


COUNCIL OF CHRISTIAN APPROACHES TO DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT  
<15th Annual Conference?>  
Friedewald, 2-6/IX/1977

1. "Political and strategic implications of the Carter presidency for Europe"
2. "The present situation of security policy"/ Graf von Baudissin
3. "Short response...to 'The present situation of security policy' by Graf von Baudissin"/ Pierce Corden
4. "L'évolution de la situation politique en Europe: rétrospective et prospective"/ Marcel Merle
5. "Technology and politics: ethical insights"/ J.S.Habgood
6. "The Christians and the problems of peace and human rights"/ Ulrich Scheuner
7. "Public acceptance of nuclear power: some ethical issues"  
In: WCCexchange: a bi-monthly documentation service from the World Council of Churches, 2/2 (May 1977)
8. "The Netherlands reformed church and South Africa"/ The moderation of the general synod



(1)

POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE

CARTER PRESIDENCY FOR EUROPE

CCADD, September 2-6, 1977, Friedewald

1    Introduction - Outline of Presentation

2            I plan to go at this topic in ascending order of ambiguity.  
3    I will try first to highlight the implications of the Carter  
4    Presidency for Western Europe in the area of security and  
5    strategic concerns. There are enough facts here to enable one  
6    to form a coherent assessment and the result is on the whole  
7    a reassuring one, both so far as the future of NATO is concerned,  
8    and so far as the strategic nuclear balance is concerned; the  
9    future of strategic arms limitation is somewhat less clear.

10           Then I will specify what I think are the main lines of The  
11    Carter Europapolitik, including the U.S. view of U.S.-European  
12    relations, economic cooperation, Euro-Communism, detente, and  
13    human rights, i.e., the Helsinki Review Conference.

14           Finally I will discuss the Carter style and its implications  
15    for U.S. foreign policy and for Western Europe in particular.

16    Defense Policy - General

17           Last year at Leiden I predicted that a Carter defense policy  
18    would be minimal. Some events have borne this out but others are  
19    frustrating what I take to be a genuine desire to spend less on  
20    defense and to reduce the level of nuclear arms. Hence the Carter  
21    defense budget for the current fiscal year is only slightly less  
22    than President Ford's, and projections for subsequent years show  
23    no radical change from previous projected amounts.

24

25

U.S.-NATO

1       A quick perusal of the NATO communique of May 11, 1977 is  
2   an exercise in deja vu with the usual commitments to increase  
3   defense spending and the usual pious references to standard-  
4   ization of NATO weapons system. One would be safe in concluding  
5   that all's well with NATO if these undertakings are carried out.  
6   Senator Stennis in opening hearings this year on the U.S.-NATO  
7   posture called NATO our most important and enduring alliance.  
8   Vice President Mondale visited Brussels during his first days in  
9   office and told the North Atlantic Council that the U.S. defense  
10   budget "will not result in any decrease in planned investment in  
11   NATO defense." President Carter, meeting with the North Atlantic  
12   Council in London gave his support to the defense improvement plan  
13   formulated by NATO defense ministers and invited the other NATO  
14   heads of governments to meet in Washington in 1978 to report on  
15   progress in the 3-year force improvement program.

16       According to a leaked report, in the NSC consideration of  
17   the now famous Presidential Review Memorandum 10, one of the  
18   options proposed in the event of a Soviet attack in Europe was  
19   a tactical retreat or fallback which would leave the Russian  
20   forces in occupation of a third of Federal Republic territory,  
21   including Bavaria to the Lech. The option was apparently linked  
22   to an estimate of additional defense expenditures needed if con-  
23   ventional forces adequate to prevent such a development were to  
24   be provided. Was the leak intended to spur the European NATO  
25   governments on in their pursuit of the force improvement goals

1 agreed at the May summit? Official denials from The White House,  
2 The Department of Defense and General Haig suggest that the leak  
3 was not deliberate but cannot entirely remove the impression that  
4 policy makers are seeking an alternative to the early use of  
5 nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet military challenge in  
6 Europe.

7 Neutron Warhead

8 The adverse European reaction to the prospective deployment  
9 of the neutron warhead in NATO Europe is at least a fly in the  
10 NATO ointment. It was articulated by Egon Bahr who called the  
11 neutron warhead a perversion, a reflex opinion shared by many  
12 in the U.S. where the Senate rejected by one vote a motion to  
13 deny funds for radiation weapons development. Our colleague,  
14 Graf von Baudissin warned against the weapon as a possible  
15 obstacle to progress in SALT and MBFR negotiations. The  
16 respected Tablet, of London, while admitting that "from one  
17 point of view (the neutron bomb) looks like the answer to a moral  
18 theologian's prayer, was disturbed that it might "lower the  
19 threshold of nuclear war."

20 Here is the crux of the problem, not just of the neutron  
21 weapon--possibly the most precise and damage limiting nuclear  
22 weapon yet developed--but also of NATO strategy as a whole.  
23 The Washington Post thought it was avoiding ambiguity under the  
24 heading, No Neutron Warheads, when it concluded, "By making a  
25 tactical nuclear response more feasible it would sap the

1 European allies incentive to plug the NATO deficit in conven-  
2 tional forces..." and "would fly in the face of the administra-  
3 tion's broad effort to persuade other nations to forego nuclear  
4 weapons." The logic of this line of argument leads to the  
5 conclusion that NATO strategy should abandon reliance on theatre  
6 nuclear weapons altogether. After all, if your strategy relies  
7 on a credible deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, you can  
8 hardly argue that they should be weapons no one will want under  
9 any circumstances to employ.

10 The real question to ask about the neutron weapon is  
11 whether in fact the radiation effects can be limited to the  
12 immediate area of impact. If they are not significantly more  
13 limited than the radiation effects of presently deployed tactical  
14 nuclear weapons in NATO Europe, the argument for deploying them  
15 is considerably less persuasive given the revulsion on both sides  
16 of the Atlantic that greeted President Carter's announcement to  
17 produce them. The debate in the U.S. suggests that the real  
18 arguments for radiation weapons is that they are more effective  
19 against tanks than the present older generation of atomic  
20 projectiles and warheads. The implications for strategic arms  
21 control of deploying radiation weapons do not seem to have been  
22 fully considered, e.g., in relation to the possibility of  
23 obtaining a comprehensive test ban.

24

25

MBFR

1       One hears little in Washington about the negotiations for  
2       Mutual and Balance Force Reductions in Europe, which represented  
3       the U.S. price for agreeing to participate in the Conference on  
4       Security and Cooperation in Europe, MBFR talks seem as before to  
5       be going slowly with no sign of any breakthrough. Chancellor  
6       Schmidt reportedly urged President Carter to reinvigorate the  
7       negotiations, since SALT II "certainly cannot be brought to  
8       success in a few weeks." But this will not be easy! Even if  
9       a way is found to overcome the Russians' insistence on the  
10      principle of equal numerical reductions in force levels and to  
11      reach agreement on a common manpower ceiling, other obstacles  
12      remain. The Russians' demand for national ceilings on force  
13      levels is not acceptable. Negotiated reductions in weapons  
14      deployment (i.e., tanks, combat aircraft, tactical nuclear  
15      weapons) while perhaps more meaningful than reductions in man-  
16      power, seem far off.

17      One is tempted, in fact, to wonder, with CSCE an established  
18      reality, and given the slow pace of the MBFR negotiations,  
19      whether the MBFR negotiations still promise results worth the  
20      continued expenditure of time and diplomatic energies. There  
21      seem to be several reasons why MBFR can be expected to continue.  
22      It is argued, e.g., in the Federal Republic of Germany, that  
23      they keep alive the spirit of detente. It is pointed out that  
24      as long as they are in process NATO states are agreed not to  
25      undertake any unilateral reductions (with Senator Mansfield in

1 Japan this is no longer a problem with the U.S.). And, with  
2 increasing recognition of the meaninglessness of numerical  
3 comparisons of manpower, attention has shifted to the possibi-  
4 lity of using MBFR as a forum for elaborating additional  
5 measures to prevent surprise attacks.

6 SALT

7 President Carter obviously hoped that the Russians would  
8 be willing to negotiate strategic arms limitations on the basis  
9 of his proposals rather than Vladivostok. In this he was badly  
10 mistaken and perhaps ill-advised, with the result that there  
11 will be no new agreement to replace the Moscow agreement of  
12 1972 when it expires on October 3. Carter is reported to be  
13 planning to ask the USSR to extend the old agreement but even  
14 this would require Senate approval. Since the plan is a) to  
15 ratify Vladivostok, b) to reach tentative agreements for three  
16 years on the cruise missile, the Backfire bomber and the Russian  
17 heavy ICBM as well as c) to agree on principles for a SALT III  
18 negotiation, the complexity of the task of satisfying both the  
19 Russian negotiators and the U.S. Senate will be enormous. Carter's  
20 rejection of the B-1 bomber in favor of the cruise missile will  
21 greatly compound the negotiating difficulties for reasons which  
22 are well known but which I will be happy to explain in the  
23 discussion.

24

25

1 Arms Transfers

2 Early in this administration, Secretary of State Vance  
3 said, "The new administration is committed to a basic princi-  
4 ple, and that is to find a way to reduce the sale of arms...".  
5 In his address to the United Nations and in his press conference  
6 of March 24, President Carter expressed hope of getting agree-  
7 ment with the USSR to limit arms sales "to troubled areas of  
8 the world."

9 So far there has been little evidence of serious imple-  
10 mentation of this "commitment". A six point program to reduce  
11 conventional arms sales was announced in May, but its ability  
12 to accommodate a \$1.2 billion sale of seven AWAC aircraft to  
13 Iran, and new customers in Africa, indicates that the program  
14 is not very restrictive. This conclusion is confirmed in a  
15 letter dated August 22 from The Department of State which  
16 states that the new policy regards "arms transfers as an  
17 exceptional foreign policy instrument... Henceforth those  
18 within the government who favor significant new sales programs  
19 will be required to establish clearly that the transfer promotes  
20 national security or important foreign policy objectives."

21 This language will serve as a fair statement of U.S. arms  
22 sales policies under Henry Kissinger. While talks with the  
23 Russians on conventional arms sales are scheduled this month,  
24 the general impression is, as Anthony Sampson put it, that the  
25 Carter initiative to reduce the world trade in conventional arms



1 is not to be taken too seriously.

2 Political Implications

3 Among the positive implications for Western Europe is the  
4 evident willingness of the new administration to continue the  
5 practice of close consultation, not only in the NATO framework  
6 but in the continuation of the economic summit meetings.

7 Harmonization of economic policies, whether the chief national  
8 goal is economic growth or stability, is obviously of first  
9 importance politically. At the Downing Street Summit these  
10 differing priorities were recognized; with the three weaker  
11 economies stabilization was to be given top priority, while  
12 for the FRG, the U.S. and Japan, commitments were made to  
13 policies designed to maintain real growth rates in the range  
14 of 5% to 7%. The U.S. has reached its goal of 5.8 to 6.0%,  
15 the Federal Republic will almost certainly achieve 4.5% this  
16 year and Japan is close to achieving the goal of 6%.

17 In the area of North-South cooperation there was agreement  
18 to establish a common fund to stabilize certain basic commodity  
19 prices in the interest of developing countries. The U.S. is  
20 quite naturally concerned about the desperate economic situation  
21 of the United Kingdom, but at least until recently, relieved that  
22 it does not seem to invite political instability.

23 There is, of course, concern for the political future of  
24 France and Italy, and particularly for the former if next year's  
25 elections return a coalition of Communists and Socialists.

1 This could have disastrous effects on the ability of France to  
2 maintain its obligation to the European Community and would  
3 probably put a stop to the recent trend toward closer coopera-  
4 tion with NATO. The recent experience of Spain and Portugal  
5 is taken as some assurance that Euro-Communism is not the wave  
6 of the future for Western Europe.

7 While on the whole the U.S. and Western Europe have more  
8 problems in common than issues that divide, the Carter presi-  
9 dency does seem to have raised several issues that may prove  
10 divisive. One is the proliferation of the fast breeder reactor  
11 which President Carter wanted to put under agreed controls.  
12 One is the conduct of detente; another, the Carter emphasis on  
13 human rights. Actually these latter two questions overlap  
14 if they do not merge; when President Giscard D'Estaing observed  
15 that President Carter had departed from the prescribed code of  
16 conduct for detente, he probably had in mind more the Russian  
17 unhappiness with President Carter's concern for human rights  
18 violations in the USSR than with the Russian refusal to nego-  
19 tiate Carter's initial proposals for SALT II. Chancellor Schmidt  
20 and Prime Minister Trudeau reported shared Giscard's feeling,  
21 while the British and Italian political leadership have publicly  
22 supported President Carter's human rights campaign.

23 In any event, the view in Washington seems to be that the  
24 delay in SALT has been due not the embarrassment of Carter's  
25 human rights rhetoric, but rather to the negotiating package

1 offered by the U.S. More realistic proposals are expected to  
2 get SALT II back on the rails in the fall. Also, in any event,  
3 there seems to be no readiness in the new administration to  
4 soften the emphasis on human rights.

5 A more basic question in this connection, perhaps, is  
6 whether detente can survive another failure to reach agreement  
7 on strategic weapons. A continuation of the strategic arms  
8 race, with cruise missiles and MX ballistic missiles being  
9 added to the U.S. and perhaps the British and French arsenals  
10 would seem to be what some American strategic experts would  
11 like to see, since in their view the USSR "thinks it could fight  
12 and win a nuclear war."<sup>1/</sup> In this view, widely published by  
13 the self-styled Committee on the Present Danger, the USSR is  
14 adding and will continue to add to its strategic stockpile  
15 until it achieves "superiority." In the meantime, detente is  
16 a delusion for the West. The U.S. response should be to develop  
17 and deploy new weapons including the B-1 bomber, the cruise  
18 missile and the MX ballistic missile until the Russians give  
19 clear indications that they are willing to negotiate meaningful  
20 limits for all such systems. Since a number of Senators and  
21 Congressmen are sympathetic to this view, it is too early to say  
22 how this debate will be resolved in future policy decisions.

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23  
24 <sup>1/</sup>"Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear  
25 War," by Richard Pipes in Commentary, July 1977.

The CSCE Review Conference

1       The Helsinki agreement offers a lesson in diplomacy. At  
2       the time of the signing in 1975 I was one of those many skeptics  
3       who regarded it as a mindless charade: the USSR scoring the  
4       ratification of the status quo in Europe in return for under-  
5       takings everyone knew they wouldn't keep; the U.S. joining with  
6       a brave face but little enthusiasm and the knowledge that the  
7       MBFR negotiations for which the U.S. agreed to the Conference  
8       were not going anywhere.

9       Now the tables are turned. The USSR, which insisted at  
10      Helsinki on a follow-up meeting while the Western countries  
11      resisted, is now obviously rueing the consequences of a follow-  
12      up conference at which some Western delegations (not including  
13      those guardians of the code of detente) are likely to put heavy  
14      emphasis on the third basket (human rights). The Helsinki  
15      agreements have become known all over Eastern Europe, and have  
16      given new hope to dissidents.

17      The U.S. can be expected to exploit this advantage and to  
18      use the third basket, and the massive evidence of violations in  
19      Communist countries to justify its continued criticism of  
20      Communist denials of human rights. Those who regard detente as  
21      a fragile flower that will wilt and die in an atmosphere of give  
22      and take had better stay away.

23      Present Carter's Personality

24      Last year at Leiden, some of you will remember my prediction  
25      that a Carter presidency would be stronger because the president

1 and the Congress would be of the same party. The Carter  
2 Presidency is a strong presidency but not because of this  
3 factor. The Democratic majority in the House of Representa-  
4 tives is even more independent than in the previous Congress  
5 and Carter has had some initial difficulty learning how to work  
6 with Congress. The presidency is strong because the incumbent  
7 has shown himself to be a strong, decisive personality, as his  
8 emphasis on human rights and his decisions on withdrawal of  
9 forces from Korea and on the B-1 bomber have demonstrated,  
10 and because he personally has strong popular support. In  
11 short, he has popular backing and he intends to use it. This  
12 is not the same thing as a strong political base in the party  
13 and the Congress. How far he can go will be significantly  
14 tested with the Panama Canal treaty, with any SALT II treaty  
15 that can be negotiated, and with the rumored administration  
16 plan to double development aid. (It would perhaps have been  
17 more useful if this paper had been devoted to the implications  
18 for Europe of the new U.S. Congress.)

19 This brings me to the question of the Carter style and  
20 its implications for U.S.-European relations and also for East-  
21 West relations. In this dimension, Carter presents a radical  
22 break with the past and with the amoral, pragmatic approach  
23 to foreign policy of the last two administrations: he is  
24 convinced that U.S. foreign policy can embody and project the  
25 moral and political values of the American people.

1       This is at least slightly incredible to many people who  
2       either cannot credit the fact that Jimmy Carter is a funda-  
3       mentalist, born-again Baptist, or cannot seriously cannot  
4       accept that he would bring his moral and religious perceptions  
5       to bear on the formulation of foreign and military policy.

