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THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

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AMERICAN SECURITY: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF CONGRESS

by Richard Haass

Many observers have noted the increasing complexity of the environment in which the United States (and all states for that matter) must operate. The era of American domination is for the most part over, while the notion of superpower condominium is inadequate in describing the international system as it is today. Instead, the United States finds itself vulnerable and dependent upon a range of factors from the availability of fuel and other resources to the cooperation of states to control the proliferation and use of force, for which there are few unilateral answers.

Equally true, as the social scientists are wont to remind us, is the increasing complexity of the domestic environment in which American policy responses to this world are fashioned. The image of a single entity known as the "United States", both determining policies and carrying them out, is as simplistic as it is inaccurate. No doubt some rational assessment of national interests takes place in the executive branch, but any such analysis is but one factor amidst a host of organizational, bureaucratic, and personal -- or personnel -- factors found inside and outside these bureaus, agencies and departments with the ability to influence policy at virtually every stage.

To this portrait of a diverse and often competitive executive must be brought the additional complicating factor of the Congress. With Vietnam and Watergate not far behind us, one of the Panama Canal Treaties still before us, and a second SALT agreement ahead, there is little need to spend time pointing out the impact of Congress on American policy, foreign and otherwise. The imperial presidency is in abeyance. The idea of executive expertise has been shattered, as has the trust that the President and those around him would act wisely and legally. Even an administration better managed and focused than the present one would be less than dominant owing to the zeitgeist of present-day Washington.

This said, to speak of Congressional influence on public policy in the United States, and foreign and defence policy in particular, is nothing new. Nor is the phenomenon of executive-legislative tension or even confrontation. George Washington vowed never to return to the Congress himself after facing a hostile barrage of questions regarding the 1791 Jay Treaty. More than a century later, just over one third of the members of the US Senate voted to keep the United States out of the League of Nations following the First World War. In more recent times, the examples of such

institutional conflict are numerous. Besides the experiences of Congressional efforts already referred to to terminate the war in Indochina and the Watergate affair, one can include the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) debate of the late 1960s, repeated efforts by Senator Mansfield and others to reduce the US troop commitment to Europe, the chrome importation or Byrd amendment, the Jackson amendment and other initiatives linking provision of Most Favoured Nation (MFN)status and credits to non-market countries in return for guarantees of free emigration, the arms embargo against Turkey, the investigations into the intelligence agencies, and the dramatic refusal of the Congress in late 1975 and 1976 to permit operations in Angola.

The number and importance of these and other issues notwithstanding, little consideration of the implications of the enlarged Congressional role for American security policy has taken place. Too often the question has been raised as to whether the role of Congress in these matters is "good or bad", and too often the response reflects the bias on the particular issue of the day. Thus, many who supported congressional efforts to end American involvement in Southeast Asia were hostile to attempts to reduce force levels in Europe or efforts to prevent the transfer of arms to Turkey. "Congressional influence is good when I agree and bad when I don't" has become an all-too-familiar refrain.

The purpose of this paper is not to add another voice to the chorus of those either urging or deploring this influence of Congress on the course of American Foreign Policy. Rather, the intent is to look at the sources of this enhanced influence, the changes in the involvement of Congress with policy, the evolving shape of the Congress itself, and then to assess briefly the implications of these developments, both in general and in regard to the American commitment to the Atlantic Alliance and European security.

The Revival of Traditional Powers

In many instances, the recent demonstrations of Congressional influence on security policy reflect not new powers but the revival of old ones. Often the product of disagreements over specific issues, these assertions of institutional will take advantage of explicit or derived constitutional powers which were often allowed to lapse during much of the post-war era. At least six such mechanisms can be identified:

- Approval of Nominations: Major appointments, including ambassadors and top-ranking cabinet officials, require majority approval by the Senate. In certain cases, the Senate can and has refused such approval, as in the case of Theodore Sorenson, President Carter's first nominee to head the Central Intelligence Agency. Equally important, the "advice and consent" function can be used to "send a message" to the executive -- for example, the majority (but not ⅔rds) approval of Paul Warnke to head ACDA and be US Ambassador to SALT communicated Senate readiness to reject an "unacceptable" SALT II agreement.

- Approval of Treaties: Also specially reserved to the Senate is the right of advice and consent on treaties, with a ⅔rds vote of the Senate required for approval. Clearly, as in the case of both Panama and SALT, the threat of Congressional disapproval can, within limits, improve the negotiating strength of the United States; it can also make any compromise more difficult.

At the same time, the actuality of disapproval after negotiations are completed could easily undermine the legitimacy of the executive and cause major crises in US relations.

- Legislative Power: The essence of the Congressional role is lawmaking and, in the security field, the authorisation of and appropriation for the armed forces of the United States. After years of mostly "rubber-stamping" Defense Department requests, the tendency has been increasingly for Congressional committees to challenge the budgetary requests of the Executive. Not only did the House of Representatives resist eliminating funds for prototypes 5 and 6 of the B-1 bomber, but one can expect major battles over the Administration's shipbuilding programme for the US Navy and over the development of the MX ICBM.

- Domestic Policy: Also a function of its basic lawmaking role is the ability of Congress to affect US foreign and security policy indirectly through action (or inaction) on domestic policy. Energy policy or trade protectionist pressures are among the most visible at the moment, but the impact of domestic legislation on foreign policy will grow parallel to the increasing connection between these two spheres.

- Hearing and Investigations: Among the most powerful of congressional actions are the twin abilities to probe and publicise. Fulbright's Vietnam hearings were fundamental to the changing of public and Congressional opinion on the war, while the Church and Pike investigations produced reforms of the intelligence agencies. Most dramatic of all was Watergate. Of less sensational but still major significance is the ongoing Congressional ability to question Administration officials, request documents, publish testimony and information and oversee actual programmes (at often detailed, "micro-management" levels) and field operations.

- Expressions of Opinion: Both inside and outside the formal Congressional setting members have means of affecting policy. Non-binding "Sense of the Congress" (or Senate or House) Resolutions provide barometers of Congressional mood, and can be used to signal approval or disapproval of existing politices, negotiations, or actions. Just such a resolution in the Senate had an important effect on the Panama Canal negotiations several years ago. Outside the formal setting the members have available all the means of influence open to any politician, from access to media to signing open letters.

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The Creation of New Powers

The ability of the Congress to affect American security policy has moved beyond a reassertion or recovery of inherent powers that had either been permitted to lapse or had been abridged by the executive branch. Over the past five years, the Congress -- often overriding presidential vetoes -- has legislated new formal specific powers in this policy area. Whereas before the Armed Services Committees were mostly limited to review of annual posture statements and

budget requests, and the Foreign Relations Committees to passage of the annual foreign assistance requests, these Committees and the Congress as a whole now have a number of devices to influence policy. Among the most important are the following:

- War Powers: Passed over President Nixon's veto in November 1973, the War Powers Legislation, which limits a President's authority to commit US troops abroad without Congressional approval for a maximum period of 60 (under certain circumstances 90) days, has more than any other single piece of law sybolized the new Congressional role in security policy. Although it may make prolonged commitments more difficult, it could ironically increase Presidential authority in certain short term or crisis situations. In part tested by the Mayaguez incident, the War Powers Act showed itself weakest in assuring adequate consultation between the two branches and in ensuring the congress a role in crisis management. However, as any body of 535 individuals is ill-suited for any such role, the real test will come only with presidential desire for a sustained commitment of American troops in a military situation.

- Arms Transfers: Any significant sale or transfer of defence articles abroad must first be proposed to the Congress, which then has thirty days to disapprove the transfer before it goes ahead. To date, this specific mechanism or related ones have been used in three cases: the sale of Hawk surface-to-air missiles to Jordan, the sale of AWACS to Iran, and the sale of defence articles to Turkey. (The first two cases involved a threatened use of the Congressional veto mechanism; the latter a simple embargo clause rather than objection to a particular proposal.) This legislation will be the instrument of those in Congress seeking to stop the proposed $4.8 billion transfer of aircraft to the Middle East.

- Nuclear Proliferation: Passed and signed into law earlier this year, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 further increased Congressional ability to end the shipment of all nuclear materials, technology and assistance to any country not agreeing to full-scope safeguards over the following 18 months to two years.

- Intelligence: In the wake of the separate House and Senate investigations of the intelligence agencies, each house has established its own oversight committee empowered to pass on budgetary (and hence programme) requests by the intelligence agencies. In addition, each has the task of examing the quality of the performance of operations, collection, and analysis.

- International Agreements: Notwithstanding the Senate's treaty role, all other executive agreements; that is, those international agreements other than treaties - must be reported to the Congress within 60 days of entering into force. The scope for secret executive actions is thus reduced. Thought is also being given to providing the Congress with a means of rejecting Executive agreements, perhaps through joint resolutions. For the present, Congress can only work to undermine those agreements with which it disagrees through the "back door" of withholding funds to implement the terms of these agreements requiring appropriations.

- Impact Statements: In two areas, those of human rights and arms control, the Administration is required by law to produce annual statements. In the case of human rights, the statements are to assess compliance with international standards in particular countries, with such reports often influencing aid allotments. Arms control Impact statements, or ACIS, must accompany annual requests for those defence programmes of significant expense or import. The intention is both to provide the Congress with more information and to force the executive into more thorough analysis of the implications of its own policies.

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The New Shape of Congress

Before discussing the collective impact of both the reassertion of familiar powers and the legislation of additional ones, it is first necessary to examine how Congress has reformed its own structures assigned a role in foreign and defense policy making. Here two major trends emerge. The first is that the locus of decision making and policy analysis in the Congress in this area has broadened markedly. Centralized leadership is weak, party discipline hardly a factor, and seniority under challenge. The domination of committee chairmen has been reduced, with the number of subcommittees increasing and their role expanding. Major increases in staffing allowances for individual members and for the minority party on committee staffs has worked to decentralize power and authority within the Congress as never before.

Secondly, and in part related, is the far greater access to information now enjoyed by individual members of Congress as well as by committees. In part a reaction to the ABM debate when many Congressmen concluded that a viable Congressional alternative to executive leadership and domination necessitated "separate and equal" access to information and expertise, the Congress has either created new or expanded existing sources of information. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), together with the two budget committees, provides a cost analysis of administration programmes as well as the dollar costs of alternative postures and policies; the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) provides expertise in science and technological fields; the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress is a general source of information and analysis; the General Accounting Office (GAO), traditionally termed the "watchdog" of the Executive Branch, not only provides analysis of performance but has the manpower to check field operations and efficiency. These organizations, along with the extra staffing and greater access to Executive information through the intelligence committees, impact statements and The Freedom of Information Act, have accelerated trends toward a greater diffusion of expertise and power within the Congress brought about as well by structural changes mentioned above.

