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SOME THOUGHTS ON PROSPECTS FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

by

Roberto Aliboni

Questo documento fa parte di un progetto di ricerca sui problemi del Mediterraneo, che l'Istituto Affari Internazionali conduce con l'aiuto finanziario della Fondazione Ford.

This working paper is part of a research project on the problems of the Mediterranean, conducted by the Istituto Affari Internazionali with the financial support of the Ford Foundation.

Within the IAI research project on the Mediterranean - of which the Athens conference is an element - one of the problems faced was that of the prospects for industrialization in the area.

Our neglect of agricultural problems was due, not to any belief that these are less important than industrial questions, but simply to the need to optimize the allocation of scarse resources for research. Much excellent, wide-ranging work on Mediterranean agriculture had already been completed by other scholars.(1) It is no coincidence that there is a far greater level of agricultural than industrial cooperation between countries at different levels of development. Both politicians from the less developed countries and scholars have underestimated not so much the potential as the very possibility of any degree of industrialization going beyond import substitution. At the same time, with the expansion of refining capacity in the Northern Mediterranean countries, an expansion determined by considerations of company and national strategy, the usual economic rule governing the location of transformation industries ceased to apply. This rule states that the localization of these industries (in this case refining) depends on the comparative transport costs of the processed and the raw product. In the case of oil the transportation of the refined product is no more expensive than that of crude. Despite this, the period since the second World War has seen the construction of an enormous refining capacity in zones far removed from the oil fields. This development has led to serious distortions in the shipbuilding (tanker) market, as well as to dangerous problems of sea pollution (2). At the same time it should be remembered that prospects for resource exploitation even better than those for refining have also been neglected. In so far as the transformation industries are con-

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cerned it is normally considered that where it is physically impossible to transport a given raw material the development of a processing industry is inevitable . In the case, however, of the natural gas released during oil drilling, for years this was simply burnt off on the surface. Even today a large proportion of the gas produced in this way goes to waste.

In recent years, the large-scale investments by the Mediterranean oil-producing countries in the exploitation of natural gas has shown the changed prospects for industrialization. This change is due, more than to any other factor, to the will to industrialize which emerged amongst the Mediterranean countries towards the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, with the gradual elimination of the last colonial and semi-colonial regimes in the area.

It was this change, in combination with those considerations already mentioned, which led the IAI to direct a proportion of its research (3) effort towards the theme of Mediterranean industrialization. We hope to have our first conclusions ready during 1977.(4) This paper does not, therefore, represent an overall synthesis of our conclusions on the problem of industrialization. Our aim, here is, while taking account of work already done, to discuss those international factors which, in the short or medium term (not more than three or four years) might influence industrial investment in the less developed Mediterranean countries (5).

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Table one provides a number of indicators of the industrial situation in the main Mediterranean countries : manufacturing industry's share of gross domestic product, its share of total exports and the proportion of the economically active population engaged in

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the sector. The figures provided are obviously insufficient to fully explain the industrial situation in the countries under consideration. They do however show how the only countries in the area with a significant level of industrial production, a significant proportion of the economically active population employed in manufacturing industry, and (with the exception of Turkey) a significant volume of industrial exports, are those of Southern Europe. Although Israel stands geographically apart from this group, she may, for our stand point, be considered as being close to it. Her position is somewhat that of a transitional state between the first and the second group, formed of those countries listed in the table between Egypt and Iraq. In the case of these latter countries the level of industrialization is relatively low (although, considering the overall industrial structure :- the general level of education, the existence or otherwise of basic infrastructures, a tradition of manual labour etc. there are profound differences between a country such as Egypt and one such as Iraq.) The relationship between gross domestic product and exports in the manufacturing sector differs more widely between these countries than between those in the first group. In general however, patterns of exports give no sign of significant industrial development.

Lastly, there exists a third group of countries, listed between Saudi Arabia and Libya (and including countries such as Qatar, the Oman etc. - excluded here) whose industrial production and exports are either insignificant or totally non-existent. These include those oil-producing states with the largest financial surplusses.

This rather crude outline shows how, for the moment, the general level of industrialization in the Mediterranean is a modest one, but also how, at the same time, the picture varies widely from region to

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region. The distinction between the countries of Southern Europe and the North African and Middle-Eastern countries is thus both necessary and inevitable. It is indeed one of the most important factors determining the dynamic of area development. In so far as the European presence is concerned, the maintenance of this distinction remains an alternative to the international integration of the Mediterranean. This does not however remove the justification for an overall examination of the area. The two main sub-regions identified above, both aspire to a more advanced level of industrialization. Especially regarding relations with the EEC, both have relatively short-term problems of international integration.

In particular it should be emphasized that since 1973-74 new factors have emerged which apparently favour the beginning and/or acceleration of the industrialization process.

For the countries of Southern Europe the most dynamic developments have been political. The 1974 Portuguese revolution, the fall of the Greek military dictatorship and the death of Franco in Spain have led to a process of change, which, with the aid of other factors- the German attitude towards the Portuguese crisis, new trends within the French, Italian and Spanish Communist parties - has led to a movement towards membership by the Southern European countries of the EEC. It is clear that the economic consequences of membership would be modified for the candidate countries, for existing EEC members and, indirectly, for the EEC's Arab and other Mediterranean partners. Even if full membership proves to be impossible the problem of relations between the Southern and the other European countries, and especially, as we will see, with Germany, is one that cannot be eliminated.

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For the Middle-Eastern and North African countries the most significant new developments have been political and economic. The most important political development is the greater degree of political stability now attained within the Middle-Eastern area and the higher level of solidarity now obtaining between many large Arab countries. It should be noted, secondly, that the international strength, both of Iran and of the Arab countries, has increased considerably. These countries are now able to influence the course of important international negotiations at present in progress (the Euro-Arab dialogue, the Conference for International Economic Cooperation - CIEC) as well as major decisions concerning the international economy. Thirdly, those countries which have succeeded in increasing, on several occasions within a short space of time, the price of oil, have now attained an extremely significant financial capability. For certain countries, such as Algeria, the price increase is barely sufficient to finance accelerated, large-scale development plans. Others, such as Egypt, with no oil surplus for export, benefit from extremely generous aid from countries such as Saudi Arabia, with financial resources far in excess of their absorbtive capacity and development needs.

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These developments, which we have only touched upon here, are of great importance both for the future development of domestic investment and on account of the way in which they strengthen the will to industrialize. While they are not in themselves sufficient to guarantee international (especially private) investment, the subject with which we propose to deal in this paper, they are, nonetheless useful, in that they are a necessary condition if this investment

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is to materialize.

Amongst the many factors which influence conceivable short and medium-term international investment in the Mediterranean, we intend in this paper to discuss only three : those which we consider to be of the greatest significance.

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Our first theme must be the general prospects for international short and medium-term investment. Since 1974 the international capital market has undergone, in a very short period, profound change. The main actors have been private trading banks on international markets. The resources of the surplus-holding countries have been managed by the major American banks and by a number of European, especially British, institutions... The American role expanded further with the re-opening of the US capital market, at the end of 1975, to non-residents.

Official mechanisms have only played a marginal role in balance re-cycling. The private banks are thus more than ever before, the guarantors of international financial stability. It is they who have to use the resources entrusted them by the producer countries to cover the enormous balance of payments deficits of the consumer countries, whilst at the same time ensuring that this investment is sufficiently profitable to satisfy the expectations of those producer countries which own the resources invested. It is not yet possible to evaluate the success or failure of this operation. In practice the bank's responsabilities go beyond that of maintaining international financial stability.

What interests us here however is the way in which the international banks re-cycle the surplus generated by the increase in the

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price of oil. Table two, which lists publicly announced Euro-currency credits, may help to provide an answer. From the table it can be seen that, in 1974, the resources in question were absorbed mainly by the industrialized countries and in particular by those European countries with the most serious balance of payments deficits. Already in 1974 however it was possible to perceive increased drawing on the markets by the socialist countries and by the less developed non-OPEC countries. In 1975 petrodollars were re-cycled mainly through the less developed countries (including a number of OPEC members). Some credits were drawn by the socialist countries. It should be noted that in 1975 the sums absorbed by the less developed countries were significant not only in relative but also in absolute terms. Data for the first nine months of 1976 show that credit granted to the less developed countries has reached 93% of the total for 1975. The socialist countries have received 76% of their previous total. The industrialized countries, on the other hand, attained about 19% over the total for the previous year.(6) This means that whilst the trend has perhaps weakened somewhat with respect to the previous year, a considerable volume of resources continues to be invested in the less developed countries. The socialist countries have a lower investment absorbtion level. Credit to the industrialized countries, is beginning, once again, to expand.

The main conclusion we can draw from this data is that a massive deployal of resources is in process in favour of the less developed countries. It has been in this way that the banks have recycled the funds entrusted them by the producer countries.

As is well known there were worries, as early as 1975, over the debt position of the international trading banks with the less developed countries (7). During 1976 these became more insistent(8).

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It should be emphasized that these worries concerned not only the consequences of possible defaults on those banks with the heaviest credits outstanding but also the behaviour of those producer states which had deposited their reserves with these banks. The less developed countries' debt is today one of the key problems in international finance. That which interests us here is the way in which these debts with the private banks are to be managed. Can the stream of investments towards less developed countries continue?

There are two possible solutions, which might prove to be complementary. The first would be to continue to grant loans, as in fact occurred during 1976, trusting (a) that the recovery in the industrialized countries will continue and that present levels of raw materials prices will be sustained, (b) that the demand for investment goods in the less developed countries will continue at a high level and (c) that there will be an improvement in present political and institutional conditions (the institution of investment guarantee schemes, the ending or the attenuation of the present climate of confrontation etc.(9). The other solution would be a more or less generalized roll-over of the less developed countries external debt, on the lines proposed by the IV UNCTAD session in Nairobi and later passed on to the CIEC Commission for Financial Affairs. This would be complicated by the fact that it could not be carried through without measures instituting controls over the international capital market, measures which would change the latter's nature and its degree of autonomy.(10)

Quite apart from the practical difficulties involved (especially in the case of our second proposal) these solutions to the problem contain internal contradictions of their own. It seems, in other words, that even successful management of the banks' outstanding

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credits, would not suffice to guarantee an adequate flow of investment towards the less developed countries. When it is stated that one of the conditions for this flow of investment to continue is the recovery of the industrialized countries, it should be remembered that this recovery could lead not only to a recovery in industrialized country consumption but at the same time to an expansion in domestic investment. Given that financial resources are finite, the requirements of domestic investment would compete with those for investment in the less developed countries, thus leading to a fall in the latter's propensity to invest. In practice this competition is already growing, as may be deduced from what we have already seen with respect to Euro-credit trends and from the data in Table Three on international bond issues.

The data in Table three applies mainly to international investment by the industrialized countries and by multinational companies based in these countries. This is due to the extremely weak presence of the developed and the socialist countries on the market. The table does show however, how investment by the industrialized countries, after a fall in 1974(when short-term interest rates were consistently higher than those for longer term loans) in 1975 recovered rapidly. Partial data for 1976 shows that investment growth for this year was probably even higher. It should be emphasized that this upwards trend mainly concerns investment by industrialized countries other than the USA. This is due to the fact that bond issues by American companies on the Euro-market and elsewhere outside the USA are falling fairly sharply whereas non-American issues are rising on the Euro-market, on American markets

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and abroad. In general this shows a slowing down of American international investment, which at the beginning of 1976 was still continuing, and a rapid recovery, from the beginning of 1975 onwards, in non-American international investment. Overall investment is, in other words, rising. It should however be added that this increased investment by the industrialized countries is mainly in other industrialized countries. In confirmation of all this it should be remembered that the regulations on export credits for the socialist countries, agreed at Rambouillet, and the refusal of the industrialized countries, first at the IV session of UNCTAD in Nairobi and then in the CIEC, to agree to a solution for the external debt of the developing countries, is due neither to ill-will, nor to short-sightedness. Rather it is simply one aspect of this competition for international financial resources. It would be possible to get round this problem with an artificial expansion of the availability of these resources. i.e. by printing dollars. The industrialized countries do not, however, seem ready to take measures which would prove to be inflationary. Even if they were willing to do so, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States would not agree. It should not be forgotten that in a general inflation determined redistribution of wealth, such as that which occurred in 1974 and 1975, the industrialized countries stand to gain from a radical improvement in their terms of trade. This is not the case for Saudi Arabia and the other oil producers. No country is more exposed to inflation than Saudi Arabia, whose wealth is held almost entirely in financial resources. It is impossible for the industrialized countries to go systematically against Saudi interests, that is to say against the interests of a key member of OPEC and one of the strongest

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and most important US allies (Saudi Arabia plays a vital role in two key areas of international relations - the stabilization of the Middle East and the fixing of oil prices - quite apart from her growing interest in the area from the Red Sea to the Gulf passing via the Indian Ocean). Her decision to impose a smaller increase in the price of oil than certain other OPEC countries should probably be interpreted, not as a part of a unilateral anti-inflation strategy but rather as part of a multilateral strategy which enjoys the sympathy of her industrialized partners. If this is so it would be lecit to foresee the creation of an anti-inflationist climate which would in turn lead the industrialized countries to oppose the creation of new resources through an expansion in the supply of dollars. Rather they are likely to take a larger share of existing financial resources for themselves, thus cutting off funds from those countries which have invested most in recent years, namely the less developed and the socialist countries. Although this conclusion probably gives a good general picture of the likely future pattern of international investment the degree to which it applies should not be exagerated. If in other words, all available resources were absorbed by the multinationals of the industrialized countries thus would lead to serious cases of national insolvency with grave results for the whole international financial system. The crisis which followed would be far worse than that which overshadowed 1974. It is true that often market operators have lost control over the euqilibrium of the international system. It is also true that this could reoccur. It would however be mistaken to favour catastrophic forecasts for the future. The information, the mechanisms (and

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probably the will) to intervene effectively, exist.

At the same time the prospect of a more balanced allocation of resources appears to be fully coherent with medium and long term investment prospects in the industrialized countries. In the longer term any chance that the demand for investment goods might re-establish its position as a prime motor of growth is linked to investment in new sectors of production and to an intensified exploitation of technology. This implies a large scale de-centralization and broadening of capitalism's productive base, that is to say, a more balanced international division of labour. While it is far from certain that this will in practice occur there are powerful forces at work which sooner or later are bound to push in this direction. The alternative for the industrialized world is that of a development model, at least as precarious as that which led to the recession of the 1970s.

It is useless however to push too far with forecasts for the future or with speculation over the ultimate rationality of history. From our analysis so far it seems possible to draw the following conclusions:-

a)To the degree in which the recovery in the industrialized countries is stabilizing and spreading, there is a short and medium term trend towards a recovery in multinational company investment.

b)This investment appears to be centred in the industrialized countries themselves rather than in the socialist and/or the less developed countries.

c)As is normal this reduces the availability of resources for investment in the latter countries. This effect might probably be severe. This is on account of the anti-inflationist climate sought by the

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leading countries in the international system.

d)The intensity of these pressures must however be attenuated in order to take account of the necessity of avoiding over-serious and over-extended defaults and to avoid the conceivable effects on the international financial system and in particular on the private banks and on their depositors.

e)It seems possible therefore that there will be a drop in the flow of investment towards the less developed countries. The volume of this flow is unlikely however to return to the levels of the pre-1974 period. A certain volume of investment will probably be maintained. Having said all this we should turn to our second point : what are the prospects for industrial decentralization in the Mediterranean?

In what way do these conclusions effect the industrialization of the Mediterranean? Firstly, it is clear that in a situation in which the supply of financial resources available to the less developed countries is restricted, those amongst these countries, such as Algeria, Iraq and Iran, with plans for highly intensive development, are bound to suffer. The possession of oil made considerable resources available to these countries. Once however, these resources were exhausted the countries in question went to the international market to seek further funds. (This may be seen from the figures presented in Table Two. To the credits listed should be added a 1975 loan to Iraq of 500 million dollars). In the near future these additional resources may well become more difficult to obtain.

Secondly, the tendency towards an intensification of foreign investment within the western world may also be judged negatively. We have already noted signs of a reversal of the main flow of

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investments, which today seems to be towards rather than away from the United States, the opposite trend to that which characterized the 1960s. Whether or not this reversal proves to be permanent, the main flow of funds remains circumscribed to the industrialized world, by-passing the less developed countries. The feebleness of the trend towards decentralization damages not only those countries, such as Iran and Tunisia, which favour, but also those countries, such as Algeria and Iraq, which are fundamentally opposed to foreign investment. These latter countries, even where development has so far been successful, are bound, eventually, to come up against closed markets for their industrial exports. The intensification of investment in the industrialized area is protected by the industrialized countries' monopoly over technological innovation or, in the case of investment in standardized technologies, by more traditional measures of protectionism.

These general considerations are, on their own, quite enough to imply that, in the Mediterranean, as in the other less developed countries, there are many obstacles blocking the industrialization process. The creation of a new international division of labour, is, despite recent developments, and despite the will to succeed, not as easy as might at first appear. For a better evaluation we need to look more closely at the trends towards the division of labour within the Mediterranean area. If we examine the main trends of direct foreign investment in the manufacturing sector this becomes possible. The IAI Mediterranean project included an examination of this nature. (3) The figures I cite refer to the results of this work.

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The data presented in Tables 4,5,6 and 7 show the majority of reliable information available to use concerning this investment. The figures for the total stock of investment at the end of 1967 prepared by the OECD secretariat, are somewhat old. The secretariat has provided more recent figures but these are not available by sector. The OECD suggests many sources of possible unreliability in its figures which we will not repeat here. The figures for individual manufacturing sectors, collated by Vaupel and Curham are difficult to interpret, covering, as they do, numbers of subsidiaries rather than the value of investment. In this field too there is little overall data for the area (although better figures may be found for individual countries).

An examination of the data leads one to the following observations:

a)The main investment in the Mediterranean seems to be in oil. This absorbs 75.9% of total US and 58.7% of total European investment in the area. In other words, oil interests the Europeans and Americans far more than manufacturing. (for this point and for point "b" see Tables 6 and 7).

b)The Mediterranean is a priority area neither for American nor for European manufacturing investment, absorbing only 10.2% of total American manufacturing investment abroad, 76.7% of which goes to Latin America. The European countries make 17.1% of their total foreign manufacturing investment in the Mediterranean. Here again the largest share (49.4%) goes to Latin America. In other words although the area is more important to the Europeans than to the Americans, both the USA and the European countries concentrate.

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the majority of their manufacturing investment in Latin America and only a relatively small share in the Mediterranean.

c)The greater importance of the Mediterranean to the Europeans is confirmed by the overall pattern of investment in the area. Whereas 15.1% of total US investment in the region is in the manufacturing sector the equivalent figure for the European countries is 26.6%.

d)The regional and country by country pattern of European and American manufacturing investment in the Mediterranean is significant. 75% of American and European manufacturing investment goes to Southern Europe. North Africa absorbs 5.5% of American and 14.3% of European manufacturing investment. The Middle-East, on the other hand, is more important for the USA (19.5% of total manufacturing investment) than for Europe (19.2%). The main centres of US manufacturing investment are Spain (257 million dollars), Greece (82) and Iran (28). The main centres for European investment are again Spain (621), Greece (112) Turkey (67), Tunisia (50) and Iran (34). (Tables 6 and 7 confirm this interest in Spain).

e)As far as specific manufacturing sectors are concerned Tables 6 and 7 show a significant presence of both Americans and Europeans in the rubber and chemicals sectors. European investors are significantly involved in the transport industry (automobiles etc.) in the electric machinery and in the electronics industries. Their presence in the textiles sector, in light industry (wood) and in the field of precision goods is, however, slight. Thus, whilst there is clearly a decentralization of capital-intensive industry, using predominantly standardized technologies, the decentralization of labour-intensive industries is far harder to evaluate especially with respect to the technology employed.

In general terms it may be deduced from the data that the

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Europeans, relatively speaking have a greater interest in manufacturing industry in the Mediterranean than American companies. In absolute terms however it is impossible not to note a general lack of interest. Most striking is the comparison with the pattern of US investment in Latin America where 30.8% is absorbed by manufacturing industry and 28.3% by oil. The equivalent figures for the Mediterranean are 26.6% and 58.7%. It should be emphasized, at the same time, how that small degree of decentralization which has occurred in the pattern of European investment, has been centred in Southern Europe, and if we look closely, in one specific country, namely Spain. It is note-worthy that there is no clear tendency towards the decentralization of labour intensive industry, this despite the easy availablity of labour both in Spain and in other countries.

Why is this trend towards European industrial decentralization in the Mediterranean so weak? Why, in particular, is there so little decentralization towards the countries of North Africa and the Middle-East?

There are three main groups of theories which attempt to deal with this problem : those centred around the concept of oligopoly, developed mainly by Hymer (11), which emphasize pre-emptive enterprise investment on new markets ; those which explain direct investment and other capital movements primarily in terms of exchange rates and protective tariffs (12) and finally Vernon's well-known product cycle theory (13). These theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Often, as in the case of Hymer's and Vernon's theories they show a remarkable degree of complementarity. Here we will refer mainly to Vernon.

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As is well-known, the product cycle theory holds that in the field of technologically innovative products, competitivity depends, not on the production cost, but rather on the innovative content of the product. Given that innovations are conceived and developed in a highly industrialized environment, initial production is similarly localized in the advanced industrialized countries which supply the international as well as their own domestic markets. This then is the first phase of the cycle, which lasts until the innovation in question begins to be copied or until for some other reason, the innovative factor ceases to represent an advantage. At this point the crucial variable determining competitivity becomes unit cost. Investment overseas replaces exports when average production costs on the overseas market fall below the domestic marginal cost, as adjusted to take account of transport costs and, when relevant, of customs duties. Given that average costs are determined, not only by factor costs on the market in question but also by the scale of the latter - i.e. by the income elasticity of demand for the product, investment will, in this second phase, continue to be concentrated in the industrialized countries or at any rate, in countries which have already attained a significant level of development. In the third and final stage, competition may be assumed to be so strong that it becomes convenient to follow a pattern of decentralization based on reexportation (either of the completed product or of its components) from countries where production factors, and especially labour, are available at low cost. It is important to emphasize that whereas in the second stage, de-centralization is based both on relative factor costs (e.g. differences in wages) and above all else on the scale of the markets where the producer intends

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to sell as well as to produce, in the third stage, factor costs assume a predominant role. The producer aims to produce at the lowest possible price in order to be able to export to other markets.

The data examined so far provides justification, at least to some extent, for the explanation for decentralization offered by Vernon's theory. Rubber, chemicals, motor vehicles, electric machinery and electronics are all sectors in which standardized technologies predominate. They are all at the same time decentralized.

The decentralization is mainly towards the countries of Southern Europe; and primarily Spain, that is to say countries with a good industrial environment, a sizeable population and significant levels of per capita income. It seems, furthermore that the products which have been decentralized are those in the second stage, i.e. products for which decentralization aims to open up new internal rather than export markets (see Table 8).

Taking all this as given, our question remains. Why has decentralization been on such a limited scale? One is struck by the apparent lack of decentralization even of third stage products.

Those tendencies which have hindered the decentralization of European investment were implicit in the setting up of the Common Market. This represented not only a large-scale, dynamic market but at the same time an area within which industry was well protected. The existence of this market has undoubtedly contributed to the maintenance in Europe of second and third stage production processes which would otherwise have been decentralized. It may be assumed that products which were mature for second stage decentralization continued to be produced in Europe precisely

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because of this "market" factor. Third stage decentralization was delayed because of the protection given to industrial products by the Common External Tariff (CET). The CET made the main aim of third stage decentralization, namely production for export, difficult to achieve. Today the CET no longer represents the same barrier as in the past. The existence of The General Preference Scheme for products manufactured in the less developed countries has more or less eliminated the problem. Until 1967-68 however, when the tariff reductions agreed in the Kennedy round became operational, the degree of protection was far from insignificant.

Another important factor hindering the normal functioning of the product cycle was the massive migratory flow throughout the 1960s from the Maghreb, from Southern Europe and from Communist Germany (at least until the building of the Berlin wall in 1961). The large-scale presence of an easily manipulated, immigrant labour force led to a high degree of labour mobility and the slowing down of wage rises. Differences in wages and/or the availability of man-power were thus a less powerful factor favouring decentralization than they might have been.

Generally speaking we can say that throughout the 1960s the crucial conditions which might have led to the decentralization of industrial production towards Africa and the Mediterranean (regions in which political conditions were such as to make decentralization possible) were instead to be found within the EEC itself. Decentralization was thus discouraged. As is well known the EEC attracted decentralized investment from the United States. Here we refer to the massive flow of direct, mainly American investment, a part of which was presumably diverted to

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the EEC from the less developed areas.

In reality American investment in Europe is not to be explained simply by the setting up of the Common Market but by the general pattern of the international economy and especially that of the international monetary and financial systems. In practice an examination of the international division of labour, circumscribed to the Mediterranean, can be of very limited explanatory value. The growth of the European Common Market and the braking effect which this growth has exerted on industrial decentralization within the Mediterranean are simply specific aspects of the international division of labour within the overall capitalist economy. Although we do not propose here any overall analysis of this problem it is nevertheless necessary to place the Euro-Mediterranean industrial dynamic within this context.

The creation of the EEC may thus be interpreted as regional compensation to Germany for her withdrawal, under constraint, from her role as a world industrial leader. By the end of the 1950s Germany had the strongest industry in Europe and could easily have entered high technology sectors of production. Various political and economic factors prevented this transition : the impossibility of developing an arms industry and that of participating in the early stages in the development of the nuclear sector, the political fragility inherited from defeat and from naziism. Europe, and even more obviously Germany, were unable to challenge the role which the Americans were reserving for themselves in the world. Germany was thus obliged to "deepen" rather than to transform her economy, keeping with already mature technologies. This did not prevent a strong economic recovery made possible by the large-scale dynamic Common Market with her industrially inferior partners, who provided

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excellent, priviledged outlets for her industrial exports.

The "freezing" of Germany's regional role helped to encourage labour migration. It was no coincidence that this was centred on Germany. Thus Germany, the industrial and technological heart of Europe, instead of transforming herself into an advanced capital intensive economy capable of decentralizing modern sectors towards LDCs - in the same way as the USA and to a large extent Japan- has remained a labour-intensive economy, strong in quantitative and weak in qualitative terms.

These facts explain the European countries', and especially the most industrialized amongst them, namely Germany's, low level of industrial decentralization, in the Mediterranean and in the world.

If we have discussed in length Germany's role and her importance to the decentralization process this is because such a discussion helps to clarify prospects for the future, as indeed certain recent studies in France (14) and Italy (15) have shown. Today,those conditions which allowed Germany to play the role she played in the past,no longer apply. The events of 1971 and the general changes in the international system which followed, made it very hard to maintain the pre-existing situation. During the 1960s the industrial progress of Germany's community partners was such as to render their industrial structures extremely similar to those of Germany herself and therefore to place them in competition with Germany. At this point the complimentarity of the EEC economies vanished. Instead there came into being a highly competitive situation which risked leading to the disintegration of the Community. If we accept this it becomes possible to go on to look at possible scenarios for the future.

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The first scenario is that to the degree to which Germany lets drop once again the opportunity to change the productive base of her economy by decisively entering advanced technology sectors of production, the EEC member states will be faced with an alternative : either they will have to sacrifice to Germany the levels of industrial development which they have already achieved or else they will have to protect themselves. Fluctuations of exchange rates are revealing this situation to the European countries which are attempting to remedy it by increasing their competitivity with respect to Germany (through devaluation) and by reducing German competitivity (through revaluation). Other correctives are also being tried : a higher level of German investment abroad (16) and a lower level of immigration. These measures are however inadequate to respond to the basic problems. Their inadequacy is already apparent, as may be seen from the growth of protectionism amongst Germany's partners. Although this scenario appears extremely credible it is at the same time an extremely unstable one.

The solution most suited to the situation would be a reconversion of the German economy with a new German role in the high technology sectors of the world economy. If this occurred it might prove possible to re-integrate Germany within the EEC. German investments abroad, would, furthermore, under the influence of the product cycle rather than the balance of payments surplus or the continuous revaluation of the deutschmark, begin to play a role in a more useful strategy for the industrialization of the Mediterranean area. This depends however on the establishment of an international division of labour between Germany, the EEC and the USA which would differ from that which appears to be re-emerging after the crisis of recent years. The Schmidt

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administration might appear resolute in its support of the old Atlantic balance (17)and unwilling even to risk the slightest disagreement with the United States. If however, we wish to resolve the present crisis,Germany must have the courage to re-convert her economy while at the same time involving the other European countries. In other words,the re-conversion of the German economy is possible, even if it does lead to serious tension with the United States. It is possible however, only within a new framework of European integration (implying the development of the European defence, computer, aviation and energy industries). This would represent a form of integration more consonant with the needs of third world development and of the industrialized world itself. It is clear then that this represents not only a German but also an EEC responsability. For the moment this scenario, which in the short term presents many difficulties, but which in the long term might prove more stable than any other does not seem very realistic.

The third possible scenario is that Germany might, in the absence of any degree of EEC re-integration choose, as De Cecco suggests in the article cited, a "re-conversion downwards". She might separate from her weaker EEC partners(perhaps taking the nordic members of the currency snake with her),maintain her present industrial and technological structures unchanged and opt for integration within her traditional "Lebensraum", namely the countries of Southern Europe, which today are at the same level of industrial development as that reached by Germany's partners at the time when the Common Market was formed (18). Italy, whose economy is steadily disintegrating, could play a role in this operation. This is a less improbable scenario than the second

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we suggested. In the short term it might prove less unstable than the first. Given however that it would not resolve basic problems it would lead in the end to the return to the crisis to which it was meant to be a solution.

What are the implications of all this for the Mediterranean? If Germany and the EEC succeeded in summoning the strength to re-integrate, thus challenging the USA over the international division of labour, this would improve the prospects for heavier European investment in the Mediterranean and for more intensive decentralization towards Southern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. At this point it is possible that serious differences might emerge between the Europeans and the other Mediterranean countries over the nature of the international division of labour which would in the future, prevail in the Mediterranean. (Certain countries, such as Algeria, wish to invest immediately in a number of advanced technologies and have no intention of submitting to the logic of the multi-nationals and of the product cycle) Unlike however the situation today, there should at least be something about which to argue. Today, as we have seen there simply is no decentralization.

If one of our other two scenarios should prove to be realistic there are fewer prospects for the future. Particular attention should be paid to the possible effects of German integration with the countries of Southern Europe. The split to which this policy would lead in Europe would split the Mediterranean. Whilst Germany would maintain her priviledged relationship with her sub-continental "Lebensraum", countries

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such as Italy (if she were excluded from the German sphere of influence) and France might increase their ties with the Arab world. It should be emphasized that the Latin nations within a possible Latin-Arab sphere of influence would not have a major influence role. The direct influence which the USA exerts over the Arab world is extremely strong. In this sense the German role in Southern Europe would prove to be more significant than that of the Latin countries within the Arab world.

It should in any case be noted that within this new geo-political framework, American influence, whether this were stronger or weaker than today, would nonetheless be extremely pervasive. This represents a fundamental difference with the scenarios in which Germany and Europe decide to enter advanced technology sectors of production.

The next question we should ask concerns the industrial progress of the less developed European countries, which would inevitably be affected by this new geo-political arrangement. The experience of the less developed countries within bloc with differing levels of internal development (i.e.the colonies) and that of less developed regions within homogeneous blocs (such as the EEC) is discouraging. As Myrdal and Emmanuel's (19) development theory shows, the existing gap remains and tends to worsen. Unless there is a strong will to avoid this occurring (and even here the question is a difficult one) the blocs in question turn out to be instruments for the maintenance of those inequalities and that division of labour within the blocs which existed when it was founded. It is thus dangerous to suppose that the integration of the European countries with Germany and the other countries of the snake would necessarily guarantee

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these countries a higher level of investment and growth. To give just one example, the increase in German investment which was once expected to speed the development of the Italian Mezzogiorno has never occurred.

Concluding then our discussion of the second point it may be stated that

a)the trend towards Mediterranean industrial decentralization has, in recent years been extremely weak. This applies particularly to European investment which one might legitimately expect, on historical and geographic grounds, to have been more intensive ;

b)this may be explained by the formation of the Common Market, which has created the same kind of conditions within the EEC as those which should have encouraged the decentralization of European investment towards the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the existence of the Common Market has allowed the continued development of the German economy, the core of Europe, without any transition to advanced technology production, in competition with the USA, and without any need for decentralization outside Europe ;

c)EEC integration is based on the complimentarity which existed between German industrial hegemony and the lower level of industrial development of the other Community members. Owing to the progress made by the latter and the competition they offered to Germany, by the 1970s this complimentarity no longer existed. This situation forces Germany, and Europe as a whole, to contest the present international division of labour imposed by the United States and to win a role for herself in the

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advanced technologies.

d)if this is impossible there are two possible alternatives :- either Germany's partners will sacrifice their present levels of industrial achievement, thus allowing the re-establishment of German industrial hegemony and the recreation of a basis for Community integration. Alternatively the EEC will disintegrate. Whilst Germany integrates with the countries of Southern Europe (which being at the same level of industrial development as that of Germany's partners at the beginning of the 1960s would permit her to re-establish her industrial hegemony), both France and (perhaps) Italy would pursue integration with the Arabs (meaning in practice integration with the United States);

e)the prospects for international investment in the Mediterranean countries would be good if the EEC were to re-integrate and to take on a more significant role in the international division of labour (even if this would lead to problems with a number of countries such as Algeria). If however one of the other two scenarios were to prove realistic this is unlikely.

We have thus examined the influence of two factors over foreign investment in the Mediterranean : the short and medium term trend in international investment and the trends in the international division of labour within the Mediterranean area. We must now pass on to our third factor : international investment by the Mediterranean oil-producing countries.

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Over what probably represents a longer period than that we have so far examined in this paper, the influence of international investment by the producer countries would assume a certain significance, at least if a degree of political stability and economic

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integration were established in the Arab world. It is in any case the Arab world which is affected by this probable development which is of little importance to Southern Europe (with the exception of limited investment flows towards Yugoslavia and Spain).

Overall data on direct investment is unavailable as is data for investment by sector. Table 9 gives figures for OPEC members' financial aid to the less developed countries. The significance of these figures lies in the concentration of investment flows within the Arab world. Over the three years cited, Egypt received an average of about 40% of the sums made available. Egypt and Syria together took 54%. The recent summit conference in Riyad (January 1977) reconfirmed the aid granted at the 1973 Rabat conference to the "front-line countries". This leads one to suppose that although the flow of aid may slack off, it will nonetheless continue.

To the extent to which these funds go to countries such as Egypt and Syria which already possess an industrial infrastructure and which are engaged in an intensive development effort, they constitute a factor favouring industrialization. It should be added here that it seems that those conditions mentioned earlier, of increased political stability and economic integration in the area seem on the point of being fulfilled. The reversal of Syrian policy during the recent Lebanese civil war, the formation of the Cairo-Damascus-Riyad axis and the embryonic signs of a solution to the Palestinian national problem all leads one to suppose that in the near future the Middle East is likely to become a more stable area than in the past. If this occurred it would be due to the predominance of the conservative states of the region. Opposition is thus possible from the progressive Arab countries.

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The latters' ability to intervene is however continually falling. The solution to the Kurdish problem, agreed with Iran, has reduced Iraq's room for manoeuvre in the Arab world. Algeria's priority is national development and the maintenance of her role as a leader of the third world. Even her relations with Europe are given more importance than those with other Arab countries. There is, of course, Libya, whose isolation is, however, becoming ever more evident. Syrian hegemony over the Lebanon and Jordan assures the survival of a dynamic pole of attraction in the Middle East. Egyptian links with Syria are of even greater importance.

The capital flows shown in table 9 are considerable with respect to other countries'foreign aid.(OPEC overseas development aid in 1974 amounted to 1.9% of OPEC members' GNP. The equivalent figure for DAC countries was barely 0.3%) At the same time however, it is clear that in comparison with the development needs of the countries in question, this aid is relatively insignificant. In practice the producer countries are obliged to direct their investment towards the European and American banks which , by lending to the multinationals permit the transformation of financial into real resources elsewhere. It would nonetheless be wrong to underestimate the importance of the changes we have discussed. If political stability is consolidated and economic integration becomes a possibility, a large proportion of Arab investment will eventually be re-cycled within the Arab world,rendering obsolete the present crude, small-cycle form of re-cycling via aid to the front-line countries.

A further important aspect of international investment by the producer countries is their investment in the industrialized countries. This takes various forms, from short term desposits to the purchase of bonds and of real-estate. On the contrary

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investment in shares has been relatively rare, in part because of the xenophobic and nationalist reaction of western public opinion, in part because of government resistance. There has as yet been no direct investment. Government resistance is determined by general governmental strategy towards the OPEC countries. A number of industrialized countries (the United Kingdom and FDR) have thus attempted to place well-defined limits on foreign investment, behaviour which they themselves have violently condemned when the guilty parties were less developed countries opposed to far larger scale western investment. (20) It is worthwhile reminding ourselves of the official 1974 "report of the wise men", a document drawn up every year by a number of official German economists : "This scissors movement of reducing demand (for oil) and closing openings for long-term investment could undoubtedly work towards a significant reduction in the prices asked by the oil producers".

Despite this decidedly unfavourable attitude there has been some investment. The most recent and large scale investment (Iran's purchase of a share of Frie.Krupp in Essen and Libya's buying of a share of Fiat in Turin) has not met with government opposition. Why is this kind of investment so important for the future of Mediterranean industrialization.

The first reason that comes to mind is that it permits a certain degree of control over western technologies and gives the producer countries the possibility of helping in a concrete way to promote industrial decentralization. The most important reason is, however, a strategic one. We have seen how little chance there is that Mediterranean industrialization will be brought about by a large-scale outside contribution in the form of direct investment. So far however we have given no consideration to the prospects for domestic investment in the Mediterranean countries. In certain countries this is on an extremely

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large scale and is likely to lead to a significant degree of industrialization. The national industry of the investing countries is bound however to have severe problems in finding outlets for its exports. Not only are some products clearly export-orientated; domestic markets are likely to prove to be generally inadequate to absorb products produced on a scale sufficient to guarantee the minimization of unit costs. These products will no longer be those usually produced in the LDCs by the multinationals and other western investers. (i.e. components and other processes normally decentralized during the third stage of the product cycle simply for export). Certain products - production of which is soon to begin as a consequence of recent plant purchases (product in hand, keys in hand, plants, joint ventures, etc.) - may prove competitive with products produced in the industrialized countries themselves. The industrialized countries are unlikely to grant easy market access to these products indeed they may grant no access at all. Investment, i.e.the purchase of a share in the capital of certain American and European industries, represents an important strategic move, aimed at guaranteeing for the future market access for products produced in the Mediterranean countries themselves.

