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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

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PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

COMMITTEE 3

INFLUENCE AND IDEOLOGY

(i) IDEOLOGY IN THE SOVIET VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

by

Hannes Adomeit

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Committee 3: Influence and Ideology

IDEOLOGY IN THE SOVIET VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Hannes Adomeit

The "End of Ideology"

Many Western specialists on Soviet affairs are likely to react to any discussion of the role of Soviet ideology in foreign policy with expressions of déjà vu and boredom, and the comment that there was nothing more to say on a problem that had been discussed ad infinitum and "solved". Ideology, they say, may have explained something of Soviet foreign policy in the early period (i.e. before Stalin came to power) but there has been a long evolutionary process, as a result of which "national" or "state" interests of the USSR have superseded the ideological dimension of Soviet politics. Brest-Litovsk, the proclamation of NEP, entry in the League of Nations, the Hitler-Stalin pact, the XX Party Congress and the Sino-Soviet split are taken as landmarks supposedly demonstrating the increasingly deep contradiction between "national" or "state" interests, and ideology.

This perceived contradiction is seen as being reinforced by another. "Ideological" is usually associated with "irrational", "reckless" and "adventurist", but put in sharp contrast to "pragmatic", "opportunist" and "realistic". As a consequence, ideology as a factor influencing Soviet policy is being eroded in the mind of the Western analyst when he is faced with instances where Soviet representatives display diplomatic skill, act as shrewd and calculating businessmen or pay much attention to military power as an instrument of furthering state interests.

A subtheme of this perceived contradiction between ideology and pragmatism is the view that the ideological content of foreign policy is equivalent to the degree of Soviet support to world revolution, more specifically, the extent to which the Soviet Union is willing to employ military force on behalf of local Communists in various areas of the world. As a result, ideology in Soviet foreign policy is being eroded in the eyes of the Western analyst when the Soviet leaders apparently close their own to the oppression of local Communists while engaging in cooperation with the oppressors at the state level (as in many countries of the Arab world), stand by with folded arms as Marxist regimes are being crushed (as in Chile) or fail to exploit alleged or real advantages for deepening the "crisis of capitalism" (as in the wake of the oil crisis after 1973).

These two contradictions add up to a third and main contradiction as seen by Western analysts, namely that between Rechtfertigungsideologie and Antriebsideologie, the argument being that the Soviet state is indeed an ideology in power, but that ideology is merely providing "legitimacy" (Rechtfertigung) to action, i.e. can no longer be regarded as a guide to action and furnishing "motivation" (Antrieb). Proof of this thesis is derived from the -- undoubtedly valid -- observation that Marxist-Leninist doctrine has served to justify all sorts of policies. At the inter-Party level it has been used to justify projected governments of national union (Italy), adventurous disregard of "mathematical majorities" (the Portuguese CP in 1975) and hesitation with regard to popular-front tactics (France). At the state level it is being used to legitimise policies of cooperation with the USA but policies of confrontation towards China.

Although these facts are not in dispute, the argument presented here takes issue with the predominant line of interpretation concerning the probable role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy of the 1980s. As a starting point it questions the validity of the three above-mentioned contradictions, and on this basis suggests that it is premature to speak of the "end of ideology" in Soviet foreign policy. Instead, the argument concludes, it is appropriate to realize that what has taken place so far is merely a transformation in the various functions of ideology.

Ideology, Power and the "National Interest"

If it is true that the Soviet state is an "ideology in power" it follows that the contradiction between "ideological", and "state" or "national", interests is more apparent than real. The reconciliation of the apparent contradiction was provided long ago by Stalin in his dictum that "An internationalist is ready to defend the USSR without reservation, without wavering, unconditionally" (Sochineniya, vol X, p.45). The essence of this doctrinal assertion, of course, is the idea that what serves to enhance Soviet power internationally, simultaneously increases the prospects of world revolution. In practice, "world revolution" reads "world socialism", which reads "the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries" and those "progressive forces" (i.e. primarily pro-Moscow Communist Parties) allied with that camp.

It would be very comforting indeed if one could accept the idea that such an assertion is brazen, cynical, preposterous, arrogant, pretentious,

completely out of touch with reality, and hence has nothing to do with the foreign policy of the Soviet leadership. It is not wise to adopt such a view. Certainly, dynamic interrelationships between Soviet support for "revolutionary transformations" abroad, the occasional success of such transformations and the consequent benefits for Soviet power and foreign policy do remain. Cuba is perhaps the best example of such interrelationships. Castro's turn from a brand of liberalism to Marxism-Leninism almost provided the USSR with an extensive strategic-nuclear benefit in 1962 (if Khrushchev's idea of a fait accompli had worked out as he had anticipated it would). More recently, Cuba was instrumental in putting the Marxist-Leninist MPLA into power in Angola and pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for Mengistu's regime in Ethiopia, thereby compensating for the set-back the USSR had suffered in Somalia.

Vietnam is another important example. The "significant changes in the correlation of forces in favour of world socialism", i.e. foremost the growth of Soviet military power, provided North Vietnam with the needed amount and sophistication of weapons and (ironically, in conjunction with China) the necessary political backing to restrain the US from escalating the air and naval war even further and expanding the ground war into the home territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), thereby enabling that country to achieve an important victory. In turn, a reunified and militarily even more formidable Vietnam agreed at the XXXII Council meeting in Bucharest (late June of this year) to become a full member of of Comecon.

Evidently, the revolutionary, anti-colonial and "anti-imperalist" image successfully conveyed by Vietnam and Cuba (and, by implication, the USSR), and the demonstration of "proletarian internationalism in action" (particularly useful as a device to counter Chinese charges of "embourgeoisement") are worth a great deal to the Soviet Union. Some of the costs for the USSR include about six million dollars (US) a day in direct and indirect subsidies to the Cuban economy, virtually free arms shipments and logistical support for the Cuban armed forces and negative repercussions on East-West detente. As for Vietnam, it is safe to assume that the USSR enticed that country to align itself more closely with "world socialism" and to join Comecon with promises of substantial development aid. The bearing of these costs shows that the current Soviet role in the "national-liberation struggle" cannot simply be explained in terms of power expansion and self-aggrandizement of a traditional nation-state, but it has to be seen also as part and parcel of the revolutionary and missionary heritage of 1917.

Whether or not the pursuit of this heritage is in the main an effective strategy is a different matter. On the one hand, communism has overall been unsuccessful in the Arab world, certainly in Egypt, but also in countries where relatively good relations exist(ed) between the Soviet Union and particular regimes at the state level, e.g. Syria, Iraq and Libya. On the other hand the, from the Soviet point of view, "unprincipled" and "unscientific" nature of various brands of socialism and radicalism in the Third World, and some of the set-backs the USSR has suffered,can be contrasted with the successes mentioned above and the recent emergence of regimes with a more straightforward pro-Soviet or Marxist-Leninist orientation, including Machel's regime in Mozambique, Neto's in Angola, Ismail's in South Yemen (Aden) after the coup, and Taraki's in Afghanistan after the overthrow of President Daoud.

On balance, it is probably correct to say that the Soviet role in world affairs would not be what it is today if the USSR had not continued along the road of its "dual policy" (E.H. Carr) of long standing, i.e. the pursuit of relations at the state level under the slogans of "peaceful coexistence", "non-interference in internal affairs" and so on, while at the same time attempting to utilize Communist Parties and allied "progressive forces" to achieve changes in system and foreign policy of the countries concerned. In line with this dual policy, Soviet policy-making is still deeply affected by the idea that "revolutionary transformations" first and foremost are a blow to "imperialist" influence and control -- in Cuba and potentially elsewhere in Latin America, in Vietnam and perhaps elsewhere in South-east Asia, in Angola and in other African countries, in Portugal and probably also in France and Italy. Not every revolutionary or pseudo-revolutionary transformation <u>per se</u> can be regarded as strengthening the power of the Soviet state, and not in all cases is it possible to say that a Western loss is automatically a Soviet gain. This is the "objective" state of affairs. Yet is appears that the Soviet leadership is untiring in its optimism that if the correlation is not direct and immediate it will ultimately turn out to be so.

Seen from these perspectives it is possible to assert that what is at issue is not a matter of Russian state power <u>supplanting</u> Soviet ideology but <u>supplementing</u> it. Just as ideology constitutes a form of power that can be used to exert influence, power in turn can be used to spread ideology. (In practice, the growth in Soviet naval and long-range airlift capabilities has been used precisely for that purpose.) Finally, it is erroneous to construct an irreconcilable antagonism between "the Soviet national interest"

and ideology: "the national interest" is not something that is God-given, immutable or self-evident but it is a matter subject to almost limitless manipulation and reinterpretation. Rather than one clearly defined national interest, there is instead a whole spectrum of interests (with emphasis on the plural) which themselves may have ideological dimensions to a greater or lesser extent. As summarized by Vernon Aspaturian, "Soviet ideology itself defines 'national interest', 'power', and 'world revolution' in such a way as to make them virtually indistinguishable and inseparable as the three sides of an equilateral triangle" (Process and Power, p.333).

Ideology versus Pragmatism: "Red" versus "Expert"

As for the contradiction between ideology and pragmatism, careful distinctions need to be made. To speak of Soviet ideology is to speak of Leninism which is largely an adaptation of Marxism to the Russian social, economic and political setting, providing a set of policy prescriptions and advice on tactics. Such advice can be summed up in the firm belief that the ends justify the means, and that manoeuvering and flexibility are necessary attributes of politics at home and abroad. To that extent, opportunism or pragmatism can be a reflection of ideologically conscious policy rather than a contradiction to it. As the editor of Isvestiya put it 60 years ago at a time of undoubted relevance of ideology for policy-making, "We are convinced that the most consistent socialist policy can be reconciled with the sternest realism and most level-headed practicality" (Steklov, Izv., 15 March 1918).

It is precisely in conformity with stern realism and level-headed practicality that the Soviet Union will not be found rushing into military intervention or breaking off diplomatic, economic and other ties every time local Communist Parties suffer from suppression by regimes with which the USSR maintains good, or reasonably good, relations. (A recent opportunity for doing just that was provided to the USSR by the Ba'ath regime in Iraq when, in the wake of the coup in Afghanistan, it proceeded to hang 21 CP members for having formed illegal cells in the Iraqi armed forces.) The reasons for not doing so are obvious. On the one hand, intervention on behalf of weak CPs could be very costly and counterproductive and the rupture of relations would probably not change the fate of the communists in question. On the other, maintenance of relations on the state level can safeguard some degree of influence over the internal policies of the regime in question. This is known to have happened in Egypt under Nasser, but also in Syria and Iraq, where Soviet diplomats interceded on behalf of

local Party comrades to mitigate their fate, to let them enter into the dominant Party (e.g. the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt) or enter into coalition governments (Syria and Iraq). Undoubtedly, this is the classic dual policy still in operation.

As for the conflict of pragmatism versus ideology in Soviet relations with the developed "capitalist" countries, matters today do not seem to be very much different from what they were at the beginning of the 1920s when the Soviet Union was about to embark on economic cooperation with the West in order to relieve "temporary" economic difficulties and when Lenin wrote that:

> We must be clever enough, by relying on the peculiarities of the capitalist world and exploiting the greed of the capitalists for raw materials, to extract from it such advantages as will strengthen our position -- however strange this may appear -- among the capitalists. (Leninskii Sbornik, XXX, p.169, as quoted by Carr, Bolsh. Rev., III, Pt. 4, p. 277).

Then as now the primary form of exchange was to be Western technology for Soviet raw materials. The purpose of economic exchange was not to integrate the USSR into the Western-dominated world economy but to exploit that economy to the Soviet Union's own advantage. One of the main methods used by the Soviet leadership has been to utilize "intra-imperialist" and "inter-imperialist contradictions" so as to extract maximum benefits. And then as now the effectiveness of this policy was limited because of the serious deficiencies in Soviet agriculture (necessitating the import of grain in addition to technology) and Western distrust of Soviet intentions.

Where there has been change it concerns the long-expected "collapse of capitalism" as a result of an ever deepening crisis. It is doubtful whether the Soviet leadership still operates under the assumption that such collapse is imminent. But it is equally doubtful whether they see the present economic difficulties in the West and Japan as anything else but the manifestation of irreconcilable contradictions inherent in the capitalist world economy. The main controversial issue in the Politburo seems to be the extent to which it is possible and desirable to deepen the current crisis from the outside and inside(using local Communist Parties) and to what extent such policies would not prove counterproductive by leading to fascism, hurting the workers in the capitalist countries and bringing an end to the benefits currently derived by the USSR from economic exchanges. Undoubtedly

the optimal state of affairs from the Soviet leadership's point of view is a long-term, creeping crisis in the world economic system of capitalism that would be severe enough to force its individual members to export to the USSR, slow down their tempo of economic growth and allow the USSR to catch up.

In the final analysis, no matter whether it concerns policies vis-à-vis the developed industrialized countries or policies in the Third World, it is not inappropriate to say that the "pragmatism" of Soviet foreign policy is not pragmatism per se but pragmatism in the service of objectives. These objectives, in turn, are defined -- among other things -- by ideology.

The conflict of pragmatism versus ideology in foreign policy finds its counterpart on the domestic political level in the conflict of "Red" versus "expert". When looking at this problem, it is undeniable that a considerable degree of professionalisation has taken place in the middle echelons of the foreign policy establishment. Experts of the various international relations institutes under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and of the Moscow State Institute on International Relations (MGIMO), -- a category which Horelick has called the institutchiki -- today have probably more access to the top leadership than ever before in Soviet history. So far, however, it appears that professionalisation has served only to increase the overall effectiveness of Soviet foreign policy without having altered basic priorities and goals.

It is difficult to say whether this will change with the inevitable passing of the present gerontocracy and the emergence of a new leadership. But when speculating about the future one should not forget that the Party apparatchiki have never had any problems maintaining preeminence over the institutchiki or any other brand of experts (including, one might want to add, the military professionals). It is also useful to bear in mind that in previous succession struggles it was always the contender in control of the Party apparatus who succeeded in rising to preeminence: this was true for the transition from Lenin to Stalin, from Stalin to Khrushchev, and from Khrushchev to Brezhnev. Thus, any assessment of the relevance of ideology and the likely role of experts in the foreign policy-making process hinges crucially on the evolution of the Party. It is also inextricably bound up with the problem of legitimacy of rule.

Legitimacy versus Motivation

It is simply not true that legitimacy of rule in the USSR is based solely on achievement criteria. Ideological principles -- more often than not Leninist rather than Marxist -- are used to justify basic features of the "mature socialist society", including preeminence of the Party (the "vanguard of the working class") over all social and political forces, the restriction of all autonomous aspirations, and rejection of "bourgeois" notions of liberalism, pluralism and democracy. Individual rights and freedoms are not being regarded as "inalienable", value-free or neutral but subordinated to the bonum comune of the society as a whole -- a view that has unambiguously been codified in the 1977 Constitution in provisions demanding of the citizen the duty "to safeguard the interests of the Soviet state, to contribute to the strengthening of its might and prestige" (Art. 62) and "to be intolerant of anti-social behaviour, /and/ to contribute in every way to the maintenance of public order" (Art. 65).

As argued by Robert Wesson, Marxism might perhaps have effectively if not overtly been left behind as the new state settled down after the revolution, and might have been replaced by a straightforward faith in patriotism and Russianism and loyalty to the new rulership, were it not for the fact that the new Soviet state undertook to govern a multi-national domain. Because of its supra-national or international appeal, Marxism before the revolution made it possible to bring discontented Poles, Georgians, Jews, and Russians into a single militant organization; it facilitated the reassertion of control over the non-Russian minorities after the revolution. Finally, it became indispensable as Soviet forces asserted hegemony over nations of Eastern Europe (Sov. Studies, July 1969).

It is precisely for this reason that even the adherents of the erosion-of-ideology school are arguing that Eastern Europe was an exception to the general rule of irrelevance of ideology in Soviet foreign policy (e.g. William Zimmerman). But this is not where matters could be left to rest. By virtue of this "exception" the importance of ideology enters into a much broader set of issues in the East-West conflict, and not even clandestinely through the back door. It must enter in triumph through wide open gates into any framework of analysis, because if it is true that ideology plays a role in the Soviet sphere of influence, it must by necessity affect Soviet attitudes and policies with regard to the Berlin problem and the German problem (West Berlin, West Germany and the Western allies). It must also impinge on European security and the scope of East-West relations in political,

trade and cultural affairs, not only in Europe, but also on a global scale. Because of Soviet concerns of ideological security, it is even bound to make itself felt on an issue that could be considered esoteric and highly technical, namely mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Finally, as the conventional and strategic balance can only be seen in conjunction, the "exception" even has repercussions on SALT.

All this was true even before the Carter Administration took office, but when it did come to office, with all its emphasis on human rights, observance of the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, and demonstrative gestures of support for Soviet dissidents, it was inevitable that the inter-relationship of issues (another of those famous "linkages") would come into sharp focus. For years Soviet spokesmen had been using every opportunity to point out that relaxation of tensions at the political and military level did not, and could not, mean relaxation of the struggle at the ideological level. There has been no change in this respect. What has changed is only the fact that the ideological gauntlet was seized by the opponent, first by the US Senate (e.g. the Jackson-Vanik amendment) and then by the Administration itself.

This may provide the appropriate starting point for turning to the argument that ideology is "merely" ex post facto "justification" of policy and has nothing to do with "motivation". This distinction looks neat in theory but is not very persuasive in practice. This is perhaps best shown by an analogy. For a tribal medicine man, the sacred myths and rituals involving the alleged healing faculties of snake skins, goat blood and monkey tails are undoubtedly a source of "legitimacy" for the power he exerts. This is so irrespective of whether he is a complete cynic. Nevertheless, the myths, rituals and taboos can assume important "motivating" functions under two conditions. The first is a belief on the part of the medicine man that his power will be improved if he can spread the myths to other tribes. The second is the appearance of internal or external critics who dare call his assumed healing powers a deplorable hoax and/or deliberate deception; this is likely to call forth his vigorous counteraction.

Both of these conditions exist in Soviet foreign policy. Concerning the first condition, there are the hopes of the Soviet tribal chiefs to spread Marxism-Leninism to the national-liberation movements of the Third World. This has already been discussed. Concerning the second condition, it is painfully obvious to the Soviet medicine men that the Soviet type of ideology and the Soviet type of system in Eastern Europe is vigorously

under attack -- not only from Carter and the Western bourgeois theoreticians (Brzezinski being perhaps the most notorious of them all in Soviet eyes) and all their concepts of "convergence" and "bridge-building", but also from the "Eurocommunist comrades", in particular, comrades Carrillo, Marchais and Berlinguer, and -- even more importantly -- from the Chinese.

Predictably, on the basis of the analogy, the Soviet leaders have not reacted to these developments by acknowledging that they had been cynics all along and that Marxism-Leninism had been a deplorable hoax but by vigorous attempts to restore ideological orthodoxy wherever possible and by strenuous efforts to maintain a pivotal position in the "changing archipelago" of national communisms (Arrigo Levi). In this way, the quest for legitimacy of power and "mere" justification of policy are being transformed into motivation of policy.

Conclusions

An evolutionary process has taken place in the course of which there has occurred an important transformation in the role, or "functions", of Soviet ideology. The original ideological fervour (the "utopian", "revolutionary" or "missionary" function of ideology) and the humanistic, emancipatory content of Marxism have given way in the Soviet Union to a greater emphasis on legitimacy. Because of this, the challenges to the Soviet-type system from dissidents in the USSR, from nationalism and liberalism in Eastern Europe, from China and -- more recently -- from "Eurocommunism" and the Carter administration are likely to lead to a revival of ideological orthodoxy. The direction of this revival is likely to be in the nature of a counterreformation rather than a reformation.

Theoretically, the essence of such a development could be a mixture of isolationist, nationalist and anti-Western principles primarily affecting the USSR and the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. However, this is not the full extent of the likely role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy of the 1980s. Much of the impetus behind the age-old "dual policy" still remains intact. Within this context, increases in Soviet state power provide more effective opportunity to produce "revolutionary transformations" abroad; these transformations in turn raise hopes among the Soviet leaders that they will lead to an increase in Soviet influence. Thus, in the future (as in the past) political, military, economic and ideological forms of influence will continue to be seen and acted upon in conjunction with each other.

It is possible -- though not always plausible -- to explain many of the important international events by reference to a Marxist-Leninist framework, i.e. much of the "analytical function" of ideology remains in force. Perhaps even more important, although least quantifiable and measurable, is the psychological dimension of ideology or what modern jargon would probably now call the "political culture" of the Soviet leaders, including their fundamental beliefs and values, their subjective perceptions of history and politics, and their unquestioned assumptions about the nature of conflict. For instance, it would be fair to say that their belief, derived from Marxism-Leninism, that domestic and international politics is unrelenting struggle and that who falls behind consistently is condemned to be thrown on the "rubbish heap of history", explains much of the Soviet quest for military-strategic parity with (and, if possible, superiority over) the adversary superpower. It would also explain much of the remarkable dynamism of Soviet policy abroad that stands in such stark contrast to the retrenchment and repression at home.

If it is correct that the psychological make-up accounting for this policy is deeply rooted in the ideological heritage and in the history of Bolshevik Party struggles, and if it is also true that the role of the Party -- notwithstanding the greater input of experts into the foreign policy-making process -- is unlikely to diminish with the passing of the present gerontocracy, the character of Soviet foreign policy in the coming decade will continue to be not one of a status-quo oriented power but one of a power determined to effect (to use the appropriate terminology) a "fundamental transformation of the world correlation of forces in favour of socialism".

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PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

BRIEFING

A(1) THE MILITARY PROCUREMENT PROCESS

by

Arthur Alexander

RAND

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Briefing

THE MILITARY PROCUREMENT PROCESS

Arthur Alexander

I. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

Weapons procurement in the Soviet Union is, fundamentally, politically motivated and politically controlled. But it is carried out in highly bureaucratized institutions by people nurtured in a distinctive cultural and social setting that colours the way in which they participate in the process. Moreover, the political leaders, the bureaucrats, and the institutions are all shaped by historical influences, by military-political doctrine, by the "objective situation" (the "threat"), by internal political power relationships and accommodations, as well as by organizational arrangements, bureaucratic routines, and decision-making practices. This paper focuses on the weapons procurement process: the organizational actors, their behaviour and procedures, and their influence on the weapons themselves. Before proceeding, however, it may be useful to briefly set out a contextual setting in which to place the later discussion.

A 200-year Russian history of successive invasions threatening the very existence of the country fostered a belief in the value of massive armies. A speech by Stalin in 1931, for example, continues to have echoes that are heard today. [1)]

> "Those who fall behind, get beaten. But we do not want to be beaten. No, we refuse to be beaten! One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered for falling behind, for backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her -- for her backwardness; for military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for political backwardness, for industrial backwardness... Such is the jungle law of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak -- therefore you are wrong; hence you can be beaten and enslaved. You are mighty -- therefore you are right; hence, we must be wary of you. That is why we must no longer lag behind."

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1) Quoted in Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo, McGraw Hill, 1951, p. 79.

Consistent with this outlook was the fact that at the eve of World War II, the Soviet Union had more tanks, more aircraft, and more submarines than the rest of the world put together. A modern doctrine that entertains the possibility of fighting and the necessity of winning a war in the nuclear era requires equivalent quantities of men and equipment. So pervasive is the hand of the past, that it would be surprising if the Soviet Union could long hold to a doctrine inconsistent with its history. (Khrushchev's unsuccessful attempt to implement a doctrine of nuclear deterrence is a case in point.) However, I would argue that doctrine by itself may not be highly correlated with specific capabilities for at least three reasons: (1) doctrine is elastic -- many outcomes may be consistent with a specific doctrinal statement; (2) doctrine may be prospective or forward looking; (3) or it may be retrospective and rationalizing.

Soviet arms procurements since World War II seem to be related at least as much to external threats and internal political arrangements as to doctrine. Several phases can be discerned over this period, the present phase dating back to around 1959. In the first post-war period, arms procurement declined sharply as Stalin reduced the size of the military and virtually suspended production of conventional arms, except for the deployment of strategic bombers and first-generation jet fighters. The second phase, reversing the post-war decline, began in 1950, partly in response to Korea, and continued until the end of the Korean War and Stalin's death in 1954. The new leadership then sharply reduced armaments production and drastically cut back aircraft production from roughly 5000 per year to about 500. Large naval programmes were cancelled and manpower levels were reduced throughout the late 1950s to pre-Korean levels. The ballistic-missile programme, however, initiated by Stalin, was carried forward by Khrushchev. Since around 1959, all sectors of Soviet military production have exhibited periods of rapid growth that aggregatively and cumulatively identifies the military buildup that continues into the late 1970s. Whereas the growth rate of total expenditures has been variously estimated at 5 to 9 percent per year over this period, it has been neither continuous nor simultaneous for all types of weapons. Re-equipment and R&D cycles, shifting doctrinal requirements, and the gradual filling in of gaps have produced a complex array of growth patterns across services, functions, and weapons.

Despite the continuous growth of aggregate expenditures since the late 1950s, at least two periods of political decisionmaking appear to be behind the upward rising curves. In the early part of this period, Khrushchev was faced with the Soviet split with China, Berlin tensions, the U-2 incident, and then the Cuban missile crisis. While Khrushchev probably acceded reluctantly to the needs generated by the objective situation, the political leadership under Brezhnev in the mid-1960s seems to have accepted the military's doctrinal views and to have taken the necessary steps to close the gap between the politically accepted objectives and the nation's military capabilities. Some analysts speculate that in 1969-70, Brezhnev procured support for his detente policy by guaranteeing continued growth of the military sector. Unfortunately, detailed examination of military procurement by weapons types and by functional sectors neither confirms nor refutes the notion of major political decisions taken in 1965 or 1969. The analysis is based, rather on internal political and Kremlinological evidence.

The period since 1965 has witnessed the restoration of collective leadership, a return to orthodoxy in economics and planning, a regularization of bureaucratic routines in Party and government, stability of leaders and cadres, and an attraction to "scientific decisionmaking" that emphasizes deliberation, expert advice, information, and analyses, all of which has encouraged a devolution of authority to the technocrats. Many observers consequently discern a growth in high-level political inflexibility. Nevertheless, one must always be sensitive to the central analytical dilemma in understanding Soviet affairs: the narrowly departmental approach of the institutions versus political control by the Party and its ability to enforce priorities. "The pressure from above is ruthless and unremitting, and evasion from below is resourceful and not unavailing." [2] Soviet weapons procurement is therefore best understood in a context that takes account of both political and organizational forces.

II. THE PROCESS

ORGANIZATIONAL ACTORS

The structure of governance in the Soviet Union is bifurcated, with the Communist Party leadership and bureaucracy maintaining its historical

2) Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (2nd ed.), Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 386.

primacy in policy formulation and supervision, and with government agencies responsible for implementation of policy. For present purposes, the military establishment (although formally a branch of government) can be considered as a third element of the structure. In simplest terms, then, the Party establishes policy on political, military, and economic issues; it assigns priorities; and it allocates resources among the principal claimants. Industrial ministries in the government perform much of the weapons-related research, and develop and produce the equipment. The military issues requirements and is the user of new weapons. The organizational actors and their linkages are shown in Figure 1.

The Communist Party

The Party dominates life in the Soviet Union, and the Politburo dominates the Party. Headed by Leonid Breshnev, the Politburo's 15 full and 7 candidate (non-voting) members also hold major posts in key Party and government bodies. As the country's supreme policymaking body, the Politburo deals not only with defence, but with the whole panoply of issues arising in a large, modern nation. The demands placed upon the Politburo are therefore enormous in scope and detail. The staffing through which issues are framed, the sources of information and analysis, and the generation of alternatives are therefore crucial to decisionmaking.

The ruling style combines individuality with collegiality. This can be unwieldy when revisions to established policies come foward for decision. A time consuming process of prior consultation and careful consensus building is often necessary, but sidestepping around troublesome issues -- or simple avoidance -- is also used to reduce controversy. Sub-group specialization is another technique for dealing with major issues. Such a group in defence matters is formally established in the Defense Council.

The Defense Council is the highest level link between politics and the military. Chaired by Breshnev, it includes the Prime Minister and Defense Minister and perhaps also the military chiefs of the General Staff and Warsaw Pact forces. It is not clear though whether the Defense Council acts as a sub-committee of the Politburo, or as a supreme defence decisionmaking body whose recommendations are rubber-stamped by the

Figure 1



Organizations in Soviet Weapons Procurement

full body. In any event, given the heavy responsibilities of its members, day-to-day leadership would necessarily devolve to specialist organs elsewhere in the bureaucracy. One of the more important of these is the Central Committee Secretariat.

The Secretariat is responsible both for overseeing the implementation of Party policies promulgated by the Politburo, and for supplying to the Politburo information, analyses, and recommendations. It is consequently at a central node of policy and decisionmaking. Each of the ten Secretaries (headed by General Secretary Brezhnev) has specific functional responsibilities, administered by a score of departments and a permanent professional staff of somewhat over a thousand. Brezhnev held the secretaryship for heavy industry and defence production in the late 1950s, and the present Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov held the post for ten years until 1976. Directly under this Secretary is the Department of Defense Industry, headed since the late 1950s by I.D. Serbin. The staff of 90-100 professionals performs functions similar to those performed by U.S. Congressional Committee staffs. They are involved in politics, analysis, and investigation, overseeing Party affairs in the military production ministries, and supervising the implementation of R&D and production policies. Important decisions are often made, in fact, by staff members who enlist the support of the Secretariat hierarchy to move proposals toward formal approval by the Politburo. Given the important functions of the Secretariat, it is critical to note that it includes no organ formally responsible for purely military affairs or for defence policy, and has no institutional capacity to critique military policies or to propose alternatives, except for the technical issues of military R&D and production. [3]

Government

The Council of Ministers, at the top of the planning, administrative, and executive functions in the Soviet government, is responsible for the implementation of policies originating in the Party. However, with more

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3) For completeness, the Administrative Organs Department deals with personnel selection and promotion, particularly of Party members in the military and the KGB. The Main Political Administration, which operates simultaneously as a Secretariat department and as a directorate in the Defense Ministry, oversees Party political work in military units.

than 100 members it is too large to actually manage the economy. This job is done by a smaller Presidium -- a kind of inner cabinet -- which is led by the Prime Minister (Alexei Kosygin) and is composed of around 10 members including a deputy responsible for defence industry. Defence production, however, is just one of the many claimants on available resources, and although the Presidium would give defence the priority demanded by the political leadership, other economic goals are also important. Moreover, defence priorities disrupt plans elsewhere and reduce overall economic efficiency.

A Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) polices the special priorities accorded to defence and coordinates that sector both internally and with the rest of the economy. Chaired by the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers for defence industry (L.V. Smirnov), the VPK includes representatives from the defence production ministries, Defense Ministry, State Planning Agency, and probably from the Central Committee Secretariat. Although formally a government agency, some analysts speculate that in practice it may be supervised by the Party Secretary for defence production. The VPK performs several critical functions in weapons procurement: it vets new weapons proposals for technical and manufacturing feasibility; translates weapons specifications and designs into programmes of work; monitors weapons projects as necessary, ironing out bureaucratic impediments and other bottlenecks; and coordinates military-related scientific, technical, and economic activities with the rest of the economy. VPK head Smirnov also played a direct role in the SALT negotiations.

Eight ministries develop and produce Soviet weapons, although several predominantly civil production ministries also contribute to the military effort. The sector operates within the general Soviet system of planned allocations and outputs and faces the same problems of lagging technology and weakness of innovation. The Soviet leadership, since the first Five Year Plan in the early 1930s, has addressed this problem by giving the military-industrial sector a priority and attention not enjoyed by others. This sector also enjoys other advantages. Its managers, for example, have been unusually talented and remarkably stable in their jobs. A good deal of slack is allowed in individual plants, which is normally used to produce consumer goods but which is also available to meet unexpected demands. The ministries control research institutes and design bureaux,

a key role having been given to chief designers and their bureaux.

The importance of designers stems partly from their technical competence (based to some degree on continuity of design experience) and also from their position at the central node between research and product, user and planner. They supply to the always chaotic R&D process a leadership and coordination made even more necessary in the Soviet Union by the absence of a responsive economy. It is the chief designer who is identified with the success or failure of a project. Designers possess a degree of autonomy in running their organizations uncommon in the Soviet Union. Budgets and manpower levels of defence industry research institutes and design bureaux are relatively independent of production trends, exhibiting much less of the cyclical ups and downs of American weapons development teams. This institutional stability results in regular progression of designs and prototypes. The availability of improved weapons in prototype form may make the follow-on production decision more likely than does the American military-political process of selling a plan instead of a product.

The Military

Almost all military activity in the Soviet Union falls under the Ministry of Defense. A highly professional, uniformed organization, its weapons procurement efforts take place in directorates under the Minister, in the General Staff, and in the staffs and directorates of the five separate services. The chief ministerial body involved in weapons procurement is a directorate created in 1970 and headed by a deputy minister General Alekxeyev, formerly chief of the General Staff's Scientific-Technical Committee and one of the principal Soviet SALT delegates. Although this directorate's responsibility has not been revealed, on the basis of precedence one could guess that it oversees major new programmes characterized by high levels of priority, uncertainty, and costs.

The General Staff sits at the centre of the weapons requirement process. Typically, it neither originates nor gives final approval to weapons programmes, but all proposals flow through it, conflicting demands are ajudicated there, and service claims are tailored to meet procurement budgets and economic plans. An enlarged role for the

General Staff in weapons procurement was contemporaneous with political dissatisfaction in the mid-1960s with military procurement efficiency. Professionalism, which had always been the hallmark of the military commanders involved in weapons acquisition, shifted from competence centred on the use of weapons, to a 1960s emphasis on technical experts who knew how to build them.

Within the General Staff, several agencies are involved in weapons R&D and procurement. The available evidence suggests that a Scientific-Technical Committee plans military-related research in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. It probably also provides technical advice on weapons proposals. Most of the General Staff work in requirements, planning, and coordinating weapons procurement probably takes place in the Armaments Directorate. Analytical planning techniques and the recent interest in systems analysis and operations research is also centred in these two organizations. It is the Main Operations Directorate, however, that formulates general military policy and the main lines of future weapons development, which the technical agencies then translate into specific research plans and weapons requirements.

This Ministry-level pattern is repeated in the five services, with the central role assumed by the services' Armaments Directorates. The Armaments Directorates maintain close contacts with the research institutes and design bureaux of the industrial ministries and keep informed both of technical opportunities and limitations. They are thus in a position to receive broad weapons requirements from the services' Operations Directorates and transmit "tactical-technical" requirements to the production ministries. As part of the job of monitoring production, the Armaments Directorate sends teams of military representatives to facilities doing substantial military R&D or production work. These representatives formally accept equipment on behalf of the military customer, and assure that quality and performance meet specifications. Their authority gives the military a unique advantage in the Soviet Union where customers typically operate in a seller-dominated market.

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR

The sources of Soviet organizational behaviour have been ascribed to climate, geography, serfdom, the Orthodox Church, Tzarist autocracy, communal village life, swaddling practices, and child-rearing patterns. The continuity of certain types of behaviour over periods of a century or more hints at rather deep-seated origins. Secrecy, absence of personal initiative, communal decision processes, deference to higher authority, a "narrow and finicky adherence to technique or rule" have been observed by travellers and other observers of Russian society for generations. For present purposes it should be sufficient to briefly mention some of the more important characteristics of Soviet organizational processes and behaviour.

Bureaucracy in the Soviet Union is long-standing and all-embracing. Bureaucratic inertia and departmentalism have been intensified by the evolution of the nation into a complex and differentiated society whose many aspects of life are governed from the centre. Centralized authority managed through bureaucratic instruments has led to suppression of local initiative, red-tape and delay in communications, difficulty of coordination, and a tendency to ministerial and organizational self-sufficiency.

Many of these traits are emphasized by secrecy, which is endemic in Soviet society and most vigorously applied to all activities connected with the military. Secrecy retards the flow of information, forces details to be continually referred upward for review, limits the viewpoint of decisionmakers, and impedes the generation of policy alternatives. Organizations like the Military-Industrial Commission or Central Committee departments play a crucial role in breaking through the barriers of secrecy and departmentalism. However, even these organizations are unlikely to wander beyond their assigned responsibilities.

The natural conservatism of bureaucracy can be vitiated by personal or organizational initiative, but unless close-to-unanimous support can be marshalled, or unless the initiator is in a clear position of power over potential dissenters, compromise is necessary. Compromise, though, assumes a rough equality between the parties, at least with respect to the

contentious issue. This notion of equality does not arise instinctively among Russian officials for whom the principal question is: who is stronger and who weaker. Such tests of power, which can be dangerous to losers, are usually avoided, and so too is change.

The strong tendencies toward conservatism and inflexibility impel the high-level leadership into assuming the pre-eminent role as initiator of change, typically accomplished through intervention in the standard decision process. Party precepts decry passivity and inflexibility as undesirable traits of the Russian character that ought to be vigorously fought. But since subordinates throughout Party and government are less fully committed to Bolshevik activism, initiative from the top is episodic and implementation is a continual struggle. It is no accident, then, that sudden alterations between two courses of behaviour is seen as a distinctive characteristic of the Soviet system. The leadership views shock treatment from the centre as necessary to overcome the apathy and overcaution of the rank and file and to respond to accumulated environmental changes. Once a new line is set, however, there is a marked tendency to operate mechanically. In periods when high-level interventions are relatively infrequent because of an explicit non-intervention policy or because of an immobilism due to oligarchial power-sharing, the military-industrial sector is more apt to go the way of other Soviet institutions.

III. THE PRODUCTS

For analytical purposes, Soviet weapons can be classified according to their incorporation of new and advanced features: evolutionary systems; all-new systems of traditional types; innovative concepts; and new-in-principle systems. The bulk of Soviet weapons fall into the first category. In addition to the emphasis on evolutionary development is a pattern of design which can be summarized by its most outstanding features: simplicity in equipment; common use of subsystems, components, and parts; and limited performance and mission capabilities. Despite the pervasive evidence for this pattern, it is best interpreted as a probability distribution. American practice, in comparison, yields a larger proportion of new and advanced subsystems, little commonality, high levels of performance, and multiple missions. Although the peaks of the distributions are distinctly separate, there is still considerable

overlap between them. The existence of the Soviet pattern across services, technologies, and weapon types, suggests that there are deep and pervasive forces acting on the weapons procurement process. Many of these forces have already been alluded to above.

The tautly run, centrally administered economy and the inflexibility of the planning system create supply uncertainties that make designers reluctant to ask for new components, or to go to suppliers with whom they have not dealt in the past. The incentives are to use off-the-shelf components that may not be optimal from an overall systems calculation, but that can be counted on to perform to acceptable standards. A doctrine based on the mass use of armies and weapons provides additional inventives to adopt an R&D strategy that reduces the demands on training, maintenance, and logistics.

Organizational relationships also have an impact on weapons design. For example, the steps toward approval of a new weapon proceed in two parallel lengthy routes -- through the industrial ministries and through the military. Most proposals originate in the operations directorate of a service's staff, although there are also many examples of designer-initiated projects that are later endorsed by the military services. A proposal would first be reviewed by a scientific-technical committee of experts in the production ministry to assess technical feasibility. It would then go through the ministerial hierarchy and be passed on to the Military-Industrial Committee. Military approval begins at the service's Armaments Directorate with review perhaps by a service scientific-technical committee. The service staff would determine whether the proposal met the military requirements of the using command and fit into the overall service plan. The proposal would then be forwarded to the General Staff, and possibly to the deputy for armaments of the Defense Ministry for a systems analysis to calculate costs, benefits, and alternative approaches to the mission. Also the impact on plans and budgets would be assessed so that the military could know the industrial consequences prior to the proposal reaching the Military-Industrial Commission. Meeting approval on all counts, the Defense Ministry would recommend the proposal to the Defense Council for final approval by the political leadership. With the concurrence of the Military-Industrial Commission, the Defense Council would approve the project, but if resource requirements were large or if it raised politically sensitive issues,

it would be placed on the agenda of the Politburo for approval and perhaps even detailed discussion.

In order to eliminate unwelcome surprises along the path toward approval, most proposals -- especially for new ideas -- would most likely be previewed and briefed in advance of the formal procedures. If disapproval seemed probable, it would be withdrawn to avoid risking the ignominy (particularly severe in the Soviet context) of rejection. Assent is most probable for something quite similar to that which was approved in the previous planning cycle. Decisions are strongly biased to favour weapons already established in manufacturing, accepted by the commands, and operated by the troops. Technological constraints, economic incentives, organizational processes, and behavioural patterns favour product improvement and continuity. Soviet weapons procurement is an obstacle course whose hurdles are regularly placed and of a standard height. To successfully negotiate it, designers and customers employ technologies and strategies that ensure steady progress. Radical solutions might ultimately pay off, but it would do no one much good if the contestant were disqualified at an early hurdle.

Yet, having said this, new designs -- even innovative ones -- do come off the drawing boards and are occasionally deployed. Many of these, however, fit the pattern -- at least partially -- described above. The ZSU-23/4 anti-aircraft gun, although conceptually new, incorporated off-the-shelf chassis, engine, gun, and electronics. The MiG-25 Foxbat aircraft, although establishing world records for speed and altitude, was conservative in design, used many existing components, and performed essentially a single mission. The BMP armoured personnel carrier, although incorporating almost all new components in a system fulfilling a new tactical role, was neither of particularly high performance nor at the technological state of the art.

Occasional innovative designs are, in fact, encouraged by the relatively stable budgets of R&D organizations that finance a continuous stream of prototypes embodying new technology and improved performance.[4] While not every prototype successfully combines an acceptable combination of mission capability and costs, the multiplicity of designs increases the

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4) Stable design teams are not without disadvantages in that the stability itself can lead to excessive technological conservatism.

likelihood that an acceptable version will be forthcoming. In particular, experimental prototypes have been the means for bridging the gap from one weapons family to another. The uncertainties of technology, performance, and costs can thus be allayed. Management of uncertainty in this manner significantly eases the decision to produce a new weapon; fewer surprises are likely to upset plans made well in advance of production.

The art of design is promoted by the continuity of design teams and a level of experience that comes only from the actual creation and test of new ideas in working hardware. Not only is the designer educated, but so too is the user. Operational testing of prototypes, and extensive field testing of some types of new equipment (T-72 tank, Yak-36 VTOL aircraft, for example) generate feedback for the next design iteration.

Conceptually new weapons, though, often require high level intervention in the standard procedures -- either by direct orders to existing organizations to produce something new, or by the establishment of wholly new organizations. The first generation of jet fighters and VTOL aircraft are examples of direct orders, and nuclear weapons of new project organizations. Even direct intervention, however, is not always effective in turning existing organizations from their chosen courses, as Khrushchev discovered when he was told by the missile designers that neither storable fuels nor underground basing were feasible.

In recent years, change of two types may be altering the basic scene as pictured above. As weapons become more complex and embody a wider range of technologies that are closer to the state-of-the-art in a world-wide comparison, the old patterns may not be sufficient. Although several analysts claim that this is the case and that Soviet weapons development is coming closer to the American style, the Soviet authorities have been uncooperative in supplying the direct hardware evidence to support the argument. Furthermore, there is little evidence that the organizations, processes, incentives, and constraints have changed noticeably over the past decade. On the other hand, there has been growing Soviet concern over their ability to harness the potential of science to military requirements. A particular anxiety is that scientific opportunities and applications would not coalesce quickly enough to ensure the development of the most advanced weapons. The resources devoted in the past

decade to laser research and high-energy particle beams may reflect these concerns. Science-based developments may become more common in the future, although so far there appears to have been little payoff from the effort.

IV. EVALUATION OF SOVIET WEAPONS PROCUREMENT

Basically, the Soviet weapons procurement process works. Indeed, it works well. Despite being handicapped by an inflexible, unresponsive economy that is generally technologically inferior to most industrialized countries, the military-industrial sector of the Soviet Union has designed, developed, and produced apparently effective weapons, affordable in large numbers, and operable by a relatively unskilled, conscript army. Although the weapons are often inferior in a strict technological sense to western equipment, an astute selection of missions and performance characteristics by talented designers and professional military customers have more than made up for the deficiencies of the economic system. Having said that, however, the weaknesses of the system must also be pointed to.

Technological inferiority prohibits the attainment of some capabilities and some missions, or else renders them prohibitively expensive. While it is difficult to point to many examples, the Soviet Union has greater grounds to fear surprising and confounding new systems from the west than vice-versa. Furthermore, Soviet analysts have recognized that whereas the existing process is often effective in supporting priorities, weapons, and technologies already decided upon and acted upon, the identification and selection of new programmes to be given the highest state priorities is a complex and hazardous affair, made more so by the organizational behaviour traits noted earlier. Additionally, although military industry has been insulated from the worst problems of the civilian economy by a variety of methods -- priority, high-level coordination and attention, stability, talent, competition -- it cannot entirely escape from the perversities of the rest of the economy. These methods are neither costless nor can they be completely successful. With the increasing complexity of modern weapons, it may become increasingly difficult to avoid the patterns of behaviour of either the Soviet civilian sector or the western approach to weapons development.

A broader view of resource allocation and military procurement decisionmaking must return to the issue raised in the beginning of this paper -- the balance between political choice and organizational momentum. In summary, I would draw the following points from the fragmentary evidence, historical analogies, systemic regularities, and assertions alluded to in this paper. The military actively maintains a thorough (but not complete) monopoly of information and expertise on military affairs and armaments, on strategic and tactical thought, and on the relationships among doctrine, tactical-technical concepts, and weapons requirements. This monopoly is coupled with conservatism and incrementalism in the generation of alternatives that limit innovation and change. Non-incremental change necessitates the intervention of the political leadership. But the nature of the collective leadership of the past 15 years favours continuity. Therefore we can expect continuation of present trends until major forces for reallocation and change are supported by the leadership, perhaps from one of the following: altered composition and values of the leadership; significant change in the threat; significant change in the ability to meet the threat (technology, economy); or crisis elsewhere in the Soviet Union (e.g., agriculture, nationalities, demography).

In summary, decisionmaking practices and organizational dynamics are important, especially in the short run when political activities are quiescent and changes in the threat are minor. But politics cannot be ignored. It is at the centre of Soviet decisionmaking. This is, in the final analysis, a nation whose leaders are nurtured in the belief that issues of economics, war, and international relations are, above all, political and that these issues can only be treated and understood in political terms.