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General Implications

Together, these twin developments of enhanced powers and diffused authority are not without their irony: on the one hand, we have a Congress demanding a greater role in policy; on the other, a Congress organized less well to carry out such a role efficiently. Indeed, the two trends can at times be difficult to reconcile: the War Powers Legislation demands rapid decision-making and full consultation -- but with whom does one consult?

One should also point out the limitations to the new role of Congress. It is still a government of Presidential leadership and initiative. The Congress remains more reactive than creative, more negative than positive. More than anything, it is a large, often disparate and unwieldy institution. For the most part, crisis management will remain in the purview of the president and those around him, as will most major policy initiatives.

At the same time, however, it should not be assumed that the Congressional role is per se undesirable. Executive-dominated American foreign policy was not by any means consistently successful, either at home or abroad. Congressional oversight can improve Executive performance at many points in the policy process. At times Congress can add weight to diplomatic initiatives. It is certainly a useful disseminator of information and an important link between the large and mostly unelected Executive Branch and the population-at-large.

This said, Congressional influence on American security policy is not without its major implications and, at times, complications. In general, a Congressionally influenced foreign policy is likely to be more public and more explicit than an Executive one. It will tend to lack subtlety and discretion, if for no other reason than that legislation is a blunt instrument. Automatic withdrawal of forces, embargoes on arms, shut-offs of nuclear supplies -- all are actions that are black and white, leaving the diplomat or negotiator little to work with. The consideration of many of these concerns in separate pieces of legislation will not make it any easier to produce intelligent "packages of policy" toward any one country or region. Such problems are exacerbated by the perspective inherent in Congressmen who must be often re-elected: they are particularly vulnerable to short-term views, the desires of special interests (be they labour unions or ethnic lobbies) and to particulars rather than overviews.

More specifically, these characteristics of Congressional foreign policy are especially troubling at a time when the United States is moving toward a more discretionary policy to cope with a wide range of interests and interdependencies. Alliance management will not be made any easier by Congressional involvement. The Nixon Doctrine -- apparently still operative as evidenced by the Carter Administration's Korean policy -- depends in large part on the reliability of the United States as a supplier of arms and as an ally ready and able to reintroduce forces into local contingencies. But, for example, can the Republic of Korea realistically count on the US Congress to sanction potentially necessary operations, approve the transfer of promised military equipment or permit an extended redeployment of US troops to the peninsula in the event of an emergency? At a time when American guarantees and reliability are already suspect, the new role of Congress adds a further element of unpredictability and uncertainty into US relationships.

Congress and the Atlantic Alliance

The impact of Congress tends to be greatest either where ethnic American considerations are dominant or where the question of national interests is vague. In the case of Europe, the latter does not apply. Congress in 1978 shares the "Europe First" orientation of the Administration and is, if anything, more "hawkish" than the Administration on the Soviet threat. The ethnic factor, however, is present, as Congress has prevented full resumption of the military supply relationship with Turkey pending changes in the Turkish stance vis-a-vis Cyprus. In other areas, the impact of Congress seems small. War Powers or arms transfer

controls are not about to intrude in the Alliance; one should not confuse potential with reality. (In any case, one could argue that any severe crisis in Europe is likely to be over before the 60 or 90 day period prescribed by the War Powers Resolution expires.) In addition, one sees neither a revival of "offset" or "neo-Mansfieldism" on the horizon.

This is not to say that Congress will not have its effect on the Alliance. Several senators have already made their views on NATO organization known, and in the future one can expect more involvement with MBFR and NATO posture. Issues such as trade protectionism and proliferation policy have the potential to sour relations, as do disagreements over human rights in the East and general relations with the Soviet bloc. It is clear that factors outside Europe which still affect European security will be a source of contention, with another Middle East War posing real problems which might produce some backlash if the 1973 experience is not improved upon. Most serious, however, is the question of the domestic evolution of Europe. The American commitment to NATO depends on both a common perception of threat and a common set of values — if either of these becomes suspect, one can expect Congressional demands for a review or revision of Alliance ties in the light of both the anti-Soviet disposition and the political strength of Americans with personal and other ties to Europe.

Toward the Future

The adversary relationship between Congress and the Executive will not go away with time. Indeed, institutional struggle is intrinsic to the system -- to borrow from Richard Neustadt, the constitution created not a system of institutions endowed with separate powers but rather separate institutions sharing powers. In addition, observers must appreciate the non-European nature of the American scene, with the political isolation of Legislature from Executive and the lack of party loyalty or discipline most notable in foreign affairs.

Also, it should be added that we are at a particularly bad moment. The reaction to the abuses of the recent past is still strong, and the counter-reaction against what many feel to be too strong a Congress has yet to take hold. The current Administration is not one that can be characterised as either strong or focused. Lastly, there is little consensus as to the proper policies and priorities for the United States at this juncture. Time may work to improve the situation; yet it would be unrealistic to expect any return to a status quo ante in the balance of executive-congressional relations. The only thing that is certain is that more uncertainty is here to stay.

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THE RELEVANCE OF NATO INSTITUTIONS

by Christopher Irwin

There have been few times in the history of the North Atlantic Alliance when its institutions have been carrying out the day to day tasks which they have been set as efficiently as is now the case. Yet it is also true that, in practice, they are decreasingly the hearth in which Western security policy is forged. Other fora are being used, a trend partly encouraged by the increasing complexity of the web of interests and issues that binds the Western world together, partly by the fact that this web embraces a world that is larger than the Atlantic alliance.

The Significance of Institutions

For these reasons alone it is legitimate to pose the question: how effective are the present institutions of the Atlantic alliance? The question is a crucial one because the institutions are central to its effectiveness. It is inevitable that in an alliance of sovereign states the institutions should be the fount of collective actions and, to some considerable extent, must serve as a broker between sometimes conflicting national perspectives and even interests. The authority of the Alliance is partly derived from the institutions themselves. While they may carry out their day-to-day tasks as efficiently as they have ever done, their effectiveness has to be measured relative to the range of security issues faced by the Western world. It is clearly vital that information about Warsaw Pact force strengths should be shared between governments; but it is also important that those governments should be free to exchange views on their own abilities to counter those forces given different domestic contingencies.

The Scope of the Alliance

Just as the debate on the institutional framework of the Alliance should be of crucial interest to anyone seriously concerned with Atlantic security affairs, so also must the debate on the competences of the Alliance. It concerns two distinct issues: the degree to which the Alliance should confine itself to military security issues or seek to be more comprehensive in the different aspects of security policy that it embraces; secondly, the extent of its geographical competence. Purists tend to argue that NATO was created for a particular purpose and that its energies should not be dissipated by an extension of its competences. Yet in many ways this view ignores the pressing reality of security politics; to revive an overworked phrase from the past, we live in a 'global village'. Security cannot be compartmentalised into military, economic, domestic and so on; nor can it be containerised geographically as the Middle East War of 1973 forcibly reminded the Western world.

Although the practice has not reflected the original intentions, the founding fathers saw the North Atlantic Treaty as incorporating the broader view of security. There has always been a tension within the Alliance between those who see it as designed to fulfil a strictly limited purpose and those who believe it to provide the foundation of an Atlantic community. The desire of the latter to accrete things to Alliance functions has not always had the desired effect. It is arguable that the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS), created in 1969, not only hampered attempts to get international collaboration on environmental issues but set a bad precedent for those seeking to involve NATO more deeply in a broader range of security matters.

There is a certain paradox in that it was those who wished the Alliance to encompass a web of matters from military to economic and thus provide the basis of an Atlantic Community who also sought to impose limits on its geographic competence in order more clearly to define it. Today those who advocate a broadening in the competences of the institutions of the Alliance are often those who also argue that it is unhelpfully constrained by the geographical limits on its activities. However, advocacy of a formal Atlantic Community is largely gone: it has been replaced by a less precise pragmatic concept reflecting the ball of wax. The question that now arises is how can Atlantic institutions cope with the diffusion of interests affecting the Atlantic world? There is need for coordination, whether between different policy areas (it is intolerable that a Government should find itself committed in one international forum to cuts in public expenditure, whilst pleged to an increase in defence expenditure in another forum with those same countries viz the UK in 1976) or in policies towards third countries in as much as they have a bearing on the interests of the Alliance (as in the Middle East War of 1973).

The Problems of Restructuring

It takes little political imagination to see that any attempt to meet these problems by a radical restructuring of the existing NATO institutions is unlikely to meet with universal enthusiasm. The North Atlantic Treaty, the subsequent communiques and the habits that have given the Atlantic institutions their form are a finely balanced set of compromises, unsuited to unscrambling. In any case, as far as the prime military tasks of the Alliance are concerned, NATO is functioning well at the moment. There is a distinguished SACEUR of remarkable authority; member states have agreed and - more importantly - almost all planned to realise a three per cent increase in defence expenditure despite generally adverse economic circumstances; with the active encouragement of the new U.S. Administration, NATO has temporarily waived its normal reticence about any form of supranational activity and is well advanced with a series of long-term defence planning projects related to a number of areas that are marked both for their importance and sensitivity; the Alliance appears to have adopted a more determined approach to the problems of weapons procurement and standardisation than has ever previously been the case; there are clear signs that there is a willingness to give careful thought to the new opportunities created by technological advance in weapons development.

Crisis in the Institutions

In contrast to the effective manner in which these essentially military issues are pursued, the North Atlantic Council's activities in the political field have the hall mark of evasion. There has been a consistent failure to deal with the most pressing political issues confronting the Alliance; at best there were token discussions but too often delicate subjects were left for consideration outside the formal institutions of the Alliance. The list is a long one but these topics included the problems of succession in Yugoslavia, the difficulties created for the West's security posture by the growth of Eurocommunism, the Greek-Turkish dispute and the problems of the eastern Mediterranean, the tensions in U.S.-German relations and the more technical Eurostrategic implications of SALT-2. The list comprises some of the most pressing problems confronting the Alliance.