Having said all this however it is clear that there are still obstacles to investment by the producer countries in the industrialized countries. It is at the same time obvious why, in the negotiations at present in progress such as the Euro-Arab dialogue, more importance is given by the less developed countries to the political aspects of cooperation. A political basis is essential if there is to be a development of an industrialization strategy capable of creating an international division of labour which depends exclusively neither

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on the efforts of the countries concerned nor on international investment in these countries but at the same time on a more rapid and less subordinate integration of the latter within the international economy than has so far occurred.

To conclude this point it should be emphasized that:-

a)the improved prospects for political stability and economic integration and/or cooperation in the Middle-East allow one to presume that the present flow of inter-Arab investment will in the future become more than simply financial aid and will thus lead to a higher level of real capital formation and industrialization in the countries concerned.

b)there exist a number of factors encouraging producer countries investment in the industrialized countries. This investment would permit these countries to exert a degree of control over technology and, more significantly a medium-long term control over access to industrialized markets for the products of the embryonic industries of the producer countries. This investment is nonetheless on a small scale. It has been concentrated in standardized technology sectors (steel, automobiles). Much investment has met with government opposition.

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From all this we may draw two conclusions:-

a)International manufacturing investment in the Mediterranean and especially in the Middle-Eastern and North-African countries has been on a small scale. Once again there has emerged a tendency to concentrate investment within the industrialized countries, leading to neglect of the less developed areas. There is a tendency to obstruct producer country investment in the industrialized area. There are some prospects for producer country investment in the

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other Mediterranean countries.

b)The prospects for the future international division of labour confirm the hierarchy implicit within the product cycle. It is however difficult to evaluate the real importance of this hierarchy given that the prospects for decentralization do not appear to be significant in quantitative terms. The most likely future international division of labour and Germany's role within this division of labour suggest a deepening of the gap which already exists between the North and South banks of the Mediterranean. Today's poor prospects for industrial decentralization do not seem likely to change to any great degree.

NOTES

1) See for example M.Clawson, H.H.Landsberg, L.T.Alexander, The Agricultural Potential of the Middle East, American Elsevier Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1971.
2) See G.Sacco, Oil Pollution in the Mediterranean, Resources for Future, Inc., 1976 (unpublished).
3) See research papers and reports for the conference on "Cooperation and development in the Mediterranean Area" organized by the IAI in Milan on the 3rd and 4th of May 1974 and published in Lo Spettatore Internazionale" No.2, April-June 1974. See also studies by J Sassoon, Labour and Capital Movements in the Mediterranean Area and by G.Luciani The Multinational Corporation's Strategy in the Mediterranean, presented to the conference on "Investment and Labour in the Mediterranean : prospects for Integration and Cooperation" organized by the IAI in Milan from the 4th to the 6th of March 1976 and published in "Lo Spettatore Internazionale No.1, January-March 1976.
4) Within the framework of the Mediterranean Project other research is planned on regional industrialization quite apart from the work cited above. This paper represents a preliminary version of a study to be completed within the first half of 1977. At the end of 1976 A.Bouhdiba completed a study of inter-Arab migration. Other work in progress : F.Oualalou, Maghreb integration and relations with the EEC ; G.Sacco, The Relationship between Industrialization and Pollution in the Mediterranean. Agreement has recently been reached with Prof.Z.Y.Hershlag for a study of the industrialization of the Arab world.
5) By the terms of the definition the IAI has used throughout the Mediterranean Project (See working paper RA/III) the Mediterranean region consists of all those countries with a Mediterranean sea-board plus Portugal and Jordan. On occasions we have also considered neighbouring regions and countries : the EEC, the Balkans, Iraq, Iran and the countries of the Arabian peninsula.
6) Preliminary data for October and November seem to confirm this trend. Investment in the less developed countries appears to be 26% over the 1975 level whereas investment in the industrialized countries may have increased by as much as 32%. The Socialist countries, for which data is available only up to October, have achieved 85% of their 1975 total.
7) See "Euromoney" and "World Financial Markets" and in particular : D.Levine, Developing countries and the 150 billion Euromarket Financing Problem, "Euromoney" November 1975.

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8) For a recent article see S.Fleming, Bankers worried about Loans to Poorest countries, "Financial Times", December 20 1976. For a deeper overall examination of the question see O.Vito-Colonna, Finanziamento dei disavanzi dei paesi in via di sviluppo e pressione sul sistema xenobancario, "Bancaria" (Rome July 1976.

9) It should be remembered that here we have discussed only the medium and short term. If this were not the case we would have emphasized a fourth condition, namely an expansion of exports, and in particular manufacturing exports, to the markets of the industrialized countries.

10) From an anti-inflationary point of view it would be possible for governments to engage resources to relieve the banks of their debt burden only by eliminating the risk that the banks might use these resources to expand other banking activities. This could be obtained by requesting the international banks to create adequate reserves to cover their claims. Presently the central banks do exert a certain degree of control over the Euro-dollar market. This control is rather tighter than that which was customary prior to the 1974 crisis. It is not however institutionalized.

11) Le imprese multinazionali, G.Luciani (ed) Turin, Einaudi, 1974.

12) R.Z.Aliber, A theory of Direct Foreign Investment, in C.P. Kindleberger (ed.) The International Corporation : A Symposium, Cambridge MIT Ress, 1970.

13) International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle, "Quarterly Journal of Economics", May 1966.

14) GRESI, La Division International du Travail, 2 Voll. La Documentation Francaise, Etudes de politique industrielle, 9 Paris 1976.

15) M.de Cecco, E la crisi finale del capitalismo? "Inchiesta" October-December 1975, pp.36-38.

16) It should however be noted that between 1970 and 1974 the average annual growth rate of German foreign investment was lower than that between 1965 and 1969. See Deutsche Bundesbank "Monthly Report" No.3, March 1975, pp.25.

17) See H.Schmidt's article "Foreign Affairs", April 1974.

18) The way in which the area functions has been clarified by M.de Cecco in Sulla vocazione mediterranea dell'economia italiana, Prospettive Settanta" April-June 1975, pp.5-9

19) G.Myrdal, Economic Theory and Under-developed regions, General Duckworth and Co., London 1957 and A.Emmanuel, l'échange inégal Maspero, Paris 1969.

20) SESAME, Les investissements pétroliers dans l'industrie européenne et les operations triangulaires en direction du tiers monde, IREP, Grenoble, November 1975.

Table 1 - Some basic indicators of the industrial sector in the Mediterranean countries.

Countries	Manufact.Industry[1] as a % of GDP[3]	Manufact.Exp.[2] as a % of tot. exports.	Economically active population in manufacturing (%)
Portugal	32°	68.2*	21.7++
Yugoslavia	30°[4]	58.4*	17.7c6
Spain	28°	60.3*	25.8*
Malta	26*	81.2°	28.8+
Turkey	23*	15.9°	8.0++
Greece	20*	34.1*	17.1c
Israel	19°	75.3*	24.9*6
Egypt	16*	25.0*	12.9a
Lebanon	16+5	66.3°	16.5++
Morocco	15°	10.0°	9.3c
Jordan	15*5	21.2*	n.a.
Syria	13*	11.8°	9.8°
Iran	13°	1.5*	16.7a
Cyprus	13°	1.8°	11.5*
Algeria	12°	4.0++	6.4a
Tunisia	9*	20.6*	9.5a
Iraq	9c	1.3°	n.a.
Saudi Arabia	6+	0.0°	n.a.
Kuwait	4°	7.9°	13.2++
Lybia	2+	0.0*	6.8b

a 1966; b 1964; c 1971; ° 1973; * 1974; + 1972; ++ 1970. 1) ISIC 3 ; 2) SITC 5 to 8 (less 67+68);3)based on the former UN SNA, except for Kuwait, S.Arabia, Yemen (A.R.) and Turkey; 4) gross material product; 5)includes mining and electricity, gas and water(ISIC 2 and 4); 6)includes mining

Sources: as for both column 1&2:UNCTAD, 1976 Handbook of International Statistics, except for Iran's (Bank Markazi Iran), Algeria's (IMF International Fiancial Statistics) and Yugoslavia's(OCED) manufacturing industry; as for column 3: ILO, 1975 Yearbook of Labour Statistics.

Table 2

Euro-currency bank credits

publicly-announced in period, in millions of dollars

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976 1st Halfr	1976 QIII
Industrial countries	4 118	13 789	20 683	7 231	5 401	3 190
France	176	50	3 244	719	507	80
Greece	270	510	419	239	—	198
Italy	928	4 762	2 322	120	320	—
Spain	136	479	1 151	1 147	361	1 344
United Kingdom	689	3 150	5 655	160	1 061	40
United States	865	1 649	2 221	764	481	166
Others	1 054	3 189	5 671	4 082	2 671	1 362
Developing countries	2 465	7 282	7 342	11 164	6 534	3 844
Non-OPEC countries	1 532	4 531	6 276	8 264	5 032	2 241
Brazil	579	740	1 672	2 152	1 148	615
Mexico	197	1 588	948	2 311	760	421
Peru	139	434	443	334	50	15
Philippines	50	187	844	363	892	10
South Korea	100	205	134	347	238	187
Others	467	1 377	2 235	2 757	1 944	993
OPEC countries	933	2 751	1 067	2 900	1 502	1 603
Algeria	172	1 302	—	500	446	322
Indonesia	93	192	669	1 348	680	14
Iran	335	722	115	265	231	220
Other	333	535	283	787	145	1 047
Communist countries	274	780	1 238	2 597	1 789	192
Poland	—	430	509	475	356	60
U.S.S.R.	—	—	100	650	250	32
Others	274	350	629	1 472	1 183	100
TOTAL	6 857	21 851	29 263	20 992	13 724	7 226

a includes multi-national organizations, b includes regional development organizations, c includes COMECON institutions, p preliminary

Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., "World Financial Markets", November 1976

Table 3

New international bond issues

new issues in period, in millions of dollars

	1973	1974	1975	Jan-Oct 1976p	Jan-Oct 1975
Euro-bonds, total	**4 193**	**2 134**	**8 567**	**13 070**	**7 378**
U.S. companies	874	110	268	280	243
Foreign companies	1 309	640	2 933	4 865	2 577
State enterprises	947	542	3 093	3 714	2 733
Governments	659	482	1 658	2 064	1 480
International organizations	404	360	615	2 147	545
Foreign bonds outside the United States, total	**2 626**	**1 432**	**4 884**	**5 088**	**4 419**
U.S. companies	546	77	61	28	61
Foreign companies	396	455	1 386	1 001	1 334
State enterprises	446	568	1 314	1 624	1 266
Governments	297	138	765	958	735
International organizations	941	194	1 358	1 477	1 023
Foreign bonds in the United States, total	**960**	**3 266**	**6 462**	**8 989**	**5 185**
Canadian entities	865	1 962	3 074	4 949	2 661
International organizations	—	610	1 900	2 200	1 045
Other	95	694	1 488	1 840	1 479
International bonds, total of which issued by:	**7 779**	**6 832**	**19 913**	**27 147**	**17 182**
Industrial countries	5 770	5 065	15 213	19 925	13 755
Developing countries	664	603	827	1 398	814
International organizations	1 345	1 164	3 873	5 824	2 613

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Sources: see table 2

Table 4 - Seven European Countries*: Stock of Direct Private Investment in the Mediterranean and other Developing Areas - End 1967

(US $ million)

	Southern Europe	Middle East	North Africa	Mediterranean (sub-total)	Africa South of S.	Latin America	Asia	Total
Petroleum	95.5	1,084.9	741.5	1,921.9	986.1	1,129.9	497.8	4,535.7
Mining	81.2	3.0	43.0	127.2	862.3	60.6	154.5	1,204.6
Agriculture	-	2.5	0.1	2.6	430.6	219.9	832.0	1,485.1
Manufacturing	658.2	89.1	124.4	871.7	884.5	2,513.7	819.8	5,089.7
Trade	64.9	11.3	24.2	100.4	324.8	281.6	255.2	962.0
Other	138.7	41.0	69.2	248.9	454.1	642.8	292.5	1,638.3
TOTAL	1,038.5	1,231.8	1,002.4	3,272.7	3,942.4	4,848.5	2,851.8	14,915.4

* Belgium, France, Germany (F.R.), Italy, Netterlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom

Source: OECD, Les actifs correspondant aux investissements directs du secteur privé del pays du CAD dans les pays en voie de développement, Paris, 1972

Table 5 - United States: Stock of Direct Private Investment in the Mediterranean ond other Developing Areas - End 1967

(US $ million)

	Southern Europe	Middle East	North Africa	Mediterranean (sub-total)	Africa South of S.	Latin America	Asia	Total
Petroleum	213.0	1,607.5	590.0	2,410.5	262.0	3,329.6	598.5	6,600.6
Mining	16.0	3.0	4.0	23.0	263.0	1,720.0	48.0	2,054.0
Agriculture	-	-	-	-	50.5	382.0	56.0	488.5
Manufacturing	361.0	93.5	26.0	480.5	93.7	3,627.0	528.5	4,729.7
Trade	97.0	18.5	9.0	124.5	33.5	1,286.0	225.5	1,669.5
Other	58.0	56.5	22.0	136.5	17.5	1,432.0	320.0	1,906.0
TOTAL	745.0	1,779.0	651.0	3,175.0	720.2	11.776.6	1,776.5	17,448.3

Source: see table 4

Table 6 - Percentage Breakdown of Number of Manufacturing kSubsidiaries of non-US Based Parent Sistems by Subsidiary's Country and Principal Industry Group (as of 1-1-1971)

	Portugal	Spain	Greece	Turkey	Iran	Mashrek	Maghreb	Mediterranean	World %	World Total number
Food and tobacco	0.7	1.8	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	100	685
Textiles and apparel	1.4	3.6	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.0	5.8	100	279
Wood, furniture and paper	0.5	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	1.0	3.0	100	210
Chemicals	1.4	4.8	0.6	1.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	9.3	100	1258
Petroleum	0.5	1.6	0.0	0.5	1.0	2.1	4.2	9.9	100	192
Rubber and tires	0.9	7.5	1.9	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.2	100	106
Primay metals	1.2	2.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.7	0.2	4.9	100	413
Fabr. metals + non el. machin.	0.7	2.1	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	1.0	5.4	100	605
Electric and electronic	0.5	3.6	1.3	0.6	0.8	0.5	1.5	8.8	100	787
Transportation equipment	2.0	5.7	0.0	1.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	11.3	100	246
Precision goods	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	100	78
Other	0.6	4.8	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.6	6.9	100	336

Source: Vaupel e Curham, *The World's Multinational Enterprises*, pp. 51-55.

Table 7 - Percentage Breakdown of Number of Manufacturing Subsidiaries of US Based Parent Sistems by Subsidiary's Country and Principal Industry Group (as of 1-1-1968)

	Portugal	Spain	Greece	Turkey	Iran	Mashrek	Maghreb	Mediterranean	World %	World Total number
Food and tobacco	0.6	3.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.4	5.5	100	509
Textiles and apparel	1.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	100	102
Wood, furniture and paper	0.5	4.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	6.0	100	109
Chemicals	0.6	3.4	0.7	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.3	6.3	100	1093
Petroleum	0.0	2.9	0.5	0.5	1.9	4.9	0.5	11.2	100	206
Rubber and tires	2.7	2.7	0.0	1.8	1.8	0.9	1.8	11.7	100	113
Primay metals	0.0	0.9	1.8	0.9	0.0	0.9	0.9	5.4	100	112
Fabr. metals + non el. machin.	0.2	3.2	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.4	4.8	100	530
Electric and electronic	0.0	1.1	0.3	1.1	0.3	0.0	0.3	3.1	100	359
Transportation equipment	0.4	2.7	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.4	4.4	100	226
Precision goods	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100	74
Other	0.4	1.7	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.4	3.7	100	233

Source: Vaupel e Curham, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-63.

Table 8 - Percentage Breakdown of Number of Manufacturing Subsidiaries by Subsidiary's Principal Market and Country (non-US as of 7-7-1971)

	Portugal	Spain	Greece	Turkey	Iran	Mashrek	Maghreb
Local country	90	97	90	100	94	72	69
Export markets	10	3.0	10	0	6.3	28	31
Total percent	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total number	39	134	20	25	16	18	13

Source: Vaupel e Curham, *op. cit.*, p. 378.

Table 9 - OPEC : Total financial flow to less developed Countries (disbursement) (%)

	1973	1974	1975
Arab Countries (League)	93.7	74.8	79.0
of which : Egypt	49.3	27.9	52.2
Non-Arab Countries	6.3	25.2	21.0

Sources : UNCTAD and Monaldi V., Principali caratteristiche della cooperazione finanziaria tra i paesi esportatori di petrolio e gli altri paesi in via di sviluppo, "Note Economiche", IX, 2-3, 1976.

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LA COOPERATION ARABO-AFRICAINE APRES L'AUGMENTATION DU PRIX DU PETROLE. (Version abrégée)

by

Nabya Asfahany.

Questo documento fa parte di un progetto di ricerca sui problemi del Mediterraneo, che l'Istituto Affari Internazionali conduce con l'aiuto finanziario della Fondazione Ford.

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This conference is the last in a series of three organised within the framework of a three year research project on stability and development in the Mediterranean financed by the Ford Foundation.

Introduction

On peut dire que le dialogue arabo-africain, qui a pris corps pendant la Guerre d'Octobre 1973, ne doit pas sa naissance seulement à une conjoncture favorable. Certes, la position pro-arabe adoptée par la quasi-totalité des pays africains, lors de la confrontation armée arabo-israelienne d'une part et l'impact de la "crise pétrolière" sur les économies africaines, d'autre part, ont joué un rôle catalyseur dans les relations arabo-africaines. Cependant, le rapprochement entre arabes et africains plonge ses racines dans la première moitié des années cinquante.

1. - Origines du Dialogue

C'est dans les motivations mêmes qui sont à la base du comportement des deux partenaires arabes et africains, qu'il faut rechercher les origines du dialogue, tout en tenant compte des facteurs suivants:

- d'une part, il existe un continentalisme africain fondé sur des bases rigoureusement égalitaires, mais qui recouvre en même temps un mythe: l'unité africaine et un comportement: le particularisme africain;
- d'autre part, une certaine incompatibilité entre le nationalisme arabe et l'africanisme, qui constitue en soi un frein au développement d'une coopération arabo-africaine.

Ainsi, jusqu'à la défaite de Juin 1967, les éléments d'une véritable coopération arabo-africaine sont presque inexistants. Les relations économiques et politiques qui existent entre ces deux partenaires reflètent, à la fois des points de divergence et des points de ralliement:

- sur le plan politique, le groupe arabe au sein de l'OUA apporte son plein appui à la décolonisation totale de l'Afrique. Cependant,

les pays africains ont presque tous établi des relations avec Israel, dont la présence est vivace et active sur le continent noir;

- sur le plan économique, un embryon de coopération - toutefois strictement continentale - a trouvé son expression dans la BAD.

Au cours de cette première phase, les gouvernements de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara observent une attitude neutraliste à l'égard des deux protagonistes du conflit arabo-israelien et inclinent à laisser aux Nations-Unies le soin de résoudre ce conflit.

II. - Les Relations Arabo-africaines dans l'Entre-Deux-Guerres (Juin 1967 - Octobre 1973)

Si l'on assiste à un rapprochement arabo-africain, ce n'est ni dans la défaite arabe qu'il faut rechercher les véritables raisons de ce rapprochement, ni dans l'effort arabe pour obtenir un engagement plus sérieux de l'Afrique, dans la crise du Moyen-Orient. Il serait plus utile ici rappeler la conjoncture africaine au début de l'année 1971:

- une détérioration continue des termes des échanges qui entament sérieusement les perspectives de développement en Afrique;
- l'efficacité de l'OPEC revelée pour la première fois lors de la crise pétrolière et en même temps la situation de dépendance - voire d'insécurité - des pays consommateurs de pétrole.

C'est surtout l'espoir d'obtenir des investissements massifs arabes qui amène les pays africains à se départir peu à peu de l'attitude neutraliste envers la crise du Moyen-Orient. Différents facteurs

concourent alors à cette évolution:

- les relations diplomatiques bilatérales ont fini par dégager un rôle médiateur pour certains pays arabes africains (RAU, Algérie, Libye);
- les échanges de visites entre Chefs d'Etat acquièrent une importance exceptionnelle (charismatique du leader dans les pays du Tiers-Monde);
- l'interaction arabo-africaine sur la scène internationale, au sein de l'ONU, a fini par dégager une relative cohésion dans l'action.

Au début de l'année 1973, le rapprochement arabo-africain, désormais en bonne voie, va tenter de consolider ses assises politiques et économiques. Ce processus est accéléré par le fait qu'au cours de cette même année, l'Afrique commence à être gagnée par l'inflation mondiale. Une dynamique s'instaure alors entre les deux partenaires. Deux rencontres au sommet vont précipiter le mouvement:

1. le XIème Sommet de l'OUA (Addis-Abeba, 27-29 Mai 1973);
2. le Sommet des Pays Non-Alignés (Alger, 5-9 Septembre 1973) où l'on assiste à la rupture des relations entre Israel et la plus part des pays africains.

A la veille de la Guerre d'Octobre 1973, l'Afrique compte sur un total de 41 pays arabes, 16 pays membres de l'OUA, dont 8 en même temps membres de la Ligue Arabe.

III. - Le Rapprochement Arabo-africain en Octobre 1973

Dès le début de la guerre, on assiste, du côté africain, à une véritable rupture en chaîne de relations avec Israel. Lorsque le cessez-le-feu sera effectif, 29 pays d'Afrique Noire auront rompu avec l'Etat

hébreu qui, à l'exception du Malawi, du Lesotho et du Swaziland, n'a plus de relations en Afrique qu'avec les régimes racistes d'Afrique du Sud et de Rhodésie.

On peut déjà dégager ce qui constitue les prémisses de la nouvelle solidarité arabo-africaine:

- l'irruption de l'OPAEP sur la scène internationale, en tant que force financière nouvelle aux rangs soudés. Du côté africain, elle suscite l'espoir de voir affluer vers l'Afrique les capitaux arabes;
- dans les rangs arabes, l'unité a été rejointe pendant la guerre, au delà des clivages des différents régimes et des idéologies;
- les économies africaines subissent, indirectement, les contre-coups de la crise enérgétique.

Dès la fin de la guerre, le dialogue arabo-africain est né dans le but d'établir une coopération à long terme entre les deux partenaires:

a - lors de la Session Extraordinaire du Conseil des Ministres de l'OUA (Addis-Abeba, 19-21 Novembre 1973) des résolutions identifient le sionisme en Israel à l'Apartheid en Afrique du Sud. Une décision est prise pour créer un "Comité des 7" chargé d'étudier les moyens de renforcer "la nouvelle solidarité arabo-africaine";

b - le VIème Sommet Arabe tenu à Alger (26-28 Novembre 1973) adopte une résolution qui invite les pays arabes à rompre avec l'Afrique du Sud, le Portugal et la Rhodésie, d'appliquer l'embargo pétrolier à ces trois pays, et de fournir un plus grand appui aux mouvements de libération africains. Elle invite également à promouvoir une plus grande solidarité et une coopération arabo-africaine, notamment en créant une Banque Arabe pour le Développement de l'Afrique et en venant au secours des pays victimes de la sécheresse;

c - lors de la réunion des Ministres Arabes du Pétrole (OPAEP, 8-9 Décembre 1973) une décision est prise en faveur de l'approvisionnement des pays islamiques et africains en pétrole, toutefois ceux-ci "s'abstiendront de reéxporter le pétrole reçu aux pays tombant sous le coups de l'embargo arabe".

Toutefois, la mise en pratique d'un programme d'action pour une coopération arabo-africaine viable exige un minimum de concordance entre les attitudes et les aspirations des deux partenaires en présence. Or, ce minimum fait encore défaut:

- du côté arabe, le souci de sauvegarder le succès diplomatique qu'il vient d'enregistrer en Afrique, amène les Etats arabes à se préoccuper avant tout de la répercussion de la hausse du coût du pétrole sur les économies africaines;
- du côté africain, la crise pétrolière, tout en portant un choc aux économies africaines a, de surcroît, amenuisé les chances d'un développement futur. Aussi les pays africains attendent surtout une participation massive des capitaux arabes au développement du continent noir en tant que juste rémunération de leur engagement dans la crise du Moyen-Orient.

Cette divergence dans les attitudes et les aspirations, des deux côtés, va susciter des heurts et des déceptions d'autant plus vifs que les décisions arabes en faveur de l'Afrique tardent à être appliquées, à cause d'un manque de coordination suffisante entre les secrétariats des deux organisations: l'OUA et la Ligue Arabe.

Ce n'est que le 10 Juillet 1975 que les deux partenaires adoptent un projet unique de "Déclaration et d'un Programme d'action commune" qui sera discuté au début 1976 à Dakar. Ce projet accorde une priorité aux problèmes de développement et doit assurer, à la nouvelle solidarité arabo-africaine, des assises économiques durables.

A l'heure de Dakar (19-21 Avril 1976) la coopération arabo-africaine se trouve dotée de trois nouvelles organisations financières: le Fonds Arabe Spécial de Crédit pour l'Afrique, la BADEA, et le Fonds Arabe pour l'Aide Technique Arabe et Africaine.

Par ailleurs, un certain nombre de pays arabes ont entrepris, à titre individuel, à la contribution du développement des pays africains.

D'une manière générale, on peut évaluer l'aide fournie par le partenaire arabe à l'Afrique non-arabe, depuis fin 1973, à peu près à 1.050 Millions de dollars, sous forme d'aide multilatérale et à quelques 700 Millions de dollars sous forme d'aide bilatérale, soit au total: 1.750 Millions de dollars. Confrontée aux besoins réels de l'Afrique, cette aide si importante et fournie en temps-record (3 ans), n'a eu qu'un impact limité sur les économies africaines.

Effets de l'Aide Arabe sur les Economies Africaines

S'il est vrai que cette aide a permis aux pays africains de payer la note de leurs importations en pétrole (1974 et 1975), il convient toutefois de préciser que plus de 85% du pétrole produit par l'Afrique sont destinées à l'exportation, que, par ailleurs, la consommation africaine en pétrole est une des plus faibles du monde, enfin que ce sont les incidences des hausses des produits industriels intervenues à la suite de la crise pétrolière et dans un climat d'inflation croîssante qui, en amenant une déterioration sensible dans les termes des échanges entre l'Afrique, premier fournisseur de matières premières et l'Europe, premier client et fournisseur de machines et de biens d'équipement, ont aggravé la situation déjà bien précaire des économies africaines.

Cet état de choses n'a pas manqué d'entacher la solidarité arabo-africaine. En prenant des positions politiques en faveur de la cause arabe, les pays africains attendaient moins, en contrepartie, une opération de sauvetage pour leurs importations pétrolières, qu'une solution à leur

problèmes, sous la forme d'une injonction massive de capitaux qui leur permettraient de franchir le cap du sous-développement. De leur côté, les pays de l'OPAEP se montraient plus soucieux de ménager l'avenir par des investissements sûrs, c'est-à-dire dans les pays industrialisés, là où les marchés sont développés. Selon les uns, les investissements arabes dans le cadre du recyclage des pétro-dollars auraient atteint près de 7 Milliards de dollars depuis fin 1973, aux Etats-Unis, et 3 Milliards de dollars en Grande-Bretagne essentiellement en biens immobiliers, alors que dans les banques européennes, les dépôts arabes seraient de l'ordre de 5 Milliards de dollars pour la même période. Dans un tel contexte, les investissements arabes en Afrique paraissent bien dérisoires et suscitent surtout un sentiment d'amertume chez le partenaire africain.

Il existe donc une marge profonde entre les espoirs africains placés dans la solidarité arabo-africaine et les priorités de la nouvelle stratégie arabe qui a emergé après le succès de l'arme du pétrole.

Il faut préciser que la confrontation entre pays arabes exportateurs de pétrole et les pays consommateurs était pour les premiers plus une réaction contre la dégradation des échanges entre pays producteurs de matières premières (le pétrole) et les pays développés, qu'une épreuve de force en soi. Aussi, elle ne pouvait que déboucher sur un dialogue. Les arabes sont les premiers à le suggérer.

Y-a-t-il eu priorité du dialogue euro-arabe sur le dialogue arabo-africain? Ou même concurrence selon certains auteurs? Nous ne le croyons pas. En réalité, l'un et l'autre forment un tout qui s'inscrit dans un ensemble plus vaste tendant à refondre l'ordre économique international défaillant. Si le dialogue Nord-Sud constitue la première étape de cette lutte, on ne peut prévoir aujourd'hui ses résultats. Se limitera-t-il à une concertation au sommet entre pays consommateurs et pays producteurs de pétrole comme le voudrait M. Kissinger, ou abordera-t-il les problèmes des échanges et du sous-développement comme le souhaite

M. Bouteflika? Un fait est certain: une coopération économique arabo-africaine viable peut constituer un élément valable pour le dialogue Nord-Sud, comme elle le sortirait de l'ornière de la confrontation actuelle et lui donnerait une dynamique nouvelle.

Quelques principes de base pour une coopération économique arabo-africaine

- Cette coopération est avant tout partie intégrante de la coopération internationale;
- c'est une coopération inter-régionale entre pays sous-développés, alimentée par une solidarité politique et ne peut, de ce fait, être dissociée du mouvement du Tiers-Monde;
- l'objectif final de cette coopération demeure le développement des pays arabes et africains.

Ainsi, plus qu'une manifestation de gratitude de la part des arabes à l'égard des africains pour des positions prises en faveur de la cause arabe, cette coopération va dans le sens de la lutte des pays du Tiers-Monde pour accéder au rang de pays développés. Par ailleurs, l'aide arabe consentie aux pays africains, pour alléger les factures des importations en pétrole, n'est qu'un aspect mineur de la coopération arabo-africaine, celle-ci devant s'étendre à des investissements dans des projets africains qui offriraient des débouchés satisfaisantes au Monde arabe. Il faut donc remettre la coopération arabo-africaine sur les rails du développement de l'Afrique et du Monde arabe.

Eléments d'une Stratégie de la Coopération Arabo-africaine

En tenant compte du fait que la coopération arabo-africaine exige des relations différentes de celles qui régissent habituellement

la coopération entre pays développés et pays en voie de développement, que cette coopération doit développer des relations linéaires entre les deux groupes concernés, et ceci conformément à l'évolution de la conjoncture internationale, que l'un des deux partenaire (arabe) est en même temps producteur de matières premières (pétrole) et exportateur de capitaux (pétro-dollars), donc en situation de force sur le marché international, on peut d'ores et déjà affirmer:

- que seulement une coordination étroite entre les différentes sources de financement arabes et non-arabes est en mésure d'assurer aux pays africains un taux annuel de croissance estimé nécéssaire pour maîtriser le sous-développement (6,5% selon la BIRD pour la période 1975-80). Précisons à ce sujet: 1) que l'Afrique produit un grand nombre de matières premières mais que la totalité de ses capacités de production sont loin d'avoir été explorées, notamment pour la bauxite; 2) que la production en cultures vivrières destinées à la consommation intérieure suffit de moins en moins à combler les besoins des populations. Les raisons de cette regression sont: la faible productivité du travail agricole, la pénurie croissante d'engrais, par suite de la crise économique mondiale, la priorité accordée aux cultures d'exportations, etc....
- que le rôle qui échoit au partenaire arabe - notamment les pays exportateurs de pétrole - est celui de placer des capitaux à l'étranger. Certains de ces pays, notamment ceux à faible densité de population, ont une capacité d'absorption des technologies avancées et des biens d'équipement plutôt limitéé, par suite de l'inexistence de structures d'accueil.

Domaines de la Coopération Arabo-africaine

Le programme d'action commune adopté à Dakar (19-21 Avril 1976) reflète dans ses grandes lignes le contenu de la Déclaration sur la Coopération, le Développement et l'Indépendance Economique adopté par le Sommet de l'OUA (Addis Abeba, Mai 1973). Il s'agit donc essentiellement du développement de l'Afrique avec des investissements arabes. Toutefois, on peut relever dans le programme de Dakar quelques indices anonciateurs d'une véritable coopération arabo-africaine multisectorielle, émanant du souci des deux partenaires de surmonter leurs divergences.

Perspectives d'une Coopération Triangulaire

Il convient de rappeler que tant du point de vue des arabes que de celui des africains le développement de l'Afrique ne peut être la responsabilité exclusive des arabes:

a - la refonte du système économique international passe nécéssairement par une contribution active des pays industriels au développement du continent. C'est une conviction qui émane d'une revendication du Tiers-Monde, qui consiste à exiger une sorte de compensation pour l'exploitation coloniale du passé;

b - exigeant à la fois des capitaux à investir et un savoir faire technologique, le développement bute contre la position des pays industrialisés, qui estiment que l'arme technologique qu'ils détiennent est un atout majeur dans les négociations politiques et économiques à venir dans le Dialogue Nord-Sud.

Ainsi, est née l'idée d'une coopération "tripartite" dans le cadre du dialogue arabo-africain. Elle comporte un apport technologique substantiel devant être fourni par l'Europe. M.Chedly Ayari considère cet apport comme un moyen d'intégrer la coopération arabo-africaine dans

un cadre plus vaste, celui de la coopération internationale. D'une manière générale, la coopération et son corollaire, le transfert de technologies, demeurent une aspiration des pays du Tiers-Monde. De cette manière, l'Occident est visé par les Arabes ainsi que par les Africains et la proximité de l'Europe place celle-ci au premier rang parmi les fournisseurs de cette coopération et de cette technologie.

Dans quelle mésure cette aspiration correspond-elle aux réalités concrètes des relations existant entre les trois partenaires concernés: CEE, Ligue Arabe et OUA?

1 - Les relations eurafricaines

La naissance du dialogue arabo-africain coincide avec un tournant important dans les relations euroafricaines, en même temps qu'elle intervient à un moment où l'Europe tente en vain de remédier à la crise énergétique et à l'inflation. Toutefois, au niveau de la politique de l'aide de l'Europe au Tiers-Monde, une orientation nouvelle s'est dessinée. Différents facteurs concourent à cette évolution:

1) dès Janvier 1971, la lenteur des ratifications de la Convention de Yaoundé II, signée depuis 1969 entre la CEE et 18 états francophones d'Afrique dits "associésés" et qui vient d'être étendue à l'Ile Maurice, annonce déjà l'échec de cette association;
2) l'accord d'Arusha (Juillet 1968) signé entre la CEE d'une part et les trois pays de la Communauté Est-Africaine, renouvelé en Septembre 1969, a été entamé par l'évolution politique qu'ont subi ces trois partenaires africains (Kénya-Ouganda-Tanzanie);
3) la Grande-Bretagne, qui vient de faire son entrée à la CEE, apporte avec elle une diversification nouvelle dans les relations entre la Communauté et les pays non-européens, notamment ceux du Commonwealth.

Aussi dès Juillet 1971, la CEE tente de remplacer la Convention de Yaoundé II par un accord plus vaste, en invitant les 19 "associés" de Yaoundé II et le 19 "associables" du Commonwealth, en plus de l'Ethiopie, du Libéria, du Soudan et de la Guinée, à signer une nouvelle convention. En Février 1975 les Accords de Lomé (CEE/ACP) sont signés. Ils consacrent le nouveau tournant pris dans les relations CEE/pays en voie de développement en ce sens que:

a - pour la première fois, ces accords établissent le principe de la non-réciprocité dans les régimes préferentiels entre les deux partenaires;

b) ils subordonnent le remboursement des crédits offerts par les pays de la CEE à la situation particulière de chaque pays ACP débiteur;

c) ils tentent d'instaurer une stabilité relative des recettes d'exportation pour certains pays ACP (Stabex);

d) ils donnent l'accès aux marchés CEE pour une liste de produits en provenance des pays ACP.

La coopération européenne dans le cadre des accords de Lomé intervient en complément des efforts que doivent déployer les pays ACP pour améliorer leur économie propre.

Aux yeux de nombreux responsables africains, les nouveaux accords de Lomé constituent les prémisses d'une véritable coopération internationale entre le Monde riche et le Monde pauvre. Mais aux yeux de certains spécialistes de l'économie africaine et internationale comme Samir Amine ce n'est pas la juste interpretation, car ces accords offrent peu d'avantages aux pays ACP, leur but essentiel étant de maintenir les pays signataires sous l'influence américaine. Par ailleurs, l'apport technologique doit être adapté aux besoins du développement des pays africains au risque de devenir un instrument d'exploitation des masses. Enfin, le fait d'encourager le développement des relations commerciales entre les deux partenaires - en tant que priorité - ne ferait que "perpêtrer un transfert massif des valeurs des pays sous-développés vers les pays développés".

Des accords de Lomé il faut cependant retenir le soutien technique fourni par l'OUA, tout en étant placé sous le contrôle des instances des négociateurs, et qui constitue un précédent pouvant servir de base à une coopération future entre l'OUA et la CEE.

2 - Les relations euro-arabes

L'importance de ces relations a été mise en relief par la crise énergétique et l'inflation mondiale, donnant lieu a un dialogue euro-arabe. Dans le cadre d'une éventuelle coopération "triangulaire" on peut noter cependant:

- que toute coopération projetée au niveau régional et inter-régional ne peut être le fruit d'une improvisation;
- que cette coopération suppose un préalable: celui de dégager chez les partenaires concernés des institutions nouvelles coordinatrices des efforts déployés en faveur de cette coopération. Ce préalable fait encore défaut dans le dialogue euro-arabe;
- c'est une coopération entre un groupe de pays développés (CEE) et un groupe de pays en voie de développement (Pays Ligue Arabe) mais où le second partenaire participe pour la première fois à l'apport en capital.

Toute coopération "triangulaire" devra donc opérer une sorte de réaménagement des priorités, en d'autres termes, tenir compte des problèmes demeurés jusqu'ici secondaires chaque fois que la coopération a été envisagée entre deux groupes de pays.

