility: the PCE has moved farthest from the Leninist model, the PCF hardly at all. This continues to enable the leaders to impose sudden tactical changes, again in different degrees.

B. Western Policy Options

The key questions posed for Western policy by the approach of some West European Communist parties to government participation are, first, whether the "outside" Western powers - those without a substantial internal Communist problem - should try to prevent Communist government entry in other Western countries, and if so, by what means; and second, how they should react if Communist government participation in one or more Western countries actually comes about. A third relevant question is what the outside powers can do to prevent the rise of national "veto groups" opposed to a common Western policy, consisting of Communists with neutralist or nationalist allies, even outside the government.

I. The Western Interest

It is not a matter of course that Communist government participation in any Western country is, in present circumstances, necessarily more harmful to the common interest of the West than any realistically conceivable alternative. For two years after the end of the European war, Communists sat in the governments of all the liberated countries of Western Europe, including the provisional governments in the Western states of occupied Germany appointed by the Americans, British, and French; in every case, they left office when this was demanded by the elected parliamentary majority. In Italy, the Communists took an active part in drafting the democratic constitution that is still in force, and they keep reminding the other parties of

it to this day. More recently, a period of Communist government participation in Iceland caused some difficulties for the country's role in the NATO organization, but passed without serious harm - which any attempt at outside interference with the forming of that coalition might well have brought about. On the other hand, Communist government participation in post-revolutionary Portugal plainly constituted for a time a serious danger both to the democratic evolution of that country and to its membership in the Western alliance, and common Western interest clearly justified the effort of the West Europeans both to offer to Portugal a European alternative and to support the democratic rivals of the Communists.

Evidently, the Western attitide to a possible Communist entry into a West European coalition government should depend on its likely effect on both the country's democratic stability and its foreign and defense policies.



In the case of France, the French Communists' strongly anti-Atlantic, anti-European, anti-American, and anti-German outlook augured ill for France's foreign and defense policy, even on the - probable - assumption that the Communists would not or could not insist on the direct control of either of the ministries involved. Though the French Communists had declared that they would not demand the abandonment of the Atlantic alliance, their opposition to any practical move of interallied cooperation that could be interpreted as a step back toward integration was certain, and their demand for a defense concept directed "tous azimuts", against the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany as well as against Russia, promised serious problems. Similarly, they had only reluctantly accepted the European Community as an accomplished fact, had opposed direct elections to the European parliament, and remained determined to oppose any further progress toward European integration.

But French Communist government participation had, in the last six months before the 1978 elections, also become increasingly problematic from the viewpoint of democratic stability - not because the PCF had any plans for the revolutionary overthrow of democracy, but because its sudden tactical switches and uninhibited demagoguery showed no sense of responsibility for the working of the democratic system. The attempt to raise the range of industries to be nationalized and of wage increases to be gtanted beyond what had originally been agreed in the "Common Program" with their Socialist partners showed complete unconcern with the risks of sharpening the economic crisis or with the danger of extreme political tension if such a program was carried out by a narrow majority - the very danger that had caused the Italian Communists to advocate a "historic compromise" for ensuring a broad majority. Their repeated sudden transition from political cooperation with the Socialists to bitter attacks on them as "traitors" justified the worst fears for their behaviour in a government coalition with them. On all those grounds, French Communist membership in such a coalition was clearly undesirable from a general Western - as indeed from a French - point of view.

In the case of Italy, the negative impact of Communist government participation on Western foreign policy and defense interests would be much more limited. Not only have the Italian Communists explicitly stated their willingness to leave the foreign and defense ministries to other parties; they have long been active supporters of the European community, and are committed to the view that the community's - and Italy's - foreign policy should be "neither anti-American nor anti-Soviet." Their statement that Italy should not leave NATO "as long as Europe remains devided between opposing military blocs" has not been explained as a tactical concession to their prospective coalition partners, but based on the argument that security and peace in Europe demand a balance between the Eastern and Western forces as long

as their conflict continues; and that argument has been made more convincing by references to the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, which the Italian Communists have never forgiven, and to the need for protecting the independence of Yugoslavia, with whose leaders the Italian Communists have long maintained a close understanding. However, while their European policy can in no way be described as anti-Western, but at worst as semi-neutralist, their sympathies in conflicts within the Third World, notably in the Middle East and in Africa, are wholly on the Soviet side, except for minor reservations at the time of the Soviet switch from Somalia to Ethiopia. Moreover, they have taken an active part in the Soviet-orchestrated campaign against the "neutron bomb". It may thus be argued that Communist government participation in Italy might create problems if Italian NATO bases were to be used in an extra-European conflict, though in the absence of Communist control of the Defense Ministry those problems would not necessarily be larger than if a massive campaign against such use of the bases were conducted by a non-governing Communist party.

On the other hand, it may be argued with considerable plausibility that direct government participation by a Communist party genuinely committed to the stability of Italian democratic institutions would be healthier for those institutions than an indefinite prolongation of the agony of a succession of governments lacking a solid majority. The advantage of greater democratic stability might even outweigh the limited dangers in the foreign and defense field.

Apart from France and Italy, there are no other cases in which Communist government participation seems likely in the foreseeable future.

II. The Tools for Western Influence from Outside

The means open to the "outside" Western powers for influencing the decision on Communist government participation in the "critical"

countries are economic cooperation, advice,and pressure, including the threat of various "destabilizing" measures.

a) Economic support for the "critical" countries in their struggle against inflation and recession is clearly useful and necessary independent of any effect on the position of the Communists. But to the extent that it is successful, it may also, by diminishing the causesof mass discontent, diminish the pressure for including the Communists in the government. It is strongly to be recommended, within the limits of the "outside" countries' capacity to help, and on terms calculated to insure economic recovery without excessive social hardship.

b) Advice should be addressed to the potential coalition partners of the Communists, and should come rather from Western public opinion in general and from the foreign ideological friends of those potantial partners in particular (Socialists to Socialists, Christian Democrats to Christian Democrats) than from foreign governments: Advice on the internal affairs of a country given publicly by foreign governments is not received as advice but resented as pressure. Advice from the right sources should normally concentrate on the institutional safeguards to be ensured by the partners of the Communists, such as the need to keep them from the control of such key positions as the premiership, foreign affairs, defense,and the police. In cases of strikingly irresponsible Communist behaviour on the threshold of entry into the government, as recently in France, the advice should also stress the lessons of such behaviour for the Communists' would-be partners.

c) Pressure could range from general government statements, describing the entry of Communists into Western governments as unacceptable, to explicit threats of withdrawing economic cooperation from such governments and to propagandist encouragement of a flight of capital; in theory it could even extend

to support for antidemocratic coups to prevent such a government or to the threat of direct military intervention from outside. Obviously, the last-named threats or measures would be incompatible with the democratic principles to which the members of the Western alliance are committed and would risk greatly weakening the external authority and credibility and even the internal cohesion of the states engaging in such a policy of direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of their allies. But even purely economic pressure or demonstrative official statements opposing Communist government entry regardless of its terms would tend to be counterproductive in the sense of promoting a nationalist solidarization with the Communists and an anti-Western radicalization of their prospective allies. It is characteristic that following a statement of the U.S. administration early in 1978 that warned against Communist government participation in Western Europe, some of the very same Italian Christian Democratic spokesmen who had privately asked for such a warning protested against it publicly, under the counterpressure of Italian public opinion, in the name of national sovereignty. Generally speaking, the appearance of external pressure would thus tend to anticipate and promote the very effects of Communist government participation that it is supposed to prevent - a sharpening of conflicts between the "critical" and the "outside" countries. It is our considered opinion that it should be strictly avoided.

III. The Practice of Some "Outside" Governments

In general, the economically stronger Western governments, notably of the United States and West Germany, have been willing to support the economy of the "critical" countries, above all Italy, on non-discriminatory terms and have tried to restrain the flight of capital from them as much as was in their power.

The means of support have been either direct loans or the approval of loans by the International Monetary Fund. It is true that while those loans were not tied to political conditions in the sense of a veto against Communist government participation, they had in the nature of the situation to be linked with economic conditions to ensure rational use of the funds involved; in particular, budgetary measures and a restraint in wage increases had to be demanded as safeguards against an accelerating inflation. Inevitably, such economic conditions could be, and were, interpreted by important sections of public opinion in the receiving country as the pressure of foreign capital on the living conditions of the Italian workers. Nevertheless, the Italian Communists and the Communist-controlled trade unions have to some extent cooperated in making their enforcement possible, as they understood that the conditions were not directed against them but were needed to achieve the economic stabilization required for the survival of Italian democracy.

Political advice opposed to Italian Communist government entry has been emphatically given to the Italian Christian Democrats by the German and to some extent by other Christian-Democratic parties. The Italian party has pretended to accept the advice but has in fact agreed to several transitional steps incorporating the Communists in the government majority short of giving them seats in the cabinet. The episode seems to have contributed to the development of divergent trends among the Christian Democrats of Europe, where the German and some other parties are increasingly cooperating with the British Conservatives and the French Gaullists while the Italian and Belgian parties do not.

The German Socialdemocrats have carefully refrained from criticizing the French Socialists for their electoral alliance with the Communists - though they clearly viewed it with mixed feelings -

or from advising them against Communist government participation. It may be presumed, however, that in personal contacts they have expressed their views about the safeguards to be taken in such a coalition.

As for government statements, the British government has been very reticent. The British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, has in a carefully balanced speech on the phenomenon of Eurocommunism recognized important changes in the policy statements of the parties concerned, but expressed the view that the evidence of their durability is still insufficent for trusting them. But he has refrained from emphatic warnings in the name of his government.

The United States administration, on the other hand, has been both outspoken and inconsistent. Under President Ford, the warnings of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger against Communist government entry anywhere in Western Europe were nothing short of alarmist, and he has repeated them no less emphatically when out of office. The Carter administration started with the publicly announced intention to regard the question of Communist government entry by democratic procedures as an internal affair of the countries concerned, but early in 1978, the President issued a new public warning against such entry. As far as is known, this was not due to a reconsideration of the merits of such a policy by the President and his principal advisers, but on one side to American domestic pressure by the "moderate" wing of the Republican opposition, whose support Carter then urgently needed for the ratification of his Panama treaties, and on the other to the promptings of leading Italian Christian Democrats transmitted by the U.S. Ambassador in Rome, Richard Gardner. There has been no public follow-up to this warning after the Italian Communists became an official part of the government majority.

Finally, the Federal German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, was quoted after the 1976 Western summit meeting in Puerto Rico as stating that the assembled Western statesmen had agreed on their attitude to the danger of Communist government participation in Western Europe. The report was officially denied by him, and it is likely that a discussion had taken place but no formal decision been reached. Since then, there have been no German government statements on the matter. There is reason to believe that the German government was greatly relieved when the imminence of French Communist government participation disappeared after the elections of March 1978. On the other hand, the leief now appears to be widely shared in the Bonn Federal Government (though not in its Foreign Ministry) that the advantages of Italian Communist government entry for Italy's democratic stability might outweigh the risks of a limited Communist influence on Italian foreign policy.

None of the "outside" governments have played with encouraging anti-democratic opposition in the event of legal Communist government entry in Italy or France, nor have any entertained the idea of military intervention in such a case.

IV. Policy Towards Communists in Government

So far, no Communists have entered the government of any major Western country, though the Italian Communists have recently made important advances on the road to such an entry. If such an event takes place, the options open to the "outside" Western governments remain basically the same as before, and so would the main arguments. But there may be in that case a more continuous range of options from unconditional economic cooperation through various forms of conditional cooperation to destabilizing pressure.

a) Willing and generous cooperation with a government including Communists might counteract the risk or its "anti-Western" radicalization both by improving economic conditions, by strengthening the influence of the Communists' "moderate" partners and by promoting the further intergration of the responsible Communist leaders and the majority of their followers into the Western democratic system. As this intergration proceeds and the government concerned is economically successful, an increase of tensions between the representatives of such a type of "Eurocommunism" and the Soviet leaders is also likely.

However, unconditional cooperation regardless of the economic and other behaviour of the governments concerned is not realistically possible for democratic governments resposible to their own electorate: They must ensure that any economic support is used to reasonably good effect, and that it does not benefit a government basically hostile to the common Western cause.

b) Deliberate destabilizing pressure against a coalition government including Communists is likely to prove even more dangerous to Western interests than threats and pressure before the Communist entry: It would be felt as expressing hostility not only to the Communists but to their partners in government and drive them together into an explosive mixture of both nationalist and social radicalization. In the end, there would be a serious likelihood of the Western country or countries concerned being lost to the Western cause and indeed turning against it and leaning increasingly to the Soviet side in world affairs.

c) The real problem for the "outside" Western powers will therefore be to find the right methods of practicing conditional cooperation. They must urge rational economic behaviour by the countries to be supported, not in a spirit of doctrinal prejudice

and petty chicanery, but of ensuring a good chance for the people concerned to come to enjoy the fruits of willing and generous support. Any economic conditions should be obviously relevant to the chances of recovery and free from the stigma of ideological prejudice.

Political conditions should not be explicit at all, but implicit in the fact that the cooperation is offered to a friendly, democratic country. In other words, the only political reasons for withdrawing it should be a drastic impairment of basic democratic liberties, which is unlikely in the conditions envisaged, or an unmistakable turn to an actively anti-Western course in foreign affairs. Support should not be suspended because of isolated differences over particular issues, but only because of a reasoned conviction that the country in question is already lost to the West.

Summary

A situation in which independent, "Eurocommunist" parties may come to enter Western governments is equally unprecedented and fraught with risk for the "outside" Western powers and for the Soviet bloc. The side which shows greater caution and flexibility in reacting to the new situation is the one most likely ultimately to profit from it.

The Spanish Left:
Present Realities and Future Prospects

by

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This paper has been prepared for presentation at a conference on the West European Left to be held in Bologna, Italy in September 1978. It is a draft and no part of it may be quoted or cited.

The parliamentary elections held in June 1977 marked the beginning of what promises to be a long and difficult struggle to build a stable democracy in Spain. Once before, in the third decade of this century, that challenge and opportunity were present: for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the fact that representatives and supporters of the Right and Left saw each other as evil incarnate, the experiment did not work. The Civil War captured the tragic inability of the two Spains to coexist, much less work together. In the nearly forty years of autocratic rule under Francisco Franco that followed, things have changed significantly. No one can overlook the impact profound social and economic changes have had on Spanish society in that time, but it has been the political maturity and degree of statesmanship exhibited by the clase política, encompassing both the Establishment and Opposition, which has been of decisive importance in the almost historically unique peaceful transformation from dictatorship to democracy. A final verdict as to the success of efforts to consolidate democracy is hardly possible today but, it is fair to say, that a key element in that enterprise will be the degree to which the working class

and those political parties which have made the clearest claim to represent it are incorporated into the emerging political system.

This paper will explore the prospects for the consolidation of democracy in Spain from the perspective of the Left and particularly of those two parties -- the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol and the Partido Comunista de Espana -- whose preeminence was amply demonstrated in the June 1977 election. This essay will consist of three parts: The first focusing on the reasons for the emergence of the PSOE and PCE as the most important parties on the Left, the second, on the struggle for hegemony on the Left since June 1977 and the third on the possible evolution of the situation on the Left and in the country more generally.

The June 1977 elections were unkind to most of the groups striving for political space on the Left. The only real winner in the contest was the PSOE: its candidates received over 5.2 million votes and captured 118 seats in the newly elected Cortes. The Communist party was the only other party not to be swamped by a re-invigorated PSOE but it still trailed the Socialists badly, winning somewhere in the neighborhood of 1.7 million votes and 20 deputy seats. Between them, the PSOE and PCE captured nearly 88 per cent of the deputy seats won by the Left in 1977. For everyone else (except perhaps the Jordi Pujol led Pacte Democratica in

Cataluna which received 17.2 per cent of the tally in that region and the autonomist Euskadiko Eskerra coalition with 9.4 per cent of the vote in the province of Guipúzcoa and 5 per cent in the Basque provinces more generally) the results were dismal. The PSP/US coalition led by Enrique Galván nationally and various Socialist leaders in their respective regions captured less than 5 per cent of the national vote and elected only 6 deputies, of which two were from Madrid. Various social-democratic groups, some running separately and others in coalition, received less than 200 000 votes or just slightly over 1 per cent of the total. The extreme Left did only slightly better: the four coalitions these groups put forward attained 1.5 per cent of the vote. Not legalized and forced to run under fictitious names and forming part of umbrella coalitions, they ran at a distinct disadvantage.

Some observers may have been surprised at the magnitude of the PSOE victory (with respect, that is to others on the Left: nationally, it was the Union de Centro Democrático coalition led by the incumbent premier Adolfo Suarez which came in first with 34.7 per cent of the vote and 165 deputies) but the results were generally within the range suggested by various polls released in the last month or two preceding the election. Of course, some in extreme Left groups held on to the hope that its voters simply did not want to reveal their intentions before the balloting; the Social Democrats could not imagine how the moderate Spanish voter (one survey had indicated he was only slightly less conservative then his German counterpart) could vote

for a party like the PSOE which claimed to be Marxist; and the Communists could only with great difficulty accept the notion that the PSOE was in a position to deprive them of the fruits of their long and patient work during the years of clandestinity.

Several factors help to explain the remarkable performance of the PSOE and the failure of the Communist party to translate to electoral terms the influence it had exerted as the best organized opposition force in the country.

For one thing, the Socialists successfully presented themselves as revolutionary Marxists who nevertheless maintained a deep commitment to traditional Western, democratic values. They received support not only from those who did not believe in the moderate and democratic intentions of the Communists (and trusted the PSOE in that respect) but of assorted leftists elements who found the moderation of the PCE distasteful and the radical rhetoric of the PSOE more to their liking. The PSOE was a party with a historic past but with a youthful leadership. Unlike the Communist party, the Socialists had no previously embarrassing ties to Moscow which they had to explain away. Their leaders had not been, like Ibarruri and Carrillo, active during the Civil War and this was certainly an advantage in a situation where nearly everyone who fought then had something to hide now.

And yet, the reason for the failure of Eurocommunism to catch on with the Spanish electorate did not lie simply in the ability of

the Socialists to preempt what would have been its political space. Also relevant was the fact that although the PCE had undergone a dramatic transformation in many aspects of its domestic and international policies in the years after 1956, becoming in this decade perhaps the point party of what has come to be called the Eurocommunist movement, this transformation had not been entirely unambigous. The PCE simply could not convince large sectors of the electorate that its Eurocommunist outlook was more than a simple and expedient tactical shift. Indeed, one survey published in early 1978 by the newsmagazine Cambio 16 indicated that 26 per cent of those who voted Communist in the election did not believe something called Eurocommunism existed and another 31 per cent did not know what the term meant.

The results of the June 1977 reflected the inability of the Communists to resolve the contradictions between their claim to be a revolutionary force committed to the radical transformation of the regime and the reformist practice which has characterized its policies over the course of two decades. Under the leadership of Santiago Carrillo, the PCE had broadened the broad front orientation it had developed during the Civil War, issuing a call for National Reconciliation and urging the country to put the divisiveness of that conflict behind. The strategy was certainly successful in the sense that it softened the image the party had among the new generations which had not experienced the Civil War but the analysis which lay behind

this strategy helped undercut the long term effectiveness of the initiative. Here we allude to the predictions PCE leaders made in the late 1950's and early 1960's about the nature of change in Spanish society. Predicting the imminence of the overthrow of the regime, the Communists argued that profound social and economic change which would put Spain on the road to socialism would necessarily accompany that transformation and that any effort reformers from within the regime made to overhaul the authoritarian political structures was destined to fail. When predictions about the substance and form of change did not materialize, party leaders hardly shifted gears. They quietly dropped the idea about changes in the social and economic structure being inevitable in the short run, but continued to say that the end of the regime was still near, would come in relatively peaceful fashion and could not be frustrated by a reformist faction within the government. Clearly, the PCE was trying to please everyone and maintain the élan of militants working within Spain as well. Unfortunately, it came close to pleasing very few. Critics on the Left objected to the politics of National Reconciliation, seeing in its emphasis on peaceful change a capitulation to the bourgeoisie. More moderate elements did not altogether trust the Communists and never quite understood how the party coupled its insistence on moderation with the demand that the structures created by Franco be torn down and replaced. It was not until late 1976, much too late to do anything about the rise of the PSOE and their own isolation

that party leaders admitted the success of Suárez. Even then, the admission was grudging and in one speech in the Spring of 1978 Carrillo even dared to brush aside criticism of party predictions by saying that reality had not demonstrated the Communist analysis to be incorrect.

Our emphasis on the Communist failure to recognize the capacity for maneuver open to some elements within or close to the regime should not lead us to overlook the important role the PCE played in the opposition to Franco, and the significant strides the party made in the years after 1939 to break out of the ghetto into which it had been cast after the Civil War. Despite the relatively low proportion of votes it received in the June 1977 election, the PCE must figure prominently in any discussion of Spanish politics. Employing a strategy premised on the utilization of all legal possibilities and the penetration of organizations which had the possibility of becoming mass movements, the Spanish Communists built up a potent underground structure. The strategy was particularly effective in the labor movement and Communist activists, acting in generally uncoordinated fashion at first, sought to penetrate the Organizacion Sindical, the fascist-style substitute for a free trade movement. The first returns for this investment and strategy came in 1951 on the occasion of a now famous public transport boycott in Barcelona — the movement spread with suprising speed to Madrid . . .

and the Basque country and only came to an end when the government and employers ceded to many of the workers' demands. The Communists were quick to seize credit for the movement although, in fact, it was spontaneous and no organization was in control with workers of all persuasions participating. The 1951 strike was significant because it marked the first time since the end of the Civil War (the general strike which paralyzed the Basque country in 1947 was really the last gasp of the dying pre-Civil War labor movement) that workers had been bold enough to strike. In many ways, it signalled the birth of the new Spanish working class — a product of the industrialization and development embarked upon by Spain in the 1950's and 1960's.

Labor had been monopolized in the pre-Civil War period by the Anarchists and the Socialists. Both of these movements, organized into the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT) and Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), suffered harshly in the first decade after the Civil War. Decimated by the regime and unwilling as a matter of principle to participate in the vertical Organizacion Sindical — the UGT argued those who participated would only be coopted and thus ultimately help to legitimize the regime— both organizations lost touch with their constituencies and were unable to develop new cadres. The impact this had on the labor movement was most clear in Cataluña, virtually a fiefdom of the Anarchist movement in the pre-Civil War period and an area where the CNT had an important influence in the early 1950's. By 1978, however, it was the Partit

Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), the Catalan filial of the PCE, and Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.) which had the greatest influence among workers in the region. Communists and Church-affiliated Catholic Action groups filled the organizational vacuum and played quite a role in most of the strikes which shook Spain in the period 1958-1963. One aspect of the growth of working class dissent was the emergence of the phenomenon known as the Comisiones Obreras. This movement originated and expanded in the context of the changes in the collective bargaining law in 1958: under new provisions, negotiations for contracts could be made at the individual factory level. One index of the popularity of the new provision might be seen in the fact that while in 1958 contracts negotiated in the new way affected less than 20 000 workers, by 1962 that number had risen to 2.3 million. This change virtually revolutionarized the system of industrial relations in Spain and energized the role of jurados de empresa and enlaces sindicales.

The PCE did not control the Comisiones at the outset — indeed, the movement has always been quite heterogeneous and the Communists have had to struggle with various groups — but the Communists distinguished themselves in giving the nascent organization the provincial, regional, and national infrastructure it needed and thereby gained cadres. They benefitted, at least early on, from the curious situation where the official OS sought to coopt the movement and thus they benefitted from a period during which their activities

were generally tolerated.

Participation in the Comisiones Obreras was also advantageous to the Communists because it encouraged contact with Catholic labor activists. This was important from the PCE's point of view because it would help break down the ideological foundation of the Franco regime and also perhaps prevent the emergence of a strong Christian Democratic party in the post Franco era. Such a turn of events might even lead to the creation of a Catholic Left party which would incline toward an alliance with the Communists and Socialists. It should be noted, the PCE was quicker than the PSOE in shedding the anti-clericalism which had always been so much a part of the Spanish Left.

With respect to Catholicism as with respect to the labor movement, the Communist leadership misjudged the efficacy of their party's efforts. Certainly Comisiones activists could enter the OS but it was not that easy to takeover the organization's pyramidal structure particularly given the obstacles placed in the way by the regime. Similar things could be said of the Catholic Church. Certainly, there was a great deal of dissent and resentment toward the regime expressed in the lower levels of the clergy — especially those living in working class neighborhoods and regions where nationalist sentiments ran high — but it was quite another for this ferment to shift the balance of forces in the episcopal councils. With the appointment of Cardinal Tarancón as primate of Spain in 1969 and

particularly after his confirmation as archbishop of Madrid in 1971, the tide had certainly turned against the most inveterate supporters of the regime within the hierarchy. A break with the regime was never in the cards however, except on the one or two occasions when the government was clearly too bold in its violation of the rights accorded the Church by the Concordat signed in August 1953. Catholic leaders wanted more independence from the regime in the troubled waning years of the Franco era, but the hierarchy perceived (not unreasonably) Church interests not to lie in too active an opposition to the regime. Its interests, the government subsidy to the clergy and its virtual monopoly on education, had to be protected as well.

The effort the Communists made to be in tune with changes in Spanish society contrasted with the narrow and disoriented approach of the PSOE exile leadership headed by Rudolfo Llopis whose organizational center was Toulouse. The Socialist party had tried to maintain its organization in Spain after 1939 but heavy repression weakened and almost destroyed it: the leader of the party inside the country had been arrested in 1953 (he later died under mysterious circumstances) and five years later Antonio Amat and about one hundred companions also fell prey to the police. But repression was only partly responsible for the withering away of the PSOE organization in Spain. One factor which also helps explain the phenomenon was the obsession the PSOE leadership in exile had that some sort of foreign intervention would be decisive in defeating Franco. Such trust had

been understandable in the immediate post-World War II years (although misplaced even then) but the Socialist leaders held on to this notion twenty years after the end of the Civil War. As late as 1956, the PSOE Secretary General Llopis predicted the rapid overthrow of the Franco regime because, as he explained, the axis of the Atlantic Alliance had shifted from the Republican government in the United States to the Labor government in Great Britain. Also working against the revitalization of the PSOE organization was the almost obsessive anti-Communism which became the hallmark of the exile leadership. It should be understood that Socialist leaders who had lived through the Civil War and experience first hand the virtual destruction of their party because one part of the PSOE passed into the Communist party may well have had cause for prudence in their relations with the Spanish Communists. But the Llopis leadership used the past as a bludgeon with which to attack not only the PCE but those Socialists within Spain who advocated including the Communists in discussions leading to the creation of any anti-Franco front. Every Socialist Congress since 1944 had adopted a resolution ruling out any sort of alliance with the Communists or other totalitarian force. It was not that Socialists living in Spain were ready to leap into the arms of the Communist party — there was a good deal of resentment among them of the perceived Communist tendency to claim credit for initiatives undertaken by all the opposition and also for the effort made by the PCE in the late 1950's to infiltrate the Agrupación Socialista Universitaria — simply that the Communists were one of the most dedicated opponents of

the regime and this could hardly be ignored. The new generations of workers and students reaching political maturity in the Franco era simply could not understand anti-Communism as visceral and unflinching as that which the exiled PSOE leaders preached.

One manifestation of the loss of influence suffered by the PSOE during this time was the emergence of a variety of national and regional groups within Spain, each seeking to lay claim to the political space of democratic socialism. A few words about the most important of these groups are in order.

The Frente de Liberación Popular was one of the first to challenge the PSOE. Much impressed by the example of the Algerian FLN and the 26th of July Movement in Cuba, the FLP presented itself as a radical alternative to both the Communists and the PSOE. The first of several movements whose membership consisted of many radicalized Catholics, the FLP (known as ESBA in the Basque country and the FOC in Cataluna) participated actively in the various strike movements of the late 1950's and early 1960's and joined with the PCE in the convocation of a jornada de reconciliación nacional in May 1958. The group had a very ambivalent attitude toward the PCE. On the one hand, the FLP criticized the Communist for not being revolutionary enough, proclaiming it would show the PCE how to make the revolution; on the other, many of its members could never quite overcome a marked inferiority complex with respect to the Communists and constantly looked over their shoulders at what the Communists were up to.

Another group, this one with loose ties to the PSOE but not trusted by the exile leadership because it appeared a certain proclivity for joint actions with the PCE, was the aforementioned Agrupación Socialista Universitaria. Founded in 1957, the ASU attained a certain audience within the Spanish university and became the spawning ground for several men who would after Llopis' ouster in 1972 become important figures in the PSOE.

A third group consisting primarily of intellectuals, university professors and professionals coalesced around the figure of a prestigious catedrático who in 1965 had been deprived of his chair at the University of Salamanca, Enrique Tierno Galván. He and his supporters (organized in what was called the Frente Socialista Unido Español in 1964, the Partido Socialista del Interior a few years later, and, finally, in 1974 in the Partido Socialista Popular) had on again, off again relations with the PSOE in exile. Looking to replace Llopis and his organization within the country, the PSI nevertheless appeared to side with the exiled leader in 1972 when dissidents took over the leadership of the PSOE. Subsequent recognition by the Socialist International of the dissident group (since an October 1974 congress in Suresnes led by the Seville lawyer Felipe González) left the PSP in something of an embarrassing position and, in an effort to gain some leverage with respect to the PSOE, the Tierno group joined the Communist-inspired coalition of anti-Franco forces known as the Junta Democrática.

We should also note in this context the presence of various groups associated with Dionision until his death in June 1975. A former Falangist, Ridruejo was in many ways the Spanish Djilas and his

intellectual evolution from fascism to liberalism and then to democratic socialism earned him the respect of many oppositionists and the enmity of many former comrades. Determined to shift the axis of Spanish socialism away from its Jacobin tradition and toward social democracy, Ridruejo created the Unión Social Democrática Española with Antonio Garcia Lopez in 1974. It was Ridruejo who held the group together and after his death it split into numerous parts, losing whatever possibility it might have had for influence on the Left.

Regional Socialist groups also proliferated on the political scene during this period. Many of them had an ephemeral existence and consisted of little more than a name and a group of friends. Nevertheless, some of these groups found a fertile soil in the lack of responsiveness by the exiled leadership to rising demands among political activists in various regions of Spain for self-determination and autonomy. Historically, the PSOE had never been known for its sympathies in this regard: Catalan nationalists, for example, never forgave the Socialists for voting against a Statute of Autonomy for their region in 1932. Some efforts were made by these groups to set up national coordination but these only achieved some fruition in June 1976 with the creation of the Federación de Partidos Socialistas. The latter never became a party but remained a loosely structured federation of groups whose claim to political relevance would be shown to be rather tenuous.

Disenchantment with the sclerotic Llopis leadership in Toulouse

grew deeper in the course of the 1960's as it became apparent that the PSOE was losing the last vestiges of its influence in the politics of the opposition in Spain. A concerted challenge to his leadership by discontented PSOE members residing in Spain and some exiles occurred at the XI Congress in August 1971 at which time, and over the objections of Llopis, the delegates voiced support for the creation of a united opposition front which included the Communists. The trial of Basque separatists in late 1970, by helping to draw the opposition together against the common foe, served as a catalyst fot this change in Socialist policy. At previous Congresses, Llopis had been forced to aquiesce in raising the number of seats militants in Spain could have on the Executive Committee. Finally in 1972, dissidents within Spain — men like Pablo Castellanos, Enrique Múgica and Felipe González — were ready to join others in exile for an all out push against his leadership. Overcoming various procedural obstacles set in the way by Llopis (he and his four supporters in the Executive Committee first demanded the convocation of an extraordinary Congress and then opposed the celebration of the ordinary Congress in August 1972), the majority of the Executive Committee convoked a Congress for August which Llopis attended. The Congress replaced Llopis as head of the party and announced a series of decisions. The most important of these were the abolition of the office of Secretary General, the establishment of a collegial directorate to run PSOE

affairs, the withdrawal of the automatic veto the PSOE had put to collaboration with the Communists and the transferral of control of funds to the interior. Llopis denounced the Congress and celebrated his own version of the XII Congress in December. The Socialist International responded by suspending the participation of its Spanish filial until the legitimacy of one of the groups had been clarified. A commission appointed in early 1974 by a nearly unanimous vote (only the PSDI abstained), the commission voted to grant official recognition to the group which had seized control from Llopis. That decision flowed from the realization that Llopis was opposed by the great majority of Socialists residing in Spain and a large proportion of the members in exile. But it also reflected the judgement of the International that it was in Spain and not in exile that the fate of Spanish Socialism would be decided and that for this struggle the younger, more dynamic elements which made up the opposition to Llopis would be in a better position to wage this struggle successfully.

The decision of the Socialist International to recognize that group was to have important consequences for the PSOE. It insured West German and Swedish organizational, financial and moral support (the latter should not be underestimated: the West German embassy in Madrid intervened forcefully on behalf of the PSOE when Felipe González' passport had been withdrawn prior to his attendance at the SPD Congress in Mannheim in 1975, and the next year, when the Spanish

government did not want to give permission for the celebration of the PSOE Congress in Madrid, similar pressures were successfully brought to bear on Suárez and the King — for the PSOE and guaranteed that, all other things being equal, the party would stand heads above the other groups competing for space in the Socialist part of the political spectrum.

Many rival Socialist groups subsequently attacked the PSOE for its "social-democratic" orientation and subservience to Bonn. Whatever judgement one cares to make about these criticisms depends in large measure on one's ideological and political persuasions. What can hardly be overlooked here, however, is that a good bit of pique and resentment over the international connection of the PSOE was involved. Some of the groups which criticized the PSOE most vociferously had been trying for years to enter the International and, had they succeeded in doing so, would gladly have accepted whatever financial and organizationl assistance the Social Democratic parties in Western Europe would have offered. Moreover, a party like the PSP, one of the most vociferous proponents of a "Mediterranean" socialism, could hardly cast stones. On the one hand, the party was willing to consider the Ba'ath party in Iraq and Qaddafi in Libya to be members of the Socialist fraternity; on the other, the PSP appeared (and the June 1977 elections confirmed this) to derive most of its support from sectors of the population impressed by the moderate figure and style of its president Enrique Tierno Galván.

The PSOE was most vulnerable to criticism with respect to the regional question. Although personal antipathy played a role in the

decision of someone like Alejandro Rojas Marcos in Andalucia to challenge the national party, the fact is the PSOE had traditionally been inattentive, and, in some cases, outright unsympathetic to regional demands. A discussion of the reasons for this is certainly beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to point to the strength of the Anarcho-Syndicalist movement in pre-Civil War Cataluña as one factor which may have inhibited Socialist adoption and defense of the cause of federalism.

Conversations between the PSOE and various other group aiming at the unification of the Socialist movement in Spain began in 1974 soon after the International granted exclusive recognition to the PSOE. The parties held talks for nearly a year with little progress made on substantive issues. Many of the other groups charged the PSOE with negotiating in bad faith, arguing that the PSOE saw in the conversations and in its participation in the Conferencia Socialista Ibérica primarily a way of defusing an uncomfortable problem. The others in the CSI demanded that the PSOE renounce its exclusive participation in the Socialist International, dissolve its federations in the various regions where CSI members were active and turn over responsibility for the collection and distribution of funds to a collegial organ set up by the CSI. Unwilling to comply with these conditions, the PSOE withdrew from the organization in April 1975. It subsequently entered into negotiations with the PSOE faction headed by Llopis known as the históricos. Conversations went on into the summer of 1976 but eventually broke down when the Llopis group refused to attend a reunification Congress for which delegates would

have been chosen on the basis of membership. A final flurry of negotiations with an eye to unity occurred in early 1977 with the PSP and groups in the FPS. PSP leaders proposed to the PSOE that the two parties agree on a proposal for joint electoral lists and that unity could be discussed after the election. Emboldened by the success of its Congress in December to which most of the ranking figures of International Socialism came, the PSOE refused and insisted on having a framework for organic unity set up prior to the election. The party had more success in its negotiations with two groups within the FPS. With the Convergencia Socialista de Madrid, it agreed to fusion after waiving the requirement that all PSOE members join the UGT. The PSOE formed an electoral coalition with the Joan Raventos-led Partit Socialista de Catalunya. This last alliance broke the shaky unity of the FPS and insured that the PSOE would do well in the important Catalan provinces.

The shift in the leadership of the PSOE from exile to the forces in the interior and the recognition accorded that party by the International were important factors in bringing about the rebirth of the party and of a unified Socialist movement in Spain. The nature and the length of the transition to the post-Franco era helped the Socialists as much as it hindered the Communists. Indeed, there was more than a grain of truth in the complaint voiced by many PCE leaders in 1975 and 1976, that the regime showed the PSOE a certain toleration. Whether this was because the government preferred the PSOE or because it was in some way pressured by the PSOE's powerful international friends is not altogether clear. On the one hand, many in the govern-

ment did want the presence of a relatively strong Socialist party able to marginalize the Communists; on the other, a good number of them were also convinced that the PSOE with its radical rhetoric and Jacobin tradition would never fit the bill. This ambivalence led to government negotiations with regional Socialist groups, with the históricos, with the PSP and with various Social Democratic parties, but the government was always careful not to burn all its bridges to the PSOE. The Suarez government came closest to challenging the PSOE outright for its political space in January/February 1977 when, apparently breaking a tacit agreement with Felipe Gonzalez and his party, it legalized the históricos. The maneuver appeared to be part of a plan by Interior Minister Martin Villa and other officials to spark a coalition between ex-Falangists converted to certain socialistic ideas and the most moderate Social-Democratic groups. Some feel that there was no plan at all in this direction and that the move was really a way of pressuring the PSOE to opt for participation in the upcoming election. The reaction of the PSOE, in any case, was so virulent that, if the plan existed, it was abandoned.

By late 1976 and early 1977, the PSOE had moved once again the claim the mantle of leadership on the Left. The party had been successful in wresting the political initiative in the opposition from the Communists and, if the latter had viewed the de-composition of the Socialist party under Llopis with a certain self-satisfaction, they now could feel the shoe on the other foot. Communist leaders now had to live down predictions made several years earlier to the effect that the PCE would exert a hegemonic influence on the Left in the post-Franco era.

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In the aftermath of the June 1977 election, the Spanish political panorama had been clarified significantly. What started out as a sopa de siglas made up of some 200 parties had been narrowed down to two large and two small national parties and a few regional ones of some importance.

It did not take long for the sparring between the large and the small party, the PSOE and PCE, to begin. The Communists made their point of view clear in the analyses they published. Throwing the gauntlet down to the PSOE in almost insulting fashion, PCE leaders described the Socialist vote as "disposable", "transitory" and "militant", and made clear their intention to battle the PSOE for the same political space on the Left. At a Central Committee session in late June, the party defined its objectives. The first was to consolidate the nascent democratic institutions and prevent the return to an authoritarian form of government. The second, to stop the PSOE from consolidating its position as the Left alternative to the Suarez government.

In pursuit of those objectives, PCE leaders proposed the creation of a gobierno de concentración nacional with the participation of the UCD, PSOE, Catalan and Basque minority groups and the Communists. All would come to terms on a pacto constitucional...

and an economic recuperation program to last four or five years. The Communists insisted again and again during the summer and fall of 1977 that only such a government could rally the popular support necessary to stymie those interested in de-stabilizing Spanish democracy, but behind their warning about the dangers of polarization — Camacho cautioned as to the possible rise of a Pinochet and Carrillo railed against those "who do not see what is right in front of their noses" — the PCE was also laying the rationale for collaboration with the UCD and against the PSOE.

The proposal for a gobierno de concentración nacional did not elicit overly enthusiastic reponses from the Socialists. Flush from their electoral triumph, Socialist leaders were staking out for their party a claim as immediate Left alternative to the government and had begun to envision a two-party system developing in Spain (PSOE-UCD or PSOE and whatever the Center-Right might come up with) with the Communists and Alianza Popular playing essentially marginal roles. The PSOE expected that after new general elections it would be able to form a government on its own terms and saw in the Communist call for a broad coalition government a rather transparent effort to weaken the Socialists.

As might be expected, the idea of a Socialist government did not sit well with either the Communists or the UCD. Sparring between the PCE and PSOE had been constant much before the June 1977 election but, in the aftermath of the contest, relations deteriorated sharply with lead of the two parties engaging in rather personal attacks. Socialist relations with the UCD were not much better. Suárez and his associates had been bitterly attacked by the PSOE during the campaign and, although after the election the virulence of the attacks diminished with UCD and PSOE voting together in the first sessions of the Cortes, the honeymonn was brief.

By late summer 1977 and particularly after the Socialists forced through a motion of confidence vote (which they lost and on which the PCE abstained) in the Cortes in September, the UCD and PCE were ready to draw together in an attempt to trim the Socialists' sails. The Pacto de la Moncloa, an economic and political agreement signed in

late October and whose name derives from the residence of the Premier near the university in Madrid, was the most explicit manifestation of this confluence of interests between the Center and the Communists. While the PSOE signed the agreements only reluctantly and warned it would be up to the government to make the Pacto work, the PCE hailed them as a vindication of its policies and as the first step toward shifting the axis of Spanish politics from the parliamentary sphere (where they were so weak) to other terrain where their ability to maneuver was greater and their influence in the labor movement could be more effectively employed.