All this is not to say that these issues went undiscussed between separate members of the Alliance. Alliance consultation consists of a spectrum of methods from informal bilateral contacts in national capitals or between missions at NATO itself, to the quadripartite Bonn Group, from informal ad hoc arrangements to full meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The problem is that much of this consultation - particularly on sensitive or urgent issues - is now taking place outside the formal institutions of the Alliance. There are a number of reasons as to why it is legitimate to describe this as a problem. First, while informal and ad hoc arrangements have the clear attraction of providing a flexible means of over-coming doctrinaire opposition to consideration of a particular issue, they tend to undermine the practice and rationale of consultation within the Alliance institutions. This can create a habit and make the use of formal machinery, especially at time when there is no option but to use it, less familiar. Secondly, there is a danger that if common problems are not regularly discussed on a multilateral basis, differing national perceptions are more likely to emerge as was the case in 1973. Thirdly, informal arrangements allow member states to evade the dilemma of the limited competences of the Alliance. When the Alliance is dealing with matters that have a bearing on issues not accepted as within its competence it is possible to pursue them informally. Fourthly - and related to this last point - the formal institutions of the Alliance may become fossilised as new and probably difficult matters become the province of informal, ad hoc or altogether separate bodies.

Clearly the development of the habit of bypassing the regular formal machinery of the Alliance reflects short-comings in those institutions. At one level it can be argued that this merely reflects the problems typical of any alliance of sovereign states: they often want to do things in their own way, making use of the most convenient mechanism available and choosing their partners to suit the occasion or the issue. However, more specific aspects of this phonomena can be identified. The most obvious is that some states are unwilling to allow NATO to become involved in certain subject areas, whether because they claim they relate to their internal affairs, as in the case of Turkey or Greece over the problems of the eastern Mediterranean, or of Italy on the subject of communist participation

in government, or because they seek to place strict limits on NATO's spheres of competence as do the Dutch and the Danish in relation to third area issues. Secondly, there may be positive aspects to the desire to bypass formal machinery. Member states may believe that certain of them have common interests that can be more fruitfully pursued in limited numbers. The reasons vary. Sometimes they arise from a desire to give expression to a particular geographical entity - as in the case of the Eurogroup; at other times it may arise from specialist policy interests as with the quadripartite Bonn Group. Strictly speaking the Bonn Group is a voluntary association of those countries with a direct interest in the fortunes of Berlin although latterly it has been used as a forum in which other matters of particular interest to the four countries concerned might be discussed. This highlights what could become a tendency of the various informal groupings: namely, to use them for purposes beyond those for which they were originally set up. This must necessarily give rise to concern when, as was the case with the Bonn Group, it became openly known by the other allies that it had been used for consultation on certain aspects of the SALT-2 negotiations; it gives rise to divisive charges that certain countries are seeking to establish a directoire within the Alliance. It is noteworthy that as long as this particular exercise remained private knowledge to the other allies there was little opposition to the idea of the use of the Bonn Group for this purpose. The third reason for bypassing the established Alliance machinery appears to be the increasingly widespread view that it is unnecessarily cumbersome and that somehow the political and diplomatic implications of military and technological matters become obscured. Various examples may be encountered. It is sometimes suggested that the national sensitivities that are institutionalised within the Military Committee serve to filter and consequently obscure the value of advice on matters coming up from the MNCs. Another view encountered is that national delegations to NATO sometimes lack the relevent resident expertise to make full sense of issues under discussion with the consequent effect of consultations within the formal structures of the Alliance. Somewhat surprisingly, given its generally acknowledged success in the past, the work of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) has lately become the subject of criticism from United States officials concerned with the effectiveness of NATO consultations on SALT.

Apart from the proliferation of informal consultations a further development on Atlantic horizons has been the growth of Summits, whether of a regional nature, as with meetings of the European Council twice each year, the Western Economic Summits or the Atlantic Summits. They overshadow the more traditional meetings of the North Atlantic Council, not just because of the authority of their membership, but also because they have the ability to make the connection between the military, the political and the economic and because they are not limited by the historic boundaries of the Atlantic Alliance either in their membership or in the subjects that they are able to consider. As such, they are capable of accommodating the problems of competence that were identified earlier in the paper.

The Search for Reform

Given this background, what might be done to overcome the more deleterious short-comings on the existing Alliance institutions? It would not be politically realistic to attempt to re-engineer the entire structure of the Alliance, even were there a strong theoretical case for so doing. In seeking solutions to NATO's institutional problems it is necessary to build upon existing structures, both established and embryonic. This necessarily involves a piecemeal approach and may lack conceptual beauty. However, what now follows is designed to meet a perceived need.

The already considerable literature that has concerned itself with problems in the functioning of the institutions of the Alliance has focussed on three areas. The first concern the limits on the interests and competences of the Alliance and the constraints on the range of subjects and geographical area of activity. There are minimalist and maximalist exponents of change: those who argue that legally all that is required is a fuller utilisation of the competences provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 2 does not confine NATO to military matters; nor does Article 6 necessarily limit NATO to an area north of the Tropic of Cancer). There are others who believe that the scope of the Treaty itself should be extended in response to the new security considerations of a changing world.

Secondly, there is the series of concerns that would point to weaknesses in the instruments of the Alliance: the Council and its subsidiary bodies. These critics again can be divided into two groups: there are those who believe that all that is required is minor modification of existing instruments; other believe that there is a need for substantial change and the provision of supplementary machinery.

Thirdly, there is the belief that the Alliance suffers from ailing political commitment and will and that many of the problems inherent in an international organisation, where there is a premium on the notion of sovereignty despite the vast range in the powers and responsibilities of its members, could be overcome if some way could be found to provide the organisation with a motor, with some mechanism to facilitate initiative. Once again, there have been a number of suggestions as to how this might be provided: through enhancing the status of the permanent members of the North Atlantic Council, by arranging regular Summits, by reinforcing the political authority of the Secretary General, or by introducing into the international staff some intellectual authority with a loose brief to undertake policy planning studies of both short and long term interest and an ability somehow to ensure that such studies are fed into the defence planning procedures of the Alliance as a whole.

As a matter of expediency the minimalist line in the first two areas of concern probably holds out the greater opportunities for realisation. What is required is some attempt to codify or rationalise existing practice, both formal and informal, and, where no such links exist, ensure that there is some provision for coordination between the different spheres of activity. In certain respects the Summit mechanisms that have been developed in recent years

have already demonstrated their potential as a useful motor for Alliance activity. The London Summit of May 1977 demonstrated this fairly decisively as far as NATO was concerned.

Policy Coordination in Atlantic Affairs

The Western Summits reflect an acknowledgement that Atlantic relations comprise a web of overlapping issues, affecting different states in various ways and also often involving other parts of the world beyond the North Atlantic area on a fairly immediate basis. Past failures to coordinate international economic initiatives with other aspects of collective policy, particularly in the defence field, probably reflect most immediately upon a widespread inability to coordinate successfully the actions of different departments at a national level. There is a case for the creation of a Minister for Atlantic Affairs to ensure that there is sufficient coordination between different policy strands relating to Atlantic matters and to give strategic direction to the evolution of long-term policy. He and his staff would not have prime responsibility for day-to-day matters. Together with his counterparts from other member states he would effectively form part of a high level secretariat providing a link between Western Summits as well as those, such as meetings of the European Council, held on a regional level. These Ministers would be analagous to a holding company for Atlantic Affairs. Heads of national delegations to international Western organisations would have a dotted line responsibility to these individual Ministers as well as direct line responsibility to their mother departments. Thus there would be a clear distinction between the policy oversight responsibility of the Ministers and the executive responsibilities of delegates to existing bodies. This formula would ensure that monentum was maintained between Summits, that there was an overall direction to Atlantic policy and a minimum of conflict between different strands of national policies in international fora whilst causing the minimum interference with established international institutions. In the specific case of NATO, it would provide a reference point for the informal mechanisms that have developed, ensure that there was some resolution of the problems created by the insistence of certain of its members of the limitation of Alliance competences and provided a useful motor in its operation.

The Military Committee

As far as the internal functioning of the Alliance is concerned it is possible to make a case that the relatively simple step of eliminating the Military Committee would leave little sense of loss and improve the quality of the relationship between the military and political ends of the Alliance. In theory, the Military Committee, as the highest military authority in the Alliance, provides guidance to the political bodies and to the Allied Commanders and the subordinate military authorities. It comprises the national Chiefs of Staff or, more usually, their permanent representatives. There are a number of criticisms made against it. First, it is dubious as to whether the principle of sovereign equality - by which the Committee functions - is conducive to the best military decisions and advice, particularly when there are National Military Representatives on the staff of the Allied Commanders and when the national delegations to

to NATO include defence counsellors who, to do their jobs effectively, must provide a channel for the Chiefs of Staff to make their views known at Alliance level. Second, under present arrangements the views of the Military Committee - themselves reflecting the denominator of thirteen national viewpoints without the benefit of diplomatic skills to smoothe differences - are further filtered at the political level. Third, the introduction of traditional vertical military structures into the NATO bureaucratic process prevents horizontal contacts and can lead to the perpetuation of policies that lack a realistic in-put of non-military factors. The Defence Planning Cycle is a case in point: with the exception of the long-term planning task forces there is a separation of political, economic and military considerations at all stages except the very beginning and the very end. The fourth major criticism is that the Military Committee filters views from the Allied Commanders to the NAC and vice versa, or even shields them from one another's thinking.

It is therefore suggested that the Military Committee should be abolished and instead be replaced by an Allied Commanders' Committee (SACEUR, SACLANT etc.), served by the International Military Staff and reporting direct to the Defence Planning Committee. This arrangement would be analagous to the original arrangement for a NATO Defence Committee. If national Chiefs of Staff were likely to feel that they were insufficiently represented within the national delegations by the defence counsellors, there is no reason why their representatives should not be included within the national delegations outright. In those extreme cases where it was felt that traditional military distrust of diplomatic instincts was likely to be a cause of national friction then probably the Permanent Representative on the NAC should have a military background. Overall, such an arrangement should make the present NATO structure less cumbersome and could lead to closer awareness of problems and perceptions between the political and military levels of the Alliance.

National Delegations

The third main area of change would seem to lie within the national delegations themselves. To some extent, the compartmentalisation of function already remarked upon in the handling of Atlantic relations is carried over to the national delegation level. The British delegation to NATO is the only one which colocates the staff of the national Military Representative to NATO. But perhaps of greater concern is the fact that few delegations - in an era of increasingly sophisticated defence planning carrying with it major implications for national finance and industrial ministries - contain in their number financial and industrial policy specialists. Clearly it would not make sense to have on the staff of every delegation an expert for each administrative contingency and much can be saved by calling in staff from the national capitals concerned only when needed. However, a balance needs to be struck between maintaining a complement of staff equipped to deal with the many facets of modern defence policy and a consequent appreciation of the national implications involved, against the need for economy. One is further led to question - not entirely in the spirit of science fiction - whether it is necessary to make experts with heavy demands on their skills

shuttle between the fog-bound airports of Europe when it is now possible to obtain commercially facilities for aural and visual conference link-ups between the major nationa capitals. If it were possible to overcome the hurdle of international communication in this way, many of the traditional factors that make for the creation of standing institutions would appear out dated. Indeed, to cite but one example, the conumdrum of how best to organise consultation between allies over SALT given the rare skills of those involved would rapidly be solved.

