


"THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE: BASIC ISSUES AND MAJOR TRENDS"  
Deutsches Orient Institut, Hamburg, 25-26/V/1978

- (1) programme and list of participants
- (2) Abu Jaber, Kamel: "Development and its effects on traditional people: the Bedouins of Jordan"
- (3) Büttner, Friedmann: "Trends towards retraditionalization in Egypt"
- (4) Dann, Uriel: "The Iraqi Ba'th after ten years of power - the challenges of dogma and pragmatism"
- (5) Ende, Werner: "The Palestine conflict as reflected in contemporary Arabic literature"
- (6) Heradstveit, Daniel: "Psychodynamics of the Middle East conflict"
- (7) Hopwood, Derek: "Soviet policy in the Middle East"
- (8) Khalid, Detlev: "The relevancy of Islam in Arab national identity"
- (9) van Nieuwenhuijze, C. A. O.: "Social change in the Arab countries: motives and thrusts"
- (10) Salibi, Kamal: "'Right' and 'Left' in Lebanon"
- (11) Shaked, Haim: "Experience into fiction: Israeli writers on Jewish-Arab relations"
- (12) Steinbach, Udo: "The European Community and the United States in the Arab world - political competition or partnership?"
- (13) Wild, Stefan: "Social problems in contemporary Arab literature"
- (14) Wolffsohn, Michael: "Israel's New Economic Order"



# DEUTSCHES ORIENT-INSTITUT

im Verbund der Stiftung Deutsches Übersee-Institut

Mittelweg 150 · 2000 Hamburg 13 · Telefon (040) 45 75 81 / 45 55 32

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International Conference on  
THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE-EASTERN SCENE - BASIC ISSUES AND MAJOR TRENDS  
from 25 to 26 May 1978 in Hamburg

## SCHEDULE OF SESSIONS

Thursday, May 25, 1978

09.00 Inauguration of the symposium

09.30-11.15 THE ROLE OF THE MIDDLE EAST IN WORLD POLITICS

✓ Chairman: C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze

✓ Stefano Silvestri: The Middle East in the global balance of power

①

⊕

Derek Hopwood: Soviet policy in the Middle East

-Colomba - espinto Egit.

✓ Shimon Shamir: The United States in the Middle East since the beginning of the 70ies - The case of Egypt

②

⊕

✓ Udo Steinbach: The European Community and the United States in the Arab world - Political competition or partnership?

③

⊕

✓ Nabya Asfahany: The political and economic dimensions of Arab-African cooperation

11.30-12.30 THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST - DIMENSIONS AND PROBLEMS

✓ Chairman: Kamel S. Abu Jaber

✓ Aziz Alkazaz: Basic problems of the economic development in the oilproducing Arab countries

④

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✓ Zvi Yehuda Hershlag: Economic development in the non-oil-producing Arab countries


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✓ Michael Wolffsohn: Israel's "new economic order"

15.00 Reception by the Senate of Hamburg in the City Hall

16.30-18.00 The morning session continued



Thursday, May 25, 1978 (continued)

19.30-21.30 IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND THEIR POLITICAL IMPACT

Chairman: Haim Shaked

6 ✓ + Bassam Tibi: The social background of ideologies in the Arab Middle East

7 ✓ + Uriel Dann: The Iraqi Ba'th after ten years of power - The challenges of dogma and pragmatism

8 ✓ + Kamal S. Salibi: The problem of "right" and "left" in Lebanon

~~Rainer Bären: Ideologies in the Middle East - A political evaluation~~

Friday, May 26, 1978

09.00-11.00 SOCIAL PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST - REVOLUTION OR EVOLUTION

Chairman: Derek Hopwood

9 ✓ + C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze: Social change in the Arab countries: Motives and thrusts

10 ✓ + Kamel S. Abu Jaber: Development and its effects on traditional people. The Bedouins of Jordan

11 ✓ + Friedemann Büttner: Trends towards re-traditionalizing in Egypt

11.15-12.30 THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL ELEMENTS IN THE ARAB AND ISRAELI IDENTITY

Chairman: Kamal S. Salibi

12 ✓ + Detlev Khalid: The relevancy of Islam in the Arab national identity

✓ Itamar Rabinovich: Problems of confessionalism in Syria

✓ Elie Rekhess: Attitudes towards Islam: Findings of a field research among the Arab elite in the West Bank

14.30-16.00 The morning session continued

Friday, May 26, 1978 (continued)

16.30-18.00 THE MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS AS REFLECTED IN THE ISRAELI  
AND ARAB CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE

Chairman: Itamar Rabinovich

✓ Daniel Heradstveit: Psychodynamics of the Middle East  
conflict

✓ Haim Shaked: Experience into fiction: Israeli authors  
on Jewish-Arab relations

✓ Stefan Wild: Social problems in contemporary Arab  
literature

✓ Werner Ende: The Palestine conflict as reflected in  
contemporary Arabic literature

18.00-19.00 DIMENSIONS OF ARAB-ISRAELI COEXISTENCE AND COOPERATION

Discussion--



~~USSR~~  
/ agree

between  
ideology  
and  
~~policy~~ policy

Third world  
policy

Is it now changing?

Angola  
Ethiopia

Albanian involvement  
effort to demonstrate  
not either a  
not the revolutionary

a new element  
to be considered  
in the light  
of the West/Berlin

distinction with  
realpolitik?

a new kind of  
South "model  
proposal"?

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## International Conference on

THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE - BASIC ISSUES AND MAJOR TRENDS

from 25 to 26 May 1978 in Hamburg

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International Conference on  
THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE - BASIC ISSUES AND MAJOR TRENDS  
from 25 to 26 May 1978 in Hamburg

Kamel S. Abu Jaber

DEVELOPMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON TRADITIONAL PEOPLE.  
THE BEDOUINS OF JORDAN

Development and Its Effects on Traditional People,  
The Bedouins of Jordan

By

Professor Kamel S. Abu Jaber

Professor Fawzi Gharaibeh

Faculty of Economics and Commerce

Jordan University

To be read at

" The Contemporary Middle Eastern Scene-Basic Issues  
and Major Trends Conference "Organized by the Deutaches  
Orient- Institut, Hambourg, May 25-26, 1978".

### Introduction

Settlement is a move away from nomadism. The criteria defining a nomad, semi-nomad or settler is too obvious to deal with in this paper considering our limitations of time and space. Suffice it to say that we are concerned with constructing a model for the move away from nomadism towards settlement. The length of the transitional period is highly individualistic and the transitional person is often highly selective and eclectic about changes he accepts or strives for. The duration of his transitional stage depends upon the receptivity of the individual, his mental attitude, strength of tradition, proximity to town, influence of peer, mass media, government and the defection of his leadership.

Historically, many Middle Eastern governments have attempted and planned the resettlement of the Bedouins. The success of this trend nowadays is not the result of these efforts alone. Much has to be said for the strength of cumulative ideas and developments both within and outside the region: political, social and economic. The welfare state is a world wide phenomenon and the Bedouins too have heard about it.

We have limited our scope of study to the Bedouins of Jordan. For this purpose, and in addition to the traditional primary and secondary sources consulted, a field survey of

the Jordan Badia was conducted .\*

On two occasions, in May 1976, and May 1977, the authors of this paper along with some of their colleagues and students from the Faculty of Economics and Commerce at the University of Jordan, carried out the field research based on interviews and questionnaires in a selected sample of the Jordan Badia.\*\* A shorter version of this study entitled, The Bedouins of Jordan: A people In Transition. Amman, Royal Scientific Society Press, 1978 has just come out.

The two appendices attached are designed to portray the scope and depth of change in Jordan historically (Appendix I), and the Bedouins in contrast with the rest of the population of Jordan in 1976 ( Appendix II).

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(\*) The term Badia comes from Bedouins. It means the area inhabited by the Bedouins.

(\*\*) The completed study, hopefully to come out in book form was done under the direction of the present authors plus Professor Saleh Khasawneh, Director of the Income Tax Department of Jordan and Mr. Allan Hill of the world Population Council.



### Changing Times

Bedouin settlement or resettlement in Jordan has followed a certain sequential pattern since the establishment of the state in the 1920's. To some degree, this pattern can be observed in many other countries of the Middle East especially those that have neither followed nor attempted a compulsory Bedouin resettlement program.

The twentieth century burst into the lives of traditional people everywhere. Depending on traditions, mores, culture, stage of development, as well as literacy and a host of other factors, different peoples were affected in different ways. The fact remains, however, that the Jordanian Bedouin like the Australian Aborigini, or the African Bushman were all affected one way or another.

For the Jordanian Bedouin the pattern of transition from nomadism to settlement has been a first contact of now indeterminate origin with outside influences, a rethinking of one's position and appraisal of his life-style followed invariably by a third stage of semi-nomadism or rather semi-settlement; then eventually by complete settlement or perhaps a loss to the forces of modernity. Throughout these three stages the Jordanian government has, and continues to play a very major role. Often the role is hardly noticeable at first glance. The building of a highway through a previously inaccessible area has a tremendous impact on the life-style and destiny of the people of that area. Neither the government nor the

people in question need acknowledge this fact. Both may welcome the new highway for different reasons yet, the fact remains that life in that area is never the same again. A specific example of this phenomenon is the changing life-style of the Bedouins of the Wadi Araba region in South Jordan. Not only are the indigenous population coming in touch with outsiders and outside influences hitherto unknown to them, but ironically enough, they have established a rapport with the Nationalist Chinese contractors constructing the highway. A new highway creates demands. Not only are these people more accessible, but now they are demanding services from the contractors and government: services like better medicine, housing and water supply.

It needs to be emphasized here that the Jordan government has never attempted a compulsory resettlement program. Saying this is not to negate the governmental efforts directed towards Bedouin resettlement throughout Jordan. Efforts that have had, in our opinion, more lasting, humane and attractive results. These efforts included the construction of schools, rural highways, clinics, hospitals, extension of services, often like piped water and electricity, artesian wells, or even the construction of wells or pools in remote areas, attracting Bedouin youth to the army, scholarships to study abroad for some of the Bedouin students and finally the

perpetuation through the mass media of the value and worth of Bedouin culture, customs and mores.

Whether or not true, the image of Jordan abroad as propagated by the mass media is that of a predominantly Bedouin, or Bedouin-backed state. Some, even in Jordan object to this, yet it is the image the government seems to wish to maintain. Political prejudices set aside, it is true that the Bedouins have given Jordan a certain attractive image. An image of honesty, frankness, openness, bravery and hospitality. Whether or not the Bedouin is aware of this or is desirous of such an image is another question. The Bedouin himself is changing. Much of this change is desired by him. Some of it he understands, and consciously desires. Much, he undergoes unwillingly. Some, he recognizes the necessity of though it may be intrinsically undesirable to him.

The Bedouin folklore is that of open spaces, bravery, honorableness (however that is defined) and freedom. Change has forced itself upon him: a fact he cannot, nor can he afford to ignore. Life has acquired for him and for his environment a new rhythm, a new tempo, a new routine which he finds, consciously or subconsciously he must follow. Change is something he cannot ignore. Even to him it has become a constant fact of life.

Surely, never before in recorded history has so much change taken place in so short time. Not only space but time has been reduced and often to seemingly insignificant proportions. Distance and time have been capsuled and transistorized. Evidence: the Bedouin in his landrover (camel) with a transistor radio. The twentieth century is a heavy handed, cannot-be-ignored guest. Neither Bedouin nor urbanite can ignore this fact. Ninety percent of scientists in all fields that ever lived in recorded history are now, today, alive.

Change, for the Bedouin, more so than the urbanite, has been one of the hall-marks of modern times. Change has acquired a code of ethics all its own. It has become almost ethical. It is, as Aristotle once remarked, one of the only two constants of life. The other is time.

It is not certain yet whether changes now taking place are good or bad. Normative judgements ought to be left to those with recognized and accepted moral authority to give them, or with those having historical hindsight at their disposal. Certainly, historians of the twenty-fourth century will pass judgement.

Thirty or forty years ago the Bedouin, perhaps like the majority of all Jordanians, lived like his ancestors of centuries before. Maybe in the dark, or the middle ages. Morally and intellectually, he too, was rooted in the traditions of the past and its mores and culture. His intellectual and moral ancestors were known and easily

identifiable. The difference between him and his father, a gap of at least one generation was that of a certain degree of knowledge springing from the same traditional sources. Today, the difference between a social scientist of Bedouin origin and his father is like that between Ibn Khaldun and Karl Marx. The same is true of other disciplines and fields of knowledge. The continuity of tradition, knowledge, and values has been breached: snapped.

In todays Jordan, one sees the three Reisman types: the tradition-directed, the other-directed and the inner-directed individuals. In some instances the three factors often interplay within the same person. A heterogenous, multi-faceted complicated and complexed personality is produced. This is also to be found among the Bedouins.


Where does the line between tradition and modernity lie? Can a person in this day and age trace the origins of how he arrived at a conclusion or even a fact? Twentieth century life has acquired a tempo that makes it impossible for persons seeking seclusion to achieve it. The Bedouins of Jordan, though some may still roam the desert as nomads, are no longer isolated. They reach-out in more ways than one and are reached by equally diverse methods. Highways, planes, education, attractions, amenities, services, the transistor, even television have made their inroads into their lives.

### Pattern of Change

The diagram on the following page delineates the pattern, rather, the process which the Bedouin undergoes before turning into a "Settled" village or city dweller. The process is not a linear continuum whose cause-effect-result factors are easily definable or discernable. Rather it is a highly complex ever changing multi-varied and multi-faceted equation the same inputs of which do not necessarily always result in same or even similar outputs. People what they are and the Bedouins are people, end up differently though they may receive the same diet, education and services.

While some are still nomads, or semi-nomads, some are flying highly sophisticated military jets, others are physicians or University professors while some are phosphate miners at the al-Ilasa mines of South Jordan. Resistance to change among some of them does not necessarily mean that their life has not been affected by it. Change has a totality of impact all it own. It leaves its marks though it is sometimes not desired. We do not know what happens to those who do not like nor desire change, we know, however, or we think we know what happens to those who change.

Stages of Change



- (1) The "original" stage exhibits all the elements and the characteristics of traditionalism: A static or semi-static stage.
- (2) Contact is made in an infinite number of ways: Word of mouth, the mass media, schooling, teaching... etc! Contact can be made accidentally or by design. The dotted line indicates that some may shy away or revert to the original traditional stage after first contact.
- (3) Once contact takes place a dynamic, conscious, often subconscious process of evaluation begins. This may be long or short depending on individual ability, receptivity and exogeneous factors such as government intervention, mass media... etc! The dotted lines indicate that for most people more information or contact is needed. That done, some people choose to return to the original stage. Most, however, proceed to the last stage: changed or synthesized. Positive as well as negative factor interplay before a decision is made.
- (4) Most people reaching this stage-especially the first generation-should be termed transitional. Their children, educated or moved to another physical environment make a breakaway from the past though they are affected by it.

The Lattern Continued

First, there is some sort of contact, then, a period of gestation, then change takes place in the third stage.

First, the contact takes place in a variety of ways: literally untold number of ways. Now through the schools, the radio, the press, television, shrinking distances, cousins working in cities or coming home on leave from the army. Some through word of mouth and hearing about things. Given the strength of the oral tradition in the Arab World two stories may help illustrate ways by which news travels even in the so-called remote areas. The first story is that of a Bedouin singing about the desirability of eating the prickly pear, a fruit which he has never seen nor tasted. He says, "Oh! how sweet it must be. I have never seen it nor tasted it. A servant of my uncles (who live far away) told me he saw the person who ate it". The second story is an actual incident which happened while we were conducting our study of the South Bedouin tribes in May 1977\*. One late afternoon, and twenty kilometers out of Rum in the South of Jordan we picked up a lone Bedouin named Awad from the Howetat tribe. Upon asking his destination, we were informed he was going to an area some 60 kilometers from where he lived to ascertain whether a she-camel of his was dead or alive. It appeared his small herd of camels roams the desert alone and returns, often after the passage of many days, even weeks, to his home, unattended.

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(\*) The study referred to previously in note (\*\*), page 2.



He received word that one she-camel had died giving birth to her baby. How did he hear? Upon close questioning, we discovered he had heard the news by word of mouth from one party who had recognized the special marking of his brand on the camel and had told a friend who told a friend of Awad's who in turn told Awad.

News of more importance and of economic, political or social implications travels faster and wider. The point is that contact cannot help but be made with the news of the outside world and its developments. News of the fruits of education for the children, better health facilities, better dietary routine, better services are indeed very attractive.

News, contact which is the first stage brings awareness. The second stage is soon launched. At this stage, it ought to be emphasized that change takes place whether or not accepted. Contact brings a period of brooding, evaluation: a period of gestation where the alternative styles of life, the alternative tools, technologies, knowledge and methodologies are carefully weighed and measured. This is an underterminate period that is very highly individualistic and equally subjective. The self of the individual is tormented.

Is this the better and easier method? Should I send my child to school? What will they teach him? Is the new knowledge more relevant, more merciful? How does this new knowledge agree or disagree with the traditional styles of life? Is this a path from which one can return or is it a final step?

The inner struggle, questioning and uncertain is matched by an outer struggle with new realities of life making themselves felt. Surely the car is faster and surer than the camel. New tools are better than the old. The radio more efficient than the "tarish". The modern doctor more effective than the old. These are pull factors. Attractive and desirable they outline a new style of life more dependable in its income: more secure physically, less seasonal and thus less dependent upon the capriciousness of nature and certainly with more assured and attractive benefits.

The intrinsically attractive factors, desirable of their own volition and thus contracted and agreed to, consciously or subconsciously freely, are too numerous to list. Indeed, what drives a roaming nomad of the Howetat or the Beni Attiyyah tribes of South Jordan to become a miner in the al-Hasa phosphate mines? A force greater, perhaps more compelling? attractive? has done so.

Yet at this second stage; gestation and evaluation, there exists another set of factors which we term push factors. These are extrinsic ones, not emanating from a person's self

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(\*) The name of the messenger who used to carry news between parties.

but brought to bear upon it from outside. This is a case of salesmanship where one accepts and agrees to what is offered because it is made attractive for him and he cannot resist it. The thing is desired not for its intrinsic worth and value rather because it is made out to be very attractive alternative or the only one.

When new and highly polished values are reinforced with certain facts of life the tendency and the level of resistance becomes much lower. "Freedom" is best enjoyed when government is non-existent or terribly weak. Such was the case in Jordan in Ottoman times and well into the establishment of the state in the 1920's. As government becomes more effective the area of imagined freedom becomes smaller. It is no longer possible to raid other tribes, nor to exact the Khawah \* from the villagers or weaker tribes. Rule of law slowly replaces tribal customs.\*\* The building of the institutions of the state becomes increasingly evidenced. Mutual protection by kin, and tribe is slowly replaced by police protection. The state, utilizing modern technology, reaches everywhere. At first, the tribal shaikh is very important; soon he becomes only equal to the district governor and eventually less so. If he is at all respected or deferred to it is for traditional nostalgic and

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(\*) The Khawah is protection money which used to be paid by the weaker tribes or the villagers to the stronger tribes.

(\*\*) Tribal law of 1936 finally abolished in 1975. To give an example: the Bedouins who used to cross international frontiers freely can no longer do so at will. They do so only after prior arrangements are made between the governments concerned; or they have to procure passports and go through the routine formalities of crossing the frontiers.

familial reasons. If the tribal shaikh of today have any relevance it is because he has evolved with the times. Those who have not, are no longer shaikhs. The shaikh's importance today stems from his ability to perform services for his group: as an intermediary between the government and his people and representative and defender of their views and demands. The wider and deeper his contacts with officialdom or decision-makers, the more relevant and important he is to his people. The attractions of the welfare state add an additional factor in undermining the traditional style, outlook, authority and ways.

Nostalgia, tradition, culture, or the basic human resistance to change are negative factors constantly at work. In addition, the individual must weigh his free movement, independence and economic self-sufficiency against the attractions. Rarely has the struggle resulted in the total rejection of change. Most individuals think in terms of compartmentalized change. They think that if they accept this change/benefit only it will have no effect on other aspects of their life. Now, it is mentally asked, can better health services affect life except in this sphere. Yet it does and so does the education of the youngsters. Change forces itself, even when only one aspect of it is accepted. To accept better health facilities, a more reliable if fixed income, some education for the children takes the person a step away from nomadism.

At first the tent becomes fixed in one spot. That is because the person is in the army (income), or because of

educating the children, or because he became a part-time farmer, or because his wife, or child needs better health services. Next to the tent or in its place he first builds a "temporary" adobe. New roots!

The new roots are at first shallow and unsure. In many cases the adobe soon gives way to a cement building with piped water and indoor plumbing. As time goes on other amenities filter into the "temporary" adobe. Mentally, the person may still think of himself as a nomad. Many, in fact, maintain their Beit Shai'r, goat hair tent next to their abode.

The individual at this stage is very similar to immigrants to other countries; at once, he is attracted, hesitant, and repelled. In most cases he likes to keep his options open. That is why he likes to think of his new stage as temporary until he returns "home". Along with the tent he may keep some of his herd: sheep, goats, a horse, a donkey. Yet he also begins to think of the cultivation of his land. Many Bedouins seed their land then go on their wandering cycle for most of the winter with their flocks then, return to their "temporary" adobe for the summer. Though old habits die hard, the fact remains, they do die. With the passage of time, and children who need schooling, the temporary becomes less so. The education of the children is another "curse" that the person has to contend with. One cannot carry the school and its teachers around with him. "Dropping the children out" becomes less frequent. Leaving them with their relatives, with friends or with their mother becomes inconvenient.

The more he settles, the less of a shepherd he becomes.

He dislikes farming but begins to acquire certain of its skills then some pride in his accomplishments. The adobe often turns into a cement structure: more spacious and diversified in function. In the Badia of Jordan one can often observe the tent next to the adobe next to a more elaborate cement structure outlining the three stages of settlement. Very soon he is more of a farmer less of a shepherd. In some cases animals are left for prestige purposes only, or simply to provide fresh milk and its derivatives.

The settled life one discovers is just as predictable, if not more so, economically, as that of pastoralism. It is not so abhorrent as one first thought. New modes of making a living, new relationships, friendships. loyalties... etc! An adjustment here, another one there.

Cash is easier than barter. A monthly income though inconvenient, in that it ties one down for a whole month at a time, is more dependable. The army is attractive and is made so. Many Bedouin soldiers at first rebel at its restrictions and routine, yet the adjustments are soon made. In the army a fixed address is necessary if one is to go on leave to his family. Otherwise he may spend the leave looking for them. Then, the fixed address is moved next to the camp which is invariably near a town or village. Not problem with educating

the children here, since the town or the village has schools. Zerka, the second largest town in Jordan now traces its origins to an early Jordan army camp.

The government, the army, attractions, amenities, education..., all play a role in settling the nomads. Government land distribution around some of the old villages (in Zerka and Amman at one time), and resettlement projects such as al-Jafr and al-Diseh helped in settling many Bedouins. Government digging of wells, artesian and for rainfall collection and watering holes or pools have kept many Bedouins stationary. The periods of drought also play a similar role. During such a period, when he can find neither grazing land nor water for his flocks he turns to the towns and villages. He has now an alternative to starvation. Many never go back to nomadism.

Soon new tastes are acquired and the appetite becomes more diversified. The awareness leads to varied and wider appreciation of more things. In many a Bedouin "home", now, one can see a radio, a television, a car... etc!

The first generation settlers; i.e. those who pass the transitional period often think the change is only temporary. Some maintain that attitude until they die constituting what we would like to think of as mental or intellectual nomadism. They leave the tribe, their herds and wanderings physically though culturally they feel they still are part of the tribe. Their children complete the break for them.

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## Appendix I

Jordan in Figures  
1952 - 1975

	1952	1975	Remarks
Population	587193	1951968	Not Including the West Bank.
% Urban Population	31%	60%	
% of Labor Force Working in Agriculture	35%	32.9%	
Birth Rate	3.3%	3.5%	
Death Rate	10%	3%	
Illiteracy Rate	70%	35.2%	
Illiteracy (Male)		23.6%	
Illiteracy (Female)		52.3%	
No. of Students	139670	539790	Including West Bank Student
Ratio of Students to Population	23.8	28	West Bank Students not Included for 1975
Male Students	103189	301870	
Female Students	36481	237920	
No. of Teachers	1184	18821	
No. of Female Teachers	49	8332	For 1950
Ratio of Female Students to Population	7%	22%	
% of Female to Total Enrollment	25%	44.6%	For 1950-57 & 1974-75
No. of Females in Universities	22	2669	For 1950-57 & 1974-75
No. of Students Per Teacher	41	30	
Jordanian Students Abroad	2861(a)	39913(b)	
No. of Schools	360	2232	Private and Public
Vocational Schools	2	26	
Teachers Institutes	-	17	
Physicians	97(c)	947(d)	
Pharmacists	49(c)	285(d)	
Hospitals	10	35	Private, Military & Public
No. of Beds	623	3291	

a - For years 1955/56

b - For the year 1974/75 and not including Jordanian students in Sudan, Algeria and Latin America.

c - Including those on the West Bank.

d - Not including West Bank.

	1952	1975	Remarks
Clinics	46	321	Excluding Military Clinics
Buildings, Houses	56734	156461	
Cars	7683	47243	
Radios Per Thousand	39	203	For the years 1957 & 1972
Televisions Per Thousand	-	128	
Telephones Per Thousand	7(e)	19	
No. of Newspapers and Periodicals	5	21	
Tourists	2775	707623	
Livestock	245069	1375800	
Agricultural Land (Dunum*)	3441626	2623331	Summer and Winter Crops
Area Planted in Grains	3253457	1985454	
% Area Planted in Grains	94.5	75.7	
Area Planted Vegetables	137368	262953	
% Area Planted Vegetables	.4	10	
Area Planted Fruits	19164	333064	
% Area Planted Fruits	.6	12.7	
Area Planted Tobacco	31637	41860	
% Area Planted Tobacco	.9	1.6	
Forestry Trees	274785(f)	3600000(g)	
Imports (Dinar**)	14216895	234012700	
Exports (Dinar)	1532807	48938400	
Government Revenue	22258826	206350000	Including Foreign Aid
Foreign Aid	6019000	110550000	
% Aid to Revenue	27	53.6	
Expenditures	20806620(h)	218250000	
Gross National Product	45000000(i)	373950000	
Per Capita Income	35	191	
No. of Establishments	98	1325	Employing Five People or more.
Banks	3	77	Including Branches

e - For 1957

f - East and West Banks

g - East Bank only

h - Including West Bank

i - For 1954

Note:

\*\* Dinar - 3.0 US. Dollars (approx).

\*\* Dunum =  $\frac{1}{4}$  of an Acr (approx).

## Appendix II

Selected Socio-Economic Indicators  
Comparing the Badia and Jordan, 1976

	Badia	Jordan	Remarks
<u>Population: -</u>			
Growth Rate	3.2%	3.4%*	* Should immigration to Jordan be included the growth rate would become 4.3%
Birth Rate	5%	4.2%	
Death Rate	1.8%	0.8%	
Ratio Male to Female	1.1-1	1.03-1	
% of Population Under 15 Years	55.4%	50.6%	
Infant Mortality Rate	16.0%	8.9%	
Average Family Members	6.6	6.6	
<u>Health: -</u>			
No. of Hospitals	--	35	Private, Military & Public
No. of Beds in Hospitals	--	3632	
No. of Clinics	49	274	
No. of Physicians	N.A.*	890	* Government Physicians visit there areas regularly
No. of Pharmacists	N.A.	345	
No. of Pharmacies	N.A.	172	

	Badia	Jordan	Remarks
<u>Education:-</u>			
Illiteracy Rate	71.8%	29.3%	
Illiteracy Rate-Male	50.9%	17.8%	
Illiteracy Rate-Female	87.6%	40.9%	
% of Population with Higher Education	1.5%	4.0%	Including Teachers Institutes .. etc.
% of Males with Higher Education	2.6%	5.8%	Including Teachers Institutes ... etc.
% of Females with Higher Education	0.2%	2.3%	Including Teachers Institutes...ets.
No. of Vocational Schools	--	26	
<u>Housing:-</u>			
% of Population in Tents	5%	N.A.	
% of Population in Permanent housing	95%	N.A.	
No. of Rooms per house	2.39	2.7	
% of Housholds Served by Piped water	28.3%	N.A.*	* 403 of 794 Communities are Served by Piped Water
% of Households Served with Electric Power	4.7%	N.A.*	* 66% of Population are Serves with Electric Power



	Badia	Jordan	Remarks
% of Households with Seperate Kitchen	46.4%	49.7%	
% of Households with Seperate W. C.	19.2%	95.5%	
No. of Cars Per thousand	15.22*	25	Includes Pick-up Trucks
% of Households Owning Radio	64.2%	89.7%	
% of Households Owning T.V.	5.3%	63.3%	
% of Households Owning Refrigerator	0.6%	52.5%	
% of Households Owning Sewing Machine	20.1%	N.A.	
<u>Economics</u>			
Per Capita Income	JD 70*	JD 270	* Rough Estimate . JD = Apx. US. \$ 3
% of Population in Labor Force	N.A	20%	
% of Population (15-64) of Age	43.5%	47.2%	
% of Females (15-64) of Age	39.1%	47.9%	
% of Male (15-64) of Age	43.0%	45.4%	
Live Stock	607278	998689	
Per Capita Ownership of Livestock	5.15	0.49	

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International Conference on  
THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE - BASIC ISSUES AND MAJOR TRENDS  
from 25 to 26 May 1978 in Hamburg



Friedemann Büttner

TRENDS TOWARDS RETRADITIONALIZATION IN EGYPT

## Trends towards Retraditionalization in Egypt

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Looking at Egyptian politics since the 1952 revolution, two outstanding features require an explanation: (1) What accounts for the remarkable stability and continuity of the political system which survived through several military disasters, the break-up of the union with Syria, the death of Nasser, and after 26 years is still ruled by a man of the first hour? (2) How could the political system initiate and uphold over time policies of rapid social and economic change, including changes of the whole economic system, in spite of its weak political institutions which underwent repeated break-ups and changes? It is argued that both questions find a partial explanation in the specific structure of the Egyptian political system, as it developed in a process of retraditionalization which started under Nasser and continues under Sadat.

The Egyptian political system is undergoing a process of change in which the conflicts between exogeneous and indigenous social and political norms, between formal structures, acculturated under the pressures of Western dominance, and informal structures, rooted in Arabo-Islamic and Ottoman historical experience, are solved by a gradual turning away from the exogenous elements. Though upholding Western democratic vocabulary, the meaning and functions of words as well as of formal institutions have changed considerably. What emerged under the trappings of Western-type liberal constitutional democracy bears many structural characteristics of Max Weber's patrimonial-bureaucratic rule and might be termed a neo-patrimonial system. But the process under study is far from being completed, the term "retraditionalization" is preferred, denoting a process in which Egypt is moving away from cultural dependency and is regaining her own identity.

"Retraditionalization" is not to be confused with "Re-Islamization", although both processes are related. In its widest sense retraditionalization means "the long-term reduction of intellectual dependency" and "a partial resurrection of indigenous political culture" (Ali Mazrui). Retraditionalization refers to values which may contribute to this partial resurrection and to policies which express indigenous mores and ends; special emphasis is put in this paper on the partial reappearance of structural characteristics of the indigenous political culture.

#### Authoritarian politics in an "uninstitutionalized" system

The Egyptian political system can only be understood by analyzing the informal network of personal relationships cross-cutting the formal institutional set-up. Contrary to the Western experience, organized and autonomous groups did not become Egypt's primary channels of political activity as modernization proceeded. Moreover, formal institutions at all levels of the political system are, and have been since the Free Officer's advent to power, relatively weak and unimportant, so that the "unincorporated society" (C.H. Moore) finds its complement in an "uninstitutionalized political system".

Relatively permanent institutions guarantee the continuity and stability of institutionalized political systems, while persons are at disposition and might at times of crisis be exchanged with an other set of politicians. With an "uninstitutionalized system" I, conversely, mean a political system in which a political elite as an informal network of persons, supplementing and perpetuating itself by cooptation, guarantees continuity and stability, while formal institutions of a constitutional order stand at disposition and might be dissolved or restructured at times of crisis.

The thesis that Egypt has an "uninstitutionalized" political system in spite of or just because of its frequent endeavours at institutions-building rests on the following considerations:

(1) Egypt since 1952 has developed a "two-tiered elite system" (R. Springborg): The inner core around the president formed and forms an integrated stable group, in spite of occasional differences, personal rivalries and some turnover in membership. (The temporary personnel vacuum at the center of the political system created by Sadat's coup in May 1971 has been filled by now with a new core group.) The wider political elite, whose nucleus had been formed originally by selected military officers and a few trusted civilians, has by now become large and poorly integrated. It has expanded constantly by cooptation of more officers, but later increasingly of bureaucrats, technocrats, university professors. The elite is structured vertically by an extensive clientage network and horizontally by cleavages between shifting alliances of factions and cliques.

(2) The inner core with strategically placed "front men" forms as ruling elite the functional equivalent to Politbureau and Central Committee in authoritarian single party-systems: It exclusively formulates the strategic aims of politics; no important decision is made without its consent. It controls the formal political structure (ASU; parties, People's Assembly), the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the media by an oscillating system of more direct control through security services or of more indirect control through "institutionalized insecurities" (like vaguely formulated prohibitions).

(3) The ruling elite has not been able to develop a practical ideology, which could become instrumental in organizing and mobilizing society towards the modernization goals of the regime. Nasser's Arab Socialism and even more so Sadat's Democratic Socialism with their rejection of class struggle and their emphasis on harmony, national unity, and social peace are more of the type of expressive ideology, that cannot directly be transformed into a cohesive programme of action.

(4) Due to the lack of a practical ideology, the regime failed to transform the various movements it created (Liberation Rally, National Union, Arab Socialist Union) into stable, autonomous organizations which could become the looked-for vanguard of change. As the armed forces as the original "constituency" of the ruling elite could not become the functional equivalent of a revolutionary vanguard party, there only remained the bureaucracy as a potentially powerful modernizing institution. The bureaucracy, however, was inflated by governmental job-creation policies and as much faction-ridden as the political elite and therefore could not develop into an independent institution - although it gained some extra power by its multi-functionality: Besides its "modern" functions to administrate the problems of society, to carry out the ambitious modernizing policies of the regime, and to prepare political decisions by formulating alternative problem solutions, the bureaucracy in Egypt had to fulfil supporting functions by soliciting sympathy for the regime and at the same time fulfilled the function of interest aggregation, after becoming the principal addressee of interest articulation.

(5) Unable either permanently to mobilize the people or to control them effectively by totalitarian means, the "weak" authoritarian system was anyhow able to control - at least until recently (January 1977) - the potential danger of anomie by integrating people directly into the system. In spite of its "weakness" the Egyptian regime under Nasser has therefore been able to initiate and sustain over a considerable length of time policies of rapid social and economic change. People uprooted by this process of modernization were integrated into the system by an expansion of clientelism in its two basic forms: in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy and among the political elite predominantly in the modern form of "brokerage"; in the countryside, among lower class and lower middle class people in the cities as well as on the lower levels of the bureaucracy in the more traditional form of direct patron-client relationships - supplemented, however, on this level too by the mahsubia-system.

(6) The formation, restructuring, and dissolution of institutions coupled with<sup>a</sup>reshuffling of leadership has been the main instrument of crisis-management for Nasser - and is increasingly becoming the same for Sadat. Formal institutions of a constitutional order as well as organized groups in the wider context of the political system have never been allowed to become strong enough so that they could demand autonomy. They were fulfilling certain functions for the regime like articulating demands of the periphery to the center and channelling resources from the center to the periphery. But beyond what C.H. Moore has called "piaster politics" they were stopped short of gaining an independant bargaining position.

(7) Consequently, what appears to be a single party-system - or after 1976 some "dominant party-system" - is in fact a "no party-system". The presently dominant Misr-party does not, and the ASU did not at any time, fulfil the primary functions of ruling parties: The "party" did not formulate nor substantially influence the basic long-term policy goals; it did not control its government or the bureaucracy; it is not the recruiting base for the political elite, but rather its retiring place. Similar considerations apply to the People's Assembly.

(8) In an uninstitutionalized political system informal associations of persons become the functional equivalent to organized groups or institutions. As organized groups may become powerful and autonomous, threatening the "weak" authoritarian system, likewise may informal associations, factions or cliques, threaten the center of an uninstitutionalized system by developing into independent "centers of power". Though Nasser tried to avoid such developments by frequently reshuffling the leadership, he was not quite successful in the long run. It could even be said that after the Amer-"coup" of 1963 the two Amer-factions were supreme in Egyptian internal politics until 1967. Since Sadat has consolidated his power by eliminating the "power centers" of Ali Sabri, Sami Sharaf, and Sha'arawi Goma'a - and later the one man-power center Mohamed Hassanein Heikal - no new centers of power seem to have developed.

Patrimonial or revolutionary retraditionalization?

The army officers who seized power in 1952 were more closely identified by social background and by training with the "traditional" reality of Egypt than either the carriers of the ancien regime, who were integrated not only economically, but also socially and mentally into the international system, or the "alienated" intellectuals, who were orienting their political thoughts towards political alternatives derived from Europe, be they liberal or socialist. More closely identified with traditional Egypt, the army officers were better equipped to become retraditionalizers.

The process of retraditionalization started as soon as the Revolutionary Command Council had finally consolidated itself as the new power elite. The nativistic and populist appeal of the nationalism professed by the army officers rallied the people behind Nasser and his group, when his aggressive foreign policy of "positive neutralism" led to serious clashes with the West. While subsequent events enhanced Nasser's position, the other side of his "charisma" was a widespread feeling of identity among the Egyptians.

This feeling of identity was strengthened by the gradual development of Nasser's political thought. He was not able - or probably may have been afraid - to develop a practical ideology that would seriously mobilize those who would have gained most from revolutionary change. So his ideology remained expressive even when he spoke of "total revolution" (Charter of National Action). Words could be dissociated from deeds. But the gradual blending of Arabism and Islam and the identification of socialist ideals with the Islamic ideal of a just society allowed the people to experience themselves as part of an emerging Egypt that was "modern", socialist, and revolutionary, and at the same time Arab, Islamic, and godfearing.

For the political and economic elite of the ancien regime, but for many intellectuals, too, the retraditionalizing element in Nasser's politics and thought was vulgar and appalling, a step backwards. But their very criticism signifies their intellectual dependency as they unquestioningly accepted that "traditional" is the other end of a continuum leading to "modernity". While this thinking was fully in line with then widely accep-



ted assumptions of modernization theory, what Nasser actually did in the fifties and early sixties with his inner-directed development policies and his ideological insistence on indigenous values and goals is in consonance with more recent understandings of development as a process of decreasing economic, political, and cultural dependency.

In this sense Nasser was more "modern" than many of his contemporaries among Third World leaders:

(1) Nasser made steps towards finding a positive answer to the question of how to become modern without losing identity? He did this by initiating policies of serious social and economic change in the interest of the underprivileged and by supporting these policies with an expressive ideology that strengthened the Egyptian traditional personality. Not only in his anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, but in his anti-Marxism and anti-communism as well, Nasser delineated Egyptian Islamic-"socialist" identity against all Europeans as the "not we". This act of differentiation was in spite of all the crudeness of his reasoning an important step away from cultural dependency.

(2) The establishment of an authoritarian political system that in a way revived the political style of Egypt's modernizing autocrats from Mohammed Ali through Ismail to Cromer was in consonance with the indigenous political culture which reasserted itself in a sprawling system of inter-personal networks. But again this system - at least for a while - proved more "modern" than the one it replaced, in the sense that it more efficiently "reduced complexity" (N.Luhmann) in an increasingly complex world: It visibly and successfully (again: at least for a while) worked for the improvement of the living conditions of the poor majority of the people. With the restoration of familiar forms of firm leadership, hierarchical order, and customary procedures the world of politics and bureaucracy became foreseeable and calculable again for the man in the street. And at the same time the people's desire for harmony and community was more adequately fulfilled.

(3) The political system established by Nasser and his group made decisions possible that could not have been arrived at under the conditions of ancien regime parliamentary democracy. Gaining control, moreover, over all foreign interests in the country by means of nationalisations and at the same time playing on the East-West rivalry with an aggressive foreign policy, Nasser was able to widen the scope of political action

considerably beyond the scope of action open to other Third World countries. The programme of state directed economic development within the context of integral long-term planning as initiated in the late fifties turned out to be one of the most successful endeavours in development at the time. And Nasser managed to get more foreign aid during these years than any other country of comparable size.

But the crisis of the first Five Year Plan in 1963/64 was not only due to the lack of finance as a result of foreign policy setbacks and of the Western refusal to continue support for Nasser. By this time the structural weaknesses of the political system made themselves felt: The clientel system worked at cross-purpose with the outwardly professed modernization policy. Lack of conviction, identification, and determination immobilized the ever-expanding bureaucracy. The incompetence of many an ex-army officer who had entered the administration or the public sector in the early sixties, most definitely has worsened Egypt's problems. But I do think that the culprits punished after the disaster of June 1967 in a way were scapegoats, too, for those who remained.

After June 1967, there have been endeavours among the ASU left to transform Nasser's Arab Socialism into a practical ideology and to restructure the ASU so that in fact could become the revolutionary vanguard it was supposed to be. But these endeavours did not survive Nasser's death for long. As those of them who were not implicated in the anti-Sadat cabale of 1971 could later be condemned of having communist sympathies they were easily relegated to the impotence<sup>position</sup> of the present Egyptian left.

Retraditionalization took a somewhat ambiguous turn under Sadat: The importance of Islam as the basis of society and Muslim Egyptian identity was enhanced in many ways - the president himself leading the process by making a show of his religiousness at every possible moment. On the other hand did Sadat's liberalization policy allow for social developments that seem to turn Egypt at breath-taking pace into a class society of almost pre-revolutionary dimensions. And this new stratum of nouveau riche interspersed with some reemerged ancien regime families which recovered from the blows received by Nasser, is definitely anti-traditional in the sense that it eagerly accepts, favors, buys anything that is foreign, fashionable, and expensive.

This development cannot be in the interest of Sadat, and it seems that he is aware of the imminent dangers - as evidenced by recurrent injunctions against luxury spending in his recent speeches. There definitely is growing social unrest among those who see inflation grow much faster than their incomes while other people's conspicuous consumption evidences that money can be made in Egypt in a way that is out of conceivable proportion with salaries and wages in public as well as private sector.


Sadat has been hitting at the left and at the Wafd in recent weeks. But I doubt that either of the two is any real danger to him. And I think that the 98 % of votes for Sadat at last Sunday's referendum truly reflect the people's identification with his six principles, which most definitely are in line with the older trend and retraditionalization: National unity, social peace, and a life in consonance with the precepts of religion ( ahkam al-shara'i al-sanawiya ).

But there is danger to Sadat's regime if social developments continue to be as uneven as now. Sadat might be riding a tiger by appealing to Islam time and again. Unlike Christianity Islam was an endeavour to establish an equitable and just society in this world. With every new mosque built in Cairo, with every call to Islamic identity, with the reappearance of fashionably dressed veiles in the streets and of noticeably placed Qor'an copies in the flats of the Western educated middle class, those are strengthened morally, who one day might ask whether Egyptian society as it has been emerging in recent years is commensurated with the revolutionary implications of Islam.

