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EUROPEAN DEFENSE AND THE SECURITY OF EUROPE

by
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The crisis which occurred in October 1973 with the renewal of hostilities in the Middle East provided an illustration of the reality of the "concertation" between the two superpowers and a measure of the divergence of interests between the United States and her European allies. In spite of ambiguous vicissitudes such as the nuclear alert of October 25, the two protagonists made a conscious effort to avoid a direct confrontation, and after the conclusion of the ceasefire, they appeared as the principal artisans of a peace settlement. The European countries played a negligible role both during the crisis and at its denouement. Moreover, their dependence on the oil producing countries led them to adopt positions different from those desired by Washington. The consequent bitterness of the Americans and the frustrations of the Europeans resulted from the latter rebelling against their treatment as "nonpersons" and the former becoming irritated because their allies did not give them total support in difficult circumstances.

This episode reflected the changes which have occurred within recent years on the international scene, particularly in the relations between the USSR and the United States. Following the rupture of the Grand Alliance against the Axis powers, Soviet-American relations remained within the general framework of a policy of "confrontation" until the 1960s when the two countries began to display a willingness to cooperate in the area of arms control. A number of agreements relating to the management of the nuclear balance were successfully concluded and strategic parity was sanctioned at the end of the first phase of the SALT talks. With the

creation of a permanent consultative commission, the strategic dialogue has been institutionalized with both parties proclaiming as their objective the stabilization of mutual deterrence. This undertaking itself was part of a larger framework of cooperation aimed at preventing the unleashing of a nuclear conflict by intervening, if need be, in the quarrels of third parties should they involve the risk of escalation. Such "concertation", expressly anticipated by the June 22, 1973 agreement, can only feed the suspicions of certain European countries about the function of the Atlantic Alliance. It is not surprising, despite the laudatory tenor of the Atlantic Council's communiques, that detente and entente between the superpowers arouse less satisfaction than anxiety on the Eastern shores of the Atlantic.

To be sure, no one denies the contribution which the United States and the USSR have made to the cause of peace by concluding an armistice on the arms race front and by breaking with the practices of the Cold War. However, the bilateral character of the undertaking arouses fears that the interests of middle and small powers could be slighted and that the security of Europe might become a "theme for negotiations which take place over their heads."[1] Moreover, the philosophy of peaceful coexistence expressed in the text relating to fundamental principles that was adopted in Moscow on May 29, 1972, is not necessarily adapted to the needs of pan-European cooperation. Lastly, the Nixon-Brezhnev agreement on the prevention of nuclear war has been interpreted by some as an impediment to the application of a flexible response strategy and as a confirmation of the priority of the two nuclear adversaries' global interests over the requirements for a harmonization of policies within the Alliance.

Thus, the discords which were manifested in European-American relations on the morrow of the Moscow summit (May 1972) were amplified as the field of bilateral "concertation" between the USSR and the United States was enlarged. They reached a culmination in the months following the launching of the October 1973 war in the Middle East. The divergences in the strategies employed to face the crisis provoked by the rise in the price of oil introduced the germ of additional divisions among the allies. Thus, the conference on energy held in Washington February 11-13, 1974, took place in an atmosphere of confrontation between France and the United States. Later, the industrialized oil consuming countries became conscious of their common interests, thus favoring a reconciliation of their points of view and the adoption of a concerted effort to prepare for a conference between oil producing and consuming countries. Moreover, the signing of an Atlantic declaration by fifteen heads of state or government in Brussels on June 26, 1974, contributed to the mitigation of the dispute over consultations within the Alliance.

The accords signed in Moscow in May 1972 were also decisive regarding the opening of multilateral conversations aimed at preparing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In fact, at the end of their talks, Mssrs. Nixon and Brejnev acknowledged that the pre-conditions for such a meeting had been met and that a "reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in Central Europe," would be a factor for security and stability on the continent. It had been understood that these two negotiations would be conducted separately; but at the time of his trip to Moscow in September 1972, Mr. Kissinger obtained agreement that they would take place in tandem. Preliminary conversations were held in Vienna from January 31 to June 28, 1973, and the full scale negotiations on mutual reduction of forces began there the following October 31. Although the plans

for limiting armed forces put forward by the two parties in November 1973 had little chance of being accepted and no real progress has been recorded since then toward the elaboration of a compromise formula, it would be premature to conclude that the negotiations have failed. In any event, only a Soviet-American agreement is capable of breaking the deadlock.

The pre-eminence of the two great powers was not as clearly evident in the course of the "pre-conference" in Helsinki. There the small and middle sized countries played a positive role, despite the preliminary "concertation" within the framework of the existing blocs, and each state was able to express itself as a national entity having particular interests to assert. On that occasion, the American delegation showed remarkable discretion, and the USSR could not obtain a pure and simple endorsement of the schemes she had outlined. Not only was the Soviet Union forced to make concessions to the Western point of view on such matters as the agenda and the procedures for approaching problems, but she also had to acknowledge the divisions that revealed themselves within the socialist camp (Romania) as well as between the neutrals and the non-aligned. Nevertheless, if there was one good reason to be satisfied with the way the preliminary talks worked out, it was necessary to await the results of the second phase of the CSCE which took place in Geneva from September 18, 1973 to July 21, 1974 before attempting to reach a verdict on the success of the undertaking, especially in the

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delicate domain of cultural cooperation and human contacts. During 1974, some progress was accomplished toward the settlement of a number of litigious questions, and the Final Act of the conference was signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975.

With respect to the restrained welcome given to SALT by the United States' allies and the apprehension with which they approached the negotiations known as MBFR (Mutual and Balanded Force Reductions), we shall briefly examine the objections raised by these attempts at arms control. After appraising the impact of the agreements already concluded and the talks still in progress on the structure and functioning of the Atlantic Alliance, we shall try to assess the meaning of recent initiatives undertaken to re-enforce cohesion and to favor the development of an autonomous European component within the Alliance. Finally, we shall examine the possibilities offered by the CSCE and MBFR to overcome the structures of confrontation inherited from the Cold War and thus to increase the participation of all European countries in the organization of their security within the context of regional disarmament.

SALT and MBFR Viewed From Europe

Due to the overlapping role of American nuclear arms in the western defense arrangement, the interaction between SALT and MBFR is obvious. However, for purposes of explanation, it is convenient to distinguish between these two negotiations. The first brings the two nuclear protagonists face to face and its results only affect their allies indirectly. The second is a multilateral undertaking in which 19 states are involved and whose aim is the maintenance of a military balance in Europe by regional arms control and/or disarmament. The decisive role played by the United States and the Soviet Union in the direction of the alliances' policies and the

importance of their contributions to the armies of the two coalitions, which have been built up within this framework since 1950, explain why a limitation of armaments in Europe is inconceivable without their agreement. But some deduce from this fact that the small and middle powers will not have a voice in the matter and that their role will be limited to "recording" the agreements resulting from understandings arrived at in direct negotiations between the two great powers. The multilateral framework of negotiations would, in that case, serve to screen the coordinated unilateral reductions, and the practices favored by the Geneva disarmament committee would find their counterpart in the agency charged with negotiating what some already call the "SALT of Europe."

SALT forms part of the extended efforts made by the United States and the USSR since the beginning of the 1960s to prevent nuclear war and to stabilize the strategic balance which governs their mutual relations. In so far as the security of European countries depends on the stability of reciprocal deterrence, it is understandable that the first agreements should have been greeted as a notable contribution to detente and to the maintenance of peace. However, it did not take long for disagreements to arise, even at NATO headquarters, and ever since the Soviet-American strategic dialogue has been institutionalized, questions have continued to arise about the meaning and consequences of this change in respect to European security.

At first glance, it may appear surprising that a step whose objective is to put a brake on the arms race and to reduce the risks of nuclear confrontation has not received unanimous support. To be sure, the United States' allies could have feared that matters concerning their security

would be regulated without their participation; however, it is hard to see on what grounds they could have contested the right of the two great powers to discuss problems concerning the growth of their strategic arms since, by acting that way, they were only complying with the commitments they undertook when they signed the non-proliferation treaty.[2] But, the results obtained in Moscow in May 1972 at the end of a long and delicate negotiation are not entirely satisfactory on the level of arms limitations. Despite very strict regulation of the development of the ABM, a vast field remains open to technical-strategic competition between the two superpowers, and it seems certain that the Moscow agreements, far from putting a check on the arms race, only gave it a different orientation. From now on, the stress is to be put on the qualitative improvement of the instruments of nuclear reprisal to the detriment of the accumulation of the basic missiles.

If the Europeans greeted the contribution of SALT to a limitation of armaments with scepticism,[3] it was less the tenor of the May 26, 1972, agreements than their political and military implications which aroused reservations on their part. In fact, insofar as the security of Western Europe rests on the American nuclear guarantee and on the risk of a conflict escalating progressively until "central strategic systems" are employed, doesn't the stabilization of reciprocal deterrence at the highest level involve instabilities at the regional level? By making more difficult, if not impossible, nuclear protection of third powers, aren't the Moscow accords a prelude to the "sanctuarization" of American and Soviet territory and don't they increase the risk of unleashing limited conflicts in Europe? Finally, even if one considers that SALT I compromised no essential interest of the Alliance, isn't it appropriate

to ask oneself under what conditions Europe will continue to participate in the stabilization which was established between the two protecting powers?

In an article appearing in three European magazines during the summer of 1972,[4] Mr. Andrew Pierre develops the thesis that the codification of strategic parity does not modify at all the situation which has prevailed since United States' territory came within reach of Soviet rockets. Though the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee may be affected by it, it would be hazardous to deduce from this that engagements taken by the United States will not be honored in case of a test of force. As long as uncertainty exists in this regard and the Soviet leaders are convinced of the determination of the United States to resist a change in the balance in Europe, recourse to force to settle differences or to exercise hegemony is excluded. Whatever the relevance of this reasoning, it has not entirely dispelled doubts concerning the efficacy of the Alliance's nuclear strategy, and some see in the present trends an incentive to reinforce the European component in the western defensive system.

For the moment, it must be acknowledged that SALT has not modified the strategic equation and that there is no cause to dramatize the situation. The elements of the nuclear forces stationed in Europe, the Forward Based Systems (F.B.S.), have remained intact and the nuclear ability of the two European middle powers--France and Great Britain--benefitted indirectly from the limitations on the deployment of ABM systems. The provisional agreement on the limitation of certain offensive strategic arms does not contain a non-transfer clause analogous to that of article 9 of the/ABM treaty. Therefore, the United States has the option of furnishing information to her allies to help them improve or perfect their nuclear armaments. However, the philosophy underlying the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons assigns very narrow limits to such a step.

Finally, American authorities have clearly indicated that the French and British nuclear forces were not included in the Moscow accords, and the Soviet pretense to include them in the determination of the global balance was considered to be without effect.

In the second place, it is significant that, in conformity with the commitment made by President Nixon before the NATO Council in Brussels on February 24, 1969, the United States organized regular interallied consultations for the duration of SALT I. This procedure helped to avoid incidents such as those which had marked the negotiation of the Non-proliferation Treaty. However, if the Europeans felt that they had been completely informed as the negotiations unfolded, they scarcely had any illusions about the possibilities of changing the course of those talks. In fact, the decisive role played by President Nixon and his special counselor, Mr. Kissinger, during the last phase of the negotiations leaves no doubt about the strictly bilateral character of the operation.[5] Since then, the allies have been regularly informed on the unfolding of the talks, but this procedure could prove insufficient if the fate of the Forward Based Systems was settled in the framework of SALT. The European members of the Alliance would no doubt demand to be closely associated with every decision concerning them and probably not be content with simply being informed.

Finally, the Moscow accords have a political dimension which becomes clearer in light of the common declaration on principles (May 29, 1972) and of the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war (June 22, 1973). In fact, ever since the anxiety to cooperate in order to avoid a nuclear confrontation has dominated relations between the United States and the USSR, the traditional function of alliances has been blurred. In the future they will justify themselves less by their

concern to guarantee the security of the member states against an external threat than by the need for a framework for crisis management and arms control. If the evolution begun by SALT were to be confirmed, the foundations of the Atlantic Alliance would be shaken apart, and one could not entirely exclude the possibility that a decoupling of European security from that of the United States might occur. Indeed, the strategy of "realistic deterrence" as defined by Mr. Laird in his report of February 15, 1972, comprised elements that seemed to lend support to this thesis. Moreover, the major preoccupation of the two big powers is not to be drawn into a nuclear conflict by the dynamics of escalation, which forces them into a bilateral "concertation" in order to hold confrontations below a certain threshhold level. Suggestions that were made in 1973 to the European members of the Alliance to rely primarily upon conventional weapons to counter any aggression from the East testify to this state of mind, and certain versions of the "Schlesinger doctrine" can be interpreted in the same manner. In this respect, MBFR would usefully complete SALT by allowing the two superpowers to control their allies' movements and would confirm their pre-eminance within their respective spheres of influence.

In the 1950s, regional disarmament of Europe was the object of numerous proposals, especially on the part of the socialist countries, but they always met with total rejection by the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. The fact is that circumstances did not lend themselves to a step of this order in an era when the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany in the western defensive arrangement was a priority objective and when the deployment of nuclear arms in Europe appeared to be a strategic necessary. To this was added the fear that a zone of limited armaments in the center

of the continent would complicate the task of military planners and would involve more inconvenience than advantages on the part of the West, especially as a result of the shrinking of the area available for the deployment of troops. Finally, people feared that an indirect consequence of creating nuclear free zones or adopting other formulas for regional disarmament might be to legitimize the political status quo in Europe and to recognize the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

With the normalization of relations between the two parts of Europe and the development of cooperation among countries with different social systems, a reduction of military confrontation became a corollary to political detente. Since 1966, the emphasis had come to be placed especially on the political role of alliances, and the mutual and balanced reduction of forces no longer aroused the same objections as before. The Harmel report on new tasks of the Alliance, adopted by the Atlantic Council in December 1967, testified to this change, and the following year at Reykjavik the NATO countries issued their call for a limitation of armed forces and armaments in Europe. The FRG had supported this initiative because she saw this negotiation as a means of preventing the unilateral withdrawal of American units stationed on the continent: if the military presence of the United States had to suffer amputations, the level of forces to be maintained would then be fixed by international agreement. Besides, the Federal Government intended to proceed simultaneously with a reduction in the numbers of the Bundeswehr and to earmark the economies thus realized for the solution of social problems confronted by all industrial societies.[8] Finally, a mutually agreed reduction of forces assumed a special significance for the FRG in view of its Ostpolitik and in the framework of inter-German relations.

Within the Atlantic Alliance feelings were divided between those interested in a formula capable of providing a framework for organizing security in the new international context and those who feared that such a step was premature in view of Soviet reticence and uncertainties relative to the development of the policy of "detente, entente, and cooperation" with the East. From the beginning, France refused to associate herself with the initiative taken by her allies and publicly explained the reasons for her disagreement. This discordent voice disrupted the united tone of NATO's declaration, but it is known that the 14 had been so prompt in issuing the call from Reykjavik only because there was little chance of it being accepted in Moscow.[9] In fact, the quasi-unanimity which had been attained concealed real divergences of interests and did not consider the diversity of goals pursued by one state or another. Thus, the British scepticism of a reduction of forces in Europe was a mystery to no one and repeated warnings were sounded in London against the risks of the undertaking.[10] The countries of the Northern and Southern flanks, such as Norway, Greece and Turkey, did not conceal their apprehensions regarding the possibility that Soveit troops eventually to be withdrawn from central Europe might be redeployed on their frontiers. It was to guard against these drawbacks that the Federal Republic had suggested a freezing of the force level in sectors adjacent to the actual zone of limitation (corresponding approximately to that of the Rapacki plan) and had envisioned complementary measures to reduce the role of the military factor in intra-European relations in the form of collateral measures (force limitation agreements or FLA in the jargon of NATO). These conceptions were not accepted because their enactment would have had the effect of restricting the freedom of action of countries bordering the zone, and especially that of the two big powers who were the guarantors of this subsidiary security system within the alliances.

It is not suprising that these latent divergences came to be expressed openly once force reduction ceased to be a topic of theoretical speculation or a pretext for tactical maneouvers in diplomatic confrontations over "European security" and entered into the sphere of concrete negotiation and the elaboration of national foreign policies. The USSR was at first hostile to the undertaking, but her attitude changed in 1971 and at the time of Moscow "summit" in May 1972, the two protagonists succeeded in reaching a compromise permitting, "the opening of talks in order to promote a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in central Europe." For the United States a mutual force reduction fit into the framework of the new American foreign policy characterized by the passage from an "era of confrontation" to an "era of negotiation." It was essentially a question of establishing the type of relations between the two military organizations which face each other on the European continent comparable to those inaugurated between the United States and the Soviet Union by SALT. But a negotiated reduction of the American contingent stationed overseas would also offer the advantage of reducing the pressures exerted on the Administration by the Mansfield clan and of sparing here allies the psychological and political repercussions of a unilateral withdrawal. From a strictly military point of view, nothing prevents MBFR from producing "a more stable equilibrium, at a lower level and at less cost;[11] but in the eyes of some, this result could only be obtained by assymetrical reductions. However, the USSR is opposed to such a procedure[12] and it seems that the American Administration will not insist on the "balanced" character of limitations in keeping with the former doctrine of NATO.[13] Nevertheless, the principal European objections to a reduction of forces are of a

psychological and political nature and can be summarized as follows:

-- A reduction of foreign forces, above all American, would be interpreted as the sign of an erosion of the United States' commitment in Europe, or even perhaps as the beginning of total disengagement, in which case the most unyeilding elements of the Soviet leadership might be tempted to resort to military means in order to exert pressure on Western European countries.

-- Contrary to a widely held opinion in the United States, American withdrawals would not be compensated for by an increase in the European contribution to their common defense. Taking into account the opposition to military expenditures that has manifested itself in most European countries that are members of the Alliance,[14] it is probable that a reduction of foreign troops stationed on the continent would bring about an analogous movement in the national armies of the host countries. However, a drastic reduction of military expenditures and a premature disarmament by the West contains risks of instability and does not necessarily favor detente.

--The creation of a zone with special status in Europe would introduce an additional divisive factor among the Western European countries and would jeopardize chances for a political unification of the continent. Moreover, it would increase the dependence of European countries on the big powers and could make them more vulnerable to aggression.

The French government, which shares most of the afore-mentioned reservations, has put forth other arguments stemming from the specifics of her foreign policy. According to them, the diminution of military confrontation can only result from the settlement of political problems and from the development of co-operation. Trying to approach the problem from the angle of arms control would lead to a sanctioning of the status

quo without serving the cause of detente. From the French point of view, force reduction is not a top priority and it is necessary above all not to hinder the progess of CSCE by tieing it to a negotiation on force reductions which is judged to be premature. In addition, despite attempts to present the enterprise of force reduction in Europe as a multilateral undertaking, it originated essentially in an agreement between the two big powers and in fact only affects the two alliance systems.[15] But, such a proceeding tends to priviledge the "bloc to bloc" dialogue, thereby contradicting the cardinal principles of the French version of detente.[16] Moreover, by associating itself with the MBFR negotiation, France would be compelled to call into question the distance which she has put between herself and the integrated military organisms of NATO which have become the principal negotiating channels, at least in the "concertation" of the allies' position and in the elaboration of disarmement models. Lastly, the French government is anxious to maintain the integrity of its strategic nuclear force, and the interest shown by the USSR for limiting nuclear arms that threaten her directly cause the French to fear that the MBFR negotiations would result in the long run to mortgaging the independence of their military policy.