Although the signing of the Pacto was a victory for the PCE, the party was not able to exploit the move fully. The Socialists would not agree to the Communist suggestion that a supra-parliamentary commission be set up to oversee implementation of the accords and the PCE just did not the leverage necessary to compel the Suárez government to live up to its end of the bargain. Indeed, it became especially clear after a ministerial re-shuffle in February 1978 that the government interpreted the accords quite differently than the PCE.

The struggle for hegemony on the Left between the PCE and PSOE centered during this period (and still does) in the labor movement. The Communists, as we have noted earlier in this essay, had developed an important presence in Spanish labor in the 1960's and early 1970's through the influence they exerted in the Comisiones Obreras. PCE leaders had confidently expected their party would turn its longstanding efforts at penetration of the official Organización Sindical to advantage and would one day simply assume control of the national labor structure. The success of the Suarez reforma politica and the lengthiness of the transition to the post-Franco era foiled those plans. In the months after Franco's death, the Comisiones Obreras was shown to be an organizat which despite its claims to independence and autonomy was firmly under the control of the Communist party (in mid-summer 1976 it came out that 24 out of 27 individuals on the CC.OO. National Secretariat were members of the PCE) and the Socialist-inspired UGT had the opportunity to build a much-needed infrastructure.

The sterling PSOE performance in June 1977 (remember the Socialists received triple the number of Communist votes) provided a further shot in the arm to the UGT. Many Socialist labor activists, anxious to give their party an advantage in dealing with the Communists which no other Latin European Socialist party had had since the end of World War II, looked for the UGT to develop a hegemony in the labor movement analogous to the one the PSOE had begun to build in the political sphere. The Communists, for their part, were keenly aware of the need to hold the line in the working class: a UGT triumph in the upcoming sindical elections would be a serious blow to any hopes the PCE had of reversing the correlation of forces on the Left.

Animosity between Communists and Socialists, already evident in the Cortes and exacerbated by the Moncloa agreements, became even more acute in the context of competition for the sindical elections. Thus. Nicolás Redondo, a Socialist deputy and head of the UGT, kicked off the sindical campaign in Barcelona by telling his audience that CC.OO. was "a reformist union at the service of the UCD and of the bourgeoisie."

Many issues separated the two unions. On the issue of the Pacto, for example, UGT and Comisiones were sharply divided with the former criticizing the agreements (more than the PSOE, in fact) and the latter expressing its wholehearted approval of them from early on. Other issues on which they were at odds related to the claims the UGT made about the patrimonio sindical confiscated by the Franco regime in 1939 and to the question of whether the delegate lists for the sindical elections should be closed or open.

The UGT favored closed lists and argued that such a procedure by encouraging the identification of the worker with a union instead of an individual would not only render an accurate reading as to the implantation of individual unions but would also encourage the creation of a stable industrial relations system in the country. Behind this argument, of course, lay the conviction not only that trade unions were the best instrument for the defense of the rights of the working class but that closed lists would make it easier for the UGT to attract that workers' vote which had gone to the PSOE in June 1977. Comisiones had a different point of view on this issue. Drawing on a lengthy tradition of work-place asambleas and a disdain (tempered over time however by the necessity to consolidate control of the union) for trade union structures, the CC.OO. called instead for a system of open lists.

The dispute over which system should be introduced intensified

as the UGT accused the government of favoring Comisiones by seeking to adopt the system that organization desired. That the government did not want a UGT victory in the sindical elections is quite clear. That they instead wanted CC.OO. to win, much less so. Some individuals in the government (primarily the Minister of Labor Jiménez de Parga whose brother worked for the Comisiones and was vice-president of the Soviet-Hispanic Friendship Association) may have preferred such an outcome but those close to Suárez and with real influence in the government were less interested in promoting the Communist-led union than in keeping the UGT down and in confusing the labor situation to the point where the UCD could promote its own trade union alternative. That this was the underlying objective of government labor policy became readily apparent when the Suárez government issued its decree regulating the sindical elections. The law set up a system of closed lists in enterprises with more than 250 workers (approximately 30 per cent of the electorate) and open ones in factories with fewer than that number. In the latter, moreover, there was no requirement that the prospective delegate's sindical affiliation appear on the ballot and this permitted the government subsequently to claim many of the delegates in those factories were independents.

After several months of delay, negotiation and procedural squabbling the sindical elections began in early 1978. The voting lasted well over three months and at the time of this writing final results are not yet in. Available provisional results indicate that Comisiones came in first nationally with between 38 and 44 per cent of the delegates elected compared to between 27 and 31 per cent for the UGT. Comisiones won most clearly in the regions of Cataluña (particularly in Barcelona), Asturias and Madrid and in parts of Andalucía. CC.OO. did best in factories with less than 50 workers and its margin with respect to UGT was least in those with more than 250. Compared to Comisiones, the UGT just did not have the necessary cadres: its policy of non-participation in sindical elections under Franco hurt the union and the harm was only partially obviated by the training program it ran with some of its Western European counterparts. Although the UGT did not do badly (particularly if we keep in mind the Socialist-led union had nuclei active primarily only in Asturias and the Basque country in the early

part of this decade), on balance CC.OO. was the victor. The Socialists had more or less counted on duplicating their June 1977 showing and for the Communists to more than hold their own dealt a serious, although not necessarily fatal, blow to PSOE hopes of cementing a bi-polar system in Spain.

Our consideration of the politics of the Left in the post-June 1977 period would not be complete without an analysis of what for want of a better term we might call the ideological/propagandistic offensive which the PCE undertook in order to improve its popular standing. Because of space restrictions, we shall limit our consideration of this, focusing first on the polemics with the Soviet Union sparked by publication of the book "Eurocomunismo" y el Estado written by Santiago Carrillo and his visits to the USSR and the United States in the fall of 1977; and, then, turning to a discussion of the Ninth Congress of the PCE in April 1978 and the decision adopted there to abandon the term Leninism. Although all of these initiatives had a serious and substantive side, we should not overlook the fact they were also public relations gambits undertaken by Carrillo and others in the PCE in an effort to make up the ground the Communists had lost to the PSOE in June 1977.

"Eurocomunismo" y el Estado, published shortly after the tripartite PCE-PCF-PCI summit in Madrid in March 1977, will not be remembered for the originality or depth of its analysis. The political importance of the document derives from the fact that for the first time a Secretary General of a Western European Communist party put his name to a book which so bluntly assailed the Soviet Union, coming very close to denying the Socialist nature of the USSR and declaring that profound structural transformations were necessary there before the Soviet state could be considered a "democratic workers' state." The Russian reaction to this polemical blast did not come right away: for whatever reasons, only in late June, after the Spanish elections, did the Soviet journal New Times publish a vitriolic personal attack on Carrillo (had it come before, he only half-jokingly suggested, the PCE might have done better in the elections) accusing him of propounding ideas which "accord(ed) solely with the interests of imperialism, the forces of aggression and reaction." Some saw in the attack an effort by the Soviets to force Carrillo's ouster but what is more probable is that the CPSU was more interested in trying to isolate Carrillo and his party from their Western

European counterparts. In this effort, the Russians were at least partially successful. Although the PCF and PCI expressed a general solidarity with the beleaguered Secretary General of the PCE, they were also at pains to disassociate themselves from what they perceived to be his desire for confrontation with the Soviet Union.

In the summer of 1977, relations between the PCE and CPSU stood at an all time low, worse even than when the Soviets had encouraged Enrique García and Enrique Líster to split from the Spanish party. With many observers wondering what the next step in the conflict might be, the Spanish Communists announced in early September that a V. Pertsov, attached to the CPSU Central Committee and in Spain ostensibly to attend the San Sebastian film festival, had met with Carrillo and other Spanish Communist leaders in an effort to lessen existing tension. One formula the two sides discussed was possible PCE attendance at the 60th anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution in Moscow. Both sides had an interest in tempering the dispute at least temporarily. For the Soviets, having as heterodox a party as the PCE come to Moscow would help to reinforce the much-worn idea that Moscow was still the mecca of the international Communist movement. The Spanish also had an interest in attending: Carrillo planned to visit the United States in late November and a trip to Moscow would give his foreign initiatives a sense of balance and, perhaps help undercut criticism within the PCE and among some Western European Communist parties that he was too extreme in his criticism with the CPSU.

Negotiations between the PCE and CPSU continued into the fall with both parties coming to agreement during the visit to Madrid in mid-October of Pravda editor and Central Committee member V. Afanasyev. Carrillo and the Spanish delegation arrived in the capital of the USSR a few weeks later and, then, in a move which made the PCE leader an international cause celebre, the Soviets did not permit him to speak.

Press accounts of the incident generally placed responsibility with the CPSU or with some faction in its leadership, but there is evidence which suggests that Carrillo was not quite the innocent victim and that the affair was quite likely a public relations montage

worked out in anticipation of the Carrillo visit to the United States and designed to reinforce the impression, domestically and internationally that the Spanish leader was the most anti-Soviet and thus the most Eurocommunist personality in Western Europe.

What leads us to such a conclusion?

For one thing, all accounts of the affair agree that during Afanasyev's visit to Madrid in mid-October, both sides came to term on the general guidelines for the Carrillo speech and on the date of his arrival in Moscow. Approximately one week before his scheduled arrival, Carrillo notified the organizers of the event that he could not arrive in time for Brezhnev's inaugural speech since he had in the meantime promised to attend the closing session of the Fourth Congress of the Catalan Communist party. There can be little doubt that with nearly twenty per cent of the vote in June 1977, eight deputies in the Cortes and some 40 000 members, the PSUC, as the Catalan filial of the PCE is known, is the most important component of the Spanish Communist party but Carrillo could easily have chosen not to go to Barcelona and he undoubtedly expected the CPSU would interpret his absence for the snub that it was.

Aside from this provocation, there is the question of the Carrillo speech. According to the official PCE version, Carrillo turned it over for translation upon arrival. Oddly enough, there has been no text of the speech published anywhere (an unusual circumstance by any standard) and this leads one to wonder whether there ever was a speech (or just vague notes Carrillo jotted down as an outline and which the Soviets would not accept) or whether the speech was so weak compared, for example, to that of Enrico Berlinguer that Carrillo as the enfant terrible of the Communist movement might have opted not to deliver it. Indeed, what better way to start a trip to the United States than to have been rejected so publicly by the Russians. This aspect of the incident becomes particularly relevant if we remember that Carrillo and others in the PCE expected, incorrectly as it turned out, to have direct contacts with the Carter administration once he arrived in the United States.

It was during his trip to the United States (he spoke at several major universities and at the Council on Foreign Relations) that

he mentioned the possibility that during its Ninth Congress scheduled for early 1978 the PCE would drop the appellation Leninist and define itself simply as a "Marxist, democratic and revolutionary" organization. The proposal, like the foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the PCE with the publication of "Eurocomunismo" y el Estado and the visits to the Soviet Union and the United States by Carrillo, had as its principal objective a quest for votes and "democratic credibility".

In the weeks and months preceding the Congress, the first legal one held since 1932 when the PCE had some 5 000 members, party leaders sought to make sure the debate on dropping Leninism did not get out of hand and, particularly, that it did not catalyze too great a debate on the content of Communist policies since 1956 when Carrillo had assumed a dominant position within the party. Carrillo and others in the leadership underestimated the emotive power of the Leninism issue within It was one thing to abandon Leninism in practice, as the party had increasingly done in the years after 1956. Quite another, to formally recognize that rejection and to develop a substitute doctrine. Some of those who opposed Thesis 15 (the proposal to drop Leninism) wanted the PCE to uphold as still valid such fundamental Leninist notions as the armed seizure of power and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Others who were less nostalgic and recognized how much the world had changed since 1917 saw no necessary contradiction between Eurocommunism and Leninism properly understood. They wanted the party to be clear, however, about its objective of eventual working class hegemony but wanted a full-fledged debate on Leninism and its implication as a condition to the development of a coherent "Eurocommunist" alternati Those who thought in this fashion (they were to be found primarily in the PSUC and in Asturias, Andalucía and Madrid) feared that electoral avarice would lead to the quiet dropping of some fundamental notions. Yet others in the party would have liked to abandon Leninism entirely but voted with those who opposed Thesis 15 (and Carrillo) because they felt only a thorough airing of this issue would permit the PCE to rid itself of the lacre of forty years of Stalinism.

In the end, the tradition of democratic centralism carried the day and only in some of the provincial conferences — those in Madrid, Asturias and Cataluna — did Carrillo and his supporters face anything resembling a real challenge. The Congress, it should be stressed, was much less controversial than many imagined it would be. Despite its predictability and the inordinate amount of attention paid to the Leninism issue, the Ninth PCE was an important event because it signalled the beginning of a renovation in the Spanish party. Of the 160 members of the Central Committee elected there, 56 are new to that body as are 14 of the 46 in the Executive Committee. One development, whose implications are not yet clear, was the rise in the influence of those in the PCE active in labor affairs. Nearly a quarter of the new Central Committee is composed of people with Comisiones backgrounds (the percentage of those with working class origins in the CC was over fifty) and seven CC.OO. leaders now sit on the Executive Committee. This influx of labor activists into the highest ranks of the PCE is in no small measure due to the fact that in most parts of the country (Cataluña was an exception) those active in the labor movement distinguished themselves as the most dependable supporters Carrillo had outside the apparat. Many of them we can be sure are less than enthusiastic about some "Eurocommunist" tenets but they sided with Carrillo primarily because they felt that was the best way to control the debate within the party.

* * *

Socialists and Communists in Spain enter the post-Franco era locked in a combat for hegemony on the Left. The PSOE has a decided advantage at this stage and what is worse, from the Communist point of view, is that an improvement in the situation of the PCE will probably only come as a consequence of mistakes committed by the Socialists.

Things are not all grim for the PCE, however. It has a strong presence in the labor movement and there are signs that the Socialist electorate is not all that solidly entrenched. Take, for example, the senatorial by-elections held this May in Asturias and Alicante. Both seats were won by the PSOE candidates but, while the Socialists lost 92 000 and 70 000 votes respectively, the PCE increased its votes by 26 000 and 7 000 in the two provinces. In real terms, the Communist improvement was on the order of a modest 2 per cent in Alicante and a heftier 5 per cent in Asturias, but the general results may have betrayed a disenchantment among the voters with the UCD and PSOE. Although the situation remains fluid, the Communist could exploit such sentiment in the next election.

No date has yet been set for the next general elections. The present Cortes term runs until 1981 and it will be up to Suarez to decide if he wants to move the date up. Speculation about anticipated elections have been rife in Spain for many months now. There will be a referendum on the new Constitution (approved with only minor hassling among the major parties) some time this fall and one scenario has municipal elections late this year or early next and general elections convoked shortly thereafter.

It is conceivable that in municipal elections the Left will emerge with a higher national percentage than the Center. Much will depend, of course, on what sort of electoral law is approved by the Cortes; but, in any case, the parties of the Left will be particularly well-placed to challenge the UCD there. Not only is the Center still an embryonic political party but neighborhood and housewife associations — there

are more than 100 of the former in Madrid alone — have long been strongholds of the Left and highly politicized. With the turnout in these elections likely to fall below the 78 per cent mark registered for the parliamentary ones, a highly disciplined vote will have a much greater impact. Indeed, a preliminary assessment would lead one to expect municipal takeovers by the Left in some of the largest Spanish cities.

The economy will also affect the outcome of a new election. The Spanish economy is today in worse shape than at any time in the last 18 years. Particularly disturbing are the official figures which place unemployment at 800 000 but the total rises to nearly 1.3 million people if we include those willing to work who cannot find jobs. The situation is most delicate in Andalucía where unemployment hovers around the 15 per cent mark. The Pacto has apparently helped hold down inflation in 1978 but the 19-20 per cent rate expected for this year is still considerably higher than the 8 per cent averaged by the other

OECD countries.

There has been some speculation that with the unification of the various Socialist currents taking place under the PSOE banner — the one with the PSP is early May 1978 is the best known but not the only example and similar processes have been under way in Cataluña, Aragón, Valencia and to some degree in Andalucia — and recent statements by Felipe González to the effect that at the forthcoming 28th PSOE Congress he would propose that the term Marxist be dropped from the party program the PSOE may be able to broaden its electoral appeal sufficiently so as to gain a majority (or close to it) of the seats in a new Cortes. This will not be easily accomplished. There has been some resentment within the PSOE as a result of his declarations and a close analysis of the senatorial by-election returns in Asturias indicates that at least a part of the PSP electorate voted Communist. The PSOE has been weakened, moreover, by the inability of the UGT to win the sindical elections.

The latest poll published by the independent daily El País shows the PSOE leading in a hypothetical election with 33.6 per cent of the vote (compared to 29.3 in June 1977), followed by the UCD with 28.5 per cent and by the PCE with 9.7. Some 13.6 per cent of the voters were undecided according to the survey. More generally, the poll showed a trend to the Left in the country with 40 per cent of the electorate identifying itself as Left or Center-Left compared to 21.7 per cent Center and 10.9 per cent Right.

In the event of new elections, however, it is unlikely that either the PSOE or UCD will drop or rise sharply with respect to June 1977. And we should not underestimate the political ability of Suárez who has up to now demonstrated himself to be a consummate politician. As far as the Communists are concerned, a rise of three or four percentage points nationally should be expected. In case the PSOE or UCD achieve a relative majority, the most probable outcome will be a government formed by either of these parties in coalition with Catalan and/or Basque minority groups. A PSOE-led minority government or one in participation with the UCD might also have Communist participation at the middle levels of various ministries in exchange for a commitment of parliamentary support by the PCE. Much less likely governments would be a UCD-PSOE coalition (where the Communists might participate in one form or another), UCD or PSOE one party minority governments.

Some observers saw the Pacto (which expires at the end of this year and will probably be re-negotiated) as the first step on the road to a Spanish version of the compromesso storico. Such an interpretation may be proven correct over the long run but so far the confluence of interests between the UCD and the PCE seems to be more tactical than strategic. Granted that Carrillo in his report to the Ninth PCE Congress mentioned that alliance with the UCD was not simply a "conjunctural" objective but the UCD has always looked on the Communists more as an instrument with which to increase its leverage on the PSOE than as long term allies. Whatever the attractions a closer collaboration with the PCE might have for the UCD (and it is not clear there are many), any move in that direction would have to be carefully considered. The UCD has a potentially strong rival to its Right in Alianza Popular and AP has been looking for an issue with which to attack the UCD. There is, moreover, the reality of Socialist strength in Spain: so long as the PSOE maintains and consolidates its influence on the Left, it will be in a strong position to frustrate or, what is more likely given the PSOE is not inalterably opposed to a broadly inclusive coalition government, to condition the composition and policies of any government. The Socialists, it should be remembered, objected to the Moncloa agreements primarily because of the preeminent role played by the Communists in their conception and elaboration.

Certainly, it is too early yet to tell what the propsects for a shift in the "correlation of forces" within the Left are in the short to medium term. Much will depend on the eventual shape of the party and on whether or not an essentially bi-polar system emerges. Several factors will play an important role in this evolution.

One variable will be the UCD. Will this loose electoral coalition manage to consolidate its structures and, if it does, toward what part of the spectrum will its leaders seek to incline the party? Will it eventually move toward alliance with the less conservative sectors of Alianza Popular (thus, creating a large mass party on the Right) or will it incline leftward and try to occupy the Center-Left?

Another is, of course, the PSOE. How successful will this party be in trying to undercut the electoral base of the UCD? One survey published in Spain by La Calle indicates there is a good deal of overlap between the electorate of the PSOE and UCD. As the Socialists try to attract those voters, will they be able to hold on to those farther to the Left? Or will these turn to the PCE? To all who follow contemporary European politics the question that arises is: will the PSOE be able to avoid the fate of the PSI. There is no doubt that Felipe Gonzalez and others in the Socialist leadership are very conscious of the Italian pattern. They believe that the failure of the PSI resulted from an insufficient articulation on the part of the Italian Socialists of its alternative to the Christian Democrats and the splintering and factionalism which has bedeviled the PSI. In order to avoid a similar fate, Spanish Socialism must challenge the UCD forcefully. This may explain the occasionally aggressive behavior of the PSOE toward the government. As to the threat of factionalism, there appears to be great collegiality at the highest levels of the Socialist party with Gonzalez, as one member of the Executive put it, in the position of being "the synthesis of the postures which may be found in the Executive and in the party."

Finally, we come to the PCE. The Communists have little time to reduce the margin separating them from the PSOE. Failure to do so would inevitably bring with it a freezing of the political/electoral boundaries on the Left for at least a generation. Trying to further this objective, the PCE will pursue a dual pronged policy of, on the one hand, supporting Suarez (this helps consolidate democracy and underscores the moderation of the PCE) and, on the other, keeping the door open to the Socialists. At some point, the Communists will have to make a choice between alliance partners (at this stage, however, the discussion of medium and long term strategy is more notable for its absence in the PCE), but there is no reason why the Communist party should not be able to employ both levers simultaneously for some time to come. It will be interesting to see what impact the struggle for

leadership in the post-Carrillo PCE will have on this question.

Regardless of what the outcome of the next general election is, competition between the PSOE and PCE will be a fixture of the Spanish political scene. At the same time, we should not lose sight of the fact that, even now and however reluctantly, each side perceives the other to be a natural ally on the road to socialism. The Socialists would like to reach power alone but, if they fail in this effort, it will probably be only a matter of time before the two parties work out some sort of common platform or program. The principal obstacles which have impeded such a development up to now

— the fact that an entente, by conjuring up visions of a "Popular Front", would encourage the extreme Right and the Socialist desire to reach power without the Communists and, otherwise, to delineate with some precision the areas and limits of Communist influence — are largely conjunctural in nature and will probably (although not certainly) diminish over time.

Any assessment of Communist prospects for the longer term must emphasize the improbability of the PCE acquiring a role on the Spanish Left comparable, for example, to that of the PCI in Italian politics. At the same time, and precisely because of Communist efforts to reach parity with the PSOE, we can probably expect a deepening of the evolutionary process (which, it should be stressed, is not necessarily equivalent to "social-democratization") already under way in Spanish Communism. We should be wary of minimizing the obstacles in their way, but we must not forget that the peculiar constellation of the Spanish Left in 1978 does favor such an evolution.

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B O L O G N A C O N F E R E N C E

on the West European Left

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Draft paper submitted by:

Giuseppe Sacco

Subject:

Views from the Left in Italy and France of the Post-1973 International Economic Context

Giuseppe Sacco

Views from the Left in Italy and France of the Post-1973 International Economic Context

Contents

August 1978

Views from the left (in Italy and France) of the post-1973 international economic context

by Giuseppe Sacco
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1) Among the many ways in which the complex of present world economic questions can be broken down into a list of main issues, the following has been deemed most suitable to the aim of casting some light on the attitude and views of the forces of the left in France and Italy :

a) the oil price increase and the trend to cartelisation on other raw materials markets ;

b) new trends in the international division of industrial labour ;

c) free trade, protectionism and the politisation of international economic relations.

On these three issues, the attitude of four political forces have been examined, namely the French Socialist Party (PS), the French Communist Party (PCF) the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI).

A - The oil price increase and the trend to cartelisation on other raw materials markets.

2) The change in the price of crude oil, that the OPEC cartel managed to impose in 1973-74, put into clear daylight a problem the forces of the West European left had been (and have afterwards been) unable to solve : the problem of the conflict of interests among the working class of the developed countries and the so called "nations prolétaires" of the Third World. There was indeed little doubt of the fact that the increase in the price of oil was going to affect the standard of life of the working class in Europe. But - at the same time - it caused a dramatic interruption of the systematic downward trend of the price of oil relative to the price of the main imports of the oil-producing countries. And the downward trend of the terms of trade of raw materials -

although its existence is not universally considered as being proved - has long been one of the main elements on which the left - both marxist and non-marxist - has based his critic of capitalist "imperialism".

The highly dramatic nature of the events related to the increase of the oil price in the winter of 1973-74 and the discriminatory embargoes decided on political grounds by most Arab producers, have made the oil issue appear to world public opinion as a special one, with features quite different from the general issue of raw materials supply to the industrialised countries. On the contrary, on a logical ground the two issues are quite similar and, at least theoretically, there is a possibility that producers' cartels for other raw materials might repeat the OPEC coup in order to change durably the terms of trade with manufactured goods. Indeed, the political problems that are posed by these two issues to the forces of the left in the industrialised countries are quite similar, since it is difficult to dispute that low and generally declining prices, as well as safe and easy supply, of any other raw materials had helped not less then the low cost and easy availability of oil the great improvements in the standard of life that the working classes have enjoyed - in the post-war period - in the neo-capitalist countries of the industrialised West. At the very end - writes an Italian socialist economist (1) - "the problem that neo-capitalism has failed to solve, and that represents one of its main contradictions, the problem of disequilibria between developed and underdeveloped countries, has to find a solution, sooner or later. Either this solution is found in a positive way with a gradual diffusion of economic development, or it might be found in a negative manner, with a redistribution that will reduce the wealth of the industrial countries".

It is quite obvious that the political forces that represent, or pretend to represent, the working classes of the industrial countries look with some disconfort at this second possibility which would strongly affect the standard of life in the "neo-capitalistic" countries. These forces cannot therefore help

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(1)See Giorgio Ruffolo et al., Crisi energetica e modello di Sviluppo, in "Mondo Operaio", N° 1, 1974, p.10 - Although they cannot be considered on representing the official stand of the PSI, Mr. Ruffolo's views have a wide and acknowledged influence.

being worried in front of the crisis triggered by the first successful drive to substantially increase the price of an essential primary commodity. According to the same socialist economist, the meaning of the present crisis "is that - at a moment that coincided with the Arab-Israeli war, but in circumstances that could have been triggered by any other occasion - this redistribution of wealth has been demanded with irresistable force by a group of underdeveloped countries (1).

Notwithstanding these concerns, the political parties of the left recognise on a purely political ground that Third World aspirations are well founded. They generally also recognise the well founded of OPEC countries in deciding to increase the price of oil and look with a benevolent eye to the possibility of a general increase of raw materials prices. This second attitude is of course that much easier and less costly in popularity, as the possibility of an actual repetition of the OPEC strategy on other commodities markets appears difficult and unlikely, and as the impact on the everyday life of European workers would be less direct and immediately visible than in the case of oil.

3) The French Socialists are, among the forces of the left, the ones that dare to put the issue in quite clear term. In the view of the PS, in December 1973, with the OPEC decision of a quadrupling of the oil price, "the ancient economic order, based on the postulate of an unlimited supply of cheap natural resources from the Third World, is shaken. A new balance of power is appearing. Dependence is not one-way anymore and the affluence of Western economies is directly endangered by the OPEC's action" (2). The point therefore "is not to state that whatever is good for the Third World is, by its own nature, also good for the French workers. We - the Socialists - know that to-day's general economic trends,

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(1) See Giorgio Ruffolo, ibidem.

(2) Parti Socialiste, Les Socialistes et le Tiers-Monde, Flammarion (coll. La Rose au poing), Paris 1977, p. 122. This book, after a foreword by Lionel Jospin, "Secrétaire National du PS chargé des questions du Tiers-Monde, bears the indication that "the content has been examined by the Executive Bureau of the Socialist Party and approved for diffusion".

steered by the MNCs, that try to perpetuate the crisis and to manage it accordin to their own interests - put the workers of the world one against the other" (1).

Even if the traditional scapegoat - the MNCs - is in an unclear manner accused of being responsible for the present economic trends, the unspeakable truth is said : the interests of the workers of the world are at conflict, and a choice has to be done among them by the forces of the left. The awakening of the Third World, and its economic revindications therefore become a central issue in the position of the European lefts ; an issue very difficult to deal with and almost impossible to avoid, especially in front of an episode such as the increase of oil prices of 1973-74.

In front of those trends that put the workers of the developed and of the developing countries "one against the other", the PS makes a remarkable effort to identify a clear and politically acceptable position. The attitude of the socialists in front of the Third World, writes the official responsible for Third World questions, "is based essentially on two refusals" (2). They concern "two illusions : an old one, eurocentrism, and a new one, Third-worldism.

Eurocentrism is a well known temptation of the worker's movement in the developed countries. It consists in believing that the destiny of human civilisation depends only on the evolution of European countries (which nowadays means all the advanced countries) and that only the things that happen in this area are really important.

Third-Worldism has made its first victims in the 60's. Inspired by the analysis of LDC's economists, that has been appropriated by an extremist fraction in France, this theory says that the main changes from now on will come from the Third World. In this 'area of hurricanes', far away from the middle-class-like working class of the affluent countries, the 'proletarian nations' prepare the

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(1) Lucien Praire, Requiem pour Nord-Sud, in "L'Unité" 18-24/11/77. Mr. Praire works with Mr. Jospin in the "Third World Secretariat" of the French Socialist Party.

(2) Lionel Jospin, Les socialistes et le Tiers-Monde in "Nouvelle Revue Socialiste", April 1976.

revolutions necessary to our times. The duty of to-day's militant socialists woul therefore be a systematic support of the revendications of Third World countries ... A socialist has to refuse both these temptations for one and only reason, that they tend to replace the analysis of reality based on class struggle (that is the approach of socialist theory) with an analysis in terms of nation's struggle".

The socialists sympathise with the global revendications presented by the countries of the Third World : improvement in their terms of trade, more transfer of capital and technology, etc."but, of course, as the PS is the party that represents the interests of the popular masses of a developed country, we should certainly insist - if we were in power - on the delays that have to be foreseen for certain changes (in the industrial structure, for instance), and on a careful management of the transition process" (1).

Supporting (although with some precautions) the positions of the "Group o 77", the French socialists stress the "iniquity" of the existing order but also the drawbacks of the tendency of producers to create commodity cartels. "The reaction to the present system has brought about a trend to cartelisation ... This policy has obtained non negligible results ... but still has some limits : it cannot be applied to all products , and not all raw materials producers are in the Third World. Moreover, this policy is not without danger : it can replace to a relationship based on force another similar relationship, with no improvemen in justice. The poorest LDC's had the opportunity to learn it during the oil crisis ...

If producers cooperation has been a positive step, because it has disturbed the liberal organisation of the petroleum market, the objective to seek is the founding of trade on really equitable cooperation rules. This implies a reduction of price fluctuations, the maintenance of prices at levels both equitable to the consumers and remunerative to the producers, and the establishment of mechanisms for long-term adjustment of supply and demand". These objectives have to be pursued" with a global approach, involving a number of commodities large enough to really influence the whole raw materials market,and aiming at a form of internati nal planning, as the market mechanism is clearly unable to stabilise the prices a

(1) Lionel Jospin, Ibidem.

a satisfactory level ... Only the creation of international buffer stocks for an adequate number of commodities will make this possible (1).

The French socialist's program (2) therefore proposes "world agreement for basic raw materials, long term purchasing agreement, the organisation and financing of buffer stocks". But neither the program, nor the official publication of the French socialist Party (3) that states in more details this support to the creation of a pool of buffer stocks for raw materials, mention the request of the "Group of 77" for a "second window" aimed at introducing structural changes in the world markets and in the economy of the producing countries. This request is indeed a major one among the very specific points that make the difference between the positions of the developed and developing countries in the international fora where the reorganisation of world commodity markets is being negotiated. "It would be desirable - state the French Socialists - to create a unique financing of these multi-products stocks, in order to escape the logic of individual commodity agreements. This would make possible a certain compensation of price changes among different products and, in case, the enalergment of the operation of the common financing fund to other goods" (4). In other terms, the position of the French Socialists on this specific issue coincides, in spite of their assertions of support to the Third World, with the attitude of the OECD countries, that is fiercely under attack by the "Group of 77". But one could assume that this is probably more due to lack of knowledge of the technicalities under discussion in the international fora, that to a deliberate choice.

Moreover, the French Socialists seem to believe that "apart from market stabilisation, the creation of a network of buffer stocks would create the conditions necessary to support the price level" of raw materials exported from the LDCs (5). No explanation is given of the connection among these two things, apart from a reference to "medium term purchasing and selling agreements attached to the functioning of the stocking system", that would be the "normal prolongement" of the negociations in which the price level would be decided. For any

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(1) Les Socialistes et le Tiers-Monde, op.cit. p. 156.

(2) P.S. Programme Socialiste, cit. p. 196.

(3) Les Socialistes et le Tiers-Monde, cit. Paris 1977.

(4) Ibidem, p. 158.

(5) Ibidem, p. 158.

reader aware of the powerlessness of buffer stocks in front of long-term price trends, the meaning of this proposal is obscure.

4) The French Communist Party has a clear-cut position in support of terms of trade more favourable to the producers of all raw materials. Already in the Twentieth Congress (1973) of the PCF, Marchais stated that "the national liberation movement has entered in a new phase, a phase of struggle against neo-colonialism, for economic independence and for real sovereignity ..., in a difficult struggle for the development of a national economic system, whose first condition is free control of their national riches" by the governments of the developing countries.

At the following XXI Congress of French Communist Party, that met at the end of October 1974, Marchais kept the continuity of this line and said in his main report:"By taking legitimate measures to compensate for the deterioration of the terms of trade, and to recuperate their national riches, the oil producing countries do not affect the interests of the working class and the people of the advanced countries". Indeed, "it is perfectly possible to make to great oil trusts bear the new costs, with no impact for the people". The French Communiststherefore try to escape the dilemma in which the conflict of interest among the Third World and the working classes of the advanced countries poses the European left, by flatly denying that this conflict of interests exists. As far as the oil price is concerned, the PCF affirms that it is only the fault of the great oil companies if the common frenchman is affected by the change in the terms of trade between oil producers and oil consumers. To keep this point, Marchais is going to be obliged, a few months after the oil crisis, to engage in a campaign - to which he tries to give the appearance of an all- out war - against the oil companies. The pretext will be the so-called "Schwartz report", from the name of the non-Communist member of the National Assembly that chaired the parlamentary commission of enquiry on the behaviour of the French oil companies during and after the crisis. The entire party machinery will be engaged, in this occasion, in a colossal propaganda effort - called "opération vérité" - where the proofs of the obvious fact that oil importers had profited from the price increase will be forced and distorted in order to convince PCF followers that the energy crisis itself was a result of the speculative activities of the oil companies.

Some further light on the attitude of the PCF on these problems has been cast by Paul Boccara, a member of the Central Committee and a specialist in international economic problems. According to this authorised representative of the PCF "one would fail to perceive the real problem /of the prices of raw materials/., if only the stabilisation of export earnings, or the price of exports, were taken into account. What has to be considered is the relationship between export earnings and the cost of imports into these /commodity exporting/ countries (imports whose quantities and prices are both growing), the relationshi between export earnings and the conditions of their real, non dependent development" (1). In order to establish a fair price, "based on productivity conditions as well as on the long term decline of raw materials prices", a radical departure from the present organisation of world markets is envisaged, mu more radical than the one the LDCs themselves are advocating for. For the PCF, "Government to Government agreements are necessary, and a France ruled by the Union de la Gauche could start operating in this direction with our partners of the underdeveloped countries and may be with certain developed countries as well"

In other words, while the French Socialists propose a reorganisation of the world market for raw materials in order to improve its functioning, very much on the line of the OECD governements, the PCF proposes a total politisation and bilateralisation of raw materials trade, on the model of the trading systems presently existing in the communist countries of Eastern Europe. But it is worth pointing out that, while "state trade" countries allow-up to a certain point - bilateral disequilibria (that are indispensable in order to ensure a rational specialisation of the different countries), the French Communists do not miss any opportunity to point out the benefits that the French economy would receive from government agreements for bilaterally balanced trade with the Eastern block or some pro-Russian Third World countries.

According to the scheme proposed by the French Communists, increases in the earnings of exporting countries would not affect production costs in France,

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(1) Paul Boccara : De nouvelles relations économiques internationales in L. Blanquart (Ed.) Changer l'Economie, Paris, Editions Sociales, 1977, p. 105

(2) Ibidem, p. 106-107.

since governement-to-government agreements would eliminate the monopolistic rent presently perceived by the MNCs, guaranteeing at the same time "stable and remunerative prices /that/ would increase the earnings of the concerned LDCs, and would therefore enlarge the market they provide /for French exports/, with no negative impact on our costs".

The best example of this substitution of the world market for raw materials with a network of bilateral government-to-government agreements is provided by oil itself, and by the setting the PCF proposes in order to guarantee the French economy with the necessary oil supplies, and to heal France's bad oil deficit. "The deficit with Saudi Arabia is more than half, almost two thirds of total oil deficit in 1976 ... On the contrary, our trade balance with another oil producer, Algeria, is in surplus. We could buy much more gas and oil from Algeria ... and sell her more, so that our relations would be stronger and more balanced. Instead, we have scaled down our imports from Algeria pushing her into deficit, and this does not favour our exports" (1).

The general problem of ensuring adequate and cheap raw materials supply to the French economy is approached in the same way : government-to-government agreements with Communist countries and "progressive" LDCs, coupled with a strong self-sufficiency effort. Indeed, a leftist government would "enlarge international trade" mainly through "agreements with the Socialist countries, that can provide a number of mineral raw materials and take French exports in change"(2 But strong criticism has also to be addressed - in the communist view - to both national and multinational mining corporations for not devoting enough exploration efforts to the french territory, where a number of minerary (mostly coal) basins that have been closed in the recent past should be re-opened. At the

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(1) This approach is strictly related with the central issue of the communist program for the 1978 general election nationalisations. As Boccara writes : 'Such a change is, of course, possible only under the condition of a national control of the petroleum industry in France ; that is why we have proposed the nationalisation of the Compagnie Française des Pétroles-Total". See in Changer l'économie, cit. p. 96.

(2) Yves Fuchs, in "Cahiers du Communisme".

21st Party Congress, Augustin Laurent, a prominent PCF member, pointed out that "if national coal production had been kept at its normal mevel, 20 million tons of oil imports could have been saved ... Life is indeed proving that we have been right in the 1950s when we fought the Schuman plan, in 1960, when we fought the Janneney plan, and in 1968 when we fought against the closing down of coal basins" (1).

The attitude of the PCF on these issues is quite coherent in itself, so that it can be criticised and refused in toto, but - unlike the PS position - offers little ground for criticism of a technical nature.

In comparing the position of the French PS and PC on the issue of raw materials price, it is fair, anyhow, the emphasise the fact that, if the communist position appears less easily exposed to criticism - on a logical and technical ground - this is due in the first place to the fact that no really comprehensive and detailed explanation has been attempted - on the line of what the PS has done - of the PC's position on North/South relations (2).

5) Quite anomalous is, in this respect, the attitude of the Italian socialists. The issue of the conflict of interests among the working classes of the advanced countries and the Third World does not appear to deserve much attention (3), beyond a generical sympaty for the "exploited countries". In the socialists' view, at the origin of the present crisis "there are two main factors :

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(1) See, Proceedings of the XXI Congress of the PCF, in "Cahiers du Communisme".

(2) The opposite is true, as we will see further on, in the case the Italian communist and socialist parties.

(3) Indeed, the PSI vary seldom has felt that these questions deserved any attention at all. Quite paradoxically, if one goes through the "theoretical" journal of the PSI, "Mondo Operaio", from 1973 on, the only two systematic treatments of these questions one can find are by such authors as Harold Wilson and John Pinder, that are certainly socialists, but whose opinions can hardly be considered as representing the views of the Italian Socialist Party.

the first one consists in "the efforts of exploited countries that try to put and end to their total submission to the wealthy countries", so that "international tension, today totally located in the Third World, represents a class struggle phenomenon that is bound to become more relevant in the future, together with an increased awareness of the present exploitation". The second main factor, according to the Italian Socialists, consists in "short term speculative activities of capitalistic multinational corporations - one could just say of American multinationals - that take advantage of the revendication of raw materials producers and especially of the oil producers, in order to create artifical bottlenecks on the market, and therefore increase their profit margins" (1).

According to an important socialist personality (2), there is no conflict of interests among the oil producers and the European countries, /since/ both are the victims of the same manipulations of the multinational corporations". In the OECD group, instead, "there is no coincidence of interests at all, because the dependency of Europe (great importer of raw materials) is very different from the condition of the US, that import only a minimal fraction of their supply" (3).

6) Somewhat different from what we have seen until now are the positions of the Italian Communists on the question of the prices of oil and raw materials. The PCI does not try to convince his followers of the fact that the workers of Italy, and of the developed countries in general, had nothing to fear, or to lose, because of the 1973-74 tremendous increases in the oil prices. On this line, that stands in contrast with the position of the French PC, the Italian communists seem to be more in line with the French socialists. Indeed, Politica ed Economia, the monthly journal of the Italian Communist Party's Centre for Economic Studies (CESPE) approaches the problem in a slightly different and more sophisticated way than the French Communists, but still keeps the allegiance

(1) Cesare Bensi, Dalla guerra dei prezzi alla cooperazione economica in "Mondo Operaio", Feb. 74, p. 11. Mr. Bensi was at the time Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Italian government.

