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THEOLOGICAL AND MORAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY

I must confess that the subject of this paper brings out in me at the outset all my latent Lutheranism, and a certain regard for the "two realms" point of view. Without taking that too far, I should explain this initial reaction in the following way. If one has to make a decision as to whether or not to retain a limit of 100 km per hour on the autobahn, one might ask help from theologians and moralists. They will draw attention to the high valuation of human life which the Judaeo/Christian tradition insists upon, the danger of giving priority to economic considerations ("materialism") above a true concern for persons - and before long you will find yourself wondering whether theologically and morally the motor car stands condemned in favour of the ox-cart. Obviously this does not greatly help in the real world, and you will be thrown back on what you feel to be<sup>a</sup> common sense, compromise between safety and efficiency, with due attention to what you think will, broadly speaking, carry the consent of the public at large. And when you have finally made up your mind, you may well wonder whether the help you get from theologians and moralists made much difference in practice to the solution you could have arrived at without their intervention. I simply want to warn against our tendency as theologians and moralists to underestimate the role of common sense, a balanced and fair judgement, the proper attention to statistical and technical considerations, which represent our acknowledgement that God has given us the capacity to perceive that two and two make four, and there are many circumstances where the use of this capacity is the best way of serving Him without too complicated an attempt to find some significant part which underemployed theologians and moralists can play in getting in on the act.

The weakness of that position is of course that in experience we know we are not as rational as that, particularly when we are dealing with something touching human fears and pretensions so closely as "security". In such spheres

the issues of where our faith and hope is really founded do become germane to our answers, and it is in this sense that I approach the question, without for one moment surrendering the point that faith and hope of themselves will not excuse us from using our reason, but rather may be preconditions for our being able to retain the capacity to do so.

The next caveat is semantic in nature. In what sense are we using the word "security"? I suspect that there are shades of difference here on opposite sides of the Atlantic. In Western Europe we have grown accustomed to the fact that we no longer have the means, the unity, or the will to achieve anything approaching invulnerability for our societies from our own resources. We hope, with somewhat fading conviction, that if the worst comes to the worst American power will prove an effective deterrent to prevent our being taken over from the East. But in the USA wealth, technology and military capacity can suggest that by keeping always ahead of the USSR it is possible by military means to achieve a real security. In some degree, therefore, we are thinking about somewhat different problems. One side knows vividly that the issue of our future does not depend simply on an ultimate military guarantee which we ourselves could underwrite. There is perhaps some realisation that the future depends at least as much on how the two European social systems evolve, and whether one or other or both can represent a wider measure of justice or humanity than either does at present. I guess that the USA can still teach old Europe lessons in concern for making public policy correspond to a radical concern for the underprivileged in all our societies. Nevertheless, it retains more of a confrontational aspect viz a viz its fellow Super Power than is thinkable in its weaker European partner.

With these distinctions in mind, let me start with the theological assertion that in Biblical terms man has no security available to him in heaven or earth, other than that which he is given by the forgiving grace of God. Israel tried all sorts of other safeties - alliances, armies, wealth, religion in the

sense of tribal gods who were for sure on her side and could be bought. And at every point the prophets reminded her that these would all prove fantasies when the crunch came, and that even Jahweh could not be relied on to do what was expected of Him (Jeremiah, the Exile), but retained His sovereign freedom. We can have total confidence in God, who treats us with righteousness and mercy eternal, but that involves accepting His priorities where our temporal safety comes second to His purposes of justice and love.

This tells us that whatever we mean by "security" in its limited military sense, we cannot achieve safety thereby for our own comfort. We have to consider it in a sense which at times I think I find creeping into the thinking of Henry Kissinger. We begin with a sense of MUTUALITY with our antagonist. He is (like we are) the object of God's promises. Our resistance to him is not simply for the purpose of confounding a contrary will, but because we believe he has not yet any better, and not even as good, a prospect of solving the problem of injustice and inhumanity, in comparison with ourselves. To the best of our judgement we have a duty to resist his HEGEMONY - but we could be wrong. And if in historical fact our society is overcome by his, ~~that~~ we would have to see this as God's judgement on our failure to love justice enough. I recall that in the early months of the last great war Archbishop Temple stood firmly against his pacifist friends believing that with all its horrors the war had to be pursued rigorously. But he refused to authorise prayers for victory, acknowledging that he could not know what in God's purposes was the outcome best for the world - though he knew his own mind on it, with all its preconceptions and limitations.

The role of security in this context is to help to build a stable system which offers no obvious inducements to one side or the other to attempt to upset it - and thus to buy time for us all to respond more fully to God's demands for a society in which the weak, the helpless and the nonconformist and stranger are heard and protected, and one in which the spirit of man can continue his discovery of the wonderful mysteries of God. It means buying time for repentance.

This implies a very serious moral responsibility to create and sustain such a system. Its object is stability rather than aggression. It is designed as much to provide "security" for our opponent as for ourselves. Obviously the lower the level of defence expenditure at which it can be maintained the better, and for this reason SALT and negotiations for mutual <sup>FORCE</sup> price reductions are necessary to prevent our bankrupting each other for lack of a forum in which to talk.

It is in this connection that I would like to take up the proposition that Christian witness in this field should include some pressure on statesmen to "take greater risks for peace". I have never been able to give this idea any concrete reality in my own mind. Is it proper for a representative official, negotiating with a hostile opponent, at any point seriously to put at risk the lives and future of millions of his own nation, without any kind of consent on their part? I doubt it, and I judge that exhortations to do just this tend to be treated as rather misty hot air.

The point, however, can be made more realistically in another way. The stable security system for which we work can be designed to meet every conceivable possibility that one's opponent might grasp. This is the symptom of the search for absolute security which I have described as wholly contrary to biblical teaching. The Bible denounces it, not just as wicked, but as foolish, the hunt for a will o' the wisp. And so indeed it proves insofar as we never succeed in foretelling all the possibilities ahead, and if we could it would prove ruinously expensive to provide against them. The same politician knows that it is not possibilities but probabilities he must cope with. And in determining what degree of probability to take seriously, he has to ask how much of the national wealth can be diverted to security, knowing that one could easily spend so much on it that there was not enough left to develop a society worthy to be defended. Such security is a hollow shell. What we have to impress on ourselves and our governments is that the arithmetic of probabilities, not possibilities, of how much we can afford for a realistic

security system while being able also to mend the wounds in our own national society and do our duty by the poorer nations - that this arithmetic should be honestly done, and the tendency for defence to take on a life of its own should be resisted as idolatrous.

This is a fairly easy point for Christians to grasp as morally responsible. The other side is not so readily accepted. It is that a refusal to take seriously the unpleasant necessity to contribute to a common stable security system, as far as possible with, rather than against, our rivals, can also be immoral. This is particularly so when it implies a lazy reliance on the enormously dangerous nuclear deterrent, at the expense of less apocalyptic methods of attending to local pressures and incidents which are the common experience of international life. This is perhaps a particular temptation in Europe, where the churches have often been unwilling to take a constructive and honest position in this field of defence provision. In effect it is a refusal to face the awful dilemma of offering no riposte except one that could destroy vast areas of Europe, and so a refusal to devise beforehand sensible alternatives which lower the temperature and win space and time for heads to cool, passions to abate, and compromises to be sought. This too is a contribution to a just and humane international order.

I have in this paper restricted myself to considering "security" in terms appropriate to a discussion of Defence and Disarmament. There are wider issues, not least on a global scale, relevant to the confrontation of the wealthy north and the less developed south, which bear upon our moral understanding of world "security". But they do not lie in the field of military preoccupation, except in the sense that the north's inability so far to achieve a stable system within itself except at vast expense consumes extravagantly our resources which ought to be employed in relieving poverty. This puts a high priority on every serious effort of detente which can promise a reduction in the level of defence expenditure on all sides.

Le levain évangélique dans la pâte des relations internationales

par André Dumas

(2)

Je vais d'abord réfléchir sur le type de rapports que la parole évangélique entretient avec la réalité du monde au milieu duquel elle est annoncée. Je décrirai ensuite l'état des relations internationales, tel que je l'entrevois dans la situation européenne actuelle. Je préciserai enfin quelques points d'action possible. Mon exposé sera ainsi successivement systématique, descriptif et exhortatif. Puisse-t-il l'être de la façon la moins hachée possible entre des parties qui se succèderaient sans s'interpénétrer, mais qu'au contraire chaque élément apporté serve à mieux agir, car agir sans voir n'est que naïveté et fanatisme, tandis que voir sans agir tourne au scepticisme.

I Le levain dans la pâte

Il y a plusieurs façons d'envisager les rapports entre l'Evangile et les sociétés. L'histoire de nos Eglises montre que ces façons ont toutes été pratiquées autrefois et que nous les retrouvons aujourd'hui.

a) Christ et César. Chacun a un rôle différent. Le tout est de respecter cette différence entre le rôle de l'Eglise et celui de l'Etat, du spirituel et du temporel, de la morale et de la technocratie, de l'inspiration et de l'organisation. Mais, justement, la différence est loin d'être claire: s'agit-il de la fin ou des moyens? Mais une fin sans moyens reste un vœu et des moyens sans fin ne sont qu'un processus. L'efficacité de la parole évangélique risque de disparaître en tant que finalité de la politique. A notre époque surtout, où la compétence de l'Evangile est fort disputée, ce modèle de rapports tend à reléguer Christ dans le domaine du subjectif, individuel et privé, tandis que César occupe tout le domaine institutionnel, collectif et public. Le libéralisme moderne, avec politesse, et le marxisme, avec autoritarisme, se rejoignent ici pour préconiser la même différence séparatrice. En fait, le célèbre passage de Matthieu XXII, 15-22, sur lequel s'appuie cette tradition de la différence, avait une toute autre portée. Il exhortait le groupe d'adversaires politiques, pharisiens et hérوديens, venus embarrasser Jésus, à "rendre" autant à Dieu qu'ils rendaient, déjà, en fait, à César. Leur hypocrisie, démasquée par Jésus, consistait à le contraindre à se déclarer soit comme un rebelle au pouvoir, soit comme un infidèle à Dieu. Jésus, en réplique, démasque leur tiédeur vis-à-vis de Dieu, alors qu'ils se prétendent "contestataires" sourcilleux de César.

b) Jérusalem et Babylone. Ici, chacun a un rôle antagoniste. Babylone symbolise la vie des nations qui exploitent, corrompent, mentent et tuent. Au contraire, la Jérusalem à venir symbolise un monde fraternel, véridique, les portes ouvertes à toute race, toute classe, toute tribu. Il faut fuir Babylone pour gagner Jérusalem. Cette fuite peut être de nature intérieure (monacale ou puritaine), isolationniste (sectaire ou anabaptiste), futuriste (millénariste ou utopiste). Ce modèle donne une plus grande importance que le précédent aux exigen-



gences collectives de Dieu, mais ses difficultés sont évidentes: est-on sûr qu'il faille abandonner à la mauvaise Babylone tous ceux qui ne font pas partie du groupe en fuite? Est-on sûr que la nouvelle Jérusalem n'est pas un leurre et que l'on ne va pas y retrouver les tentations et les pratiques de la vieille Babylone? Surtout, est-on sûr que la contre-société, la contre-culture, le contre-pouvoir prennent en charge les relations globales de l'humanité, sans constituer seulement une marge, ce qui inciterait par contre-coup, à conclure que son Dieu, lui aussi, est en marge de la réalité du monde? Le célèbre passage de Matthieu XIII, 24-30, sur le blé qu'il faut ne pas séparer encore de l'ivraie, rappelle que Jérusalem et Babylone restent mêlées jusqu'à la fin de l'histoire et qu'un tri prématuré arracherait aussi le blé. Le premier modèle met en lumière l'hypocrisie des "politique d'abord", le second, celui des "spirituel seulement".

c) Le levain dans la pâte. C'est pourquoi j'ai choisi le troisième modèle, tel qu'on le trouve dans la parabole de Matthieu XIII, 33, "Le Royaume de Dieu est semblable à du levain qu'une femme a pris et a mis dans trois mesures de farine jusqu'à ce que la pâte soit haut levée". Dans ce modèle, nous trouvons quelques indications significatives. L'Evangile du Royaume est, au premier abord, indiscernable, petit, mêlé à une lourde pâte. Pour qu'il pénètre, il faut un long travail de brassage dont le résultat n'apparaît pas en cours de travail. Pourtant, la parabole annonce que la pâte entière lèvera, si le levain y a été réellement mêlé. C'est donc un modèle, non de face-à-face, ni de fuite, mais de brassage. C'est un modèle qui confie aux croyants un travail de pénétration, le levain lui-même étant ce que Dieu nous confie. Enfin, il comporte une annonce de banalité, bien que le résultat ne soit pas visible au cours de la route. Je crois que c'est un bon modèle pour insérer l'Evangile dans la réalité des relations internationales plutôt que de dresser face-à-face deux compétences dans deux domaines artificiellement séparés ou encore d'imaginer un monde qui serait déjà un Royaume, mais un royaume sectaire, ayant renoncé à faire lever la pâte toute entière.

On peut maintenant préciser avec plus de détails ce que contient cette pâte et ce en quoi consiste le levain, sans entrer encore, cependant, dans une analyse plus située, comme je le ferai par la suite. La pâte du monde comporte évidemment des conflits. Dans les Evangiles, ils sont de multiples natures: conflits idéologiques avant tout, si l'idéologie est l'attitude d'ensemble d'un groupe face à la réalité qu'il vit et les schémas d'interprétation dont il dispose pour réagir à cette réalité. Il y avait, par exemple, au temps de Jésus, quatre grands groupes idéologiques: les pharisiens, laïcs scrupuleux, modernistes et opposés intérieurement à Rome; les sadducéens, plus sacerdotaux, traditionnels, composant politiquement avec Rome; les esséniens, ermites messianiques, réfugiés au désert, attendant le jugement de Dieu contre Rome; enfin, les zelotes, activistes religieux, exigeant le jugement de Dieu sur cette même Rome. Comme toujours, la foule suivait

plus ou moins les écoles idéologiques et se ressentait aussi abandonnée et silencieuse. On pourrait, naturellement, citer encore d'autres sources de conflits: doctrinaux (sur la résurrection, par exemple), moraux (sur l'observance de la loi), sociaux (sur les riches et leurs clients, les pauvres), géographiques (sur les provinces pures ou impures), etc.... Mais, j'ai préféré m'en tenir à une description idéologique, qui a l'avantage de recouper plusieurs réalités actuelles.

La pâte du monde comporte également des alliances tactiques, en vue d'un but temporaire, entre des partenaires méfiants. On peut, par exemple, toujours du temps de Jésus, envisager deux de ces groupes: celui des pharisiens-sadducéens qui obtiendra du pouvoir romain, la mise à mort de Jésus, ou, inversement, dans le groupe des disciples, celui des zélotes vengeurs et des publicains méprisés, adversaires qui accepteront pourtant de suivre ensemble Jésus, à cause de l'espoir d'un Royaume qui libérerait les uns et accueillerait les autres. Ces alliances tactiques disparaissent une fois le but atteint ou l'objectif manqué. Il ne s'agit donc pas de paix, mais d'un changement d'ennemi ou d'ami principal et d'une modification de la stratégie à mener à son égard.

Telle est la pâte; que peut en être le levain?

Je lui vois essentiellement un double rôle, en m'en tenant aux analyses évangéliques choisies. D'abord, la chasse à l'hypocrisie, quand elle prétend qu'un groupe idéologique est fondamentalement plus pur que l'autre, alors qu'en réalité, il se justifie en privilégiant telle valeur, tel projet, et en omettant les autres. Jésus démasque la vie des groupes en conflit qui avaient chacun une haute idée de son appartenance et de sa mission. Il les contraint presque à ces alliances tactiques qui leur font connaître le mensonge de leurs ~~proposition~~ prétentions à l'auto-justification, ou encore leur révèlent une fraternité dont ils ne voulaient pas entendre parler. Le jugement, c'est la mise à nu des hypocrisies, la mise à la lumière des options et des pensées cachées. C'est le caractère corrosif du levain.

Mais l'Evangile n'est pas seulement critique (ce qui deviendrait la nouvelle hypocrisie de la dénonciation universelle sans repentance personnelle). Le levain évangélique est aussi une obligation de vivre ce que l'on dit, sans utopie, sans contrainte par le devoir d'Etat, sans discours sur le passé ou le futur. Jésus ne demande pas ~~à Pilate~~ à Pilate de croire en lui, mais de le reconnaître judiciairement innocent. Il ne demande pas aux pharisiens de transgresser les lois de Moïse, mais d'en vivre la finalité, ni aux zélotes de renoncer à leur combat, mais de réfléchir aussi à la violence, fille de la violence. Jésus ne paraît pas avoir d'idéologie alternative aux autres, mais plutôt une théologie de l'honnêteté de l'idéologie par rapport à elle-même. Cette exigence a été jugée par tous insupportable, ce qui a provoqué sa mort. La foi chrétienne, c'est, à cause de la résurrection, la reprise de ce double levain évangélique, démasquer les hypocrisies, mettre en œuvre les déclarations. Ce programme politique peut

paraître vague et moralisant. En fait, il est salubre, car le levain n'est pas là pour supprimer la réalité de la pâte; mais pour la brasser et la faire lever, afin que l'histoire internationale ne soit pas seulement celle des multiples conflits et des alliances tactiques rendues inévitables par les situations variables, mais aussi celle de la clarté et, si possible, de la réalisation de rapports plus vrais et plus productifs entre les nations.

## II Immobilisme et incertitudes dans la situation européenne actuelle

a) Il y a, me semble-t-il, trois facteurs majeurs d'immobilisme dans la situation présente. D'abord, bien sûr, la détention de l'armement par les super-puissances qui tendrait à remplacer la guerre par la dissuasion, l'affrontement, par l'avertissement, l'usage des armes, par l'indication de leur possession, on pourrait presque dire l'action, par la stratégie de l'espionnage. On signale que telle superpuissance n'admettra pas telle modification de l'équilibre acquis à la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale. A certains égards, cette situation de stabilisation <sup>est aussi rassurante</sup> qu'une police mondiale, effectuée par deux patrouilleurs, coordonnant plus ou moins leurs rondes de surveillance. A deux autres points-de-vue, elle est oppressante: au niveau des dépenses militaires qui sont devenues une escalade rituelle en temps de paix, d'autant plus que le marché des armements représente désormais, pour plusieurs pays dont la France, une donnée importante de l'équilibre du commerce extérieur, du marché de l'emploi et de la concurrence industrielle. D'un autre point de vue, cette immobilisation des frontières est factice dès lors qu'un pays change intérieurement d'orientation idéologique et que les pressions à son endroit ne peuvent pas être directement militaires, mais nucléaires. D'où, à côté du sentiment de sécurité précédemment évoqué, également un double sentiment de gaspillage effroyable et d'étouffement inquiétant chez toutes les nations, moyennes ou petites, qui cherchent l'indépendance contre la domination des super-grands.

Ensuite, la persistance des nationalismes et, souvent, la réapparition des régionalismes. Nous ne paraissions pas aller vers des fédérations politiques plus solides, parce que les peuples ne sentent pas leur appartenance commune à des ensembles trop grands, à moins qu'une histoire vraiment vivante n'ait forgé ces ensembles. Certes, l'Europe est une entité économique de première importance et elle garde une mémoire émue de son rayonnement ancien, mais elle connaît tant de divisions (et pas seulement depuis 1945) que l'on voit mal comment elle représente une réalité supra-nationale. Elle n'a pas d'objectif politico-idéologique commun et elle ne pratique pas une solidarité économique durable, surtout en période de crise et de difficultés internes à chaque nation.