Au niveau institutionnel

Il est nécéssaire créer des institutions communautaires qui reflètent dans leurs buts une coopération inter-communautaire dynamique

et qui ne soient pas le simple prolongement des institutions existantes. Or, rien dans le Traité de Rome prévoit une coopération réelle au développement des pays "associés" qui puisse servir de point de départ à une coopération triangulaire véritable. Et encore, les institutions de la CEE chargées d'appliquer une politique d'aide et de coopération pour les états associés ont été crées à l'origine pour consolider les liens d'échange forgés sous l'ère coloniale entre métropoles européennes et "territoires d'Outre-mer ou les territoires ayant des liens spéciaux avec les pays membres de la Communauté" c'est à dire les colonies.

Du côté africain, les institutions qui pourraient servir de cadre à cette coopération triangulaire sont quasi-inexistantes par le fait que dans une organisation continentale comme l'OUA le seul élément de cohésion véritable est peut-être l'appartenence à l'Afrique.

Enfin du côté arabe, il existe, au niveau du dialogue euro-arabe un comité directeur chargé de suivre de près les activités des deux partenaires. Au niveau du dialogue arabo-africain, le comité des 12 (OUA) et son homologue à la Ligue Arabe sont chargés de promouvoir une coopération entre les deux partenaires. Toutefois la création de ces organisations inter-communautaires est surtout le fruit de décisions politiques. Il reste donc à leur donner un contenu économique viable, non sans avoir amendé les textes dans un sens qui reflèterait la nouvelle politique d'ouverture du Monde arabe en direction de l'Europe et de l'Afrique établie vers la fin de l'année 1973.

Au niveau des investissements

Il faudrait là aussi, réviser les normes et les principes qui régissent la politique d'investissements pratiquée par les deux partenaires détenteurs de capitaux (européens et arabes) dans un sens qui assurerait le développement à la fois de l'Afrique et du Monde Arabe et

de l'Europe Communautaire. Une exigence préalable à toute coopération triangulaire en ce domaine est une sérieuse coordination des efforts des pays de la CEE et des pays arabes, ces efforts devant en priorité promouvoir le développement économique et social de l'Afrique et du Monde Arabe. Tant dans l'un que dans l'autre, il existe des ressources énormes et diversifiées non exploitées jusqu'ici (hydraulique, industries, agriculture mécanisée, etc.).

Le second préalable à une coopération triangulaire est donc la refonte des politiques d'investissements et l'élaboration d'une politique inter-communautaire nouvelle qui répondrait mieux aux besoins prioritaires du développement des pays africains arabes et européens.

Dans l'élaboration d'une politique inter-communautaire en matière d'investissements, la BAD/FDA, la BADEA, le FDE et la BEI sont appelés à jouer un rôle primordial. Mais d'autres organisations régionales peuvent également contribuer à cette entreprise: notamment la BDEAC, les Fonds arabes koweitien, saoudien, Abu Dhabi, enfin la Banque Islamique, etc..

Au niveau des échanges commerciaux

C'est surtout la promotion des échanges intra-africains, demeurés négligeables à cause du sous-développement, renforcés par les clivages crées pendant l'époque coloniale et maintenus après l'indépendance, qui se pose comme une priorité majeure.

Le partenaire européen de son côté devrait chercher un remède à l'inflation dans l'élargissement des marchés extérieures plutôt que dans l'acheminement des matières premières vers ses pôles de développement et, en contribuant ainsi au développement des échanges intra-africains (création d'industries locales: alimentaires, habitat, etc.) qui répondent aux besoins des populations africaines dont la grande majorité

continue à vivre en économie d'auto-consommation.

Au niveau de l'apport technologique

Cet effort incombe principalement au partenaire européen. Toutefois, on ne peut dissocier les connaissances technologiques, notamment industrielles, de la civilisation qui leur a donné naissance, au risque de créer, des industries enclavées dans un evironnement replié sur soi-même et sans possibilité de rayonnement. Aussi cet apport européen devra-t-il être avant tout, d'un niveau accordé aux besoins réels des sociétés qui le reçoivent.

Conclusion

On peut conclure que dans le cadre des trois organisations CEE, Ligue Arabe, OUA, il existe des possibilités réelles pour une coopération triangulaire. Cependant tout effort dans ce sens, exige au préalable de la part des trois partenaires, une révision à plus d'un niveau, afin qu'il émane d'une attitude nouvelle plus conforme aux exigences prévalant désormais sur la scène internationale: le grand besoin de paix, et de stabilité politique, enfin une plus grande convergence des efforts, afin de mieux lutter contre ce qui menace de plus en plus, l'avenir du monde: le sous-développement.

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THE POLITICAL USE OF MILITARY POWER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

by
Barry M. Blechman

Questo documento fa parte di un progetto di ricerca sui problemi del Mediterraneo, che l'Istituto Affari Internazionali conduce con l'aiuto finanziario della Fondazione Ford.

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and

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DRAFT

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Prepared for the Institute for International Affairs Conference on Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean Area

January 1977, Athens

On November 11, 1944 the Turkish Ambassador to the United States, Mehmet Munir Ertegün, died in Washington. Not a very important event at a time when Allied forces were sweeping across France and east Europe toward Germany, and Berlin and Tokyo began to approach Götterdämmerung. Sixteen months later, however, the Ambassador's remains were the focus of world attention, as the curtain went up on a classic act in the use of armed forces as a political instrument: the U.S. Department of State announced on March 6, 1946 that the late Ambassador Ertegün's remains would be sent home to Turkey aboard the U.S.S. Missouri, visibly the most powerful surface combatant in the United States Navy and the ship on board which General Douglas MacArthur had recently accepted Japan's surrender.

Between the Ambassador's death and this annoucement not only had World War II ended; the Cold War--yet untitled--had begun. In addition to issues between the United States and the Soviet Union that had developed over Poland, Germany, Iran, and other areas, the Soviet Union was demanding the concession of two Turkish provinces in the east and, in the west, a base in the area of the Dardanelles. Moreover, a week after the State Department's announcement, the number of Soviet troops deployed near Turkey's eastern border was increased.

On March 22, 1946 the Missouri began a slow journey from New York harbor to Turkey, escorted by the destroyer Power. At Gibraltar the British Governor placed a wreath on board; and on April 3rd, in the eastern Mediterranean, the light cruiser Providence joined the force. Finally, on the morning of April 5th, the Missouri and her escorts anchored in the harbor of Istanbul.*

* Log of the U.S.S. Missouri.

The meaning of this event was missed by no one, as Washington not so subtly reminded the Russians and others that the United States was a great military power, and suggested that it could project power abroad, even to shores far distant. Whether the visit of the Missouri, or it together with other actions that followed, deterred the Soviet Union from any planned or potential, coercive behavior will probably never be known. What is clear, though, is that as a symbolic act of American support for Turkey vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, it was well received and appreciated by the Government of Turkey, the Turkish press and, as near as anyone could tell, by the Turkish citizenry at large. The post-mortem report by the American Ambassador to Turkey to the Department of State was that the action had indicated to Turkey that

> the U.S. has now decided that its own interests in this area require it to oppose any effort by [the] USSR to destroy Turk [ey's] independence and integrity.*

In returning to the United States, the Missouri visited Athens, Naples, Algiers, and Tangier. No doubt, the most important was the visit to Athens. In addition to territorial issues between Greece and Bulgaria and Albania, it was apparent that Greece was ripe for insurrection and civil war, directed by the Greek Communist Party and supported by Greece's neighbors to the north. The response by Athenians to the Missouri's arrival on April 10th was extremely favorable, and again the political-military meaning of the visit was not missed.**

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* U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946: Volume 3: The Near East and Africa (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 822. Also, see: Stephen G. Xydis, "The Genesis of the Sixth Fleet," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 84 (August, 1958), pp. 41-50.

** Stephen Xydis, Greece and the Great Powers, 1944-1947 (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963), pp. 180-88.

In the quarter century following the Missouri's triumphant tour, the United States established a major military presence in the Mediterranean area, enough to exert an important influence on the course of regional events. The development of this American military presence was especially conspicuous insofar as British naval power receded. Indeed, for a time, the American military presence in the area was uncontested. But times change!

On October 25, 1973, during the Middle East War then in progress, three American aircraft carrier task groups preparing for combat operations began to converge on a position south of Crete--surrounded, in turn, by a Soviet fleet that rose in number during the following week to include as many as 57 surface combatants and submarines*. Elsewhere, the Egyptian Third Army had been encircled by Israeli forces on the West Bank; only hours earlier First Secretary Brezhnev had sent a blunt note to President Nixon: 'I will say it straight,' Brezhnev related, 'that if you find it impossible to act together with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.'**

Of the period from October 25th to 31st, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations at the time observed later; "I doubt that major units of the U.S. Navy were ever in a tenser situation since World War II ended than the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was for . . . [that] week."***

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* Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch (New York Quadrangle/New York Times, 1976), p. 447.

** Quoted in Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), p. 490.

*** Zumwalt, pp. 446-47.

Earlier during the war, both the United States and the Soviet Union had airlifted thousands of tons of arms and equipment to Israel, Egypt, and Syria; increased the size of their respective naval presences; and placed theater adjacent ground units on alert.

Three things stand out about these events: first, for the past three decades the Mediterranean area has been a focus of world attention and crisis, as a result of both internal developments and external interests. Second, the eastern Mediterranean has remained a place of prospective conflict between the superpowers. And third, the development of a major Soviet military presence in the area has altered radically the political and military calculations of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and of Mediterranean states.

Throughout the turmoil of the past thirty years, however, neither American nor Soviet military units in the area have ever fired a shot at each other; and with the exception of the Soviet air defense of Egypt in 1970, neither has ever directed a violent act at any regional actor either.* Each, however, has used its armed forces on numerous occasions to achieve political objectives--i.e., as an instrument with which to influence the behavior of each other and other actors. Indeed, the presence of American and Soviet military forces in the area is the result of that purpose and has such effect.

In maintaining a standing military presence in the area, the superpowers have sought to continuously assure allies and to deter antagonists--including each other. The permanent deployment of military forces to the region may also provide the superpowers a certain diffuse or general influence in the area.

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* The closest the United States ever came to conflict with a regional actor was in the form of confrontations between U.S. troops and Yugoslav and Lebanese military units in 1946 and 1958, respectively.

Although impossible to delimit, much political, economic and other behavior in the region may be an implicit function of the existence of these respective presences.

How have the superpowers used their armed forces in the Mediterranean area in order to obtain specific political objectives in particular situations? More specifically, where have they used their armed forces? In what contexts? What levels of forces have been used? And what did those forces do? What is the historical record, and what may be expected in the future? It is to these questions that this paper is addressed.

In considering these questions, this paper will focus more heavily upon American than upon Soviet uses of armed forces. Throughout the postwar era the United States has been the dominant military power in the Mediterranean area. The United States has also used its armed forces much more frequently. That there is more information about U.S. than about Soviet behavior goes almost without saying. Before examining how the superpowers have used their armed forces in order to achieve political objectives, however, it is worth considering the development of their respective military presences in the region.

The American Military Presence

Sending the body of the Turkish ambassador home on the battleship Missouri was an inspired act of diplomacy. Perhaps more important militarily and in the long run politically was the deployment to the Mediterranean in August 1946 of the aircraft carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt. Its relief, in November, by the aircraft carrier Randolph signaled the maintenance in the area of an aircraft carrier task group able to project power ashore in support of America's

allies. Whereas only three U.S. ships (the light cruiser Providence and two destroyers) had been in the Mediterranean at the end of 1945, by the end of 1946 the United States typically maintained in the area an aircraft carrier and approximately a dozen surface combatants. Most importantly, though, this development signaled the establishment of a permanent American military presence in the area, which in later years was further increased in size. The missions of American military forces in the area during the next three decades included:

1. Sea defense on NATO's southern flank;
2. Tactical support for NATO ground operations;
3. Symbolic support to NATO southern flank nations;
4. Support for American nuclear deterrence;
5. Shows of force in crises.

In January 1948 a new capability was added when an amphibious reinforced Marine battalion joined the fleet, then including the carrier Midway. The coup in Czechoslovakia had not yet occurred; nor had the first Berlin crisis erupted. But in the Mediterranean area, Trieste was of continuing concern, the civil war in Greece was raging, and Palestine was aflame. Clearly Washington sought to be able to place ashore, if necessary, at least a limited number of ground troops, whether it be to intercede in a conflict, or support an evacuation. By this time U.S. Army strength on the continent had declined from 2.8 million in 1945 to approximately 100,000; and virtually all of these troops were in Germany. The last American troops in Italy (2,000) had departed in December 1947. Being more mobile, the Marine battalionwas a flexible replacement force to those troops just departed.

In later years and in relation to the American commitment to NATO, U.S. Army ground troops were redeployed to Italy. These units currently include the 1st Airborne Battalion Combat Team/509th Infantry and the 2nd Battalion/30th Field Artillery, both of which are based in Vincenza. These units comprise the only land based U.S. ground forces in the Mediterranean area.

A further increase in the size and in the capabilities of the Sixth Fleet took place during the Korean War. Notwithstanding the immediate demands on the Korean peninsula and in the western Pacific, by September 1950*, over 50 American warships were in the Mediterranean; an additional increase being made for at least a short time during 1951. For the longer term, the important development was that the military capability of the fleet was permanently increased from one carrier task group deployed in the Mediterranean to two--at a time when a Soviet naval presence there did not yet exist.

Besides the two carrier task groups that the United States has since maintained in the Mediterranean for the past quarter of a century, the only additional tactical aircraft deployed to the area have been those in the 401st tactical air wing based in Spain, portions of which are deployed periodically to forward bases in Italy and Turkey. Deployed to Spain in the mid-1960s, the 401st currently includes F-4 and F-111 aircraft in its inventory.

Since the augmentation to two carrier groups during the Korean War, a third aircraft carrier and other naval units operating with the Second Fleet in the Atlantic have sometimes been dispatched to the Sixth Fleet during major crises; but these deployments have always been of a temporary nature, never lasting beyond the cooling down period after the crisis. In the same vein,

* The New York Times, September 23, 1950, p. 6.

a second amphibious Marine battalion has also been deployed during a number of crises. Of perhaps more permanent interest, though, was the addition to the Sixth Fleet of an LPH (helicopter carrier), which allowed a vertical assault capability of the regularly stationed Marine battalion.

Table 1 presents numbers of different types of units on station as of January 1st in the 1970s. What stands out is constancy, both in the total number of ships and in the numbers of different types of ships. Moreover, these numbers have remained relatively constant for the past quarter century.*

Since the early 1950s, the Sixth Fleet also has had aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The first were P2V-3C Neptunes, which, although they were not based on carriers, were able to take off from an aircraft carrier. A number were based at Pt. Lyautey in Morocco and, on occasion, were loaded by crane onto a Midway class carrier. The difficulty was that when these planes were on board, there was no room left for the carrier's normal complement of attack aircraft; hence, the second carrier was needed to provide air defense for the first. The AJ-1 Savage was the first aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons that could be based on a carrier. Since then the succession of aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons which have been based on board American aircraft carriers have included the A-3D Skywarrior, A-4 Skyhawk, and A-6 Intruder. Into the early 1960s these aircraft were included in U.S. strategic nuclear planning. No doubt, what is important to Moscow and other Warsaw Treaty Organization(WTO) members

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* Data provided by U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, Naval History Division.

TABLE 1

SIXTH FLEET SURFACE COMBATANTS

AND AUXILIARIES, AS OF 1 JANUARY 1971-1975*

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Aircraft Carriers[1]	2	2	2	2	2	2
Cruisers[2]	2	2	2	2	1	1-3
Destroyers[3]	18	17	17	16	16	15-13
Patrol Boats[4]	2	2	4	4	4	4
Amphibious Warfare Ships (including Helicopter Carriers)[5]	4	4	5	5	7	5
Auxiliaries	6	8	7	11	10	9
Total	34	35	37	38	39	36

[1] CVA, CVS, CV
[2] CG, CLG
[3] DLG, DDG, DD, DEG, DE, FF
[4] PG
[5] LKA, LPA, LPD, LPH, LSD, LST

* Source: Robert G. Weinland, "A Somewhat Different View of the Optimal Naval Posture," p. 12. Presented at American Political Science Association meetings, Chicago, September 1976. Data provided by U.S. Navy.

that the Sixth Fleet retains a nuclear strike capability.

Also in the 1950s, the United States established as part of the Strategic Air Command(SAC), the Sixteenth Air Force in Morocco and Spain. The principal aircraft of the Sixteenth Air Force were B-47 nuclear bombers. Bases in the European theater were necessary because of the limited range of these aircraft. The bases in Morocco were lost in 1963, however, and in 1965 the last B-47s were withdrawn from Spain. The B-47s, however, were replaced for a time by a significant portion of the B-58 inventory, the last of which left Spain in 1968.

The United States continues to maintain a strategic nuclear presence in the area, however, in the form of nuclear powered ballistic missile firing submarines (SSBNs), first deployed to the Mediterranean in 1963. While playing a role in U.S. strategic planning, these SSBNs have also had a political role--i.e., they were a symbolic regional replacement to the intermediate range missiles (IRBMs) that were withdrawn from Italy and Turkey in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis; hence the well publicized visit by the Sam Houston to Izmir in April 1963 after the United States withdrew its IRBMs from Turkey.

In order to support the Sixth Fleet, SSBNs, and other American military units in the region, the United States maintains a number of facilities in Spain, Morocco, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. The services provided by these support facilities to U.S. combat units include electronic intelligence and communications, maritime reconnaissance, repairs, and the replenishment of consumables. In the early years of its deployment, the Sixth Fleet heavily used facilities in France and Morocco. Today, facilities in Italy and

Spain are used most extensively for Fleet support.*

Finally, with reference to the support of crisis as well as combat operations in the Mediterranean area, it is important to note the strategic significance of Lajes Field in the Azores. Barring transit through northern Europe, Lajes is a generally necessary stopping point for U.S. tactical and transport aircraft flying from the United States to southern Europe or the Middle East. In the 1973 Middle East War all aircraft flying to Israel from the United States and from West Germany were routed through the Azores, where they either landed in-transit or were refueled while they remained in the air.**

The Size and Nature of the Soviet Military Presence

The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean can be discussed in terms of four chronological periods: 1946-53, 1954-60, 1961-63, and 1964 to the present.*** In the first period, the immediate postwar years until shortly after Stalin's death, there was no Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean to speak of. Of course, there did not exist much in the way of a Soviet Navy during these years; but, in any case, there was no apparent concern or interest in maintaining even a minimal presence in the Mediterranean.

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* Barry M. Blechman and Robert G. Weinland, "Die Bedeutung von Seestützpunkten im Nuklearzeitalter" ("The Importance of Naval Bases in the Nuclear Age") Europa-Archiv, 31 (Number 18, 1976), 577-88. Also, see Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), pp. 18-33.

** On the airlift and use of Lajes Field during the 1973 War, see Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress: Airlift Operations of the Military Airlift Command During the 1973 Middle East War, April 16, 1975; "Israel Airlift Flights Underscore C-5 Rapid Deployment Capability," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 99 (December 10, 1973), pp. 16-19; Lt. (J.G.) F.C. Miller (USN), "Those Storm Beaten Ships Upon Which the Arab Armies Never Looked," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 101 (March 1975), pp. 18-25.

*** See Robert G. Weinland, "Soviet Transits of the Turkish Straits: 1945-1970 - An Historical Note on the Establishment and Dimensions of the Soviet Naval Presence in the Mediterranean" (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper, No. 94, April 1972), p. 4

The second period, 1954-60, saw the growth of a small but nevertheless regularly visible force in the Mediterranean, although its largest component was a submarine squadron. While the latter was militarily addressed to the Sixth Fleet, these deployments also were used politically to show off a presence in the area and to make port visits. The first visit to an Arab port occurred during the 1957 crisis between Syria and Turkey, when the cruiser Zhdanov and destroyer Svobodin paid a ten day call at Latakia, Syria--while both Soviet and Arab media exalted Soviet military power and deprecated the capabilities of the Sixth Fleet.*

Of further importance was the establishment in 1958 of a logistic support base for Soviet submarines at Vlone, Albania. At the same time that Soviet interest and involvement in the Middle East was growing, expansion in the size of the ocean going Soviet Navy during these years provided Moscow with an instrument which was both flexible in nature and symbolic of growing Soviet power and influence. Nevertheless, the primary motivation for this deployment was probably strategic defense and deterrence insofar as aircraft of the U.S. Sixth Fleet were capable of carrying nuclear bombs and had a range allowing their delivery of these weapons into the Soviet Union. Indeed, these aircraft remained through the 1950s a part of the United States' strategic strike force.

Then in 1961, after seven years of development, the Soviet naval presence suddenly declined; not because of a change in Soviet military capabilities and only doubtfully as a result of a shift in policy. The most probable reason

* George S. Dragnich, "The Soviet Union's Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to the June War of 1967" (Arlington, Va: Center for Naval Analysis, 1974, Professional Paper, 127), pp. 10-11.

for the reduced level of the Soviet presence, which lasted through 1963, was the loss of the base at Vlone, a little noticed but not unimportant outgrowth of the Sino-Soviet rift, already in blossom in the Communist world. The loss of this base particularly affected the deployment to the Mediterranean of Soviet submarines.

The standing Soviet naval presence now in the Mediterranean was initiated in 1964, coincident with the Cyprus crisis. Between 1964 and 1971 the number of Soviet ship days in the Mediterranean increased from 1500 to 19,000!* An important intermediary point was the 1967 War in the Middle East, during and after which the Soviet naval presence increased radically in size (see Figure 1). This build-up slowed only in 1972, a half decade after the June War and more than a year after the August 1970 ceasefire in the Middle East. The Soviet Fleet reached a new peak in 1973 in the context of the October War, but since then has essentially levelled off in size.

Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean has for the past decade accounted for almost half of the total number of out-of-area shipdays worldwide of the entire Soviet Navy.** This would seem a clear indicator of the importance Moscow attributes to the region and perhaps the American military presence therein. The current "normal" composition of the Fifth Escadra or Soviet Mediterranean squadron is presented in Table 2.

The Soviet Mediterranean squadron typically consists now of fifty or more units, approximately half of which are warships and submarines. The force usually includes two to four cruisers and nine to twelve destroyers or other escorts. One of the two Soviet helicopter carriers (which are used for anti-

* Robert G. Weinland, "Soviet Naval Operations - Ten Years of Change" (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper No. 125, August 1974), p. 3; updated by R.G. Weinland. One ship day is the equivalent of one naval or naval-subordinated ship spending one day in the Mediterranean.

** Weinland, "Soviet Naval Operations...," p. 2.

FIGURE 1

SOVIET SHIP DAYS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1964-1975



Source: Robert G. Weinland, "Soviet Naval Operations - Ten Years of Change" (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper No. 125, August 1974), p. 3; updated by R.G. Weinland. One ship day is the equivalent of one naval or naval-subordinated ship spending one day in the Mediterranean.

TABLE 2

"NORMAL" SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN

SQUADRON COMPOSITION*

Submarines		
8-10 Torpedo attack		
2-3 Cruise missile	Total Submarines	10-13
Surface Combatants		
2-4 Cruiser types		
9-12 Destroyer types		
2-3 Minesweepers		
1-3 Amphibious warfare ships	Total Surface Combatants	14-22
Auxiliaries		
18-20 Support ships (replenishment, repair, etc.)		
5-6 Survey/Research ships	Total Auxiliaries	23-26
	"Normal" Squadron strength	47-61

* Source: Robert G. Weinland, monograph not yet titled, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977, forthcoming).

Data from: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments: Background Material for Addressing Soviet Naval Developments by U.S. Naval Personnel, April 1974, pg. 11; [a revised edition, published in April 1975 by the U.S. Government Printing Office, gives slightly different figures for minesweepers (1-3) and support ships (15-20), and therefore, "normal" strength (43-61). With one exception, the figures from the earlier edition are closer to and hence probably more representative of the prewar situation in 1973, so they are given above. The exception is the torpedo attack submarine strength, which reportedly stabilized at a higher level after the October war than had been the norm before the war.]

submarine warfare) is also seen frequently in the Mediterranean. Reinforcement in time of crisis is always possible. Reinforcement during time of war would be more difficult, if not impossible, however.* Other Soviet forces that could affect the outcome of a conflict in the Mediterranean include, most importantly, strike aircraft based near the Black Sea. These planes would pose a considerable threat to U.S. surface naval forces operating within combat range.

The Soviet naval force in the Mediterranean would seem to have three general missions: to take pre-emptive or defensive action against SSBNs and the Sixth Fleet in the context of impending or actual conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union directly; to caution against and to lessen the political impact of particular movements and activities of the Sixth Fleet during crises involving Soviet and U.S. clients; to project an image of Soviet power in order to increase the influence of the Soviet Union in the area generally.

There is no point in trying to assess the "balance" between the Sixth Fleet and Fifth Escadra. Their military missions are entirely different: the Sixth Fleet would be concerned to secure sea lanes and project power ashore; the Fifth Escadra would attempt to deny these objectives. In short, the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean is designed in a combat sense as a counter to the U.S. force and not as a force to secure sea control or to project power ashore.

Could the Fifth Escadra carry out its combat mission and, in particular, could it incapacitate, if not sink, the American aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean? Assessing this question is beyond the scope of this paper;

* See Barry M. Blechman, "Toward a New Consensus in U.S. Defense Policy," in Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze (Eds.), Setting National Priorities: The Next Ten Years (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 75.

however, it is of the greatest importance to the success of the non-combat Soviet naval missions that this question has even arisen. The greater the perceived military capability of Soviet forces vis-a-vis American forces, the more likely that Soviet actions during crises will inhibit U.S. military actions and impact on the considerations of American and Soviet allies; and consequently, the more likely that the non-crisis presence of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean, exercises, and port visits will convey an image of real rather than token power.

Certainly, the Soviet squadron is something of an inhibiting influence on U.S. crisis behavior. While the increased concern of U.S. Admirals can be easily documented, we need only point to the experience of the 1973 War as compared with, for example, that of the 1958 Lebanon crisis. Notwithstanding the maneuvers staged by Soviet forces in the area of Turkey's border with Bulgaria, the Lebanon environment was one of essentially no risk;* that of 1973 was one of acute danger. Of at least equal importance, this may have been the perception of Soviet allies.

Currently, the Soviet Union has no ground or combat air capability in a state bordering the Mediterranean. Moreover, no Soviet forces are stationed in Rumania or Bulgaria, although the latter may be considered a firm Soviet ally. Of great importance to Turkey, however, are those forces maintained in the area the Soviets identify as Europe/Southern Sector, which includes the Odessa, North Caucasus, and Trans-Caucasus Military Districts. These

* New York Times, July 20, 1958, p. 11.

forces have been estimated at 244,000 troops, 4400 tanks and 550 tactical aircraft.* Crises maneuvers by forces in these areas have been of no small concern to Ankara historically.

Of significance to Yugoslavia are the four Soviet (including two tank) divisions in Hungary, although these troops alone may not pose a serious threat. What would present a real danger would be the renewed emplacement of Soviet forces in Rumania; especially if that was to happen prior to or concurrent with a succession or other crisis developing in the wake of Marshal Tito's death. But the Soviet forces mentioned above are only those currently emplaced in given areas. In a crisis they could be reinforced and might have the support of other WTO forces.

Of perhaps greatest interest, at least since the 1973 War in the Middle East, is the Soviet airborne capability to reinforce its allies. Soviet forces currently include seven airborne divisions and approximately 800 medium (AN-12) and long range (AN-22 and IL-76) transport aircraft.** These aircraft are capable of lifting, at one time, a full division together with its equipment complement. During the October War all seven airborne divisions were placed on an increased level of alert. An even higher degree of readiness was evidenced by the behavior of three of these divisions; and following the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army it appeared that one actually was being readied for immediate movement. Of further note,

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* R. Meller, "Expensive Luxury or Painful Necessity? Europe's New Generation of Combat Aircraft; Part I", International Defense Review, 8 (April, 1975), p. 180.

** The Military Balance, 1976-1977 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), pp. 8, 10. Also see: Robert P. Berman, Soviet Air Power: Trends and Implications (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977, forthcoming).

and of potential future significance, the Soviets were allowed by Belgrade to use Yugoslav air space.*

Finally, one wants to keep in mind the 1970 deployment of Soviet aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and personnel to Egypt in defense against Israeli air operations in the area of the Nile Delta. Prior to the August 1970 ceasefire, Soviet pilots in Soviet aircraft engaged the Israeli Air Force, and Soviet ground personnel took over the direction and operation of the Egyptian air defense system. In the words of one observer, "by the time of the ceasefire in August, Egypt had been turned into a prototype Soviet air defense district".** Soviet combat aircraft, pilots and ground personnel departed Egypt in 1972, and by 1976, of course, all Soviet military personnel had been ousted from Egypt.*** But the point remains that Soviet personnel have taken part in combat operations in the area in the past and could do so again.

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* Aviation Week and Space Technology, 19 (November 19, 1973), pp. 14-15.

** Berman, forthcoming. Of historical interest, in 1951 Soviet tactical aircraft were reported deployed to Albania to help intercept emigré aircraft attempting to drop leaflets and support guerrilla actions. New York Times, March 31, 1951, p. 5, and December 28, 1951, p. 2. Outside of east Europe, Soviet combat forces were also reported deployed to Yemen in 1967, the Sudan in 1971, and Iraq in 1974.

*** Between 1967 and 1972 the Soviet Union developed in Egypt an important complex of support facilities for the Fifth Escadra, including an exeedingly useful shipyard in Alexandria.

THE UNITED STATES USE OF ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT

The remainder of this paper will focus on the use by the United States of its armed forces to influence events in the Mediterranean area. Of further interest will be the use of U.S. armed forces within the Mediterranean area to influence events elsewhere. Finally, we will be concerned to consider Soviet behavior relevant to these actions.

The focus, thus, is on the use of armed forces as a political instrument--i.e., as a tool of diplomacy. In saying this, it may be noted that the United States has utilized its armed forces often since the Second World War; and in a wide variety of ways. Most of these uses have a political dimension; that is, they are likely to influence the perceptions and behavior of political leaders in foreign countries to some degree. We will be concerned here only with those uses of the armed forces which meet the following definitional criteria:

> A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence; or to be prepared to do so in a specific instance.

In using this definition we exclude as a political use of the armed forces, the following: participation in a war; the direct defense of U.S. property, citizens, and military positions; the <u>continued</u> presence of forces

in an area; routine armed forces activities (e.g., exercises, maneuvers, and most port visits); support provided routinely to foreign governments (e.g., disaster aid); evacuations; military assistance.

World-wide, American policymakers used U.S. armed forces in a way that met this definition on 215 occasions between 1 January 1946 and 31 October 1975 (an arbitrary cut-off date necessarily imposed on our research).* Fifty-five of these actions--i.e., one-quarter of the total--were principally related to incidents in the Mediterranean area; and in another eight incidents taking place elsewhere, U.S. armed forces in the Mediterranean area were used to support policy. Appendix A presents a list of these 63 incidents which are the subject of our analysis.

The Time and Location of Incidents

Initially in the postwar era, armed forces deployed by American policymakers to the Mediterranean area were directed at countering Soviet power and Communist influence in the Balkans and Italy. Situations of concern included Soviet threats to Turkey, developments prior to and during the civil war in Greece, the issue of Trieste, and internal developments in Italy. Virtually all of these situations were resolved, satisfactorily from the American perspective, by the time the Korean War began.

In addition to the visit by the Missouri, other American warships including the aircraft carriers Franklin D. Roosevelt, Randolph, and Leyte made pointed visits in 1946-47 to various Greek and Turkish ports. Similar actions preceded

* These incidents were determined on the basis of an examination of a very wide variety of sources, including: (a) official records of United States military organizations, such as fleet histories; (b) chronologies of international events, such as that which appears in the Middle East Journal; and (c) compilations of U.S. military activity prepared by U.S. Government agencies and other researchers.

the February 1948 elections in Italy. An even tenser situation was that of Trieste and American relations with Yugoslavia. Indeed, in August 1946 Belgrade was responsible for forcing one American aircraft to crash land in Yugoslavia and for shooting down another.* In response to these and other actions by Belgrade, naval visits were made to Trieste, an Adriatic Patrol was established, and the border between Italy and Yugoslavia was reinforced.

The issue of Trieste was not resolved until 1954,** but the break between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1948, and then the movements of Soviet forces near Yugoslav borders in 1949 and 1951, lessened the likelihood of provocations by Belgrade. Indeed, in December 1951, after the United States had initiated both economic and military aid to Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito cruised on board the aircraft carrier Coral Sea, in the company of a full American task force. The United States was no longer threatening Yugoslavia over Greece and Trieste, but was supporting Yugoslavia against the Soviet Union.

Following the 1951 scare over Yugoslavia, U.S. Mediterranean forces were used infrequently for specific political objectives either in or outside of the region--until 1956 (see Figure 2), when the ferment occasioned by the Egyptian revolution and Arab nationalism boiled over in the Middle East. Britain's ability to control events then declined rapidly. At the same time, Washington became increasingly anxious about the intentions of President Nasser, his following in the Arab world, and the growing Soviet influence in the area.

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* Both American planes were unarmed.

** When the issue was resolved, 4,000 American and 2,500 British troops were withdrawn from Trieste.

The only prior American political-military activities in the Middle East were several select naval visits to Lebanon (in 1946, 1950, and 1952), and actions related to the 1948 conflict in Palestine. The latter included the establishment of a destroyer patrol and the detachment to the United Nations mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, of several transport aircraft and a number of Marines.

In early 1956, the United States established a Red Sea Patrol, and following General Glubb Pasha's dissmissal by King Hussein and worsened relations between Britain and Jordan, Sixth Fleet units were deployed to the eastern Mediterranean. A more permanent American involvement was signaled, though, during the crisis which followed President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal and the Suez War. In reaction to the developments following the initial Israeli attack, the United States deployed three aircraft carriers inside the Mediterranean (Randolph, Coral Sea, and Antiedam) and two others (Franklin D. Roosevelt and Forrestal) to the eastern Atlantic. Marines inside and outside of the area were alerted, evacuations of American citizens occurred, and, at the height of the crisis, when Moscow threatened Britain, France, and Israel, the Strategic Air Command was alerted and aircraft were deployed to forward bases. Since 1956 the focus of American military actions has been on the eastern Mediterranean,--i.e., on Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria (see Table 3).*

In the first postwar decade, three-quarters of the American involvements in the region were related to issues developing in the Balkans and Italy. Since then, almost as many have been related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and internal

* Jordan is considered a regional state conceptually.

developments in the four Arab states mentioned; particularly in Jordan and Lebanon. Another group of incidents since 1956 have been related to Cyprus. For example, during the 1974 Cyprus crisis, a task force including the aircraft carrier Forrestal and helicopter carrier Inchon established a presence near Cyprus. Meanwhile, the aircraft carrier America delayed its scheduled return to the United States while its replacement (the Independence) steamed toward the crisis area. One Army battalion in Italy was also alerted. Thus, in the past two decades, more than five out of every six incidents in which U.S. armed forces participated were related to events at the Mediterranean's eastern terminus.

In the 30 year period examined, only four U.S. actions were related to regional actors other than those already mentioned. All of these actions were of minor significance. For example, a company of Marines was flown to Port Lyautey in Morocco in order to secure the American base there when tension between the Moroccans and the French developed during the 1956 Suez Crisis. In another instance, American naval units were alerted (and, perhaps, re-deployed) in reaction to political developments in Libya in 1969.

However, since the 1948 elections in Italy and the defusal of the issue of Trieste, United States armed forces have rarely been used to achieve specific political objectives in the area of the western and central Mediterranean. Clearly, the focus of activity has been at the eastern end. The dominance of the Middle East and the Balkans is further observed by considering the number of incidents in which individual states participated. Nine regional states were participants in six or more incidents. All but France were Middle

FIGURE 2

ANNUAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS IN WHICH MEDITERRANEAN AREA U.S. ARMED FORCES WERE USED AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT, 1946-1975



TABLE 3

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS BY TIME AND LOCATION

	Egypt, Israel Jordan[a], Lebanon, Syria	Cyprus, Greece, Turkey	Italy, Yugoslavia	Other in Med Area	Total in Med Area	Total Number in Which U.S. Forces in Med Area Were Used Outside Area	Grand Total	Row as Percentage of Total
1946-50	3	6	5	-	14	2	16	25.4
1951-55	1	1	2	1	5	-	5	7.9
1956-60	11	-	-	1	12	1	13	20.6
1961-65	2	5	-	-	7	4	11	17.5
1966-70	8	2	-	2	12	1	13	20.6
1971-75	4	1	-	-	5	-	5	7.9
Total	29	15	7	4	55	8	63	100.0
Column as Percentage of Total	46.0	23.8	11.1	6.3	87.3	12.7	100.0	

a. Jordan is considered a regional state conceptually.

East or Balkan states (see Table 4).

Of the eight non-regional incidents, five were related to security issues in Europe (i.e., Berlin, 1948, 1959, and 1961; the war scare in 1951; and Czechoslovakia, 1968); and a sixth was the Cuban Missile Crisis. The two other actions, both relatively minor in nature, were related to Kuwait (1961) and Yemen (1963).

In light of the above, it may be stated first, that if the principal rationale for having U.S. armed forces in the Mediterranean area has been concern with the military defense of NATO-Europe against the Soviet Union, these forces have been used to support this objective in specific instances only infrequently; which is not to gainsay their role as part of a general deterrent force. While perhaps supporting the latter by their simple presence in the area, U.S. armed forces when have been used for specific purposes, have been directed primarily at political and military crises in and between Mediterranean states rather than at Soviet threats to European security.

Political Situation

Political situation refers to the nature of the external events or relationships at which the U.S. use of armed forces was directed. The 63 incidents being examined were divided into two categories: those that were essentially intra-national in nature and those that were essentially international. The latter were further categorized on the basis of whether or not the United States was a primary actor in the pertinent events or relationships leading up to the introduction of U.S. armed forces. Tables 5 and 6 present percentages of incidents in each of these categories by time period

TABLE 4

MEDITERRANEAN STATES PARTICIPATING IN SIX OR MORE INCIDENTS

State	Number of incidents in which state was a participant	Percentage of incidents in which state was a participant
Egypt	14	22.2
Israel	13	20.6
Turkey	12	19.0
Greece	10	15.9
Jordan	10	15.9
Yugoslavia	10	15.9
Lebanon	9	14.3
Syria	9	14.3
France	7	11.1
Cyprus	6	9.5

and location.