(2) Although it is impossible to identify an official position of the PSI on these matters, Mr. Bensi seems to represent in foreign relations the most authorised voice for the Party in 1974.

(3) C. Bensi, ibidem.

of the Italian Communists to the cause of the Third World. "Some observers see the recent increase in the prices of raw materials (1) as a part of a process leading to a change in the terms of trade between developed and developing countries. The 'unequal exchange' ... would then be in the process of becoming less unjust ... Anyhow, simplistic generalisation should be avoided... The raw materials whose prices have most noticeably increase in the last year are the ones whose market is controlled by the multinational corporations ; or the ones on which there has been a strong concentration of international speculation aimed at making supply more difficult and more costly to competing enterprises. A typical example is the Japanese hoarding of Australian wool". Oil is not mentioned, but it is implied that the price increase has nothing to do with a reversal of the "unequal exchange".

The long-term evolution of the oil prices is explained by the PCI with the interplay of a variety of forces : the oil producing companies, the oil-consuming manufacturing companies, the American wildcatters, the nationalised enterprises (such as ENI and Elf-Erap), the USSR as an oil exporter. "Views differ on the question of which forces brought about the decline in oil prices [between 1955 and 1970], but authors such as Peter Odell attribute it to the pressure of manufacturing industry in a phase of trade liberalisation", but "it has to be added" that 1955 is also the year when "optimistic forecast for the nuclear sector were announced" (2).

As far as the causes of the "changes - that could have been, but were not foreseen - of the 1971-73 period ... it would be too simplistic ... to explain everything with a deliberate action, fully autonomously decided by the producing countries", reacting against the so-called "unequal exchange". Indeed, "the slow decline of the oil prices in the preceding 15 years had been much smaller than the decline

(1) Eugenio Peggio, Crisi energetica, inflazione e crisi economica, in "Politica e Economia", October 1973. Mr. Peggio was at the time Secretary General of CESPE, Member of Parliament, and Economy Minister in the PCI's "shadow cabinet

(2) Francesco Pistolese, La cooperazione internazionale in campo energetico, "Crisi economica e Condizionamenti internazionali dell' Italia", pp. 97-98. Mr. Pistolese was at the time the PCI's expert on energy questions.

in other raw materials prices, so that it was not even mentioned" (1) by the "Group of 77" in their complaints about declining terms of trade. "The majority of oil producing countries never had a militant attitude on prices, and the ones that had something to revendicate, normally demanded an increase in their market share, a typical case being Irak" (2).

This rather cool attitude towards the OPEC countries and their successful action does not mean that the PCI has no sympathy or does not support the request of raw materials producers for a change in the terms of trade, even at the expenses of living standards in the advanced countries. The PCI is no doubt aware of the fact that "easy access to petroleum and other raw materials under declining prices, has permitted to enlarge the domestic market through an increase in wages with no impact on costs" (3), but considers as morally and politically inacceptable that the relative prices of raw materials and manufactured goods have no connection with their labour content. "The developed countries are certinaly bound to have in the future an inflation of prices due to a long overdue world redistribution of revenue, based on the recognition of the labour values produced in the LDCs. FAO experts believe, for instance, that - if the work of a peasant in Ceylon has to be paid as much as it is in Europe - the price of the tea he produces should be 10 to 15 times higher than it is now. At the present moment, instead, the main causes of the raw materials price increases are quite different" (4).

The obvious conclusion, for the PCI, is that a negotiated solution has to be found, where the interests of both parties should be taken into account, and common sense prevail. Such a negotiation should "take into account all the aspects of the crisis, globally". The negotiating parties, on their side, should avoid "the risks that are inevitable in such case" :i.e."that the producers try to pull too much the rope on their side, giving too hard a blow to the advanced countries, with the ensuing recession, that would affect - because of the strong lies existing - both, these countries and the Third World" ; and that the developed countries refuse to acknowledge that for too many years they have reduced or prevented the growth of the LDCs , that have to have a different rôle and weight in the international community" (5).

(1) F. Pistolese, cit., p. 100.
(2) Ibidem.
(3) Pistolese, cit., p. 99.
(4) E. Peggio, Crisi energetica, etc, cit.
(5) Giancarlo Olmeda, in Politica ed Economia, vol.V, n.4, p.69.

B - New trends in the international division of industrial labour

7) A great number of inter-related issues have to be touched upon in examining the attitudes of the parties of the left towards international industria problems, the main ones being : (1) the obstacles encountered by some European countries to stay (or to enter) in the market for some advanced industrial products (such as aircrafts and space, atomic energy, armaments, etc.) ; (2) the internationalisation of production processes due to the multinationalisation of firms, to foreign investments and to national investments abroad ; (3) the decline of certain traditional industries in Europe because of intra-OECD competition (such as in the case of steel and ship-building, where the main problem has been until now mostly japanese competition), or of the competition of cheap-labour LDCs (such as in the case of clothing and mass electronics).

The political forces under study in this paper don't approach these issues all in the same way. Indeed, some of them concentrate their attention on some issues, and sometimes on one issue only. In all cases, the main emphasis is put in such a way as to make their positions not perfectly comparable .

8) The position of the French Communists on this question appears indeed to be quite clear and to cover all its aspects. Moreover, the PCF has contributed to make industrial policy, that used to be a subject restricted only to a small circle of specialists, an element of everyday's discussion.
"Our factories close down ; our capital is invested abroad. Let's produce French !" proclaimed PCF posters from the walls of Paris at the end of 1977. A few weeks later, the ortodox gaullist opened their campaign with enormous pictures of the Concorde,coupled with the slogan "yes, to an innovation oriented France". Industrial policy - comments an intelligent observer (1) - has entered not only the political debate, where it has been for a long time, but the election's debate, and this is quite new".

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(1) Christian Stoffaes, La grande menace industrielle, Calmann-Levy, Paris 1977.

Criticism to French industrialists, and to Giscard's government, for "preferring foreign beauties" (1) - i.e. for investing abroad, for accepting the presence of MNCs in France, for entering joint ventures with foreign partners, for the purchase of foreign technologies - is a permanent element of the PCF's arguments and propaganda. At the Twentieth Congress of the PCF a strong condamnation was expressed for the abandonment of the "filière française" the French technology for natural uranium atomic power plants, for the "sellout" of Citroën to Fiat (2), for the merging of Creusot-Loire (a steam generator maker) "into the Westinghouse orbit", for the allowing of a joint venture between Creusot-Pechiney and Westinghouse (production of nuclear fuel). "In an industry of the outmost importance for the future, the government has chosen to abandon national independence, and to offer to US trusts the possibility of doing what they like of our national riches"(3).

This line is confirmed at the XXIst Congress, where the government is accused by Gilles Cohen - Member of Parliament for the Essonne Constituency where many atomic research laboratories are concentrated - of betraying national interests for having shifted to the enriched uranium technology. Significantly, the date of the "treason" is set at 1969, i.e. the very year General de Gaulle retired from the Presidency (4).

Among the possible objectives of industrial policy, national independence is the one that the French Communist always declare to be at the top of their priority list. They are normally very critical of other countries' protectionism, and of US protectionist tendencies in particular. It is quite significant, though, that in order to prove the existence of American protectionism, they always quote the difficulties created to the utilisation of the "Concorde" on the Atlantic route. But the reason that the PCF gives to explain why it is favourable to the Concorde are typical of the most classical economic nationalism.

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(1) See Michèle Dominique, Ils preférent les belles étrangères, in "Economie et Politique, Janvier 1978, p. 24.

(2) The cooperation agreement among the two firms, announced in Oct. 1968, was terminated in June 1973.

(3) René Guyard, in Proceedings of the XX Congress of the PCF, in Cahiers du Communisme, cit.

(4) The passage from de Gaulle to Pompidou is also indicated by the PCF as the moment when all serious effort for economic cooperation with the Eastern bloc was practically abandoned.

In the official summary of the debates of the XXIst Party Congress (1), wide criticism is reported for "the considerable waste due to non-utilisation of the human and technical potential" of the French aerospace industry. "In a moment when our country owns - thanks to the quality of our workers - an indisputable leadership, inside the so-called western world, in supersonic transportation, and when it appears clearly that the future of long range transport is in the supersonic plane, the government decides to stop both production and the development of improved models. Will in the future our airline, Air France, be obliged to buy American supersonic aircrafts ?" (2)

In a few occasions, however, the PCF goes beyond this petty nationalistic attitude and shows a deeper and more sophisticated approach to the problems of the so-called process of capital internationalisation. In front of this phenomenon, the main problem for the communists is how to adapt their main tool in industrial policy (nationalisations) to the transnationality of today's industrial phenomena, and to the multinational nature of the modern industrial enterprise. According to the PCF (3), when "the MNC is a conglomerate of different activities" there are "no problems". Things are different when the production process of individual goods have themselves become multinational ; in this case one-way dependence can be avoided "not with autarky and isolation, but with a diversified system of trade and cooperation agreements established with the maximum number of other actors operating in the same field, independently from their nationality or the social regime in which they live". However, the "most advanced" example of such co-production agreements still is "the Concorde experience". Totally ignored are the radical differencies among the nature of the French-British division of labour in the Concorde endeavour and the type of division of labour that, thanks to the MNCs, is spreading between some developed and some developing countries. Indeed, the same communist author recognises the existence of these differencies when he writes that "co-production has to be based on complex, long term contracts, while in the MNC's everything is speculation and instability" (4).

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(1) This manipulated version of the proceedings is the only one that has been published in "Cahiers du Communisme". It can be considered very "official", since the authors of the "summary" are four prominent members of the Central Committee.

(2) In "summary", cit.

(3) See J.P. Delilez, in "Cahiers du Communisme", vol. 50, n.10 oct.74.

(4) Ibidem.

It cannot be surprising that, in such a vision of world economic relations, there is little sympathy for the export-oriented development efforts to a growing number of LDCs. Even though the French communists systematically try to avoid discussing this question, there is little doubt that these countries appear to them as having a completely different view of international economic relations - much less rigid and clearly oriented towards market economy. In short, these countries create for the PCF the problem of either admitting that the existing "world order" still leaves a path open to a change in the status of at least some LDC's, or abandoning the general stand that Third World countries have a permanent and natural coincidence of interests with the international communist movement. When avoiding the subject is altogether impossible, the PCF tends to point out that "the so-called industrial redeployment has brought about in recent years a wild competition to the manufactured products of developed countries, through making use of cheap labour of South East Asian and Latin American countries, but with capital provided by the great capitalist groups ... This monopolistic redeployment has already led to overproduction and unemployment. It is based on ... a contradictory and intolerable association of material wastes and low wages ... It goes without saying that we cannot accept - under the pretext that this allows more industrial transformation in the LDCs - this savage competition, organised to the advantage of the big industrial multinationals" (1). Sometimes, anyhow, the multinationals disappear from the picture, and the French communists' reasoning to explain why they are opposed to imports of manufactures from the Third World takes almost racist undertones. "New factories have been opened in South East Asia, where transistor radios are produced with an underpaid and underqualified manpower, that competes with workers in industrialised countries, so creating unemployment and downward pressure on wages. It is sometimes observed that, when a new factory is opened /in a LDC/ it creates jobs and purchasing power. In such a way, we are told, a country can take off. This is false, because, when 2000 workers are necessary, 5000 starving peasants gather in shantytowns around the cities. What is first needed is not transistor radios, but other goods suitable to national needs. What these countries need is a developing agriculture, adapted to soil and climate, in order to reduce hunger (2)".

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(1) Paul Boccara. Changer l'économie, cit. pp. 108-109.

(2) André Lajoinie, member of the Bureau Politique of the PCF, in "France Nouvelle (weekly for PCF Party officials), Jan.2, 78, p. 45.

9) Industrial policy has been the very point of open disagreement that has brought about the PS-PCF rift on the common programme before the last French general elections. But it has also been the main area in which the relations between the communists and the "renewed" PS (1) have been more difficult all along the seventies. As early as 1972, G. Marchais declared to the Central Committee that "the nationalisation of the steel industry had been the toughest point in the negotiation" with the PS (2).

Apparently, at the moment of the final PS-PCF conflict - just before the general election of 1978 - the disagreement was almost exclusively on the number of private companies to be nationalised ; in reality, there was a more substantial disagreement - at least with some of the socialists, the ones nearer to Mitterand' position - on the very purpose of the nationalisations. In some instances, such as in the very case of the steel industry, the conflict of views was almost paradoxical. The PCF insisted for total nationalisation, while the socialists opposed it, because - as J. Attali wrote - "this would add up to compensate the great capitalist groups for their poor past management" (3), and would help private capitalists get rid of a sector with no future. And, in general, while the PCF seeks public ownership as a tool to preserve the endangered industries and fight against the "waste" of the capitalists that tend to reduce capacity, the socialists consider it a pre-condition for structural change in "the many sectors (steelmaking, aviation, shipbuilding, etc.),where reductions in employment appear inevitable" (4).

It has to be noticed, though, that the differences among the French socialists and communists are not always so wide and so clear-cut. Indeed, of all the different groups that form the PS the one that has the most detailed and

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(1) The "renewed PS" can be defined as the result of a process started around 1970 with the abandonment of the "social-democratic compromises" of Guy Mollet's times, and the adoption of a new political line whose most qualifying point is the fact that a break with capitalism is considered inevitable.

(2) Reported in "Economie et Politique", February 1973.

(3) In "Nouvel Observateur", August 28th, 1971.

(4) Report to the Comité Directeur of the PS at its meeting of Man. 22, 1977.

coherent industrial policy program is also the one that is nearest to the communists - the CERES. In the view of J.P. Chevenement, the leader of CERES, the necessity of restructuring the French industrial sector goes without saying, but "a long-term socialist /industrial policy/ program cannot exist without a program for independence from the world capitalist market"(1). The French industrial sector should therefore be divided into four main subsectors, three of which almost completely government-owned or controlled : a first one should be "totally isolated from the world market" in order to preserve national independence and would include armaments, energy (including nuclear industry), basic research and possibly agriculture ; a second one ("an area of encouraged economy") would include the industries to be subsidised because they are deemed to form the desirable international specialisation of France for reasons related to value added, jobs provided, balance of payments effects (steel, aircraft, etc.) ; a third one would be formed by industries that produce for French public consumption (building, mass transportation, health, social services, etc.) ; a fourth and last one would be a "market sector, open to international competition" where "many firms, but not all, will stay private" (2).

Moreover, some socialist personalities that are normally considered to be "moderates" or even "social democrats", seem to find this way of putting things quite appealing. "The socialists wish to keep the French economy open", affirms Jacques Delors (3) - the Délégué National of the PS for International Economic Relations - but he immediately elaborates on his assertion by adding that this pledge to keep the French economy open does not mean "making exports a dogma, and not even the main engine for expansion".Moreover, since "competition exists on the French market as well as on world market, we should reduce the imports that our industry can substitute in normal competitive conditions"(4).

In this framework, it is understandable that the socialists tend to skip the question of their policy towards foreign investments. The official documents of the PS are quite synthetic on this issue : "The attitude of the PS on foreign

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(1) J.P. Chevenement (member of the Bureau Politique of the PS). Report to the Seminar on Socialist Industrial Policy, Paris, 12-13 Jan.1977. Proceedings in Cahiers du Nouvel Observateur", n°10, April 1977.

(2) J.P. Chevenement, Ibidem, p.10.

(3) At the same seminar, Ibidem, p.20.

(4) Ibidem, p.

investments should not be dogmatic ... Movements of investment capital among France and the foreign countries have to take place in a controlled framework, and reflect an equitable reciprocity". To avoid what has happened in the past, when too often the internationalisation of investments had brought about a limitation of French sovereignity, the left will manage to make foreign investment part of cooperation and co-development agreements that France will conclude with other partners" (1).

As far as the new competition in manufactures from LDCs is concerned, a socialist France should - again in Delors' view - accept to import, and restructur the challenged French industry to produce the goods for which it is still competitive and the capital goods necessary for the industrialising countries. But not everybody, in the PS, not even among the socialist "moderates", shares this view. It is indeed Mitterand's most influencial advisor, Jacques Attali, that has invented the concept of "implosive non-growth" (2) (changes in production that coincide with politically determined changes in the structure of the demand) "Implosive non-growth naturally implies a smaller degree of external openess, because the gains from trade ... become negative after a certain threshold", that "has been passed at the moment of the increase in the price of energy" (3).

The successes of the "export led" development model (that is the reverse of Attali's implosive growth") in a number of developing countries, appears to these "friends of Mitterand's" as the "reproduction one and a half centuries later of the excesses of the early capitalism". This reproduction of history is taking place "in some totalitarian Third World countries", where the Governments "exerces a merciless repression of any efforts for social progress". The competition of these countries is therefore "illegal and unfair, since it is based on exploitation" (4).

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(1) Parti Socialiste, 89 réponses aux problèmes économiques, Flammarion Paris, 1977, p. 69-70.

(2) See in J. Attali, La parole et l'outil, PUF, 1975.

(3) Alain Boubil, Le socialisme industriel, introduction by J. Attali, PUF, 1977, p. 64

(4) Ibidem, p. 68.

10) By comparison with the views of the French left on industrial policy problems, the Italian communist and socialist parties seem to live in a different world. Indeed, of all the areas of international economic relations, this one appears the very one in which the identification of differencies and similarities among French and Italian political forces is most difficult and, on the all, practically useless. Indeed, not only the main themes of the political debate in the two countries are radically different, because the order of priority and importance attributed to problems is not the same, but also the two Italian parties the PCI and PSI - seem to have different audiences, divergent strategies, incompatible and actually opposed aims.

The nationalisation issue that agitates the French left, and that is normally considered a qualifying banner for any European labour or socialist, has disappeared long ago from the programs of the Italian socialists and communists. Historically, it is indeed the right that, in Italy, has created and inflated the government-owned industrial sector ; apart from the nationalisation of electricity (that had mostly political aims, since the so-called "electric barons" were very active and influencial in the political arena), no major enlargement of the public sector has been demanded by the left. Even the PCI declares, and has been declaring for years, that "no expansion of the public sector is desirable" (1). In reality, the difficulties in which many enterprises have been running in recent years have obliged the Government to intervene repeatidly with large subsidies. But even in these cases, the political forces of the left - including the communists - have managed to save a fictio of private majority in the controlling stocks, as well as a real concentration of managerial power in the hands of the private partners.

11) In the view of the Italian communists, industrial policy has to pursue "the aim of a substantial improvement of the position of Italy in the internationa division of labour, and to make this position more coherent with the potentialitie and the needs of Italy (2).

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(1) See the main report by Giorgio Amendola at the Seminar on "Impresa pubblica e participazione democratica", Proceedings in "Quaderni di Politica ed Economia" n.7, 1973.

(2) See Eugenio Peggio, Main report to the PCI's Seminar on "Crisi economica e condizionamenti internazionali dell' Italia" (15-17 March, 1976), in "Proceedings", Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1977.

Technologically and/or economically obsolete plants have to be "radically transformed", but at the same time government purchases "geared to the satisfaction of public needs in housing, mass transportation, schooling, health, etc ... have to be rationally planned to help "the Italian industrial system cover the gaps existing in its structure". A policy geared to push the Italian industry in the technologically advanced or avant-garde sectors (such as aircrafts, computers, nuclear power plants) "would be an illusion". What is to be obtained are quality improvements "in intermediate technology sectors, where possible increases in employment are the biggest" (1).

In other words, the PCI is suggesting that the position of Italy in the international division of industrial labour has to evolve along the same path that was followed after the liberalisation of trade in 1952. In the decade 52-62, indeed, Italy disappeared from the world markets as an exporter of certain "typical" agricultural products and became instead an importer of food, fuels and raw materials on our side, and of technology on the other, that were paid for by exports of footwear, clothing, steel and petroleum products, automobiles, household appliances, machine tools, office equipment, computer peripherals, helicopters, armaments and - on a subcontracting basis - parts of planes.

But these are the very sectors in which competition is stiffening, inside the OECD and even more dangerously with industrialising cheap-labour countries. The PCI seems perfectly aware of that, and of the consequences this implies for the Italian working class, should the "illusion" of a substantial change in the international specialisation be rejected. Italy, say the communists, "is constrained by the divergent ways in which Trade Unions struggle develops in the different countries. ... In all capitalist countries, the crisis has brought about a serious attack to the popular masses. Unemployment has grown ... Everywhere, the dominant economic and political forces try to make the workers pay ... the cost of the decision taken by firms and by government in order to find an issu to the crisis .

In Italy, as well, the situation, from this point of view, cannot be substantially different (2) from the other industrialised capitalist countries. But it is well known that, since the late '60s, the Italian Unions have become very

(1) Ibidem.

(2) Our italics.

strong, and have been able to reach great successes". In the other capitalist countries, therefore, the struggle of the Unions "has had a smaller impact than in Italy", they have shown "inferior capacity to defend and affirm workers' rights". They have presented "very moderate revendications" and "have proved open to accept large reorganisations of production activities", while "this openess is almost non-existent in Italy" ... And this "for a country like ours, open to the international market, that has to face the exasperation of international competition, creates problems that should not be underestimated" (1). Through the smokescreen of cautious wording, the meaning is nonetheless very clear : one of the reasons that prevent Italian industry from confirming and improving her position in the international division of labour is the excessively high cost of labour, that an automatic adjustment clause protects from inflation. This does not mean, of course, that the PCI favour a more "reasonable" Unions behaviour ; they only suggest that Unions should not concentrate their combativity on wages but on other objectives, more important in the long-term to the workers themselves. "The line that the Unions have chosen many years ago gives first priority to full-employment and to investment, and subordinates to these aims their behaviour on matter such as wages. On this line, the Unions fight with all the working class strength that can be mobilised" (2).

In the present situation of Italy, the PCI can have no illusion about a "preferential treatment" by the Unions to a coalition government with communist participation, such as it can be found in Britain with labour governments. The Secretary General of the CGIL, Luciano Lama, himself a member of the PCI, makes it very clear : "Trade Unions autonomy is a condition that cannot be forfaited, no matter the type of government, or the type of parlamentary arrange-

(1) All quotations from Peggio, ibidem, p.20-21.

(2) Luciano Lama, in "Crisi economica e condizionamenti ... cit., vol.1, p. 239.

ments" (1). It is therefore as a communist that Mr. Lama stands in favour of Trade Unions moderation. "A line of moderation is not a self-defeating line, if the Unions set qualitatively more important objectives, objectives worth more of a nominal increase in wages ; objectives such a development policy for the South, a policy to restructure our industrial system into a more modern and more complete one, a policy for the full employment of the resources of our agricultura sector" (2).

If we now move to examine the rôle the PCI sees for thr MNCs in the future of Italian industry, we have again to quote Mr. Peggio (3) : "in the framework of the policy for industrial restructuring and for an enlargement [to sectors and productions presently missing] of Italian industry that we are proposing, MNCs can certainly find a space. We do not think indeed that MNCs should be banned from Italy ..., but these companies cannot be left without any control". On this purpose, "a good example for Italy" can be provided by "the countries that most seriously have studied the problem ... such as Canada, France or Japan". Apart from the reference to a country such as Canada, as a model for the policy of a hypothetical leftist government towards the MNCs, it is worth pointing out that the Italian communists look "as an example" at the behaviour of that very French government that the French communists continuously accuse of "selling out France" and of "giving up national independence", because of its tolerance for foreign investments.

The attitude of the PCI towards the MNCs is in fact rather complex. As it has been pointed out by an Italian economist (4) "in the party press, among party members and among trade unionists, a strongly negative attitude is widespread ... [but] the attitude of the party leadership is quite different, and there is an evident effort to find a pragmatic line".

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(1) Ibidem, p. 244.

(2) Ibidem, p. 243.

(3) E. Peggio, Main report to the Seminar on Crisi economica e condizionamenti etc, cit., p. 35.

(4) Giacomo Luciani, Il PCI e il capitalismo occidentale, Longanesi, Milano, 1977, p. 59-60.

In an interview to Business Week (1), Giorgio Napolitano, member of the PCI Direction, summarised the PCI attitude in the following way : "We are not against the presence of MNCs in Italy. We only oppose certain habits of the MNCs, such as moving rapidly from one country to another. But this is not a problem of Italy alone, that is why a code of conduct is being discussed in the EEC". And if Napolitano is worried because the MNCs might leave Italy, Peggio expresses hos worry because the MNCs do not invest enough in Italy. "It cannot be accepted that foreign enterprises come to Italy only to take a share of the market" (2) from production plants located in other Common Market countries.

This pragmatic attitude can sometimes create paradoxical situations, such as the one related by Peggio : in Milan, at the general Assembly of the workers of the pharmaceutical firm Lepetit (owned by Dow Chemicals), "the official spokeman for the socialist party said that the Lepetit case showed how necessary it was to expell the multinationals from Italy. On my side, I said clearly that the PCI does not believe that the multinationals have to leave Italy : on the contrary, we have to encourage them to stay" (3).

The judgement of the PCI leaders on radically anti-MNCs positions is extremely severe ; "In the ritual condamnations of the multinationals, moralism had replaced the analysis of the hard laws of the economy ; these condamnations were therefore of no use neither to correct the negative elements in the growth [of the MNCs], nor to identify the positive ones (growing world interdependence, diffusion of technology and management skills, etc.) ... An interpretation [of world problems] where a satanic rôle is attributed to the multinationals (considered the cause of all plights, from pollution to Chile) might be satisfactory for moralistic populism, but explains nothing, and proposes even less" (4).

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(1) May 3rd, 1976, p. 121-122.

(2) E. Peggio, Report to the Seminar on "Condizionamenti ..., cit. p. 36.

(3) In an interview with the international consulting firm Hill and Knowlton ; see "Lettera Finanziaria dell' Espresso", Milano, n°25, June 14th, 1976; p. 11-12.

(4) Renato Sandri, La sfida del Terzo Mondo, Editori Riuniti, 1978, p. 96. Mr. Sandri is Member of the Italian and European Parliaments, Vice-President of the Development and Cooperation Commission of the European Parliament, Vice President of IPALMO (Institute for Matin America, Africa and the Middle East). In this Institute, Christian Democrats and Communists and Socialists, in their official political capacity, work together.

Given this pragmatic position on the issue of the MNCs, one could wonder what the PCI's attitude would be on the question - much more serious for Italy than for any other OECD countries, given the specialisation of the Italian industry - of the new competition from Third World manufactured exports. Indeed, it is through the scapegoat of the MNCs that the European left normally finds the pretext for a protectionist attitude against the exports of industrialising cheap-labour countries.

According to the PCI,(1) the "maturity of the Italian working class" can be seen from his attitude in front of the competition from the newly industrialising countries on both the domestic and the world markets. Indeed, "from the rank and file of the Italian working class, neither a mood of intolerance has risen against the LDCs, nor have come the protectionistic revendications that can be noticed in the present attitude of large sections of the working class of the West" (2).

But such a moderation is not sufficient ; "just because of the very difficul times ahead, this maturity has to be coupled with a serious effort to understand the global nature of the present crisis". The analysis of the left on international realities has been - according to some communist leaders - terribly poor. Its support to the struggle of the Third World was "large and passionate" : but it has been forgotten that the people of these countries 'could die for independence, but not live of independence' ; that, after political freedom, these countries were bound to revendicate a different position in the internationa division of labour. The support for their struggle "has not been accompanied by a theoretical effort and by a political initiative common to the LDCs and the working class of the West, to stage a battle for new economic structures, new economic relations, for global development" (3).

The problem created by the emergence of a number of new competitors in the LDCs has been underestimated by the left : "we were looking at Vietnam, but we could not see what was going on at the same time in Hong-Kong and in Seul" (4). Now, the only way out appears "a consultation among the social partners in Europe and in the LDC, as a step to the opening of the European market to Third World

(1) See G. Napolitano, in Proceeding of the Meeting of the Central Committee of the PCI, Oct. 27th, 1977.

(2) R. Saudri, La Sfida, etc., cit., p. 101.

(3) Ibidem, p. 99.

(4) Ibidem, p. 98.

products and to the contemporary restructuring of the industrial and agricultural systems in the EEC countries". A new division of labour has to be the ultimate target of this transformation, but not a new distribution conceived only as the "delocation" to the LDC of some of Europe's activities assumed to be "an abstractly fixed amount" : the real "challenge is an international division of labour that would increase employment, useful productions and world development"(1

C - Free Trade, protection and the politisation of international economic relation

12) As we have been able to see quite frequently in the previous pages of this paper, tendencies to protection against imports from the LDC's and to the bilateralisation and politisation of trade are a recurrent temptation in the position of the left in both France and Italy.

The French communist lead to the way in this direction, as they openly propose a complete reorganisation of the foreign economic relations of France. Indeed, at the Twentieth Congress of the PCF, Paul Boccara pleaded for a "complete control (2) of external economic relations (including capital transfers) by the public industrial sector, the /nationalised/ banking system and, most important, by democratic planning" (3). This "encadrement" has a twofold aspect : on the organisation of foreign trade in order to control its directions, and - as we have seen in the previous chapter - on the specialisation of France in the international division of labour, in order to control its content.

As far as the control of the direction and the choice of trade partners is concerned, the same Boccara, in an interview to the official communist journal France Nouvelle, repeats that France has to buy "less oil from Saudi Arabia which does not buy enough from us and lets us go into deficit with her, and more oil from Algeria, Lybia and Irak, to which we can sell much more, and with which we

(1) Ibidem, p.99.

(2) The very French world "encadrement" (literally "framing") has absolutely no corresponding concept in any other language known to the author ; it is used in the meaning of the English expression "officering" not only for an army, but also for the civilian population and activities, in the sense of subjectin it to the control of non elected government officials.

(3) Proceedings of the XX Congress of the French CP, cit.

can increase our cooperation". Similarly, he adds, France has to buy "less capital equipment from the US and the Federal Republic of Germany, through a stimulation of national production, but also through the establishment of new trade relationship in the field of plants and equipments, a development of technological relations and co-production in Europe, with Italy - for instance - as well as with the socialist countries" (1).

This view can be easily considered as representing the official position of the PCF. The theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, indeed, elaborates on it, and even tries to define an ideological point. A new concept is created : the concept of "economic exchanges" as something different from "commercial exchanges", the former being the exchanges based on Government-to-Government agreements with State-trade countries, the USSR in the first place. According to the French communist journal, the present crisis has made indispensable for the West to move from commercial to economic exchanges. "The reality that appears more and more clearly" is therefore that governments of the western countries and the US in the first place have "to reconsider their economic policy" and take "the road to Moscow" (2).

To understand the historical and ideological dimension in which the French communist leadership is living, the following quotation will be enlightening. "The internationalisation of economic life is represented mainly by a fast development, on a new basis, of international trade. No doubt, trade among peoples and among countries goes far back in the history of mankind, but it has taken in the last few decades a completely new form. The existence, first of all, of the USSR, and later of a world system of socialist countries, has changed the basis itself of international trade" (3).

In this perspective, the trade policy of the French government is judged severely. The French government has tried, after 1969 (i.e. after the departure of de Gaulle from power), to reduce Franco-Russian trade, with the "pretext"

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(1) P. Boccara, interview by J.L. Gombeaud in France Nouvelle, Jan.9, 1978, p.47.

(2) L. Baillot, Relations économiques internationales : nécessités et possibilités in "Cahiers du Communisme", Vol.50, n° 7-8, 1974.

(3) Ibidem.

of the mediocre quality of soviet-made goods. But, on the contrary "for long time now American and other capitalist businessmen have shown their interest for the very advanced technology /the USSR can provide/ in fields such as metals transformation, machine tools making, electronics, optics, aluminium production, the mining of useful minerals" (1). The main responsibility for the failure, on the side of the French government, to grasp the opportunities of trading with the USSR goes to Common Market engagements (that represent "a serious abdication from national sovereignity" (2). "To escape the limitations created by EEC rules, the agreement signed by France and USSR in July 1973, presents absolutely innovative terms, called by the economists 'compensation deals', on the basis of which France ships to the USSR capital equipment that will be paid for with the goods produced with their equipments" (3). Despite the risks that this type of agreements creates for the capital equipment supplier, and the widespread damage that this dangerous form of new competition from the East has done - and is doing - to the Western working class, the PCF deems that such a new conception of international trade is "absolutely desirable", since it is "based on the principle of mutual advantage". Indeed, "bilateral commercial agreements are absolutely in the interest of our country" (4).

Of course, the generalisation of such practices would create a drastic shift in the geographic pattern of French trade, with a reduction of commercial relations with the Western countries - where these trading practices are uncommon and a development of "economic exchanges" with the Eastern bloc. Bu the PCF thinks that it is also "in the interest of the great foreign capitalist corporations to expand international relations, even if the partner refuses to be dominated, under the condition that a stable and reciprocally profitable relationship is guaranteed" (5). This would mean nothing less than establishing with the

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(1) Ibidem. The reader should not be surprised for these assertions. The PCF has indeed an extraordinary capacity to present very seriously the most bewildering assertions : at a meeting of the Communist Parties of Western Europe, for instance, the PCF has presented a document in which it was said that "the successes obtained by the agriculture of the Socialist countries show the incapacity of capitalism to solve its problems". On that occasion, the Italian communist daily "L'Unità" reported that "there was no consensus" among the PCs. See "L'Humanité" and "L'Unità" of 24/5/75.

(2) See G. Marchais, Report to the XX Congress of the PCF, 1972.

(3) L. Baillot, cit.

(4) Ibidem.

(5) P. Boccara, in Proceedings of the XX Congress of the PCF.

Multinational Corporations the same type of relationship they presently have with Eastern bloc countries. The fact thet this type of relationship is in the interest of both parties "is shown by the recent developments - that are bound to continue in the future, because of the crisis of /Western/ Monopolistic State Capitalism - of the economic relationship among the advanced capitalist economies and the socialist countries" (1).

France should therefore not only become a State trading country, where trade would be bureaucratically regulated on the basis of government-to-government or government-to-foreign company agreements, not only should she restrict the number of her trading partners to those countries or MNCs that accept this type of "economic exchange" (i.e. the Eastern bloc countries), not only should she have a bilaterally balanced trade, but should have the content of trade regulated by long-term "compensation agreement". And apart from the fact that the very nature of these agreements shows the technological backwardness of the Eastern economies, one could wonder in which way it could be in the interest of the French working class the generalisation of the job-destroying practice of creating in Eastern bloc countries (i.e. in cheap-labour countries) latest technology plants to be paid for with the products of these same plants.

13) The tendency to politicise trade relations does not affect only the PCF, even though it is only in the communist position that it brings about a coherent and detailed program for the conversion of France is a semi-autarchic State-trading country, similar to a Comecon member. In a way, one has to pay hommage to the coherence of the PCF attitude, when compared with the cahotic mixture of un-realistic temptations that converge in the socialist position. Should a Communist government implement its program, the cost of the transformations of the French economy and society would certainly be terribly high in terms of the welfare the French have acquired in the half-century after World War I ; but on a purely logical ground, this policy appears technically feasible. The socialist attitude, instead, is more difficult to evaluate, and even to summarise. One could indeed identify a wide array of socialist positions on these matters, ranging from views very similar to the PCF proposals (e.g. Jean-P. Chevenement) -

(1) Ibidem.

to the views of the official economic advisor of the PS General Secretary Jacques Attali, to whom the main problem of France - in the very end - is its insufficiently capitalistic nature (1), and its insufficient participation in today's phenomena because there are not enough French based MNCs comparable in size and strength to the US multinationals. But the picture of the variety of approaches to world economic problems inside the French PS is furtherly complicated by the fact that it is impossible to identify clearly "radical" and "moderate" positions that would respectively coincide with a government control, self-reliant economy and an open decentralised one. Even if differencies in the attitude towards international economic affairs are sometimes recognisable, certain ideas appear often to be rooted where one would not expect them to be. "Social democrats" with a catholic background, such as Jacques Delors, sometimes show autarkic attitudes : "The anarchy of world trade enables the strong to become stronger and makes the weak weaker ... We cannot found growth on a continuou increase of exports : there are more disadvantages than advantages in being dependent from the world economy"(2) . On the other side, Michel Rocard, formerly one of the leaders of the extremist party PSU, who is normally considered a "planning technocrat" said, at the 1977 Congress of the PS, that "without an aggressive political and economic design we will slide into protectionism. France has to export in order to be independent" (3).

This complex variety of views explains why the official stand of the PS very seldom appears as a clear cut position, sometimes as the result of a compromise among, and quite often as the simple adding up of the economic proposals related to, conflicting political lines.

In general, anyhow, a "strategy to reduce dependence" and to give a "higher degree of autonomy to national economy policy" is considered by the socialists as the natural aim of the action of the left in international economic relations. This autonomy is limited to-day by physical scarcities (in energy and raw material as well as by "a past development based on the opening of borders and on

(1) See, for instance, in J. Attali, La nouvelle économie française, Paris.

(2) Interview with the Quotidien de Paris, 25/11/77, quoted in Christian Stoffaes, La grande menace industrielle, Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1978, p.11/

(3) Quoted in Christian Stoffaes, cit., p.12.

international trade" (1). This is therefore considered as a drawback as bad as the insufficiency of mineral resources.

This "strategy to reduce dependence" includes steps such as "a larger autonomy in the field of energy, a diversification of supplies" as well as "long term agreements with raw materials producers" and "an appropriate exchange-rates policy". This would anyhow be "not a strategy of isolation, but a dynamic strategy in the international framework". For the French socialist, the EEC remains "a reference framework and a preferred field for cooperation", since it has contributed - together with "the development of international trade" to "the growth of the life standard". But today the stiffening of competition can sometimes endanger the very survival of some industries "because of "underpaid manpower" or because of "more efficient technology" (2). In these cases, the resort to "over-tariffing the products or to restricting the imports by decree is very appealing,"but such a policy can be endeavoured only if the outmost attention is given to the international balance of forces. Indeed, protectionist measures taken by France could bring about similar measures in foreign countries against French products. And such an escalation could be extremely dangerous for our country". Protectionism, therefore, is not bad in itself, but only in the cases in which France is not strong enough to resort to it with no risk of retaliation. According to the PS, French "economic policy has to act in favour of endangered industries in order to protect the workers", but "cannot take measures that could trigger a reaction capable of endangering the exporting sectors" (3). In any case, "as stop-gap measures, an efficient protection of French production will be necessary. But the resort to quantitative restrictions and to strengthened tariff protection will be reserved to the situations that require urgent measures to defend employment and protect production plants" (4).

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(1)Parti Socialiste. 89 réponses aux problèmes économiques, Flammarion, Paris, 1977, p. 101.

(2) Ibidem, p. 103. The idea of protecting an economic system against "more efficient technology" would deserve some comments of its own.

(3) Ibidem, p.

(4) PS - Programme Commun de Gouvernement de la Gauche : propositions socialistes pour l'Actualisation, Flammarion, Paris 1977.

A government of the left, according to the socialists, should on one side correct the present policy, that "does not pay enough attention to the possibility of substituting national products to foreign goods, and on the other side improve the situation on the export side. "A too large fraction of our exports is formed by raw agricultural products, low value added intermediate products, manufactured goods exposed to increased competition and to the cycles of foreign countries (such as the automobile). Moreover, our sales abroad are made by a small number of firms, while it should be possible to increase the exports of many small and medium-size enterprises (1). What is necessary, together with protection of the domestic market, bilateral agreements with raw materials producers (2), import substitution, exchange control (3), purchase of regulation of foreign firms operating in France (4), is "the development of the activity of French firms abroad : creation of new enterprises, improvement of their operating environment (i.e. the action of the diplomatic and commercial services abroad)"(5) In other words, the French socialists want the best of both worlds, the world of economic nationalism and the world of free trade and competition.

14) Quite similar - although much less detailed, and never officially presented in a comprehensive text - is the position of the Italian socialists. As far as protectionism is concerned, in several occasions the belief that it was indispensable to the Italian economy has been expressed by Antonio Giolitti, i.e. the man to whom the PSI - when it has been in government - has entrusted the maximum responsibility for economic policy (the Ministry for Budget and Economic planning), that represented Italy at the VI Special Assembly of the UN (where North-South economic relations were being discussed), and that was the socialist candidate for the Presidency of the Republic as recently as in 1978. In 1975, Giolitti has indeed declared "it seems very difficult to me to avoid [in order to find an issue for Italy in the present crisis] the resort to protectionist measures. Independently from the technical means through which the protectionist effect is obtained ... I believe that such a line of action cannot be ruled out" (6).

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(1) Ibidem, p. 107.

(2) Ibidem, p. 108.

(3) See also in Programme Commun ... cit., pp. 88-89.

(4) Ibidem, p. 102.

(5) Ibidem, p. 108.

(6) Antonio Giolitti et al. Uscire dalla crisi, in "Politica ed Economia", 1975, n. 1-2, p. 54.

One year later, invited at a seminar organised by the Italian Communist Party to discuss on "Economic crisis and international constraints on Italy", Antonio Giolitti seized the opportunity to plead in favour of import controls. "I understand the importance of the profession of faith made by the leaders of the Communist Party in favour of the liberalisation of international trade. But let me add a plead against the full application of this principle, because I am convinced that the situations we have to face does not allow ruling out the possibility of resorting to import controls" (1).