These sketchy suggestions do not pretend to be comprehensive although they do seek to address themselves to what appear to be some of the most pressing issues facing the Alliance. The principle that has guided their conception is that one should attempt to do little more in terms of re-engineering politically delicate institutions than is dictated by present practice. But they are geared to ensure a move effective institutional constribution to security. The present danger is that unwillingness to use the formal institutional structures of the Alliance, rather than more flexible mechanisms, brings into question the ability of allies to ensure that in time of crisis NATO's institutions realise their full potential contribution to Atlantic security. They may be creaky from lack of use and less effective because of it.

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DOMESTIC SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN TURKEY

by Duygu B. Sezer

What strikes one as the most marked feature of the Turkish domestic scene is the high degree of instability in nearly all major spheres of society. Serious economic problems, political polarization along ideological lines, political violence (particularly among the radical youth), the ineffectiveness of the political process and the lack of leadership with a strong popular base able and willing to resolve the major problems have done two things. They have unsettled Turkish domestic life on the one hand, and on the other they have set in motion a series of pressures that have shaken, though not entirely pulled away, the grounds on which Turkish foreign and security policies had rested without any serious problems for nearly two decades.

I. The Economic Scene

As a new state born on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, Turkey under Atatürk made national survival and modernization the twin goals of her existence. Modernization was interpreted as development along the lines of the 'contemporary civilization' of the West. What Atatürk achieved was a social and political transition in Turkish society through what are known as the 'Kemalist Reforms'. Economic transformation had to be postponed until after the Second World War for a variety of internal reasons, the most important of which was the lack of capital and skilled manpower.

Turkey, though a neutral during the war, entered the post-war period bearing the economic and social costs of maintaining a large, mobilized army on a weak, agrarian base. The demands of the Soviet Union in 1945 for two north-western provinces and the Straits found Turkey with a weak economic base, to say nothing of the less-than-perfect fighting condition of the armed forces. Turkey's unconditional resistance to Soviet demands was not deterred by this unfavourable balance. However, she realized that she had to give priority to economic development in order to improve her defensive capability as well as the standard of living of her people. She could not achieve economic development and, at the same time, siphon off the necessary funds for her defences by the application of her own resources simply because she did not have enough. Therefore, she sought economic assistance from the West and a security relationship that would protect her against possible future Soviet pressures.

With her security concerns largely eased, first through the Truman Doctrine and then through her admission into NATO, she had the opportunity to devote her own resources and the large amounts of economic assistance supplied by the US to her economic development. This initial large-scale effort at economic development happened during Turkey's first experiments with parliamentary rule and a multi-party system. The combined effects of the two had a profound effect on the political, social and economic profile of the country. The appeals of political and economic freedoms and rewards, supplemented

by an economic philosophy that favoured free enterprise, generated a dynamic motivation among the population in the direction of both uninhibited political participation and economic initiative and experimentation. Particularly motivated were the large masses in the countryside and the smaller groups with business and commercial interests in the urban areas who aligned themselves behind the government. Business expected increased profits. The rural poor hoped for emancipation from poverty.

Having been traditionally agricultural, the basic stratification of Turkish society was a large mass of the subsistence-level agricultural population, clusters of small-scale businessmen, tradesmen and artisans, and a core of landowning, bureaucratic and military groups who at the same time held the political power and identified itself with the State.

The social reforms and the less spectacular economic initiatives of the pre-World War II era had been successful in changing this structure to some degree by paving the way for the creation of an entrepreneurial middle class with professional, managerial and technical skills and experience. It also made people restless for opportunities to develop these skills. The policies adopted in the post-World War II period to achieve rapid economic expansion were, among other things, largely a response to the needs of this newly emerging economic class and a cause of its further entrenchment. The 1950s in Turkey saw the rise of a new middle class, motivated towards investment for profit and enjoying political and economic status on the basis of skill and wealth.

Increased economic activity on the national scale began also to enlarge the numbers of skilled and semi-skilled industrial workers. Large-scale investments in public works, petro-chemicals, mineral extraction and processing, and in textile, food and spare-parts industries attracted the agricultural worker from his village to the urban-based industries. The rush to the cities for employment spurred urbanization but also created social problems and sowed the seeds of conflict.

What started as an ambitious development venture by Turkey in the 1950s did accomplish substantial economic expansion within two decades. After a short but serious break in the late fifties and early sixties, expansion picked up again and has achieved a steady growth of 7% annually until recently when it began to confront difficulties, not all of which were of direct domestic origin. The per capita income of about $100 in the early 1950s rose to $300 in the mid-1960s and to $1,000 in the mid-1970s.

Sustained economic expansion during the past 25 years has created a complex of problems more serious than the rate of growth and per capita income would seem to suggest. The main reasons are that economic development was based on heavy foreign and domestic borrowing, on inflationary measures, and on industrialization through exports, with little emphasis on internal savings. The difficulties of this type of development can be offset fairly easily as long as there is either a reliable supply of foreign capital, i.e. economic assistance, or an export sector capable of financing the imports, or both. On the first score Turkey was fortunate until the Seventies. External resource transfers in the period 1950-69 provided on average over 4% of the GNP; they amounted to almost 50% of the total foreign exchange earnings of Turkey during this period. In other words, Turkey was the beneficiary of substantial foreign capital primarily from the

US and later through the Consortium to aid Turkey in the 1960s in which the US contributions again fared the largest. By late 1960s she had received nearly $5 billion of aid, one third of which was economic and the rest military.

Though the amount of aid began to dwindle in the early 1970s, the adverse effects of this situation was amply made up by the foreign currency remittances deposited in Turkish banks by Turkish workers employed in Federal Republic of Germany. So, in 1973, she enjoyed her first favourable balance of payments for nearly twenty-five years. The effects of the rise in oil prices began to hit her, too, after 1973. While she has had to devote nearly half of her export earnings to pay for her oil imports, she has also had to bear another consequence of oil politics: the return of some thousand of Turkish workers from Germany in the aftermath of the worldwide recession following the oil embargo. This in turn reduced the amount of foreign exchange remittances by Turkish workers.

The export sector of the economy failed to rise to the expectations originally pinned on it. The undiversified agriculture could not raise production of the four traditional export commodities - tobacco, cotton, figs and hazel nuts - to any great extent. The irrational management methods of state industries (which make up nearly half the major industries), and the consumer-goods oriented private industries (which found supplying the large domestic market more lucrative than competing with external markets) consumed on the whole more foreign exchange than they produced.

A persistently unfavourable balance of trade could not be curbed as long as the 7% annual growth rate was set as a target to be maintained at all costs. What this has meant has been a roughly stable annual domestic exports of $4 billion in the mid-seventies ($2.5 billion from export revenues and $1.5 billion from worker's remittances and other service transactions) as opposed to an import requirement of $5-6 billion between 1975-77, anticipated to reach $7-8 billion in 1978, if 7% growth rate is desired. This imbalance must be evaluated against a background of a total foreign debt officially stated to be approximately $5 billion, but unofficially believed to be $10 billion, of which half a billion has to be paid back annually as the loans reach maturity.

This, in short, is the situation that has lead recent Turkish governments to seek negotiations with the IMF and some private foreign banks. The dependence on foreign exchange to keep the economic development at its accustomed pace of 7% has created an economic standstill when the two avenues of obtaining the foreign exchange - import of foreign capital and export earnings - have not proved as promising as inticipated. Investments have had to be decreased, causing a fall in productivity and a rise in unemployment at the cost of fuelling further social unrest and political instability.

This organic relationship between development and foreign currency has been a cause of anxiety, especially for the intelligentsia. While the average man is frustrated at the economic standstill because it deprives him of the many conveniences he had come to expect (particularly in the urban centres and even smaller towns), the intelligentsia's reaction has been more profound. They wonder about the inherent weaknesses and injustices of capitalism, a system that Turkey has been trying to install for nearly a quarter of a decade; they attribute the recent setbacks to the failure of private enterprise to place the country's welfare ahead of profit.

They see the hazards of a dependency relationship for economic development and defence. The US arms embargo arising from the Cyprus issue, the reluctance of international financial institutions to offer credits, and difficulties encountered with the EEC in which she is an associate member tend to underline the hazards. It is only natural that the IMF proposal of Autumn 1977 to underwrite foreign loans to Turkey on condition that she reduces her growth rate from 7% to 3-4% was not very popular even though governments may still find that they have to accept the conditions.

The Cyprus question has added to the difficulties already encountered in the national economy. The uncertain political climate has scared private enterprise; the budgetary burdens of the Cyprus involvement have been quite extensive; and the arms embargo has meant the diversion of resources from economic investments to defence procurement.

The wealth created by the achievements has not been distributed as equally as was hoped. Because the middle class is largely made up of salaried groups, their income is taxed at source, thereby leaving no possibility of tax evasion, whereas the same tax system is full of loopholes for those engaged in private business.

The rate of population growth at 2.7% per annum has been another cause of the disappearance of the wealth created. The population (42 million) is expected to double by 2010, and this will absorb most if not all the growth of GNP. Living standards cannot be expected to rise unless GNP increases dramatically.

Inflation has beenrunning at about 25%-30% a year since 1974, with all that implies. The absence of price controls has allowed rising costs to be passed on.

Unemployment and underemployment has angered nearly 3 million of the 16 million work force. Governments, with their relatively static investment allocations, could not keep pace with the demand created by the pressures of population growth for new jobs. The right to employment has become a social issue with political implications as well as economic.

In the final analysis, I think it is safe to say that Turkey has serious economic problems <u>but</u> that they are not insurmountable. The lure of economic development united the people behind the political leadership in the fifties but development has not benefited equally all segments of the population. Economic policy is now the source of one of the main ideological and political disputes.

II. <u>Turkish Politics: Rewards and Problems of Democracy</u>

With the transition to democracy in 1950 (after twenty-five years of authoritarian rule under one-party government) Turkey became the scene of vigorous political activity. However, while the new political regime was undoubtedly democratic, it had an uneasy and rather brief exposure.