Je verrai enfin, dans une certaine répétition idéologique, le troisième facteur de notre immobilisme. Les références aux modèles sont devenues assez rituelles. On est passé de la mobilisation à la légitimation, qui cache souvent une grande démobilisation. Ainsi, les économies du marché libre ont recours aux

garanties de l'Etat, aux ententes de prix et aux monopoles transnationaux, tandis que les économies à planification centralisée ont, de leur côté, recours aux intéressements des initiatives, à l'élargissement des échelles de salaires ainsi qu'aux capitaux et aux technologies provenant de l'économie capitaliste. Tout cela demeure une analyse sommaire. Mais, plus encore que sur l'impureté de chacun des deux modèles, je veux insister sur leur pragmatisme, dans l'espace européen au moins, qui est le seul où ils se cotoient dans un immobilisme souhaité, semble-t-il, de part et d'autre, afin d'y garantir une zone de sécurité alors qu'ailleurs grandissent les incertitudes.

b) Les incertitudes grandissent sur ce fond d'immobilisme. Il y a d'abord les incertitudes des pays du Sud de l'Europe où l'on est devant des mutations de régimes d'autant plus considérables que le conservatisme, l'autoritarisme, le régime policier ont régné en maîtres pendant des années sans conquérir le soutien populaire. Le Sud est également loin des zones du Nord et de l'Est où se sont stabilisées les zones d'influence à la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale. Enfin, elles n'appartiennent ni aux pays de social-démocratie, où le communisme est marginalisé, ni aux démocraties populaires, où c'est le socialisme qui est absorbé. Il y a donc de fortes chances pour que l'immobilisme n'y joue pas aussi fortement que le reste de l'Europe.

Il y a les incertitudes à l'intérieur-même des espaces nationaux. Elles sont difficiles à analyser car on y retrouve une protestation contre le travail et la production en série (le côté libertaire plus que libéral du printemps 1968), mais aussi une anxiété sur le marché des emplois et les salaires (depuis la crise inflationniste accentuée par l'augmentation des prix du pétrole). Les deux malaises ne vont pas ensemble, puisque la protestation suppose une marge de manoeuvre assez considérable pour favoriser la qualité de la vie, tandis que l'anxiété se lie à l'expérience beaucoup plus ancienne de la survivance difficile de la cité. Mais, pour le moment, ces deux crises s'ajoutent l'une à l'autre et créent une désaffection interne à l'égard du système où l'on vit, surtout parmi les jeunes générations et, peut-être, autant à l'Est qu'à l'Ouest.

Il y a, enfin, l'incertitude beaucoup plus générale sur le prix à payer pour le progrès technique, pour les pays qui n'ont à offrir sur le marché mondial ni matières premières suffisamment rares et indispensables, donc coûteuses, mais seulement de la main d'oeuvre à bon marché et des matières premières exploitables au double sens du mot. Ce prix à payer pour le Tiers (ou le Quart-) Monde, représente la mauvaise conscience de l'Europe. Je crois cependant que le rôle de cette mauvaise conscience a diminué au cours des dernières années: la crise renforce l'égoïsme national tant chez les gouvernements que dans l'opinion publique. Il faut ajouter que les Européens sont moins sûrs que par le passé de ce pourquoi on paie et on fait payer le prix. La mise en doute de l'universalité du modèle industriel, qu'il soit lourd ou sophistiqué, est, certes, encore restreinte à des minorités,

souvent privilégiées. Pourtant, c'est une immense incertitude qui rend de l'importance à la variété des cultures, face à l'uniformité des techniques.

J'ai donc esquissé trois zones d'incertitude, par rapport à un arrière-plan d'immobilisme qui règne depuis trente ans en Europe. Il faut maintenant préciser quelques points d'action possible. Je ne suis pas certain qu'il s'agisse chaque fois du levain évangélique dans la pâte européenne! Je voudrais en tout cas les aborder sans hypocrisie ni logomachie.

### III Que faire ?

Prenons d'abord la division centrale de l'Europe, celle qui a fait l'immobilisme et qui fait ressurgir les incertitudes, la division Est-Ouest, qui peut devenir beaucoup plus complexe: Sud-Nord, etc.... L'hypocrisie réside sans doute dans le jumelage de la coexistence pacifique avec l'autoritarisme idéologique pour les uns et la défense du monde occidental avec le commerce Est-Ouest, pour les autres. Le mot hypocrisie est sans doute trop fort, car ces jumelages valent assurément mieux que la guerre froide, mais les limites du bénéfice que les populations tirent de ces échanges sont vite atteintes. Il y a des Eglises chrétiennes considérables dans les deux parties de l'Europe et j'aurais tendance à croire que la chrétienté dure serait plus souvent à l'Est qu'à l'Ouest. Dans les pays de l'Ouest il y a des chrétiens qui votent pour les deux camps. Je ne crois pas à une sorte de troisième voie, neutraliste, sans contours assez définis pour être un pôle d'attraction. La stabilisation en Europe va favoriser les échanges entre l'ordre (l'Est) et la libéralisation (l'Ouest), car il vaut mieux poser ainsi les deux pôles actuels, plutôt que d'opposer exploitation capitaliste et révolution socialiste, ou encore dictature des masses et parlement des citoyens. Il y a là un levain possible pour la pâte européenne. J'y verrais une certaine mutualité de reconnaissances possibles: ici la sécurité et la moralité, là l'initiative et la liberté d'expression. Je n'ignore pas les grandes difficultés que rencontrent de telles reconnaissances et n'envisage pas la création d'aucun vacuum militaire ou idéologique. Mais je suis convaincu qu'une certaine mutualité de reconnaissance est davantage possible et bénéfique aujourd'hui en ce domaine précis et essentiel.

Quelles institutions peuvent et doivent dépasser le cadre national; non pour en faire disparaître le sentiment d'indépendance dans un conglomérat équivoque, mais pour unir les potentiels nationaux en vue d'une tâche qui dépasse chaque pays? A l'évidence, des accords entre puissances industrielles et pays producteurs de pétrole, non pour réserver des circuits privilégiés, mais pour lutter en commun contre la misère du Tiers-monde, sont et seraient des accords fondamentaux, capables, je pense, de réunir un consensus populaire, en dépit de leur caractère technocratique et, forcément, lointain. Là aussi surgit une tâche possible, où le vouloir moral manque sans doute plus que le savoir technique.

Enfin, il faut poser la question des normativistes, ce mot abstrait où l'on s'attend à ce que le moraliste décolle définitivement du rêve. Me souvenant de l'arrière-plan évangélique que j'ai développé, je dirai que la première normativité reste la mise en oeuvre de ce que l'on dit, ce qui oblige la parole à l'exactitude et aussi, la conduite à l'énergie. Justice et liberté sont certes essentielles. Chacun les revendique. Mais, la vérité est presque prioritaire. Son absence crée la méfiance que la puissance ne suffit nullement à dissoudre. Les églises chrétiennes devraient être des lieux, certes, de générosité et de justice, de critique et de prophétie, de consolation et de promesse, mais, avant tout, de vérité, quoiqu'il en coûte à nos solidarités nationales, idéologiques et culturelles. Celui qui a "la vérité fera de vous des hommes libres" (Jean VIII, 32). Jésus l'a dit justement à des interlocuteurs qui affirmaient n'avoir jamais connu la servitude! Pour vérifier la vérité qui vient de Jésus Christ, il nous faut avouer chacun pour notre part, reconnaître les servitudes que nous ne croyons pas avoir et oeuvrer pour le combat incessant et coûteux de la vérité, dont dépend la confiance et, par elle, la paix, par elle, la justice. La priorité de la vérité n'est pas une chimère, mais le levain pour nos vies comme pour nos nations.

(3)

SELECTIVE RESPONSE OPTIONS, ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE, AND ASSURED DESTRUCTION:  
THE CONTINUING DEBATE ON AMERICA'S STRATEGIC POSTURE AND DOCTRINE

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INTRODUCTION

In his annual report to the Congress on the defense budget for Fiscal Year 1975 and the five-year defense program for Fiscal Years 1975-1979 (Ref 1), Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger gave a candid and detailed review of the rationale that guides US force planning and plans for the operational employment of strategic and general purpose forces. Particularly with respect to strategic forces, Mr. Schlesinger indicated some dissatisfaction with the inherited strategic posture and doctrine, highlighted certain continuing and new Soviet strategic developments that are causes of concern in US strategic planning, announced several new emphases in the US doctrine that are intended to respond to risks in the present balance and to fulfill the Presidential desire for strategic options, and outlined the strategic programs by which these new emphases would be implemented.

Mr. Schlesinger's candid and detailed review of strategic issues at once brought a latent debate on the American strategic posture and doctrine into public focus and called for wider participation in that debate. The public understanding and discussion that he invited require a moral and intellectual rigor to match that which he has brought to his own strategic and economic analyses since he left teaching in 1963 to join the RAND Corporation.

Since at least the middle 1960's there had appeared to be a growing consensus in American strategic circles that the posture and doctrine of primary reliance on so-called "assured destruction" provided both an economic and effective deterrence against the initiation of general war and, particularly in view of the Soviet development of a comparable assured destruction capability, the best opportunity for negotiation of nuclear arms limitations between the Superpowers. By the end of the 1960's only a handful of American strategic writers were seriously challenging primary reliance on assured destruction. Besides Schlesinger himself, this handful included men as different as Albert Wohlstetter, Donald Brennan, Paul Nitze, and Fred Iklé.

The last major public debate about the American strategic posture and doctrine centered on the issue of whether the US should build a ballistic missile defense system, either of the Sentinel variety first announced by Secretary McNamara in September 1967 or of the Safeguard variety that the early Nixon Administration sought. Both systems were defeated essentially by the growing consensus that an assured destruction capability should be guaranteed to both the Superpowers. The Wohlstetters, the Brennans, the Nitzes lost the argument that the US should have a defensive strategic option (at least at a low level) to the public belief that mutual assured destruction reduced both the temptations and the risks to either side that initiation of nuclear war could be a rational policy. The SALT I ABM agreement of 1972 seemed to confirm that even the Soviets had joined the consensus.

In one of the most forceful, but almost forlorn, attempts to break the consensus and reopen the debate, Fred Iklé subjected what he called the "dogmas" of mutual assured destruction to scorching intellectual and moral scrutiny in a paper published in Foreign Affairs in January 1973 (Ref 2). Now the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Iklé argued in early 1973 against a "rationality" that banked all our hopes to avert nuclear war on the presumed rationality of all possessors of nuclear weapons under all circumstances and undergirding this "rationality" of ours with the evident immorality of threatening a swift ("launch-on-warning") retaliation against millions of the enemy's non-combatant civilians.

While in the public arena the consensus on the reliability of mutual assured destruction was holding against relatively isolated challenges, the apparent consensus within the government gave signs of eroding as early as 1970 when President Nixon asked in his annual report on foreign policy:

Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face? (Quoted in Ref 1, p. 35)

And in his report of 1971, President Nixon further indicated his dissatisfaction with reliance on calculations of assured destruction, briefly sketched his "doctrine of strategic sufficiency," and announced that he had "started a number of studies within the NSC framework to refine further our understanding of the strategic relationship and the number and types of forces required to maintain sufficiency." (Ref 3, p. 171)



By the time Mr. Schlesinger became Secretary of Defense on July 2, 1973 the search for meaningful, selective nuclear options was well underway. It is clear from his own first annual report and his supporting testimony in the Congress (Ref 4), however, that this search is most congenial to him and he has become the Administration's principal spokesman for modification of sole reliance on assured destruction.

#### MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION: A REVIEW

To understand the new American strategic debate and what the modifications to the US strategic posture and doctrine purport to accomplish, it is worth attempting to review the origins of the concept of assured destruction, why it came to dominate much American strategic thinking, and the role it has played in the development of the US strategic posture and doctrine.

Fred Iklé has argued that the concept began to be promoted by Secretary McNamara after 1963, perhaps primarily "as a convenient bureaucratic tactic" (Ref 2, p. 279). By this time, military systems analysts had already distinguished two principal roles of US strategic forces as "damage limitation" and "assured destruction" and had begun to measure the effectiveness of strategic forces in these two quantifiable categories. The category of damage limitation measured the capability of US offensive forces to destroy enemy offensive forces and thus limit the damage they could do to US forces and value. The category of assured destruction measured the capability of US forces that survived a first-strike by enemy forces to inflict destruction on the enemy's value in a second strike. Damage limitation and assured destruction were thus, originally, terms intended to replace less quantifiable terms like counterforce and retaliation that had also acquired unwanted emotional impact and strategic implications. By proper quantification both could use comparable yardsticks of effectiveness: millions of friendly deaths avoided by damage limitation, and millions of deaths inflicted by assured destruction.

Besides the first-strike implications of counterforce, damage limitation quickly proved, by most calculations, to be an exceedingly costly enterprise that could not, technologically or safely, come close to "damage elimination." To approach that goal would require a full first-strike capability which was probably impossible of attainment and could also invite, in a crisis, the enemy's preemption. Assured destruction fared much better in all strategic calculations. Technologically and economically it seemed possible to guarantee a capability for some number of strategic retaliatory forces to survive even an all-out enemy first-strike and to inflict such massive destruction that the enemy would find a first-strike totally irrational for any political or military goal.

Since damage limitation apparently could not guarantee that we would not suffer perhaps 20-40 million deaths and assured destruction apparently would guarantee that we could inflict perhaps twice those numbers of deaths, assured destruction appeared by far the more effective role to fulfill, especially with limited resources. Moreover, and, for many persons far more importantly, assured destruction appeared to be the role that would deter initiation of war while damage limitation appeared to be important only if war occurred and thus to make war more likely either by our initiation (which was always eschewed) or by tempting the enemy to preempt and thus deny us our damage limitation.

If the strategic-exchange models and calculations of the middle 1960's told the whole story and were fully believable, it is easy to see why assured destruction came to hold such strong appeal for so many people. By repeating the number of Soviet deaths we could inflict in retaliation for a Soviet first-strike, we seemed to be guaranteeing deterrence of the initiation of war. Moreover, by emphasizing this capability of existing and programmed strategic forces - and this is where the bureaucratic tactic that Mr. Iklé identified comes in - we could hold in check costly pressures to expand or increase strategic forces without limit. Finally, since technology and their weapons development and programs had conferred on the Soviets an assured destruction capability that almost matched our own, mutual assured destruction, as long as it could be guaranteed and understood by both sides, seemed to open the door for tacit or negotiated agreements to limit and reduce strategic arms competition and roles.

Despite the fact that the Kennedy Administration had come into office with ambitious attempts to move away from a strategy of massive retaliation toward a strategy of flexible response options to meet the variety of threats confronting US interests, many of President Kennedy's closest advisers, who remained President Johnson's advisers, ended the decade of the 1960's reconciled to assured destruction (a limited version of massive retaliation) as the principal role for nuclear weapons. Of course, the strategy of flexible response had always emphasized the conventional capabilities that were required to supplement nuclear forces, but Secretary McNamara, most notably in his Ann Arbor speech of June 1962, had also advocated a departure from the countervalue role of nuclear weapons toward a limited counterforce role. By the end of the decade that Ann Arbor speech was almost totally forgotten or repudiated.

In an illuminating article on "The Relevance of Traditional Strategy" in the same issue of Foreign Affairs as the Iklé article, Professor Michael Howard examines modern strategy in a larger historical timeframe (Ref 5). His insights may give us a better perspective to comprehend why the concept

of assured destruction has held such sway in the past ten years. Noting that in the 17th Century and prior, embryonic states did not have a sufficient monopoly of violence to defend their own populations, Professor Howard points out that "strategy" then depended largely on the capacity to hold hostages or to retaliate against an opponent. Traditional strategy - involving the manipulation of military forces to induce an opponent to do one's will or face unacceptable losses - developed with the modern state system beginning in the 18th Century when states had acquired a sufficient monopoly of violence, but a monopoly that engaged only a fraction of the state's resources and population. After the Napoleonic era, the growth of technology together with the growth of the modern state provided for the mobilization of larger and larger portions of the state's resources in the event of war, resulting in only an uncertain likelihood that the opponent's will could be affected through the manipulation of forces alone. The First World War made clear that the morale and cohesion of the community as a whole had become an element of strategy, and the Second World War had to be fought to the finish. The advent of nuclear parity has produced a situation reminiscent of the 16th Century since the inability to defend one's population and value has caused the nuclear powers to revert to hostages, threats, and retaliation as the elements of strategy.

The great difficulty in the modern era is that such large portions of populations have become the hostages and the potential targets of retaliation on both sides, that the threats of retaliation - because of and despite their catastrophic proportions - tend to lose political credibility even as they gain technical credibility. Professor Howard points out the vexing problems of modern strategy that result from the fact that resort to nuclear weapons appears to lose political credibility in rapidly descending order among the following situations:

- a. In response to a nuclear attack on one's own territory.
- b. In response to a conventional attack on one's own territory.
- c. In response to an attack (nuclear or conventional) on an ally.
- d. In response to a manipulation of risks by an adversary.

Thus, acceptance of and preoccupation with assured destruction may amount to more than seduction by systems analysis and a bureaucratic tactic and actually reflect a tacit or explicit acknowledgment of a severe limitation on the military and political utility of nuclear weapons. Perhaps such acknowledgment should be an occasion for rejoicing: There is a certain

respectability to the view that, if nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated from modern arsenals, the best thing that can be done with them is to ensure that their sole role is to be the deterrence of initiation of nuclear war. However, acts of irrationality, our adversaries, our commitments, technology, and accidents may deny us the capability to ensure that this will be their sole role.

We must be clear that the US Military Establishment never really made sole reliance on assured destruction or, even less, mutual assured destruction the exclusive rationale of all strategic nuclear programs and plans. However, even for the Military Establishment, assured destruction clearly became the principal, if not the sole, concept by which strategic nuclear programs and plans could be publicly explained and defended. There is, perhaps, no better illustration of this than in the transition from the Sentinel ballistic missile defense system to the Safeguard system.

The original public justification of the Sentinel system given by Secretary McNamara was that it would provide a population protection against at least a light nuclear attack, perhaps from China, and incidentally protect against general nuclear war resulting from accident or other non-rational or irrational nuclear incidents. Even in supplying this justification, Mr. McNamara was at pains to explain that the US had no ambitions to develop an ABM system to protect against heavy attack and "thus" threaten the stability of mutual assured destruction. When it became clear in the ensuing public and Congressional debate that the public and some of our allies feared more the relatively remote possibility of upsetting the balance and stability apparently ensured by mutual assured destruction than a light Chinese attack or the consequences of other unlikely (but possible) nuclear incidents or accidents, the Nixon Administration shifted the public justification for a light ABM system 180 degrees to a further protection of a retaliatory or assured destruction capability instead of a protection of the population or a modest damage limiting capability. While there were some real reasons to fear erosion of the MINUTEMAN portion of the US assured destruction capability, this shift in public justification of a defensive option amounted to a final accommodation to the existing consensus on the acceptability of almost sole reliance on assured destruction.

My own view is that such accommodation was regrettable even though it eventually resulted in the ABM accords in SALT I and SALT II. An extremely high value must be placed on the achievement of agreement as such, if it requires our forswearing a program that could have afforded some protection against a light nuclear attack or accidental launch and minimize a "requirement" to respond in kind.

Fred Iklé (Ref 2, p. 274) has pointed out how the ABM debate apparently reinforced among various influential people the pernicious "dogma" that not only should our announced and planned policy be to retaliate against the enemy's population in the event of any attack, but that we should adopt an announced and planned policy to guarantee that our retaliation would not wait to discern the nature and weight of the attack. Apparently Senator Fulbright meant it when he advocated in 1969 a "launch-on-warning" policy as part of his argument to defeat the proposed Safeguard system.

#### TOWARD A NEW APPROACH

The principal reasons for Mr. Schlesinger's and others' dissatisfaction with the inherited strategic posture and doctrine and its appearance of sole reliance on assured destruction may be briefly summarized along with a discussion of the new emphases and modifications they seek.

#### The "Morality" of Deterrence

First, the inherited strategic posture and doctrine does rely primarily and appears to rely almost solely on a programmed and planned capability to kill civilian non-combatants. On the face of it this is morally abhorrent and contrary to centuries of attempting to develop some rational, ethical restraints in the conduct of war. It certainly violates a principle of discrimination, and, just as certainly when combined with "launch-on-warning" dogmas, of proportionality. In an important Public Broadcasting Service debate on the new emphases in American strategic doctrine, Mr. Robert F. Ellsworth (now the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) called this aspect of the old strategic posture and doctrine genocide (Ref 6).

It would be short-sighted and wrong to underestimate the moral abhorrence of key officials in the Nixon and the New Ford Administrations with the people-killing aspects of assured destruction. That abhorrence runs deep in Mr. Iklé's thinking and writing (Ref 2) and in Mr. Schlesinger's annual report (Ref 1). Of course, Mr. McNamara shared that abhorrence as his Ann Arbor speech revealed; in the end, he appeared to make his ethical peace, however, with the apparent stability provided by the mutual threat to kill civilian populations.