6       The resulting perplexity has produced the following  
7       doggerel from a reader of the Manchester Guardian:

8                               DEMENTIA AMERICANA

9       James (Earl Carter) reconciles with aplomb  
10      HUMAN RIGHTS and the NEUTRON BOMB --  
11      A two-handed policy which clearly affords  
12      To Minority Groups of absent landlords  
13      The Right to Return, hippity hoppity.  
14      To their corpse-strewn but otherwise  
15      undamaged property  
16      Or else James (The Baptist) can send his  
17      fissile  
18      Pax Vobis ensconced in the nose of a  
19      missile  
20      On a sub-radar CRUISE which, just for a lark,  
21      He paints to resemble the jaws of a shark.  
22      MORAL:  
23      For B-1 deficiency, while still calling a  
24      "halt"  
25      to the Arms Race, just take two more pinches  
26      of SALT

                             Kenneth Gardner  
                             Plantations Bldg.  
                             Bridgetown, Barbados

20       The reality of such a complex person will be more readily  
21       understood by members of this group. President Carter has set  
22       forth his own statement of principles in a speech at Notre Dame  
23       University on May 22. Among other things, he said:

24       "I believe we can have a foreign policy that  
25       is democratic, that is based on fundamental  
26       values, and that uses power and influence which  
27       we have for humane purposes. We can also have  
28       a foreign policy that the American people both

1 support and for a change know about and  
2 understand.

3 We are confident that democratic methods are  
4 the most effective, and so we are not tempted  
5 to employ improper tactics here at home or  
6 abroad... We are confident of our own strength,  
7 so we can seek substantial mutual reductions in  
8 the nuclear arms race... Being confident of our  
9 own future, we are now free of that inordinate  
10 fear of communism which once led us to embrace  
11 any dictator who joined us in that fear..."

12 "...I believe in detente with the Soviet Union.  
13 To me, it means progress towards peace, but the  
14 effects of detente should not be limited to our  
15 own two countries alone. We hope to persuade the  
16 Soviet Union that one country cannot impose its  
17 system of society upon another... We hope that  
18 the Soviet Union will join with us in playing a  
19 larger role in aiding the developing world, for  
20 common aid efforts will help us build a bridge  
21 of mutual confidence in one another."

22 "...We have affirmed America's commitment to  
23 human rights as a fundamental tenet of our  
24 foreign policy. In ancestry, religion, color,  
25 place of origin and cultural background, we  
Americans are as diverse a nation as the world  
had ever known. No common mystique of blood  
or soil unites us. What draws us together,  
perhaps more than anything else, is a belief  
in human freedom."

17 We have no reason as yet not to take these statements at  
18 face value. How successfully the sentiments they reflect can  
19 be brought to influence the course of world events remains to  
20 be seen.

21  
22 EWD/rjmc/29-Aug-77  
23  
24  
25

Ammonio  
NFR  
②

Graf von Baudissin

## THE PRESENT SITUATION OF SECURITY POLICY <sup>+</sup>)

Presentation for Discussion at CCADD, 1977

Friedewald, September 2nd - 9th

1. The dominant East-West relationships may best be characterized in terms of non-confrontation (referring to the past) and non-détente (referring to the future). We are in a state of Cold Peace, differing from Cold War in so far as negotiations and cooperation on the most various levels and in all fields with a fluctuation of actors, are not only possible, but even necessary; mutual interdependence is becoming accepted.
2. Politics in this period are made up of a sequence and simultaneousness of various elements, viz. of confrontation, competition, and cooperation.

The process of détente derives its complexity from the following main sources:

- the burden of certain historical experiences;
- the deeply rooted conflicts of interest between the world powers and their allies, both on a global and a regional level;
- conflicting political objectives of governments, who will often tend to overemphasize certain interests for intersystemic reasons;
- the contradicting concepts of détente;
- irreconcilable philosophies of social and world order;
- the destabilizing effects of the inter-state process on the systems themselves.

<sup>+</sup>) Translated from the German by Peter Krapf



3. Security Policy today must be conceived as a partial strategy of the process of détente, defining the objectives, strategies, and potentials of security policy.

If we reverse the order of priorities and define security policy as the dominant element, we would either overstrain the concept of security or confuse means and ends; this attitude is yet another remainder from the era of confrontation, in which relative military strength essentially determined international relations.

4. In the stage of non-confrontation, security policy is of particular importance. If no safety from settling conflicts by military force were guaranteed, the risks of détente policy would seem intolerable. As in the past, there still is, and always will be, extreme sensitivity to intersystemic antagonism: if there are merely signs of slight social and international instability, this antagonism will cause a feeling of threat, prompting an actor to maintain his distance still further, and perhaps even yield again to confrontation.

In the field of military strategy, instability has particularly threatening effects on whichever side is inferior; the dependence which is inevitable whenever any form of cooperation is engaged upon, is felt to produce intolerable vulnerability, stimulating to "catch up" in the arms sector.

5. The objective of Security Policy in the process of détente is therefore strategic stability, i.e. the creation of a worldwide distribution of strength in which the risk involved in any attempt to handle a conflict with military means may be calculated and will be unacceptable (kalkuliert untragbares

Risiko). This stability does not correspond with parity, and is not desirable in every sector of the shield of deterrence, or in every geographical region.

The military strategies of such a policy are mutual deterrence (flexible response), and arms control (kooperative Rüstungssteuerung).

6. Although no substantial changes have occurred in the relative strength of the world powers, strategic stability has recently again come up for discussion, for various reasons:

- the USSR have caught up in the fields of nuclear strategic armament and the deep sea navy, levelling down the spectacular superiority the West previously had enjoyed;
- the element of "general purpose" has undergone even further extension, both qualitatively and quantitatively; some observers believe these efforts will, or are intended to, enable the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) to launch an aggression;
- the USSR have developed considerable transport capacities by air and by sea, and are now capable of moving units and systems within and outside Europe over longer distances at short notice;
- the reinforcement of Civil Defense (assured survival capacity) and the modernization of the arms industry have both been interpreted as instruments of a warfare concept;
- the insufficient transparency of motives behind power policy and strategies of security policy conceal the intentions and objectives behind the extraordinary efforts outlined above.

This concern about strategic instability is justified in terms of security policy, in so far as a precaution against dangerous developments in the next decade is implied, but the present situation should not be precariously dramatized. Neither the USSR nor the WTO command a capability in Europe they may exploit in military strategy.

7. In this present discussion on strategy, the following points are put forward:

- the credibility of a concept of deterrence is called into doubt, the ultimate consequence of which is said to result in suicide; instead, the notion of territorial defense in depth by conventional means is suggested, as the type of arms and organisation involved would make an escalation up to the nuclear stage unlikely;
- the credibility of the US strategic deterrence for Western Europe is questioned once more, while emphasis is put on the necessity to drastically strengthen the conventional forces;
- a number of arms technologies are also recommended for Europe, e.g. PGM or Cruise Missiles, as they offer options of limited warfare.

The following hazards should be pointed out here:

- the danger of falling back into defense strategies which claim to limit casualties, thus reducing the aggressor's risk and the extent of damage inflicted upon him and, as a consequence, the deterrence effect.
- the fascination of technological achievements and their tactical effect has brushed aside the primary issue, i.e.

what effects such weapons will have on the political solidarity of the alliance and the strategic stability between the alliances; in such circumstances, such problems will, at best, only receive marginal attention.

- The effects of non-nuclear weapons, even when used in brief combat, are belittled and one resigns to the fact that wars are an ineradicable means of settling international conflicts.

8. In the Final Document of Helsinki, issues of security policy are only directly referred to in the "Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament". The political threshold for a military conflict in Europe was, however, set still higher than before as

- the participating states pledged, i.e. promised, to respect the security interests of the other governments and to promote cooperation in the fields referred to in Baskets II and III;
- the Principles II (Refraining From the Threat or Use of Force), III (Inviolability of Frontiers), and IV (Territorial Integrity of States) serve to guarantee the status quo; while this recognition of the status quo initially met Eastern security interests, including the Brezhnev Doctrine, it also increased security in all Europe, i.e. including the West;
- the joint responsibility of the USA and Canada for European security was stipulated;
- a double safeguard was provided for the security of Berlin.

9. The Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) of the Final Document, which had to be negotiated in the face of considerable resistance from the Eastern side, which was reluctant in applying these measures afterwards, has proven to be a success. The Bucharest Declaration of the WTO already speaks of these measures as a matter of fact.

In the past two years, notification was given of 25 manoeuvres, of which 14 were carried out by NATO members, 8 by the WTO, and 5 by neutral states. The WTO members, however, maintained a restrictive practice of invitation, passive as well as active. On the other hand, Moscow has just invited observers to attend a manoeuvre at a place in West Ukraine, including representatives from NATO members (France and the Federal Republic of Germany), the neutral and non-aligned states (Yugoslavia, Austria, and Switzerland), and the WTO (Bulgaria, the CSSR, and the German Democratic Republic).

At this year's Review Conference in Belgrade, an extension of Confidence-Building Measures should be proposed. The following may serve as example of items to be negotiated:

- additional obligatory notification of small-scale manoeuvres, including command and staff post exercises, if possible by exchanging annual exercise schedules;
- detailed information on the units participating, the area and course of the manoeuvres;
- the obligation to notify of larger movements, including troop transports;
- "rules of conduct" for observers' programmes;
- institutionalization of informing neutral and non-aligned governments on progress in arms control talks.

If such Confidence-Building Measures were to be applied in accordance with corresponding "associated measures" of the MBFR talks, the single constraints (which are quite tolerable) and insights might amount to a substantial increase of "stability and security in Europe". If governments may follow up the other side's routine practice, unusual procedures may quickly be recognized and clarified.

10. The arms control negotiations, SALT and MBFR, have not produced any manifestly measurable results last year. Some reasons for this are the contradicting conceptions and objectives the political actors also have in this field, an insuperable suspicion and dislike of transparency, the variation of potentials and the rapidity of the innovation process.

In effect, technology today offers weapons of ever-increasing target accuracy, destructive capability, range, and mobility for every arms sector. The categories underlying arms control efforts are becoming questionable, e.g. nuclear and conventional, strategic and tactical, or ground, naval, and airborne; weapons are turning out to be increasingly less verifiable and negotiable. Also in this field, conventional negotiation diplomacy is no longer able to cope with the innovation pressure.

As a relief, one might resort to permanently functioning mixed structures such as the Standing Consultative Committee (SALT I), which would have to be entrusted with crisis management and comparing the military planning of both sides. Only by cooperation on an early stage may we preclude programmes and measures which would create destabilizing and hardly superable faits accomplis. At least, the conditions prevailing

at present should be qualified by operational requirements. One could agree, for example, that units stationed in a certain area may not be structured and equipped for launching a surprise attack.

11. SALT I, i.e. "The Interim Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms", is due to expire in early October this year. There seem to be no objections, however, to tacitly or formally renewing the agreement.

Points of controversy remain however, such as the Cruise Missiles and the Bomber-Backfire, and some new Soviet MRBM and IRBM systems, in particular the mobile SS 20 with ranges beyond Western Europe.

Moscow did not respond to President Carter's unexpected proposal of substantial cuts well beneath the Vladivostok ceilings, and several qualitative restraints, such as limitation of tests and prohibition of further modernization.

The situation has been complicated by the abandonment of the B - 1 programme and the consequent shift of emphasis to Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM). The ALCM, the main concern of the USSR, have become even less negotiable. Moreover, they demonstrate, in line with the other innovations, the technological inferiority of the USSR, even on the arms sector. But experience shows that the inferior side has no interest in arms control.

Yet at least there seems to be some consensus on the formal framework of possible negotiation results:

- an agreement, valid up to 1985, would set ceilings for

for strategic systems and multiple missiles, which would probably remain somewhere near the Vladivostok guiding figures.

- an agreement, valid up to 1980, on the development and use of Cruise Missiles, Backfire, and certain Soviet Missiles;
- a protocol on the governments' pledge to considerable reductions after 1985.

At their meeting in March, Vance and Gromyko agreed to set up commissions, mostly bilateral, whose main task is to deal with SALT-related problems of arms control.

The items under discussion in these commissions are the following:

- Demilitarization of the Indian Ocean (freeze of present distribution of strength, and later reduction of forces);
- comprehensive test ban for military and peaceful explosive devices.

(The commission is open-ended; the United Kingdom is already participating in the talks).

- Ban on chemical and radioactive weapons.
- Prohibition against the capability of attacking observation satellites in space.
- Civil Defense.
- Control of transfer of conventional arms.
- Prior notification of missile test firing.

12. In the MBFR talks, the figures presented by the WTO at the 150. full session on June 10, 1976 created a new situation. According to the Eastern side, parity has already been achieved:



NATO comprises 981,000 troops, the WTO 987,000, of which 791,000 and 805,000 respectively come from the army. The previously proposed argument that the superiority of the WTO secured peace and was thus necessary, was therefore abandoned, but the negotiating position of NATO was not improved.

The following preliminary items remain unsettled:

- what is to be reduced: Troops and/or materials; the same equipment or menacing surpluses of both sides (tanks in exchange for tactical nuclear systems); army units and/or all armed forces, excluding the navy?
- who will reduce his forces: the hegemonial powers and/or all states; reductions in a specific or loosely specified stage schedule?
- for whom will the ceilings apply: for the alliances or single member states?

The argument about figures is of little relevance as in the era of qualitative arms dynamics, such figures have only limited significance; instead, it would be politically more efficacious to attempt to reach a consensus on such concepts as parity and transparency, and to agree on operational criteria. In the context of "associated measures", one should also attempt to discuss the verification of future ceilings. Without such possibilities to maintain certainty about the contractual loyalty of the other side, arms control agreements between antagonistic systems will create more mistrust than confidence, especially if both sides, as in this particular instance, diverge in their estimate of the initial situation.

13. The CSCE and its related review conferences, SALT and MBFR, are interconnected, at least atmospherically. Successes or a standstill on one level will point to the prospects on other levels; the negotiation results are also closely connected.

SALT and MBFR agreements are thus related to another in a particular way. The problems, technologies, and arms sectors which are not controlled by them will develop into dark zones of particular dynamics and hence into sources of future instability which, eventually, one cannot afford to ignore.

14. The Bucharest Declaration of the WTO of November 28, 1976 shows, in all its non-commitment and inherent contradictions, what obstacles still have to be overcome by détente-oriented security policy in the field of arms control.

While the paper declares the willingness to disband the alliances, it also proposes further consolidation of the WTO developing coordination and consultation structures. Passages emphasizing the states' sovereignty stand side by side with others legitimizing the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The document contains a barely convincing draft agreement, addressed to the participant states of the CSCE, the negotiation partners in Vienna, and the NATO members, proposing to refrain from a first strike with nuclear arms. Referring to a possible association of a democratic Spain with NATO, the document pleads neither to extend existing "military-political alliances", nor to establish new ones. These

pronouncements are followed up by a repetition of a whole range of long-known "disarmament" proposals, which have been either rejected or become obsolete: e.g. disbanding oases on foreign soil, withdrawing foreign troops, cuts in the military budget, or a ban and disposal of chemical weapons. All these suggestions are rather more animated by the spirit of the disarmament conferences of the fifties, accusing the other side of unpeaceful intentions, than by the will to cooperate.

It is a different matter however, whether NATO should not have approached the WTO and made reference to some points, instead of a mere blank rejection. The text of the document on Confidence-Building Measures offers excellent opportunities for additionally establishing communication on the level of the alliances in a more concrete way, thus promoting mutual understanding. Objections against a first-strike ban should not be raised on the grounds of refraining from the use of force, but rather because of the arbitrary limitation of the means of self-defence, which is permitted by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Due to geographic conditions, such a limitation would also put NATO at a disadvantage.

15. Parallel to tendencies in security policy, new horizons are also coming into sight in the field of economic cooperation; directly or indirectly, they will affect the actors' objective security and their feelings of safety, and will therefore influence the process of détente:

- in certain regions and industrial sectors in the West,

jobs are becoming increasingly dependent on the willingness of the Socialist countries to import Western goods; energy supplies from the East are also generating new forms of vulnerability.

In addition, there is deepening concern that Western exports of technology and capital will facilitate, if not even support, the qualitative armament efforts of the WTO, while overseas supply routes of energy and raw materials to the West are coming under increasing pressure from Soviet naval power;

- the East is becoming ever more aware of the fact that economic competing-power may only improved and sustained with capitalist assistance. Continued economic growth depends on a substantial boost of Western technology and capital, resulting in considerable debts, and new vulnerability;
- yet it seems that the deficiencies of both sides may not be exploited without risk as long as both sides maintain an interest in continuing the process of détente, and therefore in the functioning of the other system. If the industrialized societies of Western Europe were cut off from their energy supplies, their inclination to cooperate would immediately drop; such measures would therefore only be possible in crises in which such supplies were of no more importance. The same would apply to the attempt to blackmail the East by its financial and technological weakness. Both instances of threatening the other side's security would

soon produce a boomerang effect.

16. Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker has put forward the following thesis:

"Peace may only be secured on a long-term basis by a profound change of the political world structure. Every security policy must be simultaneously judged on the basis of the criteria whether it facilitates or impedes such a change."

Deep-rooted changes set off radical conflicts, and they should therefore be embarked upon in a process still controllable to a certain extent. A political and social order may only be structured on a world-wide scale by forming regional federations to which an increasing range of competences may be transferred.

Security policy will therefore facilitate development towards "world peace",

- if the process of the détente between the 1st and 2nd World is promoted and structures and procedures of regional crisis management, arms control, and non-violent conflict resolution are developed;
- if the settlement of conflict in the 3rd and 4th World is assigned to the existing regional structures and if, at least in one's own security interests, conflict is not catastrophically stepped up by proliferation and transfer activities. These constraints, however, must rely on the joint support of the 3rd and 4th World.