(3)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Oxford, England - 7-10 September, 1978

PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

Falco
Perle: bisogna tener conto non solo di quelli che studiano l'Occidente (Arbatov, Inozemtsev), che possono dire cosa ci dicono da quelle che dicono ai leaders loro, ma anche di quello che dicono gli altri consiglieri.
Se hanno [illegible] sul SALT i [illegible] sono di [illegible] a loro vantaggio

COMMITTEE 1

THE WEST IN THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

(i) THE UNITED STATES

by

Alexander Dallin

Stanford

Marin: la politica verso l'Eur. Occ. è dettata più da considerazioni relative all'Eur. Or. e alla Cina, che all'Eur. Occ. stessa. Forse sta ritornando la Germania come problema centrale.
Sull'eurocomunismo sono ambivalenti, e l'ambivalenza riflette una loro ambivalenza interna (è problema di [illegible] con il [illegible]). La priorità è al controllo dell'Europa Orientale.
Rapporti con PCI si stanno sviluppando: ma la nuova posizione del PCI al riguardo di Praga potrebbe danneggiarli di nuovo

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Committee 1: The West in the Soviet Perspective

THE UNITED STATES

Alexander Dallin

In 1965 I asked a Soviet official at the United Nations whether there were in fact differences within the Soviet leadership regarding the United States--for instance, whether the American role in Vietnam was but the latest case of imperialist intervention or an aberration from which the US must be rescued. When he acknowledged that there were differences among Soviet observers, I encouraged him to describe them. "There are those", he replied, "who think that the US is evil, and there are others who think that it is stupid". Only later did it occur to me that this made a lot more sense than it seemed at first -- and that it made a lot of difference which conclusion you reached.

If the United States was evil, presumably you had to prepare to fight it; there was no reason for Moscow to expect the capitalist system to alter its predatory essence -- hence the assumption of persisting conflict and perhaps higher levels of military spending. If on the other hand the US was stupid, presumably this condition could be either utilized or modified; it behooved the Soviet Union to teach the US a lesson or two and in any event to take advantage of American stupidity for its own benefit. Here we have an illustration of how different perceptions lead to different attitudes and inferences, which in turn invite different policy preferences. This chain extending from perception to policy will be central to the argument presented in this paper.

The Soviet view of the United States has been, and continues to be, inherently ambiguous. The US has been the object of both envy and scorn; the enemy to fight, expose, and pillory -- and the model to emulate, catch up with and overtake. Suffice it to say that there are multiple sources, reinforcing each other, for this ambiguity. There are traditional Russian views, going back a century or more, as well as the "scratches on their minds" in the Bolshevik leaders' grudging admiration of symbols of industrial efficiency such as Pittsburgh and Detroit -- along with their conviction that US finance capital had been responsible for crises and abuse in the world economy, from the Great Depression to the multinational corporations of our days. There are the Soviet ideological biases which, coupled with

overwhelming ignorance regarding the US, shaped much of Moscow's attitudes in the Stalin days. And, it must be recognized, there is the reality of American life and US behaviour, which often validates and reinforces such uncertainties: however distorted the Soviet image, both American intervention after the Russian Revolution and Allied partnership against Nazi Germany did indeed occur; and there is a basis for the images of both abundance and squalor; Pentagon and populism; optimism and opportunity, as well as racism and the shallowness of a mass culture symbolized by Mickey Mouse and Elvis Presley.

The difficulty in defining the Soviet perspective on the United States is due, however, not only to the simultaneity of contradictory elements -- such as admiration and fear -- in their perception of a system and a society they do not, by and large understand nor trust, but also to the existence, within the Soviet political elite, of <u>different</u> images, perceptions, assumptions, and policy preferences regarding the United States -- and each set of metal pictures of the adversary gives rise to a set of congruent attitudes.

We must then start out by rejecting, for the Soviet Union much as we have done for the West, the model of a unitary, rational actor represented by the "state" (or the "party"). Even if the range of Soviet views is less sweeping than its Western counterparts, one could show that the differences among Soviet observers are significant, have often been consistent, have persisted for a long time, and logically fit into, and inform, distinct and fairly coherent world views and political priorities.

What I am suggesting is that a careful reading even of public pronouncements and publications will reveal at least two distinctly different clusters of Soviet images and arguments concerning the United States (and some analysts would say, more than two). While this is a distinct oversimplification, I believe it would not be grievously unfair to label one a moderate-realistic, and the other an intransigent-hostile, perspective; the former is likely to be pragmatic, the latter may, but need not, be dogmatic in approach.

Curiously, one can trace back both these sets of pictures, and the policies that flow from them, at least to the end of World War II; and one can show (as, for instance, Franklyn Griffiths has done) that there has been a remarkable degree of consistency in the outlook and analysis which each cluster of images has helped define. If Maxim Litvinov took seriously the need for the wartime allies to continue working together thereafter and

believed that they could, others like Molotov and Zhdanov were convinced that the ultimate clash between the two opposite world systems was inevitable. Before long the orthodox Stalinists would condemn those Soviet economists (Eugene Varga being perhaps the best known) who had begun to argue, e.g., that government regulation and a Keynesian policy served to mitigate the strains of private enterprise, and that the expansion of productive capacity and GNP heralded a massive rise in the American standard of living -- forecasts which made their authors suspect of being soft on capitalism. The dominant perspectives in the years of late Stalinism (as Frederick C. Barghoorn, among others, documented at the time) more and more resembled a caricature, with Soviet accounts of American policy and American life candidly described as "weapons" in the cosmic contest.

All the more important, then, the fundamental reversal that came in the post-Stalin years. International relations and foreign-area studies came into their own, with changing views of nuclear war and deterrence, an end to self-isolation, and the gradual emergence of a new corps of Soviet analysts and consultants who -- with all their shortcomings -- were increasingly knowledgeable and influential: trends which William Zimmerman and others have carefully traced and examined. Needless to say, it took time to shake off some of the habits of predictable dogmatism, self-serving distortion, and phony optimism, and to stop reporting what it was assumed the boss wanted to hear.

Meanwhile Nikita Khrushchev found it convenient to fall back on Lenin's old formula that there were "two tendencies" at work in Western (and now particularly American) society. Over the past generation Moscow has often invoked the notion of two conflicting tendencies (toward the USSR as well as in other issue areas) competing for support in the United States. Inasmuch as the outcome of this internal American tug-of-war is not predetermined, the US is not doomed to clash with the Soviet Union; and it follows that one can speak of the "autonomy of the superstructure", that "subjective factors" (including personalities) do matter and can make a difference -- that politics is not merely a by-product of the ownership of the means of production.

Khrushchev argued, in the early 1960s, that in each camp there were both "men of reason" (or realists) and "madmen"; that in the nuclear age it was imperative for the former, on both sides, to get together so as to freeze out the madmen who took a future showdown for granted, and thus to forestall nuclear catastrophe on a world scale. Here was an example of symmetrical or mirror images, in which actors perceive the adversary camp

in substantially the same terms as their own. (Khrushchev's description of his conversation with President Eisenhower on the "greedy and self-seeking"nature of the men who run the armed forces, both in the US and USSR, has often been cited as a telling example of the same approach.)

There are very distinct limits, however, beyond which such images of symmetry or convergence cannot publicly progress. Ideologically it has remained impermissible to erode the organic, qualitative difference between the Soviet system and Western capitalism. Many aspects of American politics and culture have remained genuinely baffling to Soviet observers. And some sophisticated insights by Soviet commentators must remain concealed behind screens of ritual rhetoric.*

Gradually Soviet commentators came around to acknowledging that the American bourgeoisie, or the business community, or the power elite, are by no means monolithic, either. Curiously, a more pluralist image of the US appears to have been proffered more readily by those who are themselves prepared to see a more diverse USSR as well. In illustration of differences among Soviet perspectives, one might refer to Khrushchev's arguments with Molotov, Mao, or Malinovsky. Since the Stalinists and Maoists have been better known, it may be useful to refer to the repeated instances in which Khrushchev spoke of the necessity of coexisting with the United States, while Marshal Malinovsky, as head of the armed forces, would insist (without challenging Khrushchev) that the imperialist beast could not change its spots, that it was (and was bound to remain) the enemy of socialism and national liberation movements.

A comparison of statements made some ten years later by Leonid Brezhnev, on the one hand, and Marshal Grechko, on the other, shows each using just about similar formulations -- laying stress on the necessity (and benefits) of getting along or, on the other side, the impossibility of doing so.

It is important to note that neither of these major Soviet orientations has asserted -- either in the 1960s or now -- that the United States is a "paper tiger", that the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc is stronger than the US or NATO. Neither took the riots and protests in the US as indicators of a looming collapse; nor have they exaggerated the crises engendered by

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* It may be in order to remark briefly on some characteristic fallacies in Western commentaries on Soviet images of America. (1) Some accounts suffer from a lack of historical perspective: stressing the failings of current works, the authors ignore the changes that have occurred since the Stalin era. (2) Some have ignored the diversity in Soviet perceptions and the patterns underlying them. (3) Some have assumed a close correspondence between published images, on the one hand, and operational assumptions of Soviet decision-makers, on the other. (4) Some have ignored differences in the levels of analysis in media addressed to different audiences.

economic setbacks, inflation or unemployment in the US (while making propaganda capital of strikes and dislocations, typically in the more serious media speaking of the economic problems as cyclical and transient). Soviet observers have often condemned the New Left for underestimating the "objective" problems of an effective revolutionary movement in the US. At all times Moscow has given the US high marks in science, technology, and of late also in the "science of management". And, whatever their differences over other issues, virtually all Soviet policy-makers and experts seem agreed in discounting for the foreseeable future all prospects of either a collapse or a successful proletarian revolution in the United States.

II. The current phase in the Soviet assessment of the United States goes back to 1969, when the basic decisions were taken in Moscow regarding Soviet aims for superpower relations in an age characterized by (1) strategic parity, (2) the Sino-Soviet conflict, and (3) increasing Soviet awareness of slowing economic growth and technological innovation. By then the USA Institute had begun to function in Moscow under Georgii Arbatov's direction and to offer expert advice to the Kremlin (on the whole, from the moderate end of the political spectrum). Fundamental decisions were made in favour of arms limitation talks and, more broadly, of multiplying various forms of (carefully controlled and highly selective) transactions with the outside world. In particular, there was a strong case made that, given the high priority of securing greater productivity, greater responsiveness, greater efficiency in economy, management and public administration, an escape from economic and technological autarky and self-reliance to greater interdependence was an alternative vastly preferable to a risky, destabilizing and uncertain reorganization of the Soviet economic and administrative systems.

With some oversimplification, it may be said that this stage involved an overall Soviet assumption that "realism" in American policy (the result of objective trends, including the shifting international balance, as well as transient events such as the Vietnam war) made the United States a possible partner in a variety of common enterprises; that the US economy would continue to function and produce, and that peace would be maintained (or else the whole calculus made no sense, either in terms of Soviet gains from grain purchases, technology transfers and joint development projects, or in its anti-Chinese implications); and that both sides stood to gain from a better Soviet-American relationship -- that (in contemporary social-

science jargon) it was essentially a non-zero sum game.*

While such a perspective became dominant from about 1969 on, it reached its peak with the Nixon and Kissinger visits to Moscow, about 1972/73. Though its basic assumptions and arguments have persisted, as we shall see, a change has set in from 1976 on, with both the amerikanistyand the policy-makers concerned about the resurgence of "rightist" tendencies in the US and the deterioration of Soviet-American relations. As yet, this has not led to an abandonment of the assumptions underlying the Soviet detente calculus -- for one thing, because it is so completely identified with the Brezhnev leadership that its abandonment would imply an attack on the incumbents; but also because the signals Moscow receives from the US are ambiguous and unclear, and the Kremlin is unwilling to conclude that things cannot yet get back on track.

Once again it would be a serious misreading of the evidence to assume that the question -- whether one can do business with the Americans, literally and figuratively -- had been settled in Moscow. In fact, it remains an open question to this day, and here there is indeed some symmetry between the two superpowers. I think it was Carl Sandburg who once remarked that every time there is an argument in Chicago whether there is such a place as hell, there is a debate in hell over whether there is such a place as Chicago.....

To be sure, by contrast with the Khrushchev years, elite conflicts and differences have received far less publicity in recent years. Yet there has been periodic confirmation of the continued existence of the basic cleavages. And one major cluster which currently brings together divergent assessments and preferences, linking domestic and foreign policy issues in Moscow, might be identified under the headings of

-- assessment of the United States
-- SALT II
-- detente: the Soviet calculus

Those Soviet observers who have tended to see the US in more unideological and moderate terms, have also been more inclined to be optimistic about the

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* I realize that such a capsule formulation credits the dominant orientation in Moscow with a rather benign view and even some wishful thinking in regard to the US. I do not mean to imply a disappearance of the deeply-engrained approach symbolized by the formula kto kovo. But it does appear that even at that time Soviet fear of the US was considerably greater than its commitment to, or even its optimism about, "doing it in". While undoubtedly there was a strong temptation to utilize the new situation for unilateral gains, there never seemed to be any confidence about it nor any willingness to take high risks. There may have been some officials who saw the new course as a facade for mischief-making, but if so, there is no way of documenting their existence or their views.

prospects of detente (at least until 1977) -- both its expected benefits and its likelihood of enduring. (And, to quote a general rule deduced by Franklyn Griffiths from the materials he studied, "the more perceptive an individual's stated view of the adversary, the less hostile his apparent feelings toward it, the more he was inclined to urge policies of conflict limitation and agreement...")

This is not the place to exhibit the evidence in support of this general argument. It ranges from Soviet materials -- an occasional remark by Brezhnev or an oblique attack by Gromyko on certain comrades who see "any agreement with the capitalist states .../almost as/ a plot", to samizdat documents -- such as the summary of a speech by Moscow gorkom secretary Vladimir Iagodkin, assailing both "dogmatic negativism" and "opportunist illusions" regarding detente -- to several American doctoral dissertations carefully analysing diverse perceptions found in Soviet sources; and the testimony of recent Soviet emigrés (such as Dimitri Simes, Alexander Yanov and Boris Rabbot) who had an opportunity to hear what was being said in Soviet elite circles. Whatever questions one may raise about their particular assertions, there is little reason to doubt that (in the words of one) "the internal debates over detente in Moscow reflected uncertain perceptions of American intentions among the Soviet leaders...."

Given the nature of Soviet elite politics, it is often impossible to reconstruct the alignment of particular actors or groups on a given cluster of issues. It remains uncertain just how importantly perceptions of the US figured in the ouster of Shelest, Shelepin, or Podgornyi (probably more in the former, least in the latter, case). Sophisticated and informed efforts have been made (e.g. by Vernon Aspaturian and Astrid von Borcke) to see how particular occupational and bureaucratic groups in the USSR perceive their self-interest vis-à-vis an improvement in Soviet-American relations (and thus their perspective on the United States).

It is clear that a number of "hardliners" in Moscow, in the Party,* in the police apparatus and in the armed forces, opposed both the new and more benign image of the United States and what they saw as the implied opening of the USSR to "subversive" influences from and contacts with outside. Some perceived this as a threat to their own roles and careers; others (as Marshall Shulman has suggested) saw the abandonment of autarky as opening the way to a fatal Soviet dependence on the adversary power,

* Michel Tatu has suggested that, in addition to the ideologically orthodox Party functionaries, the policy is "opposed by a mass of lower cadres who are prisoners of the dogmas and the primitive views of the world imposed upon them... How can they avoid being more 'hawkish' than their leaders?".

felt threatened by new prospects of American "bridge-building" to Eastern Europe (let alone Soviet nationalities), opposed sharing Soviet natural resources with foreign countries and described the effects of anticipated economic transactions as objectively postponing the twilight of capitalism. To a degree Brezhnev was able to take the wind out of their sails by insisting on a policy of repression at home calculated to minimize the political costs of the new course at home, but this of course deals with only one dimension of the problem. It is also likely, though harder to show from compilations of Soviet sources (such as those analysed by Stephen Gibert), that some Soviet "hardliners" have more recently complained about the excessive price of detente to the USSR -- that, in effect, interdependence deprives the Soviet Union of freedom of action, and that it is not getting enough in return to warrant the degree of self-restraint which the US demands of Moscow.

At the other end of the spectrum, the "experts" have sought to counter these muffled attacks on the Brezhnev policy and the underlying perspective on the US. In particular, these are the staffs of the Arbatov and Inozemtsev institutes, who have access to influentials in the Kremlin; in all likelihood their views have often been endorsed by senior foreign ministry personnel.

The level of competence in studies produced by these and other research bodies and the conclusions contained therein are by and large good indices of the substantial advances made over Soviet analyses of the US a generation ago. Monographs on particular institutions and processes -- e.g. the Federal Reserve system or the National Security Council -- are serious academic studies, despite their obligatory rhetoric, occasional lapsuses and predictable distortions. Those who have studied the Soviet output conclude that Soviet analysts are far more comfortable in dealing with the Executive branch -- and in particular the, State and Defense Departments and the White House -- than with Congress and public opinion. Bureaucracy, decision-making and factional politics are categories they can understand and deal with. On the other hand, there was surprise at such developments as the passage of the Jackson Amendment. More generally, Moscow failed to understand what Watergate was all about. It tends to see the human-rights issue as a strictly manipulated special-interest gimmick. Soviet observers have typically misjudged the role of media in the US, unwittingly seeing newspapers and television as equivalents of Soviet media in their role as mouthpieces for the powers-that-be. As Morton Schwartz remarks in a forthcoming book,

> They do not seem able to understand, for example, the principle of limited government, the rule of law, the separation of powers and majority rule. They have difficulty even conceptualizing the value we place on individual liberty, freedom of speech and the press, the concern we have regarding the morality of our public leaders... Obviously, Soviet comprehension of the American political process is severely hampered by their truncated political preconceptions.

Still, the dominant school in Moscow correctly saw a shift in American outlook on world affairs and the Soviet Union in particular, and it liked what it saw. And yet doubts and fears remained even in the years of greatest euphoria, when e.g. Arbatov would argue that the United States tends to embark on foreign policy adventurism to take the heat off the Administration at home -- as it ostensibly did in Cambodia in 1970, in the Middle East (in the middle of the Watergate crisis) in 1973; perhaps the same is being said in 1978. The USA Institute would remind its readers that the United States has typically been committed to changing internal aspects of the Soviet system (a perception that was bound to be revived in 1977/78 and make the human-rights issue an even more sensitive nerve than it already was). From time to time Soviet commentators would speak of the efforts of "reactionaries" to reverse the general course of American foreign policy, of the attempts of "militarists" and "fascists" to gain greater influence on policy and public opinion. And yet, Moscow appears to have been unprepared for what it now perceives, with some bewilderment, as a serious deterioration in Soviet-American relations -- unprepared because such a deterioration had not been predicted and because the "objective" conditions which (the incumbents in Moscow had convinced themselves) had given rise to the detente policy have not essentially changed.

III. When during the Nixon visit, at a banquet in the American Embassy in Moscow, the Soviet dignitaries were served baked alaska, Brezhnev was observed shaking his head as he remarked to Kosygin, "Hot icecream: crazy Americans!" Indeed, "hot icecream" may be a good way to characterize the dominant Soviet perspective on the US. While the diehards have an easy time mumbling the Russian equivalent of "I told you so", most of the others are baffled or, disappointed as they observe contradictory elements in US behaviour. As one Soviet visitor remarked privately, "If I had not experienced the Khrushchev years, I wouldn't believe that a great power can behave so ne-ser'iozno /unseriously/".

Soviet doubts began multiplying during the Ford Administration. The disuse of the term, detente, was first written off as pre-electoral childishness. The platform adopted at the Republican National Convention was a bit more bothersome. So was the Schlesinger retargeting. There was evident disappointment that the SALT II agreement was not completed -- and the US was blamed for dragging its feet. Even more than by any of these developments, Moscow seemed to be surprised by the galvanization of "hysterical" and "primitive" anti-Soviet forces, such as the Committee on the Present Danger and the "Team B" national intelligence estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities. While Arbatov warned that there would be a price to pay for the "dishes broken" during the presidential campaign, in the end the Soviet experts somewhat hesitantly banked on the incoming Carter Administration as the best bet -- an estimate which was reasonable enough under the circumstances, but which has cost the same advisers some "clout" within the Soviet elite since their misjudgment became manifest*

In substance, Moscow observers see the United States as (1) "hypocritically" accusing the Soviet Union of seeking military superiority, while it is dragging its feet on arms limitation and itself developing new weapons, beefing up NATO forces as well as Japan, and preparing to give military assistance to the Chinese;

(2) launching a "hysterical" human-rights campaign, which amounts to intolerable interference into the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state (particularly galling, moreover, since it is selectively applied against the USSR but not others whom the US chooses to overlook for political reasons);

(3) erecting "artificial barriers" to commercial intercourse and other economic and technological cooperation;

(4) playing the "China card";

(5) overreacting to events in Africa, which Moscow does not see as a violation of prior Soviet-American understanding: the Soviet leadership seems agreed that the USSR never promised (indeed, never could have promised) to freeze the international status quo and not to give aid to national liberation movements;

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* It is ironic that time and again developments in the West have aborted Soviet "revisionist" reconsideration. Thus the looming Soviet discussion over the nature of capitalism (and its crises) and the role of the state was arrested by evidence of failures after the 1973 energy crisis and its effects in the West. Similarly the argument that the US welcomed detente for economic reasons seems to have gone down the drain.

(6) stepping up a variety of covert operations in and against the USSR and its allies.

Even if some of these and related points, when presented in the Soviet press, are clearly inflated for propaganda purposes, there is reason to think that the substance of the above "charges" is taken seriously by many thoughtful and influential observers in Moscow. This is true even if some of them are privately embarrassed by the Soviet handling of dissidents and other forms of repression.

In particular, Soviet authorities evidently do - not believe that the USSR has moved ahead of the United States in military power. They have not claimed to have done so (being no doubt more keenly aware of Soviet shortcomings than outsiders are likely to be), thus incidentally depriving themselves of whatever political benefit they might derive from asserting such an edge.

Surely if the more complex "correlation of forces" is taken to include economic capabilities, as well as the level of scientific and technological development, Moscow cannot seriously believe that the US thinks the Soviet Union has pulled ahead. But even in strictly military terms (whatever the reality of the situation, which goes beyond the bounds of this paper), Soviet commentators point out that the build-up of the Soviet navy, armour, and combat aircraft, and recent Soviet missile programmes have all been natural products and parts of the Soviet acquisition of global parity and superpower status. Why, they ask, should the US retain control of the seas as well as superiority in strategic weapons? In the Soviet perspective, Washington has continued to resist the logical implications of parity, refusing to acknowledge that the USSR is equally entitled to a presence far away from its shores, a global navy, a voice in all international disputes -- in short, to act much as the US has been doing all along.

Irritation among Soviet political leaders has been heightened by what they perceive to be an American challenge to the Brezhnev policy and, to a degree, Brezhnev himself. From Moscow's vantage point, it has become far more difficult to make a compelling case for the continuation of detente policy in the terms in which it was originally "sold" within the Soviet elite. The neglect of the Vladivostok formula in the first Vance mission to Moscow betrayed an ignorance of Soviet bureaucratic politics. The espousal by the new President of the human-rights issue,

from his letter to Andrei Sakharov to his defense of Anatoli Shcharansky, amounted to a challenge which the Politburo evidently concluded it could not afford to yield on: here it has been prepared to pay a price in Soviet-American relations for the sake of proving to the US that its efforts were bound to be counterproductive.

Finally, the tightening up of American policy on scientific exchanges and technology transfers theatened to deprive the USSR of one of the few remaining areas of tangible benefits from its new policy toward the US.

Most Soviet observers have had genuine difficulty seeing how Soviet actions in Africa violated understandings with the US. They do not see the Soviet Union "getting away with something". They judged correctly that the risks of American involvement over Angola or in the Horn of Africa were nil. But Soviet policy-makers evidently erred seriously in dismissing the effects of Soviet behaviour (in Africa, over "human rights", and on other salient issues) on American public attitudes toward and suspicions of the Soviet Union.

In turn, the key analysts in Moscow appear to have been alarmed by the "China card" played in the Brzezinski orchestration in 1978. After insisting for some twenty years that the Soviet Union was no longer the victim of hostile encirclement, Soviet comments now begin to reflect new fears, with the Sino-Japanese-American "coalition" in the Far East and its NATO equivalent in the West looming as a two-front threat. (And, incidentally, the new rapprochement between the US and the PRC permits Soviet analysts to return to a "two-camp" view of the global alignment -- from the cognitive dissonance generated by the Sino-Soviet rift back to orthodox primitivism.)

In the end, Moscow tends to explain the "counteroffensive" against detente as part of the general onslaught from the political "right" within the United States, backed by a coalition of professionals (bureaucrats, journalists, academics) threatened by it; by special interests (above all, the "Zionist" lobby); by the military-industrial complex; and by "primitive anti-communists". Soviet comments reflect surprise that business did not exert a stronger influence in favour of better Soviet-American relations as Moscow had assumed capitalist self-interest would demand. As for American labour, Moscow has in effect given up on it.

Soviet observers thus find themselves confused. For one thing, it is not clear whether the Carter policies should be attributed to incompetence or mischief. Soviet journalists have remarked that it was hard to believe that every four years all US policy had to stall, before and after an election, and that every time a new team took over, people without memory would start from scratch, acting out their pet fantasies! And yet, the dominant voices in Moscow continue to affirm (and probably to believe) that a new SALT agreement can be reached (though they do in all likelihood underestimate the difficulties it would face in the United States Senate if the Carter Administration sought to secure its ratification). The conclusion of such an agreement might indeed have the effect of "reassuring" some of the Soviet doubters. But the doubts are bound to go deeper than that. If (except for the diehards) they have difficulty making sense of the present American scene, this is due not only or so much to Soviet misconceptions as to the contradictory signals from Washington and the inherent ambiguity of the situation. Thus Moscow is uncertain whether interdependence is a fact, a sound calculation, or an American device to secure leverage. Caught as it is between refuseniks and confuseniks, it cannot quite figure out what Washington (who? Vance? Brzezinski? Carter?) will insist on or settle for. Meanwhile the "objective" pressures and constraints that propelled Moscow toward its present course -- demographic, economic, managerial, and scientific trends, as well as the power constellation, including the arms race as well as the Sino-Soviet dispute -- remain as valid and vivid in Soviet eyes as they were ten years ago.

Were it not so serious, it would be ironic to find that neither superpower has been exactly skillful in pursuing its own interests (as it sees them) vis-à-vis the other; and that the Soviet Union, now more powerful than ever before, should find itself on the verge of greater dependence than ever on American technological and economic assistance at the very time when the US economy was suffering from serious disorders, American society was experiencing a crisis of morale and confidence, and American politics lacked both leadership and clear purpose. For better or for worse, most Soviet observers did not perceive the United States in such terms.

IV. It is impossible to predict the dominant Soviet perspective on the US in the years ahead, because it depends on at least two major variables and their interaction: (1) who is in charge in Moscow, and correspondingly

what the nature of Soviet priorities and policies will be; and (2) what American policy will be -- including, in particular, American signals to the policy-makers in Moscow. While one may want to exclude some ludicrous extremes from the range of the possible, the gamut of possible scenarios for the 1980s is too great for comfort or any degree of certitude. Moscow does acknowledge that the situation is open-ended and that there is room for will and choice.

Some years ago Herbert Dinerstein suggested that distortions in Soviet-American relations have been due, to a significant degree, to each side's failure to comprehend the complexity of the other's decision-making. While there may be a danger in overstressing cleavages and conflicts in the Soviet elite, I would consider this a lesser caricature than the customary proclivity to "black-box" Soviet foreign policy outputs.

In this light it may be the wrong question to ask, as is often done, whether the United States can influence Soviet outlook (and hence behaviour). I would maintain that (whether it wants to or not, and whether it knows it or not) the United States by what it says and what it does (and by what it fails to say or do) inevitably contributes to the dialogue which is being carried on among members of the Soviet elite: the mutual perceptions of the superpowers are shaped, in large measure, by each other's behaviour (along with domestic pressures and constraints). The US is thus an unwitting participant in internal Soviet arguments and reassessments, and this is likely to be the case with particular importance at times of genuine debate and uncertainty in Moscow -- times which are once again upon us.

Though neither side likes to hear it said, one may also speak of tacit alliances between adversaries. The "moderates" in Moscow and Washington share an interest in promoting agreements they deem mutually beneficial, be it a comprehensive test ban or exploration of outer space. The military-industrial establishment on each side cites the research and procurement of the other to justify its own demands for budgets and allocations. Indeed, it has been suggested that in a number of branches -- for instance, the navy and foreign trade -- Soviet and American counterparts are in effect functional bureaucratic allies and "external pacers" for each other.

Even the "hawks" on each side unwittingly cooperate: they need each other to validate each other's expectations. Their commitment to worst-case analysis requires the assistance of the adversary to provide support (at least in their own minds) for self-fulfilling prophecies of doom. The beating of tocsins of alarum in the United States (when Moscow genuinely finds them unjustified -- unlike Soviet objections to American construction of B-1 bombers, cruise missiles, or Tridents, which are transparently tactical and manipulative) is bound to strengthen the hand of the Soviet diehards, who deny the possibility of meaningful and useful accords with the US and who see no evidence of American good-will but firmly expect an eventual military showdown.

The record of recent years would seem to show that the Soviet Union, or at least its most sophisticated experts, have learned a lot when it comes to understanding and analysing the United States. It also suggests that there is quite a bit more learning to be done. It is true that at times the messages it has received from the United States have been considerably less than clear. Thus, for example, Moscow has not perceived an explicit American "price list" of rewards and penalties for Soviet behaviour. The next generation of Soviet leaders have yet to learn that, as a matter of self-interest, they have more to gain from getting along with the United States than from confronting it. If the US wishes this lesson to be assimilated, it can (and needs to) make a vital contribution to its being learnt. Whether it is capable of effectively teaching it, is an altogether different question.

(4)

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PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

BRIEFING

B(i) RECRUITMENT PATTERNS FOR THE LEADERSHIP

by

John Erickson

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Briefing

RECRUITMENT PATTERNS FOR THE LEADERSHIP

John Erickson

At this point in time both the Soviet and the non-Soviet world have a common interest in one pressing problem involving not so much the vagaries of détente as the eventual resolution of the Kremlin succession issue, though perhaps the fate of détente and the shape of any future Soviet leadership group are not after all such disparate elements. Few would deny that the Soviet leadership is in great and growing disarray, a condition which looms larger with each passing month on the Soviet horizon and impinges urgently on the world scene as a whole. Loaded with high offices and heaped with honours, Mr Brezhnev is an ailing 72-year old, while his most immediate replacement - A.P. Kirilenko - is the same age, Suslov, the grand and desiccated old man of the Party, is now 76: the ranks of younger contenders have recently been thinned by the sudden death of F.D. Kulakov, espied by some as a genuine heir apparent to Brezhnev and younger than him by more than ten years.

* * * *

The succession problem has plagued successive Soviet regimes, but for all the labyrinthine Muscovite intrigue and palace plots certain rules have emerged - arbitrary affairs, to be sure, but something of a guide as to how things might be conducted. What stands out in the present circumstances - as if in deliberate defiance of the rules - is the reluctance (or the refusal) of Brezhnev publicly to indicate his successor: Stalin stood out most prominently as a successor to Lenin, Stalin himself took the opportunity of the 19th Congress to give Malenkov that prominence which showed him off as heir-apparent, Khrushchev allowed himself the luxury of several successors including Kirichenko and Kozlov, but it waw the last 'crown prince', Brezhnev, who acted to displace his master. Perhaps Leonid Brezhnev has not forgotten the ambitions of 'crown princes': certainly he deliberately ignored the occasion of the 25th Party Congress (February, 1976) to show off any new leader on the Party's shield, from which one can only assume that Brezhnev intends to carry on as long as he is able - and it is possible to speculate that retirement in a special Soviet sense is ruled out, since Brezhnev could not relinquish his post as General Secretary and still

retain a measure of real influence on Soviet policy. To institutionalise such an innovation would mean significant change at the top, a precedent which the Politburo and the Central Committee would not be willing to endorse, for it could set an embarrassing precedent.

Thus, we can assume that the present succession crisis (or process) in the USSR is not quite following the rules and will, therefore, demonstrate some unique properties. Much depends, of course, on the state of Brezhnev's health: barring total collapse, there is ironically a case for certain elements in the Politburo and the Party keeping Brezhnev propped up in office, for it enables these groups to consolidate their own power and expand their own constituencies. In bizarre fashion this applies to the older and younger contenders alike, since no single individual can demonstrate any commanding pre-eminence: Kirilenko can wait a while and continue to tighten his grip on the levers of Party power, but younger men can also organise their own 'bailiwicks', though the longer Brezhnev clings to office and to power the more the chances of Kirilenko and Suslov - well into their seventies - dwindle to nothing. It is possible that in the event of a sudden collapse on the part of Brezhnev either (or both) men could be involved in a short-lived transitional government, but this would simply paper over the cracks. On the other hand, sudden and unexpected action cannot be ruled out entirely: the strange 'Podgorny affair' of 1977 suggests intensive manoeuvring and even if Podgorny was elbowed roughly out of the Presidency it suggested that he, with others, thought that the Brezhnev-Kirilenko front was not inviolable, though taking this same instance it can be argued that here was a warning - with Podgorny's dismissal - not to open up the succession issue in too precipitate a fashion.

How long will the BrezhnevKirilenko front hold? With his recently acquired title of Marshal of the Soviet Union and his accession to the post of Supreme Commander - so coyly disclosed in November 1977 - the military metaphor should please Brezhnev. However much Brezhnev may bend the rules, Rule No.1 is that any real contender for power must control the Party organisation, which is Kirilenko's present forte (and was Brezhnev's own path to power over Khrushchev). It is this which at once limits the list of possible contenders, especially among the younger men, for the key post of General Secretary of the Party. Under present circumstances it is almost inconceivable - given the ramifications of the nationalities problem - that a non-Russian would be acceptable: in addition to increased Party and KGB control of the nationalities, the key posts of Second Secretaries in the

Union Republic Central Committees are being steadily 'russified', thus checking any non-Russian predominance.[1] (The Politburo will no doubt continue to be weighted in favour of Russians in a 3:1 ratio.)

Among the younger men (and the term is relative)[2] - Andropov, Romanov, Grishin and Dolgikh (Kulakov before his death would also have been included in this group) - it seems unlikely that Andropov as head of the KGB will be allowed to exercise full power over the Party, allowing for the dread image of Beria and recalling his habit, like that of Andropov, for cultivating a liberal image, though Andropov cannot be entirely excluded from the competition as successor to Brezhnev. In his mid-fifties G.V. Romanov, First Pary Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast and Politburo member, appears at first glance to be a rank outsider but the longer the leadership stakes run the better are his chances, that is, he will be able to organise his 'bailiwick' and extend his power in a national as opposed to a regional sense (though the Leningrad Party organisation is a powerful factor in its own right). Much the same might be said of another dark horse, V.I. Dolgikh who is in his mid-fifties and would probably need to develop a national base and a national image. Grishin is also prominent at the First Secretary level (for the Moscow Oblast)but he appears to lack any great dynamism and he has certainly not laboured to encourage his image as a 'Brezhnev man' - indeed, the relations of the General Secretary and his colleagues in the Moscow apparatus have been strained, to say the least. It remains to be seen what will emanate from Brezhnev's own 'cadres policy' - including the steady elevation of the so-called 'Dnepropetrovsk Group,[3](derived from Brezhnev's own political base in the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast),though it is unlikely that this group would survive the demise of its main patron. Kirilenko is part of this group and like Brezhnev a former First Secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, together with Shcherbitskii whose influence extends powerfully into the Ukraine and who can also be regarded as one of the founder members of the Brezhnev group.

While there is undoubtedly a 'Brezhnev group' at work - and it is silently surveyed by the Politburo and by the Central Committee - it is important to remember that it is buttressed mainly by the First Secretaries of the Republic and Regional (Obkom) Party committees, who are in a genuine sense the real king-makers in the Soviet system. The Regional Secretaries were of enormous significance in Stalin's rise to power, they helped Krushchev on

his way to the top- and they speeded his downfall in 1964, largely because of the havoc his policies caused amongst their ranks. Having established some two-thirds of the present Regional Secretaries in office,[4] Brezhnev can claim to have a secure and loyal power base here, even if there is some limited cause for dissatisfaction in the lower rate of replacement of cadres practised under Brezhnev - a new man might induce changes in the Party leadership as a whole and thus open up new opportunities. It is also worth noting (also in the context of Brezhnev's general line of recruitment to the Party) that these Regional Secretaries have largely an industrial background (as opposed to Khrushchev's stress on agriculture).

Thus, we come to see in the succession problem not merely a nominal change in names and men but a whole displacement in the system. There are, of course, coalitions of interests and combinations of purpose which impinge on the entire scene - with the main division within the ruling group being between those who embrace technocratic solutions and others who see the primacy of Party control as the main issue, with a persistent struggle taking place over these issues at a level just below the Politburo and the Secretariat. And while the spotlight is on Brezhnev, the problem of a successor to Kosygin should not be overlooked: in fact, there will be a whole series of competitions for and conflicts over lesser posts. Here we can see a great deal of linkage within the Soviet system: for example, the elevation of Ustinov to the post of Defence Minister (and Marshal of the Soviet Union) did seem to eliminate him as a replacement for Kosygin and the premiership - though it is not inconceivable that Ustinov could return at some later date as a very dignified premier - or else Shcherbitskii could be a well-qualified candidate with his experience in the Ukraine, or yet again Romanov could be elevated rapidly to this eminence under certain circumstances.

Let us now look at this complex scene and see what rules apply (or do not apply, as the case may be). Barring the immediate collapse of his health, Brezhnev can probably count on as many men anxious for him to stay - for the short term, at least - as would have him go: in terms of actual control of the Party organisation, that sine qua non, Kirilenko has obvious advantages but age conspires against him. A short-term caretaker government could combine Kirilenko with Suslov to hold the line but the succession problem would still remain. Among the younger men there is no one of obvious pre-eminence, so that we might otherwise predict another version of collective leadership after Brezhnev, allowing time for a younger man to force his way through, mobilise the First Secretaries, re-order the 'cadres policy' in

his own favour and possibly deflect a rival in the direction of the premiership. If anything, he would probably open the Politburo to some greater institutional/bureaucratic representation - the present arrangement in Party-state terms is 8:7 (8 for the Party)- if only because he would need this institutional support. In any event, it would not be easy to reverse the institutional promotions made by Brezhnev in 1973.

We can now re-appraise some of the rules pertaining to the organisation of the top leadership in the Soviet Union. It would appear that none can escape the requirement to control the Party organisation, nor to develop his own 'cadres policy' - with particular respect to the First Secretaries: nor can he reverse the wider institutional representation on the Politburo, initiated by Brezhnev, indeed he may well expand this process, thus creating a special 'bailiwick' of his own. It would also seem that an established rule both now and for the future is that the General Secretary should gather to himself most significant offices. Policy will also be generally constrained by the present institutional arrangements and by the same need to compromise, to balance the coalitions represented within the Politburo itself, the Central Committee and the bureaucracies.

* * * *

It goes without saying that one of the singular features of the Brezhnev regime has been its special relationship with the military. The present convolutions associated with the succession problem cannot be divorced from changes in the Soviet High Command, which has been experiencing its own succession problem and generation gap. In general, with the death of Marshal Grechko, a whole generation of Soviet military experience and expertise came to an end: the appointment of Ustinov did mean that there need be no flurry within the Politburo itself, that a certain managerial element had been formally introduced at the highest level and that this man - in view of his age - need not necessarily be binding for too long on any successor regime. Equally (and here the speed of the appointment is significant) the choice may well have represented Brezhnev's partiality for having men about him with whom he was familiar, not unlike Grechko himself. Now aged seventy, Ustinov can carry on for some time and could finally be elevated to some honorific position, not excluding the Premiership, in any reshuffle, but the eventual departure of Ustinov - the so-called civilian (which, in fact, he is not)[5] - will produce problems in selecting a future

'civilian' Defence Minister. In general, it appears that this is not a precedent for the severing of the institutional link between the military and the military-industrial complex by 'civilianising' the leadership of the Defence Ministry: the crucial change would be a dissolution of the Politburo majority presently in favour of the massive Soviet arms programme and proponent of an approach to arms limitation talks which is little more than an attempt to hobble the enemy.

Three factors have generally affected (and will continue to affect) the higher levels of the Soviet military command: the impact of the 'military-technical revolution', the expansion of the Soviet armed forces over the past decade and the military implications of overall Soviet policies - including detente - both for the present and for the future. Of all these, the growing sophistication of weaponry and the impact of technology have worked most specifically to force a certain rejuvenation - younger officers with technical backgrounds - on the senior command levels, a process counter-balanced by an opposite tendency encouraged by the political leadership (and best exemplified in the Grechko-Brezhnev relationship) to retain military men known to them and whose style was very familiar. The result has not only been to sustain senior officers who are over-age but also to keep these same officers in particular posts for lengthy periods of time - Deputy Defence Ministers (arms and services commanders) have been in office for a time-span ranging between ten and seven years, with Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov outdoing all with his astonishing tenure as naval C-in-C and as a Deputy Defence Minister. The Soviet high command thus emerges with an average age of sixty-three and its general profile bears a curious similarity to that of the political leadership - a group of younger men waiting and working to break into the very highest positions.

What do we mean by 'high command' and 'key positions'? In round numerical terms, there are about fifty positions which can be said to compose the 'high command' (either by rank or by importance of the post itself): while this will include the Ministry of Defence, the First Deputy and Deputy Defence Ministers, the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and operational arms commanders (six of them, including Civil Defence), the group of senior officers within the 'high command group' can be broadened to take in the commanders of Groups of Forces abroad, fleets and flotillas and military districts - to which must be added all first deputy commanders, not to mention

chiefs of political administrations. We can thus divide the "high command' by rank and by post, as well as by commanders in post and potential commanders (first deputy commanders, even chiefs of staff) - giving a pool of some 350-400 officers, a figure which could be somewhat expanded by counting in the senior level of the military-educational system.

At the present time Marshal Ustinov holds the post of Defence Minister, with Marshal Brezhnev acting as chairman of the Defence Council and officially proclaimed Supreme Commander: if Brezhnev goes, Ustinov could continue as Minister for some time, though a replacement must be found for him in due course. No other 'civilian' readily suggests himself and the military under a successor regime might well object to any further 'civilianising' of this post - it has been depicted more than once as the prerogative of the professional military. Marshal Ogarkov, presently Chief of the General Staff and with wide military-political experience (including the SALT negotiations), could be an obvious military candidate. Aged sixty, Ogarkov holds a key and prestigious post, understands both the operational and the managerial side of military policy, though he has so far not held a major command - Group of Soviet Forces Germany(GSFG) or the Warsaw Pact - in the manner of his predecessors. Four years younger, Marshal Kulikoz presently holds the post of C-in-C Warsaw Pact and was Ogarkov's predecessor at the General Staff, where he 'rejuvenated' and 'technologised' his command, though apparently he was not an unqualified success in this job, being at times indecisive and not infrequently arrogantly dogmatic - shades of Marshal Zhukov! The need for stability and continuity in the Warsaw Pact might require Kulikov to remain in that post for some extended period of time, though his eventual destiny seems to be Defence Minister. The political preferences of a successor regime would obviously be of vital importance here and it is worth noting that, together with Kulikov, a group of younger officers - the 'Kulikov group' - is also waiting in the wings.

The General Staff will probably increase in importance in the coming decade, exercising its command function, its operational functions and military-managerial competence: in terms of rules, the Chief of the General Staff(CGS) has normally been appointed from outside, usually from GSFG, though Ogarkov was an exception. Should Ogarkov move up, General Gribkov, presently Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact, could take over the General Staff, since Gribkov holds the post ex officio of First Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff. The rejuvenation of the General Staff carried out by

Kulikov (largely by replacing half of the Deputy Chiefs) has resulted in the average age level of these senior echelons of the Staff dropping to the mid-fifties. It can be stated with some confidence that the General Staff will expand both its competence and its personnel in the next decade and will occupy a key position in the development of Soviet military policies. Meanwhile Admiral Amelko has taken over the position of 'naval assistant'/ General Staff left vacant by the death of Admiral Lobov, thus continuing the naval presence.

The Main Political Administration (MPA) must also undergo some change in its leading echelons, though again this will probably be postponed for as long as possible: General Yepishev, Chief of the MPA, has held this post since 1962 and is now seventy years old, his days like those of Brezhnev being numbered. A likely possibility is that he will be succeeded in formal style by Colonel-General Sredin, the First Deputy Chief, unless new political masters have other preferences. Much the same kind of waiting game is being played with Political Directorates of the Navy, the Ground Forces and the Air Force, so that we can expect a grand reshuffle in most of the major posts in the none too distant future. The basic connection between political control and security must be maintained by any future regime as it is currently cultivated by the present leadership, involving different styles (such as the visibility of political officers and KGB elements) but it is worth noting that Yu. Andropov, head of the KGB, was appointed to the ramk of Army General in 1976. The responsibilities of the Political Administration will also grow throughout the next decade as the problem of the relationship between technical progress and political reliability comes to the fore, pushed faster by the impact of demographic changes which may oblige the military to search for 'technology-intensive' solutions as opposed to labour-intensive practices - the Party has never like this all-out technological approach and fought one bitter battle over it in the Khrushchev period. The new head of the MPA will have his work cut out.