Whether the new officials will be able to give realistic and acceptable programmatic consequences to their moral revulsion with the threat (implicit or explicit) and prospect of retaliating against civilians remains

to be seen, but their revulsion is clearly one of the driving forces toward modification of the degree of reliance on assured destruction. The dilemma they face (as their critics are happy to point out) is that they may appear to make nuclear war more thinkable (and, in the extreme, more attractive) as they try to think through more moral ways to use nuclear weapons against military targets rather than non-combatant civilian targets.

Members of the American arms control community, in particular, appear to believe - with equal moral fervor - that this aspect of dissatisfaction with the inherited strategic posture and doctrine is morally dangerous not only for appearing to give moral sanction to the use of nuclear weapons against military targets (which, they say, would also kill almost as many civilians) but because, they believe, the programmatic attempts to give reality to the moral concern would inevitably threaten the stability of assured destruction and lead to a new arms race and to an increased likelihood of preemption in a crisis. Mr. Barry Carter, a former member of Mr. Kissinger's National Security Council staff, debated this way with Mr. Ellsworth and has written extensively on both the strategic-stability and strategic-moral aspects of the new debate (Ref 7).

#### The Control of Conflict

The linkage between the ethical aspect of threatening assured destruction and the stability aspect is evident in a second major reason for dissatisfaction with the inherited strategic posture and doctrine. As Mr. Schlesinger says, "Flexibility of response is also essential because, despite our best efforts, we cannot guarantee that deterrence will never fail; nor can we foresee the situations that would cause it to fail" (Ref 1, p. 38). Moral satisfaction (and political-military satisfaction) in assured destruction is possible, if at all, only so long as deterrence by assured destruction works. Government officials bear an awesome responsibility to plan for contingencies that almost everyone may fervently hope will never take place. As Mr. Schlesinger puts it:

"Not only must those in power consider the morality of threatening such terrible retribution on the Soviet people for some ill-defined transgression by their leaders; in the most practical terms, they must also question the prudence and plausibility of such a response when the enemy is able, even after some sort of first strike, to maintain the capability of destroying our cities. The wisdom and credibility of relying simply on preplanned strikes of assured destruction are even more in doubt when allies rather than the United States itself face the threat of nuclear war" (Ref 1, p. 35).

The question that advocates of assured destruction must face is: "Is there a necessary disjunction between what we must threaten (implicitly or explicitly) to do in the worst case and what we would actually do in any case?" Consistent advocates appear, either, like Senator Fulbright, willing to involve themselves in the deepest ethical contradiction and potential catastrophe of dogmas such as launch-on-warning or, like Mr. Carter, only very slightly to hedge their bets, and trust that less than the ultimate responses might be made in a crisis even though they have not been fully debated and thought through and programmed for in advance. Mr. Iklé is especially disdainful of this approach (Ref 2). I have already remarked on his impatience with the alleged "rationality" of planning, by assured destruction, to deter only a rational opponent who would see, with our clarity, the folly of any attempt to knock us out with a massive first strike.

Herbert Scoville, a former high official of the Central Intelligence Agency and of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, insists in his book, Missile Madness, that: "Reliance must be placed upon DETERRENCE. Nuclear war can be prevented today only by making the consequences of its initiation clearly unacceptable to all parties" (emphasis his, from an excerpt reprinted in Ref 8). Mr. Schlesinger's insistence, on the other hand, that "we cannot guarantee that deterrence will never fail" - even though he concedes we cannot predict the circumstances in which it will fail - is a primary reason for his demand that we have plans and capabilities for "selective response options."

Besides having the necessary plans and capabilities for responding in limited ways to limited nuclear attacks or incidents, however, Mr. Schlesinger believes that the deterrent function of nuclear weapons can and should be extended into wartime if deterrence fails:

"If a nuclear clash should occur - and we fervently believe that it will not - in order to protect American cities and the cities of our allies, we shall rely into the wartime period upon reserving our 'assured destruction' force and persuading, through intrawar deterrence, any potential foe not to attack cities. It is through these means that we hope to prevent massive destruction even in the cataclysmic circumstances of nuclear war" (Ref 1, p. 5).

The new American strategic emphases have sometimes been called a "doctrine of controlled conflict." It is probably premature to call these emphases a doctrine - and Mr. Schlesinger, himself, asks help in thinking through all that may be involved before his emphases could become doctrine - but the fundamental point is that we must not concede that at the first opening of any nuclear war we have no alternative but to plunge hopelessly into catastrophe. The primary role of nuclear weapons in wartime - a role almost as important as the deterrence of the initiation of war - should be

to bring war to an end with the minimum loss of life to all parties that our best wisdom could promise. This requires plans and capabilities for selective responses to a wide variety of attacks, backed up by an assured destruction capability that we would not be forced to use automatically even in war.

Habits of thought about the inevitability of the escalation of war are hard to break. To many people, concepts of "intra-war deterrence" seem wistful and absurd if not outright dangerous. Such concepts, as well as the moral restraint not to convey an unshakable intent to kill non-combatants - are frequently ridiculed as trying to make nuclear war "humane" or civilized or even attractive (see, for example, selections in Ref 8 and the arguments offered by Mr. Carter and his associates in Ref 6). By attempting to provide plans and capabilities to control a nuclear war and end it, advocates of selective response plans and capabilities are accused of a kind of self-fulfilling prophesy that would make nuclear war more acceptable and likely. On the other hand, intentionally to deny ourselves the plans and capabilities to limit nuclear war in order to reinforce deterrence of its initiation will almost certainly guarantee the escalation of war if deterrence fails. (See Ref 2 for further development of this point.)

Besides the issue of intra-war deterrence of nuclear war, there remains the perennial problem of escalation of a war that starts at the conventional level. Because of the problem of the credibility of a nuclear response to even a massive conventional attack upon an ally, Professor Howard has stated that "under conditions of nuclear parity, the power which can force upon its adversary the decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons enjoys an enormous strategic advantage" (Ref 5, p. 262). Because of his abhorrence of nuclear war and his recognition of how difficult ("agonizing") it would be to take the political decision, Mr. Schlesinger agrees that nuclear weapons cannot be a substitute for manpower (a "stalwart non-nuclear defense") in a posture that provides adequate flexibility and that "we prefer to force a potential enemy to make" the decision to use nuclear weapons first. However, "given our doctrine of flexible response," he is at pains to emphasize to our allies as well as our adversaries "that the adoption of these and other programs does not signify any change in basic NATO strategy; nor does it preclude the use of nuclear weapons should a Pact assault prove of overwhelming weight and speed" (Ref 1, p. 89).

#### Maintaining the Balance

A third element of the dissatisfaction with the inherited strategic posture and doctrine is that the high-confidence stability that assured



destruction is believed to provide may be transitory if not illusory. In this area, the issues of Mr. Schlesinger's "theology and philosophy," as Leslie Gelb has called them (Ref 9), are complicated by his appraisal of the nature of strategic equilibrium and by his assessment of recent Soviet developments in nuclear weapons and missile technology, production, and deployment.

According to Mr. Schlesinger:

"The Soviet Union now has the capability in its missile forces to undertake selective attacks against targets other than cities. This poses for us an obligation, if we are to ensure the credibility of our strategic deterrent, to be certain that we have a comparable capability in our strategic systems and in our targeting doctrine, and to be certain that the USSR has no misunderstanding on this point..... Through possession of such a visible capability, we hope to reinforce deterrence by removing the temptation for an adversary to consider any kind of nuclear attack. Therefore, the changes we are making in our strategic planning this year are specifically intended to shore up deterrence across the entire spectrum of risk. We believe that by improving deterrence across the broad spectrum, we will reduce to an even lower point the probability of a nuclear clash between ourselves and other major powers." (Ref 1, p. 4,5)

I have quoted Mr. Schlesinger's words at such length both because of the prominence he gives to the question of the strategic balance and because this is, perhaps, the most controversial point in his approach from the point of view of détente diplomacy and the negotiation of further strategic arms limitations.

There is evidently a larger area of disagreement between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger on the question of the present balance than in any of the foregoing. It is impossible and would be premature in view of the scheduled hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on détente to attempt in this paper to go very deeply into this aspect of the new American strategic debate. However, it is clear that Mr. Kissinger places a very high value on achievement of a replacement agreement on offensive strategic arms by 1977 when the interim agreement of 1972 expires. To him, this is the only way to preserve the present stability. As he said at his press conference on July 3 following the last Moscow Summit meeting:

"If we have not reached an agreement well before 1977, then I believe you will see an explosion of technology and an explosion of numbers at the end of which we will be lucky if we have the present stability, in which it will be impossible to describe what strategic superiority means. And one of the questions which we have to ask ourselves as a country is what in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?" (Reprinted in Ref 10, p. 42).

Mr. Schlesinger's approach is not that of advocating a fruitless search for "strategic superiority," although Mr. Kissinger appeared to imply this when he suggested "that both sides have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint and that is not a thought that comes naturally to military people on either side" (Ref 10, p. 41). Mr. Schlesinger has called the concept that guides both his approach to what would be an acceptable strategic arms limitation in the long run and his approach to certain new weapons procurement and research and development a concept of "parity" or of "essential equivalence" (the term used in the congressional resolution approving the 1972 SALT agreements). In his view:

..."we are eager to begin a reduction of the strategic forces by mutual agreement and on terms of parity. That is our first preference. We would be quite content if both the United States and the Soviet Union avoided the acquisition of major counterforce capabilities. But we are troubled by Soviet weapons momentum, and we simply cannot ignore the prospect of a growing disparity between the two major nuclear powers" (Ref 1, p. 42).

Paul Nitze, former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for SALT, is pessimistic about Mr. Schlesinger's first preference and the Soviet weapons momentum. As he recently testified to the House Armed Services Committee: "I believe it is not possible at this time to negotiate a permanent agreement to replace the interim agreement which would be balanced, contribute to maintaining crisis stability and lay a basis for reducing the strategic arms competition..." (Reprinted in Ref 10, p. 43).

The Soviet weapons momentum that principally troubles men like Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Nitze is the "massive effort" to develop four new ICBM systems with "new bus-type dispensing systems, new MIRVed payloads, new

guidance, new-type silos, new launch techniques, and probably new warheads," - all under the terms of the 1972 interim SALT accords. According to Mr. Schlesinger: "This very impressive program appears to have three main objectives - expanded target coverage (particularly countermilitary) with MIRVs, improved pre-launch survivability with the new hard silo designs, and the attainment of a significant hard target kill capability" (Ref 1, p. 46). Mr. Schlesinger estimates that the ICBM programs alone could increase overall Soviet throw-weight (not limited by the interim agreement) from the current level of 6-7 million pounds to 10-12 million pounds and increase the number of their ICBM warheads to about 7,000 one-to-two megaton warheads. Combined with other improvements in SLBM forces, development of a new strategic bomber, and modernization of Soviet air defenses, the ICBM programs give little reason to be sanguine about either the durability of the present balance or present Soviet intentions to negotiate an overall agreement on anything like "essential equivalence."

In the absence of these Soviet developments, a new targeting doctrine to emphasize military targets, improved accuracies and yield-to-weight ratios to improve our capacity to strike military targets with reduction in collateral civilian deaths, and certain improvements in command and control of strategic forces would evidently still be justifiable in Mr. Schlesinger's view to provide the selectivity and flexibility required to reduce our dependence on an all-out retaliatory response. The Soviet weapons development, however, evokes additional programs - in Mr. Schlesinger's view - "to hedge against foreseeable and unforeseeable risks" (Ref 1, p. 49). Several of these additional programs, though they would reinforce the other changes regarded by Mr. Schlesinger as presently required, are regarded as negotiable if the Soviets could be persuaded to enter an overall agreement that provided essential equivalence. These programs are mostly long-term developmental programs and include research on an entirely new ICBM, on a cruise missile for airborne launch, on a mobile ICBM, and on an advanced ABM system.

In a recent and very thoughtful article on "Changes in American Strategic Doctrine - An Initial Interpretation," Professor Laurence Martin analyzes two strands in Mr. Schlesinger's thinking which he identifies as the problem of "sizing" strategic forces and the problem of dealing with the deficiencies "in the concept of assured destruction itself" (Ref 11). Under the "sizing" problem, Professor Martin discusses those negotiable modifications to the present US strategic posture that I have here attributed to the desire "to shore up" the deterrence for the "long haul." Under the problem of inherited deficiencies, Professor Martin examines the non-negotiable changes required in the Schlesinger rationale for moving more

decisively from primary reliance on assured destruction to a selective response doctrine.

A sympathetic critic, Professor Martin is quite correct in pointing out the difficulties in maintaining the separability of the two strands that he sees Mr. Schlesinger as desiring to maintain. Harsher critics do not even grant him a sincere desire to make the separation and see selective targeting as simply the public rationale for acquiring a hard-target kill capability just because the Soviets appear to be pursuing this capability or because there is an autonomous military urge to acquire any capability that is technologically feasible (see, for example, John C. Baker's article on "Flexibility: the Imminent Debate" in Arms Control Today - Ref 12).

The separability of "sizing" and doctrine may not be as clear in Mr. Schlesinger's own thinking as Professor Martin avers. Mr. Schlesinger may be partly caught between his own two desires to limit the growth of nuclear arsenals and to achieve a more rational and stable posture. It may in fact be harder, politically, to achieve a comprehensive arms control limitation providing for "essential equivalence" and selective response options than it is to achieve an agreement in which we reconciled ourselves fully to mutual assured destruction whether or not the other side did. It may only be far more desirable from the point of view of long-term stability and rationality to achieve an agreement that steers away from mutual assured destruction and provides for hedges against "foreseen and unforeseen risks."

#### Strategic Power and Political Purpose

I have intentionally borrowed a heading from Professor Martin's paper to discuss the fourth and last major reason for dissatisfaction with the present balance and the inherited strategic posture and doctrine.

Throughout most of his explanations of the need to maintain a parity of forces and not merely a mutuality of assured destruction, Mr. Schlesinger stresses that this parity must be visible and be perceived by our allies, our adversaries, and ourselves to represent at least an essential equivalence of strategic forces between the Superpowers. As Leslie Gelb has pointed out, Mr. Schlesinger has always displayed an interest in the political implications of strategic forces that almost matches his interest in their technical aspects (Ref 9).

The purposes of "shoring up" deterrence to a wide variety of threats go well beyond the need to provide hedges against foreseen and unforeseen technical risks. Mr. Schlesinger is unwilling to accept the severe limitation of nuclear weapons solely to the deterrence of nuclear war that Mr. Scoville and other partisans of mutual assured destruction advocate. In an able and enthusiastic defense of the new doctrinal challenge to mutual assured destruction, a fresh strategic analyst (who happens to be an Israeli living

and teaching in the United States), Edward N. Luttwak, has stressed the inherent political significance of strategic power (Ref. 13). Along with the other noted and notable deficiencies of mutual assured destruction, Mr. Luttwak notes its political uselessness: "As we have seen, the basic axiom of the 'mutual' version of the doctrine is that strategic power cannot be applied usefully to political purposes" (Ref 13, p. 58).

For those like Mr. Kissinger who ask plaintively and rhetorically "what in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?" - Mr. Luttwak believes the Soviets may be better prepared to answer than the advocates of mutual assured destruction. He writes: "It takes intellectual arrogance on a truly global scale to assert that the Russians must be wrong in believing that more weapons, and more powerful weapons, are politically more useful than fewer and less powerful ones. In dealing with a troublesome Israel, the Soviet Union has already resorted to the direct nuclear threat on more than one occasion - usually successfully" (emphasis his, Ref 13, p. 58).

The differences between the original doctrine of massive retaliation and the doctrine of assured destruction are striking in relation to the question of political purpose. The original doctrine - enunciated in 1954 when the US enjoyed almost total strategic superiority - was intended to have more political significance than military significance. It was a warning to the "whole Communist world" that we would brook no aggression (especially in Southeast Asia) with our nuclear hands tied. The reality of the rough nuclear parity of the late 1960s and early 1970s, perhaps as much as the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, eroded that initial link (which was even then tenuous) between strategic power and political purpose.

The Cuba missile crisis of 1962 and the Vietnam War dealt the final blows to the doctrine of massive retaliation and its easy linkage of strategic power and political purpose: The first, by the apparent, immediate success of the application of the doctrine and its stimulation to Soviet weapons development as well as to a stark American awareness of the dangers of invoking the doctrine; the latter, by the apparent (and probably wise) unwillingness of the US seriously to invoke the doctrine and its tacit willingness to accept its irrelevance.

Professor Martin is again correct in pointing out that there are presently very many difficulties in reestablishing a clear linkage between the strategic posture and doctrine that Mr. Schlesinger now advocates and political purpose (Ref 11, pp. 163, 164). The least that can be said,

however, is that the Soviets do appear to believe there is a link and that link must exist in their minds between our strategic power and political purpose as well as between their strategic power and political purpose. Also, in the minds of America's allies there must be some kind of link between America's strategic power and political purpose - especially within NATO. It seems reasonable to suggest that Mr. Schlesinger firmly believes this, but that the exact nature of this linkage cannot be spelled out in detail. Surely this is an area where the call for wider public discussion and public debate is most urgent and genuine. The new American strategic posture and doctrine need most help from America's allies and friends on this score because they are the ones who will be most affected.

#### CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT

It must be evident that I am mostly sympathetic with the dissatisfaction with the inherited strategic posture and doctrine and would support most of the modifications to primary reliance on assured destruction that the new Schlesinger emphases have introduced. That is not the point I would wish to leave here, however.

The main point I would wish to leave, rather, is one made by Mr. Luttwak. That is that "For once, then, a doctrinal controversy is really about doctrine" (Ref 13, p. 53). Mr. Schlesinger has outlined his approach in remarkable candor, developed real doctrinal guidelines and announced the programs for carrying them out, admitted the incompleteness of his own thinking, and asked for a morally and intellectually rigorous debate. He has shown, perhaps more clearly than any other American official that, not only are strategic doctrinal issues serious, they are fraught with moral and political significance as well as strategic and operational significance.

The question to which CCADD was initially addressed - What should we do with military power? - is still open and has been fully joined in the new American strategic debate. The critical, unsettled areas of this debate must, however, be larger than an American debate. In particular, the issue of the linkage between strategic power and political purpose requires at least Alliance debate and wisdom if not also the participation of Soviet debate and wisdom.

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NATO's THEATER NUCLEAR POSTURE:  
A REAPPRAISAL AND A PROPOSAL\*

by  
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INTRODUCTION

NATO's theater nuclear force posture, its composition and deployments, and the concept and rationale for employment of theater nuclear forces have been subjects of great concern and reexamination on both sides of the Atlantic within the past two years. It is difficult to single out a primary cause or event that precipitated this concern and reexamination. However, former Secretary James R. Schlesinger's seminal annual report to the US Congress of February 1974 (discussed at length in this forum two years ago) may be taken as a benchmark that brought into a new public focus many causes and stimulated a new nuclear debate (Ref. 1). Dealing largely with the US strategic nuclear force posture and its modernization and modifications, that report gave rise to extended hearings in the US Congress in the spring of 1974 in which, inter alia, the theater nuclear posture came under critical review along with the strategic posture (see excerpt in Ref. 2). These hearings, in turn, led to the so-called Nunn Amendment (after Senator Sam Nunn, of Georgia, author of the amendment) to US Public Law 93-365, passed in August 1974, which directed the US Secretary of Defense to:

study the overall concept for use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe; how the use of such weapons relates to deterrence and to a strong conventional defense; reductions in the number and type of nuclear warheads which are not essential in the defense structure for Western Europe;

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and the steps that can be taken to develop a rational and coordinated nuclear posture by the NATO Alliance that is consistent with proper emphasis on conventional defense forces (Ref. 3).

Mr. Schlesinger's report required under that amendment was issued in an unclassified as well as classified version in the spring of 1975 and became a key document in the current NATO reexamination of the theater nuclear force posture (Ref. 4).

