


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
THE BELGRADE MEETING WITHIN THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE
CSCE AND THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY



BELGRADE, MAY 9-10, 1977

THE BELGRADE MEETING WITHIN THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE CSCE
AND THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
Institute of International Politics and Economics
Belgrade, 9-10/V/1977

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C O L L O Q U I U M

"THE BELGRADE MEETING WITHIN THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE
CSCE AND THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY"

MILITARY ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

by Ljubivoje AČIMOVIĆ

Institute of International Politics and Economics

Belgrade, May 9 -10, 1977

QUESTA PUBBLICAZIONE È DI PROPRIETÀ
DELL'ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

MILITARY ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

by Ljubivoje Aćimović

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe devoted a serious effort to the cause of promoting the military aspects of European security. This was reflected in the adoption of a separate Document on this matter within the Final Act.¹

The value of this document lies above all in its specific political effect, particularly because its adoption indicates that the attitude on the complementary nature, or mutual relationship, of political and military aspects of a security, has been on an all-European level recognized in principle and applied in concrete terms; a new step has been made towards creating an all-European multilateral system of military security measures and the first, albeit modest, mechanism was created to build up confidence (in the first place the measure of prior notification of major military manoeuvres); and finally, a new all-European track of efforts aimed at controlling and restraining effects of the military factor in Europe has been traced, and the monopoly of the

1 Because of the French opposition the title of the Document does not include the proper wording "the military aspects of European security", but, instead, it reads "Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament". Despite its having been used all the time during the drafting stage in Geneva, the French delegation strongly opposed at the very end of the Second phase of the CSCE any explicit reference to the military aspects of security.

blocs in the field of military security has been thereby challenged. This achievement, just as an initial step and a basis for further developments, is no doubt important and deserves attention. Yet viewed as a move towards the ultimate goal, it is extremely modest; moreover, it is disproportionate to what was accomplished in other domains at the Conference, especially in the political field. This critical note, needless to say, should not be understood as a negation of what has been achieved, but rather as a recognition of the realities which call for new, increased efforts on the road that has just commenced.

The implementation of the document on the
military aspects of European security

The system of notifying military manoeuvres, along with inviting observers, has been, on the whole, functioning to some extent satisfactorily. According to the information at my disposal, twenty one military manoeuvres have been notified till March 1977: thirteen of them organized within NATO, three within the Warsaw Pact and five in neutral (Switzerland, Sweden) and nonaligned countries (Yugoslavia). This entirely new practice in Europe becomes still more significant if some additional facts are taken into account: the system of prior notification has functioned regularly despite the fact that the Final Act suggests, in a way, its voluntary basis; a large portion (about two thirds) of the notified manoeuvres has been of a level lower than 25,000

troops; invitations of observers have taken place in nine cases; in addition to the above mentioned notifications of large - scale military manoeuvres there have been quite a ~~few notifications of lower-scale military manoeuvres given on a bilateral basis (for instance, twelve between Yugoslavia and Italy).~~

However, in the functioning of this system certain weaknesses have occurred. Some instances of evading notification of major military manoeuvres have been reported, ~~by breaking them into several smaller-scale mutually coordinated ones,~~ developing either in succession or simultaneously, but on different places in one geo-strategic area. In addition, there have been some complaints about the way in which exchanges of observers were implemented because in some instances they were not offered adequate possibilities to fulfill properly their functions.

As to the other measures, however, very little has been accomplished so far: there has been no notification of either major military movements or of manoeuvres of amphibious or airborne troops, as well as of those in the adjoining sea area and air space; the already existing exchanges of military personnel have in fact little changed within the Follow-up to the CSCE - either in qualitative or in quantitative terms; no visible self-restraint has been displayed in military activities liable to cause misunderstanding or tension; no information about relevant developments in the MFR negotiations has been provided to other states by the negotiating forum in Vienna; ~~the whole concept of the complementary nature of the~~

political and military aspects of security, as set forth in General considerations, has not been genuinely applied in practice.

Finally, as far as the present military context of European security is concerned, the situation is, no doubt, unsatisfactory: nothing has changed from the Cold War days regarding both the military structure and the level of arms and forces deployed in Europe. Moreover, from the point of view of the modernization of armies and qualitative improvements of weapons the situation has even worsened. It goes without saying that this state of affairs affects the process of promoting security and co-operation in Europe. It, in fact, sets limits to this process.

The Belgrade meeting 1977 - tasks in the field
of the military aspects of European security

First of all, let me make a preliminary remark: in discussing the implementation of the Final Act everyone eloquently emphasizes the inevitability of its integral application; in practice, however, many have a rather selective approach and de facto treat individual portions of the document quite differently. Further, deficiency lies in a tendency amongst many to alleviate the concessions they made at the Conference for the sake of compromises by interpreting certain provisions of the Final Act in a way which actually means a retreat towards their original i.e. starting positions; finally the third deficiency lies in the fact that the implementation of the Final Act has been approached in a static way in spite

of its built-in dynamic concept.

These three deficiencies figure very prominently in the domain of the military aspects of security. This has been manifested so far first because individual provisions of the Final Act have been either neglected or interpreted in "one's own way", and secondly, many states have let it be known that they consider these measures to be definite and final, refusing their further development whatsoever.

A genuine realization of the concept of European security built into the Final Act calls for serious efforts to further promote the military measures of security. The more so if one bears in mind the continuing unsatisfactory situation in the military field, where there is a very high level of military potentials and the armament race is still progressing. Indeed, it is precisely this state of affairs which essentially caused a certain setback in detente in the period between Helsinki and Belgrade.

In this light the issue of ensuring the proper place and adequate treatment of the military aspects of European security at the Belgrade meeting has become increasingly important.

The Belgrade meeting 1977, being the first stage within the Follow-up to the CSCE and an expression of the generally accepted view that the initiated multilateral process must be continued, should discuss "the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference" and "the deepening of their mutual relations, the improvement of security and the development of cooperation in"

Europe, and the development of the process of detente in the future".¹ In accordance with this, the function of the Belgrade meeting would be to reaffirm the objectives, commitments and tasks undertaken in Helsinki, to evaluate the hitherto implementation of the Final Act and take steps to further develop measures of the Final Act. In short: all that was agreed upon must be reaffirmed and evaluated, and new efforts to reach all-European detente should be initiated.

To be specific from the point of view of this paper, the tasks of the Belgrade meeting regarding the military aspects of security could be summed up as follows: (1) reaffirmation of the concept of interrelation between political and military aspects of security and of corresponding commitments made in Helsinki; (2) a thorough exchange of views on the European situation in this domain and especially the implementation of the respective provisions of the Final Act; and (3) discussion of future efforts and initiation of new measures. The realization of these three basic tasks - which are mutually closely related - should include the following:

1. The reaffirmation of relevant general considerations implies, first, that the question of the military aspects of security should be given its full political weight; secondly, the discussion should embrace the problem of the military situation in Europe in its totality, and it should insist on exerting efforts towards solving the whole complex;

1 Final Act, pp. 133-134,

thirdly, the meeting should note the very unsatisfactory situation in this field in general, which is in vast discord with the results achieved in the political sphere and, accordingly, it should imperatively insist on the progressive alteration of this state of affairs.

2. The evaluation of the implementation of the Helsinki provisions should be comprehensive and must, on the one hand, make use of positive experience, and also point to the negative experience, on the other hand. In general, the discussion on this subject should serve the promotion of ~~the~~ very practice of implementation of adopted measures as well as their further development. In accordance with this, in the political-psychological sphere, they should perform both as a pressure towards a consistent implementation of obligations and as an impetus for new efforts. It should also be clearly presented in the final document of the meeting.

3. New measures or efforts to further develop the system of measures for the strengthening of security and promoting cooperation in Europe will no doubt be an important component of the action of bloc-free and some other, mostly smaller, countries at the Belgrade meeting. The reasons to insist on this dynamic component of the Follow-up to the CSCE are manifold. First of all, if the Final Act adopted in Helsinki recognizes the Conference as a multilateral all-European process or as a continuing effort, then it necessarily presupposes a permanent advancement of the action, i.e. the taking of new measures.

In some way this was stated in the Final Act. Further, the Helsinki document is undoubtedly an important but only the first step made so far, which means that many issues are still pending. Finally, not only that the Final Act was unable of solving everything adequately and efficiently, but the time factor should also be taken into account; if there were no continuous and progressive development of the Final Act, it would shortly become obsolete - not so much in terms of general considerations but in terms of practical-operative issues.

Efforts along the line of adopting new measures could be realized in three ways, that is three types of decisions: (1) declarations of intent to adopt new measures and guidelines for their elaboration; (2) procedural decisions to this end (the setting up of working groups or groups of experts, convening of diplomatic conferences and so forth); and (3) new measures.

The character and the contents of these three kinds of potential decisions of the Belgrade meeting are clearly denoted in the above headlines: the declarations of intent would in fact express the orientation for future action regarding a measure and commitment (explicit or tacit) to consider or eventually adopt this measure at the next meeting; the decisions on procedural issues should include not only those involving the setting up of working bodies but also its mandates; the decision on concrete measures would contain more or less elaborated elements of these measures, in a similar way as it was done in the Final Act.

As for new measures, they could include the following:

I. Confidence-building measures

1. Notification of major military movements - concrete elaboration of the system!
2. Notification of major military manoeuvres and exchange of observers - the removal of deficiencies (including the elaboration of a code of conduct governing exchange of observers).

II. Measures designed to restrain military activities that may cause misunderstanding or tension (major military manoeuvres or movements in the vicinity of frontiers, movements of fleet close to alien territorial waters, electronic jamming of radio communications and the like, as it was presented in the original Yugoslav proposal submitted at the second stage of the CSCE) - concrete determination of both the contents of the measures and their obligatory nature.

III. Force reductions (General considerations)- the commitment contained in the Final Act regarding the information about the negotiations in Vienna to be provided to other states, should be made more specific.

This is only a list of potentially feasible, and in the opinion of a number of states, desirable measures that might be considered at the Belgrade meeting. True, they are not entirely new, because they are already embodied in the Final Act (in a certain way and to some degree); one should rather say that the above proposals are aimed at making these ideas more operational and better elaborated. They, however, do not include the improvement of parameters for notification of

major military manoeuvres (size, territory), as such an attempt does not seem very likely to succeed at the present moment, but one might try to achieve some progress in this respect too by means of recommending further steps to be carried out on a voluntary basis, as a sign of good will.