An explanation of the political line that lies behind these statements can be found in an article on "Economic policy and international choices" published in the theoretical journal of the PSI by a prominent socialist economist "On the backstage of our present economic and political difficulties - he wrote in 1974 - a great opportunity is appearing in the field of international economic policy. The oil crisis (and the ensuing balance of payments problems) could be faced through ... an agreement with France (2), that would have led to bilateral agreements with the oil producing countries, ... (to) a different equilibrium inside the EEC, less tied to American policy. "With such a choice", oil policy, isolating at least partially Italy from the cartel, would re-acquire the elasticity it had lost after Mattei's death ... Shortly, this would be a policy founded on a higher degree of isolation (3) - or a lesser degree of openess - to international trade ... a [commercial] policy open only to a few of our partners in international trade " (4).

The limits to such a policy in the socialists' views, are similar to the ones that are also indicated by the French socialists : the danger of accelerating the protectionist trends in the USA". But the advantages - more similarly

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(1) Antonio Giolitti, in "Crisi economica e condizionamenti, etc ..." cit., p.

(2) This socialist author does not explain why France assumed to follow a policy of bilateral agreements with the oil producers, should be interested in finding "alliés" on this line, since any "ally" would be a competitor.

(3) Literally : "una politica di maggior chiusura (o di minor apertura) al commercio internazionale".

(4) Paolo Leon, Politica economica e scelte internazionali, in "Mondo Operaio", n. 3, 1974, p. 13.

to what expected by the French communists from their proposals - would be that, while in pro-American and a pro-German strategy "deflation is one of the objectives, in the pro-French case the balance of payments is re-equilibrated through purely political measures (increase in the gold price, bilateral agreement for petroleum) ... On the other side, this policy is the only one compatible with an economic policy directed by the public sector, instead of one directed by the privates" (1).

The establishment of bilateral relationships with "a few" of Italy's partners was actually attempted by the socialist Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Bensi, that, during a journey to Syria and Irak, found the "proof" of the belief that"a direct approach to the Arab world is the best therapy to 'heal' the relations of our country with the countries of that region . We should pursue a form of partnership with the oil producing countries that have a substantial development potential, such as Irak ... /through/ general agreements involving not only /the creation in Irak of/ the oil-related industries, such as refining, petrochemicals and marketing, but also the construction of fleet specialised in oil transportation" (2).

In the opinion of the Italian socialists the argument for and against bilateralism "has not to be encouraged" because it is"nominalistic" (3). The only problem the PSI seems to have with bilateralism is the political "decency" of the partner. The argument on bilateralism, said Pietro Nenni, the founding father of the PSI - and at the time still President of the Party - in an interview to "Mondo Operaio", "is artificial and byzantine, ... because the Europeans eventually deal, in these bilateral negotiations, with US-owned multinationals".(4 To the socialists, the main problem appears to be the question if it is "a scandal

(1) Ibidem.

(2) Cesare Bensi et al. "Dalla guerra dei prezzi alla cooperazione economica", in "Mondo Operaio", n° 2, 1974, p. 13.

(3) Ibidem, p. 11.

(4) L'Europa e il Terzo Mondo", interview with Pietro Nenni, in "Mondo Operaio", Feb. 1974, p. 5.

or not to enter into bilateral negotiations with "reactionary" oil producing countries. "I believe - says Nenni - that /these agreements/ can be useful from a commercial point of view, if they are intended to solve supply problems for a few months or a few years. There is no reason of scandal for a commercial agreement with Saudi Arabia, or with Iran, a Persian Gulf Sheickdom or Emirate, if it is a good deal, ... but I do not think that one can give a "political" "Third-Worldist" (1) interpretation to such commercial operations, especially when they involve, as one of the partners, corporations with mostly American capital, such as the Aramco ... In conclusion, no objections from our side to commercial agreements, but all political theorizations should be avoided" (2).

15) Much more cautious, and remarkably different from the position of both the French communists and the Italian and French socialists, is the position of the Italian communists. We believe - writes Eugenio Peggio in his official capacity of secretary of the PCI's Center for Economic Studies - "that Italy - because of the trading system to which she belongs, ... because of the ideals of peace and cooperation she nortures - cannot look for a solution to her problems through choices inspired by narrow-minded conceptions, that would lead to nationalistic and isolationistic trends.

The pressures - that come from many sides - to revert to protectionist or even autarkic, economic policies cannot and must not be encouraged, and not even accepted. The very history if Italy shows that the periods marked by protectionist and nationalistic policies are the ones during which national economic development has been extremely weak, or even non-existent. On the contrary, the periods in which our country, thanks to a policy of openess to world markets has strongly developed its foreign trade, are also the periods marked by the most significant progress of the Italian economy and society.

Protectionistic trends do not exist in Italy alone. Indeed, it is mostly in other countries - such as the US, France and other EEC and non EEC industrial-

(1) In Italian "terzomondista".

(2) Pietro Nenni, L'Europa etc., cit., p.6.

ised countries - that strong pressure is building up for the adoption of protectionistic measures, that would have, and are already having, badly negative consequences on the Italian economy, as well as on international trade" (1).

The PCI's position on these issues is clearly stated : "Italy has no interest at all in a further degradation of international economic relations, a degradation that might lead to an undoing of one of the main factors of the great post-war expansion of the world economy - the liberalisation of trade. From this very point of view, the undoing of the Bretton Woods system has already had extremely bad consequences ... Presently, a few protectionist initiatives may trigger a trade-war escalation, that would be rouinous to everybody" (2).

Elaborating on the same line, Luciano Barca (3) goes even further : " "I think it is useful to repeat - but neither as an act of faith nor for the extremism of the recently converted - that we are against protectionism. I think it is useful because /in Italy/ we have a system that has survived for too long just because of protection (the protection of low wages, of low raw materials prices and Third World exploitation), and after that is now looking for new protection through devaluation and inflation" (4). According to Barca, the discussion on external constraints is largely useless : "The problem is not to be for ir against international constraints, especially for a country to which the choice to stay in open international markets is a compulsory one, to-day as well as in the future ... International constraints, indeed, are just the other face of international cooperation and of the international division of labour, without which there would be no progress". The only problem is therefore "to find out in which position Italy may stay - as she has to stay - in the network of reciprocal constraints" - and in which way she might "have more weight in the decision-making process in the various systems to which Italy belongs : the monetary system, the NATO and the EEC" (5).

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(1) Eugenio Peggio, Main report to the Seminar on "Crisi economica e condizionamenti internazionali dell' Italia", cit., p. 24.

(2) Ibidem, p. 24-25.

(3) Member of Parliament, Member of the Direction and Head of the Section for Economic Planning and Reforms of the PCI.

(4) In "Crisi economica e condizionamenti, etc., cit., p. 167.

(5) L. Barca, ibidem.

In conclusion, the PCI's view of the position Italy should have in the international economic system can be summarised in the following way : "the present structure of Italy's foreign trade has formed, in the last 30 years, in the framework of the Bretton Woods system, i.e. in a climate of certainty and strong committment to free-trade, on the basis of spontaneous international market mechanisms.

This has had positive results among which is the rather high degree of competitivity of the Italian industrial system, but has also brought about disequilibria, inequalities, distortions and limits to growth" (1). A policy of industrial restructuring is therefore necessary, and "for a country like Italy ... there should be no doubts on the type of changes to be introduced. They should tend ... to increase the number of domestically produced goods, mostly in the agricultural sector, to expand and drastically strenghten the industrial sector, especially in the South : and all this adds up to a policy that implies ... an higher degree of international openess of our country, and a larger and more conscious participation to the trends towards increased inter-dependence in Europe and in the world" (2).

If the views of the PCI are compared with the approach of the PCF on one side, and of the socialists of both countries on the other, the minimum one can say is that the stand of the two communist parties has the merit of being clear. But this is almost all they have in common, at least on the specific issue of free trade versus politisation of commercial relations. The PCI's position is miles apart from the views of the PCF, and could indeed be accepted by any American liberal. This was confirmed when MIT Professor Franco Modigliani expressed his "agreement with the point of view - put forward by Mr. Peggio in his very interesting report - that self-reliance and autarky (a word that makes me remember the times of the fascist dictatorship), offer no solutions to present problems" (3). On the other hand, the PCI's stand comes

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(1) Umberto Cardia, La nuova politica italiana degli scambi, in "Cooperazione", n.3, 1977, p.40. Mr. Cardia, Member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the House of Deputies, is the Head of the Commission for International Cooperation of the Italian Communist Party.

(2)

(3) Franco Modigliani, Proceedings of the CESPE Seminar, cit. p. 244.

as a shock to many well-established ideas of the West-European left. So that one cannot be surprised if it has been sharply criticised for being too favourable to free trade by the well-known - they all are - Cambridge (UK) economist Bob Rowthorn : "Free trade is a luxury Italy cannot afford - he harshly declared in response to Peggio - because the free trade system presently existing means freedom only for the capitalists (1).

(1) Bob Rawthorn, in Proceedings of the Seminar on "Condizionamenti ... cit.p.248

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DEFENCE POLICY QUESTIONS:
THE COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST PARTIES OF ITALY, FRANCE AND SPAIN

by Stefano Silvestri

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~~James Walston translation of Stefano Silvestri piece for I.P.~~

Italy, France and Spain make up the hinterland of the Atlantic Alliance. The biggest American and/or N.A.T.O. bases in Southern Europe are in Italy and Spain, and France provides the vital depth which is necessary for the defence of Central Europe.

However, by now, none of these three countries is fully integrated in the Atlantic Alliance. Spain is not part of it (even though it has bilateral treaties with the U.S.A., France and Portugal, all three of which are members of the Alliance). France is not within N.A.T.O. although it has stayed in the Alliance and although it has shown clear signs of once again gradually closing the gap between its strategic and operative choices and N.A.T.O.'s. Italy is formally speaking, fully integrated into N.A.T.O., but it is geographically separated and traditionally it has restricted itself to the role of defending its national territory from a direct attack (which if it were by land would cross a band of neutral countries) and of playing host to the American Air Force and Navy strike forces.

The choice of whether to take part in the Alliance, N.A.T.O., or to sign important bilateral defence treaties with Western countries has been and is the subject of heated debate in all three of these countries. However, none of the three countries (with the possible exception of Italy to a certain extent immediately after the war) has ever felt itself to be on "the front line" in the East-West confrontation.

The only country of the three which has had the ambition and the potential of a great power in recent times (France) has played its cards in the Third World and within the Western Alliance; the change in de Gaulle's attitude to-

wards the Soviet Union was more a function of France's different position in the West than an attempt to develop an alternative to the American policy. France is not China (and unlike China, does not have a frontier with the U.S.S.R.).

The first problem which we must therefore deal with is that of the perception of threat. It is not by chance that all three of the countries each have a powerful lobby which is indiscriminately named "pacifist", or "Third World" or "Mediterranean" or "African" or "~~Arabophile~~ pro-Arab" etc. (the label depends on the particular moment in time and the different cultures and traditions). This lobby has always attempted to provide an alternative to the East-West optic. Such an alternative would give the country a particular and eccentric position which would not necessarily be neutral or anti-European (anti-West or anti-East) but which usually takes no notice of the limits and obligations which spring from the division of Europe into two blocks.

Partly, of course, we are dealing with a nationalist tradition. In the countries where nationalism is strongest (France and Spain) this tradition takes on a revanchist or "strike force" colouring. In Italy, where the nationalist tradition has never been as strong, it every now and again assumes the character of a catholic/humanitarian nature or sometimes even that of a pauper (the disinherited), or otherwise it has socio-economic justifications. In whatever form it takes, the tradition of the "third route" is present in a wide spectrum of socio-political forces which go from left to right. Thus it is useful to bear in mind that in Italy in 1948-49 the opposition to the Atlantic Alliance did not only come from the left but that an important section of Christian Democrat politicians (Dossetti, La Pira, Fanfani) was against it. In France it was a conservative government which took the

decision to leave N.A.T.O. And Franco's Spain for a long time kept up an independent stand (which was pro-Arab) and which was only reduced by the progressive internal weakening of the regime. While it may perhaps seem somewhat paradoxical, we are being strictly accurate with regard to the historical experiences when we point out that all the serious problems and the internal dissent which in these years has weakened N.A.T.O. have been officially started by conservative (or at most, centre) governments and certainly not left-wing ones.

Naturally, though, the left in these three countries suffers from the same problems. In this way, we have a left which is populist, Third Worldish, Mediterranean etc. in the same way that we have (or we can only say now that we had) the more traditional pro-Soviet left. And once again, it is not by chance that the parties which were the most orthodox in their pro-Soviet attitude were those which were the most jealous of the prerogative of having their "national church". Despite the fact that the P.C.I., the P.C.F. and the P.C.E. were in general quite happy to acritically follow the strategic convolutions of the Soviet Communist Party, they have always made a point of emphasising the "originality" of their line of thought. They were of course limited in this by their "tactical" situations; thus, for example, the least independent of the three was the Spanish Communist Party in exile. Though in any case it exploded once it had freedom of action (which showed the strong hidden pressures). The P.C.F. prefered to emphasise the themes inherent in the French nationalist tradition rather than ideological charac-

teristics. On the other hand the P.C.I. has used Gramsci's writings with a careful ideological scales in order to restate each time its "fraction" (greater, lesser or minimal) by which it differed from the Soviet Communist Party ~~which it held to be politic at any given moment.~~ It would not be an exaggeration to think that if any one of these parties had found themselves in their country's government and allied to the U.S.S.R., they would have given the Communist bloc more anxiety than Hungary and Chechoslovakia did. perhaps even

In my opinion, the problem lies in the different "perception of threat" which is not clearly matched by the perception which the bigger allies have. This produces different conclusions ~~which are different~~ as to what is the best model for international stability and security.

However, in spite of these reserves (which, by the way, are only present in part of public opinion) it is still true that these countries are allied to a power bloc (the Western one) and that the Marxist left has for a number of years and in a number of ways supported the rationale and the policies of the opposite power. This choice of sides has conditioned political life in the three countries by bringing together into a single discussion the big strategic choices and the attitude which has to be taken with respect to the everyday decisions of military policy decided by Parliament and Government. It is just because the choice of sides was "a priori" and did not come from a general consensus of opinion on the nature of the threat that the discussion on defence questions has taken on an ideological tone. In this way, every single "technical" decision has become firstly something to be

evaluated ideologically which in turn prevented a factual analysis (cost-efficiency, technical needs, etc.) of the various initiatives; an ideological choice which was very often made with internal policy in mind before considering international policy or defence.

At this moment in time, the French, Italian and Spanish left is close to Government. Moreover, it has made substantial modifications in its analysis of the international system as far as the part which concerns the Communist bloc and the relationship between the Soviet Communist Party and the three Communist Parties which we are considering here is concerned. The relationships between the Socialist and Communist Parties have also changed; this has forced the left to make some important ideological revisions on the basic problem of the "choice of sides". This has also brought about a deep change as far as the security policy is concerned and it is this change which we are going to analise in the following pages.

However, the basis of any change is still the perception that the division of the world into two blocs and the security policy which derives from that fact does not fully correspond to the requirements of the country. Moreover, the evolution of "Eurocommunism" ~~which~~ has weakened the links of the three Communist Parties with Moscow and at the same time has increased the importance of internal policy over international policy. This has produced a tendency for the further isolation of national political discussion within the three countries from the "perceptions" of the political classes in the other allied countries. However, since an alliance can only

function if there is a sufficient number of common denominators and common perception (of the threat and of the ways in which it is necessary to face it and of the priorities) our line of argument must continually seek to evaluate not so much the actual decisions which have described a security policy but rather the motivations and reservations with which the political classes have taken these decisionx. We must also try and work out whether these motivations and reservations (more than the actual decisions) are perhaps not evolving, in a number of cases, towards a point of view which is more favourable to maintaining the Western security policy.

ITALY

The Italian discussion on defence themes has completely followed, right from the start, the track which involves the "choice of sides" between East and West. The necessity to reinforce the government coalition tilted the scales in favour of this choice. This necessity also broke the false unanimity of the governments of national unity (in which all the parties participated from the Communists to the Christian Democrats to the Liberals with the single exception of the extreme right) which followed the war and the struggle of the resistence against Fascism and Nazism.

The "national unity" period did not take big decisions concerning the security policy but it did stabilise establish the institutional order (a Republic rather than a Monarchy) and the constitutional order (the proclamation of the new constitution) of the coun-

try. This period gave rise to what was subsequently called the "constitutional pact" or "the forces within the constitutional span" (which also included the parties of the left, including the P.C.I.). These phrases are understood as delineating those forces who could legitimately claim the title of "founders" of the republic. Despite all the subsequent polemics and decisions which have been taken, the idea of the "constitutional span" is one which has become deeply rooted in the Italian political system; it is the political reflex which avoided a civil war between the pro-West and the pro-East factions (as happened in Greece). On the contrary, it allowed the rules of the Parliamentary game to be freely established. It was also as a result of this reflex action that the P.C.I. initially reduced and then eliminated completely its "secret" or revolutionary structures. At the beginning of the fifties, this apparatus had ceased to exist. In these years the party was reorganised and at the end the secretary of the P.C.I. who was responsible for organisation (Secchia) was pushed out; he was the most ~~linked~~ ideologically linked to the idea of a "tough" party.

The only initiative taken by the governments of national unity which is relevant to our discussion of the security policy of the country was the debate and ratification of the Peace Treaty. The only question which produced heated debate (apart from a short-lived polemic on the colonies) was that which concerned Trieste. In that case both Nenni (a Socialist and for a period Foreign Secretary) and Togliatti himself did not shift substantially from the position taken by the other political

groups. On the contrary, there was an attempt at mediation by Togliatti when he made a journey to Belgrade. In in the Secretary of the P.C.I. tried to get round the negotiations which were being carried on between the governments in order to reach a political solution. But as a matter of fact the agreement he concluded with the Yugoslavs was too imprecise and had no influence on the final results (1).

The principal and decisive choice, for or against the Atlantic Alliance comes after the 1948 elections. These elections confirmed the existence of a majority government (as opposed to the socialist-communist minority) and the decision was seen by the majority as a useful means of bolstering its identity and confirming its separation from the opposition parties.

In this way it is possible to maintaim that there were not only international reasons which formed the foundations of the decision to join the Atlantic Alliance but also reasons of internal policy bound up in the choice.

Twenty years later, Giulio Andreotti, (the present Prime Minister of Italy) wrote about the De Gasperi governments, in which he was closely involved, that foreign policy was also considered first and foremost before the internal Italian choices (2). The Atlantic Treaty, the EDC, and European Unity, according to Andreotti were the everpresent formulae which allowed De Gasperi to overcome all the internal dif-

(1) See P.QUARONI "Le trattative per la pace" in La Costituzione e la Democrazia italiana Florence, 1969 vol. 1, pp. 733-734.

(2) in La Discussione no. 11, 1967.

ferences and each time to bring the coalition back into line using the agreement on international policy as a binding force. In other words, Andreotti considers the international picture as a positive element which allows the "Parliamentary line-ups" to be kept under control. Luckily, he says: "at the crucial moments, the principles of international coexistence always end up being the determining factor of the final decision". More recently, he has used just this thesis when linking the possible inclusion of the P.C.I. in the Italian government with a development of an integrated European system.

Within this framework, the policy of the Left lacked any genuine counter-proposals. We can see an example of this in the polemic against the EDC launched by a well-known P.C.I. "intellectual". He wrote against the artificial "division" of Europe and Germany which the American warmongers wanted to"put into action". In this way he reached a number of points which are rather curious to reread today; for example the U.S.A. is apparently committed"to propping up the Fascist and totalitarian regimes in Spain, Greece and Yugoslavia", in that way putting Tito and Franco into the same boat together (3).

It is however true to say that Andreotti's interpretation of foreign policy as a type of "norm" which can be used to regulate a coalition on internal policy was (also) in practice accepted by the Left. For the most part, this explains the progressive pro-West evolution first of the P.S.I. and then of the P.C.I.

Starting in 1956, the relationship between the P.S.I. and the P.C.I. began to deteriorate at the time of the events

(3) Emilio SERENI "Argomenti per l'Europa" ed. by the Comitato Nazionale dei Partigiani della Pace, Rome 1954.

in Hungary. The two parties took the opposite position but the pro-Western development of the P.S.I. only became clear in the following years and in particular after the two leaders Nenni (who was secretary of the P.S.I. and had been allied to the P.C.I.) and Saragat (secretary of the Social Democratic Party, P.S.D.I., which was declaredly anti-communist) ~~got together~~ brought their parties together again.

This alliance reached its peak between 1958 and 1962 when the two parties agreed on a re-unification policy and proposed the new formula of government to the Christian Democrats - the centre-left.

As the P.S.I. came closer to being in the government, ~~paradoxically, the~~ (and closer to the policy of Western security) paradoxically, the "pacifist" or "Third World" line met with some difficulties. This line had been supported in those years by for example the Christian Democrat Fanfani who as Foreign Secretary during the Arab-Israeli war of 1956 had tried to work out a "third way" for Italy which would have been pro-Arab and removed from the Western line which was pro-Israeli. On the contrary, the P.S.I. found itself faced with the problem of how to integrate itself further in the West and as it found it difficult to base itself directly on N.A.T.O., it prefered to publicise the merits of European integration (the E.E.C. and in the final analysis also European defence). As for N.A.T.O. the Socialist Party stated that it accepted the organisation only inasmuch as it was "a defensive Alliance which is geographically limited" and it insisted on the necessecity of positively activating article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty with regard to European totalitarian regimes (primarily Portugal). However, the two "spirits" stayed together in the

reunified Socialist Party; these were the pro-Atlantic wing and the more neutral one (which had been pro-Communist before). Thus for example, there is Lombardi who states (4) that the "purpose of the Atlantic Treaty ought to be discussed" and that it ought to be used for the solution of serious problems like the Portuguese one, the Viet Nam one or what followed the coup d'état by the colonels in Greece. Even if he then finished up by saying that "to ask for the giving up of the Treaty is also a political mistake because it is necessary to let time pass so that the prospects which appear after the dissolution of the blocs can be seen". At the same time the Social Democratic wing insisted on sticking to the Atlantic Treaty because it was a "choice of civilisation" which is a secure link betwwen Italy and the American democracy. (5).

The meeting point of these opposing views was after all, only contained in the common pro-European outlook which they held. They favoured the integration into the community and it is this point which is coherently developed.

The road which the P.C.I. took tells a remarkably similar story. At the foundation it also had internal and international motivations. The starting point can be taken as 1967 - 1969, when the "Prague Spring" and the student movements in Italy

(4) L'Astrolabio, no. 38, 1967.

(5) Aldo GAROSCI,'L'Italia e il Patto Atlantico,' in La Politica estera della Repubblica Italiana, Milan 1967, ed. Bonomi.

(with their criticism of the P.C.I."from the left") together with the obvious crisis in the centre-left government coalition formula (and the new split between the Socialist into the old groupings of P.S.I. and P.S.D.I.) forced the P.C.I. to rethink out its strategy. This tendency could already be see in 1968 from a number of articles which had appeared in Rinascita. These articles pointed out that "the dictatorship of the proletariat" was an outmoded concept and that the P.C.I. was committed to the democratic and Parliamentary system (and this included the possibility of a "Parliamentary alternance of power)(6). It could even be seen in 1967 when the P.C.I. took the political decision not to fight a campaign against the renewal of the Atlantic Treaty, twenty years after it had been signed (in 1969). This decision was taken with articles which talked about the "process of revision of Atlanticism" (7) and proclaimed the necessity of facing "the delicate problem of Italy's international relations with a new spirit" (8). From these small beginnings we have arrived at the declarations of December 1974, when Enrico Berlinguer, the secretary of the Communist Party made clear that in the opinion of the P.C.I., Italy should not start

(6) G.PAJETTA in Rinascita, 30th. August 1968.

(7) P.INGRAO in Rinascita, 13th. September 1968.

(7) G.NATTA in Rinascita, 1st. September 1967.

(8) A.OCCHETTO in Rinascita, 25th. August 1967.

by taking unilateral action which might alter the military and strategic equilibrium which exists between N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact and so therefore she should stay in N.A.T.O. It was in this period that the P.C.I. had considered the Chilean episode (1973) very carefully and had come to the conclusion that it was necessary to go into government in some sort of wide coalition formula which would not disturb ~~the~~ international equilibria. It is from this point that its conversion gathers momentum.

But as ~~with~~ in the case of the P.S.I., ~~this~~ "European"outlook shows itself ~~under closer inspection~~ to be ~~too near closer to an "atlantic"~~ outlook to be ~~sold as~~ the new touchstone of the international policy of the Left. And it is in this direction and towards contacts with the European Social Democrats, towards the E.E.C. etc. that the efforts of the P.C.I. have been directed, much more than towards a real security policy.

This has isolated the "pacifist" and "Third World" tendencies in Italy even more; they have been left without any big parties to refer to and they have been somewhat dispersed throughout all the parties from the P.C.I. to the P.S.I. to the Christian Democrats. These forces are now trying to react.

It is in this way that for the first time since the war, the foreign policy and Italian security discussion is once again moving towards the traditioanl lines of Italian political history which have been rather left on the periphery in the last thirty years. Once the 1948-49 ~~division~~ rift between pro-Americans and pro-Soviets has been filled in, at least in ~~theory~~ principle, with the conclusion that Italy should stay in the zone of Western influence, the old contrast (which had already set Giolitti

and Crispi against each other at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth and later provided a bone of contention between the democratic parties and the Fascist regime) between a pro-European line and one which was "Mediterranean" (which at that ime was colonial and now has taken on a Third World and pro-Arab stance.)

This line can also be seen, as will be shewn below, in the considerations and proposals which have been put forward by the left when it comes to dealing with defence policies. Unfortunately, the fact ~~the fact~~ that this discussion (on defence problems) has been carried on in a way which was generic and ideological has meant that the debate has been lacking in information and thus has allowed the grossest absurdities and gratuitous statements to run riot. This does not mean that the Left is trying to overturn Italy's security policy with more subtle weapons by starting a slow and gradual move towards neutrality. Rather, it means that the Left still has not got a real and serious military and defence policy.

Given these premisses, what is the Italian Left's security policy?

We have already talked about the choices which have been made of a"general"nature (giving up the idea of leaving N.A.T.O, N.A.T.O. seen as an "organisation which is for defence and which is to be geographically limited"; remaining within N.A.T.O. in order to maintain the equilibrium and to pursue detente). But these choices and their justifications tell us very little about the genuine proposals of the Left as far as the security policy is concerned. They are the introduction, not the development.

As we have already seen, the Italian Left has not been very original within the field of the wider choices and general policy when it comes to defence. First the Socialists (in 1960) and then the Communists (in 1974) have both accepted the fact that Italy should stay in the Atlantic Alliance and N.A.T.O. They have both of them emphasised the defensive role of the Alliance and the geographical limits of the Treaty.

The point about the geographical limits is probably the most confused of the two. It means to point out

a) the fact that although these parties are prepared to take take part in the Alliance they do not wish to commit themselves to the support of American policy in the rest of the world; and

b) in particular, and as a deduction from their utterances, we can see that they want to preserve a freedom of choice with regard to what happens in the Middle East and (North) Africa.

This second position is not only held by the Communists; rather, it is common to the whole of the Italian political line-up (as, by the way, it is in France and Spain). It is partly a derivation of the "pacifist" tradition which is also present in the Catholic sector of the Italian political class. In traditional terms, the portion of Italian political groupings which was most favourable to Israel, has been the secular-Liberal-Socialist line-up (in 1967, the Socialist Party still supported the Israeli govennment policy, while the Communists had a number of reservations; they defended the survival of the state of Israel but supported many of the Arab and Palestinian demands). The situation changed over the period between 1967 and 1973; there was a growing amount of criticism of the continued Israeli occu-

pation of the territory which had been taken in the Six Day War. This tendency reached its peak during the war of 1973, when the majority of Italian political groupings both in and out of government (Christian Democrats, P.S.I., P.C.I.) worked out a common position which was against the use of Italian territory as a base for the American airlift. This agreement was also against the use of American and allied ~~stocks~~ supplies in the war in the Middle East.

The fact remains that the non-territorial waters of the Mediterranean are an integral part of the area covered by the Atlantic Treaty and that the VI Fleet was used in this conflict (it even came to a nuclear alert on 24th. October 1973). This fleet is covered by the allied agreements and has always moved within an area covered by the treaty. It is therefore clear that if it had been attacked it would have been able to bring into effect the articles of the treaty. The Italian newspapers did not explain any of this; they prefered to keep up the fiction of a "functional" division (which does not exist in the treaty) by which, in some way or other, the Sixth Fleet was outside the Alliance when it was dealing with a crisis in the MIddle East and its operations did not involve the Alliance.

This is an important margin of ambiguity, which the formula of "geographical limits" of the treaty does not resolve.

The position which has been taken over the allied and American bases in Italy is less ambiguous though. In this case it has been clearly stated on more than one occasion that there is the intention to maintain the agreemant without any modifications. Every now and again there is a more critical utterance in the Italian press which puts forward the hypo-

thesis that there should be greater control over the "nuclear components" on the bases. But in none of these cases has the point been taken up officially by any of the major parties. However, this would seem to be an opportune moment to briefly describe the problem of control.

a) Problems of political control (double key, planning, etc.)

The agreements which deal with the positioning of American nuclear warheads in Italy (whether they are to go to American or Italian vehicles) are kept secret even from Parliament. This produces a certain confusion in the language used and a very definite uncertainty on the actual meaning of these agreements and uncertainty on the guarantees which have been given to the Italian government as to the limits or the use , not so much of the Double Key Warheads (which in any case should be used on Italian vehicles) as with warheads which are stockpiled in Italy for use on American vehicles. This concerns both Theatre Nuclear Weapons which are carried on aircraft and missiles and Strategic Nuclear Weapons which are used on submarines which use Italian ports (among which there is a base which is specifically designated for nuclear submarines; the port has been constructed on the island of Maddalena near Sardinia). Neither the Italian nor the American governments have ever given precise details about this problem except for very general statements that the Theatre Nuclear Weapons would be used according to the planning criteria established in common with the other allies in the Nuclear Planning Group in N.A.T.O. and SacEur.

There are further doubts about the quality of the nuclear weapons and their quantity. The latter point is secret, even

though journalistic sources (which have had no official confirmation) suggest that the number of nuclear warheads present in Italy is between 600 and 1000 depending on which estimate is taken (the most reliable talks of 700). The former problem (the quality of the weapons) is better known but there is an ambiguous note when it comes to the so-called nuclear mines. For a long time official sources ~~that~~ stated that there were no nuclear mines "prepositioned" in Italy, even though rumours suggested the contrary. Recently, in 1978, the Minister of Defence replied to a Parliamentary question by Communist and Socialist deputies on the subject; he made the distinction between nuclear mine warheads which are in fact present in Italy according to the statement and the prepositioning of mines. According to the Minister, there is no prepositioning, or rather there ~~is~~ are only ~~in the bases which have already been prepared~~ prepositioned sites ready to take nuclear mines which are normally stockpiled in deposits like other nuclear warheads.

In any case all these problems have never taken top priority in political discussion and although they are brought up every now and again (often after pressure from pacifist or civil rights movements) they have never been given particular emphasis by the party press.

b) Ecological and environment problems

The debate which has taken place on ecologic land environment problems caused by the various military installations has not been very different. In these cases, it has usually been the P.S.I. (together with the small but active Radical Party - a pacifist and civil rights group) to bring up the most pressing problems. This was the case with the radio-

active pollution of the waters around the island of Maddalena (which was slightly higher than normal after the installation of the American base) and with the security arrangements of the big manoevres poligon used by the Italians and the allies at Perdasdefogu (which is also in Sardinia) where a series of accidents has produced dangerous precedents and finally there is the question of the military hold which is particularly serious in the North Eastern region of Italy (Friuli Venezia Giulia). In these cases the Communists have taken the line that the debate should be restricted to the regional level; in this way they have tried to stop the problem becoming a national question with the obvious ensuing political consequences.

What is more interesting when taking a general view of the situation is the discussion over the different strategic options which are open to Italian defence. In this field, there are also considerable ambiguities and debate has been limited to generic suggestions without going seriously into depth. It is however worthwhile to give a brief review of the situation.

These pptions always ~~bring one back to a consideration of whether~~ accept the fact that Italy should stay in N.A.T.O. Though every now and again there is emphasis on a certain margin of "autonomy" for the Italian choices. Among the main spokesmen for this point of view are the Communist (and member of the secretariat) Senator Pecchioli, the independent who was elected with Communist support, Senator Pasti (who is also an ex-air marshall and second in command of N.A.T.O. in Europe for nuclear questions) and Socialist deputy Accame (who is an ex-navy officer and was chairman of the Chamber of Deputies Committee on De-

fence from 1976 to 1978 and who is now the Socialist Party Defence spokesman while the chairmanship of the Committee has gone to another Socialist, Vittorelli).

None of these people have committed either the P.S.I. or the P.C.I. in the defence of their positions so they can therefore be considered at most as an indication of opinions which exist in the two parties.

In various ways these members of Parliament have criticised the present direction of the Italian defence policy as too heavily based on the North Eastern sector (the border with Austria and Yugoslavia). In particular, Accame and Pasti have also criticised the apparently "offensive" tendency in our armaments business (the new Tornado fighter bomber, the new helicopter carrier which has been laid down in the Navy yards etc.)

The two politicians seem to be generally in favour of territorial defence together with a lesser offensive component. Pasti, for example, has proposed aircraft with a shorter range and less sophisticated technology; Accame has proposed a reduction in the number of large naval units and the greater use of an integrated system of mines in the Mediterranean in order to limit the movement of the two superpowers' fleets.

In particular, Accame has developed his own theory of the territorial defence of Italy. It is based on a functional division of the armed forces (which has been partly taken from the French model and partly from the more recent theories used by the Austrian military and the Yugoslav defence) with one element which is mobile and for attack and mainly made up of professionals and another component consisting of conscripts

who would be armed to effect a widespread resistence throughout the whole territory (9).

These ideas are more or less in agreement with the Socialists' political proposals (10) which tend to give more weight to the new ~~value of~~ agreements like Helsinki ~~as far as~~ rather than the traditional Alliances are concerned. These agreements stand for an "dynamic evolution within the blocs" and the beginning of a process which will stop "the reduction of forces in the heart of Europe producing an increase of military pressure on Europe's Southern flank." Measures of the type that Accame proposes tend to reduce the role played by the superpowers as well as the tension on the frontier with Yugoslavia in such a way as to allow a "symetrical lightening" of the East-West military pressure.

The Yugoslave question, as a general rule, is the one which crops up most. There is however, in this case an obvious uncertainty in the language used. On the one hand we have the proposals of "lightening", but on the other emphasis is placed very heavily on the importance of keeping up support for the defence of Yugoslav independence and for that reason maintaining quite a substantial military force on her border which no longer has an offensive function but rather one of defence and guarantee.

The uncertainty which is present in this problem can be

(9) See for example Avanti, 14th. August 1978

(10) Expressed for example in the proposals of the 40th. Congress (March 1976) Documento di lavoro D and repeated at the 41st. Congress (1978).

seen in a recent article in Unità (11) which was critical of Accame's proposals. It is claimed that such proposals

- presuppose an increase in the defence budget and
- introduce the idea of a professional army through the back door.

It is also stated that: "it is true that the new model would clear the North East, but in order to do it, simple statements are not enough. The recent treaty of Osimo which has put an end to the frontier question between Italy and Yugoslavia once and for all and the developments in the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin emphasise the necessity that Italy and her Western European allies should once again have a"Mediterranean sensitivity"... however, this type of geo-strategical modifications have not yet happened and there is still a lot of work to be done before they come to positive fruition in Italy and the Atlantic Alliance. We certainly cannot take it for granted that Accame's proposed reform would prevent the use of the atomic bomb in case of war, especially if we bear in mind the hypothesis of Italian involvement in a general type of conflict".

The Communist stance is, as we can see, much more cautious. It is above all worried that Italy should not isolate itself from the general picture of the Alliance (and above all from Western Europe).

An exception to this mainly moderate point of view taken by the P.C.I. was seen when the problem of the neutron bomb

(11) A. BARACETTI "Un no fermo all'esercito di mestiere" Unità , 12th. May 1978.

came to be discussed (enhanced radiation Nuclear Warhead). The attack started with an article by Senator La Valle (Catholic independent, elected in the Communsit list) in Unità (12), but it immediately became heavily charged with propaganda. IT was particularly linked to the Soviet initiative in August 1977 which tried to persuade the Communist Parties to sign a common declaration condemning the new weapon. In this case the P.C.I. signed the document which didn't even receive the approval of the Roumanians and the Yugoslavs.

There were also signs of uncertainty in this case. In particular Unità gave space to an article of mine which was strongly critical of Senator La Valle and the Communist position (13).

A number of leading Communists agreed in private that it would be a good idea not to limit the discussion to the simple propaganda line that it had taken (14). However the substance of this case seemed to show a link-up between the old Communist tradition and the Catholic "pacifist" tradition. This prevented ~~any real space for~~ a serious analysis and merely left considerable space for propaganda.

In the same period there were other Communist hesitations to be noticed (for example, their pro-Soviet attitude on the Ethiopian problem which was later corrected and became more

(12) Unità 1977

(13) Unità 1977

(14) This can also be deduced from a number of articles in Unità, see for example Calamandrei in Unità 1977

balanced). This made us think that there had been a partila return to the traditional line by the P.C.I. and that the critical evolution had stopped.

We cannot say that further developments have produced more evidence in this direction. On the contrary, the responsible attitude taken by the P.C.I. in the government crisis at the beginning of 1978 and the strong support given by the party to the government in its anti-terrorism activity combined with the attempt to start a more profound discussion of strategic themes ~~lead~~-(15) lead us to believe that the policy of critical rethinking is being consolidated.

It is however true that this change has still not been made explicit and that the Italian Communist Party's attitude towards the U.S.S.R. has still to be clarified. This has also been pointed out by the Communist spokesman for Foreign affairs, the deputy Segre (16).

The policy of the Left is much more ~~secure~~ sure of itself when it comes to dealing with social, budgeting and ~~industrial~~ problems which are linked with defence. Thus for example, the P.C.I. has launched a clear-cut policy which has the party interested not only in the soldiers and non-commissioned officers but also the officers as well. And although it has declared itself contrary to enrolloing military personnel in the syndacates (its position is different when it comes to dealing with the police which it considers a

(15) See for example the articles by G.L.DEVOTO in Rinascita

(16) See Unità 1978 for the summary of his speech to the Central Committee of the P.C.I.

civil and not a military body) it supports the idea of nominating "representatives" and also the creation of a structure in which social and economic problems can be discussed within the military environment.

The positions taken with regard to the production of armaments are equally often linked to economic or social considerations (like maintaining a given level of employment) rather than being given a military evaluation. Thus for example the P.C.I. has given the financial go-ahead to MECA-Tornado programme (although it has criticised the aircraft) giving as its reasons the defence of employment. The same attitude justifies slight enthusiasm which there is to seriously criticise the sale of arms abroad. In this case there are reactions in the press in obviously scandalous cases (for example the very considerable sales to South Africa). This notwithstanding, only Accame has sponsored a bill which would place the Italian arms trade under a more rigorous parliamentary supervision, and up till now the bill has made no progress.

On a more general political level, we must (however) point out a gradual change in the Communist attitude towards ammaments production; this change can be seen mainly in the European Parliament. In this way, we see (the Italian Communists) ~~them~~ on 16th. June 1978 during the discussion the Klepsch Report (17) making a very clear

(17)"Paper presented by the Political Commission ~~on the~~ European cooperation in the armament supply sector" by Egon Klepsch, 8/5/78, doc. 83/78.

distinction between their position and that of French Socialists, Communists and Gaullists who had all voted (with different motivations) against the measure; they also distinguished themselves from the Dutch Socialist Dankert who had shown some reservations. On behalf of all the Italian Communists, Spinelli gave the following reasons for their positive vote:

a) it is important to open our market to acquire goods from the European armament production given the considerable and important role that this sector has in the Italian and European economy;

b) such an objective does not contrast either with detente or disarmament;

c) Europe must reduce its dependence on the United States as much as possible and at the same time it must stimulate its own industries; the relationship with the U.S.A. must be one of equality among allies.

Up to the present moment this is the most complete formulation that the P.C.I. has worked out in this subject. It is important to emphasise that this position was taken in public disagreement with the P.C.F. and European Socialists.

So we can see that the Italian Left is still looking for its own defence and security policy. Its influence is limited for the moment by the political uncertainty of the direction it is taking and the slight understanding which there is for

specific security and defence problems. However, its ability to influence in a concrete way the choices to be made by the Italian government is limited and this limitation is also likely to remain in the future.

The most popular channel which the Left has for increasing its influence is usually that of Parliamentary control. But it is a fact that in Italy such control is limited both de facto and de jure. As a matter of fact, twenty years of Cold War have encouraged a separation between government activity in this field and PArliamentary control; it was held that the Parliamentarians were not "trustworthy" enough to be let into important military secrets. This has encouraged the separation of the decision making process in the defence field from the normal Parliamentary process. The situation is now beginning to change (under the influence of the big scandals which have broken over aircraft orders and because of the change in climate of the Cold War within the country).