After all, even if the overarmed nuclear powers can play the game of arms control without too many risks, the small and middle European powers will not necessarily find it to their advantage.[17] France concluded from this that it would be premature to engage in this course and has remained aloof from the negotiations in Vienna on mutual force reductions. Though some people have speculated on a change of orientation in French diplomacy since Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's rise to power, there has been a remarkable continuity on this issue. In fact, as the talks in Vienna have dragged on, nothing has occurred to bring about a revision

of the French position and as long as no outcome can be envisioned which would permit the stabilization of the regional military balance to be reconciled with the security interests of all European countries, the French government will maintain its objections to MBFR.[18]

Since the prospects of an authentic disarmament are remote and detente has not abolished the concern for defense, the existing alliances will probably remain the cornerstone of the European states' security policies in the forseeable future. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider the expediency and means of increasing the European contribution to the common defense, whether this might occur by each acquiring autonomous means or by merging their efforts within the integrated framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

European Defense and Security

In a speech given on June 19, 1973, before the National Assembly, then French Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert, raised the question of European defense and announced that it would be in the background of all discussions among all the countries belonging to the western alliances and groupings. Concerned that Europe was not autonomous in matters of defense, he suggested the following November 21, before the Assembly of the Western European Union, that that organization "could constitute a useful framework for an effort at dialogue and reflection" on this problem. Despite the ambiguity of Mr. Jobert's proposal and the refusal of Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany to base the defense of Western Europe on the WEU,[20] the ideas expressed there strengthened the hopes of all those who wanted to see the autonomy of Western Europe in matters of security more firmly established. They also evoked the most express reservations from the countries of Eastern Europe, none of which had ever concealed its hostility toward the formation of a military grouping with the Federal Republic as a full participant.[21]

While affirming the requirements for a defending of Europe, the French authorities clearly indicated that such a defense could not be guaranteed without participation of the United States, and that a significant presence of American troops on the continent was necessary to give substance to the guarantee provided in the framework of the Alliance. In that spirit, the French government transmitted to its allies at the beginning of October 1973 a draft of a declaration designed to reaffirm the basic commitments of the Alliance.[22] Although this text was a confidenial document, it was published in the American press[23] and is known to have been very well received in Washington. During the December 1973 meeting of the Atlantic Council, Mr. Kissinger, in fact, even thanked Mr. Jobert publicly

for the French initiative. Though the Atlantic declaration of June 26, 1974 resulted from a compromise between the French text of October 1973 and a British plan laid down in April 1974, the decisive role played by Mr. Jobert was acknowledged at the signing ceremony.

Should one deduce from that, as many commentators have not hesitated to do, that France was breaking with its independent policy in matters of national defense in order to fit into some Atlantic ensemble? Or, on the contrary, was French policy simply adjusting to the new course of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union? It is difficult to make a clear judgment on this matter and one is reduced to suggesting various conjectures on the probable short-term developments.

Reinforcement of the Atlantic Alliance

France is not the only country within Europe to express concern about reinforcing the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.[24] The authorities in Washington would not look unkindly on the increase in conventional weapons by their allies and would even recognize the contribution of their "independent national nuclear forces" to the global deterrent within the framework of the alliance.[25] After having long deplored the inadequate military efforts of its allies, the United States has recently been congratulating itself over the achievements within the framework of the European Defence Improvement Program (EDIP), even though, from its point of view, the dispositions taken in this regard do not entirely satisfy the requirements of a flexible response strategy in an international context characterized by detente and nuclear parity. In any case, the favorable reception given to the French overtures for a consolidation of the Atlantic Alliance can be explained by the very widespread feeling in the United States that they were the beginning of a change in the

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orientation of French foreign policy in matters of defense and security. Nevertheless, until now there has been very little evidence of any French "revisionism".

In the first place, we should recall that very strict limits have been placed on cooperation within the framework of NATO ever since France withdrew from the integrated military organizations. French intentions were clearly explained in 1966 and since then all governments have deliberately discounted the possibility of any reintegration of French defense capabilities into the NATO framework, even by indirect means.[26] During the budget debates in the National Assembly on November 9, 1973,[27] the Minister of the Army, Robert Galley, rejected out of hand a suggestion by Mr. LeTheule that the Eurogroup be used to promote international cooperation for the construction of war material. Insofar as Mr. Jobert was concerned, when two British M.P.'s attending the Assembly of the Western European union asked about the chances of France returning to NATO, he certainly replied in a tone that left no room for doubt about the government's negative intentions in that regard. Since then, this position has not varied and if one believes the declarations of the President of the Republic and the Foreign Minister, it seems that France's present position toward NATO will remain intact. Two recent speeches by Army Chief of Staff, General Mery, and the President of the Republic, M. Giscard d'Estaing, to the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale on March 15 and June 1, 1976 respectively, were interpreted by the opposition and a certain number of Gaullists as indications of a break with the preceding policy and as forerunners of a realignment toward a more "atlanticist" position.[28] However, those interpretations were denied by the Government. The Defense Minister reaffirmed the continuity of French policy in a speech at Bourges-Avord on July 9 as did President Giscard d'Estaing in a television interview on July 14th.[29] In reply to a written question from a Communist deputy, M. Villon, Defense Minister Bourges

indicated specifically that, "France left the integrated military apparatus of NATO in 1966 and there is no question of changing that decision."[30]

In fact, the French government feels that Atlantic integration would not resolve the specific problems of European security and also would not serve to counteract the American tendency toward disengagement. To these objections may be added those that are derived from the political aims of France. In a press conference before the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Defense Nationale on October 19, 1971,[31] Mr. Michel Debre viewed the development of a capability for nuclear deterrence and non-alignment within the Alliance as preconditions for an independent

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French policy in the context of a reduced American commitment and a search for European security with the USSR. To be sure, Mr. Debre is no longer a member of the government, however, the constraints of an independent defense policy were bound to be felt by his successors.

It is clear, in effect, that the integration of the French nuclear force into NATO would be equivalent to its disappearance as an autonomous factor in the strategic balance; while from a French or even a European point of view, it is important above all to maintain and develop an additional capability for deterrence over and above that of the United States.[32] In the absence of political unification of Europe, her defense can only be assured by the united efforts of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance having the same view of their interests in the matter.

Beyond the American commitment, the defense of Europe then actually comes down to the combination of efforts which each European nation agrees to make for itself, a fact which does not exclude the Alliances nor cooperation in specific domains. Posing the problem of European defense in these terms raises considerable difficulties, but this approach is without a doubt the only one which takes account of present realities.

Insofar as cooperation in the area of nuclear weapons is concerned, the situation becomes even more complicated. Only two European states today possess nuclear weapons and some people have envisaged combining British and French capabilities to create the nucleus of a European deterrent force capable of compensating for the erosion of the American nuclear guarantee. Even if such a project could be justified by the need to maintain the strategic balance,[33] its realization would encounter technical and political obstacles which Mr. Ian Smart has thoroughly analyzed.[34] Given the interlocking of the British and American military

programs, the success of the undertaking in the last resort depends on the endorsement of Washington. Though a current of opinion favorable to a "European nuclear force" is becoming visible in the United States, one may well doubt that the Administration has been converted to the propositions expressed in the journal, Orbis, in the spring of 1973. This is because those responsible for American foreign policy must reckon with the opposition of important bodies such as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to divulging nuclear secrets and they must take care not to compromise the pursuit of the strategic dialogue in progress with the USSR by engaging in risky initiatives. However, it is known that the socialist countries, and especially the Soviet Union, are hostile to the establishment of any Western European military grouping. Moreover, most of the European member countries of the Alliance have renounced the nuclear option by adhering to the Nonproliferation Treaty and are not at all favorable to arrangements which tend to solidify the special status of France and Great Britain in the Alliance.[35] Mr. Jobert himself did not conceal his scepticism regarding the prospects for cooperation with Great Britain in military atomic matters and firmly excluded the hypothesis of a European nuclear force which would create more problems than one could possibly hope to solve.[36]

Under these conditions, the French initiatives in favor of a European defense appear more as a call to vigilence and a warning against errors that might compromise the future than as the expression of a precise plan outlining a European defense community.[37] In his answer to a written parliamentary question by General Stehlin, a Center Party deputy from Paris who asked him to be more specific about his views, Mr. Jobert did not go beyond the remarks made in front of the National Assembly on June 19, 1973.[38] For his part, President Pompidou, alluding to this

question during his press conference of September 27, 1973, was obliged to state: "On the day when there will be a policy of Europe, there will inevitably be a problem of European security and then European defense. But we must not put the cart before the horse". And he concluded that the problem of a truly autonomous European defense does not exist today.[39] Mr. Giscard d'Estaing and his government have maintained the same attitude, as they too consider the question to be premature in the absence of a political unification of Europe.[40] Moreover, in the eyes of French leaders, the anxiety about defense must not cancel out the pursuit of detente and cooperation with the East which are "the best guarantees of security".[41]

Security and Cooperation in Europe

If Mr. Jobert's remarks on the defense of Europe attracted attention, especially by their novel character, it is appropriate to indicate that his speeches gave at least as prominent a place to the pursuit of detente with the East and that the French authorities have never failed to recall the continuity of the policy begun by General de Gaulle in the 1960's. In 1971, Michel Debré, then Minister of National Defense, deduced from his analysis of international relations the necessity for France to state precisely not only the relations which might exist in defense matters with our principal neighbors and partners, but even to examine "the prospects for European security with the USSR whose policy is one of the keys to the future of the continent".[42] Mr. Debré set out his conceptions more explicitly in an article with the significant title: "Defense of Europe and Security in Europe" in which he straight-forwardly declared the impossibility of the Europeans alone assuring their defense.[43] According to him, the orientation toward a peace based on fear and a balance of

armaments had to be matched by an undertaking of all nations in the East and the West which together would try to "diminish tension and organize their cooperation".

In fact, the French policy of cooperation in Europe is defined by the double preoccupation with defense and detente and this set purpose involved two principal consequences.

First, the unification of Western Europe will only be realized if the national personality of states which compose it is preserved. Moreover, Europe will only be formed if she maintains "close and friendly relations with all countries and in particular with the Eastern part of our continent, that is to say, if she would not appear as a bloc but as a powerful instrument of liason, detente and cooperation".[44] To adopt this point of view does not mean that European construction must be subordinated to the realization of conditions that would permit the Eastern European countries to adhere to it, but it does imply that one never looses sight of the ultimate objective which is to overcome the division of the continent, and that "at no time should an organized Western Europe appear to be a simple appendix to a political-military bloc".[45] Thus, French policy, far from being hostile to the establishment of a European entity in the west, has favored the pursuit, and even the acceleration, of this process on the condition that the grouping which would result from it could freely determine its orientations and remain open to concerns for a reunification of the entire continent.[46] This view obviously excludes the application of the models of integration that were widely accepted in the 1950s,[47] and a fortiori a European defense community endowed with its own nuclear arms.

Second, the French government was initially reticent about the

proposal for a pan-European conference on security launched by the countries of the Warsaw Pact in Budapest in March 1969, which it saw above all as a means of perpetuating the structure of blocs and of conferring a badge of respectability on the Soviet Union less than one year after the intervention in Czechoslovakia. However, France argued in favor of this conference, once the prospect of a normalization of relations between West Germany and her eastern neighbors and a settlement on the Berlin question became clear. At that point, the undertaking offered an opportunity for fruitful exchanges in which the states concerned could assert their interest and affirm their national identities. From the French point of view, detente in Europe had to be initiated by a profound change in bilateral relations among all concerned countries, but at a latter stage a multilateral discussion could provide a new dimension to intra-European relations and even promote a new security system. In this spirit, the French delegation participated acitively in the preliminary talks in Helsinki and, thanks to the coordinated action of the Nine, obtained satisfaction on most of the points which seemed fundamental to her: organization of the conference in three phases, its agenda, and the definition of the mandates which were to guide the work of the various committees. This first result allowed one to hope that the conference would not confine itself to talking in generalities, but that it would study in depth the means for cooperation on the scale of Europe as a whole in order to end up with concrete improvements.

Mr. Jobert's speech of July 4, 1973, at the time of the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Helsinki, may have shocked people's feelings by his denunciation of the illusions of detente and his appeals for vigilance in a world where independence and the security of human communities are always menaced. But not enough emphasis was given to the constructive proposal which it contained and people have lost sight of the fact that (CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)

it fell straight in line with the French policy of "detente, entente and cooperation". Moreover, the French government took fully as active a part as in Helsinki in the work of commissions which began in Geneva on September 19, 1973, though its path was disturbed by repercussions from the crisis in the Near East. As Mr. Jobert noted during the budgetary debates of 1973, France did not expect too much from this conference because, by itself, it could not assure peace and detente, but neither did she expect too little, because at least it had the merit of allowing a dialogue and in some ways it was detente put into practice. What was really involved, apart from the political and territorial realities that exist in Europe, was how to lower the barriers which limit commerce, cooperation, information and human exchanges. This path to detente is no doubt less spectacular and requires more humility in behavior and bearing than that of arms control; however, it alone can lead to a "durable peace where each people, free to determine themselves without pressure nor outside intervention, will be able to live in harmony with its ideal."[48] The continuity of French policy in this domain was later reaffirmed by M. Sauvagnargues, both in respect to the development of bilateral relations with socialist countries and with regard to the achievements of the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.[49] At the council of ministers meeting on August 6, 1975, the Foreign Minister recalled that the final act signed at Helsinki on August 1st corresponded to French interests and that the results obtained were balanced and satisfying. He was quoted as stating further that

> "Approval of this text involves the recognition, in keeping with the policy of detente, that the political and territorial realities resulting from the war are no longer challenged by anyone. But it does not give to that recognition the binding force that would result from a peace treaty and it expressly reserves the rights of France and of the other three

wartime allies with respect to the German problem. Moreover, it establishes that the pursuit of detente necessitates efforts by all states with a view to encouraging cooperation and contacts in all domains, the diffusion of information, access of all to foreign cultures, and a freer movement of peoples. For the French Government, the effective application of all the texts of Helsinki constitutes the criterion by which real progress toward detente will be judged."[50]

(V)

This ambivalent policy, one face of which is turned toward the unification of Western Europe while the other aspires to overcome the division of the continent into a system of antagonistic blocs, raises serious problems, so much so that one may wonder whether these two objectives can be reconciled. To be sure, the French policy of openness toward the East has not brought about the dissolution of the two blocs and it must be acknowledged that a Europe where all states would assert themselves as independent national entities is a remote prospect. Nevertheless, it seems that the pragmatic approach to the construction of Europe has been ~~should henceforth be~~ acknowledged by her partners, and that her policy of openness toward the East, which aroused so many controversies in the 1960s, has since then led some to emulate it. Despite the difficulties of the undertaking and the modest results recorded until now, it is by a gradual reconciliation with the East that one may perhaps succeed in constructing a security system which would not be based on spheres of influence, would favor the interpenetration of societies, and would rest less on the balance of armaments than on cooperation among states. At this stage, alliances would have lost their raison d'etre and their dissolution would mean only that they had filled their function, which is to maintain the military balance during the long journey which leads from the rhetoric of detente to a system of strong commitments capable of guaranteeing the non-recourse to force in international relations.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Michel Debré: "Europe 1971: deux echecs, deux succes, deux epreuves, deux certitudes." Défense Nationale, October 1971.

[2]Under the terms of Article 6 of the treaty, each of the parties, "undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. . . "

[3]See, for example, debates of the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU), from December 5 through 7, 1972.

[4]"L'accord SALT et ses conséquences pour l'Europe: un point de vue américain," Politique Etrangere, 3, 1972. See also The World Today, July 1972 and Europa-Archiv, No. 13, 1972.

[5]See John Newhouse. Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973.

[6]For a discussion of this point, see the article of Andrew Pierre, "Can Europe's Security be 'decoupled' from America?". Foreign Affairs, July 1973.

[7]See the remarks of Mr. David Packard, "Perceptions of the Military Balance" at the European-American conference in Amsterdam, March 1973.

[8]The "White Paper 1970 on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and on the State of the German Federal Armed Forces" clearly explains the government's motivations. It indicates specifically that the "health of the social body matters as much as the military ability to guarantee security."

[9]On this point see the summaries of the session of the Atlantic Council of Reykjavik by Jean Schwoebel in Le Monde of June 25, 26, and 27, 1968.

[10]This state of mind is expressed perfectly in the remark which The Guardian of February 1, 1972, attributed to a British civil servant: "It took us two years and God knows how much money to reach the common sense conclusion that stability in Europe can best be maintained by doing nothing."

[11]See "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s. Building for Peace". U.S. Department of State: Washington, D.C., February 25, 1971.

[12]See the articles of Mr. Yu Kostko: "Mutual force reduction in Europe," Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya, June 1972 (translated in Survival, September/October 1972) and "Military Confrontation and the Problem of Security in Europe," op cit. August 1972.

[13]During a breakfast meeting with journalists, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Schlesinger, declared: "It is possible that the United States might not insist on an unequal percentage cut to offset these factors [the geographical assymmetries and a certain Soviet superiority in the conventional domain]. The Soviets have lesser transportation capabilities than the United States and they still have to come a significant distance." (International Herald Tribune, August 31, 1973). See also The Times (London) of September 1, 1973.

[14]Significant opinion polls in this regard were quoted in the report presented by Mr. Dankert on behalf of the commission on questions of defense and armaments of the WEU: "La défense, la détente et le citoyen," May 3, 1973.

[15]In his speech before the National Assembly, June 19, 1973, Mr. Couve de Murville declared: "You are correct, Mr. Minister (of Foreign Affairs), not to have participated in the conference on the balanced reduction of forces in Europe for this very simple reason--and it is not necessary to search for others--that it is a question of a simple, direct negotiation between the two powers, as our friends in NATO who have not taken the same position as we are

beginning to discover. Anyway, it is the agreement resulting from the Russian-American negotiation which will settle the question," Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires. Assemblée Nationale (cited hereafter J.O., A.N.), June 20, 1973, p. 2269.

[16]In the course of the foreign policy debate before the National Assembly, June 9, 1971, the Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Maurice Schumann, posed the alternative between two ways of seeking détente. "The first consists of striving to negotiate a military balance, but such an approach becomes dangerous when it tends to substitute the confrontation of blocs for efforts at reconciliation with the East founded on bilateral or multilateral contacts at the national level. The other method has as its objective to find solutions to the causes of political tension by avoiding anything that may consolidate the division of Europe and, on the other hand, by stimulating everything which tends to reduce it. During the same debate, Schumann praised the pan-European conference on security and cooperation as "an opportunity offered to all the nations on our continent to urge the expression of national identity over the confrontation of blocs." J.O., A.N., June 10, 1971, p. 2589 ff.

[17]On this point we agree completely with the analysis of Philip Windsor in "Moscow plays the balance, but Europe shouldn't." Foreign Policy, Autumn, 1972, no. 88, pp.

[18]See the interview of Mr. Jean Sauvagnargues with Le Monde, January 19/20, 1975.

[19]After lamenting that, with the exception of France, Europe does not have autonomy in matters of defense, Mr. Jobert declared: "I do not know whether the year 1973 will be the year of Europe, but I am certain that during the year 1973 the problem of the defense of Europe will be in the background of all

discussions taking place inside or outside of Europe and perhaps it will even move into the foreground." J.O., A.N., June 20, 1973, p. 2260.

[20]It should be noted that the Defense Minister of the Federal Republic, Mr. Leber, took the opposite position from Mr. Jobert before the WEU Assembly, and that on November 23, the Foreign Ministers of West Germany and Great Britain, who had discussed the prospects for the "summit" of Copenhagen in London, declared that "the WEU is not an appropriate framework for discussing matters of defense." See, International Herald Tribune, 24-35 November 1973.

[21]The Soviet press reacted vigorously against Mr. Jobert's initiative at the WEU; see, Vladlen Kouznetsov: "De nouveau la défense européene?" Temps Nouveaux, no. 49, December 1973.

[22]See the speech of Mr. Jobert before the Senate, November 30, 1973; J.O., Sénat, December 1, 1973, p. 2232.

[23]See The New York Times, November 19, 1973.

[24]Suggestions to this effect may be found in the report of the Committee of Nine presented at the 19th session of the Atlantic Assembly at Ankara (October 21-27, 1973). This text has been reproduced in Europa-Archiv, no. 21, 1973.

[25]In his report of February 9, 1972, on "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s," President Nixon affirmed that "the nuclear forces of the United States, supplemented by the nuclear forces of our allies, remain the backbone of our deterrent." This conception is reflected in the Atlantic declaration which emphasized "the separate deterrent role" of French and British nuclear forces. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, 1972: 334.

[26]See the interviews of President Pompidou in the International Herald Tribune of March 16, 1970, and in The Times (London) of May 12, 1972.