Overall, seven out of every ten incidents were of an inter-state nature, and five out of these seven initially involved states other than the United States; thus, the United States was directly involved in only two out of every ten incidents. Three out of every ten were of an intra-state nature.

Intra-state incidents were most frequent during the period of 1956-65, the years in which the domestic ferment within the Arab world was perhaps greatest, and in which communal strife in Cyprus erupted in the wake of its becoming independent. In 1966-75, the frequency of intra-state incidents was much less. Two-thirds of the incidents between 1966 and 1975 were of an inter-state nature and initially involved relationships between states other than the United States. Most important were incidents involving Israel's relations with its neighbors.

Incidents in which the United States responded militarily to an attack or violent threat posed at American citizens, property, or armed forces have been few in number; none occurred in 1966-75.*

The intra-national incidents were also divided into: (a) civil wars and insurgencies, (b) domestic turmoil and civil strife, (c) recent coups, and (d) impending or recent constitutional changes in government. Almost three-quarters of the incidents fell into the first two categories--i.e., they involved some level of violence. Not surprisingly, intra-state violence in the Mediterranean area was most frequent during the middle decade of the postwar period. However, those intra-national situations at which the United States directed armed forces during the past decade were also marked by violence.

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* A partial exception was the U.S. use of armed forces during the 1970 conflict in Jordan. It will be recalled that just prior to this conflict, three commercial airliners, including one TWA aircraft, were hijacked and flown to a desert airstrip in Jordan. The American reaction to these events was quickly subsumed, however, by the conflict in Jordan.

TABLE 5

DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS BY TIME PERIOD AND POLITICAL SITUATION: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FOR TIME PERIOD

	International		
	U.S. Not Directly Involved	U.S. Directly Involved	Intra-national
1946-55	47.6	23.8	28.6
1956-65	41.7	25.0	33.3
1966-75	66.7	11.1	22.2
ALL YEARS	50.8	20.6	28.6

TABLE 6

DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS BY POLITICAL SITUATION AND LOCATION: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FOR LOCATION

	Egypt, Israel Jordan, Lebanon, Syria	Cyprus, Greece, Turkey	Italy, Yugoslavia	Other In Med Area	Total In Med Area	Total Number in Which US Forces in Med Were Used Outside Area	Grand Total
Inter-state[a]	58.6	46.7	57.1	25.0	46.0	37.5	50.8
U.S. Directly Involved	6.9	13.3	28.6	75.0	14.3	50.0	20.6
Intra-state	34.5	40.0	14.3	—	27.0	12.5	28.6

a. Between states other than the United States.

TABLE 7

POLITICAL SITUATION AND VIOLENCE

PERCENTAGE OF INCIDENTS IN EACH CELL IN WHICH SITUATION INVOLVED VIOLENCE

	International			
	U.S. Not Directly Involved	U.S. Directly Involved	Intra-National	All 63 Incidents
1946-55	10.0	20.0	50.0	23.8
1956-65	50.0	16.7	87.5	54.2
1966-75	75.0	0.0	75.0	66.7
1946-75	46.9	15.4	72.2	47.6

The international situations not involving the United States initially were divided into: (a) wars between two or more states, (b) sporadic armed conflicts between two or more states, (c) unfriendly but non-violent relations between states and (d) friendly relations between states. One-tenth of these incidents were ones in which the prior situation was one of friendly or even correct relations between states. Almost half were situations of violence--either full blown wars or sporadic conflicts. More importantly, the trend has been toward an increased percentage of such incidents (see Table 7). Not only have inter-state situations become the dominant focus of U.S. military actions; these incidents have typically involved violence.

What are the implications for American foreign policy of the shift from intra-national to international incidents and the increased percentage of incidents which have involved violence in the past decade?

One obvious implication is that the risks to the United States have increased. The use of armed forces in a non-violent environment may or may not assure an ally or deter an antagonist; in any case, such action has almost never occasioned an immediate danger to American armed forces. By contrast, the interjection of American armed forces into a violent situation almost always involves some degree of danger. Misjudgments may be made by one of the parties, especially by subordinates; and unanticipated, but nevertheless serious political repurcussions may result--e.g., the 1973-74 oil embargo. Once so involved, it is usually impossible to withdraw,

notwithstanding the behavior of allies and antagonists. The game usually must be played out to the end, despite an unforeseen increase in the stakes.

And what is true for the United States is also relevant to the interests of other parties. Once the United States becomes involved in a conflict, the nature of the situation usually changes markedly. Typically, the relative independence of allies become less and the risks to antagonists increase. If American action stimulates Soviet involvement, the converse is also occasioned.

The shift from an intra-state to an inter-state focus means that the instruments that may be brought to bear by regional actors will be typically more powerful, both diplomatically and militarily. Allies usually will act more overtly when they are supporting a state rather than a sub-national group; hence, the facing off of states is more likely to occasion the facing off of alliances, whether they are formal or otherwise. Most importantly, the likelihood of an American-Soviet confrontation is increased.

States unlike sub-national groups also have air forces, navies, and armored ground forces. Thus, the level of violence that can be threatened in a crisis or manifested in a conflict is much greater. For a threat by American policy-makers to be credible in these circumstances, large sized forces must be available. Moreover, should these forces be committed in a conflict, they might have to be used in strength and be prepared to take significant casualties. The danger that an American action of this sort might stimulate

a Soviet military response is obvious. With this in mind, let us look at the Soviet record of involvement in these incidents.

Soviet Participation

Throughout the post World War II period the dominant external concern of American policymakers has been Soviet behavior and world influence. Moreover, whether the words used are Cold War, bipolarism or détente, students of international relations have been most critically interested in the interactions between the superpowers. The Soviet Union was a participant in 32 of the 63 incidents--i.e., one-half (see Tables 8 and 9).

The frequency of Soviet involvement was actually greatest in the immediate postwar period when the focus was on Balkan security issues and the U.S. felt itself acting to forestall the immediate expansion of Soviet influence and empire. In later years, of course, American actions were very much a function of concern to limit Soviet influence in the Middle East; however, the fact remains that the Soviet Union was not a direct participant in most of these later incidents.

On the other hand, while the frequency of Soviet involvement remained fairly constant in the past two decades--generally speaking, Moscow was an actor in about two-fifths of the incidents in which U.S. armed forces were used--the frequency of Soviet threats to use and actual uses of force in these incidents increased markedly in the last decade; and this notwithstanding the fact that during these years there was only one non-regional incident--i.e., the type in which Soviet threats and uses of force were most frequent.

Quite clearly, this increased likelihood of U.S.-Soviet military confrontation

TABLE 8

DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS BY TIME PERIOD

AND DEGREE OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FOR TIME PERIOD

		USSR An Actor	
	USSR Not An Actor	Did Not Use or Threaten To Use Force	Used or Threatened To Use Force
1946-50	25.0	62.5[a]	12.5
1951-55	40.0	40.0[a]	20.0
1956-60	61.5	15.4[a]	23.1
1961-65	63.6	18.2	18.2
1966-70	53.8	15.4	30.8
1971-75	60.0	--	40.0
ALL YEARS	49.2	28.6	22.2

a. USSR may have used or threatened to use force in one incident included in this group.

TABLE 9

DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS BY LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND LOCATION: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FOR LOCATION

	Egypt, Israel Jordan, Lebanon, Syria	Cyprus, Greece, Turkey	Italy, Yugoslavia	Other in Med Area	Total in Med Area	Total Number in Which US Forces in Med Were Used Outside Area	Grand Total
USSR threatened or used armed forces	27.6	6.7	14.3	--	18.2	50.0	22.2
USSR an actor but did not threaten or use armed forces	10.3	46.7[a]	71.4	--	27.3	37.5[b]	28.6
USSR not an actor in incident	62.1	46.7	14.3	100.0	54.5	12.5	49.2

a. In one of the seven incidents in this cell the Soviet Union may have threatened to use or used armed forces.

b. In two of the three incidents in this cell the Soviet Union may have threatened to use or used armed forces.

was related to the superpower's further involvement in the Middle East generally and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. Five of the six incidents in which there occurred a Soviet use of, or threat to use force in the last decade, were related to incidents in the Middle East. If the United States' and the Soviet Union's greatest mutual interest continues to be in central Europe, they have confronted each other militarily in the last decade most frequently in the eastern Mediterranean.

Below is a brief summary of Soviet military actions and likely concerns in the six incidents referred to above, and in regard to the 1970 air defense of Egypt (in which the United States played no military role).

o June 1967, Middle East War. The number of Soviet surface combatants deployed (from the Black Sea) to the Mediterranean was increased from three in early May to 13 by the time the conflict ended; close shadowing of the Sixth Fleet was initiated for the first time; a U.S. aircraft carrier (America) task group was harassed.*

Nevertheless, it would appear Moscow sought to avoid the outbreal of hostilities, and, once the conflict began, to avoid being drawn into it and a confrontation with the United States. While concerned to maintain, if not increase Soviet prestige in the Arab world, Moscow did not threaten Israel seriously until the conflict was all but over, and no ultimatum was ever issued.

In short, Soviet diplomatic behavior was circumspect. In this light, the behavior of Soviet naval units is to be interpreted, perhaps, as a minimal response, indicative of a Soviet interest, but not of a commitment to a particular outcome.

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* Jonathan T. Howe, Multi-crises: Seapower and Global Politics in the Missile Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 76-77; Weinland, forthcoming.

o October 1967, Eilat Sunk by Egypt. Soviet ships visited Port Said to deter Israeli retaliation and thereafter maintained a near continuous presence in Egyptian ports until 1975.*

Following the June War, serious criticism was voiced in the Arab world about Moscow's commitment to the Arab cause, notwithstanding the Soviet resupply of arms to Syria and Egypt following the conflict. After the Eilat was sunk off of Port Said by Egyptian patrol boats, Israel not only retaliated by destroying an Egyptian oil refinery, but also threatened to renew hostilities. The pressure upon the Soviets then to demonstrate their commitment was great. At the same time, it was probably considered doubtful that Israel would actually take further action so long as Cairo offered no additional immediate provocation.

o September 1968, Post-Czechoslovakia Crisis. Soviet troops were reported massed near Rumania's borders;** a naval build-up took place in the Mediterranean.

Most probably, the Soviet's never had any intention of invading Rumania. Nevertheless, the military actions noted were of concern to both Rumania and Yugoslavia. They were, perhaps, intended as a signal to Rumania that Moscow did have the will and the capability to take definitive action if Bucharest continued its independent foreign policy course or went any further in this direction. The Soviet moves in the Mediterranean may have been meant to caution Yugoslavia in its support of Rumania.

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* Jon D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1975), p. 68.

** New York Times, September 1 (p. 1), 29 (p. 15), and 30 (pp. 17-18), 1968.

o February-August 1970, Air Defense of Egypt. Soviet combat pilots and approximately 150 Frontal Aviation aircraft were deployed to Egypt together with Soviet SA-3 missile batteries and crews, in all approximately 15,000 personnel; Soviet personnel took over the management and operation of Egypt's air defense; Soviet pilots flew combat patrols and engaged Israeli combat aircraft.*

Prior to these developments, Israel had initiated deep penetration air raids against Egypt, including attacks on the outskirts of Cairo. Egypt was powerless to defend against these raids by American provided F-4 Phantoms. For Moscow not to aid Cairo in these circumstances was to endanger the credibility of its rearmament of Egypt and, with this, Soviet prestige and influence in the Middle East. No doubt, also, President Nasser's political position both within Egypt and in the Arab world generally was difficult. That Moscow consequently became involved to the extent it did was indicative of the danger that was posed, not only militarily to Egypt, but politically to Moscow's longtime ally, President Nasser; and as a consequence of both, to the Soviet position in Egypt and in the Middle East.

o September 1970, Civil War in Jordan. The number of Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean was increased from 52 to 72; Sixth Fleet ships were shadowed continuously.**

It remains unclear whether or not the Soviets encouraged or even supported Syria's decision to send a large armored force into Jordan in support of the Palestinians. Of note, Soviet military advisors did not accompany Syrian

* Roger Pajak, "Soviet Arms and Egypt," Survival 17 (July/August, 1975), 167-168; Berman, forthcoming.

** (Admiral) Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., "View From the Bridge of the Sixth Fleet Flagship," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 98(February, 1972), pp. 25-27.

troops into Jordan, and prior to Syria's intervention Moscow informed Washington that it sought to avoid a widening of the conflict. Those moves in the Mediterranean are probably best considered very precautionary--i.e., prudent moves in anticipation of a possible enlargement of that conflict into a new Arab-Israeli War.

o October 1973, Middle East War. Between April and July, Moroccan troops were moved to Syria on Soviet amphibious ships; surface-to-surface missiles equipped with nuclear warheads were possibly deployed to Egypt; the number of naval units was increased to 96 by October 31st; Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers were stalked; armaments and supplies were airlifted to Egypt and Syria; airborne forces were alerted; Soviet aircraft flew reconnaissance over Israel.*

Unlike previous crises, Soviet behavior in the October War definitely suggested that Moscow had foreknowledge of the Egyptian-Syrian attack and was willing to provide substantial support to its being successful. While the idea for the attack probably originated with Cairo and Damascus, Moscow's role was that of an ally whose diplomatic and material support was critical to the venture's success.

As compared with past experiences, Soviet behavior during this conflict indicated a much greater willingness to support Egypt and Syria vis-a-vis Israel and the United States. Although probably not welcoming the development, Moscow did not shrink from a confrontation with the United States when the Egyptian Third Army was surrounded and Cairo appeared open to an advance by

* Weinland, "Soviet Naval Operations...," p. 11; Zumwalt, pp. 424-47; Pajak, pp. 169-70; "Soviet Aid Sparks Arab Gains," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 99 (October 15, 1973), pp. 12-14; "U.S., Soviet Boost Mideast Airlift," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 99 (October 22, 1973), pp. 18-19; "Soviets Poise Three-Front Global Drive," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 99 (November 5, 1973), p. 12.

Israeli troops on the east bank of the Suez Canal.

o July 1974, Crisis in Cyprus. Soviet surface combatants were deployed closer to Cyprus; the number of naval units in the Mediterranean was increased, airborne units were reported alerted; large-scale troop movements in southern Bulgaria were reported.*

Earlier, the Soviets had supported the government of President Makarios. After the coup against Makarios, Soviet diplomacy focused on condemning the military junta in Athens and "extremist" circles in NATO. Implicitly, Moscow's statements and behavior had the effect of supporting Turkey, notwithstanding Ankara's landing of troops in Cyprus. Considering Moscow's earlier interest in improving relations with Turkey, this was probably viewed in the Kremlin as a silk lining and, perhaps, desirable; at least until the junta in Athens was ousted, whence the Soviet position became more neutral.

Concerning the "other" regional and the non-regional incidents, the Soviet Union was a participant in none of the former and in virtually all of the latter. The fact that Moscow was not a participant in any of the "other" regional incidents is indicative of their minor significance. By contrast, the non-regional incidents were of major significance precisely because the United States and the Soviet Union were participants and because each used their armed forces in half and possibly three-quarters of these incidents.

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* New York Times, July 17(p. 1), 20(p. 3), and 21(p. 20), 1974; R.J. Vincent, "Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe" Adelphi Papers, No. 119, August 1975, p. 10.

Level of U.S. Armed Forces Used

Variations in the types and size of military units which have been involved in the incidents, and the sometimes inclusion of strategic nuclear forces, make it difficult to discuss, in the aggregate, the significance of the involvement in terms of the level of force mustered by the United States. To alleviate this difficulty, a scale was constructed. Based on the historical data for all of the 215 incidents in which the United States used armed forces as a political instrument worldwide in the postwar era, the scale roughly ranked "military level of effort."

For example, when combatant naval forces were involved in an incident, they typically included one carrier task group. A carrier task group was therefore considered to constitute the "standard" naval force component. When two or more carriers were involved in an incident, it was considered to have been a use of a "major" component of force; i.e., a more significant incident. When the naval forces involved in an incident did not include an aircraft carrier, the incident was considered to have been less significant in that it required only a "minor" component of force. Similar assessments were made for ground forces* and land-based air forces,** with the following results:

	Type of force		
Level of force	Naval forces	Ground forces	Land-based Air forces
Major	Two or more aircraft carrier task groups	More than one battalion	One or more combat wings
Standard	One aircraft carrier task group	One battalion	One or more combat squadrons, but less than one wing
Minor	No aircraft carriers included	Less than one battallion	Less than one combat squadron

* Army and Marine Corps

** Air Force and Marine Corps

Granted, the units listed for each rank are quite different in terms of manpower or any other measure of size. However, that is not the point. What the classification does is to provide a rough ranking of "military level of effort" based on aggregate past experience.

Next, these levels of conventional force were combined with the strategic nuclear factor in an intuitive fashion, resulting in the scale shown below.

Level of Force Scale

		Size and type of forces involved
Greatest Effort	1.	Use of nuclear weapons plus at least one "major" force component (naval, ground, or air).
	2.	Two or three "major" force components used, but no nuclear weapons.
	3.	Either one "major" force component or nuclear weapons used.
	4.	At least one "standard" component of force used, but no "major" components and no nuclear weapons.
Least Effort	5.	"Minor" components of force used only, and no nuclear weapons.

"Nuclear weapons use" refers to the involvement of weapon platforms participating, at the time, in U.S. strategic nuclear strike plans. The scale is tailored to the existing data; the obvious holes in it (e.g., a "standard" component of force plus nuclear weapons) simply do not occur in the data.

Table 10 presents the distribution of incidents by the level of U.S. armed forces used for different locations. Before examining particular theaters in the Mediterranean area, it is worthwhile to consider the overall area distribution and to compare the latter with the distribution for incidents that occurred

TABLE 10

DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS BY LEVEL OF U.S. ARMED FORCES USED AND LOCATION: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FOR LOCATION

	Egypt, Israel Jordan, Lebanon, Syria	Cyprus, Greece, Turkey	Italy, Yugoslavia	Other in Med Area	Total in Med Area	Total Number in Which US Forces in Med Were Used Outside Area	Grand Total	Other 152 Incidents World-wide
1. One or more major components and nuclear weapons	13.8	--	--	--	7.3	62.5	14.3	3.9
2. More than one major component; nuclear weapons not used	13.8	6.7	--	--	9.1	12.5	9.5	7.9
3. One major component or nuclear weapons	17.2	26.7	71.4	--	25.5	25.0	25.4	19.7
4. Standard component	17.2	66.7	28.6	50.0	34.5	--	30.2	29.6
5. Minor component	37.9	--	--	50.0	23.6	--	20.6	38.8

elsewhere in the world during the same period.

The United States used at least one major conventional force component or nuclear weapons in one-half of the incidents examined in this paper. By contrast, such levels of force were used during the same period in only one-third of the incidents that occurred elsewhere in the world. Thus, as compared with these other incidents, the United States used greater levels of force much more frequently in Mediterranean related incidents.

The greatest levels of force were used most frequently in the non-regional incidents. Major components or nuclear weapons were used in all eight of these actions, and in five nuclear weapons and at least one major force component were used together. Clearly, in those instances when U.S. Mediterranean forces were used with reference to a non-regional situation, a major crisis was afoot. A major component or nuclear weapons was used in two-fifths of the regionally related incidents. The two greatest levels of force were used only in incidents related to the eastern Mediterranean; nuclear weapons were used together with major force components only in relation to Middle East conflict.

Greater levels of armed forces were used more frequently during 1956-65 than either before or since (see Table 11). Three-fifths of the actions in which major force components or nuclear weapons were used occurred during that time; moreover, such levels of force were used in three out of every four incidents. The least frequent use by the United States of major force components or nuclear weapons took place during 1966-75. In this most recent period, only standard or minor force components were used in one-half of the incidents. Of interest is the U.S. use of force in recent years for cooperative rather than conflictive purposes--e.g., a joint naval exercise to help improve

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS BY LEVEL OF U.S. ARMED FORCES USED AND TIME PERIOD

I. Percentage of total for time period

	1946-55	1956-65	1966-75
1. One or more major components; and/or nuclear weapons	38.1	75.0	27.8
2. Standard component	61.9	8.3	22.2
3. Minor component	--	16.7	50.0

II. Percentage of total for level of armed forces used

	1946-55	1956-65	1966-75
1. One or more major components; and/or nuclear weapons	25.8	58.1	16.1
2. Standard component	68.4	10.5	21.1
3. Minor component	--	30.8	69.2

relations with France (1967), the use of reconnaissance aircraft to help implement the 1970 ceasefire in the Middle East, and the use of a helicopter carrier to help clear the Suez Canal (1974). These uses of minimal forces for symbolic purposes were not unimaginative.

Greater levels of force were used more frequently in incidents in which the Soviet Union was a participant and most frequently when Moscow used or threatened to use force (see Table 12). Indeed, the United States used at least one major force component or nuclear weapons: in three-fourths of the incidents in which there occurred a Soviet use or threat to use force; in less than one-half of the incidents in which the Soviet Union was an actor but did not use or threaten to use force; in one-third of the incidents in which Moscow was not a participant. Most importantly, the United States used at least one major force component and nuclear weapons in one-third of the incidents in which the Soviet Union used or threatened to use force; this level of force being used in less than one-tenth of those incidents in which the Soviet Union was not a participant.

In brief, the United States has used major armed forces infrequently during the past decade. However, when such levels of force were used, the occasion was typically one of serious interstate conflict in the eastern Mediterranean, usually including Soviet involvement and the shadow of Soviet armed forces. It might be suggested that, as compared with the previous decade, American policymakers became more selective in their use of major armed forces. If the last did occur, this may have been related to developments arising out of the Vietnam War. American policymakers may have been concerned to avoid serious military involvement in two theaters at the same time. Further, public disunity over the War and increased concern about foreign entanglements

TABLE 12

DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS BY LEVEL OF U.S. ARMED FORCES USED AND DEGREE OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

I. Percentage of total for degree of Soviet involvement

Level of Armed Forces Used	USSR Not an Actor	USSR an Actor: Did Not Use or Threaten to Use Force	USSR an Actor: Used or Threatened to Use Force
1	6.5	11.1[a]	35.7
2	9.7	--	21.4
3	22.6	33.3	21.4
4	32.3	44.4[b]	7.1
5	29.0	11.1	14.3

II. Percentage of total for level of U.S. armed forces used

Level of Armed Forces Used	USSR Not an Actor	USSR an Actor: Did Not Use or Threaten to Use Force	USSR an Actor: Used or Threatened to Use Force
1	22.2	22.2[a]	55.6
2	50.0	--	50.0
3	43.8	37.5	18.8
4	52.6	42.1[b]	5.3
5	69.2	15.4	15.4

a. USSR may have used or threatened to use force in two incidents in this cell.

b. USSR may have used or threatened to use force in one incident in this cell.

may have made policymakers more reticent about committing large sized forces in support of policy. Another interpretation, not necessarily in conflict with that just mentioned, is that fewer situations developed which warranted the use of major forces.

Perhaps there is some truth in both of these interpretations. In any case, what is most important for the future is that the United States did not refrain from using large sized armed forces in the two greatest interstate conflicts of the period--i.e., the Middle East Wars of 1967 and 1973. Moreover, during the course of the 1973 conflict, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in their most serious confrontation since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Finally, if Vietnam did make American policymakers more reticent, that conflict is now over; that the effects mentioned above would be lasting is questionable.

Strategic Nuclear Weapons

A special note should be made of the implicit, and sometimes the explicit threat to use nuclear weapons.

Many U.S. military units, particularly naval vessels, are sometimes equipped with nuclear weapons for tactical uses. Warships, for example, may have nuclear warheads on-board for surface-to-air missiles and anti-submarine weapons; aircraft carriers may carry nuclear air-to-ground ordnance. Consequently, any movement or other involvement of these forces in an incident may imply, in one sense, a nuclear signal. These implications do not, however, interest us here. Only more deliberate nuclear threats, whether implicit or

TABLE 13

INCIDENTS IN WHICH STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES WERE INVOLVED

U.S. aircraft shot down by Yugoslavia	November 1946
Security of Berlin	June 1948
Korean War: Security of Europe	July 1950
Suez crisis	October 1956
Political crisis in Lebanon	July 1958
Political crisis in Jordan	July 1958
Security of Berlin	May 1959
Security of Berlin	June 1961
Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba	October 1962
Withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey	April 1963
Middle East War	October 1973

explicit, are of concern. For this reason, note was made whenever forces, which at the time had a designated role in U.S. plans for strategic nuclear war, took part in one of the incidents.

Worldwide, there were 19 such incidents; 11 were related to regional situations or involved U.S. forces in the Mediterranean area (see Table 13). In six of these incidents, the focus was on the Mediterranean area; the last such incident being the 1973 Middle East War. Before that incident, the most recent use of a nuclear "force" was the 1963 visit by the Sam Houston to Izmir. Thus, the use by the United States of nuclear weapons in a Mediterranean area conflict has been infrequent in recent years. While there is no reason to expect that this will change, it may be suggested that the danger of such a development would be very great in another Arab-Israeli conflict or, indeed, in any superpower confrontation in which both Moscow and Washington perceived important interests at stake---e.g., Yugoslavia.

Activities of U.S. Forces

If United States armed forces have not engaged in actual violence--i.e., they have not shot at people or destroyed things---what have they done? How has the United States "shown force" during the past three decades?

Of those actions by American armed forces during the 63 incidents examined, three types of activity---i.e., visits, presence,* and military exercises and demonstrations-- accounted for more than half of the total (see Table 14). Often, not just one, but several activities were engaged in during an incident. For example, during the 1967 and 1973 wars in the Middle East a naval presence was established and major arms shipments were made to Israel. In the 1957 Syrian crisis, Sixth Fleet units visited Izmir, Marines were

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* "Presence" is the appearance of forces in the conceptual area.

landed in Turkey to take part in joint "exercises," and arms were airlifted to Jordan and Lebanon. In other incidents, though, only a single activity was manifested. For example, in 1956 as a precautionary response to the turmoil in Morocco created by France's involvement in the Suez Crisis and French actions related to Algeria, a single company of Marines was dispatched. All that the Missouri did in 1946 was to visit various cities.

Indicative of the especially high stakes in the non-regional incidents, the two most frequent activities in these instances were exercises and demonstrations, and the emplacement of ground forces. In several of these incidents, U.S. armed forces also exercised a right of transit (Berlin, 1948 and 1961) and engaged in a blockade (Cuba, 1962); these latter actions, though, being performed by forces outside the Mediterranean area.

Within the Mediterranean area, American armed forces were used in a less manifest military fashion; visits and presence being the two most frequent activities. More "warlike" behavior was evidenced only infrequently. Thus, while American armed forces have often appeared on the scene of an anticipated or actual conflict in the region, they usually have not done very much more than this. American ground forces probably came closest to serious conventional conflict in the area in 1958 when Army and Marine troops were landed in Lebanon.

Although the United States did not engage militarily in regional crises and conflict, it is clear that American policymakers did exert influence on them. Such is the mark of a great power, and may be said of the Soviet

TABLE 14

ACTIVITIES OF U.S. ARMED FORCES IN INCIDENTS

NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES BY TYPE AND LOCATION

Activity	Egypt, Israel Jordan, Lebanon, Syria	Greece, Turkey, Cyprus	Italy, Yugoslavia	Other in Med Area	Total in Med Area	Total Number in Which U.S. Forces in Med Area Were Used Outside Area	Grand Total	Row as Percentage of Total
Visit	7	9	4	1	21	2	23	21.5
Presence	12	7	-	1	20	2	22	20.6
Exercise or Demonstration	5	2	3	2	12	6	18	16.8
Transport of arms or military equipment to an actor	9	1	1	-	11	1	12	11.2
Patrol/Reconnaissance/ Surviellance	4	-	3	-	7	1	8	7.5
Evacuation	3	2	-	-	5	1	6	5.6
Transport of an actor's military forces or equipment	2	3	-	-	5	-	5	4.7
Emplacement of ground forces	1	-	-	1	2	3	5	4.7
Exercise right of transit	1	-	-	-	1	2	3	2.8
Other	2	1	1	-	4	1	5	4.7
Total	46	25	12	5	88	19	107	100.0

Union as well. The question is, to what extent can the superpowers continue to exert influence in the region without themselves engaging in more conflict-like behavior. The experience of the 1973 Middle East War, the 1974 Cyprus Crisis, and the 1975-76 Lebanon Conflict all suggest that the ability of Washington and Moscow to influence events without becoming more manifestly involved militarily is declining. In the future, the superpowers may have to decide with greater frequency whether to become heavily engaged or to remain on the sidelines.

CONCLUSION

Neither American nor Soviet military forces in the Mediterranean area are in a state of flux. The U.S. presence has remained relatively stable for more than a decade, and the Soviet expansion in the area now appears to have leveled off. Aside from improvements in force capabilities which might occur as a function of the construction of new ships and aircraft, and of other technology developments, the principal variations in force size relate to the sometimes presence of only one U.S. aircraft carrier task force and the occasional presence of a Soviet anti-submarine carrier group.

Notwithstanding the Sixth Fleet's deterrent and war fighting missions related to Soviet aggression in Europe, it may be expected that its principal use in the future will be related, as it has for most of the past quarter century, to political developments and conflict in the eastern Mediterranean; specifically to the Arab-Israeli conflict, developments within individual Arab countries, and conflict between Greece and Turkey. Yugoslavia and Libya also may draw attention.

In the past, President Gaddafi has made decisions and acted in ways which have infuriated American policymakers. In the future, such behavior could occasion a strong response. A Mayaguez-like action-response is not far-fetched. Much more serious might be the provision of U.S. military support to Yugoslavia in the context of Soviet pressure or aggression against Yugoslavia after Marshal Tito's death. American military support might range from a naval visit to military assistance. It may be doubted that the United States would provide ground force support to Yugoslavia in a conflict or emplace troops

on Yugoslav soil in a crisis. But while never actually engaging, U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean might grimly confront Soviet naval forces in a situation in which Moscow was heavily committed; and with the possibility of miscalculation always present.

Clearly, Cyprus remains an issue of great salience to both Greece and Turkey. That Athens and Ankara did not actually engage each other militarily in 1974 is not a cause for optimism. Moreover, there are other issues between them--e.g., resource development in the Aegean--which, while otherwise not the cause of major hostility, serve to exacerbate relations further. Caught betwixt and between military, alliance and domestic considerations in the United States, Washington would, no doubt, hope to finesse developments in a new crisis. Certainly, the United States does not want to use military force to coerce Greece or Turkey.

Nevertheless, as in previous instances, both Athens and Ankara would be concerned to know Washington's position in a new crisis. Whatever that position is, as in the past, it will probably be interpreted more favorably by one side than by the other; and likewise, there will follow interpretations of American military actions and non-actions.

Further, as a kibbitzer or as a designing third party, the Soviet Union (with its Balkan allies) has the capability to reinforce or withdraw forces during a crisis on both Greek and Turkish borders, thereby occasioning greater alarm or confidence. The activities of Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean might also raise eyebrows and be a cause of concern or assurance. For the United States, this only means increased pressures from both Ankara and Athens to show its support for one against the other. Notwithstanding Soviet (and

other WTO) behavior, the American use of armed forces in any crisis between Greece and Turkey is not likely to go beyond that of providing a naval presence.

A new regime crisis in Jordan may be more likely to occasion a greater and more manifest U.S. military response; although if Lebanon is an example, this is no longer to be expected as a matter of certainty. Of course, things have not worked out badly in Lebanon from the American perspective--not the human tragedy, but the political and military developments. However, it is to be recalled that Washington was also notably reticent when the Palestinians were doing well in the fighting at the beginning of the conflict. Whether this was the result of good intelligence, strategic calculation, or domestic pressures within the United States, we do not know.

The likelihood of the United States using armed forces is, no doubt, greatest with reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict--i.e., the same incidents in which the Soviet Union is also most likely to use or threaten to use its armed forces. Consequences of the Soviet-Egyptian split, however, may include a lessened likelihood of a new major conflict erupting and less willingness by Moscow to support Cairo in a conflict with Israel.

Surely, though, the Arab-Israeli conflict remains the tinder box in the region. This is where serious conflict is to be most expected and where the superpowers are most likely to engage in conflict themselves. Indeed, notwithstanding the United States' and Soviet Union's greatest mutual interest being in central Europe, and their consequent deployment there of large standing armies, conflict between the superpowers, if it occurs anywhere, is perhaps most likely to happen or <u>begin</u> in the course of a conflict between their allies in the eastern Mediterranean.

Appendix A

THE INCIDENTS

This study covers the time period of 1 January through 31 October 1975. The United States used its armed forces in the Mediterranean as a political instrument, as defined, on 63 occasions during this period.

These 63 incidents are listed below in terms of: a phrase describing the basic situation that attracted U.S. attention and led to the use of armed forces as a political instrument; and the month and year in which the use of armed forces was initiated. Of note, the dates used for the tables presented in this paper are the ones on which the incidents began as political phenomena. In many instances the situation of concern occasioned an almost immediate use of armed forces. In other instances, however, a lag of some months occurred.

It is important to note that certain situations -- e.g., the political crises over the Suez Canal in 1956 and Lebanon in 1958 -- are considered to comprise two or more incidents rather than just one. This approach allows a more useful analysis of instances in which there occurred two or more clear modal uses of U.S. armed forces, or a significant change in the nature of the situation. The 63 incidents are as follows:

LIST OF INCIDENTS

1.	Security of Turkey	March 1946
2.	Political conflict in Greece	April 1946
3.	Security of Trieste	June 1946
4.	Security of Turkey	August 1946
5.	Insurgents in Greece	September 1946
6.	U.S. aircraft shot down by Yugoslavia	November 1946
7.	Political change in Lebanon	December 1946
8.	Civil war in Greece	April 1947
9.	Security of Turkey	May 1947
10.	Security of Trieste	August 1947
11.	Elections in Italy	November 1947
12.	Security of Trieste	January 1948
13.	Arab-Israel war	January 1948
14.	Security of Berlin	June 1948
15.	Korean War: Security of Europe	July 1950
16.	Political developments in Lebanon	August 1950
17.	Security of Yugoslavia	March 1951
18.	Improved relations with Spain	January 1952
19.	Security of Turkey	August 1952
20.	Political developments in Lebanon	November 1952
21.	Accord on Trieste	October 1954
22.	Egypt - Israel conflict: Red Sea	February 1956
23.	British General Glubb ousted in Jordan	April 1956

24.	Egypt nationalizes Suez Canal	July 1956
25.	Suez crisis	October 1956
26.	Security of U.S. military personnel and bases in Morocco	October 1956
27.	Egypt - Israel conflict: Red Sea	February 1957
28.	Political - military crisis in Jordan	April 1957
29.	Civil strife and elections in Lebanon	June 1957
30.	Political developments in Syria	August 1957
31.	Political crisis in Lebanon	May 1958
32.	Political crisis in Lebanon	July 1958
33.	Political crisis in Jordan	July 1958
34.	Security of Berlin	May 1959
35.	Security of Berlin	June 1961
36.	Security of Kuwait	July 1961
37.	Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba	October 1962
38.	Civil war in Yemen	February 1963
39.	Withdrawal of missiles from Turkey	April 1963
40.	Political crisis in Jordan	April 1963
41.	Improved relations with Israel	November 1963
42.	Cyprus - Greece - Turkey crisis	January 1964
43.	Cyprus - Greece - Turkey crisis	June 1964
44.	Cyprus - Greece - Turkey crisis	August 1964
45.	Political developments in Cyprus	July 1965
46.	Improved relations with Egypt	September 1966
47.	Israel attacks Jordan: Samu	December 1966

48.	Coup in Greece	April 1967
49.	Improved relations with France	May 1967
50.	Arab-Israel war	May 1967
51.	Political developments in Cyprus	August 1967
52.	Egypt sinks Israeli destroyer Eilat	October 1967
53.	Invasion of Czechoslovakia	September 1968
54.	Israel attacks Lebanon: Beirut Airport	December 1968
55.	Political developments in Libya	November 1969
56.	Civil strife in Jordan	June 1970
57.	Arab-Israel ceasefire agreement	August 1970
58.	Civil war in Jordan	September 1970
59.	Civil strife in Lebanon	May 1973
60.	Arab-Israel war	October 1973
61.	Egypt-Israel Sinai agreement	February 1974
62.	Improved relations with Egypt	April 1974
63.	Cyprus - Greece - Turkey crisis	July 1974

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AMERICAN POLICY AND THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT

by

John C. Campbell

Questo documento fa parte di un progetto di ricerca sui problemi del Mediterraneo, che l'Istituto Affari Internazionali conduce con l'aiuto finanziario della Fondazione Ford.

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This conference is the last in a series of three organized within the framework of a three year research project on stability and development in the Mediterranean financed by the Ford Foundation.

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AMERICAN POLICY AND THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT

(By John C. Campbell)

Scope of Paper

This paper is not a history or comprehensive survey but a preliminary assessment of U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israel conflict as it has developed from the war of 1973 to the American election of 1976. We shall look only at the broad lines of policy and the strategy behind it, with particular attention to the Mediterranean area. It is a personal assessment made without benefit of access to classified documents.

Aims and Strategy

Recent American policy in the Middle East is not an invention of Henry Kissinger. It is based on a conception of continuing American interests that were pursued with greater or less success by preceding presidents and secretaries of state since World War II. American objectives, maintained over the years, may be described in oversimplified fashion as follows:

(a) to prevent (or reduce)the extension of Soviet power and influence in the area that would threaten the global balance;

(b) to maintain (or restore) an American position in the Arab world that makes possible normal political and economic relations, including access to oil by the major consuming countries;

(c) to maintain the independence and security of Israel;

(d) to help to bring about a political settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict.

Sometimes the emphasis has been on one, sometimes on another, depending on the circumstances and the atmosphere of a given time. At the height of the cold war Washington's attention was fixed on the threat of Soviet gains, in military positions or in political influence over local states, and judged its relations with local states in that context. More recently, as Soviet influence has waned and Soviet-American tension has eased even though the competition in the Middle East continues, the United States has encountered new dimensions in relations with the Arabs, in which greater vulnerability to their oil power is accompanied by new horizons of economic cooperation. At no time has America been able to keep out of inter-Arab rivalries, and has more or

less consistently tried to support what it termed "moderate" forces in the Arab world, a category elastic enough to include different states and political leaders at different times. Even the position of Israel in American policy was not always fixed. When Israel was in danger, and sometimes when it was not, American policy was concerned with maintaining its independence and its security, but rarely without controversy, internally and with Israel, about the means and the price.