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Uriel Dann

THE IRAQI BA'TH AFTER TEN YEARS OF POWER -  
THE CHALLENGES OF DOGMA AND PRAGMATISM

The Iraqi Ba'th after ten years of power -- the challenges of  
dogma and pragmatism

Ten years of power, with no end in sight, are a memorable achievement for any revolutionary régime in the Middle East. They are the greatest survival success by far which political Iraq has known since 1958.

How did this happen? Chance and good luck played their part. Thus, the Arab world has experienced over the recent years a comparative low in conspiratorial tension, after the feverish high of the previous era; it is a phenomenon which still awaits its historiosophical explanation. My paper, however, tries to outline those features in the survival of the Iraqi régime which are of its own making -- with stress on the responses to the antipathetic challenges of dogma and pragmatism.

Such probing presents a difficulty in method. The response to dogma will always be largely declaratory; pragmatism by its nature evokes a predominately functional response. The yardsticks differ. Moreover, every ideological utterance can be dubbed cant if the commentator so wishes. By the same token, every significant act of policy can be seen as dictated by dogma. The observer's personality -- his background, predilections and peculiar empathy -- simply cannot be cut out. On the objective side, the present régime in Iraq is headed and effectively represented by two men, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and his younger kinsman Saddam Husayn, whose will to survive in power is an absolute; "the challenges of dogma and pragmatism" are irrelevant in this respect. Still, the problem as put in the title of this paper remains if we want to understand how Ba'thi Iraq is run.

The history of the régime so far falls into two stages. The earlier was basically Bekr's and Husayn's fight for entrenchment and the elimination of rivals. Only at the later stage, with those objectives reasonably secured, could serious attention be given to long-term policies on their own merit, whether anchored in "dogma" or "pragmatism". The transition from one stage to the other is very evident in retrospect; it took place about the turn of 1973 and 1974.

It is therefore entirely logical that the most important document to shed light on the philosophy of the régime originated at that time. It is the "Political Report" adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Iraqi Ba'th (the Iraqi Regional Party Command, in official parlance), at Baghdad in January 1974. The report was delivered by Bakr as Regional Secretary; there is internal evidence

that the author is Ṣaddām Ḥusayn. Given the relations between the two, the point is of no particular importance. The report was published in Arabic and English in the course of 1974. I shall make the Report the pivot of the remainder of this talk.

The first thing that stands out in the Report is its intellectual excellence (with occasional slips) -- an excellence that pays regard to analysis, to conclusions, to presentation, to the requirements of the situation and to the psychology of the audience. The last three are tactical; the first two touch the heart of the matter.

The second point to be noted is one which many Westerners will find some difficulty in accepting. It is the basic honesty of the Report. To say that the originators are politicians determined to preserve their rule at whatever cost to anybody else, is belabouring the obvious. This determination too comes out in the Report; if we like, we may call it part of its honesty. But there is another dimension. I think -- and I am mindful that whoever has not carefully read the whole Report must take me on trust -- that the originators believe what they say. "Revolution" and "liberation", "Iraq" and "Arabdom" are not only ritualistic catch-words. They have a plain meaning which the originators share with their audience. And at a more pedestrian level, the originators mean what they say when they describe the political options, the contingencies, the risks and possible rewards, the "what" and the "why" and the "when".

Having said this much. I am coming to the crux of our present problem. The Report is from first to last a doctrinaire Ba'thi document. Its message is that of Unity, Freedom and Socialism in the sense the founding fathers formulated it a generation ago. Unity is full Arab political unity, expressed in the terms of secular nationalism. Freedom is the wiping out of Western influence, cultural no less than political and economic. Socialism, it would appear, is étatism with the intelligent co-operation of the employees, as distinct from "state-capitalism"; it is here that the Report protests too much and is in consequence least convincing. Liberalism in the Western sense -- emphatically including the spiritual -- is expressly rejected.

The threefold message thus understood is the measure of the past, the present and the future. It is a measure applied with consistency. Successes are noted with satisfaction. More significantly, numerous failures are discussed quite freely, and blame is either not attributed at all, or put down to the régime, that is, the originators of the Report. The Report admits that the realities -- domestic and foreign; political, economic and social -- demand concessions and compromises. These, as well as their background, are defined and discussed, with regret but matter-of-fact; by and large they tally with

what the outside observer too would regard as deviations from Ba'thi doctrine.

How does this relate to the policies of the régime?

The five years of Ba'th rule that preceded the Report are scarcely relevant, for the reason alluded to above. But about the time of the Report a state of stability was achieved, in the observers' hindsight as well as in the contemporaneous appreciation by the régime -- which of course never relaxed its attention to security. At the same time something like a national policy could be evolved, and has since evolved, with a degree of coherence and strategic vision. It may be argued that this national policy is overwhelmingly pragmatic, in tendency if not in present content, with its cool regard for the needs of the state, rationally equated to those of the régime. Landmarks in this respect are the mending of fences with Iran; the down-scaling of quarrels, and in parallel of subversive action, in the Persian Gulf region; the ambiguous and not entirely hostile attitude towards Egypt since the Sadat initiative; the fostering of economic relations with the United States, apostrophied in the Report as the imperialist arch-enemy; the strictly controlled friendship with the Soviet Union. Even the obsessive quarrel with Ba'thi Syria can be presented with some plausibility as little else than the continuation of a confrontation as old as history, based on abiding clashes of interest. On the domestic front the case for pragmatism versus dogma is put by the flaunting of co-existence with communists, Nasserites and domesticated Kurdish nationalists. Trends towards concession to a consumer society are surely not in line with Ba'thi dogma. Here, one may claim, is the Iraqi Ba'th régime: sheer opportunism, adorned with ideological claptrap.

Surely this labelling is simplistic. For one, there still is much in current policy that confirms very well <sup>to</sup> with Ba'thi dogma. The stand on Palestine, even allowing for the comfortable distance from the battle line; the fundamental alignment with the Soviet Union -- ideologically, politically and strategically; Third World attitudes; oil politics; and last not least, the unrelenting hold on public opinion at home. After all, it depends where we direct our gaze. Then there is the intense activity at Party level which has gone on since the Eighth Congress: the ramification of Party organizations, both élitist and popular; the Party schools and indoctrination classes; the outpourings of literature; the passionate expounding of Ba'thi principles whenever the leaders of the régime meet the public. Surely it overtaxes human ingenuity that so much for so long should be nothing but sham.

We may go to the other extreme and regard the self-image projected in the Report as the whole truth: Ba'thi doctrine is the measure of things; compromises are not deviations, but a flexibility accounted for by doctrine, the better to achieve the un-

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unchanging aims. I think that none of us here would care to go as far as this.

The truth is probably somewhere in the middle. Two systems are at work, autonomous but with connecting strands, and each is taken seriously by the men at the top. One system, Party doctrine, serves as inspiration, alibi, and self-justification. The other system embodies the exigencies of policy as seen by ruthless and highly intelligent power-seekers who also have -- one almost hesitates to admit it -- the good of their country at heart.

And since I do not wish to go on record as an admirer of what I do not admire, I will conclude with another reference to the Report. One of the mistakes of the Party, the Report says, was this: the Party made promises without considering that on occasion their fulfillment is widely expected. How true, and what a caution for all of us!

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THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE - BASIC ISSUES AND MAJOR TRENDS  
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Werner Ende

THE PALESTINE CONFLICT AS REFLECTED IN CONTEMPORARY ARABIC LITERATURE

The Palestine Conflict as Reflected in Contemporary Arabic  
Literature

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insight The present paper starts from the assumption that the study of any literature - in the sense of belles lettres - produced by members of any ethnic group or religious community will offer some information about the basic issues discussed within that group or community at a certain time. It is even to be expected that a close examination of this literary production may offer a deep insight into the various intellectual levels and general direction of discussion within a given group or community. Sometimes this insight may be much deeper than that which is gained from national charters, the programmes of political parties, the talk of newspapermen and radio commentators or statements made by religious leaders.

If the latter assumption is accepted at least in general, we may expect that a study of Arabic literature in the twentieth century can enlighten us, to a certain extent, about what the Arabs really feel and think about one of the most crucial problems of our time, a problem which, in one way or another, concerns all Arab national states: Palestine.

In the present paper I shall refrain from trying to present an account of the emergence and development of Palestinian topics in Arabic literature ab ovo. Rather, I shall concentrate on the period since 1948. In some cases, however, it will be necessary to point to the appearance in Arabic literature of certain ideas, images and arguments prior to that date.

To our premiss that the study of contemporary Arabic literature concerning Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict can offer a way to get inside the "Arab mind", several objections may be raised, beginning with that very old one: who are "the Arabs" we are talking about here? Or, to put it in a different, more direct way: is it reasonable to believe that the Moroccans and the Sudanese, for instance, or the Shi'ites of Southern Iraq will consider Palestine an issue basic to their existence? Should literature produced in this milieu and concerning the Palestinian problem be disregarded altogether or not? And secondly: what insight can be expected from literature dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict which is produced

in an atmosphere of more or less strict censorship and under the more or less firm pressure of regimes exploiting the Palestine problem for the sake of internal stability or inter-Arab hostilities? Is it not true that a large part of the literature concerning Palestine is produced and published under the influence of "ministries of guidance" aiming at the dissemination of official propaganda? Is it not true also that the production of another important part of Arabic fiction, poetry etc. and its publication is sponsored by the PLO? Would it be possible, under these circumstances, for any Arab writer to speak freely, for instance, of his resignation about Arab Palestine or of his disillusionment with the political leadership of the PLO?

Given the fact of a rather wide gap between official statements and what could be called the "real" mind of the people with regard to many other issues in the Arab World: is it realistic to expect that all the different moods of "the Arabs" towards Zionism, Israel and the Palestinians are reflected in contemporary Arabic literature? Where, for instance, was the intense longing for peace among the Egyptian masses, their (now undoubtable) readiness for compromise, expressed in Egyptian or any other regional Arabic literature before Anwar al-Sādāt's initiative? How is it that Taufīq al-Hakīm was only then ready to talk to a representative of the Arabic programme of Kol Israel?

The objections mentioned here cannot be dismissed easily. They do not reflect, however, the very complex political and cultural situation of the Arab countries in the twentieth century, nor even that since 1948. Therefore, most of these objections apply only to certain phases in the development of some parts of the Arab World. Even countries which now are not particularly known for a liberal atmosphere may have seen better times before in that respect - take, for instance, Egypt before 1952. Thus if the development of Arabic literature prior to 1948 is also taken into consideration, we may get a much more multi-colored picture of the Palestine conflict as reflected in the writings of Arab authors.

As to the treatment of the Palestine problem by authors living far from the geographical centre of the conflict, it may be true that many of their works dealing with this subject show a certain

lack of insight into its complexity. The sheer quantity of works touching the problem of Palestine and produced even at the periphery of the Arab World, however, suggests that this issue has captured the mind of a great part of the literate population of countries not directly involved in the military conflict and only marginally confronted with the problem of the Palestinian refugees. The fact, for instance, that a turbaned shaykh in Iraq was able to collect in a book of 384 pages what the learned men of the Shi'ite holy town of Nadjaf had to say about Palestine between 1928 and 1968 cannot be explained away by hinting at official incentives.

The existence of certain forms of literary censorship cannot be denied. There was, however, for many years the relative freedom of expression in Lebanon, where not only Lebanese or Palestinian writers, but also Egyptians and others were able to publish many a dissenting view about politics, philosophy etc., including strong words of criticism and self-criticism regarding the situation of the Arabs in their confrontation with Israel. There are, finally, Arab writers in Israel, in the West Bank area and the Ghaza strip who speak out quite freely about their problems and aspirations in writings published in Israel. (mainly published in organs of the Israeli left, i.e. especially using the umbrella of publishing houses close to the Israeli Communist Party). Many of their works have also appeared, of course, in Lebanon or elsewhere.

Given the situation described above, it would be wrong to believe that in Arabic literature concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine there was nothing but shallow rhetoric, superficial propaganda, boastful war-poetry and such like. There is no doubt that all this abounds, but no fair judgment of the relevant literature can avoid mentioning that there is much more in it with regard to literary quality as well as intellectual honesty and ideological spectrum.

The fact that quite a number of works by Palestinian and other Arab authors concerning Palestine (and, for the greater part, published in Lebanon) have been forbidden in many Arab countries points to the fact that this literature is not unisono in its outlook. It must be said, however, that the reason for government action in these cases was rarely, if ever, the expression of a readiness for compromise in these writings, but on the contrary

too radical a tone of self-criticism or attacks on certain Arab regimes for their neglect of the problem, their incompetence, their collaboration with western powers supporting Israel etc. More often than not these writings were considered by Arab governments - sometimes quite rightly - as partisan statements instigated by rival Arab regimes.

Before dealing in a more detailed way with some of the most important Palestinian topics in contemporary Arabic literature, I would like to say a few words about the role in modern Arabic literature of the Palestinian cause, i.e. the conflict with Zionism, prior to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.

As we are dealing here with belles lettres only, early commentaries in the Arabic press about Zionism (for instance in "Al-Manār" of Cairo soon after the First Zionist Congress in Basle, 1897) and the reaction, especially in the Arabic press of Syria and Palestine, from 1908 onwards, to Zionist activities in the area, do not concern us here. As far as I can see, awareness of Zionism as a political factor is reflected in literary forms not earlier than about 1919/20, when the existence of the Balfour declaration and its content became generally known to the Arab public. Already at this time we find in literary works warnings that the plan of a national home for the Jews must infringe the national rights of the Arabs, who had just become free of Turkish dominance with the help of Britain and her allies. At that time, distrust towards both the Zionists and the British was already too deep in certain Arab circles of Palestine to allow for sweeping statements about a possible coexistence of Jews and Arabs there. This becomes evident in the case of the famous Iraqi poet Ma'rūf al-Ruṣāfī, who, between 1918 and 1920, was teaching Arabic at the newly established Dār al-Mu'allimīn in Jerusalem. In a qaṣīda addressed to Herbert Samuel, the British High Commissioner for Palestine - who was of Jewish origin - Ruṣāfī said:

"We are not as we have been falsely accused  
Enemies of the Jews, overtly or secret.  
The two peoples are but cousins,  
In their language is the proof.  
But we fear expulsion from the homeland  
And being ruled by the force of arms".

For several reasons - not all of them directly related to this poem or this particular passage - Ruṣāfī's verses caused strong

protests in Palestine. Wadī' Bustānī, a Lebanese Maronite living in Haifa, published a poem as a reply to Ruṣāfī's. In it, Bustānī casts doubt on the truth of Ruṣāfī's statement that the (Zionist) Jews and the Arabs are cousins (a relationship of great importance in the Middle East!) by saying:

"Sure, he who crossed the River Jordan was our cousin,  
But we are suspicious of him who now comes by sea."

Since 1920, when this was written, the notion of the total difference between the Jewish "cousin" the Arabs used to know in the past and who was living among them, and the Zionist settler coming in the wake of western powers, has become a major theme in Arabic literature concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict over Palestine. It is impossible, however, within the scope of the present paper, to survey the development of this and other aspects of the conflict as reflected in literature in chronological order. Therefore I would like to present only some of the most important ones, indicating a few writers and works in each case.

First, however, I should say a few words about the literary genres in which the topics related to Palestine are dealt with: There is, first of all, Poetry. This is the traditionally favoured form of expression in Arabic regarding political, social and religious subjects. While undergoing considerable formal change (i.e. more or less radically breaking away from classical forms), poetry has maintained its important position in Arab literary life. This holds especially true for the literature from and about Palestine.

However, there have appeared, under western influence, new genres in modern Arabic literature - all of them more or less suited for the treatment of subjects connected with the Palestinian problem. These new (or almost new) forms are:

- 1) Historical novels (and works of historiography coming close to this form), especially writings on the conflict of Prophet Muḥammad with the Jews of Medina and on Sultan Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's (Saladin's) wars against the crusaders - both subjects offering opportunities to draw parallels to today's circumstances. Also, the loss of Islamic Spain (al-Andalus) to the reconquista offers a subject which can easily be connected with the Palestinian problem.

- 2) Short stories, a favourite form of political agitation, social criticism and ideological controversy in all parts of the Arab World.
- 3) Drama - from the sixties onwards, especially as far as Palestinian subjects are concerned, under a certain influence of Bertolt Brecht's theatre school.
- 4) Memoirs of politicians, journalists, diplomats, poets etc. This genre is found in classical Arabic literature, but has gained much greater importance in modern times.
- 5) Film scenarios, radio- and TV-dramas, features etc.

Let us now turn to some of the most important themes of this literature. There is,

- I. The refugees' yearning for the lost homeland: descriptions of the good old days before the Zionist takeover abound. Daily life in this Palestine of the Past is often presented as easy, harmonious and happy. (For many refugee authors, this is the wonderful world of childhood). The beauty of the towns and the countryside is often praised in glowing terms. Especially after 1967 certain Arab writers have criticized this almost romantic picture of conditions prevailing in Palestine before the arrival of the Zionist settlers or the creation of the state of Israel, respectively. Those critics called for a clear analysis of the social realities in Palestine before 1948 in order to arrive at a better understanding of the causes of the Arab defeat.
- II. Very often combined with the description of earlier life in Palestine are visions of the return to it - visions of a return in triumph, but also in an individual act of desperation, the returning person expressing his (or her) readiness and even desire to die fighting on Palestinian soil rather than live in exile. There are also expressions of doubt: When will the day of liberation come, and: How much will the old environment have changed until the day of return? According to one Palestinian scholar the mood of many poems composed by Arab Palestinians may remind us of the Jewish Psalmist. His "If I forget you, Jerusalem (...)", this scholar says, is echoed in poems like that by Maḥmūd al-Ḥūt in which he addresses his native town, Jaffa (Yāfā), in the following terms:

"Jaffa! My tears have dried but I still wail,  
Will I ever see you again?  
My memory of you is ever fresh,  
Living within my innermost soul".

III. Accounts of the ways in which the Zionist settlers brought large parts of the land under their control prior to 1948: this was already a theme of literature published in the thirties and forties. As examples we may mention Muḥammad 'Izzat Darwazah's "al-mal'ak wa-l-simsār" (The Angel and the Broker), published in 1934 in Nablus, and Ishāq Mūsā Ḥusainī's "Mudhakkirāt dadjādjah" (The Memoirs of a Hen), published in Cairo in 1943. Darwazah describes how a simple Arab farmer is ruined by a Jewish broker who incites him to spend his money for amusement in the city, to sell his land to cover his debts, to leave his family etc. Finally he becomes a beggar who dies in a lunatic asylum. Ḥusainī's "Mudhakkirāt dadjādjah" describes the stages of dispossession and pauperization as experienced by Palestinian Arabs before 1948. It is a parable told by a hen who records her life from the time when she is able to move freely on the farm of her owner to the day when fences erected by a foreign newcomer block her way, then to the day when her owner is forced by debts to sell her to a shopkeeper, where she has to live in a cage together with other hens, some of them speaking her own language, others a foreign one. She becomes aware of the fact that the foreign hens are planning to get rid of the native ones altogether and starts thinking of ways to avert this catastrophe.

IV. The war of 1948 and the causes and circumstances of the flight of hundreds of thousands behind the Arab frontlines: Zionist acts of terrorism (especially the massacre of civilians at Deir Yasin) are frequently described in order to explain the mass exodus from the territories which became Israel. Even authors not uncritical about the present role of certain Palestinian organisations and their behaviour, as, for instance, the Lebanese diplomat and writer Taufiq 'Awwād, do not hesitate to ascribe horrible crimes to Zionist fighters in the war of 1948, such as raping an Arab girl they have already killed (Tawāḥīn Bairūt, title of English translation: Death in Beirut, 1972 and 1976 respectively).

Another aspect of the same event, i.e. the war of 1948, is the description of the exodus itself, and in this connection,



of the process of disillusionment of those refugees who left their homes convinced of an early return in the wake of the victorious Arab armies. Ghassān Kanafānī's semi-autobiographical story "Ard al-burtuqāl al-ḥazīn" (The Land of the Sad Oranges) is an excellent example for the literary treatment of this experience.

The impotence of the Arab League's armies is openly ridiculed by certain Palestinian writers, some of whom praise, at the same time, the resistance of the local Palestinian Arab population up to 1948:

"Palestine would never have fallen,  
Never would its lions have been dispersed,  
Had not seven mighty states tried to rescue her-  
Truly astounding was the outcome".

(Maḥmūd al-Ḥūt, 1951)

- V. The life of the refugees, their miserable existence in the camps or outside, the breaking up of families, discrimination in the host countries etc.: Ghassān Kanafānī's story "Ridjāl fī l-shams" (Men in the Sun), the description of three men's desperate (and in the end fatal) attempt to shake off the misery of the camp, seems to be one of the best literary treatments of this problem. (A film made in 1972 was based on the story. Its presentation was forbidden in most Arab countries).

Later, with the emergence of the armed resistance of Al-Fath etc., the uprootedness and misery of the refugee is described as the background for his decision to take up arms and join the commandos.

- VI. The situation of the Arabs remaining in Israel: in the fifties, some of the Israeli Arab writers expressed the idea that this community could become a bridge between Jews and Arabs in general. From the end of the fifties onwards, however, members of the younger generations took the lead. In their writings the feeling of alienation and dispossession in their native land became more and more dominant. Maḥmūd Darwīsh (born 1941) has described this situation in his "Yaumīyāt muwāṭin bi-lā waṭan" (= "Diary of a Citizen without a Homeland, 1971). In one passage the author reveals that this feeling of alienation is not simply the result of becoming a minority in the native country, but is the very outcome of a clash of cultures, the Israelis

representing the new age of all-pervasive technology. The author tries to demonstrate this by inventing a frivolous exchange of words between a young Israeli and his girl-friend about their preference for making love either in a tank or in the open air on the banks of the Suez Canal. To this the author adds the following comment:

"What an immense gulf between the imagination soaring unhindered in the desert and the imagination structured by modern technology and victory! Words of love are now interwoven with current affairs and the latest inventions of new weapons. Pleasure no longer comes from nature, and the Arab in Israel finds himself backward even in lovemaking. It has taken him a long time to learn how to address his love with roses. How many aeons will this creature require to be trained in this new approach?.... What are you thinking of? How they manage to have children in tanks? How they manage to have fun in tanks? This is the secure Israeli home. This is the love-nest. And this is the future".

Mahmūd Darwīsh left Israel in 1971. He is now director of the Palestine Research Centre in Beirut. Other prominent writers have remained in Israel. One of them, the communist poet Taufīq Ziyād, became mayor of Nazareth in 1976. In one of his poems, he articulates (what he thinks should be, or really is) the attitude towards Israel of the Israeli Arabs, i.e. a strong determination to hold out against the Jews on the native soil and to defend the Arab identity, causing the Israelis as much trouble as possible:

"Here we shall stay,  
A wall upon your breast,  
And in your throat we shall stay  
A piece of glass,  
A cactus thorn,  
And in your eye  
A blazing fire..."

VII. The Israeli Jew: In general his foreign origin, i.e. mainly his European or American background is stressed. In most cases he is not able (and not willing, for that matter) to understand the Arabs. He despises them and consciously or unconsciously hurts their national and/or religious feelings. The Sabra, if he (or she) appears at all, in many cases is even more evil and chauvinist than the immigrant. The sufferings of the Jews in Europe are not ignored altogether, but are never accepted as an excuse for making the Arabs of Palestine - who are not responsible for the holocaust - suffer at the hands of the Zionists.

Most Israeli characters are presented as soldiers. Descriptions of discipline, sexual morale and social relations within the Israeli army seem to be far off the mark in many cases, at least in works published up to 1967. Israeli women-soldiers are portrayed as perfidious (seducing, inter alia, fedayin in order to get military information from them), frivolous and cynic. They are prone to incite their male comrades to commit vandal acts against innocent Arabs, desecrate Islamic and Christian holy places etc.

Ka The distinction between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews is recognized and sometimes stressed. The image of the Sephardic Jew seems to be little less uniform than that of the Ashkenazi: Maḥmūd Darwīsh (in: Yaumiyyāt muwāṭin bi-lā waṭan, see above) presents a taxi driver of Moroccan origin who wants all Arabs in Israel to be wiped out, while the Iraqi communist writer Dhū l-Nūn Ayyūb (living in exile in Vienna) in one of his stories confronts us with an Israeli soldier of Iraqi origin (and with communist leanings) who, having been forced by the Hashimite monarchy to leave his homeland, went to Israel, but still considers himself an Arab. He has even declined to learn Hebrew and shows sympathy with the fedayin.

In a few cases an (Israeli?) Jew is addressed by an Arab author as a personal friend. However, the basic conflict threatening this relationship remains visible. Such a precarious friendship seems to be reflected in verses written in 1971 "To a Jewish Friend" by Fauzī al-Asmar, an Israeli Arab writer:

"Don't ask me  
The impossible  
(.....)  
Don't ask me  
To abandon my eyes,  
My love,  
The memory of my childhood  
(.....)  
My friend  
You cannot ask me  
To leave my own country".

(Publ. in "Poems from an Israeli Prison")

VIII. Arab self-criticism: inner-Arab rivalries and lack of organization in the face of the Zionist scheme was criticized already in the literature of the Mandate period (Darwazah and others). The neglect of the problem by Arab governments

was also blamed quite early. 'Abd al-Raḥīm Maḥmūd (d.1948), for instance, addressed a member of the Sa'ūdī dynasty in a poem when the latter visited Palestine in 1935:

"Have you come to visit the Aqṣā Mosque  
Or bid it farewell before it is lost?  
Tomorrow, and how near is it, nothing  
Will be left for us save tears and remorse".

After the debacle of 1948, a whole literature of self-criticism appeared, mainly in the form of essays on historical and cultural topics. This was echoed, to a certain extent, in works of poetry and fiction. The early successes of Djamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir, however, worked in favour of a considerable wave of optimism, as reflected in Arabic literature, with regard to the outcome of the final struggle with Israel. The disaster of 1967 changed that almost completely. In the field of the novel, Ḥalīm Barakāt's "Aḍat al-ṭā'ir ilā l-baḥr" (The Return of the Flying [Dutchman] to the Sea, Beirut 1969) seems to be the most mature and intellectually honest stock-taking, on a high artistic level, of the Arab's miserable social and cultural situation vis-à-vis Israel.

Many authors fell silent for some time, others erupted in expressions of shame, self-hate, guilt and wrath against those Arab leaders and military men they held responsible for the defeat. Djamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir, to be sure, was carefully spared any open criticism at that time - with the exception, perhaps, of Muslim right-wing writers who considered the defeat a result of Nāṣir's socialist experiments.

For the tendency to clear Nāṣir from any responsibility for the disaster, putting the blame on the shoulders of corrupt functionaries etc., Luṭfī al-Khulī's film (cast by Yūsuf Shāhīn) "Al-'Uṣfūr" (The Sparrow) is a case in point. (It is, nevertheless, a piece of courageous criticism).

One poet, the former Syrian diplomat Nizār Qabbānī, who had been famous until then mainly for his erotic poetry, suddenly started writing verses directed in an extremely radical way against traditional Arab-Islamic values and Middle Eastern mentalities, at the same time rebuking Arab politicians and intellectuals as responsible for the catastrophe of 1967 (Hawāmish 'alā daftar al-naksa, i.e.

Marginal Notes on the Copy-book of Defeat, 1967). The death of Djamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir plunged him (and many other writers) into even deeper abysses of despair and self-accusation:

" We have killed you, o last of the prophets!  
We have killed you....!"

For Qabbānī and many other Arab authors, the relative success of the Egyptian and Syrian armies in October 1973 came as a miracle causing elation and new self-confidence. For Qabbānī, the events of the October war are equivalent to a rebirth:

"Today, on October 6, 1973...  
I was born under the patrol boats  
and pontoon bridges..  
I came forth from the teeth  
of Syrian caterpillar tracks..  
On the Golan heights..."

Especially in Egypt the crossing ('ubūr) of the Canal became a metaphor in many literary works for a total change of mood, for leaving behind a shameful past, a rebirth etc.

IX. The Civil War in Lebanon: The events of 1975ff. in Lebanon caused many Palestinian, Lebanese and other Arab writers to express their feelings about what they consider the roots and results of the conflict. In the writings of pro-Palestinian and left-wing authors, the siege and fall of Tall Za'tar is, of course, one of the main topics. -

Given a certain support by Israel for the Christian militias, it would be interesting to see whether this has resulted, in the recent writings of extremist Christian Lebanese authors like Sa'id 'Aql, in expressions of solidarity and gratefulness towards Israel. At the moment, however, I have no information about that.

The situation in Lebanon before the outbreak of large-scale fighting has been aptly described by Taufīq 'Awwād (see above). In his novel "Ṭawāhīn Bairūt" the Palestinian movements operating in Lebanon and their Lebanese comrades and fellow-travellers are not spared a certain criticism. On the background of the country's deep and dangerous socio-cultural crisis, which the author wanted to describe at the time, the guerilla organisations appear, however, as a final

refuge not only for Palestinians living in alienation from Lebanese society, but also ( as is shown in the case of the heroine, a Shi'ite girl from a village in South Lebanon stranded in Beirut) for Lebanese who feel dispossessed and humiliated by a system of narrow confessionalism and moral hypocrisy.

- X. Religious themes and allusions: The Palestinian Arab resistance against the Zionist settlers prior to 1948 and the subsequent wars as well as the guerilla actions are frequently described as Holy War (djihād). The sanctity of Jerusalem and other places in Palestine is evoked in many works. Sometimes the plight of the Palestinian Arabs is compared, in a more or less symbolic way, with the suffering of Jesus Christ caused by the Jews, or with the tragedy of Kerbela, i.e. the resistance, death and final historic triumph of the Prophet's grandson Husain ibn 'Alī who heroically took up arms against the usurpers of power, the Umayyads (680 A.D.). The latter comparison is, of course, especially favoured by Lebanese and Iraqi Shi'ite sympathizers of the Palestinian cause.

Ḥalīm Barakāt's " 'Audat al-ṭā'ir ilā l-beḥr" (see above) is full of religious allusions especially taken from the Old Testament.

Anti-Jewish arguments, themes and motives are borrowed freely from western literature. As an example we may mention the Egyptian author (of Indonesian-Arab origin) 'Alī Aḥmad Bā Kathīr (1910-1969) in his play "Shaylūk al-djadīd" (The New Shylock, 1945). His three-act play "Ilāh Isrā'īl" (Israel's God) is a total condemnation of the role played by Jewry in the whole of human history.

It should be noted here that western anti-Jewish (anti-semitic) polemics (as, for instance, the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion") have been translated into Arabic. One of Martin Luther's anti-Jewish treatises (most probably his "Von den Juden und ihren Lügen" of 1544) was published in an Arabic translation (from an English version) by the Palestinian 'Adjādī Nuwaihīd as late as 1974 in Beirut (Nifāq al-yahūd; with a foreword by Shafīq al-Ḥūt, at the time chief editor of the radical pro-Palestinian paper "Al-Muḥarrir").

As already mentioned above, Prophet Muhammad's conflict with the Jews of Medina offers material for parallels with today's Arab-Israeli conflict. This view can be corroborated by quotations from the Quran, from Quran-commentaries and the Hadīth. This approach is especially favoured by writers from the milieu of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahhābiya.

On the other hand, the relatively safe position of the Jews in medieval Islamic society is often cited as proof for the latter's tolerance as compared to Jewish attitudes towards others in the past and present.

- XI. Visions of Arab-Jewish coexistence in a future "liberated" Palestine, i.e. after the destruction of the state of Israel: as we have seen from the fate of Ruṣāfī's poem of 1920 (see above), conciliatory words in Arabic literary writings are likely to be received with distrust and criticism in the Arab milieu. Nevertheless statements of this kind may be found here and there in contemporary Arabic literature at almost every stage of the conflict. The Palestinian poet Mu'īn Basīṣū, for instance, whose works are banned in many Arab countries because of their radical tone, already in 1948 (when he himself was 18) tried to look forward to the days of peaceful coexistence:

"And my child will be raised  
In Jerusalem and Ghaza  
With Rachel and Sarah".

It is clear, however, that the coexistence which Basīṣū seems to have had in mind already in 1948 is more or less similar to the one now officially propagated by the PLO: Arabs and Jews living together in one secular non-Jewish, potentially Arab-dominated state in Palestine.

With the possibility of a separate Palestinian Arab national state coming into the focus of international discussion, it may be that other, more realistic and constructive visions of peaceful coexistence may emerge in contemporary Arabic thought and be expressed also in literary writings.

- XII. Third World solidarity: A development typical of Arabic literature concerning Palestine from the sixties onwards - especially in the writings of left-wing authors - is a certain trend toward putting the Palestinians' struggle in the wider perspective of liberation-movements in the

Third World. Some kind of solidarity with Asian and African peoples fighting against western powers was already expressed in Arabic literature at the beginning of this century, as in the case of the Boers' war against the British in Southern Africa and Japan's victory over the Russians in 1905. In the sixties, comparisons with the struggle of the Viet Cong became popular in left-wing circles. Very often this comparison was used in literary writings as a base for strong self-criticism, attacks on Arab governments etc.

So far, the impact of this "internationalist" trend on the wider Arab reading public may be only superficial.


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International Conference on  
THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE - BASIC ISSUES AND MAJOR TRENDS  
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Daniel Heradstveit

PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

THE PSYCHODYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT.

CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF ELITES

IN THE ARAB - ISRAELI CONFLICT.

by

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## How can stability in beliefs be explained?

How do parties in the Middle East conflict make their causal analysis, how they explain events, and how they draw inferences from these events. We ask how the parties to conflict arrive at answers to the question why something happens. For example, how does one party in the conflict explain what caused the behavior of the opponent when the opponent behaved in a way that contradicted his earlier theory about how the opponent behave?

Causality as a main rule governing the formation of the belief systems has been emphasized by many.

Our method of representing beliefs of decision-makers reflects the proposition that decision-makers tend to believe that international events are related causally and thus try to infer causal relationships underlying these events and the actions of other nations, even when there is little or no evidence of causal nature. 29)  
(Bonham, 1976, Simulation and Games 7 (June 1976, p. 128).

When we try to explain events, we may say that we act as "intuitive" scientists. We try to explain the behavior of others. But we also try to explain our own behavior. Why did I behave like I did? As "intuitive" scientists we try to come up with the best explanation possible. In most cases our judgment is not based on one single observation but on several.

The individual does not only observe behavior, but takes into consideration the "circumstances in which it occurs".

These are what Bem calls the "controlling variables" of the behavior. Observation of behavior in addition to "controlling variables" are the basis on which the individual arrives at what cognitive psychologists typically call "the definition of the situation". To the extent that the behavior is free

from "controlling variables", the individual will infer the causes of behavior to the actor. Even though Bem does not discuss it explicitly, "controlling variables" must be meant to refer to only those that the individual perceives.

But how does self-perception differ from interpersonal perception? This difference is important in our study. Bem mentions four ways in which self-perception may differ from interpersonal perception:

- a) The private stimuli play a role - even though this varies with the situation - and these private stimuli are, of course, not directly available to the observer.
- b) Our experiences of the past that determine the meaning attached to what is perceived (observed) are not available in the same way to the "stranger".
- c) The protection of self-esteem and defense against threat. This may distort self-attributions in various ways.
- d) Features of the situation are differentially salient to yourself and the observer. There seems to be a difference of focus in attention between the actor and the observer. The actors' attention may be more focused towards situational cues, while to the observer, the actors' behavior is more salient.

These sources of "imperfection" will concern us here. What are the types of causal analysis involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict that maintain beliefs that may impede resolution of conflict? Are there any errors and biases in the way in which information is processed? Is there a systematic distortion when Arabs and Israelis explain the way the enemy behaves, and, equally important, the way they behave themselves?

## ATTRIBUTION THEORY

Attribution theory specifies the conditions under which behavior is seen as caused by the person performing the action, or by environmental influences and constraints. Attributions or causal explanations for behavior and outcomes are characterized in terms of an internal/external or dispositional/situational dichotomy.

Internal property: abilities, traits or motives

External property: environmental pressures and constraints

Attribution theory deals with the likelihood of alternative causal factors as explanations of observed behavior.

When explaining the causes of behavior and outcomes, "logical" thinking processes are of course involved. For example, when we observe a consistent behavior of an actor under different conditions and at different times, we are most likely to explain that behavior as caused by some internal traits of the actor. Such "logical" causal analysis is also involved when we observe an actor whose behavior we perceive as differing from that of other actors. In such cases environmental influences and constraints are not sufficient to explain his behavior and internal attributions will be made. Or in situations where we perceive alternative courses of action available to the actor, his particular choice will most likely be attributed to internal traits. Perceived freedom of choice may sometimes explain the causal analysis made. Other postulates about this kind of logical schemata for attributional analysis could be listed, but it is unnecessary to discuss this in detail since it is causal analysis, containing biases and distortions, that is of interest to our study.

The parties to the conflict will be interested in structuring "reality", so that they can respond most appropriately to this "reality". They are active information seekers and want to know as much as possible about what happens, and why it happens. They certainly do not want distorted facts, but facts relevant to their contingent interaction with the enemy, so that the optimal choices can be made. Nevertheless, attribution theory points to information processing biases that may act as cognitive constraints on what could be seen as the most logical or rational way of making inferences from the enemy's behavior and our own behavior.

The parties to the conflict want control of their environment. Therefore they want their assumptions and general theories on conflict to be valid. Sources of bias can have serious repercussions. Any distortions that we find in the way elite members in the conflict process information may potentially also have serious implications for resolution of conflict.

We are asking if the techniques the elites use for collecting, processing and interpreting the data are adequate. In examining why something happens we claim that there are systematic distortions involved in the analysis. This leads us to the aspect of attribution theory which postulates that there will be a systematic bias in the attribution process. It is claimed by attribution theories that even though we act as "intuitive" scientists in the search for explanations of what is happening in our environment, we nevertheless do not proceed exactly "scientifically". Our attributional tendencies have a bias, called by the theorists the fundamental attribution error.

The hypothesis as put forward by Heider, Jones and Nisbetts and others claims that in making our inferences about behavior there is a tendency to overemphasize

situational variables (the circumstances in which it occurs) when explaining our own behavior, while when observing the behavior of others there is a tendency to overemphasize dispositional (internal characteristics of the actor) variables. We do not draw statistical inferences because we analyze the behavior of others differently from how we analyze our own behavior. Actors are likely to attribute their own behavioral choices to situational factors and constraints, while observers attribute the same choices to the actor's stable abilities, attitudes and personality traits

Behavior is thus seen by the observer to be a manifestation of the actor and seen by the actor to be a response to the situation

The tendency to infer dispositional causes is enhanced when the observer dislikes the actor who performs the blameworthy act. The degree of involvement in the observed action also influences the attribution process. The higher degree of involvement the greater the chance of attributional bias. Where the observer is also an actor, he is likely to exaggerate the uniqueness and emphasize the dispositional origins of the responses of others to his own actions. He assumes his own actions to be perfectly standard, unexceptional and unprovocative

The one extreme degree of involvement is the mutual contingency interaction and the other extreme is passive observation

The Middle East conflict will be viewed as an instance of the former. The conflict is seen by the elite members as an interaction process where the actions of the other side directly effect their own side and vice versa. This situation should increase the likelihood of attributional bias. In the study we will investigate if the causal analysis of the parties in the Middle East conflict conform to the pattern attribution theory would predict. \* The extent to which this is the case in makes changes in beliefs in the conflict difficult and account for their relative stability.

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\* Sample include ca. 400 elite members in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria.

Beliefs about an object may be held across situations just as beliefs about a certain type of situation may be held across beliefs about objects. Beliefs about the enemy, for example, may be held across changing beliefs about the power relationships in the conflict. But it is also possible to imagine a change in beliefs about the enemy while beliefs about the power relationships remain the same. But the most stable beliefs would generally be those with reference to internal propensities of the actors, e.g. "Jews are good businessmen" or "Arabs are irrational".

The extent to which parties to conflict are dispositional in their analysis of the apparent behavior, these beliefs may be very hard to change.



### PROBLEMS OF CODING

At first glance, it might look relatively simple to divide statements on causality along internal/external (or dispositional/situational) lines, but looking further into the problem, it becomes apparent that it is not all that simple.

Statements that seem to have a clear dispositional content, and vice versa. The form of the statement may be misleading, and the context should also be evaluated. Whenever respondents made causal statements about themselves or the opponent, the coder was asked to distinguish between two types of statements:

- I explanations which assume only those dispositions that are shared by all men or typical of most men (situational)
- II explanations that assume or state something unique or distinguishing about the actor's dispositions (dispositional).

An explanation is only dispositional when the attributor assumes it is something particular, unique. Dispositional attribution is also called person attribute, which may be a better term since it is more readily understandable. Does the respondent explain a cause of some event as resulting from some traits of the person (persons)

performing the act or does he refer to reactive behavior caused by stimulus in the situation? When referring to person attribute we may say that the respondent in his information processing behaves as a "trait psychologist", and when referring to situational variables as a "reinforcement psychologist".

Some causal statements interpret behavior as reactive. This is the stimulus-response model: The behavior is seen as caused by the situation. Other causal statements will see behavior caused by unique traits of the actor. If the behavior is seen as caused by the situation, the behavior is something outside the control of the actor--he does not have any choice. If the behavior, on the other hand, is seen as caused by the person performing the act, it implies that the person has a free choice to act in more than one way; therefore he can do something about his behavior. He is able to control it.

One recurring coding problem is the reference to Zionism. If we look only at the form of the statements, it would be coded as situational. Zionism could be considered a social force and would therefore be situational. But the context in which it appears has to be considered. If Zionism is used to describe the state of Israel as being something unique, deviant and odd, or a "trait" particular to the people of that nation as opposed to the people of all other nations, it should be coded as dispositional. Very often it was used to explain why the people of Israel behave differently from all other peoples. The explanation implies that if Israel had not been based on an alien ideology, called Zionism, the behavior of that state would have been different (normal). Then the explanation is dispositional. The content as well as the form of the explanations must be examined.

In the first stage of coding we selected a random sample of the protocols, then went through the whole protocol in order to identify those questions which seemed to be most effective in eliciting causal statements. The first problem was to identify causal statements: either explicitly or implicitly the answer to the question "Why"? "The enemy behaves like this, because..." Open-ended questions will frequently elicit causal statements, but we do have questions that are better in this respect than others.

The first question we selected was:

What do you think are the basic good sides and bad sides of your part in the conflict?

This question proved useful in eliciting causal statements because most of the respondents answered the question by explaining why they thought they were good and why they thought they were bad. We are good because we want to live in peace, for example. Or we are good because we have a strong faith and high moral standards, or we are good because we do not discriminate against other people. Or we are bad because there is too much rivalry within our camp, or we are too pessimistic.

On both sides it was claimed that the behavior of our side is good because our intentions are good. "We fight for a just cause, for peace, for a just solution." "We are moderate, our mentality is peaceful, we cherish human life and we do not hate the enemy. There is a strong feeling of justice, we have some inner qualities that are highly praiseworthy; we are great human beings because we try to be human in our dealings with the opponent. We do not have evil wishes, intentions like the enemy does; our purposes are basically good." So, in sum, there is the idea that we have some human qualities (traits) that are highly admirable, which

cause good behavior. The other line of causal analysis refers to intentions.

It can be difficult to determine whether concrete policies (behavior) are dispositional or situational. Again, the context must be taken into account. Sometimes attributions are situational by explaining good results obtained by rational policies, but sometimes the statements are dispositional in that they ascribe rational and efficient policies to inner qualities of the actor. For example: we have a sense of moderation, we are not fanatic; we diagnose the situation in a down to earth way, our thinking is concrete and not abstract (ideological). Some of the respondents coded as balanced or mixed would refuse to speak about "good" and "bad" sides; their causal analysis were typically situational. For them, the causes of the policies of both sides were circumstantial, part of processes that noone could really be blamed for.