Each of the above measures would be useful while some of them, such as notification of major military movements and measures intended to restrain military activities which might cause misunderstandings or tension, seem especially important at the moment. It would be of major importance also, considering the limited possibilities of the Belgrade meeting, to set up a group of experts to deal with military questions. The setting up of such a group would be of great not even practical but also political significance.

However, we should not cherish illusions that the afore-mentioned measures could be easily realized. The resistance on the part of military alliances, especially great powers, has already been manifested, suggesting that it is too early even to discuss new measures, to say nothing about introducing them; any new effort to this end would, according to these views, allegedly imply the revision of the Helsinki document. It is obvious that these arguments are untenable, because as regards certain of these measures, not only that it is not too early for them to be realized now but it was already time in Helsinki to do so; secondly, there can be no revision of something which was adopted as a general and programme platform for a long term action if the innovations to

be made are in accordance with the basic principles and if they are in the interest of the action and its successful materialization..

x

x

x

In conclusion, I would like to underline only two things. Firstly, the Belgrade meeting would obviously have a manifold function as regards the initiation and promotion of the process of military detente. Especially in the field of new measures, it is not supposed to aim merely at their immediate adoption, but for some of them it would just have ~~to initiate preparatory work~~ and take appropriate steps for their future realization.

Secondly, the issues of the military aspects of European security will also figure as one among the priorities of neutral and non-aligned countries in the field of European security. This crops from the significance which the military component plays in the detente process as well as from the concept of interrelation between political and military aspects of security, which was explicitly built into the Helsinki document owing to the insistence of bloc-free countries. This practically means that these countries, with some support on the part of some other small states, will wholeheartedly endeavour to give this issue a prominent place at the Belgrade meeting and to accomplish an adequate result in this particular field.

C O L L O Q U I U M

"THE BELGRADE MEETING WITHIN THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE CSCE
AND THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY"

THE BELGRADE MEETING WITHIN THE FOLLOW-UP
OF THE CSCE - ITS ROLE AND PROSPECTS

by Karl BIRNBAUM

Institute of International Politics and Economics
Belgrade, May 9 - 10, 1977

QUESTA PUBBLICAZIONE È DI PROPRIETÀ
DELL'ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

Karl E. Birnbaum:

Requirements for the continuity of détente policies

The present paper contains a brief review of what seem to be representative public and governmental perceptions of recent East - West relations. This is necessarily an asymmetrical exercise, since Eastern and Western perceptions cannot be identified with equal precision and reliability. The survey includes developments until the end of 1976 but does not discuss the implications new initiatives of the of the Carter Administration and the latest inconclusive exchanges between Washington and Moscow. The purpose of the paper is to arrive at some tentative conclusions as to the requirements for sustaining the continuity of détente policies, which by the end of last year appeared to be jeopardized.

The main features of détente policies have been a combination of mutual restraint, some measure of cooperation as well as continued conflict and competition between East and West tempered by the overriding concern to avoid open confrontations. Despite all the controversy about the benefits of détente policies, it is generally recognized that they have produced important improvements in the realm of crisis-management and a concomitant limitation of the risk of confrontations that could lead to a military conflagration.

While these results were attained through postures that imposed distinct restraints on Western efforts to affect internal changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, they were neither devoid of moral values nor ineffective with regard to "the human dimension" of East-West relations. In view of the stakes involved the preservation of a peaceful relationship between East and West must in fact be regarded as the supreme moral value, constantly to be taken into account by decisionmakers and their constituencies. Nor should the tangible improvements in human conditions be underrated that were achieved as a result of the agreements of the 1970's, particularly in the heart of Europe: in Berlin and the two German states. These facts notwithstanding there can hardly be any doubt that by the end of 1976 détente policies were in the doldrums.

As for the East, the reactions of governing elites to the new emphasis on human rights and attendant perturbations suggested a decline in their previous confidence that the undesired consequences of reduced tension and wider contact with the West can be contained. Since the Soviet leadership is unable to alleviate the economic difficulties of its East European allies and seems to recognize the need to appease the increasingly self-confident workers, particularly in Poland, it has acquiesced in the relentless efforts of East European governments to expand trade and economic cooperation with the West as a means to ensure technological innovation, a high

rate of investments, and better productivity. In fact these same incentives continue to sustain the main direction of Moscow's own policy towards the West. But particularly in view of the Euro-communist challenge recent developments in Eastern Europe tend to amplify Moscow's fear of an erosion of its position in the presently most sensitive and explosive part of that region: Poland. Such apprehensions in turn are liable to enhance the perceived importance of Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe and hence to inhibit Eastern negotiating positions in Vienna that might presage an early and substantial reduction of that presence.

The fact that dissenters and human rights groups in Eastern Europe have invoked the Final Act of the OSCE to support their claims has generally sensitized the attitudes of the authorities with regard to the issues involved. Their statements suggest the perception of a growing threat to "the system" and may well reflect the faltering confidence of policy-makers in the viability of the fundamental assumption on which recent policies toward the West have been based: that détente implies a balance of benefits.

In the West, long before the Carter Administration came to power, the fate of such renowned personalities as Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov had contributed to a more critical public assessment of the premises underlying détente policies. In the United States in particular, the plight of Soviet and East European dissidents and the repressive cultural climate in many

Warsaw Pact countries produced among liberals a growing disenchantment with official policies that were felt to be insufficiently responsive to public pressure for a more adamant American position on humanitarian issues. Concurrently, the conservative wing of congressional and public opinion became increasingly alarmed by the evidence suggesting an accelerated Soviet arms build-up, both nuclear and conventional, and criticized the executive branch of the government for its failure to reciprocate in kind. The determined Soviet effort to expand military forces worried America's European allies as well. The concern about Soviet intentions inherent in these perceptions was further heightened by Moscow's involvement in Angola, widely interpreted as a breach of the rules of mutual restraint underlying the détente relationship. The ensuing conflict between the legislative and executive branches of the American government concerning what should be the appropriate response created the impression that a lingering impasse had been reached in Washington, and tended to undermine Western self-confidence and resolve. Concern was also expressed in the public debate and by governmental spokesmen in Western Europe about the discrepancy between rhetorics of détente and developments in arms acquisition and deployment underscored by the lack of progress in the SALT and MPR negotiations. The interest of the business community in cooperative ventures with Eastern partners was dampened as a result of growing frustration with the political and bureaucratic constraints that inhibit effective economic cooperation with the Soviet Union →

and its allies. Moreover, not only in the United States but also in West Germany, public opinion seemed increasingly less inclined to sustain a policy of long-term cooperation with governments in the East that clamped down on their dissidents and whose implementation of the CSCE Final Act disappointed many -exaggerated - Western expectations, particularly with regard to the "Third Basket". Finally, the more rigid and uncooperative attitudes of the authorities in the GDR towards movements across the inter-German border together with Eastern efforts to tamper with the status of Berlin raised some doubts about the viability of the basic East-West agreements on Berlin and inter-German relations, by many regarded as the touchstone of détente in Europe.

This sketchy review of Eastern and Western perceptions is necessarily fragmentary and over-simplified. The essential argument it is meant to convey is the following: In the course of 1976 the deterioration of the general climate in East-West relations reached a point, where the continuity of détente policies was seriously imperiled. A reversal of this trend seems to require (1) the creation of a new foreign policy consensus in the United States adapted to the requirements of a long-term relationship with the East marked by a combination of conflict and cooperation; (2) the continued effective orchestration of Western policies towards the East; (3) the re-establishment between policy-makers in East and West of the degree of trust that existed before but now seems to have wavered as a result of recent developments; and (4) the concluding of concrete East-West agreements, both between the superpowers and at the European level, designed to reconfirm on both sides the conviction that a rough balance of benefits accrues from the détente relationship.

C O L L O Q U I U M

"THE BELGRADE MEETING WITHIN THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE CSCE
AND THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY"

THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
AT THE BELGRADE MEETING

by Johan Jørgen HOLST

Institute of International Politics and Economics
Belgrade, May 9 - 10, 1977

QUESTA PUBBLICAZIONE È DI PROPRIETÀ
DELL'ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

DEALING WITH THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF
EUROPEAN SECURITY: THE CBM APPROACH

by

JOHAN JØRGEN HOLST

with the assistance of

KAREN ALETTE MELANDER

A paper prepared for presentation at the colloquium on "
"The Belgrade meeting within the Follow-up of the CSCE
and the Military Aspects of European Security" organized
by the Institute of International Politics and Economics
in Belgrade May 9-10, 1977.

Note:

The views expressed in the
paper are the responsibility
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1. INTRODUCTION

The present paper purports to examine the system of confidence building measures (CBM's) which was initiated by the CSCE. We propose to consider some basic objectives to be served by CBM's, the problem of establishing relevant criteria, the implications of CBM's for other policy areas, and their relations to other aspects of arms control. Against such a background we shall delineate the record of compliance, the strengths and weaknesses of the established provisions, and the problems associated with voluntary and differentiated compliance. Finally, we intend to discuss some possible options with respect to amplification, modification and extension of the current provisions in connection with the Belgrade meeting. Before we embark upon our examination of CBM's, however, it seems desirable to delineate some of the key considerations involved in the construction of arms control arrangements for the security order in Europe. We do not propose to examine the various detailed proposals which have been advanced with the avowed aim of enhancing a shared perception of increased security in Europe. Our aim is the more modest one of providing an initial framework, or a check-list, for such evaluations.

2. THE FUNCTIONS OF ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

The basic goals of arms control include:

- 1) Reduce the probability of war
- 2) Reduce the damage and suffering if war should occur
- 3) Reduce the obstacles to a rapid and equitable war termination in the event of war
- 4) Reduce the costs and burdens of the arms competition
- 5) Reduce the role of military force in international relations.

The fifth goal is to a considerable extent derivative of the first four. However, for analytical reasons we have chosen to list it as a separate goal.

Such goals can never be attained absolutely. They will in part pose conflicting policy requirements. The policy problem is that of achieving optimized outcomes rather than simple maximization of single goals.