However the Italian constitution itself has the possibility of keeping defence and national security decision making separate from normal government activity (and therefore Parliamentary control). The constitution allows for a Supreme Defence Council (which was constituted with a 1950 law) which is directly dependent on the President of the Republic (and in this way escapes Parliamentary control) and which ought to work out the more general lines of defence policy. This Council (which is made up of some ministers, the chiefs of General Staff, and whoever else the ~~chief~~ head of state wants) has already deliberated on a number of important questions (like for example the agreements on nuclear defence,

the restructuring of the armed forces etc.) some of which were not strictly within their competence (it seems, apparently, that at one time the council discussed normative, financial and budgetary question). The main feature of the Council is its secrecy and its lack of responsibility to Parliament. All this allows us to perceive the possibility of a compromise between the Left getting closer to government and the management of the more delicate problems of national security; in this way the immediate impact of direct Communist Participation in these decisions would be avoided (as would their involvement in particularly delicate information).

At the same time the participation of some ministers (and of the Prime Minister) in this institution together with the assured chairmanship of the Head of State ought to guarantee a certain coordination between that body and the internal political picture.

FRANCE

The French Left has different traditions and behaves differently to the Italian Left. Above all the premises are different:

a) France has the heritage of having been a great power and nowadays still claims the right to play a front line international role. Furthermore, it has its own independent nuclear weapons (which brings about a lively discussion within the country on the nuclear choices);

b) The French Left has a long tradition of being involved in the deciding over the important issues which the country has to face and this includes matters relating to defence

and national security (the last example was the long period of colonial wars and in particular the war in Algeria).

From these facts we can see that the French Left feels that it must have an established national security policy, on the one hand, and on the other, that such a policy very often takes on the tone and colouring of French nationalism.

There is also the inheritance on the left of the great bourgeois revolutionary tradition which is exemplified by figures like Jaurès or in episodes like the Popular Front in the Thirties; it is from this tradition that the French Left has taken its attachment to institutions like conscription, and institutionalised notions like the country in arms, the citizen-soldier and other rhetorical images. France's love of her "Armée" is nowadays perhaps on the wane but however much of it that remains, it remains just as much on the left as on the right of the political line-up.

On top of all this we have the superimposition of the Gaullist experience. It brought about profound changes in the French parliamentary political climate since it put an end to for a long time, a series of centre, centre-right and centre-left governments which had been governing France in a more or less similar way to the Italina ones (~~with-the-exeeption~~ allowing for the fact that there was never a Catholic party with the relative majority. De Gaulle brought together a big "national" (and nationalistic) force and the only opposition which was left, with the exception of a right wing which had been discredited by the Algerian adventure, was the Left. But the left wing could not remain unmoved in front of the new lease of life which the French nationalistic tradition had

taken on and so it ~~took~~assumed some of its characteristics.

Today, now that the Gaullist experience seems to be subsiding, we can see how there is a potential return to the politico-parliamentary equilibria of the past; we are moving towards a reconstruction of the centre with oscillation to left and right. Nowithstanding this tendency and especially in the field of defence and national security, the Gaullist experience is still fundamental and influences the French Left's whole policy.

France's exit from N.A.T.O. in 1966 and the decision to keep up and develop an independent strike force (with new strategic systems, the S.L.B.M. and tactical ones, the Pluton) constitute a watershed between the French Left and the left wing in the non-nuclear countries of the Alliance even when a left wing party had taken up critical positions. That is why, while in the Italian case the very fact of accepting the Alliance and N.A.T.O. are an obvious sign that the left had "changed sides" and had come closer to the responsibility of government, in the French case we cannot make this deduction.

In the Italian case (and the Spanish one) apart from the "choice of sides" there is also the very useful item of the "European" choice (the integration into Eurppe). So far, this has been shewn to be the principal motive of the Left's integration into a Western outlook. This does not work in the French case:

a) the French left has a long history of national policy which gives an a priori legitimacy to its ambitions on government without the absolute necessity (which there is is in the other two countries) of looking for an inter-

Mollet { atlantic / Euratom

natnational legitimacy;

b) in Italia nad Spain, the "centre" which is in government is .European as well as being Atlantic and this constitutes a futther stimulus for the Left to be converted to Europeanism; in France the"European" centre has, on the contrary been pushed out of the government or has been heavily conditioned by nationalistic forces whch are substanstantially anti-European; thus there is no internal motivation which pushes the French Left in this direction;

c) the "European way" is seen in France in the first place as a growing process of integration with West Germany and this produces problems for the Left (as well as for the nationalistic elements);

d) the independent uevelopment of the French Left with respect to the international "models" (Soviet communism and European socialdemocracy) has always taken the air of a French defence of sovereignty and national peculiarity with respect to the rest of Europe.

We can therefore see how the French Left is more available than the Spanish or Italian Left to discuss military and national security problems in detail. But this does not mean that there are fewer ambiguities and problems. On the contrary the ideological elements and those which can be taken a priori often become more important in this case as well; they tend to shift the debate onto security with an hnterodox meaning.

The alliance of the Socialist and Communist left and the fact that they have prepared the "programme commun" have partly aggravated the tendency to discuss these problems in an

ideological (or "in terms of principle") mode. The gradual changing of the balance of power between the Socialists and Communists in favour of the Socialists has pushed the P.C.F. into accentuating its ideological characteristics so that it can regain its politico-cultural identity and compete with the Socialist Party for the leadership of the left. Among the Socialists themselves, the left-wing group (C.E.R.ES.) has also accentuated itsm own ideological self-identification against the pragmatism of the majority of the party and through a fear that a possible spell in government would make the Socialist forget any ideological ~~characterisation~~ and anti-socialdemocratic characterisation.

All this has therefore produced an ambivalent situation; on the one hand we have the French Left which is the most interested as for detail and competence in problems of defence and international security. But on the other hand, and especially recently, the whole debate has been increasingly centred on ideological themes and has gone futher and furthur away from an examination of concrete problems.

This, by the way, has also happened in the government majority. In contrast to the "evolutionary empiricism" of Giscard d'Estaing which is open (as was De Gaulle as well) to collaboration with N.A.T.O., there is a growing "ideologiaal" opposition coming from the political groups which are more soaked in chauvinism.

France has a serious problem of redefining her defence and national security ~~problem~~ policy. She has consistently

refused to integrate her defence with the European defences (in 1954 when she refused to ratify the instituting treaty for the E.D.C. and in 1966, when de Gaulle took France out of N.A.T.O.), but she has not maintained sufficient military power to independently guarantee the country's security.

The "force de frappe" was modified in order to adapt it to a flexible strategy when it became clear that a ~~total~~ and "tous azimuts" strategy risked leaving the country completely isolated from its allies and risked aggravating the security problems. But the French tactical weapons which had been planned to fulfill a new concept of "flexibility" continue to pose insoluble definition problems (when should they be used? And above all, where? In West Germany, on the borders with France, or on French territory or on the Eastern confines of the N.A.T.O. area?). The very strategic flexibility is anything but assured; among other things, the French "trident" ad" (bombers, I.R.B.M. and S.L.B.M.) has in practice lost one of its prongs; the bombers are at best only useable on tactical missions (this is more and more being admitted even by government sources). The trident is now in danger of losing a second of its prongs if the French I.R.B.M.'s are going to stay as they are today vulnerable and inaccurate. On the other hand invulnerable systems involve expenses which are anything but negligible (and if mobile solutions are chosen, like the American ones, then there will also be very serious ecological problems). So the French deterrent runs the risk of being putting its whole future just into S.L.B.M.'s and its tactical component (this is a choice which the British took a long time ago but makes considerable reductions in

the independence of the national deterrent). With this type of weaponry it is not really possible to elaborate a credible and flexible strategy unless it is integrated with the United States.

The concept itself of a French national defence has been shewn to be too restricted also from an operative point of view. But from the moment in which Giscard and General Méry (Chief of General Staff) began to re-elaborate it and extend it to the point of covering the security of the allies (and in particular West Germany), the limits of a purely national deterrent and defence strategy came even more boldly to light and the operative justifications for refusing the integration of the French forces into N.A.T.O. were seriously weakened.

On the other hand, up till now, the French government has met all the necessary conditions for once again changing the basic direction of the French defence policy but it has then not decided to change it. So the policy continues but it has lost its basic justification.. It becomes clear how this offers plenty of space for polemics and recriminations; and it is clear why the "force de frappe" problem has emerged out of the blue as one of the principal bones of contention between the French Socialists and Communist in 1977-78.

What sort of conceptions of defence does the French Left have? They cover a wide span of opinions and there are big differences between them. Thus we note that the Communist

Jean Marrane states (18) that France must have "a national defence which efficiently insures the country against any aggressor from whichever side he might come". And he polemicises fiercly, to this end, against the gradual abbandoning of the term "national defence" and against the definition of France as an "autonomous" power instead of an "independent" one. So in his opinion there is only one single "sanctuary"; the national territory; and moreover it is necessary to be careful about everything which seems to offer a "droit de regard" to the German Federal Republic on French defence policy. To this end he says: "the nuclear weapon cannot be compared with any other"; it is the ideal weapon for national independence and because of this it is essential ~~not-to-do~~ to maintain it. ~~Later on we will see in detail exactly "how" it should be~~. Analogous concepts and ideas have been expressed by the Communist deputy Jean Kanapa in his report called: "La défense nationale, action pour l'independence, la paix"; he insists on maintaining the "tous azimuts" strategy and on a partial return to the total strategy (giving up the "counter-force" strategy).

This does not mean giving up the Atlantic Alliance but that notwithstanding, the French Left has a more negative attitude on this point than the Italian Left. While the latter accepts N.A.T.O. although it emphasises a number of limitations (defensive, geographically "limited") and it confines itself to hoping that detente will make it possible that the blocs will be "surpassed", the French Socialist and Communists write in their programme comun that: "Le gouvernement (de la

(18) J.MARRANE L'Armée de la France democratique, Editions sociales, Paris 1977.

gauche favorisera toutes les mesures qui permettrons d'atteindre par étapes cet objectif (la dissolution simultanée de l'Alliance Atlantique et du Traité de Varsovie), ce qui implique l'affaiblissement progressif et simultané des alliances politico-militaires existantes, pour aboutir à leur complète disparition". We can add that the implication of this is that France, if it were to follow such a programme ought to be systematically against any form of reinforcement or reform of the Alliance, even if is should be undertaken in order to encourage the international equilibrium.

Within the framework of the programme comun, as it was originally conceived, the objective of the "dissolution of the blocs" seems to take precedence over the objective of maintaining the equilibrium. It is a difference of not minimal importance.

The Socialist position is hazier and more confused; it demonstrates above all the large number of opinions which there are within the party. In the beginning, the Socialist PArty was an anti-nuclear party and all things considered it was pro the Atlantic Alliance. However, after de Gaulle left N.A.T.O. the Socialist Party certainly did not propose a reentry of France into the Treaty Organisation; it rather restricted itself to continuing to propose a complete renunciation of nuclear weapons. During the recent Socialist convention on defence in January 1978, a minority amendment once again showed the Socialist Party's "traditional" way of reasoning; we are dealing with the amendement by Besson, Eyraud, Gau, Josselin and others (mainly from a Christian-

progressive backround and ex-P.S.U.) according to which France ought to immediately give up its Mirage bombers, its I.R.B.M. missiles and its Pluton tactical weapons and just keep its S.L.B.M.'s. For its real defence and for the strategic flexibility, France ought to have relied on the Atlantic Alliance whose threat, with reagrd to the Soviet Union "is infinitely more dissuasive than a purely French one".

But today that proposition is generally speaking unpopular and this clears up the limits of the French Socialists' present Atlanticism.

The majority position is that much more composite and ambiguous. It was formed by a number of members of the majority who were in favour of maintaining and developing nuclear weapons (Cot, Hernu, POntillon, Martinet etc.) together with those members of the left of the party (C.E.R.E.S.) who were also in favour of nuclear weapons (Chevenement, Motchane etc.). They were mediated by Mitterand who kept very accurately out of the fray with respect to the anti-nuclear lobby (those who have already been mentioned plus Bérégovoy, Taddéi etc.) and with respect to those who doubted the political wisdom of the pro-nuclear lobby, like for example Rocard.

At the national convention this majority which had been gathered together after a fashion, passed a motion of which the main points are:

a) the continuing political objective of the renunciation of the French nuclear weapon;

b) to seek for total world disarmament through suitably convened conferences;

c) in the meantime, the operative maintainance of the autonomous French nuclear system;

d) the deferment of the final decision to the French people, the decision to be taken in a referendum.

In order to qualify this not very well coordinated group of stements, the decision was taken to not only reject the amendment which we have quoted above but also to reject an amendmant put forward by C.E.R.E.S. which had asked for a renunciation of the Pluton missiles and a second C.E.R.E.S. amendment which asked that France "should not let itself be dragged along the road which would lead to the harmonisation of her own strategy with that of the United States".

Mitterand cleared up his point of view even further when he criticised both those who put all their trust in nuclear weapons and those who want to give them up immediately thus risking the destruction of the present French defence system. He declared himself willing to collaborate with the United States not only on disarmament but also on nuclear non-proliferation and he made the following elegant distinction, even if it is not very explicit, when he gave the assurance that France would be "une alliée loyale" but would not be "une alliée integrée". The same Mitterand wrote (19) that "a policy of alliances is today a necessary condition but is no longer a sufficient condition to safeguard our national independence". On one side this statement serves as a justification of such alliances

(19) in Le Monde 14th. December 1977.

but on the other it serves the purpose of a proposal for France's "own role" in a disarmament policy through which it might reach security. Such a disarmament policy should not of course see France taking the course of once again lining itself up with the countries which have already been moving down that road for some time (according to the Socialist leader that would be the equivalent of submitting oneself to the "condominium des superpuissances"). Instead France should try an original method which he then gives some indication about (the main characteristic should be above all an allembracingness both as far as the negotiators are concerned and as far as the subjects which the negotiators are to deal with.)

The two most striking characteristics of this programme are: That,

a) ~~the first point which seems to be~~ is in agreement with what seemed to be implicit in the old programme comun, it seems to bear ~~be~~ the conviction that disarmament can create a security situation ~~which is equally nonexistent.~~

b) ~~the second point~~ that there is ~~the~~ a great similarity between Mitterand's proposals and Giscard dEstaing's as far as ~~the~~ a French role in the disarmament strategy is concerned. In both cases the common worry seems to be that of putting an end to France's isolation, of avoiding a direct bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union and above all of ~~aveiding~~-preventing the Europeans from becoming the"object" of the negotiations. On the contrary both the leaders seek to use the atomic trump which France has in order to shuffle the card once again so that

even if nothing else happens the "nuclear" countries are re-inserted in a negotiation which takes place on an equal footing.

This position attempts to reconciliate "interdependence and decisional autonomy by using a series of specific compromises (like the ones which were proposed when talking about disarmament. All things considered, we have here a "conditioned" participation in Western cooperation. Put together, this represents:

- progress with respect to explicit Gaullism ;
- a cautious ~~outlook of the~~ centre-left ~~which is also taking in~~ national security;
- but nontheless it is a position which is backward and not very useful as far as European cooperation in defence is concerned (~~this excludes~~ disarmament ~~except that~~ even if the French proposals are open to consideration, they presuppose giving up or stalemating the negotiations which are going on at the momemetn and so are not likely to make the Germans very happy);
- maintaining the ambiguity which there is at present in the French nuclear strategy (including the Plutons).

If progress is to be made in integrating France into the rest of Europe, it has got to be empirical and it must not seem to be a challenge to the sacred principle of national independence. In this way, interdependence has been recognised and the road is open but it is more of an alley than a motorway

The French policy cannot of course be reduced to its simple nuclear aspect. On the contrary, if we want to be realistic, we have to admit that although the nuclear facet is the one which gets the most attention and to a greater extent has to have political positions taken about it, the remainder which includes the conventional weapons policy, the production and trade in armamentsand the presence of the Third World, is much less obvious but much more important in its practical consequences.

From this point of view there are also considerable ambiguities and differences. Thus, for example, in the report which we have already quoted, Kanepa (P.C.F.) suggests strengthening conventional weapons and maintaining conscription (although he does include substantial improvements in the economic conditions of the conscripts). Jean Marrane holds the same position in the book which we have quoted and he specifies his dislike of the European "standardisation" measures. While we are on this subject, it is curious to note that his argument is diametrically opposed to that presented by Spinelli on behalf of the Italian Communist Party at the European Parliament; Spinelli considers European standardisation as the key to a greater European independence from the United States while Marrane sees in it the intention of an American "mainmise" on European industry. Marrane also reinterprets the the French government policy (which is no longer in favour of standardisation but prefers the "interoperability" of European weapons); he presents it not as a picture of France once again coming closer to her European allies (which has been the normal way of interpreting the policy which has had France participating in the Independent Europaen Programme

Group and discussing interoperability) but as a French countermanoevre to block the English and American (and German) initiative. He has also declared himself against the "armée de métier" and in favour of consciption and also (like the Italians) against having the sydacates in the armed forces; he prefers to hope in the formation of ad hoc committees.

The Socialists are also in favour of maintaining conscription. Thus, for example Jean Marceau (20) complains about a system of unjust exemptions and dispensations which make military service into something which is no longer egalitarian and obligatory. He looks for the means of achieving "une véritable défense" which in his opinion "passe par l'union profonde du peuple et de son armée". In order to arrive at this point he wants an osmosis between military and civil societies; this he wants to do by reducing military service to just six months (according to what was written in the old Programme comun.

In some ways, these Socialist worries seem to come close to the problems which have been discussed by military sociologists (like for example, Morris Janowitz), when they try to build a new soldier "model", which is better adapted to the dissuasion policies rather than the old pdriod of the "warring war". However, in contrast to Janowitz's elaboration or the figure of the "constabulary soldier", the Socialist

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(20) J.MARCEAU in Le Monde, 8th. and 9th. December 1977

model seems to be concentrated on the organisation of a "force régionale de défense" which must be linked-up-with a number of forces which are capable of a "défense en profondeur" with forces which are more able to deal with civil defence and defence of the territory. These would ~~kx~~ depend not on the Ministry of Defence, in Marceau's scheme, but on the "département ministériel responsable des collectivité locales" (this also implies a reform of the traditional system of prefects in France).

The proposals put forward by Jacques Huntzinger (21), another Socialist, are slightly different; he is more worried about:

- restructuring the system of coordination which exists between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs;
- stregthening the present tendency of a weakening of the Defence Minister's field of responsibility in favour of the Prime Minister and the Head of State;
- attempting to give a greater depth and bureaucratic coherence to government action through a reform of the interministerial coordination systems and the institution of a new secretariat and coordination study and planning centres (military and civil)
- - making as "democratic" as possiblethe decision making system with respect to the use of nuclear weapons.

Taken as a whole, Huntzinger seems to be more worried about Francedis general policy and about her coherence (with respect to bureaucratic obstruction) than about problems of

(21) J.HUNTZINGER L'organisation de la Politique etrangére et de la défense, duplicated, 1978

mixing civil and military apparatuses; these last are somewhat confused and are discussed in the Programme comun and other elements in the Socialist Party Defence Committee.

When it comes to arms sales, though, the stances taken by the Socialists and the Communists are decidely contradictory. As it happens the P.C.F., at the same time as it criticises the sale of arms to some of the reactionary countries, hopes that there will be development in this sector as a guarantee of French independence and her initiative in the Third World (it is only worried about changing customers). On the other hand Mitterand (22) remembers that the Programme comun merely had planned for "la cessation de toute vente d'armes et matériel de guerre aux gouvernments colonialistes, racistes ou fascistes" (which is the position which also had been accepted by the P.C.F.) and although he emphasised the economic importance of a sector which employs 275,000 workers in France, he is nonetheless worried about giving positive indications. Thus for example, he talks about the necessity of industry redeploying "ses exportations par des contrats de coopération avec les pays européens" (and this is the opposite of what the Communists suggested and is more advanced than the present French policy); he also proposes a "controle public" which would take the form of "information obligatoire des commissions de défense compétentes de l'Assemblée et du Senat sur toute signature de contrats de vente d'armes" (a similar proposal has been put forward in Italy by

(22) Le Monde, 15th. December 1977.

the Socialist Accame).

We must finally note that the Socialist and Commu reactions to the French government's African policy have been different. IT was clear that Giscard d'Estaing wanted to use the little intervention force which was left to him, in a political way from the moment he offered France as a mediator in the Lebanese civil war. Furthermore, France is still involved in Africa as the guarantor of security in what was French Somaliland, in defence of the present regime in Chad and with military advisers spread out a little but through the wole of ex-French Africa. But even though French intervention in Zaire in May 1978 was justified on humanitarian grounds, it took place in a country which had never had any links with France; it could not therefore be justified on historical or traditional grounds.

In his opposition to this operation, Mitterand (23) emphasised "the political uncertainty" which surrounded the whole operation: "Mais surtout contre qui defendons nous ceux que nous soutenons? Au Tchad combattons nous le Toubous? ... En fait si un pays est en cause c'est la Libye. Mais alors il faut le proclamer bien fort ... d'un coté ce pays est considere comme un agent de Moscou, de l'autre on nous invite à autoriser l'approbation d'accords conclus avec lui ... au Zaire qui combattons nous? ... La France cherche-t-elle à s'opposer aux ambitions soviétiques?"

As we can see, Mitterand is critical above all because the political picture does not come out clearly and nor are

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(23) Debate in the Assemblée, 8th. June 1978

the limits of committment well defined. But he is very careful not to follow the easier and simpler road taken by Marchais who after he had exclaimed to the government: "vous renouez avec l'hypocrisie colonialiste" and "politique de la cannonière", accuses the "politique de redeploiement multinational du grand capital francais" and finally gets to the political point when he states: "Vous gâchez le possibilités d'une cooperation avec l'Algérie. Vous intervenez militairement pour maintenir au pouvoir des hommes discrédités et contestés par des mouvements populaires". In his opinion, France was playing the role of the gendarme of Africa for N.A.T.O. Mitterand was much more vague about this statement; he left it as one hypothesis among many.

What conclusions can we come to from the contradictory positions which we have briefly summarised? Perhaps the French Left would not have been very united if it had managed to win the elections and go into government. We have already pointed out on a number of occasions how Mitterand's positions seemed to have been reconcilable with Giscard's. While Marchais' positions are generally closer to the nationalist right and the Gaullists (at least as far as international politics is concerned); for example, not only Marchais but also the Gaullist Sanguinetti complained about the African policy saying that it could seriously damage France's relationships with certain African countries. But this plan is insufficietn.

The reality of the situation is that French political groups from left to right, to a greater or lesser extent seem to be fascinated by the same mirage of power ("autonomous"

or"independent" according to the speaker's modesty which exists in France. This fascination with nationalism seems to increase in importance in the game played over alliances (given that the Républicains Indépendents depend on the Gaullists' vote and the Socialists are trying to get ~~Social-~~ Communist ~~ist~~ support), but it cannot be solely attributed to the most nationalistic elements.

The fact is that there does not seem to be an alternative international position for France as far as the left is concerned. Everyone seems to be convinced of the necessity and of the usefulness of keeping their country outside ~~the~~ close integration, be it Atlantic or European. The recent "independent" evolution of the P.C.F. with respect to the Soviet Union has added a new element to the discussion of national independence. But it has not led to the search for a new international context to put France into and which would be an alternative to the ~~Socialist~~ Eastern or Western context.

Taken as a whole and especially if we look at the problem in terms of security the French Left cannot be said to be fully with the "Euro" terms, whether we talk about Euro-socialism or Euro-communism. On the contrary, the French Left is firmly anchored in France and it leaves the whole burden and the prospect of European integration to the forces in the centre of the political spectrum.

From this point of view, France's strategic position and her defence strategy seem after all to be based on a rather large and general consensus. Even though each party has different criticisms or preferences, taken together they seem to agree on the "eccentricity" of France's position. So much so that even Giscard's modest European or Western

initiatives are unanimously criticised from both left and right because they seem to risk bringing about a "change" in France's international position.

The reason why the French Left is so worried about a possible change remains a mystery, for two reasons:

a) because the present French defence policy and strategy is in any case coming to a number of "structural" knots (if nothing is considered, there is the budget which everyone considers, unanimously, as being either "too heavy" or insufficient to guarantee that policy!);

b) because in giving this support, the Left gains no real advantage (unless we want to consider the possibility underneath it all, the various parties of the Left are trying each in their own way to make alliances with the government; but if that is true, then the gambit does not seem to have succeeded so far).

Up till now, it is the Socialist Party which it seems to be the most aware of this situation. It is also the party which has paid most attention and reflected most on defence problems. It has even reached the point of trying to formulate a picture of an "alternative policy". But the small moment of the reform which has been put forward is such that the initiatives taken by the President of the Republic seem to have largely taken the wind out of the sails of the "alternative" thanks to a number of initiatives of a similar type which have been already taken.

Is all this reassuring for the West? Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose... (in Italy we would call it the "Leopard policy"); but what it is today, certainly is not

enough to guarantee N.A.T.O., or to allow a more integrated development of European defence. Nor is it a sufficient guarantee in the case of political upsets in Southern Europe; this France (or the France of the Left) cannot represent a stability pole and it certainly cannot have ambitions of substituting the United States or even West Germany in this role. It is possible that it will not add its instability to the instability elsewhere but even that type of development is based more on the contingent characteristics of the present political instant than on structural motives.

SPAIN (an outline)

The Spanish Left has only recently become legal once again. In the past it had been linked to alliances and programmes which turned out later to have little value. It is enough to consider the rapid evolution of the Spanish Communist Party which went from its alignment with Moscow to its drastic attitude taken against Eastern socialism and Leninism; without doubt the P.C.E. is today the party which is most furthest along the road to reform. The Socialists themselves have undergone a rapid evolution themselves; first they were divided into lots of subgroups. Under Franco's regime these groups were characterised the utterances of some leader or other about whom the real electoral weight was unknown. Among them, for example, Enrique Tierno Galvan was first a European and then became more and more marked as an anti-American; when it came to the elections he took a small fraction of the poll (about 3%) and later moved into

Gonzalez' the much more fortunate P.S.OE. which is moderate and pro-West.

The Spanish Left also carries with it the weight of its country's history. Thus for example it feels the colonial committments which Spain still keeps up. However, the independence which has been guaranteed to the ex-Spanish Sahara has for the most part taken the sting out of the polemics and has reduced Spain's African committment. It is certainly true that the "Plazas de Soberania" are still around (the two ports of Ceuta and Melilli which are in Maroccan territory), but also in this case the prevalent outlook seems to be that of a bilateral Spanish-Moroccan agreement which will give back the two cities back to Rabat's sovereignty.

The problem of Gibraltar and that of the American bases on Spanish territory is still probably the biggest bone of contention between Spain and the West. But here too, the differences between centre and left do not seem to be very important. As a matter of fact all the Spanish parties claim the sovereignty over the Rock of Gibraltar (but they do not seem to be inclined to bring on an international crisis in order to get it). As far as the American bases are concerned, they do not seem to be in any great danger. The Centre would like to bring Spain into N.A.T.O. by 1979 (which is the dat when the Spanish American treaty has to be renegotiated), and they would like to consider those bases within the N.A.T.O.'s multinational arrangements. The Communists, on the other hand would like to avoid joining N.A.T.O. (they are against the hegemony of the two blocs over the European system and they are reasonably in favour of freezing the situation. That would mean proroging the treaty with the

the United States (although, in principle they keep up their opposition to foreign bases on Spanish soil). The Socialists who by now have 30% of the poll, seem to be also ~~in favour~~ against joining N.A.T.O. although they have shewn themselves favourable to a possible "European agreement" for defence and security, with Western Europe (and in line with the Spains immenent entry into the Common Market).

Taken as a whole, the Spanish Left seems to be quite close to the French Left as far as the opposition to the Americans is concerned and closer to the Italian Left as far as the prospect of European integration is concerned. It goes further when it takks explicitly about an integrated European army (which the Italians prefer to relegat to the distant future or to forget about completely).

This could influence the attitude of the Spanish government as far as N.A.T.O is concerned; it is in its interests not to come up against the Socialists in too forceful a manner and is equally interested in playin g host in Madrid in 1980 to the new round of the C.S.C.E. For this reason, it might be pushed into looking for a "sui-generis one off solution for the N.A.T.O. agreement which would be halfway between complete adhesion and refusal of integration.

There is however the old problem of American nuclear warheads in Spain. According to the latest Spanish-American agreement, the warheads ought to be withdrawn by 1979. It is likely that this deadline will be met, also because of the gradual change in the technical characteristics of the American strategic deterrent. But the problem could be posed once

again in a more complicated fashion if it happened that there was a political evolution in Italy which forced the American government to withdraw warhead which it now keeps in Italy. But it is very unlikely that in such circumstances, Spain could allow itself to take the weapons without creating serious internal political problems.

The problem of the relationship between the political parties and armed forces in Spain is much more complex. In this case the Franco heritage and the possibility of using the military for internal political ends is the Left's biggest worry; the tragic experience of the civil war has certainly not been forgotten. However, up till now, this does not seem to have persuaded the Left to push for a substantial change or a different type of institutional control over the Armed Forces. It rather seems that the Left is trying to dilute any such risk by linking Spanish defence as much as possible to that in of democratic Europe and by showing itself favour of any possible form of integration between the Spanish and European forces. This would certainly diminish Spain's independence from Europe (and from the West) but on the other hand it could guarantee the political neutrality of the Spanish military in internal political questions.

CONCLUSION

Thsi short analysis of the left wing positions with respect to defeench and security problems seems to confirm a

number of points:

a) the policies taken by the Left in the three countries is heavily influenced by the historial characteristics of the countries themselves. This often brings about and accentuation of a different "perception of threat " to the traditional N.A.T.O. and Atlantic Alliance one. This is not peculiar to the Left as it is also present to a certain extent in the Centre and the Right.

b) Not one left-wing party in these three countries seriously wants to rock the boat. In diffelent way and with different formulae they all seem to be rather in favour of maintaining the staus quo.

c) the main road to integration for the Left in the West, and this also applies to the field of national security seems to be not so much the Atlantic Alliance (even though in practice nobody fights it) as the European Community and the prospect of European integration.

d) the real threat to the prospect of integration does not come from forces which are tied to the Soviet Union so much as nationalistic forces in the most traditional sense se of the word. The latter are also willing to come to compromises which are acceptable to the U.S.A., the Alliance and even N.A.T.O.; but they intend to go ahead only insofar as these compromises are temporary and tactical. They therefore operate effectively against the prospect of Wester integration.

e) None of the left-wing parties in these countries seems to have a clear picture which is complete and not contra-

dictory picture of the security policy and committments of its country, let alone the future prospects.

f) None of these parties has worked out a contingency plan to deal with a serious military type of crisis in advance; they all prefer to hope that such an event will not happen. However, this does not mean in any way that they will rea act negatively if the situation should present itself. As a general rule all the parties have a strong tradition of fighting for national independence; it is therefore likely that in the case of a direct attack on their country (and probably an attack on the other European countries) they would react positively gathering in around N.A.T.O. What is more difficult to predict is how they would react in the face of an indirect crisis which might come from a more ambiguous route or from outside allied territory. In these cases the position taken by the other European countries would probably be determining as well as what the Centre would do. This was the case in the Middle East crisis in 1973; the Left kept up a critical attutude towards Israel (and as a consequence also towards the United States) which was not substantially different from their governments'.

The attitude taken by the Left with respect to defence and security problems seems to be strongly influenced by what happens elsewhere, be it an initiative started by the government or by the allies. There is no reason to believe that this is an attitude which will be easliy changed.

If this is true, then the greater part of the problem,

as far as Spain, France and Italy are concerned, consists in working out, right now, with the present governments what the degree and type of integration that these countries should have in the Alliance, and N.A.T.O. or in the Common Market.

We are dealing with a problem which is also important the American policy itself. There are strong nationalistic forces within all of these countries which at any given moment can seem to be more of less in favour of improving the relationship with the United States, for tactical reasons. At times of crisis and if there is not an integrated security system which works, then the nationalistic forces can seem to be the lesser evil. This is especially true if such forces seem to be anti-communist or anti-Soviet.

This type of policy has its weak point, however, in itd fragility and in the rapidity with which it can disintegrate. The nationalistic evolution in Italy, France and Spain cannot but accentuate the centrifugal peculiarities of these three countries with respect to the West (and accentuate the differences in the perception of threat which we mention at the beginning of the article). The same type of evolution for the Left, if it became deprived of its European reference could not but send it once again in the direction of formulae which would be pacifist, neutralist, Third Worldist or even tend once again to link up with the Eastern bloc. Since it is by now clear that the Left is going to play an important role in the future of these countries, it is also clear what the interests are in avoiding such a turn of events.

On the other hand, the development of the "European outlook is not only linked to the good will and the cooperation of the other partners (and in the first place the Federal German Republic) but also in a gradual change in the relationship between Europw and the United States within the Alliance.

We can therefore postulate the case where there will be a conflict between the prospect of greater stability in the long term and the defence of particular interests in the short term. It is from the solution of such aconflict that will depend the type of influence that the Socialist and Communist left will have, in the final analysis, over the future of security in this part of Europe.

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B O L O G N A C O N F E R E N C E

on the West European Left

Bologna, 14 - 16 September 1978

Draft paper submitted by:
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Yet Again Unresolved:
The French Left, 1972 - 1978

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Ronald Tiersky

Ambivalence Yet Again Unresolved: The French Left, 1972 - 1978

Introduction

Facing the potentially historic elections of March 1978, the French "Union of the Left" coalition divided radically against itself. Because of this, although other factors had some influence as well, the Left lost. Because of the quite extraordinary nature of the alliance, furthermore, the internal crisis which usually follows defeat is also extraordinary.

For six years, since the Socialist party (PS) and the Communist party (PCF) signed a joint governmental program in 1972, French politics has been dominated by the possibility that the united Left might win a national election and try to alter basic government policy, even the very structure of French economy and society. After March 1978, however, and despite protestations of fidelity to "Left-wing unity" which its historic leaders are obliged politically to sound, the observer of French politics has legitimate cause to question whether the "Union of the Left" is any longer a recognizable object of analysis.

Heading toward the elections in 1977-78 the French Left failed to resolve - either for public opinion or, more importantly, for itself - its dominant problem, an ambivalence about taking power and about the uses to which power should or could be put. However, ambivalence divided not only the Left alliance as a whole - i.e. the Socialist and Communist parties - it also divided each party within itself. To a surprising extent, furthermore, the non-party organizations which supported ardently the goal of a Left-wing government - in particular the Socialist and Communist

leaning labor unions (CFDT and CGT) - ended up also struck by this schizophrenia regarding how the Left should govern and even whether it should govern at all.

What is the French Left? What was the French Left?

The French Left is a mythic beast. Since the Great Revolution of 1789, it has risen regularly out of what right-wing writers in France sometimes have called le pays reel. Its purpose is to promise or to threaten French society with greater social justice and a radical redistribution of wealth. As in other European countries, ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ xxx whereas Center and Right-wing doctrines generally have called for greater liberty, the ideologies of the Left have demanded equality (as social justice) and fraternity (in the form of working class solidarity become the bond of general social cohesion). At the same time there have be authoritarian extremes of both Right and Left-wing doctrines, based on doctrines of social conflict which obliged the conclusion that the good society could be achieved only through ~~xx~~ repression.

Since French Radicalism, the dominant middle and late 19th century "Left", began decisively to win its battle for political and social secularization (permanent institution of the Republic, permanent republican and democratic primary school system, the Dreyfus affair, formal separation of Church and State in 1911), socialism, in one form or another, has been the dominant Left-wing doctrine. It seemed for a moment at the fin de siecle that syndicalism would be the most powerful form of this dream of justice and community. But the anarcho-syndicalism of the pre-WWI Confederation generale du travail (CGT) could not,

in the nature of real politics, have prevailed. "Party socialism", in the form of the Section francaise de l'Internationale ouvriere (SFIO), which in 1905 unified the Guesdist, Jauresian and other socialist currents into a single party, thereafter focused left-wing politics at the national level. The SFIO's quick dominance was obviously prepared by the weakness of French labor unions historically - both in the sense of anarcho-syndicalism's decline and the relatively low level of unionization and representativeness of French unions generally.

The SFIO, along with nearly all other European socialists movements in the Second International, entered a profound crisis at the time of World War One, both over the issue of whether or not to "participate in a bourgeois government" (~~an issue~~ a false problem far from dead even today, one laments) and, more importantly at the time, of whether ~~xxxxxxx~~ socialists ~~xxxxxxxx~~ should accept the war: That is, whether "working class internationalism" should prevail over "bourgeois nationalism", whether, to use again the imagery of the time, French workers should kill German workers for la patrie, or should instead unite with the European working class as a whole to make the proletarian revolution predicted by Marx and others for half a century previously.

As a result of the imbricated disappointments of the Great War and the less-than-great peace, the Bolsheviks, victorious in Russia, found certain elements of Western European socialism in each country receptive to joining the Communist International they founded in 1919. In France, where anti-colonialism (and to some extent also pacifism) were already strongly associated with anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism, the French Communist party at its foundation in December 1920 immediately posed a formidable challenge to the dominant socialist party, the now "revisionist" SFIO which had supported the war in a government of "national union."

I and other writers have elsewhere analyzed the history of Socialist - Communist rivalry on the French Left since 1920, noting the conjunctural ambivalence and ambiguities, and stressing the fundamental enduring differences.[1] Here, one need only say that the periods of Left-wing alliance (Popular Front,1934-38; in "tripartism" with the Christian Democratic MRP, 1944-47; in the "Union of the Left" since 1972, with the small Movement of Left-wing Radicals (MRG)), as well as the periods of hostility (the 1920s; during the Hitler-Stalin pact, 1939-41; during the Cold War; off and on during the "Union of the Left") have been conditioned more by the basic characteristics of each party than by circumstances. In a word, one understands more about French Left-wing politics if one begins with the basic differences between Western European socialism and communism than if one masters the histoire evenementielle of the 20th century. This fact implies a second: that the central issues dividing French socialism against itself in 1977-78, aside from matters of detail, are still the same disagreementswhich arose from the PCF's "bolshevization" in the 1920s and the crystaliization of Stalinism in the 1930s.

However, this is not to ~~imply~~ say that the PS and PCF in 1978 both won victories of a sort in remaining true to themselves. On the contrary, the fact that the French Left's central divisions have seemed indestructible seems to me - in a way analyzed in detail below - a considerable success of the Communists and a regrettable failure of the Socialists.[2] The Communist party, largely through that persistence which is one of its admirable qualities, has been able to/oblige the French Left-wing mass "audience" (and thus the Socialist party as an "actor") to speak a vocabularly and to use a symbolism derived from 19th century political mythology, an anachronistic Marxist maximalism which serves the PCF in its struggle against overwhelming

odds, and which prevents the new Socialist party from "being itself", or rather "becoming itself:" The Communist party is France's archtypical "industrial party"; the new Socialist party is, or could become, the first "post-industrial party" in France (and, counting only large or mass parties, perhaps anywhere).[3]

In another sense, however, the Communist success in 1977-78 in maintaining political conflict also the old terms of discourse is the sign of its own greater defeat. This is because the Communist party, to the extent it remains in its traditional limitations, is fated to wither as its historic social bases are transformed by macro-social and economic processes. The Socialist party, to the extent it destroys the Communist monopoly of setting political discourse on the Left, can "become itself," i.e. can rally the social bases and pursue the policies to which it aspires, occupying a large and now only partially-filled space which opinion polls detect consistently in French political consciousness. The French Left is indeed, as a Communist slogan has it, a place where "unity is a struggle." In this struggle one is inclined to believe that, unless the PCF makes definitive and radical a tendency to adapt to modern West European society which has been heretofore quite ambivalent and without deep enough roots, the Communist party in the long run can only lose. The Socialist party, on the other hand, can win, particularly if it is able to change the terms in which the struggle is fought more to its favor. One basic PS characteristic has been the necessity of speaking a Communist-derived language from one side of its mouth - i.e. to challenge the PCF as the dominant industrial party - and a new socialist language - autogestionnaire, ecologist, decentralist, womens' and minority group rights, ect. - from the other. Given the unusual

certain smaller political parties or groups in the outer corona of the Left (moderate and far left groups; new "single-issue" opposition organizations). Second, we will make an evaluation of the post-March 1978 situation in the sense of the question posed above: Does the "French Left" still exist?