Turning to explanations of own bad behavior, policies were criticized as either too lenient or too aggressive. On the Arab side, some policies or groups were characterized as too extreme, and on the Israeli side the Palestinian issue was brought forward. Policies were criticized for not being optimal to their own interests. There was also the criticism that policies could be more efficiently implemented. On both sides the lack of image-building was referred to. Respondents claimed that their own points of view were not explained well enough, or that there was a lack of unity, or that policies were not well enough adjusted to the situation. It was felt that policies do not take into account that the conflict can be solved, or what the true interests of the super-powers are. Bad policies were seen as caused by opponents' bad behavior (reactive). On the Arab side, dissension within their own camp was mentioned as well as extremism and underdevelopment. The propensity for

emotionalism was also referred to.

Table 3.1 IMAGE OF SELF

Q: What do you think are the basic good and bad sides of your part in the conflict?

	Sit.	Disp.	Both	Row Total
Israeli	15	21	64	(N = 33)
Arab	32	23	45	(N = 47)
	(N = 20)	(N = 18)	(N = 42)	(N = 80)
Column Total	25%	23%	52%	100%

N = number of respondents

Sit = situational attribution

Disp = dispositional attribution

Both = making both situational and  
dispositional attributions

## IMAGE OF THE OPPONENT AND IMAGE OF SELF

The Israeli findings indicate the opposite of the Jones and Nisbett hypothesis (see table 3.I) Israelis make more dispositional than situational attributions. For the Arab respondents there is a higher frequency of situational attribution, which is according to our hypothesis, but support is quite weak.

The most interesting finding is not the frequency distribution of dispositional and situational attributions, where we find contradictory findings and as a result no systematic pattern of support for the postulated bias in attribution. What is most interesting is the high frequency of respondents making both types of attributions. This tells us that there is no systematic bias involved--the majority of respondents are willing to make both dispositional and situational attributions when explaining own behavior. This finding conforms more to the logical schemata for attribution processes rather than giving support for erroneous tendencies.

What do you think are the basic good sides and bad sides of the other side in the conflict?

When mentioning the good sides of the opponent in the conflict, Arabs referred to Israel's technological advances, its economic strength, its successful propaganda, and its unity in goals and strategies. As we can see from this, there is a tendency to see the reverse of one's own side in the opponent's camp. A strength for one side is matched by a weakness for the other. We are underdeveloped, the Israelis are developed. We are disunited, the Israelis are united. Underdevelopment causes constraints for optimal policies of our side, while the stage of development in the opponent's camp causes an efficient policy. There was also a hesitancy

to express disunity in the respondent's own camp. The tendency was to say that one day we will become united, or that our intentions are to unite. But disunity is implicitly admitted when Arabs mention the unity of the opponent as one of the admirable characteristics of his policies.

There is also attributions that cites contradictory forces in the opponent's camp which may cause changes in policy. The opponent has good sides because there is internal opposition to his present bad policy in the form of environmental forces and constraints. These types of causal analyses lead to a high expectancy of change: because we see contradictory forces in the opponent's camp, there is the possibility that his policy may change.

Some Arab respondents expressed admiration for traits of the Jewish people, particularly their dedication in the fight for their existence. Sometimes this implies that Arabs are not so dedicated as the other side, but it may also simply be an expression of admiration in that they separate the traits of the Jewish people from the policies generated by the Israeli state, which is hostile--but that can be reasonably explained by situational or environmental sources or constraints.

Israeli respondents like Arab respondents, list contradictory forces in the opponent's camp which may trigger change. Egypt was frequently mentioned as an example of these contradictory forces which may neutralize more hostile tendencies and which may generate change in hostile policies against the state of Israel. Israelis also referred to traits of Arabs as a people, mentioning hospitality, pride, and self-confidence.

Some respondents would simply not use the label "good" or "bad". When explaining bad behavior of the opponent, Arab respondents mentioned that Israelis have a militaristic attitude, Israelis are militaristic by nature, and Israelis are arrogant. History is given as inductive support in explaining why Israelis behave differently from other people: these people have complexes from the concentration camps, therefore they deviate from the norm; now they want to take revenge. Other traits of the opponent cited by Arabs are that he is racist: these people have a tendency to discriminate. For example, it is stated that oriental Jews are not considered equal to European or American Jews. There is also the claim that the opponent tells lies, which can be seen as both situational and dispositional. If the opponent tells lies to support his policies, this was seen as a situational attribution (rational), but more often it was presented as a trait of the enemy (irrational).

Israeli respondents mentioned that Arabs are fanatic, irrational, cannot think logically, lack imagination, have no respect for human life, and have a tendency to hate. Again we see the symmetry in perceptions: admirable traits of their own side (such as rational thinking, a tremendous respect for human life, ability to forgive) are exactly reversed for the opponent. Lack of modernization and lack of democratic institutions in the opponent's camp were also frequently mentioned by Israelis as explanations of bad behavior. Again, we see this symmetry where modernization and democratic institutions explain why our behavior is good, standard or normal, while underdevelopment and lack of democratic institutions explain the bad behavior of the opponent. If the opponent were only as modern and democratic as we, his policies would be rational and it would be possible



to solve the conflict.

It appears, then, that this question is quite useful in eliciting causal statements and will therefore be included in testing attributional tendencies to see if there is a systematic bias in the attributional process. (Results in table 3.1b)

Table 3.2 IMAGE OF THE OPPONENT

Q: What do you think are the basic good and bad sides of the other part in the conflict?

	Sit.	Disp.	Both	Row Total
Israeli	14	41	45	39% (N=29)
Arab	13	26	61	61% (N=46)
Column Total	(N=10) 13%	(N=24) 32%	(N=41) 55%	(N=75) 100%

N = number of respondents

Sit = situational attribution

Disp = dispositional attribution

Both = making both situational and dispositional attributions

The results show that there is a higher frequency of dispositional attributions when analyzing causes of the opponent's behavior in the conflict. However, this tendency is severely weakened by the fact, as with the previous question, that most of the respondents have no systematic bias. The majority make both dispositional and situational attributions. So even if we find somewhat stronger support for the hypothesis than we found with the previous question, the main tendency is still to have no systematic bias at all in attributional tendencies.

### Concluding remarks

In explaining the basic good and bad sides of their own and the other part in the conflict, the respondents came up with causal statements by conceiving why the parties behave as they do. Our hypothesis predicts that the respondents would make mainly situational attributions when explaining own behavior, and significantly more dispositional attributions when explaining behavior of the opponent.

The results (presented in Tables 3.1a and 3.1b) do not give strong support for the predicted relationship, (on one question the results were partly counter to what the hypothesis would predict), although the results are in the predicted direction on both questions. Situational attributions are stronger when analyzing behavior of self, while dispositional attributions are stronger when analyzing the behavior of the opponent, but this tendency is rather weak.

Arab respondents provide somewhat stronger support than Israelis. The Israeli results run counter to our prediction when talking about own side, although the numbers come very close to an even split. In making attributions about the opponent in the conflict, however, there is some support in the predicted direction.

The results led us to suspect that the hypotheses are stated in a too general form. The level of generalization tends to hide important variances in the way elites in an international conflict make attributions. Analysis of the data on an impressionistic basis led us to believe that respondents make different kinds of inferences when the observed behavior is considered blameworthy as opposed to praiseworthy.

We may recall that a dispositional attribution places the responsibility for the act with the actor, while a situational attribution leaves the actor free from responsibility. The attribution mechanism will thus enable the observer to take credit when making a dispositional attribution, while avoiding responsibility by "blaming" situational variables.

Our analysis will go beyond the "fundamental attribution error" as originally put forward by Jones and Nisbett, in that we claim that the quality of the act is important. We expect different types of attributions to be made of different perceived qualities of the performed act.

Jones and Nisbett deal with evaluatively neutral situations. In our study the evaluative dimension is probably very important. We do not deal with neutral "observers" when it comes to own activities or the activities of the opponent. Furthermore, we deal not with an international situation in general terms, but rather our investigation is related to international conflict with deep emotional involvement. If ego-defensive mechanisms influence the attribution process, we would expect that this could account for variance.

The evaluation of the observed activity therefore becomes crucial, and so far we have not taken this into account. We asked the respondents explicitly to mention own good and bad activity and opponent's good and bad activity. Consequently, the question provoked responses that are especially well suited for assessing the relative influence of the evaluative content of behavior.

We therefore restate the hypotheses on a lower level of generalization to see if we can get any support for the general hypothesis on attributional biases. In emphasizing the importance of the evaluative dimension

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along with the actor-observer relationship, we may restate the hypotheses in the following form:

- 1) There is a tendency to make situational attributions when observing own bad behavior.
- 2) There is a tendency to make situational attributions when observing the opponent's good behavior.
- 3) There is a tendency to make dispositional attributions when observing the opponent's bad behavior.
- 4) There is a tendency to make dispositional attributions when observing own good behavior.

Table 3.3. IMAGE OF SELF

Q: What are the basic good and bad sides of your part in the conflict?

	<u>Our Side Is Good</u>			<u>Our Side Is Bad</u>		
	Sit	Disp	Row Total	Sit	Disp	Row Total
Israeli	14	86	(N=22) 34%	93	7	(N=15) 29%
Arab	43	57	(N=42) 66%	84	16	(N=37) 71%
Column Total	N=21 33%	N=43 67%	N=64 100%	N=45 87%	N=7 13%	N=42 100%

N = number of respondents

Table 3. 4 IMAGE OF THE OPPONENT

Q: What are the basic good and bad sides of the other part in the conflict?

	<u>Other Side Is Good</u>			<u>Other Side Is Bad</u>		
	Sit	Disp	Row Total	Sit	Disp	Row Total
Israeli	57	43	(N=14) 31%	22	78	(N=18) 31%
Arab	74	26	(N=31) 69	28	72	(N=40) 69
Column Total	N=31 69%	N=14 31%	N=45 100%	N=15 26%	N=43 74%	N=58 100%

N = number of respondents

- Subhypothesis 1: There is a tendency to make attributions when observing own bad behavior.

The support is strong in both samples for the postulated tendency. When parties to conflict explain something considered bad by their own side, they have an overwhelming tendency to make situational, and not dispositional, attributions. They thereby avoid fixing the blame on themselves: the situation is to blame. The behavior is seen as reactive--caused by situational variables leaving themselves with no choice.

- Subhypothesis 2: There is a tendency to make situational attributions when observing the opponent's good behavior.

When the opponent behaves decently, what kind of inferences are drawn? We find strong support for our prediction of situational attribution. The support here is stronger on the Arab side than on the Israeli side.

When the opponent is decent, he is not given credit. The causal analysis of his behavior concludes that factors in the situation forced him to behave in a decent manner. Again, the behavior is seen as reactive, really leaving the actor with no free choice. Since he has no choice he cannot be given credit.

- Subhypothesis 3: There is a tendency to make dispositional attributions when observing the opponent's bad behavior.

Once more, we find considerable support for the hypothesized relationship. The opponent is held responsible for his behavior. He has chosen to behave badly because of his own free will and he is in a position to change this behavior if he wants to. The explanation is then made consistent with an already established devil-image of the opponent. Behavior is no longer seen as reactive, but caused by characteristics of the actor.

- Subhypothesis 4: There is a tendency to make dispositional attributions when observing own good behavior.

This hypothesis runs somewhat counter to the proposition by Jones and Nisbett on the fundamental attribution error. The proposition may still hold in its general form, however, even though it appears from our testing that it is not valid given two additional conditions:  
1) the observed behavior is not evaluatively neutral;  
2) the observer himself is a participant of the activity  
Again, our results support our restatement of the original hypothesis. The respondents do not have, as Jones and Nisbett would predict, a bias towards situational attributions. When observing own activity evaluated as good, the bias is towards dispositional attribution. When something is done that is considered constructive, parties to conflict want to have credit

for it. Their own behavior is no longer caused by the situation but by their internal characteristics. They were in a position to act otherwise, but chose to do something good.

These results demonstrate the flexibility parties to conflict display in crediting performed behavior. The attribution mechanisms allow for operating with different "models of responsibility". Furthermore, the results demonstrate the too general level of the Jones and Nisbett hypothesis. While we found some support for the hypothesis, the explanation does not hold, as Jones and Nisbett state, that there is a general bias toward making dispositional attributions when explaining behavior of others. Rather, the results show that parties to conflict have a tendency to mention bad as opposed to good behavior of the opponent. This explains some support for the hypothesis on the general level.

#### Concluding Remarks

We have found considerable support for our four sub-hypotheses. The respondents are overwhelmingly dispositional when observing own praiseworthy behavior and opponent's blameworthy behavior, and overwhelmingly situational when observing own blameworthy behavior and opponent's praiseworthy behavior. The results show that the ways respondents make inferences follow more differentiated patterns than would be predicted by the original hypothesis on the fundamental attribution error.

The findings also demonstrate the difficulties with triggering attitude change. When observing behavior deviating from the general dichotomy of blameworthy/praiseworthy (their "expectancy pattern" of behavior), the observer still has mechanisms to explain this behavior without resorting to cognitive change or cognitive reorganization. The way causal inferences are

made, gives considerable leeway for avoiding changes in the cognitive system. Attitudes and beliefs about the enemy and themselves can remain the same. Good behavior by the enemy can be explained as forced on him by the situation; hence "discrepant" information is not allowed to challenge existing negative views of the enemy.

Do you think the other side is threatening you?

We expected the question, "Do you think that the other side is threatening you?" to elicit causal statements. We expected the respondents not only to answer yes or no, but also to explain why they felt threatened. This was true only to a certain extent. The question was sometimes answered with simply yes or no, or both yes and no, but some respondents did also explain why they felt threatened. Due to a relatively high number of yes and no, the answers are only dealt with quantitatively.

The answers to this question emphasized that fear in the conflict is not so much related to what the opponent in the conflict has done up to this point as it is to be may do in the future. From this analysis of the conflict emerges the focus on the intention component that is also very strong in responses about the sources of the conflict. Concrete changes in the situation, concrete events, and the opponent's actions in the past do not seem to be included in causal analyses of why there is a threat. Those who explain why they feel threatened make mostly dispositional attributions. This strong focus on intentions of the opponent is striking and is common to both Arab and Israeli respondents.

Firm non-probabilistic beliefs seemed to be held about the intention of the opponent. Common statements were that we feel threatened because the opponent wants to destroy us, exterminate us, liquidate us, finish us, wipe us out. Threat is also conditional on the development of the power configurations between the parties. Instead of making such statements as "we are threatened because..." which could be coded for attribution, some



respondents would make "if...then" statements discussing hypothetical future developments. Examples of this type of statement are Israeli respondents saying that if the Arabs became united then the possibility that Israel would be eliminated is very high. Arab respondents would turn this around by saying that if Arabs became united then the conflict would be solved (no threat would exist).

Some respondents simply stated that they do not feel threatened. When answering why this is the case, situational attributions were made. It is not that the opponent is so kind that he does not want to threaten us, but his possibilities for doing so are slight. The power component again is present as a strong variable in the causal analysis. The past and the future were referred to by Arab respondents where they see a basic asymmetry developing: Arabs will gradually become stronger, therefore there is no threat. These respondents did not talk about this as a hypothetical scenario, but as a given.

Do you think the other side believes you are threatening them?

We also turned to an examination of the complementary question, "Do you think that the other side believes you are threatening them?" \*

Respondents making causal statements, made both situational and dispositional attributions. On the Arab side it was claimed that Israelis felt threatened because of Arab strength. The October War was referred to in this regard. Israelis were justified in feeling themselves threatened because of the superiority of the opponent. These are situational attributions, referring to events or characteristics of the situation rather than of the actor. Dispositional statements included comments to the effect that Israel was a strange element or an artificial fragment in the area. Some Arab respondents also said that Israelis felt threatened because of extreme Arab propaganda. But more frequently it was referred to the propaganda by the Israelis themselves as causing a feeling of threat. These statements can be both situational (propaganda as means to achieve aims) and dispositional (propaganda as reflection of irrational thinking) and each statement must be evaluated in the context in which it appears.

While Arabs were both dispositional and situational in their analysis of the threat to the other side, Israeli respondents made more causal analyses in dispositional terms. For example, there is a feeling of threat, but this threat is not rational. Or, objectively Arabs should not feel threatened because of their superior position in the conflict, but the existence of myths and make-believe about the character and intentions of Israel makes them feel threatened. Threat was also ascribed to religious and cultural traits of the Arabs. These misperceptions were attributed to factors such as Arab propaganda and fear of democracy.

\*On this question too, the numbers of yes and no without causal statements were relatively high, and as a consequence the answers are not quantified.\*

Some respondents on both sides differentiated between elites and common citizens. Elites instigate irrational fears in the common people. This is also called the "black top" image, and is a dispositional attribution in that threat is seen as caused by some particular characteristics of elites while the common people are "normal".

Respondents claiming that the opponent does not feel threatened made mainly causal attributions. Both sides claimed that the generating of fear was used by the opponent as a means to promote policies. Projecting the image of threat could attract, for example, international good-will to justify an unjust policy. In this way the threat was not really felt but could be used to promote their own policies. Israelis pointed to the Arabs' use of threat to create Arab unity, mislead international opinion, justify the destruction of Israel, strengthen their side and so on.

In other words, respondents saying that the opponent feels threatened do not deny the subjective feeling that the opponent is threatening them, but claim that this belief is propagated to promote own policies. In this way beliefs about threat were not irrational or dispositional, but determined by situational variables. Beliefs about threat were used as convenient means to promote aggressive policies.

It is interesting to note the general tendency to admit that the opponent may feel threatened, but this is his own doing, not ours. This feeling demonstrates how strongly ego-defensive mechanisms operate. While we expected the question to elicit answers with reference to own behavior, this was not always true. Quite often the locus of causation was with the opponent where some genuine characteristics of the opponent as an actor were referred to.

## ANTECEDENTS OF CONFLICT

Our analysis of attribution up to this point has concentrated on how the parties explain what maintains conflict. We are now moving into the issue of the original roots of the conflict. What caused the conflict in the first place? What respondents see as antecedents of conflict may not necessarily be the same causes they give to what maintains conflict today. We deal with this within the same theoretical framework, where the main issue is whether antecedents are seen rooted in dispositional or situational attributions. The data base will be the answers to the first question in the questionnaire: If you could point out one single factor as the main cause of the conflict in the Middle East, which would you mention?

In answering the question, respondents attributed causes alternatively to the enemy in the conflict, to themselves or to both. Some would not put the cause on any one of the parties involved locally, but instead, for example, on the superpowers. Some of the answers did not attribute responsibility to any actor in particular, but to situational forces.

### Arab Respondents

Conflict was attributed to both the establishment of the state of Israel and to the behavior of that state once established. Considerable mention was made of the intentions of the Israeli state, of what was perceived as a history of expansion. To prove this point, historical examples were given, the most recent being the occupation of territories in the 1967 June War. Further inductive support for the expansionist tendency of the Israeli state included reference to the lack of willingness to negotiate within the framework of the U.N. Looking at the past and the present, Arab respondents focused not so much on the facts of existing Israeli occupation of Arab land, but rather on a theory that this state by its

nature is bent on expansion. Not only territorial expansion, but economic expansion was sometimes mentioned. Israel wants cheap labor from the Arabs, domination of all economic activities, and so on. Additional support was found in Zionism which aimed at getting all Jews to Israel, something inevitably leading to expansion. Some linked Israel to imperialism, and cited the close connection to the US.

In other words, there was a strong focus on the intention component when talking about the main sources of conflict. The intentions of the state of Israel were seen as quite different from other states. They have designs for expansion, in which Arabs will consequently suffer. This case of conflict must be seen as something unique, a deviation from the main pattern of behavior. Evaluation of the intentions of Israel were supported not so much by looking at this states past behavior, but looking at the present, where the perceived lack of willingness to negotiate is attributed to expansionist designs. This was further supported by citing the Zionist ideology where the stated goal of getting all Jews to Israel is perceived by Arabs as leading to expansion. Furthermore, this policy was linked to Western imperialism, considered a threat to Arab civilization and mentioned as a main cause of the conflict. These respondents regarded the establishment of the state of Israel as an attempt by Western nations to use Israel as a foothold in the Arab world in order to continue their imperialist policies.

The causes of conflict were therefore not seen as conflicts of interest or as rational. Few references were made to situational forces and constraints. Conflict was seen as caused by something irrational, something abnormal, odd and deviant. The perceived intentions of the state of Israel seemed to account for attributed causation as much as Israel's past and present actions,

which only serve to give inductive support for the belief on expansion.

The Palestinian refugee problem was also mentioned as a cause of conflict. There is a Palestinian problem because another state was created at the expense of the Palestinians, and these Palestinians need a country of their own. Cultural differences between Arabs and Israelis were also noted, sometimes to underline the artificial character of Israel, and sometimes as a source of misunderstanding between the two peoples. In both cases, we are dealing with dispositional attributions. Situational attributions were in statements for example, that conflict was caused by the big powers, especially Great Britain. This policy of great powers and super-powers causing conflict was seen as rational pursuit of their own interests. Attributing conflict to misunderstandings between the parties, on the other hand, is dispositional, and deviates from rational pursuit of interests.

#### Israeli Respondents

The intention of the Arabs to eliminate the state of Israel was seen as the main cause of the conflict. "The preference of the Arabs is a world without the state of Israel." The Arabs refused to recognize the Jews as a distinct independent national entity with legitimate territorial rights. As inductive support for this belief that the Arabs want to eliminate the state of Israel, respondents frequently referred to what the Arabs had said in various contexts about the state of Israel--not what they had done.

This strongly dispositional analysis puts the responsibility almost exclusively on one party. Occasionally dispositional attributions were made to their own side.

Cultural differences and ways of life were mentioned as causes of conflict. Besides causing misunderstanding, these differences were the bases for irrational policies of the opponent. Because of the present stage of development in Arab civilization, Arabs had to portray Israel as a threat. Feudal and oppressive Arab regimes maintained hatred against Israel to justify their own totalitarian exercises of power. Respondents claimed an irrational analysis was made by Arabs of the Palestinian problem, and this analysis could be explained by certain special characteristics of Arabs.

These respondents saw the roots of conflict not in environmental constraints, but in unique and abnormal characteristics of Arab civilization preventing Arabs from a rational pursuit of policies. If these deviant ways of thinking were eliminated and Arabs started to make rational calculations on the basis of situational forces and constraints, there would be no conflict because dealing with someone who would analyze problems rationally would represent no problem for the Israeli state.

There was also a feeling that Arab policies were rooted not only in deviant and odd traits of their civilization, but in gross misunderstandings about Israel and Israeli society. The opponent does not have the correct image of us. If his image of us were correct, his policies would be more rational. Arabs suffered frustration over their own failure; because of this they were aggressive toward Israel. A somewhat comparable attribution to the Arab notion of Zionism was the reference to Islam, which took on meanings of a political ideology to the Israeli respondents. Islam makes it more difficult for Arabs to solve the issues with Israel. It teaches them intolerance. According to Islam, they have to be superior.

The very existence of the state of Israel is therefore a blow to Arab pride and culture.

But causes of conflict were also attributed to rational forces such as the national movements of the Jews and the Arabs which grew out of historical circumstances. The reasoning along these lines stated that the Jews were people who returned to their homeland and reestablished their legitimate rights, but that this deprived the nativeborn population of their legitimate rights.

Finally, another situational attribution was to fix the cause of conflict to the great powers, who exploited local tensions to obtain influence. This was made by both Arabs and Israelis.

The tendency is, of course, for both Arabs and Israelis to see conflict as caused by the other party in the conflict, but as we have seen, some saw conflict as caused by both parties, or parties not under their control. We have noted the tendency to analyze the causes of the conflict in both situational and dispositional terms. We will next look further at the strength of these tendencies by quantifying the material, and we will see in this analysis the relative strength of dispositional and situational attributions.



Table 3.4

	Sit	Disp	Row Total
Israeli	62	38	(N=65) 53
Arab	56	44	(N=57) 47
Column Total	(N=72) 59%	(N=50) 41%	(N=122)

N = total number of attributions made; those making both attributions included.

### Results

First we simply counted the frequencies of dispositional and situational attributions without taking into consideration who the "causal candidates" were. These results are presented in Table 3.4. There is a split between situational and dispositional tendencies, but the overall tendency is to emphasize situational attributions. This result is the opposite of what we found for the attributions on the two previous questions. We find the strongest difference in the Israeli sample.

Why is there a stronger tendency to make dispositional attributions when parties to conflict explain what main-  
tains conflict as opposed to when they explain antecedents to conflict? Objectively speaking, we may say that the roots of conflict may not be the same as what maintains conflict. A more plausible explanation is that when looking at history, one can afford to be more detached than when observing behavior today. The results indicate a willingness to attribute more to causes stemming from a situation or circumstance the actors cannot control, rather than explicit blamefixing. But if the fundamental

attribution error disappears with more "detached" causal inference (because of time), one would not expect the opposite tendency to emerge, but simply that the "erroneous" tendency would be weakened. According to Jones and Nisbett, even a completely detached observer should be subject to the bias. But if ego-defensive mechanisms produce the bias, it still makes sense for the "erroneous" tendency to be weakened with time. There is a stronger need for self-protection for the actions we perform now than for actions we performed in the distant past. This could give rise to an additional hypothesis: In cases where ego-defensive mechanisms produce bias, the strength of bias depends on the closeness of time of the observed behavior.

#### A more discriminating analysis

We coded the attributions in these categories:

- 1) Caused by our side
- 2) Caused by other side
- 3) Neutral (caused by everybody or caused by third party)

In view of previous findings we find it important to see if we are able to find systematic variation on types of attributions made depending on what is mentioned as causal candidates.

Drawing on our previous findings on attribution, we predict the following: 1) When respondents explain conflict as caused by own side, the attributional variable will take on the value situational; 2) when they respond that conflict is caused by the other side, the attributional variable will take on the value dispositional. Note that a respondent can state that conflict is caused by own side but still not take any blame. This occurs only in the case of a dispositional attribution.

Table 3.5 ARAB ANTECEDENTS OF CONFLICT

Q: If you could point out one single factor as the main cause of the conflict in the Middle East, which would you mention?

<u>Locus of causation</u>	<u>Israel</u>		Row Total
	Sit	Disp	
Caused by our side	100	0	(N=3) 6
Caused by other side	15	85	(N=13) 24%
Neutral	78	22	(N=37) 70%
Column	(N=34)	(N=19)	(N=53)
Total	65%	36%	100%

(N=53 stands for the total number of attributions made. The same respondent can make, for example one attribution on "caused by our side" and one on "neutral". Therefore N is bigger than the number of respondents. But we do not count the frequencies. If, for example, one respondent makes two dispositional attributions on "caused by our side", they are only counted as one. Therefore N is lower than in Table 3.4.)

### Findings

#### Israeli respondents

We can conclude from the results in Table 3.5 that we get strong support for our prediction. The tendency is clearly to make situational attributions if the respondent explains conflict as caused by his own side, while the reverse is true if he explains conflict as caused by the opponent.

It is also interesting to note that there is not a pre-dominant tendency for either Israelis or Arabs to see conflict as caused by the other party. Only one-fourth of the Israeli respondents said that conflict was caused by the opponent. Some even said that conflict was caused by their own side.

It certainly seems as though one can afford to take a "cooler" look at the past. The findings confirm that ego-defensive mechanisms do not produce so much bias in explaining the more distant past. The main tendency is not to blame anyone for what caused conflict, but to blame situational forces and constraints. But if there is blame-fixing results confirm the predicted pattern.

Table 3.6 ISRAELI ANTECEDENTS OF CONFLICT

Q: If you could point out one single factor as the main cause of the conflict in the Middle East, which would you mention?

<u>Locus of causation</u>	<u>Arabs</u>		Row Total
	Sit	Disp	
			(N=0)
We are to blame	0	0	0%
			(N=25)
They are to blame	20	80	45%
			(N=30)
Neutral	87	13	55%
Column	(N=31)	(N=24)	(N=55)
Total	56%	44%	100%

(N= total number of attributions made; see note under Table 3.5).

## Arab Respondents

The results from Arab respondents are presented in Table 3.6, and support the predicted tendency to make dispositional attributions when conflict is explained as caused by the other party. The findings for both Arabs and Israelis confirm that the attributions made when explaining the causes of conflict are quite sensitive to the type of blame-fixing we make. In no instances did the respondents in the Arab sample say that conflict was caused by their own side. (In the Israeli sample we did have some cases). In these cases, situational attributions were what we predicted. When explaining conflict as caused by own side, environmental influences and constraints are "blamed". Thus, saying that conflict is caused by own side is not the same as saying that we are responsible. Situational attributions avoid blame. It is therefore not necessarily a more compromising stand in the conflict. (If conflict were seen as caused by own side and the attribution was dispositional, it would, of course, be different. But we had no instances of this in either the Arab or Israeli sample).

As we also found with Israeli respondents, Arab respondents for the most part saw conflict as caused by some third party or everyone involved (coded as neutral). Here, attributions are overwhelmingly situational, as one would have expected. This reflects the weakened need for holding the opponent responsible as time goes by.

## What will "cause" peace?

We now proceed to the respondents' beliefs about means-ends relationships when analyzing the future. Looking at attributional tendencies regarding what could cause change may provide new insight into attributional mechanisms. The data is based on the following question:

Given what you would like to see happen in the Middle East in the near future, what do you think are the most effective ways to achieve these aims?

In this question we wanted to elicit the respondents theories as to what could cause change, and what would be the best ways to cause change in the direction of expressed desires or preferred state of affairs. According to attribution, elites can see change caused by situational changes or changes in the dispositions of the actors. The present question was a follow-up to a previous question, which was formulated in the following way: As regards the political situation, what would you like to see happen in the Middle East in the near future? We will therefore briefly report those answers here to provide the logical sequence in the interviewing procedure.

Examples of Arab responses on this question were that they wanted to see a lasting peace in the area and a just solution of the conflict, or the development of good political relationships of all the countries involved. The Israeli answers were along the same lines, but here there was emphasis on peace as a process, and a sharp distinction drawn between so-called technical peace and real peace. There were some respondents on both sides who said they wanted peace on the condition that their own demands in the conflict were met. On the Arab side, justice and self-determination of the Palestinians were emphasized, as well as Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. Israeli responses focused on security guarantees and recognition of the state of Israel. Finally, some Israeli and Arab respondents simply stated that they wanted to be stronger in the conflict than the opponent.

When we posed the question about what they would like to see happen in the near future, we expected the answers to be given in a more concrete form than we actually received.

By including the near future, we suggested to the respondents that they think of concrete alternatives, but the answers given were mostly in quite general forms. This may demonstrate, or at least indicate, that thinking is not very articulate or advanced on actual resolution of conflict. What elites typically seemed to discuss, even when asked about the near future, were abstract preferences like total peace, or total absence of conflict.

We then proceeded with the question that will be subject for attributional analysis: Given what you would like to see happen in the Middle East, what do you think are the most effective ways to achieve these aims? For the expressed views on the most effective ways to achieve their aims for the near future, the level of abstraction was also quite high. There was hardly any articulate thinking about what would initiate processes towards conflict resolution. From the answers, it appears that the dichotomy in attribution is highly relevant. Both types of causal analysis appear. Some respondents emphasized informal processes of the actors (dispositional), while others focused on change in the environment (situational). Some saw change as caused by own side, others by both sides, or outside powers or the U.N., while the majority saw change as caused by modification of the opponent's behavior. For others, resolution of conflict was a question of more moderation on one or both sides. Once an attitude-change in this direction would come about, there would be resolution of conflict. This view was presented in dispositional terms, in that moderation was seen as a process internal to the actor. It was a question of becoming less fanatic, less rigid and more rational. In other words, conflict resolution was seen as a process of changing attitudes, and not changing situational influences and constraints.

Other respondents pointed to situational changes. On the Arab side, the magic word was unity. From unity strength was derived, and with strength the opponent would be forced to give in. Strength was seen as a precondition for liberating Palestine. Focus on the power component was also strong on the Israeli side, where military strength was mainly referred to, while economic strength was hardly mentioned. But on the Israeli side the problem was not often perceived as a lack of strength, but as the opponent's misunderstanding of how strong they were (dispositional).

Communication and cooperation, as well as negotiations, were expressed as potential sources of change in favorable directions. Change could occur when all countries in the area respected each other's rights. It could occur with the elimination of the influence of the superpowers; conversely, it was also felt that the influence of superpowers could have a constructive role to play. The explanation was that the parties themselves would not be able to progress towards conflict resolution without outside help. Economic and cultural development were also seen as aiding processes of conflict resolution. For example, it was claimed that education of Arabs would lead to more rational thinking.

Arab respondents saw change caused by Israeli concessions, such as withdrawal from occupied territories, and solution of the Palestine problem.

In some cases causal analysis was not made at all. Prescriptive statements were given, such as that peace should be based on justice. Or some respondents simply said that peace was a long process and therefore they could mention nothing that could cause change in the near future.



Q: Given what you would like to see happen in the Middle East in the near future, what do you think are the most effective ways to achieve these aims?

	Sit	Disp	Row Total
Israeli	77	23	(N=39) 38%
Arabs	62	38	(N=65) 62%
Column Total	(N=70) 67%	(N=34) 33%	(N=104)

N = the total number of attributions made.

### Findings

Table 3.7 presents the distribution of dispositional and situational attributions. The most striking aspect of the findings is the weight on situational attributions by both Arab and Israeli respondents. In other words, most of the respondents saw changes in desired directions caused by manipulation of situational and not dispositional variables. Returning to what caused conflict, the pattern was the same. We may therefore conclude that for both what the respondents see as original causes of conflict and what could cause it to change, the tendency is to emphasize situational variables.

As with the previous questions, we find it important to proceed with a more discriminating analysis. The dichotomy situational/dispositional is not sufficient. We have to control for the "causal candidate" of change. Does attributional tendencies vary systematically depending upon the causal candidate of change: the opponent, themselves, or some "outsiders"? To do this, we coded the causal statements into three categories:

- 1) Change caused by our side
- 2) Change caused by the other side
- 3) Neutral (third party should take initiatives or both parties)

Based on previous findings, we hypothesize: where change is seen as caused by the opponent, the tendency will be to make dispositional attributions. Where change is seen as caused by themselves, the tendency will be to make situational attributions, and finally, where change is seen as caused by neutral forces, the tendency will be to make situational attributions.

Table 3.8 ISRAELI IMAGE OF CHANGE

Q: Given what you would like to see happen in the Middle East in the near future, what do you think are the most effective ways to achieve these aims?

	Change Caused by Us			Change Caused By Them			Neutral		
	Sit	Disp	Row Total	Sit	Disp	Row Total	Sit	Disp	Row Total
Israeli	90	10	N=10 43%	44	56	N=9 41%	85	15	N=20 34%
Arabs	100	0	N=13 57	23	77	N=13 59	62	38	N=39 66%
Column	N=22 96%	N=1 4%	N=23 100%	N=7 32	N=15 68%	N=22 100%	N=41 69%	N=18 31%	N=59 100%

N = total number of attributions. Each respondent can make several attributions, but only one in each category; see note under Table 3.5.

## Findings

One interesting aspect of the findings is that the majority of respondents on both sides chose a neutral candidate for causing change. This indicates a strong belief in outside help, such as the U.N. and the superpowers, to promote solution of conflict. Arab respondents were somewhat stronger in this regard than were the Israeli.

And again the findings support our hypothesis. When change is seen as caused by themselves, the tendency is to make situational attributions, and the tendency is to make dispositional attributions when change is seen as caused by the other side. Stronger support for this latter observation is found in the Israeli data.

These findings may give rise to an additional hypothesis, since the postulated bias of Jones and Nisbett may not apply equally in expressions of future predictions or theories on what could cause change. While it is true that a bias is involved whenever any party in the conflict is made the causal candidate of change, the overall tendency is nevertheless to make situational attributions. It is therefore possible for erroneous tendencies in attribution to apply more strongly to post-decision situations than pre-decision stages. When we asked about past behavior, the bias was quite strong. It is possible that a more "logical" schemata applies in the attributional processes concerned with future change, and as a consequence, bias is not found to the same extent. More realism as opposed to, for example, self-esteem may apply. Our new hypothesis derived from these findings is: The attributional bias varies with post-decision and pre-decision stages. In the case of pre-decision, the attributional process will more conform to a "logical" schemata.

Change processes is on the whole seen as being triggered by changes in environmental forces and constraints. This confirms to the general proposition in social psychology that the easiest way to initiate change is to start off with changes in the environmental influence and constraints (for a discussion of this see Bem)

### Summary

The following questions were used to elicit causal statements:

- 1) What do you think are the basic good and bad sides of the other part in the conflict?
- 2) Do you think the other side is threatening you?
- 3) Do you think that the other side believes that you are threatening them?
- 4) If you could point out one single factor as the main cause of the conflict in the Middle East, which would you mention?
- 5) Given what you would like to see happen in the Middle East in the near future, what do you think are the most effective ways to achieve these aims?


On all questions, the data gave considerable support to our hypothesis. Attributional tendencies were found to vary systematically with actor and observer as well as evaluative dimensions of the observed behavior.

Figure (bar graphs)

SITUATIONAL = DISPOSITIONAL

ISRAELIS ARABS  
DISPOSITIONAL

100  
90  
80  
70  
60  
50  
40  
30  
20  
10



The other side  
is bad.

They are to  
blame

It is up to  
them.

The most striking finding in Figure        is the strong dispositional bias in analyzing the behavior of the opponent. The only exception to this is the Israeli finding on what the opponent should do to cause change towards resolution of conflict, but even here the majority of attributions are dispositional.

Furthermore, we have found that the attributional bias on the whole is weakened in analyses of the distant past (what originally caused conflict) and the future (what could cause resolution of conflict), which has given rise to two additional hypotheses on attributional bias related to bias as function of time and bias as function of pre- or post-decision.

### DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

In this chapter we have looked at the processes of causal attributions in the Middle East conflict. We have asked how the parties explained causes of own behavior and the behavior of the opponent. We suggested that the causes could be classified on a dispositional (internal) or situational (stimuli in the environment) basis. We further suggested that even if "logical" rules of inferences were applied to arrive at causal beliefs, there were still sources of systematic bias. Elite members in the conflict are "truth" seekers, or open and active information seekers because knowing the "truth" would put them in the strongest position to make the right choices. There are, in spite of this, sources of imperfection, one being the bias produced by the attributional process. The findings have confirmed our suspicion. But how do we explain the respondents' deviation from logical rules of inferences and introduction of erroneous tendencies in information processing? As a starting point, we may repeat the four ways mentioned by Bem                    as explanations of differences between self-perception and interpersonal perception:

- a) The private stimuli play a role--even though this varies with the situation--and these private stimuli are, of course, not directly available to the observer.
- b) Our experiences of the past that determine the meaning attached to what is perceived (observed) are not available in the same way to the "stranger".
- c) The protection of self-esteem and defense against threat. This may distort your self-attributions in various ways.
- d) Features of the situation are differentially salient to yourself and the observer. There seems to be a difference of focus in attention between the actor and the observer. The actor's attention may be more focused towards situational cues, while to the observer, the actor's behavior is more salient.

As can be seen from this list, Bem leaves open the possibility that bias and distortion can be ascribed to cognitive or informational factors, as well as motivational factors. It is generally acknowledged by attribution theorists that both cognitive and motivational forces can lead to distortion and bias in the attribution processes, and also that these factors can be mutually reinforcing.

Our first finding was that the action itself accounted for most of the variance in the type of attributions made. When we disliked the observed behavior, the attributional tendencies differed dramatically from the attributional tendencies when we approved of the behavior. This relationship points to motivational rather than cognitive factors as an explanation of bias.

Jones and Nisbett emphasize cognitive factors as an explanation of the fundamental attribution error. They point out the rather obvious fact that information on both the effects and the causes vary with actor and observer. Actor and observer may have different information as to the nature of the act, what exactly was done, what effect the action had on the environment, and how the actor himself experienced the act. Furthermore, the observer may not have the same knowledge about environmental influences and constraints on the actor as the actor himself, and the observer is likely to have inferior knowledge about the actor's intention. If Arabs, for example, decide to form a union of Arab countries, they have a different perspective of the nature of this act than the Israelis. The Israelis observing the behavior will have inferior knowledge as to effect of the action, or how the Arabs themselves experience this. Israelis will probably not have the same information on environmental influences and constraints that may have initiated the action, and they must necessarily have inferior knowledge about intentions since this cannot be measured directly. When explaining the attributional bias by cognitive factors, Jones and Nisbett point both to these informational deficits as well as to the different perspectives of observers and actors.

Our findings clearly demonstrate that not cognitive but motivational factors account for most of the variance. This emerges especially when we make a distinction between liked and disliked behavior. Motivational factors are of course most likely to produce bias if there is a high degree of involvement in the observed behavior and the affective component is strong. Both these conditions are present for the elites in the Middle East conflict. The motive of maintaining self-esteem is probably strong in producing bias.



If motivational factors are most important in producing the observed bias, this may explain why we did not get the same support for the postulated bias when we asked about the distant past and the future. Motivational factors are strongest in immediate post-decision situations ("pleasure principle"). When behavior becomes more distant, the need for protecting self-esteem may not be as great. Looking ahead--at the future or the pre-decision stage, as it were, a "reality" principle may be stronger than ego-defensive mechanisms. The logical schemata for processing causality is given more room. The causal analysis is dictated by the need to operate with an adequate and optimal information base on means-end relationships. The erroneous tendencies therefore do not apply to the same extent. After the response is given, motivational forces come into play because there is a need to defend the performed response.

#### Attributional processes as means of keeping cognitive balance

The findings also provide insight into ways of coping with discrepant information by showing the flexibility an individual has when analyzing the causes of behavior.

In our previous study (Arab and Israeli Elite Perceptions) we explained that discrepant information could be dealt with by either simply ignoring it (selective perceptual process) or giving added weight to other information (bolstering). The attribution process demonstrates another mechanism to deal with unexpected behavior and events without changing beliefs. If I have a devil image of the opponent and the opponent behaves in an indisputable friendly way, I can still maintain my beliefs about the opponent by explaining his friendly behavior as caused by environmental influences and constraints. His disposition to act in an unfriendly way remains the same, but certain characteristics of the situation have forced him to be temporarily friendly. In other words,

the opponent is not given responsibility (credit) for what he is doing. His behavior is reactive. It also follows from this attribution that the change in behavior will not be seen to be of lasting value since there is a high expectancy of change in situational variables as opposed to dispositional.

### Freedom of choice

Further important implication of the findings concerns perceived freedom of choice in conflict behavior. We have noted the tendency to attribute the behavior of the opponent to internal dispositions, while seeing own choices as governed by environmental influences and constraints.

In choosing a situational explanation the individual assumes that this is something outside the control of the actor (not caused by him)--something for which he cannot be responsible. When choosing a dispositional (internal) explanation the individual assumes that the responsibility or explanation is with the actor, and that there were two or more options available.

Dispositional attributions imply that actors are faced with freedom of choice, while situational attributions imply reaction to stimuli with no real choice involved. Our findings therefore tell us that there is a systematic bias involved in perceived freedom of choice. The enemy in the conflict is seen as having alternatives in the conflict, while one's own side pursues policies that are simply reactive to the enemy's policies. In other words, the opponent could have acted otherwise, but for one's own behavior, on the other hand, one is viewed as no available options.