Despite such benchmarks, it would be myopic to suggest that concern with NATO's theater nuclear force posture is confined to the last two years and to the US side of the Atlantic. Richard Shearer, Director for Nuclear Planning on the NATO International Staff, in a succinct, thoughtful review of this subject has pointed out that in 1962 Henry Kissinger, then a young Harvard professor, argued that:

The President has spoken of the need for alternatives between surrender and general nuclear war. To provide these, a capability for tactical nuclear operations would seem to be essential. Indeed, it is the most useful - perhaps the only meaningful - role for the nuclear weapons based on the Continent. ----In current thinking, a tactical nuclear war is distinguishable from a general nuclear war primarily by its geographic limitation - a consideration which can be of no interest to the potential victim. ----[However,] the choice between conventional and nuclear defense is not entirely the West's to make. Thus, it is extremely dangerous to reject the notion of tactical nuclear defense as rigorously as we appear to have done (quoted in Ref. 5).

That Europeans recognize they have a vital - life and death, if you will - interest in NATO's theater nuclear force posture, including suggestions for modernization and employment concepts emanating from the US, is amply demonstrated in a sampling of published articles and official statements on the subject (Ref. 6-20). Official, classified discussions have, of course, focussed in the forum of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). Since its establishment in 1966 at the suggestion of then Secretary of Defense McNamara after the abandonment of the US proposal for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) for NATO, the NPG has accomplished a great deal in accommodating if not reconciling US and European views and interests especially on the contribution of the

theater nuclear force posture to deterrence and in developing guidelines for the initial use of nuclear weapons by NATO if deterrence failed and the Warsaw Pact launched an attack on the territory of any NATO partner. General Ulrich de Maiziere has described the critical importance of this forum to the development of alliance policy in his book Führen im Frieden (see pp. 25-32 in Ref. 21). Responding largely to US initiatives, but with autonomous European views and interests very much in evidence, the NPG has given concentrated attention during the last two years to improving and rationalizing NATO's theater nuclear force posture.

At the NPG meeting in Oslo in May 1976,

the Ministers agreed on the need to improve the effectiveness of NATO's theater nuclear forces, including their survivability. They emphasized their continued support for broad Allied participation in nuclear planning and in NATO's nuclear defence posture.

Against this background the subject of improving the effectiveness of NATO's theatre nuclear forces was highlighted in a paper forwarded by the United States and in related national comments and assessments from the NATO Military Authorities. Ministers took note with interest of programmes already underway for this purpose and in particular development programmes described by the United States Secretary of Defense relating to various areas, including improvements in nuclear artillery capabilities. They encouraged continued improvements in supporting fields such as security of nuclear weapons and communications as an integral part of the contribution of theater nuclear forces to the overall posture of the Alliance. Ministers gave directions for further studies, and agreed to continue their discussion on the theatre nuclear force posture at their next meeting. These studies and discussions will contribute to the ongoing work on the consolidated statement of NATO policy for the possible use of theatre nuclear forces and the study of the political and military implications of modern weapons technology (Ref. 22).

#### THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT

Lawrence Martin has argued that the current theater nuclear force posture developed without benefit of a coherent rationale and doctrine for employment of nuclear forces in war in Europe (Ref. 11). Jeffrey Record (now a staff aid to Senator Nunn) argued similarly in his study

at the Brookings Institution (Ref. 23). Implicitly conceding a better and more balanced judgment to Martin's analysis and arguments, Richard Shearer suggests that there may have been more rationality and coherence - particularly in light of severe political and military dilemmas - to the evolution of the current posture than either of these commentators acknowledge. All three appear to agree that the current posture needs improvement - albeit for different reasons.

In my own view, the current theater nuclear posture evolved over the past two and a half decades as a function of many complex factors that could be grouped under four broad headings. These include: the changing NATO-Warsaw Pact balance, divergent US and European interests, the deterrence/defense dilemma, and the evolving technology of modern weapons.

#### The Changing NATO-Pact Balance

For brevity, I have tried to capture the essence of the changing balance in the chart shown on the following page. In that chart I have somewhat arbitrarily, if conveniently, tried to highlight trends and changes in terms of the decades of the fifties, the sixties, and the seventies. For each of these not-entirely-arbitrary periods, certain characteristics and trends stand out in four interrelated aspects of NATO's overall posture and in perceptions of the dominant features of the threat in the theater - particularly on the Central Front.

It is common now to speak (sometimes ambiguously) of the NATO triad of forces: strategic nuclear forces, theater (sometimes called tactical) nuclear forces, and conventional forces. The second and third rows in my matrix constitute one view the second element of that triad and, as I have tried to show, consist of theater deployed or commanded nuclear forces that are strategic (capable of long-range missions against the Pact's war-making potential) as well as tactical (capable of battlefield and shallow interdiction missions against engaged forces and their support and immediate theater reserve). Other uses of the expression, "NATO triad", have combined the first and second rows as the first element of "strategic forces" and confined the second element to "tactical forces". It is perhaps indicative of evolving

# THE CHANGING NATO-WARSAW PACT BALANCE

	1950s	1960s	1970s
Intercontinental Strategic Nuclear Forces	US strategic bomber superiority Limited USSR strategic bomber capability	US superiority in ICBM/SLBM and bombers established then eroded Accelerating USSR ICBM/SLBM deployment	Approximate parity in US-USSR overall numbers USSR advantage in ICBM throwweight MIRVs and accuracy US selective, limited response options
Theater Strategic Nuclear Forces	US forward deployed bombers and missiles UK bombers Emerging USSR IR/MRBM systems	US forward IRBM withdrawn Emerging UK SLBM and French retaliatory systems USSR IR/MRBM threat levelled off	US SLBM committed to SACEUR Significant UK and French SLBM and bomber capability Continued USSR IR/MRBM capability
Theater Tactical Nuclear Forces	Initial deployments of US artillery and tactical range SS missiles and AD Initial deployments of USSR mobile tactical range SS rockets and missiles	Levelled off deployments of US artillery, SS and AD missiles, ADM, tactical air Programs of cooperation with NATO allies Significant USSR SS missiles with ground forces nuclear emphasis	Rough tactical balance between NATO and Pact forces with asymmetric mixes USSR nuclear emphasis US non-nuclear emphasis US/NATO efforts to rationalize theater nuclear posture Uneasiness about US/NATO vulnerable, QRA systems
Theater Conventional Forces	Soviet preponderance Creation of Pact forces US/NATO trip-wire forces EDC rejected Large French forces German rearmament	Pact numerical superiority Major US pressure to achieve NATO full conventional defense capability French forces withdrawn from integrated NATO commands	Steady modernization of numerically superior Pact forces Soviet naval expansion US/NATO efforts to provide stalwart forward defense capability Promise of new technologies for conventional munitions
Principal Theater Threat (Capability)	Conventional attack Theater nuclear retaliation	Conventional attack Theater nuclear retaliation Emerging theater nuclear attack capability	Nuclear attack Conventional attack

trends that in the seventies, the broader meaning of the second element (that is, theater strategic and tactical forces) and the narrower meaning of the first element (that is, intercontinental or extra-theater strategic forces) have become more common than before.

The reader is urged to examine the chart in detail. Only a few discursive comments will supplement the changes portrayed therein. With respect to the intercontinental strategic forces the changes since the fifties are well known. We have moved dramatically from US strategic superiority, first in long-range bombers and then in ICBMs into a period of approximate overall parity in numbers of strategic delivery vehicles. This approximate parity in delivery vehicles is commonly regarded as establishing a rough equivalence in mutual assured destruction capability. Within that framework resort to first use of strategic nuclear weapons by either side appears to Westerners to be irrational, although there are grounds for believing that the Soviets desire at least a politically usable superiority in throwweight, perhaps including the appearance of a first-strike capability. On the other hand, the modifications introduced in the US posture by former Secretary Schlesinger to provide limited, selective nuclear options against military targets have also been interpreted by some as a nascent attempt at a first-strike capability (Ref. 24).

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At the theater strategic force level, there has been little change since the late fifties in the overall balance in capability to deliver sheer destruction, although on the Western side there have been significant changes in the components of such capability. The dominant shift has been from heavy reliance on forward-based medium range US bombers together with vulnerable, land-based and somewhat provocative IRBMs (Thor and Jupiter) to much greater reliance on relatively invulnerable US Poseidon missiles allocated to SACEUR. Although the Soviet IR/MRBMs deployed in the Western Military Districts of the USSR continue to "hold Europe hostage", much less is made of that in Soviet propaganda since the Soviets have achieved approximate parity in intercontinental systems and since the French have developed and the UK maintained a significant, if not balancing, strategic retaliatory capability.

At the theater tactical level, differences and trends in NATO and Warsaw Pact capabilities can be accounted for largely by differences in technology and in the defensive and offensive orientations of the two alliance systems. US technology gave, and US "doctrine" and policy supported, an early emphasis on artillery and ADM systems with low yields to defeat armored penetrations at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) - quite probably on NATO territory. Similarly, nuclear arming of air defense (AD) missiles was feasible and judged desirable against the threat of surprise attack from the air. Consistent with the withdrawal of forward-based US IRBMs, US forward-based bombers were assigned more tactical missions of deep interdiction within non-Soviet Pact territory to give them a less threatening or provocative role. While the US was thus giving its nuclear weapons deployed on the Continent a distinctive defensive character, it was also emphasizing conventional defense and the criticality of the "firebreak" between conventional and nuclear defense. Simultaneously, Soviet and Pact doctrine and force reorganization were moving during the sixties in quite a different direction. With more limited technological nuclear options, the Soviets nonetheless emphasized the centrality of nuclear technology to all forms of war (Ref. 25-27). Though much Soviet military literature could be interpreted as aimed at developing Western inhibitions to conduct any form of war, it seems evident from the massive Soviet literature, including training manuals, from their force reorganization, from their exercises, and from the place given to mobile, theater-tactical rockets and missiles that the Soviet nuclear emphasis was more than a propaganda ploy. The consensus of Soviet military thought appeared to be that the best Soviet "defense" against a presumptive attack from NATO was a nuclear-prepared offense - probably preemptive.

Analyses and debates concerning NATO's conventional defense capability are too familiar and too complex to warrant any detailed recounting here. The principal point I would want to make for this discussion is that these analyses, debates, and resulting conventional adjustments have been greatly influenced by the intercontinental and theater strategic nuclear balances and by the theater tactical nuclear balance and perceptions of

them. For example, in the mid and late fifties when the US enjoyed intercontinental strategic superiority and no one in the West wanted to fight a conventional war in Europe, the conventional asymmetry between the Pact and NATO was probably exaggerated in order to justify and support reliance on an early resort to nuclear weapons by NATO as the principal deterrent to a Pact conventional aggression. If the worse came to worse and war broke out, NATO's superiority in types and numbers of tactical nuclear systems seemed also to provide the basis for successful defensive operations without the high cost of conventional defense in depth. The emergent Soviet IR/MRBM threat to Europe hung like a black cloud on the horizon, but it had a more convincing potential as a deterrent to a presumptive US strategic aggression than as a deterrent to a NATO nuclear augmentation of a theater defense against a Pact conventional aggression. As the US particularly began to doubt whether tactical and strategic uses of nuclear weapons could be kept separated in face of a growing Soviet intercontinental strategic nuclear capability and a theater tactical nuclear capability, US political leaders began also to doubt the military validity of reliance on tactical nuclear weapons to augment conventional defense (even when the forward deployed warheads had reached the famous "7000" level). Thus some argued that conventional parity was attainable if the Europeans and the Americans were willing to commit sufficient resources to this goal and could rationalize their national efforts into a more integrated and militarily effective force system for the Alliance (Ref. 28). Under those circumstances of the middle and late sixties, the forward deployed US nuclear systems came to be regarded by many analysts and some key policy makers as primarily a link to the US strategic nuclear forces that would serve to "deter" escalation of war from the conventional to the nuclear level and, hopefully, by extrapolation to contribute to deterrence of conventional aggression (Ref. 29). However, the troublesome apparent self-contradiction (partly resolved by making a deterrent virtue out of the uncertainty that would confront the Pact) was that if a conventional aggression did occur, such analysis and the resulting "policy" tended to make the use of theater nuclear forces a last resort and to confine initial use to the lowest tactical level on NATO territory to stave off an imminent conventional defeat.

Efforts by the US during the sixties to develop a credible (that is, deterring and war fighting) conventional defense capability and posture in Central Europe were frustrated by many factors including: (1) the US involvement in Vietnam, (2) reluctance of Europeans to appear to be preparing for an equally catastrophic World War II type of future war in Europe, (3) the strong nuclear emphasis in Soviet doctrine and force development, and (4) the now evident Soviet conventional force modernization and expansion.

In short, NATO entered the seventies - as the Nunn Amendment cited above recognizes - with new dilemmas in Europe concerning the relation of the theater nuclear forces to overall deterrence that previously relied on US strategic superiority or a presumptive mutual abhorrence of any war that might involve nuclear weapons and to conventional forces in actual war-fighting operations if deterrence of aggression should fail and Western Europe be confronted either by an attack that included nuclear preparatory fires from the beginning or began at the conventional level and forced the decision to resort to nuclear weapons on NATO. The theater nuclear force posture and its associated policy (or guidelines) for usage had been developed under significantly different conditions of the overall force balance.

#### Divergent US and European Interests

I do not need to belabor a point about divergent US and European interests in the theater nuclear force posture and concepts for its employment and how they must be continuously compromised and harmonized. Neither the US nor West Europeans want to fight a nuclear war of any sort. However, as Henry Kissinger and many others have long since pointed out, the choice may not be entirely the West's to make - whether the choice is forced on the West by a Pact attack that begins with combined nuclear-conventional operations or by a massive Pact non-nuclear attack that seeks to exploit the Pact numerical superiority in artillery and armor to defeat the West with surprise, shock, and deep armored penetrations before nuclear weapons could be usefully employed or on a Soviet assumption that Western inhibitions about crossing the nuclear threshold would paralyze NATO's theater nuclear forces.



Faced with such a Soviet/Pact capability (if not necessarily any such intention), West Europeans count heavily on the inseparability of any use of nuclear weapons in Europe from a virtual certainty of intercontinental exchanges to deter the Soviets from any initiative. Recognizing the possibility - however remote - of an aggression against West Europe, Americans naturally would wish to find means of containing it and terminating it before intercontinental exchanges became inevitable. To some Europeans the American point of view seems to weaken deterrence by raising the specter of a weakened American strategic guarantee. To some Americans the European point of view seems to foreclose all options between surrender and all out nuclear war in the face of a massive conventional attack and thus in a different way to weaken deterrence also. Much has been attempted in the last several years to assure Europeans of the credibility of the continuing American strategic nuclear guarantee - particularly through changes in the strategic posture introduced to provide limited, selective strategic nuclear options. On the European side, the EUROGROUP and its European Defense Improvement Program have attempted to assure Americans by strengthening the credibility and the capability of the forward defense posture on the Central Front. Moving both the US and West Europe away from sole reliance on a doctrine of mutual assured destruction, these programs and activities have significantly reduced the divergence in US and European interest and views.

The point where the natural, geo-political divergence comes most sharply into focus, however, is in the theater nuclear force posture and the concepts for its employment. If theater nuclear forces are only a link to the US strategic deterrent that would automatically trigger massive intercontinental exchanges, then Americans have cause to worry. If theater nuclear forces are only an augmentation to or replacement for conventional forces in the forward defense area providing for a war of attrition to be confined to the European theater, then Europeans have cause to worry. At the inter-governmental, policy levels such divergences have - sometimes painfully, sometimes slowly, sometimes too vaguely but nonetheless advantageously - been compromised and harmonized in such key documents as NATO's basic "doctrinal" statement, MC 14/3, "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area", adopted in 1967, and subsequent ministerial guidance.

It is quite possible to argue - as Richard Hart Sinnreich, an Assistant Professor at the US Military Academy, has lucidly done - that MC 14/3 and subsequent ministerial guidance have not really resolved but only contained NATO's "doctrinal dilemma" (Ref. 30). As Capt. Sinnreich points out:

MC 14/3 commits NATO to (1) meet initially any aggression short of general nuclear attack with a direct defense at the level - conventional or nuclear - chosen by the aggressor; (2) conduct a deliberate escalation if aggression cannot be contained and the situation restored by direct defense; and (3) initiate an appropriate general nuclear response to a major nuclear attack. (Ref. 30, p. 461).

Sinnreich argues that by such formulation,

adoption was achieved by framing the doctrine in terms sufficiently ambiguous to enable all parties to interpret it as they pleased. The extent of this ambiguity was nowhere more marked than in the role accorded so-called tactical nuclear weapons. Both the United States and the allies agreed on their importance, but for precisely opposite reasons - the allies because tactical nuclear weapons represented the best assurance that a European war would threaten the USSR with general nuclear war by escalation, and the United States because they offered the best hope of limiting a land war short of that catastrophe. MC 14/3 and subsequent NATO nuclear guidelines could readily accommodate either view: needless to say, however, the inherent contradiction effectively foreclosed any attempt to derive from declaratory doctrine precise guidance concerning the way in which theater nuclear weapons might ultimately be employed (Ref. 30, p. 463).

In his paper Sinnreich goes on - as I have done - to applaud the political achievements of revising the US strategic doctrine to reinstate deterrence of aggression and not merely prevention of nuclear war (Ref. 31) and of the European Defense Improvement Program to revitalize NATO. He also takes note of the current efforts focussed in the NPG to develop improvements in the theater nuclear posture. With respect to the latter, Sinnreich is exceedingly cautious if not pessimistic because he has found no convincing military utility for tactical nuclear weapons or willingness to address "the nuclear issue directly" and thus concludes that "a basic rethinking of NATO's defense concept is overdue" (Ref. 30, p. 476).

### The Deterrence/Defense Dilemma

While sharing much of the interpretation of commentators like Capt. Sinnreich, I would be neither so pessimistic about NATO's achievements in harmonizing US and European interests nor so sweeping in my prescription for what is required. Moreover, I acknowledge that there is and has been an important military "nuclear-conventional dilemma" in NATO strategy - certainly in contrast to the apparent resolution of such a dilemma at both the political and the military level in Soviet writings (Ref. 27). However, I think it puts the focus in the wrong place both politically and militarily to assert as Capt. Sinnreich does that "The failure to resolve the nuclear-conventional dilemma constitutes the greatest present danger to the success of an otherwise impressive US effort to rationalize NATO's defense posture" (Ref. 30, p. 476).

To put the issue in terms of the nuclear-conventional dilemma almost inevitably restricts thinking about tactical nuclear weapons to an intermediate role between conventional operations and (all-out) strategic nuclear operations. In that context, Americans will naturally want to hold off using them until a conventional defense is failing and then use them only to hold at the next "level" of violence with strategic nuclear weapons reserved to a last resort only when it is clear that the violence cannot be contained. Europeans will just as naturally want them to be perceived at least to be introduced early in a conflict with no evident way of stopping an escalation to the intercontinental use after an initial use that reveals NATO's resolve, if that has not succeeded in stopping the conflict.

A corollary of thinking in terms of a nuclear-conventional dilemma is to conceive of strategic nuclear weapons as having solely a deterrent function and conventional weapons as solely a war-fighting function. Again - if this reasoning is followed - Americans will naturally conceive of tactical or forward-deployed nuclear weapons almost solely in a war-fighting role as an augmentation of conventional capabilities. Europeans will just as naturally think of them almost solely in a deterrent role as an extension of (the link to) the American strategic deterrent. To be sure, some Americans may think of tactical nuclear weapons in the "European way" either because they are primarily concerned with the political

cohesion of the Alliance (of Ref. 23 and 29) or because they have an almost total abhorrence of any nuclear usage (of Ref. 28). The logical conclusion of the latter reason is, as Alain Enthoven has suggested, to abandon the search for a role for tactical nuclear weapons and probably eliminate the "middle" element of the NATO triad (Ref. 32).

One obvious difficulty with Enthoven's view is that the choice to use nuclear weapons may not be the West's to make. Mr. Enthoven's solution will also be of little comfort to Europeans who do not want to contemplate a conventional war of attrition on the Continent or to rely solely on a remote - however repeatedly declared - American strategic guarantee for deterrence of aggression against Europe. One often-examined solution to the unpleasant alternatives Enthoven's position leaves Europe in would be the development of an independent, integrated European strategic nuclear deterrent. The Netherlands Institute for Peace Questions has recently re-examined this "solution" in detail and with forceful logical analysis and found it wanting, preferring to live with present ambiguities so long as (I assume) neither Enthoven nor his most ardent American critics win the debate in the US about the role of tactical nuclear weapons (Ref. 10). The Dutch study reminds us that there currently exist substantial European (UK and French) strategic nuclear forces as well as theater-oriented US strategic forces that provide some of the deterrent value of an independent, integrated European strategic nuclear force and avert the many Alliance political problems that an attempt to create such a European force would entail or the nuclear proliferation that would be involved if European states separately sought strategic nuclear deterrence.