French Socialism and the New PS

Francois Mitterrand remarked in summer 1977 that the new Socialist party's problem was that "it is obliged to do everything at once." More precisely, the PS problem was the necessity of attempting everything at once: Resolving its own internal disagreements over policy and finding a leadership capable of winning national elections; controlling the Communist party both in terms of policy and of political strategy and tactics; maintaining a program of radical reforms while winning the sympathy or at least the neutrality of the rest of France and of France's Western allies, whether "social democratic" (e.g. the SPD and Labour Government) or "capitalist" (the United States); and, finally, preparing a team of capable people to govern the country through what would in any case present itself as a crisis situation. We can leave a detailed analysis of this extraordinary "problem" for later. Now let us say only the following by way of introduction: Given the Socialist party defeat in March 1978, one method of stating its failure is to say it was unable precisely to achieve everything at once, and the analytical task is then to dissect the bundle of partial successes and failures, in order to see how, altogether, they added up to defeat.

Historically the Socialist party in France, as noted above, was called until 1969 the SFIO. Under its two long-time leaders Léon Blum (1919 - 1940) and Guy Mollet (1946 - 1969) the SFIO could have become a permanent a dominant party in French politics, like the Labour party or the SPD. Between the wars it governed only once, bedeviled in part by the Left-wing mystique against cabinet participation, which allowed the Communist party successfully to wield its preventive accusation of "class collaboration" whenever the social democratic SFIO leaders seemed interested in going to government with "bourgeois" parties. The Popular Front was a Socialist-led Left-wing coalition in which the two other main partners were the newly strengthened PCF (until 1935-36 the PCF had remained a small marginal party following a rapid decline 1920-24) and the Radical party (a remnant of the 19th century battle for laicism, whose leaders played a pivotal role in Third Republic coalitions much beyond what was merited by the organization itself, and whose legacy provided the Movement of Left-wing Radicals for the "Union of the Left" in 1972). The Popular Front, despite several major social reforms, failed in its central task of halting the movement toward a Franco-German war.[4] Its failure, naturally, is not imputable to any single event or element. But one can mention several here, both becauee of their importance in the Popular Front's travail and more importantly because they constitute an example of how certain fundamental Socialist - Communist characteristics have guaranteed persistently the French Left's impotence beyond any joint policies at a given moment.

For one thing the Socialist leadership under Léon Blum was, as usual, deeply split within itself. And what in routine times can be a

fruitful pluralism became in a time of crisis a paralyzing inability to agree, hence to act. Divided over how far and how rapidly to extend domestic economic reform, and, more imperatively, over how to react to the related problems of German militarism and the Spanish Civil War, the SFIO leaders failed to act together, let alone to control the divisions in the larger Popular Front coalition or in the French situation as a whole. The dominant French social classes and their political representatives were of course dead-set against, and at a certain level even scandalized, by this first "socialist" French government. It is hardly necessary to add that other Western governments were not enthusiastic either. Finally, the Communists, who could have done at least something to give the Popular Front a better chance, were obliged, in the nature of their fundamental attachments, to weaken the Popular Front from the inside: first of all to promote the double-game of Soviet foreign policy (toward the Third Reich, the Spanish Civil War and Western Europe in general) and secondly to preserve the PCF's credibility as a radical "vanguard" organization vis-a-vis the SFIO (by agitating for more extreme domestic reforms from a government it claimed to support, wherever such action seemed not likely to threaten the, more important, interests of the international communist movement).

In the Tripartite period at the end of WWII the same essential Socialist and Communist tendencies produced essentially the same results. ~~once again.~~ The political conjuncture, to be sure, had been radically altered by the War and the victorious Resistance. The addition, to the SFIO - PCF retrouvailles, of General de Gaulle, the newly-emerged Christian Democracy (in France the MRP), and the legitimation of international Grand Alliance, for a time promised a basic change in the structure of French and European political life.

But in France, as in Europe as a whole, the competition of several political grand designs (Gaullism, Christian Democracy, the idea of a French Labour party without the Communists precisely ~~and~~ in order to marginalize them, the ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ contrary idea for a reunified Socialist-Communist party) worked to destroy all of them. Soon General de Gaulle retired to Colombey-les-deux Eglises. French Christian Democracy (the MRP) rather quickly lost its popular enthusiasm and began a rapid decline into obscurity in the Fifth Republic. Socialist and Communists in 1945 - 47 renewed their historic ~~xxxx~~ disagreements over differing socialist visions and, ~~xxxx~~ hence, international alignments. In short, the political system of the Fourth Republic quickly came to work much ~~xx~~ like the Third Republic's, even if some of the central actors were new, or had new faces. Yet the Fourth Republic, as many historians have written, might well have survived perhaps permanently were it not for the ~~intricated~~ successive crises of de-colonization, ~~xxx~~ which elicited General de Gaulle's successful establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958.[5] Furthermore, during the Fourth Republic's renewal of "musical chairs" government at the top, French social structure and the French economy had begun - despite or in part also facilitated by this - deep changes and modernizations outside the narrow spotlight of politics as usual.

However this may be, the political costs of decolonization weakened the Socialist party more than any of the other major parties which had dominated the Fourth Republic political game. The Communists in particular were rather successful in perpetuating the myth of their pure anti-colonialism,[6] a bit of subterfuge rendered easier by the fact that the SFIO openly fell away from its own anti-colonialist ~~xx~~ tradition, as in 1914 it had forgotten its anti-militarism and working-class internationalism.[7] The SFIO leader, Guy Mollet, had taken over the

party leadership in 1945 - 46 from Léon Blum, on the basis of a (short-lived) renewal of Socialist-type radical commitments. However, by the last years of the Fourth Republic, the former instituteur from the Pas-de-Calais had added a turnaround on Algerian policy to his generally non-radical domestic politics in the post-war decade. During the "Republican Front" government he led in 1956 - 57 (a Center-Left coalition without the Communist party, inevitable during the Cold War), Mollet achieved a reputation as a staunch Algérie française advocate.[8]

The SFIO was thus largely a spent force by the time the Fifth Republic was established out of the crisis of military colonial revolt in Algiers. The Socialists had failed persistently to overcome their historic ambivalence about government and about its purposes - ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ haunted by an authentic desire for socialism in turn terrified by the possibility that the Bolshevik tragedy was the only possible revolution. The Socialists were ambivalent also about international politics, where the goal of socialism and the SFIO's pacifist and anti-colonialist traditions prevented any but the most ambiguous accomodation with its choice of the West over the Soviet East when finally, in 1946 - 48 a choice was imposed on a party otherwise better suited to indecision. Furthermore, the SFIO's strong ~~xxxx~~ secularism (Mollet's pre-political career as an instituteur was symbolic: the SFIO not for nothing was reputed to be a party of school teachers and university professors) rebuffed the Christian progressive Left-wing public left floating by the MRP's failure. This was potential support which might have slowed, if no more, the SFIO's decline in the 1960s, or at least given it greater currency with which to bargain other political parties during its traversée du désert.

In any case, a complex development brought these same Christian progressives in the middle 1970s as a significant element in the new Socialist party's success. The Christian rally came to a considerable extent from the labor movement,[9] from the Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT), which in 1964 split as a majority faction from the parent Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens (CFTC), adding a Marxist radical program in 1970 to its traditional Christian social reformism. This "marxization" of the now Socialist-leaning CFDT was one delayed effect, and not the least important in the long run, of the "events of May" 1968.

The mixing of strong lay and religious traditions in the new PS was in its very nature incomplete and a further source of internal tension. Nonetheless, the CFDT-PS connection in particular has given the Socialist party a measure of influence in the organized working class, leverage essential if the PS is successfully to challenge Communist party ideological and organizational hegemony on the Left. The CFDT turn to Marxism thus both helped and hindered the PS: On the one hand it authenticated the Socialists' radical credentials and provided a militant base in the workplace, while on the other hand it prevented the PS from developing politically as freely as it might otherwise have done. In particular it obliged the PS to talk a socialist language closer to that of the Communists, adding to a blanket anti-capitalism which implied that social progress could come only in the form of a "rupture" with the established order.

A French leader once asserted that the epochal event of 20th century Left-wing politics was the Communist seizure of the key labor union, the CGT, in 1945 - 46.[10] It may well be true that the source of Communist

persistence in France since 1947 has been not so much the party itself as the union, which, because it is an efficient organization which gets results that people can measure, produces excellent Communist militants, spreads Communist doctrines and maintains broad Communist influence in the major ~~xxxxx~~ productive and social mobilizing sectors of the society. The CGT is a force which obliges French governments continuously to accord the Communist point of view a day-to-day importance beyond any other opposition organization, particularly given the large public sector of the economy whose employees are organized first of all by the CGT. Thus, the recent Socialist party penetration of the labor movement through the CFDT, whatever its insufficiencies and its inconveniences, gives the non-Communist Left some chance to counter the core of Communist strength at the base level.

Important as this recent labor movement support may eventually be, however, the Socialist party which was recreated in 1969-71 from the SFIO first constructed upon other pillars.

The first, an "anti-pillar," was the fact of a political space left vacant, an opportunity. Gaullism, even during the reign of the General himself, had ~~xxxxx~~ changed from a very ~~xxxxxxxx~~ broad and inter-class - in short, amorphous - movement of national union to save the Republic and French Destiny, into a much more narrowly-socio-economic based/~~xxxxx~~ conservatism and political nationalism. Whatever de Gaulle's intentions of promoting a society based on "participation" and a "third way", neither capitalist nor socialist, he never ~~allied~~ applied force sufficient to render his initiatives more than interesting doctrine. One can argue, of course, that pressing national and international

interests (ending the hopeless Algerian war rapidly, creating the right kind of European community) obliged a regrettable choice in priorities. Nonetheless the narrow Gaullist-led victory in the 1967 elections and the social explosion in spring 1968 were evidence that a massive current in French opinion wanted "change," whatever that might mean in terms of actual policies.

Despite their unprecedented scope, the "events of May" seemed finally a demand for reform rather than revolution. Although the revolutionary Far Left endured a spectacular and extremely short-lived popularity at this time, and although as a consequence of May 1968 a certain number of young activists joined the Communists because they now seemed the only "serious" radical force, the otherwise perplexing demobilization after such such a dramatic departure indicates more a traditional French-style incitation to quick public action (sudden, incoherent and surprising to even those who participate, as Tocqueville noted more than a century ago) rather than a demand that heads roll.

The new Socialist party emerged ambiguously at its 1971 Epinay Congress with a radical doctrine (inspired at once by the traditional and the innovative aspects of May 1968) and a leader, François Mitterrand, whose past was many things but not that. Its swift political ascent - from 10-15% of the electorate in 1969 to 25-30% of the opinion polls in 1977, and 23% of the actual vote in 1978 - was due in considerable measure to this very imprecision of image or of intent.

Leaving aside even the Christian progressive CFDT and PSU elements which rallied the PS in 1974, not all of the remaining Socialist electoral renaissance derived necessarily from the Communist or Far Left electorates. To the contrary, many of the new PS voters in the 1970s came from a variety of constituencies seeking a reformist, modernizing Left-wing party, in the

French context meaning a party that would 1) create some plausible alternative to the tirdd Gaullist majorities, and 2) would produce reform policies based on new "post-industrial" clienteles and interests.[11] At the same time, the fact that the new PS was built structurally out of the old SFIO permitted it to retain two other reformist clienteles which the Mollétiste leadership had not yet frittered away: on the one hand the historic anti-Communist Socialists, who still resonated with the radical phrase-mongering which marked each SFIO congress until the end, and on the other hand, more importantly for the strength of the new organization, the traditional SFIO clientele of local government power holders, built up over a half-century (particularly strong in the North) and impregnable even to Communist militancy.

These were the new PS's reformist, or at least moderate constituencies. On the party's left-wing, the renaissance came from a young, hard-core socialist base which had earlier been either Communist or Far Left (Trotskist or French Maoist), and which had drifted twoard the Socialist party renewal because both the PCF and the extremist "groupuscules" seemed to them to have demonstrated their limitations in May 1968. The most important elements of this group organized into the "Center for Socialist Study and Research" (CERES).

The CERES quickly became a separate organization in the party and its leaders had a crucial radicalizing policy influence just as the PS leadership fixed its program in 1971-72 and signed the "Common Program" with the Communists in June 1972. The key CERES capacities were two: an organizational militancy which the new party needed badly, and an ideological or doctrinal fluency which the party leadership accepted (wisely or not), giving the PS a quick appeal to the post-1968 young

generations. CERES's organizational and ideological predilections were once called "proto-Communist" by François Mitterrand. Indeed the CERES has maintained several Communist-style conceptions learned when many of its key leaders were in the PCF or on the Leninist Far Left: The PS commitment to a "rupture with capitalism", in particular, has been a matter of CERES persistence. Yet it is important to note that CERES, which has controlled about 1/5 to 1/4 of the party organization, has much less resonance electorally, and so is much more important within the party (because its skills and its very presence serve quite clear political interests, including a refusal to be intimidated by the Communists, something the older SFIO people could not often muster) than in public opinion.

The CERES pictures itself as the "hinge" which can tie together "social democracy" (the PS tradition) and "Stalinism" (the PCF tradition). This revised vanguardist notion is based on the strategy of radicalizing the PS economic program and assisting in the de-Stalinization of Communist politics. Thus for the CERES both the PS and the PCF are vital to its own "new" socialism, and, as Jacques Julliard says, CERES has had more faith in the "Union of the Left" than in the PS itself. (It is not surprising, moreover, if the Leninist-influenced CERES people despise "social democracy" above all else, both despite and because of their own close relation to it). The failure of the Left in 1978 and the breakdown of PS-PCF alliance at a deep level makes it difficult to imagine what the CERES will do now, but in retrospect one is astonished at how much effect, especially ideologically, it had during the "Union of the Left" 1972-77. Indeed for five years the CERES served, with however much reluctance, as a cover for François Mitterrand's left flank. It even caused problems for the Communists, with its own rather successful radical discourse:

~~Communist~~ With its partial feminist interest in vanguard politics, the CERES-influenced Socialist party obliged the Communists to debate vanguardist pretensions in the public arena - Could the PS be a vanguard party also? Had it replaced the PCF even? - whereas for half a century the Communists had been able more or less to ignore challenges to its claim to be the only authentic revolutionary socialist party in France.[12]

Finally, and most importantly in the sense of being the necessary catalyst in joining the above elements together in the new PS, the Socialists ~~had~~ found a leader of stature. François Mitterrand, who ~~had been seriously~~ compromised in his various manifestations as a Fourth Republic ministrable, emerged from the 1971 Epinay Congress and in the following three years of consolidation as the "Great Federator" of the party.[13] To be sure, the "Union of the Left" - basically any alliance putting together the Socialist and Communist parties - was a project not unique to Mitterrand.[14] But it seems clear that no other leader possessed the "personal equation," to use de Gaulle's evocative language, necessary to bring off such a complex, ~~and~~ ambiguous and audacious undertaking.

In the 1965 presidential elections François Mitterrand, as a joint Left-wing candidate, and with help from center candidates, unexpectedly obliged General de Gaulle into a run-off ballot. He was not even then a member of the SFIO and had not yet embraced a socialist doctrine. In 1974, now both a socialist (though not a Marxist) and leader of the PS, he was again the joint Left-wing candidate. By less than 1 per cent he lost the presidency, which Valéry Giscard d'Estaing took with the avowed intention of shifting the governing majority's base and of bringing the Socialists to government sooner or later. Finally, in 1976-77, in local elections, the PS under Mitterrand's leadership surpassed the Communist party electorate for the first time since the 1930s, about 26% - 21%.

In 1977-78, however, the Socialist party surge and François Mitterrand's global project were both deflated, sapped from within by a bitter struggle with the Communist party in the alliance, and from without by a crucial (if finally not so large) defection in popular support, some of it no doubt the traditional last-minute flight from the Left, but some caused also by what this internecine struggle revealed about the nature of the alliance. In the logic of circumstances as they seemed in early 1977 (Left-wing dynamism, Western economic problems and their consequences in France - heavy unemployment, inflation and stagnation of production and private investment) the "Union of the Left" seemed hardly capable of losing the 1978 elections. The key element in producing this difficult to achieve result was precisely that element over which Mitterrand himself (the degree of personal authority in PS strategy 1971-77 was overwhelming) had the least control, or was at least the most difficult to forsee: the Communist leadership's capacity to make a radical choice against the Socialists, and hence against a Left-wing victory itself. Most observers agree, although we do not know for certain because we cannot penetrate Communist secrecy, that while the PCF leadership could not entirely have excluded the possibility of victory in March 1978, even right up to the first ballot, they chose sometime in the previous half year to try to prevent it. An explanation of the reasons for such a radical choice will lead us eventually back to a restatement of the essential characteristics of French communism historically, and of the PCF's failure to push sufficiently quickly or profoundly its evolution away from this past, before it was faced with a moment of truth.

The French Communist Party

Like the Socialist party, the French Communist party for the past decade has acted out of a fundamental ambivalence, conflicting conceptions of what the party should be, and what the party should seek to accomplish, and how the two are related. Using ideological shorthand one can say the PCF in the 1970s oscillated between its traditional Leninism-Stalinism and its recent tendencies toward Eurocommunism.

On the one hand the dominant mode of PCF psychology and action traditionally has been what I am calling here Leninism-Stalinism. Briefly, by this I mean the PCF was "bolshevized" in the 1920s, therein adopting a Leninist conception and organization of the communist party as the "vanguard of the working class." The ~~Leninist~~ PCF was "Stalinized" even as it was being Leninized and consolidated ~~consolidated~~ in the decade after bolshevization began in 1924, along with ~~just as~~ Soviet politics itself. Other West European Communist parties accepted Leninism-Stalinism in theory but for various reasons worked out organizational patternsin practice much more adapted to Western European society. The PCF, on the other hand, even after it grew from a small party of a few tens of thousands, in the 1920s, to a party of 200-300,000 in the 1930s, maintained two key elements of the Leninist doctrine which many other Western CPs chose to avoid or to ignore.

The first was a dogmatic proletarianism, or ouvrierisme. This doctrine of hero-worship of the working class (or at least of its idealized image) produced results, and satisfied ~~suited~~ the newly-arrived Communist party in France, ideologically all the more in that socialist or anarchist/ouvrièrisme was by the 1920s already a French Left-wing tradition of more or less half a century. The PCF's ouvrièrisme, inside the party, was a kind of terrorism about members' social origins, which privileged real or pretended workers once they got into the struggle for advancement in

the leadership or in the party bureaucracy: A natural corollary was intimidation of the poor bourgeois or intellectual who joined up on the honest desire precisely to "betray" his class. The second Leninist recommendation which saturated French Communist psychology was a preference for a small, selective and highly disciplined party apparatus as opposed to a larger, more open and less tightly-directed organization. This policy of close supervision, or encadrement, of the entire party truly was meant at first to produce the Leninist ideal of a party as "organizational weapon," an apparatus which could be quickly mobilized as a striking force, hitting at a specified target, with a certain intent, and so on.

In addition, finally, to the ouvrieriste and encadrement mentalities which dominated French communism historically, a third element in the PCF tradition was not so much Leninist as Stalinist: "unconditional loyalty" to the Soviet Union, which, vis-a-vis the West, meant in practice mainly acting as an arm of Soviet foreign policy rather than seeking power for itself.

This tripartite PCF tradition was consolidated at the end of World War II, when the Great Power alliance disaggregated and Europe was divided at the Iron Curtain, suffering the unavoidable consequences of Liberal - Communist Cold War and great power confrontation. The French Communist movement at this time moved into a political ghetto for 15 years, "drawing up the wagons in a circle", so to speak, to form a rather impermeable "counter-society" whose purpose was to propagandize Soviet foreign policy (e.g. the "Peace Movement," the "Stockholm petition" against nuclear weapons, etc.) and otherwise to nourish itself solely within its own passion, while waiting for the Soviet system, as Khrushchev boasted, to"prove its superiority to capitalism."

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During the 15 years following Stalin's death in 1953, nonetheless, the French Communist party began to produce - however sporadically and however much slower than other West European CPs, especially the Italian Communist party (PCI) - internal pressures toward erosion of this by now much compromised tradition. Partly as a result of the de-Stalinization controversy joined throughout the international communist movement, and partly as a result of domestic political considerations, the French Communists began to preach a less dogmatic socialist doctrine, based on a somewhat enlarged legitimation of social diversity (i.e. a slight weakening of ouvrièrisme) and less political determinism (not only did the USSR not overtake American productivity in the short run, it began to be permitted to doubt whether, again as Khrushchev had said, the grandchildren of the Kennedy generation would indeed live under a red flag). Following the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia ~~xxhix~~ in 1968, which shocked the non-ruling CPs profoundly, French Communist innovations moved toward the taking of decision-making autonomy from traditional Soviet control of PCF strategy. In late 1975, the PCF switched sides against the Soviets in preparations for the 1976 international communist East Berlin conference: The point of no return on the question of party autonomy was crossed apparently in this episode.

The PCF critique of its traditional doctrine and power relationships was not simply negative, however. It also involved moving toward some coherent strategy for what the communist parties generally had come to call a "peaceful transition to socialism," a plan for superseding capitalism and installing socialism which did not presuppose either a violent revolution or, as one later was told, a post-revolutionary "dictatorship of the proletariat."

In short, as part of the tendency to move away from its solid Stalinist tradition, the French Communist party had to develop a coherent conception of itself as a party of government, i.e. party which might reasonably expect to take power electorally and to use this legitimately won power thereafter to force a "transition to socialism." The explanation of the PCF's obstinate and finally successful attempts from the early 1960s forward to draw the Socialists into a governmental program alliance - despite the possibility of creating a potential rival - lies here: In order to play its vanguard role the new PCF doctrine set the necessity of using a series of electoral alliances in which it was not likely, at first anyway, to be the preponderant force (the "great schism" of political loyalties in Europe seemed to have condemned the PCF to permanently secondary responsibilities in the national government, if at all) in order to manipulate its own ultimate political supremacy and, finally, to realize its grand vision of a new society. Therefore, in the "peaceful transition to socialism" doctrine the problem of becoming a serious government party aspirant in the Republic was merged with the Leninist idea of the vanguard party. Curiously, it now was apparent how different in certain ways were Leninism and Stalinism: Whereas Leninism was a mode of thought more or less entirely centered on the problem of winning power (making the revolution, moving from opposition to government), Stalinism, with its primacy of foreign CP loyalty to Soviet goals which might or might not fit their own, turned out to be a monumental conservatism for the non-ruling Communists - a preference for remaining loyal to Stalin and to the USSR, and therefore permanent opposition, rather than breaking loose from Soviet-style "proletarian internationalism" in order really to seek power for themselves. In this sense, the PCF's

determination in the 1960s and 1970s to go to government was <u>itself</u> one aspect of de-Stalinization. This and related changes in the <u>ouvriériste</u> and <u>encadrement</u> traditions (enlarging the party, loosening the requirements of members, asserting that socialism "in French colors" need not imply the disappearance of non-socialist classes, groups and even, to some limited degree, political organizations) furthermore turned out to be developments in harmony with a more general transformation of several Western European (and Japanese, etc.) communist parties which in the middle 1970s began to be called "Eurocommunism;" a communism which, were the "ideal-type" ever to be realized in practice, would be autonomous of Soviet control, non-violent, reformist in method if still radical in intent, and perhaps even liberal, although the latter seems to be the most difficult characteristic for any would-be Eurocommunist party to produce.

When the PCF leaders signed the "Common Program" in 1972 with the PS and MRG, the Communist party was by far the strongest party, not only organizationally but also electorally. (Had the new Socialist party not been temporarily so weak, it is very possible its leaders would not have considered it worthwhile to sign such a program, which limited the PS's choices significantly in the following years, just as the Communists had intended). In any case, between 1972 and 1976 the Communist electoral superiorly was erased. The Socialist party, building on the various elements of strength discussed above, became not only the dominant party electorally on the Left, but, according to the results of local elections in 1976 and 1977, the largest electoral party in France - moreover the only party in ascendency in the country as a whole (the Gaullist decline seemed particularly impressive), the only party seeming to

operato with a logic of breaking through the 30% barrier, i.e. of becoming a dominant government party like the SPD or the Labour party, or even, speaking strictly in terms of coalition formation, like the German or Italian Christian Democratic party.

The PCF leaders did not accept easily this new Socialist superiority, although even in 1972 they must have recognized two probabilities about the "Union of the Left": that Left-wing gains would go first mainly to the Socialists, and the PCF would enter a government as a junior partner to the PS, at least electorally and in terms of parliamentary seats. What the PCF leaders could not accept, however, was the fact that their party made no gains at all electorally 1972-77 (despite even the above-cit open concomittant changes to the party etc.), while the PS moved ahead remarkably. This inter-party rivalry on the Left, furthermore, was all the more dangerous and unusual in that the Communist party vanguard pretence itself was obviously at stake, as was therefore the entire Communist mythology of the "peaceful transition to socialism", once the Communist leadership had effectively launched an attempt: The price of possible success is possible failure. (The paradoxical attraction of permanent opposition for a vanguardist party is thus evident).

In 1974-75 the PCF leadership launched a vicious old-style Communist attack on the Socialist party, following Mitterrand's near presidential victory for the Left (i.e. especially for the Socialists) in May and several Communist failures in by-elections in the fall. In 1977-78 it cranked up the Leninist-Stalinist attack machine again, following new Socialist gains (and a significant PCF gain in the 1977 municipal elections, one notes) and Socialist refusal to agree to early Communist proposals for up-dating the 1972 joint program for the 1978 elections. By summer 1977 the PS

success and the PCF stagnation had placed the Communist leaders in a dilemma which went far beyond immediate tactical problems: In choosing their tactical attitude toward the Socialist party at this point, the Communists in the nature of circumstance chose also in a larger sense between, on the one hand, their still powerful tradition - the dogmatically working-class, organizationally-elitist and psychologically-Stalinist "vanguard party" - and, on the other hand, their tentative new Eurocommunist tendencies - which, again in their ideal-type version, legitimate a ~~strongly~~ less monopolist pretense of vanguardism as well as permanent social and political pluralism.[16]

In a word, the political risk of choosing the new over the old, the immanent over the ancient PCF, was too great for the leadership to take, at least at this point and at this stage of the PCF's own internal struggle. This no doubt was how the leadership itself conceived the alternative. But perhaps one should say rather that the situation was, indeed objectively acceptable, and that it was the leadership itself which was not psychologically prepared to follow through on its own strategy, which would have meant, again to use shorthand, choosing Eurocommunism over Leninism-Stalinism.[17] The two explanations may even be consequence and cause: During the past few years, observers have been much interested in the hypothesis that the PCF must change drastically or face an inevitable "historic decline," Its traditional social bases are in some places withering away (The PCF has combined a "modernist" working class with a "traditionalist" disprivileged clientele. The industrial working class is declining as a relative percentage of the force, as in other post-industrial social structures, and the relatively

unmodernized sectors of society are declining as a whole. The PCF can continue to count on a strong skilled working class and functionary sector, but elsewhere must replace and even expand on its losses. The Communists must change appeals (i.e. themselves) in order successfully to compete for new political clienteles, which in any case will not look like the traditional industrial working class proletariat at the center of Marx's calculation of the likelihood of socialism. In 1977-78 the leadership seemed to decide that its best alternative was to conserve the party's established position, rather than to try to better it, which could be accomplished only by risking it, and then not for sure. The way to do this, so their reasoning seemed to go, was to diminish the potential Socialist party gains, by destroying Left-wing unity and by attacking the PS's credibility - at once to scare off moderate voters who counted on a strong PS to control the PCF, and to hive off radical voters who saw the Communist party as a guarantee of Socialist radical intentions and who therefore accepted the Communist accusation that the Socialists, as always, had "turned to the right" at the crucial moment. Otherwise, so the Communist reasoning must have concluded, a tremendous PS victory in 1978 could have lost forever the contest for dominance on the Left, with all the "socialist" and "vanguardist" prize included. The PCF would have found itself in a permanent minority position, from which it would not likely have been able to escape the "historic decline" prediction.

Ultimately, however, even the success in holding down PS gains in 1978 - and thus preserving at least temporarily a certain equilibrium on the Left - may have only delayed rather than avoided the PCF's relative weakening. It is unjustified as yet to posit an empirical verification of the "withering away" of French communism, but in any

case it seems clear that the PCF's radical choice in 1977-78 has destroyed for several years at least any possibility of government participation, and perhaps then only if its leadership has changed. (It is unlikely the PCF, after all it has done in the past 15 years, could accept one or a few portfolios in a government over which it had no control; and it is now even more unlikely that any governing coalition, with or without the Socialists, could have even the minimum confidence in Communist loyalty necessary to govern with this group of leaders as a more or less full partner).

Further speculation is beyond my intent. What is important here, in conclusion, is to recognize that in choosing continued opposition and a renewal of traditional Leninist-Stalinist politics vis-a-vis the Socialists, the PCF damaged seriously its vanguard party pretence, precisely by throwing into question its pretension to be a serious and legitimate government party aspirant. During the electoral campaign, and even more so since, the Communists have behaved not as a potential government party but rather as a party of permanent opposition - the French Communist version of which has been traditionally Stalinist to its marrow.[5]

A French "apertura a sinistra"?

What of the rest of the French political spectrum, as it fits with the analysis just done? One is tempted to begin: Le centre est mort; vive le centre!

The traditional centrists in French politics - the Radical party, Christian progressives, and a motley of liberals, republicans "peasants" and "democrats for progress" - have been unable in the past decade to escape the logic of electoral bi-polarization. The Movement of Left-wing Radicals,

which signed on contre nature with the PS and PCF in the 1972 Common Program and in the "Union of the Left" generally, waited all of about one hour after the polls closed the evening of the second ballot in 1978 before diving into what American journalists unfailingly call an 'agonizing reappraisal.' For all intents and purposes the MRG failed utterly to make a go of its 1972 decision to join the socialist Left, and whether it now remains in the Left, joins the PS outright, splits, or rejoins its parent Radical party in Giscard's new Union for French Democracy (UDF) is not of great consequence politically, although, as in the "Union of the Left", its small electoral weight (3%) could be crucial given certain circumstances.

The major question on the other hand is whether President Giscard d'Estaing will be able to "govern France in the center", as he has put it. ~~This~~ Politically, this would mean three ~~thing~~ things: that Giscard move successfully away from the Gaullists (RPR) to some extent, escaping the tactical emprise of former Prime Minister Jacques Chirac; that Giscard strike a bargain with the old center remnants still outside the UDF; and, most imporantly, that he make some connection with the Socialist party, or perhaps even only some parts of it, should the PS not hold together. This project - which might, with only some imprecision, be called a French apertura a sinistra - remains of course hypothetical at this point. No one pretends to know what form a Giscard - Gaullist separation might take, let alone a "new center" with the Socialists (who are likely to keep talking "Union of the Left" until the 1981 presidential elections permit some more exact reckonings to be taken). Giscard seems to be correct, judging by various opinion polls, that the French people would now support a moderate change-oriented new center or center-left political orientation, and that the political bi-polarization -

at least in its extremism - ill reflects French society. Yet it will not be a simple matter to achieve a government "in the image of the nation." Too much anti-capitalist and anti-Western politics have had their effect. And the radical bi-polarization, in its early stages as much the result of institutions (e.g. the electoral law) as of ideologies, was exacerbated thereafter kx as much by the governing majority's shortsightedness and cupidity as by either a Left-wing "totalitarian temptation" or some illusory socialist fraternity.

Conclusion: The Eternal Return or a New Beginning?

In the middle 1970s the requisites existed for an attempt at a "transition to socialism" in France. These were: a potentially majority alliance of Socialists and Communists, a program agreement to launch massive changes in economy and society (especially nationalization of credit and industry, and wholesale redirection of public and private investment), and a public prepared either to support or to endure the experience. However shot through with internal incoherence, however ambiguous the public support, and however cautionary the solo precedent (the Allende tragedy in Chile), the French Left in 1978 raised the possibility of an historic moment, whether one liked it or not: if not necessarily of a "transition to socialism" that at least certainly some leap into the highly unpredictable.

However the Left failed. It neither won the March 1978 elections nor, therefore, began whatever it might have begun as a government coalition. Moreover the source of the Left's defeat was as much if not more its own doing (the PCF's doing in particular) as any resilience of the old majority or the hasards of social and economic conditions. In a word,

the French Left, just when it might have won the chance to realize its old socialist dream, subverted itself. But the Left has subverted itself repeatedly for half a century. Was this simply the "eternal return"? Today, despite the new defeat, does the old mentality still prevail? Is it still, after a simple accident de parcours, the "old" parties and the "old" alignments?

It seems to me, although the Left-wing leaders have not yet (and could not have) given up publicly the old idea and the old phrases of Left-wing unity, that something fundamentally serious happened in 1977-78 because of the Communist choices. At least a generation of Socialist and Communist leaders have been marked deeply by the failure to play out the "rupture with capitalism" logic in 1978. The "Union of the Left", the idea of a Socialist-Communist alliance for a "transition to socialism," may never again be so convincing as it was in the middle 1970s, either for the leaders or for the long-suffering and eternally disappointed anti-capitalist rank-and-file. In the short term, in any case, the observer is led to conclude that the "Union of the Left" seems no longer an identifiable subject of analysis.

This political failure of anti-capitalist politics has broader ramifications as well. Merging with the recent new Left-wing criticism of Stalinism, of Leninism and even of the Marxist base itself, it reinforces tendencies weakening the myth of the working class and of its supposed destiny to take power in society to create something called "socialism." In short, the 1978 Left-wing failure could conceivably foreshadow the supersedence of French Left-wing industrial (class struggle, anti-capitalist) politics as a whole, which must either succeed or die (contrary to Marx's opinion these are not inevitably the same) at some point in time.

Today one can only forecast the alternatives. It is impossible to judge with any rigor their probability of realization.

The "Union of the Left", despite everything pointed to above, may indeed be resurrected. It would no doubt require new leaders in one or both parties and even then the possible circumstances are difficult to envisage (even the 1981 presidential elections, for which the PS and PCF have already promised separate candidates, may not, despite its majority bi-polarization logic, produce a new "Union of the Left": the election of 1969 did not, for example). In any case, a new Socialist-Communist alliance would be unlikely to produce the kind of detailed radical program which the Communists continue to proclaim a sine qua non of Left-wing credibility but which the Socialists increasingly perceive as a recipe for disaster by contract. It is only a seeming paradox to say that this kind of "Union of the Left" - the old formula - is precisely the logic of the recidivist Communist choice in 1977-78. That is, the PCF leaders may choose not to take the risks of winning even with such an alliance and such a program (this was their choice indeed) but certainly, so long as they remain with the traditional logic and the absence of unconditional Soviet loyalism to justify exceptions, they have no chance of going to government outside of some clearly Left-wing coalition.

The Socialists, on the contrary, have been and remain handicapped by the old logic, an iron collar which becomes intolerable to the extent the PS is once again equal or stronger electorally than the PCF. The "old" PCF is a machine which can be geared only to the "old" Left-wing industrial politics drive-shaft - the Communist vanguard role doctrine, the myth of a unique working class destiny, and their combination in the seductive imagery of the "Left" and its "struggle for socialism." Indeed, to the extent one

can say that class conflict and the arguments about "capitalism" and "socialism" have been the characteristic politics of Western European society in the century of industrialization and of the Communist Manifesto, it becomes clear ~~xx~~ in what sense, in France, the Communist party has been, par excellence, the typical industrial party or, rather, the party of industrial politics. The PCF's major clientele - salaried workers, whether industrial or bureaucratic, private sector or public sector - was the "new class" produced by industrialization. The Communist party's major issue or problematique has been precisely the double perspective of salaried workers in industrial society: on the one hand the defense of acquired interests difficultly achieved, and on the other hand the enticing vision of a society in which the basic social tendences of European industrialism itself (class conflict, the ~~biased satisfactions~~ unforseen dissatisfactions of economic and social democratization) are no longer the locus of political conflict.

In short, the PCF choice in 1977-78 was literally recidivist. Fear of risking a painfully-acquired and maintained capital incited the inner directorate to choose again the party's traditional identity as the archtypical, if not necessarily the most morally praiseworthy industrial party (the Communists would prefer to call themselves, on this point the ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ highest form of anti-capitalist political development). To be sure, the Communists realized in the 1960s and 70s gradually that they had to adapt the party if in the long term it was to prosper ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ and even simply to escape an historic decline.[18] But, for reasons I have sketched in above and analyzed elsewhere in detail, they did not go fast enough or far enough, ~~and arrived~~ arriving at the major PS-PCF confrontation 1973 - 76 a day late and a dollar short.[19] The "Union of the Left" alliance,

the keystone of Communist strategy, progressed in these years only because the Socialist party progressed. The Communist strategy was working, but for the Socialists. In 1977-78, therefore, the PCF leaders were faced with the choice of pursuing their "new industrial party" or "Eurocommunist" identity to the end - though under conditions less favorable than they had expected, but still acceptable in a purely rational calculation - or of going back to the "old industrial party" logic of permanent Stalinist anti-capitalist opposition. One is tempted to believe the PCF leadership finally could not endure the risk of radical innovation under less than ideal circumstances.[29] Thus the traditional PCF, in practice basically a defensively-oriented, pro-Soviet party of permanent opposition (what I have elsewhere called its roles of "tribune" and "counter-society"), rationalized and maintained by its psychologically determining vanguard party rhetoric, may no longer suffice onto itself.[30] To the extent it remains locked into a policy of conserving its traditional identity and (hence) social bases above all else, it will remain both in opposition and in danger of seeing its electoral stagnation become a perhaps slow but certain decline.

The Socialist party, however, has been since the Popular Front basically a party of government. Both despite and because of the SFIO-PS changeover in 1969-71, it remains so today, in the sense that while its top leadership and central goal has been defined ~~essentially~~ more in terms of winning political power ~~rather~~ than in terms of some precise social or economic vision, the Socialist party since Epinay has nonetheless also acted out a certain ambivalence about power and its uses. But whereas the PCF ambivalence was concerned wanting power or avoiding it the Socialist ambivalence was a matter of two different logics, both of which led to government.

On the one hand the PS had to be created in part as an attempt to realize the traditional prophecy of the French Left: i.e. to lead the working class to socialism. In a word, France being what it is, the PS had to base its strategy one-half on a challenge to the PCF's role as the dominant protagonist of industrial or anti-capitalist politics. However the Communist party could hardly be attacked successfully by battling it solely on its own terrain. The image of a "red bastion" (i.e. the analysis of the "counter-society") is not inaccurate. In addition, therefore, the Socialist party had to grow also on other, non-Communist social bases, in order to become the dominant party which François Mitterrand's strategy and goals implied. Thus a serious strategy for victory (this, after all, was Mitterrand's essential contribution to the renewal of French socialism) required that the new PS take the struggle with the Communists onto a new <u>champ de bataille</u>, which I am calling the terrain of post-industrial politics.

The PCF, because of its commitment to the working class myth and to a Soviet-derived conception of socialist economy (even, heretofore, in its Eurocommunist moments) can only be essentially an industrial party. The Communist ambivalence about power - the "old" and the "new" logics, refusing power and seeking power, Stalinism and Eurocommunism - can be resumed basically as two, partially-overlapping conceptions of being an industrial party. The Socialist party ambivalence on the other hand is the attempt (and, first of all, the necessity) to be <u>simultaneously</u> an industrial party and a post-industrial party. The new Socialist party in France is thus of interest quite beyond the French context: Obliged to challenge the PCF's half-century hold on the commanding Left position in French industrial politics, the

PS - at least because of the logic of seeking power by gaining votes, although to some extent also because of some more noble end - had at the same time to become the first clear example of a major post-industrial party.

Let us define a post-industrial party by several criteria. First is that it not be a class party, or at least a class party of the industrial type, which is to say based on a single class (the working class) or on a heterogeneous group of class and strata relationships which add up in popular opinion to a single class (the bourgeoisie). The temptation is immediate thereupon to identify a post-industrial party in this sense as no more than a special type of cross-class "catch-all" or "popular" party. But it is neither - or rather not only - a cross-class "catch-all" aggregator of sundry interests and opinions, nor a broad-based yet nonetheless basically lower class, or "popular" party. Rather a post-industrial party pays particular attention and has particular appeal to what are termed post-industrial social categories. Here we need simply list the key ones:[21] the new scientific, technical and intellectual strata in the tertiary sector; the growing stratum of salaried middle and upper management workers; politicized ethnic and race minority, and certain other special interest groups (e.g. women organizing corporately to gain specific womens' rights in divorce, child-bearing, job remuneration, etc.) and, finally, but not least important, young people, especially new voters 18-21 and university students.[22] It is not the place here to present a detailed empirical analysis of the extent to which the post-1971 French Socialist party

is based on post-industrial social bases and xxxxxxxxx political interests.[23] In any case, moreover, we would find the data indicating considerable evidence which does not fit the hypothesis, e.g. a strong working class vote (about one-third of the PS total, in absolute numbers not far from the PCF total). The analysis of the PS made here, of course, is not limited to saying it is a post-industrial party: On the contrary, ty argument is complex, based partly on xxx evidence that the PS electorate demonstrates precisely the dual industrial/post-industrial logic of the Socialist renewal as a whole.[24]

One finds a xxx similar ambivalence in Socialist party doctrine, an industrial politics imagery of "class front" alliance (not very convincing because of the basic PS ambivalence on xxxxxxxxx this very point), combined with a post-industrial autogestion version of socialism which never quite evades giving the impression that xxx the main obstacle to its realization is not the bourgeoisie but rather centralized state power. This duality in Socialist party doctrine has been located in another way by Jacques Julliard: Because of xxx popular success of the socialisme autogestionnaire theme, there are/xxxx now deux discours de la classe ouvriere in France, two languages and imageries of working class politics.[25] Julliard could have added that one of these languages - that of industrial politics - is common to the Socialists and Communists, and is the ground of their struggle for similar or even the same social, political and ideological territory, the historic territory of the French left.[26] The other language, however, is proper to the Socialist party.[27] It is of course not yet clear whether the Socialists/xxx will succeed in imposing their post-industrial and autogestion politics on a Left-wing public so long in the thrall of the PCF's version

of socialism: the final working class struggle and victory in industrial politics.[29] For the moment one can say however that the idea of a socialisme autogestionnaire has had such a wide appeal in France because, as we now see, it is both "industrial" and "post-industrial": The idea is a bridge which links the traditional centerpiece of French Left-wing industrial politics, the goal of socialism, with devolution of national state authority (to local government, to corporate groups, to minorities, into intra- and trans-national organizations), in certain cases the basic category of post-industrial political demands. Moreover, if there is a socialisme autogestionnaire there is also an autogestion without socialism, understood in the traditional sense of collectivization of the means of production and distribution. Thus the ground is prepared for some potential future consensus about at least the questions in French political life, if not about the answers.