### Error of measurement

The problems involved with the data collection are discussed in a separate chapter. But one should note at this point that if self-esteem does play a central role in producing attributional bias, we have to leave open the possibility that the interview situation may have reinforced the bias, thus making it appear stronger than is actually the case.

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International Conference on  
THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE - BASIC ISSUES AND MAJOR TRENDS  
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Derek Hopwood

SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by Derek Hopwood

In this paper I want to try to demonstrate that there exists a historical continuity in Russian interest in the Middle East, that Soviet activities in this century are partly a continuation of Russian activities in the nineteenth. The revolution of 1917 was without doubt a watershed but Russia survived as a state whose historical memory and experience could not be completely erased. This historical approach may help to explain Soviet policy today.

Russia was for long essentially a land power based in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries on Kiev and Moscow. From there the state began a long process of expansion. It was a process which absorbed into the state many peoples in addition to the Russians - Tartars, Poles, Bashkirs, Turks and others. By 1700 the Baltic Sea had been reached and St. Petersburg founded. To the North Russia extended to the limits of Siberia. In the late eighteenth century Russia under Catherine the Great moved southwards through Cossack territory to reach the Black Sea by 1794 when Odessa was founded. This provided a warm water port but access to the Mediterranean was barred by the Straits at Constantinople, the Bosphorous and the Dardanelles. Ottoman Turkey seated at Constantinople could open or close the Straits at will. In the early nineteenth century Russia acquired Trans-Caucasia including Georgia and Armenia and this conquest was recognised by Turkey and Persia. In Central Asia Russia absorbed independent Muslim states - Samarkand 1868, Bukhara 1873, Tashkent 1884 - reaching the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan. In the Far East the Pacific was reached and Vladivostock founded in 1860.

Thus Russia had reached the limit of her expansion for the time being. In the north geography was the limiting factor;

elsewhere other states imposed a barrier. But the new empire needed secure frontiers and Russia looked for new areas of expansion to protect her new acquisitions. However, in the Middle East, the other powers, Britain, France, Turkey, Austria, resisted further expansion once the frontiers of Afghanistan, Persia, and certain parts of the Ottoman Empire had been reached.

During the nineteenth century Russia was pursuing certain aims in her foreign policy. One of her foreign ministers, Lamzdorf, claimed that "the entire policy of Russia was first of all an Asiatic policy". While no doubt this is an exaggeration, and while Russia was very clearly also concerned with her relations with Europe, her policy towards the Ottoman Empire was often of prime importance. Her chief aim was to be recognised as a Great Power by the other European states, as a power which was consulted and which had a voice in determining the future of the Ottoman Empire. This meant accepting a responsible role in the balance of power as well as asserting her rights. It was a system based both on self interest and on the belief that a balance preserved was better than a state of instability, rivalry and war. Of course the system often failed, especially when one power attempted to dominate another. As a result of the Napoleonic invasion and blockade Russia, in the nineteenth century, was seeking security and feared encirclement. She feared those alliances and powers which seemed to threaten her security.

The Ottoman Empire, Russia's chief neighbour in the Middle East, was a weakening power during the nineteenth century watched anxiously by Europe. Russia was awaiting its collapse or at times actively helping towards it, opposed by Britain who viewed Turkey as a means of keeping Russia out of the Middle East. One of Russia's chief aims was to maintain free passage for her warships from the Black Sea through the Straits. While this was not opposed by Britain, British statesmen did not welcome the growth of a strong Russian fleet in the Mediterranean which might threaten

Egypt and the passage of British ships through the Suez Canal to India. Russia was always seeking such a passage and equally the access to a warm water port in the Mediterranean or the Gulf. The Straits were also important as a trade route for Russian exports and for a passenger line to the Near East.

Apart from her strategic and diplomatic interests in Constantinople Russia had deep religious interests. She felt that on the fall of Byzantium she had assumed the leadership of the Christian Orthodox World and therefore had a responsibility for the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire, whether in Syria and Palestine, the Balkans or Turkey itself. Russia thus considered herself spokesman and defender of these Ottoman subjects and if she felt her prestige or their welfare at all threatened she was on occasions prepared to go to war.

This fellow feeling for Ottoman Christians - a Pan-orthodoxy - mingled with another current of thought in Russia, Panslavism which was in some ways the ideology of Imperial Russia. It was a militant ideology which sought the union of all Slavs under Russian hegemony and was adhered to by some men who had responsibility for Russia's foreign policy. Such an ideology necessarily implied the "liberation" of those Slavs in the Ottoman Empire and this "liberation" would even be offered to those who were not Slavs but were nevertheless Orthodox Christians - Greeks and Arabs. Some Russian eyes were set on a great Orthodox empire which would include Palestine, Jerusalem and Constantinople. Catherine the Great in the eighteenth century had such dreams, but any attempt to put such a policy into practice in the nineteenth would have been bitterly opposed, not only by Turkey, but also by other European powers.

In pursuing her foreign policy Russia utilized those methods available to a great power. It is important to note, however, that it is almost impossible to find great consistency or even perseverance in pursuing long-term aims. Foreign policy was hindered by changes of personnel, interdepartmental rivalries,

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conflicting ideologies and even personal quarrels.

Firstly, Russia used threats against other powers which could lead to war. Demands were made for greater privileges, in passage through the Straits, in influencing Ottoman policy which on two notable occasions led to major wars, the Crimean in 1854 and the Russo-Turkish war of 1876. When her demands were resisted or her arms defeated Russia had to fall back on negotiation or conference when she had usually to recognise that as a great power and a factor in the balance of power there were limits to her actions. For example at the Conference of Berlin she was compelled to disgorge certain of her territorial gains and the Crimean War was a means of resisting her claim to preponderant influence in the Ottoman Empire. When thus blocked she would turn away to other areas of Asia, but always watched by Britain who was a check to expansion. Lord Curzon claimed that "A single Russian port in the Persian Gulf would constitute a wanton rupture of the status quo".

Great powers attempt to gain access to and influence in any area by adopting local clients. These can be a whole nation, a sect or a party of similar beliefs and ideology. The power offers the benefits of protection, financial aid, training and education to its clients but they are dropped if circumstances demand or if the interests of the power change. A power always puts its own interests before those of its client. In the Ottoman Empire Russia showed interest in Slavs and in Orthodox Christians, Greeks, Bulgarians and Arabs. In Palestine and Syria most of the religious and ethnic groups were adopted by a power - Russia sought influence in <sup>the</sup> Orthodox Arab community. She built schools, hospitals and churches, offered financial help, training in Russia, and encouraged the national movement which was growing among the Orthodox Arabs. Just as a power can drop its clients, so the attentions of an outside power are not always welcome to the recipients and not all Orthodox Arabs wished to become clients and protégés of Russia.



In 1914 all Russian activities in the Middle East were disrupted, but she had had certain successes and certain failures up to the outbreak of the war. She was recognised as a great power in the area and during the allied negotiations on the future of the Ottoman Empire was promised Constantinople and the Straits. During the fighting her troops reached the outskirts of Bagdad. At certain periods in the nineteenth century other powers feared that a Russian takeover of Jerusalem was planned or imminent. The Straits were not closed to Russian warships and she had established a certain presence in Palestine and Syria. Her schools and churches were visible symbols of Russian prestige and numbers of Orthodox Christians looked to the Tsar as their protector. But unlike Britain and France, Russia had gained no Arab territory, the Suez Canal remained in British hands and further Russian expansion was always blocked. Russian cultural influence was minimal as Russian was not considered a useful language and an education in France was preferred.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 swept away the organisations and institutions through which Russia had pursued her policy in the Middle East. Great changes were wrought in Russia itself and initially great changes were expected by the Communists in other parts of the world, but these expectations were soon dashed. The Communist revolution was not exported and the new Russian leaders had to come to terms with the political world in which they lived, a world of compromise where ideology has often to be subordinated to practical demands. But beside or beneath a more realistic assessment of the possibilities of foreign policy there persisted the belief in the historical inevitability of the triumph of Communism, however postponed that triumph might be.

Soviet Russia had still remained a Great power in the mould of the Tsarist empire, and her aims remained basically those of the previous régime and policies followed have, mutatis mutandis, exhibited similar features. The demands of a great power are

that it has a right to pursue a policy in all parts of the world, to be consulted on all problems and in the specific case of the Soviet Union to counterbalance the influence of the United States. The Soviet Union, as a great power, conducts a "total policy" making no distinction<sup>between</sup> diplomatic, economic, psychological or even military means of operation, nor does it distinguish in any fundamental respect between domestic and foreign policy. All policy decisions are made at the highest level in the Politburo and foreign policy decisions are not handled specifically by the Foreign Ministry. Soviet policy is essentially active and militant, probing, seeking out opportunities, ready to take advantage of weakness or lack of resolve in others.

It is a difficult mode of policy for the Western powers to combat.

Soviet leaders would explain their policy in at least two ways. First it is part of the inevitable progress towards a Communist universe, which can be speeded with Russian help.

Second it is, in regard to America, a "compensatory" policy - the attempt to equal or excel the United States in all fields.

From the historical perspective Russia is trying to catch up with the U.S. and attain at least a balance in world affairs.

One aspect of this policy has been clearly stated by a Russian admiral: "The time when Russia could be kept out of the world's oceans has gone forever. . . We will sail all the world's seas.

No force on earth can prevent us". (Looking at this statement from the long historical perspective one can see echoes of the Napoleonic blockade of Russia and also the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 when the Russian Baltic fleet had to sail to Asian waters).

From the Soviet point of view there is no reason why the U.S. fleet should dominate the Mediterranean. No one navy, as did the Royal Navy earlier, can now hope to have an exclusive presence in any one area. The difference between Soviet and American policy is that the U.S. pursues a more open policy of professed

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peacekeeping, while Russian policy, is secret, and therefore mysterious and potentially dangerous. But it would appear that Russia is having to learn one of the lessons of being a great power, that the exercise of power brings responsibilities as well.

A concomitant of being both a great power and a communist state is the need for territorial expansion, in Russia's case a continuance of her nineteenth century policy. Expansion must take place where and whenever possible and even more importantly all territory under Russian or communist rule must remain so. This is explained both by the necessity for the continued advance of communism and by the history of the expanding Russian state. Stalin looked to expand frontiers in the West, South and East. If new territory cannot be annexed or dominated then at least no adjoining state must be allowed to threaten Soviet security. As TASS once reported "The maintenance of peace and security in areas adjacent to the Soviet frontiers meets the vital interests of the Soviet people". The Soviet Union continues to be an imperial power in the true nineteenth century sense. She still controls the Tsarist Empire and continues to try to export Russian/Communist culture to less fortunate peoples.

The other side of a constant Soviet advance is the containment of other powers and alliances. Russia has to attempt actively to oppose all Western efforts to penetrate and influence other countries. She naturally opposes the NATO/CENTO/SEATO grouping which can threaten encirclement. The Straits must still be kept open to Russian ships, ports and bases are still sought as are outlets for trade. Any movement which is ostensibly opposed to Western influence can claim Russian support.

While Russia is pursuing a great power policy the role of ideology is not always helpful. Just as the Pan-Slav-Orthodox ideology influenced Tsarist policy, communism is, at least theoretically, the motive behind Soviet activities, but in practice the Soviet Union has to deal with non-Communist régimes in which

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members of the Communist party are often imprisoned and which follow bourgeois nationalist policies. Soviet politicians have to deal with such countries while the ideologists close their eyes or claim that the countries they deal with are progressive, anti-imperialist, and at least on the road to socialism.

The methods the Soviet Union employs in her policy are largely the same as those employed by Tsarist Russia.

She threatens, uses force, backs warring parties, or tries negotiations if coercion fails. At the same time there is continuous criticism of the actions of others, especially the United States.

As a Great Power the attempt is made to build up clients in the Middle East, those dependent on the Soviet Union for aid and arms, education and training. This policy also has its problems as in the new nationalist atmosphere of the Third World no state which has thrown off colonial regimes wishes to appear beholden to another power.

Thus Russia can adopt "unreliable" clients who accept aid but dislike a Russian presence and can even expell Russian experts and advisors. Russia, nevertheless, continues to build her presence in the area, through her navy, through base facilities, and prestige projects. In the nineteenth century the symbol of Russian concern was the Cathedral in Jerusalem, in this century it is the Aswan Dam.

Finally, the Soviet Union attempts to build links with local Communist parties but has had little success. The parties are too small and weak, there is a weak working class basis, and the ideas of Arab nationalism have a stronger appeal than those of international Communism. Even the Arab parties that do exist are wary of too close ties with Russia.

Until the second world war both Lenin and Stalin had tried to bully and make demands on neighbouring states. Russia had concluded non-aggression pacts with Turkey and Persia but both Atatürk and Reza Shah soon disillusioned her by imprisoning their local communists. Hostility was muted, however, by the Russians continuing need to have reasonably good relations with states on her frontiers. Both Turkey and Persia feared and suspected their northern neighbour's motives. Relations deteriorated during the second world war when Stalin demanded the eastern provinces of Turkey and invaded northern Persia. Russia's Arab policy in this period was generally unsuccessful as the Soviet Union could not come to terms with "bourgeois nationalism". After the war Russia emerged as a stronger power and Stalin again, in the flush of victory, made demands. (Note how, continuing Tsarist policy, he brought so much of Eastern Europe under his control.) He demanded territory in Turkey and the right to garrison troops on the Straits. In Iran he tried to set up a puppet régime in Azerbaijan, but both countries with British and American backing rebuffed him. In Palestine Russia tried to discomfort Britain by backing partition and then by recognising Israel in 1948. But Russia had no clear policy towards the Arabs, merely that of opportunism.

The first real opportunity came in 1954/5 when Britain was trying to create the Bagdad Pact, an outworn system of alliances resented by many Arabs, and when the United States refused to help Egypt to pay for the Aswan Dam. This was the beginning of the end of British influence and the Arabs had to look elsewhere for other sources of aid and arms. Russia began haltingly to exploit this situation, but did not yet fully grasp the military, political and ideological implications of a changing situation. However, arms were delivered (through Czechoslovakia) and aid was promised for

the Dam. Russia had discovered she could achieve little in Turkey or Persia, or even Israel, so she leapfrogged over them into the Arab world.

Britain's moment in the Middle East was ending by 1956 and the Suez war and Russia's opportunity came especially in Egypt. Russia could benefit from the unpopularity of Britain and America but had herself to learn to live with Arab nationalism and Arab nationalist leaders. There was an uneasy relationship with President Nasser as from Egypt's point of view; this relationship grew from Egypt's national interest <sup>not</sup> and from ideological grounds. Indeed the quarrels between Nasser and Khrushchev were for these very reasons. The Soviet leader resented Nasser's lack of commitment to communism and his imprisonment of Communists. Nasser resented Khrushchev's attempt to dictate to Egypt. Haikal, the ex-editor of al-Ahram gives a fascinating picture of this relationship in 1959. Nasser wrote to Khrushchev "I am not a communist. I am a nationalist but because I attack communism in the Arab world it should not be taken as a criticism of the Soviet Union." Khrushchev replied "There is a campaign in the U.A.R. against the Soviet Union and consequently against the Soviet people. Don't spit into the well - you may need its water". By 1960 relations between the two had cooled although Russia was still building the Aswan Dam. Russia also had to try to come to terms with the nationalists in Iraq and Syria <sup>and</sup> and she had difficulties in both countries. While the Ba'th defeated the communists, in Iraq Russia was still trying to support local communist parties.

In the nineteen sixties the Soviet Union began to formulate a new approach. There was a reappraisal of the Cold War and more stress on peaceful co-existence. Wars, if necessary, could be fought by proxy. A new tactical approach was signalled by the building up of the Soviet navies in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean. There was a a greater

realisation of the strategic importance of the Middle East as the area guarding the approaches to Southern Russia. The area was the more important on the disappearance of Britain and because of the relative unpopularity of America. There was also a new willingness (a sign of maturity?) to accept small gains and to work with the peoples of the Middle East rather than trying the blunt force approach. Finally there was a shift in the ideological emphasis. The class struggle was relegated to a secondary position and stress was laid on the anti-imperialist bond with the Third World.

Nevertheless, until a few months before June 1967 there was little evidence of a coherent Russian policy. Then, after building up the Egyptian and Syrian armies, Russian policy seemed to be in ruins after the Arab defeat. Major policy decisions had to be taken. Clearly the Soviet leaders decided to press ahead on a greater scale. The armies were re-equipped, the Soviet fleet in the area was strengthened, base facilities were acquired and thousands of Russian 'experts' were sent to Arab countries. The period 1967-72 was the great period of the Soviet presence, when to the surprise of many observers President Sadat began to expell his Russian advisers. The Russians had refused to supply certain weapons to the Egyptian army, the Egyptians had discovered the near contempt with which certain Russians regarded them and also that they had acquired near sovereign<sup>e</sup> rights in certain facilities. It seemed that the British had been expelled only to be replaced by the Russians. The Soviets too learned, as had the U.S., that aid and assistance do not necessarily bring gratitude on the part of the recipients.

President Sadat's policy is at present strongly anti-communist although he would probably welcome Russian help in solving the Arab-Israeli dispute.

In Sudan the Russians after being strongly entrenched had to leave when the political climate altered. There had to be a similar withdrawal from Somalia. The outcome of the struggle in Ethiopia/Somalia is not yet certain where Russia is largely fighting through the Cuban army. Too great Russian influence in the area has led to fears of Russian control of the entrance to the Red Sea. In the Arab Israeli dispute Russia, because of lack of success in Egypt, is drawn towards supporting the more extreme lines of the rejectionist states and the PLO although she cannot welcome the prospect of severe disruption in the Middle East. Her chief aim is to be represented at the Geneva conference and to have a say in negotiation and future settlement.

By entering the Middle East the Soviet Union has had to face certain problems and make certain decisions.

In supporting a number of Arab states she can become involved in inter-Arab quarrels. Should she support the moderate or more extreme elements, or come to terms with the nationalist bourgeoisie? Ideology continues to pose problems.

Should the Soviet Union support local communist parties even when they are banned by their governments? Finally there is the difficulty that Russia cannot always offer the technology that is now required by many Middle Eastern countries.

Russian successes in the Middle East almost all stem from her role there as a great power. She is recognised there as a power with interests, with clients, with a fleet and base facilities. She does exercise influence in certain countries and has better relations with Turkey and Iran. All three countries recognise their mutual interest in good relations and secure peaceful frontiers. The Straits have not been closed to Russian warships. <sup>But</sup> Russia has failed in not always recognising the strength of local feelings, has behaved insensitively and as an imperial power. She has been limited by the activities of the U.S. especially in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Her ideology has been officially welcomed in only one or two countries.

In the future the Soviet Union wishes to be recognised as a status quo power in the Middle East. By becoming a super power and claiming certain rights, she has also had to accept certain responsibilities and is interested in



the "balance of power" (as in the nineteenth century).


This implies that if Russia wants to contain U.S. influence, she must accept that equally the Americans have the "right"

to contain Soviet expansion. But Russia will continue a policy of opportunism, taking what she can, withdrawing if strongly opposed. The U.S. has continually to convince the Soviet leaders that certain risks are not worth taking and that Russia, even as a super power, has limited options. The more the Soviet Union is accepted as a world power with her own responsibilities and recognises that certain areas are closed to her, the less of a threat to world order she should become.

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THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE - BASIC ISSUES AND MAJOR TRENDS

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Detlev Khalid

THE RELEVANCY OF ISLAM IN ARAB NATIONAL IDENTITY

THE RELEVANCY OF ISLAM IN ARAB NATIONAL IDENTITY

Nationalism understood as anti-colonialist revolt of the masses was often inspired by religious leaders, at least in the initial phase. Nationalism as the ideology of the rising middle class, however, was a new and, moreover, imported form of self-understanding. As such it was not easily adjustable to the medieval Islamic outlook which had remained universalist despite centuries of political fragmentation. When fundamentalism resurged as another choice beside nationalism - an alternate response to the colonialist challenge - it afforded the ancient Muslim universalism a new lease of life. Liberal nationalism and fundamentalist Islamism tend to collide in frequent competitions for loyalty. The various forms of conflict and adjustment have been dealt with in a number of studies, most of which confirm the continuing relevance of the Islamic factor, the undiminished "fierté musulmane". Certainly, a number of those who speak of the "inherent vitality of Muslim society" think primarily of such fundamentalist parties as the Muslim Brotherhood. Nonetheless, the craving for a uniquely Islamic form of self-expression is recognized as pertaining to most strata of the social fabric, although with varying intensity.

This craving for Muslim individuality is partly conditioned by the fact that colonialism invaded Muslim territories at a time when the old religious identity was still intact. To a considerable degree it is the memory of foreign militancy against Muslims qua Muslims that has so far sustained the Islamic identity. Had imperialism in its first encounter conflicted with developed national identities, a reconquest of Muslim identity might not have been felt as such an imperious necessity. As a result of the confrontation of European nation states with a still largely operative Muslim universalism, Islamic identity was on the one hand subjected to a break-up in emulation of Europe's development. On the other hand, much of its emotional hold was conserved, if not fortified, precisely because it had constituted the focal point of Western assault. That it was but the target of a sham attack on the superstructure, whereas the real aim was economic expansionism, is surely important. All the same, the awareness of this scarcely penetrated into the depth of the self-view, which remained that of Muslims suffering Western aggression as the result of an age-old religious antagonism. Even after the religious vision had dimmed with Arab intel-

lectuals, there remained thus "a kind of secular patriotic attachment to Islam as a cultural community." Detachment from Islam is generally abhorred as obliteration of the cultural identity, as "the real threat, the irreparable defeat." Attachment to Islam, on the other hand, knows a large scale of degrees and manifests itself in multifarious forms, commensurable with the manifold Western denigrations of the Muslim self-image.

The European criticism of Islam as a system of beliefs and a way of life "was perhaps even more dangerous" than military subjugation, "for it could penetrate the spiritual defenses of the community," thereby effecting a dissolution "such as foreign rule, by itself, could hardly accomplish." The mentor of nationalists in the Middle East, Jamâl al-dîn al-Afghânî, reinvigorated Islam as a counterweight to what he and his contemporaries experienced as a European undermining of their identity. Precisely <sup>because</sup> he was so fully conscious of the necessity to learn from the haughty West, Afghânî thought of a device to prevent admiration for and identification with the imperialist ruler. In need of an ideology to politically unite Muslims against European encroachment, he reshaped Islam as an ideology. Instead of the medieval quietist belief in the hereafter it became through him and his disciples the mainspring of anti-imperialist solidarity.

This analysis may be somewhat pointed insofar as the transformation could not be more than partial - and contradictory. Nonetheless, there was a palpable accentuation of far-reaching consequences. The 20th century intensification of this assertion of Islam as a 'detheologized' <sup>means</sup> of cultural distinction has been explained as the result of the progress made by Westernization. Thus, apart from the persisting trauma of colonialist menace, a certain saturation with Western culture is said to intensify the psychological need to prove that all that has been attained is the result of one's own intellectual capital and not the product of a foreign oppressor's benevolence.

As, therefore, the new demand for Islam was raised in response to the challenges of the 19th/20th century, it was neither anymore identical with the spiritual needs of old nor was it any longer the <sup>major</sup> organizing principle of state administration. It was now, first and foremost, an expression of the desire to sustain national identity in the confrontation with the overwhelming foreigner. Reduced to a cultural underpinning of political commun-

ity, Islam experienced an eclipse of the religious, if not the intellectual core. That this development is part of a larger phenomenon common to the Third World can be instanced, without detracting from the specificity of the Arab case, by Kwame Nkrumah's reinterpretation of the Lord's Prayer: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall be added unto you."

The new nationalist profession of Islam came to the fore with Egypt's freedom fighter Mustafa Kâmil (1874-1908). Some have seen his greatest merit in the fostering of unity among Egyptian Muslim and their Christian compatriots. This notwithstanding, Kâmil set a precedent in projecting Islam as a symbol of the East in its confrontation with the Christian West. For Egypt as a country with a Muslim majority, Islam was to help asserting its national identity. Himself not devoutly religious in the orthodox sense, Kâmil inveighed both against the Westernizers' contemptuous neglect of the Islamic dimension as well as against those modernists who sought to usher in an enlightenment that might have attenuated the implicit emotional attachment of the masses to the Islam that was needed as a national rallying point.

In a similar vein the Lebanese historian, Munah al-Sulh, reproaches alienated intellectuals and insists that Islam, "the property of the masses", provides a natural and mighty support for Arab liberation. As a revolutionary power, Islam is "the historic twin" and "a supplementing dimension" of Arabism. A Tunisian educationist and editor, Mahmûd Mas'adi, develops the notion of a mutual defence pact between Arab nationalism and Islam.

With some, notably the Islamists, the politicalization of the faith does not stop at the façade of Islamic symbols. Although Western thought is frequently stigmatized as a corrupting evil, especially by the Islamists, they nevertheless succumb to it by presenting Islam primarily as a social program more comprehensive and efficient than any other enterprise seeking to ameliorate the world. The common trend of reducing the Prophet's message to its temporal aspect undermines, an Arab critic warns, belief in God as the sovereign ruler of the universe which was hitherto regarded as the very *raison d'être* of the Islamic religion. He hardly overstates when he speaks of "a race between modern Muslim writers and Communists, aimed at showing which system offers more of the fruits of this temporal world....."

This attitude started with the writers and artists of the liberal generation who were confronted with the task of furnishing a rationale for the introduced reforms. Trying to bridge the hiatus between past and present, they availed themselves of religious symbols without attempting a critique of the texts. Dabbling in the history of Islam they alluded to religious notions in support of their argumentation while eschewing theology. The responsibility for this desistance from theology (detheologization) seems to devolve - apart from their often one-sided Western formation - primarily on the psychosis engendered by the politics of the time. The copious output of liberal nationalists' writings on Islamic topics reveals a prepossession with the unmitigated menace of domination by the former colonial powers. The trauma of colonialism eventuated in the preoccupation with Islam as a means of asserting national identity rather than spiritual sublimity and intellectual vigor.

There appears an odd resemblance between Arab nationalist interpretations of Islam and detheologization in modern Judaism. With the passion of rebels, the Zionists traced out whatever defiance, intrepidity and secret heresy might have been at work in those ancient heroes of the faith. As a Zionist scholar of religion sees it, they put their hands on all that, saying "this is ours!" The Bible became the guide, the reader, the dictionary of the generation. But, "while reading it we were, so to say, leaping, i. e., either we jumped across the name of God or we effaced it." In both cases the element of holiness in the Scripture became a sort of embarrassment.

In the conflict between the urge for emancipation and the anxiety over a possible loss of the spiritual basis of selfhood - the fear of being uprooted - the Arabs received but little guidance from their theologians. In the serenity of their "arrested state" the ulema fail to inspire with fresh energies and their system of certainties is discreetly discarded by the faithful as inadequate. Those few among the ulema who ventured onto untreaded ground were quickly expelled from the phratry and, therefore, did not act as spokesmen with the authority of Al-Azhar. It is sometimes argued that the root cause of this "religious sterility" is the transformation of early Islam from a promise of salvation to an enterprise of reshaping this world. The this-worldly endeavor gave birth to a particular form of Islam which may be likened to Rabbinical Judaism, to which it owes its casuistry.

This explains why in the writings of the liberals as well as the fundamentalists Islam is rarely given a positive definition. Efforts center mainly on projecting it as different each time a comparison is drawn. Thus it is being clarified that "democracy in the Islamic sense" was distinguished from both the democracy of the West and the democracy of the Soviet Union: it is, "in fact, more democratic than both." The principles of Islam, it is said, do not conflict with those of the United Nations Charter on Fundamental Rights, "only in Islam the meaning is richer and fuller."

Under the strain of continuous Western challenge, the "reconquest of identity" led to periodic reversals of liberal nationalists to a more fundamentalist bent of thought. This phenomenon started with the ostensible volte-face of Afghânî in his later career via the much-discussed "crisis of orientation" in the Egypt of the thirties to la crise des intellectuels arabes in the seventies and beyond. In this way the continuing actuality of the religious heritage for the nationalists was assured. How much it served the ends of the ruling class was exemplified by Sâdât who resumed his predecessor's search for identity with the question "where do we Muslims stand today?" The determination to be culturally independent and not to mould oneself in the image of others seems to ensure the survival of some kind of Islamic sentiment even with many Arab nationalists of Marxist leanings. Fu'âd Mursî, a leading mind of the Egyptian Communist Party, stresses that although socialism is but one, its application differs and "with us" it is subject to the national conditions and historical characteristics of the Arab countries, full of respect for the "revolutionary Islamic values."

This has led to the conclusion that even where the faith dies and the long surviving loyalty to the defunct faith finally fades, the old identity - "and with it a complex of old attitudes and desires" - abides beneath the "covering of new values and ideologies" as the only reality.

It has also been argued that in the case of Muslims the suspension of religious thought, resulting from the priority given to the restoration of political force, has a rationale: affinity with rule used to be a chief characteristic of Islam in history, so that the colonial interlude symptomized an insidious aberration even religiously. In a sense, Atatürk has been the most consequential recoverer of that destiny, but as a restitution of Islamic patterns it is most stridently effected by Qadhdhâfî. He epitomizes the psyche of modern Muslimhood laid bare, its desire to maintain Islamic specificity based on the concern for power and few other considerations. Clearer than any of the Arab leaders, Qadhdhâfî is putting the right accent in an Islam that has, numbly and without giving itself account of it, taken to accentuate political resurgence even religiously. The "critical shift from the traditional faith to the modern ideology" is embedded in that "baffling equation of Islam and state" which for many has become the new hallmark of their religion and which they now believe to be its most pristine expression.

The glory which Muslims remember so well, because it had been so overwhelmingly resplendent, was not associated with a community of race and language, even territory-wise it was not so clearly limitable; it used to go by the name of Islam. Although the Arabs themselves dealt the final blow to the tottering Ottoman Empire, after the abolition of the Caliphate there was a "real, if undefinable, feeling of loss." As an apostle of Arab nationalism has pointed out, when the Arab masses assert their attachment to Islam, especially in matters of politics and culture, the underlying motive is mostly their refusal to be reckoned vassals of the former colonial master. Adherence to Islam reassures them in their self-comprehension as part of an historical and geographical entity



with a proud legacy of values and cultural roots. Instead of losing its hold following the recession of its ritualism among the urban classes, Islam seems to have retained the emotional attachment of its adherents. With its public role minimised, Islam has, in many cases, found refuge in the consciousness of its adherents and stimulated in them an interest to have a deeper understanding of it. An instance in point to corroborate this finding may be seen in the abolition of the old courts of religious jurisdiction and - in Egypt more or less simultaneously - the increase of religious instruction at secular schools. Although Islam as metaphysics scarcely exercises a genuine hold on the mind of the educated youth, it does supply a point of national cohesion.

However, the process did not stop here. In the foregoing the question as to Islam's continuing relevancy has been answered in the affirmative, although with one important qualification, viz., its role in the post-colonial situation is primarily, though certainly not solely, one of buttressing national identity. As this yields a certain spiritual satisfaction and the pride in one's own heritage required for self-assurance, the Islamic factor remains a force to be reckoned with. This abiding relevancy, however, is not necessarily the same as intellectual competitiveness. Discarding of the religious legacy, or even too strong an infringement upon it, create a disquietening sense of lost identity. Simultaneously, however, the introduction of new methods of living along with the growing awareness of the ever widening cultural lag create a fear of becoming anachronistic, of turning into "fossils of an extinct civilization." Because the advanced part of the world arranges its affairs guided by the superiority of reason and undistracted by any supernatural agencies, the very object of human life is receiving a different and revolutionary interpretation. In this "context of the world, Islam prima facie seems to be out of place" and the question poses itself as to how far it is at all adequate to meet the challenges of an increasingly secular and pluralistic world under the dictate of rational thought. A leading Islamicist's contention that the question of Islam's adequacy was never raised before the nineteenth century can scarcely be contested provided one keeps in view the important difference to former crises. The novel phenomenon is that Islam in the modern age is no more a politically supreme power, neither in relation to other religions,

nor even at the home-front, where it is a constituting factor of importance, but only one among others, surely not absolutely dominant.

As a consequence of its historical development, Islam became institutionalized as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. In addition to its primordial role as a faith in the Hereafter it came to be regarded as a state deriving its authority from religious precepts, as a moral teaching, as a philosophy, and many things more. Most of these manifestations were, nonetheless, combined into a framework with an almost monolithic appearance. Therein one or the other aspect would predominate, according to time and circumstances. As mentioned above, its dimension as a law code held sway for much of the time. When Westernization led to a number of "compensations, substitutions, intensifications," in short, redefinitions, it resulted in what has been termed "the drift from integral Islam."

As is the case with most historical religions, the specific manifestations of Islam include moments which, with a difference in accent and stress, would give rise to a pattern of religiosity that "might appear as a deviation from the original pathos and, in extreme forms, as a betrayal and complete negation of its first intentions." In this sense, religion has been compared to art, because both diversify on a similar pattern in the course of history. In former centuries this multiplicity of moments, with all its variety of psychological motivations and resultant differences of dogmatic formulations, eventuated in sectarian ramifications. In a world divided on the basis of "ideologies", the deliberations about the requirements or components of an Islamic identity seldom assume the form of sects, they now result "in a whirl of redefinitions, frequently inconsistent with one another and only rarely capable of winning ecumenical acceptance."

In this tussle of redefinitions, characterized by the search for distinctive elements to corroborate fresh accentuations, the failing of the religious leadership to rethink the most sacred beliefs and traditions eventuated in the reducing of Islam to one or the other of the following functions that need not be entirely exclusive but, all the same, mostly seem to constitute distinguishable tendencies: 1) a mere façade of cherished symbols; 2) a socio-political system; 3) a mystic interiorization of the faith; 4) a moral philosophy akin to the broad stream of humanist tendencies in other communities.

All four of these accentuations can be met with in the writings and statements of Arab nationalists. And yet, with the majority of progressive intellectuals it is the fourth dimension which is encountered most frequently. An important instance in point is the Ba<sup>c</sup>th Party ideologist Michel Aflaq. With this Christian Arab nationalist Islam undergoes a re-evaluation. In fact, Aflaq visualizes Islam in a loftier role than it appears with some Muslim apologists who have a less felicitous pen. In Aflaq's opinion, "Arab nationalism can bridge the gap to the principles of humanity because it comprehends or is characterized by the universal religion of Islam."

But here, too, the question is 'which Islam?' Aflaq rejects fundamentalism and omits to mention Islamic political institutions and ideas. His Islam is glorified as having contributed certain values to Arabism, but it has no social ethics and is not in itself a foundation for individual morality. "This Islam is no more than knowledge of the hereafter, the one God, and the notion of individual salvation ... the points emphasized are individualism and otherworldliness."

The crux of the matter appears to be that Islam reduced to its essential moral philosophy seems hardly different from other, similarly 'purified' religions. This can be illustrated at the instance of the great mufti of Egypt, the reformist Muhammad <sup>c</sup>Abduh. He was once suspected of working for a combination of Islam with Judaism and Christianity, and of being at heart an agnostic. At the root of the calumny there might have been an intuitive apprehension about his accommodating interpretation of the faith which appeared to many as an excessive "shrinkage of the substance of Islam". In view of modernism's indebtedness to Western liberalism it ultimately tends "to interpret Islam in terms of liberal humanitarian ideas and values." Radical liberals are, therefore, impelled to discard the historical elaborations as mere scholastic encrustations and to jettison all save a modicum that passes as the kernel of supramundane truth and is equated with the timeless essence common to all religions. However, even such attempts are mostly not motivated by the desire to discard specificity. On the contrary, it is hoped that "gradually a substantial body of clearly thought-out doctrine will emerge which will be the basis of a scientific reinterpretation of Islam. Such restatement will give strength and solace to many who have lost faith in the orthodox interpretations but retain their loyalty to the essence of Islam."

In this way Islam, no doubt, will be at one with modern science and philosophy. If, however, so many detractions are made in the realm of theology and philosophy, where some wish to discard the classical elaborations altogether, one might ask if there is anything left on which to base a humanism that is not only modern but also Arab. In such a fully rationalized religion without dogmas to distinguish it from others there remains scarcely any substance to maintain the specific identity required for self-assurance after the experience with imperialism and in the continuing challenge of its aftermath. Certain statements do indeed give the impression as if the only residue left are conventions of geography and national taste or folklore: "They pursue some the fundamental human values in the name of Christianity. We shall pursue them in the name of Islam."

Others have begun to ask, at least hypothetically, what rationale there is in holding on to a system with no visible difference in essence but encumbered by the dead-weight of a distorted medieval legacy. The final crumbling of the dogmatic bulwark, though, is a phenomenon of the last quarter of the twentieth century, and the full onslaught of historical criticism is still held in abeyance by the defensive mood of the Arabs who find themselves among the political underdogs on the present world scene. In case of a possible relaxation after the attainment of genuine emancipation from the colonial status, such a critique of the sources is bound to erupt and "we may anticipate new Islamic penetrations into the large territory of Muhammad's personality in the action of the Qur'anic whole."

The ideological disputes between Islamist (fundamentalist) and nationalist intellectuals are, in any event, not very representative of mass sentiments. These groups of the educated class do, no doubt, influence the common people. Yet, no standpoint seems to score a decisive victory in the consciousness of the masses who invariably seem to coordinate these trends without always becoming aware of the potential clash of loyalties. The assessment of the popular commitment to Islam in its relationship to nationalism varies. It has been described as "quite negative, little more than a sense of difference which stiffened in the foreigner's presence. It has also been referred to as "the profound Islamic reserves of the masses that would gush forth in the struggle for liberation." Recent surveys in Egypt show that "a nebulous attachment to Islam" goes side by side with secular nationalism.

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SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES:  
MOTIVES AND THRUSTS

## SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES :

### MOTIVES AND THRUSTS

This paper is meant to contribute to a discussion of the understanding of social change in one particular setting, namely the Arab countries, also called the Arab nation. It is prompted by the realization that, rather than speaking of understanding in the singular, one should, more realistically, speak of understandings.

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. The motive forces and thrust of social change, in any given instance, will be perceived and interpreted in tune with the presuppositions of the perceiving person. Consequently, plural and indeed various perceptions are likely to exist. Such multiplicity and variety will raise questions. What will be questioned is not their validity: that can be safely assumed. Rather, the need arises to ascertain their significance, singly and aggregately, for purposes of both understanding and action.

Let it be assumed that multiplicity of perceptions reflects difference between angles of approach, determined, in their turn, by the respective frames of reference guiding those perceiving. Then, the first difference to be noted, amongst those perceiving, is between those observing and those experiencing. Crudely speaking, the former will be the ones producing the documents whilst using the latter, one way or another, as evidence. The record will be biased accordingly. The circumstance that occasionally observing and experiencing are two roles of one person is bound to have a complicating effect but it is unlikely to obviate the bias.

There is additional risk of bias when the observer happens to be an outsider not just in terms of experience but besides in terms of cultural identification. His is a double problem. In

studying, he is up against a major intercultural hurdle. In communicating his findings, he will mostly address an audience unable to appreciate the intercultural complication.<sup>1</sup> It is not just the born foreigner who will find himself in this quandary. The Western-trained Arab may well have developed a state of mind where he will experience in one manner and observe in quite another one, relying on two separate optiques. What makes it worse is that there is no saying in advance whether or when he will be aware of this position, and account for it. The root problem is by now pretty well identified and recognized, certainly with regard to the Arab-Islamic world. Inherent and concealed in a good deal of allegedly general, not to say universal, social sciences theory, there is a dose of robust Western ethnocentrism. There is of course no lack of Arabocentrism amongst Arab intellectuals, certainly those of the more traditional kind. But between the two ethnocentrisms, there is, first, no even match and, secondly and more importantly, little interaction worth the name. Instead, there exists a combination of traditional theological-philosophical dialogue-of-the-deaf and contemporary nationalistic-chauvinistic stand-off. Thus, if the problem is known, its solution is not in sight.

Provisionally, we have now identified two divisions determining differences between angles of approach to social change in the Arab world - (1) the difference between the observing and the experiencing postures, and (2) the difference between the two ethnocentrisms at play, Arab and Western. We have also seen that (a)

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<sup>1</sup> For a Western or Western-trained author, to write a well-selling study of a Middle East topic means equipping it with an appeal to the reader unlikely to do full justice to the specificity of subject matter studied. It could hardly be cast in terms of its proper frame of reference.

neither division is clear-cut, and (b) they cross-sect. When we have spoken of bias, we have used the term without its usual deprecating connotation. Any elaboration of a perception from a particular angle is biased in this basic sense; but then, perceptions from no particular angle do not exist.

Secondary lines of division come to mind fairly easily, especially with regard to the observer's stance in its Western variant. There is, however, no reason to expect all of them to have equal heuristic value.

By way of a first approximation, one may think of the difference between those referring to social change and those preferring to speak of development. Whilst both obviously have one and the same complex of phenomena in mind, the former appear less clear than the latter. Besides having the Third World as its more or less self-evident reference, 'development' denotes matters economic first and foremost, then to connote, with less precision, technological, administrative, social, political and further matters said to be of an extra-economic nature. In its turn, 'social change' appears as a concept that, once having undergone a shift in its field of application from the Western to some non-Western society, appears deprived of whatever precision it may have had originally. Whilst more or less purposely free from economic connotations, its clarity leaves to be desired both as to the substance called social and as to the thrust of observed change. In other words, though the two terms evoke two different - to an extent perhaps unduly different - worlds of discourse, there is no reason to expect them to provide clear criteria for introducing a distinction that could further present purposes.



The next point of recourse is the range of foci commonly distinguished in the field of development studies (which, with regard to the Third World, will comfortably embrace social change). To some, development is economic development whichever way one looks at it and whichever label is applied. Others are prepared to distinguish technological, administrative or management, political, and social development, to mention only these. In singling out one such aspect or segment, they are not necessarily more oblivious of remaining aspects than are the protagonists of economic development; but they may be less tempted to subsume any and every other aspect under the one of their preference. As against all these together, there are those resisting any of these ways out of the quandary of the comprehensiveness of development. They insist upon facing this comprehensiveness squarely. But unless they turn either into ideologues or into jack-of-all-trades practitioners running around in circles, they have a hard time coming to grips with their problem.

With regard to the Arab world, these various approaches have met with an unequal reception and exerted an uneven impact. Nor could all of the differences that occurred have been predicted. Indeed it is hard to say what is at play. Is it a matter of the fit, or lack of it, between the (Western) paradigm, in Kuhn's sense, underlying a particular approach, and the specific Arab state of affairs to which it would be addressed? In other words, do Daniel's culture barriers play a discriminating role?<sup>2</sup> Could it, in some other cases, be a mat-

<sup>2</sup> N. Daniel, The Cultural Barrier, Problems in the Exchange of ideas, Edinburgh (U.P.) 1975.

ter of sheer haphazard coincidence? The point is that not merely are certain approaches more visible than others, but the visible ones appear to take particular shapes. Whichever way one turns, relevancy would seem to be a decisive consideration, and Western 'general' ethnocentrism its main adversary.

I will now limit myself to briefly mentioning a few examples by way of illustration only. I propose then to shift gear and consider other secondary lines of division, corresponding to positions other than the observer's stance, Western variant, and in their turn leading to various angles of approach to social change. After this round of reconnoitering will have been completed, there will be an occasion to return to some selected approaches for some further probing. The examples I have in mind include the following.