[27]See J.O., A.N., November 9, 1973, p. 5431.

[28]See the televised interview of Mr. Giscard d'Estaing with four journalists, December 20, 1974, and the interview of Mr. Sauvagnargues with Le Monde, January 19-20

1976. General Méry presented his views in an article, "Une Armée pourquoi faire et comment?" Défense Nationale 32(June 1976): 11-34, and Giscard d'Estaing's speech appeared in the same journal, July 1976.

[29]For remarks of M. Bourges, see Défense Nationale, (August-September 1976): 158-60, and those of President Giscard were published in Le Monde, July 16, 1976.

[30]J.O., A.N., p. 3685.

[31]Reproduced in the form of an article in the Défense Nationale, January 1972: "La France et sa défense."

[32]In the report of a study group of the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère (Paris) on the theme: "Middle Powers and Nuclear Armament," it was emphasized that the nuclear ability of a middle power is based on the element of additional uncertainty which it introduces into the calculations of a potential aggressor. This uncertainty is tied to the autonomous character of the strategic force in such a way that the country which has it at its disposal must refrain from any form of cooperation which would have the effect of merging it into a larger grouping. Politique Etrangère, nos. 5-6, 1969.

[33]Mr. Jacques Vernant disputes this premise in his article "La défense française dans le contexte mondial," Projet, November 1973.

[34]Ian Smart, "Future conditional. The Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Cooperation." International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: Adelphi Paper, no. 78, August 1971.

[35]The Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Walter Scheel, expressed the clearest reservations regarding a Franco-British nuclear understanding in an interview in the newspaper Le Monde of August 25, 1973.

[36]See especially the interview of Mr. Jobert in Der Spiegel of June 11, 1973. At the time of the budget debate on the credits of the Foreign Ministry before the Senate, he declared: "At no time did I say that we were moving

toward a European nuclear force," J.O., Senat, December 1, 1973, p. 2248. The same idea was expressed in similar terms before the WEU Assembly on November 21, 1973.

[37]See the interpretation which Jacques Vernant has give of it: "La diplomatie française et l'Europe," Défense Nationale, January 1974.

[38]Written question of June 29, 1973. The answer appears in J.O., A.N., August 25, 1973, p. 3402.

[39]This is the same opinion expressed by Raymond Aron in an article in Le Figaro of January 8, 1974: "Détente et condominium: partenaires ou rivaux?" He wrote, "There is no European identity in defense matters. France's partners inside the Community reject a military organization which would not be, in one way or another, strictly tied to NATO. Not without excellent reasons: for the coming years there is no prospect of a European defense without the contribution and the presence of the United States."

[40]See Mr. Chirac's declarations of September 19, 1974, before the Anglo-American press and the interview cited above of Mr. Sauvagnargues with Le Monde. During his "press conference" of October 24, 1974, the President of the Republic ignored questions on European defense. Later, he explained that there was no use examining the problem of Europe's defense in the absence of a political organization for the continent (Le Figaro, May 21, 1975). President Giscard d'Estaing maintained the same postion in a television interview on July 14, 1976 (Le Monde, July 16, 1976).

[41]See Mr. Jobert's speech before the Senate, November 30, 1973, J.O., Sénat, December 1, 1973, pp. 2231-32.

[42]"La France et sa défense." op cit.

[43]Défense Nationale, December 1972, "As for the West, the attempt to define a European defense, for those who are not satisfied with mere words, is a task

outside of the ordinary. Except for the case, which does not seem to be the principal case or even the ordinary one, of a threat imposed at the same moment and in the same manner on all the nations of the continent, it is clear enough that the European peoples do not have and cannot have, in a permanent manner, the same conception of defense." Mr. Debré had expressed himself in similar terms before the WEU Assembly on December 6, 1972. In an interview in Le Monde September 7, 1974, he noted that "the feeling for a European defense has diminished considerably." A similar statement had been made by the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Luns, in an interview with the UPI. See Nouvelles Atlantiques, January 15, 1975.

[44]Speech made by Mr. Pompidou September 27, 1970 in Strasbourg.

[45]Speech of Mr. Habib-Deloncle before the National Assembly April 28, 1970. J.O., A.N., April 29, 1970, p. 1335.

[46]See the budgetary debate on the credits of the Foreign Affairs Ministry before the National Assembly November 5, 1970. J.O., A.N., November 6, 1970, pp. 5177-5229.

[47]In the course of a conversation with journalists who had come to present their New Year's greeting to him on January 3, 1974, Mr. Pompidou verified that the energy crisis had increased the difficulties of Europe by inducing each state to play its own role. According to him, there would not have been a set-back in the building of Europe, except that at the Copenhagen summit it appeared that "Europe would be a confederation of states for a long time, without a doubt. This will be different from the solution imagined by the 'fathers of Europe'." Le Monde, January 5, 1974. See, in the same sense, the press conference of Mr. Giscard d'Estaing of October 24, 1974.

[48]Speech of Mr. Jobert before the Senate on November 30, 1973, J.O., Senat, p. 2232.

[49]Speech of Mr. Sauvagnargues before the National Assembly. J.O., A.N., November 7, 1974, [illegible]

[50]Le Monde, August 8, 1975.

De Boers
Session (2)

MAIN ISSUE CONFRONTING EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS.

Introduction.

In dealing with the above question we first must establich which countries we mean. For Europe extends geographically to the Oeral and even in Western Europe not all countries are completely in one boat as to the problems they are confronted with.

I therefore want to restrict my review formally to issues confronting countries being members of NATO and EEC together, which does not mean to say that issues are not relevant for other countries as well. The more so, in the degree they are more in the same position as the above group of countries.
Also I must warn you that of necessity my outlook is somewhat coloured by my own natioanl background.

And lastly I wish to point out that even though I will be adressing certain issues separately, this does not necessarily mean they are not related.

In fact some of them may be rather symptons of a much larger problem, than problems as their own, which would make them all the more difficult to solve.

Todays most in the foreground main issue is the present economic recession. This recession is being complicated by the fact that it goes hand in hand with a rate of inflation in the above countries, which was in all and still is in some of them far too high.

This has caused that the main instrument generally used to speed up economic growth, i.e. enlarging credits has become to a large-r extend blunted, as this in turn leads to even further increased inflation.
Which is exactly what these countries cannot afford without serious social and therefore economic destabilising effects, and so the vicious circle they are in would be closed.

This problem, although not limited to the above European countries, is a far greater danger for them than for instance for the USA.

Reason for this is the absence of the same high degree of self reliance in raw-materials, which is the USA's (or the USSR's) and the (notwithstanding the EEC) still too much fragmentated domestic market, which makes Europe much more vulnerable for interruptions of the normal economic processes. This for reason of the fact that these generally lead to protectionary measures in all countries affected, while Europe is more than many others dependent upon a large degree of liberalisation of trade.

The problem is also compounded for the EEC-part of Europe by the

fact that maintenance of competitivity with other potential suppliers becomes increasingly more difficult for it than other countries.

This is due to the following factors:

1. In global terms this part of Europe has a relatively high standard of living, plus a relatively high standard of social security already in existence or at least under development in most countries. Both of these partly as a result of the economic growth and the social amalgamation process caused by the development so far of the EEC.
2. This part of Europe has, again in global terms, an extremely high population density, and has been in that situation far longer and for that reason has experienced the resulting lowering of the birth rate much earlier than most other comparable areas, which has resulted in a proportionally large part of the population being aged and having to be supported by a relatively smaller active population.

   The second effect of this high population density has been a very intense exploitation, gradually drawing up to what is absolutely possible, of all natural ressources, including those of the very air, water and soil itself, which are increasingly becoming a serious problem.
3. Both the above consequences of this high population density in their turn have an upward effect on the production costs of every product which is being produced in this part of Europe, to which countries less densily populated are less susceptible.

What this leads to, can best be seen in the sector where the EEC has been effective fof the longest time and that is in the agricultural sector, where, as a result of investment, costs (in the acquisition and the preparation of land to turn out the desired crops) and farmers incomes being probably higher than anywhere else in the world, the whole sector only can be kept going against competition from outside by very large subsidies and by relatively high prices for some products being paid by the customers within the Common Market.

This is not to say that I blame the present EEC agricultural policy. For one thing at least it helps to keep in good operation one of the larger food production possibilities of the world, in a world where we are not in a position that we can afford to loose that, so long as many hundreds of millions of people are never very far off from starvation.

Even if this is done at the expense of a population, but which can afford it, this still seems to me a good thing.

Notwithstanding that, this kind of protectionary system remains to a certain extent an anomaly in the western economic system and to a certain degree also an obstacle in the way of the liberalisation of trade, which globally is the only correct solution for the present economic difficulties.

The same applies in principle for protectionary measures for large parts of the European Communities industrial establishment which are at present being kept forcefully alive by the community or by individual governments.

Thus it is, being hedged between the devil of its dependence upon others, and the deep blue sea of its own growing uncompetiviness that EEC Europe must try to find a solution to its economic perils.

And it looks like this can only then be found by trimming the size of its needs by a strict tightening of belts all the way round and by sticking all very close together.

/of The first/which is primarily a matter for individual governments to assure, but which in the last ressort may also become a task of the community to ensure an equal division of the pain thereof.

In order to achieve the necessary closing of ranks of those who are all virtually in the same boat within and around EEC Europe the following seems indicated.

1) the present system of periodic consultation of governments leaders should be gradually intensified/relation with the /and its community institutions gradually institutionalised
2) the position of the European currency should be strengthened - both in the interest of increasing european economic growth through further european economic integration and in order to take some of the pressure of the US dollar;
3) the internal coherence in the community should be strengthened bij gradual strengthening the position of the commission, gradual development towards decision making bymajority vote instead of unanimity, and by strengtheningthe the position of the European parliament, a great step to which will be made by having the European parliamentarians directly elected;
4) the community membership should be extended to Greece, Portugal and Spain, and eventually to all those in Europe, presently in NATO, with the possible exception of Turkey, (in the opposite direction an Irish membership of NATO seems indicated).

For one thing this would allow the EEC to take on a coordinating

task in the standardisation of military equipment and military production sphere which the European Parliament has already shown an interest into.

Another main issue for these countries, i.e. those who are both members of NATO and the EEC and who also happen to be the former colonial masters of most of the world, is still that of how to cope with the completely new world which has come into being after their abdication of colonial power, voluntarily or forced.

Now that the flood wave of the fifties and sixties of nation after nation claiming its independence has ceased and the waters are quieting down, all kinds of problems, which at first seemingly had disappeared in the floodwave of independence surging over the lands are coming back to float on or even worse just underneath the surface of the newly established relationship between former masters and the newly made independents.

This problem is in no small way being aggravated by the fact that so many nations, not all of them equally mature and ready for independence, have come to the age of independence in such a short time.

Now in granting them independence the above mentioned European countries, albeit may be grudgingly, had to accept that the freshly turned independent countries from that moment on, would lead their own lives, for better of for worse, in democracy if possible, but even in tyranny if it cannot be helped.

Also these European countries could know or at least should have known, from experience in their own histories, that the new countries or at least a number of them would have to go through very bad storms indeed, but they don't seem to have realised that fact or the implications thereof.

Maybe they just assumed that the predicaments of the newly independents, whenever these might occur, would be of no concern of theirs, unless maybe having been expressly invited to do so and therefore being in a position to tell the others to do exactly as they were being told, as in old times, when things were being simple and straightforward.

Some of them may even have hoped for exactly that to happen in certain cases. At least it has looked that way occassionaly.

Indeed, in fact some of the new countries, being heirs to tremendous fortunes in natural ressources, which they experienced great difficulty in to harnass properly, found themselves sooner of later obliged, if they had not already done so on

the eve of independence, to turn around to the very colonial parent, from those house they had fled in such great haste only recently.

Others had to do the same, for exactly te opposire reason, i.e. the near complete lack of any natural ressources worth mentioning they could call their own.

Yet both groups in doing this, still wanted to keep their recently obtained independence intact and have generally proven themselves quite unwilling to barter this prized asset for any material gains they might obtain from a new possible close association.

On the other hand experience has shown that it were exactly the former colonial masters, who lost to a certain degree their possibilities for taking independent action, without regard to the opinion of their former colonies. Be this either for reasons of the moral obligations they felt they had towards their former colonies, but also quite often because of their own sound financial and economic interests.

Also every so often one of these European countries finds itself in een squeeze due to the involvement in a former colony it still has, and the resulting responsibility in some degree for what is going on there, without actually having at the same time the formal or even the practical possibility, the right and the means to interfere, in case things are not going the way they should.

Specifically this situation seems to have developped in these European countries' relations with Africa, in which continent Europe still seems inextricably involved in many, many ways and where notwithstanding the remaining vestiges of its former military presence there, Europe has far to little force left to bear, to prevent things from not going our way, if the Africans want to do it their way.

The fact that this is maybe in the historical development context rightly so, still does not make it any easier, when for instance one of these European former colonial masters is confronted with difficult situations, such as can specifically arise from the above involvement.

One of these could be for instance in the case of an uprising or so, in one of the African countries, the problem of catering for the safety of its own nationals, who happen to be living there in numbers for the very reason of providing such a country with the necessary competent labour it needs for its development and which it lacks itself.

Another problem in that respect is that of the observation of human rights in many African countries not being completely in accordance with Western European ideas, which again leads to the question whether the European countries in dealing with their African counterparts should not link economic help or a favourable economic relationschip to a requirement for a stricter observation of these human rights.

This question becomes the more pointed as there seems to be a growing public awareness in Europe, in fact in all the western world, that the way human rights are being upheld or not elsewhere in the world, in this case in Africa, cannot in the long run remain completely disconnected from the way they are being upheld in our parts of the world and vice versa.

For which reason the fact that they are being generally not upheld, at least not in the way, most Europeans think they should, gradually becomes a real cause for concern.

On the other hand it is towards Africa more than towards any other former colonised territory that Europeans generally still tend to take the most paternalistic attitude, which tendency also is being manifested sometimes in the acts of European governments towards Africa, and one can hardly blame the Africans in such cases for feeling this and resenting it.

And this in turn seems to lead to a very gradual but definite waning of the European political influence in the exact area, where it could be maybe most effective both in the interest of Europe and of the African peoples.

For that reason it is important that the renewal of the treaty of Lomé is to take place, as this is one of the occasions providing Europe with an opportunity to regain some of the potential it used to have in a friendly way to exert an influence to the good in Africa.

All this provided that the negotiations are being handled in the right way and that African sensitivities are left untouched.

Helping to find and bring about the right solution for the problem of Zimbabwe, and that of Namibia, and last but not least South African apartheid are other occasions where africans will feel they can test Europeans good intentions.

In many respects what has been said about the relation of Europe with Africa, can also be said about the relation of Europe with the Near East.

With one difference, and that is, that Western Europe here, even less than in some remoter parts of Africa , seems not

to be able to come up with the right solutions at least in a convincingly enough manner for the very serious problems existing there, on its very doorstep, like the Greek Turkish dispute, the situation in Lebanon and the Arab - Israël dispute.

Europe used to be able to cope with such things, and there still is a definite feeling that we still should be able to do so, if we only want it badly enough to put up with the effort to achieve a very clear common standpoint among ourselves and then stick with it.

Lacking that, so far we only have been able te scratch the surface of these problems, and have been incapable to prevent their des-integrating influence upon the border of our commonwealth from spreading further.

In fact we must be aware that even within Western Europe itself, notwithstanding the growing economical, social and political unification process which is presently going on between the verious present national states, there is also a growing spirit of dissent, threatening to split these same nations from the inside.

Sources for this process can be found in leftovers from the formation period of the present states, as remaining social and economical inequalities between different classes of the population, or remaining cultural and linguistic inequalities between different ethnical groups or remaining inequalities in the social, economical and cultural acceptance of various religions, or combinations of all these effects.

Sources for this process however also can be found in the fact, that Europe more than collected its share of the human flotsam, knocked loose by the waves of change in the transition period the world has been going through since the end of world war 2, in the way of displaced persons, post colonial period remigrants, fugitives from foreign regimes and on a large scale imported labour, and increasingly the European born offspring of these groups, who don't belong anymore to where they came from but who have not completely been amalgamated either.

These groups, some of them with a birth rate significantly higher than the majority of the country they live in, form an increasing reservoir of people, feeling themselves in a material or immaterial sense or both havenots, mostly without any/with or even opposed to the traditional governing political parties, from which it is relatively easy to draw support for any extremistic political movement, willing to pay lip service

/ties

However if this situation constitutes one danger to the survival of the present political system, which most Europeans still believe in, it is one at long distance, the counterpart of it which maybe constitute even a greater danger. This is the reaction by the majority to both the above trreat, in many ways still indefinite and for that reason maybe the more ominously looking, and all the other uncertainties of our present times, some of them related to the uncertain economic situation we are in, others due to the uncertain mondial political situation we are in, but all of them leading to a general sense of uneasiness occasionally rising close to a feeling of alarm, which make large parts of the population gradually susceptible for governments using more authoritary approaches in order to solve them.

The dangers threatening ancient republican Rome from the outside in fact proved themselves far easier to overcome than the temporary imperial dictatorship the last democratic rulers of that city thought they had to agree to in order to do so.

Translated in actual politics this means that Western European Gevernments and governmental political parties should take great care in preserving the democratic rights intact, even in the seemingly adverse conditions which occasionally occur.

Terrorismo

I do not intend to seem unfeelingly to the very grave personal sorrow which is involved in every political murder, but speaking as a politician with a soldiers experience, I could say that nothing much can go wrong with our present political system even if hundreds of us would be killed bij extremists, because there are still many many more men equally capable ready to take over our duties, than any group of extremists even under for them optimal circumstances would be able to kill.

And just as there are times, when soldiers have to accept the possibility of being killed as part of thier duty, there are times, when this is part of the politicians bagage.

In order to be complete I finally want to mention the for western European governments as well as for other NATO governments very big issue of the maintenance of external security against the possible threat posed by the Warsaw Pact countries.

I expect much more will be said about this problem bij others, so I will remain brief.

Superficially at least the situation is simple and all looks well in this respect, as everybody sticks to firm adherence to NATO and its official chosen strategy of flexible response

under the aegis of an all-encompassing US strategic nuclear quarantee.

But in fact it looks like knowledgea-ble people need all fingers on both hands to keep them pressed on all the leaks in that theory, in order to keep it at least superficially afloat.

What has happened, is that both the developments in the bilateral SALT negotiation, which we applaud, and the increased US interest in the strengthening of the conventional and theatre nuclear defence posture seem indicative for a tendency in the US to reduce the risk of an all-out nuclear clash with the USSR.

Separated from the issue of maintaining a credible defence posture for Europe this is a good thing.

In connection with it, it has less charm for the Western European countries.

In fact, in view of the situation that the Warsaw Pacts conventional forces presently can outfight NATO's, and that therefore for the time being it is impossible for NATO to do without keeping the option open of a possible first use of theatre nuclear weapons, while on the other hand it is selfevident that Europe cannot really afford to have either conventional or theatre nuclear fighting going on its territory for some time, it must be perfectly clear that the whole credibility of the European defence posture eventually rests firmly embedded upon the firmness of the US strategic nuclear quarantee, and the willingness of the US president to eventually unleash his weapons in order to save Europe.

And this is exactly what is becoming the more unlikely as the SALT negotiations are drawing to a result.

A result consisting of the very stabilisation of a situation where in neither of the superpowers will be able to in-flict serious harm to the other, without having to undergo the same damage reciprocally.

This does not mean that the SALT negotiations should be seen from Europe with distrust, or that we should not hope for them to succeed.

The opposite is true, as we view these as an important contribution to the greatest undertaking of the post WW 2 period, the attempt to soften East - West relations to a point well below the danger level.

But in our eyes reaching an agreement in SALT 2 is only good, if the process of armaments limitation, it is part of, continues beyond that stage and does not remain limited to the strategic armaments, but will eventually be offset by mutual and balanced reductions of the conventional and theatre nuclear defence forces

in such a way, that not only the danger of global war for the whole of the alliance is being averted, but also the danger of a local war being fought in Europe, which would be equally devastating for us as a global war would be for the whole world.