5 Sept. 1977

3

SHORT RESPONSE by Pierce Corden

Nubner, J. J.

to

The Present Situation of Security Policy by Graf von Baudissin

I. First, I would like to say that it is a pleasure to be here, and indeed an honor to be asked to give a short response to the informative paper by General von Baudissin. In my view the paper is a good summary of the present security situation. In reading the paper before the session, I was led to the following observations.

II. Observations

A. While the SALT and MBFR negotiations have not produced any formal agreements during the last year, the delegations are hard at work, and I am hopeful that progress will be recorded soon. In the meantime, a number of other positive developments can be cited:

(1) The parties to the Seabed Arms Control Treaty *Stensbøck* carried out a successful review of that treaty, as required by Article III, 15 years after entry into force. No nuclear or any other types of weapons of mass destruction have been emplaced on the seabed during that time, nor has there been a need to exercise the verification procedures specified by Article III, which include the possibility of inspection under certain circumstances.

(2) On May 18, 1977, 34 nations (states) signed the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. This Convention, by prohibiting any

hostile use of environmental modification techniques (such as cloud seeding and large-scale use of herbicides)

QUESTA PUBBLICAZIONE È DI PROPRIETÀ  
DELL'ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

<sup>wide, large + extensive</sup>  
 having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects,  
<sup>and more</sup> should effectively eliminate the direct exploitation  
<sup>however</sup> of the environment as a weapon, what Bishop Habgood has  
 referred to as ecological warfare. <sup>way</sup> Article III of  
 the Convention provides for full exchange of information  
<sup>onwardly</sup> on peaceful uses of environmental modification <sup>in well known</sup>  
 techniques; in a statement issued on the occasion  
<sup>interestingly</sup> of the signing, the U.S. secretary of State Cyrus Vance  
 said that the United States earnestly desires that all  
 research and development, as well as use, of such  
 techniques be carried out solely for peaceful purposes.

(3) In late July the United States Senate held  
 hearings to begin the process of ratification of  
 the two integrally connected bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R.  
<sup>concerning do nuclear weapons tests</sup>  
Treaties on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear  
<sup>underground nuclear</sup>  
Weapon Tests and on Underground Nuclear Explosions  
<sup>Teste underground in kind. Sweden</sup>  
for Peaceful Purposes. These Treaties impose, for

the first time, <sup>from</sup> limits on nuclear explosions under-  
 ground, which explosions were not regulated by the  
1963 Treaty of Moscow, which prohibits such explosions  
 in the atmosphere, in <sup>underground</sup> outer space and under water. The  
 1963 Treaty now has over 100 parties, and France, while  
 not a party, is conducting its tests underground.

(The United Kingdom, I should add, has announced that  
 it will keep its underground explosions under the  
150 kiloton limit of the bilateral treaties). These  
 bilateral treaties contain a number of important  
 precedents, the principal one being the identical 150  
 kiloton limitation placed on explosions at defined  
<sup>affected states</sup>  
 weapon test sites and on so-called nuclear explosions

for peaceful purposes. Thus the agreements recognize the fact that it has not proven possible to distinguish between the technology of nuclear explosives intended for use for <sup>Waffenwecken</sup> weapons purposes and intended for use for peaceful purposes. (This fact was recently emphasized by the Foreign Minister of France in his radio interview <sup>Stombeau - had after</sup> concerning the possibility of a nuclear explosion ~~xx~~ by South Africa. The Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom made a similar statement in June.) A <sup>Reunderfall</sup> second precedent is that the treaty <sup>Unterirdische Explosion</sup> on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes provides, for certain categories of explosions, for the presence of American personnel on Soviet territory (and vice versa), who may use electrical equipment, placed very close to the explosive, <sup>Sparysah</sup> to ensure that the yield <sup>Größe</sup> of the explosion does not exceed 150 kilotons.

(4) In his <sup>Antikaride</sup> inaugural address, President Carter reaffirmed the commitment of the United States, embodied in (Article VI of the non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,)

to the elimination of nuclear weapons. As General von Baudissin has noted, one of the products of the March discussions in Moscow between the U.S.S.R. and the United States was agreement to work toward <sup>Waffenruhe</sup> <sup>Teststop</sup> a comprehensive test ban on nuclear explosions. Bilateral discussions to this end were held in June, trilateral discussions, including the United Kingdom, in July, and full-scale negotiations are scheduled to begin on October 3 in Geneva. While achievement of a comprehensive test ban would hardly be the end of <sup>Nuklearen Wettrennen</sup> the competition in nuclear weapons, it would be a <sup>Wettrennen</sup> major restraint on this competition by essentially



stopping the further development of the nuclear  
Spang Kopf  
warhead components of nuclear weapon systems. Of equal  
importance would be the impact that a comprehensive <sup>unfassbar</sup>  
test ban <sup>an</sup> would have for the non-proliferation efforts  
of the parties to the non-proliferation treaty, both  
nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. A comprehensive  
test ban treaty is widely regarded as a specific  
fulfillment of the obligations of the nuclear weapon  
states <sup>Verpflichtung</sup> under Article VI of the non-proliferation <sup>Atomaren</sup>  
treaty, and thus as a step in redress of the imbalance <sup>ausgleichend</sup>

<sup>Behandlung</sup>  
of treatment between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon  
states in the non-proliferation treaty. Moreover,  
in a world in which at least three of the nuclear  
weapon states have stopped all testing, <sup>stärken sogar solche</sup> even states of  
<sup>potenziell</sup> potential <sup>to are</sup> concern for <sup>Vorwissen</sup> proliferation such as South  
Africa and Brazil <sup>obwohl</sup> whether or not they become  
parties to the test ban treaty or to the non-proliferation  
treaty, <sup>für einen Teilbereich</sup> would be confronted with a much more difficult  
political context in which to start testing, so that  
they might have to be content to rely on a non-tested,  
and thus relatively invisible, nuclear <sup>Fähigkeit</sup> capability,  
or better, <sup>die Entscheidung ist</sup> choose <sup>Nukleare Waffen</sup> not to fabricate nuclear devices  
at all. So it will be indeed a positive measure of  
restraint if the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. can  
reach agreement on the essential elements of a treaty  
to stop all testing, and if the Conference of the  
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva then works out a  
complete treaty.

(5) As previously noted, the concerted action of both  
Western and Eastern powers has led to a South African  
denial that it plans to explode a nuclear device. <sup>Spekulation</sup>

This was apparently related to a desire not to be <sup>overwhelmed</sup> denied nuclear power equipment. Similarly, India appears now to be in a position of not continuing with nuclear testing, for the sake of obtaining reactor fuel. *Brenhoff*

(6) The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have now held five rounds of bilateral discussions to develop a joint <sup>Verbot</sup> <sup>C-weapon</sup> initiative for the prohibition of chemical weapons; and the United Kingdom has been making a very significant contribution to the multilateral discussion of the issues involved in this question at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

B. These six developments which I have cited as positive steps may be considered small or perhaps <sup>being expedited</sup> even inconsequential. I would not agree with such a conclusion, because I find it very difficult to place a time limit on when progress toward disarmament should be achieved. Moreover, the steps are leading in the right direction. The agreements on nuclear testing and their relation to non-proliferation, however, contain what is to me an interesting problem, perhaps the basic one which confronts us in working out a more peaceful world. This problem is two-fold:

- 1) first, the question of discrimination, and second,
- 2) the question of direction. With regard to discrimination, <sup>Unterchied</sup> <sup>zwischen</sup> the non-proliferation treaty specifies nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, and Article IV provides for a sharing of peaceful technology adequately safeguarded.

But as the question of the control and the export of

of *subcritical* technology  
 reprocessing technology makes clear, the line  
 between what is peaceful and what is dangerous  
 is extremely difficult to draw. In some cases,  
 such as nuclear explosive technology, it is  
 essentially impossible, at least for now. The  
 search for solutions to this problem has led to  
 research on internationalizing the nuclear *along the Isen-*  
 fuel cycle, including reprocessing, and to *stoppyklus*  
 proposals for worldwide *worldwide* restraints on the use  
 of nuclear technology, with a search for  
 alternative *energy sources* sources of energy. It seems to  
 me that some combination of mutual restraint, *independence* *cooperative* *restraint*  
 plus a careful development of new energy sources,  
 may prove to be the best solution. In this  
 regard, the problems raised by technology may,  
 at least to some extent, be solved by technology,  
 perhaps *some energy* solar energy technology. If nothing  
 else, our experiences *i* with elaborating a system  
 for the control of nuclear energy may have been  
 instructive to us as to our own *limits* limits at this  
 time in history.

*Unlikely odd story*  
 The question of direction has been motivated  
 in part by the problem of discrimination. Do we  
 want to proceed in a direction of greater reliance *Unlikely to be right and good*  
 on force, in particular on force out of proportion  
 to direct military ends which is represented by  
 weapons of ~~mass~~ mass destruction, or ~~to be~~ in  
 a direction *i* of less reliance? If to a greater  
 reliance, are we willing to grant to all states  
 the rights that ~~are~~ certain states now have to

That hardly seems likely. Moreover, it  
 own such weapons? ~~It~~ seems to me impossible to  
 envision a static world, a continuation of the  
 status quo. Not only does it seem almost self-  
 evident that Christians should work for a world  
 in which less reliance is placed on force as a solution  
 to problems of international relations, at least at  
 the upper end of the scale, but some 100 states are  
 committed by the force of international law, in  
 the non-proliferation treaty, to seeking such  
 a world order. The question is sometimes raised  
 as to what sort of political structures can be  
 envisioned for handling international relations  
 when very large scale reductions in the numbers  
 of weapons of mass destruction, and even their  
 elimination, has taken place. In my view, we know  
 enough now to begin the process safely, and I have  
 enough faith in the future to believe that we  
 shall be able to elaborate sufficiently capable  
 structures, perhaps along the lines of regional  
 alignments such as General von Baudissin has suggested.

C. In summary, I believe we must realize what  
<sup>bases are, in ethical terms,</sup>  
 the ~~implications~~ of working toward reductions in  
 weapons at the upper end of the spectrum of destruction  
~~are in ethical terms.~~ In my view this task rests  
 on the perception that deterrence based on force ~~is~~  
 out of proportion with military ends cannot be a  
 permanent solution to the regulation of international  
 affairs. I think a case can be made for reliance on  
 deterrence temporarily, but it is clearly called for  
 to continue to apply very critical judgments for  
 the necessity of the introduction of new technology

which can lead us away from the process of reduction. But this ultimately becomes a question of judgment on the part of those who are charged with the governance of our nations, and I am hopeful that the general trend of such judgments, as exemplified by the progress I cited earlier, is a good one.

I think it is worth noting that nuclear weapons have been in existence for thirty-two years, a relatively short time span. The first modern arms control agreement, the Antarctic Treaty, ~~was~~ dates from 1959. The process of SALT began formally only eight years ago. The Christian virtue of perseverance seems relevant to the task ahead--perhaps nuclear weapons will not continue in existence for more than another thirty-two years.

L'évolution de la situation politique en Europe :  
rétrospective et prospective

Si j'ai bien compris la mission qui m'a été impartie, ma tâche consiste à dresser, principalement à l'usage de nos amis américains, un tableau de l'évolution et des perspectives de la situation en Europe, à partir des événements des douze derniers mois. Si rares sont les occasions où l'Europe (même celle de l'Ouest) parle d'une seule voix qu'on doit se réjouir, à première vue, de l'occasion qui m'est offerte de tenir ce rôle. Mais l'honneur est à la mesure de la difficulté de l'entreprise ; et le porte-parole s'attend à recevoir des démentis ou à enregistrer des opinions dissidentes de la part de ceux qu'il représente. Autant dire que ce rapport reflétera inévitablement mes vues personnelles - même s'il s'efforce d'atteindre à un minimum d'objectivité.

A vrai dire, aucun événement spectaculaire n'a marqué l'histoire de l'Europe depuis le mois d'août 1976. Pris séparément ou collectivement les pays européens ont "persévéré dans leur être", même si leur apparence a quelque peu varié. Mais des changements, même mineurs, peuvent être, dans certains cas, annonciateurs de bouleversements plus sérieux. Aussi importe-t-il de ne négliger aucun aspect de la situation. J'examinerai d'abord les problèmes internes à chacun des pays, puis les problèmes communs à l'Europe occidentale, enfin les relations entre les pays européens.

I

L'Europe reste une mosaïque de pays indépendants, dont chacun conserve sa souveraineté et ses problèmes. Il est néanmoins possible de tirer, par comparaison entre les situations nationales, quelques enseignements fondés sur l'évolution interne de chacun d'eux.

§ - Aucun fait nouveau ne s'est manifesté sur le plan de la situation économique : les pays européens restent traumatisés par les séquelles de la crise économique apparue en 1974. Partout, sauf en R.F.A. , l'inflation reste menaçante. Partout, même en R.F.A. , le chômage s'installe comme une donnée permanente. Dans la plupart des pays, la balance des paiements est en déséquilibre, le cours des monnaies fragile et le taux d'expansion réduit . Aucun signe de reprise ne se manifeste. Bref, l'Europe vit en état de

"stagflation" et se trouve de plus en plus tributaire, pour assurer son train de vie, de concours extérieurs qui menacent d'aliéner son indépendance politique.

Bien entendu, il faudrait introduire des nuances dans ce tableau : certains pays, comme la R.F.A. , résistent mieux que d'autres à la crise; d'autres sont au bord de la faillite (Portugal) ou contraints à de sévères mesures d'ajustement monétaire (Espagne). Mais, dans l'ensemble, le marasme économique persiste et l'Europe semble éprouver les plus grandes difficultés à sortir de la crise.

II - La situation politique a connu, par contre, des modifications sensibles. Les socialistes ont perdu la majorité en Suède; s'ils ont gagné des voix aux Pays-Bas, ils ne semblent pas en mesure de gouverner; la coalition des socialistes et des libéraux n'a conservé le pouvoir que d'extrême justesse en R.F.A. ; en Grande-Bretagne, les travaillistes ne peuvent gouverner qu'avec l'appui des libéraux et ont fort peu de chances de conserver la majorité aux prochaines élections générales. La social-démocratie connaît donc de sérieuses difficultés dans ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler l'Europe du Nord.

7 Mais l'Europe du Sud ne semble pas forcément vouée, comme on pouvait le penser il y a peu de temps encore, à glisser vers la gauche. Si les socialistes ont consolidé leur position au Portugal, c'est aux dépens du parti communiste plutôt que de la droite. L'Espagne a réussi une remarquable transition vers un régime démocratique - opération dont le centre gouvernemental a largement bénéficié. En Italie, le "compromis historique" a progressé au niveau des partis, mais les communistes sont toujours tenus à l'écart du gouvernement. En France, la perspective d'un changement de majorité aux élections législatives de 1978 reste ouverte ; mais les forces en présence demeurent très équilibrées, et le résultat ne peut être considéré dès maintenant comme acquis.

8 Dans l'ensemble, la crise économique ne semble pas avoir suscité, malgré ses répercussions sociales, la lame de fond dont certains attendaient qu'elle rejette les gouvernements européens vers la gauche. De cette stabilité relative, on peut déduire aisément la continuité dans la conduite de la politique extérieure. Au plus, peut-on noter quelques confirmations et quelques hésitations. Le Portugal et l'Espagne n'ont manqué aucune occasion d'affirmer leur vocation européenne. En France, le débat ~~sur~~ ouvert l'an dernier sur la stratégie militaire se poursuit et

donne lieu à un combat à fronts renversés : la thèse présidentielle et gouvernementale semble faire une part de plus en plus grande à la stratégie de la "bataille" - aux dépens de la stratégie de la dissuasion - cependant que l'opposition accepte maintenant l'héritage de la force de frappe nucléaire et se rapproche ainsi de la thèse gaulliste qu'elle avait toujours combattue. Mais ce ne sont là; pour l'instant du moins, que des escarmouches, plus propices aux procès d'intention qu'aux décisions irréversibles. Quant aux autres gouvernements, ils ne semblent pas avoir sensiblement modifié la ligne de leur politique extérieure, même là où la majorité en place depuis de longues années a été écartée du pouvoir (cas de la Suède). La continuité semble devoir l'emporter en politique extérieure, plus encore qu'en politique intérieure.

OK

## II

Parmi les problèmes communs auxquels les gouvernements européens doivent faire face, l'un des plus importants et l'un des plus actuels est certainement celui de l'eurocommunisme. Comme toutes les expressions qui font fortune, celle-ci manque de base scientifique, au point d'avoir été récusée par les principaux intéressés. L'année 1976-1977 marque cependant un tournant dans l'histoire du phénomène, puisque le "sommet" de Madrid a consacré l'identité de vues entre les dirigeants des trois P.C. italien, français et espagnol.

A vrai dire, le terme d'eurocommunisme est plutôt mal choisi puisqu'il désigne une réalité qui déborde largement les frontières de l'Europe (cf. l'attitude du P.C. japonais). Sa dimension européenne est toutefois prédominante, et c'est la seule qui sera prise ici en considération.

L'eurocommunisme peut se définir, négativement, comme un refus d'allégeance tant à l'égard du modèle révolutionnaire incarné par l'U.R.S.S. qu'à l'égard de la stratégie adoptée/présentement par l'U.R.S.S. sur la scène internationale. Chaque parti "eurocommuniste" revendique le droit de déterminer librement sa ligne de conduite en fonction des considérations d'opportunité nationale, qu'il s'agisse de la stratégie d'accès au pouvoir ou de la conduite éventuelle des affaires publiques. Positivement, l'eurocommunisme se traduit par l'acceptation des règles du jeu démocratiques et par l'engagement pris de respecter, en cas de victoire, le jeu des libertés publiques.