First, there is the typical economic development approach, attested to by the universal adherence to the techniques and paraphernalia of economic planning as a main tool of government, and more generally the economic or, if you prefer, economistic tone of a good deal of political and policy-making discourse. I will confess to an inclination to suspect that the level to which this type of discourse is or sounds economic is lower than in the Western European and North-American settings; but I am unable to substantiate this hunch. At the same time, there are symptoms of some disenchantment with the economic preoccupation, such as for example the search, in Egypt and perhaps elsewhere, for alternative or supplementary approaches, whether managerial or social. Besides, economic or economistic preoccupations in, for example, the Peninsula

are, for all practical purposes, a far cry from those in, for example, neighbouring Egypt or Jordan: the basic facts and considerations prompting a concern with the economics of the situation (and as such reinforcing any economistic bent of mind, acquired by those concerned, during their training) are more different than often seems to be taken into account.

It would carry too far to spell out the many more specialized interests that the economic concern will normally entail, as represented in the Arab world. Nor is it important for present purposes: there is no reason to believe that the currents of fashion have not been more or less faithfully followed. Again it is tantalizing to enquire whether there are particular differences in speed with which one or the other has been adopted, or in accent accorded, and to identify the causes of such particularisms as can be noticed. On the other hand, the mobility of economists, both Arab and Western, moving into and out of the area is likely to have a blurring effect on any such specifics.

Secondly, one may list the modernization approach, very much a Western, not to say American, import product, that has perhaps been somewhat less asserted with regard to the Arab countries than with regard to other regions of the so-called Third World. The strength of this approach for descriptive purposes, and at the same time its weakness for purposes of operationalization, is that it will inevitably discern multiple thrusts to development or change, and face an even greater *embarras du choix*, as to cause and effect, than does the economic approach. Modernization risks being all things to all people: urbanization, media impact, literacy; the reshuffling of the

interdependency between the nomadic, village and urban life styles and the shock waves affecting kinship, family and the position of the individual; secularization and its offshoots or countervailing trends, as confronted by tendencies of Westernization; the problem of sociocultural revitalization and reassertion in a One World framework. There can be little doubt that the cutting edge of the modernization approach is blunted proportional to the comprehensiveness it attempts descriptively to achieve.

There are at least two approaches that could be rated offshoots of the modernization approach, but for the circumstance that they have pretty well achieved a significance very much their own. One of these, to be given third place in this listing, is the interest in political modernization. One would expect this interest to shape up as an intellectual response to the problematic aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman empire. This would have called for rather fundamental probing into issues of modern statehood as against the backdrop of the complex imperial tradition of the Middle East. In actual fact, some of the main convergences of interest appear rather as reflections of incidental waves of interest in Western thinking, as these happened to seem pertinent to Arab conditions. This at least is how one may try to explain spates of studies on parties, elites or leadership, to a lesser extent ideologies; and legitimation. Power, or at least some of its ramifications, are discernible as background concerns most of the time, but rarely will these be addressed for their own sake. This may be one of the reasons why this approach again seems to pose insoluble problems of operationalization. Such

situations as have been sought appear more or less in the margin of the political arena, namely the area where political and policy decisions are to be implemented. The document approach here has for a long time been transfer of administrative and managerial skills or technology, with rather less concern for the understanding, perhaps modification, of existing patterns of authority and bureaucratic apparatus. Before too long this has resulted in increasingly manifest problems; but these, in their turn, seem often too hot to handle.

The other off-shoot of the modernization approach, fourth in the present listing, is the more or less sociological or even anthropological counterpart or complement to the more particularly political science outlook marking the political modernization approach. What links the two is concern with power as an ultimate or background phenomenon remaining elusive if addressed directly. The concern with structural societal change will focus upon such matters as stratification, and in so doing tend to take its paradigms from Western theoretical and/or ideological thinking. Thus, there is a noticeable incidence of dispute about the relevancy of ideas about stratification, combined with a variety of approaches to actual, budding or alleged stratification, each tacitly assuming the relevancy issue to have been settled satisfactorily. The aggregate image is one of confusion, even in regard to fairly basic ideas and facts. The chances of operatization, otherwise than for purposes of ideological propaganda, are accordingly remote.

Fifth on the list is an approach to social change setting out from religious and other cultural values. This approach is intriguing in that it follows upon, yet purposely deviates from, the famous Western tradition of Islamic studies which

for a time has been able to command the inevitably somewhat hesitant respect of some Arab scholars of Islam. There are two variants. An earlier one has addressed phenomena of alleged secularization and revitalization in Islam, and more or less grievously misread both. The more recent one has turned its back upon 'high church' concerns and chosen to concentrate on live religious phenomena, complete with their social, political and further ramifications. Thus fresh new insight has been produced, of a nature that is perhaps more monographic than can please its authors, and by and large falling outside the orbit of interest of Muslim scholarship. As compared to the other four approaches, this one seems doomed to be rated even more of a purely intellectual, ivory tower concern. Such more or less sociological questions as it may inspire are not necessarily the ones that currently concern those Arabs wishing to think and act as conscious Muslims.

In concluding this summary listing, it is perhaps useful to state the obvious. The five approaches listed represent a more or less arbitrary distinction on my part made for no other purposes than this brief overview. As a complex they can be cut up differently and thus presented differently. This does not really matter. What matters is that as a complex they are not consistent; they do not really add up. To describe this state of affairs as a case of failed interdisciplinarity would be misstating it by inappropriate oversimplification.

Turning now to the Arab perspective of the matter, whether of the experiencing and then observing or of the observing and then acting (planning, policy making, policy implementing)

variant, a preliminary observation is in order. This relates to the incidence and function of public discourse. The free countries of the West are marked by the assumption (and the hopefully matching practice) of uninhibited public discourse on public issues, whether one's own or those of others. This feature is quite specifically Western and there is no reason to expect it elsewhere. This realization seems fairly obvious, but for Westerners it is not necessarily easy to draw the consequences. For present purposes, it means that in an attempt to identify, in the Arab setting, the salient approaches to, or interpretations of, social change and development, one cannot expect to rely on fully the same kind of clues. This holds true particularly inasmuch as major segments of public discourse, namely the press, radio and t.v. and the Friday sermon are to a considerable extent (varying, no doubt, from country to country) the extensions of official information and guidance. Add to this variable degrees of control over publishing, and it will be clear that the information carried by these several media plays a different role than in the West, even if Western self-censorship and other ways of influencing information flows in the West are taken into account. Besides, another consideration enters the picture, the significance of which is hard to assess. In the Arab world oral communication has, depending upon purpose and subject matter, traditionally rated higher than or at least on a par with its written counterpart; and its role is by no means played out. In fact, radio and television may well derive from it a significance that remains unequalled in the West. For present purposes, this can only mean that the job of identifying and using clues

towards the Arab perceptions of, and approaches to, social change and development poses problems very much its own. No need adding that together, these considerations represent as many caveats for what is to follow.

Trying to identify Arab approaches to social change and development, in line with a viewpoint of the primarily experiencing and subsequently reflecting or observing subject, one runs into a welter of topics of concern and/or discourse. These may be tentatively presented under three headings.

First the change of the times is perceived as problematic in respect of the given, inherited frame of reference, which is postulated to be, basically, of all times and places. I am of course referring to the Islamic way of life primarily, but by no means exclusively: the other religions (and modern ideologies, for that matter) are not basically different. The visible tip of the iceberg are the apologetic and revitalization urges in the Islamic community. It does not matter much, in this regard, whether revitalization appears in orthodox garb as in Egypt, or as a special variant of orthodoxy, as in the Peninsula, (or, for that matter, as mysticism, as in Iran or parts of Turkey). What does matter is that the concern with the basic frame of reference is a concern about its relevancy to, and impact upon, the full round of life. This is not necessarily limited to the professing orthodox, let alone ultra-orthodox, groups, but it will inevitably show in a different way with them than with those less manifestly practising their respective faiths. This is also why, in all its ramifications, this approach - or should one say - response? - to



change is as elusive, in terms of cutting edge and net efficacy, as some of its instances may be vehement.

The second focus, in Arab dealings with change and development, closely related to the first, can be labelled as a concern about the *raison de communauté*. I am introducing here an unusual paraphrase of the well-known concept of *raison d'état*, and I am referring back to a problem already pointed out: the demise of the Ottoman empire causes a replay of one of the basic problems encountered in the early institutionalization of Islam, namely how to organize the ideal community of the faithful. Both the budding Islamic realm and the Ottoman set-up, and everything in between, have drawn heavily upon the ancient paradigm of an emergent and then self-perpetuating (and self-aggrandizing), superimposing power, capping in imperial fashion a many varied, pre-existent and self-continuing social units. This formula, however varied, has lost its validity all around in the former Ottoman empire, as, in a different way, in Iran. I like to summarize the change-over by saying that from a convergent state things move towards an integrative state, allegedly national. But however the matter is phrased, the phrasing will beg questions rather than proffer answers or solutions, let alone a novel paradigm. This is a political matter, in the classical sense of the word political: public affairs. As such, it again ramifies into almost every walk of life. And for a Western audience it pays to underline that its metaphysical dimension is by no means insignificant.

The third focus is the self-view and self-assertion of the Arab collectivity, however perceived, in respect of the

outside world, notably the West. The West, in this connection, means Western Europe first of all, and then also its two off-shoots, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. The matter has immediate intra-Arab ramifications, in addition to those in such residues of the Ottoman framework as happen to linger on (including the Arab-Turkish relationships). It is obviously incorrect to assume this to be another case of repercussions to obviated colonial rule. Such instances of belated colonialism as the Arab world has witnessed were in fact no more than one episode in the history of Arab-European, or should one say Islamic-Christian, interaction, which has lasted exactly as long as Islam is in existence. The current attempts at Euro-Arab dialogue, in their turn, are no more than the latest installment of ever the same interaction - a weird mix of cultural interpenetration and occasional interdependence, commercial complementarity up to a point, and political competition now and then. This mix is the more baffling as, *pace* serious study of mutual image-making, no penetrating attempts are or have been undertaken to unravel it.

Of these three complexes of unresolved problems, the second is perhaps the most influential one; but they are interrelated in many ways. It is unnecessary to underscore that none of them is contemporary in the sense of being new. These are problem complexes that are to an extent perennial and are replayed, *mutatis mutandis*, under conditions of manifest accelerated overall change. As such, they are determinants of the Arab perception of change, its motive forces and thrusts, and pointers to ways of living with perennial problems. Problem management rather than problem-solving.

Roughly distinguishable from this variant of the Arab position, determined by experience and reflection, is a variant rather more determined by observation as a crucial part of experience, followed by purposive action. There is perhaps slightly more of an accessible record of available evidence for the analysis of this second variant; but its manifestation is likely to vary equally more noticeably from one country to the next.

The concern with economic planning returns here as a main focus: a not unexpected mutual reinforcement between outside expertise and foreign-trained inside policy making.

In the course of time, other foci of concern have been identified; and, as suggested, the history of their identification does not necessarily follow or parallel that of the subsequent fashions in development studies as pursued in the rich countries, or in development policies as advocated by international agencies. Without attempting either a systematic order or a historical sequence, the following focal points can be listed as having caught the limelight at least in a number of countries.

As an offshoot of economic development policies, industrialization has been a long-standing interest. Its feasibility has proven problematic on many counts, but on the whole this has not daunted policy makers too much. Its developmental effects, even in successful cases, have largely remained below expectations - but then, these expectations may have been somewhat unrealistic to begin with, what with the matter readily acquiring political overtones over and above its economic merits. The Achilles heel, it seems, is that the more industry does for the 'proletariat' - never mind those well-off anyway -, the more glaringly will the destitution of the sub-proletariat appear.

From industrial and to an undue extent urban development concerns, attention will tend to be diverted, time and again, to the rural scene as a problem area, whether residual or preliminary or both at once. Land reform, very much a multi-purpose move, and one whose main thrust or motives rarely concern the countryside in the first place, evokes rural reform and rural activation schemes of various kinds, more often than not induced or imposed from above, and hardly successful. The surprising element, in retrospect, is that so many have been surprised to see that these things ran into so much difficulty, and that however relentlessly the groping for solutions continues, groping it remains.

Besides crucial areas or sectors of concern, there are crucial approaches to development, singled out for discussion and action. Perhaps the most salient is what the Maghrib calls *cadres* and what in Egypt is increasingly recognized as middle management, including middle-level bureaucracy. The avowed aim is to bridge the gap between grass roots level and central decision making, mostly in a top-to-bottom move, and thus to enhance the efficacy of development policy making.

This listing would not be complete without at least a passing reference to the long standing and currently still increasing attention devoted to physical military force as the visible part of state power. The Arab-Israeli conflict has tended to go a long way in explaining this urge but, certainly of late, it is doubtful whether it could explain all of it. It certainly has hampered the search for less inadequate explanations.

As one example of rather more specific developmental concerns the specifically Egyptian problem of overpopulation

should be mentioned, perhaps in one breath with the problem of underpopulation - if that is what it is - in the Peninsula. The developmental significance of this problem, whether negative or positive, is glaring. But it would be unduly optimistic even to suggest that those concerned are muddling through. The truth of the matter is that they are at a loss.

At this point the most interesting part of this exercise can begin. Assuming that these three listings are not impossibly caricatural, then what is there to be learned from comparing them?

As between the first (outside expert) and third (autochthonous action-oriented) positions, the correspondences are perhaps less important than the differences. With some optimism, the latter could be seen as illustrative of the effort to achieve greater relevancy by responding to needs identified as particularly urgent. The more remote perspective of what is currently called self-reliance opens up. By the same token, however, there is some enlarged risk of attempting to cure by the symptom.

The particularly notable mutual reinforcement between the economic concerns occurring in both positions is not to be overrated for its heuristic significance. It need not mean more than that the *philosophie vécue* (P. Bourdieu) of economism has made adepts or converts amongst intellectuals originating from non-Western civilizations. In particular it need not mean that economism has become, or is about to become, effectively and positively integrated in the civilizations concerned - in this case Arab culture. Budding concern, al-

ready mentioned, with social development as an answer to the quandary of economic development policies, is a tell-tale phenomenon in this connection.

Of even more interest is the comparison between the second (autochthonous, mainly experiencing) position and the other two. Two observations are in order. First, the aloofness, on the part of both, in regard of this one, is as persistent as it is unfounded, and its effect is disquieting. Nothing illustrates this better, perhaps, than the virtual absence of any links between outside expert interest in particular issues of political development and the experienced problems of *raison de communauté*, as I have called them. I do not doubt that this absence of effective correspondence is a root cause of the impotence of either concern. Likewise, the relative impotence of the economic approach may be explained by the absence of any focus of autochthonous experience to which it could be linked.

Secondly, the lack of correspondence between this position and the other two, as regards the concerns they engender, is fully disquieting. It goes well beyond the level of formal paradigm-building and conceptualization. With a little exaggeration, one could perhaps speak of a rift between two worlds of perception and action - and it is clear that this is not simply the rift between West and non-West, in this case Arab.

Am I implicitly putting in a plea for integration of these three kinds of approaches? I do not intend so. On the other hand I believe that a conscious and purposive attempt to assess their relative significances and draw conclusions from

the diversity of the orientations and action patterns each will inspire has hitherto been missing: for no good reason and with quite adverse effect. Perhaps my plea could be for an attempt at clearing, or at seeing the three positions not as separate but as necessarily interrelated. This leaves it just shy from becoming a plea in favour of an attempt at harmonization.

The Hague, April 1978

C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze

Obave (Western) - outside

- economic development

- modernization

• political modernization

• changing social & political  
(modernization) (classes)  
(liberalization of lower country  
to western concept) (elites)

③ - religious identified life  
style

experiencing / reflecting  
in mind

- recovery of colonial  
frame of reference

(to resist & establish)

the phenomenon in relation of change

— colonialism (institution?)  
~~institution~~ fundamentalism

— quest of true community

— self perception and self action  
in the broader framework  
of outside world

observing - external  
(inner)

- economic development

- land reform and  
rural reconstruction

- codes / middle level  
management

- physical force  
(common sense)

- (control of population  
in some countries)

N. K. WEN HUI ZHANG SCHEN



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International Conference on  
THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE - BASIC ISSUES AND MAJOR TRENDS  
from 25 to 26 May 1978 in Hamburg

Kamel S. Salibi

"RIGHT" AND "LEFT" IN LEBANON

## "RIGHT" AND "LEFT" IN LEBANON

In reporting on events and political developments in Lebanon in recent years, the Western news media popularized the terms "Right" and "Left"--more specifically, "Christian Right" and "Moslem Left"--to denote the fronts involved in the civil war of 1975-76, and in the crisis which has since continued in the country. The use of these stereotype terms suggests that what has been going on in Lebanon during these troubled years has been essentially a contest between rival ideological stands reflecting a socio-economic gap between "haves" and "have nots", with the rich Christians upholding the cause of bourgeois capitalist liberalism or illiberalism, and the poor Moslems upholding the cause of socialist reform or revolution. That there are rich and poor in Lebanon -- as elsewhere -- is true; with the rapid economic growth of the last two or three decades, the gap between them has certainly widened, and social tensions have undoubtedly arisen. The political exploitation of these tensions, however, though persistently attempted by interested parties, has not yet been truly successful. In the on-going Lebanese crisis, these tensions may well have contributed -- in one way or another -- to the intensity of the conflict, but they have not ranked prominently among the basic issues involved. Throughout the civil war, and until today, they remain overshadowed by other factors of conflict -- factors of a more archaic nature, perhaps, but nevertheless of clearer and more immediate relevance in the parochial Lebanese context.

So far, Lebanese society -- despite the phenomenal economic development of recent decades -- continues to be divided along traditional lines, into primordial communities definable mainly in terms of religious affiliation. Each community commands the spontaneous loyalty of the general run of its members, and exhibits a tight group solidarity -- what is called in Arabic a 'aṣabiyya. While some communities may, on the whole, be richer than others, none has a monopoly of wealth or an exclusive claim to poverty. Social class cuts across the religious community divisions, as it also cuts across family, tribal or quasi-tribal affiliations within each community. As a result, social class interests become modified -- if not distorted beyond recognition -- under the effect of the traditional 'aṣabiyya loyalties which naturally contain them.

While this continues to be the case, genuine commitment to any given social ideology in Lebanon is bound to remain mostly a matter of individual idiosyncrasy, never really reaching the level of a mass movement either at the community or the national level. The Left has, indeed, a superficial appeal to the Moslem Lebanese, mainly because it is associated in the popular mind with Arab nationalist defiance of standing Western power interests in the Middle East. The Right, on the other hand, readily appeals to Christians who see in "Leftist" Arab nationalist activism nothing more than an Islamic militancy in

disguise. In some cases, lip-service ideological commitments can become the fighting slogans for a given Lebanese community or faction -- Moslem or Christian -- which seeks to present its archaic 'aṣabiyya stand in a respectable "modern" form. In other cases, such lip-service ideological commitments may be no more than tags marking the strategic dependence of a given community, or of a faction or gang within a given community, on an outside patron or sponsor of the "Right" or the "Left". The patron or sponsor in question may be an Arab or Middle Eastern regime, or a superpower, or an Arab or Middle Eastern regime closely associated with a superpower. The strategic dependence on the outside patron or sponsor, where it applies, can be direct or indirect. In the case of some "Leftist" Lebanese factions, the intermediary between the Lebanese "client" and the external patron or sponsor would normally be some Palestinian organization with established external ties. While the patronage or sponsorship is sometimes initiated by the external party, with a view to gaining political leverage inside Lebanon, at other times it is solicited by the Lebanese "client" to the satisfaction or ultimate embarrassment of the external party.

In the continuing Lebanese crisis, indeed, each of the participants has, claims to have, or is commonly believed to have a

"Rightist" or "Leftist" external patron or sponsor either in the Arab world, or in the world at large, or in both. This external dimension of the "Lebanese Question", however, though extremely important in its own right, does not concern us here. What concerns us, rather, is the Lebanese conflict at its purely parochial level -- even to the exclusion of its Palestinian dimension, which is partly an internal factor, partly an external one in relation to the conflict. At this purely Lebanese parochial level, the terms "Right" and "Left", stripped of their ideological overtones, may be used to describe the difference between the Christian Lebanese position which is politically defensive, and hence conservative, and the Moslem Lebanese position which demands political change, and to that extent may be considered radical. A clear appreciation of the two community positions is essential for the understanding of the current Lebanese predicament.

If "Right" means simply a determination to maintain a given system or order as it stands, then the Christians in Lebanon, by and large, are certainly "Rightist". Since the outbreak of the civil war, the Christian Lebanese front (more correctly, the Maronite front) has been fighting and manoeuvring -- so to speak -- "to keep the past upon the throne". The Maronite political and administrative establishment enjoys traditional prerogatives in the Lebanese Republic which it is unwilling to relinquish, or even to have

put to question. Spokesmen for the Maronite position argue -- to some extent convincingly -- that the Lebanese Republic can only maintain its special character in the Arab world -- as a self-propelled democracy with liberal traditions and institutions -- if the Christian political prerogatives in the country are kept intact. Most notable among these prerogatives are the Maronite Presidency of the Republic, command of the Army, and directorship of civil and military intelligence services; also the maintenance of the Christian Sunday (instead of the Moslem Friday) as the official sabbath. The Moslem Lebanese front, on the other hand, fought during the civil war -- and now manoeuvres -- to secure a new political deal, although the various factions which form this front are not of one heart and mind as to what this new deal should be. On the whole, the Moslem Lebanese envisage fundamental changes in the Lebanese political system -- changes which would abolish or at least reduce the traditional Christian prerogatives, and increase the Moslem share in political power and spoils. Beyond that, the Moslem and Christian Lebanese appear to be, by and large, equally conservative. While it is a fact that an ideological "Left" has never ceased attempting to graft itself onto the Moslem Lebanese stand in the national conflict, the graft so far has not taken, and may never really take.

Where the classical Moslem Lebanese point of view is concerned, the fundamental national issue is as follows: Lebanon, as an Arab

State, was born in guilt; it had first come into existence in 1920 as a result of Maronite political conspiracy with French imperialism against pan-Arab national interests; the Maronite political establishment developed and maintained power in the Lebanese State with the backing of Western imperialism and some suspect Middle Eastern regimes which collaborated with this imperialism. From this the following basic Moslem position in Lebanon emerges: for Lebanon to be cleansed of its original guilt, the policies of the State must be brought back into line with the pan-Arab national interest, of which the Palestine Question is to this day the touchstone. This cleansing process, to the ordinary Moslem Lebanese, can only be brought about if the special political prerogatives enjoyed in the country by the suspect Maronite establishment are abolished, to give way to a more genuine representative democracy in which every Lebanese citizen could have an equal say. In maintaining this position, the Moslem Lebanese count on their growing numerical preponderance in the country, and also on the boost which the large Palestinian presence in Lebanon gives to this preponderance -- facts which are recognized with alarm by the Maronites and other Christian Lebanese, and which were first driven home by violent action during the pro-Nasser Moslem Lebanese rising of 1958.

To the Maronites and other Christian Lebanese, the Moslem position never seemed to stand to reason. What the Moslems regarded, and

continue to regard, as unjustified prerogatives enjoyed by a politically pretentious and scheming minority, was seen -- and is still seen -- by the Christians to be no more than minimal guarantees to their security and dignity in an overwhelmingly Moslem Arab world. Against the Moslem argument of what Lebanese democracy should be, the Christians present an effective counter-argument. Lebanese society, they maintain, happens to consist of various religious communities which command the loyalty of their respective followers and represent their primordial interests; these communities must share -- as communities -- in the management of the State, which is what they do under the present political system, and what they should continue to do. Each community, by tradition, has the right to exercise a liberum veto to guarantee that its stands on fundamental national issues are respected. To change Lebanese democracy from a system of community representation, to a system of ordinary statistical representation, could only result in putting an end to a workable democracy in the country, because it would inevitably mean the submission of the Christian communities to the will of the Moslem communities once and for all. A Christian minority with special prerogatives in the State -- some Christians argue -- is bound to be circumspect in the exercise of its prerogatives, constantly taking into account the views and interests of the majority. On the other hand, a system of absolute democratic representation, based on individual votes, could only bring to power a Moslem majority rule which would leave the Christians with no guarantees for



their community interests, and even (many Christians fear) for their ordinary human dignity.

The crux of the matter is this: the Lebanese system as it stands guarantees a special position for the Christians at the expense of the Moslems. The statistics, however, threaten ultimately to favour the Moslems at the expense of the Christians. This naturally places the Christians on the defensive, and the Moslems on the offensive. The conflict between the two sides -- regardless of the form it takes at any given moment -- is essentially a conflict between primordial community loyalties. Inasmuch as it is so, it does not involve serious ideological commitments to social doctrines of the "Rightist" or "Leftist" kind. As defenders of the established Lebanese system, the Christians (particularly the Maronites) describe themselves as "Lebanese nationalists", and the Maronite political front, since 1976, has called itself the "Lebanese Front". The Moslems (particularly the Sunnites), on the other hand, call themselves "Arab nationalists", clamour for the establishment of an "Arab Lebanon", and describe the Christian front as "isolationist" -- in the sense that it seeks to "isolate" Lebanon from Arabism. Individual Christians and Moslems -- numerically a negligible minority of the total Lebanese population -- form small and sometimes compact and active groups of ideologically committed "Socialists", "Communists",

or "Social Nationalists". Some primordial groups, as already indicated, may profess doctrinaire commitments by way of political tactics (like the Joumblati Druzes, who formally describe themselves as "Progressive Socialists"). By and large, however, the political commitment of the ordinary Lebanese citizen is to his community and its solidarity -- i.e., to his 'aṣabiyya. A cursory survey of the positions of the major Christian and Moslem political parties and organizations illustrates this point.

Among the Christians (mainly the Maronites), the most prominent political parties at present are the Kataeb (Phalanges Libanaises) and the Chamounists (Parti National Liberal, or P.N.L.). Both are militantly patriotic parties, interpreting Lebanese patriotism in fundamentally Christian terms; i.e., neither party can envisage a viable Lebanon in which Christians do not enjoy special power prerogatives. In political action, the Kataeb are organized as a modern political party with a military arm, and their power emanates mostly from their high degree of organization -- which includes a remarkably efficient intelligence service. Although they call themselves "Social Democrats", and proclaim that their party is non-sectarian and open to all Lebanese regardless of religious affiliation, they are generally and correctly recognized to be no more than politically organized and militant Maronites with some following of other Christians. Remove the Christian 'a-

sabiyya from the Kataeb Party, and it would cease to be what it is. As for the Chamounists, they differ from the Kataeb mainly by the fact that they form a Christian political rally of a more traditional kind. In political action, they depend on the leadership of former President of the Republic Camille Chamoun, whose stand against the pro-Nasser Moslem rising of 1958 made him a hero to many Maronite and other Christian Lebanese. The political organization of the Chamounist P.N.L. is little more than a form, and the leading officials of the party are mainly the sons of the leader and his close personal associates. Like the Kataeb Party, the P.N.L. represents the grass-roots sentiments of the Christian Lebanese, and more particularly of the Maronites. Both parties are strongly opposed to the continued presence of Palestinians in Lebanon -- armed or unarmed -- because of the numerical boost the Palestinian presence gives to the Moslems in the country, and of the political threat implied by this boost to the Christian Lebanese position as they envisage it.

Among the Moslem Lebanese, the pattern of political groupings is far more complex. To begin with, there are the traditional-type rallies around prominent leaders, which are fast becoming a thing of the past. Among the Shi'ites, who are mostly of peasant stock, the traditional leaders have been either tribal chiefs (like the late Sabri Hamadeh of the Baalbek region) or quasi-feudal landlords (like

Kamel al-As'ad, Adil Oseiran and Kazim al-Khalil of South Lebanon). Among the Sunnites, who are mostly townsfolk, the traditional leaders have been city bosses like Saeb Salam of Beirut, or Rashid Karami of Tripoli. With the social changes of the last two or three decades, which involved -- among other things -- the emergence of an ambitious Sunnite business and professional bourgeoisie, and the transformation of many Shi'ite peasants into an urban proletariat, the position of these traditional Moslem leaders was considerably weakened. Today, the only such leader who retains something of his past power is Saeb Salam of Beirut. During the civil war, Salam tried to modernize his power base by organizing his followers as the "Vanguards of Reform" (Ruwwad al-Islah), with his own son Tamam as secretary-general. The organization -- which has a military arm -- derives its present standing mainly from the personal prestige, experience, and internal and external political connections of its founder-leader, who enjoys strong support from Saudi Arabia.

The steady weakening of the traditional Moslem leaderships, during the last twenty years, paved the way -- mainly among the Sunnites -- for the growth of what is called the Nasserist movement: a popular form of Moslem pan-Arabism which takes its name from President Nasser of Egypt. Until the death of Nasser in 1970, the Nasserist movement in Lebanon was actually sponsored by Egypt. Since then, it split into a

number of splinter-groups, each with its own boss, and each enjoying the support of some Arab regime (the pattern of external support is constantly shifting, and defies definite categorization). The "Independant Nasserists", better known since 1975 as the Murabitūn (an emotive Islamic term meaning "Defenders of the Faith"), are closely associated with Fatḥ -- the leading Palestinian organization, which heads the P.L.O. Another Nasserist group, called the "Union of Popular Working Forces" (Ittiḥād Qiwā al-Sha'ḥ al-ʿĀmil), cooperates at present with Syria. Like all Lebanese Sunnites, the Nasserist organizations stand for the Arabism of Lebanon, and interpret this Arabism in distinctly Islamic terms. They openly profess the Nasserist brand of "Arab Socialism" (as distinct from the more doctrinaire Baath "Arab Socialism"), but their actual commitment to Socialist ideology is dubious, and is certainly transcended by Moslem ʿaṣabiyya sentiments. Nevertheless, by contradistinction to the traditional leaderships which, by nature, are staunchly conservative, the Nasserist organizations, with their youthful leaderships, may be regarded on the whole as politically radical.

Among the Shi'ites, the decline in power of the traditional leaders did pave the way, at one stage, for a rapid spread of Leftist radicalism in the ranks of the community. Before long, however, the matter was taken in hand by the Imam (religious leader) Musa al-Ṣadr, who set out to

inspire his followers with a strong sense of community solidarity by assuming the spokesmanship for their social grievances -- as neglected peasants, or as a depressed proletariat. Šadr's "Movement of the Deprived" (Harakat al-Mahrumīn), with its military arm Amal (Hope), sided with the Palestinian Resistance during the civil war (the Amal militia was originally sponsored by Fatḥ), but later turned to cooperate with Syria, and remains closely associated with Syrian policy today. The movement, however, lacks compact organization, and remains no more than a sectarian rally of traditional type.

Among the Druzes of Lebanon( who are not strictly Moslem, because they do not follow the Shari'a, or Moslem law), the ranks continue to be divided -- as they have been since the seventeenth century -- between the two traditional factions of the Yazbakis and the Jounblatis. From the time Lebanon became independent, the non-militant Yazbakis have normally cooperated with the Christian establishment in the country, and are hence regarded today by the Maronite political forces as friends and allies. Their recognized leader since 1943 has been Majid Arslan, who may be succeeded in time by his son Faysal. Unlike the Yazbakis, the militant Jounblati Druzes have normally been defiant of the established Christian ascendancy in the Lebanese Republic. Their recognized leader from 1943 until 1977 was the intractable Kamal Jounblat -- an expert player on Maronite phobias who set out in 1949 to espouse the cause of

socialism (his followers are formally known as the "Progressive Socialist Party"), and who openly sided with President Nasser of Egypt after 1956 to establish himself as the foremost Lebanese champion of pan-Arabism and of Arab nationalist causes -- notably the Palestinian cause. Under his leadership, the Jumblati Druzes played a prominent role in the pro-Nasser Moslem rising of 1958, cooperated closely with the Palestinian Resistance movement beginning in 1964, and also became closely associated with the Nasserists, with the Baath Socialists (in both their Syrian and Iraqi branches), with the Communists, and with other radical groups of the doctrinaire "Left". In 1969, Jumblat became the spokesman of a coalition of these Arab nationalist and radical groups known as the "Nationalist Movement" (al Haraka al-Wataniyya). After 1973, he became the chief Lebanese supporter of the extremist Palestinian group known as the "Rejection Front". While it is often assumed that the radicalism of Kamal Jumblat was more a matter of personal tactics than of actual conviction, his consistent stand on the side of the Lebanese and Palestinian "Left" during the civil war of 1975 - 76 certainly contributed to make the Moslem Lebanese stand in the war, on the whole, appear as "Leftist". Following his assassination in 1977, the Jumblati Druzes readily accepted his son Walid as his successor. Under the new leadership, the "Progressive Socialist Party" retains its membership in the "Nationalist Movement" and maintains good relations with the Palestinian Resistance and Rejection Front, but its radicalism has certainly

become more subdued. The Joumblatis today concentrate, politically, on securing the Druze community interest in the Lebanese political holocaust, and readily concert measures with their Yazbaki adversaries for the purpose.

Between the Christian Kataeb and Chamounists, on the one side, and their Moslem and Druze antagonists on the other, the continuing conflict can by no stretch of the imagination be described as one between rival social ideologies of modern type -- of the sort commonly described as "Right" versus "Left". It is, rather, a naked struggle for power between two basically confessional fronts which -- in the final analysis -- are equally determined to prevent the transformation of the Lebanese Republic from an archaic structure <sup>inc</sup> to a modern, workable civility in which "Right" and "Left" can have real meaning. At one level, indeed, the conflict evokes memories of the medieval squabbles between the "Paladins and Saladins" of the Crusader period. During the civil war, militiamen of the so-called "Christian Right" often fought under the emblem of the Cross, while the battle-cry of some "Moslem Leftists" was "Allāhu Akbar" -- the traditional battle-cry of Islam. Among the outstanding leaders in the war was a Maronite abbot, Father Sharbil Qassīs -- a modern Lebanese version of the Grand Master of the Knights Templars -- and a Shi'ite religious dignitary, Musa al-Sadr -- an Imam complete with beard, cloak and turban. Among



the ranks of the Moslem "Left", as among those of the "Christian Right", the principle of dynastic succession has a strong appeal. The day Kamal Joumblat was buried, the Shaykh al-'Aql -- head of the Druze religious establishment -- placed the dead leader's mantle on the shoulders of his son and proclaimed him his successor, to the unanimous approbation of the Druze community and its "Leftist" allies. Among the "Rightist" Kataeb, Amin and Bashir, the sons of Pierre Gemayel, already partake in the leadership of the "Social Democratic Party" with their father -- the first as at the political level; the second at the military. Dory and Danny, the sons of Camille Chamoun, assist their father in a similar way in the leadership of the "Parti National Liberal", and -- like the Gemayel brothers -- are expected ultimately to succeed to full leadership.

At the purely internal level, the Lebanese political set-up after two years of civil war remains as archaic as it has been since the Lebanese Republic first came into existence. The social set-up is also archaic in the sense that Lebanese society continues to be divided into religious communities with conflicting primordial loyalties. On the surface, this division was considerably deepened by the recent civil war. At another level, however, there are growing numbers of Lebanese who already recognize these divisions as obsolescent, and who look forward to their ultimate disappearance -- though not with

much optimism. Some of these "new Lebanese" would like to see a liberal, secular democracy established in the country, with bona fide representative institutions. Others think in terms of Socialist "reforms" or of a social revolution. Politically ambitious Lebanese who find themselves excluded from the archaic political establishment often try to form independent platforms, but so far with hardly any real success. Others join Socialist or Communist parties or organizations which tend to derive their importance mainly from outside support (as already indicated), or which actually serve as Lebanese agents to some outside Arab or non-Arab power. During the civil war, most of these Lebanese Socialists and Communists were active under the umbrella of Joumblat's "Nationalist Movement", in association with the Palestinian Resistance organization. Since the last stages of the war, as the "Nationalist Movement" became divided over the issue of the Syrian intervention, these groups ceased to cooperate with one another as closely as they did before and -- at least for the moment -- have been reduced to a marginal consequence.

. . .

The "Lebanese Question", as it stands today, attracts international attention not so much by virtue of the internal, somewhat folklorish conflict between the Christian Moslem Lebanese (which is still far from being

ved), as from the external dimensions of this conflict at the regional and international levels. How the "Lebanese Question" will ultimately be settled does not depend so much on what happens between the presumed "Right" and "Left" in the country, as on what happens between the many outside parties -- the regional and world powers -- involved in the broader "Middle Eastern Question". So far, these outside parties, for reasons of their own, have in many cases chosen to invest in Lebanese discord. Should the standing international issues with respect to the Middle East, one day, be finally settled, such external investment in Lebanese discord would naturally be reduced. The internal problems of Lebanon would then become of little consequence to any but the inhabitants of Lebanon who are still there -- whoever those may be. Only then would the country be able to find a way out of its present predicament, possibly to emerge -- once and for all -- as a true modern civility.

Kamal S. Salibi

Beirut,  
May 18, 1978.

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International Conference on

THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE - BASIC ISSUES AND MAJOR TRENDS

from 25 to 26 May 1978 in Hamburg

Haim Shaked

EXPERIENCE INTO FICTION: ISRAELI WRITERS  
ON JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS (THE CASE OF  
HASUT BY SAMMY MICHAEL)



מכון שילוח לחקר המזרח התיכון ואפריקה

THE SHILOAH CENTER FOR  
MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN STUDIESDRAFT

Not for Quotation

Haim Shaked

EXPERIENCE INTO FICTION: ISRAELI WRITERS  
ON JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS (THE CASE OF  
HASŪT BY SAMMY MICHAEL)

Paper presented at the Conference on  
The Contemporary Middle Eastern Scene -- Basic  
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Hamburg, 24-25 May, 1978.

The night of Monday, 13 February 1978, was a usual Israeli night, except for an intangible atmosphere of a widespread public feeling of expectations and excitement, normally reserved for nights in which important national sports events take place.

At 21.30 all ordinary activities and conversations came to a standstill at many Israeli homes as the popular monthly Israeli Television programme, "The Third Hour", came on air. That particular moment was a culmination of a heated public debate which had beset all walks of Israeli intelligentsia ever since it had been publicly announced, a week earlier, that a TV showing and discussion of a film based on the novel Khirbet Hiz'a (The Site of Hiz'a)<sup>1</sup> published in 1949 by the well-known Israeli author S. [milansky] Yizhar, was postponed and might be banned as a result of action taken by several members of the Executive Board of the Israeli Broadcasting Authority and the Minister of Education.

The Khirbet Hiz'a debate, which had very quickly avalanched into a growing stream of newspaper articles, letters-to-the-editor, and parliamentary questions was tangential to several issues simultaneously. It went through two phases: the first, which concentrated on the legal,

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1. In this particular context the term Khirbe has the dual meaning of "the village of..." and "the ruins of...".

educational and political pros and cons of the postponement of the television programme began the day it was announced that the first scheduled showing of the programme had been postponed and ended with its actual showing one week later. The immediate issue in question was that of political censorship and extraneous interference with the editorial policy of the independent broadcasting media -- a hyper-sensitive issue in the light of apprehensions in many Israeli circles that the then relatively new Israeli Likkud government might utilize its political power in an attempt to impose its own views on the content of the programmes produced by Israeli radio and television. The second phase began the day following the actual showing of the programme and rather quickly subsided and completely dissipated, within a few days. The substance of the debate at this stage was twofold: one main question which was raised now, by way of an anti-climax, could be summed up as: "was it all worth it?" Another, not less significant question which now came to the fore dealt with the actual content of the filmed version of Khirbet Hiz'a, which tells of the Israeli occupation of an Arab village in the war of 1948 and the evacuation of its inhabitants: to what extent was this story truly representative of the realities of the Jewish-Arab relations in a wartime situation; did the story reflect history as it really was?

Indeed, the leitmotif of the debate, in its two stages, could be reduced to the problem of the relationship between the historical realities of the continuous conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and Israel, and its various artistic expressions in contemporaneous Israeli literature.

Put in somewhat less concrete terms, it could be argued that one major issue which was inherent in the Khirbet Hiz'a debate was the vicious circle of the relationship between literary fiction and the realities of the surroundings in which that fiction is produced. Another, perhaps more complicated issue, that constantly crept up in the debate was the reverse of the same vicious circle, namely, the impact of the content and message of that literature on the realities of the situation which it attempted to portray and tackle.

The Khirbet Hiz'a debate, which by now is no longer a public issue in Israel brought to the fore, at least for a while, the interesting subject of the imagery of the Arabs and of problems related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to Jewish-Arab relations in Israeli literature. When, in 1963, a well-established Israeli author by the name of Joseph Arikha edited an anthology of Arab Life in Hebrew Prose,<sup>1</sup> one of its reviewers, noted that the editor had "drawn the attention to a special corner of the Hebrew literature in the Land of Israel -- the Arab subject. Every now and then, such a story would appear, but it did not occur that gradually a whole literature had accumulated".<sup>2</sup> Hardly

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1. Amm Hassefer Publishers, Tel Aviv, 1963.

2. B. Karu, "Stories from the Life of the Arabs", Maariv, 1 November 1963 (in Hebrew). Italics mine. H.S.



should this be a surprising fact. After all, the Arab-Israeli conflict and various other, less salient but nonetheless very significant, aspects of the Jewish-Arab encounter and relations in modern times play an important role in the aggregate experience of the Israelis -- individuals and society alike. The coincidence of an expanding literature in the Hebrew language which uses an Israeli scenery as a backdrop for its plots, Israeli figures as its characters, and Israeli existential problems as its issues, with the inescapable centrality which the Arab-Israeli theme occupies in modern Israeli life -- have deeply affected the content of modern Israeli (Hebrew) literature.

The ever-growing body of Israeli literary output which deals directly or indirectly, marginally or centrally, with Arabs or Arabs and Jews, has found expression in all literary forms -- poetry and prose, plays, diaries and memoirs. Books, periodicals and the daily press as well as the theatre, radio and television, have provided -- every medium in its own way -- platforms for those poets, writers and playwrights who wished to wrestle with the highly sensitive and very delicate issue of interweaving Arab characters or Arab-Jewish issues into the plots of their literary creations. Over the years, there have been numerous cases in which writers opted to make these the pivotal points of their literary works.

Surprisingly, students of literature, history and political science alike have thus far neglected this important bulk of evidence in their

scholarly pursuit of modern Hebrew literature or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hence the extreme dearth of systematic analyses of the imagery of the Arab in Israeli belles lettres in the Hebrew language. One of the unique attempts to plough in this virgin soil was made by Ehud Ben-'Ezer, himself an accomplished young Israeli writer, who has dedicated the last ten years to a systematic collection of relevant material and its classification. In a series of articles which he published,<sup>1</sup> he made some very interesting observations, based on an attitude "which is neither just that of literary analysis, nor that of a historical description but a comprehensive method which is attempting to see the psychological history of our attitudes to the Arabs from the end of the last century up to our own period and the feeling of war and siege through their literary reflections. This is based on the assumption that literature expresses the true rhythm of human existence which is sometimes hardly discernable in historical studies, books of memoirs, volumes of documentation, political debates or formalistic analyses of literary texts".<sup>2</sup> Ben-'Ezer believes that since its first significant

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1. Ehud Ben-'Ezer, "Breakers-through and besieged, studies of the young Israeli literature", Keshet, vol. , 1968, pp. 124-160 (in Hebrew); "Between romance and the bitterness of reality, the Arab question in our literature; A talk with Ehud Ben-'Ezer", Shdemot, vol. , 1972, pp. 11-26; vol. , pp. 3-15 (in Hebrew); "War and peace in the Israeli literature, 1967-1976", (in Hebrew). See also his unpublished manuscript, The Shade of the Groves and the Volcano (the Arab question in the Literature of the Land of Israel), (in Hebrew). For a study of Israeli (Hebrew) children's literature see Menahem Regev, "'The Arab Problem', in Israeli children's books", 'Akhshav, 1968, pp. 209-234 (in Hebrew).