It is the realisation of this fact gradually dawning in Western Europe, which is one of the reasons for the general feeling of unrest over the present situation, which for instance has led to the majority of the Netherlands Parliament being against the production and introduction of the neutron-bomb.

As to what should be done in order to reach the desired result of achieving significant balances and mutual reductions of the conventional and theatre nuclear forces on both sides of the Iron Curtain, on our side a first necessary step is to increase the mutual confidence within the Alliance. It is vital that every member of the alliance feels that their security is just as much of a concern to the others as it is to themselves and can feel safe in that respect that everybody will be sticking to his guns, and that there are nowhere any lingering thoughts of a possible defection from the duties each partner has undertaken to shoulder himself.

In order to achieve that it would be desirable for the Western European members of the Alleance to join together in renouncing even further the prerogative of national decision making in the field of defence in favour of a more common decision making process, for instance in the field of the acquisition of the necessary armament, which brings me right back to one of the conclusions priviously drawn by me, i.e. the necessity of gradually combining the membership (at least in Europe) and the achievements of the two most important pillars of post war western collaboration, NATO and EEC.

Doherty
Session 3

VIEW FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

C.C.A.D.D. MEETING, SEPT. 1 - SEPT. 5, 1978

I. INTRODUCTION

II. THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

III. THE STATE OF DETENTE (INCL. HELSINKI)

IV. SALT II

V. MBFR

VI. U.S. & CHINA

VII. A NOTE ON RECENT LITERATURE

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The view from the western hemisphere continues to be dominated by East-West friction between competing systems, North-South disagreement about the distribution of world income, and inability of the developed countries of the West to harmonize their trade and growth policies.

The bright spots are the continuing cohesion of the NATO alliance, the determination of both sides to reach a SALT II agreement, some slight forward movement in MBFR and the restructuring of the CCD that was the main accomplishment of the U.S. Special Session on Disarmament. Also encouraging are the opening-up of Peking's foreign policy, the prospects for early normalization of U.S. relations with Vietnam, and the achievement of independence for Namibia.

Uncertainty continues to characterize the future of Arab-Israeli relations, Rhodesia, the Horn of Africa, and North-South progress on market access and stabilized commodity prices for the exports of the developing countries. The Helsinki accord can be put in this category since it promises continued outside attention to human rights in the USSR and Eastern Europe without assuring any improvement internally.

Dark spots around the world include Cambodia (now Democratic Kampuchea) where genocide appears to have been committed on a large scale, South Africa, Uganda, The Philippines and most of Latin America.

II. THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

The NATO countries, under U.S. summit pressure are committed to a 3% real growth in their defense expenditures. NATO remains the principal focus of U.S. defense policy, along with preservation of the strategic deterrent. Concern was expressed at the Washington summit NATO meeting about the USSR's build-up of medium range nuclear capabilities (SS-20 missile and The Backfire bomber) and the Soviet employment of its own and Cuba's forces to project its presence and influence into Africa. Approval by the U.S. Congress for lifting the embargo on arms shipments to Turkey creates one of the necessary conditions for effective defense of the southern flank.

Developments in France, Spain and Italy have somewhat diminished concern within the alliance about Euro-communism.

III. THE STATE OF DETENTE, INCL. HELSINKI

The mood in the U.S. has turned sour on detente. The combined effect on American attitudes of (1) a growing perception of Soviet strategic power outrunning that of the U.S., (2) Soviet (and Cuban) "disruptive" actions in Africa, and (3) heightened sensitivity to Soviet ill-treatment of dissidents is an increasing reluctance to confide in Soviet good intentions. This growing distrust is reflected in public opinion polls, is powerfully articulated by such groups as

the Committee on the Present Danger, and is being exploited by opponents of the SALT process to bring about suspension of the talks. The Carter administration is attempting to de-fuse the powder train by lesser actions, such as cancelling scientific and cultural exchanges and subjecting exports embodying new technology (e.g., computers, oil well drilling equipment) to new restrictions.

IV. SALT II

Earlier this year SALT II was almost derailed in a bid for primacy in U.S. foreign policy by the NSC director, Dr. Brzezinski: ZB favored suspension of SALT II until the Russians agreed to stop making trouble in Africa. He also antagonized official Soviet opinion by remarks made on and just after his Peking trip. Strong U.S. official criticism of the Soviet trials of Sharansky, Ginsberg and Petkus seemed almost designed to disrupt SALT II. However, Secretary of State Vance eventually prevailed and insisted that SALT II continue, as well as talks on conventional arms transfer restraints.

The SALT negotiations are under no time pressure, however, since it is clear that no agreement could be ratified by this dying session of Congress, or even surfaced before the November elections. So the timetable is for agreement to be reached sometime early in 1979 and sent up for ratification in the Spring.

There are, however, not inconsiderable negotiating road-blocks. One is the U.S. determination to replace its present

Minuteman II ICBMs with the MX missile and to adopt some kind of mobile basing mode for the MX, probably the so-called MAP (mobile aiming point) mode in which the missiles are moved at random among a much larger number of silos. Under this system the number of silos and missiles would be submitted to periodic on-site inspection to insure Soviet verification of the numbers but to deny them information as to the location of the missiles at any particular time. How the Backfire bomber and the cruise missile are to be regulated under the treaty is also still undetermined.

The real difficulty is likely to lie in the mood of the Congress, which makes it doubtful if any negotiable outcome can be made acceptable to a 2/3 majority of the Senate. Ratification of a SALT II treaty will be the severest test to date of President Carter's leadership and political support.

V. MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

The only encouraging thing one can say about MBFR is that the talks have not been completely broken off. As Churchill said, "Jaw, Jaw is preferable to wah, wah." The chief point of disagreement is still the so-called data base. The USSR has now agreed in principle to common ceilings of 700,000 ground forces on the central front. The USSR explicitly confirmed its adherence to parity in the joint Brezhnev-Schmidt declaration of May of this year. However, the Eastern negotiators continue to insist on figures which show only a small disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, whereas

NATO estimates indicate some 925,000 personnel on the Eastern side and about 777,000 on the Western side.

Other issues that continue to plague the negotiations include that of collective ceilings (NATO) vs. the Soviet insistence on national ceilings and national reductions; and phased reductions (U.S.-USSR first) vs. reductions by all participants on each side from the beginning.

VI. CHINA AND THE WEST

No recent development can be more important than the development of Peking's foreign relations under Chairman Hua, dramatized by his recent visits to Romania and Yugoslavia, where he did not hesitate to criticize Soviet (and, for balance, U.S.) hegemonism. While this subject is not explicitly on our agenda, it deserves some attention, perhaps during the discussion of issues for NATO's fourth decade.

VII. A NOTE ON RECENT LITERATURE

A noteworthy contribution to the theoretical literature on the ethics of war appeared in 1978 in a work by Michael Walzer, professor of government at Harvard University, Just and Unjust Wars (New York, Basic Books). In this book, reviewer John Murray Cuddihy notes (in the New York Times Book Review, Feb. 5, 1978), "The legal and moral traditions of the 'just war' theory are extended, refined and applied to the difficult terrain of

modern war and terrorism."

Walzer addresses the two principles of jus ad bellam and jus in bello by applying them to particular cases, e.g., the German attack in Belgium in 1914, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the Japanese attack on China, the Russian invasion of Finland and many others, including of course the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Stanley Hoffman has praised the book for its "analytic subtlety" and the elegance and grace of the writing.

One may note also, as of perhaps comparable interest and importance, Michael Howard's "War and the Liberal Conscience," delivered as the George Macauley Trevelyan lectures at the University of Cambridge in 1977.

Session 5 (4)

R. A. Gessert
29 August 1978

THE MEANING OF ALLIANCE: THE CRITICAL MILITARY ISSUES FOR NATO'S FOURTH DECADE

A Discussion Outline

ASSUMPTIONS

1. The Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact will continue to try to stalemate the United States and other Western powers at the strategic nuclear level, to maintain a distinctly favorable advantage in conventional and theater nuclear forces on the European continent, and to increase its ability to project forces elsewhere in the world.

2. The United States and NATO will accept strategic nuclear parity, will seek to maintain Alliance deterrence and defense capabilities in Europe but only with difficulty and distraction, and will be very hard pressed to match or counter the Soviet Union's growing ability to project military power.

3. The Soviet Union will promote arms control measures and negotiations for propaganda purposes, when it is militarily convenient as in SALT, and insofar as it does not limit its freedom to project or exert military power and influence when the Soviet Union feels it has an advantage. That is, arms control will be used as a supplement to military power. as previous US Administrations did

4. The United States and NATO will continue to seek arms control measures and negotiations as an alternative to military build up to match Soviet power. That is, the West will continue to see arms control as a preferred alternative to and not a supplement ~~of~~ to military power.

UNCERTAINTIES

1. Outside NATO's territory, the Middle East will remain an area of tension and uncertainty, the stability of which, however, will be vital to NATO security both in Europe and North America. The Soviet Union will cautiously but opportunistically exploit any serious ~~use~~ rise of tensions and instability in this region.

2. The African continent will continue to be a region of instability, rich in resources important to the West and susceptible of opportunistic exploitation by the Soviet Union and its surrogate, Cuba. Success is by no means assured to Soviet-Cuban interventionism, but interventionism will frequently seem worth the risk for both material and ideological reasons.

3. The Soviet Union will be increasingly suspicious of and seek to neutralize Chinese power and influence in Asia and the Pacific. Signs of any effective Sino-American or Sino-European alliance against the Soviet Union will be regarded as exceedingly dangerous to the Soviet Union and will be opposed by all means that appear effective, including "linkages" to the main areas of Western detente and defense vis a vis the Soviet Union and its allies.

4. The internal stability and character of the Soviet Union and its major allies will continue to pose uncertainties to the West as to how to advance on the avenues of detente and defense. As the "old men" in the Kremlin become replaced by younger leaders, this uncertainty and its ambivalent effect on Western policies of defense and disarmament are likely to grow, creating conflicts and uncertainty in Western policies.

5. Internal and international sources of political and economic tension and uncertainty will continue to plague the Western Alliance. Access to energy and raw materials, uneven economic growth, competition in industrial policies, and relations to

the Third World will complicate NATO cohesiveness - especially as younger generations with no personal memory of the early Cold War years and the original impetus for community within the West assume leadership in the West.

CURRENT NATO EMPHASES

1. Within the past four or five years - and especially within the past year and a half - NATO has focused attention on ~~showing~~ shoring up theater deterrence and defense particularly in the conventional area. The steady qualitative modernization and quantitative expansion of Soviet-Warsaw Pact conventional forces capabilities ~~is~~ are now widely recognized and regarded as providing capabilities far beyond anything needed for internal security or for defense against NATO. The three-pronged NATO defense response of the last two Summit meetings has been to:

a. Commit nations to 3% annual real increases in defense expenditures to try to catch up.

b. Launch the NATO Long Term Defense Program for the 1980s and undertake immediate short-term measures to improve readiness, antitank munitions, and war reserve stocks.

c. Place new stress on armaments collaboration to achieve standardization or interoperability of weapons and equipment as well as tactics and doctrine.

interoperability more important than standardization

2. NATO has also actively sought an MBFR agreement, including making significant concessions to the Soviet Union-Warsaw Pact negotiating posture, as the strongly preferred approach to European security to relieve a necessity for force buildup and modernization. NATO has also endorsed - with some uneasiness about the "gray areas" - sustained negotiations to achieve a SALT II agreement.

Interoperability
1 ~~C~~ C^3
2 - Servicing Air forces and fleets
3 - Munitions
4 - Battlefield Surveillance Target Acq
5 - Components and spare

3. Through economic Summit Meetings, including Japan, and through other economic and political consultations NATO leaders have ~~has~~ sought actively - if not always successfully and harmoniously - to tend to critical aspects of the economic and political health of the Alliance.

4. In important ways, NATO has also, however, merely been "hoping for the best" in critical areas where no genuine NATO consensus really exists. The most critical defense areas are:

a. The theater nuclear posture. Task Force 10 on theater nuclear modernization appears to have been the least successful of the ten task forces in the LTDP. The debacle on the enhanced radiation warhead symbolizes this critical deficiency in the NATO political/military consensus.

b. The emergence of a convincing interpretation or revision of NATOs strategic concept in the light of Soviet-Pact buildup and apparent posture for a short war with little or no warning.

c. The still ambiguous role of certain national forces in event of an aggression or war - especially those national forces that have chosen to remain outside the integrated military commands and military planning.

NEEDED FUTURE STEPS

1. Support and nurture the momentum that has been build up in the last year and a half to redress the theater conventional imbalance. An increased and credible role and participation by France in integrated military planning would help greatly as would encouragement and support of other European initiatives by the United States. However, the odds are against large and enduring measures to match the Soviet Union-Warsaw Pact force modernization and buildup.

2. Tend assiduously and cautiously to the theater nuclear force posture. This is probably the most difficult and most critical military issue NATO must confront in its fourth decade. US leadership in this area has been ambiguous at best. European contributions to this debate have been sparse and evasive except for French policy which has little support and British policy which continues to "hope for the best." The issue of production and development of the enhanced radiation warhead will have to be confronted again and similar innovations are likely to be introduced in the future. One can only hope and pray and begin to work now to assure that public debates about such weapons will be better informed militarily, politically, and morally than they were the last time around.

3. The need will have to be confronted to interpret or revise NATOs strategic concept - including a rational and credible concept for the use of theater nuclear forces - to deal with the realities that the Soviet Union-Warsaw Pact will probably continue its modernization of conventional forces and their posture for offensive operations with little warning, will continue to try to neutralize NATOs theater nuclear posture and to achieve superiority over it including a capability to destroy Western Europe with nuclear weapons, and will continue to maintain at least strategic equivalence with the United States.

4. NATO will also have to face up increasingly to the problem of the growing capability of the Soviet Union to project military power and influence into other regions of the world vital to the interests of NATO states. The dangers of confrontation with Soviet power outside the NATO area are likely to increase significantly in the coming decade, presenting NATO states with new challenges to their security in an interdependent world.

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Session 5 Scheuner

Council of Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament

Maryknoll 1. - 5. September 78

Session 5: The Meaning of Alliance: The Critical Political and Economic Issues for NATO's Fourth Decade

1. The Role of the Alliance

1.1 The necessary Continuation of the Alliance

At the end of the sixties the hope was sometimes expressed that the progress of detente might overcome the existing alliances by a new international or European order. The evolution of the relations between the two great political units has clearly demonstrated that the detente fundamentally depends from the stabilizing influence of the existing organizations in East und West. The nations of Eastern Europe remain under the firm guidance of the Soviet Union and the West has still to regard these countries as a cohesive political block. To maintain the Atlantic Alliance is therefore for the Western countries a condition of their security as well as of their capacity to entertain relations with the East on the basis of equality. In their military defence, the West European countries remain essentially dependent from the United States. This dependency tends rather to be enlarged if one regards the continously growing conventional and regional-nuclear superiority of the Soviet Union in the central theatre of Europe. Without the backing which the European members of the Alliance receive through the nuclear capacity of the other world power, the U.S.A. , their political independence could not be assured. Under the prevailing political and social conditions of the European members of NATO they cannot maintain conventional armed forces capable to withstand alone the military power of the Soviet Union and their allies. Europe needs the protection of the U.S.A. nuclear deterrent and this will not change in the next decade. In the fall of 1977 the European governments resolved to raise their military expenditure by 3% for some years to come. The internal political constellation in the European countries, how ever, leeds rather to further reduction in their military efforts. Difficult issues will arise over the modernization of the military

equipment in a time of sharply rising costs.

The situation demands a continuous re-examination of the strategical planning within the Western Alliance in order to meet new technological developments and the challenge of a growing Eastern armament. The strategic evaluations within the Alliance, however, remain closely linked with the considerations of arms control and the pursuance of an understanding with the Soviet Union. The introduction of a weapons technology cannot be considered without the reckoning of the effect it could have upon the negotiations between the East and West going on on the international and European scene. Also the internal political situation in most European countries - and probably also in the United States - underlines the necessity to look to strategic planning and to disarmament as two closely interconnected areas in the Alliance's policy.

1.2 The Area of the Alliance

The territorial extension of the Alliance will probably remain the same during the coming years. Recently, Spain marked an interest to be included into the Atlantic Community, but there are also hestiations at Madrid to commit itself. The members of the Alliance might be inclined to attend the further constitutional development in Spain. The links of Turkey with the Alliance has been weakened by the arms embargo introduced by the Congress of the U.S.A. after the intervention in Cyprus. If the House of Representatives follows the example of the Senate in raising these limitations, the further membership of Turkey within the Alliance will be strengthened. As Europe depends for its economic activity as well as its defence on a safe line of delivery of oil, the presence of the Soviet fleet in the South Atlantic and the installation of basis for the Soviet Navy inAfrican countries along the oil route from the Persian Gulf might raise new problems of defence. However, any extension of the region covered by the Alliance is highly unprobably. Aid to western-orientated African countries against incursions and rebellions aided from outside (Zaire, Mauretania, Tschad) has been left to French responsibility, with a hesitating approval of other European countries. In the same way, the problem of the agitation for a 'liberation' of the Canary Islands will be left to Spain.

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1.3 Negotiations in Arms Control and European Security

Following up a policy of detente and co-operation in arms control negotiations with the East have been conducted on two levels. The U.S.A. seek to reach a bilateral temporary understanding on a limitation of nuclear strategic armaments by extending and continuating the SALT I agreement by a new SALT II settlement. All members of the Alliance, except France, participate in the M.B.F.R. negotiations in Vienna. The continuation of these conversations is one of the greatest importance for the maintenance of a co-operation between East and West, even if the hope for a SALT agreement will not realize during the coming months. Both these negotiations raise far-reaching problems for the strategic policy and the cohesion of the Alliance.

The main issue in the SALT conversations, the limitation of the international nuclear devices raises no special problem from the European point of view, even if one considers that the fixation of strategic parity between the world powers and the ensuing balance may give more weight to the existing unbalance of forces in the European theatre. Difficulties spring up from these weapons systems which are not included neither in the SALT conversations nor the Vienna conference, because, on the one side, they are not regarded to be long to the international strategic field, and, on the other side, they remain territorially outside the area of possible reduction in Central Europe. Among them count the Soviet bomber Backfire capable to carry nuclear arms within regional range, but stationed outside the M.B.F.R. area, and the SS-20 MRBM, fired from mobile land vehicles beginning to be installed in the Western regions of the Soviet Union replacing older systems of nuclear covering of Western Europe. On the U.S. side, the development of the cruise missiles, able to carry nuclear loads to a medium range and circumventing the existing system of detection and defence does not belong to the intercontinental system. And the same comes true for the employment of a new nuclear warhead with a reduced blast and enhanced radiation for tectical use in defence against armed attack (the so called neutron bomb). All these devices do not belong to the international strategic field because of their limited range. But their deployment would deeply influence the European strategy and the problems of nuclear flexible response and escalation.

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Should the weapons of this 'grey Zone' , as some voices in Europe demand, be included in one of these arrangements on arms control ? It seems that there have been tendencies to include some aspects of airplanes and missiles capable to carry nuclear arms - the obligation not to give away these weapons to the disposition of allies - into the SALT talks. Regulations in this direction in bilateral agreement would inevitably have repersussions on the situation in Europe. Therefore here is an area where consultation within the Alliance is necessary to maintain the interconnection between the posture of the forces in Europe and the strategic nuclear protection which it can only receive through the commitment of the U.S.A. The European powers remain interested that the U.S.A. retain their option for introducing new technology in the regional nuclear deterrent they deploy in Europe and which is due for modernization in the coming years. Otherwise the connection between the global strategic covering of the European region and the forces of European defence could be seriously weakened. At the end of 1977, the deliberations of the ministers of the NATO countries have recognized the importance of balancing the new developments on the Soviet side with the modernization of the deterrent on the Western side in Europe. The attitude of European governments, under the influence of interior political currents, has not shown a coherent opinion. When the completion of the modernized tactical weaponry with less immediate damage and more radiation was announced, European governments gave it a cautious reception. That may have contributed to the resolution of President Carter in April 1978 to postpone the introduction of this weapon. Some European governments supported the idea to seek a bargain with the Soviet Union, in order to obtain for a postponement a reduction of the superiority of the Soviet tank forces in the Central European area. The Soviet government made it clear in December, 1977, that it was not interested in such an exchange.