Beaucoup d'observateurs ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ s'interrogent à bon droit sur la sincérité d'une conversion qui a conduit, en quelques



mois, à l'abandon de la dictature du prolétariat et à la mise en veilleuse du dogme de l'internationalisme prolétarien. Plusieurs indices sont de nature à justifier ce scepticisme. Dans un livre publié récemment par trois membres du Comité directeur du P.C. français ( Les communistes et l'Etat, Editions sociales) on retrouve intactes, sous la profession de foi démocratique, l'affirmation du rôle moteur du parti et la défense inconditionnelle du "centralisme démocratique", qui laisse bien peu de place à la liberté de choix individuelle. Il est évident que le P.C.P. n'est pas encore purgé, au niveau de sa direction, de tous les relents du stalinisme. Mais si le danger d'une "dictature" des partis communistes subsiste, il s'est pourtant fortement atténué : la rupture idéologique avec Moscou est en effet une condition nécessaire pour conserver à ces partis une chance d'accéder démocratiquement au pouvoir. La pression d'une "base" qui demeure surtout soucieuse ~~extérieure~~ d'obtenir rapidement des satisfactions matérielles, l'aspiration des dirigeants au partage du pouvoir - d'où ils se trouvent exclus depuis une génération - la surveillance exercée par les rivaux et, plus encore, par les alliés des P.C. : tous ces éléments semblent garantir, au moins dans une première phase, la prudence du communisme européen.

L'eurocommunisme n'est pourtant pas à l'abri des équivoques et des crises. Ce serait d'abord une erreur que de le traiter comme une nouvelle doctrine politique: dans les trois pays où il s'est manifesté avec le plus d'éclat, il a revêtu et il revêt encore des formes très différentes : le P.C. français a opté pour une alliance de classe ( même s'il tente parfois, au nom de la stratégie de l' "union du peuple de France", de déborder ses partenaires sur leur droite), et il demeure très hostile à toute forme d'intégration européenne. Le P.C. italien accepte, au nom du "compromis historique", une alliance avec la bourgeoisie. Quant au PC espagnol, soucieux d'obtenir sa réintégration dans le jeu politique national, il accepte de collaborer avec un régime qui était, hier encore, la cible principale de ses attaques. Si l'on ajoute que les P.C. italien et espagnol sont parmi les ~~les~~ plus fermes défenseurs de l'intégration européenne, on peut conclure que l'eurocommunisme est loin de présenter un front cohérent et qu'il risque fort, au nom de ses propres principes, d'éclater en stratégies rivales, sinon contradictoires .

La poussée de cette tendance risque cependant de provoquer de sérieuses perturbations à l'extrême gauche de l'éventail politique. Dans plusieurs pays ( Grèce, Suède, Grande-Bretagne), le ralliement de la direction du P.C. à l'eurocommunisme a déjà entraîné des scissions qui peuvent avoir, au moins dans les deux premiers pays cités, des répercussions très sensibles

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sur la représentation parlementaire et sur l'efficacité politique de la gauche. Là où l'homogénéité du parti a pu être sauvegardée, les tendances "gauchistes", qui dénoncent depuis des années l'embourgeoisement du parti communiste, se trouvent renforcées dans leur conviction et dans leur volonté de déborder sur la gauche les alliances auxquelles les P.C. participent : cette stratégie, qui recourt systématiquement à la violence, est déjà nettement perceptible en Italie; elle pourrait se manifester demain en France, en exploitant la déception qui pourrait bien suivre l'arrivée de la gauche au pouvoir. Pour l'instant, ce danger est amoindri par les querelles auxquelles se livrent entre eux les groupuscules gauchistes et par le désarroi dont souffrent les "maoïstes". Mais la réintégration des P.C. dans le jeu politique aura inévitablement pour effet de reconstituer une extrême-gauche très active et de modifier par là les données du jeu politique interne dans les pays concernés.

esquissés !

Mais le risque principal que comporte le succès de l'eurocommunisme se situe paradoxalement à l'Est plutôt qu'à l'Ouest. Les réactions de Moscou sont, à cet égard, caractéristiques. Dans un premier temps, les dirigeants soviétiques ont fait connaître avec vivacité ~~leur~~ leur mécontentement; puis, ils ont fait volte-face et semblent devoir s'accommoder, faute de mieux, de l'émancipation des P.C. occidentaux. Ce revirement témoigne à l'évidence de l'embarras où se trouve l'U.R.S.S. face à un mouvement qui répond au vœu exprimé par ses propres dissidents et par ceux qui leur font écho dans les démocraties populaires : condamner catégoriquement l'eurocommunisme équivaut à une déclaration de guerre ouverte contre les opposants, ~~de plus en plus~~ de plus en plus nombreux, aux régimes des pays de l'Est ; tolérer l'eurocommunisme revient à donner théoriquement raison aux dissidents tout en leur retirant un de leurs meilleurs arguments. Au delà de ces arguties, qui ne trompent plus personne, le véritable problème posé par l'eurocommunisme est celui de savoir si la libéralisation de la société communiste pourra s'étendre, à partir de l'Occident, jusqu'aux pays situés ~~au~~ de l'autre côté du rideau de fer. C'est en tout cas un fait de nature à bouleverser les relations internationales que le débat sur la liberté et sur les droits de l'homme n'oppose plus seulement les régimes démocratiques aux régimes totalitaires mais soit porté désormais à l'intérieur du monde communiste. En ce sens, l'eurocommunisme pourrait exercer un effet déstabilisateur beaucoup plus grand que les propos du Président Carter sur les droits de l'homme.

### III

Quant aux relations entre les pays de l'Europe occidentale, elles sont toujours marquées par les difficultés de l'intégration à l'intérieur de l'Europe des Neuf. Celle-ci se heurte à un triple obstacle : économique, politique et international.

I - L'intégration économique n'a pas progressé. Aux yeux de nombreux observateurs, elle est même en train de régresser. Aucun progrès n'a été accompli sur la voie de l'union monétaire. Le marché commun agricole fonctionne de plus en plus difficilement et devra sans doute subir, pour se maintenir, de profonds aménagements qui n'iront pas sans provoquer de laborieux marchandages. Si aucun compromis ne pouvait être trouvé, une pièce essentielle du dispositif communautaire viendrait à faire défaut. Quant aux règles de la concurrence, elles sont de plus en plus fréquemment faussées par le recours aux clauses de sauvegarde ou par diverses mesures (comme les subventions) prises unilatéralement par les gouvernements pour protéger les marchés nationaux - à sans même invoquer l'incidence inévitable de l'instabilité monétaire sur les courants commerciaux. Si la crise économique n'a pas encore provoqué les manifestations autarciques qu'on aurait pu redouter, elle a eu au moins pour effet de bloquer le développement de la solidarité économique intra-européenne. En contrepartie, il est juste de noter que les tendances à l'autarcie auraient sans doute prévalu si la machinerie communautaire (règles de droit et surveillance de leur application) n'avait pas imposé le maintien d'un minimum de discipline.

II - La coopération politique n'a pas beaucoup progressé non plus. Certes les sessions du Conseil européen donnent lieu, périodiquement, à une large confrontation de vues et à la publication de communiqués. Sur certains points, comme le règlement de la situation au Moyen-Orient, il arrive que des positions communes soient adoptées. Mais la discipline ne joue que partiellement. Dès qu'un pays trouve son avantage dans une initiative séparée, il n'hésite pas à agir seul - quitte à faire "ratifier" après coup son intervention par les instances communautaires comme on l'a vu dans l'aide apportée par la France au Zaïre. Les chasses gardées et les ambitions nationales n'ont pas disparu; elles ne céderont pas de sitôt devant les exigences d'un intérêt commun qui reste, pour l'instant, une abstraction.

Précisément, l'élection du Parlement européen au suffrage universel direct aurait pu constituer une "relance" de la construction européenne. En décidant la mise en oeuvre de ces dispositions, prévues par ~~le traité de Rome~~ ~~le rapport de l'Assemblée~~ ~~aux printemps 1978~~

~~par~~ le traité de Rome, et en fixant au printemps 1978 les premières élections européennes, les membres du Conseil européen pouvaient légitimement espérer redonner un second souffle à l'Europe, en utilisant l'influx populaire qui lui avait fait jusqu'ici défaut. C'est bien ainsi que les choses semblent avoir~~é~~ été comprises en R.F.A. et en Italie où les dispositions nécessaires (ratification et régime électoral) ont été prises avec l'accord des principaux partis. Il n'en a pas été de même en France et en Grande-Bretagne. A Paris, le vote de ratification a été acquis par un artifice de procédure parlementaire qui a permis de tourner l'opposition du P.C. et de la plupart des gaullistes. Encore la décision a-t-elle été précédée d'un avis du Conseil constitutionnel qui exclut par avance toute extension de compétence du Parlement européen. Grâce à l'utilisation de la représentation proportionnelle, les partis contrôleront strictement le choix des candidatures et les thèmes de propagande. Ainsi a-t-on accumulé les précautions pour se prémunir contre les risques de la dynamique électorale. A Londres, les choses sont encore moins avancées : déjà paralysé par ses dissensions internes, le parti travailliste doit faire face aux revendications régionalistes et aux exigences des libéraux (dont dépend présent<sup>em</sup>ent son maintien au pouvoir). Toutes ces difficultés se cristallisent autour du choix d'un mode de scrutin.

On peut sans doute se réjouir de voir le thème de l'intégration européenne devenir un enjeu de la politique intérieure; mais il faut bien constater que, pour l'instant, c'est la politique intérieure qui contamine et qui "infecte" la politique européenne. Dans ces conditions, il paraît illusoire d'espérer que l'élection du printemps 1978 - si elle a réellement lieu, ce qui n'est pas certain - puisse aboutir à un changement révolutionnaire. Il faudrait un concours de circonstances tout à fait imprévisible pour que l'Assemblée de Strasbourg soit le théâtre, d'ici à l'an prochain, d'une sorte de ~~Strasbourg~~ "nuit du 4 août" européenne.

III - Les problèmes posés par l'extension de la C.E.E. ne sont pas moins redoutables. On sait que la Grèce, le Portugal et l'Espagne ont fait ou feront prochainement acte de candidature. A première vue, cette initiative constitue un succès de première grandeur pour les institutions de Bruxelles. Mais, à la réflexion, les choses paraissent moins simples. D'un côté, il apparaît souhaitable d'ancrer solidement à l'Europe démocratique et libérale trois pays qui viennent de sortir de la dictature; l'opération est d'autant plus "rentable" sur le terrain politique que les risques de voir basculer ces pays sous un régime communiste semblent désormais très faibles. Mais, d'un autre

côté, l'élargissement de la C.E.E. soulève des problèmes économiques inextricables - au moins si l'on tient à protéger l'équilibre qui a été si difficilement obtenu dans les rapports entre les Six, puis entre les Neuf. Qu'il s'agisse des produits agricoles (Grèce et Portugal) ou des produits industriels (Espagne), l'abolition de nouvelles frontières aura pour effet d'exacerber la concurrence et de menacer, plus encore qu'ils ne le sont aujourd'hui, les secteurs les plus retardataires de l'économie des Neuf. Pour parer à ce danger, on peut envisager des mesures transitoires et des régimes différentiels. Nul doute que la négociation qui va s'ouvrir ne s'oriente dans cette voie, au demeurant longue et difficile. Mais le Marché commun risque, au mieux, de se diluer dans une vague zone de libre échange, au pire, de se morceler en une série de compartiments étanches, dont la réglementation et le fonctionnement seront si complexes que seuls les "experts" parviendront à les maîtriser. Le choix entre la densité et le volume ou, si l'on préfère, la dimension et la cohésion, mettra de toute façon à rude épreuve la capacité de négociation des Neuf.

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Ce bref rapport ne comportera pas de conclusion. Les données qu'il propose pourront être interprétées différemment par les uns et par les autres, selon le point d'observation où ils se trouvent. L'essentiel était de fournir matière à réflexion et à discussion. L'auteur sait, par expérience, qu'il peut faire confiance aux membres du C.C.A.D.D. pour ces deux exercices.

Le 21 juillet 1977

Marcel MERLE

TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS : Ethical Insights.

By the Right Reverend J.S. Habgood,  
Bishop of Durham.

In the draft agenda this section was entitled: "Do technical developments determine our policies or do our policies indicate the needed technical developments?" A further question might be: "Do our policies enable us to make the best use of the technical developments already available?" And there are a great many subsidiary questions which might be asked about the practical relationships between the worlds of technology and politics in our different countries, and the extent to which the general public is or ought to be involved in the decisions which are made.

My concern, though, in this paper is a general one, and my main theme is that the interaction between technology and politics is highly complex, but that there is scope for ethical insights to make a difference.

Technology is now such a dominant feature of the way of life in developed countries, and the rate of technological advance is so rapid, that it is easy to succumb to a belief in its inevitability. Kant's dictum "ought implies can" seems to have become "can implies ought". The mere possibility of some technical innovation invites the presupposition that in due course it will be tried out in practice. Once something becomes thinkable, people will go on thinking it, and even if the originator of an idea takes it no further

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further, the chances are that sooner or later someone else will. It has frequently been remarked that in the history of science ideas have their appropriate time, and many people may be on the verge of making the same discovery when a particular breakthrough comes.

There is no way, therefore, of putting a brake on creative thought or human invention, and in a competitive society the practical disadvantages of even trying to do so are obvious. Nor does the long history of opposition to scientific and technical advance offer much encouragement to those who feel that it ought to be possible to stop it. Yesterday's dangerous innovation becomes today's commonplace. A recent writer, commenting on the nuclear proliferation debate, has said: "There is no single instance in which mankind has currently succeeded in holding a rapidly advancing technology at arm's length ....". Those who fear that our present technological momentum is a major, perhaps the major, factor in shaping the modern world, have solid reasons for doing so.

On the other hand, it constantly needs to be asserted that technology is a human enterprise, the result of human choices, and its advance is only inevitable if those who make the choices believe that they have no alternative. Over emphasis on technological dominance creates self-fulfilling prophecies. In fact there are many ways in which control can be, and is, exercised

exercised, of which the most obvious is selective funding. The more sophisticated technology becomes, the greater its dependence on Government finance, and the greater the likelihood that political considerations will determine the choices. Too much political control may be as undesirable as too little and, since the reasons behind decision-making at this level are often obscure, there is much to be said for devising some machinery for widespread public debate about controversial projects. Often this takes place too late. The strategic moment is at the conceptual stage, before any substantial investment has been made.

A good example of the way in which public opinion can have a decisive effect, even in matters of military technology, was the disquiet in America over ecological warfare in Vietnam. In throwing doubts on the legitimacy of the war, it probably contributed substantially to its outcome. Whether such weapons will ever be used again remains to be seen, but the fact that certain applications of science to warfare create acute controversy, while others have already been banned, is a striking proof that the political control of technology can be effective. However, controversies tend to be confined to new technologies. Beyond the conceptual stage there may be a further crucial period during the introduction of, say, a new weapons' system, when public opinion is of the utmost importance. Thereafter, what has become familiar is likely to go on being accepted.

Weapons presuppose a context for their use. A new weapon



weapon is not merely a new technological device, but has built into it a series of military, political and ethical assumptions which do not follow automatically from the technological advances which have made it possible. The neutron bomb presupposes that it is better, politically or militarily though presumably not ethically, to kill people than to destroy buildings. We are told that the necessary technology has been available for twenty years or more. The decision to build it is a political one.

War, and the threat of war, stimulate technology, and it is almost certain that without this stimulus the two largest technological enterprises of recent years, the space programme and the development of nuclear energy, would not have taken place. Technology, on the other hand, changes the character of war by making it more devastating and more impersonal. It thus creates a paradox in which the moral responsibility for the effects of war is increased, while the sense of personal responsibility in actual fighting is diminished. Serious talk of casualties in terms of millions is only possible for those who are distant enough from the consequences of their actions.

Within this complex interaction between the pressures of technological invention and political realism the voice of those who appeal to ethical insights may seem very feeble. Yet it is a basic fact of human nature that men even, or perhaps especially, when they are

are making hard decisions about intractable problems, seek to justify themselves by reference to principles and values on which these decisions are based. The principles may be wrong-headed or misapplied, and frequently become distorted in the actual course of a conflict, but the fact remains that some kind of moral legitimacy is sought even for the most horrific actions. The critical assessment of principles and values, therefore, is far from being a marginal activity. Most human action has an ethical dimension, and it is interesting to observe the extent to which this is now recognized in areas which, until quite recently, would have been regarded as value-free. A general growth of uncertainty about the desirability of unlimited scientific and technological advance is one symptom of this new ethical awareness. And the most striking contemporary example of it is the current debate on the proliferation of nuclear energy in which scientific, technical, political, international social and ethical considerations are intextrically interwoven. I shall say more about this later.