In Washington's ideal world, the Middle East should be made up of free and independent states living at peace with each other, resisting the expansion of Soviet power and influence, cooperating generally with the West, and continuing to provide oil to the industrial countries. Such a Middle East, however, did not exist and could not be brought into existence no matter what policies the United States followed. Middle Eastern states had their own outlooks, aims, interests and conflicts which did not fit American preconceptions or desires. The result was that America could not successfully and consistently pursue its various objectives. One obstacle, often underestimated by Washington, was the fact that the United States was an outside power, with global concerns and an intimidating presence in the area, and with less than full understanding of local preferences for staying out of, or profiting from, the big-power competition. Another obstacle was the persistence of the Arab-Israel conflict and the effect of America's special relationship with Israel on its ability to find a durable relationship with the Arab world.

From time to time the United States, alone or in association with others, had tried to cut through these problems by moving Israel and the neighboring Arab states toward a political settlement, or in default of that, toward a reduction of tensions and of the danger of war. The world's interest in peace was reason enough for such efforts. But the United States had additional strong interests of its own: negatively, to remove or at least reduce what had become an incubus on its own position and an asset to that of the Soviet Union; positively, to break through to a new and more constructive relationship with the Arab world without sacrificing the security of Israel. It was the one obvious way to serve all the objectives of its Middle East policy - but also the most difficult. The unsuccessful efforts of Secretary Rogers in 1969-1972 showed that the time was not ripe and that the obstacles - some of them of America's own making - were still too great.

It was Henry Kissinger's good fortune that the conditions produced by the war of 1973 and not least by the way in which he conducted policy during that war - demonstrating that the United States would neither let Israel be defeated nor allow it to win a smashing victory, associating with the U.S.S.R. to stop the war but warning in the most serious way against a Soviet military intervention - opened the door to initiatives and to achievements that had not been possible before. Israel, Egypt and even Syria were prepared to negotiate some limited agreements and to do so in the only way that was practical, with the United States as intermediary.

The Kissinger diplomacy of 1974-75 may not prove to have lasting results. It had its contemporary critics, and as historical perspective lengthens varied judgments will surely be passed upon it. Yet there can be little doubt that at that particular historical period the United States had the possibility of political and diplomatic action whereby it could serve all the objectives mentioned earlier in this paper. It could restore broken relations with key Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Algeria, convince the Arab oil-producing states to call off their oil embargo, and begin a rapid expansion of economic ties throughout the Middle East. It could maintain its relationship with Israel, which had had a salutary demonstration of dependence on American arms and protection. It could, for the first time, bring Israel and Arab states into serious negotiations on territorial changes and security arrangements which had intrinsic importance whether described as comprehensive armistice terms or as steps toward peace. And in doing all this the United States, without repudiating the overall U.N. and Geneva framework and its joint U.S.-Soviet chairmanship, could effectively exclude the Soviets from the peacemaking process and dilute or replace Soviet influence in certain Arab states, notably Egypt.

Results of the Agreements of 1974

The success of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in helping to bring about the Egypt-Israel and the Syria-Israel agreements on new cease-fire lines and limitations on forces in border zones confirmed, in American eyes, the rightness of the chosen course.

Two Arab states had made bilateral agreements with Israel that were more than just a confirmation of the state of affairs resulting from military operations and could be considered the opening phase of a process leading to negotiated peace. Israel had proved willing to draw back not only from Egyptian and Syrian territory taken in October 1973 but from some it had occupied and held since 1967. All three had accepted security arrangements providing for separation of their forces and with a key role for U.N. forces in demilitarized zones, thus giving promise of security from incidents or aggression across the ceasefire lines. The United States had demonstrated that it could play the intermediary role between the parties and was probably the only outside power that could do so. The Geneva framework, set up under the co-chairmanship of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., remained in being but had no role except to register in formal ceremonies the agreements reached elsewhere, and the Soviet Union chose not to be present at those ceremonies.

Did these results mean that the United States was excluding the Soviet Union from the Middle East? No, such an outcome was beyond the intention, and was recognized as beyond the capability, of the United States. The Soviet Union maintained significant ties with Egypt even though recent events had put their relations under strain. It was still the main outside provider of arms and of economic and political backing to Syria. It had a strong position in Iraq, in Southern Yemen, and with the P.L.O. Yet there was no blinking the fact that a major change had taken place in that Egypt and Syria, the two main

"confrontation states" in the Arab conflict with Israel, the two leading exponents of the radical Arab nationalism and socialism on which the Kremlin had counted in its two decades of forward strategy in the Middle East, had turned to American diplomacy as the only way by which they could recover territories lost to Israel. They had seen that the Soviet Union would not help them to retake those territories by force, because it would not risk war with America, and could not help to recover them by diplomacy, because it had no influence with Israel.

It was not surprising that the diplomatic successes of 1974 created a feeling of satisfaction, even of elation, in Washington. The conclusion of the Syria-Israel agreement contributed especially to this feeling because Syria previously had seemed to be so ideologically motivated, so intransigent toward Israel, so hostile to the United States, and so closely tied to the U.S.S.R. In the negotiations Hafez el-Assad had proved to be reasonable, straightforward, and desirous of reaching an agreement - a hard bargainer, but a man with whom the United States (and Israel indirectly) could do business. Not the least of the results of this negotiation was the conviction reached by the American participants that for both political and economic reasons Syria hoped for and sincerely desired a normal and expanding relationship with the United States; and conversely, that it did not wish to be confined to an exclusive reliance on the Soviet Union. Syria was thus following a line of policy parallel to that of Egypt, but was doing so not through subservience or loyalty to Cairo - the feeling was rather one of rivalry and suspicion - but because this course appeared to serve Syria's own interests.

The Sinai Accord of 1975

One of the arguments most often made by Washington in defense of its step-by-step approach to peace in the Middle East was that each completed step generated momentum for the next. After the laborious negotiations with Israel and Syria over the new line of division in the Golan Heights it was obvious that no new negotiation could be undertaken there for some time. The question was whether the next step should be with Jordan or with Egypt again.

King Hussein was ready. Before the conclusion of the Syria-Israel agreement he had put forward proposals for Israeli withdrawal from a zone along the Jordan River in the West Bank area, to be accompanied by security arrangements similar to those contained in Israel's agreements with Egypt and with Syria. But Israel was not prepared in 1974 for any withdrawal at all on that front, for reasons which were close to the core of its essential security concerns and its domestic politics; the government had indeed undertaken that no concessions would be made regarding the West Bank without going to the country in an election. Hussein's proposal, accordingly, fell on stony ground, and after the Arab League met at Rabat later that same year he was no longer in a position to repeat it, for the League at that meeting formally designated the P.L.O. as the negotiating authority for the Arabs of Palestine. It was only then, faced with the possibility of having to deal with the P.L.O., that Israel began to find the Jordanian alternative attractive.

Between Israel and Egypt, however, the way was open for a second agreement by which Israel would give up additional occupied territory and Egypt would give political assurances that would move the two countries closer to peace. The negotiations proved extraordinarily difficult because neither side could get the minimum it really wanted from the other -- Egypt wanted to regain the Sinai oil fields and the strategic Gidi and Mitla passes and Israel wanted an end to the state of war -- without giving up more than it was willing to give, and in the intense exchanges of the winter of 1974-75 all the ingenuity and persistence of Henry Kissinger's diplomacy proved unsuccessful in finding a mutually acceptable compromise.

The reassessment of U.S. policy which followed the breakdown of the negotiations in March 1975 was interesting and instructive in that it indicated both the strength of the position the United States had gained in the Middle East and the limitations, domestic as well as international, on its ability to take advantage of that position. In his public utterances after returning from the Middle East Secretary Kissinger attributed the breakdown to the inherent difficulty of the problem and studiously avoided assessing the blame.[1] It was an open secret, however, that he felt he had come within a hair's breadth of success and had been thwarted by Israel's narrow view of security and its unwillingness to seize the opportunity for agreement and a giant step toward peace with a moderate and accommodating government in Egypt, an opportunity that might not recur.[2]

The reassessment undertaken in Washington was a consideration of alternative lines of policy. The United States might attempt a broad initiative aimed at a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement in the Geneva framework. It might seek something between an interim and a final settlement. Or it could simply, after a breathing space, resume the step-by-step approach, beginning with a new attempt to find the compromise between Israel and Egypt that had eluded Kissinger's grasp in March. During the reassessment, deliveries of arms to Israel were suspended.

The real issue for decision, it was soon apparent, was whether to seize the bull by the horns and go for a comprehensive settlement, a course which had a considerable measure of support within the executive branch. That course, moreover, would presumably call for the United States to outline its own views on the nature of such a settlement and to seek to persuade others to move in that direction.

Knowledge of such a reassessment in Washington, especially in an atmosphere in which Israel appeared to be blamed for the failure of the step-by-step process, understandably caused resentment and alarm in Israel and among supporters of Israel in the United States. Israel had never liked the "Rogers Plan," a general statement of U.S. views made by the Secretary of State in 1969, largely because of its indication that in a final settlement Israel should withdraw substantially to the pre-1967 lines. Regarded for years as

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[1]News conference of March 26, 1975, Selected Documents: U.S. Policy in the Middle East, Nov. 1974-Feb. 1976, (Department of State Publication 8878, October 1976), pp. 20-22.

[2]The Washington Post, March 25, 1975; Edward R. F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1976), pp. 164-5.

laid to rest, the plan now seemed about to be disinterred. And if America declared its position on the terms of settlement, the implication was that at some stage it would put pressure on Israel to accept those terms. Israel decided to meet the challenge and to put the issue squarely on the basis of America's special relationship with Israel and the continuing support it implied. Israeli leaders appeared in Washington and on the lecture circuit in America to make their views known. The "Jewish lobby" was especially active, and sentiment in the Congress, always favorable to Israel, began to assert itself. A group of 76 Senators signed a letter to President Ford urging that the current reassessment of policy in the Middle East be based solidly on the premise that the United States stands firmly with Israel, and that U.S. aid policies would be responsive to Israel's military and economic needs.[3]

How far the senatorial letter affected the Administration's decision may be debatable. But there is little doubt that Ford and Kissinger were not seeking a bruising show-down battle with the Democratic Congress or a public debate over policy toward Israel in the year before a presidential election. The choice, as it turned out, was for a further effort to bring Egypt and Israel together over the Sinai. Perhaps the entire "reassessment" was little more than an elaborate charade with the aim of returning to that point, with Israel in a more chastened mood.

This time Kissinger was successful. Israel gave way on maintaining a foothold in the Gidi and Mitla passes but gained means of protecting its security through other positions and warning stations and the presence of American technicians. It did not get a renunciation of the state of war by Egypt although the latter accepted the reciprocal obligation not to resort to the threat or use of force to change the status quo. Egypt maintained its basic legal and political positions and got back some territory, but was still a long way from its pre-1967 border.[4] The important thing, in Kissinger's view, was not which side had gained or lost in September as compared to what was offered in March but the fact of their agreement. This was the first formal accord voluntarily entered into by Israel and an Arab state and not merely an armistice arrangement following hostilities, involving shifts in control of territory and a variety of mutual obligations. Kissinger could say with some justice that it was a significant step toward peace. That conclusion had to be measured, however, against the reaction to the agreement in Israel, in the Arab world, and elsewhere (including the United States), and in the light of the prospects for further progress toward peace. Much of the reaction was negative.

In Israel the Rabin government was hard pressed to defend the agreement against its parliamentary and other critics. They alleged that Israel had yielded too much to American pressure, that it had abandoned important strategic and economic assets in Sinai, and that it had abandoned the principle that

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[3]The New York Times, May 22, 1975.

[4]Text of agreement in The Department of State Bulletin, September 29, 1975, pp. 466-469.

territory could only be given up in exchange for real peace. The net result of the debate in Israel was to create a mood of greater toughness hardly conducive to further negotiation. Having yielded to Kissinger's persuasion, Israel's leaders felt that they had won the right not to be subjected to more of it and also to receive all the modern weapons they needed. They believed Israel was entitled to several years during which it would be permitted to digest the new situation and to maintain or increase existing military advantages over the Arabs.

On the Arab side Sadat found himself immediately on the defensive. As expected, the "rejectionists" (Iraq, Libya, and the more extreme factions among the Palestinians) accused him of abandoning the Arab cause in order to make a deal with the enemy. More serious was the bitter opposition of Syria and of Yasser Arafat and the P.L.O. Because this opposition was so strong even Saudi Arabia, which had welcomed the agreement and appeared to back Egypt in its moderate course, hesitated to declare itself in the dispute between Cairo and Damascus and said that the accord must be judged by whether it led to further Israeli withdrawals and satisfaction of the rights of the Palestinians. As a consequence, Sadat was virtually isolated in the Arab world, his diplomacy hamstrung and his influence curtailed.

The Soviet Union took advantage of the situation to weigh in with criticism of its own, aiming particularly at Sadat, who in the previous March had carried his anti-Soviet policy to the point of denouncing the bilateral security treaty signed by the two countries in 1971. Egypt had followed the United States in a policy which the other Arabs rejected, said the Soviets. Let Egypt and the United States pay the price. The Soviet Union, putting forward the idea that the only way to peace lay through a comprehensive settlement providing for Israel's withdrawal from all occupied territories and for fulfillment of the rights of the Palestinians,[5] hoped at the same time to regain lost ground in the Arab world and to undercut the position of the United States.

In the United States itself Kissinger's diplomacy won loud and widespread acclaim, but the Sinai accord was looked at closely and not always favorably. This was largely because it was not simply an agreement between Egypt and Israel. It was a cluster of agreements, in some of which the United States itself undertook obligations to one party or the other or to both. The United States was involved physically in that some of the early warning posts in Sinai were to be manned by American technicians. It was involved politically in that pledges were made to Israel to coordinate policies and tactics in future negotiations.[6] It was involved financially in commitments of military and economic aid. The requests which the Administration presented to Congress for Fiscal Year 1976, "the central part of our efforts to help achieve programs toward peace," totalled $2.24 billion to Israel and $750 million to Egypt. Some critics began to figure, if it cost America $3 billion to bring about a withdrawal from a few square miles of Sinai desert, how much it would cost before all the occupied territories were returned.

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[5]See, for example, the communiqué put out on the conclusion of Arafat's visit to the Soviet Union in November, in Pravda, Nov. 29, 1975.

[6]Department of State Publication No. 8878, cited, pp. 40-44.

There was no real possibility that the Congress would reject the Sinai accord. But the price to be paid and the magnitude of the American commitments had a sobering effect. Israelis might be saying that they had made a deal under American pressure. But Americans were looking at the evidence that Israel had been paid a rather high price for its concessions, not by Egypt but by the United States. Some raised the question whether Washington had not expended much of its bargaining power for only fractional results. Others wondered what additional and secret agreements Kissinger may have made. His explanation of the character and extent of U.S. commitments was not wholly reassuring.

The End of Step-by-Step

Already before the negotiation of the Sinai accord certain critics of Secretary Kissinger were condemning his strategy in the Middle East as mistaken. Former Undersecretary of State George Ball, in a number of statements made in 1974 and 1975,[7] made the argument that the United States could not by itself carry through a long series of bilateral deals between Israel and its Arab neighbors without taking on responsibilities beyond its capacity to fulfill. It could not exclude or ignore the Soviet Union, because the Soviets had the power to spoil the game. On the contrary, the only course was to try to bring them into it, as the combined influence of the superpowers was necessary both to get a peace and then to guarantee it.

Henry Kissinger was not diverted by such critics from pursuit of the Sinai accord. But the view that the step-by-step process was running out of steam was gathering an increasing number of supporters, especially among those professionally concerned with the Middle East affairs. That view came through clearly in hearings held by the Senate Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asian Affairs in the summer of 1975, when the Sinai agreement was within Kissinger's grasp but not yet concluded.[8] Without slighting the importance of that agreement, witnesses said there was no logical next step to follow. Egypt could not take it before some other Arab state did. Syria was not prepared to talk about a minor modification of the line in the Golan Heights but only about a total Israeli withdrawal, which Israel would not even consider discussing. Jordan was no longer in a position to negotiate about territory in Palestine, for it had lost that position to the P.L.O.

In these circumstances it was time once again for reassessment. The only hopeful course, unless momentum toward peace were to be entirely lost and a new round of war rendered inevitable, seemed to be a broad approach to a general settlement between Israel and all its Arab neighbors. Setting out on this course would require facing a number of tough questions which the United States, in its step-by-step strategy, had been able to avoid.

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[7]For example, his speech to the Trilateral Commission, December 8, 1974.

[8]"Priorities for Peace in the Middle East," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, July 23, 24, 1975 (Washington: G.P.O., 1975). See also Henry Owen, "Next Step in the Middle East," The Washington Post, June 1, 1975.

One of these questions was that of Palestinian representation. If a comprehensive settlement, of which the central core was Palestine, was to be negotiated at Geneva or elsewhere, who would speak for the Palestinians? The United States was not prepared to give any status to the P.L.O. so long as the latter did not accept the existence of Israel; indeed, the agreements negotiated with Israel in connection with the Sinai accord committed America not to change that position. But the problem remained.

Another question was whether further territorial charges could be negotiated without facing the issue of the location of final borders, a point left in dispute by conflicting interpretations of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and left aside by the interim agreements. How to begin when Israel starts from the premise that "secure and recognized" borders are to be negotiated, while the Arab states take a stand on total Israeli withdrawal as a governing principle?

A third question concerned the role of the Soviet Union. If the settlement process was to be taken to Geneva, the Soviet Union would be there, and presumably there would have to be some prior understanding between Washington and Moscow on how to organize the negotiations and possibly on where they might come out.

A study group of the Brookings Institution, made up of persons conversant with Middle East affairs and having diverse professional affiliations and points of view, undertook a review of the situation in the summer and fall of 1975 and proposed that the U.S. government and the other parties move toward a general and comprehensive settlement.[9] It is not useful or necessary to describe or summarize here the Brookings report. Suffice it to say that it attempted to address some of the tough questions mentioned above, with the idea that clarification of these points, both of substance and of procedure, might make it easier for the governments concerned, and especially the U.S. government, to move forward. The terms of settlement envisaged were not remarkable or original, and on some crucial matters like Jerusalem they deliberately avoided specificity, but the report had the merit of presenting the issues clearly as a basis for decisions on policy. The basic idea was that Israel would give up the territories occupied in 1967 (with possible minor changes in borders and a separate settlement for Jerusalem to be negotiated) in exchange for peace and normalization of relations, both processes to take place over a period of years in parallel stages with each stage completed on both sides before the next begins. The report also went beyong existing U.S. official positions in stating that Palestinian self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza was a necessary part of a settlement, and that Palestinians must be represented in the negotiations.

American Policy Marks Time

While the many outside friends and critics of the Administration were stressing the urgency of negotiation and the danger of a new round of war in the Middle East, the Administration itself did not feel impelled to take new initiatives. Secretary Kissinger, in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 22, 1975, showed a willingness to move into a general negotiation,

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[9] Toward Peace in the Middle East (Washington: Brookings, December 1975).

noting that if it were not practical to go at once to Geneva, then perhaps there could be an informal multilateral meeting prior to the convening of a conference at Geneva. The roadblock to a preparatory meeting was the same as to a general conference: the question of Palestinian participation. The U.S. Administration, if it had felt a strong sense of urgency, might have bestirred itself to get some movement on this and other sticky problems, but for two reasons it did not feel that sense of urgency. One was the coming election campaign at home, and the other was the civil and inter-Arab strife in Lebanon.

The chancelleries of the world have learned from experience not to expect constructive diplomatic initiatives on Middle East questions in the course of an American presidential campaign. Officials of the Ford Administration, in the fall of 1975, were counting on other countries' tolerance of this quadrennial phenomenon and willingness to wait it out. In particular they were looking to Egypt, which was in the process of digesting the Sinai accord, to restrain Arab impatience and to hold the line for moderation. They were less sure about Syria, which was busy trying to compensate for Egypt's defection by constructing with Jordan and the P.L.O. an eastern front for pressure and perhaps war on Israel.

The silence of the State Department during the waiting period, however, would not be matched by silence on the part of the politicians and the candidates. Perhaps one should not pay undue attention to the party platforms, which are anything but a sure guide to an administration's later performance in office, but they cannot be wholly ignored. They do show how political leaders gauge the views of voters and how international issues are refracted by the prism of domestic politics. The two platforms were, in fact, the strongest ever adopted by the respective parties in support of Israel. The Republicans cited with approval the progress made toward an Arab-Israel settlement, the turning of a new page in relations with Arab countries, and more forcefully, the unprecedented level of aid to Israel in the past few years. Both parties called for maintaining Israel's deterrent strength and for face-to-face negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, but on these and other aspects of support for Israel the Democratic platform generally went beyond its Republican counterpart and well beyond existing policy. It defined the commitment to the independence and security of Israel as the "cornerstone" of U.S. policy, opposed any "externally devised formula" for peace (i.e., no pressure), recognized the established status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and proposed that the U.S. Embassy be moved there from Tel Aviv.[10]

The campaign statements of both candidates for the presidency linked America's mediatory role in the search for a peace settlement with unwavering support of Israel. In his first major address on foreign policy, given before he was nominated, Jimmy Carter spoke of his deep belief that a Middle East peace settlement was essential to American interests, to Israel's long-range survival, and to international cooperation.[11] A couple of months later, in a

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[10]See Alan Dowty, "The Middle East in the Democratic and Republican Party Platforms," Bulletin of the American Professors for Peace in the Middle East (October 1976), pp. 1-3.

[11]Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, March 15, 1976.

statement devoted specifically to the Middle East, he spoke of the need for America to lead the way to a peace of general reconciliation.[12] That peace must be based on absolute assurance of Israel's survival, and therefore its achievement "depends more than anything else on a basic change of attitude: to be specific, on Arab recognition of the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish State." It required concrete actions: (a) formal recognition of Israel, (b) diplomatic relations, (c) a peace treaty with Israel, (d) open frontiers, and (e) an end to embargo and boycott and hostile propaganda. As for the other key issue, territory, he said that the formal borders should be determined in direct negotiations and not imposed from outside. In that context the question of the status and rights of the Palestinians could be resolved. Carter did speak of America's ties of friendship and economic interdependence with Arab countries and recognized that failure to achieve peace would harm everyone's interests, those of America, of the Arab peoples, and of Israel. The approach was not without balance, but also without a hint that Israel, like others, might have to make sacrifices or take risks for peace. On the two main themes of the speech, peace and American concern for Israel, nothing was said to which the government of Israel would have taken exception.

The statements of both candidates, as election day drew near and the closeness of the race gave the "Jewish vote" in key states like New York and California the apparent possibility of swinging the election, seemed to illustrate a kind of Gresham's Law, especially in Mr. Carter's case. He found an issue in the position taken by the Administration in favor of selling advanced missiles to Saudi Arabia; he vowed he would end the Arab boycott and would respond to an oil embargo by cutting off trade with the Arabs; he talked less about the requirements of peace and more about support of Israel. He virtually forced the Administration, by his campaign, into making some new and advanced weapons immediately available to Israel; Ford took the action, with appropriate fanfare, but Carter got most of the credit for it with the Jewish community. The President, while opposing the idea of waging economic warfare on the Arabs and maintaining that Carter's policies could drive moderate Arab leaders into the arms of the Soviets, also stepped up the intensity of his own pro-Israel declarations, especially in his campaign in New York.

What would be the effect of all this on American policy in a new administration? Would the winning candidate be able to carry on the Kissinger role of maintaining credit with both the Israeli and the Arab side while nudging both toward areas of agreement? The worldly view is that no one should take campaign promises too seriously. The Arabs, though they might not have liked Carter's statements, might be expected to wait and judge him by performance in office. The government and people of Israel and their supporters in America were perhaps less likely to dismiss it all as campaign oratory. If and when the time comes for Mr. Carter, as President, to undertake initiatives for peace in the Middle East, he is certain to be reminded of his statements and, at the least, to find them a limitation on his administration's ability to bring the parties together and to sell an agreement, if he can get one, at home.

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[12]Address of June 6, 1976, Elizabeth, New Jersey.

The Effects of the Violence in Lebanon

The other new element in the 1975-76 picture was provided by the events in Lebanon. In this conflict Arab governments and political movements found themselves engaged in a constantly changing situation of extraordinary complexity. In greater or less degree it diverted them from the struggle with Israel and thus provided a welcome breathing space for the Israelis and for those outside powers concerned about the loss of momentum toward a negotiated peace. The danger was ever present, however, that Israel would be drawn, or would inject itself, into the Lebanese affair in order to remove any threat to its security from across its northern border. And in view of the direct participation of the P.L.O. and of Syria, to both of which Moscow had provided arms and political support, the Soviet role was uncertain.

The United States saw no reason or merit in intervening in any way other than in urging peace and negotiation. To do so, either at the request of one of the parties, as it had in 1958, or with the general purpose of enforcing peace, could only have entangled America in situations outside of its control, antagonized all Arab states, and possibly provoked Soviet intervention. The principal part played by Washington, other than trying to look out for American lives and property, was serving as a channel of communication between Syria and Israel, to make sure that they knew each other's intentions and the necessary limits on their actions if a military clash was to be avoided.

The most important international impact of the Lebanon affair was on inter-Arab relations. It came at a time when Egypt was under verbal attack from other Arab states, notably Syria, because of the Sinai accord. Sadat was being pilloried for having forsaken his Arab brothers, especially the Palestinians. Then when Syria, for reasons of its own national interest, sent its own forces into Lebanon and eventually engaged in battle there with the P.L.O., Egypt took on the role of friend and supporter of the Palestinians as a means of regaining an influential role in inter-Arab politics. Amid the agony of Lebanon, the failure of the Arab League to cope with it, and the bitter competition and mutual hostility of the Arab states in trying to turn the situation to their respective advantage, the issue of what to do about Israel inevitably receded to the background, except for the concern about an Israeli move into southern Lebanon.

As the Syrian intervention grew in volume, the United States pointedly avoided expressions of disapproval despite Syria's past close association with the U.S.S.R., its scarcely concealed intention to control Lebanese politics, and the danger of a clash with Israel. For Syria obviously had a strong interest in stopping the civil war, in reforming the Lebanese constitutional structure to bring it more in line with political realities without destroying historic communities, and in permitting neither a partition fo the country nor a leftist victory resulting in a radicalized Lebanon controlled by the P.L.O. and possibly allied with Iraq. Given those purposes and those alternatives, the Syrian action seemed in American eyes a stabilizing factor.

After many abortive attempts to bring an end to the fighting and enforce an armistice through collective action by Arab states, a decisive Saudi Arabian diplomatic initiative finally brought Syria and Egypt together in an arrangement that gave some promise of being effective and could get general Arab League approval. It gave a general Arab cover for the Syrian forces in Lebanon, without really challenging their control of events there, and in that sense it confirmed the defeat of the leftists and of the P.L.O. But at the same time it set limits on Syria's victory and saved a chastened P.L.O. from subjection to the Syrian will.

In a broader sense the result of Saudi diplomacy, backed by the financial power which made it effective, was to reconstitute a common front of moderate Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) not only to calm the storm in Lebanon but to end debilitating disputes among themselves and to face together the question of negotiation (or eventual war) with Israel.

Prospects for 1977

Objective factors at the end of 1976 seemed to be more favorable to constructive negotiation than at any time in the past. Those forces in the Arab world which were prepared to deal in a practical way with the fact of Israel's existence and to make compromises for peace had consolidated their position. The radical states, Iraq and Libya, had lost ground. Events in Lebanon had given the moderate regimes in Riyadh, Cairo and elsewhere a disturbing picture of the dangers of radicalization. Syria, now heavily involved in Lebanon, working into a close association with Jordan and feeling threatened by Iraq, had decided at least for the moment on a policy of solidarity with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The P.L.O. was obviously weakened by its losses in Lebanon, and the Arafat leadership was being pushed into more moderate positions as a result. Signals were coming from the Arab world indicating readiness for negotiations at Geneva. No Arab state was ready for recognition of Israel -- that step presumably would come after peace was negotiated -- but the "confrontation states" all seemed ready to meet Israel at the negotiating table. Even the P.L.O. was sending signals that its practical aim was a Palestinian state in the West Bank area and the Gaza strip, although Arafat's much publicized "dream" of a single secular state in all of Palestine, an article of the P.L.O.'s faith and of its covenant, could not be renounced.

The government of Israel had also stated its readiness to go to Geneva. On all sides, as was apparent during the UN General Assembly session in the fall, the movement toward a Geneva meeting early in 1977 was gathering steam. The Soviet Union and the United States were on record for it, and the Secretary General said he was prepared to convene it.

In the United States the Ford Administration was living in the shadows, deliberately immobilized in foreign policy. No one could be sure how the new president would choose to tackle the question of the Middle East. No doubt he would have to take a position fairly early in the term in view of the momentum of the rush to Geneva and the near certainty that high Israeli and Arab leaders would be asking to come to Washington not long after the inauguration. Even before taking office Carter was already the target of considerable advice, solicited and unsolicited, from his compatriots on how to move forward toward peace in the Middle East.

The world would be wise, however, not to expect too much too soon. There is no doubt that Mr. Carter and his nominee for Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, will be well briefed on the Middle East, including the relatively propitious circumstances of the moment. But two factors have to be given full weight. One is the internal situation. Carter, elected primarily on domestic issues and by a narrow margin, will be concentrating in the early months of his term on difficult economic problems and trying to keep his footing as he works out his relations with Congress. Obviously, international events will create their own tempo and their claims on his attention, but it is not likely that he will embark on any early initiatives in foreign policy, especially if they are clouded with uncertainty and carry significant risks of failure. The other factor that cannot be ignored is the legacy of the election campaign: Carter's position with the Jewish community in America and with the state of Israel, and its bearing on the American role in negotiations for a settlement.

The risks of action -- or of inaction too for that matter -- might well be magnified because of exaggerated expectations, especially on the Arab side. Egypt, for example, had patiently waited out the American election campaign with the expectation that, once it was over, the United States would resume the mediation effort in the Geneva framework, and would use its influence on Israel. In the sense that Arab leaders were willing to wait and see, to give Carter some time, the signs from the Arab world were indeed favorable. But there was obviously an unspecified and unpredictable time limit. If months should pass and the "American strategy" pursued by Sadat and the Saudis should prove barren of results, then pressures would mount for a change in that strategy and for a new round of war.

President Carter, coming into office after a campaign in which he had said so much so forcefully about the special relationship with and support for Israel, might not have full flexibility to resume the effective mediating role exercised by the United States in the Kissinger period. One can only speculate about that, knowing that reasons of state can bring changes of mind and of position. But it is well to remember that the special relationship with Israel has tended to thrive with Democratic administrations in Washington, and that the leaders of the American Jewish community who supported Carter's candidacy presumably intend to hold his feet to the fire.

Even with a full desire on the part of the United States to use its influence to bring about a settlement, the difficulties are enormous. The Arabs and much of the rest of the world tend to see the requirements of peace in the simple terms of pressure on Israel to give up the occupied territories and recognize the rights of the Palestinians. As many years of diplomatic effort have shown, however, the problem is more complicated. If there is to be a settlement with any chance of enduring, both sides must be persuaded to make sufficient changes of view and modifications of fixed positions to make possible genuine negotiation and agreement. There must be a process which builds confidence by accretion and avoids shocks and breakdown while at the same time bringing the parties to the point of facing the basic decisions without which there can be no settlement.

First of all, the question of Palestinian representation in negotiations, which is a substantive and not just a procedural matter, has to be resolved in some way before Geneva can begin. Then, either in advance of Geneva or at some later stage, Israel must contemplate acceptance of final borders which will

mean, at the end of the process of implementation of the peace treaties, withdrawal from all or virtually all of the occupied territories, and must accept the principle of Palestinian self-determination as the basis for disposition of the West Bank area and the Gaza strip. The Arabs, in turn, must be ready to accept, at the end of the process, a real peace, which means normal relations with the state of Israel. Without a breakthrough that enables both sides to see in general terms where they will come out at the end, the Geneva negotiations will never get beyond wrangles over procedure and maneuvers for tactical advantage.

Terms of settlement, of course, are a matter for agreement by the parties, not for determination by the United States, the Soviet Union, or any other outside power. But outsiders may have to point the way and to use influence, the power to provide or to deny what the parties want, if success is to be achieved. As long as present configurations of politics and power prevail, the only outside power with a chance of bringing them together is the United States. But what it has done so far, with great expenditure of effort, is little more than a beginning. Even the remarkable achievements of Henry Kissinger in 1974 and 1975 were agreements on the periphery of the conflict. The central questions remain: the Palestinians, Jerusalem, Sinai and Sharm-el-Sheikh, the Golan Heights, security arrangements and guarantees, and above all the acceptance by the Arab states and Israel of a normal relationship. No wonder that the Carter Administration may be hesitant in plunging into a Geneva conference, where all the world will be looking to the United States to exercise its influence in favor of a settlement. It may not, given the political obstacles, be able to do so. Without careful preparation both internationally and at home for a conference -- and for the lengthy and difficult negotiating process to which a Geneva session would be only an introduction -- progress is hardly possible. Even if American leadership surpasses itself in diplomatic skill and political courage, success is anything but sure. But the only alternative, unfortunately, is continued instability in the Middle East and eventually new rounds of war.

The Wider Aspects

This paper has attempted to describe American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict itself, and especially the difficulties of pursuing peace in a situation where policy and diplomacy are limited by the irreconcilability of aims and the intensity of feeling of the disputants and by the character of relationships America has developed with both sides. For the United States, as for others, the problem also has its wider aspects.

To the east of the combat zone is the oil-producing region of the Persian Gulf. There the new economic power and the active diplomacy of major Arab oil states create a link between the question of Israel and that of the West's energy supply and with the course of the producer-consumer dialogue now in progress in Paris and elsewhere. The cause-and-effect relationship is not automatic, as the rulers of the oil states have many interests other than the conflict with Israel, but the connection cannot be ignored, as we learned in 1973.

To the west of the zone lies the Mediterranean, where the presence of superpower naval forces in confrontation with each other and situations of political uncertainty in many Mediterranean states create a dangerous instability certain to be made worse by continuing or renewed crisis at the eastern end of the sea. The Mediterranean, geographically and in other ways the link between the Middle East and Europe, can act as a conductor of disruption and violence from one end to the other.

To the north is the Soviet Union, stung by recent reverses in the Middle East and seeking to regain influence by exploiting both its public role of patron of the Arab cause and its capacity for backstage maneuvers in the shifting game of the inter-Arab politics. The Soviet-American detente has not been extended to the Middle East except in the most elementary sense that both powers agree on the need to avoid situations that could lead to nuclear war. The political competition continues, with resulting encouragement, deliberate or unintended, to local instability and conflict.

The United States as a world power must take account of these wider aspects. It must consider how what happens in the Arab-Israeli dispute -- whether it is war, continued stalemate, or peace -- will affect the security of the Persian Gulf, the oil supply of the Western world and Japan, the solidarity of the Western alliance, the balance of power in the Mediterranean, the security of southern Europe, the future of detente with the Soviet Union, and the capacity of the international system to control and contain dangerous local conflict. To analyze all these possibilities would take this paper beyond its prescribed limits, but we may look at them broadly from two perspectives. The first is negative: What would be the effects of failure to reach an Arab-Israeli settlement on these wider interests, and what might be done to prevent or limit the damage? The second is positive: What might be done in these areas to reduce the danger existing in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

One contingency is the outbreak of war. It may seem unlikely in the present state of Israeli military superiority and Arab disunity and weakness, but unfavorable odds did not deter the Arabs from resorting to war in 1973 to break the stalemate and stir the powers into action. We cannot assume that a new war would follow, in its course and consequences, the script of 1973. We can be fairly sure that, if it went on for as long a time, it would be more disruptive and more likely to spread beyond the immediate area of the "confrontation states." If the supply lines from the superpowers to the belligerents became essential to continuing military operations, they might be subject to forcible interruption and the widening of the war; at the very least there would be political pressures, recrimination and friction both between the military blocs and within them. The horrendous possibilities of massive destruction of cities or the use of nuclear weapons cannot be excluded. The Arab states would probably impose a new embargo on oil shipments to the United States if it were supporting Israel (as it almost certainly would be) and drastically cut exports to others in order to make it effective. The dialogue between the Arabs and the advanced industrial states, and the growing economic cooperation that has gone with it, would break

down; or else the Europeans and Japanese would strive to maintain their part of it by turning against America. The strains on the Western alliance might prove to be close to intolerable, compromising the defense of Europe. In the Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey might reduce still further their ties to the United States and to NATO and seek security, against each other and against outside powers, by moving toward non-alignment in East-West competition and new forms of association with Mediterranean and Middle East states.

One can extend the list of perils to world order and danger to American interests that a new round of Arab-Israeli war would bring in its train. On the other side of the ledger there is one possible entry, and that is the contingency of a war stopped very quickly by the action of outside powers. That outcome might bring the parties to negotiate more realistically and more seriously for a political settlement than they had previously been willing to do. It is, of course, a crude and costly way to learn a lesson.

If, instead of producing war, the conflict continues for some time in the status of "no war no peace," then the disasters mentioned above may happen more slowly, less spectacularly, but with the same deadly effect. On the Arab side the position of moderate leaders generally committed to negotiation and to the American connection would deteriorate and eventually become untenable. Their countries would change policies or change leaders. The accompanying frustration, accompanied by serious economic problems in a number of countries, would create situations of turmoil and radicalization in the Arab world, not necessarily to the advantage of the Soviet Union but most certainly to the disadvantage of the United States. The Soviet Union could nevertheless be expected to try to reassert its position in the Arab world and to put increased pressure on Balkan and Mediterranean countries which neither those countries nor the Western powers would be in a strong position to resist.

The nations of Western Europe would face a dilemma. If the Middle East deadlock persisted they would be tempted to try to save their Mediterranean and Middle East connections by divorcing themselves from American policies. But the nations of Western Europe are too weak and insufficiently united to take a strong decision one way or the other. Their response to the dilemma would probably be a mixture of frustration and reflex reaction to crisis, raising the level of destructive economic nationalism among the developed countries and setting back efforts of common policy such as the International Energy Agency, without finding salvation in the still shadowy projects of regional association that bear the labels of "Euro-Arab dialogue" and "global Mediterranean policy." American and European interests would both suffer.