The problems of new technology and modernization of the forward based deterrents may also arise in the Vienna negotiations. Until now they have been orientated towards a quantitative diminuation of the armed forces deployed in the central area of Europe. This has led the conference into a certain stalemate over the estimation of the numbers of military personnel existing at the present moment in this zone. In the future problems of qualitative

armament may be introduced into these deliberations. The critical issues of defence will need a close co-operation and planning within the Alliance. Selective arrangements over some weapon systems offer always possibilities of circumvention through new technologies. Cohesive agreements do not come within a realistic expectation. So it will be essential in the coming decade of NATO to shape its defence policy in accordance with the demands of security but always also in the connection with the possibilities to reach partial arrangements with the countries of the East.

2. Political Development and Problems in Europe

2.1 Detente and the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe

In the past 30 years the political situation in Western Europe has been shaped by three factors: The influence of the United States, mostly employed in the direction of a furthering of greater Euro-European countries, the process of European economic union and the continous reduction of the former dominating European position in Asia and Africa and its replacement by new relations with former dependent areas based on economic and cultural links. Will there be changes in this basic elements of Western European policy ? New factors have become descernible. First, the strategic parity of the Soviet Union with the U.S.A. and its world wide presence may lead European countries to greater attention to the political opinions of the Kremlin, and strengthen the inclination of European governments to continue the line of detente and peaceful co-operation. Second, the ideological line which devided Europe after 1950 has become less clear. The growing up of strong Communist parties in Western Europe, especially in the area bordering on the Mediterranean, opens the possibility of far reaching political changes in the orientation of some countries which could considerably affect the southern flank of the Alliance. Penetration of Western thought into the Eastern countries is visible, provoked harsh repression from the governments, but is still very difficult to assess in its future importance. Finally, Europe is slowly acknowledging a new responsibility, still mostly in economic terms, for other parts of the world and has to reorientate its policy according to a new dependancy from the Arab oil and to a Mediterranean situation in which the countries on the Southern and Eastern shores of this sea can exercise an influence upon European situation by economic factors as well as by movements of migration and acts of terrorism.

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The East-West conflict is still a fundamental issue in Europe and will continue to be it, but new political elements arise in the interior political development of some European countries and in the problems Western Europe has to face in its relations in the Mediterranean and Arab countries and the Third World. In the relations with the East, the continuation of detente will be a diminant issue. What is the meaning of this expression ? A definition would insist upon the readiness to look for peaceful sulution of conflicts, the whish to come at least to partial arrangements over political and military questions and the whish for an extension of economic and cultural relations. Since long years, these aims have been excepted by NATO and made apart of its political strategy. If in the last months a certain restraint could be observed in the relations between East and West, the impulse for a continuation of the policy of detente has no alternative. It is possible that expectations on the results of this policy are now more moderate and less inflated than a few years ago. This attitude is confirmed by the experience with the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe. The arduous endeavours in shaping the text of the Final Act, signed on August 1, 1975 did not only introduce among the recognized principles of the Act the respect for human rights, they tried, by a careful setting out of a widened system of personal, cultural and economic links between the peoples too, to show the way to limited mutual personal and intellectual exchange. Some progress has been made, especially in the area of family reunion and emigration. In the cultural sphere, personal links have been extended, even if the Eastern countries understand them not as a free personal exchange but as a carefully guided official operation.

One of the main points of Western interest on the implementation of the Helsinki agreement, was the protection of human rights. In this point, the Western attitude underestimated the fundamental differencies existing between its own conception of human rights and fundamental freedoms as rights of individual liberty and the Soviet idea that fundamental rights are embodied in the whole social structure of the community as collective aims and not so much as individual rights. The resonance which the proclamation of human rights found in many Eastern countries, opens a new line in the

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intellectual debate between East and West. For the first time, dogmatic Communism is here in a defensive position and has to recognize the fundamental strength of traditional Western convictions. Here is an important issue the Western powers will have to pursuit and to keep alive. The outcome of the Belgrade Conference from October 1977 to March 1978 seems to be not very satisfactory. But also on this point, expectations should not go to short-time results but to an issue which demands persistent efforts for a long time. The experience of the Conference of Continuation will be repeated at Madrid in two years time. It is essential to maintain the moral impetus of this question without expending it into an object of political confrontation or to renounce to it for fear of impeding detente.

2.2 NATO and European Unity

The organization for European Defence which was the first to develope after World War II produced an Atlantic Community, whereas the idea of European Unity, intellectually prepared in the last years of the war, looked to Europe as an autonomous entity which could regain some of its international stature by united action of the European nations. The political and ideological foundations of the NATO and of the European Community at Brussels are therefore different, but they have not led to practical conflicts. In the Atlantic Alliance, the European powers have always tended to maintain their independance and to underline a special European interest, even if they recognize that European security cannot be assured without the connection with the United States and the acceptance of a dominant role of them. On the other side, the U.S.A. have backed the movement for European unity until now, Europe has regained after the war a position as an independent economic unit of primary importance for the world trade, but it remains linked with the U.S.A. in its military situation and the development of a political position of the European Community is still in its beginning. The range of NATO exceeds that of the EEC in the Mediterranean and in Norway, on the other side, Ireland is a member of EEC but not of NATO. These two organizations which dominate Western Europe, will therefore remain separated also during the coming time. Never the less, NATO remains interested in a future evolution of the European Community.

The European Community is passing a difficult period of its expansion. It has to accomodate to more modest aims and expectations. Already before the British accesion it had become clear that the goal of an European Federation was not acceptable to important members. The attempt, to widen the customs union with large powers of central direction to a monetary and economic union, has failed for lack of a comon economic philosophy of the member governments. The creation of a closer relation among the currencies of the Community, now reinstated after the Bonn summit of July 1978, will probably show again that without a common understanding upon the essential principles of economic direction a common monetary policy cannot remain effective. It seems therefore that the aims of the EEC have to be restricted to a further develop_ment of the existing customs union by the elaboration of stronger directive features, harmonization of the legal and social conditions in the member states and by strengthening the unity of the association towards third states. Indeed, the major steps in advance have been made at Brussels in the domain of exterior commercial policy which now has been taken over entirely by the Community itself. The central administration at the Berlaymont is pursuing the aim of harmonizing and uniting the economic activities of the member states, but progress is now slower than in the founding years. The moral and political background of the EEC will be strengthened if general elections will be held in June 1979, but the directly elected Parliament will have to widen its powers before it could influence the policy of the Community. National Governments and Parliaments will not be inclined to renounce lightly the principle that the main decisions must be made by consensus of the national governments. Two issues will put the Community before important and critical decisions: The economic recession evokes more and more protectionist tendencies which endanger the main goal of the Community, the creation of a wide area of free exchange of goods and capital. Will the Community be able to avoid the temptation to erect new economic fences and to renounce to their original aims ? Political reasons have induced the governments of EEC to accept the three Mediterranean states, Greece, Portugal and Spain, as new members. This enlargement of the Community will not only bring difficult problems for the agrarian policy through the agrarian surplus of these new members, it will transform the EEC from an union of fully industrialized strong economic units to an orginazation in which sharing

of burdens and equalization will have to play an important role. The administrative machinery of the EEC will only with great difficulty adjust to a new extension.

In the last years the members of the EEC succeded in reaching a common attitude at conferences, in the deliberations of the UN and in certain questions of foreign policy. Could the Community become, in the eighties, a nucleus of a common European foreign policy ? Could that strengthen the European position in NATO in raising Western Europe to a political status corresponding to its economic position ? That would be a critical issue for the next decade, but it is not to expect that such a spectacular rising European unity and responsibility will take place. The common European policy, now embodying the reunion of the heads of government in a European Council from time to time, will gain in strength, but will rather result in the cautious neutral attitude the European contries have preferred to follow in the past. The challenge for the European policy in Africa will be met by the economic ties binding a big number of African states to the EEC by the Lomé Treaty; political actions will be left to the responsibility of single states.

2.3 The Mediterranean and the Interior Orientation of European Nations

The Mediterranean will form a critical region for the next period. The political situation in that region is now more mainly dominated by the East-West conflict; new forces have evolved in the Arab world and on the nothern shores of Africa. Should a new armed conflict arise in the Middle East, the Alliance would be severely tested in its capacity to bring about a common attitude of its members. On the eastern flank of the Alliance the Cyprus conflict is apt to remain a source of weakness. The conception of NATO is orientated towards the protection before the Eastern power, the problems in the Mediterranean area which are not connected with this conflict remain outside the responsibility of the Alliance but, as some events in 1973 showed, the attitude of NATO members in a crises bordering on the NATO area, can have deep repercussions on the cohesion of the organisation.

The most critical issue in the next decade arising from the Mediterranean region, will be the interior political developement in various member states. The strong position of Communist parties might bring them to a direct governmental responsibility in one or

the other of these countries. Until now the Alliance has been able to adjust to a situation where a Communist party shares its part in political positions but not in governmental participation. The problem, however, remains a critical point in the future of the Alliance.

2.4 Political Stability on Eastern Europe

The silent condition of interior political stability on which NATO is founded in its existence in Western Europe, does naturally not extend to the East European region. But as the two Alliances in Europe are somewhat mutually connected in their existance and their dealings which each other, the interior cohesion of the Eastern countries can also be regarded as a critical issue of the coming years. Discussing the human rights problem we have seen that there are signs of discontent at opposition in some Eastern countries. In recent years, Communist governments have repeatedly been forced to make concessions in their economic policy in order to avoid interior disorders. It is a serious problem whether destabilizing factors should be welcomed in all cases by the Western countries. A new and younger generation of Soviet leaders could be temptated to seek solutions for interior difficulties in a more active foreign policy and endanger the maintenance of peace and security. It cannot be the aim of Western orientation to lend assistance to the maintenance of the domination of Eastern governments, but sudden and disruptive changes, as have occured in the past in several countries, will always bring the danger of military intervention and political crises. During the next years a particular situation of this kind will arise in Yugoslavia when the succession after the regime of Tito will have to preserve the unity of the country. The Western countries are interested therein that the process can be solved successfully; every serious disorder could produce dangerous consequences.

3. The Atlantic Community and the International Economic Order

3.1 Energy and Non-Proliferation

Some of the most important problems for the international relations in the next period lie in the economic field. Compared with the situation in the fifties when the international trade followed still the cause of the Western system of free exchange of goods,

the present conditions show still the Western industrialized powers in a dominating position, but new trends have arisen among the nations of the Third World and a new center of economic forces has originated in the Middle East oil producing countries. If one excepts some of the countries with the biggest territorial extension, the interdependance of all nations has been increased considerably. The industries of Europe are, with some recent exceptions for oil and gas, almost entirely dependent for their resources in energy from the import of oil coming from the Arab countries, and the percentage of oil imports in the United States has dramatically risen during the last years. Also the Soviet Union will have to import oil during the eighties. The energy problem will be, therefore, among the most critical issues of the next decade. It will not only lead to difficulties of payment; one has to take into consideration the predictible exhaustion of the world's oil resources, even if higher prices would open up possibilities for extracting oil from less favourable deposits, and the strategical problems of assuring a safe supply. A limitation of the demand for oil in the economy of a country is a difficult task for a government, and the developement of other resources of energy is not open for countries without national resources.

There is an urgent need for greater international co-operation in the field of energy. The problems being very complex, the task is one of the most difficult in the next decade. Oil will to be have slowly replaced by other energies. Coal and gas, however, are also of limited supply and the distribution of recourses are uneven. Solar energy can have only a limited effect. Practically - before a new technological break-through opens new possibilities - the use of nuclear energy will be indispensable. Estimates show, that instead of ca. 150 reactors now in active use some 4 - 500 will be in use at the end of the century.

The spreading of nuclear power installations over the world - the need for them in the Third World will be limited, but a great number of countries with raising industrial developement will use them - provokes - besides ecological problems and the difficulties for the storage of waste products - serious questions about the danger of a spreading also of nuclear armaments. The main question arising

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out of the employment of nuclear energy are the following:

a) Uranium is found in some countries only, so the problem of regulated supply of fuel is of utmost importance for all industrial nations.

b) Only some highly industrialized nations dispose of the knowledge and the faculties for enrichment technology which gives access to the practical peaceful use of uranium. This fact sharpens the critical situation mentioned under a).

c) The same is true for the reprocession technique by which fuel can be re-extracted from waste products.

d) An international mechanism of controls can supervise the circulation process of fuel, but as plutonium is won or can be won in the processes of enrichment and reprocession, there is always a certain danger of abuse and abduction of material for military purposes.

e) The problems of peaceful use of nuclear power, therefore, cannot be entirely separated from the question of non-proliferation of nuclear armament. On the other side, there is no legal or moral foundation for a limitation of the use of nuclear power to some leading industrial powers. All nations have an undeniable right of access to new and necessary technology.

A world wide control system has been created by the IAEA, but not all countries have submitted to these controls and the Vienna organization lacks powers for enforcement. The 15 leading industrial nations have found an egreement in 1976, revised 1977 for guide - lines for the delivery of nuclear technology published in January 1978. Practically they have also decided, after the production of an Indian atomic bomb in 1974 and the discussion on some contracts for the delivery of enrichment technology (Brazil 1975) to set a stop to the delivery of sensitive neclear technology. The Carter administration has shown a great interest in the strengthening of the control of a nuclear technology. The Bill adopted by the Congress in the spring of 1978 limits American deliveries of fuel and technolog to states which are ready to accept supplementary precautions against

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the diffusion of fuel or nuclear technology. It has to be seen whether these national regulations will be accepted; if strictly adhered to, they might procure an enducement for some countries to seek technology and supply outside the existing systems of control. The renewal of contracts for supply for India shows that this danger is not overlooked. There are main problems that will have to be solved in the future:

a) It would be desirable to concentrate the sensitive enrichment and reprocessing processes in international installations with sufficent control. This is only acceptable for all nations if the supply of enriched material is safely guaranteed and cannot be used for political pressure.

b) New technologies which reduce the demand for fuel in an essential way as the fast breeder, cannot be withheld from those nations which have no alternative sources of energy. This raises another problem of control.

c) An international co-operation will be desirable also for the solution of the storage of radioactive waste products.

3.2. Employment and Inflation.

The organization of defence procured by NATO rests in alia on the interior political stability of its members and on their economic capacities. Both will be under strain in the next decade under the menace of an economic recession and continuing unemployment in the industrialized Western countries. Until now the present recession has been treated by the governments of the Western countries as a problem of technical management of monetary and economic steering. The question can be raised whether the situation could be regarded also as the outcome of a long-time structural crises, resulting from dwindling advantages of the highly industrialized countries with a very high living standard and high costs of production. The welfare state, developed in Western Europe has led to a considerable immobility of economic and social dispositions and limits sharply the range of innovatory structural decisions which will be needed for the defence of a guiding economic role of the West and for the creation of new relations with the Third World. Keynesianism and

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inflation, the cherished palliatives use by governments, cannot bring a solution. It is possible also, that the economic and social philosophy in European countries may be more clearly distinct from that of the United States under socialist influence than in the past.

3.3 The International Economic System and the Third World.

The third main problem of the coming years in relation to the adjustment of the international system of trade and payments to the demands of the developing countries which regard the present order as detrimental for their interests. Since the demands of these nations, which from the majority within the General Assembly of the United Nations, have found expression in the Resolution 3218 (XXIX) of 12.12.1974 of the General Assembly, negotiations have been iniated between the industrialized powers and the countries of the Third World, in order to find an agreement on alterations of the existing economic order in favour to the developing countries. The main points of the demands of the so called group of 77 are the following:

a) Preferential treatment for the products of the developing countries in the tariff system of the industrial nations in order to make up for the alleged unfavourable term of trade to the disadvantage of the Third World;

b) Creating of an international machinery for the stabilization of the prices of raw materials produced in the Third World, consisting of an internationally financed Buffer Fund for the equalization of movement of prices;

c) Transfer of modern technologies to the developing countries;

d) Respect for the sovereign disposition of all nations over their natural resources, including the right to nationalize foreign industrial companies working in the national territory.

The transition of an economic world order founded upon the free exchange of goods and the principle of the adjustment of economic differences through the working of the free marked to an

altered system of a certain amount of international solidarity, organized in order to diminish the economic differences in the world, will be one of the tasks of the next decade which probably can only seeth beginnings of wider changes.

The international economic system may also have to face problems in the supply of the industrialized nations with the necessary raw materials. A civil war in South Africa would deprive the European countries of important sources of raw materials. As the resources in minerals and other commodities are more widely distributed over the world as those in oil, it seems less probable that associations of producers could reach a similar success as OPEC has won during the last years.

Behind the problems of a new international order for economic exchange and finance, other world problems of great dimension have become discernible in recent time, such as protection of the ecological system of the earth and its space, finding food and employment for a growing world population, limitation of population growth, migration and ordered planning of the future resources of globe. All of these problems of universal importance for the future of mankind are now in view, but the present state of international organization and co-operation will not be sufficient to tackle them seriously. They will remain a silent warning to look farther ahead in international relations than the short-term political thinking of our political leadership is accustomed to do.

Prof. Ulrich Scheuner, Bonn

Session (6)

THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

by Christopher Mallaby

Introduction

The first Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to disarmament took place from 23 May to 1 July 1978. Was it a success? Can such meetings play a valuable rôle in achieving progress in disarmament?

Origins

The idea of a Special Session on Disarmament is older than many people think. It was first suggested by President Tito at the non-aligned summit at Belgrade in 1961. The idea was revived and endorsed by the non-aligned at their 1976 Summit at Colombo, when it was suggested that the agenda should include a review of disarmament problems and a programme of priorities and recommendations. The UN General Assembly later adopted a resolution (31/189B - 21 December 1976) calling for a Special Session in May-June 1978.

Attitudes

There was initially concern among some states that another discussion forum might not achieve anything concrete. Indeed a high level meeting might raise public expectations and then disappoint them. And if the meeting produced polemics, prospects for progress in disarmament might actually be reduced. But a much more positive assessment gained ground among Western States as the Special Session approached. It seemed reasonable to hope for certain worthwhile results from the Special Session despite the limitation that the General Assembly has no powers to adopt treaties or take decisions binding upon governments. The first reasonable aim was that the Special Session could mobilise world opinion in favour of progress in disarmament, express this

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in a document calling for progress, and thus provide a new impetus in the negotiations where actual treaties were under consideration. More generally, it was reasonable to believe that the Special Session could stimulate governments to review their disarmament policies and produce new ideas; bring more governments into international discussion about disarmament and thus spread knowledge; and draw wider public attention to disarmament.

The Western States, guided by the ideas in the previous paragraph, wanted the Special Session to adopt a realistic, practical and balanced approach to disarmament. It should cover conventional disarmament as well as nuclear, and pay attention to the need to prevent nuclear proliferation. The West wanted account to be taken of the importance of maintaining stability and avoiding anything which, for instance by undermining deterrence, could make war more likely.

The Soviet Union appeared to want the Special Session to be a stepping stone towards a World Disarmament Conference - an idea to which the Warsaw Pact states but not others are commiteed. The Soviet Union also hoped, no doubt, that the Special Session would be a good occasion to gain support for its existing ideas in the general field of disarmament; such as "mutual" renunciation of the enhanced radiation warhead; an undertaking by the 35 CSCE States on no first use of nuclear weapons against each other; and dissolution of military alliances. All these ideas are seen as destabilising and unacceptable by the NATO States. The non-aligned showed from the first that they saw the Special Session as a means of putting pressure on the nuclear weapon States to make faster progress in nuclear disarmament. They also hoped to establish as close a link as possible between disarmament

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and development, arguing that resources saved in the defence sector should be diverted to economic aid.