Among the most ardent critics of Enthoven-type thinking in America are atomic scientists and military analysts who would appear to wish to establish the firebreak between tactical usage of nuclear weapons and strategic usage. In an exchange of correspondence with Messrs Bennett, Sandoval, and Shreffler of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory in the July 1975 issue of Foreign Affairs, Enthoven accuses such critics of doing just that (Ref. 32). With emphasis on nuclear miniaturization and the lowest and almost immediate use of such "mininucs", these men believe a massive Pact attack can be stopped in its tracks without massive exchanges of nuclear weapons deep into Pact territory inviting response

in kind and, thus, leading to holocaust. This type of approach to tactical nuclear usage has been developed by one of Enthoven's correspondents (Sandoval) and other scientists who see the advent of precision guided munitions (PGM) together with miniaturization as providing the right combination for a totally new approach to defeating a massive Pact land attack (Ref. 33). In a similar view, the French analyst, Marc Geneste, also sees possibilities for a credible nuclear defense force (Ref. 17). Thus this approach cannot be dismissed merely as American protectionism.

The Sandoval et al approach suffers the same difficulty as the Enthoven approach in not taking adequate account that a Pact attack might be nuclear from the beginning and not merely conventional. Also as in the Enthoven approach strategic nuclear forces tend to be viewed only in a deterrent role before war occurs and conventional forces in a defense role only if deterrence fails. Between these poles, Enthoven would concede at best a dubious contribution to deterrence from the tactical nuclear forces that vitiates against providing adequate conventional forces. Sandoval et al would prefer a primary defensive role for tactical nuclear weapons to supplant as much as supplement reliance on expensive and inadequate conventional forces if deterrence should fail.

When nuclear and conventional forces are polarized between deterrence (at the general war level) on the one hand and war-fighting (in the theater) on the other hand, forward-deployed nuclear forces (particularly tactical-battlefield forces) will be a focus of sharp contention, if not irreconcilable views. It is perhaps more valid as well as far more useful to recognize that each element of NATO's triad has both a deterrent and a defensive role - prewar and within war. If deterrence is conceived of as deterrence of aggression rather than as "deterrence of war" (a semantic confusion), it should be made to be as relevant in wartime as in peacetime even though our ultimate hope is that it will need to be relevant only in peacetime. Deterrence in this sense is properly a matter of affecting an enemy's will to initiate or to continue an aggression. It is common to conceive of deterrence, especially in peacetime, as largely a function of a credible capability to punish an enemy for any aggression. In wartime as distinct from peacetime - in my view -

deterrence continues to work so long as this capability to punish is reserved in some significant degree, while relevant military forces (including nuclear weapons) are employed to deny specific enemy objectives. The basic objectives of defensive operations are also to deny specific enemy objectives with decisiveness. Thus, in wartime, defense and "intra-war deterrence" are always supplemental. Conversely, a credible capability and concept for conducting effective defensive operations in wartime is a necessary element in establishing the peacetime credibility of deterrence.

For Europeans especially - and in my view also for Americans - theater nuclear forces (both strategic and tactical) must be conceived of as having, and given in policy and force posture as well as in concepts of operations, both deterring (peacetime and wartime) and defense roles. I would go further and argue that the other two elements of the NATO triad - strategic nuclear forces and deployed conventional forces - should be conceived in the same way; but it is vital that theater nuclear forces, occupying a pivotal position, be so conceived and so structured.

#### The Technology of Modern Weapons

Our habits of thinking about deterrence and defense are partly, at least, influenced by what technology has offered in weaponry. There was a time when feasible yields, relative vulnerability of delivery vehicles, poor target acquisition capabilities and accuracies of delivery all seemed to confirm that nuclear weapons of any sort had only a punishing capability and one that had to be employed fully and immediately at the first failure of peacetime deterrence if it was to be effective at all. Obversely, poor target acquisition capabilities and delivery accuracies also limited the defensive capabilities of conventional munitions, making their augmentation by tactical nuclear weapons appear highly desirable if not necessary against the Pact conventional threat. Technologies of surveillance and guidance now have advanced so rapidly as to appear to challenge some notions that had almost become metaphysical about what is strategic and what is tactical, about what can provide a deterring (punishing) and what a defensive (objective-denying) capability, about what can destroy specific war-making or war-supporting

capabilities. Time and space do not permit a discussion of these technologies here. James Digby's Adelphi Paper on precision-guided weapons is an excellent source for some of the technical possibilities and their doctrinal and strategy implications (Ref. 34). Suffice to say here that this advanced technology should be capitalized on to free us from previous concepts of deterrence and defense that derived more from technological limitations on what was feasible than from carefully thought out and preferred political-military approaches to what is desirable. If the "basic rethinking of NATO's defense concept" is as overdue as men like Capt. Sinnreich argue, we should be sure we engage in that rethinking on political-military (and more) grounds rather than on grounds of technological limitations or (perhaps worse) of technological opportunism to seize upon the latest gimmick.

#### A PROPOSAL

As a step in the direction of rethinking NATO's defense concept - especially concerning the initial employment of theater nuclear weapons if confronted by a Pact attack of the conventional level - I would conclude by proposing for discussion a shift in emphasis in current NATO guidance and policy.

#### Current Guidance

Current NATO Ministerial Guidance (appended to the Communique of the NATO Defence Planning Committee, Brussels, May 23, 1975) states that

The aim of NATO's strategy and military planning is to ensure security through deterrence. The primary aim is to deter an attack before it is launched, by making it clear to any aggressor that any attack on NATO would be met by a strong defence and might initiate a sequence of events which cannot be calculated in advance, involving risks to the aggressor out of all proportion to any advantages he might hope to gain. . . . Should aggression occur, the military aim is to prepare or restore the integrity and security of the NATO area by employing such forces as may be necessary within the concept of forward defence and flexibility in response. NATO forces must be prepared to use any capabilities at their disposal (including nuclear weapons) for this purpose. This determination must be evident to the aggressor (Ref. 35).

The Ministerial Guidance also indicates that, in order to implement the strategy of deterrence and defense, NATO needs a triad of forces

consisting of "conventional land, sea and air forces, a capability for the effective use of nuclear weapons for tactical purposes, and strategic nuclear forces. These elements of NATO forces should each possess a credibility of their own, and should combine to produce an interlocking system of deterrence and defence."

In further elaboration, the Guidance states:

The purpose of the tactical nuclear capability is to enhance the deterrent and defensive effect of NATO's forces against large-scale conventional attack, and to provide a deterrent against the expansion of limited conventional attacks and the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons by the aggressor. Its aim is to convince the aggressor that any form of attack on NATO could result in very serious damage to his own forces, and to emphasize the dangers implicit in the continuance of a conflict by presenting him with the risk that such a situation could escalate beyond his control up to all-out nuclear war. Conversely, this capability should be of such a nature that control of the situation would remain in NATO hands (Ref. 35).

In conformity with the concept of flexibility in response, the current NATO Ministerial Guidance is deliberately vague concerning the tactical use of nuclear weapons by NATO, particularly in terms of the nature, timing and locale of first use. This is consistent with the emphasis in the Guidance on the deterrent function of the NATO tactical nuclear capability, whose efficacy as a deterrent is strengthened if a potential aggressor is unable to predict in advance the circumstances under which NATO might employ the capability and is thereby unable to assess with any assurance the balance of risk and gain.

In theory, first NATO use could be on NATO territory, on Pact territory, on both simultaneously, or on neither. In reality, however, a number of factors appear to have converged that probably provide a convincing basis for a strong presumption on the part of NATO policy-makers, the general public, and the potential aggressors that the first tactical use of nuclear weapons by NATO would take place on NATO territory.

Among the factors that tend to lead to a presumption that initial tactical use of nuclear weapons by NATO would take place on NATO territory are the following:



- (1) Emphasis in the Ministerial Guidance that the military aim is to "preserve or restore the integrity and security of the NATO area by employing such forces as may be necessary within the concept of forward defence and flexibility in response." The statement stresses the defensive character of NATO in the face of an implied penetration of NATO territory by an aggressor. Forward defence involves the protection of NATO territory contiguous to Pact territory.
- (2) Reference in the Ministerial Guidance to the need for conventional forces strong enough to "resist and repel" a limited conventional attack and, in the case of large-scale conventional aggression, to sustain "a conventional defence in the forward areas sufficient to inflict serious losses on the aggressor. . . ." The clear implication is that conventional fighting would be defensive in nature and would take place on NATO territory.
- (3) Lack of comment in the Ministerial Guidance, in public statements by NATO officials and national spokesmen of NATO countries or in other policy documents about the precise character of NATO's initial tactical use of nuclear weapons. In the absence of such comment, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that NATO's first use would also be defensive in nature and probably in direct support of NATO conventional forces fighting on NATO territory. Such a conclusion would be supported by NATO's emphasis (official and public) on controlled, discriminating use on a modest scale against military elements clearly engaged in the aggression, partly for its military (tactical) effect but primarily for its value as a signal to the aggressor of NATO's determination to resist. Furthermore, NATO's public concern about minimizing collateral effects on the NATO civilian population and urban areas is certainly not incompatible with a presumption that first tactical use of nuclear weapons by NATO might occur on NATO territory.
- (4) The pattern of NATO exercise scenarios together with the availability of deployed nuclear delivery means capable of supporting such scenarios (large numbers of short range delivery systems with low yield weapons). The typical exercise pattern reinforces a presumption that initial tactical use of nuclear weapons by NATO would take place on NATO territory, even though most exercises go on to include follow-on tactical use on Pact territory and a subsequent general nuclear exchange.

#### Reasons for a New Approach

If the existence of a presumption that NATO first use would take place on NATO territory is a reasonable possibility, the deterrent value

of the NATO tactical nuclear capability may have been seriously undercut. Pact leadership may question whether NATO would ever take the decision to resort to tactical use of nuclear weapons if the collateral effects are to be confined solely or even mainly to NATO populace and infrastructure. Even if the Pact leaders should concede that NATO would use nuclear weapons, they might well conclude that the likely scale of NATO first use on NATO territory would inflict less damage on their military forces than the damage that might be anticipated from an initial NATO tactical use on Pact territory, or on the territory of both alliances. In any event, such a shift in the pre-attack assessment of relative costs and gains could tip the Pact leadership in the direction of committing aggression, clearly reflecting a reduction in the deterrent value of the NATO tactical nuclear capability.

In a similar but perhaps less obvious way, the war-fighting and war termination roles of NATO's tactical nuclear capability are likely to be adversely affected if a presumption that initial tactical use by NATO would occur on NATO territory goes unchallenged. For example, the military effectiveness of initial tactical use could differ significantly depending on whether use is on NATO or Pact territory. If weapons are employed on NATO territory, restrictions on locale, timing, type of delivery system, scale of use and perhaps other parameters are likely to result in reduced military effectiveness. Other complicating factors would be the increased complexities of political decision-making and the requirements for warning and protecting the local population. With respect to war termination, one might question whether initial NATO use on NATO territory would provide as strong an inducement as use on Pact territory for the Pact leadership to decide to stop its aggression.

The foregoing suggests the need to consider alternatives to the current NATO Ministerial Guidance regarding the NATO tactical nuclear capability. One alternative that warrants close inspection would be adoption of a policy by NATO that initial NATO tactical use of nuclear weapons would take place only on Pact territory. Simply stated, the proposed policy would stipulate that NATO, if forced to resort to tactical use of nuclear weapons to stem Pact aggression, would confine its initial use to military targets on Pact territory. Since there are advantages

to stating proscriptions rather than prescriptions, however, the proposed policy might be labelled "No First Use on NATO Territory," indicating only that initial NATO use of nuclear weapons for tactical purposes would not take place on NATO territory.

#### Elements to Consider

The feasibility and desirability of adopting such a policy would depend on such considerations as the following:

- (1) Policy definition. What points, specifically, would the proposed policy include? What weapons systems should be covered? What modes of employment? What about ADMs, air defense weapons, weapons for maritime use? What area limitations, if any, should be specified? What about non-US (i.e., British and French) tactical nuclear capabilities in NATO?
- (2) Impact of the proposed policy on the deterrent value of the NATO tactical nuclear capability. How would the deterrent value against Pact conventional attack be changed? How would the intra-war deterrent value against Pact tactical nuclear use be changed? Would the intra-war deterrent value against escalation by the Pact be changed?
- (3) Impact on the war-fighting aspect of the NATO tactical nuclear capability. How would the proposed policy affect NATO's ability to deal with the tactical situation at the FEBA? NATO's ability to disrupt the attack and the aggressor's reinforcement and logistic support? How would the proposed policy affect criteria for target selection, area coverage, depth and intensity of first use employment? What effect, if any, would the proposed policy have on escalation tendencies?
- (4) Impact on the war termination value of the NATO tactical nuclear capability. How would the proposed policy affect the utility of NATO's tactical nuclear capability to induce the Pact leadership to decide to stop its aggression? What would be the impact on the political and military situation that might obtain when the fighting terminates?
- (5) Impact on alliance cohesion. Would the proposed policy affect solidarity and cohesion in NATO or the Warsaw Pact and, if so, how? If there are changes in alliance cohesion on either side, would this strengthen or weaken or leave unaffected the current and projected threat posed by the Pact to NATO security? How would the changes, if any, affect the consultation and decision-making processes in NATO?

- (6) Impact on NATO force structure and deployments. Is the current and projected force basis compatible with the proposed policy? Can current and planned deployments support the proposed policy? What are the implications of the proposed policy for such matters as command and control, target acquisition, attack evaluation, and damage assessment? What changes (improvements), if any, would be required in conventional forces to enable NATO to deal effectively with aggressor forces that have penetrated NATO territory if first use on NATO territory is precluded?
- (7) Policy implementation. How could or should the proposed policy be effectively implemented as a declaratory policy? What are the arms control/arms limitation implications of the proposed policy? Would they create difficulties in implementing the proposed policy as a declaratory policy? How would the policy be executed in wartime and what steps, if any, could be taken now to facilitate its effective wartime execution?

#### Utility of the Policy Shift

Such a policy shift is not proposed because I believe it will solve all of NATO's dilemmas concerning the theater nuclear force posture, let alone other nuclear-conventional or deterrence/defense dilemmas. It is proposed seriously, however, as a meaningful clue as to where to place the emphasis that should guide our efforts to improve NATO's theater nuclear force posture. It would put Western Europe and the US on more equal footing concerning both the deterrent and defensive uses of nuclear weapons. It would also clearly have the advantage of removing the notion from anyone's mind that NATO's first resort to nuclear weapons, if compelled by a Pact attack, would be to attempt to deter the Pact from continuing its aggression by punishing NATO civilians, industry, and territory while denying the Pact its objectives within NATO territory - a notion that surely looks like destroying NATO interests in order to save them.

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## THE REDEMPTION OF PRUDENCE:

### AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SELF-INTEREST

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A delightfully cynical remark once escaped the lips of Count Cavour, a prime minister of the 1850s: "What scoundrels we would be if we did for ourselves what we are ready to do for Italy!"

This paper concerns the dialectic between personal and national morality. But, soon or late, a discussion of ethics and the national interest will also pit individualism vs. collectivism, idealism vs. realism, ideology vs. pragmatism, principles vs. situationism, and -- if theologians or ecclesiastical functionaries are permitted to join in -- religion vs. politics.

It is my premise that such dialectics may be useful up to a point, provided they fall short of shattering the conviction that the many dimensions of truth do not ultimately contradict one another. We must constantly keep working at the tasks of reconciliation, not only to overcome estrangements among groups and nations, but also to overcome the partitions of our own Balkanized minds.

So: religious ethics and political reality cannot, and must not, be sundered into two separate, sovereign domains, with only irregular courier service between them. My notion is that ethics and politics must be brought into a kind of federal relationship in which each accepts the legitimacy of the other, there is the fullest possible intercourse between them, and both acknowledge a transcendent humanist faith.

#### I. NATIONAL INTEREST AND NATIONAL STYLE

Whatever the dialectics of a general discussion of ethics and national interest, we Americans bring a peculiar dualism to it -- a dualism virtually amounting to cultural schizophrenia. While our official rhetoric concerning the Indochina War has been loaded with expressions of this schizophrenia (as we shall see), let us first repair to more ancient rhetoric for evidence.

In his inaugural address in 1845, just a year before the expansionist Mexican War, President Polk provided one of the truly classic affirmations of the American character under God, in all of its providential beneficence:

Foreign powers do not seem to appreciate the true character of our Government. Our Union is a confederation of independent states, whose policy is peace with each other and all the world. to enlarge its limits is to extend the dominions of peace over additional territories and increasing millions. The world has nothing to fear from military ambition in our government.

This is an imperial projection of national interest which asks the world to believe in the disinterested benevolence of our peaceful intentions.



My alltime favorite in this genre came from President Theodore Roosevelt in the midst of another controversy over imperialism -- and that concerning a nation with whom we have yet to develop a relationship founded upon either a reasonable view of national interest or a mature ethical perspective: Cuba. TR said 70 years ago:

I urge the adoption of reciprocity with Cuba, not only because it is iminently for our own interests to control the Cuban market and by every means to foster our supremacy in the tropical lands and waters south of us, but also because we . . . should make our sister nations of the American continent feel . . . that we desire to show ourselves disinterestedly and effectively their friend.

In such utterances as these (and there are many of them), blatant moralism combines with aggressive declarations of self-interest.

It is perhaps too simple, if not altogether unfair, to put this dualism down as a shameful display of hypocrisy. There are very deep cultural roots of this moral-political schizophrenia. The philosopher Santayana once said that the American nation had been launched with a certain "metaphysical passion" which issued in a sense of moral apartness from other nations. This spiritual isolation is a compound of at least four things: (a) Puritan certitude in being a Chosen People; (b) a "psychic necessity" to reject the Europe of our fathers (Max Lerner); (c) long absorption in our internal and material development; and (d) the experience of geographical and cultural isolation prior to the communications and transportation revolutions.

These roots nurtured a national style of the most paradoxical traits:

America fostered the most messianic pretensions alongside a special brand of "tolerance: the "melting pot."

America became the most conspicuously religious nation and the most grossly materialistic nation.

America mixed the most intense moralism and idealism with a native genius of pragmatism,

America exhibited a fervent legalism ("There ought to be a law") and an enthusiastic voluntarism.

America encouraged the most generous humanitarianism but is still unable to accept the welfare state.

America unleashed the most notorious individualism but is almost uniquely burdened with social pressures to conform.

America was a revolutionary nation which has become counter-revolutionary in order to protect its own vision and interests.

America has a singular "Founding Father complex" even while sloughing off any serious or continuing sense of history.

These unresolved paradoxes have enormous implications for our attempts to grasp the relationship between ethics and national self-interest in this country. They suggest that we are in deep trouble on both counts. We do not have a very wide-spread or mature ethic to guide and chasten our notions of national interest. On

the other hand, we do not seem to have very clear or cogent conceptions of national interest to temper our moral dispositions. Underlying both deficiencies is what I believe to be an absolutely dangerous identity crisis about our own nationhood -- to which I shall return near the end of this paper.

There is a severe dissociation of vital elements in our cultural heritage which makes our subject a peculiarly vexing one. At the risk of exaggerating this dissociation, let me propose the following:

- (1) Both our intellectual and our domestic political traditions are largely pragmatic and non-ideological.
- (2) However, there is a strong anti-political bias in the intellectual community, matched by an equally strong anti-intellectual animus in the political community.
- (3) Our most characteristic moral tradition, especially in the religious community, is both anti-intellectual and anti-political.
- (4) Our diplomatic tradition is messianic and moralistic, not least because of religious conditioning, but it also partakes of the anti-political biases of the religious and intellectual communities and the anti-intellectual biases of the religious and political communities.