Among the urgent replacement appointments for senior commanders ailing or too aged, that of the Air Defence Command has been resolved with the installation of Air Marshal A.Koldunov, promoted Marshal in October 1977 when he was First Deputy Commander/Air Defence Command (PVO Strany), to replace the C-in-C, Marshal Batitskii who had held this post since 1966. This also represents a major recovery for the 'air'/manned interceptor proponents of the Air Defence Command, as apposed to the missile officers. Obviously,

with the prospect of the advent of the US cruise missile and its possible impact on the strategic balance, the Air Defence Command will continue to be a key appointment throughout the coming decade: Koldunov also comes to his new post with his experience as GOC/Moscow Air Defence District from 1970/75, while his promotion represents the classic jump from First Deputy to C-in-C. In his mid-fifties, Koldunov can be expected to hold his post for some time to come and exercise a major influence on Soviet strategic defence, not to mention the military space programmes. The other pending appointment is that of the C-in-C of the Soviet Navy: it has been reported that Gorshkov wished to retire during the past year but stayed on at the express wish of Brezhnev, However, his retirement cannot be too long delayed. An obvious contender for is Admiral of the Fleet N.I. Smirnov, presently First Deputy C-in-C the post of naval C-in-C/and formerly Pacific Fleet commander and just over sixty years of age: his reputation rests largely on his tactical expertise, but what will be interesting will be the balance struck in the naval command between active fleet command and administrative background, between the planners and the operational-tactical specialists as well as between submariners and surface-ship men. In this context the appointment of Admiral of the Fleet G.M. Yegorov (formerly Northern Fleet commander) to the post of the Chief of the Main Naval Staff is of special interest, since it introduces a senior officer from a major fleet command to the Staff (unlike his predecessor, Sergeyev, who was essentially a staff man without fleet command experience): nor can Yegorov be ruled out as a possible naval C-in-C should the 'First Deputy to C-in-C' rule be waived or ignored. In any event, the Smirnov-Yegorov team could prove to be very formidable. The commander of Soviet Naval Aviation, Colonel-General Mironenko, has not yet acquired the accolade of Aviation Marshal accorded to his predecessor and this elevation may have to wait upon a full refurbishing of the naval command - if it comes at all, in spite of the growing importance of naval aviation.

In other arms, such as the Soviet Air Force (SAF), the strategic Missile Forces and the Ground Forces, the 'First Deputy to C-in-C' rule may well apply, should command changes be required: Air Marshal Yefimov could take over from Air Chief Marshal Kutakhov, C-in-C/SAF, without any great change in policy, Grigor'ev from Tolubko in the Strategic Missile Forces (though the trend has been to 'import' a C-in-C, usually from the Ground Forces), while in the Ground Forces the First Deputy Petrov (a member of the 'Far Eastern lobby' and recently experienced in extra-peripheral operations in Ethopia) could take over from Pavlovskii, though the competition for this job will be hot. For all the diversification and expansion of the Soviet

armed forces, the Ground Forces maintain a curious hegemony in command posts and in influence. Here we can look briefly at the significance of the promotions of October, 1977, to Army General: Koldunov was raised to the rank of Air Marshal (in anticipation of his elevation as C-in-C/PVO Strany), Gelovani as Deputy Defence Minister for Billeting and Construction became a Marshal of Engineer troops (the rank going with the job) and three officers - Govorov, Mayorov and Gerasimov - were promoted to Army General.[6] All three of these officers are in line for very senior posts: Gerasimov (GOC/Kiev MD) is in a post which is linked with the GSFG command, Govorov (son of the wartime Marshal Govorov) commands the prestigious Moscow Military District (MD) and could go either to the Warsaw Pact or GSFG, while Mayorov is an able 'high flier' in command of the Baltic MD, who could go to the Ministry of Defence in a senior post, or to the Ground Forces command itself. *

A decade ago a case could be made for the Soviet military being somewhat short of talented and experienced officers to fill senior posts. That situation has now been rectified. A pool of able officers has been developed in the Groups of Forces abroad and in the major and strategically important Military Districts (MDs) - including M.M. Zaitsev in the Belorussian MD and Tretyak in the vital Far Eastern MD, as well as Varennikov in the Carpathian MD. It is worth noting that officers are also advancing from command of élite formations (in GSFG or in the interior) to important MD posts, thus establishing and reinforcing a command/promotion line for men displaying the requisite characteristics - loyalty to the Party, professional ability, discipline combined with initiative and a creative approach to their duties. This style, praised by Brezhnev, is very likely to appeal to his successors as criteria for patronage and promotion.

Party patronage has been used and will continue to be used to insure the kind of stability favoured by the Party leadership, be this with men or institutions: the uncertainties of détente and the implications of

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* In a 'balancing up' promotion, though on merit, Colonel-General V.I. Varennikov, GOC Carpathian MD, was promoted to Army General in February 1978: at the same time Army General S.L. Sokolov, the 'administrative head' of the Defence Ministry and appointed a First Deputy Defence Minister in April 1967 (effectively a 'deputy' to Grechko) has been appointed a Marshal of the Soviet Union. Sokolov is sixty-seven years old.

continued technolgoical progress will reinforce this symbiosis, but while professional competence and technical expertise will advance younger men this will still require underwriting by the Party. The days of relationships fashioned by wartime friendships and associations are now practically done, so that any military-political compact will not have that personal imprint demonstrated by, say, Brezhnev and Grechko. The Party and its new leadership will almost certainly support high priority for defence programmes, but the leadership will probably resist the military's claim to a greater managerial role - preferring its own supervisors - and will also watch with much caution the move towards technology-intensive solutions in military organisation. At the same time a new leadership will also require some stability in senior appointments where new weaponry or new branches are involved - here they may override immediate military preferences. In short, more of the same - but better, even if short of the radicalism implicit in Kulikov's observations on the need to revamp (or re-think) the system.

* * * *

We can now look finally at those rules which govern accession to the top leadership and to high command in the Soviet system. Paradoxically, Brezhnev has obeyed the rules by breaching them: for example, he probably learned from Khrushchev that it was well nigh fatal to nominate a successor: also younger rivals must be kept as carefully as possible out of the public eye (internal and external), lest they build up their own image (as Brezhnev did himself). As for the much vaunted collective leadership, while it lasted longer than most Western experts predicted, it did finally fall victim to the political ambitions of one man - Brezhnev: following the rules almost to the letter, Brezhnev first adjusted the Party apparatus at First Secretary level and not only built up his own power base but brought something akin to his own faction - the 'Dnepropetrovsk mafia' - into existence, a variegated group owing much to Brezhnev in terms of patronage or protection or (not least important) wartime friendships. Brezhnev then went on to use the 25th Party Congress to implement his primacy, signalled by his elevation to head of the Politburo and the use of 'vozhd' - 'leader' - in connection with his office. Thus, retracing these steps, we see: (i) an astute, even cynical and certainly opportunistic use of his position as heir apparent, (ii) the creation

of a court faction all his own and linking those men to himself as leader, (iii) the very able and deft manipulation of the Party organisation - perhaps the key element in the power business, and (iv) the calculated disbursement of patronage - to which we must add in the case of Brezhnev a very singular association with the military designed to bring 'the leader' a bonus of 'authority by association' (however grotesque the historical distortions, athe myth being all important as opposed to the fact).

The military itself has benefited from this compact, involving both the role of the Party and the persona of Brezhnev himself. However, the technical exigencies of the military build-up have produced a greater impress on professional expertise as opposed to political patronage in promotion patterns, a trend which must surely continue. In any event, a successor regime must not only live with the existing weapons procurement plans - ICBMs already bought or in an advanced state of development, extensive strategic air defence plans, missile submarines, the new combat aircraft programmes, Ground Forces modernisation - but also with a substantial number of senior commanders in key positions, officers young enough to hold their posts for some considerable period. What will be worth watching will be the manner in which the military manages its own feuds and internal differences - for example, the fate of the 'Kulikov group' and Kulikov himself, for that matter, as well as the issue of 'politics versus technology' and the whole management of the Soviet military effort. As in the political establishment, there are younger men stamping about impatiently and watching for an opportunity to break into the highest echelons, but on the military and political scene it looks as if both are going to have a struggle ahead of them to get just where they want - and remain friends in the process. However, what will unite them willy-nilly will be the promotion and the protection of the super-power status of the USSR, the implementation of a Soviet version of its own international droit de seigneur, deepening doubts about China and an unyielding nationalist fervour.

Curiously enough, the 1980s in the Soviet Union could come to resemble the 1890s of Imperial Russian days. [7]

NOTES:

1. For a detailed study, see John H. Miller, 'Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas - Recruitment of CPSU First and Second Secretaries in Non-Russian Republics of the USSR', Soviet Studies, January 1977, pp.3-36.

2. The average age of the Politburo hovers around the 66-67 mark: see Rein Taagepera and Robert Dale Chapman, 'A Note on the Ageing of the Politburo', Soviet Studies, April 1977, pp.296-305.

3. See 'Der Vormarsch der "Dnepropetrowsk-Franktion" in Sowjetunion 1967/77, Carl Henser Verlag, 1977, pp.21-24: the note on p.25 refers to the 'succession problem' and to the late Kulakov as chief pretender to the throne, but Kulakov was not an '"all-round" Fuhrer' - and nor does anyone else appear to be such a figure. Masurov is mentioned as a successor to Kosygin, but Masurov's health is also suspect, and his career has been in decline for some time. Nikolai Tikhonov, though also in his seventies, could be a stop-gap appointment.

4. See T.H. Rigby, Die Gebietssekretäre der RSFSR. Die Brezhnev-Generation (1964-1976) published by Bundesinstitut für ostwiss. und internat. Studien (Report 28 - 1977), 55 pp. Also his important study 'Soviet Communist Party Membership under Brezhnev', Soviet Studies, July 1976, pp. 317-337.

5. While Ustinov is frequently cited as a 'civilian', he was after all for many years a colonel-general (technical branch) and rather than talking about 'civilian' leadership of the Defence Ministry we should perhaps emphasise the Party element, the institution of direct Party control.

6. The promotions date from October 28, 1977 and included the elevation of B.P. Bugayev (the Minister of Civil Aviation) to the rank of Air Chief Marshal, whereas his predecessor E.F. Loginov died in this post with the rank of Air Marshal. A conspicuous omission from the promotion list was the name of Colonel-General N.N. Alekseyev, a Deputy Defence Minister (responsible for weapons production) who was not made a full general. See Krasnaya Zvezda, October 29, 1977.

7. In a recent interview (International Herald Tribune, 10 July) Andrei Amalrik reiterated his view that the Soviet Union was heading for catastrophic crisis - and recalled the situation in the 1900s: he contrasts the advanced structure of Soviet society and 'the immovable and antiquated structure of Soviet power'. I still think that there is a case for looking at some of the historical coincidences, particularly the role of the military and the General Staff.

APPENDIX

Defence Ministers and First Deputy Defence Ministers

Name/Post	Rank	(i) (ii)	Age Time in post
D.F. Ustinov Defence Minister	Marshal of the Soviet Union (MSU)		70 2 years
V.G. Kulikov 1st Dep Def Min C-in-C Warsaw Pact	MSU		57 20 months
N.V. Ogarkov 1st Dep Def Min Chief of the General Staff			60 20 months
S.L. Sokolov 1st Dep Def Min	MSU (since 2/78)		67 10 years
	Deputy Defence Ministers		
V.F. Tolubko C-in-C Strategic Missile Forces	Army General		64 6 years
I.G. Pavlovskii C-in-C Ground Forces	Army General		69 11 years
A.I. Koldunov C-in-C Air Defence Command	Air Marshal - presumably replaces MSU Batitskii		54 just appointed
P.S. Kutakhov C-in-C Soviet Air force	Air Chief Marshal		64 9 years
S.G. Gorshkov C-in-C Soviet Navy	Admiral of Fleet of Soviet Union		68 C-in-C since 1956 Dep Def Min since 1962
K.S. Moskalenko Chief Inspector/ Def Min	MSU		76 16 years

Deputy Defence Ministers

S.K. Kurkotkin Chief/Rear Services	Army General	61 6 years
A.V. Gelovani Chief/Billeting and Construction	Marshall of Engineers	63 4 years
A.T. Altunin Chief/Civil Defence	Army General	57 6 years
N.N. Alekseyev Dep Min/Weapons Production	Colonel-General	61 8 years

(There is also an additional Deputy Defence Minister recently appointed, by rank a colonel-general.)

Main Political Administration(MPA)

A.A. Yepishev, Chief/MPA	Army General	70 16 years

Army Generals (full General)

Name/Post	Date of Promotion	(i) Age (ii) Time in post
A.T. Altunin Chief/Civil Defence	1977	57 6 years
Yu. V. Andropov Chairman/KGB	1976	64 11 years
P.I. Batov Chairman/Veterans Committee	1955	82 8 years
P.A. Belik GOC/Trans-Baikal MD	1969	69 12 years
S.P. Vasyagin Chief/Ground Forces Political Administration	1976	68 11 years

I.A. Gerasimov GOC/Kiev MD	1977	57 3 years
V.L. Govorov GOC/Moscow MD	1977	54 6 years
A.I. Gribkov Chief of Staff/ Warsaw Pact	1976	59 2 years
E.F. Ivanovskii C-in-C/GSFG	1972	60 6 years
P.I. Ivashutin Deputy Chief/ General Staff	1971	69 15 years
S.K. Kurkotkin Chief/Rear Services	1972	61 6 years
N.G. Lyashchenko GOC/Central Asian MD	1968	68 9 years
A.M. Mayorov GOC/Baltic MD	1977	58 6 years
E.E. Mal'tsev Chief/Mil-Pol. Academy	1973	68 7 years
V.F. Margelov Cdr/Airborne Forces	1967	70 17 years
I.G. Pavlovskii C-in-C/Ground Forces	1967	69 11 years
V.I. Petrov 1st Dep Cdr/ Ground Forces	1972	61 2 years
V.F. Tolubko C-in-C/Strategic Missile Forces	1970	64 6 years
I.M. Tretyak GOC/Far Eastern MD	1976	55 2 years

V.I. Varennikov GOC/Carpathian MD	1978	54 5 years
also		
I.E. Shavrov Head/General Staff Academy	1973	62 5 years
I.N. Shkadov Chief/Main Admin Cadres/Defence Min.	1975	63 6 years

Note: Army General Radzievskii, promoted in 1972 and head of the Frunze Academy since 1969, has recently retired from this post. He is 67 years of age.

Senior Admirals

Name/Post	Promotion	(i) Age (ii) Time in post
S.G. Gorshkov C-in-C/ Soviet Navy	1967 (to Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union)	68 22 years
N.I.Smirnov 1st Dep Cdr/ Soviet Navy	1973	61 4 years
G.M. Yegorov Chief of Naval Staff	1973	60 1 year

(5)

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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Oxford, England - 7-10 September, 1978

PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

BRIEFING

A(ii) SOVIET STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

by

Fritz Ermarth

R AND

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Briefing

SOVIET STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

Fritz Ermarth

This briefing explores the possibility that the Soviets entertain and base their planning on a theory or strategy of victory in strategic nuclear war.

Alternative interpretation of Soviet strategic doctrine are considered. The possible elements of a Soviet theory of strategic victory are explored.

Possible implications for arms competition, deterrence stability, and arms control are explored.

Evolving Western views of Soviet strategic thought and doctrine.

- Increasing appreciation of differences between dominant Western theories and official Soviet military doctrine.
- Soviet doctrine fully appreciates the destructiveness of nuclear war and the primacy of deterrence (war prevention) as a strategic/policy objective.
- However, Soviet strategic objective embraces "war-fighting" values, goals, and calculations.
- Overall, Soviet force improvement programme (R&D and deployments) reflect this doctrine.
- The thrust of Soviet doctrine and policy strongly imply belief in the possibility of strategic victory.

Official Soviet military rhetoric strongly implies this belief.

A representative passage:

> The concepts of "direction" [rukovodstvo] and "command and control" [upravleniye] are close in content. The first term is usually used in our military literature with respect to political and strategic direction over the Armed Forces, and the second term is used with regard to operational and tactical levels...
>
> Direction over the Armed Forces encompasses all aspects of their activity. Its chief task is to ensure that the Armed Forces are kept in a state of constant high combat readiness in peacetime based on a comprehensive evaluation of political and economic conditions and the current military-strategic

> situation; and in case of war, to mobilize all the efforts of the country and the Armed Forces to repel aggression and defeat the enemy with the least possible human and material losses of our own...
>
> Marshal A.A. Grechko, 1975

Alternative interpretation: Pure pretence.

- Reflection of professional military values only, not political leadership?
- Propaganda for military morale?
- Rhetorical compensation for long inferiority?
- A requirement of political ideology?
- A requirement of the Soviet arms bureaucracy?

Even if these interpretations are valid, as expressions of the decision system they reflect the system's values, perceptions, and preferences. Hence they bear on its future behaviour.

Alternative interpretations: Beyond pure pretence.

- Soviet "victory theory" could be a projection to the plan of intercontinental warfare of operational concepts of theatre war.
- Soviet doctrine could be a theory of "surviving better" than the opponent.
- A plausible integrated theory or strategy.

Possible elements of a Soviet theory of strategic victory; the importance of

- Initial conditions
- Scope of conflict
- Duration of conflict
- Strategic choice and command performance
- Operational variables, uncertainties
- National survival and recovery operations.

Key implications...

- General nuclear war is much more than an intercontinental exchange.
- Strategy is a major variable (as distinct from raw force potential).

- US and Soviet assessments of force performance could be at substantial variance.
- Victory is possible, but so is defeat.

Implications for arms competition and SALT:

- Soviet doctrine implies no intrinsic "sufficiency" criteria, but an unlimited appetite for arms.
- However, raw force superiority is not an absolute prerequisite or guarantee of "victory".
- A de-facto stability is not impossible, but difficult
- But force performance uncertainties and a clear clash of strategic values place SALT in jeopardy.

Effective SALT requires greater symmetry in US and Soviet military doctrines and the existence of explicit, more symmetrical unilateral "sufficiency" criteria on both sides.

Implications for deterrence and crisis stability...

-- The good news...

- Neither side wants strategic crisis or war
- The Soviets fear defeat is possible
- The "pure aggression" model of deterrence is exaggerated
- Countering Soviet strategy is as important (and possible) as countering forces.

-- The bad news

- Soviet power and assertiveness, tardy or uncertain US responses make strategic crisis more likely.
- Strategic crises present powerful incentives and opportunities to pre-empt.

Net result: Deep strategic crisis is less stable than we believe or would wish. But the Soviets worry too.

The apparent Soviet minimum requirements for strategic power...

- Perceived equality or "essential equivalence" with the US
- The ability to back an assertive global policy in peacetime.
- Clear dominance in Eurasian theatres.
- A "fighting chance" to win central war.

More ambitious goals are not ruled out.

Soviet fear and political avarice combine to drive competitive behaviour.

Can the West <u>accommodate</u> to Soviet strategic aims and concerns without severe jeopardy to vital interests?

Is an <u>adequate</u> Western response compatible with detente and arms control?

Can Soviet aims and concerns be altered?

(6)

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PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980's

COMMITTEE 2

SOVIET POWER AND POLICIES IN THE THIRD WORLD

(ii) IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by

Galia Golan

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Committee 2: Soviet Power and Policies in the Third World

THE MIDDLE EAST

Galia Golan

The Middle East has traditionally been of interest to Russian leaders, be they Soviet or not, because of its proximity to the country's southern borders and the need for access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. In the nuclear era, however, more complex strategic considerations have come to dominate Soviet interests in this region. The strategic factor became increasingly important in the 1960's as the Soviets sought to expand their naval power and reach. Primarily this came as the result of a gradual shift in Soviet strategic policy in which conventional forces, particularly the naval arm, were to provide the Soviet Union with greater flexibility, thus opening up global options, whether for purposes of intervention, defence, or confrontation. It was also to meet the challenge of the American SSBNs that the USSR shifted to forward deployment of its fleet, and put massive resources into the development of anti-submarine warfare techniques, despite all the difficulties involved in the latter. Thus, the more general expansion of the Soviet fleet in pursuit of global flexibility in military-strategic competition primarily with the US and its allies, combined with the more specific response to the deployment of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, brought about the formation of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron and, with it, an upgrading of the Middle East in Soviet strategic considerations.[1]

The expansion of the Soviet fleet brought with it other Soviet undertakings, for, inasmuch as the Soviets had not developed aircraft carriers (the decision to do so apparently came in the 1960s, the first of such carriers entering service only in the late 1970s), Moscow sought not only shore facilities for its fleet but air-bases as well for the aircraft necessary for the protection and functioning of the fleet.[2] Egypt was the focal point of this venture, mainly because of the relative suitability of its ports and airfields but also because of its geo-political position and the relative stability of its regime. With the loss of Soviet facilities in Egypt, Moscow sought a strategic alternative in Syria and, later, Libya.

Given the broader scope of Soviet strategic interests, however, Soviet efforts have not been limited to the needs of the Mediterranean Squadron and the area of what are known as the Arab confrontation states (in the Arab-Israeli conflict). The same interests at play in this area apply further southward as well. Indeed, with the deployment of the American Poseidon

and, shortly, the Trident missile, the Indian Ocean -- and its peripheral states -- have assumed an increasingly important position in Soviet thinking.[3] Locations further West in the Mediterranean became feasible targets for Soviet military interests once Moscow succeeded in improving its own means of supporting its fleet and producing larger numbers of modern long-range aircraft. Thus, the uncertainty of the Soviet military presence in the area of the confrontation states, including Syria as well as Egypt, might be compensated for by facilities in states to the west such as Libya and Algeria. Moreover there may be differences of opinion in the Soviet Union, specifically within the military, which may have evoked a controversy over the relative strategic importance versus the risks of Soviet military involvement in the area. In any case, by the mid-1970s the Soviet strategic interest in the confrontation states, while still operative, has diminished somewhat. In contrast, the interest in the Indian Ocean area as the coming confrontation point between Soviet and American strategic forces (and a stepping-off point for crisis intervention in Asia) appears to have grown.

Soviet political interests in the Middle East have been geared to achieve and maintain strategic objectives. In addition to penetration efforts designed to gain influence over and even control of the local security, military and political forces, the Soviets have also sought friendship treaties to provide a formal framework for relations and a degree of stability for the strategic achievements. It might be argued that Communist regimes would surely be the best insurance for the maintenance of Soviet facilities in the area; indeed more ideologically oriented individuals in the Kremlin may well be arguing for such an objective, even at the expense of strategic interests. The realities of the situation in the Middle East, as well as elsewhere in the Third World, have generally, however, led the Soviets to downgrade this ideological objective, occasionally sacrificing it altogether when it threatens to impede progress in the realm of strategic interests. Moscow, nonetheless, continues to nurture this option in anticipation of the right opportunity, i.e., a moment when the risk of outside, specifically American, intervention is minimal.[4] Such an opportunity would appear to have occurred most recently in Aden.

Economic Interests

If the primary Soviet interest in the Middle East is strategic, and political interest subordinate to the strategic interest, and if the ideological interest is less operative and longer term, the Soviet economic interest in the Middle East is open to some speculation. The Soviet Union itself is

one of the world's major oil producers and one of the cardinal rules of Soviet trade policy has been strictly to avoid dependence upon outside resources. These two factors combined may account for the fact that the USSR imports extremely little Middle Eastern oil and, certain western estimates notwithstanding, apparently has no plans to do so in to any significant degree. Rather, for all the expense and difficulty involved, Soviet energy plans are to develop Soviet sources, with or without outside technological assistance.[5] Moscow has urged its East European allies to import Middle Eastern oil so as to lighten the Soviet obligation to meet their energy needs -- and possibly to release more Soviet oil for sale on the world market.[6] But the Soviet Union still provides almost all of these needs, at recently raised prices, and any indirect benefit derived from the Middle East supplies appears at best marginal.

An indirect economic interest could derive from Soviet control over the flow of Middle Eastern oil to Japan and the West. Certainly the Soviets have sought to limit western influence in the oil producing states as well as to improve their own relations with these countries. Yet Soviet prospects are greatly limited by the complexities of Persian Gulf relationships as well as inner Arab relationships, to say nothing of the traditional animosity of the major oil producers - Iran and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, given the importance the Americans attach to the unimpaired flow of Middle Eastern oil to world markets and the Soviets' own involvement in these markets, it is not certain that Moscow is particularly anxious to tamper with the flow of these supplies or risk East-West confrontation over the oil-lanes.

Although no figures are available, the fairly recent Soviet arms sales for hard-currency cash payments may provide an economic interest for the Soviets in the region.[7] Yet tough Soviet demands in connection with certain arms deals (e.g., the proposal to Jordan in 1976[8]) as well as Moscow's own proposals -- albeit infrequent and vague -- for limitation of the Middle East arms race -- suggest that the USSR does not consider arms sales to the region a major interest. On the other hand, whereas Soviet economic relations with the Middle East once constituted something of a burden to the Soviet Union, today Moscow is beginning to receive, and demand, a return on its investment there, at least in the form of a more favourable balance of trade. This development may well reflect a shift of Soviet interests away from the Middle East for the generous trade and credit terms once offered to the confrontation states are now much more apparent in Soviet trade with countries bordering the Indian Ocean.[9]

Soviet Inroads

Many factors contributed to Moscow's successful penetration of the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s. These include the general collapse of imperialist rule in the area, the retreat of the British, the limited American interest, and the rise of the Third World neutralist philosophy. At the same time, the Soviets were not perceived, traditionally, as imperialists by the peoples of the region, nor did they make exaggerated ideological or even political demands, while their economic model did offer certain attractions to the centralist regimes of the area. Moreover, unlike the West's Soviet economic assistance was extremely generous, with almost no regard for cost-benefit considerations or practicality.

One of the most important contributing factors was, of course, the Arab-Israeli conflict. Beginning with the Soviet-backed Czechoslovak arms deal with Egypt in 1955 and Soviet political support in response to the Suez Crisis and continuing through the Six Day War followed by Soviet resupplies and direct military assistance in the War of Attrition, an Arab dependency upon Soviet military and political support appeared to have been created. There was a direct correlation between the accommodation of Soviet strategic interests, in the form of naval and air facilities, and Soviet willingness to equip, train and otherwise assist the Arabs. Tension in the area, at least Arab-Israeli tension, appeared to serve Soviet penetration efforts, highlighting as it did not only the Arabs' need for Soviet assistance but the polarization of the super-powers' position and America's commitment to the "enemy" side - Israel. The positive contribution of the conflict to Soviet interests was so great that it was even arguable that Moscow actively sought its continuation and, possibly, even its aggravation (in the Six Day War, for example), so as to ensure continued Soviet presence in the area.[10]

The above factors did not, however, remain constant. As Soviet military and political penetration of the Middle East increased, with the Soviets attempting to influence events through leaders sympathetic or beholden to them, the Arabs gradually began to perceive them as another imperialist power. This image was sharpened by the actual Soviet bid for bases, the behaviour of Soviet advisers and personnel in the host country, and a Soviet tendency to treat the Arab leaders in an imperial manner, often disregarding their requests or even humiliating them. Even the "progressive" regimes baulked at these infringements of their independence. In the case of Egypt, this led to the actual expulsion of the Soviets and abrogation of the mutual friendship treaty; with Syria, this meant refusal to enter such a treaty, and policies were followed

which were to Moscow's preferences with regard to the local Communist party or the Lebanese civil war; in the case of Iraq, it meant refusal to grant the Soviet Union extra-territorial rights for naval facilities or political concessions on the international scene.[11] This Arab independence, even to the point of defying Soviet attempts at arms blackmail, increased significantly with the rising importance of the petro-dollar, and the consequent rise in the importance and influence of the oil-rich states, particularly Saudi Arabia.

A factor which has further complicated Soviet efforts is the kaleidescope of relationships within the region itself. Such problems as the Syrian-Iraqi dispute, the shifting Egyptian-Libyan-Sudanese relationships, or the Lebanese war confronted Moscow with serious policy dilemmas. Particularly detrimental to Soviet interests in the region has been the rising influence of Saudi Arabia, whose anti-Soviet position carries with it the potential for influencing not only Egypt, for example, but even the loyalties of Syria and the PLO. Neither the periodic cohesion of the more radical states, such as Libya and Iraq nor their relationships with element's of the PLO necessarily help to solve this problem, for the radicals' "Rejectionist" position regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and other issues does not entirely suit Moscow's own policies.

Indeed, disagreement between the Soviet Union and its Arab clients on various issues of substance has operated against the achievement of Moscow's aims. It was not only the Soviets' imperial attitude towards Egypt which led Sadat to expel the Soviet military advisers in 1972, but also -- and mainly -- Moscow's growing detente with the United States and, in particular, its opposition to another Arab military offensive against Israel. Similarly, there have been serious Soviet differences with the more radical Arab states and the PLO regarding the issue of a "political" versus a "military" solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, specifically the matter of the Geneva peace conference and Security Council Resolution 242 which imply both recognition of Israel and assurances of her security.[12] And, as already mentioned, serious substantive differences arose between Moscow and Damascus over the Lebanese problem.

Limits to Influence

What really places limits on Soviet moves and policies in the region, however, is the super-power relationship. Here, as elsewhere, the estimated American response, specifically the risk of direct Soviet-American confrontation, is the ultimate consideration in Soviet Middle East calculations.[13] From this point of view the Soviet risk was great in the late 1960s, when Soviet involvement was at its height, but even at this time Moscow sought to restrain the

Arabs, both by controlling the types of armaments supplied and by persuasion, so as to avoid an all out Arab-Israeli war and the concomitant danger of Soviet-American confrontation.[14] Soviet caution persisted even when Moscow decided to renew arms supplies to Egypt in early 1973 in view of Sadat's determination to act with or without the Soviet Union. It was this caution which prompted the Soviets once again to risk disfavour in the eyes of the Arabs by pressing the latter to agree to a cease-fire almost immediately after the opening of hostilities in October 1973, Soviet arms supplies notwithstanding, and in continuing these pressures until a Soviet-American cease-fire was more or less imposed.[15] Given the continued volatility of the Arab-Israeli conflict even after the war, and the growing American involvement in the region, this major limiting factor remains operative.

Thus, the situation which had facilitated Soviet entry into the area has tended, in time, to become extremely dangerous, even counter-productive for Moscow. If the conflict could have been strictly controlled, it might have retained its value for Soviet purposes but, given the highly volatile nature of the conflict itself, coupled with increased American involvement, declining Soviet influence over its Arab clients (notwithstanding arms blackmail attempts) and (particularly) with the rise of Arab independence in connection with the petro-dollar, the Arab-Israel conflict has lost much of its usefulness. In part the Soviets themselves are responsible for this, for their reluctance to fulfill the role of "war-maker" has greatly reduced their relevance to the Arabs. And, if they are unwilling to provide the war option, they are virtually unable to provide anything else. They cannot play as potentially an effective role as the Americans in bringing about a settlement for they have no leverage over Israel. Nor can they significantly compete with the Americans in the peaceful area of economic assistance. Not only Egypt but even Syria and Iraq have become somewhat less certain allies from this point of view.

These matters may have caused differences of opinion amongst the Soviet leadership; indeed such differences could even constrain Soviet policy. Yet, while there are some signs that disputes have occurred over Middle East policies, it is almost impossible to prove this or positively to identify the various proponents.[16] Moreover the Soviets themselves have been known to refer to such "dissenting" opinions - very likely for their own tactical purposes in foreign negotiations.[17]

A Balance Sheet

A stock-taking of the Soviet position in the Middle East after twenty-five years of activity reveals a sharply ascending and then descending curve which tends in the direction of relative failure. On the success side of the ledger there is the Soviet treaty with Iraq, legalization of the Syrian Communist Party and its inclusion in a Front with the ruling Ba'ath Party, the Marxist orientation of South Yemen, improved relations with Libya, Kuwait, Jordan and, within limits, Iran, as well as significantly improved relations with Turkey, and an identification with the PLO as that movement has gained in world recognition. More significantly, the Soviets have gained at least informal recognition as a political factor in the Middle East, even it is more of potential than actual importance. This last accomplishment is connected with Moscow's successful strategic achievements, specifically its military presence in the Mediterranean. While there are varying opinions as to the relative strength (and speed and versatility) of this squadron vis-a-vis the American Sixth Fleet, its deployment in times of crisis can serve as a check on American freedom of action. To a lesser degree the same might be said for the Soviet fleet in the Red Sea-Indian Ocean area, though the Soviet naval presence there is still quite limited.[18]

On the negative side of the ledger, Soviet relations with Egypt, the former cornerstone of Moscow's Middle East policy, have eroded entirely. The Syrian have jealously guarded their independence, even defying Mosocow in such instances as the Lebanese war, while they periodically repress or restrict the local Communists. Iraq has proved problematic and Libya is a highly erratic political partner. Moreover, Soviet policy regarding Eritrea has raised problems for Soviet relations with the radical Arab states. And, in almost all cases, the rising influence of Saudi Arabia -- with its potential for underwriting a westward shift by the Arab states -- has placed Soviet achievements very much in question. This applies also to Soviet relations with the PLO which is not by any means totally dependent upon or even responsive to the USSR. Even in the realm of strategic interests, Soviet policy has met with certain failures; the port and air facilities lost in Egypt and Somalia have not been fully compensated for by moves elsewhere. Neither the Libyans nor the Syrians have been as cooperative as the Egyptians, nor have the Iraqis -- or, to date, the Ethiopians -- been as forthcoming as the Somalis once were.

On the whole the relative price the Soviet Union has to pay for political and strategic benefits has significantly increased when compared with the actual return received. Given the increased demands and risks involved in

a Soviet Middle Eastern presence together with the slight shift of at least future priorities towards the Indian Ocean, the Soviets have shown that they are reluctant to make the necessary concessions -- or pay the necessary price -- in order to regain fully their former position in the region.[19] The lack of Soviet willingness to compromise with Egypt without the latter's full renunciation of the United States, Moscow's risk of its Syrian link during the Lebanese crisis, and its exaggerated demands regarding a Jordanian air defence system all point to this conclusion. The Soviets would appear to have opted for what might be termed a minimal rather than maximal policy, that is the best that might be obtained in the present context. This would entail two interrelated objectives: (a) maintenance of a Soviet presence at not too great a cost; (b) prevention of a total American takeover of the area.

For a Middle East Settlement

Such Soviet objectives could be served by a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, so long as the Soviet Union itself were a party to the settlement. Soviet thinking along these lines was apparent even in the pre-1973 two-power and four-power efforts for a settlement;[20] it probably sharpened following the 1973 War as the negative aspects of the ongoing conflict became more acute. A settlement would eliminate the risks associated with the conflict while, possibly, reversing some of the negative trends affecting the Soviet presence in the region. Soviet participation in a settlement, particularly in its guarantees, would provide international, formal recognition and legitimation of the Soviet Middle Eastern presence. (Such formalities, however apparently superfluous, have traditionally been of importance to the Soviets, as shown by their persistent efforts to achieve a European security conference to formalize East Europe's post-World War II borders.) Such recognition would provide greater stability for the Soviet presence than the present, uncertain need to rely on the good will of host Arab regimes. Thus, surveillance flights in the region (including coverage of the Mediterranean area), port facilities and the like would be granted for the purposes of peace-keeping rather than as a result of a separate agreement with one leader or another. Navigational rights, as the Soviets themselves have suggested, might well be included. That such a presence might also entail limitations would not necessarily interfere with Soviet interests; their own presence, at least at sea, lags behind that of the Americans, so that limitations which affected also the Americans would not be unwelcome. Similarly, Moscow itselft has proposed limitations on the arms race following a settlement, presumably because of America's growing role in this sphere, as well as the danger of nuclearization of the region.

Soviet participation in a settlement is not however, an easy matter and Moscow's quest for a role in the negotiating process has involved it in a number of contraditions. Any Soviet interest in a negotiated settlement evokes the ire of the "Rejectionist" Arabs from the outset. But even in discussions with the more moderate elements Moscow has had to put forward a position close to the Arab's maximum demands so as to offer the Arabs something beyond the more limited agreements the Americans proposed. Increasing support of the more radical Arab demands became necessary not only to distinguish Moscow from Washington but also in order to prove to the United States (and Israel) the absolute necessity of bringing the Soviet Union into the settlement process as the controller of the war option. (In time this became also a tactic to isolate and pressure a pro-American country such as Egypt.) Yet this identification with the more radical demands often prompts Soviet support for, or at least tolerance of, positions contrary to its own interests or policy. Soviet support for the radicals, while not altering overall Soviet policy, does constitute a component of a dualistic Soviet position. They continue to advocate a settlement, through the Geneva mechanism, which recognises Israel within secure borders (specified as those of pre-war 1967) as well as a Palestinian state. The maintenance of the Soviet position despite and even in argument with its more radical clients (such as the PLO) strongly suggests that Moscow is indeed committed to these positions as the most realistic and feasible. The Soviets have to convince Israel and the US that they are reasonable partners for negotiations and, therefore, a positive, rather than negative or obstructionist factor for resumption of the Geneva conference. Part of this tactic is a carrot and stick approach to Israel, with declarations of Soviet willingness to provide guarantees and recognition of Israel's 1949-1967 borders often appearing when Soviet participation in negotiations seems likely and a border-line position such as press references to the 1947 partition plan (and its borders) when Moscow seems totally excluded from the picture.[21] Nevertheless, the basic Soviet position on a settlement, multi-faceted as it is, remains relatively constant.[22]

Despite the fact that Soviet policies in the Middle East, particularly in the Arab-Israeli context, have become reactive rather than originating, dependent upon clients and events rather than dominating and directing them, and tend on balance to failure rather than significant achievement, there is little reason to believe that the Soviet interest in the Middle East, if defined as including the Persian Gulf and northern Indian Ocean, will in fact decline in the near future. Future Soviet policies for and position

within the Middle East will most likely be subject to most of the factors operative until now and dictated by most of the same interests. In any case, the East-West balance of power and the East-West relationship constitute the major determinant, although shifts or reorientations within and amongst the local regimes continue to play a very significant role. While the overall direction of Soviet strategic interests may lie more in the area of the Indian Ocean, a strengthened position in the Horn of Africa might also benefit them in their struggle for influence in the Arab-Israeli context. The latter would appear, however, to be declining in importance and those factors which have limited Soviet influence, even at periods of peak Soviet involvement, would appear to be more dominant rather than less. Changes in the Soviet leadership might well occasion a shift in Soviet tactics. Support or identification with one group or another may change and may even precipitate Soviet initiatives in apparently new directions. It may even be argued that recent events in South Yemen and Afghanistan are evidence that a more hard-line, ideologically - oriented policy has already gained dominance because of Brezhnev's inability to rule as fully as previously. Nonetheless, the objective circumstances both of the East-West relationship and of overall Soviet interests are relatively constant, suggesting that, even with the advent of a more (or less) adventuristic Soviet regime, the options and actual policies will be adjustable in only a very limited way.

FOOTNOTES

1 For a discussion of the development of the Soviet fleet and the influence of the Polaris, see Michael MccGuire, "The Background to Soviet Naval Developments," The World Today, Vol. 27, No. 3, March 1971, pp. 93-103; Michael MccGuire, "The Evolution of Soviet Naval Policy: 1960-1974" in MccGuire (ed.), Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, Praeger, New York, 1975; or John Ericson, Soviet Military Power, Royal United Services Institute, London, 1971, pp. 53-60; Geoffrey Jukes, The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy, Adelphi Paper No. 87, 1972; or Richard Ackley, "Sea-Based Strategic Forces: Mid-term Security for an Era of Nuclear Proliferation," Halifax (Dalhousie Seminar), 1974, pp. 10, 18. For Soviet references, see, A.K. Kislov, "The United States in the Mediterranean: New Realities," SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologia, No. 4, April 1972, pp. 32-3; Admiral Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace," Morskoi sbornik, No. 2, 1973, p. 20 or in Pravda, 28 July 1974, Krasnaya zvezda, 22 March 1974.

2 See J.C. Hurewitz, The Persian Gulf, Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1974 pp. 44-7; Arthur Davidson Baker III, "Soviet Major Combattants," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 100, No. 4 (854), 1974, pp. 47-8; or Norman Polnar, "The Soviet Aircraft Carrier," loc. cit., Vol. 100, No. 3 (853), 1974, pp. 145-61. See, Commander Thomas A. Brooks, "Soviet Carrier Strategy," US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 100, No. 4 (854), 1974; p. 103 or Bradford Dismukes, "Roles and Missions of Soviet Naval General Purpose Forces in Wartime: Pro SSBN Operations'?" Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, Virginia, August 1974.

3. There is some controversy among western observers over the authenticity of Soviet concern regarding the American strategic threat from the Indian Ocean because of the difficulties involved in submarine detection and the variety of possibilities open to the Americans for launching positions against the USSR.

4 John Cooley, "The Shifting Sands of Arab Communism," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, 1975, p. 33; Robert Freedman, "The Soviet Union and the Communist Parties of the Arab World," unpublished paper, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1974, pp. 28-9. For Arab Communist disagreement with the Soviets over this, see Kerim Mroue, "The Arab National Liberation Movement," World Marxist Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1973, p. 70 and Victor Tyagunenko, "Trends, Motive Forces of the National Liberation Revolution;" loc. cit., Vol. 16, No. 6, 1973, p. 124 and A.S. Becker and A.D. Horelick, Soviet Policy in the Middle East, Rand Corporation, 1970, pp. 30-5.

5 Dina Spechler andMartin Spechler, "The Soviet Union and the Oil Weapon," in Yaacov Ro'i (ed.), The Limits of Power: The Soviet Union in the Middle East, Croom Helm, London, Forthcoming; A.S. Becker, "Oil and the Persian Gulf in Soviet Policy, in the 1970's," in M. Confino and S. Shamir (eds.), The USSR and the Middle East, Israel Universities Press, 1973, p. 174-85; Franklyn D. Holzman, "Soviet Trade and Aid Policies," in J.C. Hurewitz (ed.), Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East, Academy of Political Science, New York, 1969, pp. 104-120. Robert Hunter, The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East, Adelphi Papers Nos. 59,60; 1969.

6 Becker, op. cit., p. 181. See also Marshall Goldman, Detente and Dollars: Doing Business With The Soviets, Basic Books, New York, 1975

7 The Soviets reportedly began to demand, and receive, such payments in 1973. Financing even of some Syrian acquisitions has been provided primarily by Saudi Arabia but also by Algeria and Abu Dhabi. New York Times, 20, 22, October 1973, 4 February 1974. INA (Iraqi News Agency), 26 April 1974; DPA, 13 April 1974 (Sadat interview), Le Monde, 21 December 1973, 31 March - 1 April 1974, 18 April 1974; MENA, 22 September and 8 October 1974 (Sadat interviews).

8 Moscow demanded not only cash payment but the stationing of Soviet military personnel in Jordan. MENA, 20 June 1977 (Jordanian Military spokesman).

9 Gur Ofer, "The Economic Burden of Soviet Involvement in the Middle East," Soviet Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, January 1973, pp. 329-47 and Gur Ofer, "Economic Aspects of Soviet Involvement in the Middle East," Ro'i (ed.), op. cit.

10 The Soviet Union did play a role in precipitating the Six Day War by providing reports of Israeli force concentrations on the Israeli-Syrian border. For various analyses of Soviet motivationssee, Yaacov Ro'i, From Encroachment to Involvement, A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1974, pp. 436-8; Nadav Safran, From War to War, Pegasus, New York, 1969, pp. 269-70, 285, 294-6. The Arabs claim, however, that the Soviets also sought to prevent them from actually going to war; Moscow probably neither expected nor welcomed the results of the war inasmuch as Soviet prestige in the Arab world was negatively affected and the risk of super-power confrontation increased.

11 For fuller discussion of such issues, see Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis, Cambridge University Press, 1977; Galia Golan, "Syria and the Soviet Union Since the Yom Kippur War" Orbis, Vol. 21, No. 4, Winter 1976, pp. 777-802.

12 See Ibid. and Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and the PLO, Adelphi Paper No. 131, 1977

13 Although Soviet leaders and literature often speak of applying detente to the Middle East, mainly as a means of limiting the risks of super-power competition there and, following the Yom Kippur War, as a means of at least sharing in the developments involving the area, there is little evidence of any Soviet (or American) linkage of the detente issue with that of the Middle East. See, Galia Golan, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict in Soviet-US Relations: Is Detente Relevant?," Ro'i, op. cit The contentions of Sadat, Gaddafi and others notwithstanding, Soviet behaviour particularly during the Yom Kippur War, but also before and after it, strongly suggested that the Kremlin was willing to undertake certain risks to detente which, it calculated, could be handled and in time overcome.

14 See Jon Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1975 and Golan, op. cit., Yom Kippur and After.

15 The cease-fire was even explicitly based on Security Council resolution 242 and called for negotiations -- both conditions which, until then at least, had been unacceptable for such parties as Syria, Iraq, and the PLO. The massive Soviet material assistance to the Arab war effort re-

presented compensatory action designed (unsuccessfully, as it turned out) not only to preserve Moscow's prestige in the region but also to prevent an Arab defeat of the dimensions which might precipitate a call for Soviet military intervention. For an analysis of Soviet objectives during the war and Arab criticism see, Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After, op. cit.

16 For the issue of difference of opinion regarding the Middle East see, T.H. Friedgut, "The Domestic Image of Soviet Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Ro'i, op. cit.; Dina Spechler, "Internal Influences on Soviet Foreign Policy, Elite Opinion and the Middle East, Research Paper No. 18, Soviet and East European Research Centre, Jerusalem, 1977; Oded Eran, "The Soviet Perception of Influence: The Case of the Middle East," in Ro'i, op. cit.; Galia Golan, "Internal Pressures and Soviet Foreign Policy Decisions," unpublished paper, Jerusalem, 1973; Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After, op. cit.; Ilana Dimant, "Pravda and Trud -- Divergent Attitudes Towards the Middle East," Research Paper No.3, Soviet and East European Research Centre, Jerusalem, 1972; Ilana Dimant-Kass, Soviet Involvement in the Middle East, Westview Press, Colorado, 1978; Ilana Dimant-Kass, "The Soviet Military and Soviet Policy in the Middle East 1970-1973," Soviet Studies, Vol. XXVI, No. 4, 1974, pp. 502-21; Uri Ra'anan, "The USSR and the Middle East: Some Reflections on the Soviet Decision-Making Process," Orbis, Vol. XVII, NO. 3, 1973, pp. 946-77; Muhammed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan, Fontana/Collins, London, 1976, pp. 83-6; al-Nahar (Beirut), 1 March 1974.

17 See Akhbar al-Yom, 23 April 1977; al-Asubua, al-Arabi, 9 May 1977 for Palestinian accounts.

18 This limitation is probably due simply to the limited number of Soviet ships available at present and the rate of shipbuilding. At present the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean is drawn from the Far Eastern fleet. The Suez Canal, therefore, is not of as great a military value as once thought. See, Jukes, op. cit. and D.O. Verall, "The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean," Halifax (Dalhousie Seminar), 1974 pp. 53-4.

19 An exception to this is Turkey, the importance of which has not receded.

20 See Lawrence Whetten, The Canal War, MIT University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1974, pp. 67-115, 340-61; chapters by P.M. Dadant and Ciro Zippo in Willard A. Beling, The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1973, pp. 169-236; Martin Indyk, "Israel and Egypt in the October 1973 War: The Effects of Political and Military Dependence on Small Powers in Conflict," unpublished paper, Canberra, 1974, pp. 13-14.