Particular objectives of arms control in any specific area have to be assessed in their concrete setting and context, because European arms control/^{measures} cannot be considered as politically neutral technical arrangements designed for purposes of enhancing stability. They constitute instrumentalities for the construction and management of the evolving security order in Europe. They should be assessed in a political context. Arms control proposals have been advanced for purposes of constraining undesirable political change from a particular interest perspective. They have been deployed also as a means of exploiting favourable asymmetries, blocking undesirable departures, and promoting political advantages. The ostensible commitment not to strive for unilateral advantage, can neither eliminate political competition nor incentives and opportunities for exploiting ambiguities and spin-off effects. However, the whole concept of arms control is based on the notion of certain shared interests transcending the competition of the moment. International politics is not a zero-sum game. The shared problem of nuclear holocaust has forced the states to look upon security as a shared value to a significant degree. That idea is derived from notions of community and a regulated system of power balance based on interdependence and reciprocal restraint. Such notions are not equally strongly founded in the political traditions and outlooks of all the states in Europe. We find there also competing traditions, emphasizing hegemonic ambitions and a commitment to struggle.

When we turn to an assessment of the goals of arms control we move inevitably into the realm of normative politics. However, the normative prescriptions should be based on an analytical evaluation of the nature of the security problems in Europe. For purposes of the present analysis we shall not

consider the five basic goals of arms control, but concentrate rather on concrete objectives derived from the basic goals of arms control and aiming at confidence building under present conditions in Europe. Thus, we shall postulate that the elimination or amelioration of preemptive instabilities constitutes a legitimate objective on the arms control agenda. Measures intended to enhance crisis stability need be based on a detailed analysis of given force dispositions and the particular characteristics of the weapon systems involved. The urgency of the problem of preemptive instabilities is to a considerable extent a function of technological developments; their introduction into the force structures, and the impact of the latter on political relationships in the areas of immediate confrontation.

Furthermore, we consider another objective of arms control, to involve the blocking of surprise attack options. Again we have to deal with the incentives inherent in certain weapon characteristics, troop dispositions, and deployments. It is important that arms control efforts keep pace with the evolving nature of the security problem in Europe. Arms control negotiations tend to be rather prolonged. The nature of the problem at hand may be transformed much more rapidly than diplomatists are able to construct agreements on the basis of initially discrepant proposals. The emerging problem of security in Europe is closely connected with options for zero- or rapid reinforcement attacks across the East - West division. The manpower approach at the MBFR talks is not ideal from the point of view of this problem. Similarly, we have witnessed how technological developments have burst open some of the categories and distinctions upon which SALT has been predicated till now.

In the European context measures of arms control should provide reassurance with respect to military activities and dispositions. This perspective reflects a recognition of the interdependent nature of the security of states in Europe. The problem is structural and intrinsic to the nature of international society. Measures of reassurance can be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral; reflecting explicit agreements or tacit coordination.

Basically speaking, an implicit objective of arms control in Europe is to reduce the impact of the military factor on the process of European politics. Such an objective involves curtailing the shadows rather than the substance of military power; reducing the political convertibility of the military currency and imposing constraints on the application of military force. Those who possess military power but in small quantities are likely to become ardent champions of such approaches. The states that are militarily powerful tend to be rather reluctant to concede their comparative advantages, verbal declarations to the contrary notwithstanding. However, from the point of view of the European political process, curtailing the rôle of military force is more important than reducing the level of military establishments per se. Reduced levels may or may not result in a reduced rôle for military force, depending on the details of reduction. Hence, the so-called associated measures that are under consideration in Vienna are as important, if not more important, than the aggregate ceilings proposed. The associated measures discussed in the MBFR talks are functionally related to the CBM's of the CSCE.

Arms control measures could also provide engines or catalysts for political detente and cooperation in Europe beyond the sphere of military security. They are important for purposes of maintaining momentum. A détente which did not extend to the military confrontation in Europe would, as we see it, inevitably grind to a halt.

3. THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF CBM'S

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in July for
presentation*

Confidence building with respect to the military situation in Europe involves the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats. Modern technological means of surveillance have long since penetrated the hard protective shells of secrecy traditionally surrounding the military preparations of the nation state. CBM's can be but a minor supplement to the various means of intelligence collection. They are of political and psychological importance because they can only be implemented on the express initiatives and wishes of the states whose military activity is notified or observed.

Hence, a major objective of CBM's is to provide reassurance to the rest of the states in Europe. They should provide reassurance by reducing uncertainties and by constraining opportunities for exerting pressure through military activity. CBM's would ideally shorten the shadows of military force. Confidence would be enhanced to the extent that the option of surprise military action recede into the background.

Ideally, confidence building measures with respect to the pattern and practice of military activities should serve to raise the threshold against military transgression of the rules with respect to interstate behaviour; such rules as are promulgated in the decalogue of the Final Act from CSCE. They should provide a basis for continued growth through practice. The system of CBM's for Europe need not be enshrined in formal agreements, but could evolve through state practice over time, reflecting the will for continued détente. The incentives for CBM expansion will reflect not only the experience gained and examples observed with respect to CBM implementation, they will reflect and influence as well the general atmosphere and broad scale substance of East - West détente.

In attempting to move from general principles to concrete measures of a confidence building potential, it is necessary to establish reasonable criteria for assessment of the relevant parameters. What should be the numerical threshold for prior notification of manoeuvres? First of all it is necessary to find a reasonable unit of account since formations differ in size and nomenclature. The number of men seems the most simple and obvious solution. How large a number? Here we have to make assessments with respect to the expected frequency of notification and the volume capable of constituting a threat. The answers may differ in the various regions of Europe. But from the point of view of overall equity it is important to establish uniform rules. There is little doubt that the current thresholds are somewhat high compared to the scale of feared threats in many regions of Europe.

Then we have the question of notification time. Clearly, there ought to be some relationship between the time actually spent in preparing a manoeuvre and the required leadtime for notification. Otherwise observed preparations which are not notified could generate fears of actual preparations for attack. Political crises may erupt suddenly. Hence, it is important that military manoeuvres be announced well ahead of time in order to allay fears that they are staged for purposes of influencing a domestic crisis situation.

Most Western states in fact preannounce their military exercises much longer in advance than the 21 days stipulated in the Final Act. That practice has developed because of the need to inform the local communities which will be affected by the manoeuvres, the press, and the outside world. It will be detrimental to the status of the CSCE provisions if Western notifications through diplomatic channels appear as an anti-climatic afterthought. Hence, we should probably envisage a longer period than 21 days for the prior announcement of major military manoeuvres.

We also have to confront a prior question:

How can we guard against states using official notification of manoeuvres to exert pressure on a given state or situation? Notification can be done very quickly, while it takes considerable time to stage manoeuvres. Could it be that notification according to CSCE rules in some circumstances could serve to amplify signals of threat and warning and thus facilitate a more rapid exertion of pressure than in the absence of the CSCE system of prior notification? No final answer can be given, except to note that the proof of the pudding lies in the eating. Should the perception spread that the CBM system were being exploited for purposes inimical to the spirit of the Final Act, the whole system would very soon collapse.

The possibility of misusing CBM's for purposes of exerting military pressure had to be assessed also in relation to how notification was to be given and who was to receive it. |

Should notification be confined to those most immediately concerned because of geographical proximity, or should it include all of the states in Europe? In order to reduce the danger of focussed pressure, it was from the point of view of the smaller states in Europe, important to insist on universality. Attempts at subregionalizing the security order in Europe to the advantage of the dominant military power have been resisted by a majority. It is in consideration of such dangers that the Western states have invited observers not only from the most immediate neighbours to attend manoeuvres. A representative sample of observers which can sustain the notion of an all-European security order among formally equal states, has been chosen by those states which for practical reasons, of capacity have had to refrain from inviting everybody. The Eastern practice has been somewhat different.

How much information should be communicated in notifying manoeuvres, and how much should invited observers be allowed to observe?

Clearly, the information should be sufficient for outside powers to make a proper assessment of the nature of the exercise. Observers who feel unduly constrained in their ability to obtain a clear picture of the exercise in question, may come to suspect that they are kept in the dark, that some important information is being hidden deliberately.

On the other hand, access should not be so extensive as to stimulate illicit intelligence activities. The observers should be treated with confidence and not subjected to security harassments, bugging, covert surveillance, etc. It would clearly be desirable to develop a code of conduct with respect to the treatment of observers. This should be in everybody's interest. Too little information can often be more destructive of confidence than no information at all. The long term goal should be the emergence of practices which are consistent with the idea of a more transparent and open world in the military as well as civilian spheres of human activity. We should recognize that the barriers to such a state of affairs are more pronounced in some countries than in others. But they do exist everywhere.

How much should be formulated as obligations of states, and how much should be left to voluntary practice?

Again we have to adopt an evolutionary perspective.

It should be possible for states by coordinated practice and proper publicity to exert pressure on those that are the least inclined to move beyond the minimum provisions. Hence,

a fairly broad scope for voluntary implementation above and beyond the minimum requirements constitute an important precondition for organic growth.

Finally, we have the problem of defining the phenomena to be observed or notified. How do we define the boundaries of a given manoeuvre if it be chained to a continuous series of exercises? What counting rules should then apply with respect to the obligation to provide prior notification? We face, furthermore, such problems as the one of defining a military manoeuvre in a manner which distinguishes it from a military movement. If such distinctions are difficult to make in the abstract, they may be even more perplexing to the states whose confidence depends on being able to know about major military activities in their immediate environment. It would seem logical to conclude that both major military manoeuvres and movements be included under the umbrella of CSCE-obligations.

There is a salient anomaly in the fact that current CBM's do not extend to naval forces, as the latter have traditionally been the forces which have lent themselves most easily to the exertion of political pressure (gunboat diplomacy) upon states.

CBM's with respect to military manoeuvres do not legitimate any such manoeuvre, they take cognizance only of the fact that such activities take place and that they affect the perceived security of several states in Europe. CBM's

need not be confined to the phenomenon of military manoeuvres. They should be focussed on the particular aspects of military activity which tend to produce fears and uncertainty.

Thus it would seem reasonable to focus future attention on the possibility of arriving at certain codes of conduct with respect to the nature and pattern of military activities in national border areas. Special constraints may be imposed, furthermore, on activities of a particularly offensive potential, provided we can avoid the interminable definitional problems which plagued the negotiations about qualitative disarmament in between-the-war years. Finally, another area of uncertainty, replete with incentives for expanded competition,

is that of military budgets. There is at present a great asymmetry in the availability of information about how much the various states are actually spending on defence, how they spend it, why they spend it the way they do, and how they envisage the long-term budgets, particularly with respect to procurement. Here an accepted formula for providing verifiable information to some European agency which would publish all budgets in the agreed detail, could presumably slow down one of the major engines of the arms competition: lack of knowledge about the programmes and ambitions of the potential adversary.