Christians have no ready-made set of principles from which answers to such problems can be deduced. Recent discussions, held under the auspices of the World Council of Churches on the subject of Science and Technology for Human Development, have stressed the ambiguity of technical advance, its potential for both good and evil, and have also illustrated the delicate balance between short-term practical

practical decision making, and long-term hopes and ideals. In fact Christian ethics has always moved between the two poles of what is practicable at a given time and radical criticism of basic principles. No Christian can ignore the Sermon on the Mount. Equally, no Christian, especially if he carries social responsibilities, can live as if his more mundane obligations were of no account. The contribution of Christian insights to ethical discussion is thus made on various levels. On some levels the territory has been well mapped and old practical guidelines, such as the Just War doctrine, still retain some usefulness. On other levels Christian insights may set the tone of a discussion without suggesting any specific action. A stress on human sinfulness, for instance, may serve as a corrective to naive optimism ; on the other hand the message of Christian hope provides encouragement to grasp opportunities for constructive change, and prevents political realism from relapsing into fatalism.

It is not easy to specify relevant Christian insights in the field of weapons technology, but I tentatively suggest three as a basis for discussion:

1. The first is a general criticism of the belief that human problems can be solved by technological means - the so-called "Technical fix". A report soon to be published on Harmless Weapons, i.e. the use of sophisticated devices

devices in the control of civil disorder, makes the important point that the more such devices are used by the police, the more their relationship with the civil population is damaged, and the harder it becomes for their ultimate aim in preserving the peace to be achieved. The same may be true in war. In losing sight of the ultimate aim of military operations in trying to create a peaceful, just and sustainable world society, those who are placing their reliance on technological superiority may unwittingly betray the end by concentrating on the means.

War is fundamentally a human problem, not a technological one, and a major part of Christian witness in the face of war must be to concentrate attention on the human factors which cause it. And this implies abandoning the belief that the technological race between nations could or should ever be won.

2. Christian ethics has always made use of the notion of limits. In different ages and different circumstances the limits have been specified in different ways, but there is a persistent tradition that there are boundaries in human behaviour, which ought not to be crossed, whatever the provocation. The Just War tradition, with its principles of 'proportion' and 'discrimination' was an attempt to set limits on the use of military power. Though its main justification was theological, it can also be defended on non-religious commonsense grounds, which is perhaps why it has still managed to retain such an influence.

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Precise limits are difficult to define. Even so, the notion that limits exist can help to counteract the general tendency to drift in human affairs, which obscures the crossing of important boundaries. Those who see the limits more clearly than others can help to sharpen the consciences of those who feel themselves driven by practical necessity.

For instance, it is a serious question whether anything, however threatening, could justify a major nuclear war. Politically and ethically there is still a sharp dividing-line between nuclear and non-nuclear hostilities, and the risks of a nuclear holocaust are diminished so long as this dividing-line is maintained, and the psychological barrier against crossing it is high. In military terms, however, the psychological barrier has already been crossed by tactical nuclear weaponry, and there are military pressures to lower the barrier still further. It seems to me that this is one of the areas in which the Christian conscience ought to say 'No'; not by advocating any unrealistic abandonment of nuclear capability, but by stressing the unpredictable and irreversible consequences of crossing this particular ethical and psychological barrier, and by opposing policies which might have the effect of lowering it still further.

A related issue is the current debate about the proliferation of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. There seems little chance of avoiding the spread of nuclear energy

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energy to many countries which have not hitherto had it, and there are strong grounds for claiming that it would not in any case be just to limit the rights of developing countries to its benefits. On the other hand, current debate about the development of breeder reactors which, if they were to become the main source of nuclear power, would inevitably lead to a large increase in the availability of weapons' grade plutonium, poses the question whether there is not here also a limit which ought not to be passed. Subsidiary arguments about the risks of nuclear technology, the disposal of radioactive waste and the safeguarding of nuclear installations, have created a climate of popular concern which, at least in Britain, would make a decision against the further development of breeder reactors politically possible. Such a decision might strengthen the ethical and psychological barriers against the otherwise seemingly inevitable spread of nuclear weaponry.

3. Christians must refuse to think about war in impersonal terms, just as they must oppose anything that belittles or destroys human relationships. Part of the crisis of Christian conscience over modern warfare lies not only in the devastation it can cause physically, but in the absence of the kind of personal relationships between combatants, which in other circumstances can impose their own restraints. Human value is destroyed, as well as individual human beings, and the consequent wounds go deeper.

It would be foolishly unrealistic to hope that greater technological

technological sophistication could reverse the trend towards killing by remote control. However, there are compensating factors which might be recognized and exploited more fully, the most obvious of which is the growth of mass communications. Though combatants in modern war may never see each other, television can show it happening, and can illustrate its effects in highly personal terms. The influence of television on the outcome of the Vietnam war is a matter for debate, but it undoubtedly enabled very large numbers of people to identify themselves with the war to an extent which would not otherwise have been possible. And this in some measure, I believe, limited its destructiveness of human values.

Large abstract claims about the depersonalizing effects of modern technology achieve little. But sensitivity to the ways in which personal values are in fact over-ridden, and skilful use of the means provided by technology to enhance personal awareness, would seem to me a valid Christian response.

No doubt there are many other ethical insights which might be brought to bear on our discussions. Our previous consideration of human rights has an obvious relevance to my theme. But I hope I have said enough to illustrate the kind of contribution to these complex questions to be made from within the Christian ethical tradition.

## Council of Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament

Friedewald 2-6 September 1977

### The Christians and the Problems of Peace and Human Rights

Prof. Ulrich Scheuner, Bonn

#### I. Challenges to Peace

1. The maintenance of international peace has been of the main concerns of Christian endeavour for a whole generation. The demand for disarmament, arms control and for steps able to reduce the political tensions leading to an armaments race has been a continuous attitude of Christian churches and gatherings. In one of the main areas of conflict, the East-West antagonism in Europe, the intensity of political confrontation has now considerably been lowered, but still without leading at the same time to a reduction of the military forces assembled at the line dividing Europe. Nobody will deny that the results of long years of dedicated work for the aims of disarmament are disappointing. The arms race between the two super powers has been slowed down only partially by the SALT I agreement of May 26, 1972. One can still hope for a further agreement (SALT II), but the first attempt too come to an understanding after the begin of Carter's presidency in May 1977 has failed. We have to wait for future negotiations. The arms race is continuing. If we follow the estimates of the Sipri Institute of Stockholm, the amount of means converted to armaments all over the world in 1976 will be 334 billion dollars. (cited in a CCIA document on World Armaments, June 1977).

#### 2. Following suggestions from the Vth Assembly at Nairobi 1975

(Section VI para 15 Nairobi Report p. 124) the World Council of Churches has initiated a program on Militarism and the Arms Race in order to arouse the conscience of the churches



for the dangers of this development. It may be difficult to define militarism, the more so if this concept should include also situations of interior politics where the superiority of military values and forces prevail. In every case, the studies of the WCC scheduled for autumn 1977 and 1978 will help the churches to recognise their responsibility as far as their attitude to war and defence or even their involvement in particular situations is concerned.

It is well recognised that the extension of armaments is only an exterior sign of deeper instabilities and conflicts in the contemporary international structure which induce governments to seek their safety in the acquirement of instruments of power. To promote peace it is necessary to look into the from which insecurity and fear spring and the stimulus is given to the states to build up their military armour. It is not possible here to enter into a full discussion of the problems involved here. But it can be said that one of the main reasons for the unsatisfactory situation is the continuing instability of the international order, to which new developments always bring new uncertainties and induce governments to maintain or even to augment their military efforts.

3. Here, I will only call attention to three major challenges to peace which seem to me of overriding importance at the present moment:

a) The appearance of new military technology with far reaching consequences for the existing balance of power and therefore with a destabilizing effect. In the relations of the super powers and their alliances.

b) The emergence of new centers of international conflict especially in Africa arising not only from the residues of colonialism of racial domination but springing out from the appearance of grave territorial conflicts among the independent African states.

c) The deepening of differences between the industrialist sta-

tes of the Northern hemisphere and the developing countries concerning the future international economic and social order which threaten, if ways are not found to secure a better distribution of wealth and income among the nations of the globe, to foster stronger conflicts in the economic area and in the end even violent reactions.

4. Continuous research in arms technology produces from time to time new problems for the existing precarious balance between the super powers. Among these new technical developments which will be discussed in another section of this conference, I may mention precision guided weapons, cruise missiles and new types of airplanes (Backfire Bombers) as well as the neutronic bomb. Which recently came under discussion. Without going into a detailed debate, these new technical openings raise new difficulties for the assessment of the existing balance and for the negotiations to limit the further development in sophisticated weaponry. Will PGW be a counterweight to the existing superiority of the East in hardware on the oil of the European continent? Do cruise missiles belong to the area of strategic weapons or does their limited range justify, as the U.S.A. think it does, their attribution to another category of weapons? Already the conversations at Moscow in May 1977 have shown that these new technologies raise new problems and will not facilitate progress in the SALT negotiations.

Whereas the new technologies in armaments mentioned here are mainly important for the direct relations between the two super power and their alliances (which besides count for 70 % of all armaments expenses in the world) there is another problem not so much connected with new inventions as with the spreading of nuclear technology. Since India kindled its bomb in 1974, fears are rising in the U.S.A. that the wall build up by the Non Proliferation Treaty in 1968 will be pierced and nuclear arms acquired by a series of other countries. The administration of President Carter has given expression to these feelings by marking a turn in American policy towards export of nuclear technology. It seeks now to limit the exportation of deve-

veloped nuclear technology which might make it easier for countries to transgress the threshold of nuclear arms technology. European countries like the Federal Republic and France have been induced by the Washington government to adhere to such a line at least for their future commitments. It is true that the spread of nuclear experience may enlarge the possibility of a transgression of the limits set up by the NPT. On the other side, however, limiting peaceful civil use of nuclear facilities may prove in the end contraproductive for the aims involved. Some of the threshold states which might be tempted to acquire the atomic bomb have never acceded to the NPT and are themselves able to develop the necessary technical installations.

5. The interest in disarmament has been focussed for a long time almost exclusively at the imposing military upbuilding in Europe and neglected other areas. There is no doubt that the concentration of troops from both sides assembled at the dividing line of Europe is one of the most stabilizing factors in international politics which firmly excludes any form of violence transgressing this line, whereas in other places of the world an almost continuous warfare, even if of a limited nature, with open or hidden participation of the super powers has gone on. That a limitation of the military effort in Europe would be desirable and possible, is beyond doubt. But the real zones of danger lie now more in the areas of conflict in other regions. They have now, after the end of the Vietnam war, shifted to Africa. At the moment, the Near East conflict remains in a less dangerous condition. Syria is still occupied with its intervention in Lebanon, and the Sadat regime, if seriously weakened in recent times, is still open for negotiation. Dangerous developments must be expected in South Africa. If major fighting will result in Rhodesia or later on in South Africa itself, the African forces will need a considerable amount of military equipment perhaps also of military personnel or "friendly" forces. This could lead to a most critical escalation in foreign involvement resulting in severe international conflict. It cannot be overlooked that already at this stage, before a solution in South Africa is found, various territorial conflicts between African independent nations are simmering.

I mention the struggle in the West Sahara where forces are backed by Algeria against Morocco, and the imminent dismemberment of the Ethiopian territory. The latter situation has led to a fast shifting of alliances. Whereas Somalia was backed for a long time by the Soviet Union, the USSR has now taken stand behind the Mengistu government at Addis Abeba, and Somalia receives assistance, with Saudi Arabian mediation, from the U.S.A. In the North, Eritrea is no almost entirely, some cities excepted, in the hands of different secessionist groups. In all these cases questions of arms trade, foreign assistance and of growing rivalry between the super powers are involved. Will Africa become the field of major clashes between the world powers in the coming years?

6. The third problem, the dispute between the Western industrialised countries and the developing nations upon the structure of world trade and the universal economic system is not directly related to arms and armaments. But as the promotion of peace demands also the inquiry into the real causes of present or future conflict, we are here at the roots of one of the main areas of conflict in the present international society. For long years, the Western nations were able to shape the economic relations of the world -outside the Communist bloc-according to their principle of an open market und free economy. These principles are embodied in various international agree ents from GATT to the statutes of the World Bank. Since the middle of the sixties, the third world has risen in a certain opposition against the Western domination of international economic relations. With the forming, in the later sixties, of a nucleus of developing states, the so called group of 77, within the General Assembly of the United Nations, and the rise of this group to a domination majority in this assembly, the developing countries, assiasted by UNCTAD, found the oppertunity to formulate and express their demands within this forum. During the 29th General Assembly, in 1974, the General Assembly of the United Nations accepted a suystematic code of the demands of the Third World in the "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" (Res. 3281 (XXIX) of Dec. 12. 1974). As a resolution of the General

Assembly this document imposes no legal obligations on the member states, but the practice of the United Nations tends to strengthen the legal or at least moral value of such resolutions by often referring back to them and making them the foundation of further declarations. In fact, the demands of the developing nations for a "New International Economic Order" became the topic of several international conferences, some of them between the Western states and the new nations, some of them of an universal character. In May 1975, the IV. UNCTAD Conference addressed specific demands also to the Communist states asking them for a more active cooperation in the work of development. (Res. 95 (IV) of UNCTAD). Against the tendencies of the developing countries to submit the markets of the world to a system of directives and centralized influences, the Western nations will have to defend their economic principles of an open and free world trade. On the other world economy to a greater degree of social justice and international solidarity. The Christian churches will have to play a role in bringing home, in the Western countries, to their communities the urgency of the problems and the necessity for a better understanding of the moral questions involved. There is no doubt that these problems are intimately connected with the future preservation of peace and stability. Especially for the European countries, with their dependency on raw materials coming from the third world, serious problems may arise in future in this field, foreshadowed already during short time during the oil crisis of 1973. In the future, these economic problems may also change into relations of power and into causes of deeper conflict endangering international relations.

Some of the problems involved in the relations between different parts of the world today find their expression in the debate on human rights. Which has come to the foreground of international attention in the last years, the connection of the human rights problem with international peace and security will be treated in the next part.

## II. Human Rights, Social Justice and Peace

7. If one can observe a dispute between different viewpoints on economic questions going on in the international society, the

interpretation of the intrinsic sense of human rights is no less a significant expression of different opinions prevailing among groups of states, which are divided by their adherence to different principles of political and social order and by deep ideological cleavances. The debate on human rights conducted today in the international sphere reflects the fundamental division between various regions of the world and groups of states separated by their ideological and social diversity.

In the Western tradition, founded upon the history of the idea of human rights since its appearance in the 17th century in Anglo-Saxon surroundings, human rights are the expression of personal liberty and individual freedom. They are destined to protect a sphere of free personal movement including liberty of thought and expression and the right to a free choice of profession and sojourn. For the West, human rights, in short, are an expression of human values founded upon the dignity of man. The socialist conception of human rights leads to quite different views. Man is seen in Marxist theory as part of a collective society. Human rights are embedded into the economic system of the society. They reflect the economic condition of society and correspond to the societal structure. They are less an expression of individual isolated situations as of collective solutions of the relation between man and society. In the socialist conception social rights such as a right to work, to education or a decent standard of life are of primary importance, even if the right to life and personal liberty is recognized. It is a task of the State to guarantee the realization of these social and collective rights and it is therefore, the national state to which responsibility for the implementation of human rights exclusively belongs. That excludes any sort of international control as a kind of foreign intervention. The ideas of third world countries about human rights are understandably attracted by the concept of social rights from which can be derived also the demands of these peoples to greater justice in international relations. Among them, the rights to self-determination and racial equality are mainly emphasized.

8. If we look to these sifferent conceptions of the idea of human rights in international surroundings, it bedomex clear that they reflect to a certain degree the deeper ideological and social conflicts permeating the present international society and point to the fundamental problems of greater international justice. For a long time Western opinion regarded human rights mainly in the centext of the Western tradition of individual liberty. However, already the Declaration on Human Rights of Dec. 10, 1948 contained social rights, and in the early fifties the General Assembly of the U.N. decided that the elaboration of a convention on civil and political riths should be accompanied by a convention on economic, social and cultura rights. In recent debates on human rights, especially those held in the orbit of the WCC, the tendency became visible to widen the conceptions of human rights beyond the range of traditional individual rights to an expression of fundamental human demands for a life founded upon respect for human dignity and social justice (See Nairobi Report 1975, Section V p.1o2ss.). In this formulation human rights receive a more collective appearance embodying fundamental rights to liefie and work, to adequate food, housing and education besides the right to follow one's own conscience in religious service and public expression. Further studies will be necessary to develop a more uniform and less controversial conception of human rights which, on the other hand, avoids a dissolution of this idea, founded upon the personal value of man, into a general and vague definition of social justice, and which elaboates the real callenge to Christian responsibility beneath the demand for human rights. From these debates the connection of the human rights question with peace and security becomes clearly visible. Denegations of human rights, wether in the interior order of a state or in the context of international relations-here regarded under the aspect of negligence overlooking existing deep inequalities-creates tensions and may in some cases endanger international peace.

International implementation of human rights is still in a primitive stage. The system of the European Convention on Human Rights works under the favorable conditions of a common legal and cultural tradition among European Nations. In the wider range of the United

Nations the world wide implementation is still a very modest one. The Human Rights Commission did not read for long years to communications received on human rights violations. Recently by Res. 1503 (XLVIII) of the Economic and Social Council (1970), an annual examination of such communications is foreseen, even if bound to a participation of the government concerned and conducted in strict non-publicity. But in some cases the Human Rights Commission went beyond this procedure and instigated investigations e.g. for Chile and Israel. Whether the Committee, foreseen in art. 28 of the convention on civil and political rights of 1966 (in force since 1975) will open new ways for an examination of state reporting or even for individual communications, remains to be seen.