21 For a more detailed analysis of this aspect of Moscow's position, see Golan, op. cit., The Soviet Union and the PLO.

22 For Palestinian accounts of this tactic see, Zuhair Mohsen interviews in Akhbar al-Yom, 23 April 1977 and al-Asubua al-Arabi, 9 May 1977.

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PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

COMMITTEE 2

SOVIET POWER AND POLICIES IN THE THIRD WORLD

(i) IN AFRICA

by

William Griffith

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Committee 2: Soviet Power and Policies in the Third World

IN AFRICA

William Griffith

There are two essential prerequisites for understanding Soviet policy in Africa.[1)] First, because it is primarily reactive to Soviet opportunities (and capabilities), not the result of a "master plan", one must understand the immense complexity of African politics. Second, because it is a part of Soviet global competition with the United States and China, one must understand Soviet global strategy.

Since the 1959 Sino-Soviet break the Soviet Union has competed simultaneously with the United States and China, worked to prevent an alliance between them, and tried to lower the risk of nuclear war by arms control negotiations with the United States, while simultaneously maximizing Soviet power and influence, as other young, dynamic empires have always done. Unlike the West, for the Soviet Union influence is party (organizational and ideological) as well as state in nature. Khrushchev abandoned Stalin's passive Third-World posture for a forward strategy there and added to it competition with China as well as with the West. Brezhnev concentrated on more selective Third-World targets and used greater Soviet military capabilities to score dramatic gains in, e.g., Angola and Ethiopia.

In the early 1960s, after early Soviet attempts failed, notably in the ex-Belgian Congo and in the Cuban missile crisis, Moscow concentrated on achieving strategic nuclear parity with the United States, a seven-ocean navy, long-range air- and sea-lift capability, and a non-Soviet ground intervention capability, which Moscow first demonstrated with the Cubans in Angola in 1975. Rising Soviet military capabilities required more air and naval facilities. Finally, in the 1970s the Soviet Union profited from the Vietnam-Watergate syndrome in the United States: American popular opposition to military involvement, especially covert, in developing areas, the weakened power of the Presidency, and a more powerful but institutionally fragmented Congress. Thus by 1974, the year of the most recent "great turn" in Africa, the Soviet Union had much greater military capabilities; it faced an uncertain and indecisive United States; it had drawn the lessons of its African failures in the 1960s; and it saw new opportunities in Africa, which it thereupon proceeded to exploit.

It is often forgotten that in 1945-6 Molotov not only demanded a Soviet mandate over ex-Italian Libya but also Soviet control over the ex-Italian Eritrean port of Massawa [2] (which it now seems likely to achieve.) This having been prevented by the West, Moscow launched its first political-military offensive in Africa when the British and French colonies there began to gain independence in the late 1950s and even more when the Belgian Congo became independent in 1960. Soviet support there of Lumumba in 1960 and of Gbenye and Soumaliot in 1964 was unsuccessful because of insufficient Soviet air- and sea-lift capability, US and UN capability and will, and the near-chaos of the post-independent Congo. Moreover, except for Sékou Touré, all the radical, pro-Soviet African dictators - Nkrumah, Keita, Ben Bella, and Nasser -- sooner or later gave way to military leaders who turned away from radicalism and ties with Moscow. In the 1960s Moscow also competed with Peking in Africa, winning out there when in the late 1960s the Cultural Revolution paralyzed Chinese African efforts.

But despite these African setbacks, the Soviets were still convinced that Africa would go radical, because of the fragility of its moderate governments and even more because of the black "national liberation movements' " (NLMs) struggle against white minority rule in southern Africa, which, Moscow knew, could never hope to succeed without Soviet arms and training. In the early 1960s Moscow had begun a long-range programme of military aid, training, and financial support to these movements. It concentrated on the two which were largely white- or mulatto-influenced, Marxist-Leninist in ideology, and pro-Soviet in foreign policy: the MPLA in Angola and the main black South African liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC), within which the South African Communist Party (SACP) had major influence. Moscow also supported Nkomo's ZAPU in Rhodesia and Nujomo's SWAPO in Namibia, neither then Marxist. The primarily tribal tensions within the NLMs, intensified by Sino-Soviet rivalry, led in the 1960s to splits in most of them and the Chinese supported the groups which split away: PAC in South Africa, ZANU in Rhodesia, and SWANU in Namibia. (FRELIMO in Mozambique and PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau did not split and continued to get arms from Moscow and Peking.)

1974: The Great Turn

In 1974 three events greatly increased Soviet opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa: the collapse of the Portuguese African empire, the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, and new, radical, often Marxist-Leninist regimes in Somalia, Benin (ex-Dahomey), and Madagascar. Furthermore, notably in Zaire, traditionalism, elitism, tribal rivalries, and above all corruption produced instability and tribal rebellions, e.g. in Zaire's Shaba (ex-Katanga) province in 1977 and 1978. By 1974 the Soviets also had the air- and sea-lift capability and the Cubans to take advantage of these new opportunities.

Moreover, they had learned several lessons from their previous African failures. First, they now supported not rebels, as they had before, but OAU-recognized governments and NLMs, and existing boundaries, however artificial, against irredentist challenges. (Moscow had tried not to appear to support the Shaba revolts.) Second, given the demonstrated unreliability of its previous radical but non-Marxist-Leninist civilian and military allies, Moscow now supported soi-disant Marxist-Leninist parties, e.g. MPLA in Angola and (by 1977) FRELIMO in Mozambique. Yet even so, the Soviets (and Cubans) often had to support ethnic, racial, religious minority groups (e.g. Christians in Ethiopia and mulattos in the MPLA) or NLMs - a strategy which only remained effective as long as these allies were dependent on the Soviets for victory or for continuing their struggles against white minority rule.

Finally, the Soviets now had Cuban troops as their allies. The Cubans in Africa are not, pace Senator Moynihan, the Gurkhas of the Soviets. Fidel has long had his own policy in Africa, including before 1968 when his relations with Moscow were not good. Cuba is too small for him; he failed to revolutionize Latin America; and his policies are not the result of Soviet plans but, now, parallel with them. But for Moscow the main point was none of these. Cuban "Third World" troops in Africa serve Moscow's purposes and are essential to Neto and Mengistu. Moscow also profited in Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique from the use of East German specialists in police, intelligence and communications media work.

Angola

Since the early 1960s a three-way struggle against the Portuguese had been going on there, involving Holden Roberto's FNLA (black, Bakongo-based, Zaire-, U.S.-, and later Chinese-supported, with a 25% tribal support among the population), Agostino Neto's MPLA (largely led by mulatto, assimilado urban intellectuals, Soviet-supported, and also with 25% tribal base), and, later, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (black, Ovambundu-based, Chinese- and later South African-supported, with a 40% tribal base.) Once Caetano collapsed in Lisbon, the increasingly radical Portuguese armed forces movement (MFA) supported the MPLA, and the Soviets brought in massive arms support and thousands of Cuban troops. Moscow may well have started this against China rather than the U.S. but its policy defeated Western as well as Chinese interests. Without any foreign intervention, FNLA and UNITA would have defeated the MPLA; primarily because together they had a much larger popular base. Thus for the first time in Africa, Soviet, not Western military support was decisive. (China withdrew rapidly once it realized the extent of Soviet and Cuban intervention.) U.S. public and congressional opposition forced Ford and Kissinger to abandon support of FNLA, whereupon UNITA and South African armed forces, only some 60 km from Luanda, retreated; and the Soviets and Cubans brought Neto and the MPLA to power. (Savimbi has continued to fight in southern Angola.)[3]

Mozambique

There FRELIMO took power rapidly. Until it did, Chinese, not Soviet influence in it had been more important but FRELIMO remained independent of control by either Moscow or Peking. After it took power, the Chinese withdrawal from Angola, the intensification of Mozambique-based ZANU guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia (see below), and therefore Machel's fear of Rhodesian military reprisals made him rely on Soviet arms supplies. (Even so, ZANU in Mozambique continued to get its arms from the Chinese). Machel and Frelimo remained Marxist-Leninist and anti-Western in theory and practice but also were fiercely independent and refused to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute.[4]

The Horn

By the early 1970s Moscow had gained a strong position in Somalia, including naval facilities in Berbera, and Somalia's leader Siad Barre

had set up a Marxist-Leninist party while continuing to praise Islam. Somalia's pro-Soviet alignment occurred because Somali irredentism, as fierce and unsuccessful as that of the Irish, demanded that the Somali-inhabited Ogaden be "recovered" from Ethiopia, where American influence was predominant, and that Somalia therefore get Soviet arms. Haile Selassie was in 1974 overthrown by a military junta (the Dergue), which under the leadership of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam was rapidly purged and radicalized. After he broke off Ethiopia's close relations with the United States, and because he was confronted by the threat of the disintegration of the Ethiopian empire, historically dominated by the Christian Amhara minority, he had to repel the Somali invasion of the Ogaden and crush the Eritrean rebellions. He therefore turned for military assistance to Moscow and Havana. He also allied with one of the seven Ethiopian Marxist-Leninist groups, the Meison, a formerly Paris-based leftist Leninist movement, to crush the other main Leninist group, the student-based EPRP, in a bloody wave of terror -- only thereafter in August 1977 to turn on the Meison and drive it into prison, clandestinity, or emigration.

Moscow staged an air- and sea-lift operation in Ethiopia greater than it had in Angola, overflying Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan, and using Aden as a staging base. Soviet command and arms and some 20,000 Cuban troops defeated Somalia in early 1978. Since then, with Soviet and Cuban logistical support but no direct combat involvement, lest the Eritrean rebels' Arab and Third World support be overly antagonized, Mengistu had driven the Eritrean rebel groups (ELF and EPLF) out of the cities back to rural guerrilla fighting.[5)]

Thus Moscow and Havana won two major victories in Africa, in Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviets also achieved another victory: an intensified global image of American indecision and hesitation. They did, however, also suffer some losses, in Africa and elsewhere. The rapid and massive intrusion of Soviet and Cuban military power into Africa alarmed not only the conservative African states but also such centrist ones as Nigeria, which by mid-1978 was putting pressure on Neto and Mengistu to cut back on the Soviet and Cuban military presence, as was demonstrated at the July 1978 Khartoum OAU summit meeting. The May 1978 second invasion of Shaba by Lunda tribesmen from Angola, while in large part tribal in character, could hardly have occurred without Soviet and Cuban

knowledge, and East Germans may well have been involved in training the rebels. The invasion triggered a French response, followed by a largely Moroccan pan-African force and increased French, other West European, and U.S. concern about Soviet operations in Africa. The U.S., at French request, had sent transport planes to fly in French and Moroccan troops and material -- the first direct U.S. military involvement in Africa since the 1960 UN Congo operation and the first U.S. military support to extra-European French military operations since the first Indochinese War. Thus Franco-American relations improved to Moscow's disadvantage. A Western-Japanese-Saudi economic consortium was formed to overcome Zaire's near-bankruptcy, thus, with the pan-African force, at least temporarily propping up Mobutu. Although the Polisario and Frolinat rebellions against French-supported Mauretania and Chad were Libyan - and Algerian-armed, the arms were Soviet in origin, a fact which strengthened Paris's view that Moscow was trying to subvert French influence in Africa.[6)]

Finally, and perhaps globally most important, Soviet support of (ex-) Christian, Marxist-Leninist Ethiopia against the largely Muslim Eritrean rebels turned the Arab world, including radical Syria and Iraq, against Moscow on this issue. Indeed, in terms of global Soviet and Western strategy, the Horn is primarily a Middle Eastern rather than an African crisis area.

Two other developments showed the problems which arose from the Soviets' African successes. In spring 1978 the Cubans, hardly without Soviet knowledge and consent, smuggled back into their embassy in Addis Ababa a major Meison leader, Negede Gobezie, who had been abroad when Mengistu turned on the Meison in August 1977. (Thereafter Negede had criticized Mengistu for being not radical enough at home and too pro-Soviet abroad but later became pro-Soviet and Cuban, presumably after Mengistu turned on him.) Mengistu then ordered out the Cuban and South Yemeni ambassadors and Negede left with them. It thus seems likely that the Soviets distrust Mengistu and would like to set up a Marxist-Leninist party under at least partial civilian leadership. There were also press reports that the Soviets were intriguing with three prominent Dergue members, Legesse, Gesesse, and Tamrat, against Mengistu. Mengistu himself was careful not to break off all relations with Washington and indeed agreed to the appointment of a new U.S. ambassador.[7)]

In Angola it first seemed that Neto could not survive without continued massive Soviet and Cuban help against the continuing UNITA rebellion in southern Angola, the less serious FNLA operations in the north, and the dissentions within his own leadership. In 1977 rebellion against Neto and the largely mulatto civilian MPLA leadership, led by Vito Alves and other black military leaders, was crushed only by the intervention of Cuban troops. After the May 1978 second Shaba invasion the Carter administration, after unsuccessful soundings in Congress about covert aid to Savimbi, reversed its course, sent an emissary to Luanda, and thereby somewhat improved Angolan-U.S. relations and reportedly got some Angolan help in the Namibian negotiations (see below).[8] At the Khartoum OAU summit Neto and Mobutu agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations, cease support of guerrilla activity against each other's territory, and reopen the Benguela railway for shipment of Zaire's minerals to the Angolan port of Lobito. Neto has since visited Kinshasha.

This kaleidoscopic series of events shows on what shifting sands African alignments are built. While Neto has a Marxist-Leninist background and is closely linked with the Soviets and the Cubans, he is also an African nationalist. It is even more true in Africa than elsewhere that all communism in power becomes national communism. Neto can hope for more economic progress, African support, and Western economic aid if he disengages himself somewhat from Moscow and Havana. Moreover, the probable approaching end of South African military presence in Namibia would decrease Savimbi's threat to him.

And yet... Because Neto and Mengistu are still threatened, they will hardly want to dispense entirely with the Soviet and Cuban military presence in the near future. One cannot know, in sum, whether the Soviets and Cubans will stay, cut back in, or even leave Angola and Ethiopia. It seems unlikely, however, that they will totally dominate those countries. Nor can Moscow assume that Washington will remain indecisive in Africa indefinitely; there are already signs in the U.S. to the contrary. On balance, however, Soviet and Cuban military and political presence in Angola and Ethiopia in 1978 is still predominant, and Moscow is therefore stronger in Africa than it was in 1974. And it may well become stronger still.

Southern Africa: The Soviet Prospects

It is in southern Africa, and particularly in South Africa, that Soviet prospects in Africa seem the brightest during the next decade. Not because South Africa will soon come under black majority rule, led by a Marxist-Leninist party -- and even if it did, it would be then subject to the same conflicting pressures which now beset the MPLA in Angola, and Soviet influence thereby come into question. Rather, because it will not. Soviet influence on the protracted black guerrilla struggle against white rule in South Africa will increase as the guerrillas need more arms, will not be able to get them from the West, or enough of them from the Chinese, and will therefore have to get them primarily from the Soviet Union.

At an early stage the Soviets became the principal suppliers of arms and money to SWAPO in Namibia and ZAPU in Rhodesia. When ZANU initially broke away from ZAPU, it turned to China for arms and money. As the guerrilla war in Rhodesia intensified, ZANLA, the ZANU guerrilla wing, based in Mozambique, drawn largely from the Karanga sub-tribe of the Shona, and headed by Mugabe, Tongarera, and Nhongo, broke with the ZANU "civilian" leadership of Muzorewa and Sithole, who came to terms with Smith (the "internal solution"). Mugabe has continued to rely on China for arms and training, although his recent visit to Cuba may diversify his arms supply. SWAPO has profited from the Soviet and Cuban camps in Angola and ZAPU from continued Soviet arms and some Cuban training in Zambia.

Marxism-Leninism is certainly stronger in ZANU than in SWAPO, but it is primarily of the Chinese, not the Soviet variety. (ZAPU has some Marxist rhetoric but hardly much more.) Nor are the ZANU and SWAPO leaderships undisputed: the ZANU military leaders Tongagora and Nhongo wield much influence and Nujomo is potentially menaced by Toivo and, to a lesser extent, by Shipanga. Finally, the Rhodesian and Namibian movements have strong Christian influence.

In August 1978 the Nkomo- and Mugabe-led Patriotic Front guerrilla activity was on the rise in Rhodesia and the "internal solution" therefore in increasing difficulties. [9] In Namibia the Western proposal for

peaceful, UN-monitored transition, although accepted by SWAPO and South Africa, was endangered by rising SWAPO guerrilla activity and doubts whether South Africa would tolerate a SWAPO-dominated Namibian government. [10)]

South Africa

The black struggle for majority rule in South Africa will almost surely be protracted indeed. The terrain south of the Lim popo is not hospitable to guerrilla warfare. The formidable South African security forces and their informer networks among the black population are major initial obstacles to effective black urban guerrilla warfare and industrial sabotage, theoretically the most effective violence-oriented strategies for the black majority. Despite such recent developments as the gradual dismantlement of petty apartheid, increased political particupation for coloureds and Indians, and perhaps the beginning between the moderate (verligte) Afrikaners and moderate black leaders, the lack of realism and obstinacy of most Afrikaners and the bitterness and despair of most blacks make peaceful transition to black majority rule unlikely. For although some of the English-speaking whites might eventually accept it, and more would emigrate to avoid it and/or violence, most Afrikaans-speaking whites will long resist it with the utmost vigour and ruthlessness, and most black activists will hardly accept anything less. For the Afrikaners their nation, language, history, religion and culture are at stake. In their own minds they have no place to go. Nor do they think of themselves colonialists but, rather, the victors of their own national liberation war against British Colonial rule. And most black activists feel they have the same right to black majority rule as do the blacks to the north.

Thus a protracted black-white guerrilla struggle in South Africa seems likely. True, after Rhodesia and Namibia move to black majority rule, as seems likely in the next year or two, the black African states may well want and take a breathing spell, for how long one cannot know. Yet the South African NLMs are already trying to carry on some sporadic guerrilla activity in South Africa, and internal urban dissidence there has become endemic since the 1976 Soweto black demonstrations. Nor can the black African states indefinitely dare not to support the black struggle for South Africa.

The Soviet Union will support it as well. Moscow will have the capability, the opportunity, and the motive to do so. True, present Soviet capability would be stretched seriously to do in or near South Africa what it and the Cubans have done in Angola and Ethiopia -- but after what they did there, one would be foolhardy to think it necessarily and indefinitely insufficient. Moscow's opportunities are obvious and multiple. First, without Soviet arms and perhaps Cuban troops, black guerrillas within and without South Africa can hardly hope in the forseeable future to overcome Afrikaner power and determination. Second, South Africa, even more than Namibia and Rhodesia, has strategic minerals which Western Europe needs even more than the United States does. Third, perhaps for Moscow the most important, it controls the Cape route through which passes much of the oil for Western Europe and increasingly for the United States. True, Soviet military interruption of oil transport around the Cape would mean general war, and is therefore unlikely. But Soviet capability to do so, e.g. from a black-ruled South Africa, might cause some West European governments, although hardly the U.S., to be less openly anti-Soviet, i.e. somewhat "Finlandized". Yet Western support of South Africa, or even lack of opposition to it, would turn the black African states and NLMs more toward the Soviet Union than will otherwise be the case. Finally, by supporting the black struggle against South Africa the Soviets would once again demonstrate their superiority over the Chinese.

Moreover, the Soviet Union has other assets vis-a-vis South Africa. The major external South African black NLM, the ANC, has long been armed and financed by Moscow. Some of its leaders are (black) members of the South African Communist Party. The SACP has a long and faithfully pro-Moscow history. Officially multiracial, its de facto leadership is white and largely of East European Jewish origin. Thus Moscow has some trained black and white SACP cadres at its disposal. (Yet Soviet multiracialism will continue to be a handicap in the black South African NLMs; the PAC split from the ANC on this issue and turned to the Chinese, who have been trying to play the black nationalist card.) [11]

The United States is hardly likely to play anywhere near a decisive role in the coming struggle for South Africa. For while U.S. liberals and blacks will urge help to the blacks, U.S. conservatives, out of anti-Soviet, anti-terrorist and sometimes racist motives, will

urge help for the whites. The two will probably cancel each other out. The British, with their massive South African investments and rising anti-black domestic racism, will probably do little and the rest of Western Europe even less. The Chinese will compete with the Soviets for the favour of the black NLMs and thus drivo Moscow on to greater efforts, but Chinese capabilities will remain much less than Soviet. Finally, the more aid the Soviets give the South African NLMs, and the more essential and effective it is, the more their prestige and influence will increase in the more radical and anti- South African black African states.

Thus the Soviets and the Cubans are likely to be the primary external forces acting on South Africa, and short-range Soviet prospects there seem good. Soviet influence in the NLMs and among sympathetic black African states will probably rise and that of the West decline. And although Soviet operations in Southern Africa will contribute toward a further worsening of their relations with the West, Soviet activity there may well be stimulated thereby.

And in the end? Will the blacks, with Soviet aid, eventually wear down the Afrikaners? And, if so, will Soviet power in Southern Africa thereafter decline? Only the long run will tell -- and we know what Keynes said about that.

One final caveat. For the West and Japan, Africa is much less important than the Middle East. The Soviets are not doing so well in either; the Chinese are opposing them more vigorously; and the Sino-Japanese treaty may well be the kind of historic turning point compared with which the subject of this essay, no matter how fascinating and, probably, how tragic, is still of secondary importance.

Footnotes

1) This paper is primarily based on travels in the Soviet Union, Africa, and the Middle East in May-August 1978, for which I am grateful to The Reader's Digest, of which I am a roving editor, and to its editor-in-chief, Edward T. Thompson. For recent general background, on which I have drawn extensively, see the articles by Colin Legum on the African background, David Albright on Soviet policy in Africa, and George T. Yu on Chinese policy in Africa in Problems of Communism, Jan.-Feb. 1978 and my "The Soviet-US Confrontation in Southern Africa" (MIT Center for International Studies, mimeo., Nov. 1976). For Africa in general at present, see Colin Legum, ed., The Africa Contemporary Record (New York: Africana, 1966), and for the history of Soviet policy in Africa, Wolfgang Berner, "Afrikapolitik" in Dietrich Geyer, ed., Sowjetunion: Aussenpolitik 1955-1973 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1976), pp. 713-843. I am also much indebted to conversations with Colin Legum, Robert Legvold, and Robert Rotberg.

2) Berner, "Afrikapolitik", op.cit., p. 713.

3) The authoritative treatment of the Angolan civil war will be John Marcum, The Angolan Rebellion, vol. 2 (to be published by the MIT Press in Autumn 1978).

4) The above is primarily based on conversations in Maputo in August 1978. For Machel's recent authoritative declaration of "communist neutrality", see his "Relatório do Comité Político Permanente do Comité Central", IV. Frelimo CC Plenum, in Tempo (Maputo), no. 310, Aug. 13, 1978, pp. 30-43: "...nunca agiremos para consolidar ou agravar divisoes na familia revolucionária, agiremos sempre em favor de unidade".

5) The above is primarily based on conversations in Moscow, Tehran, Damascus, Cairo, Khartoum, Mogadiscio, and Nairobi in June-August 1978. See also the analyses by J.-C. Guillebaud and J.-C. Pomonti in Le Monde, especially Guillebaud's articles of Feb. 27-28, 1977 and Feb. 20, 1978. For the Soviet airlift to Ethiopia, see Newsweek, Jan. 23, 1978; for the Soviet-Somali break, F. Stephen Larrabee in Radio Liberty Research, July 5, 1977 and Jan. 2, 1978; for background, Volker Matthies, Der Grenzkonflikt Somalias mit Athiopien und Kenya (Hamburg: Institute für Afrika-Kunde, 1977), and his "Unterentwicklung, Nationalismus und Sozialismus in Somalia", Afrika Spectrum, 1977/1, pp. 49-75 and "Somalia -- ein sowjetischer 'Satillitenstaat' im Horn von Afrika?", Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee, Vol. 9, no. 4 (1976), pp. 437-456; for Barre's Islamic posture, Halgan (Mogadiscio), Eng. ed., Oct. 1977; for general background, Peter Schwab, "Cold War on the Horn of Africa", African Affairs, vol. 77, no. 3-6 (Jan. 1978), pp. 6-20

6) For the above, see primarily the running coverage in Le Monde. For the DDR's role, see Colin Legum, "It's Germans, Not Cubans", The New Republic, June 24, 1978. I have benefitted from conversations in Paris in May 1978.

7) For Negede Gobezie's criticism of the Soviets, see the interview with him by Guillebaud in Le Monde, Sept. 17, 1977; for the rest, The Economist, June 3, 1978, p. 68.

8) The New York Times, June 23, 1978.

9) For ZANU Marxism-Leninism, see the Political Commissariat lecture series in Zimbabwe News (Maputo), vol.10, nos. 1 and 2 (Jan.-Feb. and March-April 1978.) For Chinese influence, see the excerpts from Mao's works in the latter number.

10) Conversations in Moscow, Lusaka, Maputo, Pretoria, Windhoek, and Salisbury, June and August 1978. The best running coverage of Rhodesia and Namibia is in The Economist.

11) I have benefitted from conversations in Moscow, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Cape Town in June and August 1978. For verligte views, see the writings by Willem de Klerk, editor of Die Transvaler, especially his "South Africa's Domestic Politics: Key Questions and Options", Politikon, vol. 3, no. 2 (Dec. 1977), pp. 178-189. For the more orthodox view, see A.P. Treurnicht, Credo van 'n Afrikaner (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1975). The best running coverage of South Africa is in The Economist.

(8)

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PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

COMMITTEE 4

THE CONCERN FOR SECURITY

(ii) THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN SOVIET DEFENCE POLICIES

by

David Holloway

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Committee 4: The Concern for Security

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN SOVIET DEFENCE POLICIES

David Holloway

No analysis of the prospects of Soviet power in the 1980s would be complete without a look at the way in which defence policy is made, for it is through the policy-making process that the Soviet Union determines the size and shape of its Armed Forces, and decides how military power will be used. An examination of how policy is made will not tell us what the substance of policy will be, but it may help us to understand how the Soviet Union will react to the problems of the 1980s. This paper will look at the structure of the policy-making process, at the pressures and influences that come into play, and at the way in which Soviet security concerns are formulated. It will ask whether what we know about the decision-making process makes it possible to say what Western policies might influence Soviet decisions in the direction of restraint, cooperation and arms control.

When looking at Soviet defence decision-making it is important to bear in mind the role of the military factor in Soviet history. When the Soviet leaders in the late 1920s embraced the goal of "catching up and overtaking" the advanced capitalist powers, they proceeded to channel resources into heavy industry to provide the basis for economic growth and military power. A vast and powerful Party-State bureaucracy enforced the priorities of the leaders, and a wide rift was created between regime and people. One of the ways in which Stalin tried to bridge this rift was by encouraging a form of Soviet nationalism in which the Russian element was dominant. It was during the war (the Great Patriotic War) that the regime most appealed to this source of its legitimacy, and it was then that, in spite of the opposition that did occur, regime and people were most closely united in a common purpose. Since 1945 the war itself has formed the basis of military-patriotic propaganda. The intensity of this, and the genuine feeling behind it, are evident even to the casual observer. It has been an important feature of the Brezhnev years, and Mr. Brezhnev has contributed to it with his own memoirs.

General though these considerations are, they form an essential backdrop to any discussion of Soviet defence decision-making. The strength of "military patriotism" does not mean widespread support for war, but it does

underpin a system of decision-making that gives priority to military matters; it points to the significance of the Armed Forces as a symbol of national power and integrity; it suggests a general belief that Soviet security requires military strength and that there is no contradiction between Soviet military power and a more peaceful world; finally, it indicates a conviction that it is in Moscow, and not elsewhere, that Soviet security interests should be decided.

The Formal Organisation of Defence Policy-Making

The Politbureau is the most authoritative policy-making body in the Soviet Union. It is there that the main lines of Soviet policy are determined, the major resource allocation decisions taken, and the most difficult issues resolved. The Politbureau meets once a week; it has also met in special session on several occasions to consider US arms control proposals. Its role in foreign and defence policy has been strengthened by the inclusion of the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs and the Head of the KGB as full members since 1973.

There exists also a Defence Council which, under the 1977 Constitution, is a State, and not a Party, body. This, like the Politbureau, is chaired by Mr. Brezhnev (who is also Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) and has wide responsibilities for the Armed Forces and defence policy. Reports of its composition suggest that it is small, consisting of some leading Politbureau members, along with the Party Secretary responsible for the defence industry. The Minister of Defence appears to be the only representative of the Armed Forces on the Council (although the extent to which he represents them is an open question); the Chief of the General Staff may also be a member, however, and others will be called to attend when necessary. The precise relationship of the Defence Council to the Politbureau is not clear. It may handle detailed matters of policy for which the Politbureau has no time, while leaving the major issues to that forum. Alternatively, it may consider all major issues and make recommendations to the Politbureau, in which case it is likely to be an important body and an effective instrument for ensuring Mr. Brezhnev's domination of defence policy. The constitutional status of the Council, and Mr. Brezhnev's new position as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (which decides on the composition of the Council) suggests that the latter role is more likely.

The Politbureau's work is supported by the Central Committee apparatus and the personal staff of the General Secretary. The Central Committee has three departments which deal with defence matters: the Main Political Administration (which is also a main administration of the Ministry of Defence) is concerned primarily with the morale and political state of the Armed Forces; the Administrative Organs Department deals mainly with personnel matters; the Department of the Defence Industry has responsibility for military production. It is important to note, however, that there is no Central Committee Department that matches the Ministry of Defence or the General Staff in questions of military doctrine or military operations, in the way in which the International Affairs Department "shadows" the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Defence Council may have a secretariat, but there is no evidence to suggest that it has great influence, or embodies any particular military expertise.

The Central Committee apparatus is not very large, and certainly does not match the government bureaucracy in size. But what it lacks in size it makes up for in authority and influence. It prepares the policy decisions of the Politbureau, and can call on any institution or individual in the Soviet Union for advice and help. It is largely by providing expertise and staff work for the Central Committee that the policy-oriented institutes of the Academy of Sciences (for example, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations and the Institute of the USA and Canada) have been able to play a role in policy-making. They can write analyses of political, economic and military developments in the areas they study, point to new problems and issues that may come to face the Soviet leaders, and serve as the source of new policy ideas. These institutes may play a role in arms control policy-making by providing analyses of the other side's policy. But they do not appear to take part in the detailed formulation of Soviet defence policy - for example, in weapons acquisition or the use of military power - for this is not their responsibility, and they lack access to the necessary information.

The role of the Council of Ministers in defence policy is confined mainly to the planning and management of military R & D and production, in line with the general policy of the Politbureau. Since the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs are members of the Politbureau, it is unlikely that major issues of policy are discussed in the Council of Ministers, which appears now to be concerned largely with economic policy. One of the Council's Deputy Chairmen (L.V. Smirnov) heads the Military-Industrial

Commission which oversees the weapons acquisition process, but even his work may be directed by the Central Committee Secretary responsible for the defence industry, or by the Defence Council. Production and R & D are carried out chiefly in the research institutes, design bureaux and factories of various production ministries, and in particular of the nine ministries in the defence industry group. The defence sector enjoys special priority in the economy, and this helps it to perform more effectively than civilian industry. It should be noted that the operation of the defence sector imposes its own pattern of design and development on Soviet weapons policies.

The Armed Forces naturally play a major role in the formulation of defence policy. They draw up operational plans, gather and assess intelligence information, produce procurement plans and orders, and also play a part in planning and managing R & D and production. The procurement plans have to be coordinated with other agencies such as the Military-Industrial Commission, Gosplan and Gossnab, and approved at a higher level by the Defence Council or the Politbureau. The High Command in recent years has acquired considerable technical and managerial competence to enable it to perform this side of its work. The exact division of responsibilities between the General Staff and the main administrations of the Ministry of Defence is not always clear (they naturally must work closely together) but the General Staff does have particular responsibility for command and control and for operational and doctrinal matters, while the Ministry focusses more on administration. The appointment as Minister of Ustinov, whose career has been in defence production rather than in the military profession, may strengthen this distinction. It is the General Staff that is the main repository of military professionalism in the Soviet Union. It is there that future military operations are prepared for, and the requirements of the Armed Forces are worked out. It is not unknown for individual branches and arms of service to lobby the political leadership, but the main channel of communication between the High Command and the Party leaders appears to be through the Minister and the Chief of the General Staff. In the Ministry of Defence the Main Military Council (consisting of the Minister and his Deputies) coordinates the activities of the different elements of the Armed Forces. It may have considerable power in the day-to-day running of the military establishments.

The present arrangements for defence decision-making appear to have been created in the late 1960s, but more information about them has become

available in the last two or three years as Mr. Brezhnev's position has grown even stronger than before. In the defence policy-making process it is the Party leaders who hold the dominant position, and there is nothing to suggest that civilian political supremacy is threatened. The Party leaders have various sources of advice and analysis in foreign policy - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Committee apparatus, the KGB and the Academy institutes. In military matters, however, the Armed Forces play a major role in decision-making, by virtue of their monopoly of professional expertise. With the extension of Soviet military power throughout the world, and the involvement of the Soviet Union in arms control negotiations, the military have been brought more often into the policy-making process.

Pressures and Influences in Defence Decision-Making

The formal structure of the defence decision-making process is not very different from that which existed under Stalin, but the informal process has changed in important ways. Stalin dominated, in a ruthless fashion, the Party-State bureaucracy which his policies had helped to create. His authority in military matters was unquestioned, and he intervened in a detailed way in all aspects of defence policy. He took advice, of course, but he could ignore it when he wished. Khrushchev's leadership was naturally different, but even when he was at his most powerful his position did not compare to that of Stalin. He was not able to dominate the Party-State bureaucracy in the same way, and his attempts to ignore the views and interests of the various elements of that bureaucracy led him into political difficulties. When he fell from power it was opposition not so much to his policy goals as to his methods of pursuing them that formed the basis of the coalition that removed him.

The Brezhnev Politbureau has adopted a style of policy-making that is much more responsive to the advice of the different elements in the Party-State bureaucracy. Most observers agree that there has been a diffusion of power at the centre and that this has had important consequences for policy-making. In the Soviet Union these changes have been described in terms of a shift towards a more scientific form of leadership - an approach that recognises the claims of professional expertise and special competence. In the Politbureau itself an attempt is apparently made to reach decisions on the basis of full agreement. In other words, the support of the Party leadership and the relevant bureaucracies is sought for policy decisions.

It would be a mistake to idealise this style of leadership, and to suppose that conflict and disagreement have been eliminated entirely. But even where a policy is controversial the effort is made to assuage doubts and fears by some compensating measure: thus in the policy of detente we find arms control pursued along with high levels of procurement; defence spending raised alongside an attempt to regenerate the economy by importing foreign technology; better relations sought with the West, but repression at home to try to prevent any political contamination from this.

This new approach to policy-making has been called "institutional pluralism" or "pluralism of the centre". Like all pluralisms, however, it is very far from perfect, in the sense that some groups have a prestige and weight which others lack, while some are excluded completely from the political process: hence the paradox of the Brezhnev years that greater policy debate (within clear limits) has been possible, even while cultural and intellectual freedom are more severely curtailed. With the diffusion of power at the centre, some groups and institutions have been well placed to increase their influence. The Armed Forces have had an advantageous position. They enjoy general prestige as an institution that embodies national power and integrity - a prestige enhanced by the extensive military-patriotic education. Secondly, the high priority given to defence remains embedded in the system of planning and administering the economy, as well as in Soviet political culture. Thirdly, the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence are institutions of undoubted competence and reputation, which enjoy a monopoly of expertise in the relevant field. They are able to protect that monopoly by holding secret the information necessary to make informed judgements about current policy. Moreover, they are able to couch their arguments either in the technical language of systems analysis or in Marxist-Leninist terms - both of which count as "scientific" discourse in the Soviet Union. Finally, in the political conflicts of the post-Stalin period the military have shown themselves to be a powerful ally, whom no cautious political leader would antagonise unnecessarily.

One other factor requires fuller mention between the different groups in defence policy-making. In Soviet terms, military doctrine consists of two parts. The first is the political element, which determines the political goals and character of war, and to what end military power is to be used; this is the prerogative of the political leadership. The second is the military-technical element, which (in line with Party policy) is concerned with how a future war is to be waged, the equipment of the Armed

Forces, and the maintenance of combat readiness; these questions are a military, and in particular a General Staff, responsibility. The political element is the primary one and has been evidenced in the desire to avoid war and achieve arms control on the basis of some kind of equality with the West. But this approach to military doctrine allows considerable scope for military influence on the size and structure of the Armed Forces. In the late 1960s the doctrinal debates of that decade were settled in an open-ended way, thus providing a framework within which all elements of the Armed Forces could press their claims. The Party leaders accepted this settlement, and thus left themselves open to military pressure.

It is now possible to point to some general features of the defence policy-making process under Mr. Brezhnev. The Party leadership is the dominant force in the process, and sets the objectives of policy. The Armed Forces appear to have considerable influence on the methods used to obtain these objectives. In assessing relationships and military requirements the Party leaders must rely on the General Staff, for there appears to be no other institution competent or well-informed enough to provide alternative advice. The Brezhnev style of policy-making has been inflexible because the support of the relevant expert groups and the agreement of the Politbureau are sought, and once they are obtained the policy will not be changed readily. It is, moreover, a style of decision-making that can lead to internal contradictions precisely because it is responsive to domestic pressures. In general, it is a style of policy-making that does not lead to dramatic twists and turns of policy, and yet by small steps it has helped to bring about large changes in East-West military relations, to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

Ever since the XXIV Party Congress in 1971 it has been clear that, even though the Politbureau has adopted a consensual style of policy-making, Mr. Brezhnev has been the dominant figure in foreign and defence policy. Since 1976, however, there has taken place what can only be described as the "militarisation of Brezhnev": it has become known that he is Chairman of the Defence Council and Supreme Commander-in-Chief; he has been made a Marshal of the Soviet Union and received a number of major military decorations; his military career has been publicised; he has appointed as Minister of Defence a close associate who is not a professional soldier. Personal vanity alone cannot explain these developments. They point to a closer identity between the Party leadership and Soviet military power. They signify, if not an increase in Mr. Brezhnev's institutional power,

then at least greater authority in military affairs. They are likely to give him more flexibility and room for manoeuvre in defence policy.

All this represents a shift in relationships in the defence policy-making process, but it is not clear to what end the new flexibility might be used. There are signs of a greater assertion of Party primacy over the Armed Forces; Mr. Brezhnev has stated more clearly that the Soviet goal is not military superiority, but equality and parity (and such statements must now be treated as authoritative elements of Soviet military doctrine); there has been a new approach at the Vienna talks, and an evident desire for a SALT II agreement. The significance of these moves is not self-evident. If equality is sought with all potential enemies, is there not room for a continuing military build-up? Will not the General Staff's assessment of "equality" look like "superiority" to other governments? Is an attempt being made to shift military resources from the central relationship with the West to other areas (China, Africa)? Finally, it should be noted that the greater flexibility which Mr. Brezhnev seems to have acquired in defence policy-making may not be transferable to a successor, for much of his authority is personal rather than institutional. The professional authority of the Armed Forces, on the other hand, does not depend on an individual, and will remain a permanent factor in defence policy-making.

Western Influence on Soviet Policy

It is evident that much of Soviet defence policy is directed towards the Western powers as potential enemies. But it is not clear how far Western governments can use their policies to elicit desired responses from the Soviet Union - for example, restraint in the use of military power, readiness to conclude arms control agreements, or the reduction of military spending.

This is not the place to attempt specific predictions or recommendations, but it is possible to point to some elements of the Soviet decision-making process that bear on this question. In the first place, Soviet policy is not merely a response to what the West does, but is a product of Soviet history, institutions and domestic power relationships. Consequently many (probably most) of the factors influencing any policy are not amenable to Western influence. When the Soviet Union responds to Western actions, it responds in a Soviet way, and not necessarily as

the West would like. Secondly, the Soviet policy-making process appears to be inflexible, so that policies, once launched, may be difficult to change. This, along with the secrecy which surrounds Soviet policy-making, makes it difficult to exert influence on the process in any very precise way. Thirdly, the attempt to put overt pressure on the Soviet Union to change its policies may arouse Soviet nationalism and superpower amour propre and thus merely stiffen resistance. Similarly, Western policies which do not show restraint and cooperation in military affairs are unlikely to encourage these qualities in Soviet policy. The SALT agreements gave international recognition that, in military power at least, the Soviet Union had achieved its historic mission of "catching up" with the West. Although there are many good reasons why the Soviet Union should shift resources away from the military effort, it is inconceivable that it would not offset and resist a Western attempt to gain a new superiority.

Many of the reasons for being sceptical about the possibility of influencing Soviet policy spring from the inability of Western governments to coordinate and control their own policies in a precise way, or even to decide precisely what is desired from the Soviet Union. But those elements of the Soviet decision-making process just outlined also suggest caution: there is no magic formula for gaining influence over Soviet policy. Of course the degree to which the Soviet Union will respond to Western actions in the desired way depends in part on the issues at stake, and on the way in which influence is exercised. There is a difference between negotiations on specific issues (where some effect might be had) and the attempt to use one instrument of pressure (for example, trade) to change the general line of Soviet defence policy (which is likely to end in failure). The only practicable approach appears to be to try to structure, in a consistent way and over a sustained period, the choices which the Soviet Union faces: for example, by keeping open the opportunity for restraint and cooperation. In this way it might be possible to influence the "institutional pluralism" of the Soviet political system; but even here the caveats listed above should be borne in mind.

All of this raises the question whether the Soviet Union is able to apply to its defence policy the kind of political calculation that seems to be required in the current state of East-West relations: for example, in assessing the implications of using military power far from the Soviet borders, or in bringing arms control considerations to bear on weapons

procurement decisions. In making a decision about the use of Soviet military power abroad the Soviet leaders, besides calling for military advice, can seek recommendations and analyses of the political context from other bodies. In making procurement decisions, however, it seems unlikely that other than military, scientific and industrial recommendations are sought, given the secrecy which surrounds these questions. Consequently, assessment of the political, diplomatic and arms control implications of new weapons or new deployments would seem to be provided mainly by the Armed Forces themselves. This may have positive military advantages in reducing political pressures on defence policy. It may also have political disadvantages in the repercussions which development or deployment may have on relations with other governments. This compartmentalisation of policy-making makes it less likely that the Soviet Union will accommodate its defence policy to its political relations with other powers, and thus reduces the opportunity for those powers to influence Soviet defence policy.

Conclusion

Specific predictions are not possible, but some general issues can be raised about Soviet defence policy-making in the 1980s:

a) The Party leadership will remain dominant, but, unless there is a drastic recentralisation of power, military influence will remain strong in defence policy-making. From this it seems to follow that Soviet military requirements will be defined in a cautious and conservative way, particularly in view of the doctrinal settlement reached in the late 1960s.

b) As long as the present leaders remain in charge, major shifts in policy seem unlikely, although there are signs that Mr. Brezhnev has increased his own power and authority in defence policy-making.

c) The succession question has not been solved, and this suggests that Mr. Brezhnev's disappearance from the scene may be followed by a hiatus until a new leader establishes his authority. The 1977 Constitution may make it easier for the successor to establish himself (if he is made General Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet), but much of Mr. Brezhnev's authority is personal rather than institutional and will not easily be transferred. Past

experience suggests that power becomes more diffused during a succession crisis, and also that the Armed Forces are well placed to take advantage of this opportunity to increase their influence. At the same time, however, a succession crisis offers the possibility of reordering priorities and advancing new political strategies. Moreover, the new generation of leaders will not have been marked so strongly by the war: this might give them a different outlook, though it might also lessen their authority vis-a-vis the Armed Forces.

d) If the Soviet Union faces serious economic problems in the 1980s, it is possible that strong pressure for a shift of resources from the military effort will arise in the Party-State bureaucracy, and more generally in society. Because of the way in which the Soviet system has developed, however, a reordering of priorities would be very difficult to accomplish. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Soviet leaders would fall behind the West in military power, if they could avoid it. Consequently, the international situation is likely to have some bearing on the choices the leadership makes.

e) The possibilities for the West to influence Soviet policy are not great, although they might grow during a succession crisis. Accommodation and cooperation on small matters may of course be possible, but the Soviet Union is unlikely to respond to pressure for major changes in its defence policy. If the West wants restraint, cooperation and effective arms control from the Soviet Union, then it must adopt these policies and at least keep open the possibility for the Soviet Union to pursue them too.

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PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

COMMITTEE 4

THE CONCERN FOR SECURITY

(i) SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE 1980s

by

William Hyland

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Committee 4: The Concern for Security

SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE 1980s

William Hyland

Technically the 1980s begin in 16 months. But history does not neatly divide itself into discrete decades. Nothing of major significance is destined to occur in January 1980; indeed, the first "landmark" for the 1980s, in Soviet terms, could be the Party Congress, scheduled to take place in 1981. The odds are that there will be a top leadership change before then, and this could be the first post-Brezhnev Congress. Projecting well into the next decade is hazardous, if not foolish. Only historians are able to identify the characteristics of various decades. Even GOSPLAN and the Pentagon only make five year plans.

What follows, therefore, tries to build on a few "facts" beginning with the Soviet leadership and the domestic economic situation, and moving into the vagaries of regional security and the effect of the military balance.

Internal Politics

Sovietologists generally must strike a balance between the "objective" factors that shape Soviet policies, and the impact of power politics within the top leadership. Some would argue that it does not matter very much who the General Secretary of the Party will be in the 1980s; even if we could produce the name of the individual, we would still not know much about his policy. Soviet history, however, lends some weight to the importance of the play of politics and personalities. After all, Stalin and Khrushchev (and to a lesser extent Brezhnev) have left their imprint. Since we can only guess about individuals who might survive, some insight may nevertheless be gained from rough calculations. For example, barring an enormous political upheaval or a wholesale purge of the politburo, (admittedly major assumptions), and using a rule of thumb that 72 is the age limit for politburo members, then at the XXVII Party Congress in 1987 the leadership could conceivably still include about 9-10 members of the present top hierarchy (i.e. politburo, candidates and secretariat.) Their average age would be about 69, and would include, as "elder statesmen", Andropov, Grishin, Mazurov, Solomontsev -- all aged 72; the "youngsters" would be Masherov and Shcherbitsky at 68, Romanov at 63, and Dolgikh at 61.