It has been observed that all the CSCE baskets are of equal significance and value. There is an obvious feedback relationship between the actual implementation in the various baskets. However, the speed of implementation may not be completely synchronized over the short run. We cannot expect equally paced linear progress. Furthermore, every basket has the potential of contributing momentum to the several processes of detente. Detente is not confined, of course, to the CSCE process. Hence, progress in any of the CSCE baskets will depend on the general climate and direction of East-West relations also outside Europe. We need not postulate any formal linkage between European problems and those involving the major powers of East and West outside Europe. But there is an unavoidable political linkage across issue areas and regions. Hence, progress at SALT and in the MBFR-talks will improve the general climate of confidence, and, by implication, probably increase incentives to expand the confidence building process at the CSCE-level. No explicit linkage needs to be established between the various levels of negotiation involving different constellations of actors.

There is, however, an atmospheric linkage in the general process of East-West detente, as well as a more specific connection between CBM's and the measures of verification, stabilization, and non-circumvention which may be associated with a reduction agreement from the MBFR-talks. Some of those measures may be directly related to a particular reduction agreement, others may provide a basis for subsequent adoption at the all-European level and thereby symbolize and reinforce the notion of an indivisible peace in Europe.

4. IMPLEMENTATION OF CBM's SINCE HELSINKI

Having outlined some of the purposes and characteristics of CBM's we turn next to a brief examination of the record so far. We recognize, of course, that such an analysis can be nothing more than an interim report in view of the short time that has elapsed since Helsinki. Also we should recognize that shortcomings with respect to compliance and implementation may not reflect intrinsic weaknesses in the provisions of the Final Act only. They may have been caused by institutional inertia as well as by a lack of political will. CBM's have but a limited potential for influencing the political atmosphere in Europe. CBM practice is, however, likely to reflect in part the actual state of East-West relations in Europe and beyond. The relationships are complex and very hard to unravel.

The Final Act is actually but an overture, suggesting themes to be developed in a new concert of Europe. The orchestration will be determined by state practice, also in the field of CBM's. The record of compliance with the provisions of the Final Act is in fact somewhat dissimilar for the different states in Europe. The Western states and the neutral states have tended to go beyond the minimum provisions in order to generate confidence momentum. The Eastern states have stayed closer to a minimum implementation. It took longer for the Eastern states to notify manoeuvres (see Table 1) than the Western states. The institutional obstacles may have been more pronouncedly biased against increased openness in the East. However, the initial five month period of silence with respect to Eastern notifications did not constitute a failure to adhere to CSCE provisions, but rather an apparent unwillingness to notify manoeuvres below the 25 000 man threshold.

According to our calculations altogether 25 manoeuvres have till now been preannounced in accordance with the provisions in the Final Act, 14 of which were Western manoeuvres, six were Eastern and five were conducted by neutral countries (Table I).

Half of the Western manoeuvres were below the threshold of 25 000 men as were four of the manoeuvres by neutral countries. Hungary did in April and October of 1976 notify manoeuvres below the 25 000 man threshold. However, notification was given only one day ahead of the initiation of the manoeuvre in the first instance, and on the same day in the second.

Thus we note that the Eastern states have notified fewer manoeuvres than the West. That fact is not attributable to a larger number of Western manoeuvres, but rather to a greater propensity on the part of the Western states to notify manoeuvres below the threshold of 25 000 men. In the Final Act the states recognize "that they can contribute further to strengthening confidence and increasing security and stability, and to this end may also notify smaller-scale manoeuvres to other participating states, with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres".

The Final Act also contains a paragraph wherein the states recognize "that they may notify other manoeuvres conducted by them". However, to the extent that this observation was intended to refer to independent air or naval exercises, no states have preannounced any such manoeuvres according to the CSCE procedures.

The Eastern states have adhered to the practice of inviting observers only from neighbouring countries. This is not in contravention of the Final Act where it is explicitly stated that it is up to the inviting state to "determine in each case the number of observers as well as the procedures and conditions of their participation". The Western states along with the neutrals have invited observers from a broader spectrum of CSCE participating states.

The Eastern States have not till now accepted any invitation to observe Western manoeuvres. The reasons for not accepting the Western invitations are not known as they have not been explained. It should be observed in this connection that the exchange of observers according to the Final Act is to take place "in a spirit of reciprocity". With the exception of Rumania, the Eastern states declined to send observers to a manoeuvre in Switzerland in 1975. Observers from the Eastern states participated in a manoeuvre in Yugoslavia in 1976 and

the USSR, Poland and DDR sent observers to a Swedish manoeuvre in March of 1977.

The procedures and conditions which have determined the participation of observers during manoeuvres have also varied considerably. The Western and neutral states, generally speaking, have granted the observers greater opportunities for direct observation and contact with host nation participating personell than have the Eastern states. Participating states have differed with respect to the number of observers invited, whether or not they included experts from the capitals in addition to the accredited military attachés, the rank of the observers nominated to represent their countries during manoeuvres, etc. They have followed different practices also with respect to the equipment which observers were allowed to bring with them, most notably photographic equipment. Furthermore, states have adhered to different patterns in connection with the information provided about the manoeuvres in question.

We have noted above that the purpose of exchange of observers is not to gather intelligence information, but rather (to as-
certain the true nature of the military activities under
observation and to pave the way for enhanced confidence through
greater openness and transparency.)

The Final Act states that the participating states recognize that they may at their own discretion and with a view to contributing to confidence building, notify their major military movements. No state, however, has provided such notification since Helsinki.

5. THE SCOPE FOR AMPLIFICATION, REINFORCEMENT, AND EXPANSION OF CBM'S

Having reviewed briefly the pattern of implementation, we now turn to a discussion of possible amplification and strengthening of the provisions in the Final Act with respect to CBM's. We shall explain briefly also certain possible options for additional provisions as part of a continuous process of confidence construction in Europe.

We note that the participating states seem to have adhered to the formal requirements contained in the Final Act.

However, when it comes to discretionary practice a differentiated pattern emerges. This is particularly true with respect to notification of major military manoeuvres below the 25 000 man threshold. It would seem desirable for purposes of ensuring a more uniform practice that the threshold be lowered to e.g. 10 000 men. The frequency of such manoeuvres is not so high that the modification would produce practical problems. Continuation of a differentiated pattern of implementation could give rise to the view that those states which exhibit reluctance to pre-announce below the threshold of 25 000 men are less interested than those who do in expanding confidence and mutual security. Tensions could indeed arise from an irregular pattern of actual implementation, particularly in view of the emphasis on reciprocity in the Final Act. Many of the smaller states in Europe never stage manoeuvres of a size which approach the current threshold. From the point of view of universality, it is important to ensure the participation and include the concerns of all the participating states.

Hence, we conclude that it is important to strengthen the commitment to preannounce manoeuvres below the current threshold of 25 000 men. In the absence of a decision to lower the threshold to 10 000 men we believe that the modal verb "may" in the paragraph on small scale manoeuvres should be replaced by "will". If the fixed threshold be lowered to e.g. 10 000 men, it would seem desirable to focus more specifically on below-threshold notification of military manoeuvres in the immediate vicinity of national border areas in order to strengthen mutual confidence in the areas where the potential for fear and misjudgment is particularly salient.

We have noted that states have differed also in their propensity to invite observers, in the selection of countries from which observers have been invited, and in their treatment of observers. Hence, consideration should be given to the possibility of amplifying and strengthening the provisions concerning observers so as to produce a more equal and consistent pattern of implementation. We deem it important to preserve the basic principle that observers be invited at the discretion of the host country. They should not constitute externally imposed agents of control. They are observers at

the disposal, so to speak, of the host country, desirous of demonstrating the absence of aggressive designs. It is possible to envisage also ~~(the eventual growth of the observer institution to include special surveillance teams which could be~~ on call whenever a state in a crises situation wanted to be able to provide convincing demonstration of the absence of aggressive preparations.

The Final Act already states that participating states "will" invite other states to send observers. This should be done "voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill". The obligation is general and not tied to major military manoeuvres only. Western and neutral states have invited observers to manoeuvres of a smaller scale than 25 000 men. Hence, the general obligation is clear enough. In order to avoid a practice leading to a subregionalized implementation through selective invitation of observers from neighbouring and small states only, it would seem useful ~~to include a provision stipulating that observers will be invited from a representative group of participating states.~~ It is desirable, furthermore, to consider the formulation of common criteria for the treatment of observers. ~~A code of treatment~~ could include provisions, for example, designed to ensure the ability of observers to observe adequately by guaranteeing them a reasonable freedom of movement in the manoeuvre area under escort. They should be given adequate briefings on the scenario, forces, objectives and terrain of the manoeuvre. The observers should have the right to use binoculars and cameras, with exceptions made, perhaps, for particularly sensitive areas. Such a code would be designed to produce a greater uniformity of practice and to enable the observers to fulfill their confidence building functions. We want to reemphasize in this connection that the exchange of observers is primarily an instrument affecting perceptions of the political climate. It is of rather limited military utility. However, out of the observer practice in the CBM context could grow more ambitious schemes for mutual observation and control in connection with agreements on arms control and disarmament, e g as a result of the Vienna talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe.

We have observed above that the 21 days minimum time for notification of major military manoeuvres should be extended to coincide more realistically with various preparations associated with major military manoeuvres. A period of 60 days would seem reasonable. It would provide increased insurance against the interpretation that a given manoeuvre be organized for purposes of exercising pressure in a political crises.

Consideration may be given also to the possibility of broadening the content of notification to include more information about the participating units, particularly their use of heavy equipment such as tanks, armoured combat vehicles, etc; the naval and air components in combined manoeuvres, and the possible links between the manoeuvre in question and other previous or subsequent manoeuvres.

No states have till now chosen to notify military movements. We have observed that such activity may in fact be hard to distinguish from a manoeuvre. All manoeuvres imply movement of forces. However, all movements do not involve a structured phase of two-sided activities which characterizes a military manoeuvre. The ambiguities involved, and the fact that manoeuvres are almost invariably preceded by movements and build-up of forces point in the direction of rewriting the provisions on military movements so as to make them analogous to, or indeed congruent with, those that apply to major military manoeuvres with respect to the obligation and threshold of notification.