2. PN (B), p. 9, see also SA, pp. 11-12.

dealings with the "Arab question" at the turn of the last century, Israeli (Hebrew) literature has been vacillating between two poles, that of the romantic attitude (the grove shade) and that of the bitterness of the reality (the volcano). The main characteristic of the Hebrew literature written in Palestine until the 1920's was its overwhelming romantic attitude to the Arabs. In the 1920's and 1930's, the Israeli Hebrew literature reflects "a wrestling between romance and the bitterness of reality". Then came the age of the Palmach and the 1948 generation of Israeli writers, in whose works the Arab "becomes a moral issue of the Israeli man, the Israeli fighter". This third generation, to which S. Yizhar and his Khirbet Hiz'a belong, with its moralistic-ideological attitude, did not share the romantic approach of the first generation of authors in the Hebrew language in Palestine. It was naive and perhaps full of self-pity but not fatalistic or pessimistic. To the fourth generation of Israeli authors which are by now gradually becoming the establishment of Israeli literature -- the Arab no longer poses a moral question. He ceases to be treated as an individual, as a person. Rather, he becomes the Israeli's nightmare, and he is treated as a gender, as a group, as a symbol. "In the years of the siege [from the early 1950's] until 1967 the Arab is always the Arab who stands beyond the border -- the infiltrator, the one who threatens -- and he is part of some kind of an existential terror which encompasses the Israeli hero and does not let him live his life the way he wishes to. The figure of the Arab is the projection of the terror which exists within the Israeli hero".<sup>1</sup> Gradually, the Arab

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1. SA, pp. 12-13.

problem has turned into a Jewish problem. The first generation of authors "was concerned with what happens to the Arabs. The third generation, that to which S. Yizhar belongs, "was concerned with what happened to the Israeli man as he was relating to the Arab", while the younger, fourth generation is "not so much concerned with what happens to the Arab but rather with what happens to us, to the Israeli hero. It is not [any longer] the moral dilemma which is the principal matter, but the nightmare". <sup>1</sup>

As regards ~~the figure of the Arab~~ the figure of the Arab as symbolizing a collective terror and nightmare, Ben-'Ezer makes another interesting observation. He draws a sharp line between the figures of that Arab who lives on the 'other' side of the Israeli-Arab border, who neatly falls into the aforementioned category, and the Israeli Arab, who is treated as a member of "a low community who makes his way through Jewish women and pressure groups in order to get to the top; the deprived who aspires upwards. Obviously, he is treated as an individual, not as a part of a [collective] nightmare". <sup>2</sup>

The impact of the October 1973 war, as Ben-'Ezer sees it was one of an unforgettable blow which has made Israelis aware that "the existential <sup>revelation</sup> ~~question~~ of siege, which characterized our feelings until June 1967, is perhaps truer than the drunkenness which befell us between these two wars [of 1967 and 1973]".

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1. SB, pp. 13-14. For a very fine comparison between the Arabs <sup>as they figure</sup> in the writings of S. Yizhar's and 'Amos 'Oz, see PN, pp. 128-129.

2. SA, p. 13.

This ~~the~~ siege feeling may have turned into a certain "national schizophrenia". On the one hand eyes have to be kept constantly open, lest watchfulness be reduced and hence the danger of being *destroyed*. ~~less~~. This forebodes the possibility of sinking into complete despair. On the other hand, there is another possible way, that of closing the eyes, which carries the blessings of forgetfulness which permits normal life to go on. <sup>1</sup>

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Far from being an exercise in the study of literature, the purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly, to draw the attention to a dimension of Jewish-Arab relations and of the Arab-Israeli conflict which has heretofore not been the subject of serious academic study. [The Shiloah Center is planning to hold during the coming academic year an all Israeli conference on the theme of ~~the~~ Arab Imagery in Israeli literature, and ~~the~~ Israeli imagery in Arab literature.] Secondly, to utilize just one -- albeit important -- recent Israeli work of fiction as a source for the reconstruction of viewpoints and attitudes: as a record which contains historical data the way a painting, rather than a photograph, would do it.

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1. PN (B), p. 7.

In May 1977, a new Hebrew book, by the name of Hasūt, was published by the respectable Israeli Am Oved Publishing House, in its very popular series: ~~the~~ "the Library for the People". Relatively unnoticed at first, this book has gradually been picking up in sales and becoming an object of elaborate reviews and of public interest -- both from the literary and the ideological-political points of view. In January 1978, the author <sup>of Hasūt</sup> received the respected annual Holon Municipality prize for belles lettres in memory of Dr. H. Kugel.

The story narrated in the book occurs ~~during~~ in October 1973. The main plot begins on the eve of Yom Kippur and ends two days after the holiday, while the October War is still in its initial phase -- that of the combined surprise Egyptian-Syrian offensive (a period which has become known in Israeli parlance as "the curbing"). As the plot ~~develops~~ develops, there are ~~disturbances~~ <sup>digressions through</sup> "flashback" scenes dating back ten to twenty years, which add to the main story a time perspective, and thereby depth and richness. Geographically, the plot takes place mainly in two locations: the Arab town of Jenin in the West Bank, and an apartment building in the mainly Jewish city of Haifa in the northern part of Israel. The number of characters is rather limited and, obviously, some of them play a major, primary, role while the others have merely supporting roles of a secondary or tertiary nature. All primary figures are members of a political body which is referred to in the book as "The Organization" -- undoubtedly

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1. According to oral information supplied by the Managing Director of Am Oved, the average for book sales in this series is 25-30 thousand copies. Until mid-May 1978, some 30 thousand copies of Hasūt had been sold -- which is considered a "good distribution" for a book published just one year before. According to information he had received from bookstores, demand for Hasūt was rising with the passage of time.

a literary name for the New Communist List.

Briefly, the plot of Hasūt tells of Fathī, a young, successful, nationalist Israeli Arab poet who is admired by Arabs and Jews (particularly his Jewish girl-friends). He settled with his family in an Israeli Arab village after they had left their own village during the 1948 War. On the eve of Yom Kippur he travels with Wasfī, his future brother-in-law, to the West Bank. Wasfī goes there to pay a visit to the latter's brother's widow, who lives -- with her daughter and sons -- in a refugee camp in Jenīn. The aim of Fathī's trip is to meet with an important leader of "the Organization" -- Zuhayr. Unlike the radical, revolutionary zeal represented by Fathī -- Wasfī is wealthy, drives an impressive American car, and owns a partnership in a well-established Jewish garage in the Haifa Bay area. While Wasfī, who is rich, corrupt and happy-go-lucky spends the night at his widowed sister-in-law's hut -- and bed -- in the refugee camp, Fathī stays in the city with his friends -- a Palestinian refugee turned well-to-do dentist called Majīd, and his wife 'Abla. Both Fathī and Wasfī encounter, during the night, the Palestinian Fidā'iyyūn movement.

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1. The Israeli Communist Party has for many years been a very small party in terms of <sup>its</sup> parliamentary seats but the only available outlet for Arab anti-Zionist and nationalist feelings. Its main support during parliamentary elections, has come from the Arab sector of Israel's population, whence the party also drew its active members and leaders. In 1965, the Israeli Communist Party split into an overwhelmingly Jewish Israeli Communist Party which is patriotic in its attitudes and critical of Moscow's political line concerning the Middle East and the Arab Israeli conflict; and the New Communist List. The latter is loyal to Moscow, very critical of Israeli governmental policies and overwhelmingly Arab in membership and leadership. In the May 1977 parliamentary elections, a leftist bloc called Sheli which includes the former Israeli Communist Party gained ~~x 20~~ seats while the New Communist List obtained ~~5~~ seats of the 120 seats.

Fathī witnesses the bringing of a Palestinian wounded in action (against Israel?) for treatment to Majid's house; <sup>and his death</sup> while Wasfī is threatened that his American car be blown up unless he pays ransom to the Palestinian organizations. The next day, on Yom Kippur, Fathī clandestinely meets <sup>at</sup> Majid's house with Zuhayr -- a meeting which is interrupted by the news of the outbreak of the [October] War.

The main location of the plot now moves to Haifa, to the house of Mardūkh and Shūla. He, a Jew of Iraqi origin who was a member of the Communist party in Iraq, <sup>and therefore</sup> suffered fierce torture and a long term of imprisonment, joins his military unit as soon as the war begins. His wife stays behind with their retarded child 'Ido, her unfulfilled love to Rāmī (now a career Lieutenant-Colonel in the Israeli Defence Force), her friends, her neighbour Tuvia (who represents the average Jewish man-in-the-street), as well as her memories of moments spent with Mardukh during which he <sup>had</sup> told her terrible things about his capture and torture in Iraq. Shula's friends are all members of "the Organization": Shoshana, a Jewish girl from a well-established agricultural settlement <sup>who</sup> is married to Fu'ād, a Christian Arab, editor (?) of "the Organization's" newspaper; and Emile and 'Amalya <sup>He</sup> ~~is~~ another Arab leader in "the Organization" and she -- the daughter of a Jewish MP of "the Organization". When the war breaks out, Emile and 'Amalya ask Shūla to hide Fathī <sup>in order</sup> to prevent his probable administrative arrest by the Israeli authorities. She complies and henceforth the plot concentrates on the dramatic confrontations between the main characters, <sup>who find themselves</sup> in a most unusual situation created by the war.



Fathī and Shūla nearly have a love affair. Shoshana and Fu'ād's three boys transfer the tension <sup>that rages</sup> between Jews and Arabs into their own home; Rammi -- Shūla's true first love -- is killed in battle; Fathī is becoming more and more excited by the prospects that this time the Arab side will win the war <sup>he</sup> is discovered by Shūla's neighbour Tuvia; Shūla is under much stress due both to lack of news from her husband who is in the front and the presence of Fathī in her house; and every one keeps arguing politics with the others. The story terminates rather abruptly, when Fathī decides to go back to Jenīn in anticipation of the final Arab victory and Shūla does not wish to accept his invitation to flee with him. The ending of the book expresses, very bluntly, the height of the drama:

"No Fathī, I am staying here". And she got on her long legs and switched off the light and opened the door to the balcony. In the darkness her face was a pale stain. In front of her, the dark sea crouched heavily. At that hour she was like a soft twig which the storm might pluck. He almost said I love you.

"I shall call Tuvia", she said. "He will watch 'Ido and I shall drive you to 'Amalya and ~~Elimo~~ <sup>Emile</sup>."

"Yes", he said in a hushed rage.

"You hate me", she said.

"Is it so important to you now?"

She was silent. He got up and his dry lips searched in the darkness for her lips. Her face recoiled and he felt a chill, as if a deathlike cold barrier had come up between them. At that hour they ceased to be man and woman. He was <sup>just</sup> an Arab and she was just a Jewess".<sup>1</sup>

In one of the more penetrating reviews of Hasut, published in a leftist daily newspaper, the reviewer correctly remarks that "it is hard to be mistaken about the intents of Sammi Michael. Almost any one of his heroes is an anthropomorphous idea. Though the novel is realistic and at times even naturalistic, it is also a quasi-"symposium" in which each participating figure is expressing the Weltanschauung which <sup>he or she</sup> ~~it~~ represents. If it is true that this particular point of weakness in the literary performance of the author of Hasut does exist -- it is precisely this combination of realism, naturalism and ideologization of the characters which provides the <sup>student</sup> ~~analyst~~ of Jewish-Arab relations with a unique insight into extremely complicated situations and issues. Thus, while Hasut could be read, and enjoyed, primarily as a story -- it can also be read as a document, in which

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1. Hasut, pp. 371-372.

2. E. Ben'Ezer, "Between Jews and Arabs", Al Hamishmar, 22 June 1978.

the figures, their personal thoughts, their dialogues, <sup>and</sup> ~~as well as~~ the situation they are trapped in -- all exemplify (if not symbolize) the author's rendering of his own views and experience. Thus, the three primary heros of the story represent three worlds which happen to live together in a continuous situation of national conflict. The poet, Fathī, would represent the young, educated, radicalized and torn Israeli Arab whose life is full of internal contradictions and unresolved problems of clashing loyalties, national objectives and personal feelings and requirements. Mardūkh, who for the larger part of the book is not on stage, but whose presence is nevertheless constantly <sup>hovering</sup> there -- represents an oriental Jew who ~~has~~ <sup>home</sup> come to Israel because he was forced to leave his own natural surroundings and had nowhere to turn. At a time of real crisis and emergency, and unlike Fathī who hides -- he cannot wait to be mobilized and joins the units fighting at the front. Interlocked in between is Shūla -- the ~~central~~ <sup>of the book</sup> major figure -- an Israeli whose roots are well embedded in Israeli Jewish society. She loves Rammi, is loyal to her husband Mardūkh and almost makes love to Fathī. All three belong to a political organization -- the main slogan of which is supra-national fraternity or comradeship -- a slogan which collapses even before the War actually begins. The reader of Hasūt is not <sup>at all</sup> surprised ~~when~~ when towards the end of the book it becomes known that both Shūla and Mardūkh have decided to leave "the Organization".

The title of the book, Hasūt, is significant in this regard. In English, it means "refuge, protection, aegis, patronage, auspices".<sup>1</sup> In Arabic it means lujū', himāya, ri'āya, wiṣāya.<sup>2</sup> <sup>However,</sup> ~~In~~ its literary sense -- as used by Sammi Michael<sup>3</sup> it acquires a more complicated meaning. The word occurs several times in the text. Mardukh uses it twice when he tells about "the house which gave me refuge" in Iraq, while he was hiding from the secret police.<sup>3</sup> Then Shula is "requested to give refuge to an Arab", to Fathī<sup>4</sup> and she remembers that "Mardukh, who had been persecuted for so many years, sanctified the term Hasūt... He tried to make her realize that providing the persecuted with refuge is the supreme value".<sup>5</sup> At a later stage Shula explains to her mother, who is <sup>a</sup> veteran member of "the organization", that Mardukh joined the war because he wanted to fight for the country which "gave him refuge. In his inner heart he felt that he owed a great debt to this country. He sees the mistakes but he will never forget that this is the only state which gave him a home".<sup>6</sup> Finally, Fathī is grateful

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1. R. Alcalay, The complete Hebrew-English dictionary, Massadah, Tel Aviv-Jerusalem, 1965, pp. 797-798.

2. Y. Kojman, A Hebrew-Arab dictionary, Tel Aviv, 1970, p. 268.

3. Hasūt, pp. 185, 187.

4. Hasūt, pp. 189, 190.

5. Hasut, p. 191.

6. Hasut, p. 293.

to Shula who "gave him refuge in the midst of the war days, provided him with all his needs, and tried as much as possible to make his stay with her pleasant inspite of her concern for her husband".<sup>1</sup> It is this variegated meaning of the term which, undoubtedly, is central to the book; that provides a clue to the one of the main aspects of the Jewish-Arab relationship: from a minority in their countries of origin the Jews <sup>we</sup> had now reached a position of granting -- not requesting -- refuge to an Arab minority which is part of <sup>a</sup> Middle Eastern Arab majority in which Israel as a state represents a minority...<sup>2</sup>

In a way, the more concrete issues reflected by Hasut derive from this basic complication of a multi-dimensional majority-minority conflict that is coupled with a whirlpool-like situation created by a coincidence of historical processes. Due to lack of time I shall not go into a full elaboration of these concrete issues which have been besetting Jewish-Arab relations <sup>and which Hasut presents.</sup> Suffice it to mention that the book dwells on the following major problems: (a) mixed Arab-Jewish marriages (Shoshana and Fu'ad, Amalya and Emile, Fathi and his relations with his Jewish girl-friend -- or bed-mate, ~~in~~ Daphna; (b) the less than welcome attitude of veteran settled

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1. Hasut, p. 357.

2. See an interesting allusion of Sammy Michael to this point in an interview he granted to Maariv, 10 June 1977. See also Tuvia in Hasut, p. 220: "It is a pleasure to see, eventually, a Jew providing refuge at his home to a 'goy'".

Arabs to Arab refugees that tried to integrate and the deep hatred of Arabs to Arabs generated by this attitude; (c) the ambivalent, hostile, disparaging attitude of the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank to Israeli Arabs; (d) the diametrically opposed attitudes to war as expressed by the various characters; (e) the debate about the very possibility of developing, let alone maintaining, a spirit of Arab-Jewish, or Arab-Israeli fraternity; (f) the radicalization of the Israeli Arabs, as reflected in a scene at the editorial offices of the organ of "the Organization",<sup>1</sup> where the younger members think the poet Fathī "is not ~~enough~~ enough of an extremist";<sup>2</sup> (g) the tense, ambivalent relationship between the Israeli Arabs and the Palestinian Fidā'iyyūn; (h) and, finally, the most complicated issue of all -- the alienation and identity-crisis of the Israeli Arab.

The last two issues merit, perhaps, some illustration. While Fathī stays in Jenīn, and the wounded Palestinian is brought into Zyhayir's house, he envisages the following dialogue between himself and the commander of the Palestinian unit:

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1. Hasūt, pp. 232-235.

2. Hasūt, p. 233.

"Are you ready to carry arms in order to Kill?"

"Yes, I am.

"Every person, whether you know him or not -- you are ready to kill him if the superiors order you to?"

"I don't know...I don't think...what do you mean?"

" They will tell you, go there and kill.

" Every person?"

"Man, you must not ask questions.

"Even Mardukh, his wife, and his retarded son?"

"Who are they?"

"Israelis, friends of mine.

" Jews?"

"Yes...Jews. But they courageously defend the Arabs.

" Jews !

" I told you. They are Jews of a totally different kind.

" All Jews are of one kind. All sit on land robbed from the Arabs.

This Mardukh and his wife, are they floating in the air or walking on land which is not theirs?

"You cannot present the matter in such a way.

"The revolution presents its principles in a sharp way. When you shoot already, there is no room for fine distinctions. Every <sup>doubt</sup> serves the enemy.

"Mardukh is no enemy.

"Can he carry arms?"

"Yes. Actually, he serves in the Israeli Army at least one month each year. He fights in the lines of the Jewish army.

"Yes...when he is mobilized he is a soldier and has to obey.

"Which means, he obeys instructions which compel him to kill Arabs. And you, the Arab, hesitate to harm Jews.

"I meant Mardukh and his family.

"Traitor!

"Do not make accusations! Indeed, I have never held weapons but for many years I fought for the Palestinian cause within the enemy's bastion, when you were idle in coffee houses playing cards.

"What did you do?

"I compiled poems.

"How many Jews have breathed their last as a result of your poems?

"You are narrow minded.

"Prepare yourself, kid.

"You talk nonsense.

"You shall be executed.

"Idiots, I still have many poems that I wish to compile. One moment! do you wish to tell me that the revolution is not in need of poets? Don't tell me that this is a bunch of impermeable brains. Since when is it the poet's duty to carry arms?

"This is no new thing, my dear. 'Antar did that before the advent of Islam.

"I am not 'Antar.

"You are a Zionist worm. The Jews robbed you of your manhood. Yalla, get up! In your stead I would not be sorry to take leave from such degrading life".<sup>1</sup>

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1. Hasūt, pp. 104-105.



The forte of Hasut, in my own eyes, is its masterful presentation of the identity crisis of the Israeli Arab, as condensed into the figure of Fathī. On the one hand, Fathī proudly regards himself as the opposite of Wasfī -- who has long ago come to terms with the Jews of Israel and through full collaboration with them has flourished <sup>economically.</sup> Furthermore, he is full of self-esteem, <sup>being</sup> the poor Arab refugee boy who had come to live in Wasfī's village <sup>now,</sup> and has taken full revenge for all the degradation he had suffered: "Fathī has become the crown of the village. Moscow and Berlin were flat at his feet, the beds of Tel Avivian blondes took him with a thrill, his poems reverberated from Damascus to Cairo..." <sup>1</sup> In his heart, however, Fathī is full of doubt. Moreover, the people who surround him treat him as a stranger, some even mistake him for an Israeli Jew. <sup>2</sup> "What are your problems?" 'Abla asks him, and he replies "I do not find myself", and immediately regrets his frankness. <sup>3</sup> Fakhrī, an Arab friend who joined the PLO publishes a strong critique of Fathī in which he calls him "a traitor" and "an intellectual whore which was captivated in the salons of the poison concoctors". <sup>4</sup> He goes to Jenīn in an attempt to shed his feeling of being

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1. Hasut, p. 40. See also p. 55 where .../so big that even Jews acclaim his calling them sons of prostitutes./

2. Hasut, p. 65.

3. Hasut, p. 61.

4. Hasut, p. 62.

a stranger. Instead, this feeling is accentuated when he meets with Zuhayr, and the latter asks:

"What oppresses you, man?"

"I do not know where I am".

"You are there and we are here".

"I am fed up with the acrobatic games. It does not adhere. I am trying but it does not hold -- both an Arab and an Israeli".

"Is it so hard in Tel Aviv?"

The poet blushed when he noticed the irony, and remained silent. Then he said in a complaining voice which sounded childish in his ears:  
it is <sup>choking</sup> ". 1

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There are several points in the biography of the author and in the plot of his novel, which add a measure of first-hand experience and realism to Sammy Michael's observations. Sammy Michael, a 52 year old Iraqi Jew who was an active member of the Communist party in Iraq, who was forced to escape to Iran (1948) and whence he went to Israel in 1949 and was, for several years an active member of the Israeli Communist Party.<sup>2</sup> In this regard, he is a representative of a number of authors, mainly of Iraqi Jewish

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1. Hasūt, p. 121.

2. See Hasūt, p. 1. For more details see his interview in Maariv.

origin, who have in recent years used their rich personal experience as a basis for fiction. Notwithstanding the statement which ~~appears~~ in the front matter of the book, that "any similarity between the figures in the book and living persons is purely coincidental", reviewers and observers have identified various figures which have a prominent place in the book with living persons. Thus, Fathī has been identified with well known the Israeli Arab Samīh al-Qāsim, who is a prominent nationalist, communist extremist Arab poet, while Fakhrī has been identified with the well-known Arab poet who is now a prominent member of the PLO -- Mahmūd Darwīsh.

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The proximity between the realities of Arab-Jewish relations and the ambivalent relations between Israeli Arabs and West Bank Arabs on the one hand, and the story narrated by Sammy Michael in his Hasūt on the other, as well as the special blend of first-hand experience and a high degree of sensitivity applied by the author in his observations -- all these have contributed to the importance of his work as a document and a source of information -- an objective which, apparently was far from the author's mind when he wrote the book.

While some Israeli reviewers have ~~praised~~ criticized Hasūt from the purely literary point of view -- the majority of them praised it as a highly

sensitive, and extremely important mirror of <sup>and</sup> Arab-Jewish relations the life of Israeli Arabs and aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Two reviewers, however, have gone beyond the others in claiming that Hasut (and several other works of fiction published <sup>in Israel</sup> since 1974) may be a harbinger of a new phase in <sup>the development of</sup> Israeli works of fiction which deal with the Arabs, and Arab-Jewish relations. <sup>This, they say, is a</sup> phase which no longer treats the Arabs as a collective nightmare, ~~but~~, rather, <sup>it</sup> concentrates on their concrete social and national problems.<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps too early to tell whether this is indeed <sup>the beginning of a watershed</sup> a new trend -- but it might be <sup>a good idea</sup> very ~~interesting~~ to watch it carefully.

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1 See E. Ben-Ezer, 'Al-Hamishmar; Y. Besser, "A Contribution to a New Literary Move"; Davar, 15 July 1977.

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THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE - BASIC ISSUES AND MAJOR TRENDS

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Udo Steinbach

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE ARAB WORLD -  
POLITICAL COMPETITION OR PARTNERSHIP?

3650

1. Pragmatic Mediterranean Policy and "Global Approach".

The EEC has devoted particular interest to the Mediterranean region since its inception, in the context of its external economic relations. The special position of the regions in North Africa, which had formerly been colonized by France and Italy (Morocco, Tunisia and Libya) was already recognized by the "Rome Treaties". Algeria, as a French territory, was still fully integrated into the sphere of application of the EEC Treaty in 1958; by Article 227 of the Treaty.

The six EEC nations began to play an active role in the Mediterranean when Association Agreements were made with Greece (effective from 1.11.1962) and with Turkey (effective from 1.12.1964). These foresaw a gradual removal of tariffs finally leading to full membership in the EEC for both nations <sup>(1)</sup> as well as financial support by the EEC. Although these agreements were principally of a financial nature, they received a political tone insofar as it was the USA themselves who pressed for the conclusion of the agreements. The association was combined with the goal of tying the two south-eastern NATO partners more closely to Europe, with the prospect of later incorporation into European economic integration. During the 1960's and early 1970's, a number of agreements of varying content and economic and politico-economic extent were made, although it must be said that the Turkish and Greek experiment was not repeated. The treaties were largely restricted to the establishment of preferential trade relations. Here the agreements with Israel, Lebanon

Morocco and Tunisia, Spain, Malta, Cyprus as well as Egypt and Portugal should be mentioned.<sup>(2)</sup>

In making these agreements, the EEC took a pragmatic path of strengthening economic co-operation with the nations of the Mediterranean at the same time contributing to the political stabilisation of the whole region. A conception of the form of relations with third parties in general, or with the Mediterranean nations in particular, had not previously been worked out.

The multiplicity of treaties had become confusing and unmanageable, quite apart from the fact that the individual agreements with different

Mediterranean nations began to produce contradictions in the policy of the

Community and demands for equal treatment of one country with another

were heard. This was the situation in the first half of 1972. Three

Mediterranean problems were on the agenda of the "European Council" at

this time:

- the re-negotiation of the treaties with Morocco and Tunisia "on an extended basis";

- the consequences of the extension of the community to Spanish and Israeli foreign trade;

- the applications of Spain, Israel and Turkey for incorporation into the general preference system.

Since any decision made in these problem areas would necessarily have consequences for the existing treaties, and those in the process

of negotiation, the "Council" directed the "Commission" to provide it with proposals for a "global Mediterranean scheme". The Commission complied with this wish in its statement of 14 July 1972. In a session in November 1972 (i.e. before the oil crisis broke out), the Council established the basis of a Mediterranean policy. The Community is prepared, in the context of this "global Mediterranean policy", to make full treaties with all states bordering on the Mediterranean which want them (and Jordan). These include a complete opening of the market of the Community for industrial goods, preferential access for agricultural produce, economic co-operation and, if the occasion arises, financial and technical assistance from the side of the community. The content and extent of treaties to be made with nations concerned should be determined according to the particular circumstances of each case. (3)

The "Global Policy" did not achieve extensive agreements between the European Community and its Mediterranean partners. First, because of the multiplicity of competing interests among the European member states, secondly, those among the Mediterranean nations, and thirdly those between individual member states and individual Mediterranean nations, an extensive realisation of the goals could hardly have been achieved. (4)

The guidelines of the global Mediterranean policy were, from the beginning, not intended to apply to the relationships of association of Greece and Turkey. Above all, priority of application concerned Spain,



Israel, and the Maghreb nations. The first treaty, with Israel, was signed in May 1975, followed by the Maghreb nations Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in April 1976. The end of negotiations with the Mashrek nations Egypt, Syria and Jordan in January 1977 (the agreement with Lebanon being delayed till May 1977 because of the internal political crisis there) closes an important chapter of the relations of the Community with the Mediterranean region.

The European Community has established a system of agreements with all of the Mediterranean nations (and Jordan) with the exception of Libya and Albania. Their arrangements are restricted to economic relations, but at the same time, this system is intended to make a long-term contribution to the realisation of two foreign policy goals:

- the economic and social development of the Mediterranean nations through close economic co-operation, in order to encourage economic and, at the same time, political stability in the region;

- the establishment of close economic co-operation as a contribution to the foundation and protection of a lasting peace.

## 2. "European Political Co-operation" (EPC).

In spite of implicit political elements within the treaty policy of the Community in the Mediterranean, this did not by any means imply a

Mediterranean "policy", but was merely an expression of a natural emphasis which to this region had to be accorded in the Community's foreign policy for a number of reasons. The European Economic Community also had no body which would have been able to plan or carry out common political steps in any direction whatever. Genuinely noteworthy steps in this direction were first suggested at the summit conference of member states of the Community in December 1969. These came to fruition in the creation of the "European Political Co-operation" (EPC) in 1970. In this framework, set by the Davignon Report, an instrument for political negotiation was established. Its most important component is four meetings of foreign ministers of member states of the Community annually, apart from the routine summit meetings. Although formally outside the institutional framework of the Community, the Ministers, in the EPC, can make their appearances as members of the Economic Community. A "Political Committee", consisting of the political directors of the foreign ministries prepares the meetings of ministers.

It was indicative of the political importance of the Mediterranean and Middle East region, that the EPC chose the Middle East and the crisis in that area as a political priority beside the "Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe". (CSCE).

Certainly the political basis for a common standpoint of the six member countries (at that time) on the most important points of the Middle East problem was still weak: Traditions and interests of the

Mediterranean members of the Economic Community in relation to the Arab world differed from those members bordering on the North Sea. The political-psychological role of Israel was not the same in all of the partner nations. France and Great Britain had a special position with regard to the Middle East Conflict as permanent members of the UN Security Council. Finally, co-ordination of positions and the political role of Western Europe in general with the United States was insufficient. The result of the political consultations within the EPC, a report of the "Political Committee", which the foreign ministers accepted in May 1971, then led to a differing response in the member states and to considerable reservations and open disapproval from the USA and Israel.

Indeed, the "Six" had reached agreements on a common basis on the most delicate points of the Middle East conflict: The question of Israel's withdrawal from the areas occupied in 1967 (albeit with "minor modifications"), the modalities of "recognized and guaranteed borders" (international guarantees, de-militarised and internationally controlled security zones), the demand for an "administrative inter-nationalisation" of Jerusalem, the settlement of the question of the Palestinian refugees, as well as that of shipping in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. The impression that the EEC nations wanted to take their own initiative in negotiations and exercise pressure on Israel over the territorial question arose. Israel reacted strongly and denied the right and the qualifications of the EEC nations to engage in efforts to settle the conflict. In contrast, the reports of the EPC Report were discussed positively in the Arab capitals. The USA and the Soviet Union showed reserve.

Although there was no declared connection between the efforts for a "global" approach in EEC external economic relations with the Mediterranean nations and the attempt at political agreement within the EPC, the energy crisis would soon show that the re-ordering of economic relations in terms of partnership and equilibrium would be an important element in overall relations between the two areas. This crisis occurred as a result of the imposition of the Arab oil embargo at the end of 1973.

European engagement in the Middle East conflict seemed to meet with resistance for two principal reasons: On the one hand, Western Europe seemed to possess insufficient political weight to make an effective contribution to a solution of the conflict; her "interference" thus seemed only to create confusion. On the other hand, Western Europe's dependency on oil occasioned suspicion that she might side too strongly with the Arabs under the pressure of the "oil weapon" and thereby weaken Israel's bargaining position.

### 3. The Euro-Arab Dialogue: Preparation and Basis.

After the United States and the Soviet Union agreed, during the course of the October crisis (1973), to limit the peace initiatives at the Geneva Conference to themselves and the conflict parties, the Nine had to withdraw from their considerations of the idea of a Western European contribution to the peace initiatives. They then had to press

towards a new long-term sphere of activity in European-Arab policy  
(5)  
outside the realm of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The idea of Euro-Arab dialogue, which four Arab ministers presented in Copenhagen in December 1973 on behalf of the 20 member nations of the Arab League, correspond with European considerations of a new form of organisation of relations with the Arab region. In view of the particular situation of Western Europe, which was marked by the double nature of economic and political foreign relations, the different relations between the EEC members with Israel and the Arab nations, and US-Israeli mistrust towards European political initiatives, this dialogue had to assume a new form of diplomatic and political contact.

The conception of the "Dialogue", which was worked out in the first half of 1974, reflects the efforts of the administrations of the Nine to establish relations with the Arab world on a stable long-term basis of partnership. Thus, it was clear from the outset that the dialogue should not impede the imminent initiatives of the politics of oil on a wider international stage, and, above all, that it should not interfere with attempts at a peace settlement for the Middle East. That is to say, that the conflict should not be a point on the agenda of the dialogue. This was made clear by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, at the press conference on 11.6.1974, in which he formally confirmed the beginning of the European-Arab dialogue. Thus, the

dialogue was to be located institutionally both outside foreign economic relations with the Middle East nations, which were to be arranged according to the principles of the "Global Approach", as well as being outside European Political Co-operation (EPC).

Even though political components, especially the Israel-Arab conflict were excluded from the dialogue by definition, one must not overlook the political background against which the establishment of its approach is to be understood.

1. For a long time, a number of Arab states on the Mediterranean have pressed for the acceptance of questions of Mediterranean security into the agenda of the Helsinki "Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe" (CSCE). This was to be done in order to discuss the question of Mediterranean security in relations to European security as well as the problem of peace, stability and security in the Middle East. These efforts found only a limited response from nations meeting in Helsinki. The dominant feeling was that the CSCE should restrict itself to security in Europe and should not get swallowed up by peripheral problems of security outside Europe, particularly in the Middle East.

2. The October War (1973) made the studiously ignored connection between the security of both regions dramatically obvious. Not only had the involvement of the two super powers immediately affected

Europe, the USA had even alerted her nuclear forces late in the war and transported military equipment, stored in the Federal Republic, to Israel without consulting her allies. This was a step which was to cause difficulties for the Federal Republic of Germany both with the Arab states and with the USA.

3. With the application of the oil embargo against most of the European nations, the Arabs tried to shift Western Europe to a statement in favour of their goals against Israel. This made apparent how strongly dependent the economic prosperity of the Nine was on a balanced and active policy in the Middle East.

4. The Middle East statement of the Nine of 6 November 1973 did not mean the adoption of an active policy in the Middle East conflict. However, it did make clear that Western Europe had adjusted to the changed situation in the Middle East and was ready to support peace initiatives presented on the basis of internationally recognized facts and resolutions. The intimation that the Nine had allowed themselves to be "compelled" to a pro-Arab position by the pressure of the Arab states is unfounded. Their position rests, on the one hand, on important elements which were already part of the working paper of the Six in 1971, and on the other hand, as was stated, follows internationally recognized basic elements of a Middle Eastern peace policy. The bases of a balanced peace programme were established in the Security Council Resolution 242

of 22 November 1967. Added to this was the principle of respect for the rights of the Palestinians, which was mentioned in the UN General Assembly Resolution of 13 December 1972 with the support of the Nine. The guideline of EEC policy, as laid down by the statement mentioned above, should be: balanced consideration of Arab and Israeli interests; no annexation of territory by force; and consequently the requirements that Israel ends the occupation which she has exercised since the June War of 1967; this should be the result of a process of negotiation which leads to the recognition of the right of Israel to exist within guaranteed boundaries; following from this, respect for the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people on territory made free for the creation of a national homeland.<sup>(6)</sup> The Nine also demand international guarantees, but they refrain from making suggestions. Finally, the Resolution recalls the various ties which have existed between members of the Community and states on the South and East Mediterranean. In this context, the decision to make balanced, global agreements on economic relations with all Mediterranean nations is once again mentioned.

The European statement made it easier in the bilateral preparatory talks on European-Arab dialogue both to show understanding for justified Arab concerns, but at the same time to insist on parity for Israel. So the Federal Foreign Minister gave notice of a consultation with Israel in the press conference of 11 June 1974



mentioned above, at the same time as announcing the beginning of the European-Arab dialogue.

#### 4. Conflict of Interest with the USA?

The contextual position of the European-Arab dialogue has been carefully analysed. On the one hand, it could not be a direct political contribution of the Nine, since it was not prepared with such a role in mind. On the other hand, it could not be carried out in a political vacuum. Notwithstanding it was possible to avert the expectations of Arab governments of converting the success of the "Oil Front" into political capital, and yet, at the same time, to announce a credible engagement on behalf of Arab concerns, which also seemed adequate to the Arabs as a basis for the planned dialogue. However, resistance to the idea of a dialogue by the USA had to be overcome.

The USA have never taken a positive view of an active role of the EEC in the Mediterranean. They had encouraged the EEC to make treaties of association with Greece and Turkey in order to tie these two states, which were important from a security perspective, closely to the West economically as well. But very soon, with the signing of the subsequent agreements with the Mediterranean states, the Community found itself met by the constant suspicion of the USA

who were afraid of losing their market shares, and who pressed, as a result, for similar concessions in the context of GATT. "It would be indicative of the arrogance of power, when the American government, in the name of the citrus fruit millionaires of Arizona and California was able to achieve the same concessions for the USA as the small citrus farmers in Morocco and Tunisia have in Europe. It would also show the arrogance of power if the EEC reversed their own economically balanced agreement, which had been agreed by the Council of Ministers." (7 The extension of these treaties in the context of a "global approach" and the opening of talks which led in early 1975 to the EEC-ACP Treaty of Lomé strengthened American resistance. The prospect of a close connection of 46 developing countries in the African-Caribbean-Pacific regions with the European Community and a parallel network of agreements with almost all of the Mediterranean countries unsettled the American administration. Eventually, in close consultation, it was possible to convince the USA that this initiative was not directed against them, but would rather be a relief to them. By means of the so-called "Soames-Casey Formula" which has never been officially made known, the reservations of the USA were eventually removed. According to this, it seems that the USA have recognised that the European Community may maintain preferential relations in Europe with the EFTA nations, with the Mediterranean states (including Portugal and Jordan) as well as with the ACP countries, in the context of contractual agreements. These concessions

apparently could be granted more easily by the USA after the EEC relinquished "reciprocal preferences" in talks with the ACP nations, i.e. customs preferences, removal of customs duties and other advantages which her partners are offered, do not commit them to the statutory reciprocity characteristic of GATT. The USA would have regarded that as discrimination in the markets of the relevant developing countries. (8)

The preparations for the Euro-Arab dialogue certainly brought an escalation of American reservations against a European Middle East and Mediterranean policy. Already during the 4th Middle East War discord between Europe and the USA had emerged. The European nations had refused to be used as a base for arms deliveries to Israel and simultaneously the inadequacies of the consultative mechanism had become noticeable to the NATO partners. Thus, inter alia, the USA did not consult their allies over the decision on the world-wide nuclear alarm in October 1973.

Beyond their fears that the European Arab Dialogue might undermine Kissinger's policy of small steps towards solution of the Middle East conflict, the USA had very definite opinions on how the oil policy of the Arab states should be met — namely by a common co-ordinated energy policy of the Western consumer countries. At that time, the plan which led to the creation of the International Energy Agency in late 1974 was developed. They saw

the European-Arab dialogue as a threat to their plan of a co-ordinated Western energy policy, which they considered to be a means of counter-pressure on the Arab states.

As a result, the American reaction to the announcement, on 4 March 1974, of readiness, in principle, to begin the European-Arab dialogue, was very strong. As early as autumn 1973 Foreign Minister Kissinger had already made a statement relating to the independent European activities: the quest for a separate European identity would result in a confrontation with the USA. Now, Richard Nixon, US President at the time, stated in a speech in Chicago on 15 March 1974 that the European Community was conspiring together against the USA. It required intensive talks between the EEC nations and the USA before acceptable solutions could be found. Their main content was the omission of energy policy and the oil questions, as well as that of the Arab-Israeli conflict, from the European-Arab dialogue. At the same time, in "private talks" between the Nine's foreign ministers at Schloss Gymnich (20.-21.4.1974), the creation of a scheme of "organic consultative relationship" was agreed, which was to ensure that the nine EEC countries would not pass any definitive resolutions which could affect American interests (e.g. especially not the American policy in the Middle East) without prior consultation with the USA. Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher gave a comprehensive account of the contents of the "Gentleman's

Agreement of Gymnich" in his press conference on 11 June 1974:

"The ministers were agreed that in elaborating common positions on foreign policy there arises the question of consultations with allied or friendly countries. Such consultations are a matter of course in any modern foreign policy. We decided on a pragmatic approach in each individual case, which means that the country holding the Presidency will be authorized by the other eight partners to hold consultations on behalf of the Nine.

"In practice, therefore, if any member of the EEC raises within the framework of EPC the question of informing and consulting an ally or a friendly state, the Nine will discuss the matter and, upon reaching agreement, authorize the Presidency to proceed on that basis.

"The ministers trust that this gentleman's agreement will also lead to smooth and pragmatic consultations with the United States which will take into account the interests of both sides." (9)

The USA have followed the course of the European-Arab dialogue with interest and taken the opportunity to indicate this to both sides, perhaps most clearly in November 1975. During the third round of the dialogue in Abu Dhabi (22.-27.12.1975), the US Under Secretary for Energy Questions, Gerald Parsky came and engaged in talks with the United Arab Emirates on similar subjects

to those being discussed at that moment by the EC within the dialogue.

#### 5. Elements of the European-Arab Dialogue.

The European-Arab dialogue constitutes a framework for political negotiations in which the EC in Brussels and European Political Co-operation (EPC) collaborate. Whereas the EC is restricted to economic, trade policy and technical co-operation, and more or less completely excludes the political area, and the EPC, as a form of inter-governmental co-operation should be strictly separated from the activities of the Community and has hardly any actual political executive power, the European-Arab dialogue is involved in both areas. A "European Co-ordinating Group" was constituted as the EPC-EC executive body for the dialogue. It consists of special delegates of the nine governments at ambassador-level and of representatives of the EC commission. It is also the dialogue partner for the Arab side. Both sides are represented in a "General Commission", which consists of delegates of the 21 member states of the Arab League and the 9 member countries of the EC. Its function is to establish the principles of European-Arab co-operation and to co-ordinate the work of the working groups, which are concerned with individual areas of the co-operation. Considerable time was to pass, however, before this commission could meet. For even in the inaugural session of the dialogue in Paris on 31 July 1974, it was clear that the Arab side wanted to lay the

the emphasis on political talks, since agreement over any form of co-operation could not be separated from a comprehensive political agreement. The most delicate problem proved to be the question of representation of the Palestinians. Furthermore, the Arabs expected that the Europeans would put pressure on Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967. Against this, the European side insisted on the exclusion of political problems from the dialogue.

The removal of political difficulties, which cannot be mentioned in detail, constantly delayed the beginning of the dialogue, until it finally was able to begin at expert level in Summer 1975. The Europeans had to make clear, that in spite of all regard for the Arab position, they would not allow themselves to be held to ransom politically nor, in the context of the European-Arab dialogue would they pre-empt results which would first have to be reached by international agreements at other levels. The Arabs, for their part, finally recognized, by accepting the dialogue, the special character of the dialogue, as a framework for negotiations dedicated primarily to questions of European-Arab co-operation in certain areas.

At the first meeting of experts at Cairo in June 1975, working groups for the following areas were constituted:

agricultural development,  
industrialization,

projects for the infra-structure,  
development of trade between the two regions,  
finance questions  
scientific and technical co-operation, and  
cultural and social co-operation.

The dialogue is an attempt at a new form of diplomacy. Two organisations of states, the EC and the Arab League, wish to establish a relationship of structured co-operation. From the European side, the Nine participate as a unit, institutionalised in the committees of the EEC and the EPC; on the Arab side, the member states of the Arab League and the General Secretariat of the Arab League take part. Both alliances of states have a different form, and it must be left to both sides to determine their own organisation. Many reservations have been raised against the multilateral and collective approach of the dialogue. The multilateral approach is justified in particular because it builds upon the sum of bilateral relations both between the European nations and between the Arab nations, as well as those between the EC and the individual Mediterranean countries. The dialogue is an additional enterprise: It should be an inter-regional policy of order. As a result, it must relate to all the countries of both regions, and must have in mind the overall arrangement of the relationships of both regions — political, economic, cultural — and must work out the common, long-term goals clearly.