We do not have an integrated humanist perspective on either politics or foreign policy, nor do either our politicians or scholars have an integrated humanist perspective on religion. By "integrated humanist perspective," I mean to suggest a wholistic outlook in which disparate disciplines and vocations accept one another as natural, necessary, and legitimate partners in the development of personal and social life. In America, however, clergy are anxious and insecure in the company of scholars and politicians. Politicians are embarrassed, uncomfortable, and/or resentful when confronted by clergy on other than ritual occasions; politicians are suspicious of scholars and they are inhospitable and contemptuous toward diplomats. Diplomats regularly curse politicians for obstructing the arts of diplomacy, scorn clergy for their moralism and missionary zeal, and discount the relevance of scholars. Scholars disdain both politicians and clergy.

These well-developed antipathies are undercurrents, if not surface waves, in most discussions of the national interest. Occupational aggressiveness and defensiveness substitute for authentic dialogue.

It is a symptom of this dissociation that the concept of national interest should so often have been advanced and attacked in either/or debates between self-styled "realists" and so-called "idealists." In such debates, we have usually been asked to choose between two mutually exclusive constructs: (a) the national interest, which is said to be rational, modest, clear-sighted, responsible; and (b) a universal ethic which claims to transcend nationalism and which has a vision of a just and humane world order.

These are false and self-defeating polarities. It is only when each of these ideas is interpreted in terms of the other that a fully responsible foreign policy becomes possible.

## II. THE VIRTUES OF NATIONAL INTEREST

An ethical appraisal of the national interest requires some kind of balance sheet in which the virtues and the vices of the concept are tallied.

The realist-idealist debate has illumined significant ethical questions, even if it has tended to force false choices upon us. The "realists" -- such as Walter Lippman, Reinhold Niebuhr, George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau -- have regularly inveighed against "moralism" in defending the doctrine of national interest. But the "realists," without always making their own moral concerns explicit, have brought certain basically ethical matters to the fore.

1. National self-interest is stressed as a civilized alternative to the fanaticism of arrogant crusaders and ideologues. As such, national interest is held to be the ally of nonviolence, or at least restrained violence: it mitigates the extremities of human suffering because it is a rational check on the otherwise uncontrollable passions of moral indignation. "It is a curious thing," Kennan once wrote, that moralism, "rooted as it unquestionably is in a desire to do away with war and violence, makes violence more enduring, more terrible, and more destructive to political stability than did the older motives of national interest. A war fought in the name of high moral principle finds no early and short of some form of total domination." While "realists" have been wont to stress the lack of pretension in such self-interest rather than any positive virtues, this is obviously an appeal for humility, tolerance, and civility in relations among nations. And that's good! And quite ethical -- but hardly a non-moral approach to foreign policy. It is a preference for one set of morals over another.

2. National self-interest is billed as a more objective approach to the real problems and actual situations which governments confront in world politics than is the purportedly utopian, visionary style of the idealists. This billing is backed with the claim that nation-states remain the major actors in the world arena -- the United Nations, international law, Spaceship Earth, and Global Village notwithstanding. The concept of "interest defined in terms of power" is, for Morgenthau, the "main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics." Such an assumption allows us to think as the statesman does, and as "disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself." Perceiving these realities of interests in action makes for more responsible attitudes toward the capacities and limitations of government. Such an appeal is not necessarily a-moral: it characteristically springs from a commitment to relevant and responsible service in meeting the security and welfare needs of people.

3. The national interest is exalted as a demand that the nation as a whole be served, above and beyond any partial, private, or petty interests. As such it is a community imperative, not simply a selfish or greedy claim. So here, too, there is ethical content in the doctrine. Citizens, institutions, enterprises, associations are enjoined to be disinterested in serving the nation: "Ask not what your country can do for you: ask what you can do for your country."

4. The national interest is advanced as a principle of trusteeship which the government assumes for the general welfare. This is the other side of the contract: citizens serve the community, leaders serve the people. Trusteeship is not an a-moral idea: it is a lofty relationship of obligation to the people. To violate national interests may be to betray this trust. Alexander Hamilton wrote in Pacificus: "Existing millions, and for the most part future generations, are concerned in the present measures of a government; while the consequences of the private action of an individual ordinarily terminate with himself, or are circumscribed with a narrow compass." From this trusteeship perspective, government leaders have no right to be "unselfish" with the interests of the people they are sworn to serve and protect. What may be condemned by idealists as national "selfishness" often turns out to reflect a high standard of accountability for the survival and wellbeing of the citizens from whom leaders derive their power and their right to govern.

5. Finally, national self-interest is featured as the empirical principle which makes nations intelligible and trustworthy to each other. Governments depend on other governments to behave more or less rationally in meeting their own vital needs. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a faithful student of "realism," puts it this way: "No nation that rejects national interest as the mainspring of its policy can survive; nor, indeed, can any nation be relied upon that acts against its national interest. Without the magnetic compass of national interest there would be no regularity and predictability in international affairs." We are therefore urged to believe that a more or less dependable framework of expectations and understandings is made possible by the universal acceptance of the doctrine of national interest.

These positive values -- humility, objectivity, community, trusteeship, dependability -- add up to the observation that national self-interest is not so much an escape from ethics in world affairs as it is an alternative ethic. Too many persons tend to seek in this doctrine a refuge from the rigors of ethical analysis. They don't want to be caught sounding "utopian" or "moralistic." National interest, standing alone, may not be a complete ethic -- but it is anything but a non-ethic.

### III. THE VICES OF NATIONAL INTEREST

To make the concept of national interest a more complete ethic, we must identify a considerable list of ethical problems too frequently associated with the doctrine.

1. National self-interest, in too many cases, simply becomes raison d'état -- that is, an unjustified, unsubstantiated claim which, far from being humble and tolerant, becomes as arrogant and oppressive as any moralism or ideology. Terrible things have been done in the name of "national interest" or "national security" or "military necessity" -- from concentration camps for Japanese-Americans to Hiroshima, from gobbling up "buffer states" to persecution of dissenters.

There is an unacknowledged contradiction in the realist analysis at just this point. First we are told that national interest is a restraining and civilizing influence, in contrast with moral passion. But then we are told that national interest is a concept which illuminates the darkest, most demonic underside of a nation's struggle for power. Morgenthau asks:

Why should we not admit that American foreign policy has been generally hardheaded and practical and at times ruthless? Why should we deny Jefferson's cunning, say, in the Puget Sound affair, the cruelty with which the Indians were treated, and the faithlessness with which treaties with the Indians were cast aside? We know that this is the way all nations are when their interests are at stake -- so cruel, so faithless, so cunning.

Certainly there is something wrong with a doctrine which, proponents claim, is at once more humane than idealism and the best clue to barbarism in foreign policy.

2. National self-interest is as much of an abstraction as any more conspicuously ethical principle. Both the effort to give it content and putting it into practice are subject to unending controversy. We may agree broadly that national interest involves such basics as the survival and welfare of the nation. But the requirements of survival and the meaning of welfare are seldom self-evident and indisputable, even at the most general policy levels. All moral invocations aside, every major foreign policy dispute in modern American history -- from the Spanish-American War to the Indochina War, from Versailles to the SALT talks, from Hawley-Smoot to the Kennedy Round -- has been beset with contrary claims as to the content of the

national interest. Rationality and objectivity, while desirable features of policy analysis, can almost never be guaranteed simply by saying: "Let's not be moralistic about this problem. Let's take a realistic view of what our national interest requires." The pretense of realism can be as arrogant and self-defeating as the pretense of idealism.

The ethically sensitive observer will therefore note that in international affairs there is not simply argument about what ought to be: there is almost uninterrupted argument about what is, what has been, and what will be. The facticity of foreign policy is often more problematical than the choice of ethical principles. For decision-makers, there is typically a moral void beyond all the intelligence reports and all the available data: a void in which one must select and give priority and meaning to what are presumed to be facts. Whether that process of selection, priority- and meaning- giving is seen as an ethical task or as a definition of the national interest may not matter too much: the requirements of imagination in coping with factual claims are not radically different from those involved in coping with moral claims. The invocation of national interest does not necessarily tell us anything about what is really "realistic" in a situation.

Two secretaries of state, John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk, seemed to present marked contrasts in their diplomatic styles. Dulles was big on the rhetoric of ideology and moralism and on visible personal initiatives; Rusk was characteristically a soft-spoken proponent of the national interest who preferred to stay in the background. There were certainly major differences in their approaches to administration and the Foreign Service. But their world-views, their priorities, their judgments about communism, China, and Vietnam were much the same. (Whether this has any relationship to the fact that both were, like Woodrow Wilson, the sons of Presbyterian preachers is perhaps not for Lutherans to decide!)

3. National self-interest is a concept which has seldom been geared in with the dynamics of change in a world racked with revolutions. The weight of realist analysis is fraught with notions of permanence and the status quo. Interests are to be protected -- but seldom overthrown, transformed, or redirected. There is thus an establishmentarian bias: a preoccupation with officialdom and its defenses, to the neglect of social and economic flux and the metamorphoses wrought by technology. There is also a tendency to view the behavior of smaller and younger states through the spectacles of greater and older states, especially nineteenth century spectacles.

Stanley Hoffman, one of the more lucid theorists of world politics, has written: "The conception of an objective and easily recognizable national interest is one which makes sense only in a stable period in which the participants play for limited ends, with limited means, and without domestic kibitzers to disrupt the players' moves." Since 1945, however, survival itself has almost always been in question, and "the most divergent courses of action can be recommended as choices for survival." Hoffman believes that "the realist analysis fails because it sees the world as a static field in which power relations reproduce themselves in timeless monotony."

4. The appeal to national self-interest is also chronically short-sighted with reference to the span of time. What seems to be in the national interest now tends, with depressing frequency, to be contrary to the longer range needs of the nation. On this score, the isolationist rejection of the League of Nations, protectionist tariffs, the dropping of atomic bombs, nuclear testing, the short-changing of social services for the sake of the warfare state, exorbitant corporate profits at the expense of healthful air and water and public safety, two decades of trying to isolate China, unequal terms of trade with poor nations, a war in Indochina which

ripped apart the fabric of all our own institutions even while devastating the people, institutions, and landscape of Indochina itself -- these policies and others must be accounted national disasters because of their long-range consequences, even though they have all been defended in the name of national interest.

There are moments when persons of the deepest ethical concern should set aside their theological and moral language and meet the proponents of national interest squarely on those grounds of interest. On those grounds they must push hard for a wider range of data, for a projection of interests over years and generations to come, for a more aggressive inquiry into the ultimate ramifications and implications of present and proposed policies. Pragmatists forever fault moralists for not heeding consequences; we badly need persons of moral imagination who will forever push pragmatists to take a much larger view of the scope of consequences. In America, pragmatists and moralists alike have too short an attention span. Hard-core devotees of the "now generation" are pathetically all-American in their lack of historical appreciation and anticipation.

Edmund Burke (whose classic definition of a political party integrated "national interest" with "principle") may now seem too mystical in his language about the state and its interests, but he did have a time perspective which Americans, of all peoples, need. The state is rightly a "partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born." Trusteeship for the nation requires long-term vision.

5. The claim that "national interest" has been effective in transcending "special interests" within the nation is very difficult to sustain. Political factions, class elites, economic enterprises, ethnic groups, religious potentates have all pretended to identify the national interest with the aggrandizement and protection of their own sub-national interests. Thus national interest is as subject to rationalization and manipulation as any more blatant ideology or moralism.

Charles Beard's historical study, The Idea of the National Interest, traced the doctrine's ancestry to the "will of the prince" and "dynastic interests." Beard finally denounced American versions of national interest as pious frauds which cloaked internal economic interests, notably in the struggle between trade-hungry merchants and land-hungry planters for control of U.S. foreign policy.

The vulnerability of an idea to cynical manipulation does not invalidate the idea itself. The history of public rhetoric consists largely of the exploitation of the noblest ideas by chauvinists, conquerors, castes, rebels, and salesmen. If we retain the idea of national interest for any legitimate uses at all, we cannot very well demonstrate that it is more efficacious on this score than an ideological credo or a moral principle. And that is at least partly because, as we shall soon stress again, national interest cannot escape being an ideological and moral construct itself.

6. One more problem with the doctrine of national interest is that it tends to be extremely artificial in isolating national goals and actions from the rest of the international scene. The world is more and more a single, shared biosphere, full of common threats and systems, interlocking resources and networks of interdependence, transnational values and aspirations. Proponents of national interest often amend their concept to allow for "mutual interests" -- but, just as often, mutual interests are perceived as contingent and coincidental, not as common responses to transnational phenomena. Policy-makers are increasingly confronted with urgent problems which require cooperative solutions internationally -- resource

depletion and monetary instability, to mention just two of the most threatening. As the self-sufficiency of even the most wealthy and militarily powerful states declines, the idea of national interest requires an increasingly cogent framework of inter-national concepts if it is to retain any utility. Certainly it can no longer be featured as "the main signpost" on the "landscape of international politics."

So the liabilities of the interest doctrine are at least as substantial as the assets: tendencies to barbarism, contentious abstractions, static bias, short time span, exploitability, domestication.

#### IV. VIETNAM AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The scheme of this paper has been to break down the old partition between "realists" and "idealists" concerning the importance of interests. One camp starts with power defined as interests and discovers that interests cannot be perceived without some scheme of ethical valuation. The other camp starts with ethical principles but is obliged to translate those principles into policies which will serve the interests of nations. Sometimes one wonders whether it matters which starting-point, you take.

Take Vietnam. U.S. prosecution of the war was rationalized on the grounds that Southeast Asia had a vital strategic importance in the "forward defense" of the nation; that the defeat of South Vietnam might result in a "world cut in two by Asian communism"; that the struggle was a "test case" for American capabilities in resisting "wars of liberation" fomented by communists; that the prestige of the U.S. was at stake in honoring its commitments, that the American stake in "organizing a durable peace" founded upon "rational rules of conduct" required our intervention -- in these and other ways was national self-interest invoked.

But -- curious thing! -- the most celebrated protagonists of national self-interest opposed the war. Political "realists" Morgenthau, Kennan, Lippman, and Niebuhr (along with Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, McCarthy, and others) all argued that the nation had no vital interest at stake in escalating or continuing the war.

As the war did escalate, and strategic doubts grew, moralistic sanctions also escalated. President Johnson, having already commenced the bombing and arrived at the brink of committing massive ground forces, declared in his April 1965 address at Johns Hopkins University: "We want nothing for ourselves, only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way." This about-face from bald claims of strategic self-interest to a pious disinterestedness was greeted by Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff thusly:

There is entirely too much truth in the repeated American assertions that we seek no advantage, no territory, no bases, no clients, from this war. It might have been better if we did. As it is, we are left with a war of belief . . . . Terrible things are to be done in such a war. The enemy is uncompromising and brutal. Torture, assassination, impalings, intimidation, and kidnaping are among his methods. We, in turn, are implicated in the destruction of villages, in civilians killed because they cannot be distinguished from combatants; we acquiesce in brutalities and torture by allies and mercenaries, in 'free-zone' bombings. . . . It becomes hardly admissible to contemplate an alternative, since now our moral

investments are as large as our material and political commitments . . . . We are morally committed because all the deaths and all the horror must be vindicated by an outcome that can conceivably justify the interpretations we have given this war.

So: both national self-interest and moral absolutism were sanctions for the war. And: national self-interest and the moral absolutism of the anti-war movement were sanctions for the opposition.

Arthur Schlesinger says that the war became a "morality trip" and that moral absolutism was the final stop:

The moralistic cant of Presidents Johnson and Nixon helped delude a lot of pilots into supposing they were doing God's work. . . . Unfortunately, instead of strengthening the national-interest wing of the opposition to the war, Vietnam seems to have incited an equally moralistic outburst on the part of the war's most clamorous critics. Too many people on both sides of the Indo-China debate feel they know exactly what the Lord would do if He only knew the facts in the case.

I have some difficulty in translating Schlesinger's "national-interest wing" into organized political influence: factions, movements, coalitions. I don't know whether, for example, religious opponents could have functioned more effectively by appealing to national interest instead of moral indignation. Religious leaders have a big credibility problem when they claim expertise in matters of expediency and neglect ethical imperatives.

The main point of these paragraphs on Vietnam, however, is that we really don't have a very clear-cut choice between national self-interest and moral principles: neither one can save us from folly or barbarism. Neither one saved us from a ghastly, grisly disaster in Vietnam, the consequences of which we cannot yet fully compute.

## V. ETHICIZING THE NATIONAL INTEREST

More constructively, our task is to relate ethics to national self-interest in a thoroughly dialectical way. It is both to politicize ethics and to ethicize interests. It is to understand that either principles or interests, standing alone, are abstractions with a terrible capacity to dehumanize and destroy human life. There is no conceptual escape from the dilemmas of concrete responsibility for the enhancement and liberation of life. Sartre once said: "The ultimate evil is man's capacity to make abstract that which is concrete."

National interests ought to concretize ethics into the particulars of power and conflict; ethics ought to concretize national interests into the particulars of persons and communities.

Four propositions may help us to understand what it means to ethicize the national interest.

- (1) National self-interest is not only a rational concept: it is an ethical concept.

National self-interest is meaningless without some notion of the good of the nation. It is hardly a value-free, non-moral idea. If it is too often used to keep ethics out of international affairs, it ought to be seen as the vehicle



of bringing ethics into international affairs. Arthur Schlesinger, for all of his skepticism about morality in world affairs, recently wrote:

It is through the idea of national interest that moral values enter most effectively into the formation of foreign policy. Here the function of morality is to clarify and civilize conceptions of national interest. Morality primarily inheres, in short, in the content a nation puts into its idea of national interest.

William T. R. Fox of Columbia's War and Peace Institute makes much the same point, but from the reverse direction:

National interest turns out to be another name for national security, and this in turn is revealed to mean the maintenance of the state's territorial integrity and its basic institutions. Now which institutions are basic? Can this question be answered except in the language of moral principle?

Some notion of the core values in a nation's identity is almost always contained in an invocation of vital interests. Some view of personhood, some definition of justice, some sense of participation in a morally significant community, some ideology -- however deficient these may be from other viewpoints -- almost always underlie even the most "neutral" versions of interest and power.

For Christians, at least a limited and provisional patriotism is an expression of love for the "nearer neighbors" and, as John Bennett would have it, such a love may be a higher good than an abstract love for humanity or an ineffectual service to distant neighbors. The national interest, after all, turns out to be a social ethic -- not a complete social ethic, but a partial and necessary one.

It was Dietrich Bonhoeffer's strong sense of national identity and interest which caused him to return to Germany from America in the summer of 1939, even though he returned as a sworn enemy of National Socialism. He had to be with his own people when their best interests were being destroyed. He could have worked for theological reconstruction or ecumenism or peace or racial justice in a number of other countries -- he had wide acquaintances and many opportunities -- but he felt the moral force of a national imperative.

(2) National self-interest includes a moral interest in both leaders and people.

Persons with ethical concern should not only busy themselves with judgments about the material and military aspects of national life. They should especially look to the moral health and vigor of the body politic. A country whose citizens cannot trust their own leaders, whose legislative processes have almost ceased to function, whose political parties have become archaic and purposeless, whose people do not feel inspired by any common ventures, whose youth are turned from idealism to disillusionment, whose minorities feel oppressed, whose friends and allies around the world have lost confidence in her essential integrity, and whom still other peoples increasingly view with bitterness or contempt -- such a country (not to mention any names!) is destroying its own most vital interests. There is no escape from this destruction in either GNP or "assured destruction capability."

The renewal of moral interests in a nation is preeminently a responsibility of its most visible leadership. The leadership the American nation needs -- and does not have in either politics or religion -- is leadership capable of radiating common purposes which touch the "better angels of our nature"; courageous enough to challenge the entrenchment of special interests in military budgets, trade policies, tax laws, transportation systems, and medical guilds; compassionate enough to identify unequivocally and unrelentingly with the victims of racist oppression; imaginative enough to enlist Americans in cooperative transnational ventures. It does not matter whether you call such leadership a national interest or a moral imperative: it is both, and it is absolutely essential.