As military movements do not require the same preparations as military manoeuvres the lead time for notification should probably be shorter, e.g. 15 days. Some states are dependent on the rapid transfer of assisting forces in an emergency in order to deter or repel aggression. Hence, there should be an escape clause covering the case when extraordinary events threaten to jeopardize the supreme interests of a participating state.

Such suggestions as we have made in this section are in consonance with the text of the Final Act in which the participating states recognize that the experience gained by the implementation of the provisions therein together with further

efforts, "could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence".

in order to sustain the process of detente it appears desirable to initiate consideration of additional CBM's for subsequent incorporation into the text. In this connection several states have drawn attention to the fact that they consider naval and air exercises particularly worrisome. Hence, it would be useful to study possible parameters with respect to the definition of thresholds for the notification of such manoeuvres as well. Obviously a straight manpower criterion will not be very applicable. Furthermore, several states have expressed the view that particular constraints should be considered in relation to military activity in immediate national border areas, e g within 25 km of such borders. The possibility of establishing ceilings on the forces manoeuvring within immediate border areas may be considered. It is conceivable also that it would prove possible to identify certain military activities which would be considered as particularly offensive in such areas and which could be subjected to prohibition.

CBM-type arrangements associated with agreements on mutual force reductions in Central Europe could include, for instance, prior notification of movements into the area of reductions, agreed rules with respect to the rotation of stationed troops, prior notification of major exercises in the area of reductions, limitations on the size, number and duration of exercises in the area of reductions, exchange of observers during exercises. They could include, furthermore, constraints with respect to movements and dispositions in the immediate vicinity of the reduction area, and establishment of fixed observation posts at major communication nodes. CSCE arrangements could provide a general framework for the integration of such particular constraints into a broader context. Hence, a certain overlap between CSCE and MBFR CBM arrangements could serve the function of preserving the coherence and cohesion of the security order in Europe at large.

Finally, it seems to us that a commitment on behalf of the participating states to publish data about military expenditures and procurement according to accepted definitions and formats would contribute substantially to reducing the uncertainty and competition which is generated by inadequate information.

We have attempted to suggest various ways in which the provisions of the Final Act with respect to CBM's could be amplified, strengthened and expanded. In our view CBM's should serve the aim of shortening the shadows of uncertainty and fear which are all too often associated with military activity on "the other side of the hill".

The suggestions are illustrative of an approach rather than exhaustive of the available options. Our aim has been to provide a basis for further consideration and dialogue. We believe that discussion and analysis of issues such as we have addressed above could in and of itself contribute to security in Europe.

Table 1. Notification of manoeuvres and invitation of observers since Helsinki

	Sponsoring country	Name of manoeuvre	Size of manoeuvre	Observers invited	Countries invited to send observers	No of observers invited from each country
1975	<u>NATO-countries</u>					
sep	FRG	Grosse Rochade	68 000	No		
oct	USA	Certain Trek	57 000	Yes	All CSCE(1)	2
oct/ nov	USA	Reforger 75	53 000	No		
sep	Turkey	Deep Express	18 000	No		
oct	Norway	Batten Bolt	8 000	No		
oct/ nov	Netherlands	Pantersprong	10 000	No		
	<u>WP countries</u>					
	None					
	<u>Neutral and non-aligned</u>					
oct	Yugoslavia	-	18 000	No		
nov	Switzerland	-	40 000	No		
1976	<u>NATO-countries</u>					
sep	FRG	Grosser Baer	50 000	Yes	All CSCE	2
"	USA	Gordian Shield	30 000	No		
"	USA	Lares Team	44 000	Yes	- " -	2
feb/ mar	Norway	Atlas Express	17 000	No		
sep	"	Team Work	13 500	Yes	CA-DE-FRG NE-UK-AUS FIN-SWE-POL USSR-USA	2
oct	Denmark/FRG	Bonded Item	11 000	No		
nov	UK	Spearpoint	18 000	Yes	USSR-CZ-GDR- RO-YU-SWE-SUI- FI-IR-AUS-PO- NE-CA	1
	<u>WP-countries</u>					
jan/ feb	USSR	Caucasus	25 000	Yes	BU-GR-RO- TU-JUG	3
Jun.	USSR	Sever	25 000	Yes	NO-SWE-FIN- PO-GDR	2-3

apr	Hungary 2)	-	10 000			
oct	Hungary 3)	-	15 000			
sep	Poland	Tarcza 76	35 000	Yes	DE-AUS-FIN-SWE	2
	<u>Neutral & Non-aligned countries</u>					
oct	Yugoslavia	Golilja	24 000	Yes	22 CSCE-participants	2
nov	Sweden	Poseidon	12 000	No		
1977	<u>NATO-countries</u>					
1977						
May	US	Certain Fighter	24 000	No		
	<u>WP-countries</u>					
Mar	Soviet	-	25 000	No		
	<u>Neutral and non-aligned</u>					
Mar	Sweden	-	10 000	Yes	AUS-SUI-US-NO-FRG-YUG-UK-DE-USSR-GDR-PO-FIN	2

1) This implies that in general all CSCE countries were invited. It could not be ascertained however, whether the invitees included countries with no military forces of their own, such as San Marino, Monaco, Iceland, etc.

2) Notified one day in advance of the manoeuvre

3) - " - the same day as the initiation of the manoeuvre

COLLOQUIUM

"THE BELGRADE MEETING WITHIN THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE
CSCE AND THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY"

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE
AND HOW THEY AFFECT THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES

by Savo MATIJAŠEVIĆ

Institute of International Politics and Economics
Belgrade, May 9 - 10, 1977

QUESTA PUBBLICAZIONE È DI PROPRIETÀ
DELL'ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE AND HOW THEY AFFECT THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Despite the overall process of detente that has been initiated in Europe and a reduced likelihood of an armed conflict breaking out on European soil, there is still cause for concern in view of the fact that peace on the European continent is based on an extremely high level of military effectives and on the strengthening of military power which is assuming broader and broader proportions. In other words, the political easing of tensions is not accompanied by a corresponding detente in the military sphere.

Survey of the Military Situation in Europe

Europe is the region with the greatest concentration of armed forces. There are some 7.4 million soldiers in the peace establishments alone to which another 1.3 million people should be added who belong to various semi-military formations that have been set up for different purposes as well as over 15 million trained ^{men in} reserve ~~officers~~.⁺ This tremendous military power is in possession of the most up-to-date arms so far built and produced which include, inter alia, 10.500 nuclear warheads, some 38.500 tanks and 10.100 fighter aircrafts, large reserves of stockpiled armaments and other lethal equipment etc. Approximately 3.000 warships are constantly sailing the coastal seas and oceans surrounding the European continent. If we were to add to this figure the forces designated for action on the European battle-

+ Estimates made on the basis of data from The Military Balance 1976-1977, p.80

field, we will obtain a figure amounting to almost half of the total world military effectives; this number being still larger if we consider the quality, i.e. the kinds and types of different weapons as well as their total fighting capacity. Of equal significance is the presence of exceptionally strong foreign military contingents and the existence of numerous military bases on the territory of Europe. It is, for instance, a well-known fact that about one million foreign soldiers are stationed in the European countries.

The greatest concentration of manpower and arms is to be found in the region of Central Europe. Although these forces are primarily used as a basic indicator of the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance in Europe, their magnitude and power have long since become a cause for concern for the majority of Europeans. It is excessive, both from a purely military point of view and from the point of view of maintaining the balance of power between the two military blocs, since its importance is only comparative. It is highly improbable, in other words, that either side would, in the existing constellation of military power in Europe, dare take the risk of starting broader war operations, or rather to resort to military force in settling disputes. If this were to be done, there would inevitably be a rapid escalation of war into a generalized world conflict with disastrous consequences for the whole of mankind.

It is likely that the military alliances came to realize this which gave rise to the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe (MFR). This move is,

doubtless, very encouraging, as it was one of the first indications of the beginning of the process of military détente, though little has been achieved in view of its implementation. On the contrary, statements in favour of strengthening military potential in certain regions of Europe are becoming increasingly frequent and refer particularly to the North European and South European wings which have supposedly become weaker in the past few years. This would not only not make for the normalization and positive stabilization of the situation but it would be rendered more unstable still, especially in the region of the Mediterranean and the Near East. In any event, the figures relating to the total number of military effectives in the Mediterranean region, which - barring the Black Sea and the foreign troops - amount to over 2.5 million soldiers in land power alone, are clearly indicative of this. The two military blocs have no less than 120 land-force divisions turned towards the South European battlefield. If, on the other hand, we bear in mind the fact that eleven of the European countries are Mediterranean States and that three non-Mediterranean powers are present via their fleets in the Mediterranean Sea, it may easily be concluded that it would be both illogical and unnatural to divorce the situation in this region from the situation and security in Europe as a whole.

If we should add to all this the continuous development of strategic missiles and nuclear weapons by the big powers, the total capacity of which has increased ^{five} ~~seven~~-fold in the past ^{seven} ~~five~~ years, then the following question rightly arises: Are these practices and tendencies not in contradiction with the policy

of detente and do they not express the concept of the inevitability of a third world war, of the perpetuity of the division of Europe and of the world into military and political blocs and of a peace based on the balance of power and terror? Some, however, hold the view that the strength of a country's politics are in direct correlation with the military power backing these politics. One tends to overlook or neglect the fact that concentrated military power, because it does not wish to be neglected, is exerting a constant pressure, thereby rendering politics still more aggressive.

The balance that has been established between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in Europe is, however, not a guarantee for the security of the countries that do not belong to these alliances. Aware of this, these countries are compelled to set aside considerable material and other resources from their national income for defense purposes and to devote much attention to the strengthening of their territorial defense which is a markedly defensive component.