Preparations

Early meetings, in 1977, of the 54 nation Preparatory Committee agreed that the Special Session should start with a general debate and should produce a Final Document in three parts: a Declaration covering the principles which should govern disarmament negotiations; a Programme of Action stating the actual steps needed in disarmament; and a section on reform of the international fora concerned with disarmament. The various groups of states put forward drafts for these three sections of the Final Document. The drafts reflected the approaches and aims outlined above. The Western draft Programme of Action, put forward on 1 February by the United Kingdom and nine other states including several from NATO, was designed to be comprehensive and to advance new ideas but at the same time to be balanced and practicable. This draft Programme, in the preparation of which British non-governmental organisations played a part, adopted a three-fold approach. It called for progress and success in the major arms control negotiations like SALT and a comprehensive test ban. Secondly, it called for a series of confidence-building measures to reduce tension and help make negotiations possible on new subjects. Thirdly, it proposed UN studies on various subjects, so as to prepare the way for the next generation of major negotiations.

The General Debate

When the Special Session opened on 23 May it was not clear whether a comprehensive Final Document could be adopted by consensus. The last two meetings of the Preparatory Committee, which had begun to draft the Final Document on the basis of the papers put forward

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by states, had run into serious differences on important subjects. But the General Debate of the Session was a success. Of 126 speakers 20 were Heads of State or Government - mostly from NATO and the European neutrals - and 51 were Foreign Ministers. The content of the speeches was mostly constructive and optimistic. Determination to make progress was the general theme. A number of new ideas were put forward. There were relatively few polemical notes. One notable point was that Vice-President Mondale and Mr Gromyko both spoke of significant reductions in stockpiles and constraints on qualitative improvement as objectives for the next round of strategic arms negotiations. Other major themes in the debate were the importance of nuclear disarmament, especially SALT, a comprehensive test ban and nuclear-weapon-free zones; the view that disarmament could release resources for economic development; the need, stressed by the Western States, to tackle the problem of arms transfers; the importance of the peacekeeping rôle of the UN; the proposal that the nuclear powers should give appropriate "negative security assurances" that they would not use nuclear weapons against States which had renounced them; and the need to improve the structure of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva, the body for negotiating disarmament treaties.

The drafting marathon

Work started in earnest on 5 June on the drafting of the Final Document. On 26 June, two days before the Session was due to end, it was still uncertain that a comprehensive document could be agreed. One major area of difficulty concerned new steps in nuclear disarmament and the question of outlawing all use of nuclear weapons. The non-aligned pressed hard for early radical moves in nuclear disarmament. The West recognised that this subject was of particular importance but pointed out that to move too far all at once would create instability and thus could actually accelerate the procurement of arms. The West also pointed out that, because of the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe, nuclear disarmament would have to be accompanied by conventional. When the non-aligned called for a convention to outlaw all use of nuclear weapons, the West pointed out that to

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go this far would not be compatible with the policy of deterrence of aggression and thus would seriously undermine stability in the Northern Hemisphere. Another point of difficulty in drafting the Final Document concerned nuclear non-proliferation. The non-aligned were inclined to argue against any favourable mention of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There was also argument about the problem of the world-wide build-up of conventional arms. The West wanted the Special Session to launch a UN study of this subject and how to tackle it. The non-aligned at one time seemed willing to agree. But in the heat of the drafting process, India led a revival of non-aligned opposition and the idea was blocked. The Soviet Union, moreover, opposed the launching of any new studies by the UN.

The Final Document

At the very end, after the Session had been extended by 3 days, it succeeded in adopting a Final Document by consensus. As intended, it was in three parts: a Declaration, a Programme of Action and a section on the international machinery dealing with disarmament.

The Declaration contains some useful points. It states that the ultimate objective in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. As priorities, it lists effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war; prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction; and balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. A section on principles to govern negotiations says that the objective at each stage of disarmament should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. The need for adequate measures of verification is stressed. States are called upon to abide by the UN Charter and refrain from actions which might adversely

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affect disarmament efforts. Taken as a whole, however, the Declaration suffers from a lack of balance through excessive stress on nuclear disarmament and insufficient emphasis on measures to limit conventional weapons and on the need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Programme of Action sets out measures needed in disarmament in "the next few years". The section on nuclear matters sets the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Various new suggestions are made for measures which could form part of this process, but this is done in terms acceptable to all concerned. There are positive sections on the need for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and further agreements on strategic arms limitation. Nuclear weapon States are called upon to give negative security assurances, such as the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain gave during the Session. The section on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons starts with a statement of the need for action. But the subsequent reference to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is very brief and there is no list of the further measures needed, such as appeared in the Western draft for the Programme of Action. The section on other weapons of mass destruction gives proper emphasis to a ban on chemical weapons. Curbs on conventional weapons receive less attention than nuclear measures. There is encouragement for the efforts being made in the Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe. The brief and rather qualified reference to consultations on limiting transfers of conventional weapons is far less positive than the West wanted. The passage on reduction of military budgets is also general and, unlike the Western draft Programme of Action, does not call for the testing of a means of comparing budgets so that balanced and fair reductions

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could be planned. Whereas the Western draft Programme advocated a range of confidence-building measures, the Final Document is much less specific. Its only concrete suggestion is the idea, advanced by the United Kingdom in the preparations for the Special Session, of using "hot lines", and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict, in areas of tension.

The third section of the Final Document - about international machinery for disarmament - contained the major concrete result of the Special Session. Britain played a central rôle in securing agreement on a package of reforms to make the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva more representative. A way was found of reconciling the French desire for a new body with Soviet preference for very limited change. The US/Soviet co-chairmanship of the CCD, long criticised by the non-aligned and others, was abolished. The CCD was brought closer to the United Nations without endangering its practice of taking decisions by consensus. France is expected to participate in the renamed Committee on Disarmament. Provision was made for China to join and for between five and eight additional members to be selected after the Special Session.

Was the Session a success?

It was good that the Special Session provided the occasion for the widest ever international discussion of disarmament at a high level and that this discussion was of high quality and constructive It is remarkable that all states in the UN were able to agree on a single, comprehensive document on the highly sensitive subject of arms control. States have been stimulated to review their disarmament policies and more of them have been encouraged to take an active interest in disarmament. The differing points of view should now be better understood. There has been concrete progress on negative security assurances, a long-standing desire of

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certain states which in turn are being asked to renounce nuclear weapons. And the reform of the CCD should make it more effective.

Against this, the Final Document lacks balance. It pays insufficient attention to certain subjects. Some good ideas were kept out of it.

Overall the Special Session was a success, doing no ill and a fair amount of good. This kind of world-wide forum provides a means of reviewing the whole subject of disarmament from time to time, while concrete progress is sought in negotiations among smaller groups of states. To quote the final words of the British representative at the Session: "For her part, Britain will continue in all the appropriate fora to strive for progress in disarmament through multilateral, balanced and verified disarmament agreements which lead us towards a safer world. Our immediate and most urgent task is to achieve success in the tripartite negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in Geneva and to maintain the new momentum recently injected into the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna".

CCADD 1978
SESSION #7

LES PERSPECTIVES DU DESARMEMENT EN 1978

PROFESSEUR HENRI BURGELIN

1° La situation

On ne saurait apprécier les travaux de la session spéciale des Nations Unies sans tenir compte de l'évolution de la situation internationale au cours des derniers mois, tant dans le domaine politique que dans celui des armements. En effet, alors que la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe qui s'était déroulée à Helsinki du 3 juillet 1973 au 1er août 1975 semblait avoir abouti à des résultats importants dans le domaine de la "détente", c'est-à-dire de la cohabitation pacifique de pays à régimes différents, non seulement en Europe, mais dans l'ensemble du monde, force est de constater que cette détente s'est notablement détériorée.

(a) Dans le domaine politique

(i) Les persécutions subies en Union Soviétique et dans certaines démocraties populaires par des "dissidents" qui, au nom des principes fixés à Helsinki, revendiquaient soit une plus grande liberté dans leur pays, soit une plus grande indépendance de ce pays à l'égard de Moscou, soit le droit d'émigrer, ont amené à s'interroger sérieusement sur la bonne foi avec laquelle l'U.R.S.S. envisageait d'honorer les engagements pris à Helsinki.

(ii) La session de la C.S.C.E. qui s'est tenue à Belgrade de la fin de 1977 à mars 1978 n'a permis aucun progrès sérieux par rapport à l'Acte final d'Helsinki.

(iii) L'appui donné par Moscou au nouveau régime installé au Vietnam, à la fois tyrannique à l'intérieur et expansionniste à l'extérieur, la façon dont l'U.R.S.S. a soutenu des mouvements révolutionnaires en Afrique, leur a fourni des armes et des conseillers militaires et a encouragé et aidé une intervention militaire certaine dans plusieurs pays de ce continent ont donné à penser que la détente en Europe donnait aux Soviétiques des moyens accrus pour intervenir ailleurs, y détruire toute stabilité politique et, peut-être, s'y implanter.

(b) Dans le domaine des armements, la conjoncture ne paraissait guère plus favorable, pour des raisons que l'on ne peut imputer à la seule Union Soviétique.

(i) De nouvelles armes ont été ou sont à la veille d'être mises au point par les deux grandes puissances. Du côté soviétique, il s'agit surtout d'un bombardier à long rayon d'action, susceptible de transporter l'arme atomique jusque sur le territoire américain, appelé Backfire par les Occidentaux, ainsi que de nouveaux missiles à moyenne portée, SS.16, capables d'atteindre l'Europe occidentale, et des missiles SS.20 lancés de plates-formes mobiles. Du côté américain, c'est d'une longue série d'armements nouveaux qu'il s'agit : nouveau sous-marin nucléaire "Trident", perfectionnement des fusées à têtes nucléaires multiples "MIRV", "Missiles de croisière" volant à basse altitude, difficiles à détecter, mais particulièrement précis, "Missiles MX" lancés de plates-formes mobiles, donc pratiquement indétectables et enfin bombe à radiation renforcée ou "bombe à neutrons".

(ii) L'accroissement des tensions politiques s'ajoutant aux difficultés techniques suscitées par l'apparition de ces nouvelles armes, le renouveau de la méfiance réciproque qui s'en est suivi et la répugnance manifestée par une partie du Congrès américain devant toute concession aux Soviétiques ainsi que la crainte manifestée par les alliés des Américains de l'O.T.A.N. de voir une entente entre les deux Grands sur les armes nucléaires stratégiques leur retirer la sécurité que leur donne la dissuasion américaine pesèrent d'un poids très lourd sur les négociations SALT II. L'espoir exprimé par le Président Carter de les conclure pendant l'été semble désormais exagérément optimiste, car si les Américains et les Soviétiques sont d'accord pour limiter jusqu'en 1985 à 2250 le nombre de leurs vecteurs, pour ne pas accroître celui de leurs MIRV, le projet d'accord sur l'arrêt jusqu'en 1980 de la modernisation de leurs armements se heurte à de nombreuses problèmes ainsi que le projet de déclaration de principe, interdisant notamment la livraison de nouvelles armes à leurs alliés respectifs.

(iii) Les négociations MBFR se sont poursuivies à Vienne sans aboutir à aucun résultat concluant. Les Occidentaux, en raison de la disproportion des effectifs, des avions et surtout des chars déployés en Europe centrale au profit du Pacte de Varsovie, ne peuvent en effet accepter une égalité dans les réductions de forces, mais voudraient pour le moins les rendre proportionnelles. Ils ont cependant admis le principe de l'égalité de la sécurité qui fait entrer dans la négociation les armes nucléaires tactiques pour lesquelles ils bénéficient d'une certaine supériorité, sans que, pour cela, les négociations aient beaucoup progressé.

(iv) Après la France et la Chine, l'Inde s'est dotée de l'arme nucléaire et bien des indices donnent à penser que d'autres Etats comme Israël ou l'Afrique du Sud sont près de disposer aussi de cette arme. Ces pays ne paraissent prêts à souscrire à aucune mesure qui limite leur liberté d'action pour perfectionner leur armement.

(v) La crise pétrolière a permis à certains pays exportateurs de pétrole, qu'elle a considérablement enrichis, d'accroître dans des proportions énormes le niveau et la qualité de leurs armements. C'est notamment le cas de l'Arabie séoudite et de l'Iran. De ce fait, certains équilibres régionaux, notamment au Moyen Orient, se sont trouvés compromis.

Ainsi, la session spéciale de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies s'est déroulée dans une atmosphère peu favorable à une entente. Elle a surtout laissé voir le mécontentement d'un grand nombre de puissances contre les objectifs poursuivis par les deux Grands et contre leurs méthodes de travail dans le domaine du désarmement, notamment parce qu'elles ne laissaient qu'une part insuffisante d'initiative et même d'expression aux autres puissances. Cependant l'on a pu constater des différences sensibles entre les puissances secondaires dotées de l'arme atomique, comme la Chine et la France qui s'en prenaient au monopole des deux Grands et les puissances non nucléaires qui tenaient

à mettre un terme à la course aux armements atomiques, notamment en obtenant l'interdiction de tout essai nucléaire. Parmi ces puissances, les différences n'étaient pas moins notables entre celles dont la sécurité est assurée par une alliance militaire avec l'un des Grands et celles qui ne peuvent compter sur aucune garantie extérieure, entre celles qui produisent et exportent des armements et celles qui n'en exportent pas. Bref, si la communauté internationale s'est montrée soucieuse de faire un pas en avant sur la voie du désarmement, elle n'a jamais été à ce point divisée par ses intérêts et ses conceptions d'une sécurité que tout Etat considère comme un droit essentiel.

2° La session spéciale des Nations Unies

La réunion d'une session spéciale de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, du 23 mai au 1er juillet 1978 permet de faire le point des tendances qui dominent actuellement en matière de désarmement.

La première constatation qui s'impose c'est sans doute que les deux Grandes puissances n'y ont pas dominé les délibérations comme elles l'avaient fait depuis vingt ans. C'est la Yougoslavie, pays non-aligné, qui a proposé la tenue de cette session, lors d'une réunion ministérielle du groupe des non-alignés, à Colombo, en 1976. Pour la première fois, les pays de la Communauté européenne, qui s'étaient concertés au préalable, ont présenté, à titre particulier ou au nom de six d'entre eux, de nombreuses propositions dont plusieurs semblent avoir retenu tout particulièrement l'attention. Les pays non-alignés ont également joué un rôle notable, tandis que les deux Grandes puissances n'ont paru accorder qu'un intérêt moindre à cette réunion. On peut d'ailleurs se demander si cette discrétion des Etats-Unis et de l'Union Soviétique a constitué un facteur favorable aux travaux de cette Assemblée.

L'ordre du jour de la session comportait l'adoption d'une déclaration, celle d'un programme d'action et l'examen du mécanisme de négociations internationales sur le désarmement.

Certains pays ont présenté des propositions précises, sous forme de projets déposés avant la session, à titre particulier ou au nom d'un groupe de puissances. Tous ont pu s'exprimer par des discours devant l'Assemblée, tenus souvent par les chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement ou les ministres des affaires étrangères.

C'est dire que l'Assemblée n'était pas un lieu de négociations ni de décisions concernant le désarmement lui-même, mais simplement un vaste forum où chaque puissance présentait ses idées et ses conceptions, ce qui devrait permettre ensuite le développement, dans d'autres enceintes, de négociations proprement dites. Le document final, adopté par consensus, ne comporte que peu de décisions, mais fait état d'un certain nombre de résolutions, destinées à ouvrir la voie à des négociations ultérieures. Trois pays : l'Albanie, Israël et le Vietnam, ne se sont pas associés au consensus.

(a) L'élément le plus caractéristique de ce texte est sans doute la volonté qu'il manifeste d'un <u>retour vers les Nations Unies</u> de l'entreprise du désarmement. Bien sûr, les négociations entamées hors de ce cadre, comme les SALT et les MBFR n'en sont pas touchées, mais il est mis fin à la Conférence du Comité sur le désarmement, continuatrice depuis 1969 du Comité des dix-huit puissances, élargi alors à trente. Le nouveau Comité du désarmement sera lié aux Nations Unies qui fourniront son secrétariat et sa présidence sera assurée par rotation mensuelle. Cette mesure avait été demandée par la plupart des participants, mais avait rencontré de sérieuses réserves de la part des Etats-Unis et de l'Union Soviétique. Son adoption reflète donc une volonté assez générale de ne plus voir les deux Grands dominer les négociations sur le désarmement, ce qui permettra à la France et peut-être à la Chine d'y occuper la place à laquelle elles y ont droit en tant que puissances nucléaires, alors qu'elles ne siégeraient pas à la Conférence du Comité sur le désarmement.

D'une façon générale, presque tous les participants ont manifesté le désir de voir le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies détenir et exercer de plus grandes responsabilités dans ce domaine, notamment pour ce qui concerne l'organisation de négociations et surtout les mécanismes de vérification et de contrôle.

L'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, dans ses sessions ordinaires ou dans de nouvelles sessions spéciales ou encore à sa première Commission où tous les membres sont représentés est apparue comme le lieu souhaité par beaucoup pour un débat général sur le désarmement, mais comme un forum trop vaste pour la négociation, confiée au Comité du désarmement où siégeraient les représentants d'une cinquantaine d'Etats, parmi lesquels les puissances nucléaires et, à tour de rôle, les autres puissances, selon un dosage tenant compte des alliances et de la représentation des différentes parties du monde. De plus, les pays n'en faisant pas partie pourraient lui adresser des propositions et participer à l'examen de ces propositions.

L'ensemble de ces mesures manifeste incontestablement un souci d'élargir au monde entier l'entreprise du désarmement. On peut toutefois se demander si cet élargissement rendra plus facile de déboucher sur des résultats précis et pratiques et si les tentatives faites pour que le désarmement échappe à la tutelle des deux Grands n'aboutira pas à stériliser cette entreprise qui, finalement, ne pourra aboutir à rien sans l'accord des deux Super-puissances. Toutefois, la poursuite des négociations bilatérales (SALT) et multilatérales (MBFR) entre les deux alliances peut remédier à cet inconvénient.

(b) Un second aspect de cette session a été le souci manifesté par nombre de ses participants et repris par le document final, d'empêcher que la course aux armements se développe sur des voies nouvelles en interdisant la mise au point, le stockage et l'emploi d'armes chimiques, bactériologiques ou radiologiques et de toutes nouvelles armes de destruction massive. Un accord sur ce point n'est

peut-être pas exclu puisqu'aucun Etat ne fonde actuellement sa sécurité sur de telles armes. Il reste toutefois extrêmement délicat de définir ce que seraient ces armes nouvelles et ce qui les distinguerait de perfectionnements d'armes plus anciennes.

(c) En ce qui concerne les armes nucléaires, de très nombreuses propositions ont été déposées. Elle reflètent une grande variété de préoccupations et ne permettent guère de dégager les éléments d'un consensus véritable.

(i) La proposition d'un engagement à prendre par toutes les puissances nucléaires de ne pas utiliser la première l'arme atomique peut difficilement être acceptée par les pays de l'O.T.A.N. puisqu'elle équivaudrait à annuler l'effet dissuasif de la force nucléaire américaine et à valoriser la supériorité soviétique en armements conventionnels, notamment en Europe centrale. A l'inverse, celle faite par les Neuf d'inviter les puissances nucléaires à ne pas utiliser ou menacer d'utiliser leurs armes contre des puissances non-nucléaires devrait, pour les mêmes raisons, faire l'objet d'une étude approfondie avant d'être adoptée par les membres de l'O.T.A.N.

(ii) L'Assemblée a demandé l'ouverture d'une négociation en vue d'un accord interdisant les essais nucléaires de toutes natures. En attendant cet accord, tout essai serait prohibé. Mais les deux pays les plus intéressés à poursuivre ces essais, en raison de l'état du développement de leur armement nucléaire, la France et la Chine, ont fait savoir qu'elles ne participeraient pas à un tel accord et qu'elles ne s'abstiendraient pas, en attendant cet accord, d'expérimenter leurs armes. Les représentants des deux pays ont souligné qu'à leurs yeux, une telle mesure, prise dans la situation actuelle, n'aurait d'autre effet que de renforcer le monopole nucléaire des deux grandes puissances et de lui donner un caractère permanent, tandis qu'eux avaient besoin de nouveaux essais pour combler leur retard. Les aléas qui pèsent sur

la négociation SALT II et sur l'ouverture d'une négociation SALT III destinée à opérer enfin une réduction du nombre des vecteurs nucléaires stratégiques chez les deux Grands ne pouvaient que fournir des arguments à leur refus.