It came to an abrupt stop in 1960 when the military intervened with a coup in response to the increasingly oppressive and authoritarian rule of the Democratic Party, who had come to power in 1950 on the very basis of democracy. The economic problems created by the

government's bold but haphazard economic policies also played their part in bringing about the coup.

After a year of military rule, the civilian leadership resumed power through elections and were subjected to the pressures of a complex set of forces whose lasting impressions on domestic politics as well as foreign policy have relevance for the Turkey of today.

When the military yielded to civilian rule, Turkish politics and the economy were no more stable than they had been before. However, under the military, Turkey adopted a new constitution that expressed the major forces that operated in the country at the time. The Constitution of 1961: 1) Upholds democracy and democratic freedom; 2) establishes social justice as an indispensable goal of the State; and 3) institutes checks-and-balances aimed primarily at the Executive.

The Constitution was a response to the political and socio-economic transformation that Turkey had gone through during the previous decades of modernization. Political socialization through democracy had been nearly achieved. A high degree of political participation and efficient nationwide party organizations had taught people that they could participate in politics and in decision-making only if democracy were upheld; the memories of the pre-World War II authoritarianism made democracy cherished. Economic motives were just as instrumental as political incentives in favouring a democratic system of government. People had seen that democracy allowed different economic interests the freedom to develop and express themselves through political participation and competition. However, economic interests were not to be pursued in such a way as to jeopardize the social balance, to lead to the supremacy of one or more social groups at the expense of others, or to hinder the right of the individual to self-improvement and development.

As the crude stratification and traditional loyalties of Turkish society crumbled each newly emerging group made demands on the wealth that was being created. Constitution provided them with the political framework in which to proceed towards the attainment of their interests. In other words, Turkey in the first half of the 1960s was ready and willing to plunge into a pluralist democracy where any view and interest could be freely expressed and organised for political action.

The lower income groups whose fortunes had not fared so well during the process of economic expansion had the most serious grievances. Studies conducted by the State Planning Organization of Turkey (1966) and by some Turkish scholars (1971) on income distribution have shown that income inequality in Turkey has been greater than in most of the developed and developing countries. It has also been shown that the top one-fifth of the families in the sample received about 60% of the total national income and those in the bottom one-fifth only 3-4%. The persistence to this day of similar disparities explain some of the sources of political instability in Turkey.

It is important to understand this dynamic situation in the early 1960s. Today's instability is an extension of the issues and developments of those years in a polarized political setting. Economic and social demands, organised at a time of political awakening and conscious of the merits of democracy, made the task of the governments of the 1960s very difficult. Demands could not easily be reconciled. There had to be substantial flexibility in the leadership or even a reorientation in social philosophy as a basis of policy as well as co-operation from non-governmental leadership groups.

The Justice Party (JP), in power from 1965 to 1971 with a strong majority, underwent a change in leadership by electing Suleyman Demirel as the head of the party in 1964. He was Prime Minister until the military's subtle intervention in 1971. A successful technocrat of peasant origin, he believed in liberal freedoms, rapid economic development and a role for free-enterprise. It was largely through his economic policies that expansion occurred in the sixties which led to an improvement in living standards. With the frequent resort to collective-bargaining by labour, tax reforms, state subsidies to the small farmer and extension of social security benefits to larger segments of the population, a degree of social justice was attained. However it fell short of aspirations - particularly those of organized labour in the cities and of salaried groups under the pressure of inflation. Furthermore, Mr. Demirel's ideological refusal to relate material improvements to the need for social justice, to come up with a social rationalization for his economic successes gradually alienated the urban-based labour for whom he had created job opportunities by his heavy investments and the intelligentsia whose belief in democracy he shared. According to him economic development would promote equality without the need for extensive intervention. Yet it did not. His bold tax reforms were not sufficient to redistribute the wealth created. But most significant of all, he failed to develop a social philosophy in which development went hand-in-hand with social justice, the latter being the single most important value in Turkish society in the sixties to persist to the present. Social justice is seen as both the cause and the result of economic well-being and demoracy, but he could not bring himself to explain his economic successes in social terms.

The other major party, the Republican People's Party (RPP), underwent a change of philosophy in 1965 and of leadership in 1967-1971. Mr. Bulent Ecevit became the chairman in 1971 when he defeated the veteran Turkish politician and statesman, Mr. Ismet Inome, in a clash of views over the extent of the socialism that the party was prepared to adopt. Beginning with the 'Left of Centre' slogan in 1965, the RPP has ultimately adopted social democracy as its guiding philosophy. The increase in the percentage of votes it has mustered since 1969 demonstrates the appeal of this shift to the Turkish electorate.

The emergence of the Turkish Labour Party (TLP) in the early sixties was most significant. It filled a vacuum that long existed in Turkish democracy. Marxist by commitment yet a socialist party in its official description due to the ban on communism, the TLP took to itself the task of formulating and solving scientifically the rising demands of the under-privileged groups in Turkey. The emergence of an organized left-wing party in parliament for the first time in Turkey's history at a time when social ferment for economic equality was the central focus of politics have had a lasting influence on the political and social evolution of society. The TLP explained in terms of class structure, class conflict and international capital the underlying causes of Turkey's economic backwardness and the presence of inequality.

The TLP, very persuasive in urban areas, was also successful in reaching out to the rural areas through its local and youth organizations. However, the rifts among the top leadership on the question of the degree of Marxist orthodoxy to be properly pursued within the Turkish context contributed heavily to its disintegration. Its parliamentary strength came down from 15 in 1965 to two seats at the general election of 1969. The party was banned in 1972 following the 'intervention by ultimatum' of the military in politics in 1971, to be legalised again in 1975.

The failure of the Left as an organized political party has been amply compensated for by the popularity that leftist ideologies have found in the universities, among youth, in the lower echelons of the bureaucracy, and in part of the labour force. In a period of Turkish political development when complete freedom of expression and organization was an inviolable right of every citizen and when both the idea and the fact of social inequalities occupied intellectually and politically a vital place for the process of the allocation of national resources, the Left prospered. However it has failed to be a successful political movement within the rules of democracy. The political role of the TLP - to lead Turkey through the democratic process to the dictatorship of the proletariat - has been taken over by radicalized youth and part of the labour force but with one difference; parliamentary process and democracy are no more seen as a necessary element of this goal, as they reflect merely 'ballot-box democracy' and enhance the power of the ruling classes.

Among the many Leftist youth organizations, the Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey (FRYT) held the allegiance of many young radicals and was the most effective in its leadership, organisation and the execution of its terrorist activities between 1969 and 1971. Presently the Leftist youth is organized around a wide spectrum.

Political terrorism conducted by the FRYT and the People's Liberation Army of Turkey (PLAT) was effective in bringing a high degree of fear and uncertainty to the people in the cities, seriously disrupting civil order and governmental authority.

The Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Union (CRTU) has been the only major voice of labour dedicated to Marxist ideology and to action. The CRTU, which presently has a membership of about 200,000, was born out of the ranks of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Turkey (CTUT) in 1967 as a reaction to the CTUT's officially non-political stance. In fact the CTUT had closer relations with the Justice Party in the 1960s. Presently representing the largest segment of organized labour, the CTUT has close to one million members and now supports the RPP's social democratic platform.

The challenge to the radical Left came mostly from the militant Right. The party that had represented the Right in Turkish politics, the Republican Peasant National Party, was reorganized in 1965 by its new leader, Alparslan Turkes, in order to reflect its more extreme position in favour of the exaltation of nationalism, the State and the Turkish youth as bulwarks against foreign influences and ideologies. The party name changed to the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) in 1969. Yet, despite its nationalism, it was able to secure only one seat at the election of 1969. Though the growth of its parliamentary strength was slow between 1969-1973, (only three seats in the elections of 1973) an upsurge of its strength to 16 seats in the 1977 elections has been a cause of concern among the many moderate circles. One development of the Right in Turkey is demonstrated by National Selection Party (NSP), an Islamic party that fosters the old values of traditional society. This party believes in development through self-reliance and autarchy but they lost in 1977 half of the 50 seats won spectacularly in 1973. NSP is not a militant party and will remain so as long as it operates within the confines of law. If it is forced to close down, it is likely that it would go underground and become more militant. The loss it has recently suffered in popular votes is attributable more to the loss of credibility of its chairman, Mr. N. Erbakan, than to dislike of his politico-religious policies.

In the organization of the radical Rightist youth, the NAP of Mr. A. Türkes has played a major role since the mid-1960s. The tasks of the militant youth movement was to assimilate and disseminate the ideas and ideals of Turkish nationalism and to suppress communism. The militants, called the 'Grey Wolves', receive their specific directions from the Organization of the Hearths of Idealists, the name of the most effective rightist youth movement, and Mr. Türkes is publicly claimed by them to be their 'Leader'. Just as the radical Leftist youth considers itself to be the vanguard of the exploited classes of Turkey, the Rightist youth looks at itself as the saviour of the Turkish nation and of the glories of the Turkish past.

The inability and reluctance of the Government to cope with terror again brought military intervention in politics in 1971. Civilian rule by appointed governments under the shadow of the military and under marshal law stopped terror. But it stopped terror by an indiscriminate drive against the Left while showing restraint to the Right. By the time genuinely elected governments came to power in late 1973, the organized radical Left had been more or less eliminated. The militant Right, however, managed to stay relatively intact both as a political party and as manifested among the youth. For a brief period during the rule of Prime Minister Ecevit in 1974, it looked as though Turkish political life would restabilize itself with the restoration of democratic freedoms. But it has not.

One final topic that deserves attention in an analysis of the domestic sources of instability in Turkey is the relationship between domestic politics and the developments that have taken place in Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey felt the need to make some readjustments, though minor then in her foreign policy in the mid-1960s. Subsequent to the Cyprus crisis of 1964, there emerged a volatile anti-Americanism and anti-NATO feeling among youth, the press, the universities and other groups with access to mass media.