While, on the one hand, advocating the policy of détente, the members of the military blocs are, on the other, increasing each year, their production of arms and modernizing their armed forces at an ever greater speed. This trend is particularly evident in the case of the super powers who are, thanks to their economic and technological potential, the greatest producers and exporters of all kinds of modern weapons and the mainstays of the continued arms race. According to the data obtained from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in

London, the total nominal military expenditure of the European countries, the USA and Canada for 1976 amounted to 306 billion dollars which represents a 6 per cent increase as compared to the previous year.¹⁾ In 1975, the NATO countries accounted for 44.8 per cent of the total military expenditure in the world, the Warsaw Pact countries for 33.3 per cent, the countries of Europe that do not belong to the blocs participated with 1.8 per cent, whereas all the other countries in the world accounted for 20.1 per cent.²⁾

In modernizing the armed forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pacts, special emphasis is laid on strengthening forces and means aimed at offensive action. New combat equipment of a considerably higher quality is being introduced or being built for this purpose, such as: new types of tanks, armoured transporters, the newest generation of precision guided missiles, warheads with space-effect explosives, new types of armed helicopters and fighter-bombers and airborne units of an accrued capacity. The conventional component of the armed forces of these countries is, hence, gaining new qualities in that their manoeuvring and firing capacity is enhanced by several times. It is within this context that one should view the frequent statements concerning the allegedly major contributions being made toward military détente and which, in fact, consist in a reduction of military service by a month or so, or in a symbolic cut in manpower in some services or operational groups in the armed forces. Mention is rarely made of the

1) The Military Balance 1976-1977, p. 78

2) SIPRI, Yearbook 1976, p. 128

fact that the power of arms does not merely reside in its numerical value and that the genuine capacity of certain services and branches of arms may be greater even with a smaller number of people.

It is, for instance, a matter of common knowledge that 1976 marked the end of one five-year plan concerning the further modernization of the NATO Pact armed forces and the beginning of a new five-year plan. According to incomplete data published, the members of this military alliance will produce, in the above period, 9.200 fighter planes, approximately 3.500 highly modern tanks of only one type as well as several tens of thousands of different kinds of weapons of the most up-to-date type. As regards the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, the 1975-1980 five-year plan for their modernization is now being applied. According to incomplete information published in the literature of the Western European countries, the members of that military alliance have acquired, in the course of the past ~~two~~ years, some 5.000 tanks, approximately ten thousand armoured transporters and self-propelling artillery pieces, new types of helicopters and fighter aircraft with a larger radius and load-carrying capacity etc.

These are only some of the manifestations of the arms race. If we consider the constant research for the building and production of new and more modern kinds and types of arms, ranging from missiles to thermonuclear and other combat weapons aimed at mass destruction, then the arms race becomes all the more apparent. The purpose of the arms race is not, however, to maintain the existing balance but rather to gain a vital one-

sided preponderance and thereby swing the balance in one's favour. This is why this competition is so dangerous because it may lead to a strategic destabilization which would have unforeseeable consequences on peace and security in the world and in Europe also.

It is evident that the techniques and technology of warfare have developed to a considerable extent. The military and political alliances and blocs are in possession of such vast quantities of warfare techniques and have such extensive possibilities of further parallelly developing these techniques and technology that any prospect of acquiring an essential advantage one over the other as regards power would seem quite unrealistic. The only realistic alternative for the European countries is, therefore, the process of detente, the reduction of armed forces and armaments and the promotion of mutual confidence.

Nuclear Weapons Limitation, the Reduction of Military Effectives and the Halting of the Arms Race - the Greatest Contribution to the Process of Military Detente and Security

It is obvious that the policy of the easing of tensions constitutes, within the framework of international relations, a tendency aimed at preventing the settlement of social contradictions occurring in the contemporary world by the use of weapons. Eventhough this policy constitutes, under present day conditions, the only alternative to a world-scale nuclear war, it is nonetheless fraught with serious contradictions. As it mainly relies on a precarious general military balance between the two super powers based, primarily, on missile-nuclear armaments, it is not a limiting factor in the continuance of the arms race and in raising the

balance to a higher strategic level, although the reverse process was expected in the Helsinki spirit.

The beginning of negotiations between the USA and the USSR regarding the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons (SALT) as well as the initiation of subsequent negotiations in Vienna between a group of NATO Pact and Warsaw Pact members concerning the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe (MFR) gave rise to a certain optimism as to the materialization of such a possibility.

The statements made by official representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States after the recent talks in Moscow give the impression that there is a still greater divergence in the approach to the problems at stake and that the achievement of the SALT agreement is still more uncertain than it had been prior to the talks. It would seem that some of the above effects are already being felt in the Vienna talks. The views of both sides taking part in these negotiations differ so widely that the genuine prospects of reaching an agreement between them in the near future are unlikely, even though the reductions under discussion are limited in significance and in scope.

We are aware of the fact that the Vienna talks represent, in view of the character, complexity and delicate nature of the questions involved, a unique event within the system of regulating relations between two military and political alliances in Europe, and that they reflect the positive view taken by both sides that the relaxation of political tensions and the easing of conflicts between the blocs cannot be achieved without the

adoption of corresponding measures in the field of military relations. For the time being, the talks only relate to the initial phase in reducing military effectives and arms in the region of Central Europe. Assuming that the present talks are successfully concluded, scope would be provided for continuing talks concerning the further reduction of arms and armed forces in other regions of Europe. The halting of any further increase in military effectives, offensive weapons and of mass destruction means would in itself be an encouraging achievement for the European nations.

Virtually all the talks that have so far been conducted in connection with the halting of the arms race and the reduction of military effectives have clearly assumed a-bloc character and have taken place within the framework of negotiations between the two alliances, under the decisive influence of the two big powers. If, however, the Vienna talks are regarded as one of the vital elements which ought to lead to reducing military tensions in Europe - then all the European countries have an interest in the proceedings and results of these negotiations. The Helsinki Conference has, in fact, adopted the view that participants in negotiating fora, which means also the Vienna talks, should "see to it that information about relevant developments, progress and results is provided on an appropriate basis to other States participating in the CSCE" as well as the view that it is "the justified interest of any of those States in having their views considered", which binds those taking part in the Vienna talks to inform the other European countries about the proceedings of the negotiations, a commitment which they have so far failed to meet.

It is our belief that no one labours under the delusion that genuine security can be built on a continuous arms race in order to maintain the balance of power or on mutual promises of non-aggression. As concerns Europe, much more substantial guarantees are essential to the people that belong or that do not belong to the two military and political alliances. These guarantees include, of course, a certain balance of power but not a balance that implies and encourages an increasingly dangerous arms race but rather one that will gradually lead to total disarmament and to the beginning of a genuine process of military detente.

Security, however, will not follow this line of development of its own accord. This will, above all, depend on the readiness and choice of all the European nations and states to gear their activity toward the development of a system of guarantees apt to ensure the consistent implementation of the Helsinki Conference provisions and they are, as we know, based on the achievement of a gradual reduction of arms and armed forces, on the enlisting of new efforts in favour of the achievement of general and complete disarmament, the development of mutual confidence among the European countries and the strengthening of their independence and peaceful cooperation.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and
the Process of Military Detente

Realistically recognizing that political goals cannot be, under contemporary international conditions, achieved by means of aggression, the participating States in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have agreed to: "refrain

in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration adopted."

It is of a particular importance that the CSCE placed on its agenda the problem of the indivisibility of security and that it indicated that a parallel and continued political and military detente was essential since it was only under that condition that a contribution could be made to peace and security. In order to initiate this process, the Conference adopted the document on "Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament." Eventhough these measures are, in essence, very modest, symbolic and not comprising even the most essential aspects, they are, nevertheless important in that they point to the initiation of the process of military detente in Europe.

The period from the Helsinki Conference to the present day bears all the marks of an initial process which has yielded rather substantive and encouraging results but has also shown certain waverings and even considerable deviations from the spirit and purpose of the Final Act of the Conference. According to data we have at our disposal, the most significant contribution has been made in regard to the implementation of certain confidence-building measures.

As concerns cooperation in the military sphere, it is worthwhile stressing that the majority of manoeuvres held on the territory of Europe from the holding of the Conference to the

present day have been notified. With reference to the Final Act of the Conference, the Yugoslav government has been notified of 26 manoeuvres by 32 Participating States. Several countries have simultaneously given notification of several multi-national manoeuvres. Notification has also been given of manoeuvres of a considerably smaller-scale than the one provided for in the Final Act: 19 manoeuvres comprising less than 25.000 people have been notified.

It is difficult to determine the exact number of notifications on a European scale, since most of them have been given on a regional or a bilateral basis. According to incomplete data, in 1976 108 major military exercises and manoeuvres have taken place in Europe as compared to a total of 76 performed in the previous year, 1975. This indicates that there has been no cut in military-manoeuve activities in Europe after the Conference, neither in terms of the total number of exercises and manoeuvres held, nor as regards the total number of troops engaged and the size of the manoeuvring area.

Certain tendencies have emerged with respect to military-exercise activity which are contrary to the letter and purpose of the notification provisions. For example:

- No notification has been given of manoeuvres constituting organizationally a series of comparatively smaller manoeuvres but having a general aim, a single operational concept, time-frame and area of conduct, and which are constitutive parts (elements) of larger manoeuvres, bearing all possible adverse implications for security and confidence among the States although, as such, should be notified.

~~- Notification has now included manoeuvres of amphibious or airborne units,~~ although such manoeuvres were held, and the Document adopted provides for such a notification.

~~- No notification has been given regarding manoeuvres in coastal areas and in the airspace.~~ The notification of such manoeuvres is not, it is true, compulsory according to the Final Act (... "if applicable"). These manoeuvres have, however, acquired the features of the permanent activity of large-scale fleet formations, particularly in the Mediterranean. Due to the conditions of crisis in this area, manoeuvres of the naval forces always constitute a potential threat and have, in fact, had an adverse effect on general security and confidence among the States. ~~When such large fleets or parts of such fleets enter into narrow seas, such as the Adriatic, or when they approach some country without prior announcement or conduct manoeuvres in its vicinity, (especially if it is a non-aligned country),~~ then this can be said to be contrary to the wish for promoting confidence and establishing better relations among peoples and States.

It is certain that the strengthening of confidence among the States would be further enhanced by a more consistent notification of all manoeuvres, in accordance with the parameters that have been set forth in the Helsinki Final Act. This means that all Participating countries in the Helsinki Conference should give notification of all manoeuvres comprised within the framework of these parameters, then of all manoeuvres for which the Final Act has not set specific parameters but suggests that they should be notified as well as of somewhat smaller-scale manoeuvres which are conducted for a longer period of time, for which more

*Italy and Yugoslavia
have done so 12 times*

information than that which is required by the relevant provision of the Final Act should be given. This implies the notification of smaller-scale manoeuvres of airborne and amphibious troops, and especially of military activities which are carried out in the proximity of the land or sea frontiers of other countries; even if they are conducted on a smaller scale.