The point of this artificial exercise is that there is at least some chance that a few of the men making Soviet policy will have some links to the Brezhnev era and even to the Khrushchev period. In other words, there is likely to be an element of continuity. Ironically, Sovietologists of the mid-1980s, however, could be making the same predictions they are today, i.e., that the politburo of the XXVII Party Congress is ageing and due for a wholesale replacement.

To the extent that the current oligarchic character of the top leadership persists, there will be bureaucratic inclination to continue tested policies, or, at least, to change them only modestly and gradually. In this scenario of considerable continuity, the chances of a revolution from above will recede. This could mean that the Soviet leadership of the 1980s will reflect some of the characteristics of their mentors of the 1970s and 1960s: a rather conservative, prudent lot, appreciative of the power the Soviet Union and committed to expanding it, but without running excessive risks. One authority, Robert Conquest, recently wrote that the "younger generation of apparatchik, the men around 40-45 are even more dogmatic and more dangerous, in their total myopia about the dogma and the system."

There are obviously alternative scenarios. Two might be worth mentioning because of their potential impact on foreign policy:

--Conceivably, there could be growing pressure to "get the country moving"; a sort of reaction against the conservatism of the 1970s; a quest for more innovative domestic policies, particularly economic reform. The question is: would a regime engaged in major domestic changes, be more or less likely to see its security problems in a new light? Would they be more adventuresome, or more prudent? One would guess that the tendency would be toward seeking more stability abroad.

--Also conceivable is a series of mini-crises, precipitated in part by a disorderly succession process; in this case, a general disintegration could occur in which one man would have to emerge almost out of necessity. A return to one-man rule, unfortunately, still does not tell us much about policy: assuming, however, that one man consolidates his position by gaining support in key political sectors, then the traditionally most powerful forces would be necessary: The KGB, the Armed Forces, and the political cadres -- in other words a conservative coalition.

All of this may simply be a way of stating a probability: the odds of a "liberal" Soviet regime composed of personalities that tend to the reformist mode seems the least likely outcome.

In this light, changes in Soviet security policy seem less likely to result from a change in the mental makeup or political outlook of the top command than from the influence of external forces.

Economic Necessities

An examination of Soviet security in the 1980s should begin with the domestic base. It is after all the prime purpose of the CPSU to stay in power and, according to all the holy writ of Party Congresses, to insure the "peaceful" building of communism. Most projections, however, suggest that "building communism" in the 1980s is going to be far more complicated, or at least a much slower process.

According to the CIA, rapid economic growth of the past decade enabled the Soviet Union to: (1) catch up with the US militarily; (2) steadily expand its industrial base; and (3) meet at least minimal consumer expectations. But based on CIA projections for the next decade, reduced growth "will make its pursuit of these objectives much more difficult and pose hard choices for the leadership, which can have a major impact on Soviet relations with Eastern Europe and the West." Without debating all the assumptions and estimates involved in this study, several possibilities should be mentioned as factors affecting Soviet security:

--Cutting back on oil deliveries to Eastern Europe, which would force the East Europeans to turn to the West to make up oil shortfalls and, most important, would burden them with import bills that would cut into their ability to obtain industrial materials and equipment.

--Almost out of necessity the Eastern Europeans would be drawn toward increased trade with the West, and acceptance of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF.

--Spending on national defence, which seems likely to continue growing, will nevertheless, be an increasingly fat target for reductions, or as the CIA study puts it, "ways to reduce the growth of defense expenditures could become increasingly pressing for some elements of the Soviet leadership."

--Finally, as Soviet ability to pay for imports from the industrial West declines in the early and mid 1980s, the USSR may well seek long term credits, especially to develop the oil and gas industries, and much of the needed technology will have to come from the US.

To put it crudely Soviet economic vulnerabilities may increase. A new political leadership will have to grapple with such explosive questions as how far could Eastern Europe be permitted to drift into significant dependence on the West? Could defence investment be curtailed? What political price would have to be paid for Western credits and technology?

Thus one set of circumstances in the 1980s could be that a new leadership will emerge that is not significantly different in character from the present one, but it will have to face some painful economic choices that carry with them foreign policy consequences that a conservative regime will resist.

The foregoing is highly conjectural. If the CIA can foresee these economic problems, the Soviet leaders cannot be oblivious to them and remedies could be taken. The most important point, perhaps, is that the 1980s will not be an easy decade for the USSR, at least in managing its domestic economy. But that probably could have been said at any time since the Revolution. In general, the policy pressures will be toward a political atmosphere that permits greater economic intercourse, especially with the Western countries.

European Security

This tendency towards greater economic intercourse, arising out of economic realities, would be consistent with what has been the main trend of post-war policy in Europe: to consolidate the territorial and political status quo. It is instructive to re-read the rantings of the Soviet leaders about Germany in the 1960s, and compare them with today's more comfortable appraisal. At the XXIII Party Congress in March, 1966, Brezhnev said:

> "Today West German imperialism is the USA's chief ally in Europe in aggravating world tension. West Germany is increasingly becoming a seat of the war danger where revenge-seeking passions are running high... The policy pursued by the Federal Republic of Germany is being increasingly determined by the same monopolies that brought Hitler to power.
>
> The Rhineland politicians fancy that once they get the atomic bomb frontier posts will topple and they will be able to achieve their cherished desire of recarving the map of Europe and taking revenge for defeat in the Second World War.
>
> One of the most ominous factors endangering peace is the bilateral military alliance that is taking shape between the ruling circles of the USA and the FRG. This factor remains an objective of our unflagging attention."

More recently, in an offhand remark in Minsk, he said:

> "The improved political climate in Europe is one of the most important peaceful gains of the last decade. This could be felt especially during our recent visit to the Federal Republic of Germany.
>
> There is hardly any country in Europe with which there would be as many obstacles, both objective and subjective, in the way of establishing relations, and where every step would be as complicated. Today, however, the relations between the USSR and the FRG -- without shutting out eyes to the negative moments -- have become an important element of stability in Europe and in relaxing tension on the European continent."

This is simply by way of illustrating that at present the Soviet Union has reason to be satisfied that its European policy has been a reasonably successful one and that there is very little reason to change it.

In short, economic security and political security would seem to be mutually reinforcing: i.e., a stable relationship with Germany and France should lead to the economic benefits that the Soviets may well have to have for domestic reasons. The longer term effect of a European detente is more problematical.

A protracted period of stability between East and West in Europe might deepen the spheres of influence. The Soviet optimists may even go beyond this and hope that a European detente will produce a political atmosphere in which anti-communism will be seriously weakened, and communist participation in governments will come to be an acceptable process.

But there are two areas where the Soviets could have room for apprehension: first, in the European military balance and second, in the political-ideological impact.

The Soviets have supported the status quo in Central Europe because the military balance provides an underpinning that gives Soviet diplomacy in Europe added weight. But it is also possible that the Soviets are producing a European reaction to their military preponderance. The Western defence record is not encouraging, despite repeated pledges to increase the common effort. But, leaving aside purely conventional defences, there is looming on the horizon the question of a European nuclear capability, under US auspices, to counter the Soviet theatre forces either by cruise missiles or medium range ballistic missiles. No Soviet leadership, however, could simply accept the possibility that West Germany could be converted into a base for launching deep attacks against the Soviet interior. This may explain the renewed Soviet interest in some form of limited disengagement in Central Europe as reflected in their new MBFR proposals.

Should, by some outside chance, these lead to some agreement, it would probably mean a bargain in which for the first time since the war some Soviet forces would march eastward and leave Central and Eastern Europe, in return for a limit on longer range nuclear forces in West Europe.

One can only raise the question of the psychological and political impact in both East and West Europe once this process began.

And this leads to the second area of potential apprehension: the dilution of Soviet authority in East Europe. It is one of the minor ironies of history that as the Soviets seemed at long last to grasp their coveted goal of ratifying the status quo in Europe at Helsinki, forces were being unleashed that challenged the settlement. The demands for "human rights," freedom of movement, etc., which the West interprets to be the true meaning of Helsinki, raise a fundamental challenge to the USSR. The Soviets have no intention of permitting East Europeans to be infected by the "Spirit of Helsinki" to such a degree that they might feel that they could carve out greater autonomy within the Soviet sphere. The Soviets have already demonstrated at Belgrade that they can blunt the process. But they are also stuck with it and the chances are that the idea of pan-European cooperation will grow, and be given an occasional impetus through the European Security and Cooperation Conferences.

This fear of dilution of authority would probably also increase if, as a result of political evolution in West Europe, hybrid regimes arose imbued with a sort of Carrilloism.

A simultaneous weakening of political, economic and ideological barriers in Europe would be a nightmare for the Soviets, but there is some chance of such a trend gaining ground in the 1980s. (The other side of this process is the weakening of Western links, especially in the security area, raising the question of which side gains from a blurring of the East-West division.)

Asian Security

The real Soviet nightmare, however, is the two-front threat.

It is already evident that, since the death of Mao, Chinese policy has swung sharply toward a more pragmatic line. The main direction is against the USSR through various diplomatic combinations: (a) a rapprochement between China and the EEC in economic relations; (b) a political rapprochement with key European countries, with the aim of securing military supply sources in Europe; (c) a clear breakthrough with Japan, re-

flected in the new treaty, as well as potential economic collaboration and (d) some strengthening of economic ties with the US.

Of particular concern for the USSR is the prospect that China will gradually modernize its military establishment, with European, American and Japanese assistance. At present the Soviets, as a result of a major effort, have established a military position along the Chinese frontier which is probably satisfactory for defensive purposes. According to US Government studies, spending for Soviet forces aligned against China accounted for about 10 percent of the total Soviet defence effort over the past decade; the number of divisions doubled between 1967-72; there was a fivefold increase in frontal aviation; since 1975 more modern versions of aircraft have been deployed in the Far East; the level of spending in 1977 in constant roubles was triple the 1967 level.

The Chinese have made no comparable effort, thus giving the Soviets some clear present advantages. If the Chinese now embark on modernization, then in conventional military terms the balance should shift more favourably to the Chinese. And this could occur in a period when the Chinese are certain to develop some more significant strategic capabilities against the Soviet interior. In this same period some increase in Japanese rearmament is almost inevitable. And it seems likely that the Sino-Soviet Alliance will formally lapse in 1980.

It would be surprising if the Soviets passively watch all of this occur; the general Soviet reaction is already forcefully stated in formal diplomatic notes, warning of the consequences of the Sino-Japanese treaty:

> "It was also noted that in the case of the conclusion of a treaty with provisions directed against the USSR, the Soviet side would be compelled to make certain conclusions and introduce certain correctives into its policy towards Japan." (Soviet statement, June 19, 1978).

Reacting against Japan, however, illustrates the Soviet dilemma. Japan supplies over $3 billion in official credits to the USSR and East Europe. Japan is the source of technology and capital for exploiting Soviet resources in the Far East and Siberia. A long term deterioration of relations with Japan and China would seem the most foolish Soviet diplomacy. But weaning Japan away from its present course requires territorial concessions, which would have a backlash in any negotiations over the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviets have steadfastly refused to make the concessions that might possibly have diverted Japan from its Chinese alignment. Two

possibilities seem to loom for the Soviets. First, a serious effort to find some accommodation with the Chinese. Despite the strident anti-Soviet policy of the new Chinese leaders, there is the intriguing possibility that they are sufficiently pragmatic to consider some bargain with the Soviets. In particular, if the Chinese conclude that the US is a weak reed in the riangular competition, they would have to consider some effort to appease the Soviet Union. Indeed, one can speculate that the various incidents and manoeuvering of this past year -- in Indo-China, in the border incidents, in Brezhnev's Far East tour and the accompanying military demonstrations -- are all manifestations of a political dialogue that has been conducted in private.

Assuming, however, that accommodation fails, then the military option may become a more serious one for the Soviet leaders. After all, the Soviets remember that the battle of Khalkin Gol bought them a respite in the Far East in circumstances that may be quite similar to the "encirclement" of the 1980s. The tactics, risks, goals, etc., of the military option can be debated, but given the geo-political realities of a Quadruple Alliance directed against the USSR, it would be unwise to discount severe Soviet actions to disrupt or wreck such a coalition. A humiliation of China would go a long way toward relieving the USSR of some of its security problems; the political impact would be massive not only in Asia but also in Europe.

The Military Balance

It might seem customary to begin rather than end a discussion of Soviet security with the various military equations. One reason for deferring this until the end of this discussion is to stress that Soviet security is not solely a question of military hardware, but equally a question of geo-politics.

The military outlook can be divided into two distinct periods: From the present through the early 1980s, and for the remainder of the decade.

In this first period, the trend lines seem clearly favourable to the USSR in strategic nuclear weapons and in conventional forces. The vulnerability of the American land based ICBMs has been emphasized at great length and in alarming terms. It appears that this period will peak about 1982-84. The major question is whether this margin of strategic advantage (which is by no means agreed to by all the experts), will give the Soviet leaders a new sense of confidence that the "correlation" of forces has turned decisively. If so, then we may witness a period of growing Soviet assertiveness. The dangers are obvious: a direct confrontation in an era

of apparent Soviet advantage would face the West with stark choices. At a minimum one would expect strong Soviet political pressures in Europe and in Asia to prevent the coalescence of the Quadruple Alliance. Moreover, Soviet strategy already gives some signs of a thrust toward the Persian Gulf and the Arabian peninsula, where the European and Japanese sources of energy are located. It can be argued, therefore, that we are already witnessing the political consequences resulting from a shift in the overall military balance.

In the second period, the outlook is hazier. It is difficult to believe that the US will permit the present trends in strategic and theatre capabilities to continue without a counter programme. A great defence debate in the United States is likely to be percipitated either by the signing of a SALT II agreement or by its failure. Out of this debate will almost certainly come a clearer sense of US defence priorities for the 1980s. The discussion in the US of esoteric programmes such as Multiple Aim Points, simply reflects the growing American awareness that strategic competition with the USSR will not be seriously altered by arms control. The outcome of the debate is guess work, but two trends can be identified. First, some short term, stop-gap measures are likely: cruise missiles for the bomber force, a light air defence, and a "new" medium range bomber; possibly some form of ICBM mobility, and a renewed interest in hard point anti-ballistic missile defence.

It is in the second period, from about 1984-1985 forward, however, that the prospect of a shift in the balance toward the West might be anticipated. Major new strategic programmes might appear by then: a new large ICBM in a less vulnerable system, a second generation of submarine launched missiles, as well as a new ballistic missile submarine, the appearance of massive air launched cruise missile carriers, and possible land and sea based long range cruise missiles.

Finally, it is worth noting that redressing the strategic balance will coincide with the period of major economic strains in the USSR, the probable expiration of a SALT II agreement, the inauguration of a new US President and the XXVII Congress of the CPSU and the five-year plan of 1986.

* * *

Very roughly speaking it would appear that the optimal period for Soviet security policy will be the next five years or so; after that the trends may be more adverse. The overwhelming question therefore is whether the Soviet Union will try to take advantage of this optimal period to insure against some of the problems that will beset them in the late 1980s.

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PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

COMMITTEE 3

INFLUENCE AND IDEOLOGY

(ii) IDEOLOGY AND SOVIET POLICIES IN EUROPE

by

Leopold Labedz

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Committee 3: Influence and Ideology

IDEOLOGY AND SOVIET POLICIES IN EUROPE

Leopold Labedz

The relation between ideology and Soviet policies is one of those perennial subjects which has been analysed to the point of exhaustion in the past, but it seems that the question still continues to exercise curiosity. The old duality of ideology versus Realpolitik and hackneyed formulations about the role of ideology being primordial as against power motives and national considerations, or vice versa, in Soviet external conduct still recur regularly in articles and books. New debates on these subjects are occasioned by current developments in East-West relations, by discussions on them among Soviet dissidents (between, say, Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, or Medvedev and Shafarevich), or simply by the emergence of new generations of analysts.

But if the subject is not exactly unexplored, there is still nothing approaching consensus on it. As Pierre Hassner remarked, "the same crude dichotomies between ideology and power have re-emerged intact after a generation in current debates about détente, the significance of Soviet arms policies, Soviet attitudes toward change in Western Europe, and the source of Soviet conduct in Africa". Although many analysts, like Lowenthal and Brzezinski, pointed out already twenty years ago that the two factors are interdependent, attitudes to the problem continue to be polarized between those who see ideology as the ultimate source of Soviet conduct and those who see in it nothing but post hoc rationalization of other basic drives. Thirty years ago Kennan saw the problem as one of interaction between Marxist-Leninist ideology and the "circumstances of power", even though he argued that the former provided "a highly convenient rationalization" for the "instinctive desires" of the Soviet leaders. Recently, however, he came to the conclusion that "the rhetoric of revolutionary Marxism" is today just a "verbal smokescreen" for traditional nationalist Russian foreign policy.

Where then do we stand now vis-à-vis this evergreen question? Is the end of ideology in the Soviet Union in sight? If the answer is "yes", what are its implications for Soviet foreign policy? If the answer is "no", and ideology continues to play a role in Soviet conduct, even if

it is changing, how does this change affect the Soviet leaders' concerns with the power of their party and their empire? Does it imply in either case that the Soviet challenge to the West would become easier to manage?

Western Simplifications

Before tackling these problems in any detail I would like to clarify some of the verbal fog in which the concept of ideology is shrouded. Past debates on the subject may be forgotten, but they did help to avoid the confusion which usually tends to accompany the discussions on the relation between ideology and Soviet policies.

One of the sources of confusion in the controversies about the role of ideology is the lack of a clear distinction between the significance of its particular and its general features.[1] To be concerned with the first aspect is to deal with the modification or abandonment of specific tenets of the Marxist-Leninist gospel, be it the "dictatorship of the proletariat" or the "withering away of the state". Doctrinal change of even the most cherished particular tenets is compatible with the preservation of ideology. It is only the modification of the general features of ideology which might spell a basic change of its character or presage its demise. Such general features include the Utopian perspective of Marxism, its soterological and chiliastic nature, and a belief in the scientific character of its historical "laws". As long as these general features of communist ideology are preserved any alterations of its particular features can be rationalized.

Dialectics is always at hand to reinforce the dogma "when the prophecy fails". Indeed, specific parts of a Utopian doctrine must change in confrontation with the reality of historical development if ideology is to survive. Otherwise the credibility gap could grow too wide even for true believers. But the ideology survives in spite of the credibility gap; it does not depend just on the existence of true believers. Those who say that ideology is "nothing but rationalization" do not ask what role rationalization performs in the maintenance of ideology, why there

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1) The distinction is related to, but differs from, what Martin Seliger calls the restricted and inclusive conceptions of ideology. The former refers to specific political belief systems, the latter to all political doctrines. Cf. The Marxist Conception of Ideology (Cambridge University Press, 1977).

is a need for rationalization rather than the abandonment of ideology, in short, how pertinent is the relationship between ideology as rationalization and ideology as a motivating force. Even for an individual, "motivation" and "rationalization" can be mutually reinforcing mechanisms; this is even more the case in respect of political processes in society, and particularly in Soviet society, where power rests on doctrinal authority. The crux of the matter is that ideology is a necessary part of the system because it provides the principles of its legitimacy and imposes the general framework for the perception of reality. Thus, inevitably, it also conditions Soviet attitudes towards foreign policy.

To grasp the nature of the evolution of Soviet foreign policy it is not enough just to analyse the changing foreign policy situation. It is also necessary to be aware of doctrinal evolution in the Soviet Union, of the current state of ideology there, which is a related but distinct problem, and of the specific relation between them to power and other factors. To treat the problem as if it were only one question is to oversimplify it to a point where wrong conclusions about foreign policy inevitably follow.

Those who dismiss ideology as "nothing but rationalization" stress the "pragmatic" character of Soviet policies; but this overlooks the Leninist distinction between short-term considerations (which impose limitations on policies) and long-range ideological goals. In a certain sense, all politics, ideological or not, tend to be concerned first of all, with short-term considerations. But there is a difference between policies which appertain to nothing else, and those which take long-term considerations, ideological or other, as their frame of reference. To confuse the two as "pragmatic" in the same sense is to misunderstand the character of Soviet policies in the past, and I would argue, also at present.

It is this fallacy, this indiscriminate use of the word "pragmatism" vis-à-vis both Soviet and Western foreign policies which accounts for most of the erroneous expectations generated in the West by political leaders and commentators on many occasions. Whenever the Soviet Union comes out with what looks like a particularly flagrant violation of its ideological articles of faith they find in this a confirmation of their

preconceived ideas about Soviet policy. This was the case with the treaty of Brest Litovsk, the Stalin-Hitler Pact, Yalta, and detente. Throughout this period, all too many voices in the West have been ready to disregard the persistence of the ideological factor in Soviet foreign policy. "Bourgeois" politicians tended to see only the Soviet need for "pragmatic" "accommodation" and "compromise"; revolutionary "true believers" in the West treated these occasions as ideological betrayal (which only reinforced the short-sighted illusions, or wishful thinking, of their less "progressive" brethren).

No amount of official avowals would induce most Western politicians to treat Soviet ideological utterances seriously. When confronted with a myriad of Soviet assertions which contradicted American assumptions about détente, the usual Western pattern of reasoning was to pooh-pooh them, explaining them away as just "ideological rationalization" or "ideological rhetoric". The additional stock argument was that they were for home consumption only, even though they were also addressed to foreign communists.

Henry Kissinger provided the grand premise for this type of Western self-deception. He assumed that what he imagined to be the "rules of the game" in détente are also binding on the Soviet Union. According to him these "rules" precluded: a) "attempts by either country to achieve a position of predominance either globally or regionally", b) "any attempt to exploit a policy of détente to weaken our alliances", c) the exploitation of "relaxation of tension ... as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots".

These "rules" were based on the Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations between the US and USSR, signed in Moscow in May 1972 and on a similar document signed in Washington in June 1973. They solemnly proclaimed that neither of the two powers would try "to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other."[2)]

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2) I criticised this interpretation in my testimony before the Committee on Government Operations of the US Senate (12 July, 1973). In an article in Survey (Winter 1976) I wrote: "To present such surrealistic hopes about Soviet foreign policy behaviour as any kind of Realpolitik was a unique feat, worthy to be included in the Guiness Book of Records".

The illusions about Soviet "pragmatism" die hard and so does wishful thinking about the Soviet approach to détente. After Yalta there was a disenchantment in the West when it finally dawned upon it that Stalin's use of the word "democracy" did not quite coincide with Western usage; now there was another painful discovery of the obvious: that Brezhnev's use of the concept of détente differs from the Western one. But if the sancta simplicitas of the earlier period has to some degree been dispelled in the West only to resurface in the 1960s, traces of the new naïveté (or of self-induced faux-naïveté), which has again been knocked down by Soviet behaviour, are still lingering. It is still assumed by many that the Soviet leaders accepted (in fact) the Western "rules of the game" in détente. Zbigniew Brzezinski complained in May 1978 that the Soviet Union has violated its "code". This presupposes, of course, that the signing of the pieces of paper by the Soviet Union in Moscow, Washington and Helsinki amounted to it having seriously accepted such a "code".

Just as on past occasions, there was no dearth of voices in the West warning against such interpretations of current Soviet policies. They predicted their significance quite precisely on the basis of past experience, but, as usual, they were not heeded. Innumerable doctrinal and ideological pronouncements were quite explicit about the Soviet attitude to "peaceful co-existence". In fact, Soviet words matched Soviet deeds in anti-Western policies and propaganda. They were of course incompatible with Soviet diplomatic declarations, but there was nothing new in this: Soviet policies in the past always displayed such duality when engaged in a diplomatic "soft-sell" during the periods of "offensives of smiles".

Now that the period of the "bourgeois" euphoria about détente is over, it is interesting to recall how Soviet political commentators tried to persuade the Western New Left that the Soviet Union remained faithful to its revolutionary ideology. Here is the American "independent Marxist" journal, Science and Society, describing how Eduard Batalov explained in his book The Philosophy of Revolt[3] that the ideological Angst of Western radicals is groundless:

> "The problem of violence, according to Batalov, exposes the New Left's lack of grasp of the correlation of class forces. Certainly in our epoch revolutionary transformations have thus far been carried out only by means of violence. But a premature outbreak of violence incites an overwhelming reaction from the right. Consequently, this

3) Progess Publishers, Moscow, 1975.

> question must be handled with extreme tactical skill and must be based on a careful analysis of class alignments and forces ... Many New Leftists use guerrilla warfare, the revolutionary method par excellence, as a pretext for attacking "Soviet revisionism" and détente -- even though no other country has been a more consistent supporter of authentic guerrilla movements. Détente submits capitalism to two pressures, the external one of socialism and the internal one of the working class. Détente favours the liberation of people from imperialism, and helps consolidate socialism."

And one can multiply such examples of Soviet ideological assurances.

Ideology in Evolution

One way to approach the problem of whether ideology is "nothing but rationalization" is to ask whether without it some Soviet policies would be the same. Even if it is only an inhibiting or exacerbating factor, it does play a role in important specific cases. It is difficult for instance to imagine that a pragmatic approach would maintain the present structure of Soviet agriculture, a source not only of domestic but of international weakness for the Soviet leaders. Or to move to foreign affairs: whatever the historical roots of the Sino-Soviet conflict may be, its character would be different without the ideological dimension which makes it not just a clash between national interests and powers but a contest which is even more profound because it also affects the legitimacy of the respective ruling Parties.

If, then, one is of the opinion that ideology does indeed play a role beyond that of mere rationalization, one still faces questions about its evolution and its present role with regard to both general and specific aspects of Soviet conduct. The fact that we are dealing here with long-range consequences which are difficult to determine is no reason to disregard them altogether.

Ideological evolution during six decades of Soviet history can be summarized as a reluctant retreat from the Utopian and universalistic claims of Marxist doctrine without, however, their abandonment. The content of the doctrine has been undergoing constant modifications in line with the dual impulses coming from the intractable reality on the one hand and from the needs of legitimation of power on the other. There is, of course, nothing historically extraordinary in the reluctance to retreat from universalist pretensions of a doctrine. Even in time of decline Byzantium obsessively stuck to its imperial claims of Christian universality. So

did Rome faced with the Reformation. Tribal religions evolve into universalistic ones, as history testifies, but there usually is no reverse evolution in places which claim to be the fons et origo of such universal doctrines, and the same applies to the secular ideology of communism. There is usually only a fragmentation through splits -- into Christian churches, Islamic sects or national communist parties -- each one adapting the universal doctrinal truths to local conditions. This is the one formula on which all communist parties in this polycentric age agree in theory, but the Soviet Union continues to emphasize the universal validity of its own interpretation of Marxism against those who deny it.

In spite of sociological parallels drawn by Crane Brinton, Jules Monnerot and S.F. Kissin, communism is not a religion: it has no transcendental concern. Certain social and political consequences follow from this. The promise of Utopia is not the same as the promise of Paradise, it is to be realized on this side of the Great Divide. Therefore the legitimacy of Churches, even where Christianity was a state religion, was a different problem from the one faced by communist parties in power. The latter cannot accept the separation of the Church (the Party) from the State. Their legitimacy depends on the construction of a communist society with its Utopian features, not on attending to the spiritual (theistic) needs of the faithful.

It is not surprising therefore, that this part of Marxist doctrine has undergone modifications in the Soviet Union under the dual impulses mentioned earlier. Communist Utopia has been constantly postponed ever since Lenin wrote his State and Revolution, but it has never been abandoned as unrealizable. From War Communism and the first Party Programme, through Lenin's "Dictatorship of the Proletariat", Stalin's "sharpening of contradictions under Socialism", Khrushchev's State of All People and the promise of Full Communism within two decades in the third Party Programme (1961), and finally to Brezhnev's "Developed Socialism" -- all these doctrinal formulas testify to the same problem: Power needs Legitimacy, Legitimacy needs Utopia, Utopia cannot be realized so it has to be at the same time preserved and constantly postponed. But, needless to say, the State has not withered away and is even no longer expected to,

the Party has become not only de facto but also constitutionally its alter ego; classes are officially on the way to extinction, but social and political hierarchies flourish in all their rigidity.

That is not of course how Pravda sees it. In its editorial article "The Strength of Our Ideology" (24 August 1978) it says:

> "Marxist-Leninist ideology of the working class which triumphed and became firmly established for ever in the motherland of October is an ideology of genuine humanism and of social justice, of socialist patriotism and internationalism, of freedom, equality and brotherhood of nations. It joins workers, kolkhozniks, intelligentsia and toilers of all nationalities of our country; it unites the nations of the socialist commonwealth; it manifests growing influence on the broadest masses of toilers all over the world. Marxism-Leninism has become the ruler of the minds of all advanced humanity. This has been in many respects helped by the active ideological and theoretical work of the communist and workers' parties and their increasingly strong ideological co-operation. Mentioning this in his speech at the ceremonial meeting in Prague in the spring of this year, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev said: 'Today Marxist-Leninist ideology occupies an avant-garde position in the world's social thought. It is a focus of passions, it attracts various social movements. This is to a very great extent the outcome of the common creative activity of our parties, the result of the influence of the richest practice in building a new world.'
>
> The growing influence of real socialism, of communist ideals in the consciousness of working men is the most important factor in the ideological struggle between the two social systems at the present stage. As the 25th Congress of the CPSU indicated, the problems of the ideological struggle are coming more and more to the fore in present conditions, and the truth about socialism is a mighty weapon in this struggle. In co-operation with other fraternal parties, the CPSU is doing its best to make the example of the victorious socialism radiate more and more brightly, to make the magnetic attraction of Marxist-Leninist ideology grow ever stronger."

Reading Pravda regularly (which for my sins I have done for decades) teaches one how to perceive its emphases. They reflect, without fail, Soviet leaders' concerns in however inverted or camouflaged form, and the example above is no exception. There can be little doubt that, after 60 years of doctrinal acrobatics, Soviet ideology is showing strains; its credibility is wearing thin. It is no longer a living faith, but only a ritual code and a mental straightjacket. From the point of view of the mechanism of the Party power it is necessary, a kind of ballast which cannot be thrown out. But it is a source of strength which is now becoming a source of weakness. Internally, even the attenuated Utopian perspective necessitates the continuing flaunting of the reality principle. Externally, Soviet

ideology has lost most of its persuasiveness and is more and more frequently forced to confront polycentric ideological challenges within the international communist movement. What was once a source of unqualified support is now often a drag and an embarrassment. Revolutionary romaticism is as dead as a dodo in the Soviet Union. It has therefore lost almost all power of attraction for the "idealistic" radicals abroad (it has to use Cuba as a substitute). Its political sex-appeal is increasingly based on crude power. The rise of the Soviet empire coincides with its fall as an ideological Mecca of communism.

Ideology: A Wasting Asset?

All this cannot but have some negative repercussions, not only for the general image of the Soviet Union, but also for its performance in specific areas of international relations. The long-term implications of this are yet to be assessed, but its present consequences can be discerned even though they are contradictory and not quite clear.

Their contradictory character stems from the fact already mentioned: Soviet expansionism finds its justification in Soviet ideology, but this ideology is now becoming less effective for Soviet power projection. This is important among other reasons because the Soviet geo-political attitude, which is rooted in Leninism, has always aimed at changing the status quo at the margin by using the strategy of an indirect approach to achieve a shift in "the correlation of forces" in its favour. It is a strategy which recommends itself in the nuclear age even more, because the risks have become inordinately high and the need for caution great, even when strategic parity with the USA has been formally achieved by the USSR in SALT I. But Soviet Leninist strategy and Soviet Leninist ideology have somehow got out of joint. Ideology is now hardly an asset which can tip the scale.

Politically the Soviet Union has almost achieved a state of splendid isolation. Its so-called "allies" in Eastern Europe are unreliable satellites. It has always been preoccupied by the spectre of two-front confrontation. Stalin avoided it by helping to deflect the Japanese imperial drive southwards (during his conversation with Matsuoka, when he told him: "We are both Asians"). But after the war the Soviet Union managed to frighten the West sufficiently to provoke the creation of NATO, and it is no exaggeration to say that it was Stalin who was

the architect of German rearmament. Thirty years later the flagrant ambiguity of Brezhnev's détente combined with the Soviet arms drive and expansionism provoked the very situation the Soviet Union feared most: a tendency towards a two-front strategic confrontation. Brezhnev cannot claim the entire credit for the American-Chinese rapprochement and the Sino-Japanese Treaty, but he has a major share in it. Even if there is no complete symmetry because Sino-American rapprochement and the Sino-Japanese Treaty are not military alliances and in both of them the partners of the Chinese are apt to pursue a less stringent anti-Soviet policy than China, it is nevertheless clear that in both cases the Soviet Union is the losing party. It cannot prevent the United States from "playing the China card" or Japan from supplying technology and economic assistance to its hated neighbour instead of to itself, as it had once hoped. On the other side, the Soviet Union is of course hemmed in by the Western alliance. A policy which succeeds in mobilizing one way or another as adversaries: the USA, Western Europe, Japan and China is not exactly a great political achievement, even though it can be defended in the "ideological struggle" on all fronts. And indeed the Soviet Union is now involved in such an "ideological struggle" with China and the West, not to mention Eurocommunism, Albania, and parts of the Third World. The real question for the Soviet Union, however, is how impenetrable the present adversary line is, how invulnerable the emergent countervailing coalitions are, in short: can they contain Soviet expansion or not? The Soviet "ideological struggle" has to be taken of course in conjunction with geo-political and military factors. This poses three basic questions for the future:

-- One: how will this dynamic of Soviet expansionism be affected by the fact that ideology no longer helps it?

-- Two: Soviet expansionism provokes countervailing coalitions, while Soviet self-centred ideology is finding few supporters abroad. In view of the gap between the traditional Soviet strategy and the debilitation of its ideological appeal, is it not possible that the Soviet leadership might in future be taking a higher-risk strategy to compensate for its internal and external frustrations? This may be tempting in view of the increased Soviet military strength and of what is perceived as the Western failure of political nerve.

-- Three: If the Soviet Union will try to break its "splendid isolation" (as China did when Chou En-lai started its "ping-pong diplomacy" to make up for the self-inflicted wounds of the Cultural Revolution), what political and military strategy can it conceivably adopt?

If one were to use the Chestertonian technique by inventing a Sovietological Father Brown who would look on the political and strategic developments in the world through Soviet eyes, he would be struck by a number of ideological juxtapositions and political dilemmas facing the Soviet Union at present. He would notice that the Soviet Union has now abandoned its previous perspective on the Third World. As Kommunist (No. 11, 1978) put it,

> "There is no sufficient basis ... for calling the developing countries a "Third World" which allegedly has a parallel existence with the capitalist and socialist worlds. To determine the common features of developing countries it is necessary to take as a starting point two fundamental observations: the division of the contemporary world into two opposite socio-political systems and the historical significance of our epoch as a period of transition from capitalism to socialism. This predetermines the objective impossibility for the liberated countries to develop in a "third" direction.
>
> Among developing countries there are already states which are following the capitalist path and states which have chosen the socialist orientation, and simultaneously there can and is going to be a gradual erosion of their commonality as a result of some developing countries associating with the world socialist system and some others joining the developed capitalist countries."

Among the former group, Kommunist lists Angola, Congo (Brazaville), Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Madagascar, South Yemen, Benin, Tanzania, Algeria, Libya (neither Iraq nor Syria are mentioned). Among the latter group are Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

It is clear that the inclusion into one or the other group is determined by Soviet political interests and hopes, and not by any Marxist, social or economic criteria. Some of these countries have fully-fledged communist regimes, others are included in the "progressive" group simply on account of their pro-Soviet foreign policies. What matters to the Soviet Union are obviously the strategic and geo-political opportunities they may be providing, and in this respect Afghanistan, South Yemen and Ethiopia (after its reconquest of Eritrea) are offering particularly good prospects as the staging ground for pressure on the Persian Gulf riparian states with their access to oil, the jugular vein of Western industrial economies.

If our Sovietological Father Brown were to divine Soviet political perceptions, he would certainly differ from the usual Western approaches to the problem. He would certainly not imagine that the Soviet Union was committed to the international status quo; he would know that it was ideologically against it and striving to change it. Unlike most of his

Western colleagues, he would be at least as much concerned with Soviet geo-political strategy as with its military stockpile which is almost the only focus of Western perceptions (which is not to say that he would be more concerned with Soviet intentions than with its capabilities). He would realize that both intentions and capabilities depend on opportunities and temptations which are sometimes provided by fortuitous circumstances, but which are exploited by strategic and tactical foresight.

Finally, Father Brown would trace the historical evolution of Soviet foreign policy. He would bring to light the Soviet perceptions of their position in the world at different stages of Soviet history. He would emphasize the erosion of ideology in Soviet short-term foreign policy conduct from the beginning (when Trotsky, on becoming a Commissar for Foreign Affairs, imagined that he would soon be able "to close the shop" as there would be no need for foreign policy any longer). He would also bring to light the long-term modifications of the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy. He would stress in particular that in the early period, under Lenin, it was still playing a direct role, that its significance diminished under Stalin, that it was overshadowed by economic and strategic perspectives under Khrushchev and even more by military power under Brezhnev. But all this time in spite of doctrinal erosion Soviet foreign policy conduct was firmly rooted in the politique d'abord principle derived from ideological perception. In spite of the erosion of its role, ideology itself has never become entirely irrelevant, even though its specific impact has not always been easy to discern and although it has gradually been overshadowed by other factors which were seen as providing a more effective impact abroad than the dwindling Soviet ideological influence.

How would Father Brown look through Soviet eyes on Soviet foreign policy strengths and weaknesses? He would not be able to see them objectively (the West tends to overestimate Soviet political skill, the East -- the Western political will). Nor would he be able to see properly the overall historical perspective on Soviet foreign policy through Soviet ideological lenses. This can only be done from outside. But he could try to see how the historical balance-sheet of Soviet foreign policy successes and failures looks from inside.

The past foreign policy record is indubitably a positive one from the Soviet point of view. The Soviet Union managed to achieve the status of a super-power and registered many gains in the Third World. It has even managed, in spite of détente, to avoid the stigma of ideological betrayal, the stigma which it now pins on China for her bedfellowship with the "imperialists".

Its overall achievement has been summarized by a Polish commentator in Trybuna Ludu (14 August 1978) as follows:

> "In the long-run the attitude of the capitalist countries to détente ... is determined and will be determined in future by objective circumstances. As far as the United States is concerned there are several. But I will limit myself to the enumeration of only a few of them.
> 1) The change in the balance of power between the socialist and capitalist systems. During the more than 30 years since World War II there have been substantial shifts in the political, economic and military correlation of forces between East and West /in favour of the former/...
> 2) The inability of the United States to win the strategic race with the Soviet Union. In spite of great arms expenditures in the USA, the doctrine of "assured" strategic superiority over the USSR has ended in fiasco...
> 3) Changes in the world political configuration. The emergence of about 100 new states after World War II, despite their political differences, has generally weakened the capitalist countries. On basic questions of war and peace many new states supported the concepts of the socialist countries...
> 4) The West has not won the Cold War. It has not achieved the goals of its policy, it has not "contained communism", nor reversed the progressive social and political changes in the world..."

Although this points to real developments it is far from being the whole picture. The post-war balance-sheet of East-West relations is undoubtedly marked by Western strategic backsliding, but the Soviet advance was accompanied by so many unwanted occurrences which complicate both the power and the ideological perspectives that the prospects of the triumphal Soviet march into the radiant futureare somewhat less than certain.

Internally, the erosion of ideological momentum spells long-term trouble for Party legitimacy and position. Soviet economic performance is on the decline. Nationality problems are on the increase. The handling of any of these problems would intensify the difficulty with at least one of the others, while immobilism renders future action on them even more difficult.

Externally, it is enough to read the fifth page of Pravda (dealing with foreign affairs) to see that its self-congratulatory exultation on its editorial page one is bunkum. In just the short period of summer 1978 it was filled with indignant outcries against almost everybody, as well as warnings and threats to the United States and China, Japan and Pakistan, France and Germany, Yugoslavia and Rumania, Iran and North Yemen, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The list can be prolonged.

More than one spectre is haunting the Soviet Union: the spectre of anti-communism (from the USA), the spectre of Eurocommunism (from Europe), the spectre of communism (from China)... Ideological polemics are now more variegated than ever in Soviet publications. The Sino-Soviet dispute has reached the high point of absurdity. The Soviet Union accuses China of persecuting the dissidents, of violating human rights, of using show trials against political opponents, of practising "legal farces" against those "suspected of dissatisfaction".

But such high-minded sentiments, expressed in the Soviet press shortly after the trials of Orlov, Ginzburg and Shcharansky, are not only directed against what Pravda (27 August 1978) calls "reprisals from above" in China. Similar indignant denunciations are also regularly made against the abuse of human rights in Great Britain and the United States, hardly the case of the pot calling the kettle black. Yet it goes on and on. One article condemns a "War against Dissidents" in the USA, another compares the strengthening (by four thousand men) of the much-dwindled British army to the Nazi military build-up in the thirties, a third cavils sarcastically on the misuse of psychiatry in capitalist countries, and so forth. Day after day, country after country, and personality after personality, from Chile to Israel, from Santiago Carillo to Zbigniew Brzezinski, become targets of Soviet obloquy.

The unrelenting castigations of all and sundry make the black list longer and longer. Today it is Fukuda who is attacked for getting ready to sign the "anti-hegemony clause" in the Sino-Japanese Treaty, tomorrow -- Hua Kuo-feng for visiting Rumania, Yugoslavia and Iran. Even Albania has not escaped censure, although its split with China was seen as opening promising possibilities for the Soviet Union in future. Albania was harshly reprimanded because she "has still not changed her extremely dogmatic ideology nor her policy which even today equates the socialist Soviet Union with the imperialist United States, the Warsaw Pact with NATO, Comecon with the Common Market".

But if dogmatic Albania was sternly rebuked, so were the "revisionist" Eurocommunists. The Spaniards like Azcarate are already beyond the pale, but even the more accommodating Italian communists are getting stiff lessons in elementary Leninism. Thus Kommunist (No. 10, 1977) reminded them of Gramsci's words that "not a single revolutionary movement can be dictated to by a national assembly", that the problem of power cannot be decided by "arithmetic majority", that this basic problem of revolution "cannot be decided by voting" but must transcend "the framework of the formal principles of bourgeois democracy".

As can be seen, "ideological struggle" in the Soviet Union has become a matter of défense de tous les azimouths. And this, I suppose, is as good an indication as any that, contrary to the historical reflections of the Trybuna Ludu commentator, not everything is for the best for the Soviet Union in the worst of all possible imperialist worlds. It may even suggest that some waves of the future may never reach the future. Lincoln Steffens thought that he "had seen the future, and it works" in Soviet Russia, but 60 years later there is an increasing doubt about it.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Oxford, England - 7-10 September, 1978

PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

Laloy: they accept now the idea of West. Eur. integration - disentangling Europe from U.S.
; The peace offensive they launched during Helsinki was been much less successful than they expected. They are thinking now to protect Eastern Europe than to influence West. Eur.

COMMITTEE 1

THE WEST IN THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

(ii) WESTERN EUROPE

by

Jean Laloy

Quoi

Weiss:
Hammer: accettano la struttura finale dei rapporti occidentali, ma creano tutti i problemi che possono
Bert: Un'Europa neutralizzata potrebbe destabilizzare l'Europa orientale.
pressioni psicologiche sui paesi scandinavi (Hammer anche su Germania).

Hanna: dice che ^[più] sono più "conservative" e attive di quelle che si ritiene (anche noi: l'Euro-comunismo lo sono, credono che se ci sono tensioni nell'Europa orientale in conseguenza dell'Eurocom-, loro lo possono controllare).

Forbes: W. Europe strategically helpless. (Trans-NATO looking only to abroad & problems with ~~for~~ some attention to the Flanks, but at ~~on the~~ a worldwide perspective –

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Committee 1: The West in the Soviet Perspective

WESTERN EUROPE

Jean Laloy

Introduction

The expression "Western Europe" does not belong in the Soviet political vocabulary. The term, rarely used, was accepted only after the creation of the European Economic Community, which in its turn was considered established only after the great crisis of 1958-62, and then usually in an economic sense. In official texts (speeches, reports to the Party Congress etc.) Western Europe is referred to only in terms of its member states: Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, France etc.

On the other hand Soviet leaders speak of "Europe" in connection with their proposals for security or cooperation agreements, the Geneva UN Economic Commission, or simply in designating the Continent which they at least partly belong to. It is worthy of note that, since 1978, the Council for Economic Cooperation (Comecon) has been active over four continents, and has thus assumed a universal role.

In the Russian tradition, the term "Europe" has a special meaning, as indicated by the many works dealing with Russia and Europe. This underlines the fact that Russia has her own past and that she considers herself quite separate. Slavophiles and Westernists alike emphasize this difference: the former in arguing that Russia should maintain her apartness in the course of her development, the latter that Russia should assume in Europe a role befitting her importance. Both schools dream of a unique role for Russia. At the beginning of the 20th century these feelings became less evident, but they reappeared with Bolshevik messaianism, and still survive today.

Since 1945, there has been the added problem of relations with the United States - both American-Soviet relations and relations between the United States and Western Europe. There is no well established tradition in this field. Ideas vary, ranging from attempts to expel the United States from Europe to efforts which aim to create a special relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. This extension of the West to the other side of the Atlantic cannot be completely ignored when examining the evolution of Western Europe as Soviet leaders see it.

The Method

According to the fundamental Soviet myth, leaders can only strive for the good of the people, which, in turn, cannot but love them. Consensus rules. Therefore, criticism is brought to bear only on the implementation of policy, not on the principles. Language is codified. As elsewhere, the real world bears almost no resemblance to the myth, and language is far from real. It can be used to justify anything. The room left for interpretation is great, as are the risks that errors may arise through misinterpretation.

In an effort to simplify matters (and maybe also out of laziness), the following method has been adopted. Rather than try to distinguish the slight nuances in the pile of works by commentators or historians, this paper reconstructs, as a starting point, the actual opinions expressed by the leaders. In so doing, the relationship can be established between their public (or private) statements and their actions. Two criteria remain: the factual (their intended or accomplished actions) and the conceptual (indicating the justifications or motives). From that, we may not get quite to the truth of the matter, but we should at least arrive at a more or less reasonable assessment.

The Problem over Time

Four periods can be distinguished - two under Stalin and at least two others under his successors.