Those were the years, as will be recalled from the pages above, when uninhibited freedom of expression was seen as a prerequisite of democracy. In the public debates that ensued on the Cyprus issue and Turkish-American relations, foreign policy, as pursued during the previous twenty years, showed up the costs of a bilateral or multilateral dependency relationship rather than the rewards. The people had always been told of the advantages of having close relations with the US and NATO; they had never been told that such relationship also involved risks and inhibitions. Had Turkey's foreign policy, a strictly taboo area until then, been a subject of public discussion prior to crises in which the United States interests conflicted with those of Turkey and had the style of American intervention been less arrogant, the public's reaction in the 1960s probably would have been less serious. The Turkish Labour Party was the most active in exposing practically all the unknown aspects of Turkey's relationship with the US but freedom of debate provided many non-Leftist circles with the chance to vent their views. When released from two decades of silence on the subject of foreign policy, people could point to the excesses in US-Turkey relations that had built up during the two decades of close co-operation. The strains in US-Turkish relations which occurred in 1964 and have continued since 1974 have helped demonstrate visibly these weaknesses. An ally who had had no second thoughts about using Turkish soil for intervention in Lebanon, an act that had no connection with NATO responsibilities, did not hesitate to inhibit Turkey in the pursuit of her national interests in 1964 in the name of alliance solidarity, and since 1975, for unauthorized use of arms supplied by her. The contradiction could not but seriously undermine the image of the US in the eyes of the public.

The persistence of Turkey's economic problems, too, have had implications for Turkey's overall attitude towards the West. After all, Turkey has been trying to develop through the 'capitalist road to development', with the aid of substantial Western assistance but without success. The perennial economic problems and the ensuing social unrest have bred doubts about the wisdom of taking the West as the unconditional model for development. Since Turkey's foreign and security policies were basically built on the assumption that her domestic political and economic systems would copy those of the West a suspicion about the former would breed a suspicion about the latter. In other words, her foreign and security orientation were at the same time a social and political choice. Apprehension over the relevance for Turkey of the Western economic model and its supporting political institutions has reached significant proportions and this has also been reflected in Turkey's foreign policy.

This type of thinking, encouraged by frustrations over the failure to develop along the lines of the Western model, difficulties with the EEC and the United States and isolation in international forums has developed in the direction of claims for a Third World identity, neutralism in foreign policy, militant nationalism and a yearning for identity with the islamic community. Claims to belong to the Third World and neutralism would automatically result in a drastic change in foreign policy and security policy. The pressures of nationalism and Islam would weaken Turkey's ties with the West in more subtle ways and more gradually but both are likely to come together in forcing a break with the US and NATO if carried to the extreme.

CONCLUSION

None of the above explains why the democratic political institutions and processes have failed to build on the achievements of economic and political development.

In general terms, I believe that this is a case of the crisis of democracy in a developing society. Turkey has succeeded in establishing the formal institutions of an improved model and gone some ways to improve living standards but, when faced with the pressures and counter-pressures mobilized by these developments, she has failed to utilize the democratic political process to reduce conflict, to compromise on points of disagreement and to enhance the points of consensus.

Turkey's two main political parties, the JP and the RPP, have demonstrably failed to lead society towards real freedom. The Turkish electorate have shown consistently since 1961 that their choice has rested with these two parties. Extreme ideologies and policies of both the Right and Left have been rejected by the great majority. It was incumbent on the two main parties to develop social justice and to pursue the policies that would respond to the needs of the people.

Instead, they have engaged in fierce competition that essentially focussed on an expression of their world views rather than on socio-economic issues. The first half of the 1960s should have shown clearly the needs and issues on which Turkey's future peaceful evolution depended. Although ideological competition and conflict absorbed their total energies neither, ironically, was politically motivated in exclusively and strictly ideological terms.

The JP, stressing the individual, sought a curious coalition with the militant nationalism and theocratic traditionalism of the Right in its confrontation with the RPP who sought an unreliable alliance with the revolutionary collectivism of the Left. By 1975, they had successfully established two socio-political poles, the JP leading the pole of individualism in a paradoxical coalition with national socialism, and the RPP leading the pole of democratic socialism in a paradoxical coalition with totalitarian collectivism. The RPP is linked less formally and rigidly with their allies than the JP. The Youth organizations reflect exactly this political polarization but in a more militant way.

In this battle of ideologies, economic and social issues have been neglected although each pays lip service to them in order to legitimise their ideological positions.

The Electoral failure of the T.L.P. (Turkish Labour Party) has helped to polarize politics. Had it functioned as a viable political party or the extreme Left, the RPP would have been able to transmit to the JP social philosophy as a left of centre party, therefore posing less of an overwhelming threat to the JP within the rules of democracy. The JP's perception of the RPP as the single voice of the wide spectrum of the Left, therefore undermining JP's chances of coming to power through the democratic process, has forced it to seek alliance with the militant Right and thereby undermine its own basis of popular support. The intervention of the military in politics in 1971 has been unhelpful; their persecution of the Left and the closing down of the TLP has increased the strength of the Right while decreasing that of the legally organized Left. It has heightened the tensions between the JP and the RPP.

Where does Turkey go from here? I believe that depolarization of Turkish politics is the first imperative for stability. If the two major parties would only pursue their own socio-economic philosophies with the country's problems in mind instead of attacking each other, the democratic political process would resume and stability would follow. Each has to disengage from their formal or tacit alliances with movements which do not represent its own world view. There is ample room in the Turkish political system to accommodate all currents of thought and all kinds of socio-economic and political ideologies. Neither needs the support of the militant groups that stand on its side of the Centre. If they both believe in democracy as genuinely as they profess, the JP's liberal democracy and the RPP's democratic socialism must not be turned into a drive to cancel each other out. Turkey's economic problems are serious but not insurmountable, as I have said above. If the major parties look to governmental power as a mandate to attack these problems within the framework of their world views rather than attacking each other, there will be progress. But before this stage can be reached, the JP has to accept that the social bases of power have been changing in Turkey and that therefore large segments will vote for the RPP without being communist just as the RPP has to accept that the JP represents large segments of the population who are not fascists. Extreme Left and Right wing shades of opinion have their own political representation within the Turkish political system.

If the process of depolarization does not materialize, instability will only increase. The present government of Mr. Bulent Ecevit, who relies on a very small majority, will not be able to cope with political terror which has become the most acute problem; nor will it be able to pass the necessary legislation to cope with the economic and social problems.

How will domestic instability affect Turkish foreign and security policies?

Both the JP and the RPP have exercised restraint so far in order to maintain the basic foreign and security relations of Turkey. However there is pressure from several segments of public opinion for either a reduced degree of dependence or a radical change towards neutralism. The setbacks experienced in Turkey's relations with the West and her rejection by the Third World for having allied herself with the West strengthen these tendencies. Each main party is aware of the void created in Turkey's defensive capability.

Whether under a JP or an RPP government, Turkey feels she is under the coercive pressure of the US, which to her symbolizes the apex of her relations with the West. This perception, coupled with pressures from some segments of the public opinion, may make neutrality a much more attractive option (in which she will at least know where she stands) than the present one in which she does not seem to fit anywhere.

This option would be much more difficult for the JP to choose than for the RPP. Each would have to win the support of the military in such a move. The top echelons of the military are assumed to be pro-NATO. However, their role in the society being the defence of the country, it is possible that the experiences since 1974 may have adversely influenced the basis of their previous calculations and preferences towards a total NATO commitment.

Mr. Ecevit's search for a new security concept may be the key to what he has in mind. It is not a concept that has been elaborated officially in detail. Essentially, I think, it will aim at reducing Turkey's reliance on the collective security system and enhancing the contributions of domestic elements to the defensive capability.

List of possible questions

1. What are the advantages of Turkey's membership in NATO to Turkey and NATO respectively?

2. What are the main causes of tension between Turkey and the US presently?

3. Do improved relations with the Soviet Union imply that the Soviet Union is not perceived as a source of threat to Turkey's security?

4. How do proponents of neutralism propose to take care of Turkey's security?

5. What are the main sources of tension between Turkey and the EEC?

(4)

Security in Southern Europe

by Christoph Bertram

Address given to the Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estrategicos del CESEDEN, Madrid, 28.3.78.

This is, ladies and gentlemen, one of those titles that seem clear but are not, that appear to provide order in the intellectual jungle of political analysis and do not. In fact, it begs the question - Is there a Southern Europe, in the sense of a coherent region with shared problems of security? Or are the security problems within Southern Europe - from Turkey in the East to Spain in the West - too diverse to fit under one common category? And even if - in security terms - there is a Southern Europe, is it special in its security problems as compared to other regions of Europe, and sufficiently so to make a real difference? I propose to approach our subject tonight, therefore, in discussing three concentric circles of security, starting with the security in Europe, then to security in Southern Europe, and, finally, to security in the part of Southern Europe where we meet tonight: the Iberian Peninsula.

I Security in Europe

Today, and for the foreseeable future, we cannot talk about security in Europe without taking into account what are, essentially, extra-European developments. The Soviet Union is only partially a European country, but - due to her vicinity and military might she is <u>the</u> European military superpower. The major focus of West European security concerns lies here: how to cope with this Soviet superpower. Because this <u>is</u> the chief military threat to Europe's security, we cannot discuss it - and cope with it - without the support of another extra-European power, the United States. As a result, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States has a direct bearing on security in Europe: Soviet-American tensions become tensions for Europe, and Soviet-American détente while reducing East-West tensions in Europe may create new internal problems for the Western Alliance. Finally, we are entering a period when developments outside

the traditional East-West spectrum will increasingly influence European security concerns, not in the more narrow sense of <u>military</u> security, but in that of national welfare and economic well-being. Let us look at each three of these aspects in turn.

First, the Soviet security problem for Europe. This used to be, at some time in the 1950's, a problem of military, political and ideological dimensions. Today, the ideological threat of the Soviet system has largely subsided. The attraction of the Soviet brand of bureaucratic marxism has disappeared. Ideologically, the Soviet Union today is on the defensive; a tired, uninspiring political system, unable to provide ideological leadership, justice or economic welfare for her citizens. She has become, as a result, a traditional power, to be measured by traditional yardsticks of performances.

By most of these yardsticks, the Soviet Union's record is unimpressive. She may celebrate at the anniversaries of the Soviet revolution, the achievements of the past 60 years. But compared with the achievements - in social justice, economic well-being and respect for human rights - of the non-Soviet world, these are a very poor record. Moreover, it remains a primitive political system which has failed to solve even that elementary task of modern societies, namely to provide for a procedure of succession in the political leadership.

But the generally poor performance of the Soviet system is no cause for Western complacency; the Soviet Union has sought to compensate for her many shortcomings by the most visible means of power - military power. She is today a superpower only because of her military power, relevant to the 20th century only because of her armies, tanks and missiles. The more the shortcomings of the Soviet system become apparent, the greater her reliance on the military means of power will be.

This poses two serious security problems for Western Europe. The first is that of the over-hang of Soviet military power, the second is that of the inherent inability for the Soviet Union to control political developments within Eastern Europe other than by military force.