There is one other aspect of moral interest which must be mentioned. It has to do with the motives we offer ourselves and other nations for our foreign policies. We have already noted the inconstancy of official motivation for the Vietnam War. There have been similar vacillations in justifying foreign aid. The self-interest arguments for aid, especially concerning communist threats, have been mostly for congressional and domestic consumption. The "disinterested" humanitarian motives have been for export and propaganda purposes -- and also to enlist the support of clergy and women's societies. Of course, the Capitol Hill rhetoric of self-interest is heard and read abroad, thereby exposing the "hypocrisy" of humanitarian motives. Accordingly, it has been proposed that if we mean to continue economic and technical assistance to poorer nations, we should no longer broadcast it as a philanthropy; we should stick to the colder claims of self-interest. That, however, short-changes the ethical stakes really involved, depriving our own people of the imperatives of social justice through their participation in development and depriving recipient peoples of any sense that we do indeed care about them and their struggles for nationhood. That is to squander moral interests very badly. Better it is to be candid about the mixture of self-interest and other-interest in helping poor nations; this mixture might be characterized as "reciprocity," a rather moral concept after all. Senator Fulbright has given this felicitously balanced rationale for development assistance:

The continuing need for the rich countries to assist the poor countries is a matter of both political and moral compulsion. It is difficult to see how the world's less developed countries can overcome their enormous social and economic problems without generous assistance from the more favored nations, and it is difficult to see how the rich countries can expect to be secure in their affluence as islands in a global sea of misery. But beyond the social and economic and political and strategic reasons for the rich aiding the poor is the simple motive of humanitarian conscience.

Unfortunately, present amounts and terms of aid are more cause for shame than for celebrating our humanitarian conscience.

### (3) Prudence is an ethical virtue.

Discussions of national interest regularly result in a silly and unnecessary hiatus over the political requirement of prudence. "Realists" like to claim a monopoly on the concern for prudence but tend to "de-moralize" their notions of prudence; "idealists" are usually only too willing to acquiesce in that monopoly, viewing prudence as expediency (suggesting cold, calculating, ruthless, altogether amoral).

The humanist stream of classical ethics from the ancient Greeks through St. Thomas to at least a few moderns will not permit such a hiatus. It is not only justice which is an ethical virtue: prudence is a cardinal virtue itself. So to be rational in estimating the requirements of the national good and in applying policies designed to serve that good is anything but an unworthy exercise. It is a moral mandate. Once again, we must reunite interests with ethics. And, again, Morgenthau:

The contest between utopianism and realism is not tantamount to a contest between principle and expediency, morality and immorality, although some spokesmen for the former would like to have it that way. The contest is rather between one type of political morality and another type of political morality, one taking as its standard universal moral principles abstractly formulated, the other weighing these principles against the moral requirements of concrete political action, their relative merits to be decided by a prudent evaluation of the political consequences to which they are likely to lead.

That's a somewhat self-serving way of putting the matter to the advantage of "realists," it fails to acknowledge their own problem with abstraction in the concept of interests, and it seems at odds with much of Morgenthau's early writings -- but it clearly makes prudence an intrinsic part of moral judgment and not a matter of amoral expediency.

#### (4) Perception of true self-interest requires ethical perspectives.

Self-knowledge, for individuals and for nations, is an unending, difficult, dynamic quest. At the interpersonal level, our very sense of self, from early socialization to old age, is critically dependent on the quality of our interaction with other selves. Similarly, nations depend upon the quality of their interaction with other nations to bring their own identities, needs, and deficiencies more clearly into focus. This interdependence of selfhood among nations is too infrequently acknowledged by national leaders, even when they have private intimations of what is at stake. Occasionally, however, the need to reaffirm the national self in the mirror of other nations' esteem is almost pathetic. The most obvious American version of this is in our periodic obsessions with prestige and popularity abroad: moments when both our vanity and our insecurity are painfully exposed. This is not a constant preoccupation, however, for we can also be astonishingly disrespectful of the opinions of mankind.

The ability to perceive our true national self-interests depends, in large part, upon our valuation of the perceptions and interests of other nations. Unfortunately, most of us don't have the habits of attention and communication which would enable us to view interests in this interactionist perspective. We need not only to consider the immediate and palpable notions of national interest; we need the insistent claims of a prophetic faith which will stretch our moral imagination to the remotest limits of the human family, to Pope John's celebrated doctrine of the international common good, to the vision of an incipient world community which is finally the gift of One who holds all men and nations under judgment. Without such imagination and vision we will not know who we really are and where our true interests lie. Religious persons should not forever set themselves against the national interest: they should redeem that interest by the humanism of their transcendent faith.

Perhaps no more pertinent or inspired description of these requirements has been given than John Bennett's:

We are not likely to see the degree to which there is mutuality of interests among nations nor will we continue to have the pervasive national conscience of a humane nation unless many people, including many leaders in government and agents of government abroad, care in their hearts about much more than national interest, unless they care about what happens to people in other countries. Even to have an enlightened view of national interest on the part of a nation as a whole depends upon there being within the nation many generous and committed people who see beyond the boundaries of national interest, however it may be defined. The role of the churches is obvious in nourishing this way of feeling and thinking.

Surely this is not the lowliest task for the churches of our times: to nourish such a way of feeling and thinking that nations may come to themselves because they have come to care about the needs and interests of other nations.

COUNCIL ON CHRISTIAN APPROACHES TO DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

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(6)

Arms Transfers: Some Observations on Recent Church Initiatives

Arthur Hockaday GB

The title of the third theme of this Conference, "Transfers of Arms", at once permits the bounds of discussion to be defined more closely than in the less precise but more emotive expression, "The Arms Trade". I propose to confine discussion still more closely to transfers of conventional weapons and weapon systems or their associated technology. It is in this area that particular concern has most recently been expressed in a number of Christian circles, perhaps because there has been little secular consideration of limitation of conventional arms transfers comparable with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the formation of the "club" of suppliers of nuclear power or technology. Some of the ethical considerations raised by the efforts of nations to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons are, however, relevant also to the possible limitation of transfers of conventional arms.

2. Christian concern over the moral, political, and economic implications of arms transfers has been voiced in the United Kingdom by the Catholic Institute for International Relations in a pamphlet entitled "Arms and the Third World" (November 1974), by the Commission for International Justice and Peace of the (Roman Catholic) Bishops' Conference of England and Wales in a pamphlet entitled "Christians and the Arms Trade" (1975), and by a group of bodies dedicated to the relief of poverty and

hunger (including Christian Aid, War on Want, and Oxfam) in a pamphlet entitled "Poverty and the Arms Trade" (1975); and also in France by the Permanent French Episcopal Council and the Council of the Protestant Federation of France in a pamphlet entitled "Note de Réflexion sur le Commerce des Armes" (April 1973).

3. The approaches adopted in these documents have much in common. They deplore the continuing growth of military expenditure throughout the world, particularly in developing countries where they note that it has increased substantially more rapidly than national wealth as a whole or expenditure upon social services such as education and health. They suggest that military expenditure consumes resources which could be put to better use; in the developing countries for the relief of poverty and the improvement of social conditions, and in developed countries for the provision of development aid. While they admit a right to provide for national security and self-defence, and recognise that the economic livelihood of many people depends upon the successful operation of national arms industries, they believe that the purposes for which arms are manufactured make their manufacture and their possession, or their transfer to others, incompatible with the sense of human brotherhood and the value and dignity of human life that flows from an acceptance of the loving purposes of God. They therefore call for a renewed effort to restrict the arms race and the arms trade. Specific proposals to this end include the registration and publication of all international arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations; agreement among developed countries to regulate and restrict the export of weapons; the

encouragement of an improved system of world security based on international peace-keeping; and study of the potentialities of non-violent means of defence.

4. Although the argument is concentrated to a considerable degree against the build-up of arms in developing countries without heavy industries of their own, several of the elements common to these approaches apply as much to the domestic manufacture, possession, or use of arms as to their transfer. The economic argument about the extent to which military expenditure pre-empts resources which might be used elsewhere, and the moral problem of reconciling such expenditure with the basic principles of the Christian faith, call in question our total attitude towards questions of defence and disarmament. This can be seen from the challenge of "Poverty and the Arms Trade" to "the enormous world waste every year on arms Expenditure"<sup>(1)</sup>; from the conclusion of "Christians and the Arms Trade" that "it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the nature, quantity, and quality of modern armaments present a threat not only to millions of lives but to life itself"<sup>(2)</sup>; or from the assertion of the French churchmen that Christians "reject the inevitability of the arms race"<sup>(3)</sup>, their positing of a need "to awaken consciences about the problems surrounding the arms race and the arms trade"<sup>(4)</sup>, and their recognition that "any decision on limiting the arms trade and reducing the arms industry affects economic structures"<sup>(5)</sup>.

(1) Poverty and the Arms Trade, paragraph 1

(2) Christians and the Arms Trade, paragraph 29

(3) The Arms Trade (English version published by Pax Christi, January 1974), page 15

(4) *ibid*, page 17

(5) *ibid*, page 18

5. It is entirely proper to link the questions raised by transfers of arms with wider questions. This is not so much because, as suggested by the French churchmen, "a limitation of armaments would bring, ipso facto, a lessening of pressures for their sale, and would make control of the arms trade possible"<sup>(6)</sup> a proposition whose self-evident truth I question later in this paper; or because of the association between the acquisition of arms and the development of international tension, a relationship which I believe to have more of a chicken-and-egg character than is acknowledged in the pamphlets I have cited. It is rather because, as I also suggest below, our ethical approach to the question of arms transfers cannot be wholly isolated from, and must to some extent be influenced by, our ethical approach to the possession and use of military power generally. Before considering these relationships, however, we must analyse, more carefully than I believe the documents which I have cited have analysed, those respects in which the transfer of arms raises issues distinct from those inherent in their manufacture, possession, or use.

6. The manufacture and possession of arms, and their use either for deterrence or in war, are matters on which a single national government can if it wishes take its own decisions unilaterally. The transfer of arms, on the other hand, necessarily involves decisions by two parties. Since transfers of arms normally take the form of sale, even if on specially favourable terms in respect of price or credit, I shall for convenience refer to the two parties as the vendor and the purchaser.

(6) *ibid*, page 22



And in referring to these two parties I am referring essentially to governments in view of the extent of their involvement either directly or through the granting or withholding of licences.

7. For an arms transaction to take place, not only must the vendor wish to sell, but the purchaser must decide to acquire. The vendor has no duty to respond to the purchaser's wish, but he has a right to do so if there are no overriding legal or moral obligations in the way. He may perhaps go further and claim that he is doing no more than supplying a want of the purchaser; that if he did not do so someone else would; and that he therefore sees no reason to forgo the benefits that the transaction will confer upon his balance of payments and upon his arms industry. These are, of course, the arguments that may be used by the pimp or the drug-pusher. But our abhorrence of the pimp and the drug-pusher is conditioned by our belief that prostitution and drug-taking are in themselves evil, or at least degrading. The Christian pacifist, who regards the possession of military forces by a nation-state as evil or at least degrading, can with consistency equate the seller of arms with the pimp or the drug-pusher. Whether the generality of Christians can do so, however, must depend first upon whether they regard the possession and use of arms as necessarily wrong in all circumstances; and then if, as with the majority of Christians who are not pacifists, they regard the possession and use of arms as more justifiable in some circumstances than in others, upon whether they regard the transfer of arms as nevertheless evil or degrading at all times, or whether they think it reasonable to apply a similar process of distinction in respect of circumstances. It does not necessarily follow that the recognition

of some wars as legitimate entails legitimising arms transfers also. For example, it has been regarded as easier in the just war tradition to justify military action in response to an immediate and pressing emergency than to justify those military preparations for the indefinite future which are the essence of military planning in peacetime. Arms transfers are in part a matter of assisting others to plan in military terms for the indefinite future; and as such may present problems for some Christians who stop short of absolute pacifism. But just as the evolution of deterrence as a prime objective of defence policy has overthrown much of the traditional wisdom of defence "establishments", it may be that its implications for the doctrine of the just war require a fuller and fresher analysis than they have to my knowledge received. It would certainly seem to reinforce the proposition that the prevention of war represents a higher moral priority even than the mitigation of its horrors or the determination of its legitimacy.

8. In attempting to discern the possibility of a clear ethical view, it may be useful to distinguish the political and security elements of arms transfers from their economic and industrial aspects, and to consider each from the viewpoint of the purchaser and the vendor separately.

9. In making his decision to acquire arms, the purchaser can legitimately claim to be influenced by his right of self-defence, his concern for the security of his own country or the stability of the area of which it forms part, the nature of the threats to security and stability which he perceives his neighbours to present, and the importance which he attaches to deterring those threats. His judgement of these factors may be erratic,

or his assessment of their permanence may be at fault; but it is his duty to take his decisions in the best possible faith on the basis of the best information available. Equally, but less legitimately from an ethical viewpoint, his purpose in acquiring arms may be to preserve his own power, to keep up with the neighbouring Joneses, or even to endow himself with a capability for aggression.

10. Economically, it is manifestly true not only that some developing countries are poor, but also that the great wealth which others have recently acquired is still disfigured by much poverty. But it is less easy to discern how far this is true simply because insufficient financial resources have been assigned to the relief of poverty, or how far it may also be due to an insufficiency of human resources in either quantitative or qualitative terms. It cannot be asserted purely as a matter of logic that social conditions cannot in one or two decades undergo a step-change comparable to the evolution of several centuries elsewhere; for the application of technology in other areas has produced the rapid progression (if that is the word) from the camel to the Cadillac and from the falcon to the fighter-bomber. But a basic military capability can be imported more easily and comprehensively, and requires less development of highly trained indigenous manpower, than is the case with a comparable provision of health or education services. As with the import of manufactured goods generally, it does not necessarily follow that, if funds presently spent on the purchase of arms were not so allocated, they could or would be spent on social purposes; and if restrictions on arms transfers led developing countries to pay greater attention to the development of indigenous arms industries, the claims upon their total

economic and manpower resources might well be greater in the long run than those involved in the purchase of arms for cash or commodities. The extent to which they could do this for sophisticated weapons would, however, depend on whether restrictions were placed on the export of technology as well as hardware.

11. In considering the political and security factors that will motivate the vendor, the acquisition of political influence must be regarded as uncertain. He may seek to acquire such influence by the provision of arms, or at least to deny his rivals a similar opportunity. But gratitude in international politics has no long life; and the future attitudes of the purchaser will be affected by his perceptions of the developing political scene, or perhaps even by the arrogant behaviour of the vendor's agents. The opportunities for success or failure are illustrated by the history of transactions between the Soviet bloc and Egypt over the past twenty years. Can we suppose that the Soviet government foresaw the events that would flow from their decision in 1955 to initiate a supply of arms from Czechoslovakia to Egypt, or the implications of those events for the relationship between Egypt and the West and for the Middle East as a whole? When the Soviet government decided upon massive support for the re-equipment of the Egyptian armed forces after the Six Day War of 1967, did they foresee that Egypt would within a few years eject Russian technicians, turn to the West for military support, and engage with the United States and Israel in trilateral negotiations in which the Soviet Union had no part?

12. The responsible vendor will do better to perceive his interests in terms of security and stability, and the balance of forces within an area. Within an area of tension this may lead him to eschew transactions which will create or accentuate an imbalance of forces. He may also be influenced by explicit or implicit limitation agreements into which he has entered (such as the COCOM regulations covering trade with the Soviet Union, China, or specified countries linked with one or other of them), United Nations resolutions (such as those pertaining to South Africa), or his assessment of the political acceptability of a particular foreign government. Some prospective vendors will look at these various factors more conscientiously, others more cynically; but the more conscientious the vendor's approach, the closer he comes to the ethical dilemma of how far he is justified in refusing to others the freedom of choice which he may assert in his own decisions upon the types of weapon systems with which he equips his own forces. A notable feature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference of 1975 was the dissatisfaction voiced by many non-nuclear powers who accused the nuclear powers of operating a "double standard" in their hard line against proliferation and their slow progress towards any limitation of their own nuclear forces. A similar reaction against "paternalism" might be expected if supplier countries attempted too obviously to impose restrictions upon transfers of conventional arms. A responsible case-by-case approach may be more fruitful unless and until purchasing countries openly accept limitations upon their own acquisitions.

13. But the vendor will also be greatly influenced by economic considerations. For countries such as Britain and France, the sale of arms is regarded as conferring a substantial benefit upon

the balance of payments<sup>(7)</sup> and as assisting the maintenance of a successful and prosperous domestic armament industry. This latter is in turn regarded both as an essential part of the defence effort to be expected from a major European country not in the super-power range and, particularly in the case of Britain, as a means of expanding production requirements and thus reducing the unit cost of equipment for their own armed forces.

14. Moreover the questions raised earlier about the proposition that resources allocated to military expenditure could or would, if not so allocated, be used for other social purposes are perhaps even more applicable to developed than to developing countries. Whereas it is possible to imagine a bag of gold containing the proceeds of sales of oil, and to envisage the allocation of particular pieces of gold either to military expenditure or to the relief of poverty, the gross domestic product of a developed country cannot be regarded as a bag of gold in anything like the same sense. The goods and services purchased out of a defence budget are themselves part of the total quantum of goods and services which constitutes the gross domestic product. The economic argument for the diversion of defence resources to other purposes therefore depends crucially upon the assurance that a similar input of manpower and materials could be employed elsewhere in the economy to produce an output of goods and services that would represent a comparable accretion to the wealth of the country. Nor should we ignore the ethical dilemma presented by the claims of a moral attitude whose practical application may affect the living standards or livelihood of large numbers of people employed in the industries concerned.

15. Nor, with particular reference to arms transfers, does it necessarily follow that, as suggested by the French churchmen<sup>(8)</sup>, a limitation of armaments would of itself bring a lessening of pressures for their sale. It is at least possible that the economic considerations mentioned above might lead to greater

(7) In the case of the United Kingdom, the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976 (Cmnd 6432, page 84) foresees an income of some £700 million from sales of arms 1976/77

(8) The Arms Trade, page 22 (see note (6) above)

competition and greater pressure for business in a contracting market.

16. The documents to which I have made reference have been written in vendor countries (Britain and France); they address their strictures primarily to vendor governments; and they demonstrate some uneasiness of conscience among Christians in vendor states. But just as Christians must be careful and responsible in considering, in the light of conscience, questions of defence and disarmament generally, and just as there is room for the wide range of approaches to these questions recognised by CCADD and epitomised in its title, so it is with transfers of arms. The factors to be taken into account are so numerous that it is prudent, I believe, to avoid generalisations of too pejorative a character about "the arms trade". This is not to say that "the arms trade" is a good thing in itself, but simply to suggest that "the arms trade" may be too facile an abstraction. Unless we believe, as some among us do, that any possession or use of arms is incompatible with the Christian faith, it would seem difficult to condemn all transfers of arms indiscriminately without falling into the dilemma of denying to those countries who do not themselves manufacture arms a freedom of decision which we claim for ourselves. It is perhaps more practical for the non-pacifist Christian to adopt the position that transfers of arms are as such neither morally objectionable nor unobjectionable; that some particular transfers of arms are unobjectionable while others are open to objection; and that a judgement concerning each individual transaction can be made on ethical as well as political, military, and economic grounds.

17. The vendor should accordingly look with care at the relevance of a particular weapon system to defence or deterrence against realistically perceived threats to the purchaser; at the likely effect of the supply of a particular weapon system upon the balance of military force within an area and upon its political stability; and at the relationship of the cost of the weapon system to the purchaser's economic resources. In short, he should consider as objectively as possible whether the purchase will represent a responsible expense for the purchaser to incur. He will also have regard to existing international obligations restraining supplies of arms to particular countries or regions.

18. But domestic economic and industrial considerations will place limits upon the altruism of even the best-intentioned vendor. If, therefore, there is to be any significant reduction in the growing volume of arms transfers, there must be restraint on the part of the purchasers also. It is more realistic to expect this to be effective if it is generated from below than if it is imposed from above. It is perhaps most likely to be generated from below as a self-denying ordinance on the part of a number of countries forming a regional group. A potential example of this type of restriction is the Declaration of Ayacucho issued in December 1974 by eight Latin American countries<sup>(9)</sup>. The signatories undertook "to foster and support the building of a permanent order of international peace and co-operation and to create conditions permitting the effective limitation of armaments and putting an end to their acquisition for offensive military purposes, in order to devote all the

(9) Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Venezuela



resources possible to the economic and social development of each one of the countries of Latin America".<sup>(10)</sup> It is not yet clear how, if at all, the signatories intend to proceed to the conclusion of a Convention in definitive treaty form. A meeting of experts in September 1975 made recommendations for the banning of nuclear and toxic weapons, weapons which threaten the ecology, and sophisticated offensive weapons not yet existing in the region; and suggested that their governments should study the possibility of setting ceilings or maximum limits for some (unspecified) types of weapons. While, however, this declaration may develop into a valuable complement to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America, its implementation in respect of conventional arms may be more difficult than Tlatelolco to accommodate within the national policies of the signatory states, who cannot be unaware that Peru, the convenor of the Lima Conference which issued the declaration, is herself relatively heavily armed.