9. In some cases the practice of the United Nations has gone farther than these limited procedures will allow. With regard to consistent violations of human rights especially concerning self-determination and racial equality, the organs of the U.N., especially the General Assembly, found in such behaviour or former colonial powers as Portugal or governments like those of Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, an attitude which might endanger international peace and security and which therefore gave the U.N. a right to intervene. In these cases also the USSR, which fundamentally denies any international intervention in matters related to human rights, adhered to the resolutions of the organs of the U.N. It can be said that these actions of the U.N. bear a selective character singling out some only of the gross violations of human rights in the world. Nevertheless, it becomes clear from these short remarks that the protection of human rights on the national and international level is intimately connected with the strengthening of social justice in the international field and assisting thereby the maintenance of international peace and security. This relation has recently been confirmed by the discussions following the Helsinki Declaration of 1975 to which we now will turn.

### III. The Helsinki Declaration and Human Rights

10. The connection between the promotion of peace and security and the observance of human rights found a significant expression in the Helsinki Declaration signed by 32 European states, the U.S.A. and Canada on August 1, 1975. The main issue of the Declaration is



concerned with security and co-operation in Europe and its great importance lies in the fact that for the first time all European governments (except Albania) joined in a common effort to strengthen the foundations of European security and co-operation. This has been done in the first part of the document by a Declaration on Principles guiding the Relations between Participating States in which the signatories confirm their intention to follow these lines in their political attitude. In substance, the principles laid down in the Declaration correspond to those found in the U.N. Charter and the Declaration of Friendly Relations among States (GA Res 2625 (XXV)). During the preparation of the Declaration, the Western powers insisted upon the inclusion into it of an express recognition of human rights and fundamental freedoms embracing also freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief.

This statement finds its place in part I of the document among the guiding principles. There, we read, that "The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States."

One may observe that the link between the respect for human rights and universal peace is expressly stated in the text.

11. If we look back after two years at the effects of Helsinki it can be said with confidence that the Final act has made a useful contribution to European peace. Among the dispositions of the Declaration which have found realization the confidence-building measures, as prior notification of military manoeuvres and movements and admission of observers to the first, have been generally accepted by the powers and generally observed, including the U.S.A. and USSR. (See the list of cases given in Survival July/August 1977 at pp.150/51) The psychological value of such opening of access to military information cannot be underestimated. Also in the economic field, exchanges between the Eastern states and the other signatories have developed in a satisfactory way, even if the financial and economic recession has brought about a certain stagnation. Disarmament, however, has not made the expected progress. It cannot be overlooked

that the negotiations for an reduction of forces in Europe lie outside the Helsinki discussions; they are conducted by the Vienna Conference on arms reduction. If this body has~~not~~<sup>ak</sup> made great progress, the reason may be found in the slow evolution of the SALT II conversations. Before results are reached in the contacts between the super powers, the Vienna conference will find it difficult to advance.

12. In the period after Helsinki the problem of human rights has unexpectedly won a certain pre~~mi~~<sup>n</sup>inence. The inclusion of a statement on human rights into the Helsinki Declaration was significant in so far as it focussed attention upon the respect for these rights as a common fundament of mutual co-operation. The legal s<sup>n</sup>~~id~~<sup>id</sup> of this commitment, however, should not be overestimated. If it is important that all signatory states have recognized the importance of human rights, one might refer to the fact that several of the Communist States have signed and ratified the two U.N. conventions in Human rights. ( e.g. the USSR and CSR). Further, in difference to these two conventions, the Helsinki Declaration is not a legally binding document. All signatory governments insisted upon the circumstance that the Declaration should not be a formal agreement with binding force. Therefore it has not been registered with the United Nations according to art. 102 of the Charter. The legal and moral force of the Helsinki Act is not easy to assess. It may be defined as a statement of guiding principles to which the signatory states have given their approval and undertaken a moral obligation to observe them. (See Skubiszewski and Delbrück in Drittes deutsch-polnisches Juristen-Kolloquium vol. I. Baden-Baden 1977 p14 ss, 31 ss.). Moreover, the dispositions of the Final Act on human rights should not be read in an isolated way. The Act formally states that all their guiding principles are coherent and should be read and observed in equal fashion. The paragraphs on human rights, therefore, should be interpreted in the context of the whole Declaration and that may as they should be read in a sense that furthers co-operation and detente.

Two circumstances have mainly contributed to bring the human rights question to the foreground in the following-up of the Helsinki Conference. The first is the attention given to this element of the

Declaration by groups in the Eastern states themselves. The Helsinki Declaration has been published, according to a clause in it, in the Communist states. The result was that its content became widely known among the population. In January 1977, a group of 77 intellectuals in Czechoslovakia published a declaration blaming violations of these rights and claiming their observation. In the USSR Andrej Sacharow and others came forward with utterances in a similar vein. (Texts of some of these documents in Europa-Archiv 1977 No 13 at pp. D 335 ss.). These events led to measures of repression in the states concerned. Without overestimating the strength of this movement, it became visible that the reference to human rights in the Helsinki Declaration was not without an echo in the Eastern states and laid open some weakness in their interior situation. The result of this observation was a certain shift in the evaluation of the Declaration. Whereas the Eastern governments initially had laid great value on the Declaration, their attitude became more reticent now. On the other side, conservative voices in the western countries which formerly had blamed the whole Helsinki enterprise, now found a new interest in the Final Act. A second circumstance was added to this development by the accession of Jimmy Carter to the presidency who immediately maintained the cause of human rights with great publicity. Also Congress turned its attention to the Helsinki document by setting up, in 1976, a Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe operating under the Committee on International relations of the House of Representatives which organized a series of hearings of witnesses from East Europe during the spring of 1977. (See Second Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe June 1977 No. 91-487 of 95th Congress 1st session).

To these critical observations the Soviet Union reacted with the claim of undue interference with its interior affairs.

An outcome of this debate was the Soviet attitude at the preparatory conference which had to set up the agenda of the following-up Conference scheduled in the Helsinki Declaration for autumn 1977 at

Belgrade. The Soviet Union seemed now inclined to limit the duration of the conference and to give it no great publicity. Is it possible to construct from these events a contrast between the pursuit of detente and defence of human rights? If some comments of the press have indicated such an opposition, it does not seem convincing to me. The real sanction of failings in the observance of human rights lies in the public debate, by which governments will be influenced in their attitude. Any movement, however, with the intention of propagating human freedoms, will always have to consider the complex nature of such publicity which in some cases can be counterproductive. The Western opinion will have to insist upon the principle that international concern for human rights following up international conventional obligations or formal declarations cannot be regarded as illegitimate but finds a legal foundation in the international principles guiding the conduct of states. If we take into consideration the whole context of the Helsinki Declaration and its interior coherence in all its commitments, ways should be found not to indulge in mutual recriminations but to join in a common effort to overcome difficulties which might arise in the implementation of the commitment of human rights enclosed in the Helsinki Declaration.

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A B-MONTHLY  
DOCUMENTATION SERVICE  
FROM THE  
WORLD COUNCIL  
OF CHURCHES

No. 2  
May 1977

PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER:  
SOME ETHICAL ISSUES

2/2

## Introductory Note

The World Council of Churches' conference on "Science and Technology for Human Development", held in Bucharest, June 1974, declared on the issue of nuclear energy that "it remained an open question whether the widespread proliferation of nuclear power plans is a desirable choice for society to make ... The nuclear option entails a risk whose magnitude is a matter of debate. Widely divergent views of this risk are held in the scientific community." Unable to resolve the divergent views in its own meeting, the conference recommended that the WCC "initiate a study of the major, moral, economic, social and scientific implications of the extension of atomic energy plans in the world". In response to this the WCC Central Committee in 1974 requested the sub-unit on Church and Society to make a preliminary assessment of "the risks and potentialities of the expansion of nuclear power".

In June 1975 Church and Society held an "ecumenical hearing" on nuclear energy at Sigtuna, Sweden, at which scientists, technologists, politicians and theologians holding widely divergent positions on the issue stated their views. It was a valuable exchange resulting in a report which recorded areas of agreement and interpretation of the divergences.

In accordance with the recommendations of the WCC Assembly in Nairobi (December 1975) the ethical and social issues of nuclear energy continued to be a subject of study by Church and Society; and in August, 1976, the sub-unit presented to the Central Committee the abstract of a submission on "Public acceptance of nuclear power" to the International Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle, organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Salzburg, Austria, 2-13 May 1977. The Central Committee authorized a submission along the lines of the abstract.

This document is the text of the statement submitted for the WCC to the conference in Salzburg by Dr John Francis of the United Kingdom, at a plenary session on 9 May, and chaired by Dr Paul Abrecht, director of the sub-unit on Church and Society. Over 2000 scientists, engineers, environmentalists and other specialists from 60 countries participated in the Salzburg Conference.

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No. 2  
May 1977

## PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF NUCLEAR POWER - SOME ETHICAL ISSUES

### 1. Introduction

1.1. Since the last major International Atomic Energy Agency Conference on "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy", nations have been obliged to adjust to significant new factors that have come to dominate the world energy market. At previous meetings, the industrialized nations were assuming a long-term dependence on the use of nuclear energy for electric power generation. The developing nations were closely monitoring the circumstances governing investment in nuclear power but were for the most part acknowledging that for them the point of entry was some way off. The IAEA itself was acting to provide access to the nuclear option for those nations that were exploring the scale of their future commitment to nuclear energy. There was a certain fluidity in the situation as each nation examined its own position in the general programme of nuclear power development. Public opinion had, for the most part, acknowledged from a distance the availability of nuclear power. But it failed to perceive the implied future scale of dependence on nuclear energy and was apathetic to its social and ethical implications.

1.2. Since 1973 there has been a historic shift in this process of gradual appraisal. The rapidly increasing costs and the escalating scale of demand for all forms of primary energy, set against a familiar back-cloth of diminished fossil fuel resources, suddenly brought forward in a dramatic way the threshold of a more substantial world-wide dependence on nuclear energy.

1.3. It is not, therefore, surprising that a vibrant debate began to gather momentum outside the nuclear industry with the immediate purpose of raising the level of public awareness of the social, political and

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The statement was prepared by the following members of the Energy Advisory Group of the Working Committee in Church and Society, World Council of Churches: S. Arungu-Olende, John M. Francis, William Nashed, B.C.E. Nwosu, David J. Rose, Roger L. Shinn, Diogo de Gaspar and Paul Abrecht. The statement has been published in French in SOEPI, the WCC News Service in French, No. 15, 23 May 1977.

technical risks that are inevitably associated with the large-scale and accelerating adoption of nuclear power generation. The nuclear industry has given a mixed response to this debate, to accusations of irresponsibility and to demands for more specific attention to the recognized hazards of the fuel cycle. The World Council of Churches favours the widest possible discussion of these issues. It is most encouraging that the IAEA has been able to admit to this forum contributions that are not committed to the unqualified acceptance of nuclear energy production. It is to be hoped that future discussions will be even broader.

## 2. The Public Appraisal of Nuclear Energy

2.1. For those scientists and engineers who have dedicated their lives to the development of this technology most of the problems posed in the public debate have been part of their concern for a long time. However some of these now take on a fresh importance in the light of public exposure and the growing recognition that particular questions - such as those concerned with the long-lived radioactive wastes - introduced a new time dimension into the concern for environmental protection. Some specific problems have been too long submerged. In any case, a policy of ignoring or treating lightly the volume of public questions and criticism will not work. The nuclear industry cannot afford merely to point to a very creditable safety record in justification of its present action and future plans. There is a collective responsibility on all participants in this conference to address the critical issues in a much more substantive way. While there have been occasional misrepresentations of facts there is now an established body of informed public opinion holding that we cannot proceed to the adoption of a plutonium-based fuel economy without a more fundamental and completely open examination of the risks involved.

2.2. In this situation non-governmental bodies such as the World Council of Churches have a responsibility to examine carefully the issues so far identified and to place these in a social and ethical context. <sup>[1]</sup> The W.C.C. involvement in the nuclear debate is only one part of its more general concern for the risks associated with rapid technological change, from the manipulation of genetic material to the prevention of industrial pollution. The W.C.C. wishes to present its general position on nuclear energy as follows:

A. The availability of nuclear energy is a controversial feature of today's world in that it affords the opportunity to provide a large fraction of the world's energy needs, counterbalanced by the exceptional nature of the risks involved, and other problems related to the

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<sup>[1]</sup> For example: Report of the 1974 World Conference on Science and Technology for Human Development, Anticipation no. 19 (1974) 9, where the W.C.C. first considered the "nuclear power option"; Facing up to Nuclear Power, ed. by John Francis and Paul Abrecht (Edinburgh and Philadelphia, 1976), including the report of the 1975 Ecumenical Hearing on Nuclear Energy in Sigtuna, Sweden; and "Energy for a Just and Sustainable Society", Anticipation no. 23 (1976).

employment of large-scale, capital-intensive high technology.

B. The maturity of the nuclear energy system is not yet such as to justify its world-wide application; the consequences of large-scale expansion of nuclear energy production are still relatively poorly understood and require further assessment.

C. The rights of access to nuclear technology should be preserved to the extent that the nuclear 'haves' may not deny the nuclear 'have nots' by any form of exclusive consultation.

D. There should be sufficient discussion of the factors governing access to nuclear technology to bring all nations to a new awareness of its risks and uncertainties as well as its opportunities; and the collective responsibility for monitoring and administering safeguards should reside with the IAEA rather than with individual governments.

E. Public confidence in the use of nuclear energy, seriously shaken in recent years, can be revived only by the widest possible public discussion of the technical options and of the value judgements underlying present patterns of energy consumption.

2.3. What emerges from these statements is a requirement that decisions governing the future utilization of nuclear energy must now be taken in this larger setting, and that the pattern of nuclear energy supply must be rethought in terms of total world energy needs and the wide disparities in supply that exist at present. In this connection there is need for a new emphasis on the ethical component, in order to perceive the provision of energy resources for all people as an essential part of the struggle for a more just and sustainable society.

2.4. Within each country already possessing a basic capability in nuclear technology, certain assumptions have already been made governing the scale, availability and general disposition of their future nuclear development. Such assumptions are now open to challenge. The days of great expectation arising from the birth of nuclear technology have now been foreclosed by the days of decision under uncertainty that presently characterize nuclear power developments in many countries. Surely few are politically naïve enough to suggest that nuclear technology could be abandoned; but a new sense of realism is undoubtedly abroad and challenges to a high level of nuclear dependence must be answered. If public confidence in the future deployment of the technology is further eroded, then reestablishing such confidence will prove undoubtedly to be even harder. A clear definition of future risks and uncertainties would therefore seem essential.

### 3. The Risks of Nuclear Technology

3.1. The W.C.C., in cooperation with a group of nuclear scientists, has studied this matter, and wishes to make clear its own understanding.

3.2. The risks are those of inadvertently incurring various social costs, which fall generally into three broad categories: (1) of unintended accidents and hazards associated directly with operation of



the technology; (2) of an unquestioning and undesirable dependence upon the technology and the degree of social and economic centralization it incurs; (3) of the misuse of fissionable material for weapons.

3.3. Debates like this, far from being new, have appeared with varying seriousness and intensity through all of history. <sup>/27</sup> Technological security is a relative matter involving other technologies, other persons, other places, other times. Recalling the lessons of history we recognize that absolute security is a dangerous myth.

3.4. It is our understanding that the principal perceived technological risks are these:

- (a) Of improper storage of high-level radioactive nuclear wastes;
- (b) of catastrophic accidents, principally to nuclear reactors;
- (c) of the effect of a multiplicity of low-level releases of radioactivity during normal operation, from various parts of the nuclear cycle;
- (d) of possible accidents in fuel reprocessing plants.

#### Nuclear Waste Disposal

3.5. The nuclear waste problem is probably the greatest single cause of public anxiety. It is our understanding that the situation is as follows:

- (a) Except for plutonium, the radioactive waste generated per unit of energy produced is about the same for present-day reactors now in service, and for breeder reactors. Thus the nature of the radioactive waste problem is similar for all nuclear reactors.
- (b) Regarding plutonium, present-day reactors produce about one-half as much plutonium in their normal course of operation as would a breeder reactor operating on a uranium-plutonium cycle. Some of this plutonium fissions in the reactor during its operation, and the remainder appears in the used fuel. Thus the plutonium question already exists: the main difference is that, with breeder reactors, the plutonium must be recovered from the spent fuel and recycled as new fuel. With present-day reactors the fuel need not necessarily be reprocessed, as long as the reserves of high-grade uranium ore last; but that is only a few decades at most.
- (c) Regardless of decisions about civilian nuclear power, a legacy of nuclear wastes exists from weapons programmes in several countries, and its total equals the wastes expected to be produced by all civilian nuclear power plants operating until about AD 2000. Thus at least for some countries, the waste problem is present, real and unavoidable.

3.6. It seems to be generally agreed that the critical storage time for the decay products of the civilian reactor programme will depend

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<sup>/27</sup> Agricola in publishing his classic treatise De re metallica in 1556 starts his work not with technology but rather with the fundamental questions both of safety and desirability of mining - an issue hotly debated at the time.

on the details of chemical separation, but will require safe management for a minimum of about 1,000 years. Beyond that time, the toxicity of the remaining actinides starts to become comparable to that of the uranium ore originally mined.