To look at the positive side, there are many lines of policy the United States could follow in relations with its allies and with the Soviet Union with the purpose of limiting and counteracting the effects of stalemate or conflict in the Arab-Israeli zone. Such policies, indeed, have been followed in the past, albeit fitfully and often without notable success. Success depends, of course, on the degree that others see their own interests served by what is proposed. For example, is there a Soviet

interest in Soviet-American agreements on how to prevent an Arab-Israeli war, on how to stop one if it breaks out, on how to move the parties toward negotiated peace, on how to control the Middle East arms race, or how to define Soviet and American interests in the area in order to minimize the danger of a clash? Is there a European and Japanese interest in solidarity of the developed countries in dealing with energy policy, in working out relations with oil-producing countries in the Middle East, in facing the Arab-Israeli conflict itself and providing for mutual protection against the impact of a new round of war? Is there an Arab interest in expanding the growing economic ties with the industrial countries, on which the success of Arab development plans depend, creating common concerns that minimize the dangers of resort to economic warfare as a political weapon? Is there an interest on the part of Mediterranean countries in making new security arrangements, something in the nature of a Helsinki agreement for the Mediterranean, as a means of putting their own house in order, their own disputes on ice, and their relations with the great powers on a new basis of understanding? The possible rewards to an American diplomacy aimed at agreements based on such interests are obviously very high. Although signs may be discouraging -- as they have been particularly in exchanges with Moscow -- the possibilities should be continually tested. But these are large matters, and they take time. The Arab-Israeli conflict is not likely to allow enough time. But that does not mean these are not the most constructive lines of policy to take while the efforts toward a negotiated settlement go on.

These dire predictions may be wrong. There are those in America who take a quite different view. It has been, and will be, argued that a Middle Eastern balance based on Israel's deterrent power can maintain stability for a period of years; that Arab disunity and the decline of the P.L.O., both recently demonstrated in Lebanon, provide time for rethinking; that the Arabs, having tried the Russian route in the past and found it did not work, know that they need the Western connection, both for a political settlement and for their economic future; that the sound course, therefore, is to hold firm and wait until they are ready to negotiate directly and on a realistic basis with Israel.

The Carter Administration, will have some crucial judgments to make in its first year. It may choose caution and relative passivity, either because it accepts the above analysis or for other reasons. The time kept by the Carter clock in Washington, however, may not match the pace of events in the Middle East. And if only a fraction of the foreseeable adversity flowing from a failure to reach an Arab-Israeli settlement comes to pass, the consequences for America's interests and world position can be very serious indeed.

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SOUTHERN EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
(Communication)

by

Franca Gusmaroli.

Questo documento fa parte di un progetto di ricerca sui problemi del Mediterraneo, che l'Istituto Affari Internazionali conduce con l'aiuto finanziario della Fondazione Ford.

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Franca Gusmaroli.

This conference is the last in a series of three organized within the framework of a three year research project on stability and development in the Mediterranean financed by the Ford Foundation.

There has been a great change in the role of European fleets in the Mediterranean. Before 1956, and the political and military adventure of Suez, the latter claimed an independent role for themselves, depending exclusively neither on the Americans nor on the Atlantic Alliance. Since then European naval intervention has always been within the framework of overall Western strategy. After 1956, European forces intervened in Lebanon and Jordan (together with the Americans) ; they supported, up until 1962, the war in Algeria ; from Cyprus they assumed a nuclear support role, as well as other less important tasks, for CENTO. Never however did they take on a major political role. The only purely European affair, in which they were involved, was probably the Algerian war. Even here however, as was the case for Suez, the American position, favouring an end to European intervention, in the end, prevailed.

The policy followed by the Europeans was still that of the old colonial powers. Never was European policy truely "European" or multilateral. Even the Anglo-French intervention at Suez had been determined by the imperial logic of the past. Since Suez there have been occasional outbursts of "great power", "imperial" feeling. Never however have these had concrete results. On the contrary, there is a well-defined trend towards a diminution of European influence in the Mediterranean states.

The appearance in strength of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean has led to a general reshuffling of cards. Previously the role of these fleets was mainly that of intervening to maintain order between local states. After the appearance of the Soviets, the main problem became that of balancing the latter's influence. This created

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new problems for the European fleets. At the same time it may have provided them with new roles to play. The area today is no less unstable than in the past. Quite apart from the major East-West confrontation there are a whole series of local conflicts.(The most serious of these is the Israeli-Arab conflict. One should not forget however either the Greek-Turkish conflict or the various disputes over fishing rights). Today these conflicts converge. The parties cluster around Moscow or Washington and enormously complicate the East-West conflict.

How might it be possible to unravel this situation? Might there be a role here for European forces and policies?

It is obvious that we are no longer in the period of the great colonial powers. There are two possibilities for an effective policy, that is to say

a)a policy agreed upon with Washington from the start.

b)a multilateral European policy.

These two policies are clearly not incompatible. If a European initiative is to succeed it must however be at least either genuinely multilateral or genuinely agreed upon with the Americans. This implies the re-organisation of European forces and a more advanced common European policy than that which exists today.

So far the Europeans have failed to move in this direction. They have carried through a number of positive political initiatives. They have begun to represent a pole of attraction for the Mediterranean countries. They have not however so far succeeded in making progress in the field of military integration.

The most important changes have probably been by the British. It has been argued by some, such as Geoffrey Lee Williams, that the

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end of traditional British naval strategy became explicit in 1968 with the publication of the annual defense White Paper which opted for a "Eurocentric" defense policy rather than a world role. L.W. Martin seems to share this opinion. As early as 1967 he observed that in order to adapt to the realities of ground defense in Europe Britain had had to reduce her naval investment.

As a result of these factors, plus the economic crisis of recent years, the British undertook a radical revaluation of their defense priorities. The greatest cuts and the most drastic revisions came over Britain's naval role in the Mediterranean. These measures set out in the 1975 and 1976 White Papers, are more far reaching than the withdrawal from East of Suez and reflect the decision to wind up military commitments that are not strictly linked to the North East Atlantic, the Channel, the B.A.O.R. and the nuclear deterrent. The decline of Britain's naval potential is not restricted to deployment. Its new defense plans foresee the reduction of the total numbers of frigates, destroyers and mine-sweepers by 14% and of conventional submarines by 25%.

Great Britain has undertaken a gradual withdrawal of naval forces and of marine patrols from Gibraltar and Cyprus; she is definitively withdrawing from the island of Malta and has decided upon severe reductions in the special reinforcement units destined for Southern Europe. The 1976 defense White Paper states that as from April 1976 the British naval contribution in the Mediterranean will consist of the occasional presence of ships of the Royal Navy to participate in NATO manoeuvres, and of the biannual loan of a frigate to the Allied Naval Force "On-call". As far as air and ground forces are

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concerned, Great Britain will make available to the Allied Mobile Force - which is periodically deployed in exercises in the Mediterranean area and in Northern Europe - an infantry battalion and a squadron of attack aircraft.

Britain's contribution to the Mediterranean will continue to include special units made available to the strategic reserve assigned to the Supreme Allied Command in Europe (SACEUR) earmarked for possible deployment in Northern Italy. However, from April 1978 mobile British ground forces will be reduced from 9 to 5 battalions based in the South-Eastern zone. This force will include a small group of paratroops complete with anti-tank and air defense weapons. In addition it will be possible, at the request of SACEUR to send 2 fighter squadrons into Italy. The Royal Air Force will continue to utilise NATO's Southern European bases for training operations.

As far as the British presence in Gibraltar is concerned, the 1976 defense White Paper states that, following the 1974 defense review there will be a 10% reduction by 1978. A garrison made up of a single infantry battalion will remain. Today the British presence in Gibraltar is made up of a frigate, an infantry battalion and a certain number of Hunter aircraft, particularly useful for close air surveillance of Soviet vessels passing through the straits. Furthermore, there is the headquarters of the British naval forces in Gibraltar whose commander takes on the functions of NATO commander of the Mediterranean zone of Gibraltar, in case of war. English mine-sweepers based there were withdrawn on March 31st 1976.

As far as the island of Malta is concerned, it was an important

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naval base for Britain during the last war. Immediately after the war, when the Royal Navy was heavily committed in the Mediterranean the English established the headquarters of their Commander in Chief for the Mediterranean in Malta. Later this became a NATO naval headquarters. After Don Mintoff asked for the removal of the NATO Naval Command in 1971, the British naval headquarters remained on the island conserving its functions as headquarters for the allied naval forces of the South Eastern Mediterranean during war time. In 1972 Great Britain signed a new defense agreement with Malta for 7 years terminating on March 31st 1979 in which the British, for a price maintain their right to station armed forces on the island both in time of peace and in war and to utilise all existing military installations there. The headquarters and British naval installations in Malta will be gradually phased out. Withdrawal will be complete by the date on which the agreement expires. In addition to the marine commandos and an artillery battalion, the British maintain Canberra and Nimrod reconnaissance-aircraft on the island. The latter are also available for use by Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).

There are two British sovereign bases on Cyprus. However, the 1976 defense White Paper pointed to substantial reductions that have been made : for example, the fixed-wing aircraft, including the Vulcans, the Lightings and the Hercules and the surface-air missiles are no longer permanently based there. The British had already announced the year before that, although remaining a member of CENTO, by 1979 they would no longer make military forces available to this organisation (that is, the Nimrods and the Canberras based in Malta and the Vulcans based in Cyprus).Until

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March 31st 1976 the British headquarters for land and air forces in the Middle East were both in Cyprus. These included a group of armoured reconnaissance vehicles, an infantry battalion, two infantry companies and a few helicopters. As far as the British infrastructure on the island is concerned, the Akrotiri airport remains open for only a few hours each day, and the radar installations and the electrical listening equipment (which provide useful information on the Soviet naval communications in the Eastern Mediterranean) are without anti-aircraft protection. In time of crisis however, Great Britain could send enough reinforcements to guarantee a significant contribution to the defense of NATO's Southern flank. During the 1950's the British forces in Cyprus were considered as potential reserves destined for the Middle East. Today Britain considers them to be more important for NATO tasks and she also utilises them for the training of army units and marine commandos. Finally, the British have some units assigned to the United Nations peacekeeping force on Cyprus consisting of 7 armoured reconnaissance vehicles, an infantry battalion and a helicopter squadron.

France's role in the Mediterranean after Suez and the Algerian war followed a parallel pattern of reductions. De Gaulle's Vth republic, reinforced by the priviledged relations it maintained with some Mediterranean countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Lebanon, tried in vain from 1962 onwards to establish for itself an imposing status. The building up of a strategic nuclear deterrent, the refusal to sign the Partial Test Ban and Non-Proliferation Treaties, the veto on Great Britain's entry into the

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Common Market, and the illusion of being able to be the priviledged interlocutor of the Soviet Union in Europe, etc. were among the policy choices whereby France moved away from her Mediterranean role.

As far as the Mediterranean in particular is concerned, first De Gaulle and later Pompidou, limited themselves to quite modest objectives ; (1) - they tried with limited success to reinforce France's position through a series of bilateral relations with a number of Mediterranean countries, especially former colonies or protectorates ; (2) - they tried to present themselves as a "third" interlocutor, between USA and USSR, useful for limited bargaining (such as arms deals) ; (3) - they tried not to choose sides between Arabs and Israelis and amongst the Arabs themselves in order to present themselves as mediator, at a later stage. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy overcame their hopes. During the civil war in Lebanon, Giscard d'Estaing declared that he was prepared to send French armed forces (on the pattern of United Nations peace keeping forces) into crisis areas, and was equally unsuccessful. On the strictly military level, however, Giscard's policy was at least better sustained, than De Gaulle's one. As a result of the rationalisation of the British fleet and the recent improvements of France's fleet, the latter is likely to become Western Europe's most significant, in this area.

After having given priority to strategic nuclear forces for many years, the French navy recently began an important programme of modernisation, since the major part of her ships will, by the end of this decade, have been in service for more than 25 years and will have to be progressively withdrawn thus causing a large reduction in total tonnage.

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Today surface vessels include 2 aircraft carriers (with about 40 planes each), 1 helicopter carrier, 2 cruisers, 20 destroyers and 28 frigates. There are 23 conventionally-propelled attack submarines, while the construction of nuclear-propelled ones has been delayed because of the priority given to the strategic forces. The naval units are assigned to two commands : 1 for the Atlantic and one for the Mediterranean, respectively at Brest and Toulon.

Early in the 1960s, France decided that its Mediterranean fleet would no longer be earmarked for assignment to NATO and in 1966 this decision was finally enacted. It was at that time that De Gaulle reassigned a substantial part of French naval forces from Toulon to Brest to operate essentially in the Atlantic.

Last year on the contrary the French National Defense Council decided to move the bulk of the fleet from Brest to Toulon, leaving the nuclear-armed submarines in the Atlantic. An important construction programme was announced, including a new nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier. As of this year the two aircraft carriers Foch and Clémenceau have begun service in the Mediterranean with their escort of cruisers and missile launching frigates. One carrier, on a rotation basis, will operate permanently with aircraft while the other with helicopters. Double the actual tonnage is foreseen in the next few years for the Mediterranean fleet and this will include about 40 units amongst which 11 conventionally powered submarines, 2 aircraft carriers, a helicopter carrier, 14 escorts and frigates, new missile launching cruisers, destroyers, mine-sweepers, anti-submarines forces and other land-based air forces.

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The most appropriate justifications for the recent reconstructions are of an operative, a logistic or an industrial nature, but the main reason is found above all in the qualitative and quantitative increase of the Soviet Ezkadra in the Mediterranean. The present French naval chief of staff recently declared that the present capacity of the national fleet is not up to protecting commercial sea lanes outside the Western Mediterranean and the central Atlantic. This recognition, other than justifying the recent strengthening of the navy, also presented the occasion for indicating the importance of the cooperation amongst allies in the Mediterranean. Accepting the idea that unity creates force, and rightly considering that the Mediterranean has become overcrowded enough to force almost always a multilateral retaliation in case of serious crisis, France arrived at the conclusion that it is necessary to organise a planned reaction with her allies.

The cooperation between France and the naval allied command of Naples (NAVSOUTH) is very close today. French units regularly participate in combined exercise, and air units for sea control cooperate with allied command MARAIRMED. There is a constant exchange of officers between the Naples allied command and general headquarters of the French navy at Toulon ; lastly, some contingency plans seem to have been studied together with the allies. In practice the French navy utilises the doctrines and the common procedures of NATO, as far as these are compatible with her national objectives.

The other fleets integrated into the Mediterranean allied defense structure are the Italian, the Greek and the Turkish ones.

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As far as numbers and tonnage of ships are concerned, the Italian navy is equal if not larger than the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, since Italy from the mid 1950's has undertaken an important naval programme which resulted in some effective fighting units, with missile launching capability. Today she has 3 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 10 frigates and 7 corvettes. There are 9 submarines, all conventionally powered but soon another 4 are to be added. A programme of modernisation has recently been approved at the cost of around a billion dollars ; this foresees new constructions, including a "through deck" cruiser equipped to handle both helicopters and VTOL aircraft, 12 frigates, 10 mine-sweepers, 1 amphibious landing craft and 13 hydrofoils.

The Greek fleet is essentially composed of escort ships with the exception of 8 submarines and 9 destroyers. This is a force with few offensive characteristics and therefore hardly able to fight against the modern Soviet warships. Slightly larger but just as old is the Turkish fleet, which is composed of 14 submarines, 12 destroyers and 2 frigates.

Finally, even though it is not part of NATO, the Spanish fleet should be considered as far as the contribution it can make to the East-West force balance in the Mediterranean. Spain has a good antisubmarine capacity, a fair anti-air capacity (limited however to middle range artillery) and an acceptable amphibious capacity. It consists of 11 submarines, 1 helicopter carrier (capable of carrying approximately 20), 1 cruiser, 13 destroyers and 13 frigates and corvettes. Until a few years ago her role in the Mediterranean was marginal due to the

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quality of her armaments, but today, since she has commissioned the USA to undertake a vast programme of modernisation her future role is likely to be far more important.

Generally speaking, these European fleets can be considered fit for coastal defense purposes and escort duties, even if the submarines ,helicopter carriers and cruisers could be used for wider surveillance and offensive operations. The two most modern, well-equipped and powerful fleets are the French and the Italian with the difference between the two being that the French have their own nuclear armaments. In any case, given present dimensions and capacities, in any eventual East-West conflict the European Mediterranean fleets could only play a supporting role to the American VI fleet to which the offensive operations foreseen by NATO would be entrusted.

However, one can foresee a future role based on two principle trends. The first concerns naval armaments. In view of the quality and cost of some modern and sophisticated equipment it seems very doubtful whether medium or small naval powers will be willing to use them in minor conflicts thus risking unacceptable losses. Since only the superpowers are able to face both the cost of modernising their fleets and of loosing some of it in case of conflict, the others are likely to be discouraged from precipitate action.

The second trend concerns strategy. The emphasis put on the European land theatre and forces has for some time reduced the share of the national budgets allocated to the navy. This has brought about a somewhat unbalanced defense strategy on the

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flank. The result of this was that while the Europeans defended their land borders, the Americans were entrusted with the naval role in the Mediterranean. This trend was further emphasized by the British naval withdrawal from Mediterranean waters and De Gaulle's shifting of the bulk of the French fleet to the Atlantic. Today this trend seems to go the reverse (with the exception of Great Britain) and this could bring about a change in NATO's strategy on the Southern flank. Between the two alternatives facing the Europeans : to reduce their fleets or to reorganise them in a more flexible and effective way, they appear to have chosen the second.

The improvement of European naval capacities could well support the US. Mediterranean fleet. A difference will remain due to the nuclear potential of the US VIth fleet and to the character of NATO's nuclear strategy in the Mediterranean. We are probably not too far from reality in suggesting that there is very little (or perhaps none at all) flexibility in the use of nuclear weapons in this area. This can be seen in land forces (for example the presence of nuclear mines in border areas) but it is even more true of naval operations. It seems very unlikely that a conflict involving the American and Russian fleets could avoid "going nuclear" from the very first shots. This is why a duality will always remain between the role of the European allied navies and the VIth fleet. This is also why it is worth trying to rethink the role of the European fleets in order to increase the number of options open to NATO's contingency planning. If non-nuclear naval forces are to be used in a broader and more effective way, it might well be possible to raise the nuclear threshold in the

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Mediterranean. In order to exercise a greater role, however, the reorganisation of the European fleets should go deeper, and confront a series of problems such as the standardization of communication and command systems, the organization of multi-purpose reserves, etc. All these problems require a greater degree of cooperation and integration between allied forces, thus increasing the need for rethinking the Alliance.

All these observations substantiate the view that, despite the lack of desire for involvement in military security in the Mediterranean and the recent reductions and reorganisations caused by economic factors, and despite the reduced role of conventional naval units in the flexible stragegy of the Alliance, the future of small and medium European navies seems assured even if problematical. Originally founded upon traditional political and strategic grounds to serve historic national purposes, these navies have (and are likely to continue to do so, for the foreseeable future) derived their justification increasingly from the contribution they make to collective strengths. So long as international military cooperation is indispensable there are a number of reasons why a greater cooperation is particularly easy with the naval forces. One of the foremost is that navies, being composed mostly of ships, are made up of units that are small enough to permit the assignment and flexible deployment of limited national contributions. Furthermore, because of their mobility and their relative independence of an international infrastructure, the assignment of naval forces does not entail an explicit or definite abandonment of other, perhaps more

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specifically national purposes such as the stationing of ground forces under an integrated command might signify.

The Allied Naval on-call Forces for the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) made up of American, English, Italian, Turkish and Greek vessels (the latter having participated since 1974) does not have a permanent role in the Mediterranean but is brought together periodically. It is until now the only integrated force in the Mediterranean region.

A greater integration of European fleets is feasible, centred today around the Atlantic Alliance and tomorrow as part of an integrated European defense structure within the Atlantic framework. In this last case, from a strictly military point of view, during a nuclear crisis, the role of the European fleets would probably remain that of auxiliary to the VI fleet but their presence could increase the flexibility of our response, thus making it possible to avoid the immediate escalation of the crisis to the nuclear level. If the nuclear crisis is avoided, then the role of the European navies can increase, paralleling the already determinant European economic presence in the Mediterranean. From a political point of view, the permanent presence in the Mediterranean of a united European naval force could result in a new element of stability in the Mediterranean. Let us consider an example in Southern Europe. Politically all countries from Portugal to Turkey are going through a difficult period of instability. The internal political prospects are confused : coups, changes of regime and difficult attempts to establish democratic socialism. The creation of an integrated European permanent force in the

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Mediterranean could offer a point of reference and an important guarantee in as much as it would offer an alternative to the super-powers to Southern European governments. The political backing of the European countries, accompanied even by a purely symbolic military dimension, would strengthen what is left of the unity of NATO's Southern European flank. With the enlargement of the EEC, since certain instruments are necessary for European policy towards the Mediterranean, and since it is more and more necessary for greater European cooperation in the field of the arms procurement, it does not seem unrealistic to predict an increasing future role for the European fleets in the Mediterranean. An integrated European fleet would need to foresee in addition to Spanish, French, Italian, Greek and Turkish participation, also a contribution from the English and the Germans (or in general from the Central-Northern European countries) in order to avoid too distinct a division between central European and Southern European defense. This means for example that, if Great Britain is compelled to withdraw from Malta and Cyprus, the European countries should work out a burden sharing scheme (as in fact has already happened over Malta) thus helping to maintain a multi-European presence in the Mediterranean. An integrated European fleet should have characteristics that, from a political point of view as well, would permit a limited role in certain zones rather than in others ; for example, with regard to the Middle East it is difficult to think of an effective European role. In other words, the presence of a mere military instrument would not be enough for guaranteeing a common European policy towards the many problems existing in the Mediterranean area.

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Moreover, given the financial problems of the economies of the participating countries, it would mean a relatively small but sufficiently flexible force. Conventional armaments and therefore surface vessels would receive a greater priority than the nuclear armaments or submarines. One would not therefore be dealing with integrating English and French strategic forces but, at least at first, only their surface vessels.

Thirdly, a decision-making and institutional body should be organised to ensure the functioning of the European fleet in an effectively integrated manner. Today, lacking a central European power, in every situation where intervention appears necessary it would be necessary to reach agreement between participating governments , with the consequent possibility of delays and uncertainty. This could be resolved through various compromises, the best being the establishment of common integrated institutions (linked to the European union), the worst resting on the traditional allied way of entrusting to each member country some specific responsibilities.

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CHANGES OF REGIME ON THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

by
Arnold Hottinger

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CHANGES OF REGIME ON THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

by

Arnold Hottinger

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In both countries of the Iberian Peninsula the same basic constellation has come about in recent years : the regime of an old and well entrenched strong man who had dominated his country completely for more than a generation came to an end by the death of that dominating political leader. Both societies saw themselves confronted with the need to begin a new regime. In both the questions were posed : how much of the old order, its institutions, its personalities, its profiteers and privileged groups could be preserved ; how much of them had to change, to disappear ; how was the change to be accomplished, gradually, by violent means ; who would supervise it?

Inevitably the answers given to those questions have turned out to be different in the two countries. But there are sufficient points of similarity to warrant the attempt to view them together comparing and contrasting events and their reasons in both countries. In Portugal things began happening first, when Salazar at 79 was incapacitated by a stroke in September 1968. But in the years after his replacement by Caetano, who ruled as prime minister from 1968 to 1974, there was little change. In fact too little, as later was to become obvious. The reasons for this can be grouped under several headings : personal, institutional and economic, military, intellectual.

Personally Caetano was a conservative lawyer, a man of some age, grown up inside the regime of Salazar, a rather timid character and at the same time an obstinate man. He found himself surrounded by the establishment of Salazar, again old men, rather obstinate and many of them decided to defend to the very last all their previous priviledges and advantages which through forty years they had come to consider as their due.

In particular the head of state, Admiral Américo Tomàs, who had helped nominate Caetano as successor to Salazar, himself a very old man

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became the center of all forces who resisted even such minimal changes as Caetano attempted to introduce.

Under Salazar a tight little social and economic system had grown up. It was based on very powerful family holdings which dominated the banks and industry (1). The few dominating groups had divided production amongst themselves so that there was little competition ; the colonies were an essential part of their operating area ; towards the outside world they were protected by customs barriers. For long years they had little incentive to modernise their methods of production and management, as they were rich and grew richer anyhow. The same can be said of the big landowners in the Alentejo.

But some movement had come into the previously immobile economic system in the last years of Salazar and in the period of Caetano. This was due partly to emigration of the rural and urban working classes to the EEC,partly to the ever increasing costs of the colonial wars. Rural and urban labour leaving the country in very high proportions forced the landowners to give somewhat higher salaries and consequently to make better use of their land in order to afford those wages. The same was true of some industries, mainly textiles. On the other hand the state needed more and more money for the wars (those had begun in 1961 in Angola with the raising of the future FNLA) and it saw itself forced to increase the efficiency of Portuguese industry by admitting foreign capital and know-how in association with the established Portuguese industrial holdings. Under Caetano a certain struggle had developed between a modernised sector of industry which looked forward to larger markets and association with Europe and a traditional sector which had been unable

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to renew itself and was only interested in preserving things as they always had been. This second sector spoke of traditional values, the Portuguese overseas empire (i.e.the colonies), our brave soldiers etc. It managed to retain the political hegemony under Caetano, partly by allying itself with Admiral Tomàs and other high dignitaries, civilian and military, grown old in the service of Salazar.

Trade unions had been arranged by Salazar in such a way that they were practically incapable of action. The political police (PIDE) looked after that, as indeed after all political opposition. For a short period Caetano had granted the trade unions somewhat greater freedom of action. But he grew frightened as he saw the Communists taking advantage of this immediately and put the controls back on.

The colonial wars entering into the second decade under Caetano and offering no realistic hope of ever ending in victory served for a long time to help immobilising the regime. No changes could be made as Portugal was in a war situation ; no risks could be taken ; the main financial and administrative efforts of the regime went into the colonies. The wars served also as a pretext to keep all intellectual life stagnating. Censorship lasted all through the Caetano period and it strangled all public discussion of political and social issues. The censorship was one of the main reasons for the ever growing disaffection of all intellectual groups and professions. The war was invoked as its justification, but in reality it was used to strangle all intellectual life in the country.

Revolution in Portugal

As it is well known, it was the colonial wars which led finally to the decisive disaffection of the young officers towards the regime,

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their grouping into an officers movement (MFA) and their coup d'état of April 25, 1974.(2). The MFA program was basically moderate and seemed to be aiming at a "bourgeois" democratic regime. Two principal factors however, contributed to a more and more radical "reading" of the program by the officers themselves : the struggle for power among two officer groups known as Spinolists and MFA-Officers; and the action of the Communist party and allied elements among the disaffected intellectuals and workers. MFA-Officers and Communists collaborated at first in order to overcome Spinola and his followers. In the course of those operations (they consisted of three main "crises" due partly to unsuccessful initiatives by Spinola, partly to provocations of Spinola by the Communists and their allies : July 1974, September 28 of the same year and March 11, 1975), the MFA officers collaborating with the PCP and allied elements managed to impose Vasco Gonçalves as prime minister (3). Later he turned out to be a strong pro-communist if not a secret member of the party (4). They forced the retirement of Spinola and his replacement by Costa Gomes as chief of state and finally allowed them to nationalise all strategic positions in the economy, to nominate an "assembly of the MFA" obedient to the pro-Communist line and to occupy important positions in the army (propaganda, information, secret services, some key units in Lisbon, the command of one of four military regions, navy positions, military police in Lisbon, arms deposits in Lisbon) with officers either sympathetic to them or secretly belonging to the party (5). Pro-Communists and Communists also took hold of the information media, state owned like radio and TV, or privately held like most newspapers ; they managed to monopolise the trade union movement and to occupy decisive positions in the offices of the prime minister, chief of state, and services to the Revolutionary Council. This Revolutionary Council became the real center of power ; but it was split between pro-Communist MFA-officers

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and an officer group which grew more and more suspicious of the brazen attempts of the Communists and their allies to monopolise power.

The second group, at the time known as the moderates, also the group of "nine", took action under the leadership of Vasco Lourenço, one of the earliest organisers of the MFA. This action evolved on two fronts : publicly, by resisting openly the pro-Communist trend in the army assemblies, the information media, public life generally, and secretly by the formation of a special intervention group inside the army, commanded by Col.Ramlho Eanes, which prepared itself for the moment of a future armed show down (6).

Public discussions and debates inside the army, marine and air-force assemblies took place all through the summer of 1975. Major Melo Antunes, one of the "nine", wrote a document critical of the attempt to impose a new dictatorship of the left which was circulated among the officers and found the approval of 80% of them (7). The political parties critical of the Communists, PS,PPD, CDS, had proved in the constitutional elections of April 1975 (8) that they represented the vast majority of the people and they themselves began opposing energetically to a Communist take over in the streets. In September officer assemblies of the three branches of the armed forces obliged Vasco Goncalves to quit his post as prime minister. A new government was formed under Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo in which the parties were represented according to their electoral strength, the Communists being accordingly in a minority.

But the PCP and allied elements continued their struggle for power be revolutionary means. They began organising the soldiers of certain army units, principally around Lisbon and in the South, into revolutionary groupings which were told to accept only revolutionary orders. Which orders were revolutionary and which not, was made clear to them

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by the news media, particularly certain radio stations and TV, which were in the hands of the leftists and pro-Communists. Since the main order forces of Lisbon were among the units thus revolutionised, government grew gradually impossible. Episodes like the siege of the constitutional assembly and the office of the prime minister by striking building workers of November 12 occurred without any police or army intervention (9). Finally, in secret agreement with the officer group of the "nine"(10), the government suspended its activities but refused to resign. Shortly after an attempted rebellion of parachute troops occupying the air force command and postulating a new composition of the Revolutionary Council, in order to exclude a decisive number of moderate officers(11), led to the intervention of the forces prepared and commanded by Col.Eanes on November 25, 1975 and to a quick and nearly bloodless defeat of the revolutionary units. The counter insurgency action of November 25 proved decisive. It broke the attempt of the PCP and the extreme left groups to reach power by non democratic means and consequently stabilised the democratic system : the army was reduced and reorganised on non-political lines ; parlamentary elections took place in April 1976 (12) and Eanes was democratically elected president in June (13). The majority party of Mario Soares formed a government in July. There have been some minor clashes among officers since. The "moderate" group of the MFA has now become the left wing of the officers and on some occasion they were opposed by so called professional officers who disliked their continued political role. The Revolutionary Council remains with greatly reduced powers as a kind of constitutional watch dog committee. But so far Eanes has been able to moderate these new military tensions. Vasco Lourenço has taken over from the "populist" officer Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho as military commander of Lisbon.

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The Economic Challenge

At the present time the economic difficulties are a danger to the new Portuguese democracy. They have accumulated from the period of Caetano : already at that time there was a serious trade imbalance and considerable inflation, both principally due to the colonial wars. Since this time troubles have grown : in 1974 the trade deficit grew from 28,5 Milliard Esc to 55,8 Milliards, and the balance of payments grew negative as well from +6,5 Milliards, to -16 Milliards. According to the finance minister in June 1976 the payments deficit had reached 100 Million Escudos daily. Salazar had accumulated big reserves in dollars and in gold, and those were gradually spent during the two years of revolutionary activities. Much of them went for basic food stuffs, needed to feed the nation. The efficiency of Portuguese industry has never been very high, partly because in the past it had been able to operate in a closed and captive market. It has declined further as a consequence of social disorder which in part was stimulated by the leftist groups and partially was due to the longstanding and justified resentments of the working population which had been kept under permanent police pressure by the previous regime. The colonies which in the past had helped the economy of the European part of Portugal have gone. But over half a million refugees came from them to the homeland and swelled the ranks of the unemployed and resentful. Inflation increased to 24% in 1974 and was about as high if not higher in 1975. Production decreased except in the sector of foodstuffs : textiles, shoes, clothes by 17,3%, metallurgy by 18%, building by 12%. The increased food consumption was a consequence of the government policy of increasing considerably the wages of the lowest paid groups. This in itself speaks of the very low standard of living of these lower paid classes ; they spent their increase in more and better food- not even in clothes. The agricultural reform in the Southern latifundia

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which was accompanied by considerable local agitation and irregular occupations of land, has done nothing to increase agricultural yield, rather the opposite so far. Similarly, the nationalisation of industries and banking caused at first disruption ; the politicians were too much occupied with the political struggles to give the necessary attention to the reorganisation of the nationalised assets. The Soares ministry has introduced saving measures, increased taxes and a more severe working discipline. But in the long run it will have to increase productivity and exports if the economy is to become balanced again. If this should not come about, in the long run new social difficulties and consequent political troubles are likely.

So far, evolution in Spain

In Spain - contrary to events in Portugal - a certain evolution in the sense of liberalisation had taken place already in the life time of Franco. This had begun with a new economic policy - following the break down of the previous one of autarchy - in 1959 and the following years. It had consisted in opening up the Spanish economy to the - western - world market by arranging for the convertibility of the Peseta and inviting foreign capital and know-how into the country. It had led to rapid economic growth, on the average 10% each year during more than 10 years (15). Emigration and tourism, both linked with the new economic policies, had increased contacts with Europe. In 1966 a press law was introduced which permitted to lift censorship, even though it left large discretionary powers to the authorities permitting them to strangle disobedient news media (16). The new press freedom, limited as it was, admitted a certain amount of discussion about the time after Francos death.

On the personal level the man Franco had trained and prepared to

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take his succession and to safeguard the regime, Admiral Carrero Blanco, a hard line conservative and profound admirer of Franco was murdered in Madrid at the end of 1973 by Basque terrorists(17), after he had served as a prime minister for a mere 100 days. No true replacement for him has ever been found, and consequently one stone in the carefully built arch Franco had foreseen for bearing the regime after his death was missing. In the last years of Franco it was even possible to discuss considerable changes in the structure of the regime. These discussions turned around the possibility of admitting different political associations in the framework of the regime and a first timid law in this sense was passed at the end of 1974.(18)

Spain had no real colonial problems. The one remaining colonial question was the future of the Spanish Sahara, and with an eye to events in Portugal the Spanish officers and civilian authorities decided that the Sahara was not going to cause a war. After a tense confrontation with Marocco the territory was ceded bloodlessly to the Maroccans and Mauritanians, much to the disgust of Algeria and to a considerable part of the inhabitants of the Sahara itself.

There were some signs of unrest in the army after the revolution in Portugal had broken out. This was due to the generation gap which goes through the whole of Spanish society, dividing those who have participated actively in the Civil War from those who do not remember it. Some of the younger officers, apparently captains and some majors, founded an illegal military association called Union Militar Democratica (19). Nine of them were captured and eventually condemned to long prison terms. The tensions inside the army opposed the younger officers to their superiors, the generals who had fought with the nationalists in the Civil War. The old generation wanted to maintain the regime ; the younger officers desired a non-partisan army in a pluralist state.

The king, belonging himself to the younger generation and having

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waited patiently for many years in the shadow of Franco, declared immediately after the death of the Caudillo (November 20th 1975) that he was willing to bring a new democratic regime to Spain. The Church itself had gone through a modernisation in the years following the Vatican Council; for several years and with increasing decision it had spoken for greater justice, more participation, more equal distribution of wealth, and it now came out for the plans of the king.

But the king was tied to the institutions and institutional laws laid down by Franco. Behind those institutions stood considerable powers : all the previous dignitaries and interest groups tied to the state from the members of the Spanish Cortes down to the police men, and behind these interests the army was supposed to guard and protect the institutions of the state. The institutional framework was laid down in the Leyes Fundamentales, a series of laws of constitutional rank promulgated by Franco in the course of his regime. The oath of the officers and of the civilian servants of the state, ministers and undersecretaries, including the king himself, consisted and still consists of the promise to safeguard and uphold those constitutional laws. The laws admit the possibility of revision, they even foresee the necessary procedure. Two thirds of the Cortes have to agree to any such revision. The introduction of real elections and an elected parliament necessitates a revision. An other vital prescription of the Fundamental Laws obliges the king to select his prime minister from a list of three men nominated by the crown council (Consejo del Reino) This council itself is composed of 17 of the most important dignitaries of the Franco regime, many of them picked by Franco himself, and it possesses the faculty of renewing itself by internal election when one of its permanent members retires or dies. Franco himself had declared that everything "was tied and well tied up" for the time after his death. In fact, the Fundamental Laws were of enormous importance since the consensus of the higher army officers seemed to be, that the new regime of the king could do whatever was admitted by those Funda-

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mental Laws, including changing them according to the ordained procedure, but that he could not overstep their limits without risking intervention by the officers who had been educated in the idea that they were the ultimate guardians of the "Constitution".

It became clear quickly that the crown council was not willing to nominate a liberal politician in his list of three, and the king consequently gave up the idea of appointing a new prime minister. He prefered keeping the last prime minister of Franco, Arias Navarro, but to make him change his ministry, appointing several politicians to it, who were well known for their liberal views. Making use of his constitutional powers the king did appoint a new president of the Cortes and of the crown council : Torcuato Fernandez-Miranda, who had been a teacher of the king at the University and offered the advantage of being a minister of the previous regime and at the same time a backer of King Juan Carlos.

The new ministry of Arias Navarro formulated a reform project which would have led to an elected lower and a more or less government controlled upper house. But before it could become reality friction between King Juan Carlos and prime minister Arias Navarro (20) increased. The king complained that his prime minister did not follow his directives and he seems to have become more and more afraid that the slow pace of the reforms could divide the country into two hostile halves. He took advantage of the first opportunity to change his prime minister. This seems to have offered itself, when Fernandez-Miranda, president of the crown council, could assure the king, that the council would now be willing to put at least one candidate acceptable to the king on the short list of three. A crisis was suddenly precipitated as this point was reached, and the relatively young and unknown Adolfo Suarez became prime minister.

Adolfo Suarez and his team decided to outdo the reformers of the

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previous government, principally Fraga, the minister of the interior and Areilza, minister of foreign affairs, by offering more liberal and more authentically democratic reforms. Their project was characterised by elected upper and lower houses, increased power for the king by granting him the possibility to convoke plebiscites, a new conformation of the crown council and above all quasi-constitutional powers for the future lower house that was to be elected democratically. Elections were promised before July 1977, a plebiscite about the new order, prescribed by the Fundamental Laws was planned for December 1976. But before this could take place the reform laws had to pass the Cortes with a two thirds majority. At the time of writing there were hopes that the Cortes could be pressured to agree to the law, even though they would in doing this, as the left opposition was found of remarking, "dig their own grave". The government counted on their power over many of the Cortes deputies, who in their majority owe their positions to the government, in order to make them pass the reform bill. There was some danger that the contents of the bill might be watered down in order to reach an agreement with a sufficient number of deputies.