Finally, then, even if the Socialist party fails ultimately to emerge as a dominant party by fully "becoming itself," its interest for observers of political life in advanced industrial societies is radical. It is, potentially, and already partly in reality, a new type of party with a new political program, an agenda of issues which attracts the innovative elements of existing social democratic parties, modernist "catch-all" parties and also the most advanced elements of Eurocommunism. Thus, despite its failure in 1977-78, the French Socialist party has blazed a trail, and its potential atavism should not be discounted.

The Communist and Socialist parties in 1978 thus remain both ambivalent in their natures. But the Socialist party ambivalence is at once more interesting intellectually and more promising socially. Beyond

whatever leadership changes may occur, the Socialist future will be indicated by the party's popular appeal. Its dual social base can lead in one of two directions: that of the CERES-influenced industrial party logic still dominated by the Communist party, or that of the autogestion post-industrial party logic which ultimately opens onto the key problem of the new politics: the increasing relative autonomy of the state vis-a-vis class conflict and corporate power, and the resulting danger to liberal regimes of contemporary Leviathan.

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Notes

1. See Tiersky, Kriegel, Verdier, Fauvet (with Duhamel), Walter, etc.

2. The Socialist party SFIO ~~is~~ has been known as the PS since it was recreated on a new basis 1969-71. Alain Savary was a transition leader 1969-71, and at the Epinay party congress in 1971 François Mitterrand became the leader.

3. It is not to reveal any secret to say the term "post-industrial" is like a bullfighter's cape. I do not mean it in the polemical or ideological sense of arguing some kind of a sequence of "industrial society - post-industrial society" which might be opposed to a theory of a "capitalism - socialism" sequence. (Nor does any serious writer as far as I know). I mean it in an analytical sense, to refer to a transformation of social structure in advanced industrialism; thus "post-industrial society" is a misnomer as far as I am concerned. "Post-industrialism" is a concept to refer to new or emerging social categories, which have ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ characteristics and interests tending to create political issues decisively different from the typical politics of industrial social bases, i.e. class politics. (See Bell, ~~xxx~~ Inglehart, etc.) A society can be ~~xxxx~~ characterized therefore by both capitalism and post-industrialism (or, socialism and post-industrialism), just as ~~xxxxxxxx~~ capitalism and socialism may also be two forms of industrializing or industrial society. To be frank, aside from clarity about ~~theory~~ method the reason for this explanation is simply to try to ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ forestall my Marxist friends from the easy (and false) accusation that my intent is to 'defend post-industrial society against socialism.' My position is not political, and at the level of theory it is neither "for" post-industrialism nor "against" socialism. They are, both interesting ideas indeed

4. It has been characteristic of French politics for nearly two centuries that in crisis situations of a certain dimension the powers that be call on an homme de recours (or, in this case, a radical change in governing ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ alliance, a coalition de recours) to resolve a mess he (or ~~they~~) did not make, in exchange for the possibility (immediately narrowed once the crisis is past) of implementing a new policy. Examples are Napoleon, Clemenceau, Blum and the Popular Front, General de Gaulle (Boulanger was a not-so-near miss). Despite the Western economic recession in the 1970s, the "Union of the Left" was not like the Popular Front in this regard. It was never perceived as a recourse in crisis (although the Communists tried to make it seem so).

5. See Bernard Brown, Fauvet, etc.

6.

7. See Simmons, Combin, etc. The Christian Democratic MRP was less damanged by the colonial issue than by its own internal incoherence and by competition from the Gaullists during the latters' period of radical opposition, 1947 - 53, and later from "surge" movements like Poujadism, all of which challenged the MRP for the clerical conservative, progressive and nationalist social bases.

8. François Mitterrand, at this time a non-Socialist ministrable who at one point was Minister of the Interior, also achieved a reputation as a hardline supporter of the attempt to maintain French colonies. The public memory ofthis position has been one limit on his popularity within the Left in the past decade.

9. In particular after the Assises du socialisme (October 1974), which brought not only union support but also the central leaders of the Unified Socialist Party (PSU), including Michel Rocard, to the PS. See the proceedings of this convention in a volume with the same title (Paris, 1975).

10. This completed a strategy first begun during the Popular Front, when the largely Socialist-oriented trade unionists agreed to reunify their union, the CGT, with the small xx PCF-controlled CGTU, which had split off 15 years before to join the Profintern. As a result of the Communist internal takeover in 1945-46 the Socialist unionists split to form the minority CGT-Force ouvriere (known generally as FO) in 1947. FO, a product of the Cold War, was financed as we now know by largely by American sources, just as the Communists were financed by the Soviets. Altogether, French domestic politics provided a mirror image of international politics.

11. In short this meant a party that could occupy the empty political space created by Gaullism's social constriction and by the PCF's failure either to win back the traditionalist voters it had lost to Gaullism in 1958 or successfully to solicit (as the Italian Communists were doing) the modernist interests in society.
In the 1960s some of the new post-industrial groups had been organized into "clubs" in which the top leadership was generally made up of professionals, journalists and medium and high-ranking civil servants. Some of the issues raised were, for example, the state/citizen and state/society relations, local government powers and finance, reform of the bureaucracy. The Club des Jacobins was a xxxx rather successful representative of the type. xxx The interested reader can consult its publications: e.g. L'etat et le citoyen (Paris,), etc.

12. The xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx usual killing line for the Communists was to note that 'social democracy has never made a revolution.'
Another beneficiary of the CERES-PS success in this regard was the Far Left, which appears to have a stable electorate now of more or less 3 per cent (in 1973 and again in 1978) which the Communist party no longer controls or has great hopes of co-opting.

13. Mitterrand played a crucial personal role with enormous talent and subtlety. But one must add that the underlying basis of federation - what held together the diverse socialist currents against each other and often also against Mitterrand's xxxxxxx overwhelming personal authority - was the institution of a directly-elected president and the logic of political-electoral bi-polarization it set in place.

14. Here I am talking of non-Communist leftists. The PCF had been after a "Common Program" with the Socialists since the early 1960s. Achieving it, given the fundamental anti-Communism of the electorate and of the Socialists as well, was a large Communist success.

15. On the tradition of ouvrierisme, encadrement and Soviet loyalism, see my chapter in Rudolf L. Tokes (ed.), Eurocommunism and Detente (forthcoming). On the "counter-society" see Annie Kriegel, Les communistes francais (Paris, 1970, 2nd ed.) and my xxxxxxxxxx analysis in French Communism, 1920-1972 (New York, 1974). On the "Peace Movement" and the PCF as an arm of Soviet foreign policy in general during this period, see Marshall Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (New York, 1969 and Tiersky, op. cit.

16. Here is not the place to discuss the issue of whether the Italian and Spanish Eurocommunist notion of "hegemony" is or could become an authentic liberal conception of pluralism.

17. In the chapter in Tokes, op. cit., I have called the autonomous, xxx xxxxx strictly nationalist in certain matters and Stalinist in others, PCF a "gaullocommunism." It is an evocative term, but to add it to an already considerable conceptual load would be abusive.

18. As the Italian Communist leaders recognized even earlier. The xxx French Communist reaction however, unlike that of the PCI, came too late to produce even modest immediate results (Paradoxically, the Socialist party would have been perhaps better served if the PCF had progressed somewhat also 1972-76. This is one justification for the PS leadership's otherwise puzzling generous attitude toward the PCF in the 1977 municipal elections. PCF electoral gains at this point would have also, no doubt, reinforced the Eurocommunist tendencies in xxx xxxxxxxx what I have elsewhere analyzed as choice between Eurocommunism and Caullocommunism. See the source cited in note 17.

19. For a detailed analysis of this period see my "French Communism in 1976," Problems of Communism (January-February 1976), and the chapters in the Hoover Institution's Yearbook on International Communist Affairs for 1976 and 1977.

20. Neil McInnes has rightly remarked that one of the characteristics of Western European Communist leaders has been the tendency, perhaps derived from the thesis of "historical inevitability," to underestimate the opposition they face in the long run. The other possibility, of course, is that the interpretation is too generous, and that the West European Communists never really believed they would come to power or gave up this belief early on - which would go some xxx way to explain the strength of Stalinism in relation to Leninism in a given party. Leninism, a true revolutionary mentality, is precisely a mode of thought and action for radical innovation in less than ideal circumstances (i.e. making a revolution).

21. For summaries of a mass of literature, and for their own important contributions, see Bell (op. cit.) and Inglehart (op. cit.).

22. It is too neatly in accord with my argument here, but nonetheless not entirely unimportant evidence therefore, that after the 1978 elections the two major PS "currents" (the "majority" around Mitterrand and the "minority" based on the CERES) were joined by two fledgling xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx groups: a "womens' current", led by a xxx PS mayor elected in 1977 and new to politics, and a "young peoples' current". The point is not, moreover, that the PS has necessarily more women or more young people than other parties. Rather it is that the PS addresses the political concerns of these groups directly and tries to xxx aggregate them into a party organization (which distinguishes post-industrial party politics from the "single-issue" grouping or its apparent French equivalent in the 1960s, the political club).

23. I shall take up this question as part of a work in progress on ~~xxxxxxxx~~ theories of politics in advanced industrial societies.

24. Plus other characteristics: e.g. the desire of a significant sector of French opinion for a moderate opposition and a change in government coalitions (In 1977 approximately 1/5 of the PS electorate had voted for Giscard d'Estaing at the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ second ballot in 1974. See the ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ data and analysis by Roland Cayrol and Jerome Jaffre in Le Monde, March 22, 1977, p. 10.

25. See his excellent essay, Contre la politique professionnelle (Paris: Seuil, 1977).

26. Soon after signing the "Common Program" in 1972, Francois Mitterrand announced at a meeting of the Socialist International that one of his goals was that the PS should take 3 million voters from the PCF(which had about 5 million at the time).

27. The Communists - as part of their attempt to modernize and also partly as traditional ideological warfare - have adopted some of the PS language. In particular they have attempted to co-opt the autogestion concept, which is one sign of its importance. To the extent the Communists can destroy the originality of PS discourse they avoid fighting the Socialist party on unfamiliar terrain, therein maintaining the industrial politics primacy which is, as we have seen, at once their immediate strength and their ultimate weakness.

28. The French version of the International does indeed begin: "C'est la lutte finale..."!

Heinz Timmermann

(F)

Theses on the Subject

Democratic Socialists, Eurocommunists and the West

I. Factors of change

1. Since the end of the 50s, a number of different factors have been instrumental in the increasing re-integration of the "Eurocommunists" into national political life: Thus, in the wake of the crisis befalling world Communism, the "Eurocommunists" were able to disentangle themselves to a greater or lesser extent from Moscow's political-ideological embrace and to develop their own conceptions of Socialism. Furthermore, the policy of détente went a long way towards scaling down domestic political polarization and rehabilitating the Eurocommunist parties as national forces in the eyes of broad sections of the population.

2. During the same period, the Socialists of Southern Europe likewise went through a period of radical change. The economic and social crises in their respective countries allowed them to come forward with calls for drastic structural reforms involving far-reaching rights of worker participation - whether in the form of more pronounced economic programming for society as a whole (PSI, PSOE) or in the form of the expansion of the nationalized sector of the economy (PSF). The Social Democrats in Northern and Central Europe, too, intend to pay more attention than they have done in the past to augmenting political into social democracy.

3. Parallel to all this, new challenges and opportunities had arisen for the Left in Western Europe. Thus, for example, the multinational corporations had gained an organisational lead, and not only over the labour movement as organised in the trades unions and political parties. Rather, they were also in a position of strength in their dealings with individual states - by virtue of their ability to exercise considerable influence on the economic and social policies of those states by transferring production, re-directing flows of capital etc. as part of their own investment policy.

4. In the meantime, the unions of Western Europe (including the Communist-Socialist CGIL) have joined together in the ETUC with the aim of formulating the labour force's demands of the multinational corporations and also of the national governments and of the organs of the EEC. Furthermore, the

forthcoming direct elections to the European Parliament have given at least the democratic-socialist left new incentives to closer co-operation at the party-political level. In the opinion of a major section of the parties of the left, the EEC could, if its institutions were given wider powers and greater democratic legitimation, also serve as a means of coming to grips with existing economic and social disparities by applying greater influence and stricter control.

II. From Confrontation to Dialogue: The Pattern of Relations within the West European Left

5. Here there are definitely points of contact between the conceptions of the Social Democrats/Socialists (or the "democratic socialists") on the one hand and the Eurocommunists on the other. But, amongst other factors, their different historical backgrounds and national traditions make any attempt at reconciliation a contradictory and multi-level process. In any case, it is important to distinguish between three dimensions in which the mutual relations of the West European Left are carried on: relations between the Communists, relations between the Social Democrats/Socialists, and relations between the two groups (or between parts thereof).

6. As far as the West European Communists are concerned, the differences between them have become so pronounced with the passage of time that the similarities do not go beyond extremely vaguely worded general declarations such as were last formulated at their Brussels Conference of January/February 1974. Of course, a number of common viewpoints did emerge at the bilateral meetings of the PCI/PCE (July 1975) and the PCI/PCF (November 1975) and at the March 1977 Eurocommunist Summit Conference in Madrid. Thus it was agreed that political democracy is to be attributed fundamental importance to the Socialist society, too, and the necessity of the complete independence of each and every Communist Party was also emphasized.

In central questions, however, such as those of relations with the bourgeois state and its institutions, of the strategy to be used in changing society, of policy towards the alliances and of attitudes towards the EEC, NATO and the USA, the various conceptions were so divergent that the Italian and Spanish

Communists appeared to be nearer to the Latin-European Socialists in many respects than to the French Communists (or, of course, to the other West European Communist Parties loyal to Moscow).

7. In the case of the West European Socialists, too, it appeared in the mid-70s as if they were drifting apart into a welfare-state orientated, moderate Social Democracy in Northern Europe and a Socialist group whose objectives were radical structural changes in the Mediterranean area. However, important special interests on the part of the individual parties and the assimilating effects proceeding from the European elections prevailed upon the parties to accept the principle of "unity in diversity" as their politico-organisational principle and as the goal of international Democratic Socialism.

8. The most intensive endeavours to develop better relations with the Social Democrats of Northern Europe were undertaken by the CPI. These efforts are to be regarded to quite a considerable extent as a deliberate attempt on the part of a Party to court the confidence of parties on whose solidarity or benevolent neutrality, or those of the governments which they lead or influence, the CPI may very soon have to depend if - as it hopes - it continues to make progress towards assuming government responsibility. Similar considerations, indeed, have induced the Latin-European Socialists likewise to seek rapport with the West German SPD.

9. Besides the Mediterranean Socialists, a number of Northern European Social Democratic Parties have now established formal relations with the CPI. This does not imply, however, that they are aiming for trans-national alliances or parliamentary associations (in the directly elected European Parliament) with Eurocommunists. In the substance of the matter, their relations, like those of the SPD, hardly amount to more than informatory contacts; and insofar as there are any farther-reaching forms of agreement at national level (France, Spain, Italy), the relationship is rather one of "loyal competition in pluralism" or even one of inherent conflict in which one of the aims of the Socialists is to accelerate the transition of the Eurocommunists and, for the rest, to change the balance of power among the parties of the Left in their own favour.

The French Socialists in particular, and, recently, the Italian and Spanish ~~left~~ Socialists, too, have stressed this again and again.

Without doubt, there persist reservations in principle with respect to the Eurocommunists. On the one hand, their insistence on the principle of "democratic centralism" for the formulation of the communal will within the Party gives cause for misgivings - a principle which it is difficult to reconcile with the acceptance of pluralism and of political democracy for State and Society. On the other hand it is the Eurocommunists' still extremely ~~self-~~cautious attitude towards the Soviet Union and their support of Soviet foreign policy which keeps the scepsis of the democratic socialists alive.

III. Stances by the Left Wing Parties on West Europe: Convergences and Divergences

10. In any attempt to appraise the change of direction of Eurocommunist Parties towards Europe and possible trends of convergence towards the democratic socialists, it is of supreme importance to determine how they rate political democracy and the gradual approach as a means of changing society. For the democratic socialists have always defended political democracy as an indispensible element of their conception of Socialism and are of the opinion that the changes which are necessary with a view to increasing economic democracy can only be brought about step by step and not by a radical break with the capitalist system.

11. In both these points there are pronounced differences between the French Communists on the one hand and the Italian and Spanish Communists on the other. With its retreat into its politico-ideological "bunker" (Althusser) which became evident in 1977/78 in its polemics against the Socialists, the CPF isolated itself, for all practical purposes, within the left wing of Western Europe and once more assumed traits, at both national and international level, of an "anti-society" which had been considered to have been for the most part superceded. As long as it maintains its present strategy of consummating an irreversible break with the existing system and of assuming the leading role in this process, the CPF can be disregarded as far as a common approach towards a democratic-socialist Western Europe is concerned. The Italian Communists (and, to a certain degree, the Spanish Communists, too), on

the other hand, have, as CPI executive Napolitano emphasized, in the meantime unequivocally opted for a "choice of camp (scelta di campo) in favour of Western-style democracy" by advocating "the continued development and the preservation of the liberal and democratic traditions of the Old Continent" - traditions "which may be counted among the best that Europe has brought forth".

12. A similar constellation is emerging with respect to the problem of integration in the EEC. The CPF refuses to co-operate in any further integration, as it regards the EEC as a capitalist bloc under the domination of Washington and Bonn which affords the formations of the labour movement no chance of a gradual Socialist transformation. The Italian and also the Spanish Communists, on the other hand, are converging on the positions of the democratic socialists in that they are of the opinion that a democratic-socialist society can only be realized in a Western European context and that the Western Europeans can only rise to the new economic and political challenges at all by acting in unison and taking as their objective the extension of the economic and monetary union to a political union with supra-national institutions and jurisdiction. There are also convergences with respect to a fundamental rejection of economic autarchy and to willingness to join forces to master the present crises, and to elaborating an EEC solidarity programme for Southern Europe.

13. As far as security policy is concerned, the PCF appears to envisage for France a concept which bears a certain resemblance to the Yugoslav prototype: a neutralist policy designed to give a government of the Left the opportunity of building up Socialism unhampered by external influences and of playing an active and independent role between East and West. This position is shared neither by the democratic socialists nor by the Italian and Spanish Communists. However, there are significant differences, occasioned by their respective specific situations, which go right through both groups. While the Northern European social democrats generally advocate closer security policy links with the USA and NATO, the Left in Spain and, similarly, the PSI and PSF are more in favour of a more pronounced identity for Europe in this field, too. In the

case of the CPI, it would appear that the Party's security policy commitment to the West does not yet necessarily subscribe to any hard military policy options at all. At any rate, security policy is one of the fields which pose the greatest problems with respect to convergence amongst the Left Wing of Western Europe.

14. The future course of events in Yugoslavia is likely to be of key importance to the attitude of the Eurocommunists towards Europe and its non-Communist Left. Indeed, stronger pressure from Moscow on the Yugoslavs, not to mention any Soviet intervention, could give rise to a situation in which the Eurocommunist Parties would be driven even closer towards the side of the West, and here towards that of the democratic socialists. The PCI, in particular, which looks upon the non-aligned status of Belgrade as being of vital importance to Italy's national interests and upon the autonomous line followed by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as being the mainstay of its own independent course, may be expected in such a case to seek more active involvement in NATO and to orientate itself even more obviously towards the parties of the SI. This might also apply to the CPE.

IV. Prospects

15. It is quite conceivable that in a long-term process - admittedly, one of a conflictive nature and characterised by setbacks - the common interests of the the Western European Left may become more pronounced in line with increasing European unity. However, this would hardly come about within the perspective of Europe as a "Third Force" standing between the Superpowers, as was the goal primarily of democratic socialists in the years immediately after the war. Security problems and shared basic values indicate that, from the point of view of most of the relevant Parties of the Left, the European Community can only develop its own identity in close co-operation with and, of course, as an equal partner to the USA.

16. Furthermore, a trans-national co-operation between the parties of the Left in Western Europe would probably not create compact fronts of mutually antagonistic bourgeois parties on the one side and Socialist-Eurocommunist parties on the other, but rather give rise to multifarious lateral connections

between the various groups. For neither the democratic socialists nor the Italian and Spanish Eurocommunists not even the influential sections of the christian-democratic and liberal orientated trans-national formations are interested in confrontation. In the long term, it is much more likely that configurations will arise in which parties of various ideo-philosophical and political outlooks will converge to deal with certain specific problems. One possible such configuration could have the democratic socialists as its core and embrace, on the one hand, the Italian (and later also the Spanish) Communists and, on the other, those bourgeois parties which, be it for christian-socialist or socialist-liberal motives, work towards step-by-step economic and social reforms for the benefit of the working population.

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B O L O G N A C O N F E R E N C E

on the West European Left

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Draft paper submitted by:

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Subject:

The Ties that Bind: West European Communism and the Communist States of East Europe

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The Ties that Bind: West European Communism and the Communist States of East Europe

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July 1978

THE TIES THAT BIND:
WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNISM AND THE COMMUNIST STATES OF EAST EUROPE

Relations between the major West European Communist parties and the Soviet-oriented regimes of East Europe began to acquire during the 1970s some of the characteristics of the historic relationship between Social Democracy and Leninism. The schism within the European Marxist movement some five decades earlier had been a rupture between ideological brothers whose shared vision of a future socialistic society was flawed by bitter controversy over the means to that end. For the Leninists of the the Third Communist International the Social Democrats' commitment to democratic methods in the quest for social change spelled treason: their reformism would only shore up the capitalist order by dulling the revolutionary impulses of the toiling masses. For the Social Democrats the Leninists' use of dictatorial methods to preserve their power likewise spelled treason: party-controlled industrialization and social development could never alone provide the bases for the liberation of human potential envisioned by Karl Marx.

Some of these same themes lie at the heart of the controversies that have wracked the European Communist movement over the past decade. However, historical analogies are never exact. And in this case there is one overarching difference. The protagonists in the contemporary intra-Communist debate appear to have no intention of repeating the organizational rupture of 1920.

The Soviet leaders and their loyalist allies disparage "Eurocommunism" with remarkably little restraint. The June 1977 attack on Spanish CP leader Santiago Carrillo in the Moscow journal New Times received front-page coverage in the Western press. The CPSU's polemics against the Italian Communist leadership are more subtle yet no less barbed. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders

went to great lengths to paper over those differences in time for the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Revolution in November 1977. Russian emissaries conferred with Carrillo in Madrid, assuring him of equal time to present his views along with other West European representatives at the Moscow festivities. At the end of October the editor-in-chief of Pravda published a lengthy feature lauding the achievements of the Spanish CP and quoting Carrillo as saying that the upcoming anniversary of the October Revolution was "a holiday for all us Communists of Spain." When Carrillo was actually prevented from speaking in the Great Hall of the Kremlin on November 2, the Soviet leadership pleaded innocence (Carrillo, they claimed, had arrived too late for his speech to be translated into the seventeen languages required for the occasion) and proceeded to shower their attention upon PCI General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer. Despite the influx of guests from some 100-odd countries, Brezhnev, Politburo member Mikhail Suslov, a Boris Ponomarev, the CPSU Secretary in charge of relations with non-ruling CPS, managed to find time the very next day to meet with Berlinguer for fifty minutes — "in an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship" according to the official comminiqué. Given the close personal and political ties between the Spanish and Italian CP leaders as well as Berlinguer's blunt reaffirmation of the PCI's independent posture in his speech to the Kremlin gathering, the respectful treatment accorded to him can be interpreted as an attempt by the Soviets to minimize the negative impression conveyed by their sleight to Carrillo. They evidently wanted to underscore their contention that the clash with the Spaniard was due to technical circumstances (or personal obstreperousness on Carrillo's part) rather than political differences.

Just as the CPSU leadership strived for a public image of pan-European Communist harmony, so too the Eurocommunist triad of major non-ruling parties rejected the idea of a break with Moscow. Upon his return to Madrid on

November 4, 1977 Carrillo declared that the Spanish Communists didn't want, nor did the Moscow incident represent, a rupture with the USSR, a theme which he repeated a week later at a joint press conference in Rome with Berlinguer. As for the PCI, Berlinguer and other leaders had said much the same thing any number of times, particularly at moments of high tension with the CPSU. Two such cases had already occurred during 1977, first in February after the Italian CP's immediate and outspoken defense of the Czechoslovak "Charter 77" movement, and then in July, after the PCI's vigorous and carefully reasoned rebuttal of the New Times attack on Carrillo, both in the party press and during top-level talks in Moscow. As will be discussed later, friction between the French Communist Party and the Soviets developed at a different tempo and along different lines than in the case of the PCE and PCI. The quality of personal links at the leadership levels varied accordingly. The French representatives at the October Revolution celebration did not become involved in the Carrillo flap. But by the same token, PCF leader Georges Marchais chose not even to attend the celebration. Nevertheless, the head of the French delegation, Paul Laurent, declared in the Kremlin that despite the divergences between his party and Moscow "fraternal ties have always existed and continue to exist between the CPSU and the PCF."

This almost defiant commitment to unity seems ironical when viewed against the backdrop of deepening controversies that have enveloped the international Communist movement since the 1960s. But the paradox does not end there. The Soviet leaders, intent on securing public manifestations of ongoing Communist cohesion have repeatedly given in to the demands of the more autonomist Communist parties of West and East Europe. The independent-minded West European CPs have, in turn, responded with ever more trenchant criticism of Soviet-style socialism — their avowals of enduring fraternal unity notwithstanding. In short, as

will be elaborated below, the "correlation of forces" within the pan-European Communist movement is shifting in favor of what I shall call the loyal opposition, whose political center of gravity lies among the more innovative West European parties and their autonomist Romanian and Yugoslav allies but whose influence may gradually be penetrating sectors of the Soviet-style regimes as well.

Echoes of 1920: Strategy and Organization in the Pan-European Communist Movement

Divergent perceptions of party interest have always existed between Moscow and one or another non-ruling Communist party of Europe (and elsewhere), even during the Stalin era albeit only in latent form. But since the mid-1950s and even more so since the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, differences have become explicit on questions ranging from the organizational structure of the international Communist movement to the strategy of revolution and vision of socialism appropriate to the countries of developed capitalism, i.e., West Europe. The controversies are often couched in cumbersome and esoteric jargon. Yet the issues in dispute boil down to those that divided the protagonists of the Second and Third Internationals some sixty-odd years ago: individual party autonomy versus a centralized international organization; democratic versus dictatorial socialism; a legal electoral revolution versus a minority power grab by manipulation and intimidation if not outright armed force.

Lenin's answer to Social Democratic insistence on party autonomy was the creat of the Third Communist International as a world revolutionary party organized acco ing to the same principle as the Bolshevik Party: democratic centralism, or the absolute subordination of minorities to the majority will expressed at internation conclaves. In fact the non-ruling CPs, financially and psychologically dependent on Moscow, were quickly subordinated to the Soviet minority within the Comintern bureaucracy. But beginning with the post-Stalin

era Khrushchev and his successors, assured of solid majority support from the clandestine, inconsequential, and dependent CPs that predominate within the international Communist movement as a whole, sought to contain the movement's centrifugal tendencies by permitting wider latitude to the practical implementation of Lenin's theory of democratic centralism. This attempt at centralism via majority rule foundered inter alia on the oppostition of the Maoists at the 1960 world Communist conference, the abstention of the PCI on major portions of the final document of the 1969 world Communist conference, and the emergence of a pan-European coalition of autonomist CPs during the preparations for the 1976 Berlin conference of European Communist and workers' parties. What all opponents to the Soviet organizational policy held in common was their insistence on consensus rather than majority rule as the only viable basis for a joint international Communist line. Here it may be useful to note that in the contemporary European Communist lexicon the Soviet-supported centralist approach to inter-CP ties falls under the rubric of "proletarian internationalism," a slogan which the autonomist CPs have recently discarded in favor of "internationalist solidarity."

The Communist parties comprising the autonomist coalition vary widely among themselves on strategic questions. The Romanians are among the most orthodox when it comes to matters pertaining to domestic political and economic centralization. The Yugoslavs are orthodox on the issue of exclusive Communist political hegemony yet innovative in their policies of economic decentralization and international non-alignment. Most pertinent to this discussion, however, are the Italian and Spanish Communist conceptions of socialism. For they have set forth a vision of socialist pluralism and regionalism the very articulation of which is tantamount to a direct challenge to the domestic legitimacy of the single-party Soviet-oriented Communist systems of East Europe.

For both Latin European parties the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovkia in August 1968 acted as a catalyst in the evolution of their strategic thinking. The PCI had a tradition of theoretical innovation and political assertiveness vis-à-vis Moscow dating back to the mid-1920s. Not surprisingly, therefore, it joined its impassioned defense of the Dubcek reform movement with the postulation of a democratic and pluralist alternative to Soviet-style socialism. At the party's Twelfth Congress in February 1969 Luigi Longo, then PCI General Secretary, gave his official blessing to the notion of a socialist society in which "a plurality of parties and social organizations" would be "engaged in a free and democratic dialectic of contrasting positions, something qualitatively different from the experiences known till now." Such a conception of socialist pluralism was antithetical to the CPSU's "general laws for the construction of socialism," foremost among which were the leading role of the Communist party and the obligatory inculcation of Marxism-Leninism. These "general laws," first set forth by Mikhail Suslov in December 1956 in the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution, have ever since been tauted by CPSU ideologues as binding on all CPs — whatever their geographical locale or proximity to power. Yet at the June 1969 world CP conference in Moscow Berlinguer, soon to become Longo's successor as PCI head, tweaked the ears of the Russian bear from the podium of the Kremlin by flatly denying the existence of any such "general laws." At the same time he reiterated the PCI's support for "a pluralistic and democratic political system" under socialism. Over the years the concept of socialist pluralism adumbrated in the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis was gradually broadened to include the notions of civil rights, competitive elections, and the secular, or non-ideological, state generally associated with the Eurocommunist vision of socialism today.

Under the guidance of Santiago Carrillo the Spanish Communist Party replicated the PCI's programmatic support for a pluralist model of socialism. But the Spanish party promoted more forcefully the idea of socialist regionalism, that is, an entente of developed socialist states in West Europe distinct and independent from the Soviet bloc of East Europe. The concept of a regional mutuality of interests among geographically and developmentally similar parties was not of course new to the Communist movement. It was popularized under the rubric of "polycentrism," the term coined by Palmiro Togliatti in his celebrated Nuovi argomenti interview of June 1956, and concretized by the Chinese Communists in their jockeying for support within the international Communist movement, especially prior to the Cultural Revolution. Still, it was the PCE leaders who conveyed the impression that regionalism denoted a united socialist West Europe rather than merely a congruence of strategic views on socialist revolution and construction. The reasons for their insistence on this point are still conjectural In the early 1970s spokesmen such as PCE ideologist Manuel Azcárate charged the CPSU with sacrificing revolutionary change in West Europe to the interests of the Soviet state and the preservation of the pan-European status quo. They thereby provided a theoretical rationale for according primacy to regional solidarity among the West European CPs. But the intensity of their commitment probably stemmed from outrage at the CPSU's barely concealed efforts to unseat the PCE's autonomist leadership in the 1969-1972 period combined with lingering resentment at Stalin's withdrawal of meaningful material support from the Spanish Republican forces from mid-1937 onward (as he edged toward the non-aggression pact with Hitler).

The CPSU took a differentiated approach to the deviationist postures of the Spanish and Italian CPs, betraying as it were a cautious respect for the political

clout of the PCI. As noted above, Moscow actually gave its tacit backing to dissident groups within the leading organs of the PCE, factions that were later discredited and expelled by the Carrillo leadership. With regard to the PCI, however, the Soviets displayed their displeasure largely through esoteric polemics against socialist pluralism, at times equating its supporters with imperialist agents and at other times merely deriding the misguided views of certain fraternal comrades in the West. This two-pronged tack was especially apparent in a series of articles published in the CPSU agitprop bi-weekly, Partiinaia zhizn, in early 1974. In the late February issue an unsigned commentary lambasted Azcárate for his views on socialist regionalism and its corollary of Soviet support for the European status quo. The very next issue carried an article by the prominent Soviet ideologue Alexander Sobolev (department head at the prestigious Institute of Marxism-Leninism and editor-in-chief of the journal published by the CPSU's Institute of the International Workers' Movement) denouncing unnamed advocates of socialist pluralism. In a sense Moscow's June 1977 New Times denunciation of Carrillo's "Eurocommunism" and the State employed the same approach. Carrillo was the explicit target but he was castigated among other things for supporting the strengthening of NATO, a charge that could just as easily (if no more accurately) have been leveled against the PCI.

The question of how the PCI and PCE hope to alter the status quo in favor of their vision of socialist pluralism and regionalism would require an in-depth analysis of their respective domestic strategies: as such it can only be touched upon here. Suffice it to say that Khrushchev's endorsement at the 20th CPSU Congress of the possibility of a peaceful parliamentary transition to socialism in the capitalist West was taken to heart by the Italian, Spanish, and French

CPs — all their national peculiarities and nuances notwithstanding. It is the CPSU leaders that have evinced misgivings over the implications of Khrushchev's initiative. Soviet theorists cannot even seem to agree on whether a peaceful revolution in the West may be brought about by an "arithmetic" majority or a "political" majority, i.e., 51% of the electorate or a minority of political activists infiltrating and manipulating the levers of state power in the interests of the working-class majority. At issue here is the time-worn question of revolution by ballots or the Leninist vanguard that one would have thought was resolved at the 20th CPSU Congress.

The orthodox conception of revolutionary change was infused with new vitality by the violent overthrow of Allende's Unidad Popular government in Chile and the nearly victorious seizure of power by Cunhal's Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). After 1973 the sectarian proponents of revolution by a "political" majority once again figured prominently in the pages of Pravda and the more specialized CPSU political journals. And even those Soviet publicists who continued to stress the potential for a majoritarian electoral revolution in the West were constrained by the formulation of "general laws of socialist revolution" that began to appear in the Soviet press in the mid-1970s. First called for by Sobolev in early 1975 (the protracted negotiations for the Berlin conference of European CPs were just getting under way), a leading exponent of this new variant on the "general laws" of socialism turned out to be Konstantin Zarodov, renowned for his August 1975 Pravda commentary disdaining proponents of an "arithmetic" majoritarian revolution (read PCI and PCF) and hailing the virtues of revolution by the "political majority" (read PCP). Two years later, again in a major Pravda feature, Zarodov spelled out as "general laws of socialist revolution" directives that were almost indistinguishable from the CPSU's much vaunted "general laws of socialist construction." The leading role of the Communist party and the trans-

formation of the economic base of society were ineluctable preconditions for success. The only guideline peculiar to the revolutionary process as such was the requirement that Communists be prepared to utilize all methods of struggle. And that was hardly novel. What was significant in the Soviet postulation was that even a ballot-box revolution by an arithmetic majority must be led by the CP vanguard. In the eyes of Moscow's more sectarian spokesmen the new alliance strategies of the West European CPs (union de la gauche, compromesso storico) were little more than tactical embellishments on the familiar theme of orthodox frontism. Once again the legacy of the Third International outweighed the pressures for aggiornamento in the relations between Moscow and the West European CPs.

David and Goliath: West European Communism at Odds with Soviet Policy and Ideology

From the founding of the Soviet state the CPSU's approach to West European Communism has been characterized by ambivalence and instrumentalism. In the early days the creation of the European CPs and their adherence to the Comintern held out the promise of ideological vindication for both the Bolsheviks' seizure of power and their rapid advance toward theoretical monism and single-party rule. At the same time, as left-wing radicalism receded during the 1920's, the revolutionary impulses that had fueled the formation of the world Communist movement became an encumbrance and an embarrassment to the foreign policy interests of "socialism in one country." Stalin's conversion of the Comintern into an instrument of Soviet raison d'état temporarily papered over but in no sense eliminated this historic tension between the CPSU's foreign policy and ideological interests. Indeed, in the 1970s the contradiction between the two dimensions of Soviet international relations became as intense in the European arena as it had been in Asia during the 1960s.

The 1976 Berlin conference of European Communist and workers' parties may be best understood as the direct, even inevitable, outgrowth of the Soviet Union's obsessive push for the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. If in Moscow's eyes the Helsinki agreement was designed to secure the status quo in East Europe, the Berlin conference was intended to reassure the Western CPs and the world Communist movement as a whole that the CPSU opposed the status quo in West Europe. Détente and class struggle were to be viewed as compatible, at least in theory. What no one anticipated when the Soviet Union began to mobilize the European Communist movement in support of a pan-European collective security conference was that the Helsinki negotiations would develop in tandem with economic crisis in the West and political radicalization in Latin Europe. Discussions of revolutionary change thus moved from the abstract to the concrete. The Latin European CPs and their autonomist allies cooperated with the Soviet Union on Helsinki. But the price they exacted on the road to Berlin turned out to be an ideological can of worms for Moscow.

The precursor of the Berlin conclave was the April 1967 conference of European CPs held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. At first glance Moscow appeared once again to be successfully mobilizing the Communist movement behind a key Soviet foreign policy objective: the legitimation of the postwar division of Europe. The final document appealed for a "system of European collective securi that would acknowledge and guarantee the "existing situation" on the continent with regard to the two Germanies and the postwar territorial arrangements in Central Europe. Yet its tone was virulently anti-American and anti-Bonn, decrying West German revanchist militarism and German-American collusion. On the one hand, this militant anti-Westernism precluded the participation at Karlovy Vary of both Romania and Yugoslavia, the latter because of its policy of non-alignment and the former because of its normalization of relations

with Bonn some three months earlier. On the other hand, it also obscured the more concrete policy proposals that help to explain the pro-Soviet stance of an already disparate group of CPs: the withdrawal of all foreign troops and bases, the dissolution of both military blocs, recognition of the value of "neutrality" if not non-alignment, and international treaties banning inter alia the use of force and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On balance, the Karlovy Vary document served the vital interests of both the Soviet bloc parties and the West European Communists. The concurrence in the Soviet initiative by the already autonomist Italian party is further explicable in light of the then "existing situation" in Vietnam as well as the trends toward innovation in East Europe — Hungarian domestic relaxation, Romanian foreign policy deviations, incipient Czechoslovak ferment.

Some five years later the relationship between the superpowers had been altered beyond recognition. But so too had inter-CP relations within the European Communist movement. The shoring up of the Soviet hold over East Europe through the occupation of Czechoslovakia and suppression of the Dubcek reformers — in addition to the Soviet military build-up in general — enabled Moscow to proceed with détente. Nixon and Brezhnev initialed SALT I in May 1972. The 35-nation Helsinki consultations began the following November. But as we have seen, the Soviet march into Prague also placed in question the ideological legitimacy of the Soviet system among important sectors of the European Communist movement, impelling at least the PCI and PCE to devise alternatives to the CPSU's "general laws" of socialism. And Moscow's preoccupation with East-West détente at a time of deepening economic crisis in the West raised further doubts concerning the CPSU's ideological integrity.

Signs abounded of a growing cleavage between Soviet raison d'état and the Latin European CPs' commitment to domestic social change. The Spanish party's allegations regarding the CPSU's preference for the pan-European status quo at the expense of revolutionary advance in the West, first voiced at the PCE's

Eighth Congress in 1972, were articulated most forcefully at a Central Committee plenum in September 1973. That same month PCI chief Berlinguer postulated the strategy of the historic compromise, justifying it as a means of avoiding the political and social polarization that had led to counterrevolution in Chile. Initially viewed as a cautious retreat from the Communist-supported new left radicalism of the late 1960s, the historic compromise represented in fact a forward strategy in the Italian context. The Berlinguer leadership sought quite literally to insert the PCI into the political status quo, thereby enabling it gradually to alter the Italian socio-economic order. With the overwhelming defeat of the Italian Christian Democrats in the divorce referendum of May 1974 and the onset of severe stagflation soon thereafter, PCI media and leadership pronouncements began to exude confidence in the imminence of radical change. A similar situation prevailed in France. The March 1973 elections to the National Assembly signaled a return to the leftward momentum that had become apparent during the 1967 parliamentary elections (only to be quelled temporarily by the conservative backlash to the May 1968 upheaval). François Mitterrand's tally of 49.2% of the votes cast in the Presidential election of May 1974 added to the sense of impending political change. The French Communists, exhilerated by the prospect of breaking out of their prolonged political isolation, scheduled an extraordinary party congress for October 1974 to plot out the steps that would presumably carry the union de la gauche to victory in the 1978 parliamentary contest if not sooner.