At the end of the war, in 1945, there were traces in Stalin's thinking of a pan-European, or rather pan-Continental, policy. But this was difficult to reconcile with his policy towards Eastern Europe. In fact, this dilemma can be summed up in these terms: in 1945, Stalin wanted to have one cake and eat the other one as well.

From 1947-48 Stalin tried to prevent the creation of a political system in Western Europe, his instrument for that purpose being Germany, and his instrument for working on Germany was Berlin. He failed in this as he failed to eliminate Yugoslavian dissidence. In trying to break the links then forming between the United States and Western Europe, he only managed to contribute to their strength.

After the 20th Party Congress (1956) the horizon broadens considerably. Phrases like "Peaceful Coexistence", "peaceful transition to (a diversified) socialism" "peace zones", plans for "European and Asiatic security" reflect this. The existence of an economic Western Europe is recognized and a new effort made to block it from becoming a political unit (as in the second Berlin crisis). The relationship between the United States and the USSR becomes a necessity.

In the present period, beginning in 1969, the USSR has developed a European policy which has some resemblance to the one adopted in 1945, and which faces the same dilemma. Yet conditions have changed radically in the meantime. Different prospects for Soviet policies have opened up as a result, depending on a number of conditions, many of which remain unfulfilled today.

Liberated Europe (1945-47)

Did Stalin have a European policy? The record is mixed.

- In October 1939, Stalin said to Paasekivi: "Whoever wins this war will inevitably attack the USSR".[1] This might be an argument for negotiation, but it does not indicate any particular affinity with any of the Western or Central European states.

- In December 1941, Stalin proposed a quid pro quo to Anthony Eden: bases in Eastern Europe for the USSR against bases in the West for Great Britain (Dunkirk) and for the United States (Dakar). This offer, confirmed during the Anglo-Soviet negotiations in the spring of 1942, was reiterated in Tehran in November 1943, in a modified form (Dakar and Bizerta).
- During the war, several Soviet statements speak of the USSR as having saved "Europe" - on 9th May, 1945, for example, - but at the same time, projects for a "Western Bloc" are severely criticised.

More concretely, between 1941 and 1945, Stalin stayed in close touch with Europe, acting successively on Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Balkans, Germany and France, without neglecting the Mediterranean states in the South - Turkey, Greece, Italy - and the Baltic states in the North - Finland and Sweden.

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1) cf Jakobson Finnlands Neutralitätspolitik zwischen Ost und West, Duesseldorf 1969, p. 30.

As to Poland, even in July 1941 Stalin did not abandon the Ribbentrop-Molotov line (which had become the Curzon line after a few modifications) that the British Government had agreed to as early as the autumn of 1940 (in a letter of its Ambassador in Moscow). Stalin refused to discuss any of the compromises drafted after Tehran by Mikolajczyk between February and October 1944. In 1944-45 he imposed upon Poland a government which agreed to this line - a tough policy indeed.

In respect of Czechoslovakia, Stalin signed an alliance treaty in December 1945 which the British Government had tried to prevent, and which pointed, more effectively than any formal declaration could have done, to a Polish-Czech Federation. He assured Benès that the liberal regime would be maintained in Czechoslovakia after the victory. In August 1945, he proceeded to annexe the Subcarpathic Ukraine, the Eastern province of pre-1939 Czechoslovakia - a rather mild policy, though not without pinpricks.

In the Balkans, Stalin obtained in Tehran an undertaking that his predominence would be accepted, and Churchill, in October 1944, confirmed that Rumania and Bulgaria would remain in the Soviet sphere of influence. From the summer of 1944, Stalin controlled the battlefield in the East, and started to show an interest in the Turkish Straits (Yalta 1945).

Germany became a matter of major interest for Stalin. From February 1942, he pointed out that Germany would survive even after Hitler. He did not rule out dismemberment of that nation which would enable the extension of Poland to the Oder (and of the USSR to Koenigsberg); but, once this was settled, he had no intention of obliterating Germany from the map. In 1943-44, he began to bring the German Communists and the Wehrmacht closer together in the Soviet prisoner-of-war camps. In 1943 he obtained an unsolicited promise from the allies that all of Germany would be occupied and, above all, that all German political authority would be suppressed after the capitulation. In 1944, he exhorted General de Gaulle to relinquish his claims to the East Bank of the Rhine.

With France, finally, Stalin signed (in December 1944) an alliance treaty modelled on the Soviet-Czech Treaty - with its serious limitations on the weaker of the two signatories (Article 4 obliged one of the two parties to enter the war if "the other one is dragged into hostilities against Germany").

No precise proposals were put forward by Stalin during the war which revealed his longer-term intentions towards Europe. The best description is in the memorandum sent by Charles E. Bohlen on his return from Tehran:

> "Although it is not possible to call it precise, the picture one has of Soviet intentions is sufficiently clear to give an idea of what is planned for Continental Europe after the war. Germany will be divided, and will remain so. The states of Eastern, South Eastern and Central Europe will not be allowed to group themselves into federations or to form associations. France will be stripped of her colonies and strategic bases abroad, and will not be allowed to maintain any sizeable military forces. Poland and Italy will be in the same position. Thus, the USSR will be the only military power on the European continent. The rest of Europe will have been rendered impotent".2)

The network of pacts signed by the USSR between 1943 and 1945 with Czechoslovakia, France, Poland and Yugoslavia (the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 1942 is of a different nature) precisely foreshadow a continental security system that would be dominated by the Soviet Union. Between 1945 and 1947, Warsaw and Prague attempted to conclude an alliance with France to complete this system. There is, therefore, reason to believe that Stalin did have a European policy or at least some notion in the back of his mind and that this left little room for the autonomy of the other participants.

The Crises of 1947-1952

There are only three ways in which such a system could have evolved: either if the USSR had physically dominated Germany as far as the Rhine following the armistice; or if the Western leaders had turned a blind eye to Soviet ambitions; or if relatively liberal regimes had been established in Eastern Europe. The first two possibilities were not achieved. The third encountered the problem, neatly summed up by a remark made by Stalin to Philip E. Mosely in Potsdam: "Any freely elected government would be anti-Soviet, and that we cannot permit".[3] The only exception is Finland, and that can be explained by specific factors.[4]

Thus Stalin's European policy, designed to be as progressive and cautious as it was persistent and disguised, broke down and gave way to an Eastern Europe based on the prototypes of Ulbricht's Eastern Zone and the Poland of Bierut, and a Western Europe in which liberal notions began to emerge from 1946 onwards (e.g. Fulton speech, rejection of the first French Constitution, etc.).

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2) Foreign Relations of the United States (F.R.U.S.) The Conferences of Cairo and Tehran Washington 1961, p. 845

3) Philip E. Mosely, The Kremlin in World Politics, New York 1960 p. 214

4) cf. Jakobson op. cit. pp. 46-89

In the years 1945-47, one can detect two trends in Soviet attitudes towards the outside world, especially towards Europe and the United States. The majority view within Russia aspired to a period of rest and wished for a relaxation of the constraints imposed by discipline and terror. The theories of Vargas supported this trend, arguing that the capitalist world after the war would be able to discipline itself, avoid a break-up, and eventually co-exist with the Soviet Union without war.

The other view, especially prevalent in the Party, was hostile to any such suggestion either within or outside the country, and favoured a militant policy. Zhdanov is believed to have been its main proponent (although whether he really held that position, or whether he was forced to adopt it when put in charge of the repression of the intellectuals in the summer of 1946 remains uncertain). It is the second view which carried the day, primarily due to the apparent risks that internal relaxation within the Soviet system might bring. External factors played no more than a secondary role in 1946.

At the same time, there were also differences of view within the United States, between those remaining partisans of Roosevelt's policies and those who advocated a position of firmness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. General Marshall made the historic choice when, on his return from Moscow, he said of Europe: "The patient is dying while the doctors argue". He decided to restore Western Europe, including Germany as far as the demarcation line, without waiting any longer for Stalin's consent.

Stalin, influenced no doubt by memories of the Four Party Alliance (1933) and of Munich, probably regarded this as the dawning of a new European Coalition against Soviet Russia. He responded strongly: the Marshall plan was rejected; Czechoslovakia was forbidden to join it (June-July 1947); a campaign of strikes was launched against the Marshall plan (autumn 1947); and the Cominform was set up (September 1947). There followed the Prague coup (March 1948), the blockade of Berlin (June 1948-May 1949), the Yugoslav crisis (June 1948), and purges in the East (from Kostov 1948 to Slansky 1952). Thus the hard line was confirmed, with the USSR in the predominant position in the Eastern camp. The policy included a cautious but nonetheless determined use of force to prevent the establishment of West Germany and a massive campaign against American influence in Europe, against any coming together of Western Europe, and against the atomic bomb. The explanation for this new policy was provided by Zhdanov in his speech at the inaugural

meeting of the Cominform: "The question of Germany ... is the main problem of international policies and one which will sow discord between the United States, England and France".

In the spring of 1949, despite the earlier signing of the Atlantic Treaty, Stalin lifted the blockade of Berlin. The GDR was born a few months after the Federal Republic of Germany. Stalin sent a message to Wilhelm Pieck which stated that as long as the USSR and Germany are friends, "there can no longer be war in Europe". A detente of sorts emerged in Europe. The Coal and Steel Community was launched in May 1950, disproving Zhdanov (who had died in August 1948). This first period of detente was interrupted by the Korean War (the causes of which remain difficult to ascertain) and by plans for West German rearmament which represented the Western reaction to it. But it re-appeared in 1951-52, with the negotiations of Panmunjom, the Economists' Conference in Moscow (April 1952) and the exchange of notes on Germany up to September 1952.

Could the first great European crisis have been avoided? Perhaps a better American understanding of the problems facing a Soviet Union which was victorious but ruined could have softened some of the blows. But would that have been sufficient to make Stalin think any more kindly towards Western Europe? We have an answer from his own entourage. In an interview with an American journalist in Moscow on June 18, 1946, Maxime Litvinov was pessimistic: "Hottelet asked him (Litvinov) if Soviet suspicions ... would be mitigated if the West were suddenly to give in and grant all Russian demands.... He said it would lead to the West being faced, after a period of time, with the next series of demands".[5] One month earlier, Litvinov had remarked privately that, in his opinion, "the best that can be hoped for is a prolonged armed truce".[6] This, therefore, is the conclusion that can be drawn from that second period: confronted with an obstacle, Stalin displayed caution. He withdrew to the territories under his exclusive influence. But there, as elsewhere, he encountered difficulties whose solution he leaves to his successors.

"Peaceful Coexistence" (1953-1964)

In the years 1953-55, three trends appear in the policies of Stalin's successors: a hard-line approach, a trend towards revisionism, and attempts to reconcile the two. Led by Molotov and Kaganovitch, the hard-liners maintained abroad Stalin's old policies but in a less severe manner.

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5) F.R.U.S., 1946, vol. VI p. 764

6) ibid. p. 763, footnote 11

Revisionism, on the other hand, had no known leaders: it becomes visible primarily through the criticism levelled against it. There were, for example, claims that from 1952 some "capitulators" wished to "appease" capitalism, or, in 1955, that there were philosophers "refuting the objective existence of general laws on the development of societies", and economists looking for an "intermediate state between capitalism and socialism".[7)]

The middle way is that of Malenkov, later that of Khrushchev. It maintained in theory the fundamental principles of Leninism, but accepted in practice that there might be periods of slower progress and even detours along the way. This is the meaning of "peaceful coexistence" as defined by the 20th Congress in 1956: war is not inevitable, nor is revolution, but the victory of Soviet socialism is inevitable.

As regards Soviet policies towards Western Europe, this approach was demonstrated by the following episodes:

- during the Big Four Conference in Berlin (January 1954), the Soviet Union proposed a Pan-European Agreement for collective security, aimed at replacing the European Defence Community (EDC) - and probably the Atlantic Treaty - and neutralising the two German states;[8)]
- after the defeat of the EDC in the French Parliament (August 1954), Soviet leaders showed a surprising degree of passivity, no doubt as a result of disagreements over what should be the best strategy to be adopted against the Paris Agreements (Winter 1954-55);
- the German problem and the question of European security remained deadlocked at the Summit Conference (July 1955), as did the issue of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and West Germany. For all intents and purpose, the Soviet leadership gave up its earlier position that only once the German problem had been solved could there be security in Europe.

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7) cf. Kommunist, January 1953, article by Tchesnokov;
Voprosy Filosofii, November 1955 editorial;
Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1955, No. 9 article by Glouchkov

8) cf. V.P. Nikhamin (ed) Contemporary International Relations and Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, Moscow 1978 (in Russian), p. 98: "The Soviet proposals (at the Berlin Conference) would have led to the neutralisation of the two German states.....".

The 20th Congress considerably broadened the horizons of Soviet policy which has, since then, included the Third World. The idea of a "peace zone" which would group around the USSR the more or less progressive countries of the Third World (and, to begin with, those of the Middle East), has a clear anti-European slant, as the 1956 Suez Crisis demonstrates.[9)]

The signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 provoked vigorous opposition from the Soviet Union.[10)] The Seventeen Theses, published by IMEMO in July 1957, sharply criticised the project but also displayed a certain amount of uneasiness which was to become even more marked in 1959 and to lead, in 1962, to Pravda's Thirty-Two Theses (25th August 1962). These were still as severe in their criticism but were increasingly embarrassed by the Community's success which is so out of keeping with Lenin's predictions. It is only in the present phase of Soviet policy that a more positive view is advanced (see below).

In that earlier period, the Berlin crisis, launched one year after the first Sputnik, can be seen as an all-out Soviet effort to paralyse West European enterprise and as part of the dialectical relationship between detente and peaceful coexistence. Perhaps it was also designed, if successful to impress the Chinese as well as those Communist Parties elsewhere which began to move away from Soviet control. In any case, Soviet policy, in contrast to 1948, was not just a reaction to a Western initiative. The failure of this attempt, in conjunction with failure over Cuba in 1962, initiated a new phase in Soviet strategy. The first manifestation of this was the Treaty of August 1963, banning nuclear tests, which revealed the existence of a special Soviet-American relationship with no direct link to European issues. But Khrushchev did not survive to benefit from this new phase. He was replaced by a group of men who announce their intention of pursuing a more considered policy, on a "scientific" basis.

European Security (1964-1978)

At first, relations with the United States, complicated by the Vietnam War, were conducted through negotiations in a United Nations framework, especially those concerning the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the Outer-Space Agreement of 1967 and the Ocean-Bed Agreements. With regard to

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9) "The long-term objective (declares in 1955 a functionary of the USSR Council of Ministers before a group of Soviet scientists) is to use Arab nationalism in order to cause difficulties for the oil supplies of the Europeans and thus render them more malleable", quoted from A. Sakharov, Mon Pays et le Monde, Paris 1975, pp. 7-9

10) cf. A.P. Binns, From U.S.E. to E.E.C.: The Soviet Analysis of European Integration under Capitalism, Soviet Studies, vol XXX No. 2 April 1978, pp. 237-261

Western Europe, two trends emerged. One consisted of improving relations with France in particular, especially after 1964, and the pursuit of -- bilateral relations in general. The other, nurtured by the fight against the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), led, after 1966, to the reactivation of plans for a European Security Pact and the Bucharest Appeal. These two trends were characterised by hostility towards the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 brought the first part of this phase to an end.

The election of President Nixon (November 4, 1968) and the formation of the Brandt Government opened up new perspectives. Chancellor Brandt's policy towards the East led to Treaties with the USSR (1970), Poland (1970), and the GDR (1972), as well as to the Four Power Agreement on Berlin (September 4, 1971). The improvement of relations with the United States cleared the way for the Conference on European Security, including the United States and Canada as full participants. In the Soviet literature, this period is referred to as that of "decisive change" (Perelom) in Europe, the success of more than twenty years of Soviet effort to obtain "the confirmation of the territorial status resulting from the Second World War". At the same time as the Helsinki negotiations on security and co-operation got under way, so did those concerning mutual balanced force reductions in Europe in Vienna in 1973.

From 1972 onwards, the attitude towards the European Economic Community changes. The idea of integration is no longer criticised by the Soviet Union, it is even used to define the programme of economic coordination in the East. As early as 1965, a Czech economist envisaged "theoretical common models" which might be applied to both the Socialist and the Capitalist form of economic integration. He was severely criticised.[11] From 1974, contacts were being established between Comecon and the EEC. Is this the dawning of a new era in which the two European parts recognize each other as different but compatible? This is perhaps a long-term trend, but since it is a revisionist notion it is as yet unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

A number of new elements emerged in the second half of the 1970s which tend to undermine the stability which the Treaties signed between 1970 and 1975 were supposed to provide for the USSR. First, the "Capitalist" world no longer fits into the traditional patterns of Soviet ideology. A new technological revolution is taking place. The notion of the "working class" no

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11) cf. A.P. Binns, Op. cit. p. 256

longer reflects the new realities. New ideological currents are developing on the political left.

Second, the development of economic relations between East and West has had unforeseen consequences. The economic crisis in the West which began in 1973 has had unfavourable effects on the economies of Eastern Europe as well. The idea that there might be a solidarity of interests transcending the regimes began to emerge.

Third, there seems no remedy for the crisis within the Communist movement. Throughout the world the Soviet myth has collapsed. Moreover the Communist Parties, beginning with the Chinese, all contest, to a certain degree, the Soviet claim to hegemony. This leads not only to Western "Eurocommunism", but also, in Eastern Europe, to centrifugal trends in public opinion which national leaders have to take into account. Finally, in the USSR itself, the Helsinki principles encourage political dissent which demands the right to express itself openly.

Faced with these problems, the Soviet leaders display considerable uneasiness. In the USSR, they opt for repression. But in Eastern Europe they are forced to tolerate a situation which is far from satisfactory to them. In relations with Western Communist Parties, they tried to solve problems over doctrine at the Berlin Conference in July 1976, but without success. "Eurocommunism" was neither sanctioned nor condemned and continues to manifest itself. The tactical problems were even more delicate: how to direct, from Moscow, the tactics of the Chilean Party between 1970 and 1973, or those of the Portuguese Party in 1975? As for the latter, there seem to have been some differences of opinion among the Moscow leadership during the summer of 1975. Although they cannot be blamed entirely for Cunhal's failure, if failure stems from uncertainty over the very premises of the system it is all the more serious.

These and many other phenomena probably explain the increased trust the present leaders put in organized force and armed strength. First, they have redressed in their favour the two global military imbalances (nuclear and naval) which until now have enabled the United States to compensate for the regional European imbalances. Secondly, they rely increasingly on military forces for overseas influence (Cuba, Ethiopia, and even Vietnam) rather than on political movements, be they Communist or Progressive. Thirdly, in Europe, they enjoy a military superiority which they continue to protect and to reinforce.

Thirty-three years after the war, therefore, we see the contours of a policy towards Europe that is both constant and yet very different. In view of Soviet activities in the Middle East, and, since 1975, in Southern and Eastern Africa, one can almost envisage a scenario in which the USSR would accept the existence of a separately organized and non-communist Western Europe, dependent on the Third World (which the USSR hopes to influence) for its energy and raw materials, and on the United States (with which the USSR hopes to establish links) for its defence. It is unlikely that such a scenario will become reality, but it nevertheless deserves mention because it would not leave much choice to the Europeans themselves; they would only have to consent to a situation which does not seem to warrant any vigorous reaction on their part. Many other possible scenarios might produce that same result, claimed by Mr Brezhnev to be indispensable for European security, namely a "military detente" that has become "irreversible".

Today, Western Europe is still far from peaceful. It remains vulnerable to crises which can either erupt spontaneously (as in Eastern Europe) or be the result of a more or less deliberate policy (e.g. over Berlin). On the other hand, it cannot be denied that important changes are taking place both in the East and in the West. These are linked, in one way or another, not to the "end of ideologies", but rather to the weakening, not to say the withering, of Marxist ideology - not only in its Leninist but also in its socialist variety. It remains to be seen whether this phenomenon may not in itself generate future crises. That is why, to conclude, we must examine whether past crises have been due to misunderstandings, or, on the contrary, whether they can be explained by clear-cut and more or less constant factors.

Past and Future

If Stalin made a mistake in the first and second phases (1945-1953), it was to assume that the three Western Allies could never agree on their policy toward Germany. He counted on a long period of indecision in the West and was surprised by General Marshall's initiative (probably more so than by the Truman Doctrine of March 1947). This error resulted partly from ideology (the "contradictions of Capitalism" etc.) and partly from the experience of the interwar years 1919-1939. When Stalin realised his mistake in the winter of 1948-49, he retreated. He re-launched the attack in the winter of 1950-51 (Korea and German rearmament), retreated again in 1952 (exchange of notes) and died dissatisfied. His second mistake was

over the relations between the United States and Europe. He made a major effort to bring about a climate in Europe which rejected the United States ("US Go Home"), only to achieve the opposite. However, he accurately measured the balance of forces and retreated without too much difficulty. This taught the West Europeans a lesson: it is possible, with American backing, to stay firm without provoking a war. Stalin was not Hitler.

In the third phase, the years 1953-55 are of particular interest. Malenkov had it within his reach to torpedo the Paris Agreements (and therefore, eventually, to push West Germany out of the Western system). He did not seize his "opportunity". The Soviet leaders recognized it but were paralysed by their own internal divisions. Or did they unconsciously prefer the system which took shape in 1955? To this major question the second Berlin crisis provides the answer. Those four years of effort to impose on the United States and its Allies a symbolic retreat in Berlin (with considerable political consequences) indicate that, in this third period, the Soviet Union indeed aimed at establishing a greater fluidity in Western Europe and at separating Europe from the United States. Other factors also intervened, such as the necessity of restoring the prestige of the Soviet Communist Party in the eyes of the Chinese and all other Communist Parties.

In the fourth period, that of "scientific" foreign policy, two specific changes occur: first, there appears a tendency to accept as a fact the coming together of Western Europe; and second, there is a move towards creating direct and special relations with the United States, based on "realism" ("let's get together and not be bothered about our allies!"). These have resulted in considerable gains for the Soviet Union in Europe but they have also produced new problems, both in the USSR and in Eastern European countries and, with this problems, come new risks. Thus what to do about Western Europe seemw to be one of the central issues facing the leaders of the Soviet Union: to what extent can the real world be allowed to penetrate their system (system of ideas and system of force)? Or should they rather continue to reinforce its total impermeability to foreign influences? In the first case, they run the risk of causing major centrifugal forces to emerge, with unpredictable consequences. In the second, they will have to maintain and expand all those instruments of military power which isolate them from the outside but which at the same time allow them to operate beyond their borders. Such are the limits within which the team that will succeed Mr Brezhnev must operate. Their choice will probably reflect an unsatisfactory compromise between the two alternatives.

Western Europe can only influence this choice if she is strong enough to resist future crises, if she is able to define her own long-term political objectives in a way which the USSR will have to take into account, and if she succeeds in encouraging the Soviet Union to move beyond mere coexistence towards the idea of a true peace (albeit that, for the time being, such a concept remains alien to the Soviet regime).

Such a policy, which presupposes a close sense of solidarity between the United States and Europe, will include:

- the definition of long-term objectives such as peace and reconciliation instead of struggle and coexistence with the various consequences that arise from this;
- continuation of the efforts for a real transformation of the relationship which began in Europe in 1950 and which have already had an effect on the thoughts and experiences of many Eastern leaders (cooperation instead of exploitation, progressive solutions to internal social problems instead of the alternative of revolution or dictatorship, etc.);
- all those other measures which tend to replace the "rivalry in decadence which Pierre Hassner referred to, with a "rivalry in renovation". This would add to the inevitable pragmatism of Western policies a general conceptual thrust which would, by drawing on the experiences gained since the end of the war, affect not only the West but the East also.

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PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

PLENARY SESSION

Thursday, 7 September — Evening

THE CONCEPT OF POWER AND SECURITY IN SOVIET HISTORY

by

Robert H. Legvold

Council
N.Y.

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Plenary Paper

THE CONCEPT OF POWER AND SECURITY IN SOVIET HISTORY

Robert Legvold

Beneath the growing concern over the Soviet military threat, there rest, unattended, fundamental questions involving the Soviet conception of power, security, order, and change. Grand, difficult, elusive matters like these understandably are not the preoccupation of the practical people who analyse "the threat" and even less those who devise a response. But the quality of their analysis and their response inevitably depends on our ability to comprehend at this other level. Interpreting the significance of Minuteman vulnerability or of Soviet-Cuban combatants in Ethiopia ultimately requires an honest effort to know what the Soviet leaders think about the place of military power in international politics; how they conceive their national security and what regard they have for ours; and whether they worry in any depth about international stability or the interplay between order and change.

Too long we have contented ourselves with demi-thoughts and vague impressions about these elemental dimensions of Soviet perspective. Some are impressions transported across the years and converted by now into accepted wisdom, such as the central role attributed to military power in the Soviet approach to foreign policy. The Soviet leaders, more than most, by this standard, believe in the utility of military force and even of war, stake their policy on its political exploitation, and labour constantly to perfect the fusion of policy and force in a formal strategy. The equally common assumption about the Soviet definition of security stresses the Soviet

Union's peculiar insecurity, so great and so self-centered that it can be assuaged only at the expense of everyone else's sense of safety. As a result it matters little whether the Soviet Union is a consciously expansionist state. The practical effect of its obsession with absolute security and its disregard for others' peace of mind amounts to the same. To these loose but enduring impressions we often add a third and ultimate one: Beyond its presumed faith in the instrumentalism of military power and beyond its menacing insecurity, the Soviet Union has long appeared to many as an adversary with little or no stake in international stability, save for within its own camp. In the final analysis, the Soviet Union remains for us an alienated power, disaffected with the world, or, at least, our part of it, less dedicated than we to quieting troubled areas that threaten the peace, indeed, happy to exploit instability where selfish Soviet ends may be served, and lost to the idea of building a more stable global order, particularly, one based on notions of equity and equilibrium.

Other of our impressions owe more to the moment. We, for example, dwell so much on the current growth of Soviet military power not only because of its scale and tempo but also because it parallels what many perceive to be a new "global thrust" in Soviet foreign policy. Because we sense a shift in the inspiration of Soviet policy, we tend to dramatize the meaning of shifts in the military balances. And, because we attach such significance to the changing state of the military balance(s), we tend to make Soviet behaviour in specific instances, Africa, in particular, a confirmation of global ambitions. The analysis, however, has a circular quality, one fear flowing from the next, with no clear starting point; and rarely is its internal logic justified. Little effort, for example, is made to probe the

assumed link between the evolution of the central balances and Soviet assertiveness in Africa's instabilities. Even less attention is given to defining the nature of the Soviet Union's "global thrust" or the way the shifting military balances are to be manipulated to serve it. Yet, to a large degree, these assumptions and these fears now dictate the terms within which the discussion of the Soviet challenge proceeds.

At best these are partial truths, draining reality of its complexity and imposing on us associations with no demonstrable basis, truths neither powerful enough to capture the subtlety of Soviet self-conception nor balanced enough to convey the impact of a changing global environment on the Soviet outlook. If we are to put the Soviet challenge in perspective, we need to release ourselves from these simple assumptions and begin to deal directly with the notions actually shaping the Soviet approach to the primary issues of power, security, and order. One starting point is the past, a hill from which to judge the evolution of Soviet perspective.

From Lenin to Kirilenko

No two moments symbolize more perfectly the plenitude of fifty years than Maxim Litvinov in Stockholm in 1918, waiting to learn whether the Allied governments would allow him to come to Paris where from the antechamber of the Versailles negotiations he, and the half dozen other individuals claiming to represent various Russian governments, might better follow the fate being decided for his country by Woodrow Wilson, Lloyd George, and their colleagues, and Andrei Gromyko before the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in 1971, telling the delegates: "Today, there is no question of any significance which can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it."

One might choose other ways to depict the change: The chaos and fragility of power picked from the rubble, contrasted with a regime long ascendant over the society it commands. A peasant economy, war-devastated, with but the first struts of industrialization in place, contrasted with a large, modern economy, second only to the United States' and many times greater than the original. Or, perhaps most strikingly, a ragtag, anarchic army, with scavenged supplies and a navy in revolt contrasted with scores of ballistic missiles, the 58 divisions poised against Western Europe, and the 3500 tanks that annually roll off the assembly line.

But the distance between Gromyko's boast and Litvinov's discomfort communicates better the product of these years. It also touches more directly on the Soviet Union's historic impatience and self-appointed destiny. For even in the early years the imperative of policy was never merely to defend the "only fatherland of socialism" nor later, when the fatherland was well-defended, was it ever merely the glorification of Soviet power and the expansion of its influence. From the start -- or from the point at which the dream of a European revolution began to fade -- the Bolsheviks arrogated to their country the role of history's vanguard, a pose requiring a permanent concern for the character of change virtually everywhere.

Because our convictions about the Soviet Union have been so thoroughly shaped by the long interlude of Stalin's rule and because his rule has always seemed to us so cynical, nationalistic, even anti-revolutionary, we have trouble taking seriously the residual force of earlier ideals. The notion that Leonid Brezhnev and others like him in fact believe their nation embodies a revolution, has a "manifest destiny," and stands for change that

may not always be self-serving is outside our normal perception and, as a result, rarely figures in our analysis. Reading Gromyko's words, therefore, we reach one of two conclusions: Either, as some like to think, he is only confessing the Soviet Union's long-felt sense of inferiority and claiming the right to a voice on a par with the United States', moderation they find consoling. Or, on the contrary, as a great many more conclude, he is in fact trumpeting the momentum of growing Soviet power, telling us the Soviet Union is ready to throw its weight around, and acknowledging in effect a new "imperial" phase in Soviet foreign policy. Either way, the issue is reduced to a matter of Soviet ambitions, and these in turn to the status of power seeking for the sake of power. The contest between East and West is kept primitively strategic, a contest featuring one side's will and ability to jeopardize the other side's interests.

In the process, we miss the more interesting and significant possibility that Gromyko has in mind less his country's growing power than its original vocation. Not in the simple sense of a revolutionary mission, but as a faith in the course of events and a confidence that the Soviet Union has an ever greater role to play in influencing the reordering of international politics. Not necessarily a role of direct intervention or of assault on the strategic positions of the capitalist world; and not one predicated on coercion and overt control. Still, one that transcends the conventional concerns and ambitions of most states and that makes the Soviet Union a special challenge. By ignoring this distinction and clinging to the image of a state with conventional concerns and ambitions, only more distended, we obscure rather than clarify our problem. (I will come back to this handicap in a moment.)

Stalin, in a sense, nationalized the Soviet Union's revolutionary personality, that is, he subordinated everyone else's revolution to the needs of his nation's own, and, thereby, persuaded us that the peculiarly ideological impulse of Soviet policy had been largely supplanted by the revival of a commonplace, Russian imperialism. This left us unprepared to notice how much Stalin remained a "revolutionary" in Henry Kissinger's sense of the word: That is, how little allegiance he felt to the international system of his day. Stalin's Russia, as Lenin's Russia before, was never of, only in, the prevailing international order. His government's strong advocacy of collective security in the 1930s never signified the slightest concession to the "system" of Woodrow Wilson's hopes, the now crumbling collective security system the Versailles peacemakers thought they had put in place of the nineteenth century balance of power. Collective security was for it an expedient not a way to give order to international relations. By joining the League and championing its strength, Stalin's regime meant only to extract from the environment what aid it could in coping with a specific danger, not to make peace with this environment. Rallying to the principle of collective security, in Stalin's eyes, had no more nor less legitimacy than the decision to strike the bargain he eventually did with Hitler and both choices involved an equal disdain for the nature and organization of the contemporary world.

His commitment to the postwar order that in theory he helped to design was no greater. On his own terms, he was prepared to tolerate the creation of institutions so important to Hull and Roosevelt -- even to value them for the contribution they might make to great power cooperation -- but he

took care to build his own security system alongside and, for the rest, assumed that in the long run events would undo whatever structure the Western powers sought to impose on international politics.

This was his legacy to his successors: The continuing faith in the inherent vulnerability of an international system fashioned of, by, and for the major capitalist powers. Only, Khrushchev improved on the legacy by convincing himself that the process was already well-advanced and that further far-reaching changes were just around the corner. At the heart of his confidence was an exuberant belief in the transfiguration of his own country's power, one involving its military potential but based above all on economic performance. So exhilarated was he by the prospect of growth in the Soviet economy and technology that in the late 1950s he went as far as to forecast the timetable by which the Soviet Union would overtake and then surpass the United States. It was an extraordinary proposition. In little more than a decade the Soviet Union was to become "first in the world, both in total production and in per capita production."[1] We are, Khrushchev said, "moving forward four times as fast" as the United States and the momentum, reinforced by the surge of Soviet science and technology, came to epitomize for him the basic shift in power underway between East and West. Coupled with what he took to be an accelerating defection of the newly independent nations from the Western camp, the Soviet leader saw in trends the shadow of a radically revised international order. For four critical years between 1958 and 1962, Khrushchev's foreign policy would be deeply influenced by this perception.

These years are critical because, more than any other, they mark the origins of the modern Soviet challenge. In 1930 Stalin proclaimed the

"doctrine of capitalist encirclement" and, over the next quarter of a century, let it stand for the Soviet predicament. Khrushchev abolished the phrase, saying that it was meaningless when no one could any longer determine "who encircles whom." Thus did he cut his country free of its Stalinist introspection, its narrow preoccupations, and its timid assault on a status quo repudiated a thousand times over. And, by the same token, thus did he launch it on a new international career, born of a special self-confidence and promising a renewed activism.

The Modern Soviet Challenge

Much of what drives our current concern, in fact, has evolved from this earlier phase of Soviet policy. By slighting this connection, we forsake the insights of the recent past and leave our view of the moment significantly unbalanced, finding new departures where there are none, adventure where there is also restraint, and purposefulness, even a coherent design, where there is greater disorder and opportunism.

We would do better to place trends in historical perspective. When that is done, the transformation of Soviet military power under Brezhnev is striking and so, too, the readiness to use it in ways previously untried, but at the same time, the larger dimension turns out to be more involved and less portentous. Set beside Khrushchev's bold, simple -- and credulous -- notions of international politics or beside his aggressive and often impetuous policies, those of the current leadership appear considerably less sweeping or calculating and considerably more intricate. To a large degree, they emerge as both an extension and a trimming, a refinement and a repudiation of Khrushchev's original impulses.

For, if anyone, it was he who indulged a crude globalism, though even in his case Soviet globalism had neither the imperial nor the preeminently military quality often assumed by commentators in the West. He not only believed in the promise of Soviet power and the imminent decay of the other side's, he acted on his belief, taking the turmoil of decolonization and making of it a theater in the historic confrontation between capitalism and socialism, challenging the West in Berlin, daring it to prove that its resolve was not already fatefully eroded, and sparring with the Chinese over what was, at root, their lack of faith in the spontaneous revolutionary process.

His activism, moreover, fed (as it in turn was fed by) a readiness to celebrate in doctrine the underlying significance of events. In the phrase of the day, capitalism had entered the third stage of its "deepening general crisis," a ritualized way of saying how important this new historic juncture was, ranking it with the 1917 Revolution itself and the expansion of this revolution into a "world socialist system" after the Second World War, each the occasion of an earlier stage in the "general crisis." Only this time it was not the balance of power that was being altered by revolutionary change but the other way around. At last -- to understand the depth of Khrushchev's exhilaration -- the Soviet Union had ceased being the object of its environment and had begun shaping that environment instead, all of it, not merely parts torn from it and added to the enclave.

Those who drove him from office thought Khrushchev took matters too far. Their demur is key to understanding the way contemporary Soviet leaders view their country's place in the world, the role of its (military) power, and the

requirements for its security. He was, they thought, naive and incautious in his judgment of trends within the Third World and, once finished with him, they swiftly expunged from policy its simple revolutionary expectancy. Like him, they had learned the futility of trying to intimidate the other side without the substance of power, and with it the risks inherent in, what used to be called, "brinkmanship." No doubt these lessons, too, they would later begrudge him. They mistrusted his ebullient confidence in his ability to get the better of Western leaders at the Summit and in one-on-one encounters, particularly, when in his last years, he appeared actually ready to do some political trading. But, more than any of these other excesses, Khrushchev's confidence in the momentum of the Soviet Union's own development bothered them. Their doubts, in the end, called into question the whole edifice of his optimism and, in doing so, established the boundaries for another, less fulsome version of the Soviet Union's global vocation.

For nothing had been more central to Khrushchev's "globalism" than his confidence in the speed with which the Soviet economy would outdistance that of the United States (hallowed in the notion of the "extensive construction of Communism"). This he merged with a climactic image of change within the Third World (culminating in his theory of "revolutionary democracy") and together these two great historic currents, when enhanced by the growing internal contradictions of the other camp, were rendered as a fundamental power transition (as the third stage of capitalism's "general crisis"). His successors disbelieved the premises of each proposition and, after he was gone, they quietly dismantled each of the attending theories. They have never replaced them with new ones, something we ought not to overlook.

Before turning to the perceptions of the current leadership and its notion of the Soviet Union's global role, there is another dimension of the Khrushchev legacy worth noting, one involving the essence of the Soviet definition of power. For all his intemperance, at the same time, Khrushchev guarded a quintessentially economic notion of power. Indeed, the one came first and had to be for the other to thrive.

Soviet leaders back to Lenin have believed that the "correlation of forces" is the principal dynamic of international politics or, more fundamentally, the dynamic by which international politics will be liquidated. Not being a part of this tradition nor persuaded of history's commanded pattern and caring more about the stability of an international order that, for all its imperfections, remains basically congenial, we think more in terms of a "balance of power." The difference is profound: Between, on the one hand, an approach featuring the eternal ebb and flow of power and the virtues of equilibrium in international relations and, on the other hand, an approach dedicated to the impermanence of every international order, save for the last, and the long run triumph of a single historic force.

By the same token, however, the "correlation of forces" turns out to be a broader concept than we frequently appreciate. To a Soviet it stands for virtually the whole of an era -- not merely the growth of Soviet power or the deterioration of the West's, but the vigor of the "national liberation movement," the elan of the peace movement, the fortunes of the Left in Western Europe, and even the militancy of capitalist trade unions. It is decidely not the simple comparison of power, still less of military power, that many in the West assume. Where it is dependent on the strength of the socialist camp, the notion of strength has far more to do with the basic (or comparative)

dynamism of these societies than with the size of their armies or the throw-weight of the Soviet ICBM force.

Khrushchev embodied this essential conception in the extreme, but embody it he did. His euphoric preoccupation with the material base of power has its natural antecedents in Stalin's own concerns thirty years earlier: "Those who fall behind get beaten," he said in 1931, "The history of old Russia is one unbroken record of the beatings she suffered for falling behind, for her backwardness."[2] Khrushchev was merely on the other side of the pre-occupation. His successors, sharing the same understanding of power, re-pressed his simple enthusiasms.

Not that the Soviet concept of power lacks a military dimension; on the contrary, the Soviet leadership has always had the keenest sensitivity to the role of military power in international politics. One of the first forms of backwardness abjured by Stalin in his famous 1931 speech was "military back-wardness." When Khrushchev trumpeted the approaching superiority of socialist forces, he also had the Soviet Union's military strength in mind. And a Brezhnev version of the earlier Gromyko quote goes, "At the present time no question of any importance in the world can be solved without our participa-tion, without taking into account our economic and military might."[3] But it is absolutely critical that, in the Soviet mind, military power remains not only a function of other forms of power, economic in particular, but their auxiliary; never, as so many analysts in the West make it, their substitute. So it was Khrushchev's Minister of Defence who last insinuated Soviet military superiority, a near figure of speech in January 1962 when he spoke, because it was Khrushchev who thought the claim could justifiably be made precisely on the strength of the underlying shift in the correlation of forces.[4] Having

no such illusion, at least, not crudely so, Brezhnev has denied his ministers of defence the same liberty and has himself chosen to emphasize that the Soviet Union "is not seeking and will not seek military superiority over the other side."[5]

Security, Power, and Contemporary Soviet Policy

Since 1917 the Soviet Union's security concerns have changed radically. The transformation, at one level, is obvious. A regime that has ruled for more than a half century, endured great trials, and amassed nearly peerless military power clearly worries about the world in ways different from one with the frailest grip on power, embattled in civil war, and isolated among hostile and stronger capitalist adversaries. In the years separating Brest-Litovsk from SALT and the first Soviet-German non-aggression accord from the second, the Soviet Union has freed itself from the spectre of any nation successfully threatening its territorial integrity. En route, however, it has extended its sway over other nations, creating new insecurities centered on the stability of empire. And, out of this empire, it has stirred a bitter challenge from a great power once ideologically allied and now the more hostile for it. In short, from the security of power, to the security of nation, Soviet concerns have proceeded to the security of alliance, and, ultimately, to the security of the faith.

Each turn has not destroyed, but overlaid, the previous one, weaving an ever more complex security environment. Thus, the Soviet Union emerges unable to distinguish national security from the security of its authority in Eastern Europe, and this security, in turn, becomes of essence orthodoxy rather than partnership. Similarly, the conflict with China reinforces two Soviet fears at

once -- one the dangers of fragmentation within its own camp and the other of a common front among adversaries. The complexity grows, moreover, because each individual threat has changed over time: The Chinese are no longer merely an ideologically disruptive force within the socialist world, but a traditional enemy, armed, and bent on jeopardizing Soviet policy in every sphere. Eastern Europe is no longer menaced most by the ill-will of the United States and its allies but instead by the contaminating effects of detente and interdependence, less by NATO and more by lapses in economic performance. The German threat has been transformed, even in the last ten years; containment has lost much of its force, but American (economic) power increasingly shapes other parts of the Soviet environment; and so on.

Compelling though these factors are, if left at that, they obscure the full change in the character of Soviet security concerns. For, at another level, the potential hazards to Soviet well-being have not only multiplied and commingled, but grown constantly more diffuse. That is, the issue is not merely one of interlocking complexities but of imperatives existing on different planes and impervious to traditional solutions built from traditional forms of power. Like all of us, the Soviet Union faces an increasing array of challenges that cannot be met by military power or military alliances. Its ability to integrate the Soviet economy into the larger order, beginning with the energy sector, for example, will have as much to do with its security and perhaps even more to do with that of its allies than any plausible erosion of the strategic nuclear balance. Its growing stake in selected foreign markets and expanding lines of communication as well as its fishing, shipping, and mining activities will impose as many demands on the quality of Soviet diplomacy as on its capacity for force projection.

The Soviet leadership by and large knows this and, over the last decade, a great deal of Soviet analysis has come to reflect an awareness of the link between interdependence and security. (We have been so preoccupied with our time-honored notions of what moves the Soviet Union that we have scarcely noticed.) Something of the same sensitivity echoes in the Soviet insistence that detente be more than the absence of war; that it involve a conscious restructuring of East-West relations and explicit forms of cooperation. (Again, an area of Soviet thought largely ignored by Western analysts.) Indeed, it is this recognition of security's growing subtlety that leads to the crux of the issue.

Profound choices confront the Soviet Union, though not the ones ordinarily implied by many Western analysts: Not whether to press the strategic arms race so that someday soon an overmatched United States can be intimidated at will; and not whether to intervene wherever local instability offers the prospect of compromising Western strategic positions. But, rather, how the Soviet Union's increasing stake in the existing international order, even in its stability, is to be squared with its genuine and historic alienation from that order. There is, indeed, a "global reach" to contemporary Soviet policy but its significance derives from the interplay between these two impulses, not from the simple aggrandizement of Soviet power.

At last the Soviet Union has the (military) wherewithal to affect the evolution of the status quo almost everywhere, but at last the Soviet Union has also engaged itself in almost every dimension of that status quo. The purchase of Western technology, the traffic of its merchant marine, the imperatives of EEOCs, and the myriad other Soviet involvements, even the effort to displace Western economic influence in Third World nations amount to an

extensive incorporation of the socialist countries into the larger (economic) order. As this sphere of activity swells, the Soviet concept of security does also. But, for the Soviet Union, it creates a strange security concern, what with the mutual dependencies on which it rests; stranger, still, since the framework within which it flourishes remains largely the handiwork of the industrialized capitalist powers and inaccessible to Soviet influence.

In contrast, the regional instabilities of the Third World are more accessible and these, for many observers, have long evoked the older and deeper Soviet drive to overthrow an uncongenial international order. It is in this light that the Soviet interventions in Africa take on significance: Thus, for the first time the Soviet Union has been able and willing to use its military power to decide the outcome of distant crises. Angola and the Horn pose the question whether the Soviet Union henceforth intends to play a more active role in regional instabilities and sees its growing military power as, in these circumstances, a useful instrument for laying siege to the status quo where it is most vulnerable. (The starker but inapt version of the same question is whether the Soviet Union means to conquer facilities and destroy Western strategic positions throughout the Third World.) Behind this question lurks the more fundamental apprehension that Soviet assertiveness in Africa stems from a new "arrogance of power" based on the general shift in the military balance.

This, it seems to me, misphrases the challenge of the Soviet Union's growing military capabilities. In the Soviet outlook, military power has always constituted an important element of foreign policy, but never its central element and never the blunt instrument that some make it out to be. Neither has it ever been the perfectly matched complement of political

strategy that others perceive it to be. In fact, for all their praise of Clausewitz, the Soviet political and military elite have done less to integrate defence and foreign policy than their American counterparts. The language of Soviet strategists and leaders has misled us on this score, trapping us into confounding rhetoric with authentic conceptualization. In truth, the Soviet leadership has never worked out, not publically, at least, an integration of military force and foreign policy comparable to the American doctrine of "flexible response," spelling out the hierarchy of threat and molding a response across the balances. Nor has it labored over the place regional instability and low-level violence should occupy in its overall political-military strategy. Until Admiral Gorshkov's modest efforts early in the decade, the gulf between political strategy in areas outside the central theatres and military strategy (designed essentially for these theatres) was very wide.

Second, as a practical matter, the central place assigned military power in Soviet thinking is said to be a function of the central place military power occupies in Western, particularly, American foreign policy. Thus, when Soviet analysts deal with the political implications of military force, they tie these to the way the United States has allegedly used its military power in the postwar period. There is no independent significance ascribed to Soviet defence building. How exclusively the Soviet Union conceives its military power as a counter to the effects introduced into international politics by Western military power is, of course, a disputable and unconvincing matter. Nonetheless there is a distinction that we often lose sight of between a military effort predicated on the challenges raised by the reality of others' forces and one based on the inherent superiority of military power as an

instrument of foreign policy. Whatever we think of the validity of the first, the second simply cannot be demonstrated in Soviet thought.