Suarez' difficult path

The Suarez government in its attempt to obtain a change of regime by peaceful and constitutional means has to proceed between two oppositions. On the right a powerful alliance was formed under Fragas' leadership comprising a number of previous ministers of Franco giving themselves the name of Alianza Popular and intending to win the future elections. In order to do this they wanted the future election law tailored to their needs, above all they desired a majority system. As they had many friends in the Cortes they seemed in a position to impose their will on the government, particularly as long as they remained moderate in their demands.

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On the other side there was a long series of center and left democratic groups, stretching from several shades of Christian Democrats and Liberals to several kinds of Social Democrats, multiple Socialists, the Communists and small radical groups left of Communism. All this array including the Communists, desired a peaceful passage to "bourgeois" Democracy ; only the revolutionaries left of the PCE dream of a direct way to socialism and revolution. But the center and left opposition did not really believe that the government would be capable of achieving a passage to true democracy by way of using the political institutions of Franco. They spoke of the need for a break and a freely elected constitutional assembly to make a clean start. However, the more the plans of Suarez for elections progressed, the more the parties of the center and left opposition recognised the need to deal with the government and to obtain assurances that the elections would be accomplished in such a way as to give equal chances to all. They want a proportional election law. They want their share in TV time, radio time, propaganda possibilities, and there is at the time of writing a strong tendency to negotiate about all these questions with the government. Things are complicated however, by the fact that the government has made clear that the Communist party will not be permitted to compete in the elections. The prohibition of the Communists is another of the conditions laid down by the leading generals of the army. The civil war was against Communists and Separatists, or so the officers have been told all their lives. At least the older generation of them sees it as their military duty to avoid any possibility of the Communists or the Separatists ever being legalised again. So far both governments of King Juan Carlos seem to have respected this desire of the military hierarchy. On the other hand, the non-Communist left parties have been tied to the Communists by bonds of solidarity. They have formed a common platform with them against the old regime in the so-called Coordinacion Democratica. If they want to negotiate with the

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government, leaving out in the cold the PCE, they would have to dissolve that common platform.

The PCE itself says it is ready to accept a bourgeois democratic system and it would be willing to leave power if it should be voted out of power ; but the government and the army officers do not trust such assurances. Sometimes the speculation is voiced that the PCE might participate in coming elections, but not as PCE, only with independent candidates.

Another difficult problem for the reform is the question of "separatism" as it appears to the falangists and the high officers of falangist convictions ; i.e.the problem of the spanish "nationalities", as the Catalans and the Basques as well as many Gallegos like to call it. Contrary to Portugal there are strong autonomous tendencies in those three regions which speak their own languages as well as on the islands, Canaries and Baleares, and in the country and city of Valencia. Other regions have begun to call for their own autonomous administrations as well, declaring that they have been neglected scandalously by Madrid during centuries. In Barcelona, the Basque provinces and Galicia, the local parties have formed alliances aiming at autonomy, and there is no doubt a strong will to reach at least a return to a special statute (estatuto) such as had existed in Cataluna and in the Basque countries before Franco. The government would like to leave the definitive decision in these difficult problems to the future elected parliament, but the local party groupings are pressing for at least some previous assurances, before they agree to go to elections.

The government and the king have begun to change cautiously the structure and the mentality of the army. In September the previous vice prime minister in charge of army affairs, General de Santiago, was retired suddenly and replaced by a much more liberal general, close to the king, Gutierrez Mellado. Since then, Gutierrez has made

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it clear(21) that the future army will not have the task of upholding one political mentality, if not party, as it had been the case ever since the Civil War under Franco. But that instead it will have to serve the state in its new pluralistic shape. There are signs that a careful reorganisation of the army is under way, the same is true of the police. But in both cases this is not yet concluded.

In the case of the police it is evident, that the rank and file of the older policemen resent the new democratic tendencies. There is little doubt that policemen in civilian clothes form the backbone of the so-called "uncontrolled groups" which take it on themselves to beat up left wing and "separatist" elements, to menace them and to destroy their houses and shops. Such groups are too small to cause decisive damage by themselves. But they are dangerous because they might be capable of provoking serious unrest, and serious unrest could lead to an army intervention. This could possibly lead to attempts by the right wing extremist officers to exercise pressure or even to seize power.

The left wing, including the Communists, but not the small revolutionary groups left of them, seem to have understood this danger. They try hard not to start any uncontrollable agitation which might play into the hands of the ultra right elements (22). But another element in the dangerous balance of the present approach towards a democratic system are the - illegal but tolerated - trade unions. The government has promised trade union freedom soon, but it intends to leave to the future parliament the definitive regulation of the trade union question. So far the discredited state "sindicatos" are still the only legal groupings. But the illegal ones, Comisiones obreras, UGT and USO are more or less tolerated. Inflation and a low standard of living force the workers to militancy. The competion between the future trade unions and inside " comisiones obreras" (where the pro-communist line has fairly violent fights with the so-called minority line of ORT and

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PT, both groups standing left of the PCE) also makes for increased militancy. The danger of street troubles caused by the "illegal" trade unions and violent suppression of them by the police (possibly in the interest of fomenting their own political aims, namely wrecking the attempts of reform) is ever present ; it will further increase as economic difficulties grow (23).

This is bound to happen because already now the Spanish economy suffers from the general world slump (which has reached Spain late) and in addition to it from lack of confidence in the future. This is typically more pronounced among Spanish capitalists, for they are mostly people of the old regime, than among foreign investors. The Spaniards do what they can to take their money out of the country, while foreign investment is still flowing in . A new economic upturn seems unlikely before the new political system has been established and the new regime has settled down. But it would be over optimistic to believe that a new period of calm can begin already after the promised elections have taken place - if they take place at all. After that, many decisive and possibly divisive questions will remain to be settled by the parliament and even in the best case they will take a considerable time to find solutions acceptable to all sides.

Contrary to Portugal where rapid politicisation of nearly the whole population set in at once (in part expressly promoted by the left elements of the MFA in the so-called dynamisation campaigns) in Spain only certain social groups, workers in the big cities, Basques, Catalans, students, have been politised so far. Large parts of the provinces are still quiescent. But increased interest and political activity is bound to come with the approach of elections.

In the two countries opposite approaches to the problem of readjusting a new political system to the societies seem to have come about. In Portugal, politics started - after long enforced quiescence -

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by an army coup, and the essence of politics for several years remained army and officer politics ; the political parties served mainly to simulate different groups of officers to different actions. Eventually the army found a new equilibrium and only after that the political system could settle down.

In Spain politics started as a civilian affair, the officers served at first only as a retarding element, menacing possible intervention if the rules of the old system were not observed. But by now political change in Madrid has reached a stage in which it will either become possible to hold the promised general elections in the foreseeable future or else it could happen that the army might see itself forced into politics and tempted to seek a political role for itself. If this should happen things might well become muche more violent and dangerous in Spain than they have ever been in Portugal. This is partly so because of the civil war past, which has still not been overcome ; partly because of national idiosyncrasies and in part because of the question of the "nationalities" which introduces one more sharp dividing line into the Spanish situation. But it is also true that there is awareness of the dangers any conflict might bring, if it should break out, particularly so inside the army. And this awareness, so far, has worked in favour of caution.

NOTES

1) Compare : Maria Belmira Martins : Sociedades e grupos em Portugal editorial estampa, Lisboa, 1973.
2) Most revealing are three short booklets of Te.Coronal Luis Ataide Banazol : a origem do movimento das forcas armadas, Prelo documentos, Lisboa 1974 ; the same : Os capitaes, analise critica da sua formacao, Prelo, Lisboa 1974 ; and : A tarde dos Generais, Prelo, Lisboa 1975. compare also : Avelino Rodrigues, Cesario Borga and Mario Cardoso : O movimento dos Capitaes e o 25 de Abril Moraes, Lisboa 1974 and the documents printed there.
3) Details see in : L.Pereira Gil : Novembro 25, anatomia de um golpe. Editus, Lisboa 1976 and Avelino Rodrigues, Cesario Borga, Mario Cardoso : Portugal depois de Abril, Lisboa 1976 ; shorter in German by the Author : Die portugiesische Demokratie in der Bewährung, Europa Archiv, Folge 15, 1976 p.487-496.
4) cf.Rodrigues, Borga, Cardoso as in Note 2, p.170 for indications of communist antecedents of Vasco Gonçalves.
5) For details see the important book of José Gomes Mota, A resistencia, Edicoes Jornal Expresso, Lisboa, 1976 p.32 ff giving names and positions of pro-Communist officers. This book is the first inside report of an officer who collaborated with the "nine".
6) see Gomes Mota as above note 5, p.99 giving other officer's names.
7) Document printed in Gomes Mota, as above note 5,p.121 also details of its history.
8) PCP 12,53% of voices ; other left groups : MPD 4,12% ; 7 small groups of the extreme left : 4,53% - against this : PS 37,87% ; PPD 26,38%; CDS 7,65% ; total : 71,6%.
9) The escalation of violent events in Oct. and Nov.cf.Gomes Mota as note 5 : p.166 ff.
10) cf Gomes Mota as above p.176 ff
11) cf Gomes Mota as above p.190, and L.Pereira Gil as note 3, p.205 ff and documents.
12) results : PS 34,97% ; PPD 24,02% ; CDS 15,9% ; PCP 14,56% - this time the MDP did not participate ; extreme left : lo groups together 5,74%
13) Other candidates were : Carvalho 16,52% ; Pato (PCP) 7,58% ; Pinheiro de Azevedo 14,36% ; Eanes obtained 61,54%
14) Numbers according to :Eugenio Rosa, A economia portuguesa em numeros, Lisboa 1975 and blasco Hugo Fernandes, Portugal atraves de alguns numeros, Lisboa 1976 4. ed. completed by : A.Rebelo de Sousa, Analise da conjuntura economica in "Tempo" (Lisboa) 24/6/1976 and Salgado Zenha in "Jornal novo" (Lisboa) 25/6/1976. "A Luta" (Lisboa) 12/9/75 p.6
15) cf the Author : Spain in Transition, Washington Papers no.18 and 19 : N° 18 p.21 ff.
16) Details in the brilliant book of Manuel Fernandez Areal : la libertad de prensa en Espana 1938-71, Cuadernos para el dialogo, Madrid 1971.

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17) cf.Julen Agirre : Operacion Ogro, como y por qué ejecutamos a Carrero Blanco, Handaye and Paris 1974.
18) The author was Arias Navarro, but the law had been reduced to little significance by the Cortes cf. the author : Spanien vor dem Ende des Franco Regimes , Europa Archiv 19/1975 p.600 ff
19) A collection of documents of the UMD was published anonymously "by a group of citizens" in Feb.1976 under the title : Union Democratica Militar, los militares y la lucha por la democracia.
20) For details see : Cambio 16 (Madrid) 3-9/5/1976 p.8 ff "Arias para todo".
21) see his long declaration to the press agency efe as printed in all Spanish papers of 24/10/1976.
22) cf. "Opinion" (Madrid) 6-12/11/1976 p.8 f, speaks even of a pact between government and opposition intended to avoid excessive tensions.
23) These dangers became evident at the occasion of a recent strike of bus workers in Madrid lasting from Oct.28 to Nov.3, 1976. cf. "Opinion" as above p.17.

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THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR AND THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

by

Walid Kazziha.

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THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR AND THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

by

Walid Kazziha.

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This paper is the second part of a research on 'The Political and Ideological Impact of the Palestinian Resistance Movement on the Arab World Since 1967' conducted by Walid Kazziha for the IAI

The eruption of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975, had been described by observers of the Arab scene as a conflict between the Muslim left and the Christian right, a sectarian and socio-economic conflict. Some viewed the confrontation as one between pan-Arabism and Lebanese nationalism; in other words an ideological confrontation. Still, others laid emphasis on the politico-ethnic aspect of the conflict and saw it as one between the Lebanese and "foreigners" represented by the Palestinians. Some even entertained the idea of a clash between Soviet and American interests in the area.

There is some truth in most of these interpretations, however, unless some effort is made to analyse the different components of the Lebanese crisis, a very confusing and misleading image of the situation might arise. This is a tentative attempt to study the recent violent upsurge in Lebanon in the light of the accumulative effects of a number of changes which had taken place in Lebanese society and led to rendering the so-called "Lebanese formula" redundant and obsolete.

"The Lebanese Formula"

Since 1943, the ruling class in Lebanon including a reasonable segment of intellectuals and scholars had prided themselves with the fact that Lebanon had moved a long way towards modernization without resort to radical changes. The "Lebanese Formula" better known as the 'National Pact' had often been referred to as the corner-stone of Lebanon's political stability and the driving force of Lebanese progress.

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"The slow gains accomplished, step by step, in cultural, economic, and political spheres are the results of stable political institutions and of a formula for government based on conciliation and consensus." (1)

In effect the National Pact was a communal compromise between the Christians, more specifically the Maronite community leaders, basically isolationists with strong pro-Western sympathies, and the Muslims, especially the Sunni pan-Arab leadership to recognize a fully independent Lebanon with Arab attachments. The first president of the Republic after independence and one of the architects of the Pact expressed the essence of the compromise by saying:

> "Lebanon wants its complete independence within its present boundaries; and we want, on this basis, to co-operate with the Arab States to the greatest possible extent." (2)

What these words failed to reveal was the fact that, apart from being a formula for co-operation and co-existence between the two major religious communities in Lebanon, the National Pact was also an expression of the social and economic forces dominant in Lebanese society at the time.

It is generally accepted that the Lebanese economy is an economy of services, whereby this particular sector forms over 68% of the G.D.P. Traditionally, the merchants of Beirut and the coastal towns, predominantly Sunnis, had been closely associated with the Arab hinterland. Sunni merchants and town notables had been instrumental, since independence, in expanding Lebanon's trade and business links to the rest of the Arab countries especially Syria, Iraq, and Jordan and since the oil bonanza to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Many of them through intermarriage, had developed social and economic ties with the leading families of Damascus and Aleppo. More recently, a large number of Muslim young men had moved east to find employment in Saudi

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Arabia and the Gulf, while over 60% of Lebanon's exports found its way to Arab markets. The Maronite businessmen and merchants, on the other hand, had close relationships with the West. They imported goods from the West and through their Sunni contacts sold it to other Arabs. Many of them were able financiers who made use of the inflow of oil money and managed to develop Beirut as the financial center of the Middle East.

The National Pact put paid to the marriage between the two business communities in Lebanon.

Prelude to 1975

From 1943 to 1975, Lebanon witnessed the growth of new social and political forces which eventually threatened the whole fabric of society and the system of government established in the 1940's. One major development had been the numerical increase in the size of the Shi'i community to a point where it became the largest single sect (3). In itself this would have posed no serious problems. It was only when a growing number of educated Shi'is became dissatisfied with the system and large numbers of poorer Shi'is moved to the towns, particularly Beirut, that a sharp social and political problem gradually emerged. Neither the Pact with its limitations on the proportion of Shi'is employed in government administration nor the expansion of the services economy were able to absorb this growing number of less-to-do Shi'is. Professor Salem admitted that the Shi'is in South Lebanon were the least to benefit from economic prosperity (4).
Many of them moved at different intervals during the 50's and 60's to the suburbs of Beirut in search of employment on the fringes of the services sector and were hardly able to make ends meet.

In a survey carried out by a team from the Lebanese daily al-Nabar

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to investigate the social conditions of the Shi'i quarters around Beirut, which had been involved in the heaviest rounds of fighting and which were often referred to in the international press as the "belt of misery", the following observations were made:

1- In al-Shiyyah quarter, the majority of the inhabitants suffered from a high rate of unemployment and under-nourishment. The average number of people living in one room was ten. On the other hand, Ain al-Rummana quarter, inhabited by a majority of Maronites and separated from al-Shiyyah by an eight meter wide road had an average of seven persons living in one house. Most of its inhabitants had employment in some 2000 commercial firms and 600 small industries (5).

2- Al-Nab'a quarter, another shi'i slum area had a population of 100,000 inhabitants before it was overrun by the phalange forces last summer. The majority of them, some 80%, were landless peasants who emigrated from South Lebanon. "13% of the families of al-Nab'a live in one room, and 20% of these rooms accommodate approximately 10 persons." According to the only medical doctor in the area the inhabitants suffered continuously from illness caused by hunger and cold. "A large percentage of the children are unable to walk before the age of five" while 90% of the women were anemic and lacked calcium (6).

3- Al-Maslakh and Karintina were undoubtedly the most deprived areas around Beirut. Immediately after they were occupied by the phalange forces in late 1975, they were levelled to the ground and the Maronite monastic order claimed the ownership of the land. Eighty five percent of the inhabitants lived in tin huts which on average accommodated eight to fourteen persons each. The two quarters had no running water or electricity and practically no educational facilities (7).

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The Shi'i emigration to Beirut and the depressing social and economic conditions under which they lived presented the radical movements with the ideal grounds for recruiting an increasing number of political supporters. As a result, a deprived religious group in the economic and social sense was transformed into a politically active and militant community. A leading sheikh described the emergence of an armed militia among the shi'is in the following words:

> "The movement emerged as a result of the suffering of the people who were living under the worst conditions of corruption and a minimum standard of a decent life.
>
> On top of this, our people in South Lebanon were continuously threatened in their existence by Israeli aggression. On the other hand, our government's policy was one of neither defending the South nor developing it economically. Consequently a belt of poverty was created around Beirut. It included a group of people who were emigrants from the Beq'a and South searching for means of livelihood."

When asked where his followers were trained, the following discussion ensued:

> "Wherever there is deprivation.
>
> In Beirut?
>
> Wherever the deprived exist we have training camps.
>
> Where do you get arms from?
>
> Our sons deprive even their own children from food to buy arms.
>
> And trainers?

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We coordinate with the Palestinian Resistance and this is no secret. In addition we have some retired army personnel who sympathize with us." (8)

A qualified observer of the Lebanese scene summed up the conditions around Beirut in the following words:

"Six hundred thousand people are crowded into the 'belt of misery' which strangles Beirut and her suburbs. In the financial metropolis of the Middle East,where banks crumble under the weight of univested cash liquidity, more than one third of the population subsists on the brink of famine. The mortality rate there is two to three times the national average. Low paid workers and the unemployed alike find it difficult to feed themselves due to exploding prices. Decent housing is nearly out of reach as rents have tripled in two years due to real estate speculation. For their children, schooling and medical care are virtually out of reach." (9)

The Palestinians

The Palestinian presence in Lebanon is estimated at 350,000, of whom some 90,000 live in refugee camps. Before 1967, the Palestinians did not carry any significant political weight in Lebanon. As a matter of fact a sergeant in the Deuxieme Bureau (army intelligence) was often able, according to the widely used phrase among the inhabitants of the camps" to close the whole camp "by his sheer arrival at the site. Palestinians were aware of the old days when lieutenant Joseph Kilani, incidentally a Maronite, of the Deuxieme Bureau would without

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inhibitions humiliate "the biggest head" in any of the refugee camps and arrest any of its inhabitants. After 1967, the situation radically changed.

In the first instance after the June War, the Arabs viewed with great admiration the emergence of the Resistance Movement and held it as a symbol of Arab defiance against Israel and the U.S. The Arab regimes defeated and discredited competed among each other to win its blessings. In such an atmosphere of euphoria it was hardly conceivable that any of the Arab governments would try and emasculate the new movement. Soon enough with the influx of armed Palestinians into Lebanon, especially after September 1970, a dual power situation evolved. Whereas the Jordanian regime was successful in reasserting its territorial sovereignty, the Lebanese government failed to do so. In 1969, the Lebanese regime made an attempt to contain the Resistance Movement by force, but when this failed a compromise was reached. Under the auspices of Nasir, an agreement was concluded in Cairo by which the Palestinians extracted "formal recognition of their autonomous presence in the country and of their right to engage in operations from Lebanese territory subject to the principle of 'coordination' with the government" (10). In April 1973, under the pretext of putting an end to Palestinian excesses, the Lebanese army received instructions from President Franjieh to launch a coordinated attack against the Resistance's strongholds in the midst of the Muslim quarters in Beirut". The army's operation ended in a miserable failure, and the Palestinians in Lebanon once more consolidated their position through reaffirming the Cairo Agreement.

One major consequence of the event was the realization on the part of the Maronites that without developing their own military strength, there was little prospect for them to regain their political supremacy.

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Another was a growing awareness among the Palestinians and their Muslim supporters that the army belonged to one group of Lebanese, namely the Christians, rather than to the nation as a whole. No such vigilance was ever exercised by the Lebanese army when the Shi'is in the South and Lebanese sovereignty were threatened by Israel. Both parties, the Maronites on the one hand and the Palestinian-Muslim coalition on the other seemed to work in a direction which had the ultimate result of undermining the authority of the central government. In the meantime, the more radical forces in Lebanon appeared to take advantage of the situation by aligning themselves with the Resistance Movement and opting for a programme of political and social reform based on an entirely new formula.

The Left

Until very recently, the left in Lebanon has had very little impact on the development of political and social events in the country. The communist party founded in the 30's remained for decades a marginal political force unable to command any significant following except among a minority of workers and a small number of intellectuals and students. Its appeal to the Lebanese masses had been negligible due to the adoption of a strategy which often emphasised Soviet interests in the region to the exclusion of the national concerns of the peoples of the area. Undoubtedly the fact that the political and economic organization of Lebanon was based on confessional grounds tended to militate against a purely secular movement. During the 50's and 60's, a new force emerged in the area operating under the banner of Nasirism and Baathism. The new movement while giving the cause of Arab unity paramount importance preached the idea of social justice and economic equality. However, with the failure of the first experiment in Arab

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unity, following Syria's recession from the UAR in 1961, radical Arab nationalists and communists began to focus their attention on the internal social and economic conditions in each Arab country. Consequently splits began to take place and new inward-looking political groups emerged seeking the achievement of social and economic transformation in their own societies. By 1965, the movement of Arab nationalism in Lebanon had given birth to a number of left wing organizations which together with the communist party and Junblat's Progressive Socialist Party formed a political front advocating mild political and social reforms. A keen interest in the welfare of the workers and small peasants was developed and from the mid-sixties onward the left in Lebanon did not lose any opportunity to champion the cause of the lower classes. Mass rallies were regularly held in support of the small farmers to market their produce at more reasonable prices than the ones offered by the merchants who had a monopoly over agricultural exports. Very often security forces were called upon to intervene in breaking the strikes in factories around Beirut. Young radicals fought side by side with the workers in the tobacco industry as the latter barricaded themselves in the premises of the company. Students were similarly mobilized in the Lebanese, American and Arab universities in Beirut in support of trade union demands. The most serious incident took place in late February 1975, when the left led the fishermen in Beirut, Saida and Tripoli in a series of demonstrations against a newly established company with wide fishing rights owned by ex-president Shamoun. Clashes between the army and protesters at the end of a two-week general strike in Saida culminated in the death of some 24 persons, including leftist leader and former parliamentary deputy Maruf Saad. The left blamed the authorities for the incident (12).

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The involvement of the left-wing organizations in trade union disputes and demands won them the following they had been yearning for for years Membership in these organizations rapidly increased and new cadres were formed in different parts of the country most notably in the coastal towns, the south, the Baqa'a valley, the Shi'i quarters around Beirut and the mountain villages south of the Beirut-Damascus highway. Some of the organizations,particularly the Communist Party and the Organization of Communist Action managed to penetrate into a number of Greek Orthodox villages. In the meantime, the remnants of the Nasirite movement regrouped themselves into three active organizations most important among them, the Marabitun, headed by Ibrahim Qulailat. It commanded the loyalty of a sizeable segment of the Sunni middle classes in Saida and Beirut. The Naserites made a common cause with the left on the basis of their antagonism to the Lebanese formula and their support for the Palestinian Resistance.

From 1965 to 1970, a new bloc in Lebanese politics had emerged, the Progressive Bloc. It represented a coalition between the left with its growing popular base among the lower Muslim classes and the Nasirites and Baathists representing the Sunni middle classes. The role of Kamal Junblat in this coalition was unique compared to other Lebanese Zaims. While maintaining his traditional power base among the Druzes, he was able to extend his political appeal to the poorer Muslim classes by sponsoring the demands of the deprived and championing the cause of the Palestinians in Lebanon. Junblat became the spokesman of the left, its patron and leader. Once the Progressive Bloc appeared on the political scene it gradually acquired teeth through its close association with the Palestinina Resistance Movement.

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The Progressive Bloc plus the Resistance Movement

Lebanon entered the seventies with an explosive situation which eventually disrupted the whole fabric of society. The Lebanese Formula and the mystical optimism which had been woven around it proved to be so fragile to the extent that the very political and economic existence of the country appeared to be rapidly disintegrating. Even as late as 1973, the ruling class in Lebanon as well as some scholars and intellectuals continued to underestimate the impact of the new forces of change. Professor Salem wrote:

> "Radicals often disagree on policy matters and lack sufficient organization on party lines to pose a serious danger to the prevailing political order" (13).

It was during that same year that the radical movement in Lebanon cemented its links with the Palestinian Resistance as the latter fought successfully to repel the first serious onslaught of the Lebanese regime against it. After each encounter with the Lebanese government and the Christian militia, the new forces of change; namely the Progressive Bloc and the Resistance Movement found additional grounds for maintaining a common front against their opponents. Closer links were formed on every level. The Shi'is, who in the first instance blamed the Palestinians for Israeli reprisals in the South, soon realized that abandoned by the central government in Beirut they had no one to turn to except the armed Palestinians who lived among them in the villages and the nearby refugee camps. After a period of hostility, friendly relationships were forged between the two communities, and the Shi'i lower classes turned to the Palestinian organizations for arms and military training. Soon enough, the radical segment of the Palestinian Resistance actively adopted the political and economic demands

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of the Shi'i community. In return the Shi'i masses moved hand in hand with the left to provide a Lebanese front for the protection of the Palestinian military and political presence in Lebanon. Such a relationship was further consolidated by the organizational arrangements made between the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese patriotic and progressive parties. The pro-Iraqi faction of the Baath Party coordinated its activities with the Arab Liberation Front, while the pro-Syrian faction of the Baath cooperated with the Syrian sponsored al-Sa'iqa Organization. Similarly the organization of Communist Action devoted much of its energies in support of the Palestinian Democratic Front and jointly published the weekly al-Hurriyya, while the PELP headed by George Habash was most instrumental in founding the Arab Labour Party. The Communist Party, the Progressive Socialist Party and the Naserite organizations formed a front in support of Fateh. Thus no matter how hard an attempt was made, especially by Fateh, to separate the internal crisis of Lebanese society from the Palestinian question the two had become the inextricable components of the same problem. The mechanism of the situation was quite simple. Once the Lebanese order posed against the Resistance, the Lebanese progressive forces were immediately alerted and rallied to the support of the Palestinians. On the other hand, whenever the Lebanese regime attempted to suppress the radical movement, the Palestinian Resistance came to its aid and viewed such a move as a preliminary step towards the isolation and final liquidation of the armed presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon.

The Maronite Front

The Lebanese ruling class and the Maronite community were ultimately faced with one of two choices; either to sit back and watch

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their position being gradually eroded or confront their opponents both Lebanese and Palestinians at one and the same time. It would appear that a combination of external and internal political and military factors made the latter option sometime around the beginning of 1975 more plausible. The first serious armed clash which trigered off a series of violent rounds took place on April 13, 1975, when a group of Palestinians returning to Tel al-Zaatar refugee camp from a political ralley were ambushed by the Phalange militia in Ain al-Rummana.

The Maronite community had since independence gained a predominant position in the political and economic life of the country. At the head of the Lebanese political hierarchy stood a Maronite president with a network of well-established members of his own community placed in positions of power. First among them was the commander of the army and the top ranking officers. According to a study published by al-Amal, the organ of the Phalange Party, Maronite officers formed 36% instead of the 28% allotted to their community in the Lebanese officers corsp (14). Furthermore, the system of political favouritism allowed the president to appoint his close followers to the higher echelons of the civil administration and even create new posts for them when such posts were not available. President Franjieh, throughout his term of office, did not refrain from exploiting this advantage to the point of alienating even some members of his own family including his brother Abdel Hamid Franjieh. Economically, the Christian community and more specifically the Maronites as a whole being the largest single Christian sect, benefited most from an economy dominated by the financial and services sector. According to Professor Sayigh out of a "sample of 207 enterpreneurial businessmen, only one sixth were Muslims, ... " In addition "The early Christian dominance of the trade

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and finance sectors of the economy helped to maintain the upward mobility of the Christian petty bourgeoisie ... In Beirut, the Christian petty bourgeoisie was demonstrably larger and better off than its Muslim counterpart..."(15).

In the agricultural sector political and economic developments since the midnineteenth century in Mount Lebanon "stimulated a growth of peasant proprietorship" among the Christian farmers, thus weakening the hold of the feudal landlords. On the other hand, such a process of social and economic transformation "was impossible in the predominantly Shi'ite Muslim region cut off geographically and culturally from the educational and commercial revolution in Beirut" (16). In Industry the Christians tended to be the proprietors of the larger factories which employed cheap Muslim, Syrian and Palestinian labour. In the industrial region around the famous Tel al-Zaatar camp in north-east Beirut, the scene of the bloodiest battles that took place in the civil war, was located 29% of the factories of Lebanon with a capital forming 23% of the total industrial capital. In this same region were employed 22% of Lebanon's workers most of whom were drawn from the nearby Shi'i quarter al-Nab'a and the Palestinian camps of Jisr al-Pasha and Tel al-Zaatar (17). The owners of the factories included such well-known Christian bourgeois families as Thabet, Tutanji, Huweik, Fulayfel, 'Aql, Faddul and 'Usayli together with a few well-to-do Sunni families.

The Christian social pyramid emerged with a base confined to a wide petty bourgeois class and independent cultivators. The poorer classes of Lebanon including the workers, and the small and landless peasants formed the base of the Muslim social pyramid. But this was not all, the Christian social structure was historically reinforced by the evolution of an ideology which rested on the concept of a compact community encouraged by the Maronite church under the hegemony of

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leading families and more recently acquired a 'populist' appeal among the independent Christian farmers. According to Albert Hourani "In a sense, the phalanges of to-day can be seen as heirs of this (latter) tradition" (18). This ideology did not only provide the Maronites with a self-image, but also determined their perception of the others; namely the Muslims:

> "The Maronite common man felt very different from the Moslim. He never did like him. He seemed to tollerate him; but in fact he did not tollerate him as much as he ignored him. And he could ignore him as long as this Moslem did not threaten to challenge his factual, or imaginary position of power" (19).

The Muslims, on the other hand, had traditionally been attached to a pan-Arab ideology. Their commitments had often been made to Arab movements and governments outside Lebanon's borders. Thus an ideological mosaic had emerged among the Muslims extending from moderate forms of pan-Arabism to extreme brands of Marxism-leninism.

As the Palestinian Resistance began to entrench itself in Lebanon, the Maronites pinned their hopes on the intervention of the army to put a limit to it. In 1973, such hopes in the Lebanese army disappeared in thin air. On the one hand, the army did not prove to be a match to the Palestinians and on the other, signs of dissension appeared among its rank and file and finally led to its disintegration. At that point, the Phalange Party acting as the spearhead of the Maronite community and representing the bulk of the Maronite petty bourgeoisie moved to face the challenge which in effect threatened the supremacy of their community. Bashir Jumayyil, the military leader of the Phalange dated the confrontation between the party militia and the Palestinians to

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1970 in Kahhale east of Beirut. Since then the party began to establish training camps for the purpose of 'self-defence' but by April 1975, Jumayyil claimed that his men were using heavy arms (20).

The Confrontation

In 1975, the two competing blocs posed against each other for a final showdown: the radicals versus the conservative forces who opted for the status quo; the Muslim poor against the petty bourgeois and rich Christians; the advocates of pan-Arabism against Lebanese particularism. and the Palestinians and their leftwing allies in opposition to the Maronite Front. The formers advocated two main demands; the complete freedom of the Resistance Movement to operate from Lebanese territory and the introduction of social and political reforms which would redress the balance between the different sectarian groups. The latters feeling threatened by these two demands both on the socio-economic and political levels claimed that international communism was conspiring against Lebanon's independence. The leader of the Phalange Party and the Maronite leaders including the President of the Republic accused Junblat and the Palestinian Resistance of being the agents of international communism and Zionism.

The fighting in Lebanon passed into three main phases. The first phase from April 1975 until the end of the year was characterized by a war of positions. The dominant feature of the conflict was the continuous sporadic shelling of Muslim border-line areas by the Christian forces and vice versa. During that time, fighting broke out in Beirut along the Shiyyah-Ain al-Rummana axis and in the luxury seaside hotels district. Another front was opened in the north between Tripoli and Zghorta, Franjieh's home-town. On the part of Fateh there was some serious hesitation from entering a full-fledged battle against the

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Maronite Front. This, however, did not prevent the smaller radical Palestinian organizations from joining hands with the forces of the Progressive Bloc.

The second phase of the fighting began early in January when a coordinated offensive was launched by the Maronite forces and showed clear signs of moving towards the partitioning of the country. The Christian side systematically moved to wipe out the Palestinian and Shi'i enclaves in their midst. First to go was the small refugee camp of Dubay near Jounish. It was followed by the massacre of large number of Shi'is and Palestinians in the Maslakh and Karantina quarters. Simultaneously, a blockade was imposed on the Tel al-Zaatar and Jusral-Pasha refugee camps. This ushered in a new stage in the development of the fighting, in which Fateh was drawn into the battle in full force so as to protect some 16,000 Palestinians and 54,000 Shi'is in and around the Tel al-Zaatar area. On January 18, the Lebanese Sunni Prime Minister resigned in objection to the deployment of the air force against the Palestinian forces attacking the Christian town of Damour south of Beirut. On the same day, the Phalange forces took full control of Karantina, and Arafat addressing the Arab Ambassadors in Beirut said that, "he could no longer be held responsible for the ensueing conduct of Palestinian forces under his command", while Radio Israel reported that PLA troop moved into Lebanon across its borders with Syria. Two days later, the town of Damour and Sadiyyat fell into the hands of the left-wing forces and the PLA (21). At this point the balance seemed to tilt in favour of the progressive forces. However, the Syrians immediately took the initiative and tried to find ways of creating a stalemate between the warring camps and prevented the formal partition of the country.

Consequently, the third phase in the development of the civil war

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in Lebanon ensued. It was dominated by the growing military role played by the Syrians and the eventual Arabization of the Lebanese crisis. At this new level of the conflict, the local forces,Lebanese and Palestinian were unable to determine the course of events. The conflict was now very much under the control of Syria and to a lesser extent Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Libya.

The Syrian Position

For a while the Syrian role in Lebanon appeared to be extremely enigmatic. On the one hand, when the Maronite forces were gaining substantial grounds in the fighting, Damascus allowed the PLA to enter into Lebanon and check their advance. This was quite understandable in view of the fact that Syria had consistently supported the PLO since it appeared on the Arab political and military scene. However, what was puzzling was the gradual shift in the Syrian attitude once the Progressive forces joined by a dissident segment of the Lebanese army under the leadership of Leutenant Ahmad al-Khatib moved to the offensive in violation of a Syrian sponsored ceasefire. At this point, the Syrian army intervened in the South, East and North, thus pinning down a large part of the progressive forces to defensive positions and allowed the forces of the Maronite Front not only to storm Tel al-Zaatar camp after a long siede, but to regain most of the positions they had lost north of Jounieh and in the mountain. The intransigence of the Resistance Movement and its radical allies was further checked by the Syrian assault on their positions in Hammana and Bhamdoun and the encirclement of Alley where the mountain headquarters of the Progressive-Palestinian forces was located. By the time the Arab leaders were ready to go to the Ruyadh mini-summit, the PLO and its Lebanese allies had militarily been cut down to size.

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There were a number of factors which led to the development of such a situation. One important factor was the sudden growth of the military capabilities of the Progressive Bloc, when towards the end of January, al-Khatib and a group of Muslim officers in the Beqa'a and Akkar districts deserted to the side of the left and formed the Lebanese Arab Army. A couple of weeks later it was revealed that PLA troops of the Ain-Jalut unit had been transferred from Egypt to Lebanon. The latter move was a clear indication that Egypt together with some other Arab countries especially Iraq were ready to offer the PLO substantial military assistance to counter the military and political monopoly which Syria sought to exercise over the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese crisis. Furthermore Egypt pledged its full support to the PLO and called for an Arab summit to resolve the conflict, while Sadat in an interview with the Saudi daily, Ukaz of February 21, warned the Palestinians from accepting a Syrian tutelage over them. Simultaneously, the Progressive Bloc as well as the Muslim traditional leadership were highly dissatisfied with the terms of the Syrian-sponsored constitutional declaration made by Franjieh in mid-February. All these factors combined tended to encourage the Progressive forces towards the end of February to violate the ceasefire and launch an offensive against the Maronite forces. By March 13, al-Khatib's troops had occupied all army garrisons in the south, three in the north and several in Beirut; in effect three quarters of all army positions. Ten days later, the Progressive forces dislodged the Phalange from the seaside hotels in Beirut, and on March 25, Franjieh fled the presidential palace in Baabda and took refuge in the Maronite district. The leftist forces then advanced on the Christian strongholds in Mount Lebanon in an attempt to penetrate into the heart of the Maronite area. The Syrians, however, were in no mood to tolerate

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the gradual loss of their control over the situation to the Progressive camp and other Arab governments.

Signs of Syrian dissatisfaction with the PLO had already appeared earlier in the year when Arafat refused to yield to Syrian pressure exercised upon him to enter as a junior partner in an alliance with Syria and Jordan. A spokesman of the PLO announced that his organization had little to gain from Syria's attempt to revive a PLO presence in Jordan in return for that alliance (22).

On February 22, Abu Ayad, the second man in Fateh in an interview with the Financial Times described the leaders of the pro-Syrians Saiqa Organization as "Syrian employees-not-Palestinian leaders."