According to the available data, there has been after Helsinki, no notification of larger-scale military movements. It is a well-known fact, however, that several movements of military forces have taken place outside the framework of manoeuvres. Although the Helsinki Final Act does not give a final definition of this measure but rather that it would be further discussed in the follow-up to the Conference, it is nonetheless suggested to the Participating-States that they may: ... "at their own discretion ... notify their major military movements". Prior notification of major military movements would, doubtless, contribute to confidence - building and would be in the Helsinki spirit.

Inviting observers to attend the manoeuvres proved to be one of the most important measures in favour of strengthening confidence. Although this measure has been, to-date, restricted as regards its application, it has nevertheless largely contributed to a better mutual understanding and to precluding possible suspicions, misunderstanding and miscalculations of the military activities of other countries. We feel that the contribution of this measure would be even more substantial if it were more frequently applied and if each notification of a major military manoeuvre were accompanied by an invitation of observers.

We consider that it is equally useful that the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference encourages, within the framework of the other confidence-building measures, the Participating States to: "with due regard to reciprocity and with a view to better mutual understanding, promote exchanges by invitation among their military personnel, including visits by military delegations. "Experience has confirmed that ~~friendly visits~~ of military personalities, groups, representatives of schools, institutes and institutions are a useful contribution towards a better mutual acquaintance, understanding and confidence.

The Final Act adopted at the Helsinki Conference contains, by and large, sufficient measures aimed at strengthening confidence among the countries that have subscribed their signatures. The contribution of these measures will, however, only be a genuine one if it gives rise to concrete changes in the situation and attitude of the military factor. In this context, it would be of a particular importance if the Participating States themselves ~~refrained from military activities apt to cause~~
~~anxiety and tension, especially in areas and at times of crisis.~~

C O L L O Q U I U M

"THE BELGRADE MEETING WITHIN THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE CSCE
AND THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY"

THE BELGRADE MEETING WITHIN THE FOLLOW-UP
OF THE CSCE - ITS ROLE AND PROSPECTS

by Djura NINČIĆ

Institute of International Politics and Economics
Belgrade, May 9 - 10, 1977

QUESTA PUBBLICAZIONE È DI PROPRIETÀ
DELL'ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

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I. The notion of a follow-up to the CSCE stemmed, it will be recalled, from an awareness - which, incidentally, was somewhat slow in coming - of the fact that the Conference neither marked the beginning nor should, of course, be expected to constitute the end of the process habitually described as the détente. The CSCE was, as pointed out in the Final Act, an important part of the process, which thereby acquired a new dimension and was to become "increasingly viable and universal in scope" and thus grow into a broad multilateral effort to "improve security and develop co-operation in Europe". The purpose of the Belgrade meeting, which is an essential element in the follow-up is, accordingly, to ensure the continuation and expansion of the process by giving further effect to the results of the Conference.

II. Viewed in the light of this general purpose, the more specific assignment of the Belgrade meeting stands out in clearer outline. This assignment will consist in assessing and furthering "the implementation of the Final Act and of the tasks set by the Conference". We have, of course, used the singular advisedly in referring to the assignment of the Belgrade meeting, since it is, in fact, a single assignment,

falling into two closely related and interdependent parts, the first of which should, moreover, be primarily construed in function of the second. Any attempt to split these two facets of the assignment, would, needless to say, run foul of the entire concept of the follow-up as defined in the Final Act.

III. From these general observations, there flow two further considerations, which it is essential to bear in mind both in the effort to assess the progress achieved so far and in the endeavour to extend the scope and accelerate the pace of the progress. The first of these considerations - which, no matter how obvious, tends sometimes to be overlooked - is that the Final Act is a comprehensive document, consisting of several parts and a multitude of provisions, which are inter-related and of equal importance (although not necessarily identical in nature and wording), and should, accordingly be construed and applied in its entirety - and within the context of the effect to be given to the results of the Conference as a whole. Any tendency - and it is hardly a secret that such tendencies are, in fact, apparent - to single out any one part or provision of the Final Act for exclusive application (or non-application, as the case may be), would be grossly at variance with the letter and spirit of the Helsinki document and destructive of the ends it is designed to serve. The document, as now seems to be generally admitted, possesses the unique merit of constituting both a delicately balanced compromise between the different - and often divergent - attitudes and interests involved and a consistent approach to the many aspects of the over-all problem of security and co-operation in Europe. To try to undo this compromise and disrupt the comprehensiveness of the approach, is tantamount to moving

backwards rather than forwards - it would mean reverting to pre-Helsinki rather than advancing towards post-Belgrade modes of thinking and patterns of behaviour.

The second consideration relates to the general nature of the process, of which mention has already been made here and of which both the Helsinki Conference and the Belgrade meeting are a part. The recognition of the evident fact that the Belgrade meeting is part of a process has a threefold implication. On the one hand, it leads to a recognition of the impossibility of achieving everything at once and that progress - whether before or after Belgrade - necessarily has to be gradual. On the other hand, the long term and continuing nature of the process involved, opens broad prospects of further advance towards more genuine security and expanding co-operation. Finally, since the "implementation of the Final Act and of the tasks set by the Conference" is part of a process, it has to be viewed within the context of the latter and assessed in terms of the impact produced thereon. It should, by the same token, be approached in a dynamic and forward looking spirit.

It is, probably, in a failure to take due account of these over-riding considerations that the selective and restrictive attitudes - and they frequently tend to converge - to the problem of implementation originate and reflect some of the difficulties to which the problem seems to have been giving rise.

III. Such, then, would appear to be the general conceptual setting within which the Belgrade meeting should be

expected to set about the more practical task of surveying the ground covered since Helsinki and of mapping the further course of the "multilateral effort" initiated by the CSCE. That this should be done in a practical and constructive spirit, seems to be the prevailing view - at least in so far as it is expressed. That this should be done with an eye to the future, to further and fuller progress after - and as result of - Belgrade, also seems to be a major premise upon which the success of the coming gathering in our capital primarily depends. A few words might, accordingly, be said with regard to the "development of the détente in the future" - as the Final Act puts it.

The further implementation of the Final Act will, needless to say, call for a more effective effort to put into practice those provisions of the Helsinki document which have not so far been adequately applied. This will, at the same time, require further measures, both of a substantive and of a procedural nature, wherever such further steps are explicitly envisaged or implied in the Final Act. Such measures would, obviously, mean neither a revision of, nor an addition to, the Final Act, but rather an essential part of its more effective implementation. Some of these measures readily come to mind, especially in the area we shall presently be dealing with - that of the military aspects of European security. But the same applies to the other "baskets" as well, including, in particular, the fourth basket or what might be described as the "continuation of the follow-up".

That the follow-up, if it is to have any real meaning, should continue after Belgrade, is no longer, it is to be hop-

ed, a matter of dispute. What the Belgrade meeting will have to decide, and this will be an extremely weighty decision, will concern the form (or the "modalities") ~~the follow-up will~~ assume subsequent to that gathering. The activities that have been taking place in view of the meeting, the vast significance the latter is clearly acquiring and the stimulating effect it is already having, provides ample evidence, if any were needed, of the vital importance of such meetings as an essential element of the follow-up and the general process of which it is a part. Further meetings should, therefore, be provided for, preferably on a periodical basis and, possibly, on a somewhat higher level, because it is of the first importance that the follow-up should be divested of the elements of uncertainty which now becloud it and which are bound to react adversely on the détente as a whole. It is equally important that, in the meanwhile, the groups of experts, envisaged in the Final Act, including the activities of the international organizations referred to in the relevant section of the document, should also continue apace.

IV. The task that will face the representatives of the ministers of foreign affairs as they assemble in Belgrade later this year, will be a complex one and the setting within which they will have to tackle it will be far from simple. Their success in performing it will depend, to a very large degree, upon the extent to which the meeting proceeds along genuinely democratic lines, along the lines that were gradually evolved by the Conference itself. Upon which, in other words, rule no. 1 of the Procedure adopted at the Conference

is observed and "all States participating at the Conference (i.e. meeting) shall do so as sovereign and independent States and in conditions of full equality" and that the meeting genuinely takes place "outside military alliances".

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Belgrade, May 9 - 10, 1977

QUESTA PUBBLICAZIONE È DI PROPRIETÀ
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The Belgrad Meeting within the Follow-up of the CSCE

10 Theses

1. Two years after Helsinki one may state that quite a few concrete improvements have been introduced into European politics. Among them the most important seems to be the re-appearance of the traditional notion of Europe which had been missing for some thirty years as a consequence of the fundamental political cleavage after World War II. While the fundamental political and ideological contradictions remained unsettled and proved unsurmountable, public opinion all over Europe became aware that beside well-known state interests there are interests of the people themselves which should much more be taken into consideration by European politicians. Thus the re-unification of families made headway on a larger scale.
2. It is worthwhile mentioning that economic cooperation between the different parts of Europe has not only survived the global economic crisis but in some countries even increased its share in overall foreign trade. Some of the special agreements of Helsinki have more or less been practised, e.g. prior notification of, and exchange of observers to, military manoeuvres.
3. In Belgrade the representatives of the European states are going to discuss the positive and negative results of Helsinki. This may become a useful exercise if the participating governments resist the temptation to produce mere propaganda or behave like 35 prosecutors. Whether Belgrade will really become successful depends first of all on the ability of the diplomats to detect areas of common interest where additional parts of the

Final Act of Helsinki can be realized and cooperation enhanced. For all practical purposes economic and technical cooperation should be tackled by existing agencies such as ECE to guarantee maximum efficiency at minimum cost. Duplicating existing organizations will deter public opinion from cooperation rather than encourage to.

4. It might be useful to analyse in more detail the impact of the Final Act on the political situation in Europe. While the general tendency, which emerged in East-West-relations at the beginning of the seventies, did not change, intensified communications between the different political and social systems did not always result in détente in the sense of political relaxation. If détente means to learn living together in spite of existing differences, the interpretation of the Final Act by government officials and mass-media sometimes led to strains rather than to relaxation. Domestic difficulties or overdrawn expectations made dogmatics and sceptics again resort to polemics, which were well-known from the Cold War, or to inactivity.
5. Since the text of the Final Act is very comprehensive and detailed it would not make sense to negotiate new agreements in Belgrade. What has been reached in Helsinki is probably to be considered the maximum of what can be done at the present stage.
6. The positive effects of the Final Act of Helsinki have become visible most of all in the field of humanitarian problems. There are reports from many European countries which introduced new regulations enhancing communications between the people across national frontiers and taking the personal interests of their citizen much more into consideration than in former times. Since it is the purpose of states and governments to serve the interests of the people, attention should be devoted to expanding these activities.