3.7. The need thus arises to do two tasks well: (a) to separate the wastes carefully, recover  $^{239}\text{Pu}$  (or  $^{235}\text{U}$ ); and turn the remainder into an insoluble glassy matrix, without spreading contamination through the plant or surrounding environment; (b) to sequester the residual glassified wastes in appropriate geologic structures.

3.8. The public is assured that these activities are technologically feasible. The question is: Will the work actually be carried out on the appropriate scale? Past performance has been inadequate, partly to be blamed on the haste of great powers to build nuclear weapons capability. We are assured that the mistakes of the past will not be repeated. It is our judgement that this can be best assured by a policy of open review. However as long as technologically satisfactory solutions to the high level waste disposal problem have not been demonstrated the idea of rapidly expanding nuclear power production is bound to strike much of the public as highly questionable, given the irreversible character of the risk.

#### Catastrophic Accidents

3.9. Many people are concerned about the possibility of catastrophic accidents. Studies in the U.S. [37] of present-day light-water reactors quote the probability of large accidents caused by design, engineering or operating failures (not including hostile acts) as about one chance in a billion per reactor-year of operation, with a loss of several thousand lives. These figures are disputed, but no better ones are yet forthcoming; and there is the further observation that no core melt-down accidents have been reported in about 500 reactor-years of large power plant operation world-wide. Such an event would be the necessary but insufficient precursor to an accident that significantly involves the public.

3.10. Maintaining an accident record as favourable as even the present demonstrable performance requires great dedication to high standards; a few precedents exist, such as for airplane manufacturing, where the record is generally good, but occasionally clouded by conscious problem-avoidance. Predictions of accident patterns show that smaller ones involving little or no public hazard will occur much more frequently than the catastrophic large-loss ones. Thus scrupulous investigation and publicizing of the whole spectrum of small-scale accidents should contribute to avoiding the large ones.

3.11. Public concern over major accidents on fast breeder reactors is being widely propagated and the basis for public reassurance is still largely hypothetical. The public naturally believes that since the stored energy in a fast reactor core is greater than in a thermal re-

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[37] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report NUREG-75/014, October 1975 (U.S. National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Va. 26161).

actor, then the release of this energy under accident conditions will be proportionately greater. Some of the principal researchers have agreed that they do not have enough knowledge to justify a major commitment to fast reactor technology. [47]

#### Accidents in Reprocessing Plants

3.12. The likelihood and possible severity of accidents in fuel reprocessing plants are hard to judge at present. Experience in plants processing weapons-type material are largely irrelevant, because they handle uranium or plutonium in its highly reactive pure metallic form, whereas nearly all commercial reactors, planned or in service use oxide fuel. In a civilian nuclear reprocessing plant, the bare metal never appears anywhere in the stream, but only as the relatively (or very) inert nitrate, oxide, etc. Critical amounts of uranium or plutonium salt solutions have accidentally accumulated in processing streams. While the accident hazard here appears small, the probability needs better estimation.

#### Low-Level Radiation

3.13. The routine low-level emissions of nuclear power cause little harm, especially if compared to the environmental and health damage caused by the fossil fuels that it replaces. In fact, the largest hazard would probably arise from uranium mining and milling if the reactors were of the light-water type - about 70 deaths per year. For a breeder, the mining and milling requirements would be 70 times smaller. These numbers stand in striking comparison to recent estimates of death attributable to burning coal in the Eastern United States: for 400,000 MW of coal-electric, the deaths would be 8000 - 40,000 per year with no sulfur abatement, and perhaps 1000 - 4000 per year with full enforcement of the present air quality standards. The statistics on morbidity from this cause are poor, but the effect is undoubtedly large.

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3.14. Public concern about the risks of nuclear technology has led in many countries to a demand for a moratorium, especially on the reprocessing of spent fuel and on the commercial development of the breeder reactor. Some church group have adopted this approach. A report by the World Council of Churches' study group has pointed to the possible misuse of the moratorium as a tactic to avoid making a decision or to delay a decision without regard to the consequences. [57] However if a moratorium provides an opportunity for an informed public discussion and the communication of continuing research on technical problems this could be a useful action.

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[47] F.R. Farmer, "The Safety of a Commercial Fast Reactor", in Nuclear Reactors: To Breed or not to Breed, ed. by J. Rotblat (London) 1977, 59-66.

[57] "Energy for a Just and Sustainable Society", Anticipation no. 23 (1976) 6.

3.15. In view of current uncertainties over the maintenance of energy supplies, particularly to large urban communities, the W.C.C. appreciates the necessity of retaining nuclear power as one of several possible options for the future in many countries. This should in no way diminish the search for alternative, long-term, safer forms of energy. The credibility of the nuclear option can be achieved only through the resolution of the major questions inherent in its use. In view of the impending large and irreversible world-wide commitment, these questions must be tackled without further delay.

#### 4. Nuclear Weapons

4.1. The possibility of diverting fissionable material for nefarious purposes is important, and has figured significantly in the debate over the advantages and disadvantages of nuclear power.

4.2. Our difficulty in discussing the matter stems from the simple fact that the hazard from weapons made from the diversion of materials from the civilian power programme is negligible compared with the hazard from the vast store of nuclear armaments in the military programme. Yet the two hazards are so inextricably linked that they cannot be discussed in proper perspective separately.

4.3. At this point we emphasize the findings of the 1975 W.C.C. Hearing on Nuclear Energy concerning Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons:

"It is difficult on political and moral grounds to deny countries without nuclear technology the right to obtain it because of a fear that they might use it for the development of nuclear weapons. The proposition that the appropriation of nuclear technology would forever be a limited right, to be doled out by the present nuclear countries according to rules determined by their interest is unacceptable. This would be an intolerable situation for many developing countries seeking to benefit from the peaceful application of nuclear energy and throw off technological domination by the already industrialized countries."/67

4.4. The 1975 Hearing noted further that the continuing production and possession of nuclear weapons by the major industrial countries was the principal obstacle to nuclear disarmament; and pointed to the serious limitations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in preventing nuclear arms' proliferation, because "it is based on discrimination in favour of countries already possessing nuclear weapons"./77 Since these statements were made our opinion about the particular vulnerability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been reinforced.

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/67 Facing up to Nuclear Power (op.cit.), 193.

/77 op.cit. 193.

4.5. Much has been written about the need for the highest possible degree of physical security to prevent the misuse of nuclear materials. Hence, guarding critical nuclear facilities against terrorists would, it is claimed, lead to a virtual police state. Careful calculations based on present experience tend to deny such claims. It is possible to design the system so that such a high degree of physical security is necessary at only a few strategic points - entailing no threat to basic liberties.

## 5. Access versus Security

5.1. Nevertheless two dangers exist: of the misuse of nuclear technology for clandestine weapon-making and the protection by the presently nuclear-armed nations of their proprietary rights.

5.2. The first of these dangers leads to the nuclear safeguards of the IAEA and other international arrangements, which attempt: (a) to ensure that nuclear materials are used for peaceful purposes only; (b) to deter by early detection the diversion of such materials to illegal purposes; (c) to build up safeguards systems that are as effective as possible within practical national and international limitations. None of these systems is fool-proof. The IAEA's ability to deter diversion can be impeded if a participating government changes its attitude and either withdraws from its treaty obligations or produces critical material in clandestine operations. Furthermore, no safeguards system can be completely satisfactory until the entire nuclear activity in the receiving country is placed under IAEA safeguards. This is not the case in many countries, even though more than 100 nations have subscribed to such safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

5.3. The countries presently well advanced in nuclear technology are using the Non-Proliferation Treaty to protect their own proprietary interests. This can have two deleterious consequences. First, an additional separation between rich and poor countries can develop. Second, frustration among either non-signers or constrained signers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty can lead to the establishment of new ventures and centres entirely outside the "established" groups. These dangers appear obvious to the public, hence public confidence erodes.

5.4. An international decision on the allocation of reprocessing facilities is now urgent and overdue. The present pattern of reprocessing is at an impasse because of the unsolved problems of long-term waste storage. At the same time there is undoubtedly an immediate demand for reprocessing facilities to match reactor programmes even in the major producing countries. Such an important decision cannot be limited to those nations already in consultation over the control of these technologies.

## 6. Nuclear Energy and a New International Economic Order

6.1. Nuclear energy provides the only presently available alternative to fossil fuels and hydro-power for the supply of bulk electric energy, and many countries want its benefits. However its larger social implications have yet to be adequately identified and explored. Some people

are concerned that this complex technology might reinforce the trend towards the centralization and urbanization of society which they would like to reverse. Others fear that it will tend to widen the economic and technological gap between the rich and poor countries. They are also concerned lest the present commerce in nuclear technology undermine the struggle against racial and social injustice. Clearly there is a need to determine how the use of nuclear energy relates to the struggle for a new and more just international economic order.

6.2. Thus far most of the debate about nuclear power refers to industrialized countries. The same assumptions do not apply to the developing countries, and there is need to establish how best to accommodate nuclear power programmes within the framework of their development.

6.3. A number of factors have precluded the widespread use of nuclear energy for electricity production in developing countries. Many of the power systems there are of modest proportions and cannot absorb the large nuclear generating units of the order of 600 MW and above.

6.4. However in the longer run, some of these countries will be on a sufficiently strong industrial and economic footing to support nuclear power installations and be large enough to need the power. There is consequently a growing interest in nuclear energy technology in many developing countries. It may be some time - perhaps 25 to 30 years - before their distribution systems could accommodate the large nuclear units; but they must start preparing now for the future. [87] This means training of skilled manpower for the maintenance, operation and supervision of nuclear plant installations. Some are seriously considering the feasibility of setting up sub-regional or regional training centres.

6.5. The high initial costs of a large nuclear power unit would, it is argued, be met through joint financing along the same lines suggested for the development of large-capacity hydro-electric plants. [9]

6.6. The same developing countries have shown great interest in the technical, environmental and social problems associated with the adoption of nuclear technology on a large scale. The candid and honest airing of these problems, the risks involved, the safety limits, resource limits, and waste products and spent fuel management, should go far towards providing a realistic picture for those countries seriously contemplating nuclear energy.

## 7. Ethical and Religious Perspectives

7.1. Every phase in this analysis has involved an interaction between two kinds of thinking: one, highly technical, depending on the know-

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[87] Summary Reports, Second African Regional Meeting on Energy, Accra, Ghana, November 8-19, 1976.

[9] Appraisal of Current Energy Situation and Future Prospects in Africa. ECA; E/CN.14/NRSTD/E/2, December 18, 1975.

ledge of contemporary scientific experts. The other concerns human purposes, values and commitments. These have been the subject of centuries of inquiry by prophets and poets, tragedians and comedians, heroes and saints in all societies. This quest is not the domain of any elite; every human being has a voice and a stake in it.

7.2. Although technology exists to serve human needs, it can destroy people and human values, whether by deliberate intent of oppressors or by unintended consequences. Hence the values that guide technological processes require constant public scrutiny and discussion. The question must also be raised whether technological processes are actually serving the ends intended or whether they are proceeding by a momentum of their own that overrides human values.

7.3. It would be convenient, if it were possible, to separate neatly goals and values from techniques and means, to assume that societies decide their goals, then enlist scientific technologies to realize them. But in fact technology influences goals. Sometimes it suggests or makes possible new goals not previously envisioned. At other times the technical means used to achieve some goals destroy possibilities of achieving other equally important ones. Any sharp separation of technology from human values greatly oversimplifies the dialectics of the relation between technology and society.

7.4. That is why our present contribution to the discussion about the expansion of nuclear power, though based on religious and ethical commitments, has necessarily entered into many technical issues. For the same reason the scientific literature on nuclear energy frequently shows a high sensitivity to the ethical issues connected with the awesome power it makes available.

7.5. Thus decisions about large technical issues like nuclear energy are too important to remain confined within the nuclear scientific and engineering communities. Yet without the full collaboration of these expert groups there can be no resolution of the questions. The problem is to devise new ways by which technological developments can be examined by many different groups. Fortunately there are emerging in many countries some encouraging new examples of creative dialogue between technical experts, governments, and the public as part of a responsible decision-making process.

7.6. Scientists themselves are asking about the meaning of their achievements for human life and destiny. Metaphysical and spiritual issues hang like a shadow over all the purely practical discussions of nuclear energy.

7.7. At the same time religious thinkers are aware that their traditions offer no ready-made answers to the right use of nuclear technology. If they welcome the increasing awareness that science and technology are not the sole ways to truth and wisdom, they know their own limitations, too. A critical attitude toward technological reason must not lead to social confusion, to delight in the irrational, to the veneration of simplistic and utopian solutions to human problems. Moreover no one religious perspective can be accepted today as the spiritual basis of a new world-wide concern for humanity and the right

use of science and technology. So the churches and religious leaders are not in a position of moral superiority but share the uncertainty which afflicts our contemporary culture. This however does not diminish but rather heightens the need for a clear sense of moral purpose at the centre of the decision-making process.

7.8. In urging continuing conversations on the technical and the ethical-religious aspects of nuclear energy, the W.C.C. Hearing on Nuclear Energy (1975) refused to "put forward categorical recommendations ... in either entirely rejecting, or in whole-heartedly recommending large-scale use of nuclear energy". In submitting this paper we re-emphasize the need for further information, further inquiry, further conversation.

### Three Convictions

7.9. Nevertheless we do not hesitate to express three convictions:

7.9.1. Pandora's box cannot be closed. We cannot live as though nuclear energy had not been discovered. It is one of the ingredients of our technological age. Campaigns against its development and use in some particular situation must reckon with this fact. We shall find no quick solution to our dilemma, either by abandoning nuclear energy entirely or by devising fool-proof means to control it. The technological system has brought us great benefits but it has also led us into new dangers. Nuclear energy epitomizes this dilemma.

7.9.2. There is need for a continuous conversation among people of diverse faiths and ideologies about the relation of ever-increasing production and consumption of energy, and other economic goods, to the good life and good society. Nuclear energy must not be looked upon as an end in itself, but must serve social justice and quality of life. There is a temptation to seize upon growth in production as a device to evade the demands of social justice. Too often the rich and powerful have sought to answer the rightful demands of the poor not by justice but by promises, sometimes false, of economic and technological progress that would presumably benefit everyone and cost no one anything. While affirming the need of many societies for increased energy, we deny that such energy is either a panacea for contemporary social ills or a substitute for justice. The churches feel a responsibility to take a stand for a new style of life which would emphasize values other than consumption.

7.9.3. The wise use of high technologies, like nuclear fission, depends paradoxically on a new understanding of human limits. The modern spirit has emphasized the energetic technological drive to overcome obstacles, to solve problems and enhance human powers. The record includes glorious achievements. But increasingly voices, often from within the scientific community, are calling people to a new recognition that they are not God, that their power has its limits, that not all problems yield to technological solutions, that humanity must learn to live with nature as well as to harness its resources. A wise humanity will therefore unite aspiration with modesty. Indeed the dilemmas now faced by nuclear scientists may make them especially aware of the validity of the spiritual insight that, in the future as in the past, we must "work out our salvation in fear and trembling".



## THE NETHERLANDS REFORMED CHURCH AND SOUTH AFRICA

CCADD 1977, session 9.

### Introduction

The paper which here follows was presented as a policy paper to the general synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church by its moderature (= "synodal board"). It was adopted by the general synod on June 15, 1977.

This was not the start of a new involvement of this church (which is the largest protestant church in the Netherlands; it is the former "state church"). Rather, it should be considered a "retraining" or a "revision exercise". For many years the Netherlands Reformed Church has been deeply involved in the issues of racism and colonialism in Southern Africa. Positions taken by this church sofar have included:

- 1962. Pastoral letter on the race problem. ("Racial discrimination by christians turns our God and Father of Jesus Christ, creator of heaven and earth, into a racial god, a god of whites only. In the deeper sense, the race problem is a religious problem. The faith in God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is at stake").
- 1971. Decision to contribute to the Special Fund of the Program to Combat Racism (PCR) of the World Council of Churches. (Although over the years our church has given financial support to victims of racism in many parts of the world, this decision raised loud protests because PCR's support included humanitarian aid to liberation movements in Southern Africa. The protests were loud, in spite of the fact that the money would not come from the general income but only from special collections. A recent announcement in 1977 by the Diaconal Board that maybe in the future the Special Fund of PCR will be included in its regular project list has already lead to threats from a certain, strongly organised sector of our church that it will create its own diaconal board).
- November 1973. Heated discussion in the synod about the issue of investments in S.A., because of the "disinvestment" resolution of the Central Committee of the WCC. Results, among others:
  - 1) The synod identified itself with the "conditions" for investments as formulated by the Dutch trade unions (e.g. factual recognition of trade unions and the right of collective bargaining for all groups of the population; termination of job-reservation; equal salary systems for all groups of the population, etc.). The Department for Church and Society was authorized to start an intensive dialogue with Dutch business representatives.
  - 2) The congregations should be informed about the various aspects of the (dis)investment problems.
  - 3) The synod decided to take a decision about the WCC disinvestment resolution before the Assembly of Nairobi.
- February 1974. Emigration to South Africa by church-members was strongly dissuaded. Consumer-actions were spoken of in a positive sense (although it was also decided not to mention by name certain boycotts, such as the boycott of

QUESTA PUBBLICAZIONE È DI PROPRIETÀ  
DELL'ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

Angola coffee and of South African Outspan oranges). Pressure was put on the Dutch government to take the necessary steps to recognize Guinea-Bissao.

- June 1975. Rejection of new investments in S.A. A terminated evaluation is necessary of the effects of the existing investments.