As the relationship between the Syrian regime and the Progressive Bloc continued to deteriorate, the Syrians moved to take a more aggressive stand. Early in April, Syrian troops crossed into Lebanon and occupied the border post of al-Masnaa and Disarmed al-Khatib's troops who held the post since February. A Syrian official statement issued on April 1, warned Junblat and his left-wing supporters that Syria would hold them "responsible before history for the results of their conduct, particularly for partition, which could be considered the greatest crime committed against the Arab nation and against Lebanon and its people" (23).

In mid-April a new attempt was made to reconcile the differences between the PLO and the Syrian government, but failed to produce any positive results. In the meantime fighting continued to escalate in Lebanon. Towards the end of May, coordinated military moves between the Syrians and the Maronite forces on all fronts were more than obvious. And by the first week of June, the Syrians had blockaded all roads leading to the Muslim quarter of Beirut with the exception of the southern route.

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Encouraged by the turn of events the Phalange forces again laid siege to Tel-al-Zaatar camp. The camp fell in late August after thirty five days of a heroic and long struggle. Apart from holding on to some positions in the mountain, the Progressive Bloc seemed to be bent on withdrawing its forces to the main towns on the coast notably Beirut, Saida, Tyre and Tripoli. Militarily, a final showdown with the Syrians was expected to take place in the towns. The Syrians, sensing the great difficulty and perhaps the huge cost of getting involved in an urban guerilla warfare, preferred to mark time, and opted for a political solution which eventually yielded the same results. The summit meeting in Riyadh held on October 16, offered them this opportunity.

It would seem that the Syrian position in Lebanon had been largely determined by two major considerations stemming from Syrian national interest. Firstly, the Syrian policy-maker was determined not to allow the situation in Lebanon to drift into the actual partitioning of the country into a separate Muslim and a Christian state. Secondly, Syria was keen, once and for all, to control the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and establish its hegemony over a region extending to Beirut and possibly Amman.

From a Syrian point of view, a partitioned Lebanon would have partly meant the emergence of a political entity on Syria's borders which was Muslim-Palestinian, radical and certainly more inclined towards a continuous confrontation with Israel. Such a situation would have left the initiative of war and peace in the region in the hands of the new Lebanese state and Israel. It would have also posed a number of critical questions to the Syrian policy-maker for which he had to find answers. What would the Syrian position have been if in

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the course of the confrontation Israel decided to occupy southern Lebanon? In such a case Syria's alternatives would have been either to face the Israelis or sit quietly and lose face. In any case, the initiative would have entirely been left outside Syria's political will. At the same time the emergence of a purely Christian state in Mount Lebanon would have carried with it, in the long run, the potential of another Israel being created in the region. Close cooperation and coordination might then have ensued between the Christian and Jewish states, and Syria's future and its existence might then have been endangered. With such disasterous prospects in mind, the Syrians moved on two occasions to prevent the virtual partitioning of Lebanon. The first time was in January 1976, when the Maronite forces appeared to gain the upper hand in the fighting, and the second time was in April after the Progressive Bloc had launched its offensive. In the first instance, the foreign minister of Syria threatened that if need be his government would take over Lebanon. In the second instance, Syria went beyond more threats to deploy its own armed forces against those of the Palestinian Resistance and the Progressive Bloc. In Riyadh, Asad was at pains to point out to other Arab heads of states that Syria "backed the Palestinians in Lebanon when they faced liquidation. We stood against them when it became a question of partition" (24).

The ideal situation for the Syrians in Lebanon was that of redressing the balance between the two fighting camps, and bring about a compromise which would preserve the unity of the country. Within this context, Syria kept the channels of negotiations open with the two competing parties and made every effort to achieve a settlement. The last of these efforts was the 17- point constitutional declaration which in essence, except for minor modifications, tended to revive the

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old sectarian system, but failed to satisfy the demands of the Progressive Bloc. However, as the Progressive forces continued to take an intransigent position, the Syrians stepped in. The moment then had arrived for an Arab summit, lest that other Arab countries might throw their military weight behind one faction or the other. It was rumoured at the time that Cairo was entertaining the thought of dispatching Egyptian troops to Lebanon.

Syria's initiatives in Lebanon were not only geared to preventing partition, but also sought to strengthen Syria's position in the region as a whole. For many years Syria had been closely cooperating with the PLO on the account of its own relationships with other Arab countries in the area,notably Jordan. It would seem that after the second Sinai agreement, the Syrian and Jordanian regimes found themselves in a position of relative isolation. Assad accused Kissinger of dividing the Arabs, while the Jordanian Prime Minister refused to support the Sinai agreement publicly. "Assad all but described Kissinger as Israel's foreign minister; Hussain warned me (Sheehan) of 'new disasters not far away' " (25). Both countries felt that a joint effort was needed and that a common front might lead to extracting better terms from the Americans in future negotiations. In December 1975, cooperation between the two regimes had reached a point of conducting joint military manoeuvers to test the Syrian defences against a simulated Israeli attack on Damascus. Some ten thousand Jordanian troops took part in the manoeuvers. Throughout 1976, visits were regularly exchanged between the two heads of states, and top ranking officials in both governments met often to work out joint military and political plans. In the meantime, Asad attempted to draw the PLO into his alliance with Husain but without much luck. He probably figured out

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that with a docile Palestinian partner on his side his hand would be strengthered in any future negotiations at Geneva. But time was still on his side, the American elections were to be held in early November and before that no peace initiative was expected. However, as time passed he began to stack his cards for a final count. The Syrian circle was completed in October 1976, a few weeks before the American elections. The Riyadh mini-summit held in mid-October and attended by Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon and the PLO did not only endorse the Syrian military campaign in Lebanon but went a step further. It provided an Arab political cover for Syria's action and pledged financial support for its military intervention in Lebanon under the guise of an "Arab deterrent force".

Other Arab Regimes Fall in Line

The Riyadh mini-summit satisfied in different ways other Arab regimes. In return for a Syrian free hand in Lebanon, Egypt had some important gains to make. Both Syria and the PLO were now in no position to accuse Egypt of betraying the 'Arab sacred cause' for its acceptance of the second Sinai agreement. At least internally, and as far as the Egyptian public opinion was concerned, Sadat emerged as the maker of peace in Lebanon and the saviour of the Palestinian people. Finally, with the prospect of a new peace initiative in the Middle East, Egypt preserved the Palestinian card at its disposal and the disposal of other Arab governments including Syria and Jordan. As for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the PLO in the last few years had become an embarrassement to such Arab governments. On the one hand, seeking to play the major role in Arab politics, Saudi Arabia found itself in a position which required from her to act as the champion of the Palestinian cause. At the same time, it recognized that an autonomous

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Palestinian radical movement might eventually revolutionize the whole situation in the region and open the door for communism to enter the Arab world. The left-wing outlook and the growing association of the Resistance Movement with the communists and radical forces in Lebanon led to a change of heart on the part of the Saudis. There were even some claims made by the Palestinian Rejection Front to the effect that Saudi Arabian and other Arabia oil producing countries were providing the Maronite Front with financial aid. What was more obvious was the fact that since the Syrian intervention began against the Progressive forces the Saudis conferred their blessings upon it. The Saudi minister of state was reported on March 26 to have said that his government "appreciated the efforts of the Syrian leaders to re-establish security in Lebanon" (26). It would seem that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had throughout the Lebanese crisis been interested in accomplishing two main objectives. Firstly, they were interested in curbing the revolutionary zeal of the Resistance Movement so as to render it more acquiescent to Arab pressure. This could have only been achieved by allowing Syria enough time as well as affording her political and perhaps financial support to contain the Resistance Movement. Secondly, both countries moved at the right moment to bring about an Arab concensus, especially between Egypt and Syria. Once the first objective was achieved i.e. containment, Riyadh was ready to receive the Arab heads of states in a mini-summit to achieved the second objective namely; an Arab disengagement in Lebanon. Out of all the Arab regimes only Libya and Iraq refused to endorse the agreement reached in Riyadh. Both countries had since the eruption of the civil war pledged their unyielding support to the Progressive forces, but their impact on the development of events in the area compared to that of Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt was marginal.

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The Super-Powers

A complete picture of the development of the Lebanese conflict and its resolution cannot be drawn without examining briefly the political position held by the two super-powers. To what extent were the Americans and the Russians involved in the crisis? Late in 1975, the French special envoy to Beirut, Couve de Merville found it difficult to comment on such a question, "because it is evidently difficult to define their game for the time being" (27). A year later it was still difficult to ascertain the level of their direct involvement, however, it was possible to make some reasonable suggestions concerning their political stands towards the development of events in the area. One question which was raised was this : in a conflict which dragged on for over eighteen months and in which all kinds of weapons were used including heavy artillery, tanks, rockets, etc... who provided this inexhaustible mine of ammunition? There were indications that some of it was bought on the international arms market, some was acquired from the Lebanese army as it disintegrated into small factions, certainly some Arab governments and Israel made their contributions to one side or the other, but to sustain such an inflow of arms and ammunition for such a long period of time required some sort of involvement by the super-powers. Some sources estimated that in the last year of fighting there was on average something like half a million dollar being expended daily in the form of firepower. Could the Arab governments collectively dispense with such an amount of ammunition without jeopardizing their own defences? But perhaps this is a question for the military expert to consider before a final conclusion can be reached. Politically, however, some answers might be discerned.

As the crisis unfolded, the U.S.A. gradually took a more sympathetic

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attitude towards the Syrian military intervention in Lebanon. At first when the PLA forces entered Lebanon on the side of the Progressive forces in early January 1976, a State Department spokesman warned that the U.S. was opposed to any outside intervention by any country including Syria and Israel (28). But towards the end of the same month, the U.S. commended Syria for its 'constructive role' in arranging a cease-fire between the two opposing forces (29). On March 30, and as the Syrian troops began to harrass the Progressive forces, the state Department maintained its opposition to foreign intervention, but again praised Syria's 'peace efforts' (30). At the same time, Dean Brown who arrived in Lebanon on a fact-finding mission adopted the Syrian stand on its opposition to partition. He stressed Washington's disapproval of any action which might lead to partition (31). Finally, three weeks later, a White House spokesman announced that President Ford had ended his opposition to outside military intervention and approved Syria's action in Lebanon (32). From then on the Syrian role in Lebanon continued to enjoy the blessings of the U.S.

Whether Syria had informed the U.S. of its intentions in Lebanon or not was questionable, but what was quite clear was that the Syrians had played consciously or unconsciously into the hands of the Americans. Nothing could have pleased the American and Israeli policy-makers more than the thought of facing in the future at the negotiating table a weakened and tamed Palestinian national movement, surviving under the suffocating wings of the Arab governments, and perhaps even represented by one of these governments, possibly Jordan.

Since 1972, the Russians had been finding it increasingly difficult to maintain a foothold in the area. Once Egypt was lost to the Americans, the Soviet Union tended to pin its hopes on Iraq, Libya, the PLO, and last but not least Syria. However, the Russian position was

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further eroded as a result of the conflicts which across among its Arab allies. Iraq and the PLO stood on one side in the Lebanese crisis while Syria joined the opposing camp and drifted into a policy of near collusion with the U.S. The Soviet Union, in an effort of rectify the situation exerted some pressure on the Syrians, but to no avail. The political spokesman of the PLO emphasized that the Soviet Union had throughout the crisis supported the Palestinian Resistance in every possible material, moral, and political way. Furthermore Soviet leaders adamantly opposed the military intervention of the Syrians in the Beqa'a valley early in June, and refused to issue at the end of Khaddam's visit to Moscow in the summer of 1976, a joint communique endorsing the Syrian moves. On June 9, Brezhnev addressed a letter to President Asad in which he expressed his strong objections to the Syrian action in Lebanon (33). At a later date, Asad complained to the Arab heads of states in Riyadh that "The Soviet Union now blame us for preventing the establishment of a leftist state in Lebanon" (34). At no point during the course of the conflict in Lebonon did the Resistance Movement complain of a shortage in Russian-made firearms or ammunition. This perhaps prompted the leaders of the Phalange Party to reiterate on almost every occasion their concern at what they believed to be a plot against Lebanon designed by international communism. In fact what the Russians were trying to do was to maintain their foothold in the region against what looked to them to be an American attempt to oust them.

Conclusion

The outcome of the civil war in Lebanon benefited at every level one side in the conflict to the exclusion of the other. On the international level the Russians seemed to suffer a serious set-back in the

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region as a whole and in Syria in particular. On the Arab level, the Arab regimes managed, perhaps for a long time to come, to impose their will on the Palestinian Resistance and its leftist allies. On the Lebanese level, the position of the Maronite Front and more notably the Phalange Party had been consolidated, while that of the Progressive Bloc was greatly undermined. Israel stood to gain from the erosion of the position of the left in Lebanon, the containment of the Resistance Movement, the growing influence of moderate Arab regimes seeking a peaceful settlement at the hands of the U.S., and the relative revival of American hegemony in the Middle East.

The tragic events which engulfed Lebanon for one year and a half do not make much sense unless an attempt is made to examine their repercussions on the evolution of a new, more stable system of government, and the achievement of an overwhole solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. There is no desire here to suggest that there was a conspiracy behind the crisis, although such a conclusion had not been excluded by the participants in the conflict. However, it is reasonable to assert that the recent events in the region prepared the grounds for two probable major developments.

1. The establishment of a new political order in Lebanon to replace the old system, which on at least two occasions in the modern history of the country, proved to be most fragile and inadequate. It is well-known that the new President of Lebanon, Elias Sarkis was one of Shehab's most faithful desciples. In 1970, he contested the presidency against Franjieh, but the latter won by a majority of one vote, and as a result political feudalism or the Zeims system of government made a come back to power. From 1958 to 1970, Shehabism represented a new trend in Lebanese politics. It was a serious attempt to displace the old power structure based on sectarianism by building up a strong

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central government and a tight internal security system.

> "Shehabism had tried to institute checks upon the operations of civil relations in order to make the state the sole political unit in the country. Its Deuxieme Bureau was supposed to displace the traditional Chieftains by taking over their role as the sole Za'im from whom state benefits would be obtained. In pursuit of this policy the Deuxieme Bureau promoted the rise in the Sunni areas of more or less popular leaderships who capitalised on their role in the 1958 civil war and who were outside the control of traditional leaders" (35).

Today Sarkis has a better chance than his predecessors Helou and Shehab to realize the Shehabist model. He comes to power as the saviour of the country after it had been torn apart by a devastating internal strife. He has the political, militarary and financial backing of the Arab governments which initiated the Riyadh agreement. His task is further facilitated by the fact that the civil war had discredited the traditional opponents of Shehabism, namely the old sectarian leaders. On the Muslim side a new political leadership has emerged, while on the Christian side the position of the Phalange Party has become predominant. In the future Lebanon might witness the gradual disappearence of such well-known figures as the As'ad, Salam, Yafi and even Shamoun and Franjieh. Instead the newly emerging regime might depend on the younger generation of Muslim and Christian leaders who made a name for themselves on the battle-field in the recent civil war. The gap between the new Muslim leadership and the Phalange might prove to be not as wide as had been first expected. Bashir Jumayyil, commander of

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the Phalange forces has recently stressed that Lebanon could never return to the old arrangement, "we do not want to revive the 1943 pact". He urged for the establishment of a new secular Lebanon with a strong central government. His brother, Amin, claimed that the Party had fought in essence against sectarianism, feudalism and those who regarded parts of Lebanon as their personal fiefs (36).

In the absence of a Palestinian military presence a compromise between the Progressive Bloc and the Phalange might be feasible, especially under a Shehabist form of government. But with the rise of "neo-Shehabism" Lebanon's 'sectarian democracy' would become the sacrifice. Instead, an Arabized Lebanon might emerge in which the state play a major political and stablizing role, similar to that played by central governments in other parts of the Arab world.

2. The Palestinian Resistance has undoubtedly suffered a serious military set-back. Its military presence in Lebanon, the last sanctuary for Palestinian armed struggle has been greatly undermined. Even its political existence has been placed at the mercy of Arab governments. Such a change in the fortunes of the Resistance Movement has eliminated an embarrassing challenge to the sovereignty and political interests of some Arab countries. Over and beyond this, the military decline of the Movement has removed the threat of radicalizing the political and social conditions of some Arab societies. The organic links between the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese left have accordingly been dismantled. Recognizing the facts of the new situation, a prominent leader of the Lebanese left in a joint meeting with the PLO said, "From now on we have to tackle the Lebanese issues ... As for the Resistance you should concentrate on the Cairo Agreement and its implementation" (37). In other words, the Progressive Bloc was

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absolving the Resistance Movement from its previous commitments to the left.

Arab governments appear to be under the impression that the year 1977 might witness a final settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict in Geneva. Awaiting such an eventuality the Palestinian Resistance is to remain within the confines drawn by the Arab regimes, and overbidding on the part of the PLO would not be tolerated. The solution envisaged for the Palestinians is that of a West Bank-Gaza state. This is the nearest one could translate the often-repeated formula made by Arab statesmen regarding 'the national rights of the Palestinians.' The Syrian-Arab military intervention in Lebanon brought home to the Palestians, under the present conditions of the Arab world, the impossibility of taking an independent stand from that of the Arab regimes. Accordingly, the political spokesman of the Resistance Movement declared at the UN, last November that his organization was willing to go to Geneva and accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (38).

However, while this looks to be the most likely path the Palestinians might follow, it is not yet certain whether other options have been entirely closed or not. After all, many observers believed in late 1970, after the collapse of the Resistance Movement in Amman, that for all intents and purposes the efforts of the Palestinian organizations had come to an end. Nevertheless, the Resistance Movement eventually managed to exploit the differences among the Arab countries and gradually succeeded in gaining a political and military foothold in Lebanon. While the Arab party seems to be well prepared to go to Geneva today, other parties are under no such pressure to do likewise. And even if a Geneva conference ultimately materializes, there is no guarantee that the Arab side would be able to extract the demands it

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has put forward; a Palestinian state and an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders.

The road to Geneva might prove to be too long and difficult. In the meantime, the Arab regimes cannot guarantee their own stability at home nor can they sustain a common front for ever. It for one reason or another inter-Arab conflict is again intensified, or if any of the front-line regimes undergoes a radical change, the Resistance Movement might once more be presented with a golden opportunity to revive itself politically and militarily. And this is no more speculation or wishful thinking. In a region such as the Arab world political and military variables often elude the sharp senses of the political analyst.

NOTES

1) E.A. Salem, Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London, 1973, p. 4.

2) As quoted in K.S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon, London, 1965, p. 187.

3) Since 1932, Lebanon has had no population census. It is, however, widely believed that the Shi'is form the largest single sect. It is estimated that together with their co-religionists, the Sunnis, they comprise some 60% of Lebanon's population.

4) Salem, p. 45.

5) Al-Nahar, July 8, 1975.

6) Ibid, July 9, 1975.

7) Ibid, July 10, 1975.

8) Ibid, August 22, 1976.

9) Eric Rouleau, Le Monde, September 20-25, 1975.

10) W. Quandt, F. Jabber, A.M. Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, University of California Press, 1973, p. 193.

11) Al-Hawadith, Beirut, October 24, 1975.

12) Current History, N. Howard, January 1976, p. 6.

13) Salem, p. 15.

14) Al-Amal, August 1, 1975, p. 5.

15) M. Johnson, Confessionalism and Individualism in Lebanon, Review of Middle East Studies I, London, 1975, p. 87.

16) Ibid, p. 88.

17) H. Mandis, Labour and Labourers in the Palestinian Camp: A Field-Study in Tel al-Zaatar Camp, (Arabic), Beirut, 1974, p. 25.

18) A. Hourani, Ideologies of the Mountain and The City, Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon, (Ed. Roger Owen), London, 1976, p. 37.

19) T. Khalaf, The Phalange and the Maronite Community: From Lebanonism to Marotinism, Essays ... p. 46.

20) Al-Nahar, August 22, 1975.

21) Arab Report and Record, issue no. 2, 16-31 January, 1976.

22) Al-Sayyad, Beirut, February 25, 1976.

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23) Arab Report and Record, issue no. 7, 1-15 April, 1976.

24) Events, no. 3, Beirut, November 5, 1976, p. 19.

25) E. R. F. Sheehan, How Kissinger Did It. Foreign Policy, Spring issue 1975, p. 65.

26) Arab Report and Record, issue no. 6, 16-31 March, 1976.

27) L'Orient-Le Jour, Beirut, November 25, 1975.

28) Arab Report and Record, issue no. 1, 1-15 January, 1976.

29) Ibid, issue no. 2, 16-31 January, 1976.

30) Ibid, issue no. 6, 16-31 March, 1976.

31) Ibid, issue no. 7, 1-15 April, 1976.

32) Ibid, issue no. 8, 16-30, April, 1976.

33) Tali'a, Cairo, October 1976, p. 62.

34) Events, p. 19.

35) A. Al-Azmeh, The Progressive Forces, Essays..., p. 63

36) Al-Sayyad, November 18, 1976.

37) Ibid, November 11, 1976.

38) Al-Hawadith, November 26, 1976.

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INFRA-BALKAN RELATIONS AND STABILITY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

by

Udo Steinbach.

Questo documento fa parte di un progetto di ricerca sui problemi del Mediterraneo, che l'Istituto Affari Internazionali conduce con l'aiuto finanziario della Fondazione Ford.

This working paper is part of a research project on the problems of the Mediterranean, conducted by the Istituto Affari Internazionali with the financial support of the Ford Foundation.

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IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

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INFRA-BALKAN RELATIONS AND STABILITY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

by

Udo Steinbach.

This conference is the last in a series of three organised within the framework of a three year research project on stability and development in the Mediterranean financed by the Ford Foundation.

The stability and security of the eastern Mediterranean are endangered by a number of real or potential conflicts on the land belt surrounding it. This is clear in the case of the Middle East conflict - attention is regularly called to the possibility of international involvement in the case of an acute conflict between Israel and the Arabs.

This is no less clear in the case of the Cyprus conflict, or the dispute between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean. The effect is different in the case of the Middle East conflict, in which global fronts between the Soviet Union on the one side and the USA on the other are reflected in the support for the regional conflict parties, from that of the Greek-Turkish conflict, where the effects are more indirect ; the weakening of the NATO would strengthen the position of the Soviet Union on different levels. This strengthening would lessen the preponderance of the West, on which, at present, the security of the Eastern Mediterranean depends, and would lead to a fragile balance of force, within which a greater conflict-potential would be present than is currently the case. (One should not overlook the fact that the present system is, nonetheless, so stable that it was able to bear the Cyprus conflict without any too great harm).

As well as the Middle East and the Greek-Turkish area, the Balkans are the third area, which is of great significance for the security and stability of the eastern Mediterranean. Before investigating the connection between Balkan policy and security in the eastern Mediterranean, one should make the following restrictions:

-Under Balkan countries, the following are intended : Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Greece and Turkey. The Greek-Turkish conflict will be excluded in so far as it is a Greek-Turkish concern.

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Only in as far as it effects the contacts and co-operation of the Balkan countries with one another will it be drawn in.

-The investigation will be restricted to the interaction between individual Balkan countries. Speculations concerning what might happen, for example, in the case of a Soviet intervention against one country or another (e.g.Rumania or Jugoslavia) or in the case of internal political changes in a country (especially in the event of Tito's death) are beyond the scope of the paper.

Preliminary Historical Remarks

The Balkans have never been a unified political sphere exerting great power in international politics. The history of the individual Balkan people's achievement of independence from the Ottoman Empire, from the beginning of the 19th century to the end of the First World War, prepared the national divisions which have, more or less, remained to this day. Controversial territorial or ethnic problems, such as the Macedonia or Epirus question or the respective minorities of Turkish, Greek, Albanian, Bulgarian or Rumanian descent which live in alien countries serve, even today, as reminders of the difficult process of state formation in the Balkans. Further developments in political orientation since the Second World War have complicated the picture : Greece and Turkey have joined NATO : Rumania and Bulgaria belong to the Warsaw Pact ; Jugoslavia is non-aligned ; and Albania has orientated herself towards the People's Republic of China. In view of this situation, one can only set limited expectations on inner Balkan relations.

"Balkan policy" in the sense of a mobilization of political and

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business links between Balkan countries experienced a revival first at the end of the 1960's. In spite of different motivation for each country, it was nonetheless a common concern to create a regional political area apart from membership of one of the two large blocks, in order to achieve a greater degree of independence in foreign policy within the respective block. Rumania, in particular, had an interest in assuring her aspirations of greater independence within the Soviet Block through institutionalized multilateral Balkan co-operation. The Greece of the military regime attempted to break out of her isolation through an intensification of her ties with the Balkan countries. Turkey's contacts with other Balkan countries also began to intensify towards the end of the 1960's. Behind the Turkish policy also stook the endeavour to balance out the growing pressure of contacts, in particular with the USA, through ties with the Balkan countries (and especially too in the Middle East).

Problems of Co-operation

The contacts of the Balkan countries with one another should be seen against the background of their ties with respective international major powers. What, then, are the conditions and problems of co-operation between the Balkan countries?

Co-operation in multilateral political and economic institutions like the European Community or the Arab League in the Middle East did not exist between the World Wars and is currently not in sight. Beside the above mentioned differences in international constellation, the following divisive factors should be mentioned :

1)Different economic structures : Trade takes place between the Eastern state enterprise countries on the one hand and countries based on the free enterprise system (Greece and Turkey) on the other side on a barter basis. In view of the relatively low level of complementarity of produce, possibilities for extending exchange are limited.

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2)Territorial animosities and ethnic problems. These are to a great extent remains from the domination of the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire and the Wars of Independence of the Balkan peoples, which occured under constant influence of the European powers, and in which, the Balkan countries attempted to annex as great an area as possible from the Ottoman Empire for themselves.

3)Open conflicts. The Cyprus conflict - even though partially falling under category (2) mentioned above - has an ambivalent effect: on the one hand, it led to positive impulses for an intensification of bilateral ties between Greece and Turkey with the other Balkan countries. On the other hand it has a negative effect on the multi-lateralization of Balkan ties.

To (1)

Certainly the extension of trade ties between state enterprise countries on the one hand and Turkey and Greece on the other, and the undertaking of joint technical-economic projects is an indication of the improvement of the climate in the Balkan region. The extent and nature of these ties will now be briefly shown, using Greece as an example.

In 1975, trade between Greece and Bulgaria had a value of 85 million dollars ; an expansion to 110 million dollars by 1979 is planned. Bulgaria obtains above all citrus fruits, olives, juices untreated skins, cotton, steel products, textiles, shoes and phosphate fertilizers from Greece. Reciprocally, Bulgaria supplies Greece with cattle, machines, electronic equipment etc. According to an agree-ment the extension of the railway and road systems are anticipated. Co-operation is of particular importance in the area of water supply and transport on the rivers which cross the border, the Evros,

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Strymon and Nestos. In this connection, the construction of a joint network for trade in electricity plays a special role. Further interests for both lands for co-operation are, from the Bulgarian side, assured access to the Aegean Sea (particularly via Salonika) and from the Greek side, a corresponding access to the Bulgarian harbours on the Danube.

Economic ties between Greece and Rumania have developed similarly: whereas in 1971 Greek imports from Rumania had a value of 13.2 million dollars and Greek exports to Rumania a value of 12.0 million dollars, a trade volume of 80.0 million dollars is aimed for in 1976, and in the next five years, this trade volume should be doubled. As in the case of other Balkan countries, a mixed government commission exists, which organises this trade exchange ; and a closer co-operation in the fields of machine construction, chemicals and electornics has been agreed upon.

Greece's quantatively greatest trade with another Balkan country is with Jugoslavia. Its value in 1976 is probably around 165 million dollars. The range of goods, however, is not significantly different : Greece obtains meat, wood and wood products, metal, machines and chemical goods from Jugoslavia. Greece in turn provides cotton, untreated skins, citrus fruits, fruit, household goods, cement, etc. Jugoslavia imports her oil through Salonika, where she is working for the establishment of a free port. The Vardar (Axios) is a natural connection between Salonika and Jugoslavia. As a long-term aim, a canal connection to the Great Morava, which flows into the Danube near Belgrade, is being considered. Salonika would thus be connected to the European canal system. The project of a pipeline from Salonika to Skopja is still more realistic. Trade by Greece

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with Albania is lowest in value. It was 10.7 million dollars in 1975, and should be 16.5 million dollars in 1976. Greece imports asphalt, chemical products, sulphur, copper products from Albania, and exports iron products, cotton and textiles, sanitary equipment, pharmaceutical products and leather goods.

It is obvious, that the development of trade ties is limited at present, and that it only has a low value within the total volume of Greek foreign trade. Trade develops according to state planning, in which the trade agreements which have been established each year find their expression.

The conclusions which have been drawn for Greece's trade with the Balkan countries are valid in dimension and problem areas also for Turkey's trade with the Balkan countries. The proportions of total volume of Turkish foreign trade in 1974 was, for exports to Bulgaria 0.5%, to Rumania 0.4%, to Jugoslavia 1.7% and for imports from Bulgaria 0.4%, from Rumania 2.1% and from Jugoslavia 0.6%.

To (2)

The territorial questions and the problems of minorities are of considerable importance for the ties of the Balkan countries with each other. Although they are not decisive, at present, for the political climate (with the exception of the Cyprus conflict), they obstruct a particularly close bilateral co-operation and hinder the emergence of multilateral co-operation. Excluding the Cyprus conflict, these are the main problems in this area:

-The existence of Turkish groups in north-east Greece and Bulgaria. The statistics vary considerably. Figures which give 125,000 Turks in Greece, and 600,000 Turks in Bulgaria do not sound improbable.

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Around 10,000 Greeks are thought to live in Istanbul alone.

-The Bulgarian-Jugoslavian dispute over the federal state of Macedonia is the most dangerous source of unrest in the Balkans. In Sofia, the explanation is that the Jugoslavian Macedonians are ethnically speaking Bulgarians ; present day Macedonia constituted the heart of the Bulgarian empire for a long time in the Middle Ages. Part of the Bulgarian people would not be able to be made into an autonomous country, and the Bulgarian dialect could not be turned into an independent written language, as Jugoslavia has done with the Macedonian federal state. Greece adopts a neutral position in the Macedonian question, but does not, however, recognize the Slavo-Macedonian nation created by Tito.

-Relations between Greece and Albania are not free from tensions over the question of North Epirus and Southern Albania. Athens regards Southern Albania as the old North Epirus, where according to Greek estimates 125,000 Greeks lived until the compulsory resettlement to the north.

-Finally, Jugoslavia's relationship with Albania is strained. In the autonomous area ,Kossovo, a strong Albanian minority lives, which, from time to time, is provoked against the central government in Belgrade from Tirana.

With exceptions (e.g.Albanian-Jugoslavian, Turkish-Greek and Bulgarian-Jugoslavian ties) tensions between the Balkan countries have decreased in recent years. This is particularly the case for ties between the two pro-western countries Greece and Turkey with the remaining communist Balkan countries. In 1975 and 1976 Greek and Turkish politicians of every party and rank have visited Bulgaria, Rumania and Jugoslavia and received return visits from these countries.

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To (3)

In toto, Greek-Turkish relations and in particular the conflict over Cyprus had direct and indirect effects on the relations of the Balkan countries with one another. On the one hand, both sides sought support for their position in the Cyprus question, particularly when it was necessary to vote on the Cyprus problem at international level. All in all, the communist Balkan countries stand nearer to the Greek position than to that of Turkey. This is particularly so for Jugoslavia, whose head of state, Tito, is linked to Archbishop Makarios through their common policy of non-alignment. The basic Greek position, that the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island, is an assumption for settlement talks for the crisis, is shared by all the communist Balkan countries. Nonetheless all have avoided making definite statements in favour of the Greek position. That this has not occurred is, at any rate, a certain success for the Turkish Balkan policy as well, and proves the interest that the communist Balkan states have in co-operation with Turkey.

On the other hand, the Cyprus conflict and the other related points of disagreement between Greece and Turkey make approaches towards a multilateral co-operation in the political area impossible in the Balkans. Precisely because Turkey knows, that the majority of Balkan countries stands on the Greek side in the basic questions of the Cyprus conflict, she would see a Greek attempt to seek cover for her own political ambitions in every approach in this connection.

Indirectly, the Cyprus conflict effects the overall situation of security policy in the Balkans and thereby also the political relations of the Balkan countries with one another. The noticeable weakening of NATO is of varying significance for the Balkan coun-

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tries. For Bulgaria, as a member of the Warsaw Pact and a close ally of the Soviet Union, it means a strengthening of position, not least in view of the shift in the balance in favour of the Soviet Block. For Belgrade, the loosening of Greece's and Turkey's ties with NATO does mean a step in the direction of the Jugoslavian aim of a neturalization of the Mediterranean ; but at the same time, a strong NATO in the south-east was an effective safeguard against a possible Soviet attempt to draw Jugoslavia more closely, politically and militarily, into the Soviet zone of power again.

Similar considerations are certainly also employed in Bucharest, where every increase in the Soviet power zone means an extension into the hinterland and thereby a strengthening of Soviet pressure.

Albania, too, reacted to the weakening of NATO. The worry over her own security shows in two arguments which are only seemingly contradictory : on the one hand, concern over the weakening of NATO and the corresponding estension of power by the Soviet Union finds expression. On the other hand, Enver Hodscha called upon Greece and Jugoslavia, in November 1974, not to tolerate any military bases or naval visits. The concept of establishing a regional security block against the threat of external powers, with a simultaneous dislodgement of the superpowers also appears to be indicated here.

The Balkan conference, which occurred in 1976 in Athens, also showed how narrow the basis for a multilateral co-operation between the Balkan countries is. The delegations, (Albania was not even represented) discussed exclusively about economic problems and projects ; agriculture, post and telephone services, tourism,

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transport and the environment. The production of a communique proved difficult. In spite of this, it is remarkable that the atmosphere of the conference was good, although there were bilateral tensions, and that it proved possible to exclude burning political issues.

The approaches and concepts for multilateral co-operation which have been worked towards or partially realized in the past have not proved to be capable of extension. The Friendship Treaty, which was signed by Jugoslavia, Greece and Turkey at the height of the Cold War in 1953, and the Balkan Pact of 1954 fell into disuse, as relations between Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union relaxed and the different opinions between Greece and Turkey over the future of Cyprus became more definite. The plan which Rumania has followed for years, too, that a zone free of atomic weapons and military bases should be established in the Balkans, has found hardly any open political support to date.

Conclusions

In view of the connections between security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the situation in the Balkans, the following conclusions can be drawn together in summary :

- The security of the Balkan countries rested in the past, irrespective of alignment in foreign policy, on the balance of power and, paradoxically, on the south-east flank of NATO. The fact that the weakening of the western military alliance, especially through the Cyprus conflict, has not lead to stronger pressure from the Soviet Union on this region, seems to prove that the intensification of bilateral relations between the Balkan

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countries - above all between Turkey and Greece on the one hand and the communist Balkan countries on the other - has improved the regional balance in the Balkans, and that the internal stability of the region has thus increased.

- The stabilizing character of this co-operation lies in the restriction to the possible. This, further, lies in the economic area and in bilateral economic co-operation across borders (e.g. transport, communication, energy supplies etc.)
- An over-rapid multilateralization of co-operation should be regarded as of little value, and in view of the intensification of co-operation rather as counter-productive. In the long term, such a multi-lateralization of co-operation should, however, not be excluded:
  - -if economic co-operation could take an even closer shape ;
  - -if it were possible to identify further areas of common interest for the Balkan countries ;
  - -if Greece and Turkey should actually leave NATO completely, and a basis for closer military co-operation, at least between Turkey, Greece, Rumania and Jugoslavia should thereby result. But this seems very unrealistic.
- The most vital participant, which cannot be overlooked, is the Soviet Union. For her, there are four scenarios of varying significance for Soviet policy, which are worthy of consideration.
- A solid Iron Curtain, such as existed in the 1960's. Apart from the fact that this is unrealistic during the era of detente, it is also in direct contradiction to the interests of the Soviet Union in the eastern Mediterranean, which are directed at softening the south-eastern flank of NATO.

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- An extensive fragmentation of the Balkans. This scenario, too, is hardly realistic and would also not be in accordance with Soviet interests in as far as the allied instability occasions the danger of possible involvement and confrontation of the two superpowers.
- A solid multilateral organisation of some of the Balkan countries. One can foresee that the possibilities of the Soviet Union of tying the eastern satellite countries close to herself, within such a constellation, would be decisively decreased. The possibility of a military intervention, in the case of such an interest arising, would also be decreased. Such an intervention could no longer be justified on the ground that it happened within their own sphere of influence.
- The scenario of a limited co-operation in the Balkans, coupled with regional stability can be regarded as the most acceptable for the Soviet Union at present. The possibility of co-operation in the Balkans leaves an option for the two NATO members in view of the deterioration of their political and military relations with the USA and NATO. This deterioration has its causes in domestic and socio-political changes, which, in the long-term are in the interests of the Soviet Union. The climate which has thus emerged makes the pro-western Balkan countries less sensitive to Soviet interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East and on the Turkish Straits and allows a certain influence on the solution of political problems and crises (e.g. Cyprus). On the other hand, the Soviet Union is able to use her political influence in individual communist Balkan countries, when it is necessary, to hold them within her sphere of influence

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within the context of loose co-operation of the Balkan countries one with another.

The Soviet Union is well able to play a role in the shaping of Balkan policy by means of a policy of restraint towards the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. She is quite obviously aware that the present situation is advantageous for her interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

For the Western alliance, the Cyprus conflict has had negative effects which have probably not fully emerged as yet. The alienation of Greece and Turkey from the USA and NATO can be felt. It will probably continue - in the case of Turkey even more than for Greece - and could lead to an estrangement from the West as a whole - again more likely in the case of Turkey than in Greece's case. This could mean, too, an estrangement from Eastern Europe in Turkey's case.

To a certain extent, this development has its roots in socio-political and cultural processes in both countries themselves. It has been apparent for a number of years and was, to a certain extent, unavoidable. The attempt to stabilize the whole regional constellation by means of a policy of regional understanding means, at the same time, to introduce a new element to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean. From the Western point of view, this development should be supported to the extent to which it draws the countries of the area away from seeking their security in bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union and from excessive concessions to her. It is indeed a unique coincidence in the history of the Balkans, that at least four of the Balkan coun-

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tries have a common interest in one point (apart from the two pro-western countries, they are Rumania and Jugoslavia) ; in seeking a regional balance in order to avoid greater dependence on the great powers. This will not change the face of the Balkans now or in the near future - as was shown above. But nonetheless it is a stabilizing element in the Eastern Mediterranean.