The over-hang of Soviet military power does not mean that Soviet forces will march westwards tomorrow. They will not. The Soviet Union is not confident that she could take Western Europe by force in two or three days; she fears, rightly, that any war in Europe can escalate into a world war which cannot but put her own destiny in doubt.

But it does mean that political relations in Europe will continue to be overshadowed by military considerations and concerns. The Soviet leadership may be convinced that all they are doing in the military arena is to make sure that they can cope with a Western attack and repulse it on Western territory. But for the rest of Europe this inevitably represents an offensive, not a defensive posture .. Over the past few years, that posture has become even more threatening. As a result of a continuous and determined military effort, totally unaffected by Soviet professions for political détente in Europe, the Soviet military threat has increased further. We note: a much greater mobility of Soviet ground forces; in the air, the increased introduction of surface-to-air missiles for air defence has freed a large number of tactical aircraft for support of the ground battle; new systems for strategic nuclear delivery against major West European targets have been introduced, exposing cities and major military installations all over Western Europe to potential Soviet nuclear strikes; at sea, the Soviet Navy has not overcome its central shortcomings, namely that of unrestricted access to the waterways of the world, but she has continued in the effort of making her navy more self-reliant, a more independent force capable of action against Western targets and lines of communication. This has been further enhanced by the effort on maritime strike aircraft with long ranges - the Backfire bomber is the most recent

and the most disturbing example.

The result of these efforts - has been to increase the political weight of Soviet military power in Europe. Unless we want our choice of policies to be affected by this, or to run the risk of panicking in a crisis, the West must maintain its defences adequately. There have been some doubts about its readiness to do so. More recently, however, we can notice a swing of the pendulum: as concern over the Soviet military effort has grown, so has the readiness by governments in Western Europe to strengthen their own defences. It will be adequate to make Soviet military aggression unlikely, provided the credibility of the American security guarantee for Europe can be maintained. But it will require a constant effort, one that will not be materially facilitated by arms control agreements or even by new military technologies; an effort that will always cost more money than our governments would like to spend, and that will need a constant political justification and the democratic consensus to support it, particularly at a time of economic recession.

This direct Soviet military threat is, however, only one aspect of the security problem the Soviet Union poses for Europe. The other is that the nature of Soviet power in Eastern Europe will continue to provoke internal conflict there which might well spill over into an East-West war. For the past 25 years, military force in our continent has been directly employed in Eastern Europe 4 times. There are today no signs that the relationship between the Soviet Union and her allied regimes in Eastern Europe has found a firmer and more harmonious footing than in the past, which might make the use of military force redundant - on the contrary, rumblings of discontent have again been heard, particularly in Poland and East Germany, in the past year or so. This may well be the first major test for President Brezhnev's successors: how to cope with the mounting economic problems of the Soviet Union without jeopardising economic welfare in Eastern Europe on which political stability there depends. In the absence of any other glue to hold the "socialist commonwealth" together, the fear of the military power of

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the Soviet Union will appear to her leaders as the most effective incentive for cohesion; I would expect that, as problems in Eastern Europe grow, we well could see again the actual use of Soviet tanks and soldiers to support weak regimes and to suppress angry uprisings.

The inherent dependence of Soviet control in Eastern Europe on military force is both the reason for an active policy of détente, in order to complicate a Soviet decision to use force, and the reason why there are limits to the impact of détente. Today, we are entering a period of lower temperatures in East-West relations. This is so for a number of factors. There is the experience that, in spite of the major steps to an improvement in the political relationship between East and West in Europe, Soviet efforts to consolidate a military advantage have continued unabated. There is the concern over Soviet action in Third World conflicts, such as the current war in the Horn of Africa. There is a more sober assessment of the possibilities of détente. And there are the mounting problems of translating political détente into military compromise: East-West arms control is today in a state of major difficulties which are likely to increase political controversy and political distrust.

This is particularly visible in the Soviet-American negotiations on strategic arms limitations. It remains desirable but is far from certain, that the current negotiations will produce an agreement that is acceptable both to the United States and the Soviet Union. As weapons technology changes rapidly, so purely quantitative agreements become less and less adequate. As qualitative weapons improvements are more difficult to observe, so verification by satellites becomes less and less relevant. And as many weapons developments escape the traditional definitions of SALT or of MBFR, agreements in these areas are less and less complete in covering disturbing systems - like the cruise-missile, or the Soviet SS-20 medium-range missile. But behind these technical obstacles to arms control there is another, deeper

Not the prob. Problem definition "good" agreement.

one: the growing difficulty of reconciling the security interests that each side regards as legitimate. For the Soviet Union who sees herself, with some justification, as technologically lagging behind the United States, the accumulation of a massive arsenal of weapons and probes into every avenue of future technology - from civil defence to satellite killers and ABM - is the most promising policy of strategic re-insurance. For the United States, the very nature and extent of the Soviet effort must appear as the search for nuclear strategic superiority. There is, at present, no way out of this dilemma, and SALT II will not provide it in a durable fashion. We are, therefore, in for a period of mutual concerns caused by perceptions of mutual threat.

Moreover, the uncertainty over the succession in the Soviet leadership will not help. Not only will it take some time before it becomes clear who will be in charge in Moscow and what policy priorities this will imply for the post-Brezhnev period. It will also take some time for the new team to acquire control and confidence. It may well be that, due to lack of confidence, they will rely more on the military instrument of power than the system of European post-war politics can bear.

Finally, security in Europe is today less exclusively East-West security than in the past. Conflicts in the Third World are likely to increase. Not all of them will affect the security of the developed industrial countries that constitute Europe today. Many will be irrelevant - except perhaps in humanistic and ethical terms - to what we in this room tonight regard as essential for our security. But there are three categories of Third World conflict which will have an impact. The first, and perhaps the most traditional, is when local conflict and war spills over into a wider confrontation between the major powers of East and West; a new Middle East war falls firmly into this category. The second is when local conflict can interfere with assured supply of

commodities essential to our economies, such as a civil war in Saudi Arabia, or a denial of uranium ore from Southern Africa as a result of protracted fighting and war. The third category is more indirect but no less significant: it is when a conflict somewhere in the Third World tests neither the security nor the economic well-being of the West but its political authority and credibility. This could be the case of the current war in the Horn of Africa where Western inaction, in the face of Soviet interventionism, might give to the Soviet Union a new aura of influence and deprive the West of similar influence and credibility well beyond the region.

There may be additional ways in which Third World conflict will affect our security in Europe. The purpose of these examples is not to present an exhaustive list but to point to the seriousness of the problem. It is likely to weigh increasingly on the policy - and the security - concerns of West European governments in the future.

II Security in Southern Europe

At first glance, there is little that makes security in Southern Europe a coherent subject. In contrast to the apparent tidiness of the East-West tension, détente and deterrence in Central and Northern Europe, the area that stretches from Turkey to Spain and Portugal is stamped by a series of conflict issues, of which the East-West conflict is only one, albeit the most important, underlying and shaping the others.

Of these, the most dangerous remains the Middle East conflict. It remains dangerous for three reasons. First, the eruption of war between Arabs and Israelis has repeatedly brought the two superpowers to the verge of confrontation. Second, any new Middle East war in the near future is likely to find Israel in a commanding military position which would leave to the Arab countries no other options than actively seeking Soviet support and threatening the industrialized world with

serious interruptions in the supply of oil. Third, the range of compromise between Israel and her neighbours remains highly limited, as President Sadat found out since his initiative last November: while Israel insists on security as the precondition for peace, even the more moderate Arab governments can offer no more than the promise that peace will be a precondition for security. At best, the present efforts for peace will be difficult and slow; at worst, we shall be witnessing another round of fighting in a few years' time.

The second conflict issue is the dispute between Greece and Turkey; both members of the Atlantic Alliance. It is, over Cyprus, a dispute that has weakened Western defence on its Southern flank for a long time. It has led in both countries to a serious alienation from the Alliance and to active anti-Americanism. This will not be easily repaired even if the Turkish and Greek governments should - as seems probable now - find a workable compromise over the issues that for so long have separated them.

The third conflict area is on the Northern shore of Africa, in the Maghreb region. Tension between the three Maghreb states has often erupted into military clashes though not yet into war. This is, however, no cause for complacency. The lines in the Maghreb are again, as at times in the Middle East, drawn between countries sympathetic to the East and those to the West. A full-grown war between Algeria and Morocco would in all likelihood make Algeria a major staging post for Soviet military force in the region, not just an independent sympathizer as today. What makes the situation particularly vulnerable is the way in which changes in domestic policies could determine the behaviour of these states: what - once the present generation of leaders has left - can be new structures of stability and cooperation in the region?

Finally, in this list of South European conflict areas, there is the uncertainty over the future of Yugoslavia, and the consequences that would follow from the failure of the country

to hold together after the death of Marshal Tito. Indeed, if one were to look for the most conceivable area of major East-West confrontation in Southern Europe, a Yugoslavia in the turmoil of federal disintegration would seem a likely candidate. What if the Soviet Union, invited or not by a rebel government in the federation, were to send forces across the border from Hungary to recapture for the socialist bloc the only country which, has been able to escape from it? Such a change in the political balance of power would have a profound impact not only on the Balkans but beyond for Europe and East-West relations as a whole, of the scale perhaps of the Korean War - 25 years ago. But although this is one of the most frequently cited security threats in Southern Europe, it is nevertheless an unlikely contingency. There can be little promise in a direct military Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia except to unite the country firmly against an invader and thus forge the cohesion the lack of which it had sought to exploit. The most disturbing event to follow from Tito's death would not be a Soviet invasion, it would be the gradual disintegration over time of Yugoslavia, and this would re-open many of the irredentist issues which the post-war division of Europe had seemed to foreclose if not settle.

What is striking about this list of potential conflicts in Southern Europe, is how regionalized they are. In itself, Southern Europe is not one security region but many: the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Maghreb etc., coexisting side by side without direct interactions. Southern Europe thus demonstrates that the fear of East-West confrontation is not, or no longer, powerful enough to push aside all other disputes, fears and passions. It is possible to talk of South European security in relation to that of the Centre and the North: a Soviet advance into West Germany and France would deeply change the security situation for Italy, or for the Iberian Peninsula. It is also, though perhaps to a lesser degree, true in reverse: Soviet bases in Italy or Portugal would significantly weaken present security arrangements for the rest of Western Europe. But as a self-contained region of security, Southern Europe

does not exist.

And yet, there are common themes in the security policies of most countries in Southern Europe, two in particular: the Mediterranean Sea as a strategic waterway, and the exposure of all the countries on the Northern littoral to potentially far-reaching domestic political change which cannot but affect their own security and that of their allies as well.