(iii) L'idée de multiplier les zones dénucléarisées, telles que l'Amérique du Sud (Traité de Tlatelolco) a été avancée par de nombreux pays et n'a fait l'objet d'aucune objection de principe. Toutefois, on ne saurait envisager d'accord de dénucléarisation sans la participation de tous les pays d'une même région et, dans les circonstances actuelles, ni l'Europe occidentale dont la sécurité n'est assurée que par l'arme nucléaire, ni l'Asie orientale où l'Inde et la Chine sont puissances nucléaires, ni probablement le Moyen Orient où Israël n'est probablement pas décidé à abandonner a priori cette ultime garantie de sa sécurité, ni l'Afrique australe, où l'Afrique du Sud a des préoccupations analogues, ne paraissent pouvoir être dénucléarisés. L'application du principe proclamé par beaucoup de puissances d'une égalité de la sécurité paraît, dans bien des cas, s'opposer à la constitution de telles zones, d'autant plus que l'on voit mal les grandes puissances garantir en tout état de cause la sécurité de ces pays. Il est donc difficile d'imaginer de rapides progrès dans cette direction.

(iv) L'interdiction totale de toute dissémination des armes nucléaires, renforcée par un contrôle plus strict de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique sur les transferts de matières fissiles et sur leur utilisation.

(d) Pour les armes conventionnelles, plusieurs soucis se sont également manifestés :

(i) Celui de limiter les ventes d'armes, notamment aux pays du Tiers Monde. Cependant, la fixation de normes, par exemple à partir d'équilibres régionaux, se heurte à des difficultés considérables qui n'ont guère été abordées. D'une façon générale, les pays acquéreurs d'armements se sont montrés très réservés sur ce point.

(ii) Celui de limiter les armements conventionnels en Europe, soit en activant les négociations MBFR, soit, selon une proposition française, en étendant les réductions envisagées à l'ensemble des 35 signataires de l'Acte final d'Helsinki. Il y a, à vrai dire, assez peu de chances de voir l'Union Soviétique adhérer à une telle proposition qui toucherait à sa liberté de déployer ses forces sur son propre territoire.

(iii) Celui d'une réduction des matériels conventionnels alliant la mobilité à la puissance : véhicules blindés, chars, avions, artillerie, hélicoptères, etc., par dissolution contrôlés d'unités.

(iv) Celui de fixer, par des accords régionaux, des plafonds aux niveaux de forces et d'armements conventionnels. De tels accords paraissent indispensable à la constitution de zones dénucléarisées, en vertu du principe de l'égalité dans la sécurité qui ne pourrait pas être respecté si la dénucléarisation devait favoriser les détenteurs d'armements conventionnels.

(e) Une série de mesures destinées à établir et à renforcer la confiance réciproque ont également été envisagées. Ces mesures porteraient essentiellement sur l'information mutuelle, notamment dans les domaines suivants :

(i) En ce qui concerne les budgets militaires, ils seraient établis selon des normes identiques et vérifiables pour permettre une réduction concertée. Plusieurs pays d'Europe occidentale ont fait dans ce domaine des propositions précises et le Royaume-Uni a offert de soumettre avec quelques autres son budget de défense, à titre expérimental, à des normes définies par le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies.

(ii) Le système des notifications préalables des manoeuvres et des mouvements de troupes inauguré dans le cadre de la C.S.C.E. pourrait être précisé et étendu et l'invitation d'observateurs généralisée.

(iii) Des informations sur les structures de commandement et l'implantation des grandes unités pourraient être échangées, ainsi que des données chiffrées sur la production d'armement et sur les forces armées.

(iv) La Chine a demandé la réduction des forces implantées à proximité des frontières de chaque Etat. Toutefois, il serait, dans ce domaine, difficile de se mettre d'accord sur des normes communes à l'Europe et à l'Asie.

(v) Les Etats-Unis, soutenus par plusieurs autres Etats, ont proposé la création d'une force permanente de maintien de la paix, par les Nations Unies.

(vi) L'ouverture aux Nationa Unies d'un registre où figureraient tous les transferts d'armes a été proposée et, d'une façon plus générale, la publicité de tels transferts. Les pays industrialisés occidentaux se sont montrés très favorables aux principe de telles mesures qui a soulevé des objections de la part de certains pays du tiers monde qui craignaient de voir ainsi leur sécurité intérieure ou extérieure plus difficile à assurer.

(vii) La recherche d'accords régionaux en vue d'organiser le règlement pacifique des conflits.

(viii) Enfin, on peut compter parmi les mesures destinées à établir la confiance, la proposition faite par plusieurs pays industrialisés d'inviter les pays "surarmés", notamment les puissances nucléaires, à consacrer à l'aide aux pays sous-développés une certaine proportion des sommes qu'ils utilisent pour leur armement. Cette proposition a connu un certain succès sans qu'un débat ait eu lieu sur les bases à partir desquelles cette contribution serait fondée. Il convient cependant de souligner la nouveauté du lien qui serait ainsi créé entre les armements et l'aide au développement.

(f) Enfin, la session spéciale de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies a accordé une attention toute particulière aux mesures de vérification et de contrôle. Elle y a été encouragée par les progrès récents des techniques de contrôle qui rendent désormais possible à ceux qui disposent des moyens suffisants de vérifier l'exactitude des déclarations des autres puissances. Cependant comme seuls les Etats-Unis et l'Union Soviétique détiennent une gamme complète de ces moyens, c'est de leur participation à toute organisation internationale du contrôle que dépend son efficacité. Or il n'apparaît guère probable que ces deux pays donnent accès à d'autres à certains de ces moyens de contrôle.

(i) Tel est notamment le cas de la proposition française de créer une Agence internationale de satellites de contrôle, chargée de recueillir, de traiter et de diffuser les renseignements transmis par les satellites d'observation dont seuls disposent actuellement les Etats-Unis et l'Union Soviétique, afin de contrôler l'application des accords sur le désarmement. On ne peut prévoir que les Nations Unies disposent de tels satellites avant de nombreuses années. Cette proposition n'a d'ailleurs pas été retenue dans le document adopté par la session spéciale.

(ii) De nombreux autres procédés de contrôle et de vérification ont été envisagés, depuis la présence d'observateurs aux manoeuvres jusqu'au contrôle sur place des industries chimiques et nucléaires et aux procédés de sismologie pour détecter les essais nucléaires.

(iii) L'idée de créer un Institut international de recherche sur le désarmement, autonome sous le contrôle des Nations Unies et composé d'experts chargés d'étudier les techniques militaires, les systèmes de contrôle et les applications du droit à la sécurité afin d'aider les négociations en cours ou de prendre des initiatives propres a été avancée par M. Waldheim ainsi que par plusieurs délégations.

3° Les perspectives ouvertes

On voit que la communauté internationale n'a pas manqué d'idées en matière de désarmement, ni même du désir d'aboutir à des résultats pratiques : si la plupart des pays ont affirmé que leur objectif demeurait le désarmement général et complet, de nombreuses perspectives ont été tracées sur les voies devant permettre d'y aboutir par des actions progressives. Mais c'est précisément la multiplicité de ces voies qui peut faire douter de l'efficacité de l'entreprise et la notion défendue par beaucoup du "droit à la sécurité" voire d'"égalité dans la sécurité" s'oppose bien souvent à des progrès réels parce que les moyens de cette sécurité ne sont pas les mêmes pour tous. Comment la définir ? Quelle place peuvent y tenir les alliances, les armes nucléaires ou conventionnelles détenues par des alliés ? Si, en Europe, il est possible d'en tenir compte, comment y parvenir au Moyen Orient ou en Afrique où l'aide militaire, voire l'intervention directe ne sont généralement pas liées à des alliances en bonne et due forme ?

En second lieu, s'il est tentant de laisser un rôle important aux Nations Unies dans les initiatives pour la paix et le désarmement, il est bien difficile d'espèrer que l'organisation international exercera une quelconque autorité sans l'appui des deux Grands. Soixante ans d'expérience amènent à être sceptique sur ce point et l'accroissement du nombre de ses membres ne semble guère la rendre plus efficace.

Dans le domaine nucléaire, l'initiative ne peut appartenir qu'aux grandes puissances et, secondairement, aux autres puissances nucléaires. Ce sont les SALT qui limiteront, peut-être, le nombre et les spécifications des vecteurs nucléaires, sans pour cela d'ailleurs que la puissance nucléaire des deux Grands s'en trouve amoindrie, compte tenu de leurs capacités actuelles. Peut-on espèrer que la France, la Chine et l'Inde renoncent à perfectionner leurs armes par de nouveaux essais ? Cela paraît difficile, surtout dans le cas de la Chine. Peut-on penser qu'Israël renoncera à l'arme

atomique s'il sent sa sécurité menacée ? Certainement pas sans des garanties très précises des Etats-Unis que ceux-ci ne semblent pas prêts à lui donner.

Alors, dans la masse des propositions présentées à la session spéciale des Nations Unies, retenues ou non dans le document adopté, il en est un petit nombre qui paraissent susceptibles d'une prochaine traduction dans des accords internationaux. Peut-être peut-on envisager des accords régionaux, par exemple dans certaines régions de l'Afrique portant sur leur dénucléarisation, sur des plafonds aux armements et sur une limitation des transferts d'armes. Sur cette question particulière des ventes d'armes, des accords particuliers pourraient, semble-t-il, être envisagés entre les puissances exportatrices, sur une base régionale : l'Amérique latine, peut-être aussi des régions où les conflits menacent comme l'Afrique ou le Moyen Orient pourraient être exclus des ventes de certains types d'armes modernes. Mais la solution la plus satisfaisante serait celle d'un double accord, l'un régional entre les pays acheteurs qui pourrait fixer des seuils d'armements et, ensuite, l'autre entre les pays vendeurs pour garantir le respect de ces seuils.

Mais l'opposition entre la doctrine du "contrôle des armements" et celle du démantèlement des blocs militaires demeure. Parmi les propositions complètes et cohérentes présentées, celle soutenue par six membres de la Communauté européenne (R.F.A., Belgique, Italie, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni) ainsi que par l'Australie, le Canada, le Danemark, le Japon, la Norvège et, partiellement, la Turquie, répond à la première doctrine, celle présentée par la France et celle, sur les procédures du désarmement, présentée par les quinze membres non-alignés du Comité du Désarmement relèvent de la seconde. Entre les deux conceptions, il y a quelques recoupements possibles, notamment dans le domaine des procédures, des méthodes de vérification et, peut-être, du commerce des armes, mais ils sont limités. Rien n'indique que le désarmement puisse, aujourd'hui, aller au delà.

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"Theological Perspectives on Security, International Responsibility, and Reconciliation"

Studying the order of some of the words in the title assigned for this presentation may be an exercise similar to that of reading tea leaves or searching for divine guidance in the entrails of chickens, but it is an interesting speculation and possibly even suggestive of the issues we are to consider. Notice that "security" and "reconciliation" are separated from each other by "international responsibility"--a division which may imply differentiation, compartmentalization, and even fundamental incompatibility. Notice also that concern for security is placed first in the order of thought leading to responsibility, whereas the mention of reconciliation comes afterwards. Does that arrangement imply that the relationship between security and state responsibility is natural, necessary, and even primary, but that the relationship to reconciliation is accidental, incidental, and heteronomous? Or does it suggest that a commitment to reconciliation must amplify and in other ways correct a concept of state responsibility that is limited too narrowly to a narrow understanding of security?

Reflection on possible meanings of the order of words in the title yields the following preliminary observations: First, if both concern for security and commitment to reconciliation qualify as state responsibilities, they nonetheless are not generically similar. Security, like economic viability, falls

generically into the category of national interests. Reconciliation becomes a national interest only in certain instances where reconciling policies and acts serve particular national purposes. These acts and policies may elicit some broader moral approval when they promote the common purposes, and indeed the community, of several nations, but their genesis is in a state's perceptions of the conditions relating it to other states. Considered on its own terms, reconciliation transcends national interests and may even call for their sacrifice. The same vulnerability for which security is the intended antidote is a condition accepted characteristically, freely and openly for the sake of reconciliation.

Second, concern for the temporal security of people, territory and ruling group belongs--by the authority of common agreement and established usage--to the essence of the state, whereas the mission of reconciliation does not. States exist in a political environment where hostility and threat must be presupposed in principle, even though they vary in form, degree and constancy, and where no finally authoritative and decisively powerful world government exists to resolve their conflicts and protect them from loss and destruction. What no world government can do, the states must do. Vulnerability of all that is under their jurisdiction justifies their existence as institutions which organize, monopolize, and administer power. Security is not their only business, but it is their first order of business. By contrast, the promotion of reconciliation is not a reason why states come into existence, and it is not a definitive attribute of statehood. States have the responsibility for promoting peace, but they also have the obligation to conduct war to protect their vital interests, among which the most vital usually is their security. The theory of the state rests heavily on security, and only very lightly on reconciliation.

Third, if the call for reconciliation expresses a pious, confessional bias, it also articulates the perception that the politically orthodox concepts of and approaches to security are theoretically and practically inadequate to their own purposes. Dominant images of statehood and security, and the kinds of security policies derived from them, have been overtaken and challenged by events, and especially by technological developments in communications and military means of destruction. Fundamental retheoretization now is essential, and policies must be reformulated to reflect the revised theoretical understanding. Security cannot and will not be removed as a central concern of the state, but increasingly it must be sought in the strength and durability of relationships rather than in the presumed invulnerability of the fortress. We may hypothesize, therefore, that the call for commitment to reconciliation is not a proposal that the state be transformed into the church, and that it take the work of reconciliation instead of promotion of security as its foundational responsibility. Rather, it is a proposal to penetrate the thinking that produces policy with the truth that security is contingent upon the development of community among nations, not upon the expansion and technical refinement of arsenals. In the light of that understanding, the "pious, confessional bias" becomes the highest political wisdom.

The title of the paper announces that it is to provide a "theological perspective" on the topic. That proviso requires both a theological analysis of political reality and an indication of the normative direction of political action. So far as the former is concerned, the line of investigation will begin with security and subsequently consider reconciliation. That order is appropriate for several reasons. One is that the inquiry itself

was provoked by profound uneasiness over the efficacy and moral justification of current security policies and arrangements. The call for reconciliation is a response to that uneasiness. A second is that theological reflection on politics must begin with the reality of politics. As we have argued, security is the principal reason for the existence of states. A third reason is that security is no less theologically significant and susceptible of theological interpretation than reconciliation.

So far as the latter, that is, the normative direction of action, is concerned, we must allow the conclusions to follow from the inquiry. We have indicated that security is theologically significant; therefore we may discover that a continuing concern for security is an element in the "normative direction of political action." Also, we approach the task with the conviction that God works in history and nature to make all things new--to bring the entire creation to the fullness of the promised shalom. We shall have to discover the political meaning of that reconciling work in relation to the problem of security in the definition of state responsibilities in international politics.

Theological Perspectives on Security

Security theologically understood and security politically understood both are concerned with the vulnerability of human existence. Their provisions for coping with vulnerability are predictably and characteristically different. Security theologically understood is a relationship of dependence on and trust in God which carries hopes for the future but asks and expects nothing other than what God wills to provide. Security politically understood is a symbolic, material and institutional arrangement for protecting persons, institutions and property and for making the open and threatening future liveable by institutionalizing behavioral expectations. What is the

relationship between the two? Specifically, what is the theological perspective on and evaluation of political security?

We can speak of a "biblical attitude toward political security," because the position is consistent throughout the Bible. It is one of negation and condemnation. The arrangements which human beings make or attempt to make by human means for securing their present and future are both futile and sinful. They are futile because they place trust in what is weak, fragile and perishable, under the illusion that it is strong, invulnerable and enduring. They are sinful because implicitly they renounce dependence on God and place confidence in man to do what God presumably cannot do. The biblical attitude is stated clearly and characteristically in the following quotation from the Book of Isaiah:

> "Woe to those who go down to Egypt for help
> and rely on horses,
> who trust in chariots because they are many
> and in horsemen because they are very strong,
> but do not look to the Holy One of Israel
> or consult the Lord!" (Isaiah 31:1)

Alliances with major powers (Egypt), possession of advanced military technology (chariots), and the ability to deploy masses of men and cavalry will not give protection against a superior enemy, and their use will invite an even more devastating defeat. More important than such pragmatic calculations, the wrath of Yahweh will bring defeat and destruction on those who rely on ordinary political and military wisdom to give them security or victory, "but do not look to the Holy One of Israel or consult the Lord!"

This biblical attitude towards political and military security must not be confused with pacifism. To the contrary, it is a fundamental element of

the holy war doctrine of ancient Israel, which carries over in principle even into the New Testament.[1] There will be fighting and the building of fortifications, but only when God gives the command. And when the command is given and the people fight and win, they win only because God fights for them. "The horse is made ready for the day of battle, but the victory belongs to the Lord" (Proverbs 21:31). If God does not fight for the people, no amount of soldiers, horses and chariots will carry the day. If God does fight, then victory can come with a Gideon's Army of three hundred men, blowing trumpets, shouting, and smashing jugs, thereby throwing the thousands of Midianites into such confusion that they hack each other to pieces. The issue is not whether armies and fortifications are good things or bad things, but whether kings and people look for security to those human means or to the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.

The basic attitude towards security--that it comes from God alone and not from political and military means--is the same in the New Testament as in the Old Testament. However, despite the agreement on that fundamental point there are important differences. One is that the Old Testament expects those who trust God for their security to be protected from physical danger, whereas the New Testament does not. In the Old Testament the psalmist can speak of the Lord preparing a table for him in the very presence of his enemies. According to the New Testament, Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ of God, the man of perfect faith, was nailed to a cross and killed by Roman soldiers, and God did not intervene to protect him. Because God did not intervene, even in response to the cry of dereliction from the cross, the implication for the Christian story is either that God was (and is) absent, or that the resurrection is truth. If God was (and is)

absent, the question of security turns back to the consideration of merely human means. If the resurrection is truth, then whatever true security might mean, it is to be found only on the other side of exposure to suffering and death.

A second difference, which follows in part from the first, is that the New Testament calls Christians to accept the risks of vulnerability for the sake of reconciliation with the enemy. The linkage of faith to physical security thus is broken completely. The linkage to security in relationship with God remains, but as the present assurance of a future blessedness--either in a realm of eternity above history, or in a transformed world at the end of history.

These differences may become significant when we turn to a consideration of reconciliation in relation to international responsibility, but they do not alter the agreement on the fundamental theological perspective on political and military security: Security policies and measures are at best a weak reed, at worst a dangerous and demonic delusion. In either case, they imply a repudiation of genuine faith in the living God.

A second major theological perspective on security is provided by the doctrine that the state is a divine instrument of order in a fallen world. According to this view, the state is an emergency order of preservation which holds the world together and keeps it from being driven centrifugally into chaos by the forces of sin released by the Fall. It is a security order of protection which maintains domestic peace and repels external foes, and shields the innocent from the predatory actions of the wicked. It is a punitive order which inflicts on evildoers the temporal sanctions of divine wrath. It is an external sacrament (in Calvin's language, not Luther's)

which serves the redemptive work of God by providing time and space for the preaching of justification.

Although I have referred to the first theological perspective on security as "the biblical view," the proponents of the second insist that it, too, is biblical. Helmut Thielicke, who has given us probably the most extensive contemporary exposition and application of this doctrinal stance contends, following Luther, that the state as an order of preservation was established by God in the covenant with Noah.[2] Nevertheless, the attitude towards the quest for political and military security is much more affirmative in the second than in the first. The central theological claim of the second view is that God as Sustainer provides temporal security as an integral aspect of the divine work in history. To that end political institutions and magistrates receive divine ordination and serve as instruments and vicars of God. Although some Christian communions which share this theological view of the state exclude true Christians from any and all political participation, others believe that Christians may be called to serve the neighbor in love by administering the institutions which attempt to provide security. The Calvinists prefer (actually it is God's preference!) that only the saints should rule! In the development of doctrine on the question of political and military security, the random interventions of God in response to faith and sin have become institutionalized into a constant mode of divine historical activity which invites human response and participation.