The success of the dialogue cannot yet be measured in concrete results. Without doubt, political agreement and economic co-operation have become closer. In the cultural sphere, too, new contacts could be established. Capital involvement and entrepreneurial co-operation have been encouraged, and the opportunity of a permanent dialogue has lessened the chances of short-term, politically motivated actions being undertaken against the interest of the other party. The progress of the working groups and their sub-groups (the project groups) is admittedly not overwhelming. Nonetheless, progress has been made, as in the areas of industrialisation (extension of the petro-chemical industries), infrastructure (including technical education), agriculture, and cultural-scientific co-operation. In other areas, the difficulties seem hardly surmountable: The demand by the Arabs for the opening of the European market for Arab products is just as controversial in this context as a treaty on the protection of capital investment or parity with European colleagues for the Arab "Gastarbeiter".

In spite of this, the progress of the working groups was sufficient, in the second half of 1975 and early 1976, for the decisive body of the dialogue, the "General Commission", to meet on this basis for the first time in May 1976 in Luxembourg. Representatives of the countries of the Arab League and of the General Secretary of the League, as well as the member

countries of the EC and a delegate of the EC Commission at Ambassadorial level took part. There had been a Palestinian representative included in the Arab expert groups, which had acted as unified delegations and now a Palestinian representative in the General Commission was present as well. The Programme of Luxembourg foresaw:

- an evaluation of the results of the expert meetings to date,
- the establishment of a time-table and the co-ordination of the various working and project groups,
- the exchange of political statements.

However, no spectacular results could be achieved at the session in Luxembourg either, since this too was marked by Arab attempts to push through the acceptance of fundamental political positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. This became clear, for example, in the question of the Palestinians: Whereas the European side assumed that the communities as a whole were represented in the delegations, it had been the case in the groups of experts, the Arabs explained in their introduction that the member states were represented individually. Since the Community accepted this silently, a quasi-recognition of the PLO was thereby achieved.

Nonetheless, with this meeting, an alternating succession of sessions was set up, with meetings in the working groups,

which dealt with problems of co-operation, and flanking sessions of the "General Commission," in which political statements could be exchanged, although this was not the real purpose of the dialogue. As a result, the second session of the "General Commission" in Tunis (10.-12. February 1977) was not only preceded by intensive meetings of all working groups, but also by a political discussion by the foreign ministers of the Nine (London Statement of 31 January 1977). This drew significantly on the Middle East Statement of 6 November 1973, and once more particularly asserted the rights of the Palestinian people. It also announced the readiness of the members of the EC to take a concrete part in a peace settlement in the Middle East and to consider the possibility of participation in the guarantees for the security of the participants. It was emphasized that a settlement would have to include the right of the Palestinian people to express their national identity. This later formulation should be interpreted in connection with the statement of the representative of the EC at the 31st General Assembly of the UN (October 1976), that the Palestinian people must be allowed their own territory. (10

Even though this statement did not satisfy the Arab participants, a climate was thereby created which allowed a development of the relevant questions. The General Commission examined the results of the 7 working groups and the 16 project groups. In relevant questions such as the financing of the dialogue and co-operation

in the realm of technology transfer, agriculture and cultural relations, progress could be made. The only political compromise was the agreement to consider the creation of a political committee for the discussion of political questions in the context of the Euro-Arab dialogue.

The Euro-Arab Dialogue has, until now, operated in the field of tension between the strong desire for closer co-operation on the one hand and different political attitudes on the other. The third session of the "General Commission" in October 1977 in Brussels was also held under this tension. Once more, a statement of EC heads of government (published on 29 June 1977) preceded it. This drew significantly on previous statements, but spoke out more clearly for the creation of a homeland (German = Heimstatt, French = patrie).

In addition, a politically fortunate coincidence occurred insofar as the member countries of the EC and of the Arab League voted, on the 27 October, 1977, in the UN General Assembly, against Israel's settlement policy and for a resolution which determined among other things, "that measures and actions taken by Israel in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction of efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." In the working groups, it was already

possible to identify common projects, towards the realisation of which feasibility studies could be undertaken as a first step. As a political result, it is notable that considerations on the creation of a committee for political consultation between the two sides, which were occasioned by the Arab side at the second session of the "General Commission", were taken a good deal further.

#### 6. Balanced Double-Tracking.

The progress of the dialogue has shown that, in spite of the attempt to restrict the content to questions of economic, technical and cultural co-operation, a slowly growing politicisation is unavoidable. The political statements of the Nine on the situation in the Middle East, which also reflect the attempt to achieve a common political language for problems in which European interests are involved, have been made outside the context of the European-Arab dialogue. Naturally, they have had consequences on the dialogue itself, as we have shown, in particular on the work of the "General Commission". The dialogue will certainly be further politicised, should the creation of a political committee be realised.

On the other hand, the EC has not allowed itself to be pressurized into accepting one-sided Arab positions, and has thus followed credibly a balanced policy. It is to misunderstand the

goals of European policy, and also to overestimate its role when the right of the EC to publicly present an independent policy on developments, in the realm of the Middle East conflict is disputed by Israel. In a region, which is of great security importance for Western Europe and in which the EC carries out an effective policy of trade and co-operation, Western Europe may and must have her own political conception for its future.

That European Middle East and Mediterranean policy, at various levels, is not directed against Israel has been emphasized regularly by the Community. Not least, the signing of the trade agreement with Israel on 11 May 1975, was the reason why the start of the Euro-Arab dialogue had to be postponed again. For the Arabs had expected that the EC would use precisely this agreement's signing as a means of political pressure against Israel, and they blamed the Community for surrendering this opportunity. The EC explained to them, that they would not allow themselves to be told with whom they could sign agreements. Until now, the expectation has not proved unfounded, that continual strengthening of economic ties between Western Europe and the Arab states (bilateral, in the context of the "global approach", and multilateral, in the context of the Euro-Arab dialogue) has exercised a certain influence in terms of moderating political goals and of a quest for Arab-Israeli co-existence. Important interests in the economic and development policy area have been created,

which have materialized in co-operation with the EC, and which would suffer set-backs through any renewal of the military dispute. Finally, a credible double-tracking in Middle East policy by the EC provides the possibility of engaging more openly on the Israeli side. "Black lists" and threats of boycott should, in the long-term, lose their point in such a climate.

#### 7. Consultation with the USA.

Western Europe and the USA have, in general, similar interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Numerous points of political contact result from this.

- The USA are the only power, which has sufficient means and influence over both sides to be able to work towards the solution of the Middle East conflict in the context of diplomatic initiatives. Since the security of Western Europe depends, to a considerable extent, on the stability of the Middle East, she must support all efforts towards a settlement of the conflict.

- The states of the region are seeking a diversification of relations and reject any one-sided dependency upon one power or the other. The implication for Western Europe is that, in working out a policy for the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the objective cannot be to create a system of exclusive relations

and to "displace" the USA. Rather, she must make room for achieving her own interests and offer points of contact on the Arab side for the efforts of the USA towards a solution of the Middle East conflict.

- The dependency of Western Europe on the USA in the area of security policy also establishes limits to a European solo effort in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The presence of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean will remain necessary as long as no real detente becomes apparent in the region and no new options to the present situation of the security policy become apparent. A contradiction between European Mediterranean policy and US interests would, in the last analysis, weaken the overall position of Western Europe in the region.

The growing political independence, however, of the EC has certainly shown that a better co-ordinating mechanism between the European Community and the USA must be found. From the European side, the European Political Co-operation (EPC) appears to be the suitable partner. A fund of common attitudes and steps by the Nine could be a concrete basis for Western European activity in international relations. Compared with the early sixties, the capacity for co-operation in material and organizational respects has grown on the European side.



For the United States, this opens the prospect of some devolution of power and sharing of responsibility. In fact, its readiness to share responsibility in world-wide contingencies thus becomes more credible. Primarily in order to diversify burdens stemming from a commitment, but also because there is a widespread realisation that the trend is not towards a new climax of "imperial presidency", the management of world diplomacy will no longer be considered as a monopoly of the US Foreign Secretary. The new danger lies in shifting responsibilities; particularly if the partners of the USA claim competence (like the Europeans in the Mediterranean) without being able to live up to them in a crisis.<sup>(11)</sup>

It cannot be overstressed, therefore, that the preconditions for co-operation, which are beginning to show signs of improvement in Western Europe and the United States are not of a comprehensive nature. There are also simultaneous opposing trends (increased dependence, more bilateralism.) However, Western Europe should be able to achieve selective co-operation with Washington in the area of diplomacy. Crises have a selective character in any case, and the Nine is in possession of the best organizational basis (comparatively speaking) for such purposes — namely the use of the EPC.

Compared with the situation of 15 March 1974 (see above p. 16), certain factors have thus changed in the Western European-American

relationship. The Gymnich Agreement of June 1974 has not been seriously tested, in practice to date. It still constitutes the most concrete provision for the relationship between EPC and US diplomacy. It provides a protective *modus vivendi*, a defensive formula, if one examines the story of its origin. This formula continues to be necessary. However, what is obviously lacking is an offensive formula for constructive co-operation between the EPC and US diplomacy. The present tradition of co-operation is insufficient to avoid lower-level escalations and to fend off long-term or permanent disturbances. Although specific personalities are available on both sides for regular contacts between US diplomacy and EPC, the "linkage body" (presidential representative of EPC plus representatives of the State Department) has been used rather unilaterally to date. In general, the European side "discusses" the agenda items for the next meeting of the "Political Committee" with the US representative. Why should these meetings not also be used for discussion of items on the American agenda? The Gymnich formula, if extended to mutuality, might find practical application in Washington as well, where possible contacts between State Department and EPC ambassadorial meetings have not been fully exploited.

The European Community has made it clear, since the beginning of the seventies, that it is going to expand into the Mediterranean,

i.e. into a crisis area (Balkans, Yugoslavia, Turkish-Greek and the Middle East conflict, Lebanon, West Sahara, Gibraltar) in coming years. For the Europeans, this means new interests and responsibilities in crisis management. They have raised expectations which must be met in the short-term, as well as in the long-term. The enterprise boils down to investment by the North European member states in their own security. But without the United States, the tasks in the Mediterranean cannot be mastered.

N O T E S

- 1) Cf. Theo M.-Loch/Hajo Hasenpflug: Die Assoziierungs- und Präferenzpolitik der EG. Bonn 1974; and Udo Steinbach: Auf dem Wege nach Europa? Die Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft durchlaufen eine kritische Phase. In: Orient, 1/1977, p.79-101
- 2) For more details cf. Loch/Hasenpflug, op.cit., passim; H. Andresen: Über die Verwirklichung einer gemeinschaftlichen Mittelmeerpolitik. In: Europa und die arabische Welt. Probleme und Perspektiven europäischer Arabienpolitik. Europäische Schriften des Instituts für Europäische Politik. Vol.41/42. Bonn 1975, p.293-326; R. Regul: Die Europäischen Gemeinschaften und die Mittelmeerländer. Schriftenreihe Europäische Wirtschaft. Vol.75. Baden Baden 1977, passim; Avi Shlaim: The Community and the Mediterranean Basin. In: Kenneth J. Twitchett: Europe and the World. The External Relations of the Common Market. London 1976, p.77-120
- 3) Cf. Andresen, op.cit., p.304-306
- 4) Cf. Loukas Tsoukalis: The EEC and the Mediterranean: Is "Global" Policy a Misnomer? In: International Affairs. London, July 1977, p.422-438
- 5) Cf. Günther van Well: Die Entwicklung einer gemeinsamen Nahost-Politik der Neun. In: Europa-Archiv, 4/1976, p.119-128
- 6) For the full text see Europa-Archiv, 2/1974, p.D 29 f.
- 7) Ralf Dahrendorf: Plädoyer für die Europäische Union. München: Piper Verlag 1973
- 8) Cf. Carl A. Erhardt: Die EG und der Mittelmeerraum. In: Außenpolitik, 2/1976, p.224 f.
- 9) Europa-Archiv, 18/1974, p.D 416
- 10) Cf. Ursula Braun: Der europäisch-arabische Dialog - Entwicklung und Zwischenbilanz. In: Orient, 1/1977, p.30-56
- 11) In my conclusions I am relying very much on the conclusions drawn by Reinhard Rummel: The EPC in U.S.-West European Crisis Consultation: The Cyprus Experience. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen/Isar, November 1977

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International Conference on  
THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN SCENE - BASIC ISSUES AND MAJOR TRENDS  
from 25 to 26 May 1978 in Hamburg

Stefan Wild

SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY ARAB LITERATURE

## Social problems in contemporary Arab literature

Stefan Wild

How are basic social problems of contemporary Arab society reflected in present day Arab literature ? It does not seem very profitable to try to answer such a question in the abstract. I am afraid I do not have a theoretical key which would allow me to give a meaningful answer to a question which is as fundamental as it is vague. What I propose to do, therefore, is to single out one specific question, one specific social problem and try to see whether and how it is treated in modern Arab literature. More than one case study of this nature would surely be necessary to give a precise and comprehensive answer.

The social problem of which some aspects will be presented in a brief and general way is the role of women in Arab society as set against the picture of Arab women drawn by today's writers and novelists. I think that we are confronting a fundamental problem here and that even a sketchy outline of literary reality and its interaction with social reality on this point can lead to a better understanding of modern Arabic literature and modern Arab society.

Any such attempt is, of course fraught with the danger of inadmissible generalization. The gap between prejudice and generalization is very narrow. There have been studies in recent years on topics such as "the Arab mind" which are dangerously close to a thinly veiled racism. There have been

books with titles such as "The Private Life of Islam", which hints - wrongly in my view - that Islam is the most important single social force responsible for the condition of women in Kabyle A<sup>l</sup>geria.

By "Arabic literature" I mean some Egyptian writers and a handful of Syrian ones - Syrian being taken to include Palestinian and Lebanese. I have concentrated on prose and neglected poetry, for the simple reason that I have read very little of modern Arabic poetry. I suspect that some issues mentioned can be found in Morocco as well as in Irak, and for that matter in <sup>many</sup> developing countries outside the Arabic speaking world.

The first true Arabic novel was, of course, a man's work and bore a woman's name as a title: Zainab by "an Egyptian peasant" (miṣrī fallāḥ) - the pseudonym chosen by Muḥammad Husain Haikal (first edition Cairo 1914). The name of the novel is in a certain sense a misnomer, its central figure being not Zainab, the poor village girl, but Ḥāmid, the son of the wealthy landowner. Ḥāmid, who resembles Haikal himself in many respects, is the only really living person in the novel, the two heroines, Zainab and 'Azīza are more shadows than individuals. There is a very interesting episode when Ḥāmid after many unsuccessful attempts finally manages to talk to 'Azīza alone. At this point, the two of them cannot find anything to say to each other, the long awaited opportunity passes, communication between them breaks down. As is well known, Haikal wrote his novel in Paris and

there is certainly an element of nostalgia in his novel. But there is no effort to idealize Egyptian village life and the difficulty of communication between the lover and the loved one is a case in point. The extensive dialogue between the heroes of a novel was an essential ingredient of the European tradition of the novel. To transpose this into an Egyptian rural environment proved very difficult. It has been claimed that the death of the heroine before the lovers are united - a feature dear to many greater and lesser writers of Arabic literature of this time - has a special significance; the meeting of a man and an unmarried girl was socially unacceptable. So it was easier to let the heroine die than to imagine a totally unrealistic dialogue.

The first convincing literary plot with a woman as central figure is probably Maḥmūd Ṭāhir Lāshīn's Ḥawwā' bi-lā Adam (Cairo, n.d. (1934)). Ḥawwā' is portrayed as an energetic and ambitious young teacher, of a middle class background, determined to run her own life. She becomes a member of a Feminist society and devotes her life to the progress of the Egyptian society in general and Egyptian women in particular. Falling in love with a Pasha's son, Ḥawwā' realizes that she is not accepted by her environment. Crushed between conflicting demands and torn between her feminist ideals and the social reality facing her she is driven to suicide.

One evident aspect of literary life until the Second World War is that it is mainly a male preoccupation. The few women who did play a role in public life, women like Malak Ḥifnī Nāṣīf, Hudā al-Sha'rāwī or 'A'isha 'Abdalrahmān, preferred



doing direct political work. And even as famous a writer as Mayy Ziyāda contributed little which could interest us in this context. Inevitably the awareness of men as far as the problems of women were concerned was limited. In Bishr Fāris' famous article Des difficultés d'ordre linguistique, culturel et social que rencontre un écrivain arabe moderne, spécialement en Egypte (1936) there is no word on women.

This changes significantly only after the Second World War. And it is surely no coincidence that the first significant steps of women towards bringing their own problems into a literary form were taken in Beirut. Lailā B'albakkī's Anā ahyā (Beirut 1958) is the vivid description of a Lebanese girl, a student at the American University of Beirut, who fights for her academic and emotional freedom and rebels against family traditions. Samīra 'Azzām, who wrote in the fifties and sixties portrays in her short stories and novels her rebellion against the social stigma of being a woman added to the political struggle for survival, in which she was caught as a Palestinian in Lebanese society. Beirut was at the time an intellectual center of the Arab world which had in some respects surpassed Cairo. Censorship of the press was almost non-existent, in contrast to all other Arab countries. A number of books which seemed politically, theologically or morally risqué in Egypt or other Arab countries were published in Beirut and then exported. One of the most famous pieces of modern Arabic literary writing, Naguib Maḥfūz' Aulād ḥaratnā appeared at first in serial form in al-Ahrām but could not be published as a book in Cairo. So the book

was printed in Beirut. The same is true for some of the novels of Yūsuf Idrīs, e.g. Hādithat Sharaf, which seemed unacceptable to Egyptian authorities in book form and was consequently published in Beirut.

Beirut was also the most Europeanized city in the Arab world. This is important, because the problem of woman's status was forced on Arab society and on Arabic literature by Europe. So it was in Beirut that the most explosive Arabic books on the question of women were published. Nizār Qabbānī in his collections of poems and Ṣādiq al-'Aẓm in his book al-Hubb wal-hubb al-'udhrī (Beirut 1968) put the question of sexual liberation of women in the most disruptive way. Important as both voices are, I feel that the approach to the problem and the discussion of it are very masculine and surely the solutions offered are lightyears away from the aspirations and experiences of most Arab women. The most important novels and short stories published by women were normally published in Beirut - the short stories and novels by Colette Suhail, Emilie Naṣrallāh, Lailā 'Usirān and others.

In the work of Naguib Maḥfūẓ his treatment of women is not the strongest part of his oeuvre. "The women in Maḥfūẓ' novels, with few exceptions, are portrayed in the traditional role of wife, mother or prostitute and it is assumed that their place should be in the home " (Hilary Kilpatrick, The Modern Egyptian Novel, London 1974, 175f.) The position of Egyptian women is accurately described, with all the touches of Maḥfūẓ' realism but the emotional world of the women depicted remains distant and blurred.

The independence of most Arab countries and the first steps towards decolonization brought fresh problems. Arab women had played a certain role in the struggle for independence. Algeria is one of the better known examples. After independence was won, certain cultural tenets like the separation of sexes were reinforced in the name of decolonization and Islam, which had loosened their hold during the struggle against the colonial establishment. The Algerian writer Assia Djebar has made this problem the focus of her novel Les Aïouettes naïves (Paris 1967), and the fundamental issue facing her heroine Nfissa is succinctly put in the sentence: "Car je sais à l'avance que la guerre qui finit entre les peuples renait entre les couples".

A similar problem can be seen in the historical case of two guerrilla fighters of al-Fatah who were sentenced to death by the military leadership of al-Fatah, because they had taken two Lebanese village girls in broad daylight in their jeep twice around the village - nothing more. As far as I know, this problem which this incident exemplifies has not yet been treated by any Palestinian writer except for Ghassan Kanafānī who devoted a long - non-literary - article to it.

Meanwhile European feminism is spreading towards the Middle East. One of the most bitter denouncements of the position of women in Arab society comes from a Syrian writer Salwā Kham-māsh in al-Mar'a al-'arabiya wal-mudjtama' al-taqlīdī al-mutakhallif (Beirut 1973) - published, of course, in Beirut. Her Egyptian colleague Nawāl al-Sa'dāwī has had the courage

to put her finger on one of the most tabooed points of her society by an all-out attack on clitoridectomy, as still widely practised in Egypt and the Sudan. She has tried to develop a consistent theory of the role of women in Eastern society. One will find ample room for disagreement with her theory which combines elements of Freud and Marx, Mead and de Beauvoir. Her theory links the emancipation of women to the struggle of all economically and socially exploited groups for justice, without confusing the two issues. This social concern seems to me to set her apart from the more exclusively feminist writers such as Lailā B'albakkī. At any rate, as far as facts are concerned, Nawāl al-Sa'dāwī certainly knows what she is talking about. She is a trained physician who did years of work in the Egyptian countryside among fallāhīn as well as among the poorer strata of Cairo. And recently she has tried to put her ideas into a literary form. Her novels such as e.g. Imra'atān fī mra'a (Beirut 1977) are accurate descriptions of Egyptian girls and women, their feeling in places like universities, buses, the way they are taught to walk, to flock together in all-female groups wherever the basically hostile but all-important male appears - observations, formulations which one seeks in vain in writers where sexuality is abundantly talked about but the focus remains masculine - I think of the novels and short stories of Suhail Idrīs.

To call Nawāl al-Sa'dāwī's novels a littérature engagée is an understatement. These novels, this type of literature

wants to achieve something, wants to bring about a well defined change in social relations individually as well as collectively.

There is no need to go into the problem of literary theory in how far such a message can interfere or interferes with literary quality. But while waiting for the appearance of a female Naguib Maḥfūz, it can safely be forecasted that there will be a lot of this type of literature to come.

Social problems on this and other levels will be a constant challenge to Arabic literature. Literature will of course not solve any of them. But it can open the door towards an understanding which goes beyond the knowledge of mere facts and numbers.

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Michael Wolffsohn

ISRAEL'S "NEW ECONOMIC ORDER"

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### ISRAEL'S "NEW ECONOMIC ORDER"

#### LATE ADJUSTMENT OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM. LONG-TERM ASPECTS

Considering the development of the political, social and ideological, i.e. value systems in Israel, the liberalized "New Economic Order" which the Likud-led government introduced in 1977 had long been overdue. In fact, it just had to be a matter of time until the economic system would be adjusted to the changed conditions of its environment characterized by a steady decline of the importance attached to the socialist ideas and ideals of Israel's "Founding Fathers".

#### Changes in the political system

In the political system, the rightward trend could be observed since the 1955 general elections, when the center of gravity within the Labor as well as Non-Labor/ Non-Religious or "Second" (GUTMANN, 1977) bloc shifted to the right (cf. DISKIN/WOLFFSOHN, 1977; LASAR, 1976:58). From 1973 on, this rightward trend was not confined to movements within these blocs but started to affect the electoral balance between them, thus, leading to the 1977 electoral disaster of Israel's traditional "dominant party" (Duverger), i.e. Mapai/Labor.<sup>1)</sup>

In retrospect, it could even be argued that the rightward development of the party system started as early as 1944, when the split between Mapai and its Left Faction ("Siah Beth") occurred (for details cf. Ishai, 1978). Ever since, Mapai was not more than nominally a "workers' party" being transformed by Ben-Gurion into a catch-all party (Kirchheimer). Mapai/Labor "has turned from what Duverger calls the real left to the apparent left" (ARIAN, 1972: 197). In fact, Mapai/Labor became "the" center-party of Israel's political system (cf. DISKIN/WOLFFSOHN, 1977; ARIAN/BARNES, 1974 for details). This shift is apparent from and coincides with the support which Mapai (since 1969 the Labor/Mapam Alignment) received especially from the "moderately well-to-do" segments of Israel's society (ARIAN, 1972: 196/97). Moreover, as ARIAN (op.cit.:197) found out in his 1969 polls, the "Labor Party and Mapam, both of which define themselves as socialist, are supported heavily by individuals who report their own political tendency as right of the left". This pattern is documented in Table I (ibid.).



TABLE I

Political Trend by Party Vote

	N	Left	Moderate Left	Center	Right	Religious	No Interest in Politics
Alignment	728	7%	37%	23%	13%	1%	20%
Gahal	241	2	3	31	46	1	17
Religious	154	1	2	11	9	74	3
Other	114	8	20	36	18	2	16
No Decision	114	2	11	23	20	3	41
Total	1351	5	23	24	19	9	19

Party Vote by Political Trend

	N	Alignment	Gahal	Religious	Other
Left	66	77%	6%	3%	14%
Moderate Left	300	89	3	1	8
Center	304	56	25	6	13
Right	237	38	47	6	9
Religious	123	4	2	92	2
No Interest in Politics	207	70	19	2	9
Total	1237	59	19	12	9

In 1969, already, less than half of those who reported to vote for the Alignment considered their political trend as left or moderate left. Naturally the Alignment did not and could not pursue a really socialist policy any more.

Changes in the value system

As far as Israel's general ideology (value system) is concerned, the rightward trend has been evident since the early 1960s. In the mid-60s ARIAN came to the conclusion that the country's "new" ideology was "less socialistic and more pragmatic"; it "demanded, among others, less individual sacrifice and more continued economic prosperity and development" (ARIAN, 1971:282).

Using Guttman's scalogram analysis, ANTONOVSKY could show that in 1962(!), the ideological scale types consisting of the "extreme left", the "left" and the "left-of-center" hardly made up for a third of the whole ideological spectrum of Israel's urban population (ANTONOVSKY/ARIAN, 1972:91).

TABLE II

Please insert Table II

Whereas the consensus about Israel's security and foreign policy remained virtually unaffected, even after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, dissatisfaction and dissens about the economic policy of the Alignment grew constantly (GUTTMAN, 1977:9).

TABLE II

Distribution of ideological scale types in the Israeli population, 1962

Position	Scale Type	Per cent Distribution	Pro-Activist	Anti-Histadrut	Not strongly Pro-Socialist	Pro-Western
Extreme Left	1	2.0	-	-	-	-
Left	2	7.7	-	-	-	+
Left-of-Center	3	22.4	-	-	+	+
Center	4	23.4	-	+	+	+
Right	5	18.5	+	+	+	+
Deviant	6	9.9	+	-	+	+
Non-ideological	-	16.1				
		100.0%				
		(N=1170)				

Dissatisfaction with the economic policy of the Alignment is demonstrated by the following data: In September, 1973, 58% of Israel's adult urban population was "concerned" or "very concerned" about the country's economic situation; in October, 1973, 30-45%; from November, 1973, to July, 1974, 56-80%; and in September, 1975, 76-79%. Between August, 1974, and June, 1975, 75-92% remained "equally concerned". In September, 1975, 25-37% thought that the government's handling of economic problems was "very good" or "good", whereas 52-62% believed that it handled security matters "very well" or "well" (all data from Economic Indicators, 1975: 6 and 8).

Simultaneously, and also because of the dismal situation of their economy, 79% of the (polled) Israelis thought that it was "definitely" or "perhaps" necessary to make far reaching sacrifices.

In June, 1967 (war!), 80-84% thought the same; between February, 1968, and July, 1972, there were 61-80%; between October, 1972, and February, 1973, 51-55%; in October-November, 1973, 79-89%; and between December, 1973, and July, 1975, 46-77% (ibid.).

However, one has to take into consideration that the Israeli public is generally less interested in economic than in security matters. In May/June, 1975, 94% of the polled Israelis were interested in problems of terrorism, but "only" 81% were interested in Israel's economic situation.

Compared with the 1973 data, this last figure shows an increase of seven percent, though (LEVY/GUTTMAN, 1976: 22). On the other hand, economic interest seems to be a dependent variable. Whereas 44% of Israel's high school students of North African origin (=father's birthplace) are "very interested" in the country's

economic situation, only 25% of the high school students whose father came from a English-speaking country are "very interested" in the same subject (op.cit.: 290). Obviously, the origin variable has much to do with the economic and social status of the respective groups. Therefore, we will now turn to the social system. There, too, the ground was prepared for a new economic policy.

Changes in the social system- the macro level

The political and ideological changes were closely related to demographic changes affecting Israel's social system. Since 1948, a gradual "Orientalization" of Israel's population has taken place.

Whereas the country's population consisted of 54.8% "Ashkenazim" (European-American origin) and 9.8% "Sepharadim" (Asian-African origin), in 1948, there were 42.8% Ashkenazim and 46.2% Sepharadim, in 1976 (Statistical Abstract, 1977: 45; own or father's birthplace taken into consideration. Rest: Born in Israel).

Although ARIAN (1972 b:211) stated in his 1969 poll that Israel's "Oriental" population, like the Euro-American one, was more in favor of "the socialist method" (as a "verbal formula"!, cf. op. cit.:209), it remains doubtful whether they kept favoring this rhetoric socialism in the 1970s, when it became more and more evident that their economic situation did not improve significantly. Israel's Oriental population has become its "proletariat". Therefore, "Orientalization" and "proletarianization" are closely interrelated; they are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. This, in turn, caused the growing support of Herut/Gahal/ Likud among the Sepharadim.

Finally, it made Likud's takeover possible (for details cf. DISKIN/WOLFFSOHN, 1977).

Changes in the economic system due to changes on the micro (=elite) level of the social system

It must be noted that state interventionism and socialist ideals were on a continuous decline, also

among economic policy makers of Israel's elite, its Founding Fathers, as well as among their followers and disciples.

The first drastic change of economic policy in Israel occurred in February, 1952, when the government declared its "New Economic Policy" consisting of a major devaluation and a restrictive monetary as well as fiscal policy (for details see, MICHAELY, 1975: Chapter 1 and 2; HALEVI/KLINOV-MALUL, 1968: Chapter 1 ).

Domestic prices were allowed to rise and unemployment followed suit reaching an all-time record in 1953 (STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1977: 342).

However, from 1952 on, the process of liberalization of Israel's foreign trade and foreign-exchange policy "proceeded almost without interruption" (MICHAELY, 1975: 23 cf. also HOROWITZ, 1973).<sup>2)</sup>

The (second) "New Economic Policy" initiated in February, 1962, was another turning point in the gradual liberalization process. (see, among others, the same authors). Israel's currency was, again, devalued. This devaluation was intended to be an act of unification of the effective exchange-rate system consisting of different rates for different transactions (MICHAELY, 1975: 24). Almost all export subsidies were abolished (and reintroduced in 1966) and the rates of many import tariffs were lowered (ibid.).

On February 9th, 1962, the Minister of Finance went as far as declaring the following aim of this liberalization policy: "The government will gradually lower the walls of overprotection of domestic industry against imports. In order to make manufacturing and

agriculture (which was left out of the process from the very start; M.W. cf. MICHAELY, 1975:65) stand on the basis of cheap and efficient production, the government intends to restrict the ceiling on rates of protective tariffs and to eliminate the quantitative restrictions of imports. Local production will have therefore to compete with imported goods"(quoted from MICHAELY, 1975:59).-- A declaration which could have been attributed to Israel's new Finance Minister, Simha Ehrlich.

The 1962 "nominal liberalization" (op.cit.: 62) was, in fact, sabotaged by the "Public Commission", consisting of representatives of several government ministries, primarily the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (which stood rather openly against liberalization and even more emphatically against devaluation; ibid.) as well as a few organizations, primarily the Histadrut and the Manufacturers Association which, of course, disliked the abolition of export subsidies. MICHAELY (1975:67) estimates that probably one half of domestic manufacturing remained outside the liberalization process (food processing, motor vehicles and motor parts industries, especially).

On the other side, the same author contends that "although liberalized imports were not very substantial even by the end of the process, in 1968, the act of liberalization was probably not purely 'nominal'" (MICHAELY, 1975:68 f.).

By 1969, most quantitative restrictions on imports have been lifted (op.cit.: 75 f.). However, this does not mean that import tariffs were abolished, as the measures introduced in 1970 have proved.



If an economy has been subject to exchange control and import prohibitions for a long period, concludes MICHAELY (1975:8p), and its whole industrial structure has been determined accordingly, it is very difficult to introduce changes which open the economy to import competition. Only gradual transitions promise success in the transition from one industrial structure to another, MICHAELY continues (ibid.). If one is to apply this lesson he learned to the 1977 abandonment of currency controls, the floating of the Israeli pound, and the abolition of export subsidies, one ought to be sceptical as far as the prospects of the "New Economic Order" are concerned. However, given the well-known "countervailing forces" of government and bureaucracy "realization" (=sabotage) the program of a clear-cut operation might well turn into a gradual transformation, unintentionally, of course.

"The lesson of the failure of 1962", reasoned David Horowitz, the first governor of the Bank of Israel, taught "that implementation is as important as the setting of goals and the selection of the policy mechanism by which they are obtained" (JERUSALEM POST, henceforth J.P., Magazine, November 4th, 1977:4).

As far as the disillusionment of the Founding Fathers with their own traditional and more "socialist", i.e. state interventionist, economic policy is concerned, David Horowitz is a case in the point. The former director-general of the Treasury, partly in charge of the first "NEP", then governor of the Bank of Israel (from 1954 to his retirement in 1971) and also a founding member of the Histadrut, came out with an all-out support of the Likud's "New Economic Order"

(see J.P. Magazine, November 4th, 1977:4 f.).

Surely, "late in life, but on the basis of a long and disappointing experience with the alternative system of arbitrary and unrealistic bureaucratic controls" (ibid.), he now prefers the mechanism of the market forces. "The system of artificial rates of exchange imposed by a rigid system, occasionally corrected by massive devaluations, was largely responsible for the disastrous and continuing gap between export earnings and import expenditures, and for the serious distortions in the structure of the economy. It was also one of the main causes of the recent protracted stagnation of the economy", Horowitz maintained (ibid.)

Yigal Horowitz, one of Ben-Gurion's faithful followers and disciples and, now, Israel's new Minister of Commerce and Industry, is another case in the same point. In 1965, together with Ben-Gurion and others, he founded "Rafi" as a breakaway party from Mapai and belonged, contrary to Dayan and Peres, for instance, to those Rafi politicians who refused to rejoin the Israeli Labor Party, in 1968. His "State List", which ran as a separate list in the 1969 elections, joined, in 1973, the Likud bloc and, in 1976, merged with two other groups into the "La'am" faction within the Likud.

"Not everything of the Ben-Gurion period deserves to be continued, Horowitz stated (HA'ARETZ, Magazine, January 27th, 1977:8). Being afraid of the huge apparatus run by Labor, he and his friends, says Horowitz, were not inclined to return to the Labor Party. "We might have disappeared there" (ibid.). Asked about the reasons why he had joined Begin's Likud, he answered: "First, the dedication to "Eretz Israel" (the Land of Israel), and, second, the desire for a free market" (ibid.)

The gradual disillusionment of both, David and Yigal Horowitz, and other former as well as present Labor leaders who have not been mentioned here, has not to do only with changes in Israel's political, ideological and social systems.

Any regulation and any planning of the Israeli economy meets with three basic structural difficulties.

The country's economic development depends on factors which are virtually impossible to predict in advance: immigration, defense expenditure, and capital imports (cf. BRODT, 1973:102). No Israeli politician or technocrat will be able to evaluate the inclination of Jews in the "Diaspora" to come to Israel (or the Soviet authorities' willingness to grant exit visas), nor the political future of the Middle East (being full of surprises), nor the preparedness of (mainly) American Jews to raise money for the Jewish State, nor the U.S. administration's inclination to grant economic and military aid, nor private direct investment from abroad which, too, is not uninfluenced by the general political situation in the Middle East (For these and other less salient sources of capital import to Israel cf. MICHAELY, 1975:14f.).

All these facts influenced the traditional elite, too.

#### Economic structure and "consociational democracy"

The disenchantment of both Horowitzes with their former economic philosophy is quite instructive as far as the topic of "consociational democracy" in Israel is concerned.

Elsewhere, DISKIN and I have dealt with this problem in length (DISKIN/WOLFFSOHN, 1977) and, in accordance with GUTMANN (1977), contended that the classification of Israel as a consociational democracy is highly problematic. The shift in David and Yigal Horowitz' economic outlook proves this point.

According to LIJPHART (1969), ideological coherence and loyalty to one's own subculture or segment is a prerequisite of any "famille spirituelle", "Lager" or "Bloc". Referring to Israel, LIJPHART calls her a "semiconsociational democracy" (LIJPHART, 1977:129 ff.) stressing the "encompassing and self-sufficient character of the segments" (op.cit.: 130, "semi", because of a short lived grand coalition). However, this tendency has decreased over the years. Moreover, leaders of the different segments have switched from one camp to the other. Yigal Horowitz is just one example. In addition to this, the diminishing ideological homogeneity, as exemplified by David and Yigal Horowitz' economic philosophy as well as the rivalry between the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Commerce and Industry in the realization of the 1962 New Economic Policy, proves that ideological coherence, a prerequisite of any "famille spirituelle", has long ceased to exist in Israel, at least as far as the Labor and the Second blocs are concerned.

GAL-NUR (1977: esp. 14/15) has been able to demonstrate that, as to the economic structures of the different segments, they have long been interwoven and not fragmented on segmental lines.

On the macro level, there has long ceased to exist a separate Labor or "bourgeois" agricultural as well as industrial sector. Even the Histadrut, Labor's last stronghold, has partly been "subverted" by non-Labor forces. Since 1965, when Herut's trade union joined

the Histadrut, it has not been an exclusive Labor affair any more. GAL-NUR's findings confirm the economic interaction (and not self-sufficiency!) of all three (Labor, Second, Religious) segments, on the micro level as well. The Yishuv, however, the pre-state Jewish Community in Palestine, could, more justifiably, be called a consociational democracy (cf. HOROWITZ/LISSAK, 1977).

#### The new technocratic elite

The changes in the political, value and social systems on the macro and micro level as well as the gradual dissolution of the formerly coherent sub-cultures of the Yishuv contributed, among many other factors (see for details DISKIN/WOLFFSOHN, 1977, GUTMANN, 1977a, GUTMANN/LANDAU, 1975), to the formation of a new technocratic elite which did not resemble the old agriculture-oriented pioneering ideal.

The takeover of this "post-revolutionary elite" (GUTMANN, 1977a) is well documented by the professional composition of the 9th Knesset, elected in May, 1977 (DISKIN/WOLFFSOHN, 1977: 830 ).

#### TABLE III

Please insert table III

Contrary to previous professional compositions of the Knesset (cf. GUTMANN, 1977a, GUTMANN/LANDAU, 1975), the proportion of lawyers and economists is relatively high, especially as far as the winners of the 1977 elections are concerned, Likud and the Democratic

TABLE III

The declared profession of the members of the 9th Knesset

Profession Party	MK	Journa- list	Teacher	Farmer	Lawyer	Econo- mist	Entre- pre- neur	Public Em- ployee	Scho- lar (Univ)	Manual Wor- ker	Others	No da- ta	Sum
Likud	-	3	1	4	11	4	9	4	4	1	2	-	43*
Alignment	1	2	5	5	3	4	-	4	1	2	2	3	32
DMC	-	1	-	2	5	2	3	1	1	-	-	-	15
NRP	-	-	5	1	3	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	12
Communists	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	5
AI	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Others	1	-	-	1	2	-	1	-	3	-	1	-	9
Sum	5	9	11	13	24	10	13	12	11	4	5	3	120

DMC= Democratic Movement for Change

NRP= National Religious Party

AI = Agudat Israel

\* "Shlomzion" (General Sharon) listed separately.

## Movement for Change.

Compared with the professions which traditionally used to dominate within the (Knesset) elite, namely farmers and teachers, lawyers and economists are, undoubtedly, "technocrats".

These two professions also indicate an increasing "embourgeoisement" of Israel's political elite. The socialist, pioneering ideal has lost considerable ground.

In sum, all the preliminary remarks underline that the ground for a new, liberal (=not "socialist"), free enterprise-oriented economic order has been prepared for years.

### Theoretical conclusions

Paradoxically (...?), a "socialist", i.e. state interventionist, economic system generated a free enterprise and market-oriented one. True, demographic and, simultaneously, social changes brought about an evident transformation of the dominant value system which, in turn, led, among others, to the formation of a new, more technocratic elite which prepared and/or supported the new economic policy. However, in the end, the political system set the rules for the economic system. The old, Alignment dominated, political system, itself, created its own failures and deficiencies setting into motion economic, social and ideological developments which, finally, led to an electoral, i.e. political upheaval in May, 1977.

Then, again, the political system, now dominated by the Likud bloc, set new economic rules which, in turn, might be the beginning of a new erosion leading to a renewed Alignment takeover.

Anyhow, a purely "economic interpretation" of the Israeli economy will remain unproductive and un instructive. In my view, the dominance of the political factor in Israel's economy and society has remained undisputed.<sup>3)</sup>

## THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

### MIDDLE- AND SHORT-TERM ASPECTS

In the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel has been stuck in a vicious circle of inflation, stagnation, mounting foreign indebtedness and, since November, 1974, "gliding" devaluations.

After two boom years (GLASS, 1977:173) and a relative military relaxation in 1971 and 1972, Israel's "golden early seventies", this turn was especially discouraging. Since the 1973 War, the promising efforts of the previous years to curb military expenditures as well as the import of military hardware (GLASS, 1977:82) have abruptly come to an end.

The growth of the gross national product which from 1950 to 1970, had risen at an annual average of ten percent (HOROWITZ, 1972: XIII) decreased rapidly. In 1974, it rose by a rate of 6.6%; in 1975, by 2.0%; and in 1976, by only 0.8% (STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1977: 149).

Simultaneously, an alarming rise in inflation could be observed. The consumer price index (1969=100) has risen from 224.8, in 1974 to 313.1, in 1975 and 411.2, in 1976 (op.cit.: 235).



In spite of \$ 35 billion Israel has received between 1948 and 1977 from non-Jewish foreign sources (according to Prime Minister Begin, in: J.P., October 31st, 1977: 1; compared with "old" \$ 12.4 billion Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe, cf. LEXIKON, 1974: 505) and in spite of \$ 8.9 billion U.S. economic (\$ 4.6 billion) and military (\$ 5.3 billion) aid, between the end of the 1973 War and December, 1977 (A.KAPELIOUK, in: LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, January 4th, 1977; DER SPIEGEL, 23/1977: 119 and own calculations based on figures mainly published by the JERUSALEM POST and HA'ARETZ), Jerusalem's obligations to foreign countries, excluding investments by foreigners in Israel in securities and real estate, have ballooned from \$ 8,041 million, in 1974; to \$ 10,285, in 1975; and \$ 11,939, in 1976 (STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1977: 179).

U.S. aid to Israel in fiscal 1978 will amount to \$ 1.8 billion (\$ 800 million non-defence) and is to be as high in fiscal 1979 (J.P., October 31st, 1977: 2). No government will rejoice at such a dependence which limits its manoeuvrability; less so, a prime minister who might run into foreign policy troubles with the president of his main creditor. "The Americans are sick and tired of supporting us economically and ask: 'How long is this going to last?' The Jewish people, too, begins being tired of covering part of our balance of payments deficits", Finance Minister Simha Ehrlich remarked (HA'ARETZ Magazine, January 20th, 1978: 12).

However, since 1974, the Alignment government has succeeded in reversing the trend of a permanently rising trade deficit. In 1974, there was a per capita trade deficit of \$ 722 which could be reduced to

\$ 657, in 1975, and \$ 496, in 1976 (including trade with the Administered Territories by the Israeli Defence Forces; STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1977: 185). In 1976, the trade-gap could be improved by roughly \$ 700 million (ibid.)