7. While much is left to improve East-West-relations in Europe this complex is becoming overshadowed more and more by worldwide difficulties. The global economic system appears not to be sufficient any more (which is relevant to CMEA-countries likewise). New methods of cooperation, concertation, control and guidance will become inevitable. The problems of energy and commodities, of the international division of labour, of the protection of environment, of the preventing ~~of~~ abuse of nuclear plants and of the protection of civil nuclear industries have to be thoroughly discussed. This is a challenge to cooperation of all countries including the socialist countries in Europe and the states of the Third World. Excluding themselves from this cooperation will not save the socialist countries from being affected by the deficiencies. While ideological slogans may have met with applause from developing countries for some time, the states of Africa, Asia and Latin-America will in the future identify their friends according to their actions rather than to their wording.
8. In the field of international security it has become obvious that détente cannot be limited to Europe. The process of détente will develop worldwide, or collapse. People have become sensitive against industrialized states delivering weapons and armaments to developing countries in excess of their defensive needs and thereby introducing a new form of colonialism for reasons of strategic interests or financial profits. By the way, some industrialized countries have experienced the unwillingness of developing countries to be used as proxies in conflicts between East and West.
9. While arms control negotiations did not result in substantial progress in the past, pressures from less powerful states towards real achievements will grow. In addition, the necessity to develop new energy resources will lead more and more countries to the "threshold" which eventually might jeopardize any endeavours to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The more

so if the super-powers will not come to an agreement to substantially reduce their strategic armements. The Vienna talks, however, are unlikely to produce meaningful results in a foreseeable future. Economic pressures to reduce the burden of armements will not become strong enough to force governments into international agreements on arms control as long as threat perceptions are permanetly being fed by a strong military build-up on one side and by a militant propaganda, the more so since the technicalities of arms and forces reductions are highly complicated, and the European balance of forces is inseparably intertwined with the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

10. One ^{chapter} might be analysed in more detail by the governments in Belgrade, in so far as it might have politically destabilising effects. What I have in mind is the activity of radio stations broadcasting in foreign languages. The very fact that these broadcasts meet with interest in the ~~broad~~ populace is evidence that people do not really trust their national radio stations. The best remedy would be therefore to improve the national news programs and to encourage independent commentaries. But this appears difficult and is precluded in certain countries by ideological peculiarities. In view of the different political systems it seems not to be promising to strive for common and binding guidelines which would guarantee "positive" qualities of those broadcasts. The only way to avoid negative implications on East-West-relations might be to apply the same restrictions to foreign broadcasts which the radio stations have to observe in their domestic activities. If the stations for instance want to criticize a foreign government they should not exceed the limits they have to watch when criticizing politicians within their own countries. Whether it is advisable to institutionalize some sort of international (but non-governmental) control over these broadcasts may be open to discussion.

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ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ БЕЛГРАДСКОЙ ВСТРЕЧИ В СВЕТЕ ОПЫТА
ПРЕТВОРЕНИЯ В ЖИЗНЬ ЗАКЛЮЧИТЕЛЬНОГО АКТА СОВЕЩАНИЯ
ПО БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВУ В ЕВРОПЕ.

I. Международная действительность наших дней характеризуется динамизмом и многоплановостью. Экономические трудности и внутриполитическая борьба во многих капиталистических государствах; неурегулированность конфликтов в тех, или иных районах земного шара; обострение проблем, связанных с задачей перестройки международных экономических отношений — все это не только усложняет картину, но порой заслоняет масштабы и значение сдвигов в межгосударственных отношениях двух систем, охватываемых понятием разрядки. Между тем, вне контекста разрядки не могут быть правильно поняты, и, тем более решены многие сложные ^{как} проблемы глобального, так и регионального характера, с которыми человечество сталкивается на пороге последней четверти XX века.

2. 1 августа 1975 года, когда высшие руководители тридцати трех европейских стран, а также США и Канады, подписали в Хельсинки Заключительный акт Совещания по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе, начался новый этап разрядки. В повестку дня встало претворение в жизнь согласованных на Совещании положений и договоренностей, "материализация разрядки" в различных областях. С того дня прошло почти два года. Достаточен ли такой срок для оценки воздействия этого документа на международные отношения, для подведения итогов? Вопрос этот особенно уместен в связи с предстоящей встречей в Белграде. Вряд ли можно на него ответить однозначно. С одной стороны, Заключительный акт — это долгосрочная программа, рассчитанная на годы и десятилетия. Но с другой стороны, на пути претворения в жизнь Заключительного акта уже сделаны первые шаги,

достигнуты практические результаты, выявились определенные – порой противоречивые – тенденции и позиции, анализ которых имеет существенное значение для понимания хода и перспектив процесса разрядки в целом.

3. При оценке современного этапа разрядки существенное значение имеет выбор критерия. Если сравнивать нынешнее положение с абстрактными и субъективными представлениями и идеалами, то, конечно, нетрудно найти повод для критики и неудовлетворенности. Но если оставаться на почве действительности – по самой своей природе сложной, динамичной и противоречивой – если сравнивать его с конкретным и не столь уж далеким периодом "холодной войны", то нельзя не прийти к выводу о бесспорно позитивном характере продолжающихся сдвигов на международной арене.

Правда, по сравнению с предшествующим периодом, когда речь шла в первую очередь об устранении тех наслоений "холодной войны", которые явно обнаружили свою несостоятельность и пришли в противоречие с интересами не только прогрессивных общественных сил, но и правящих кругов Запада, и когда процесс разрядки протекал сравнительно быстро, нынешние сдвиги в межгосударственных отношениях двух систем выглядят менее "эффективными". Работа по претворению в жизнь договоренностей, достигнутых в Хельсинки, складывается из многих практических дел, не всегда заметных, но тем не менее важных.

В Советском Союзе придается большое значение претворению в жизнь всех положений Заключительного акта. Эту работу вовлечены многие министерства и ведомства. Естественно, что по одним направлениям сделано больше, по другим – необходимые меры принимаются постепенно или только еще разрабатываются. Многое здесь зависит от общего состояния политических отношений между государствами, от "уровня" разрядки.

Плодотворные последствия разрядки, необходимость ее продолжения и углубления очевидны. Этого не могут игнорировать и ответственные государственные деятели Запада, которые уже после Хельсинки неоднократно заявляли о том, что политика разрядки не имеет разумной альтернативы, и подтверждали курс на ослабление международной напряженности, обосновывая его реальностями мировой ситуации, жизненными интересами ^{своих} стран.

4. Хотя разрядка сохраняет свое значение ведущей тенденции международной жизни, современный этап мировой политики характеризуется проявлением и других, нередко противоположных тенденций: продолжается гонка вооружений, существует ряд очагов напряженности, дает себя знать активизация противников мирного сосуществования государств двух систем.

Кампания против разрядки ведется по многим направлениям. Это и рассуждения о "бесплодности" разрядки или о ее якобы односторонней выгоде для Советского Союза, это и необоснованные обвинения социалистических стран в "невыполнении" принятых в Хельсинки обязательств, это и шумные кампании вокруг "защиты прав человека" в социалистических странах, сопровождающиеся попытками вмешиваться, вопреки духу и букве Заключительного акта, в их внутренние дела, это и бездоказательные утверждения о росте "советской угрозы".

Все это не остается без влияния на официальный внешнеполитический курс, затрудняя реализацию уже достигнутых договоренностей, в частности в области ограничения вооружений, и препятствуя развитию взаимовыгодного равноправного сотрудничества.

5. Думается, что поиски врагов мира не в состоянии перечеркнуть достижений разрядки, опирающихся на прочную объективную основу.

Тем не менее их деятельность таит в себе серьезную опасность. Задержка в поступательном развитии разрядки, ^а тем более попятное движение, возврат к "холодной войне" могут обернуться не только бесцельной растратой материальных ресурсов в гонке вооружений, но и опасными обострениями международной обстановки. Все это налагает особую ответственность на правительства всех стран — больших и малых, требует высокой бдительности и нарастающей активности широких общественных кругов, всех миролюбивых сил.

Первостепенное значение имеют проблемы обуздания гонки вооружений, ибо в наши дни ее продолжение заключает в себе серьезную угрозу всеобщему миру и может ^свести на нет достижения политической разрядки.

~~Следует~~ Необходимы терпеливые поиски все новых путей и конкретных форм развития мирного взаимовыгодного сотрудничества между государствами с различным общественным строем. В деле материализации разрядки большую роль по-прежнему призвано сыграть основанное на принципе мирного сосуществования ^в двустороннее сотрудничество, возможности которого, как показывает практика, далеко не исчерпаны. Вместе с тем положительное значение имело бы развитие многостороннего сотрудничества государств, образующего как бы связующую материальную ткань прочного мира. На это направлены известные советские предложения о проведении общеевропейских конгрессов или межгосударственных совещаний по проблемам транспорта, энергетики, защиты окружающей среды.

Предстоящая в 1977 г. встреча представителей государств-участников общеевропейского совещания в Белграде, дает возможность обменяться мнениями о положительном опыте сотрудничества государств в решении задач, определенных в Заключительном акте, и продолжить на многосторонней основе обмен мнениями о дальнейших усилиях в целях

5. упрочения безопасности и развития сотрудничества в Европе, развития процесса разрядки в будущем.

6. Что касается Советского Союза, то последовательность его курса на разрядку, его решимость вместе со всеми миролюбивыми силами добиваться упрочения безопасности в Европе и во всем мире, расширения равноправного и взаимовыгодного международного сотрудничества в различных областях, получили подтверждение в решениях XXV съезда КПСС, в документах Берлинской конференции коммунистических и рабочих партий Европы (июнь 1976 г.), в материалах Октябрьского пленума ЦК КПСС, в итогах совещания Политического консультативного комитета государств-участников Варшавского договора в ноябре 1976 г. в Бухаресте, в выступлениях Л.И.Брежнева.

Советский Союз и другие страны социалистического содружества добиваются дальнейшего развития благоприятных для мира и социального прогресса перемен в международной обстановке, превращения разрядки в непрерывный, все более жизнеспособный, универсальный и необратимый, охватывающий все континенты процесс, перехода к устойчивому плодотворному мирному сотрудничеству между государствами, достижения практических успехов в разоружении — в первую очередь ядерном.

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