The political thrust of these separate initiatives was compounded by the January 1974 Brussels conference of West European CPs, convened to devise joint measures to resolve the mounting economic crisis in a socialist direction. The CPSU's reaction to this regional gathering was symptomatic of its attitude

toward West European radicalization in general: minimal and distorted coverage in the Soviet press. Significantly, Problems of Peace and Socialism, edited by Konstantin Zarodov, did not see fit to publish the final Brussels communiqué — in contrast to the prominence it generally gave to international Communist documents. In fact the Brussels conference may well have been intended as a warning to Moscow that continued disregard for West European Communist concerns would further undermine not only the CPSU's ideological authority but the very unity of the pan-European Communist movement.

The upshot was Soviet acquiescence in the proposal for a second pan-European Communist conference, first suggested by the PCI in early 1973, after the inception of the Helsinki talks. CPSU spokesmen made clear that such a gathering would be but the prelude to another world conference of CPs, as was the case with Karlovy Vary in relation to the 1969 Moscow conference. Unlike Karlovy Vary, however, ideological questions were to dominate the protracted negotiations for the Berlin Communist summit. At issue was not the Soviet Union's foreign policy of détente — with which all European CPs were in basic agreement — but the insistence on the part of the West European parties that détente be coupled with moves toward altering the status quo. Berlin was to be their reposte to Helsinki. The Soviet Union could have no quarrel with the idea of social change as such. It was the content of that change that mattered. The crux of the contention between Moscow and the Latin European CPs since 1968 had been their divergent visions of socialism and strategies of revolution. Not surprisingly, therefore, this was also to be the case during the lengthy preparations for the Berlin conference. As we shall see, what was to be so striking about the final Berlin document was that it insisted on changing the West European status quo in a socialist direction without in any way prescribing the political parameters of socialism.

But before analyzing the results of the Berlin conference, some discussion of the inception and key turning points in its protracted preparations is in order.

From the onset of the preparatory talks, the Soviet leadership was ambivalent and even defensive. It has been suggested that the CPSU endorsed the pan-European conference project in order to thwart the move toward West European regionalism and reassert Soviet influence over the non-ruling CPs. Yet prominent CPSU leaders, including Brezhnev himself, never ceased voicing their preference for world Communist conclaves, and at the Budapest preparatory meeting in December 1974 Ponomarev warned of the dangers of "Eurocentrism." Soviet misgivings could only have been exacerbated by the decision reached at the initial Warsaw consultative meeting in October 1974 to operate according to the procedural rule of consensus in all matters affecting the Berlin conference preparations. The Helsinki talks were conducted according to the consensus principle, partially at Yugoslav and Romanian insistence. And these two Communist party-states also refused to participate in the Berlin summit on any other basis. It is not inconceivable that both autonomist CP regimes backed Moscow during the final Helsinki deliberations as part of a tacit quid pro quo on this procedural issue. Nevertheless, the men in Moscow surely understood that decision-making by consensus would preclude the imposition of CPSU views, even with majority support, on any conference document agreed upon at Berlin.

Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet leaders were not only ambivalent toward the pan-European Communist summit but also defensive regarding the charges, explicit or otherwise, that their foreign policy was detrimental to the cause of revolution in the capitalist world. Ponomarev almost admitted as much in his speech to the October 1974 Warsaw meeting when

he explained that the paramount importance of ending the Cold War had perhaps led the CPSU to underestimate the extent and import of Western radicalization during the 1960s. But Soviet defensiveness also took on a self-righteous and even admonitory tone: to wit, social radicalism cum economic crisis might well provoke a Fascist reaction, as in the 1930s. Hence the continuing importance of the SALT and Helsinki negotiations.

During 1974 the Soviet position was probably complicated by differences of opinion within the leadership itself over the proper pace and mode of revolutionary change in the West. Such differences could be discerned among the establishment intellectuals writing in the Soviet equivalent of think-tank journals. And the appearance of divergent viewpoints at that level presupposed either uncertainty or controversy in the upper echelons of the CPSU. The cleavages ran along two planes: cautious reformism versus militant activism; and electoral majoritarianism versus orthodox political manipulation by a Leninist vanguard. As noted earlier, the latter dichotomy can still be seen in the Soviet press. However, the question of revolutionary tempo was resolved in a conservative direction by the winter of 1975. The CPSU could obviously not opt for the status quo, confronted as it was by the growing militancy of the West European CPs. Its solution to the dilemma of revolution versus détente was to endorse the strategy of a democratic transitional stage between capitalism and socialism, a formulation that was flexible enough to embrace the French, Italian, and even for a time the Portuguese Communist policies while at the same time cautioning against destabilizing revolutionary adventurism.

Both the Soviet conservatives and radical activists may well have supported the initiative for the Berlin conference, the former viewing it as a mechanism for restraining the Western CPs and the latter as a means of goading them on.

But it was soon to become evident that the cautious conservatives had won the day in Moscow. The radical viewpoint no longer found an outlet in Soviet public affairs journals, while the CPSU displayed reticence toward the Portuguese crisis and preoccupation with normal state-to-state relations with Western powers even after the signing of the Helsinki agreement in August 1975. This posture soon drove the French Communist leadership to level against Moscow the same charges voiced by the Spanish party in the early 1970s: Soviet raison d'état inclined the CPSU toward acquiescence in the status quo rather than support for class struggle in the West.

This brings us back to the original linkage postulated between the Helsinki consultations and the pan-European CP summit. By endorsing the latter Moscow hoped to avert criticism from within the Communist movement over the former. The role of the Spanish, Italian, and French CPs in the Berlin conference preparations provides circumstantial support for this supposition. On the eve of the October 1974 Warsaw consultative meeting that laid the initial groundwork for the protracted Berlin negotiations, a formal CPSU-PCE communiqué was signed in Moscow the gist of which was that steps toward détente should in no way impede social transformation in the West. The CPSU also agreed to refrain from interference in internal Spanish party affairs. The first such top-level meeting to be held since 1970, the Spanish delegation included Manuel Azcárate, the individual so recently singled out for censure in the Soviet journal Partiinaia zhizn because of his allegations of Soviet support for the status quo. His presence in the Soviet capital implied that the CPSU leaders had signaled their willingness to reach an accommodation with the more alienated members of the West European Communist movement.

The PCI, as official cosponsor with the Polish party of the Berlin summit and early supporter of the conference project, doubtless played a part

in the CPSU-PCE rapprochement. The Italian Communists had backed the Spanish party in its post-1968 clash with Moscow, regularly publishing PCE statements — including those of Azcárate — in the PCI press. The Italians had at the same time maintained correct if not cordial ties with the CPSU, notwithstanding the esoteric PCI-CPSU polemics over socialist pluralism. Such conciliatory behavior was an integral part of the Italian party's tradition. As early as the mid-1920s Antonio Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti, the intellectual progenitors of the contemporary Italian Communist leadership, had opposed Stalin's mounting recourse to purge of dissidents on the left and right. Eventually charged by Stalin himself with indulging in the "opportunism of conciliation," the PCI leadership opted for surrender to Moscow rather than exclusion from the Communist movement. But with the passing of the Soviet Union's sway over the international Communist movement, Togliatti reasserted his preference for reasoned discourse over polemical confrontation in inter-CP relations. This approach was nowhere more apparent than in the PCI's consistent opposition to Moscow's policy of collective mobilization against the Chinese Communists during the escalation of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the early and mid-1960s. It was appropriate, then, that the Italian party should play the role of mediator in the clash that developed between the Soviet bloc loyalists and West European dissident CPs in the mid-1970s. This was even more the case since, as noted earlier, the historic compromise represented something of a paradox, i.e., a forward strategy within the context of the Italian political status quo. Not only procedurally but strategically the PCI bridged the chasm between the defiant Spaniards and restive French, on the one hand, and the conservative Soviets on the other.

With the PCE-CPSU rapprochement of mid-October 1974 and ensuing multilateral agreement on the consensus rule at the Warsaw consultative meeting, a

tenuous compromise was reached that permitted the beginning of the twenty-month long bargaining that led to the Berlin conference in late June 1976. The tortuous intricacies of the sixteen-odd meetings of drafting groups, editorial commissions, and intervening bilateral consultations required to achieve consensus on a final conference document have been masterfully recounted by Kevin Devlin. What is important to underscore here is the impact on that process wrought by the French Communist volte-face of mid-1975. In November 1975 the PCF publicly aligned itself with the PCI and the PCE on questions of revolutionary strategy, thereby giving rise to the tripartite entente that was soon to receive the label of Eurocommunism. But at the root of the burgeoning PCF-CPSU controversy lay the question of revolutionary tempo: namely, the degree to which Moscow's cordial relationship with the French government ran counter to the interests of French Communism.

PCF-CPSU tension over the nature of Franco-Soviet inter-state relations had probably been simmering for some time. Moscow's eagerness to pander to the powers-that-be in the Élysée was evident ever since De Gaulle's rupture with NATO in the mid-1960s. But only in the 1970s, under the twin prods of economic crisis and leftist electoral gains, did the contradiction between Soviet raison d'état and PCF militancy come to the surface. For despite the radicalization of French politics, Moscow did not alter its line. During the PCF's Extraordinary Twenty-first Congress in October 1974, convened to mobilize the French left for further advances, Pravda waxed enthusiastic over the fiftieth anniversary of Franco-Soviet diplomatic relations. While devoting due attention to the PCF congress, the CPSU daily compressed Marchais's critique of President Giscard d'Estaing's pro-NATO foreign policy into one terse sentence. By the same token, Pravda's coverage of Brezhnev's trip to Paris the following December for the annual Franco-Soviet summit was extensive

and glowing. Then in March 1975, on the heels of the conservative victory over the radical militants within the CPSU, French Premier Jacques Chirac was warmly received in Moscow.

A clear signal of French Communist displeasure at this attitude of business as usual came in mid-May 1975 when the PCF issued a statement asserting that the crux of the dispute in the snarled Berlin talks lay between those who favored détente cum revolutionary struggle and those who would "go easy on imperialism, for the sake of diplomatic considerations or domestic opportunities." This was clearly a double-edged attack: first on the CPSU for its preoccupation with Helsinki and détente at a time of heightened revolutionary tensions in Portugal; and secondly on the PCI for its late 1974 shift to qualified support of NATO as well as its ambivalence toward Portuguese developments. While the PCF was outspoken in its support of the Portuguese CP's orthodox Leninist conduct, the Soviet leadership assumed a public posture of relative detachment until the conclusion of the Helsinki conference and — not less importantly — the waning of the PCP's domestic political clout. All the while the PCE and PCI were of course openly critical of Portuguese Communist sectarian activism.

Giscard's visit to Moscow October 13-18, 1975, marked the decisive turning point in PCF-CPSU relations. By way of backdrop, one of the Berlin conference working groups had just concluded a meeting on October 9-10. On October 10 the PCF Politburo drafted a communiqué announcing its resolute opposition to the political status quo, defined as Giscard's pro-Atlantic orientation as well as his domestic conservatism. The statement also chided Moscow for not repudiating Western press reports of an appeal the previous March by Premier Chirac to Brezhnev to help restrain the PCF's militancy. Although the communiqué was dated October 10, it was not published in L'Humanité until October 13,

the day of Giscard's arrival in Moscow. The very same issue of the PCF daily carried an interview with Jean Kanapa, the PCF's international affairs spokesman, on the recent meeting of the Berlin conference editorial group. While conceding that any document emanating from the projected CP summit should focus on questions relating to détente, Kanapa stipulated that this in no way precluded the PCF from pursuing "our revolutionary struggle in France for the burning needs of the working people, against the Giscardian power of the monopolies, for democracy and socialism." He was, in short, saying yes to détente but no to the status quo back home.

It would appear that both the Politburo communiqué and Kanapa interview were timed to coincide with Giscard's visit to Moscow, thereby throwing down the gauntlet to the CPSU. On October 15, Pravda carried an abridged version of the communiqué, omitting the personal attacks on Giscard and Brezhnev. That same day Brezhnev unexpectedly cancelled a scheduled meeting with Giscard, to the consternation of Western newsmen who assumed (once again) that the general secretary was on his death bed. As Brezhnev reappeared in sound health the very next day, it seems more than probable that on October 15 he was simply back at the CPSU Secretariat trying to cope with this latest challenge to Soviet authority.

The PCF's attempt to arouse Moscow to a more militant ideological stance was to no avail. The Brezhnev-Giscard talks ended with their usual fanfare and the signing of a series of Franco-Soviet technical agreements. On October 25 L'Humanité resumed the offensive with an article condemning Soviet imprisonment of dissident mathematician Leonid Pliushch in a mental institution. Pravda replied the next day with a long unsigned commentary hailing Franco-Soviet state relations. Then came the electrifying PCF-PCI declaration of common strategic principles. Its publication on November 18

coincided with yet another in the ongoing series of Berlin preparatory meetings, this one notable for the unexpected intransigence displayed by a CPSU delegation that included among its members Konstantin Zarodov.

The denouement in PCF-CPSU relations came during the Soviet party's Twenty-fifth Congress when Brezhnev, in spite of the earlier PCF protests, not only declared that Franco-Soviet state relations and views on a number of foreign policy questions had grown closer, but also claimed that "this has met with widespread support from the French people and the majority of political parties in France." Marchais, who had made a point of not attending the CPSU congress, quickly informed the world that the PCF was not one of those parties! On February 26, the day after Brezhnev's report appeared in Pravda, L'Humanité retorted with verbatim excerpts from the PCF leader's scorching attack on Giscard's foreign policy at the Twenty-second PCF Congress held earlier that same month.

The winter and spring of 1976 were marked by escalating polemics between the CPSU, on the one hand, and the PCI and PCF on the other. (Presumably the PCE was preoccupied with the evolving post-Franco political scene in Spain.) It seemed as though the PCF's shift to the side of the autonomists in the pre-Berlin bargaining had triggered one final round of public polemics and posturing. The Soviets insisted on the primacy of inter-CP unity, on "proletarian internationalism" in their terminology, and stipulated as a major criterion of proletarian internationalism the avoidance of anti-Soviet criticism on the part of fraternal CPs. The French rejoined that proletarian internationalism entailed reciprocity, while the Italians called for an entirely new form of internationalism, one that embraced solidarity among Communist, Socialist, and Catholic workers as well as the peoples struggling for liberation in the Third World. The PCF meanwhile stepped up its criticism

of Soviet repression of domestic dissidents while the PCI characteristically accentuated the positive, insisting that Soviet economic and social development had reached the point where the free confrontation of dissenting ideas was not only inevitable but would be beneficial. The mutual sparring became quite nasty, with Suslov in mid-March equating "regional" or "national" versions of Marxism with opportunism, for which leading PCF and PCI spokesmen rebuked him by name in their party dailies. Meanwhile on each side of the polemical barricades, lesser party personalities were subjected to more invidious accusations.

The truth of the matter, however, was that the fate of the Berlin conference already lay in the hands of the autonomists. Should the CPSU not concede to their demands, the conference would simply not take place. Should the conference not take place, Moscow would have to shoulder the blame. Once the traditionally pro-Soviet PCF had thrown in its lot with the rebellious Spaniards and maverick Italians, the CPSU would have difficulty persuading even the loyalist CPs that the twenty months of negotiations had foundered on the objections of a small band of recalcitrant dissidents. And the CPSU had too much at stake ideologically to risk either the onus for or the fact of a breakdown in the conference talks. Not only would the mounting charges that the Soviet Union was a status quo oriented superpower be bolstered; but the CPSU's domestic legitimacy as the purported vanguard of the world Communist movement would be further undermined.

The European Communist conference finally took place in East Berlin on June 29-30, 1976. With the proceedings open to the public, Western news media focused on the unprecedented diversity of views expressed in the speeches of the 29 participating CP leaders, including Marshal Tito — present at an international Communist meeting for the first time since the Soviet-Yugoslav

break of 1948. Neither the pro-Soviet loyalists nor the East European autonomists and West European pluralists broke substantially new ground in the presentation of their respective party positions. But the articulation at a common forum of the widely disparate visions of socialism and norms of interparty relations that had evolved during the preceding half decade was a momentous development in the annals of the Communist movement.

Equally significant was the content of the Berlin conference document that finally emerged with the consent, however reluctant, of all participants. The Berlin declaration elaborated upon the foreign policy proposals of the 1967 Karlovy Vary statement (those that had not yet been achieved) while eschewing its fulminations against U.S. aggressiveness and West German militarism. Under these circumstances such suggestions as the dissolution of the two military blocs and the withdrawal of all foreign troops and bases acquired a new connotation, i.e., superpower co-responsibility for their creation in the first place as well as their removal. (Was this the result of the CPSU's support for détente or the ever more pronounced PCI and PCE, as well as Romanian and Yugoslav, even-handed approach to Moscow and Washington?) In contrast to the Karlovy Vary statement, moreover, the Berlin document stressed not the need to guarantee the pan-European territorial status quo, which presumably had been achieved at Helsinki, but the need to alter the West European political and social status quo in favor of socialism. And it did so without prescribing in any way the manner in which such change should be effected. Gone were the Soviet dictums on "general laws" and "proletarian internationalism" that had featured so prominently in the concluding statement of the 1969 world conference of Communist and workers' parties. In their place were the autonomist formulations regarding "different paths" to socialism, "internationalist solidarity " among CPs and all other forces working

for social progress, the legitimacy of "non-alignment," and acknowledgement that criticism of Communism was not tantamount to anti-Communism. Perhaps most portentous was the injunction to observe in practice the Helsinki principles of "respect for the rights of man and fundamental liberties, including the liberty of thought, conscience, religion or creed...". In the international Communist context the autonomist coalition had succeeded in putting together a genuinely revolutionary document. Fortunately for Moscow, the contents of the final Berlin statement were merely prescriptive rather than binding upon the conference participants.

The CPSU's first reaction to the proceedings and outcome of the Berlin conference was defensive and internally oriented. Readers of Pravda would not have suspected the range of views espoused by the European CPs. The most controversial portions of the Carrillo, Berlinguer, and Marchais speeches were simply deleted from the Pravda summaries. For example, Carrillo drew an analogy between the Communist movement and early Christianity, only to proclaim that "we are beginning to lose the characteristics of a church," including what he called the mysticism of predestination. Berlinguer emphasized the importance of regional CP ties, "on the West European level" as well as "on the all-European level," alluding favorably to the concept of Eurocommunism. Marchais stressed the depth of the capitalist crisis yet debunked the notion that the imperialists could resolve it by recourse to war or Fascism, thus rebutting a standard Soviet argument against undue revolutionary militancy in the West. Indeed, he insisted that the PCF would not permit steps in behalf of peaceful coexistence to inhibit in any way its struggle for socialism. All these themes were expunged from the CPSU daily, as were all critical innuendoes against the socialist systems in East Europe. In the same vein, statements made in support of socialist pluralism by the PCE and the suddenly rather eloquent PCF leader

Marchais were also omitted. Curiously, Berlinguer's advocacy of libertarian socialism appeared intact, perhaps because he had said much the same thing at the 25th CPSU Congress the previous March. But the Soviet overseers of ideological probity evidently had no intention of informing the Soviet public that the French and Spanish CPs had joined forces with the PCI on this question. Distortion by censorship was compounded by outright falsification: Pravda's editorial commentaries on the Berlin summit repeatedly lauded it as a victory for "proletarian internationalism," the "general laws," and the growing unity of the international Communist movement.

Then in the autumn of 1976 the CPSU shifted from the defensive to the offensive, initiating a campaign against Eurocommunism that resembled in manner and substance the post-1968 campaign against pluralism. Much as in the early 1970s, Soviet criticisms were echoed and often magnified by loyalist CP spokesmen, with the Czechs replacing the East Germans as the most vitriolic antagonists of the new Eurocommunist deviation. Similarly, the attacks were made on two levels: one treason, the other revisionism. At times the Eurocommunists were accused of anti-Sovietism and collusion with imperialism because of their divisive impact on the European Communist movement. At other times they were merely censured for denying the validity of the CPSU's "general laws," or ridiculed for tauting as theoretical verities propositions that had never been tested in practice. Authoritative Soviet commentators and political media (e.g., Kommunist and Pravda) took the latter more moderate tack. The former more extreme charges were voiced in lesser Soviet journals of limited domestic circulation (e.g., New Times) or by the more sectarian CPSU allies (e.g., the Bulgarian CP chief Todor Zhivkov and the prominent Czech leader Vasil Bilak). Again, the Soviet leadership proved reluctant to reveal to its own citizens the widening breach in the purportedly ever more unified movement. As in the anti-

pluralism drive, there was also an escalation from generalized polemics to attacks on individuals. From late 1976 through the first half of 1977 the Soviet loyalists stuck to broad-gauged diatribes. Then in June 1977 Moscow launched the controversial New Times attack on Carrillo, castigating him for what amounted in Soviet eyes to treasonous conduct, i.e., unwitting aid to NATO by way of his support for West European socialist regionalism and "conscious anti-Sovietism." These themes were reiterated to varying degrees by the loyalist CPs of East Europe. By autumn 1977 sideswipes against the PCI also began to appear in Pravda. In a major feature in the CPSU daily on September 1, the day before top-level talks between Suslov and PCI Secretariat member Gian Carlo Pajetta were to take place, the leader of the pro-Moscow Greek CP attacked the "revisionists'" theory of Eurocommunism precisely for its denial of "the basic general laws of socialist revolution." On October 1 an unsigned TASS report in Pravda noted with "surprise" the participation in anti-Soviet seminars and symposia by members of the PCI, "whose leadership has not once denounced the campaigns against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries." In effect Moscow seemed to be stepping up its own criticism of the PCI for the twin sins of revisionism and anti-Sovietism As we have seen, the CPSU managed to put on a facade of harmony for the November 7 celebration of the October Revolution. But immediately thereafter Soviet polemics against Eurocommunism resumed, while the PCI-PCE entente was further cemented during Carrillo's visit to Rome.

The question that must be addressed is why the CPSU returned to a posture of confrontation with the West European CPs after Berlin. The pre-Berlin polemics can be interpreted as part of the jockeying for position that accompanied the final stages of bargaining on the conference document. But with the conclusion of the summit and the subsequent concealment of the CPSU's concessions from the

Soviet people, what was there to be gained from a confrontation that would only further publicize the cleavages in the European Communist movement? Moreover, there may well have been an element of truth in the frequent Soviet-inspired allegation that "Eurocommunism" was an invention of the bourgeois press. Aside from the purely technical question of the term's origins, the Western media's concentration on the phenomenon of West European CP regional ties and their increasingly congruent views came at a time when the major parties involved were actually focusing their attention more on domestic concerns than interparty issues and contacts. They had won a victory for the principle of autonomous paths to socialism at Berlin. They now had to vindicate their strategic choices on the homefront. The PCI was engaged in enhancing its quasi-governmental status accruing from the electoral gains of June 1976. The PCF was bent upon advancing its position within the union de la gauche as well as among French voters in the upcoming municipal elections of March 1977. The PCE was preoccupied with obtaining legal status in the kaleidoscopic context of post-Franco Spain. Despite these everriding domestic issues the March 1977 Madrid meeting of Carrillo, Berlinguer and Marchais signified that the concept of Eurocommunism as an affinity of strategic views was alive and well, a point that was to be reaffirmed at the bilateral PCI-PCE summit the following November. But the participants refrained from responding collectively to the Soviet polemics (just as they refrained from a joint condemnation of Soviet-bloc repression). To their sectarian CP critics they turned, as it were, the other cheek; to the rest of the world they professed once again their commitment to a pluralist model of socialist revolution and construction.

One may, therefore, surmise that a major impetus for the escalating denunciations of Eurocommunism come from developments within the Soviet bloc itself. Dissident activism in support of human rights was growing in Czechoslovakia and

Poland, to a lesser degree in the Soviet Union and GDR. The loyalist ideologues evidently sought to discredit one of the wellsprings of that activism, the Eurocommunist vision of socialism, by stigmatizing it as revisionism if not outright subversion. Yet the CPSU and its allies were caught in a bind. They justified their single-party rule at home on the basis of their claim to knowledge of universal laws of historical development. The public allegiance of the international Communist movement to the CPSU's "general laws" provided a major buttress to that claim. Increasingly, however, the CPSU and even more so its loyalist allies were confronted with a systemic challenge from the most substantial remaining component of that movement, the major non-ruling Western CPs. They could neither break with those parties nor condone the pluralist alternative to Soviet-style socialism without undermining the ideological matrix of their own domestic power. Thus limited in their options, they confined themselves to largely esoteric polemics aimed at party cadres at home as much as those in the West European CPs. Probably much to their chagrin they were discovering that Soviet superpower status was of little consequence as the correlation of ideological force and appeal within the pan-European Communist movement began to shift in favor of the Eurocommunists.

The Loyal Opposition: Constraints and Opportunities

If the Soviet-bloc parties are bound to the West European CPs by the exigencies of domestic power and legitimacy, the Western Communists' opposition to a rupture with Moscow is rooted as much in ideological commitment as in political expediency. One must bear in mind that the members of the PCI, PCF, and PCE are Communists by choice, not circumstance — in contrast to so many of their East European comrades. And while the appeals of Communism have changed over time, the international dimension has remained a constant attribute. From the 1930s into the 1960s public CP criticism of "existing socialism" was minimal and

and "proletarian internationalism" was the accepted standard of interparty relations. To judge from the recently available memoirs and correspondence of CP members, the contradiction between the promise and practice of socialism in the East was either rationalized away as imperialist propaganda or relegated to the inner recesses of the individual Communist's consciousness. More specifically, during the later years of the Comintern era Moscow's role in fostering anti-Fascist action in the West, especially when contrasted with the inaction of the Western democracies, blinded many to the extent and import of the Stalinist purges. During the postwar Cominform era the conservative restoration in France and Italy, abetted by cold war polarization, not only dashed the Resistance hopes of socio-political renewal but also lent a positive cast to the emerging peoples' democracies in East Europe. Even during the Khrushchev era the revelations of Stalin's crimes and surge in French, Italian, and Spanish rates of economic growth were apparently offset by the disparities in income distribution in the West combined with the trends toward consumerism and reduced political regimentation in the East.

It was the shock of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that impelled West European CPs to articulate alternative visions of socialism and to launch systematic critiques of the Soviet model. This process of critical rethinking was further galvanized by domestic political calculation as ever wider sectors of the Western electorates became disenchanted with the political status quo in the face of mounting economic crisis. Still, the West European CPs rejected the prospect held out by some political analysts of electoral gains at the expense of international Communist ties. As we shall see below, they began instead to acquire the characteristics of a loyal opposition within the pan-European Communist movement.

The tenacity of the international component of the West European Communists' ideological posture may be explained in a number of ways. Internationalism is of course an integral part of their theoretical heritage. But to state this is only to beg the question of why that heritage remains so compelling. Three major reasons come to mind, involving questions of ideological affinity, historical identity, and strategic calculation. First of all, considerable ideological agreement continues to exist among the West and East European CPs regarding the economic structure of a socialist society. PCI leaders from Berlinguer on down repeatedly endorse the "fundamental directions" of Soviet economic policy, claiming that it represents the interests of the working class. PCF leader Marchais voiced allegiance to the "general law" of" common ownership of the principal means of production and exchange" even at the French party's twenty-second congress in February 1976 — notwithstanding the intensifying polemics with the CPSU and the party's decision at that same congress to discard the slogan of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." PCF conduct since 1976 has certainly not belied Marchais's endorsement of the principle of nationalization. As for the Spanish party, in "Eurocommunism" and the State Carrillo deplored not so much the economic structure of Soviet society as the absence of democratic control over the public sector and within the workshop.

A second consideration that binds the West European CPs to the CPSU is the simple fact of their historical identity. A new generation of leaders may be coming to power. But the men in their fifties were nurtured in their twenties on the myth of international solidarity, Soviet ideological prowess, and the historic breakthrough of the Great October Revolution. Moreover, the members of the Comintern generation were at one time intimately linked to Moscow by a web of personal and bureaucratic ties. Carrillo remarked revealingly in his speech to the Berlin conference, "today we have grown up." But adults rarely disavow their

parents, however critical of their upbringing they may be in retrospect. Finally, it would be rather absurd for the West European CPs to break with the Soviet Union of the 1970s when they failed to do so in the 1930s or late 1940s. How could their leaderships explain such inconsistency to themselves, let alone their followers?

This brings us to the third question of strategic calculation. A rupture with the CPSU on the part of one or another Western CP would be likely to provoke a schism in that party itself, encouraged all the while by Moscow. The fissures that developed within the Spanish party as a result of PCE-CPSU tensions after 1968 are indicative of the type of disarray that a break with the CPSU might precipitate. Such a course of action seems almost unthinkable in the case of the French and Italian parties. The pro-Soviet members among their rank-and-files who flock to the Soviet booths at local festivals of L'Unità and L'Humanité, who delight in cut-rate excursions to Moscow and Leningrad, would be incensed and bewildered. The party leaderships would risk not only incalculable damage to the internal cohesion of their cadres but the loss of that aura of transcendent internationalism that must account for some of their devoted following. Internal dissension would, in turn, reduce their electoral appeal.

There is another more speculative yet also more grave aspect to the strategic importance of ongoing West European Communist ties with Moscow, namely, their possible linkage to the Soviet Union's policy of détente. The PCE and PCF may have criticized Moscow for excessive preoccupation with harmonious East-West relations. But from the Western vantagepoint of 1977-1978, such criticism appears somewhat fatuous. Indeed, it seems not inconceivable that the CPSU would react to a full-scale tilt to the West by, say, the PCI in a manner not dissimilar to Mao's reaction to Khrushchev's overtures to the West in the late 1950s: namely, a hardline militant foreign policy. Since it is

under conditions of East-West détente that the Western CPs have enhanced their domestic stature in recent years, a return to cold war tensions would be Moscow's most deadly riposte to an interparty schism. It may be recalled that in the aftermath of the Soviet New Times attack on Carrillo high-level talks took place between the PCI and CPSU. Upon their return to Rome, the members of the three-man Italian delegation elaborated in unusual detail upon the depth of the differences between the two parties. Yet one of them, Emanuele Macaluso, also pointedly rejected the idea of a PCI rupture with Moscow as inimical to the interests of both the Italian workers' movement and "our country." In the same breath, as it were, he acknowledged the Soviet role in creating the preconditions (i.e., détente) for the cooperation of all Italian democratic forces. Macaluso's words can be read as support for the hypothesis that the Soviet leaders may have waved over the heads of the PCI (and their Eurocommunist comrades) the damoclean threat of renewed cold war tensions.

Whatever the case, the major Western parties proved intent on maintaining correct interparty ties with Moscow while simultaneously asserting with ever greater concreteness their particular views on issues pertaining to the European Communist movement. The PCF confined itself largely to the defense of absolute autonomy for all CPs, ruling and non-ruling, in their ideological and policy choices. For the PCI and PCE, however, their more insistent advocacy of socialism in liberty entailed the spillover effect of harsher criticism of the absence of liberty in the socialist systems of East Europe. Both tactical expediency and theoretical coherence dictated such a linkage. Since the Italian and Spanish Communists argued that a pluralist form of socialism was possible and necessary in West Europe precisely because of the high level of economic development in that region, they could scarcely avoid defending similar political

principles for the countries of "developed socialism" in the Soviet bloc. Carrillo was blunt on the subject, calling for the transformation of the USSR into a democratic workers' state. True to form, the PCI leaders were more subtle and conciliatory. The most effective contribution the Eurocommunists could make to "the renewal of existing socialist societies," they claimed, would be the completion of the revolutionary process in the capitalist metropoles, the achievement of socialist pluralism in their own societies. Thereafter they would influence developments in the East by force of example, as it were. At the September 1977 national festival of l'Unità, this position was eloquently and forcefully spelled out by Secretariat member Paolo Bufalini — and echoed by Berlinguer himself in his closing speech to the gathering a week later. The CPSU's reaction to Carrillo was the New Times polemic. Its reaction to the PCI's conduct was to pay scant attention to the l'Unità festival in Pravda and to ignore Bufalini's speech altogether.

However, the Eurocommunist leaders did not limit themselves to statements of abstract principle in their efforts to influence the Soviet-style systems. They also cultivated close ties with those regimes that shared one or another aspect of their programmatic goals — while criticizing those that did not. This differentiated approach helps to explain the autonomist coalition that evolved on the road to the Berlin conference between the internally rigid Romanian CP, on the one hand, and the Eurocommunist triad on the other. Their mutual interest in CP independence as well as their inception of frequent interparty contacts dates back to 1967, the year that Romania broke with the Soviet foreign policy line by establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn and maintaining them with Israel after the June War. The West European CPs' selective treatment of the East

European ruling parties according to the criterion of programmatic affinity also accounts for the cordial relations between the PCE and PCI, on the one hand, and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) on the other.

Steps toward a PCI-LCY entente were begun by Togliatti back in 1956 and resumed during the early and mid-1960s, with the Italian party playing a moderating role in the renewed Soviet-Yugoslav party clash of the late 1950s. In early October 1977 a PCI-LCY communiqué, published after a visit by Berlinguer to Belgrade, underscored the two parties' agreement on the importance of the Berlin conference document, the positive value of "non-alignment," and the need to respect "in practice" the principle of autonomy in the face of "negative tendencies still present in the international Communist movement" (a slur at the Soviet attack on Carrillo). Small wonder that Pravda ignored both the visit and the communiqué. As for the rationale behind the PCI-LCY entente, the Titoist posture on autonomy needs no elaboration. The Yugoslavs also endorse socialist pluralism in principle, ascribing their own insistence on exclusive CP control at home to the danger that multi-partyism might intersect with and exacerbate the ethnic tensions that plague their land. Thus they are staunch supporters of the West European CPs' pluralist orientation, including the bid for closer ties with socialist and democratic forces in general. The LCY outdid even the PCI in its ardent defense of Carrillo and the PCE after the New Times incident.

Perhaps the most significant and at the same time sensitive area of pan-European CP ties involves the PCI's relations with the party leaderships of Poland and Hungary. With regard to such ties, the PCF is relatively detached because of the primacy it accords to autonomy, while the PCE is

effectively precluded because of its blatant "anti-Sovietism." Moreover, geopolitical considerations are conducive to a more West European orientation on the part of the Spanish party. By the same token, geopolitics goes far in explaining the Italian party's preoccupation with pan-European as well as West European interparty contacts. But as far as the PCI's relations with Poland and Hungary are concerned, there is an additional factor to consider. In both countries the top CP elite appears to be divided between an orthodox conservative wing and an innovative moderate wing. It may be surmised that the PCI's intensification of multiple-level interparty contacts with Warsaw and Budapest is designed to enhance the political leverage of the more innovative leadership groupings in those countries, including CP chiefs Edward Gierek and Janos Kadar.

The PCI assumed an ambivalent posture toward the crisis that erupted in Poland after the June 1976 workers' riots sparked by sharp hikes in the price of basic food products. On the one hand, the Italian party press carried full and apparently objective reports on the riots, the resulting arrests, and the subsequent activities of the Polish dissident Workers' Defense Committee in support of those arrested. The PCI refrained from direct editorial censure of the regime's conduct, all the while intimating its disapproval by juxtaposing the dissidents' allegations of police brutality and violations of legality to the official party denials of such conduct. On the other hand, the Italians maintained high-level party contacts with Warsaw in 1977 and published authoritative commentaries on the Polish scene that coincided with the views of the Polish Communist innovators on such themes as the need for more decentralized decision-making and consultation with public opinion groups, including non-party intellectuals and the Roman Catholic Church. When the arrested workers and their allies among the dissident intelligentsia were finally amnestied and

released from prison, the PCI warmly commended the regime's conduct, singling out Gierek for particular praise. There is no way of gauging the extent to which the PCI's attitude may have influenced the course or outcome of the Polish crisis. Nevertheless, its show of support for conciliation rather than confrontation on the issue of internal dissidence was indicative of its overall posture toward developments in the Soviet bloc: encouragement to the forces of moderation without undue provocation to the more sectarian elements in the party leaderships.

PCI-Hungarian relations became ever more cordial during 1977, as if the Hungarian party leadership had been encouraged by the outcome of the Berlin conference to assume a more independent posture on European Communist matters. Open political dissidence didn't appear to be a domestic issue in Hungary. There were, however, differences within the party leadership regarding economic policy. In the immediate aftermath of the Polish food-price riots, l'Unità carried several reports on a somewhat similar rise in Hungarian food prices. Not only did the PCI daily comment favorably on the smooth manner in which the Budapest regime had implemented these unpleasant measures. But in doing so it also alluded to an inner party controversy over the size of the peasants' private plots, indicating firm PCI agreement with the resolution of that controversy in favor of the peasants.

The Hungarian experiment in market socialism is understandably of great interest to the PCI, given its own postulation of a mixed economy in a future socialist Italy. This was to be made clear during October 1977 summit talks between Berlinguer and Kadar which included, according to the official communiqué, a discussion of "political economy." The meeting itself was doubtless facilitated by Kadar's favorable comments on Eurocommunism during visits to West Europe (Austria, Italy and West Germany)

in late 1976 and the first half of 1977, precisely at the time of the escalation in Soviet, Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak polemics against Eurocommunism. More importantly, the reports on the bilateral meeting as well as the contents of the ensuing communiqué indicated deepening amity between the two parties. And as Berlinguer commented during an interview on Hungarian TV, the positive state of Italian-Hungarian CP relations was a good thing not just for their two countries but for the international Communist movement as a whole. Evidently the CPSU did not view this budding pan-European Communist entente in the same light. In a nutshell, Pravda omitted from its report of the official communiqué the following sensitive points: the discussion of economic questions, the call for more frequent exchanges of experiences and ideas between the two parties, and the statement that the talks took place "in an atmosphere of fraternal cordiality and in a spirit of solidarity and reciprocal understanding."

While the Eurocommunists were friendly with the non-aligned and innovative Yugoslavs, cooperative with the independent-minded Romanians, and outgoingtoward the more moderate Soviet-oriented regimes, they were openly critical of political repression in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent the GDR. There were, to be sure, gradations in the intensity of their positions. As a rule, the PCE's critiques tended to be systemic, the PCI's systematic, and the PCF's selective and fairly superficial. For instance, in "Eurocommunism" and the State and elsewhere, Carrillo questioned whether the Soviet system could even be considered socialist, given the absence of political liberty. PCI leaders and commentators, on the other hand, readily conceded the socialist nature of the USSR's economic base while suggesting, usually in a friendly manner, the need to democratize its political superstructure and rather consistently criticizing domestic

Soviet regimentation and repression. The French Communists interspersed occasional blunt denunciations of CPSU violations of democratic principles with generally bland and positive coverage of internal Soviet developements in L'Humanité. The three parties' reaction to the emergence of the "Charter 77" movement in Czechoslovakia clearly reflected this variegated posture. The PCE published the document in its entirety. The PCI press merely summarized the document but immediately came to the defense of its signatories in its editorial commentaries and daily coverage, expressing outrage at their persecution by the Prague regime. The PCF was relatively mild and conspicuously belated in condemning the repressive actions against the "Charter 77" movement.

When Carrillo, Berlinguer, and Marchais met in Madrid in March 1977, they declined to make any critical references to the Soviet bloc systems in their joint communiqué. This may have been partly due to the substantive differences in their evaluations of those regimes. But it was surely also due to their conviction that collective denunciations from the West European CPs would invite collective rebuttals from the East European party-states. Such a confrontation, in turn, would make more difficult the promotion of bilateral East-West CP ties on matters of mutual interest. Indeed, collective denunciations could develop a dynamic of their own, leading to an outright schism. For all the reasons noted earlier, the Eurocommunists wished to avoid such a denouement.

From the vantage point of mid-1978 the loyal opposition within the pan-European Communist movement is heterogeneous in its composition and goals. Alone each component has but limited clout. Together, however, they constitute a not inconsiderable political force. Whether pluralist, autonomist, or merely innovative by East European standards, they provide one another with

backing and leverage vis-à-vis the orthodox conservatives that dominate the CPSU and its closest allies. Such support extends also to the discredited innovators within these latter countries, including the members of the Dubcek reform movement and the Soviet Union's "loyalist" dissidents such as Roy Medvedev. To date this multi-faceted and amorphous coalition has been responsible for the final document of the 1976 Berlin conference and certainly deserves partial credit for the CPSU's vacillation toward Carrillo. It may even have contributed to the relative moderation of the Polish and Hungarian regimes. There seems no reason not to anticipate from it additional evidence of genuine clout in the future.