The Mediterranean

The region has been given a degree of coherence not so much by the fact that the same sea touches the shores of most of the countries in Southern Europe. It has been given that coherence by the fact that, first, the U.S. 6th Fleet and then the Soviet Escadra have deployed in it and are operating there.

To assess the significance of this presence cannot consist of the mere counting of vessels. The number of Soviet surface vessels has been reduced significantly since the closure of Egyptian port facilities for the Soviet Escadra in the early 1970's. Soviet maritime air capabilities have been similarly affected. Now as at the height of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, the Soviet Fleet is heavily out-numbered by the combined Western navies in the area.

And yet, that picture is incomplete. For one, because it does not take into account the specific mission structure of the opposing forces. The Soviet Escadra is, above all, not a sea-control but a sea-denial force, intended to obstruct the action of other, hostile naval forces. The U.S. 6th Fleet is designed to project power and to support military engagements on land, through air strikes and amphibious landings. For this, the American Fleet will have to operate close to the shores where Soviet action can severely hinder it. It must, therefore, neutralise the Soviet Fleet first before being able to bring its weight to bear in the land battle. This weakens the Western defence effectiveness against a major Soviet attack, say, in Thrace. Together with concern over Soviet conventional

capabilities in Central Europe, this has prompted considerations to move the large U.S. attack carriers out of the Mediterranean in time of crisis. But it must be remembered that the Mediterranean is not just a theatre of East-West rivalry and defence contingencies; the function of the U.S. Fleet is no less - and possibly more in future - to reassure Israel and to weigh on the Middle Eastern military balance.

The second reason for caution against purely quantitative assessments is the changing nature of the Mediterranean sea as a military theatre. It used to be, a long time ago, a purely naval arena, then a maritime one - with naval units and aircraft acting together. Progressively, it could lose that character as well, with land-based weapon systems - aircraft, missiles and parachute troops instead of marines - becoming the chief means of potential warfare and military competition, complemented by fleets of small, fast patrol boats. This is the result above all of two factors: technology and cost. The range and accuracy of weapons delivery has increased to such an extent, that surface vessels in confined waters are increasingly vulnerable to strikes by missiles from land and air, and relatively small vessels can deliver charges for which, in the past, big and stable platforms were required. The search for these new possibilities has been further encouraged by the second, the cost factor. You have had, in this country, reason to look into this problem only recently, in spite of the obvious need for Spain to maintain a modern maritime force. Even the rich United States has had to decide on a drastic reduction in naval expenditures over the next five years for reasons of cost.

Both technology and cost could, over time, produce quite dramatic changes in the structure and mission of military forces. One of these might even include the departure from the traditional distinction between air force and navy services, merging the forces required for maritime military missions together into one service, and those for non-maritime missions into the other - a development of relevance not just, and not

even primarily, for the Mediterranean Sea. In the Middle Ages, the North Italian republics of Milan and Como fought their wars out in bitter sea battles on the Lake Como - incomprehensible today, when you look at these confined spaces of water, to imagine that victory on land was believed to follow from victory at sea. Perhaps in 50 years or so, the Mediterranean Sea will have become no more than a large Lake Como, no longer a theatre for naval warfare but an extension, in military terms, of the military potential on land.

Domestic Political Change

The other common theme of South European security developments lies not in the military, but in the domestic political field. If one can make one general statement about all South European democratic countries today, it is this: that there is no general, widely-shared consensus among political forces on the basic aims of their society and the ways to achieve them. This applies to Turkey as it does to Greece, to Italy as to France, to Portugal as to Spain. It is, in the first instance, not disagreement over foreign and security policies. The main controversies are over ideology, and over social and economic objectives. But there is a danger that these more internal controversies will have major implications for foreign and security matters. For one, some domestic choices will imply choices in foreign policies and alignments as well. A victory for the French Communists in the elections five weeks ago would have brought to power a political force fundamentally anti-American and anti-German - there would, therefore, have been no basis on which to build alliance cooperation with such a government. Second, there are many political groups who have simply not taken the time to think through a rational approach to national defence and European security and tend, therefore, to adopt positions of doctrinal rigidity that bear little resemblance to the real world and its problems. As a result - and in contrast to countries further North - changes in the domestic power balances of South European countries carry with them a high degree of unpredictability and uncertainty as to their international repercussions. The possibility of such changes, moreover, weakens the credibility of alliance long

before they actually occur.

There is no easy answer to this problem, let me just offer two thoughts in this connection. First, we cannot assume that all political forces share the same view on national defence and security from the outset. Consensus does not grow on trees but has to be built through information and through debate. For instance if there is no dialogue now between the Left and the Right in our countries on the requirements of security and the means to realise them, it will not be possible to come to a more general understanding across the spectrum of political positions on foreign and security matters. Second, the Western Alliance is no straight-jacket but a coalition of sovereign states who believe it is in their interest to act together to assure their security. If the majority of voters in one or the other member country supports political parties who want to leave the Alliance, we cannot maintain it against their will. Nor should we, for the sake of a superficial formal unity, try to paper over fundamental differences; this would only undermine the ability to work together of those who want to continue to do so.

III Security of the Iberian Peninsula

To an audience which is so much more familiar with this area and its specific problems, I can make no more than a few suggestions.

The first of these is that the strategic significance of the Iberian peninsula is growing. I say this in full realisation of the fact that it is always difficult to measure such an elusive quantity as "strategic significance" - much of it is always in the eye of the beholder. Moreover, there is no virtue in being strategically significant; it is not always pleasant for a country to find itself in such a position. It means that the consequences of mistakes in policy become more costly, and that the responsibility for political leaders becomes even more weighty.

Of course, every country is of the highest strategic

significance to itself. When I detect an increase in the strategic significance of Iberia, I mean by this that the peninsula is becoming more, not less relevant to strategic interests in the East-West context: more valuable for the West to be allied to, more tempting for the East to dissociate from an alliance with the West. The reason for this is a combination of traditional and new factors. Traditionally, the territory of Spain has been important for control over the Western Mediterranean, for staging reinforcements from overseas in case of a conflict in Central Europe, as a possible strategic reserve in military manpower in a protracted East-West war in and around Europe, and as a communications centre. The new factors are those that emphasize another characteristic of Iberian geography, namely the Atlantic connection. We are likely to see in the next decades a shift of military competition to the oceans, with growing emphasis on air reconnaissance, sub-surface vessels and anti-submarine warfare, protection of economic zones in the oceans, and protection of sea-lanes of communication. It is this which will give to Spain and Portugal, with their commanding position on the Atlantic coastline to the South of Europe, their greater weight in the strategic calculus of East and West.

What follows for the security options of Spain and of Portugal? I realize this is a matter of some debate and the decisions cannot be made by anyone from the outside. But in your debate, the following considerations might be useful.

First, there is no need to act in a hurry. Spain is in the fortunate position that she is located far from the direct lines of East-West confrontation. The agreement with the United States has another 3 years to go. So there is time to think, to discuss, to consider all the odds carefully before a decision is taken.

Second, since there is no immediate or foreseeable direct military threat to Spain's security, aspects of political security will weigh at least as much as purely military ones. The decision on whether Spain should seek an alliance with

others, and how, should, therefore be firmly put in the context of the foreign policy interests of the country and the framework in which it sees its political role in the world.

Third, while a decision need not be taken in a hurry, it cannot be postponed indefinitely. Governments always prefer to keep all options open, particularly when the future is difficult to predict - as it invariably is. But events outside the control of governments can close options for them - domestic change, a major international crisis or the re-orientation in the politics of close allies.

Following these general considerations, Spain seems to me to have essentially three options for her security policies. She can opt for neutrality, and that has, in the past, not been an unwise choice. But it was in a historical period of limited, and limitable war which came to an end with the start of the nuclear era. It was possible to stay out of the conflicts of others because there remained a sheltered sector which their war did not penetrate. I think this has now become, if not impossible, at least very improbable, particularly for a strategically important country. So - since one is likely to become involved in an East-West conflict should it occur, even against one's will, it would seem to me advantageous to have a say in the diplomacy of deterrence, negotiations and crisis management of the West. Neutrality would rule this out.

There is, alternatively, the option of maintaining and formalizing further the bilateral security relationship with the United States. Again, this has not been a bad arrangement over the past years. But it has, I think, also shown the limits and disadvantages of a purely bilateral security alliance with a superpower. There are limits to the degree to which a medium-sized regional power can influence a global superpower. And there are limits to the degree to which the public and popular support can be generated and maintained, by both partners, which is essential for the durability of the relationship and the credibility of commitment.

Finally, there is the option of joining a multilateral alliance of collective security. This would be my own preference, to see Spain as a member in a formal alliance of democratic Western states. This would allow, as the small and medium-sized countries of Western Europe have experienced, for a direct Spanish involvement in common decisions. Moreover, the Alliance provides a good deal of flexibility in its specific arrangements and can take specific national preferences fully into account. Contrary to Gaullist doctrine, it does not undermine national independence; there is no automaticity of commitment, and the right to decide independently whether or not to become militarily involved in a conflict is not foreclosed. Indeed, the flexibility of the Western Alliance has been amply demonstrated in its ability to remain the framework in which sovereign nations can cooperate in spite of changing national and international circumstances.

This preference which I have is, of course, based on some assumptions about the future. First, I see no reason to expect that the East-West competition will disappear and cease to affect our security in Europe. Second, I see no reason to fear that the United States will withdraw from their involvement in Europe unless we invite them to leave. Third, I remain confident that the Western Alliance will continue to hang together - in spite of many of its current problems and the uncertainties of political change, particularly in Southern Europe.

Mr. Chairman, I am coming to the end of this exposé. It has raised at least as many questions as it has been able to answer. I have tried to point to those developments that seem to me the most significant for the security of the Europe of which Southern Europe is an integral part. One problem I have not mentioned: that of terrorism and insurgency. This has been done deliberately, although I am the citizen of a country which last year was deeply shaken by terrorist action, although I live in a country which - in Northern Ireland - has been faced with the biggest terrorist problem for almost the last 10 years

anywhere in Europe, and although I speak tonight in a country where terrorism is a serious and understandable concern. If I have omitted the issue in this talk, it has not been to belittle it in any way. But it is a problem of the internal, not of the international security of our countries. Modern democratic states are, it is true, vulnerable to terrorism. But they are, at the same time less vulnerable than totalitarian systems. They also have the means and they can use them to effect - provided they keep a cool head. That the latter is also, of course, not a bad strategy for security in Europe as a whole.