#### PARAMETERS OF THE ISRAELI ECONOMY

Any economic policy in Israel is delimited by parameters which, from the very beginning of any "new economic order", minimize the range of possible innovations.

Within the foreseeable future, the "twofold-structure of the country's economic life" (HOROWITZ, 1973: 29), its basic division into a Jewish and Arab economic sector (including the occupied territories, for the time being, at least) will continue.

The "tripartite mixed economy" (op.cit.:52), consisting of a government sector, including the Jewish Agency as well as the National Funds and local government, a Histadrut sector and a private sector, is likely to characterize Israel's economic structure also in the years ahead. The proportions of these sectors, now roughly two fifths of the net domestic product government and Histadrut ( a fifth each) and three fifths private, might be changed but neither the government nor the Histadrut sector can realistically be abolished. Because of the importance of the Histadrut and the validity of Zionist ideology, insisting on a decent level of living for every Jew in this state, labour will not become a cheap factor in Israel.

A shrinking of the unproductively large service sector<sup>4)</sup> will be very difficult to achieve, because of political resistance by these whose interests are at stake. And, there are many:

In 1976, 60.4% of the employed persons in Israel worked in the service sector, 33.2% in industry, and 6.4% in agriculture. Even worse, over the years, there has been a steady increase of people employed in the service sector: In 1948, there were 47.9% working in the tertiary sector, in 1959, 51% (HALEVY/MALUL, 1968: Table 24; in the Hebrew edition Jerusalem 1975: page 65), and in 1968, 56.3% (STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1977:314 f.).

The poverty of Israel's natural resources and its limited internal market remain an economic constant.

Defence requirements are likely to weigh as heavily on Israel's future budgets as they have in the past. Even if the Israeli-Egyptian peace talks came to a successful end, and this remains more than doubtful, there would be no all-out peace in the whole Middle East. Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the PLO, as a non-state entity, could well be future trouble makers. The U.S. arms deal with Egypt and Saudi Arabia which, with American help, constructs the new Tabuk air base, will definitely affect Israel's military strategy and, therefore, its financial prospects.

Capital imports, state bonds and contributions, will, at least for the time being, remain in government control through the Jewish National Funds (see interview with Simha Ehrlich, in: DIE ZEIT, German weekly, January 6th, 1978:17). U.S. economic and military aid, too, will, naturally, be channeled through government agencies.

True, the dependence on foreign aid is to be reduced, but as long as it does exist (and exist it will), the

role of the government as an economic agent is unlikely to be losing importance.

Increasingly, Israel's foreign trade will be oriented toward the European Common Market. In 1976, 42.7% of Israel's imports came from EEC countries; 22.6% from the United States and Canada. Of Israel's exports, 36.5% went to Common Market countries and 19.8% to the United States and Canada, 19.5% to Asia and Africa (STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1977: 194).

Therefore, and nilly-willy, Israel's economic planners will have to take into consideration the whims and sins (in Israeli eyes, at least) of EEC politicians who, more and more, have second thoughts on Israel's foreign and security policy.

This paragraph has, again, demonstrated the dominance of the political variable over the economic factor.

#### THE "NEW ECONOMIC ORDER" -THE PROGRAM

Contrary to most (foreign) reports, the economic upheaval ("ma'hapah") initiated by the Likud government did not start on October 28th, 1977. In fact, it had been put into operation in three steps. The first, on July 17th, the second, on October 26th, and the third as well as major one, on October 28th, 1977.

At the beginning, the Israeli pound was devalued by 2%, and the budget (\$ 21 million) as well as subsidies for elementary goods plus gasoline were cut, leading to an all-out price increase of 25%; then, gasoline prices were raised, again; and, finally, the "New Economic Policy" was announced.

Moreover, foreign currency laws were eased in early August, 1977 (J.P., August 8th, 1977:3), and a new Investment Encouragement Law was being prepared by top-level civil servants in the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism, in August/September, 1977 (J.P., August 10th, 1977:7; HA'ARETZ, September 21st, 1977: 8). No substantial changes were intended but the implementation of existing guidelines should be streamlined and simplified, and bureaucratic nuisances for prospective investors reduced.

The main point of the "New Economic Policy" announced on October 28th, 1977, consisted of the elimination of controls on the Israeli pound/lira (IL), permitting it to fluctuate in value according to the forces of supply and demand and causing a plunge of roughly 46% against the U.S. dollar, from IL 10.3 to IL 15.2 for the dollar (cf. NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, henceforth: NZZ, December 8th, 1977:11; TIME, European edition, November 14th, 1977:29; NEWSWEEK, European edition, November 14th, 1977:42). Import duties were slashed, tariffs remained unchanged but would gradually be reduced, in accordance with the 1975 trade agreement between Israel and the Common Market.

While the above mentioned steps were intended to improve the competitive position of Israeli exports on world markets, it also meant that imports and products containing imported components would rise in price. Thus, the government hoped to stimulate local industry to manufacture previously imported goods in Israel, find new markets for exports and attract additional overseas investment. All this was to reduce Israel's dependence on imported capital and, therefore, allow her to regain greater manoevrability, in foreign policy matters as well.

Additionally, the government abolished most export incentives, causing a de facto revaluation of the IL for certain export branches (cf. NZZ, December 8th, 1977: 11).

Henceforth, industry should turn to the stock exchange in order to raise money (cf. interview with Finance Minister Ehrlich, in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, January 20th, 1978: 12; interview with the Deputy Finance Minister Yehezkel Flomin, in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, September 26th, 1977:13); a hitherto most unusual idea in Israel where exporters had become used to be spoiled by government subsidies.

Israelis were allowed to open foreign currency bank accounts and to take out up to \$ 3,000 while traveling abroad.

A tax amnesty for "black capital" hoarded abroad, Finance Minister Ehrlich spoke of \$ 3 billion which had been accumulated over the years (NZZ, December 8th, 1977: 11), was planned by Ehrlich and his staff. For political reasons, however, Prime Minister Begin rejected that proposal (ibid.).

Therefore, the government will go on with the old habit of taxing the money, should it ever be brought back, without punishing those who return it voluntarily.

Other measures aiming at drying up excessive buying power as well as helping stem the tide of imports included cuts in government subsidies for many basic commodities which were, finally, to lead to subsidy rates of "only" 20% of the final retail price for each product. Parallely, Begin himself promised the economically disadvantaged population "full compensation" for the rises in prices (J.P., October 31st, 1977: 2).

Besides the cuts in subsidies, the value-added tax was boosted from 8% to 12%. These two measures led, in turn, to exploding prices causing yet another inflationary impact which even government economists estimated at 45% over the next eighteen months (TIME, European edition, November 14th, 1977: 29). Finance Minister Ehrlich appeared, of course, to be more optimistic. He predicted an inflation rate of 30%, in 1978 (HA'ARETZ Magazine, January 20th, 1978: 13). In order to counterbalance inflationary pressures naturally generated by the New Economic Policy, Ehrlich promised fiscal restraint for the 1978 budget (cf. NEWSWEEK, European edition, November 14th, 1977: 42; interview with Ehrlich, in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, November 4th, 1977: 5). In January, already, he was more evasive on that matter (interview with Ehrlich, in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, January 20th, 1978: 12f.). Moreover, the Finance Minister (HA'ARETZ Magazine, November 4th, 1977: 6) as well as the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Yigal Horowitz, (interview in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, January 27th, 1978: 8) envisaged a wage policy which would serve as an instrument of structural change. "Firing for efficiency's sake", Yigal Horowitz called it (ibid.). Thus, he and his colleague hoped to reduce the volume of the huge service sector and channel the freed labor force into the "productive" industrial sector. Additionally, plans were being laid to reduce the corporate income tax of 61%, and sell off state owned or municipally owned companies to private investors (cf. NEWSWEEK, European edition, November 14th, 1977: 43; interview with Ehrlich's deputy, Flomin, in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, September 26th, 1977: 13). That, however, might not be easy, for the will to sell does

not suffice, you have to find a buyer. In September, 1977, Flomin seemed to be quite confident: "There are about a dozen serious contenders, both from Israel and abroad", he told Yair Kotler from HA'ARETZ (September 26th, 1977: 13). Accordingly, in December, 1977, the Flomin Commission recommended to sell fifty state owned companies. But, then, Gideon Patt, Minister of Housing and Construction, had to admit in the Knesset: "We still have no serious customer" (J.P., December 28th, 1977: 2). In what amounted to a make-work program for Knesset Members, Israel's Parliament defeated by a vote of 37 to 20 an attempt by the Alignment to thwart the sale of the government's share in Bank "Tefahot" to private interests (ibid.).

Compulsory arbitration, too, has been on the government's agenda, but no concrete measures have been initiated so far. In early April, 1978, Labor and Social Affairs Minister Israel Katz announced in the Knesset that the government was preparing a compulsory arbitration law that would apply to a very limited number of vital industries and services (J.P., April 6th, 1978: 2).

#### REACTIONS

The public's reactions to the New Economic Policy were very vocal, indeed. Protest demonstrations were organized by the Histadrut, immediately, and attacks of the oppositional Alignment followed suit.

Contrary to some press reports, at least in the West German media (cf. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, November 1st, 1977: 22), "industrial associations and bankers" were



less than enthusiastic about the newly introduced economic changes<sup>5</sup>).

The most visible and most audible condemnations, however, cannot hide the fact that public opinion, in general, reacted favorably to the economic upheaval. Even "Davar", the Histadrut daily, had to concede that, according to decent polls, 50% of the interrogated persons "fully approved" of the New Economic Policy, 12% "approved partly", and 20.8% were "opposed" (LE MONDE, November 3rd, 1977: 8). A public opinion poll conducted by the "Dahaf" institute, in November, 1977, indicated that most Israelis were pleased with Begin, Foreign Minister Dayan, Defence Minister Weizman, and Finance Minister Ehrlich.

Of the 500 persons interviewed, 82% expressed satisfaction with Begin, Dayan was second with 78% satisfied, followed by Weizman (73.4%), and, somewhat lower but still running very well, Ehrlich with 58.2% (J.P., November 30th, 1977: 2).

Louis Guttman, Director of the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research in Jerusalem, has found out that whereas over 80% of the Israelis thought, in early December, 1977, the government was doing its job in diplomatic matters "very successfully" or "successfully", they were evenly split when asked about the government's handling of economic problems (J.P., January 5th, 1978: 5).

Apart from the instability of short-term evaluations of the public, considering the earlier positive reactions to the government's economic policy, another instructive conclusion may be drawn from Guttman's findings. "In Israel", says Guttman, "as far as the

general public is concerned, divisions on foreign policy are in essence above party politics and relatively unrelated to internal affairs, which carry more weight at election time" (J.P., January 5th, 1978: 5; see also his analysis in: Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Information Nr. 46, January, 1978). In other words, the macro level (national consensus) remains virtually unaffected by the quarrels individuals and groups lead with one another on the micro level.

This observation confirms COHEN'S findings (1975: 187) with regard to religious behavior and the problem of national coherence in a religiously fragmented society. Fragmentation does only affect the micro level (see also my article "Religion und Politik in Israel", in: Orient 2/1978).

Applying Cohen's model to the macro and micro behavior in Israel's economic domain, I would suggest the following scheme:

Model I: Economic Behavior on the Macro and Micro Level

Macro level

Zionist consensus

National solidarity ↔ Consensus perceived


Micro level

Solidarity in

economic matters ↔ Distance perceived

↔ Linkage

— No linkage



However, past and traditional patterns on the macro level do not necessarily have to persist in the future. Continuous tensions on the micro level might well have repercussions on the macro level. Moreover, external factors might as well change the traditional pattern on the macro level. It remains to be seen, whether or not the national consensus on security matters will be influenced by the aftereffects of Sadat's visit to Israel, in November, 1977.

The data collected by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research suggest that, so far, the consensus has basically persisted (cf. Louis Guttman, in: J.P., January 5th, 1978: 5; Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Information No. 46, January 1978).

#### The Histadrut and the Alignment

Israeli and foreign reports were unanimous that, in spite of numerous spontaneous and organized protest strikes, the Histadrut had a pretty hard time mobilizing its rank-and-file against the New Economic Policy (see, for instance, J.P., October 31st, 1977: 1 f; HA'ARETZ, November 3rd, 1977: 13; LE MONDE, November 3rd, 1977: 8; NZZ, November 6th, 1977: 3; DER SPIEGEL, 46/1977: 158; irrespective of the political inclination of these press organs, they all agreed on the difficulties of the Histadrut).

In some cases, members of workers' councils announced the strike against the expressive will of the workers themselves (cf. DER SPIEGEL, 46/1977:158).

The government was complaining that the strikes were organized for political rather than economic reasons (TIMES, November 2nd, 1977: 8) and pointed to the fact that the Histadrut was in control of the oppositional Alignment. This charge was emphatically denied by the Histadrut (J.P., November 7th, 1977: 12), and the Labor Alignment just contended that the economic reforms would benefit the better-off sections of the community at the expense of the underprivileged (TIMES, November 2nd, 1977: 8). Yehoshua Rabinowitz, Labor's former Finance Minister and Ehrlich's predecessor, conceded, however, that the new measures had some positive features (ibid.). This reaction could not come as a complete surprise because, after all, the creeping devaluations Rabinowitz had introduced since November, 1974, and the motivations as well as explanations given by him and his staff, in late 1974, sounded pretty much like Ehrlich's statements, in 1977 (cf. INFORMATION CENTER: The Devaluation, and the Emergency Economic Policy- November 1974, Jerusalem, December, 1974).

The discrepancy between words and deeds, and, even more so, capabilities of the Histadrut was enormous. "The entire labor force will be mobilized", declared Histadrut Secretary-General Yeruham Meshel (J.P., October 31st, 1977: 1) and added that he did not "remember such an awakening of the workers" (ibid.).

May be, Meshel, himself had not woken up, yet. Several months later with the strike wave gaining more and more momentum, the Histadrut was still unable to control and channel the movement. Wild-cat strikes were rather the rule than the exception, and, in vain, the Histadrut tried to ride the tiger (cf. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, henceforth: FAZ, April 15th, 1978: 5; LE MONDE, March 10th, 1978: 6).

For years, already, this tiger, i.e. the Histadrut's rank-and-file has, in fact, tamed the rider, i.e. the Histadrut leadership. More and more, the Histadrut functionaries have lost control of their membership (cf. FAZ, April 15th, 1978: 5). By 1969, says Izhak Zamir, dean of the Law Faculty at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Histadrut had lost its control over workers, more than half of all strikes were being called without its authorization, and works committees had become more powerful than the Histadrut (J.P., November 28th, 1977: 3).

"Short-sighted or weak-kneed Histadrut secretary-generals and their (Labor; M.W.) party-appointed apparatchiks" (J.P., November 7th, 1977: 12; the J.P., in general, is far from being anti-Labor!) have "failed to maintain the devotion of many of its (Histadrut; M.W.) members and succeeded in driving many others into cynical alienation" (ibid.). No wonder, then, that, from one Histadrut election to the other, Labor has lost permanently in favor of the Likud Histadrut faction. In June 1977, close to 40% of Histadrut members voted against continued Labor Party control of the that organization.

No wonder, that the Histadrut leadership met with mounting resistance from its rank-and-file, when it waged its protest demonstrations against the New Economic Policy. The Histadrut membership did not want a "confrontation for confrontation's sake" (Amnon DENKER, in: HA'ARETZ, November 3rd, 1977: 13). Moreover, it did not discover any coherent strategy in the steps taken by the Histadrut leadership (ibid.). Therefore, it did not come as a complete surprise that, at certain protest rallies, Histadrut officials were denounced by their members and asked to "go home" (HA'ARETZ, November 3rd, 1977: summary of events in the overseas edition; LE MONDE, November 9th, 1977: 6).

In some places, fist fights, began when Histadrut officials turned up (J.P., November 7th, 1977:1f.).

In sum, for all its efforts to ride the tiger, the Histadrut seems to have missed the chance of brushing up its tarnished image. For the first time in its existence, it could have been a genuine workers' organization, without taking into consideration the political parameters and necessities of "its" Labor government.

Whether or not the disadvantaged will really have to bear the burden and those who have will get more, as, among others, Ya'acov Arnon, former director-general of the Ministry of Finance and member of the left-of-center "Shelli" party, claims (J.P. Magazine, November 4th, 1977: 4), remains to be seen.

Most observers seemed to agree with Arnon. Nobel prize laureate Milton Friedman did not. Says he:

"...the prices paid over the counter may well have risen for some items, but before, the consumer was

also paying through taxes for the subsidies that were holding the over-the counter price down. He was being fooled about the true cost to him of the product he was purchasing and, as a result, he was not getting full value for his money. The 'true' price will now be lower, not higher, since the consumer will no longer have to pay tax collectors to take money out of his right pocket and subsidy administrators to put money back into his left pocket" (NEWSWEEK, European edition, November 14th, 1977: 43). The economic "miracle" which he predicts "will benefit disproportionately the most disadvantaged groups in Israel's population..." (ibid.). Time will say whether or not he is right.

#### The Manufacturers Association

"For years, we were standing in a bubble bath. Now, the NEP will take away the bubbles and we'll see what's the real water level", said Avraham Shavit, president of the Manufacturers Association of Israel, commenting the proclamation of the economic reform (NEWSWEEK, European edition, November 14th, 1977: 43).

However, he criticized that the change in the country's economic policy had been introduced too abruptly (NZZ, November 9th, 1977: 9).

Months before the "economic upheaval", in July, 1977, Shavit had shown some strong reservations vis à vis the basic economic philosophy of Milton Friedman whose influence on Ehrlich and his staff was widely known.

"We are worlds apart", Shavit stated when asked about his opinion on Milton Friedman (interview with

Yair Kotler, in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, July 15th, 1977: 9). Shavit on his meeting with Milton Friedman whom he had met, shortly before (ibid.): "You (i.e. the Jews; M.W.) are the best bankers of the world, Friedman said. Do we, therefore, have to turn all our hotels into banks? The first shelling of Kiryat Shmona will chase away all these banks to Vaduz. Moreover, Friedman doesn't want to subsidize pepper-growing in the Arava or in the Jordan Valley. I am all for the settlements in the Jordan Valley. Those pepper-growing settlers will not go to Vaduz. In Friedman's free enterprise computer, the subject of nation-building and the construction of a new society doesn't exist. Theoretically, he is right. Free initiative, more production. Zionism, however, wants to build a nation and a society. Subsidies for tomato-growers in the Jordan Valley are not just subsidies". The anti-Friedman front could mark some points. "If we strictly apply his (i.e. Friedman's; M.W.) theories, Israel will have to turn off all lights, within a moth's time", reasoned Simha Ehrlich (interview in: DIE ZEIT, January 6th, 1978: 17). Therefore, he continued, the Likud government did not abandon all controls on foreign currency, did not abolish all subsidies, and even increased financial support for the disadvantaged (ibid.).

In mid-July, 1977, Shavit expressed his anxiety as far as the (then) prospective abolitions of export incentives were concerned. He was also less than enthusiastic about the necessity to raise money at the stock exchange<sup>6)</sup>, instead of getting it from government agencies (HA'ARETZ Magazine, July 15th, 1977: 8). Simultaneously, he complained of bureau-



cratic annoyances. In a nutshell, he wanted to have the cake, and eat it.

Shavit's criticism did not seem to impress Simha Ehrlich. Said the Minister: "The tongue cannot reason" (interview with Yair Kotler, in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, January 20th, 1978: 12).

But, Shavit was not the only industrialist to complain about the NEP. Dov Lautmann, Shavit's deputy in the Manufacturers Association also reproached Ehrlich with having changed the economic course too drastically and too swiftly". You can't throw a baby into cold water and demand that he swim. First, he's got to learn how to swim. Israel's industry cannot be compared with the European or American one...There, people are not called up for any reserve duty. Taxes are less burdensome, the service sector is more efficient, there are no (Arab; M.W.) sanctions, there is more competition in the services..." (HA'ARETZ Magazine, February 17th, 1978: 6).

Primarily, the government's intention to eliminate export subsidies came under attack. "In the past months there has been a growing protest, on the part of the exporters, that their profitability has been hurt by the new policies and that the exchange rate is too low", reported the Jerusalem Post (November 29th, 1977: 9).

The "doubts" of the industrialists seemed to be contagious. Only a week after the proclamation of the NEP, economists of the Ministry of Finance as well as the Bank of Israel conceded that they might

have underestimated the prospective damage to the exporting industry (HA'ARETZ, November 11th, 1977: Overseas edition, weekly summary.). Because of the excessive subsidies in the past, the new and market-oriented exchange rate proved to be disadvantageous to exporters. Gone were the "good old" greenhouse days; or gone they seemed.

The Bank of Israel promised to "intervene" and further weaken the Israel pound to a level of 17 to 18 IL per U.S. dollar (HA'ARETZ, ibid.). In early March, 1978, the "Sivan Committee", appointed to examine the profitability of exports and ways to assist exporters recommended an aid package to industry worth some IL one billion for 1978. The most important recommendation being the gradual elimination of the Employers Tax which was 4% of the wage bill (J.P., March 15th, 1978: 7). For enterprises that have run into financial difficulties and are willing to shift to exports, the committee suggested an increase of the existing export conversion fund. In principal, the committee accepted the wishes of the industrialists who also wanted easier conditions for their loan collateral. However, the exchange rate supported by a proper tax structure should be the main instrument for the promotion of exports (J.P., ibid.).

Soon, an explanation was found to grant the export subsidies, again. Exporting enterprises were to be compensated for "tax increases to which they had become subject two years ago" (J.P., International edition, April 11th, 1978: 12).

In April, 1978, 1,300 exporters got government

loans mounting up to IL 4 billion and with an interest rate of 12%, i.e. roughly a third of the prospective inflation rate (HA'ARETZ, April 21st, 1978: 10).

Again, the government, this time a "free enterprise oriented" Likud government, began to bale out ailing enterprises. "Gadot" and "Frutarom", two petrochemical firms, were granted subsidized loans totalling IL 50 million (J.P., March 30th, 1978: 2). Not surprisingly, Industry and Commerce Minister, Yigal Horowitz, who had made the final decision found a convincing explanation: These loans had been approved because of a written promise by former Industry Minister Bar-Lev (ibid.). The latter, however, contended that his letter did not refer to loans or specify rates of interest (ibid.). Then, Horowitz conceded that one of the considerations in the decision to assist the petrochemical enterprises was the involvement of foreign investors (ibid.).

No, good old greenhouse days have not yet gone. Rather, the "ma'arahization" ("Ma'arah" = Labor Alignment)<sup>7)</sup> of Likud's economic policy has gained momentum.

Any way, exporters have not run into serious trouble, even before the ma'arahization. In a talk with the Finance Minister, in January, 1978, textile exporters who had been especially worried<sup>8)</sup> conceded to have done considerably well after the introduction of the NEP. So did diamond exporters (cf. interview with Ehrlich, in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, January 20th, 1978: 12).

The most authoritative confirmation of this trend came in early April, 1978. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics (known for its serious figures and not for statistical "cosmetic"), commodity exports in the first quarter of 1978 were 28% higher than in January-March last year, and industrial exports, excluding diamonds, showed a 28.5% rise. Diamond exports were up 35%, and agricultural exports went up by 14% (J.P., April 10th, 1978: 9). Viewing this extraordinary growth in exports, some economic observers in Jerusalem were reported to have asked a pertinent question about the relevance of economic policy to actual performance in this area (J.P., ibid.). Reasoned one academic economist: "Perhaps, the most that can be said is that neither policy has prevented exports from growing rapidly..." (Ibid.).

#### THE IMPLEMENTATION AS A MA'ARAHIZATION

Apart from the ma'arahization in the dispute over export subsidies, other ma'arahizations followed suit.

According to Amnon Denker (HA'ARETZ, March 10th, 1978: 9), these are the salient characteristics of "ma'arahization": Red tape, favoritism, vain promises, surrender to pressures.

Wild cat strikes were, again, the order of the day with the Histadrut, mostly retroactively, taking matters into its hand. The most prominent and most far reaching strikes took place in the merchant fleet and in El Al, Israel's state owned airlines. The settlement in El Al was widely interpreted as an all-out victory of and surrender to the Histadrut which, after a while, had supported the

originally wild-cat strike (Amnon Denker, in: HA'ARETZ, April 27th, 1978: Overseas edition, weekly summary).

Two former generals, Amit (Minister of Transportation) and Hod (director-general of El Al) were reproached with having committed "grave tactical errors", all way long (ibid.).

Ehrlich who, before, had seemed stiff-necked and had promised "a tough approach" (J.P., March 11th, 1978: 1) indicating he might bring in the army and police and would take legal steps as well (HA'ARETZ, March 10th, 1978: 9), quietly gave way to the demands of the El Al staff. This, in turn, outraged some of his colleagues in the cabinet who claimed that, publicly, they were being made fun of by Ehrlich's behavior (HA'ARETZ, April 27th, 1978: 1).

Indeed, their impression was not far fetched, because the cabinet had, unanimously, decided to play it hard (ibid.).

The results of the 79 days long strike of the merchant fleet, Israel's longest strike, saved the face of the government. In fact, at first sight, they even looked like a victory. Taking a closer look at the agreement, observers were convinced, that the "surrender" of the sailors was paying off, for the sailors, that is (cf. Elazar Levin, in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, April 27th, 1978: 5 ff.).

In the public sector, the government fought a losing battle in attempting to realize its wage policy which should have channeled workers from services to

industry by means of lower wage increases in the tertiary sector. In the end, the gap with industrial workers was narrowed. Service employees in the public sector were to get a 15% wage rise (J.P., April 11th, 1978: 1).

All along the wage front, the ma'arahization became evident (cf. Amnon Denker, in: HA'ARETZ, March 10th, 1978: 9).

The Likud government has had a pretty hard time living up to its own economic philosophy.

Since the list of failures is rather long, we should better point to a relative success, first. According to the Bank of Israel, foreign currency reserves increased by \$ 135 million between the end of October, 1977, and the end of January, 1978 (J.P., March 9th, 1978:2; HA'ARETZ, April 7th, 1978:14).

Now, let us turn some implementations that have fallen short of the expectations.

Price decontrol, a salient feature of a truly liberal economy, has not been materialized. "Nesher" Ltd. a cement producer, demanded that the government abandon its price controls and allow the enterprise to raise prices up to 25 or 30% (HA'ARETZ, April 27th, 1978: 12). Ironically, fifty percent of Nesher Ltd. belong to the Histadrut owned "Koor" Industries Ltd...(cf. Who's Who in Israel, 1973-74, Tel-Aviv: Bronfman & Cohen: 552).

A memorandum prepared by economist Yoram Gabbai of the State Revenue Administration said that the reduction of the purchase taxes which in the framework of the NEP was to give partial compensation for the increase in value added tax had only a

minimal effect on the consumer price of the goods involved. Even in the case of substantial reductions in purchase taxes, i.e. 15% or more, the profits apparently went into the pockets of the intermediaries and producers (J.P., April 11th, 1978: 7).

Other taxes and tariffs have not been collected properly, due to red tape, inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the agencies in charge. In the Department of Customs and Excise as well as in the Income Tax and Property Commission of the Ministry of Finance, "people do not show any initiative, do not make any effort, and it may even said that they hardly work at all...their book-keeping is no book-keeping, their investigation is no investigation, their reviews no reviews" (Eytan Lifshitz, in: HA'ARETZ, April 27th, 1978: Overseas edition, weekly summary). The minister in charge, Simha Ehrlich, did not do anything to improve the dismal situation. In his most crucial test, yet, the 1978/79 budget, he was not very successful either. At least as far as most reactions were concerned. Euphemistically, Yair Kotler called it a "budget of uncertainty" (HA'ARETZ Magazine, January 20th, 1978: 12).

Only few observers called it a "deflationary", recession budget curtailing economic growth (cf. Abraham Tal, in: HA'ARETZ, January 6th, 1978: 13. Tal argued that the government reduced the purchasing power of the consumers and hit the exporters; A.Schweitzer, in: HA'ARETZ, May 5th, 1978: Overseas edition, weekly summary; the correspondent of LE MONDE, January 18th, 1978: 8 pointed to a prospective growth rate of one percent, in contradiction to the official projection of an expansion of 4% cf. J.P., January 10th, 1978: 6).

The majority of commentators, including the International Monetary Fund, IMF (J.P., March 9th, 1978: 2), interpreted the budget as an inflationary one.

Making up one's mind about this problem, one has to remember that, in February, 1978, Ehrlich had introduced a supplementary budget to the previous 1977/78 one. Thus, a sum of IL 17.24 billion had been added to the current fiscal plan (HA'ARETZ, March 3rd, 1978: Overseas edition, weekly summary). Ehrlich maintained that this financial injection had become necessary because of the economic upheaval (ibid.). However, introducing the first step of his NEP, on July 17th, 1977, the Finance Minister had cut the running budget by IL 2.3 billion (FAZ, July 19th, 1977: 9). Apparently, in the government's fiscal policy zig was being followed by zag.

Also in February, 1978, the government had, once again, raised gasoline prices (HA'ARETZ, February 24 th, 1978: 14), causing angry protests of the Manufacturers Association (Ibid.: Overseas edition, weekly summary). This price increase and the way it was introduced were, again, a clear indication of a growing ma'arahization, for there was an obvious vain promise. On January 20th, 1978 (HA'ARETZ Magazine: 13), Simha Ehrlich had declared: "For the time being, I do not envisage an increase of the gasoline price. This price depends on OPEC. The only promise I can make is that, unless there are general price increases and world wide changes, we will not turn the price of gasoline into a government instrument chosen to dry up money".



Moreover, on April 3rd, 1978, government run postal and telephone services became more expensive, the rate being 40% (HA'ARETZ, April 7th, 1978: Overseas edition, weekly summary).

The original budget plan, tabled in the Knesset on January 9th, 1978, had envisaged expenditures of IL 182 billion (J.P., January 10th, 1978: 6).

In real terms, the government argued, this would be 4% less than in the previous year (ibid.).

"True", said Moshe Sanbar, former Governor of the Bank of Israel (the successor to David Horowitz), "if we include foreign currency expenditure, notably the import of arms" (J.P., January 13th, 1978: 12). However, local currency expenses, "those which create demand on the domestic market...are up, at 1977 prices, from IL 100.5 billion to IL 103 billion, an increase of over two percent", he continued (ibid.). Additionally, he emphasized that the government's estimates were based on conflicting premises. Expenditure was calculated on the assumption that prices would go up by 32%, and revenue by 40%. "The two figures can't both be right", Sanbar pointed out. "If the revenue people are correct in expecting a 40% rise, then IL 7 billion or IL 8 billion must be added on the expenditure side. If the Budget Division is correct in expecting only a 32% price rise, then several billion pounds must be deducted from the revenue. In either event, the deficit will be much greater than the IL 6 billion stipulated" (ibid.) in fact IL 6.5 billion; M.W.). This gap, by the way, should have been made good by an "overdraft" from the Bank of Israel (J.P., January 10th, 1978: 6), i.e. by the printing of money.

Another outspoken critic of the proposed budget was the present Governor of the Bank of Israel, Arnon Gafny. He came out against the size of the budget and called it a "deviation" from the government's declared policy (J.P., November 28th, 1977: 1).

True, the flexibility of Israel's budget planners has been very limited, since defence (IL 55 billion) and debt service (IL 57 billion), together, account for over 60% of the government's total outgoing (cf. J.P., January 10th, 1978: 6).

However, Gafny somehow summed up the arguments of those who found the budget too deflationary as well as those who felt it was too inflationary. He criticized the budget for not adequately reflecting the economy's long-term growth needs and (!) for not slowing down inflation. The current expenditures of various ministries should have been cut by IL 5 to 6 billion, and the development budget increased by IL 1-2 billion, he suggested (J.P., November 28th, 1977: 1).

Additionally, the research department of the Bank of Israel contended that the actual printing of money was likely to be twice the IL 6.5 billion foreseen in the budget (ibid.).

Ever and again, Gafny demanded that the government cut the original budget by about IL 4 billion (HA'ARETZ, January 27th, 1978: 6, for instance) and pointed to the rapid injections of money into the market.

According to Gafny, in January and February, 1978, alone, the Bank of Israel has been obliged to inject about IL 2 billion into the money market (HA'ARETZ, February 24 th, 1978: Overseas edition, weekly summary). Instead of the January/February sum, a limitation to IL 500 million was preferable, he maintained (HA'ARETZ, March 10th, 1978:2).

Since the public expected further price rises, the inflation mentality, i.e. the "propensity to consume", rather increased than decreased (cf. Lea Porat, in: HA'ARETZ, April 21st, 1978: 21). Finally, as Gafny and others intensified their campaign against the inflationary effects of the budget and the government's spending policy in general, the Minister of Finance gave way to his critics, partly at least. The budget was cut by about IL 3 billion totaling IL 178.185 billion (J.P., March 29th, 1978: 2).

Late in April, Ehrlich asked the director-general of his Ministry, Amiram Sivan, to investigate the possibility of further reductions in the budget (HA'ARETZ, April 21st, 1978: 9).

Yet another development in April seemed encouraging. The amount of money the Bank of Israel put into the money market had fallen drastically, to IL 157 million ! (HA'ARETZ, May 5th, 1978: Overseas edition, weekly summary).

May be, the inflationary tendencies have been reversed. May be, people began to make fun of Simha Ehrlich too soon: "...Milton Friedman?...Milton who?" Ehrlich was quoted to say in jokes Israelis told one another. May be, the NEP will cure Israel's economy,

in spite of obvious malpractices in style and, partly at least, substance.

SOME REMARKS ON THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS INVOLVING  
THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

Informed observers of Israel's political parties could hardly have been taken by surprise about the limited number of those who had been consulted about and made the decision on the New Economic Policy. The clandestine way in which it was prepared, behind the scenes and without prior knowledge of either the parliamentarians of the coalition parties, or even all of the cabinet members, was not unexpected.

True, one of the salient issues of the previous election campaign had been the demand for "more democracy" within the parties as well as for more rank-and-file participation. Within the Likud, however, these demands had hardly caused any change as far as the "exclusivity" of the decision-makers and their limited number was concerned (cf. DISKIN/WOLFFSOHN, 1977, for details about Herut cf. LICHTENSTEIN, 1974).

Elsewhere, DISKIN and I (1977:786 and 835) have suggested models of the hierarchy structure as well as of the decision-making levels within the national-religious bloc, the nucleus of Israel's new coalition and the party system as a whole. This national-religious bloc is not to be confused with the National Religious Party (NRP). The former consisting of the Likud as well as the NRP, the latter being as single party of this bloc.

In these models, Herut was situated on the first, the Liberal Party of the Likud, together with the other Likud factions as well as the National Religious Party on the second, and the originally prospective, then real coalition partner, the Democratic Movement for Change, on the third level.

With minor modifications, these models have been verified, as far as the decision-making process of the NEP is concerned.

It goes without saying, that the Histadrut leadership which, during the Alignment era, had always been consulted on matters of economic policy, was not asked during the decision-making process of the NEP. This "first" led to bitter complaints of the Histadrut leadership (cf. J.Brilliant, in: J.P., November 7th, 1977: 1).

The minor modifications of our models include the role and participation of the "above party" administrative elite in the bureaucracy, including the Bank of Israel. It is worth mentioning that this administrative elite has been "inherited" of the previous government and has proven its absolute loyalty to its new "masters". In fact, this might have been the beginning of a new "above party" "Civil Service" tradition which Israel has not yet come to experience (this hope was expressed by Simha Ehrlich in his interview with Yair Kotler, in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, November 4th, 1977: 5 f.).

The modifications have also to take into consideration an obvious division of labor between the Herut and Liberal faction of the Likud, or rather, a division

of labor between Menahem Begin and Simha Ehrlich.

Whereas Begin, together with Dayan who is his prime, some say his only, "counselor" (cf. Uzi Benziman, in: HA'ARETZ, April 27th, 1978: 14), is in complete charge of foreign and security policy, Ehrlich is in full control of economic matters. One does hardly interfere with the sphere of the other (cf. Yair Kotler's interviews with Ehrlich and the former's introduction, in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, July 22nd, 1977: 5 ff.; HA'ARETZ Magazine, November 4th, 1977: 5 ff.). Unless they were consulted, other cabinet ministers and parliamentarians did not interfere either.

This scheme seemed to work as long as the basic consensus had been intact. It worked, as far as the decision-making process involving the NEP was concerned (for details cf. the above mentioned interviews in HA'ARETZ Magazine as well as Elazar Levin's article in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, November 4th, 1977: 8ff and Yair Kotler's interview, in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, January 20th, 1978: 12ff).

Twice, Begin was asked during the decision-making process of the NEP. At the beginning, when he was quoted to have reminded Ehrlich of a compensation to the disadvantaged, five times (HA'ARETZ Magazine, July 22nd, 1977: 7), and in the end, when he gave his final approval. This way was chosen in July, 1977, as well as in October, 1977.

As far as the elaboration of and information about the new measures are concerned, three distinct concentric circles within the administrative elite can be distinguished: The first consisted of about ten persons, among them Ehrlich, his deputy Flomin,

the Governor of the Bank of Israel, Arnon Gafny, and the director-general of the Ministry of Finance, Amiram Sivan, a former Mapai activist! The members of this inner circle knew the whole NEP program. The second circle was enlarged two weeks before the proclamation of the NEP. In the end, there were about forty people in this circle. Its members knew that there would be a significant devaluation of the Israeli pound. They were, however, not instructed about its rate. The third circle was established a few days before the announcement of the measures and consisted of several groups of ten. They did not know more than certain details directly concerning their spheres (for details see especially E. Levin's article).

It is interesting to note, that the Ministers of the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) who had entered the coalition on October 24th, 1977 (the NEP was proclaimed on October 28th!) were informed about accomplished facts, and did not object. On the contrary, they lend their helping hand, as far as certain legal details had to be completed. Here, the DMC's new Justice Minister, Shmuel Tamir, was most prominent.

The cabinet as a whole was informed on the very same day the NEP would be announced. The only minister to express reservations was David Levy, the Minister of Immigrant Absorption and a Histadrut veteran. He was afraid of unemployment (cf. Levin).

Harmony did not last for long, however. In the wake of Sadat's visit, with the disputes within the cabinet and the coalition over the government's settlement

policy increasing, and partly even before, economic matters did not remain unaffected by the settlement issue. In the wage dispute involving service employees David Levy favored higher wage rises than Ehrlich, and got an upper hand (J.P., April 11th, 1978: 1). Levy's view was supported by Religious Affairs Minister, Aharon Abuhatzzeira (National Religious Party; J.P., April 9th, 1978:2; J.P., April 10th, 1978: 1).

The NRP ministers who, so far, had remained passive in economic matters, became ever more active. Zevulun Hammer, the Education Minister, explained publicly that, contrary to Ehrlich, he did not consider the wage claims of the striking teachers as "unjust" (J.P., April 9th, 1978: 3).

The dispute over budget cuts was being accompanied by certain stabs in Ehrlich's back, too. His deputy, Flomin, publicly, of course, indicated that he would go on demanding further reductions (HA'ARETZ, January 6th, 1978: 8). Yigal Horowitz ("La'am" faction of the Likud), Ariel Sharon (Herut's "Shlomzion" faction; Minister of Agriculture), Meir Amit (DMC; Minister of Transport and Communications), and Shmuel Tamir (DMC; Justice Minister) were other "trouble makers" for Ehrlich (cf. HA'ARETZ, November 18th, 1977:8; J.P., November 28th, 1977: 1). They associated themselves with the criticism Gafny had expressed with respect to the size of the budget (J.P., November 28th, 1977: 1).

Ehrlich's "surrender" to the demands of the El Al workers was the straw that broke the camel's back. His colleagues in the cabinet felt that they had been made fun of, publicly (see above; HA'ARETZ, April 28th, 1978: 1).



Of course, the controversies within the cabinet had repercussions on the parliamentary factions of the coalition parties. The parliamentarians refused to go along with the government, blindly. Members of the government parties belonging to the Finance Commission of the Knesset were opposed to the price rises in postal and telephone services (HA'ARETZ, March 10th, 1978: 3). Likud members of the same commission demanded that Ehrlich reduce the budget (HA'ARETZ, December 2nd, 1977: 8). The disputes cut across party lines, alliances were shifting, and models seemd useless because anarchy cannot be demonstrated by models.

Anybody who, before, had expected that a Likud government would succeed in forming a more disciplined coalition than the Alignment in the past, was proved wrong. Even Herut, traditionally a highly disciplined party accepting authoritative decisions, began public disputes. All this remindes of familiar scenes. The protagonists have changed, the style has remained. Basic policy decisions, however, are still made in "kitchen cabinets" (cf. Benziman, above). Again, ma'arahization. Or, considering the anarchy mentioned above, a realignment of the political forces in Israel. This process might, in turn, be supported by the disputes over economic policy, but not caused by it. The controversies over economic policy and the shifting alliances in this sphere seem to be part and parcel of the security policy quarrel. It is not identical, however. The disputes over the budget and over the settlement policy erupted at about the same time. Just by chance? Probably not.

N O T E S

1. Outbidding the General Zionists in 1955, Herut became the strongest party of the Second bloc. In the same year, Ahdut Ha'avoda made significant inroads into Mapam's electorate.
2. This is not the place to deal with the motivation leading to the liberalization. Here, I can only mention the fact that it did begin in 1952 and was further stimulated in 1962. Likewise, I cannot evaluate the pros and cons of the respective measures in this study.
3. For a discussion of the dominance of the political factor in other areas of Israel's polity see GUTMANN/LANDAU, 1975.
4. Commerce, restaurants, hotels, transport, storage, communication, financing and business services, public and community services, personal and other services (STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, 1977: 314 f.).
5. This is typical of the way certain media in Germany report on the Middle East, in general. Mostly, they project their own national political and social bias on the country they write or talk about.
6. For the stock exchange, 1977 was an absolute boom year. However, the growth of trading had started before, in the latter half of 1976. On April 12th, 1977, even before the electoral change, the stock exchange had to be closed temporarily. Banks and stock exchange were unable to cope with

the additional work caused by the immensely increased trading volume. The second, and even stronger, impetus came after Likud's victory at the polls. A new trading record was set in June/July, 1977. In August, the stock exchange had to be closed, again, temporarily, because of the same technical difficulties. In the wake of the economic upheaval, the public turned to government bonds because they were linked with the inflation rate. Sadat's visit to Israel, raised, once more, the expectations of the public, and shares bounced upwards. In late November, however, trading was less intensive, and the index began to drop, gradually. A kind of "crash" occurred in mid-December. At year's end, the atmosphere became more relaxed, again. Ever since, the general mood at the stock exchange has been stabilized on a somewhat more normal, less hectic level. Observers believe that both, the public and industry, have come to realize the potential of the stock market as a lucrative place to "gain" as well as to raise money (for details on the ups and downs cf. HA'ARETZ, Special Issue: Stock market guide, April 27th, 1978; also: J.P. Magazine, December 23rd, 1977: 9; HA'ARETZ Magazine, January 6th, 1978: 29 ff.).

7. I have taken this formulation from Amnon Denker (HA'ARETZ, March 10th, 1978: 9). I find it most convincing.

8. Their possible losses were realized in advance by the government (cf. interview with Yigal Horowitz, in: HA'ARETZ Magazine, January 21st, 1978: 8). Horowitz also predicted potential setbacks of the chemical industry. However, this did not seem to bother him too much (cf. ibid.).

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