The two positions provide us with a clear choice. In the first case, systematic security policies and their implementation are an offense against God. In the second case, they may be a faithful response to one aspect of the work of God. If the former is theologically necessary, a person who has become a new creature in Jesus Christ and lives by the authority of divine

revelation can say nothing more about security responsibilities than that nations and their leaders must wait for prophetic divine guidance and not trust their own political wisdom and arsenals. If the latter is theologically necessary, or at least possible, a confessing Christian can proceed to consider and even participate in systematic security planning under the conviction that the effort is a vocational means of sharing in God's work of preservation and protection.

Of course, the first perspective--the one that condemns human efforts to provide for security--is almost certain to be ignored and scorned. Its proponents may be persecuted. Confronted with what may be mortal danger to the society, persons responsible for its welfare will be more impressed by the enemy whom they can see than by the God whom they cannot see. If Jeremiah, who advised King Zedekiah to surrender Jerusalem to the Chaldeans, were to make the same prophecy in Jerusalem today, his words would be no more welcome now than they were then--despite the fact that the State of Israel believes itself to be founded on the gift and promise of the very God whose Word established the distinction between true and false security. And what is predictable for Israel in this regard is predictable for almost any state.

But the prospect of being ignored and trampled is no decisive argument against a theologically valid claim. If we speak the truth and are not heard, the burden of blame falls on those who refuse to hear, not on those who bring the witness. In fact, the proper inference from this division may be that those who live by the truth of the coming Kingdom ought not attempt to offer guidance to those who rule the kingdoms of this world.

However, there are strong theological arguments against the first view and in favor of the second, in addition to the claim that the state as order of preservation is grounded in the Noachic Covenant. One argument is that it does not allow the creatures of God to assume the full responsibility for which they have been created. That we have mind, will, memory, foresight and imagination is the result not of the Fall but of original creation. That we should use these attributes to give some shape and substance to world and time is not in principle a repudiation of the divine will but a fulfillment of it. It certainly is true that we cannot master history and build out into the void a fully secured highway of predictability. But we are bound by the stewardship of human capabilities to use them in the governance of the world which God has put under human dominion. Our faithfulness to God is shown in the way we discern, interpret and discharge our responsibilities, not in our abandonment of reason, will and power in the construction, maintenance and protection of viable societies.

A second argument is related to the first, but begins from incarnation rather than creation. The coming of God into the world in human flesh, accepting the full burden and possibility of humanity with its weakness, temptations, hopes and risks is inconsistent with a view of the divine-human relationship that denies the necessary role of man as a maker of history and bearer of responsibility. We cannot escape dependence on God for any moment and condition of our existence, but dependence need not mean permanent infancy. Without accepting all aspects and implications of the theologies of Friedrich Gogarten and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, we nevertheless can agree with them that the incarnate God has given to humankind responsibility for the world in which we live.

One further caveat against the first perspective on security comes to mind. I hope that no worldly government will determine its policies by prophetic deliverance rather than sober political reason. Political leaders who dispose their countries' power in response to what they believe to be direct divine leading not only confuse their own interests with the will of God but also often commit monstrous atrocities in the divine name. We always must bear in mind Roland Bainton's observation that "war is more humane when God is left out of it!"

For these reasons, the second perspective rather than the first will provide, at least tentatively, the theological perspective on security as we continue the inquiry into international responsibility. But in making this decision we must acknowledge that important elements of the first perspective are contained in the second: the fact that the only true security is that which one has in relationship with God, that political and military arrangements are fragile and transitory, that all of our efforts to preserve and protect--even though undertaken in cooperation with God--are under the judgment of God. Attempts to gain worldly security are too susceptible of illusion, too likely to distort our sense of value, too likely to involve us in brutal destruction for us to neglect the warnings and limitations and heed only the justifications. Thielicke insists that the emergency order "must not idealize its structure or make of it a law, for this structure is a necessity, not a virtue, and must be so regarded."[3]

Security and the Political Work of Reconciliation

If we have found a theological basis for security as a responsibility of states in international politics, can we also find a political work for

reconciliation?[4] At first glance, the prospects seem small. The original assertions remain firm: Security and reconciliation are generically different as responsibilities of states. Security belongs to the essence of the state as the principal reason why states come into existence. Reconciliation has no comparable place in the theory of theology of the state. Even theologies of politics like those of Barth and Bonhoeffer, which take a consistently christological stance and explain the meaning of the state with reference to the divine work of redemption, continue to characterize the work of the state basically as that of preservation.[5]

Furthermore, many of the conflicts of international politics contain elements of irreducible opposition. The issues of dispute are themselves irreconcilable, and the conflict over them generates security concerns which widen the gap and increase the hostility between the contending parties. Perhaps the most demonstrable and important of the contemporary irreconcilable conflicts is that between Israel and the Arab states. Israel is an example of _irredenta_ of "unredeemed" land--territory held by one state but claimed by one or more others. In most cases of _irredenta_--such as Alsace-Lorraine, the Upper Tyrol, and the eastern provinces of Germany--the disputed territory is only a part of one homeland or the other. In the case of Israel, however, the entire state is _irredenta_. It could be redeemed for the Palestinian Arabs and other claimants only if the State as a whole were dissolved. Obviously, the Israelis will not accept another final solution (_Endlösung_); therefore they take the security measures they believe to be necessary to protect their small state from destruction. These security measures in turn tend to provoke more hostility and opposition, especially when they involve the occupation and colonization of additional

lands taken from their neighbors. Moreover, when an Arab statesman breaks rank and attempts to promote reconciliation with the Israelis, as did President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, he does so not only at great personal risk but also at the cost of alienation from his Arab and Islamic brethren.

One could construct a catalog of conflicts with irreducible elements: China and Taiwan, China and the USSR, Greece and Turkey, Northern Ireland, NATO and the USSR, The United States, Cuba and the USSR in Africa, Black Africa and white-dominated South Africa, North and South Korea, etc. The situations have their own identity and particularity, but the common element is that the disputes are real and fundamental, and they evoke means of attack and defense. Negotiated settlements may be possible in some instances, in others not. But even the reasonably satisfactory settlement will incorporate the tension between security and reconciliation.

But "tension" does not mean complete opposition. Security in many instances is supportive of the work of reconciliation. More importantly for our purposes, reconciliation often is a necessary instrument of efforts to provide and enhance security. We can see aspects of the political work of reconciliation both by looking more deeply into the meaning of "security" as a political concept and by reflecting on the inability of contemporary military systems to provide national security commensurate with their firepower.

Terrorist airplane hijackings, when understood as assaults on fundamental social order, reveal dimensions of the phenomenon of political security which normally escape our notice. For most of the decades of commercial aviation history, security considerations pertained to the airworthiness of the flying machines, the capability, sobriety and mental health of flight

crews and air controllers, and forecasts of the weather. With the onset of "skyjackings", and especially those perpetrated by politically motivated and sometimes suicidal terrorists, the concept of "airline security" took on quite a different meaning. It came to mean protection against persons who took advantage of the inherent vulnerability of a populated aircraft to advance their own interests, often with no scruples against imposing suffering on and risking or sacrificing the lives of their hostages. In response to that development, airports and airlines hired additional guards, set up security checkpoints with monitoring equipment, subjected passengers to security checks, stationed guards on some airplanes, and gave special training to personnel for dealing with skyjacking and terrorist incidents. A few passenger grumbled about inconvenience and delay. Some protested the indignity of searches and what they saw as the violation of individual rights and the perilous expansion of the police power of the state and corporate society. Most, however, accepted the new arrangements as a relatively small price to pay for reducing the new perils of flying on an airplane.

In this context we think of "security" as visible, rationalized force, organized and deployed for the purpose of guarding the social order against those who do not consent to the authority of its norms and rules. This definition of security is correct but superficial. What the terrorist skyjackings reveal concerning security is that fundamentally it is a condition provided by common consent to the expectations and claims of social order. Security is much more fully present when persons in society accept and respect each other's existence and the regulative institutions of the common life, than when they are armed to the teeth against each other. Prior to the advent of skyjackings there was no significant "security problem" of an interpersonal

or political nature. Passengers and crew had unarmed security because, with rare exception, all of them observed the ordinary conventions of social interaction and the specific expectations of inflight behavior.

Granted, the armed condition property can be designated a "security arrangement." It is the guardian of vulnerability where violence threatens to become its own law. Theologically, it is the order of preservation, the divine ordinance of God the Sustainer. But the resort to armed defense tends to be equated improperly with security as such. The really important change in our consciousness of the problem of security comes when we recognize that real security is the freedom safely to be vulnerable, and that this freedom is a prime ingredient of an integral community.

Once we understand security in the fundamental sense of mutual consent to societal existence, we have the basis for a security politics of reconciliation. Reconciliation, politically understood, is the process of eliciting, coordinating and strengthening the elements of community in both domestic and international society. The stronger the community and its ethos, customs and laws, the stronger the invisible and presupposed security to be free to be vulnerable. The greater the invisible security of common will and supportive social fabric, the less need there is for visible, coercive "security forces." Therefore a politics of reconciliation, which attempts to overcome hostilities, conciliate interests, and generally strengthen the fabric of social relationships, may be much more valuable as a security policy than a politics of competition in armaments.

In the attempt to avoid misunderstanding, I must underscore the fact that the two forms of and approaches to security are not, in my view, an either/or choice. The world is not constituted in human material or

social organization in such manner that states can surrender their "security forces" or fail to maintain their effectiveness. The world is under the power of sin; its resources will not satisfy inexhaustible appetites or support unlimited population; all forms of social organization discriminate against and oppress someone. There is no way that human society in history as we know it can dispense with the instruments of preservation and live in liberal anarchy, Marxist classlessness, or the theocratic harmony of the Kingdom of God.

But the other side of the picture is that the society of mutual consent is not an idealistic dream. Societies cannot exist by force alone, and most of the societies of the world are sustained more by consent than by force. The Hobbesian portrayal of natural human relationships as a war of all against all might turn out to be accurate if all of us could be stripped of our socialized personalities and reduced to primal aggressive instincts, but in most social contexts we are not thusly reduced. We may be latently or overtly hostile toward each other, but most of the time we are able to tolerate each other, and sometimes even to love each other. Trust and love are neither absolutely present nor absolutely absent. To the extent that they exist, they can be nourished and increased. To perform such a work politically is the security politics of reconciliation.[6]

But let us turn to the explicitly military aspects of security policy and ask whether it is possible to speak meaningfully of a security politics of reconciliation in that connection. Under certain military conditions it would be unnecessary to attempt to link reconciliation with security. Those conditions exist where threatened states credibly can plan and successfully can build an effective shield between themselves and the threatening foe.

Reconciling efforts might be useful if the beleaguered state found it to be in its interest to reduce the threat by establishing amicable relationships, but they would not be a necessity. So long as the threatened party could exist in reasonable comfort and safety behind and by reason of its military shield, it would have no real need for reconciliation as an instrument or motive of policy.

If such conditions exist in our time, they exist only for small, weak, non-nuclear states with foes of comparable military capability. For all the other states, and especially for the nuclear powers and their allies and dependents, the luxury of security fully guaranteed by military power simply is not to be had. This situation is so well known that there is no point in spelling it out in detail. It will suffice to point to the bizarre circumstance that the security of the United States and the Soviet Union against each other's ultimate threats is defined not by the invulnerability of each society against devastating attack, but by the invulnerability of its "second strike capability," that is, of the residual ability of a state to destroy the society of its attacker after its own society has been destroyed. That is not the whole of the contemporary meaning of military security, but it is the strategic concept on which all other plans and policies rest.

It is this fateful and unique circumstance which makes reconciliation an essential component of security policy. The states and systems that stand in what at times seems to be mortal opposition must seek each other's cooperation in order to survive. That is the significance, of course, of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks and other reciprocal efforts, whether bilateral or multilateral, to impose controls on the technology of modern warfare--the demonic creations of the Sorcerer's Apprentices.

If it seems more than a little strained to speak of SALT and comparable efforts as policies of reconciliation, the problem lies not with the inherent inapplicability of the term but with our conception of it. A politics of reconciliation, properly understood, is a sustained and tortuous process of eliciting community in the midst of conflict. It is not a hortatory campaign to substitute harmony for conflict by instant conversion or the convincing illumination of a new gnosis. A politics of reconciliation acknowledges the real conflicts of interest and ideology. It hopes for accommodations of interests and the softening of ideological absoluteness, but it does not regard either form of conflict as simply illusory. It remains alert to the possibility of giant strides in the enhancement of international trust and cooperation, but it gives operational priority to the smaller steps that grope towards firm ground for the foundation of relatively just and durable accords. If one protests, as many do, that reconciliation as an ideal goal is too remote in possibility and time to have any relevance to current security conflicts, the response must be that the animation and guidance of a politics of reconciliation come not from the ideal future as such but from the evidences of present community and the possibilities of future community which can be discovered by sensitive observation in any situation of conflict. That is why SALT, for all of its prevarication, mystification, and bad faith on both sides, can and must be placed in the context of a security politics of reconciliation.

State Responsibilities in International Politics: Theoretical Reconsiderations

The two terms that have been pre-eminent in this inquiry, security and reconciliation, usually are regarded as peculiarly political in the first case and peculiarly religious in the second. Partly to counteract that preconception, and partly to amplify the theoretical understanding of a state's responsibilities in international politics, I have examined the theological perspectives on security and the security politics of reconciliation. At this point I must draw together some of the results of the investigation in order to see what implications they might have for the retheoretization of international responsibilities.

To begin with, I have maintained throughout that security is both primary and irrevocable as a responsibility of states in international politics. Has that status changed as a result either of the implications of modern weapons systems or of the demonstrated role of reconciliation in security policies? One reads occasionally that the security functions of the state have come to an end as a result of developments in military technology. One supporting argument is that weapons systems which incorporate means of mass destruction, and especially those systems based fundamentally on such means, are inherently immoral. If "security" is premised on the possession and possible use of means of this kind, it cannot be justified whatever the alternative consequences might be. Another argument is that systems whose activation will destroy what they exist to protect are self-contradictory as security measures. If states must use such means as instruments of security policies, they no longer can fulfill a rational and reliable security function.

The arguments supporting the negation of the state's security responsibilities are too complex to be examined here, and they need not be. However decisive they may be as judgments on particular means and policies, they do not touch the principle of responsibility. Nor is the principle rescued by the observation that not all security situations involve the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction. The principle of responsibility remains firm even where they are involved--indeed, <u>especially</u> where they are involved. If a society is threatened with nuclear destruction, the responsibility of the state for protecting the society--for coping with its vulnerability--does not thereby come to an end. To the contrary, the state is obligated by its reasons for existing to engage the danger in its uncamouflaged reality and devise policies for moving the confrontation back from the brink of disaster. Far from undermining the security responsibility of states, the nuclear peril and its contradictions provide its strongest confirmation.

Finding an important role for reconciliation in security policies does not change the status of security as a primary responsibility of states, for the clarification of the role comes in answer to the question, "What policies will produce more and better security?" Policies of reconciliation may be able to serve very well as instruments of reconciliation. Indeed, they may serve more effectively than military policies, especially where security thinking is preoccupied with military considerations to the virtual exclusion of all others. But the main point is that policies of reconciliation, like military policies, are instruments of security planning. Security, not reconciliation, remains the controlling issue in determining the form and substance of the state's responsibility.

Is it possible, however, that the work of reconciliation might replace concern for security as the primary responsibility of the state in international politics? The answer, plainly and simply, is that it is not possible--politically or theologically. The state by divine ordination is given the stewardship of the common good of a particular people, existing through time and usually occupying a more or less defineable space. We can assert that it has responsibilities which transcend this particularity--responsibilities which pertain to the impact of its power on others and to the care and development of the common earthly habitat. Both of these forms of transcendent responsibility confirm that the state exists in a web of relatedness far more extensive and complex than its parochial concreteness, and they relativize it. But they also confirm its parochial character, because they recognize that the organs of will and reason expressed institutionally in the space and time of a particular polis are both the locus of responsibility and the perspective from which it understands the claims arising in its relationships.

Furthermore, the state cannot take the attitude towards vulnerability that is the corollary of full commitment to the ministry of reconciliation. As we have said before, the state exists to eliminate or at least reduce the vulnerability of its people, territory and ruling group. It is bound by the claims of its office to develop the means to defend them against attack by internal or external foes. The ministry of reconciliation, by contrast, exists for the purpose of healing the wounds and divisions of a broken world. It is characteristically and willingly vulnerable. Its only defense is the conviction that the God who raised Jesus Christ from the dead will bring his world-healing work to fruition, and thereby redeem the efforts and the sacrifices of those who respond to the call to share in the reconciling ministry.

But the state as such has no knowledge of these promises and powers of God. Its vision and understanding are limited to what is empirically real in space and time. It accepts its stewardship of people and territory, and because it must do so without faith and hope in the redeeming power of God, it cannot responsibly take undue risks of vulnerability for the sake of reconciliation.

On the surface it may seem that I have simply restated the theology of the state as an order of preservation. Certainly I would maintain that preservation is of the essence of the state, and that an institution which does not perform that work as a regular expression of its office is not a "state". But the phenomenological analysis that I have made, especially of the meaning of security, should make it clear that "order of preservation" is not a fully adequate characterization of the theological and political reality of this particular human institution. What I have been discussing is not the state understood simply as organized violence or coercion. The power of the state is drawn from consent as well as from force. The more prominent the component of consent in power, the greater the authority of the state. Authority is a function of community. The truly authoritative state, therefore, derives its power from a consenting community and not from its monopoly of force. A government that is both wise and responsible will exercize the office of the state not only by seeing to the strength and effectiveness of its military capabilities, but also--and perhaps primarily--by adopting and implementing policies which evoke consent and develop the cohesiveness and integrity of the supporting community. As it does so, its work of reconciliation and preservation emerge as an integrated concept of state responsibility. From a confessional standpoint, the implication of that integration is that God works in and through the state not only as Sustainer but also as Redeemer.

In international politics, the consenting community ultimately is the community of all the peoples of the world. Its existence is more proleptic than sociologically demonstrable. Nevertheless, it is the context in which "responsibility" comes to have more than merely a tribalistic and nationalistic reference. We might develop the thought by arguing that states have a responsibility to help bring an international community into existence. In that way they perform a reconciling work. Although the basic point may be valid, it is not necessarily either helpful or reconciling. States as a rule attempt to foster whatever international environment is most supportive of their interests and values, and to disrupt those that are hostile or inconvenient. More appropriate as a principle of international responsibility is the insistence that states pursue their own security interests and other interests in such manner as to call gradually into existence an international community sufficiently authoritative to decide the justification of unilateral state actions. This principle acknowledges the irrevocable responsibility of states for their own security. It also recognizes the moral limits to the pursuit of security, and the morally significant claims of all parties affected by security policies. It assigns the authority of moral judgment not to states acting in their own interests, or to a coalition of states claiming to be an international community, but to a community-coming-into-being--one which manifests in its processive development the divine intention that the world be made whole. Placing security considerations in the context of such a community is a way of fulfilling both the protective and the reconciling functions of the state--surrendering neither, acknowledging their persistent and grievous contradictions, and thereby keeping them in creative, dialectical tension with each other.

Footnotes

[1]L.E. Toombs, "Ideas of War," Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, ed. G.H. Buttrick (New York: Abingdon Press, 1963), Vol. IV, pp. 796-801; Gerhard von Rad, Der heilige Krieg im alten Israel (Zurich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1951).

[2]Theological Ethics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), Vol. II.

[3]ibid., p. 132.

[4]I have explored this question earlier and more fully in "Reconciliation as a Foreign Policy Method," Religion in Life, XXXVIII (Spring, 1969), pp. 40-54.

[5]Karl Barth, "The Christian Community and the Civil Community," Community, State and Church, ed. Will Herberg (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), p. 158; Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. E. Bethge (London: SCM Press, 1955), pp. 332ff.

[6]For an excellent discussion of the possibilities and limits of cooperation in international relations, see Arnold Wolfers, "Amity and Enmity Among Nations," Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1962), pp. 25-35.