All the phrases that we employ to describe the modern Soviet challenge fail us: a new "imperial" era, a "global thrust," a new stage of "acquisitiveness," and the old standby, Soviet "expansionism," all fall short, saying either nothing or too much. We need, instead, formulas spanning the dual impulses of interdependence and alienation, the constraints of extended involvements and the temptations of increased military power; formulas representing the complexity of Soviet security concerns, their subtlety, their diffuseness, and their contradictions. We need ways of capturing the tension between the Soviet stake in acceptance, status, and even stability and the Soviet urge to play an ever larger role in influencing change. To the extent that the Soviet leaders find their growing military power an increasingly handy recourse for influencing change, particularly, in unstable areas, we require a better knowledge of the actual inspiration of Soviet behavior, not what we fancy it to be. Only if we confront the Soviet leaders with analyses of their ambitions troubling to us <u>that they find recognizable</u>, do we have much chance of dealing effectively with the threat. Too much do we tell the Soviet Union these days that the heart of the problem is the growth of its military might, when, ultimately, the real problem is the aspirations guiding the use of that power, aspirations, to make matters worse, that we insist on distorting or oversimplifying.

To a degree, knowing the past will help produce a sounder perspective for judging the evolving Soviet challenge. Soviet insecurities, for example, and even more the Soviet disregard for others' insecurities continue to bear the traces of Stalin's day. But we underestimate Soviet policy (and the opportunities for our own) when we overlook how much the Soviet Union has

outgrown the crudest of these earlier apprehensions, how much it has enlarged the notion of security, and even how far it has come in addressing itself to the concerns of others. Khrushchev's global vocation, too, has left its mark on Soviet policy, but saved from its original extravagance. By ignoring the measure in which his successors have moderated Khrushchev's expectations, avoided the risks he willingly ran, and tightened up on his commitments, we deny our policy a measured sense of the challenge before us.

For the past offers only partial insights into contemporary Soviet policy. It cannot represent the new choices emerging before Brezhnev and those to follow or the degree to which they are already affected. These are the choices facing all of us, but, in the Soviet case, always with a further dilemma. For the powerful, as Stanley Hoffmann has argued, the alternatives are the "politics of world order" and "politics as usual," but, for the Soviet Union, there is the further consideration that the politics of world order unfold around institutions and ideas that are often objectionable and beyond the Soviet power to shape; while "politics as usual," which by Soviet interpretation is a "politics to change the world," occur where the Soviet Union is constantly more powerful but this power is constantly less relevant and more costly in application. The world presents odd choices -- between the insecurities of interdependence and the securities (or familiarity) of instability, the power to compromise and the impotence to control, and change sought through restraint to induce others' restraint and a status quo frozen through permanent revolution or permanent intervention. We pay a foolish price in pretending that the Soviet Union is not part of this world.

FOOTNOTES

1. Quoted in Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 316.

2. Pravda, February 5, 1931.

3. March 14, 1970 speech on the occasion of Dvina maneuvers as quoted by Hon. Foy D. Kohler, Hearings before Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 95th Congress, First session, September 27, October 11, 13, 18, and 26, 1977, p. 33.

4. For Rodion Malinovsky's ambiguous comment and an interesting discussion of this phase in Soviet foreign policy, see William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 191.

5. Pravda, November 3, 1977. This is a new development but, since late 1977, it and other assurances on the nature of Soviet military ambitions have been repeated a number of times. See particularly Brezhnev's speech to the 18th Komsomol Congress, Pravda, April 26, 1978 and his interview with Vorwärts, reprinted in New Times, no. 19 (May 1978), pp. 4-7.

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PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

BRIEFING

B(ii) ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND DEPENDENCIES

by

Heinrich Machowski

DIW
Berlin

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Briefing

ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND DEPENDENCIES

Heinrich Machowski

All statements concerning the future development of the economy of the Soviet Union are at present less certain than ever before, Forecasting has become a sort of economic futurology. This is not only due to the lack of adequate information although the economic statistics relating to the USSR have not improved very much in quality or in quantity, in spite of the commitment the Soviet government made in the final agreement of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

The main reason is rather that we are uncertain how the Soviet economic leaders will react towards the altered conditions of growth in their country and to the obvious obsolescence of national economic planning. The imminent change of leadership will even increase that uncertainty. Simple extrapolation of the prevailing trends in development may be pointless.

In this context it is especially significant that the Soviet government has not yet announced any revision of the aims it set for the period from 1976 through 1980, although such a correction would seem to be absolutely necessary since it must be clear by now not only that a whole series of detailed targets are unlikely to be attained but even the basic proportions of this medium term plan can hardly survive.

The shortage of labour counts among the most crucial changes in the bases of growth of the Soviet economy which are already obvious now but which will have their full effect in the 1980s. On the one hand the demand for labour is traditionally high, and this is accentuated by rather large employment reserves in existing industrial enterprises which is one of the most striking contradictions and serious failures of the Soviet economic system.

On the other hand labour is proving more difficult to recruit due to several factors: the decline of the growth of population overall, the displacement of the crucial points of growth into Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Transcaucasus, exhaustion of the "classic" reserves of population (those working in agriculture and in household economy), and prolongation of education and training ("investment in human resources").

The labour force, which is supposed to increase annually by 1.5% during the current five year plan (1976/80), will in fact only increase by 0.9% during the next five year plan period (1981/1985) and by 0.5% between 1986 and 1990. For the first time the working population in the "Russian" Republics is expected to decrease from 1981 to 1985 so that the entire growth will depend on the development in Central Asia and in the Transcaucasus. The drafting into productive industries of young able-bodied people from areas which are far away from the most important industrial centres of the country will cause considerable problems and not only because of language and culture (Asian "migrant workers"). The employment of young people with an agricultural background who have no experience of industrial labour and who have no labour class-consciousness can only have a negative effect on average labour productivity.

Only in one field has the Soviet Union announced tangible economic policy aims for the years after 1980. During the course of its 1978 July Plenum, the Central Committee of the CPSU decided that the development of the agricultural-industrial complex of the Soviet Union shall be accelerated. The grain production of the 1981/85 plan is intended to reach a yearly average of between 238 and 243 million tons as against 182 million tons in the 1971/1975 plan and 220 million tons in the 1976/1980 plan. Meat production, which hardly came to 15 million tons in 1977, is to increase to 19.5 million tons by the end of 1985. At the same time the Soviet economic leaders have stipulated that farm production should be increased by 1990 to 1000 kg of grain per inhabitant (estimated population by 1990: 292 million).

West German agriculture experts believe that this production would be sufficient to bring USSR up to a nutritional standard which would, quantitatively, as well as qualitatively, come up to the present nutritional standards of the USA. However, Soviet agriculture is at present nowhere near this output level; the annual average grain production during 1971/75 was only 732 kg per inhabitant; it should be 837 kg according to their aims for the 1976/80 period and this is now hardly being achieved. For the period of the 1981/85 plan, the Soviet Union counts on producing 881 kg grain per inhabitant according to the resolution of the Central Committee.

In order to guarantee this (as well as all other agricultural policy goals) agriculture is to receive 27% of all investment funds of the 11th five year plan period (this represents the present agricultural share of all productive and non-productive investments). By means of these measures "mechanization" and "chemicalization" of agriculture shall be continued and it is to be accompanied by more capital and more qualified personnel.

It is by no means surprising that the Soviet economic leadership makes every effort to overcome the traditional agricultural shortfalls and instability. Agriculture still contributes about a fifth to overall economic production and almost 30% of the total labour force is employed in agriculture. Furthermore 20% of the total industrial workforce is employed in the foods and beverages industry and the output of this industry depends to a very large extent on the results of the harvests. The Soviet Union had to import $7.5 billion's worth of grain from the OECD-countries from 1972 to 1976 and this amount represents about 70% of the Soviet Union's cumulative trade deficit towards these countries - in other words, grain imports represent a considerable burden on the Soviet balance of payments. It seems unlikely that the USSR will succeed in transforming agriculture from being a growth constraint into becoming a growth reservoir by 1985. Politically and economically crude oil will represent the most important raw material of the Soviet economy in the years after 1980. As far as the future development of the Soviet oil production is concerned, Western experts do not agree amongst themselves.

The CIA estimates that the USSR will fail by a fair margin to reach its planned target of extracting 630 million tons of crude oil by 1980 because Soviet oil production is expected to stagnate at the end of the 1970s and to decrease at the beginning of the 1980s at the latest. The amount of crude oil extracted will probably only be 400 to 500 million tons in 1985 (as against 520 million tons in 1976). The most important consequences which would follow from this rather unjustifiably pessimistic CIA estimate are the following: in the future the USSR will have to import considerable quantities of crude oil from the OPEC countries at a cost of approximately $10 billion which would not only seriously affect their balance of payments position but would make it difficult to repay the credits taken from the West; and the smaller Comecon countries, which now receive 90% of their petroleum imports from the USSR, would have to use far more of their foreign exchange holdings for oil imports from OPEC countries because the USSR could not meet their needs.

The USSR and the other CMEA countries might have to import 175 million tons of oil from the OPEC countries so that world oil supply may come under even greater pressure and world market prices will go up.

Assuming that the Soviet economic leadership will make every effort to avoid these consequences, the Berlin-based German Institute for Economic Research comes to the conclusion that an actual decrease of the Soviet oil production could be avoided by supplying sufficient investment funds. However, even then the rate of growth of crude oil extraction will decrease considerably.

The Soviet crude oil balance (millions of tons)

	1975	1980	1985
Extraction	491	632	770
Imports	6	8	10
Total Quantity	497	640	780
Total Exports	93	132	138
of which:			
to Comecon countries	67	92	114
to the rest of the world	26	40	26

No matter which turn the future development of the Soviet oil economy takes, the energy costs of the Soviet economy will increase considerably in the years to come and will adversely affect the growth of productivity.

In searching for new ways of accelerating productivity, the overall economic organization of the USSR might be changed. There have recently been a number of critical comments on the weak points of the Soviet economic system in the Soviet economic press. The most pointed criticism came from a competent voice, that of Professor Walowozh, deputy editor and head of the economics section of Soviet Pravda. His criticism focuses on the present weaknesses of the Soviet economic system and, in particular, on the use of gross production figures for planning purposes. This can, he argues, lead to inefficiency and a gross waste of precious resources. He accuses the system of not applying the Marxist law of the "Economy of time" which is the criterion for the efficiency of any society and its use of scarce resources, labour and capital. He concludes that the Soviet economy

suffers from considerable losses through inefficiency and his criticism is undoubtedly one of the strongest yet made by a Soviet official.

On the other hand the traditional system of central planning has always been an effective instrument for the application of power by CPSU leaders. If a conflict arises between the "control by the party" and "efficiency requirements", the former will usually win. For this and other reasons(such as the "vested interests" of the party and state bureaucracies, ideologically motivated refusal to accept the market mechanism or lack of a comprehensive concept for reform)we cannot expect fundamental reform of the Soviet economic system to take place. There will certainly be some limited corrections to the system (the founding of industrial and production associations, new plan indicators and mathematical planning methods for example) but the success of these measures is likely to remain limited.

Since the beginning of the 1970s the Soviet Union has been applying a policy of growth which is more oriented towards foreign trade than ever before in her economic history. At the 25th party congress of the CPSU in February, 1976, foreign trade was declared a key sector of the Soviet economic policy. With a macro-economic export ratio of 7% the Soviet economy's foreign trade linkage is nevertheless rather small and even in this connexion the most direct comparison is with the US economy. Trade with the Western world represents about 30% of all Soviet foreign trade; in 1970 it was only about 20%. This shows that Western trade can have no great influence on Soviet economic growth. For instance, according to some US estimates, the USSR invested $21 billion of fixed capital in 1975, at a time when the actual annual increment of Soviet hard-currency debt averaged only $1.2 billion. This is true also for the technology imports from the Western world. There are certainly some sectors in which the imports from the West are of crucial significance for the Soviet economy, e.g. the oil technology, but diffusion of new foreign technologies in the USSR encounters the same obstacles as impede more general technological innovations. Foreign trade altogether and the trade with the Western world in particular can only make a very limited contribution to the solution of the productivity problem. This can only be solved through domestic measures.

Against this as background, we can summarize the Soviet Union's growth prospects in the first half of the 1980s. It would be much too strong to say that these conclusions amounted to predictions, they are rather results based on logic. The overall economic labour productivity is expected to increase annually by a maximum of 3% during the 1981/1985 plan as against 3.5% from 1976/1980. In terms of the national product(as defined in Soviet methodology which in the Western sense is incomplete in that it omits a variety of services) the overall economic production of the USSR could expand by 4% annually in the next five-year plan. It is presumed to be expanding by 4.5% from 1976 to 1980.

The Soviet Union will need an export surplus in the coming years in order to finance the debt service for the credits taken from the Western world and/or to finance the granting of (commodity) credits to the smaller Comecon countries and the Developing World. If the produced and utilized national products - the difference lies mainly in the balance of exports and imports - expand until 1980 in accordance with the growth rates planned for 1978 (4.5% and 3.4% respectively) the export surplus in 1980 will amount to some 4.5% of overall economic production. On the other hand, if we assume that the export surplus will be at only 2% of the produced national product in 1985, the domestic spending on goods and services in the 11th five year plan is likely to increase at an annual rate of 4.5%. But, in contrast to 1976/80, the accumulation will have to expand at a higher annual average (6.5% to 7%)at the expense of private and public consumption because the need for capital will continue to increase substantially, due primarily to the displacement of the economy to the East, the unfavourable age structure of fixed assets, the necessary catching-up of agriculture, and the need of transportation and the social infrastructure. Thus only a 3.5% growth rate annually is left for consumption. No matter how the Soviet leadership will divide this margin up between private and public consumption, the increase of the standard-of-living of the Soviet population will have to diminish as against the 1976/80 plan.

Although the growth prospect is not at all favourable for the Soviet Union, such a prospect could hardly be considered calamitous by a leadership that can contemplate with some satisfaction the economic vicissitudes of the West in the aftermath of its worst post-war recession. The main economic policy goal for the Soviet leadership should therefore be to prevent things from getting worse (a similar aim to the main goal of the Bonn summit of the 10 main Western industrialized countries in July this year).

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PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

PLENARY SESSION

Friday, 8 September — Morning (2)

SOURCES OF SOVIET POWER:
THE MILITARY POTENTIAL IN THE 1980s

by

Andrew Marshall

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Plenary Paper

SOURCES OF SOVIET POWER: THE MILITARY POTENTIAL IN THE 1980s

Andrew Marshall

INTRODUCTION

This paper presents a view of probable major trends in the Soviet military effort in the 1980s. The most plausible developments in the Soviet military effort are described and major alternatives considered. The main causal and contextual factors that are likely to influence those developments are discussed -- for example, shifts in Soviet mission priorities, economic and manpower constraints, Soviet internal political developments, and trends in the world environment as perceived by the Soviet leaders.

The paper begins with an analysis of the broader aspects of the Soviet military effort including trends in the total size of that effort measured in terms of resources devoted to military purposes, the continuation of the trend toward higher technology in weaponry and its implications, and the emergence of a new mission -- projection of military power at a distance. Then follows a discussion of the expected trends in selected mission and geographical areas -- the strategic force posture, forces targeted against the European region of NATO, forces along the Chinese border and for use in Northeast Asia, and power projection forces.

Since much of this discussion of trends in Soviet military power in the 1980s is focused on the most likely developments, it is followed by a discussion of major events or shifts in the internal or external context that might significantly influence Soviet military developments. Events might perturb current and likely trends -- for example, a major crisis could lead to increased military spending in the West as well as in the Soviet Union. Major internal economic or political changes in the Soviet Union could affect predictions. A few of these possibilities are noted and their implications are discussed briefly.

MAJOR TRENDS IN THE SOVIET MILITARY EFFORT IN THE 1980s

Economic and Political Aspects

Current estimates of the size of the Soviet military effort, using as a measure the dollar expenditures it would require to reproduce the Soviet

effort in the US, put it at approximately 40% larger than the current US military effort. Estimated rouble expenditures for defence show a remarkably steady 4-5% real growth each year for the past decade or more, with some observers placing the figure up to 2% higher. There is no reason to expect the Soviets' effort not to continue to grow into the 1980s at essentially the current rates.

Of perhaps more interest for a discussion of future military trends is the burden on the Soviet economy imposed by a defence effort that is estimated officially at 11-13% of GNP. For a number of reasons that will be summarised later, many believe that this estimate is too low. Even if it is not, however, the "defence burden" will almost certainly increase gradually during the 1980s as the rate of growth in the Soviet economy slows.

Why might the 11-13% estimate be low? First, there is some evidence that the prices of military equipment and other things purchased by the Soviet military establishment are subsidised -- directly and indirectly. For example, plants that produce both defence and non-defence goods may not fully allocate overhead costs to defence products. Further, the defence sector probably obtains preferential treatment with respect to both the timing and quality of production inputs. In a free market society, a premium would have to be paid for this special treatment.

A second reason why the 11-13% may be low concerns the definitional problems of what should be included as a defence or national security expenditure. Some Soviet policies and programmes not usually included may have a significant national security motive. An example would be the construction of the Baykal-Amur-Magistral (BAM) Railroad in the Far East, which will provide the Soviet defence planners with another 200 miles of depth to their position and greatly ease the vulnerability of communications to the Far East. Soviet policies of subsidising Siberian and Far Eastern development and movement of population into the area also may have, in part, national security objectives. Also, resources may flow directly into the military from other ministries and never appear directly in military budgets. For example, Murray Feshbach has called attention to the fact that the number of women reported in the defence ministry and the military forces is unusually small when they must have nurses and many Soviet doctors are women. Manpower may be understated as may be the costs of military forces because they are considered to be part of other ministries.

As mentioned above, the significance of underestimating the percentage of GNP going into the military sector and the 4-5% growth rate in defence spending is magnified by the projected continuing decline in the growth rate of the Soviet economy. The underlying causes for the projected decline are related to a slowing in the growth of major factor inputs. such as labour and capital, and the continued difficulties that they appear to have in improving productivity. Further, declining birth rates during the 1960s will mean a marked drop in new entrants to the labour force unless there are changes in military conscription, deferment or retention practices.

There may also be some special problems in the energy area. If Soviet oil production peaks in the next few years, they will have some very difficult choices to make regarding the allocation of oil to the domestic economy, to Pact Allies dependent on the USSR for oil, and to Western European nations willing to provide hard currencies for Soviet oil. Oil sales and the hard currencies they generate are the primary means by which the Soviets acquire advanced Western technology and equipment for improving productivity. While the Soviets produce about 20% more oil than the United States, their output of natural gas is only half. They should be able to utilise their large natural gas supplies more efficiently in the future. Their energy problems may be part of their more general investment problems in the 1980s.

The combined effect of all these factors is that if the projections of a slowing in GNP growth rate are right, and if the estimates of defence burden and of defence spending growth are too low, then the Soviet military could be taking about 20% of GNP toward the end of the 1980s. This might be a major problem for them, as well as for the West.

The Soviets could respond by reducing their military effort, but it seems more likely that they will want to keep their growth rate more or less where it is now. Since the early and middle 1960s the Soviets, through their steady investment in the military, have gained in power relative to other nations. The perception that this has been taking place is clearer now in the US, in the West generally, in China, and more recently in Japan. This may lead to increases in the defence efforts in these countries. The Soviets, therefore, just when they might wish to consider slowing down the rate of growth of their military effort, could be faced with the consequences of this general reaction to their past buildup.

The post-Brezhnev succession process will probably start soon, if it has not already begun. In the past, succession in the top leadership has taken time -- something like four to five years to make the transition from an initial period of collective leadership to the eventual domination by a single ruler. During these transitional periods, the military have played an important role in the success of the leadership that has emerged. This factor argues for continued growth in defence expenditures, at least through the mid-1980s. Later in the 1980s, a new leadership might try to restrain military spending. On the other hand, there may be more effective competition for resources from other sectors. Also, Brezhnev has been unusually close to the military, and the new leadership may be more inclined to separate itself a little and to try to exercise more control over military expenditures.

The situation that is emerging is very complex, and our ability to analyse the economic problems that are emerging is limited. We know little about the internal politics of the budget and planning process. In addition, there is a growing second economy in the Soviet Union which the central government cannot easily control. Convergence of these many separate trends, and the interaction and cumulative nature of their effects, make it hard to predict with precision what will happen. This is, perhaps, the single most important area for further analysis.

Technology

Another major trend in Soviet military developments will be the continued emphasis on science and technology. They have a long-term goal of being technologically superior -- in particular in the military area. They have a military research and development programme that is very strong and continuing to grow rapidly. However, weapon designs have been constrained by a set of policies and circumstances that has stressed the deployment of what is proven and limited the use of more advanced, but more, risky, technology. The Soviet conscript force is drawn from a less skilled population than in the West, imposing some limitations on the sophistication of the weapons that Soviets feel they could both operate and support. Also, there has been an emphasis on producing large numbers of weapons and, therefore, a desire to keep down unit costs. This has been achieved by using standard materials that are more easily fabricated and weapons designed for production using general purpose machinery. Weapons have also been designed to require limited maintenance in the field by relatively low skilled

personnel. Consequently, major maintenance requires that the equipment be shipped to factories where a permanent work force of skilled personnel can be concentrated. A different weapons design philosophy is also detectable and their approach to accomplishing a particular mission may be different. An example is their tendency to control fighter aircraft from the ground rather than to put all of the sensors and avionics needed to allow the pilot to operate independently in the aircraft itself.

In its laboratories, the Soviet Union probably is about equivalent to the West overall, but limitations on manpower quality, manufacturing skills and capabilities, and policies demanding low cost per unit have constrained the use of high technology in deployed weapons. Nevertheless, the last decade or so has seen major technological improvements in Soviet weapons. This is likely to continue into the 1980s as their large, and still increasing, R & D investments come to fruition. Soviet military R & D may become more revolutionary as high risk but potentially rewarding programmes are undertaken. There will be increased likelihood of technological surprises and the need for the West to catch up with the Soviets in areas in which they have been the first to deploy new technology.

The extent to which the Soviets will be able to make the shift to wider deployment of high technology in their weapons successfully is an open question however. It is true that the manpower quality will be improving generally, but there will be the offsetting problem of the changing ethnic composition of the 18-year-old cohort. There are also questions about how they will manage weapon system maintenance in the future. Will more sophisticated designs force them to change their practices, do more diagnosis and repair, and have more highly skilled people doing maintenance at lower echelons? Will increased use of high technology fit into the current way in which they have organised the maintenance and other support functions? They will probably have to select a few areas and make major organisational changes to utilise fully the technologies that they are capable of developing.

Power Projection Mission

In the main, the missions of Soviet forces will probably remain much as they are. The major shift is likely to be the continued development of capabilities to project power into distant crisis areas. The Soviets appear to have decided to extend their reach in the mid- or late- 1960s,

having concentrated before then on power projection into peripheral areas. Since then there have been some changes in the formulation of the statements of missions of their forces to include the protection of Soviet interests and international socialism worldwide, in addition to the classic role of defending the USSR. There have been visible developments, especially in strategic airlift and naval related forces since the early 1970s; more subtle events -- such as training manuals emphasizing the USSR's international role -- also have occurred. At the moment, Soviet capabilities for distant combat remain embryonic, and there is likely to be continued growth in their capabilities to get out into the Third World and other crisis areas.

This development will not be restricted to naval and naval infantry forces; Soviet airborne forces also are likely to play a major role. Further, the overall Soviet effort involves military aid, and they have been trying to acquire access to overseas ports and airfields for some time. Their approach may emphasise capability for rapid intervention by their own forces if that is required or if they are invited. This may, in part, be related to a general Soviet emphasis on speed and surprise as factors leading to success. We may misjudge what the Soviets expect of these forces and the contingencies for their use if we take a too narrow military view of their use. Intervention forces are probably seen and evaluated in terms of their political use and their role in altering perceptions of Soviet power.

TRENDS IN SELECTED AREAS

Strategic Force Posture

The Soviets are likely to continue the development of their strategic force posture, subject to whatever limitations are agreed on in SALT, much along current lines. Soviet doctrine and strategic thinking regarding strategic nuclear forces are quite different from those of the United States. Strategic nuclear warfare is seen as less distinct from other forms of warfare. Although they are under no illusions regarding the destructiveness of thermonuclear weapons, the objective of their strategic force programmes is to develop a capability to fight, survive, and, if possible, win a nuclear war. For the Soviet Union, a credible warfighting capability is the best possible deterrent. While strategic arms limitation agreements may have an effect upon programmes at the margins, there has been no sign

of the kind of agreement that would oblige the Soviets to alter their basic strategic doctrine, or that would prevent significant strategic force improvements.

These improvements will include an emphasis on counterforce capabilities, and on capabilities to attack an enemy's command and control assets. There will be a continued strengthening of Soviet capabilities to function during and after a nuclear war including a broad programme for the survival of the political and administrative leadership, industrial work force and military force, etc. Another aspect of the broad Soviet view of the strategic balance is that they probably look at all the forces which would be involved in a strategic nuclear war -- it is significant that the Strategic Rocket Forces and Long Range Aviation include not only weapons with intercontinental range but also forces for peripheral attack. Except for SALT purposes, it is doubtful that the Soviets single out intercontinental forces for separate assessment.

Witn this in mind, we can make some informed guesses about the areas where Soviet efforts will concentrate in the 1980s. Most of them will be programmes which appear "defensive" in one sense or another. Capabilities to attack US missiles and especially US command and control have already been mentioned. ASW is likely to be another area of emphasis, with the Soviets interested both in protecting their own SSBNs and in attacking and destroying opposing SSBNs. Another emphasis is likely to be air defence. The Soviets already have a major and long-standing effort in this field, and the deployment of US cruise missiles can serve only to strengthen Soviet efforts to improve their air defences. In much the same spirit, the Soviets probably will continue their civil defence efforts.

A major issue likely to arise in the 1980s when the Soviets consider their forces is the increased vulnerability of their silo-based systems, although the rate at which this problem comes upon them depends on US actions. They have an especially strong commitment -- bureaucratic and otherwise -- to maintaining the Strategic Rocket Forces as the main element of their strategic forces. It seems unlikely that they would shift significantly more of their forces to sea or increase the size of their long range air force. Therefore, they will seek solutions to the silo vulnerability problem. This might eventually involve either mobile ICBMs or a variety of measures to increase the protection of the silo-based systems. It may well be that they would want to develop some form of site defence using ABM systems.

The strategic forces are a natural area for the fullest application of their desire to use high technology in weaponry. They will want to develop a high quality MIRVed SLBM during the 1980s. There may also be some areas where more exotic technology would find a use -- as in the use of high energy lasers or space-based weapons of one sort or another.

The Soviet level of effort in this area measured in dollar cost has been about two and a half times that of the US. While strategic arms limitation agreements and a somewhat increased US effort may reduce this margin, it seems likely to remain a major area of Soviet military effort. This is especially so given the broad range of programmes that they are likely to continue work on. The more technically-related parts of this effort -- that is, for the development of new weapon systems -- represent rather specialised resources which the Soviets would find the hardest to divert to non-defence uses.

Forces Targeted Against the European Theatre.

We can expect a steady, long term, Soviet modernisation effort. While a number of new weapons have entered into Soviet forces in the European area, they still have several years to run before completing current modernisation of key weapons such as the newer tanks, the new self-propelled artillery, BMP, etc. The Soviets have been modernising fairly rapidly, and there might be some time before the next wave of new systems begins to come into the force, especially in ground force equipment. Tactical aircraft are likely to be a major area of continued modernisation. With some of the newer, longer-range aircraft, it would be reasonable to expect continued development of avionics and a fuller exploitation of the capabilities of these weapons through changes in training and tactical doctrine. As mentioned earlier, a major constraint may be the way in which they have organised and staffed their maintenance functions in the past.

There is likely to be a very strong effort in the area of command and control. The Soviets will be trying to make use of computers to enhance their capabilities for carrying out their tactical doctrine for theatre warfare, with its emphasis on speed of decision and speed in execution. They also will be focusing continued attention on the protection of their command and control networks which, as they use more computers and increase the flow of information amongst these units, may

have a tendency to become vulnerable, requiring greater redundancy or other offsetting measures.

There is likely to be a widening gap between the capabilities of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. Eastern Europeans have lagged behind the recent modernisation effort of the USSR and, with their current and prospective economic problems in the 1980s, they are not likely to be able to support a major modernisation of increasingly sophisticated forces. This will introduce or exacerbate a number of already emerging logistical and even, perhaps, tactical problems arising from the different weapons and the different capabilities of the units of the Soviet forces and those of Warsaw Pact units.

Soviet commitment to the ability to conduct nuclear operations in Europe will continue into the 1980s. This commitment has been evident in the continuing preparation of conventional forces to operate in a nuclear environment, the protection of key facilities and installations, and the modernisation of Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Conventional forces of the Pact are generally much better equipped than those of NATO to detect radiological and chemical contamination, to protect against their effects, and to decontaminate personnel and equipment. Many operation headquarters for Pact forces are hardened with protective shelters and buried antennae to reduce the effects of nuclear attack. Soviet force modernisation includes the introduction of new, dual-capable aircraft and the deployment of the SS-20 missile, which represent improvements in the ability to conduct nuclear strikes. These current trends are likely to continue in the future, and to become more evident as we learn more about the full spectrum of Soviet preparations for nuclear operations. In the past, we have often focused our attention too narrowly on the number of Soviet nuclear weapons, rather than on how all the elements of the Soviet military structure would operate during nuclear conflict. The Soviets generally follow a different approach, making no distinction between "theatre" and "strategic" nuclear weapons, and integrating conventional and nuclear forces more explicitly in both analysis and doctrine.

There will be important naval developments related to the NATO European area. The seas peripheral to the Soviet Union will remain of great importance to them. They will continue to modernise ships and land-based aircraft to control the northern Norwegian, Black and Baltic Seas. They probably will be alert to and respond to naval developments of all

NATO members. Soviet naval forces are constrained by geography, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean. How can they support, reprovision and re-arm their forces there? To deal with this problem, we can expect them to try to establish Mediterranean facilities and basing rights. Neutralising Turkey would have far-reaching benefits to the Soviets, because much of their offensive naval power is contained in their land-based, naval bomber force. More generally, they can be expected to expand their amphibious and air assault capacities to secure straits and to support their flanks in operations in the North, on the central front, and in the Black Sea and Mediterranean.

In time, they will try to extend their naval defence line further to the south, beyond the Norwegian Sea. Further, they can be expected to apply greater pressure on Norway and perhaps Iceland to try to limit the stationing of opposing aircraft or other military capabilities in these countries. Finally, well aware of the importance of the sea lines of communication to Europe, the Soviets will continue to try to develop the means to interdict them.

Forces on the Chinese Border and for Use in Northeast Asia

Approximately one-quarter of Soviet ground forces and tactical air forces are stationed along the Chinese border and they maintain a major naval force in the Pacific. These forces are unlikely to diminish during the 1980s, but they may not grow much in size despite long-standing Soviet concerns about China and developing concerns about possibly closer ties between China and the US or Japan. After the fairly rapid buildup that began in the middle 1960s (and which levelled out in the early 1970s), the main effort has been devoted to improving the basic military position through construction of defensive zones and the modernisation of equipment, especially for the air and naval forces. In addition, the Soviets are likely to continue to develop nuclear capabilities against the Chinese. This may well involve deployment of the SS-20 and the modernisation of the frontal aviation and long range air force units in the area. There will probably be an emphasis on improvement of warning in air defence systems around their key Asian and Pacific installations.

The BAM Railroad, scheduled to be completed by the mid-1980s, will, as noted earlier, increase the depth of Soviet positions, ease communication problems and allow an increased readiness level of existing forces along

the border. Improved transportation should both permit the stockpiling of supplies and the prepositioning of equipment to improve the ability of Soviet forces to sustain operations and, at the same time, make those forces less dependent on prepositioned stocks. The introduction of newer heavy-lift helicopters could also significantly enhance Soviet military capabilities, given the problems of transportation in the area.

The Soviets will probably increase sea control and power projection forces. Here, as in the NATO area, they are likely to improve their amphibious and air assault capabilities to seize straits and conduct other amphibious operations.

Power Projection Forces

As noted, the Soviets will probably continue their development of their still embryonic military power projection capabilities. In the 1980s, we will see their naval forces deployed around the world, eventually with a credible sea-based tactical air component, with air-cushion vehicles and other upgraded amphibious and naval infantry components, together with a mobile logistics component. They will expand the use of their merchant fleet in its quasi-naval role. This merchant fleet already includes a number of specialised roll on - roll off ships with ramps that allow the use of less developed harbour areas and reinforced decks and other provisions that make them ideal for the transport and rapid loading and unloading of wheeled and tracked vehicles.

The Soviets will also try to obtain access to ports and airfields in Third World countries as part of a systematic attempt to create an improved support system for distant operations. In time, we may even see them deploy detachments of BACKFIRE aircraft, in a manner similar to their current deployment of ASW patrol aircraft, to deny use of certain sea and air space by the West.

The Soviets already have a substantial airborne force with specialised equipments. What role these forces may play in the future in the power projection area is unclear. They seem likely to be used as part of a combined arms philosophy of power projection. For the moment, maritime components provide the political leverage and the bulk of the transport of military supplies when needed. But strategic lift aircraft have already

played a significant role in transport, and can be expected to continue to grow in numbers and to play a larger role in distant operations in the future.

In general, the Soviets are likely to become bolder. This boldness may manifest itself in the actions they take to provide themselves with more direct lines of communication into the Middle East and into Africa. They may first try increasing pressure on adjacent nations to allow transit or overflight of aircraft. They probably will become bolder in their use of Cubans and other surrogates to support Soviet clients in local conflicts.

The big question is under what circumstances the Soviets would be willing to commit their own forces in combat at a distance. They have and will continue to have significant vulnerabilities if it were to come to actual conflict with the US or the West at some distance, such as protection of their own battle groups, logistics forces and airlift forces. As mentioned earlier, it seems more likely that Soviet use of these forces will be political in nature -- perhaps in an attempt to preempt a crisis. This may lead to a strong emphasis on small forces that can get in place quickly.

MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES AND INTERVENING EVENTS

In making projections for a period as long as ten years, there are obviously many intervening events that can influence what will happen. There also are uncertainties as to how existing trends and emerging problems will work themselves out. The bulk of this paper deals with the most likely general trends, and assumes no major important shocks that shift Soviet assessments or Soviet capabilities to pursue the continued development of their military forces. The possible effects of SALT and MBFR negotiations on the Soviet military establishment of the 1980s have not been discussed directly. That is both because many other observers have commented in great detail on such negotiations, and because to date the negotiations have focused on changes at the margin. Other major perturbations or uncertainties are treated below.

Unexpected Internal Developments

Under this heading, the major uncertainty would appear to be the severity of the Soviet economic problem and the nature of the competition

for resources that may develop in the mid-1980s. The earlier discussion of the continuing slow-down in the rate of growth of Soviet GNP, the increasing defence burden, demographic and energy problems was assumed to be a gradually emerging problem that the Soviets may have to resolve. However, because there are several negative trends that are converging and which may reinforce one another, the Soviet economic problems of the 1980s and into the 1990s may be much more severe and more resistant to solution than anyone can forecast at the moment. If that were to be so, it could raise within the Soviet Union the necessity for a major reassessment of their policies. They may have to face the need to divert resources from the military sector to improve the prospects for the long term economic development of their society. Raising such fundamental problems of priorities and values would undoubtedly develop into an intense political struggle within the Soviet Union. Clearly, this could lead to a very different course for the 1980s. At the moment, however, we cannot be sure even of the diagnosis of how severe the problems will be, let alone how the Soviets would react to them.

Unexpected Reactions to Soviet Initiatives

As the Soviets become bolder in pushing out into the Third World and perhaps involving their own forces more openly, there is a possibility of a major confrontation some time in the 1980s. Even now, a number of nations are reacting to Soviet initiatives overseas. A confrontation, perhaps as intense as that of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, could have a major impact on the expected trends. On the one hand, if the situation turned out badly from the Soviet point of view, it could lead to a reassessment of how rapidly they could pursue interventions in the Third World and perhaps bring about a shift in the nature of the forces they would try to develop. The crisis, again depending on its outcome, might lead to increased military expenditures in the West and in the Soviet Union. Another sort of crisis would be a major East European crisis, perhaps like the Hungarian or Czech crises of the past. Should the Soviets find themselves required to reassert control over an Eastern European country by military force, the effects could be substantial. It might change their views of their need for forces opposite NATO, and they might increase them as they did following the Czech crisis. It might also lead them to doubt the reliability of other Warsaw Pact forces and frustrate the harmonious development of the Warsaw Pact nations. They are clearly continuing their efforts to develop the

Warsaw Pact organisation and to encourage member countries to modernise their forces (although progress may be slow, given the Eastern European economic problems). The continued attempt to integrate these forces, especially in functions such as air defence, may be a primary reason why any sort of East European political independence is seen as unacceptable to the Soviet Union. In any case, such a crisis would have a high probability of changing the mood in Europe, raise tensions, and lead to increased Western European defence budgets.

Changes in the External Environment

There are three possible changes in the external environment that the previous discussion has not adequately reflected. The first of these is the emergence of regional powers -- Iran is a possible example -- which, during the course of the 1980s, will develop significant military capabilities. These regional developments may make Soviet intervention outside its borders more likely and increase the need for visible power projection capabilities to offset this somewhat more hostile environment.

A second, though related, development is the wider distribution of sophisticated weapons in the Third World. Trends in military technology generally have been in the direction of giving smaller units significantly more firepower. This may make both intervention and the general use of military force somewhat more difficult or risky.

A third and extremely unpredictable factor is the future Japanese defence effort. Japan has one of the most powerful and productive economies in the world but she has had very limited and defensive military forces. Recently, the Japanese have become increasingly concerned about the development of Soviet military strength in the Far East and taken increased notice of specific Soviet force developments and exercises. The Japanese might wish to maintain their current situation, keeping their defensive forces very limited but, if they should decide that that was an unwise course as a result of Soviet activity, they could develop large and very capable military forces. They might also play a critical role in the future development of Chinese military forces, given their strong technological base. Any major shift in Japanese policy with respect to its defence effort would significantly alter within a short time the military situation in the Far East. Soviet naval forces in particular

would no longer appear adequate and access to and from the Sea of Japan would seem less assured. The technological level of the military competition in that region could be revolutionised.

CONCLUSION

Projections for the 1980s are, in large part, a continuation of current trends and momentum. This seems reasonable in view of the rather predictable nature of developments in the Soviet Union up until now but predictions could well be upset by major perturbations in the domestic or international environment. These might include the severity of the confluence of demographic, economic productivity and investment problems, and how they could interact with an already massive allocation of resources to defence. External developments quite independent of the actions of the Soviet Union might also upset the trends as would any substantial confrontation by the West of Soviet initiatives and policies.

In the absence of such major and inherently unpredictable stimuli, we can expect to see a Soviet military force of increasing sophistication and strength but of a size comparable to that of today. The higher costs to acquire, operate and support that technologically more advanced force may lead to organisational and manpower adjustments, but military force composition will remain much as it is today except for the continuing emergence of power projection forces.

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PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

PLENARY SESSION

Friday, 8 September | Morning (1)

SOURCES OF SOVIET POWER: ECONOMY, POPULATION, RESOURCES

by

Georges Sokoloff (France)

[illegible]
La forza dell'URSS continuerà a basarsi sulle capacità militari piuttosto che su quelle economiche.
Difficilmente si può considerare una transizione graduale dal ruolo attuale a una leadership di tipo diverso

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Plenary Paper

SOURCES OF SOVIET POWER: ECONOMY, POPULATION, RESOURCES

Georges Sokoloff

INTRODUCTION

In 1980 the USSR generates 3000 million Kw/hr of electricity; her mechanical industries produce, in volume terms, five times as much as their American rivals; the abundance of goods and the reasonable behaviour of the consumers have removed any consumption difficulties; thanks to their own demographic dynamism as well as the seductive power of the Soviet economic model for Third World countries, socialist peoples are becoming a very large majority of the world's population. Capitalism is thus beaten without bloodshed.

These prophecies, guaranteed by the veteran Communist economist Strumilin [1] are more than just an anecdote. They are a reminder of an important evolution which occurred in the USSR twenty years ago about the best means for her (the USSR) to dominate the world. It was no longer a case of triumphing by the shining light of revolutionary ideals, or merely by the intimidating power of her military-industrial capacity, but by developing a central position in the world economy. This challenge to the West in the realm of non-military power was not a totally free choice. Once accomplished, it would enable the USSR to envisage intervention in world affairs with a range of means much more flexible than naked military pressure.

Today this idea must itself be re-examined. Work, undertaken in the West, on the economic future of the USSR gives a better impression of the basis of her power. [2] Although the programme for the construction of Communism is not officially abandoned by the Party, this Western work reaches much the same conclusions, on many points, as the predictions of the Soviet planners themselves. In fact, taking into account her present position and the unencouraging prospects opened up by a prematurely slowed growth, the USSR does not, and probably will not, have the means to become an economic super-power.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY

A Huge Economy

Using the estimates which, in the last analysis, least satisfy the expert as well as the visual witness of Soviet economic realities, the 1976 GNP was approximately $710 billion.[3] This figure undoubtedly classifies the USSR as the second economic power in the world, a classification which is confirmed by several other indicators. The total labour force is, at present, over 140 million of which more than 50 million are employed in industry and construction and 10 million have completed courses of higher education. While spending considerable efforts to develop her natural riches - to the point of having become the world's most important producer of several natural resources - the Soviet Union has notably developed her processing industry (92% of industrial outlays). She has devoted an increasing proportion of her industrial investments (one-third in 1976) to the mechanical and chemical sectors.

In fact, however, the USSR remains a semi-developed economy. Dividing the GNP by population (GNP per capita : $2760 - 19th in Europe), by work force, or by surface area, gives a better indication of the low standard of living, productivity of labour, and the difficulties of efficiently exploiting the land. In the richest zones the products on offer to the consumer are of 'utilitarian' types; elsewhere serious shortages, especially after years with bad harvests, are the case. The structure of foreign trade with the West recalls that of a developing country. This impression is confirmed by the rapid rise of the foreign debt in convertible currencies since the rulers decided to open up the economy to mitigate the qualitative and quantitative gaps of her capital stock.

The Military Burden

To complete this evaluation, and partly to explain it, it is absolutely necessary to take into account the tapping of national resources represented by the search for military parity with an American economy which, each year, has had double the Soviet GNP. This tapping

is probably one-eighth of the (Soviet) GNP. To grasp more closely what such a rate means, it may be useful to point out that military stocks represent about a third of the mechanical products going to final demand;[4] this is a serious handicap for the weakest element of Soviet investment capacity - machines and equipment. There is also the impact (on consumption) of maintaining an army of four million men as well as spending the lion's share of total research and development funds on defence. Final military expenditure also uses an important proportion of the intermediary products (one-fifth of metallurgic products; one-sixth of chemical products and of energy resources) and of the factors of production of the USSR. And all this tapping of the economy is even more serious as, from the qualitative point of view, it needs what is best in the country, whether it be of men, machines or materials.[5]

THE USSR'S ECONOMIC TRUMPS AND THEIR USE

A Fragmented Economic Power

The large adjustments that must be made to a still too widely accepted view of the USSR - that of an already well-developed economy - no doubt enable us to grasp better what could be the non-military sources of Soviet power. These sources are not due to the USSR's economic weight in the world for this would mean that all decisions concerning domestic economic or foreign trade policy would have international repercussions, usable by the country to affirm its hold on its international environment. They are rather more like a collection of trumps, separately identifiable, and whose value is very uneven depending on the regions where the USSR strives to act.

In regard to the main partners within the CMEA (Comecon), she mainly uses the vastness of her mineral resource and her production of basic industrial products[6] as a means of controlling their supply of raw materials. Likewise, the comparatively enormous capacity of the Soviet market for her CMEA partners gives the USSR the option of influencing their choice of specialization.[7]

With regard to the Third World, the Soviet Union can likewise use its powers as buyer and seller, although for different groups of products. We know that the USSR's aid to this Third World is in volume terms not

very large. Its prominence is however greater than proportional to its value in as much as it is concentrated in few countries and on conspicuous public sector industrial projects. The USSR has thus been demonstrably able to contribute towards the development of heavy industry in India and Egypt, towards the Syrian and Iraqi industries and towards the extraction of Afghan and Iranian natural gas.[8] In addition to undertaking to buy back a proportion of the production initiated, in certain cases she buys large quantities of raw materials (Malaysian rubber, Bolivian tin, Moroccan phosphates and 'tropical' foods).

There were some in the West who feared the development of East-West trade believing that it would lead to a dependence on Soviet supplies analogous to that in Eastern Europe. Even taking into account isolated cases - such as the relative importance for Italy of Soviet gas supplies - observations tend to lead to the opposite conclusions. We can thus estimate that one-eighth of the new Soviet investment in machinery depends on Western supplies. Nonetheless, this dependency is susceptible to being changed into a trump card, especially when the West's economic sluggishness makes export markets for her capital goods industries more scarce and slows down her banking activities. The unequal conditions of access to her markets can be used by the USSR, even when she is in no way responsible for these inequalities, to create conflicts of interest between the Western countries: hence, trying to profit from the crisis in her relations with the USA, the USSR is once again turning towards Western Europe, even encouraging it to become an independent political entity.[9] Her position as the CMEA's largest borrower, with a total CMEA debt of approximately $50 billion at the end of 1977, gives the USSR, as it does to all debtors, a certain power over the strength of the Western financial system. Finally, her purchases of Western capital goods have ended up by giving her positions of strength in certain well defined areas: for example through the establishment of a large naval freight capacity and the export of fertilizers.

Use of the Trumps

The fragmentary, unequal and sometimes paradoxical nature of these sources of power draw particular attention to the more or less judicious use that is made from them. From this standpoint there are two main

lines of thought. According to the first one - which is the older and more often used - the USSR has used her trumps accepting, on occasions, an economic loss to prevent a greater political loss. This is especially how the Soviet acceptance of the pricing policy within CMEA, in the name of the 'Bucharest principle', is interpreted.[10] The advantageous credit conditions offered by the USSR to developing countries are also interpreted in this way, as are even certain aspects of the Soviet commercial policy towards the West - especially the 'political bonus' given to France to the detriment of the FRG in the second half of the sixties. This is a fundamental constant of the USSR's policy, for she is better equipped than others to carry out a sort of cost/benefit analysis giving priority to political criteria.[11] In any case, the 'political dumping' practised, to which we have referred, seems to stem from the decision-makers' feeling that the USSR's economic trumps, bargained at their real price, would not have been sufficiently attractive to guarantee the political interests of the country.