(About further steps we can report at the CCADD session, if necessary. While our Department on Church and Society completed its series of talks with representatives of business and trade unions and reported its findings to the general synod, we also transferred our responsibility to the National Council of Churches: Other churches should participate in the dialogue as well. The involvement of the NCC, together with pressure from action groups, has in 1977 lead to the decision of the two major banks in the Netherlands to change their policy: no new loans to the S.A. government and its affiliates, unless the apartheid system is fundamentally changed).

The synodal policy paper was also inspired by a resolution by the WCC at the Nairobi Assembly:

"South Africa, which highlights racism in its most blatant form, must retain high priority for the attention of the member churches. Apartheid is possible only with the support of a large number of Christians there. We urge member churches to identify with, and wherever possible initiate or activate, campaigns to halt arms traffic; to work for the withdrawal of investments and the ending of bank loans; to stop white migration. These issues have already been urged by the WCC and we recommend these for urgent action by the member churches. Their implementation would be an effective non-violent contribution to the struggle against racism".

Nairobi, Section V, par.87

The adoption of the policy considerations by the synod in June 1977 included also that it would be tried to have a delegation of the synod discuss the paper with our sister-churches in South Africa. But untill now, the S.A. government has always refused the general secretary of our church (dr Albert v.d. Heuvel) a visa.

We submit this synodal paper to CCADD as an example of how one particular western church struggles with the intricacy of the need to be politically relevant and to be authentically church (in the sense of not conforming to the ways and means of the "principalities and powers"), in this tragic problem far away which has such close links to our own history and present.

Jan van Veen

Laurens Hogebrink.

Policy considerations concerning the relations between the Netherlands Reformed Church and her sisterchurches in South-Africa.

1. The situation in Southern Africa is inevitably an item on the agenda of the Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church.
  - . This inevitability is not just the result of the interest for the problems of Southern Africa which exists in the Netherlands, at least certainly not exclusively or even primarily.
  - . The fact that many churchmembers have relatives in the countries of Southern Africa causes conversations and discussions on the future of the white population of South-Africa in many a local congregation. Heated discussions on the apartheid policy can not be avoided in pastoral work either, so that this becomes part of the educational work as well. This concern and expectation must be expressed in intercession and proclamation during the service. Via the channels of adult education this issue almost naturally becomes a national concern.
  - . In the context of the ecumenical movement, in the Netherlands Council of Churches and in the World Council of Churches, the South African issue is always in the forefront of everyone's mind. Whatever the position a church takes in this movement - and even if one keeps aloof from the ecumenical organisations - the ecumenical movement at least initiates items for the agenda. In this context we refer again to our Synod's pastoral letter concerning the race problem, which was accepted by the Synod as long ago as November 1962.
  - . The most important reason, however, and a decisive one for the Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church, is the appeal addressed to us by all the churches in South-Africa. In spite of their mutual disagreement regarding the relation of races and nations in their country, both black and white churches are apparently eager to be on good terms with the Dutch churches. This interest of the South African churches takes many forms: white as well as black fellow-christians ask for our understanding, continuous dialogue is highly appreciated, direct aid is also requested (by the English language white churches as well as by the black churches) for relief projects. These projects vary from emergency aid to legal assistance.

The keystone to Reformed policy with regard to Southern Africa is the conviction that these requests for dialogue and support must not be rejected.

The Synod's continued interest in South Africa is therefore inevitable and justified. It is especially because of this appeal that our Synod's policy concentrates on South-Africa, rather than on Southern Africa. For this reason these considerations will from this point deal mainly with the churches in the Republic.

In this context the Synod has always rejected those voices from within the ecumenical movement which request a termination of contacts with e.g. the white N.G.-Kerk. The same conviction prompts the moderation to continue its efforts to enable an official delegation from our church to visit South-Africa.

Nor are visits by others hindered; constant efforts have been made for those Reformed people who did get visa's to meet as many different groups within the churches of South-Africa as possible.

2. The Synod has always taken the stand that solutions to the racial and national problems in South-Africa cannot be provided by foreigners and therefore not by our churches either. Even though anyone pondering these questions will sooner or later come to favour a certain solution and show this personally, the Synod and its moderation have repeatedly stated that only the South Africans themselves - and this applies also to Rhodesians and Namibians - can find their road to the future and that they alone can find answers to the special problems which beset this continent.

However, this standpoint does not permit us just to wait and watch the events in Southern Africa passively. On the contrary, it was this startingpoint that made the Synod plead forcefully - with the government and the people, in the ecumenical movement and with the sisterchurches - that all the national groups within the country should be able to participate in the talks on the future via their own elected representatives. Talks about the future by whites amongst themselves, but even a dialogue between whites and blacks selected by whites, will not only be inadequate, they will lead to even greater tensions, to more distressing social injustice and occasionally to violent clashes.

In this context the moderation has repeatedly pleaded for such a policy with the South African government and with the churches. Pleas for the release of political dissidents and for avoidance of political lawsuits also fit into this framework. By the same token the broad moderation of the General Synod reacted with criticism to the procedure followed by the N.G.-churches in publishing the brochure "Ras, Volk en Nasie en Volkereverhoudinge in die lig van die Skrif" (Race, People and Nation and International relations previously in the light of the Holy Scriptures) as the N.G.-Kerk had not previously discussed the contents with the black churches in the country itself.

These same considerations have also caused the Synod to press for a wider consultation of all South African churches on the one hand and the Netherlands Reformed Church together with the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands on the other.

3. A truly brotherly policy in our church is seriously hampered by the diametrically opposed convictions within the South African churches, which cause the requests for support submitted to us to have entirely different backgrounds. Over against the request from the white Boeren-churches for more white immigrants came the request from the Council of Churches, the Christian Institute and a number of black organisations to stop the immigration of whites. Over against the request from the blacks to do everything possible to prevent South-Africa from acquiring nuclear energy (South-Africa not having signed the non-proliferation treaty) came the request from the whites not to make any pronouncements as a church on this subject. Over against the repeated request to support protests against forced migration, against brutal police action (which according to Minister J.F. Kruger took the lives of 117 people in 1976 alone), against legislation which damages the legal security of the majority of the population (arrest without charge, detention without trial, etc., etc.) comes the often irritated request from the Boeren-churches not to mingle in what they consider to be internal South African affairs. And above all: over against the appeal made by nearly all leading black christians to protest against the apartheid policy (multinational policies) of the South African government, comes the request from the Boeren-churches to consider the apartheid policy the consequence of biblical justice and neighbourly love.
4. These conflicting appeals seriously hinder both the discussion in the church and the policy to be followed by the Netherlands Reformed Church, as the different opinions each find their own support within the Dutch church-community. Private visits to South-Africa have not led to a rapprochement of the various opinions within our churches. The often heard remark that one must have visited the country in order to be able to judge the situation, offers no help therefore. The visitors are also divided over three categories:
  - those, who consider the apartheid policy degrading and not justifiable biblically;
  - those, who consider this policy the best possible way to arrive at a peaceful co-existence of the different national groups in the future; and
  - those, who not only accept this policy of separate development, but also consider it desirable.

The Synod felt compelled to make a choice in this situation. In this choice the Synod was particularly influenced by:  
the South African Council of Churches, which represents 85% of the christians in South-Africa 1);  
the Christian Institute, which has gained great respect among us because of the quality of its contribution towards awareness building 2);  
and especially by visits to the Netherlands made by leading black personalities in church and society.

- Ad 1) The South African Council of Churches has done the churches abroad a great service by publishing its own newsletter, called Ecunews, in which church pronouncements and developments are published every fortnight.  
As the three white reformed churches are not members of this Council, it is important to read the DRC Newsletter as well as Ecunews, in order to remain informed about direct news from this circle too.
- Ad 2) In 1971 the then secretary-general, Dr. E. Emmen, wrote "The Christian Institute in South-Africa". The views of the Christian Institute are published in the monthly Pro Veritate (which is distributed in the Netherlands). Besides opinion-forming articles the Christian Institute also publishes documentary material based on authentic sources of information from government and opposition. The latest document, with the title "Torture in South-Africa?" contains many statements made by the South African government and by former prisoners.

Moreover, the Synod feels that this choice of policy is supported by the South African Roman Catholic bishops and the international ecumenical movement. This choice implies that we, though maintaining our relations with the Boeren-churches, have made the appeal of the black churches the basis of our policy.

5. A choice in favour of support to the black majority of South African christians does not merely imply the rejection of racism and racial discrimination. Such a rejection is not under discussion and even those in favour of apartheid subscribe to it. For we are agreed that all men are equal before God and that therefore any notion of superiority within the church of Christ must be condemned. The discussion only starts when the overwhelming majority of black christians asks us to stigmatize apartheid as a form of racism and racial discrimination. The Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church has let itself be persuaded by the majority of its South African fellow christians that apartheid is based on the rule of

the white minority over the black majority, in which the blacks are treated not as subjects but as objects, where the white minority decides what is best for the black population and where a large number of laws and regulations assume and consolidate the white supremacy over the blacks.

Whatever the ideal of apartheid may be, the Synod cannot but agree with the black majority that the apartheid-system leads to an unjust distribution of land; a distribution of prosperity in which the blacks are made objects of white charity instead of receiving equal pay for equal work; a completely insecure legal status for the black majority; to relations within the labour process which make the whites the owners of the means of production while forcing the blacks to become permanent migrant workers; to a justification of the white identity which restrains the development of the black identity out of all proportion; to an imposed pattern of life which regards even love between people of different races as a crime; to a phased development which has for decades insisted on understanding for white problems while simultaneously imposing proportionate delays on black demands for equal rights; to a social structure which according to its own designers offers no solution for the 2 million coloured people and the 800.000 South Africans of Asian origin, nor for the millions of blacks who have already lived in the cities for several generations.

6. The Synod shares the opinion of the black majority and a white minority among christians in South-Africa, that such policies do not create justice nor open up new perspectives for peace and as such must be subjected to biblical criticism.

So far we have not even considered the violence used by the present South African government to carry out its policies: the tens of thousands of arrests every year, the numerous cases of capital punishment, the never ending flow of complaints made by prisoners about torture, at times with fatal results, the degrading forced migration of populations, the subtle limitation of the freedom of the press, and the systematic arrest, house arrests and convictions of all black leaders who oppose the government.

Guided by the views furnished by our South African fellow christians, the Synod has drawn up its policy. The Synod rejects every quasi-scientific attempt to base the inequality of races on so-called racial characteristics, as well as any use of state power to bring about the forced separation of races, where such separation is not desired by those directly involved.

When a government no longer uses its power to serve the whole of society and no longer wields its sword to punish evil and to protect what is good, then such a government has exceeded the limits of its task. The large majority of christians in South Africa has rightly judged their government to be guilty of such excesses and is recalling it to its task.

The Synod cannot but accept the conclusion of the majority of South African christians that the power of the government is used to protect the privileges of the whites and to restrict the rights of the blacks.

7. In spite of all this the Synod does not ignore the white majority in South-Africa. We are concerned about the whole of the population of this magnificent and at the same time deeply tragic country.  
We do not ask the white South Africans to imitate the structure of our society or even to copy our constitution. We do not ask them to renounce their justified desire to maintain their own identity: we only ask them not to translate their idea of identity into an identity enforced and inflicted upon others.  
If the talks between all groups of the population, as advocated by us, did lead to mutual agreement on the distribution of land, to federal forms of society or to a multinational society, we would not raise any protest. As it is, the Synod can only put on record that 18 million blacks are kept in tutelage by 4 million whites and that this is done in the name of a government which presents itself to the world as inspired by the Gospel, so that this government is held up as an example of a christian nation particularly by non-christians.
8. The General Synod watches with great anxiety the escalation of violence and counter-violence in Southern Africa, specifically  
For years past we have noticed the way in which the self-expression of the black majority of the population has been restricted. Albert Luthuli and Alan Paton were the first black and white christians to point this out to us in their statements and books. African society has long had a patriarchal and therefore tutelary structure. This did not only apply to the relation between nations, but also to relations within society and within the African family. Hence a tutelary attitude towards blacks was not considered to be unnatural. On the contrary, in rural areas especially, generations of whites and blacks have accepted this attitude. Thus the traditional hierarchical structure of a number of black nations was fitted into the patriarchal relationships in white (especially Boeren) society. Whites as well as many older blacks feel threatened by changes in the traditional hierarchical patterns and consider these to disturb the relations between people.



In order to cope with this threat the emancipation of whites was regretted, while the emancipation of blacks was more or less forbidden. When this could no longer be achieved amicably, compulsion became necessary to enforce it. Hence the numerous laws which define black emancipation (and white opposition) as "terrorism" or "overthrowing of the social order" and condemning them as such.

The latest phase in the conflict between traditional authorities and emancipating blacks shows clashes of an increasingly violent nature. The whites will only accept traditional black authority (chiefs) and appointed authority. Leadership elected by the black population hardly fits in with their concepts. Neither does consultation between equals. Whites as well as blacks searching for modern ways of post-industrial sharing of power are severely called to order.

9. The Netherlands Reformed Church hoped that over the years the churches in South-Africa would be able to play a role in the creation of a society in which people of entirely different background and objectives would be able to come to terms as equals. In the English language churches efforts to this end are at least made. With every election for a new synodal board the tendency towards emancipation and consequently the opposition against white tutelage increases in black and coloured churches. In the Boeren-churches this tendency is watched with great anxiety. Even an integrated Synod for the various N.G.-churches is sharply opposed by certain white leaders, even though this is not an example of "black power", but of integration.

The policy of "separate development" has played a curious role here. On the one hand it upholds old authoritative patterns, but at the same time these patterns are affected by it. Everywhere where the effects of apartheid create separate structures for blacks and coloureds, opposition against apartheid increases. This applies to schools, universities, residential districts and homelands. One does not have to look far for the reason for this ambivalence, as apartheid does not provide a just division of land, rights and power. It is known that under apartheid the ideal is that 13% of the land will be assigned to the black nations. This is done with reference to the historical division of the land. It is always claimed that this 13% belongs to the most fertile land of the republic. Black leaders - including the government-appointed traditional Bantu chiefs - question this arrangement on a number of grounds.

The most important argument is that no division of the land between the various groups of people is desired. They demand: all South-Africa for all South-Africans.

But even those who accept a division of land as an intermediate stage on the way to a multiracial society, protest against the unacceptable percentages (13% of the land for 80% of the population!), against a division which assigns all the cities, built partly by the blacks, to the whites; a division which does not take the enormous increase of the black population into account; which offers no solution for the urban Bantu or for the coloureds; which places the final responsibility for the policy in white hands and assigns that part of the land to the blacks where an agricultural livelihood can only be made possible with massive support of the white part of the population. The black population is particularly hurt by the continually repeated white assertion that South-Africa belongs to the whites and that the whites have a primary claim to the wealth of the republic.

Emancipated blacks consider that South Africa's wealth is partly the result of their labour. Did not they do the lion's share of the (mostly dirty) work? When South African whites and their foreign friends constantly point out how much they have done and still do for the blacks, this only serves to increase black irritation. Such arguments ignore the common effort made by black and white to achieve the standard of living in South-Africa today and turn the right to a proportional part of this wealth into a favour.

10. Those in favour of apartheid often refer to developments in other African countries where political independence of colonial rule was often followed by tumultuous developments. Forms of African socialism as found in Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia, Idi Amin's reign of terror, Mobutu's dictatorship in Zaïre, are all seen as the unavoidable future reality for a multiracial society in South-Africa. At the same time these developments are used to defend the present situation in South-Africa.

As synode of the Netherlands Reformed Church, we cannot possibly agree with this train of thought. Naturally, we understand the anxiety which many South Africans feel about their future. We know that this anxiety is felt by both large groups of blacks and of whites. However, we find that the white South African minority, which is now in power, does favour black majority rule in Namibia and Zimbabwe, while in its foreign policy favouring free elections to be held in these countries, elections in which the so-called liberation movements are to participate too. At the same time we find that the South African government does consider black fellow citizens to be quite capable of leading their own political and cultural communities, in their own areas.

From our black friends in the churches of South-Africa we learn that the black leaders themselves do not picture the future of South-Africa to be an exclusively black society. Taking all this into account we can only conclude that the reference to other African states cannot be a decisive factor against a joint search for a more just society for all citizens of South-Africa.

These are the considerations which during recent years have determined the policy of the Synod.

They have prompted us to advise against white emigration to that country, to reject new investments, to plead with the government within the framework of the Council of Churches, not to cooperate in the supply of parts of nuclear power plants, to talk with entrepreneurs and bankers and to urge them not to do anything that might advance the disastrous ideology and practice of apartheid.

With these considerations in mind, we have supported projects from the South African Council of Churches, from the Christian Institute and from black christian organisations. These considerations have also prompted us to call on the members of the church for humanitarian support for the work of the liberation movements (though no money from general church funds was reserved for this purpose, so as not to offend any consciences).

All this has not brought us into the forefront of the battle against racism. Far from it. At the international consultation on Southern Africa of the Council of Churches, which took place in Driebergen May 20-22, 1977, it became clear that the black christians present still expected much more from us. They regarded the situation in Southern Africa as a warsituation and expected the churches to consider their support to the black population in that context. They accused us, whites, of closing our eyes still to the true extent of the struggle, and of allowing our own interests to continue to prevail.

Consequently, during the coming period of time, we will receive repeated requests, via the Council of Churches, to increase our support to the black population. The considerations set out here are only intended as the startingpoint for the action of our church.

The moderation of the  
general synod.