The second line of thought, which conflicts with the former, stems from the Soviet desire to make her trump cards economically profitable. This desire was put into concrete form by the adoption, in 1975, of the 'Moscow rule' as the new guidelines for determining prices within CMEA which were definitely more favourable to the development of Soviet terms of trade. It can also be seen in the modification of credit terms to the Third World ($2\frac{1}{2}$ - 3% over 12 years, and then, since 1966 for certain undertakings, higher interest rates, over 5 to 10 years and with a first payment of 10 - 15%). As to the criteria used to choose between this or that Western supplier, they always clearly prefer technological capacity, financial strength and stable labour relations. Keeping to the idea of a policy based on a cost/benefit analysis, one would tend to explain this evolution by a marked raising of the marginal cost of economic resources in the USSR, hence tending to considerably increase the opportunity cost of ceding them to 'political' considerations. Now, any analysis of the Soviet prospects for economic growth in the 80s shows that there will be an unprecedented growth in the marginal cost of resources.

THE CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE EIGHTIES

The Constraints imposed by Resource Dynamics

L. Brezhnev, Admiral Turner and numerous experts of all nationalities, have reached an astonishing concensus about the future productive resource dynamics of the USSR. This is even somewhat worrying when one thinks that it deals with medium to long term economic projections in a country noted for its tradition of secrecy.

An analysis of the USSR's demographic prospects, especially well studied by M. Feshbach,[12] provides one of the corner stones for these projections. For our interests, this analysis has a double claim to being of use. On the one hand, total population is one of the distinguishing features of a great power. The Soviet population will increase by about the same number - 25 million - between 1980 and 1990 as it did in the previous decade, but the proportion of Slavs will decrease, due to the faster growth of the Central Asian populations. And, especially, the fall in the birth rate of the sixties will have particularly strong repercussions on her population of working age. One would not expect this part of the population to grow at more than a half of one percent per year during the 80s, against 1.8% since the beginning of the 70s. The fact that most of the expected growth will come from Central Asia tends to complicate matters, inasmuch as these tend to be less developed regions, whose population, for sociological reasons, does not seem to wish to migrate to the industrial zones. The global economic impact of this demographic trend must certainly not be exaggerated. According to the elasticities most often used to calculate the USSR's aggregate production functions, a variation of 1% in the number of hours worked (which can differ from that of the population of working age) leads to a change of 0.6-0.7% in GNP. Nevertheless, if the growth of the latter were to be cut by only 1% due to the relative scarcity of available labour, it would still be cause for concern.

It is even more so as the main source of Soviet growth - the increase in capital stock - is itself causing serious problems. In the USSR, the capital stock must increase by about 3% to obtain a 1% growth in GNP. Under these conditions, only a truly enormous investment effort could compensate for the loss of growth due to the relative scarcity of

the labour inputs. Now, such an effort does not appear to be feasible given the constraints. **Firstly,** the decision-makers would not be able to increase the total rate of accumulation without further endangering the prospects for consumption. Secondly, they would not - although this is a hypothesis open to discussion - be able to achieve large scale substitution of productive capital goods production for that of military equipment. Lastly, the experience of recent years has shown that increases in the rate of investment, notably in modern industries, is accompanied by large increases in convertible currency debts.

Furthermore, numerous writings have emphasized the problem posed by the availability of raw materials. Most of these are still abundant but their location, very far from the main centres of economic activity, considerably increase their cost.

The Military Burden Mortgage and the Rigidity of the Economic System

Considerations such as the ones just touched upon explain why CIA analysts [13] and other Western experts [14] reckon on an average growth, during the eighties, of total inputs to the Soviet economy of the order of $2\frac{1}{2}$ - 3%. But, as we have already noted, the projection is partially dependent on the hypothesis used about the future trends in military hardware spending.

The hypothesis used by the CIA experts for the future growth rate of military spending in the USSR set it at 4.5% per annum, that is at a higher rate than the growth in GNP. Certainly, very interesting analyses have shown that "too" great a reduction in the growth of armaments (such as to take it below 2% per annum) would benefit neither the consumer nor the Soviet's ability to grow [15] because the resulting excess growth would be absorbed by the additional investment needed to maintain a very high rate of growth of the capital stock. Nevertheless, all studies carried out agree in stressing that the maintenance of a high growth rate of military spending (equal to the present one, or that expected by the CIA) would seriously compromise the USSR's economic outlook. If the postulate of such a growth must still be accepted, it is mainly because of the inertial forces that characterise the military system which largely obeys an internal logic of its own of successive phases of research and development.

We must still elucidate why Western projections associate a small increase in the inputs to the economy with a growth rate of the USSR's GNP hardly greater than around 3% per annum. This implies a very small contribution by productivity to total growth.

This has regularly declined in the USSR to the point of being negative in the 1971 - 1975 period. This decline is partly explained by the exhaustion of the traditional productivity gains (especially inter-sectorial transfers of productive factors), by the particularly violent impact on growth in recent years of the 1975 harvest failure, and more importantly, by the maintenance of a demobilising economic system. Such conservatism is even more damaging to itself because, at the macro-structural level, the authorities apparently would wish to have a more even-handed economic policy especially as regards the consumer, the agricultural world and the country's innovative capacity. But the authorities also intend to control tightly the effects of this policy. The degree of centralisation of each decision remains enormous, and nothing is being done to replace the rigid rules of an administered economy with a truly economic mechanism. As a result, the good intentions of the country's guides do not, in practice, give the desired results.

Reforms could profoundly change this situation and notably help to loosen the constraints which burden their resources. From what we know of the lack of intensity of work and the totally artificial nature of full employment in the USSR, we can be sure that the 150 million workers she will have, on average, in the 80s would be, according to Western norms, an excessive work force. Similarly the capital resources would appear less stretched if there could be some reduction in those innumerable wastages of means and time which at present are part of each stage of the investment cycle.[16)]

The self-evident necessity of these reforms does not mean, however, that they will be adopted. Recent trends in Soviet pricing policy do not indicate a will to adjust to market relationships.[17)] The attempt by Professor Valovozh to restart a discussion about the reforms, based on a sharp critique of the present system[18)] produced no response. Basically the impression remains that the present <u>modus vivendi</u> has not only satisfied the business managers and the bureaucratic process, but the

population itself. The latter has been able to accommodate itself to a formalist regime of "natural incentives" where the rate of growth of nominal incomes has remained greater than that of the "official" consumption fund, inasmuch as the resurgence of black market activities, tolerated by the authorities, has enabled it to use its excess roubles according to its wishes.

The Usefulness of Alternative Scenarios

The permanence of a heavy military burden and of a rigid economic system naturally remain working hypotheses. Modifying these hypotheses, we could usefully build alternative scenarios of future conditions for Soviet economic growth. The realism of such scenarios could be based on one of the rare certainties we have about the political future of the country: the reign of L. Brezhnev is drawing to a close. As with all preceding guides of the USSR, he will, whether explicitly or not, be criticized for his "subjectivism".[19] An excessive commitment towards the West and the lack of reforms could come together in this critique in that Soviet dependence on the West's industrial enterprises appears to be the ransom that must be paid by a planning system which is incapable of giving the USSR an original development programme.

Nonetheless there are additional reasons which make real changes improbable. The internal debates, instead of producing real alternative policies, may simply further divide the Political Bureau into "reformers", "hawks" and "centrists". In this case "wait and see" policies would probably be implemented. Furthermore, if the pressure that is being exerted on the USSR by the present American Administration were to continue, it would deprive liberal ideas of the atmosphere of security they need for a long time if they are to consolidate themselves. Finally, as will be shown in the final section of this analysis, the "pessimistic" hypotheses appear most compatible with the ways in which the USSR might be led to use its future power.

TYPE AND EFFECT OF THE FUTURE SOURCES OF POWER

The Changing Trumps

One point comes out clearly from the previous analysis. The USSR will not be able, in the 80s, to appear as an economic super-power even

if the state of affairs in the West were not to improve. On the contrary, the development gap between the USSR and the main western powers will no doubt stabilise, leaving the USSR at an intermediate level. This situation, taking into account the cultural influence of Western products, might be bitterly received by the population, because consumption volume in the USSR could not grow at an annual rate greater than 2.5%.

As at present, the USSR would then only have a series of trumps and not a more complete form of power. However, as some of these trumps represent non-reproductive resources and as their value depends on variations in the international economic and political situation, their structure is liable to change. Hence gold could become, for the USSR, a real instrument of power especially if the political situation in South Africa were to deteriorate sharply. [20] The further we go into the future, the more Siberian resources of non-ferrous metals, timber, coal and natural gas will represent, in spite of the cost of extraction, a supply of growing interest, especially for countries such as Japan. Among the less "primary" trumps, we can expect an increased role for certain Soviet products or services: increase of maritime freight capacity, increased interest by certain Third World countries - because of their unemployment problems - in the labour intensive technologies offered by the USSR, and an increase in the Soviet export capacity in products resulting from the compensation agreements negotiated with the West (natural gas, wood pulp, basic chemical products, and non-ferrous metals).

If the importance of certain trumps increases that of others will sharply decrease. Naturally the petrol problem arises here. This has been given great prominence by the CIA reports in the Spring and Summer of 1977, but its seriousness was already apparent from a reading of Soviet sources. There were warnings by the previous minister for the petroleum industry, V. Shashin, in May 1976 [21] and recently confirmed by his successor N. Mal'cev [22], the weaknesses of geological prospecting were denounced by F. Salmanov [23] and there was confirmation by three experts from the petroleum industry [24] of the swift increase in water content and extraction costs between now and 1980. The best that can be expected is that in 1985 the USSR will produce about 630 million tonnes and will be able to export a maximum of 30 million tonnes. Certainly the USSR's

domestic needs will still be met, but the general restructuring of the different energy components which will then be necessary would probably weigh heavily on the East-European economies, whose petroleum deficit could reach 150 million tonnes in 1985. [25] Even as a supplier of alternative energy sources and with her importance as a market, the USSR would then undoubtedly lose a part of her physical hold over her CMEA partners.

The Problems of Profitability

In parallel with this change in her holdings of trump cards, the USSR will probably wish to play them differently. "Political" considerations would still guide certain decisions. For example, the USSR's socialist partners will pay for their supplies at world prices but not in convertible currencies; certain developing countries will continue to benefit from aid under favourable conditions as a reward for becoming members of the CMEA. However, in general, the USSR will probably seek to maximise the economic profitability of resources which will be costing her more and more to extract.

This desire for profitability is likely to come up against serious difficulties due to the probability of very stiff competition in international markets, to prejudices against Soviet expansionism if she were competitive commercially and also because of the dangers for the West of any extension of the Soviet's policy of making the most of their trumps in the Third World. Any increased political insecurity in those parts of the world which sell the same resources as she can only serve the USSR's economic interests. South African gold, platinum and diamonds are a case in point as is copper from Africa (Zambia, Zaire) and from Latin America (Chile, Peru). If growth of Soviet activity in the Southern hemisphere seems probable, it is not only because this region of the world contains resources which are competing with the USSR's "primary" trumps. The opening of new markets for her heavy industries and the will to control sea lanes are conditions for increasing the value of her "secondary" trumps. Also, when the USSR tries to compensate for her loss of petroleum power by outside contributions from Iran, Iraq and the Middle East in general, these areas will more than ever be the main targets of Soviet foreign policy.

Evidently these predictions carry the seeds of numerous sources of friction with the West. And it is appropriate to ask if the future "reciprocal advantages" of detente and of East-West cooperation will be sufficient to balance these damaging developments. From this point of view, there is no doubt that the Soviet's need for investment goods will continue even if only because the role of new investment as a factor of domestic growth will be more important than ever.

On the other hand there are numerous uncertainties with regard to the USSR's capacity to balance her "industrialising imports". Future demand in Western markets is still unpredictable. The conditions for putting into effect compensation accords might be more difficult than expected. [26] Although it is feasible to envisage a more favourable trend in the USSR's cereal production after 1985, it is also likely that petrol will become an expense and no longer a source of convertible currencies for the country. Nor is it certain that the imbalances in the USSR's current balance of payments can be financed in orderly conditions. Cheap Western credits with public backing will probably become more scarce. The banks' base rates are increasing once again. Consequently the USSR may well limit her imports to proportions which Western bankers and exporters have recently experienced. It is already apparent that the Western world is unconvinced by the Soviet message that detente and cooperation are a priority compared to which the USSR's actions in the Third World are not very important.

The number of risks and hazards that the future world situation holds for the USSR justify the hypotheses we have adopted about the trends in this country. They explain why she keeps "in reserve" an economic system allowing her, should the occasion arise, to make political use of certain sources of economic power, as opposed to the need to make them profitable. They especially explain the maintenance of an enormous defence effort as a means of intimidating the West, as a police force within the socialist camp and as a support for intervention - by exporting arms - in the Third World.

CONCLUSION

These last remarks underline the fact that the Soviet Union continues to need, to maintain her power abroad, the very conditions which limit

her domestic economic growth. It is furthermore likely that this need is voluntarily accentuated by the Soviet pressure groups which profit most by it. Whatever the case, it is evidently very difficult for the USSR to tear herself away from a form of power where the possible recourse to force and to politically-motivated dumping limit her development, to enable her to reach a level where her weight in international affairs would be essentially based on the wealth of her economy.

NOTES

1) S. Strumlin, "Nash mir cherez 20 let", Moscow, 1964.

2) See in particular, "Soviet Economy in a New Perspective", a compendium of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, Washington, October 1976. This source is cited below as "J.E.C., 1976".

3) According to the World Bank's estimates. For a discussion of the different methods of evaluating the USSR's GNP in dollars see G. Sokoloff and G. Wild, "Un bilan des comparaisons Est-Ouest de niveaux de développement" Economies et Sociétés, Cahiers G, No. 35, 1978.

4) The calculations of S. Cohn ("Estimation of military durables procurement expenditures from machinery production and sales data". Stanford Research Institute, June 1977) give the same results on this as my estimates.

5) "Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China, 1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of Joint Economic Committee...", Part 3, p. 19.

6) See the table published, for 1976, in East-West Markets, July 10 1978, vol. 6. No. 14, p.8.

7) See G. Sokoloff, "Deux stratégies d'intégration internationale: socialisme et capitalisme", Economie Appliquée, XXIV,No. 4, 1971, pp. 559 - 603.

8) O. Cooper, "Soviet Economic Aid to the Third World", J.E.C.,1976, pp. 189 - 196.

9) Results of the meeting between the representatives of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (Paris) and of the IMEMO in Moscow, 19 - 22 June, 1978.

10) P. Marer, "Has Eastern Europe become a liability for the Soviet Union - The Economic Aspect", Conference on the International Politics of Eastern Europe, Columbia University, March 1975.

11) See A. Nove, "The Soviet Economic System", 1977, chap. XIV.

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TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Oxford, England - 7-10 September, 1978

PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s

PLENARY SESSION

Sunday, 10 September — Morning

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF THE 1980s

by

Philip Windsor

London

Pentalen:

- ci caratteri negli anni '80 una serie di organizzazioni regionali (tipo EEC) - Regionalism Partecipazione regionale

- disaggregazione del sistema bipolare per i poli ordini locali,

- conflittualità locali: valori ideologici, nazionalità

- URSS è debole: ancora diventa una superpotenza [illegible] la base [illegible], senza interesse nel mondo esterno, non vero coinvolgimento, ma solo per bilanciare la potenza militare americana. Ha poco da offrire "Drive without a purpose". Tuttavia resta "un "world competitor".
  Rifiuta l'interdipendenza (autarchia).

- Nei prossimi 10 non è da prevedere alcun cambiamento sostanziale di questa situazione.

- 2 major constraints
  - US; anche guerra nucleare;
  - --

- nationalism has not replaced ideology. Ideology gives the space where nationalism play

Beloff: il quadro di [illegible] prende dal contributo che l'URSS può dare al sistema internazionale. Questa è la base della [illegible] di dialogo.

Lo [illegible]: distinguere fra la [illegible] della distensione (un sistema equilibrio stabile) e le politiche della distensione che possono risolvere specifici problemi.
Counter-imperialism developed by USSR in certain areas (Asia del sud, Europa, [illegible] dell'Africa).
I Russi partono dall'assunzione di un mondo conflittuale.
Neither Western policies, [illegible] "tough" or "forthcoming", can substantially influence the course of foreign policy.
[illegible]: Window [illegible] tends towards globalism, [illegible] tends toward regionalism.

continua [illegible]

IISS TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Plenary Paper

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF THE 1980s

Philip Windsor

It is, of course, impossible to discuss the role of the Soviet Union in the world of the 1980s. The nature of that world, and the part played in its determination by the power of the USSR, are so totally interdependent that one might just as well attempt to discuss the role of the trade unions in the British economy. Developments in Africa and American reactions, the prospects for the control of the arms race, the chances of a global attempt to deal with imminent energy problems, will all help to determine, and will all be in part determined by, the domestic politics of the Soviet Union and the interaction, in the form of agreement, corflict or understanding, of these politics with those of the United States and other centres of power. But this initial admission also offers a starting point for a discussion, and the starting point itself carries a further implication. The starting point is obvious. The Soviet Union has become a global power. But the manner in which it has done so also merits a little consideration. Long before it acquired anything like a global reach, the Soviet Union was regarded as a superpower. At first, this title smacked rather of an ascriptive courtesy -- reflecting Professor Fox's celebrated if erroneous wartime analysis -- than of any existing reality; but nature gradually came to imitate art, and the USSR emerged as the true bipolar partner of the United States.

But bipolarity was always a phenomenon that reflected the power of the United States. It was because the United States was a true superpower, one which could order the economic system of most of the world, one on whose strength other countries depended for their prosperity or their chances of growth, one whose political influence took a myriad forms from the overt patrolling of frigates to the covert activities of intelligence, that the world could be deemed to enjoy (or suffer from) a bipolar system. And it was only because the United States gave overriding consideration to the military power of the USSR, and to the need for preserving a stable alliance against war with that country, that the Soviet Union could really enjoy its status as a bipolar associate. It had become a

superpower purely by virtue of its strategic strength and its consequent strategic relationship with Washington; and it did so before it acquired any of the dimensions of a global power. The difficulty is that whereas the experience of the United States reflected a global involvement, a sometimes unwilling shouldering of responsibility, but nonetheless a sense of responsibility for global order before it had become a superpower, one to which its resources as a superpower were harnessed, the Soviet Union has become a global power from the previous position of already having been a superpower. For the Soviet Union, this position is a luxury, reflecting little of the pattern of its economic or political intercourse with the rest of the world, reflecting few identifiable or quantifiable interests, and therefore indicating only an enigma about the nature of its involvement or the character of its intentions.

Yet the manner of the Soviet emergence as a global power reveals the implication; and the implication is paradoxical. The Soviet Union is weak. Indeed, its military strength might well be argued to be a function of its weakness in other spheres. Its economic aid to developing countries consists largely of showpiece projects -- a steel mill in India or Turkey -- or in the guaranteed purchase of cash crops like Egyptian cotton, or in direct currency subventions to places like Cuba. It is in no sense capable of trying to sustain a programme of widespread economic growth. It has little to offer in the way of agronomic expertise or advanced technology. Since it can hardly play a forceful part in a world system where economic and political considerations interact constantly, its political influence is in fact restricted, and it is notably absent from such attempts (for what they are worth) to reconstitute relations between the rich and poor of the world as the North-South dialogue. In fact, the principal vehicle of its power is military hardware, supplemented by a sometimes transitory military presence. The policies which result are notoriously unstable, and for all its temporary successes, the USSR has been expelled from almost as many countries outside its immediate alliance system as those in which it has gained a foothold. In fact, the global presence of the Soviet Union is a demonstration of its strength but also an indicator of its weakness.

What, then, have we seen? A system apparently bipolar, but one whose bipolar nature depended in fact on the power of only one country. The emergence of its partner into the position of a global power, but one

whose very range and involvement helped to demonstrate its own weakness. In consequence, Soviet involvement in the affairs of the world has not, as it should logically have done were the USSR truly powerful, helped to confirm the bipolar system: it has challenged it. This is not of course to suggest that the Soviet Union was, or might have been, interested in securing its acceptance by the United States as a status quo power, co-responsible for world order and security, and enjoying à titre d'égaux the imperial benefits of condominium. Sometimes it was and sometimes it wasn't. Often, it has shown a degree of political interest in doing so, coupled with an ideological adversion. The military and strategic constraints of its position have prompted it in part to accept the stability of the controlled adversary relationship; but an adversary relationship it has always been. The whole history and ideological evolution of the USSR since 1917 suggest that it would always seek to challenge the reigning assumptions of the Western capitalist system, in the post-Imperial age as much as during the Imperial era itself. Nonetheless, if Soviet involvement in the affairs of other regions had taken more properly rooted economic or political forms it is possible to suggest that it would have been easier to reach some degree of accommodation or compromise with Moscow: that if the Western countries, and they alone, had not been so visibly and exclusively responsible for the economic development of the third world, that if Russians had been able to challenge Americans with money as well as with abstract models of economic development, then the USSR would have been less able to exploit grievances in what has so often appeared to be a subversive and irresponsible manner, to turn social and economic discontent into bloody conflict, to challenge that very bipolar order on which its acceptance as a superpower originally depended.

The global emergence of the Soviet Union is thus a double phenomenon. Not only does it indicate Soviet weakness, but it also suggests that that weakness is almost bound to present Soviet activity as subversive to any global understanding, and potentially dangerous to the superpower relationship. But not everything, of course, can be lain at the door of Soviet history or of the character of the Soviet system.

The bipolar system has been crumbling for a long time anyway. Political scientists have long taken pleasure in charting its decay. It was a tight system when the Soviet Union was globally at its weakest;

it became a looser system as the Soviet Union became stronger. In part, this merely reflects the gradual tidying-up of Europe. As Europe became less and less likely to cause general war between the two superpowers, so other crises in the world fed less directly into European crises. By the time that the Four Power Agreement on Berlin was concluded in 1972, there was very little connection left between the original causes of the cold war in Europe and the general pattern of conflict elsewhere. But in part, too, the decay of bipolarity reflected the comparative weakness of the United States: weakness in comparison not merely to the growing strategic strength of its Soviet rival (a strength which in many important areas has still not reach parity with that of the US) but also in comparison to the emergence of other forms and centres of power.

In the end, bipolarity might be said to have depended upon a neat, artificial, and perhaps almost fortuitous, relationship between the different forms and the single centre. When Washington was the centre of almost all political, economic and military influence, bipolarity was a world order. Since then, different centres have begun to compete with Washington in different forms. There would be few today who would still abide by the brave futurology of a few years ago, when Japan was held to be the 'emergent super-state' (since futurology is really the study of the present), but it is obvious that Japan can cause acute discomfort to its Western partners in trading and monetary matters. Yet Japan is still a relatively insignificant military power, and is likely to remain so for some time to come. Similarly, the countries of the EEC have on occasion appeared to be the centres of economic decision-making; on other occasions some of them have shown an ability to intervene with a rapid and effective show of military force in the affairs of Africa; European optimists could still claim that they exercise very considerable political and economic influence on the third world through the Lomé Convention; but not only has the success of Europe been intermittent in time and variable in content, but the EEC has always depended for its fundamental security and its very continuance as an entity on the strategic guarantee of the United States. Such a bewildering variety -- even sometimes, one might say, succession -- of different forms of power have made it very much more difficult for the most powerful state in the world to organise and co-ordinate a global order. The President of the United States is today accused of being weak and indecisive in the direction of his foreign policy. In part such accusations reflect a nostalgia, of which some of his critics may decently

be convicted, for the elegant simplicities of the cold war; in part they reflect the yearnings of those for whom Henry Kissinger was the cynosure of Machiavellian management; but in large part they simply reflect the fact that it is very much more difficult today to orchestrate American policy in so many different areas than it has been at any time since 1945.

This change in the American position relative to that of other powers, and in the management of different forms of power, has meant that the international system is no longer really bipolar, except in one sense. Clearly, it remains so in the sense of strategic management, and is likely to for the foreseeable future. But the interaction of the concerns of strategic management and the avoidance of nuclear war will almost certainly take an increasingly confused form over the next few years. If the pattern of world relationships can no longer be ordered into a system of bipolarity through a single centre of power and if instead it is likely to show more and more fissiparous characteristics, then the manner in which the two superpowers maintain their strategic relationship while pursuing their rivalries in other spheres is going to present difficulties for both. Conceptual difficulties, difficulties of domestic politics, difficulties in determining the relationship between effective threat and effective conciliation. It is possible that acts of policy, and particularly perhaps the process of agreement in SALT, which were once seen as the keystone to a whole structure of detente, will come to be regarded as partial and functional arrangements without any great relevance beyond the borders of their own immediate agenda. But if this possibility (which seems already to be taking shape) should coincide with a period of increased tension or with a pattern of apparently meaningless subversive activity on the part of the Soviet Union, if above all, the Soviet Union is still so weak that it continues to strive for influence through the medium of military power, it is further possible that the avoidance of nuclear war will lose all relevance to the control or avoidance of conflicts elsewhere. Detente will be remembered as the last gasp of a bipolar understanding which was born in antagonism and which died in the hubris of mutual esteem. As the superpowers reach the limits of their ability to control the world in order to save it, so other countries will be less ready to sacrifice their interests or stifle their conflicts in order to preserve the superpower relationship.

Trends in the 1980s

It is worth considering, therefore, the potential characteristics of the world of the 1980s, with an eye on the way in which the USSR might fit into it, and an ear for its effects on the superpower relationship. The first characteristic has already been implied, at least in the case of the United States. But it applies a fortiori to the Soviet Union. It is a decline in the ability of the superpowers to control developments outside the immediate systems of their alliances. This is not to say that they will lack allies, or quasi-allies beyond the confines of NATO or the Warsaw Pact; such creatures already exist. But as the experience of the USA with a Saudi Arabia, or that of the USSR with a Vietnam will indicate, such alliances are themselves a symptom of declining superpower control, of the need for partners, in fact of a degree of dependence. Such interdependence might constrain not only the scope for unilateral super-power action, but also the scope for super-power understanding. It could also mean considerable tension in the management of the central alliances themselves: Vietnam might be useful in helping to contain what the Soviet government regards as Chinese ambition in Asia, but it does nothing to prevent the visit of a Chairman Hua to Eastern Europe or the consequent need for "frank" discussions between the leaders of the Soviet and Romanian parties. The American relationship with Saudi Arabia might help to underpin the world economy and serve the interests of the West European allies and the United States; but it can not prevent rivalries, antagonisms or misunderstandings between the major NATO allies about the future of the Middle East. In fact, relationships within the central alliances can be complicated by the superpowers' need for partners elsewhere; and complications within alliances can also mean complications between them. The superpowers might find a way of controlling the military confrontation in Europe, but this does not mean that they can set the pattern for the development of other relations between East and West. In this sense it will probably remain urgently necessary to minimise the risks of war in Europe; but this task will not help either power to reconstitute a working relationship in other spheres.

The second characteristic follows from the first. It is a growing tendency towards regionalisation in the world. In part this tendency arises from the failure of the Western economic system to develop any restructuring of the world economic order and to adapt to the consequences

of the economic growth which it has itself helped to promote. The emergence of the Newly Industrialised Countries has been accompanied by protective measures, and just as Japan is regarded with alarm and apprehension by its OECD partners as a kind of super-NIC, so Japan's prosperity is sometimes deemed to be threatened by the more recent NICs of South Korea or Taiwan. Protectionism is a poor alternative to a logical division of labour, in which some NICs might engage in primary production while the older industrialised countries proceed towards a more advanced technology; but given the social structures and employment patterns of most Western countries, protectionism is the most likely choice. Summit meetings and functional agreements can perhaps help to palliate the effects of such policy, but it is most likely that a regionally-based series of protective associations will nonetheless arise. But the origin of increasing regionalisation does not lie only in economics: the NICs might shake hands with Nixon.

One of the effects of the Nixon Doctrine was to encourage the emergence of strong regional powers. Iran is an obvious, though somewhat anomalous case in point -- anomalous because its ability to obtain significant credits and sophisticated armaments from the United States dates back at least to the time of the Kennedy administration. The case of Brazil is perhaps more clear cut. But even where the power concerned is a ramshackle country, prone to internal decay, and hardly by any yardstick internationally strong, it can still be significant as a test case of Western intentions or as a "key" to the future of regional security. If Iran and Brazil might count as emerging NICs, this is hardly the case with Zaire; yet Zaire fulfils many of the criteria of the Nixon Doctrine. Yet what happened in Zaire? The United States certainly supported French and Belgian action there, but its own role was limited. It was a Chinese foreign minister and not an American Secretary of State who went to offer diplomatic and material support against the threat of Soviet influence borne by Cuba out of Angola. The indirectness of American support matched the indirectness of the potential Soviet threat. The case for Zaire confirmed the importance of regional security considerations both to the superpowers and to their allies, but it also confirmed that neither of them felt free to engage in a direct confrontation with the other.

The results of such considerations are somewhat paradoxical: on the one hand the two superpowers seemed to see themselves as engaged in a world

wide competition for influence, a sort of neo-zero-sum game, in which each is sensitive to the advances of the other as a repulse for itself; on the other hand this global competition merely emphasises the fragmentary nature of the world and the increasing regionalisation of criteria. In 1977, it was perfectly possible for President Carter to come to an agreement with President Brezhnev on a Joint Statement on the Middle East even while showing acute anxiety at Soviet penetration in Africa. This is a trend which is likely to continue, and, except perhaps where crises are acute, to prompt a political informality and an ad hoc style in dealing with problems and conflicts.

Regionalisation, and the fragmentary diplomacy which follows from it, also prompt a reflection on the third likely characteristic of the international system in the 1980s. This is simply a proliferation of conflict. Again, such a phenomenon can scarcely be considered without some direct reference to the Soviet Union. It is Soviet action -- again reflecting Soviet weakness -- which helps to transform indigenous social conflict in developing countries into bloody fighting with international implications. But even if the Soviet factor is subtracted, it is clear that the turmoil of development, of territorial disputes arising from the legacy of imperial boundaries, of the clash between the idea of the nation and the concept of the state, of religious hatred in an age when economic programmes demand secularisation, is going to produce endemic and frequently violent conflict in large areas of the world. Not all violence is inevitable, and indeed much could be avoided with a degree of East-West co-operation about North-South questions; but since precisely the North-South questions provide a field for East-West rivalry and help to stimulate violence through competition, it is probable that this will continue to be a characteristic feature of the 1980s. In a sense, one could argue that such violence will matter in terms of human sorrow, but need not matter at all in terms of the international system. There have been many massacres in the world since 1945, and few of them have had much impact on the relations of states. But such sanguine cynicism is probably misplaced. The relative tightness of the international system did help for many years to contain the implications of conflict. Today, its relative looseness can help to spread those implications. It is not merely the internationalisation of terrorism -- promoting as it does both the prospects of unilateral exploitation and the need for multilateral co-operation among governments -- which is at stake here. It is rather that certain kinds of international force can exacerbate and relate

conflicts which would otherwise have been left unnoticed. To take one example, the international character of Islam relates violence in the Philippines to the export of arms, to the price of oil, and to rivalries among Arab states. In circumstances such as these, the potential certainly exists for an increase in tension at the highest level, even if particular conflicts themselves would appear to be no more than local, and without any relevance to the major issues of international relations. Equally, of course, the potential exists for a deliberate exploitation of conflict and of tension -- for the re-introduction of the Soviet factor.

Closely related to this third characteristic is a fourth, namely that of a heightened watchfulness and jealousy in many parts of the third world about access to, and the use of, raw materials. Everyone is familiar with the problems of oil and the questions of future energy resources. It can also be convincingly argued that other commodities do not provide a basis for the activities of such an international organisation as OPEC. But this does not mean that shortages of important commodities, or allied questions of nationalism, might not be of the highest importance. A shortage of phosphates could have consequences for the future of the world at least as grave as a scarcity of energy fuels -- and an enormous proportion of the global stock of phosphates is concentrated in Morocco, Mauritania and Jordan. It is not hard to imagine how problems arising from this distribution could impinge on the future problems of political relations of the Middle East and the Arab world, nor how easily these could affect relations between the major powers. Similar arguments clearly apply to the related questions of seabed resources and the law of the sea.

All the foregoing characteristics create the framework for an aggravating factor, which by now bids fair to become a further characteristic in its own right. This is the proliferation of the conventional means of military power. It is possible that the superpowers, and perhaps even their allies, might find means of controlling the future transfer of arms from advanced to developing nations. There are even signs that the superpowers might be about to acknowledge a common interest in doing so. For all that, however, it is now an established truism that small countries can fight big wars -- or even big civil wars. This will not be easy to reverse in the foreseeable future, if ever. Such wars will become easier

to start and harder to stop, will draw the major powers into a pattern of competition for advantage and collaboration in control, which has already been adumbrated in the Middle Eastern war of October 1973. The difficulty here is not that such behaviour is likely to lead to the risks of direct superpower confrontation -- that will probably remain the least likely possibility -- but that the careful balance between competition and collaboration will enable either or both to pursue advantage or to take revenge in future conflicts for losses experienced in a current one. In turn, such attitudes can discourage any proper curtailment of the transfer of arms (at least so long as arms transfers are held to be a means of influence) and thereby favour a Soviet policy of purchasing dependencies in one of the few areas where it is truly strong.

One must enter a caveat here. In some countries at least, the proliferation of conventional hardware would be accompanied by better options for nuclear weapons. Here, everything suggests that, as in the recent case of South Africa, such a prospect would provide a powerful impetus for intensified superpower collaboration. Nonetheless, two questions arise. The first is how successful either superpower could be in preventing other states from acquiring a nuclear option or even a limited nuclear armoury. The case of Israel might in many ways be exceptional, but other exceptional cases could follow that example. To the degree that local conflicts could also become nuclear conflicts, superpower behaviour would be critically affected. But, and this raises the second question, the superpowers would, to the degree that they were successful in avoiding nuclear proliferation, also find themselves under great pressure to supply sophisticated conventional armaments to threshold states, and to get drawn into their conflicts in the manner sketched above.

All these characteristics suggest that the world of the 1980s will be very different from the world in which the basic code of conduct for superpower relations was so painfully drawn up. A world of looser arrangements in which it will be harder to contain the global implications of local conflicts; a world in which the incidence of such conflicts is likely to increase along with their scope; a world in which the criteria for their management have become fragmented, and in which the successful resolution of one issue establishes no precedent for the next. In short, a world which it will become very much harder to control than the rules of global confrontation or global detente might suggest. Perhaps this would have no great significance if the two superpowers, and their alliance

systems, were merely Powers in the traditional European sense of the term: divided by rivalry, prepared to engage in limited hostilities over issues of realpolitik, but united by a common conception of an international order. But they are not. Both states are informed by a powerful ideology, and both, though in varying degrees and in fundamentally different ways, appeal to this ideology to hold their diverse populations together and to defend the legitimacy of the government against those who challenge it. Obviously, these ideological characteristics also influence their international conduct.

But such symmetry is more a matter of presentation than reality. In their appeal to the third world, the two are very different. In discussing this issue, it might at first be tempting to advance a fashionable contemporary thesis: namely, that ideology is generally on the decline, that as a socially unifying credo it has lost much of its appeal to developing nations, and that it is generally supplanted by a more organic form of nationalism. It is indeed frequently suggested that nationalism has reappeared to take revenge on those supranational ideologies which were once thought to have displaced it, from China to Peru. But to argue in this way is to ignore the different functions which nationalism serves, which range from the noble atavism of Poland to the programmatic deliberation of Tanzania. It also ignores the fact that much of the nation-building in developing countries is deliberately allied to an ideological form of thinking, rooted in anti-colonialism but also perpetually casting about for more positive prospects of social advance. In this sense, non-alignment and nationalism find it very hard to challenge more explicitly "progressive" forms of ideology, as Cuba's recent reception among the non-aligned countries has shown. Finally, the assumption that nationalism and ideology are hostile in kind ignores the manner in which a continuing nationalism can embrace alternative but resolute ideologies. Chile is merely an outstanding example. In other words nationalism is, in much of the developing world, necessarily ideological; it simply changes its ideology over time.

The nationalism of the post-colonial countries does therefore provide a battleground between East and West which is likely to continue for some time yet, and to exacerbate conflicts of interest by focusing attention, in the US Congress and elsewhere, on developments which might not otherwise seem to matter very much. On this battlefield, the Soviet Union

will probably enjoy a short term advantage: partly because the history of imperialism still generates powerful emotions in the third world, and partly because the idea of socialism is still attractive to many elites, but above all because the ideology of Marxism-Leninism specifically encourages dictatorship. The Soviet Uuion can support its most ruthless and dictatorial adherents anywhere in the world without any sense of domestic discomfort, whereas the United States can only support its more tyrannical followers at the price of betraying its own political and moral principles. The recent history of President Carter's human rights campaign is a working model of cognitive dissonance. It might be true that in the long term, Western ideological beliefs will prove immensely powerful; it is probable however that in the 1980s the USSR would benefit from numbering a series of effective dictatorships among its friends.

The Soviet Role

The characteristics of the world of the 1980s which are suggested here provide, therefore, an ambiguous context for the discussion of the Soviet role. The looseness of that world will certainly give the Soviet Union scope to operate; and the weakness alluded to at the beginning need not be an impediment. While it really has very little to offer, the USSR will still draw an apparent strength from tanks, guns and a degree of ideological appeal. How far it will be tempted to exploit this in a manner which runs counter to Western notions of an international order is an open question, which has already aroused violent and opposing emotions in the latter years of the 1970s. The difficulty with any attempt to analyse it is that so much Soviet activity has been unrelated to any set of identifiable interests. In which case many people, even among those who know the Soviet system well, have been driven to conclude that it acts from a motiveless malignancy. But is it merely an Iago? Clearly, the answer will in large part depend on the evolution of society and on the new leadership which it evolves in the next decade; but others at this conference will know far more about these matters than I, and I propose here only to address two questions.

The first is that of the Soviet Union's self-image as a superpower and the second is that of the constraints on Soviet behaviour.

In one sense, the Soviet claim to superpower status implies an interest in legitimacy. This is not only because it emerged into a bipolar world

whose bipolarity depended on the great power of the United States, but also because its continuing survival depends on continuing dialogue with Washington. In this sense, it is very hard to underestimate the anxiety for acceptance, the need to demonstrate equality, which have been so characteristic of the Soviet leadership and are likely to remain so. But if this need for legitimacy ever implied a common interest in a world order, as perhaps it did briefly during the high summer of detente in the early 1970s, that interest now seems to have died. Legitimacy by now would seem to imply no more than a series of functional arrangements, most notably in the SALT talks, which, while designed for survival, might also help merely to keep the world safe for conflict. If, as I have suggested, SALT comes to be seen as a partial and functional arrangement which no longer informs a more generalised detente (and indeed SALT might well depend for any continuous success on its being clearly and positively uncoupled from the more general questions of detente) then the status of the Soviet Union as a superpower will have quite other implications. Some of these can perhaps already be discerned. The recent Japanese Defence White Paper has voiced apprehension at the USSR's attempts to create a position of political and psychological dominance in the Northern Pacific; and this overbearing pattern of behaviour is parallelled, at the other extremity of the Soviet land mass, in attitudes to Norway and the Barents Sea. In many respects, the Soviet Union seems to be developing a peculiar notion of legitimacy: that superpowers are not as other men, and that they enjoy special dispensations from the norms and rules of international conduct.

This truculence is, however, also accompanied by anxiety. Indeed one need not be a very sophisticated psychologist to discern a connection. The USSR has shown repeated apprehension lest its very power bring about a further rapprochement between the United States and China or a working co-operation between Chinese and Europeans. And its fear of China has two implications, one in Asia and one in Europe.

In Europe, I have suggested that both superpowers might find it harder to control the developments of relations between their respective alliances. But it is only the Soviet Union which is likely to find this very disturbing. It is now ten years since, with the invasion of Czechoslovakia, it abandoned its earlier assumption that part of the price for detente might be to allow a greater degree of autonomy to Eastern Europe. In recent

years, and especially since President Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade and Bucharest in 1976, the signs have all pointed the other way. Detente for the Soviet leadership seems to impose the necessity of maintaining tighter ideological and political control. Even in its fragmented form, detente in the future is likely to do so. But it is here that the weaknesses of the USSR become most apparent and most dangerous. The attempt to impose agreed forms of political and economic development on its East European allies depends, in the end, on very little leverage. It is maintained by the threat to use tanks. How far the complexities of social and economic change in Eastern Europe can be contained within a ring of steel, or for how long; how far an initial success in suppressing discontent might help to create irresistible pressure for the future, are questions which the United States and the NATO countries will have to consider in painful detail during the next decade. An Eastern European crisis could prove to be the major test of Western foreign policy and alliance cohesion that was not quite provided even by the war of 1973.

In Asia, the USSR is less likely to prove a status quo power than an increasingly activist one. It is virtually impossible to imagine any lasting reconciliation with China, and Chinese successes in foreign policy have in the recent past only prompted a greater Soviet drive for containment. In the fragmented system of the 1980s, the Soviet government might still try to contain Chinese influence by a generalised approach to Asia, on lines similar to those of its proposal for an Asian security conference. But, given the poor record of such approaches, it is possible that we will see a series of separate involvements leading to separate conflicts or coincidences of interest with different Asian powers or with the United States. In South-East Asia, in South Asia, in the CENTO area, Soviet diplomacy will be active, will probably contribute to the lability of relations throughout the continent, and will be consistent only in its desire to limit Chinese influence. A nexus of concerns, such as that which could develop from the situation in Afghanistan, involving as it does the watchful interests of India, Pakistan, China and Iran, would obviously be of major importance to the Western powers, whatever their other separate interests in different parts of Asia. And Western powers for these purposes very clearly include Japan, whose own relations with the USSR will remain delicate and difficult, and potentially tense if Japan becomes increasingly involved in the development of China.

In the rest of the world, this truculent and anxious superpower will continue to operate from an unpredictable mixture of motives. Its anxiety to secure resources for its further development will not necessarily make it more co-operative, as its history of the exploitation of the sea has already shown. Its anxiety to assert its global reach, irrespective of whether real interests are at stake or not, will probably continue, and here its underlying weakness will probably still impel it to rely on the military instruments of influence. It will perhaps concern itself intermittently with developments in Africa and the Middle East -- without any coherent strategy, without any identifiable long term aim, but with a degree of opportunism equal to its undifferentiated ambition. In this sense, the fragmentation of the world order already represents a Soviet success, providing greater local opportunities and imposing fewer constraints than did the earlier period of superpower detente.

But if this illegitimate legitimacy, this hag-ridden grandeur, prompt some foreboding , are there nonetheless any constraints on Soviet behaviour? One is obvious: the need to maintain some sort of dialogue with the USA in order to prevent crises from becoming too dangerous. But here, the Middle East probably serves as a good example for the future: the Soviet Union has shown interest in controlling crisis but not in preventing it; it is not necessarily opposed to a peace settlement between Arabs and Israelis, but it is opposed to a pax Americana. It collaborates with its rival in avoiding war, but if war can be avoided, it pursues its rivalry without inhibition. In this sense, the constraint is itself also a guarantor of antagonistic ambition. Do economic constraints indicate a different kind of future?

Both superpowers have become increasingly dependent on raw materials from areas which lie outside the area of their political control, and the process will continue. In the case of the United States, this has led to a close working relationship with certain other countries, notably Saudi Arabia. But there is very little relationship in the Soviet case between economic need and political association. It is true that for some years the USSR has had close political relations with Iraq, and also imported Iraqi oil -- but this was in fact largely for re-export to Japan. On the whole, economic and political business are conducted separately, as they have been ever since Stalinist autarchy was dismantled. Indeed, the USSR depends on the United States for two major items on its

shopping-list: computers and oil drilling equipment. Yet it is obvious that such dependency has made very little difference to the management of political affairs. It is rather that the onus of determining whether a particular form of political relationship should be allowed to determine a particular form of economic conduct is left to the other side. In this sense, such events as the cancellation of the TASS computer after the condemnation of Shcharansky might give the United States a little leverage, but it is not likely that such leverage would be either consistent or powerful. In fact, the Soviet system can not afford to allow its economic interests to determine its political structure: the primacy of politics is essential to maintaining the role of the party; and even a party increasingly interested in technocratic criteria is still going to be interested primarily in its own social and political destiny. In these circumstances, it would be misleading to suggest that the weakness of the Soviet Union will allow economic constraints to influence its political behaviour. The contrary could even be the case: that, in so far as it feels itself slipping in any form of competition for influence with its principal rival, it might be tempted to use such means as it does have available to redress the balance.

There is, however, a different kind of consideration which might be worth bearing in mind. It is that, while the Soviet government might not be open to direct influence from the leading Western powers, it might have to tread more warily in its dealings with others. It will, if it continues to develop economically, depend on imports of energy and commodities to an ever greater extent. In this sense, and particularly since it does not have much to offer to the developing world, it could find that the temptations to exploit its own power are tempered by its need. An interest in maintaining stability, at least in partial and separate areas of the world, could be related to an anxiety to secure reliable supplies. In this respect, it could, in some areas and over certain issues perhaps including that of energy, come to accept some of the premises of the Western view of international relations -- that is, to behave like any other post-colonial power.

This is perhaps a depressing form of hope. But it is probably the best that can be hoped for. A country which has cut itself off so largely from its own culture and its own past, a country which is still a moral

desert, a country whose ardent ideology has been transformed merely into offering material inducements to the majority of its citizens, will depend more on material inducements than on any other considerations. Its behaviour will be cross-cut in appearance, with considerations of prudence and interest overlaying considerations of ambition. It will still at times appear to Western observers to be random and threatening. But it can be constrained by its own need to advance, as much as prompted by its inferiority. The dialectics of weakness: this is the framework in which to consider the Soviet role in the 1980s.

Laber: reagnalism ed interdipendence are not ... mutually exclusive.

Caquold: sostiene che l'URSS ha un ritorno all'interdipendenza (che chiama B.T.L.) – Non è pagamento al modo che l'URSS [illegible], ma non si [illegible] esprime che voleva questo [illegible]