19. This paper has found no easy answer to the ethical questions which should influence the Christian approach to transfers of arms; but I do not believe that there is one. Christian bodies should indeed be concerned with these questions, and some of the suggestions in the documents to which I have referred are constructive. But as with defence and disarmament questions generally, so with transfers of arms, the influence of Christian bodies is most likely to make itself felt gradually and in a longer term, while governments have to grapple with immediate practical dilemmas posed by existing political and economic

(10) Translation by Nicholas A Sims in "The Ayacucho Declaration and the Trade in Arms with Andean South America" (The Pacifist, Vol 14, No.2 (1975))

factors. What is beyond doubt is that Christian influence can be brought to bear with relevance and effect only if it is based upon a clear and rigorous analysis of the issues and a recognition of their complexity.

Note:- This paper may not be quoted or reproduced in whole or in part without the permission of the author. Although the author is a member both of the United Kingdom Civil Service and of the British Council on Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament (CCADD), the views expressed are entirely personal and do not necessarily reflect those of either the British Government or British CCADD. The author is, however, indebted to a number of fellow-members of CCADD for helpful insights obtained in discussion..

7  
AROUND FREEDOM AND TOLERANCE IN 1500 WORDS

1. "Sir, you are talking about freedom for these Africans in these Portuguese colonies, but why are we discussing this here, in our church? The freedom of which the Bible speaks is a totally different kind of freedom!"

(somebody at a local parish meeting, somewhere in Holland, 1974).

Many individual christians have an understanding of concepts like "freedom" and "tolerance" which is not christian. Nevertheless, their serious intention to be christians and to act and think as such cannot be questioned. They are fully prepared to apply the moral implications of their faith to the reality in which they live. The claim of their faith that it should rule their total daily life is indeed total. In this respect, they must be credited with applying a principle which is crucial for the christian faith, and which liberal christianity tends to neglect. The intolerance of many orthodox/pietist christians to opinions different from their own is in principle in accordance with the christian faith, while the tolerance of many liberal christians is not.

However, the totality of the claim that faith should rule total reality is achieved at a very high price: the reduction of reality to the world of direct personal relations only. Or rather: in the orthodox/pietist conception, reality is split up into a relevant part and an irrelevant part. The consequence for approaching the issues of defense and disarmament is evident. These issues belong to the realm of "politics", and that is another world. One is not personally responsible for it. Freedom for Africans has nothing to do with christian freedom. Peace in your heart/ Nuclear weapons are a tragic necessity of this world, but fortunately they need little attention, because Gods Kingdom is not of this earth.

Reconciliation between East and West is quite something else than the reconciliation which is given in Jesus Christ. The church should ring a prophetic voice about the killing of unborn children (abortion is micro-ethics), certainly, but what does the church have to do with the killing of born children in Vietnam? (That is macro-ethics= politics)!

Splitting up reality in this way leads to political conservatism. The status quo gets passive support - in the form of indifference - or active support. The man from the local parish quoted above defended at the same meeting the Portuguese colonialist position: When people say that the church should have nothing to do with politics, they always mean left-wing politics, never right-wing politics. Romans 13 is still a mighty weapon in the hands of the status quo. It is indicative that one hears less of it when a social democratic government is in power than with a conservative/liberal government.

It is tragic that popular theology, as represented by countless ordinary and devoted church members, is often so un-christian. The subservience of the official church to the state and its interests, since Constantine doubtlessly has been a major cause. A major task of theology today is to clear away the many theological barriers to political education of the local congregation. (This topic cannot be elaborated in this paper. It should be clear, however, that I do not advocate theological soul-washing as a prelude to

is more important than peace in the world (in which, after all, you are a stranger).

political brain-washing. In my opinion, indoctrination and education are mutually exclusive).

2.

"In the fabric of international life there are a great many questions which have no certain christian significance at all ...

I do not think we can conclude that it matters greatly to God whether the free trade area or the Common Market prevails in Europe, whether the British fish or do not fish in Icelandic territorial waters, or even whether Indians or Pakistani run Kashmir. It might matter, but it is hard for us, with our limited vision, to know".

(George Kennan, 1959)

The division of labour between God and government, as is often found implicitly in popular orthodox theology, has become a system in socalled "christian realism", the political offspring of American (predominantly) liberal theology. There is one marked difference: here the seperation between international politics and christian ethics is only partial. Ethics remains relevant in two respects. First, moral considerations are relevant for "the main lines", the general design. Second, moral considerations are relevant for the individual behaviour of christian politicians, statesmen and others, within the limited room which the "laws" of political behaviour can tolerate.

An example of the first is George Kennan's remark, quoted above. I remember my astonishment as I read this, some years ago.

What kind of God is the renowned diplomat talking about ? It certainly is not the God to which the Icelandic fisherman kneels down before going to sleep. It is not the God to which Indian and Pakistani christians pray. It looks like a typically American God, seen through the eyes of a super-power ("with our limited vision", as Kennan correctly says). It certainly is not the God of the Old and the New Testament without Whom not a single sparrow shall fall to the ground (Matt. 10:29). As an example of the second I remember the "christian realist" Kenneth W. Thompson who among his "relevant norms for the Cold War" mentioned the following: Americans working in foreign aid projects abroad should be aware that the choice of these projects is of course a political one but that (given that choice) religion and ethics come in as relevant for the human relations resulting from this choice.

"Christian realism" in America must, of course, be understood as a correction of 19th century optimistic liberalism<sup>and</sup> of the habit of mixing political, military and economic interests with moral principles to such a degree that compromises between conflicting interests become unthinkable. As a philosophy it may be "realism", in the sense that it adequately describes the way in which people and peoples tend to behave. But it certainly is not christian. For christians, that means that it isn't realism either.<sup>2</sup>

3.

I am Jahweh, your God, who has brought you out of Egypt, out of the house of slavery. You shall have no other gods before me.

Exodus 20:2,3.

A blend of pietism and christian realism is not rare among christian politicians, statesmen and ordinary citizens. It should be said, of course, that both pietism and christian realism contain elements which are essential for the christian faith. But their mistake is that they both are splitting up reality into two "realities". This is unchristian. It leads to a division of labour between God and government. The long tradition in christian theology of "two realms" (and of also "body" and "soul" as two separate entities) is incompatible with the biblical message. There is only One God. God and Government are not "co-ordinated" but "sub-ordinated". Romans 13 is not primarily a call for obedience to the government but an incitement to freedom - the freedom of the christian community to do its only duty: to love, - a freedom which it must and can enjoy even can in the Roman empire, because the government is put at its proper place: sub-ordinated to God.

Biblical terms are always derived from the reality of daily life. If we try to refer them to "another" reality, they lose their critical impact on the reality they stem from. The word "covenant" (berit) which is used to describe the relation between God and man is the same word as is used to describe a political covenant or treaty or alliance among peoples (cf. 1 Kings 15:19). The word "kingdom" (or "kingship": malkut, basileia) is both used to describe the kingship of God and the kingdom or kingship of any human king.

Also biblical key words such as "reconciliation", "grace", "Lord", "justice", "love", and "freedom" are words which are derived from daily social and political reality. Their christian meaning does not lift them away from this reality. Their critical impact is aimed at a transformation of reality.

For example: The theme of the 1975 Assembly of the World Council of Churches will be "Jesus Christ frees and unites". If the meeting indeed will be held in Jakarta, what will be the meaning of this message to the thousands of political prisoners in Indonesia, who are longing to be freed from their concentration camps and to be united with their families?

Christian freedom can not be fully absorbed in a certain measure of social and political freedom. But neither does it stand aloof.

4.

"Within the Atlantic Alliance fifteen sovereign nations work together to preserve peace and uphold the democratic rights and freedom of their citizens".

(A wellknown ad by the Atlantic Treaty Association).

The quotation about "freedom" at the beginning of par. 1 was from an ordinary church-member, who knew very little about international affairs. His understanding of "freedom" in the christian sense gave me, as a theologian, a feeling of guilt. If popular theology is so bad, the blame should first of all be put on many generations of professional theologians, including my own. But what about the

Atlantic Treaty Association?

It seems that here we have already our third kind of "freedom". The freedom which the somewhat pietist parish member in Holland believes to have received in Christ is, in his opinion, totally different from the freedom for which African freedom-fighters (among whom christians) are fighting. The freedom for which, according to the Atlantic Treaty Association, 15 NATO-members are working together, does not include the freedom of the citizens of at least two of these members, nor does it include the freedom of the Africans.

I can only understand the text of this advertisement if it means: "Within the Atlantic Alliance fifteen sovereign nations work together to be powerful, so that their power is superior or at least equal to the power of the Warschau Pact". If that is what it means, it can be explained why the lack of freedom in some Nato-members is tolerated or even actively supported. For power is not the same as freedom. But is that so? In my opinion, the relation between power and freedom as understood by the Atlantic Treaty Association (and by most of us, including often myself, I should confess) is the opposite of the relation as understood by the Bible. All of us - either permanently, or at some moments - are tempted to see power as a prerequisite for freedom. The Bible seems to see power as the result of freedom.

The christian concept of power, indeed, is completely different from what tends to be ours. Perhaps we should even say: according to the bible, the power of those who follow Jesus Christ is their freedom.

5. "You know that those who seem to rule the people exercise Lordship over them and their great men exercise power over them. It is not so among you. Whoever among you wants to be great must be your servant; and whoever among you wants to be first must be the slave of all. For even the Son of Man did not come to be served but to serve and to give his life as a ransom for many".

Mark 10: 42-45.

Usually the relation between power and freedom is seen at follows: Power is constituted by elements such as: wealth, weapons, knowledge. These are means to influence other people's behaviour and thinking. Who possesses power can enforce obedience. Power in itself is morally neutral. It can be used for good things and for bad things. If used for a good thing (e.g. freedom), it is good. If used for a bad thing (e.g. slavery), it is bad.

[illegible]

In this understanding of power, it is logical that power is used for assembling more power. Power is a means which almost automatically becomes a goal in itself. And it is logical that the NATO must support or tolerate unfreedom (Greece, Portugal), so that its power may not be weakened, while at the same time this power is legitimated by its presumed protection of freedom.

The biblical concept of power, however, reminds us that the sequence, described above, is not realistic. It is not so that power (consisting of arms, money, knowledge) constitutes obedience. Obedience constitutes power. For power is a relation between (groups of) people. If somebody's "power" is not obeyed, he has no power. He can try to restore his power by employing his soldiers (or his money, or his knowledge), but if the other proves to be immune (non-obedient) for this "power" (by not fearing death, or by not caring for money, or by not being impressed by knowledge), it does not exist. The sequence is: obedience → power. The kind of "power" which consists of arms, money and knowledge is rejected by Jesus in the very beginning of his journey, in the desert. He rejects the offer of all the kingdoms of the world with the words: "Go away, Satan! The Scripture says: Worship the Lord your God and serve only Him!" (Matthew 4: 10. Jesus quotes Deut. 6:13, a text which is a reminder of Ex. 20, cf. the quotation above, par.3.).

10:42-45 At a crucial moment on his journey, on his way to Jerusalem, Jesus explains what the power which is constituted by the obedience to the One Lord is. It consists of service (~~cf. the quotation~~ Cf. Ma ~~at the beginning of this paragraph~~). The disciples, who still think in terms of traditional power politics (cf Luke 9: 46; 22:24; Matth. 18:1, 20: 20,24; Mark. 9:34; 10:35-45) have difficulty in understanding this "Umwertung". They have doubts about their own ability to follow this line (cf John 14).

At the end of his journey Jesus can say: I have been given all power in heaven and on earth" (Matthew 28:18). This power is constituted by his life of strict obedience to the will of God only, a life of "powerlessness" which to outsiders seems to have ended with a complete failure (the victory of the religious and civil authorities).

What is the relation between power and freedom? Jesus does not assemble "power" (in the traditional sense) in order to "liberate" his fellowmen. The obedience which constitutes his power is freedom. For obedience to the One Lord implies in principle disobedience to all other "powers" - and a "power" which is not obeyed is not a power.

So, the christian understanding of the genealogy of power seems to be:

Obedience to God (= service) → power (= freedom).

Is this difference between two concepts of power basically a difference between theology and sociology, between religion and science, between faith and reality (or; between the "reality of faith" and the "real reality", cf. par. 1 and 2)? Not at all. Both sociology and theology understand power to be the possibility to change or control behaviour. The difference is between christian faith and, say, fascism. In the christian faith, power is constituted by justice (which is the content of obedience to Gods will), cf Jesaja 9:6. In fascism, "power" constitutes "justice" (whoever has the "power" determines what is the "law"). Unfortunately, the fascist view is widespread, both in theology (cf. Calvin) and in sociology (cf Marx).<sup>4</sup>

And most thinking about international affairs comes close to it, by fully identifying "power" with "national interest". That it might in the national interest to have less "power" is, in this thinking illogical. One needs "power" for everything, for justice, for peace even for getting rid of "power" (more arms are needed, to enhance the chances for arms control...).<sup>5</sup>

6.

You will note that it is hoped that your delegation will (...) produce and introduce a paper of not more than 1500 words for discussion in session 9 on the theme of Christian conceptions of tolerance and freedom (not only in our common political and social life, but also at the international level).

Peter Storrs, 1974.

*(Secretary of the British Committee, responsible for CCAD)*

What does this freedom from all worldly "powers" imply for international relations ?

The question is important, because international relations are part of the totality of human behaviour to which christian ethics applies.

They are not "another reality". But to answer the question is very difficult. The Dutch theologian Ernst Stern, to whose dissertation on power and obedience I am indebted for the foregoing paragraph, is in Holland wellknown for his concern for international affairs. But the examples in his book are from the sphere of private or local affairs. He admits that the crisis of the traditional "powers" and "authorities", whose "power" and "authority" is being challenged (= is being replaced), is most difficult to illustrate in international politics. So, the answers are necessarily rather personal. International politics is always to be submitted to the same test of Gods will as any other kind of human behaviour. But the Bible gives no guarantees of the correctness of human decisions - including human interpretations of what in a given situation is Gods will - and international politics tends to be very complicated.

Of course, that "power" is not what it is supposed to be can also be seen on the international scene. The lack of power of the supposedly immensely superior armed forces of the United States in Indochina was evident. The lack of power of the Soviet Union is clearly demonstrated by the difficulties in which its regime runs, both in its domestic affairs and abroad.<sup>6</sup> The absence of power (= the possibility of changing behaviour, if wanted) is most evident in superpower confrontations such as the arms race. So, reality seems to confirm the christian insight that more "power" (in the traditional sense) does not lead to more freedom. But what are the policy consequences ? Let me try to formulate three.

- Personally, I am convinced that a security system which is based on the mutual preparedness to total destruction cannot be in accordance with the will of God. Therefore, it is a task for christians to help to find a way out of this system. Perhaps the most ominous aspect of the deterrence system is that, by nature, it does not give any way out. SALT, MBFR and CSCE, remain system-immanent, whatever their results may be. So, more is needed. One can only find a way out by means of steps which are not in accordance with the unwritten laws of the logic of the system. One of these laws is that measures of disarmament should not be unilateral. Christian freedom implies the freedom to break such laws. The freedom of christian monotheism (cf Par.3. implies that "one must obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29). This freedom also implies, for instance, that for Christians there are no "NATO-commitments", unless there is reason to believe th



respecting them is more in accordance with the will of God than not respecting them.

- In the present ecumenical discussion on the international ills of racial and economic injustice, redistribution of power is considered the cure. But what kind of power? The kind of power which the poor (rightly) want is the same kind of power which the rich (wrongly) refuse to share. It is; arms, money, knowledge. It seems to me that it is indeed necessary to share this kind of "power" and that christian freedom means that we are indeed able to do so. If not, it is an indication that we are not free. The rich young man of Matth. 19 was unable to be obedient "because" he was very rich. But can "power" lead to justice? No. Sharing money, arms (in some cases, destruction should be preferred), and knowledge should be considered a means to do away with this kind of "power". (Wealth which is equally distributed is no wealth). But if we assume that there is an abundance of "power" on the one side, which corresponds to a lack of power on the other side, because the totality of "power" in the world is unequally distributed, we are working with the wrong understanding of power. At best, this can bring about that the oppressors become the oppressed. The lack of freedom will be the same.
- What about the church? In international politics, the church now often tries to function as a lobby for good things, such as human rights, development cooperation and arms control. But in doing so, it still plays the traditional power game (be it for better goals than in the past when it used to play this game on behalf of its own interests). That the church as a power block in society is crumbling is something which I personally welcome. It frees the church of many interests which in the past have hampered it in its mission to proclaim the gospel. Church history shows that churches should not fear to be small. The voice of minor groups has often in the long run proved more powerful than the "power" of established churches which in the long run proved to be like the emperor's clothes. With the church, its power is based on its weakness, for it has no other interest to protect than its only duty: to be free to love. Its transformation from a power-block into a small minority means that we must shift our emphasis from playing the traditional power-game to political education of the local parish. I must add that in this respect I am rather pessimistic. "If you continue in my word, then you are really my disciples; and you shall know the truth, and the truth will set you free" (John 8: 31,32) - yes, but meanwhile there is a crust of nearly 20 centuries of misunderstanding the message.

Finally, if, because in the last resort christians know only one loyalty: the loyalty to the One Lord, christian freedom implies in principle disobedience to all other "powers", christians must reckon with sanctions. The "powers" have dreadful means available to restore their "power". I hesitate to discuss

this, because such things are so easily said in countries like ours, where the sanctions are mostly not of a physical nature. But who does not fear death is free from the threat of execution and murder. It has no power over him. Weapons can kill, but they have no power of their own. (ruling a realm of dead is not ruling). Examples are Jesus of Nazareth, and the blood of martyrs, from the early days of the church until the days of Bonhoeffer and of today.

7. The truth would certainly do well enough if she were once left to shift for herself. She has not received, and never will receive, much assistance from the power of great men, who do not always recognize or welcome her. She does not need force to find entrance into men's minds, nor is she taught by the mouthpiece of laws. It is errors that prevail by means of borrowed and foreign aid. If truth does not capture the understanding for herself by her own light, she cannot do so by any extraneous strength.

(John Locke, A letter on Toleration, 1689)

That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is so constituted that all who enter it ipso facto pass into the allegiance and service of another prince.

(John Locke, ib)

Lastly, those who deny the existence of the Deity are not to be tolerated at all.

(John Locke, ib)

The relation between freedom and tolerance seems sufficiently adequately described in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948):

"Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right included freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance".

But this of course, does not settle the problem of intolerance. Where and when is intolerance needed, and how much? Within the context of this paper, I can only superficially touch on one aspect of this problem.

It is interesting to see how often in our time democracy is claimed by christian writers as a typically christian achievement. Not only is this historically questionable, it also tends to neglect the question of theocracy. The point is that the christian faith

is monotheistic. Christians, as said earlier, have only one loyalty: obedience to the will of God; otherwise they are no christians. So, in the christian faith there is no room for tolerance of anything which is believed to be conflicting with Gods will. (And, considering the present international scene, it is probable that christians should be highly intolerant). The claim of christian faith is total. It claims to be relevant for the totality of human existence. This means that the church cannot leave international affairs to the state. Let me conclude with two remarks on this, realizing how many questions should be raised (as the quotations from Locke illustrate in spite of their different context).

- The church can never impose its message on the state. Although it would be naïve to assume that parliamentary democracy is the final stage of political history, and although theocracy is the real focus of christian faith, theocracy always remains a prophetic concept, not a political reality. "My kingdom is not of this world" (John.18:36). Indeed: when all people and peoples will be living in accordance with Gods will - that means that God rules and that his kingship is manifest; the bible calls this: kingdom of God -, this will not be thanks to police and army, but because in the new covenant "I will put my law inside them and write it on their hearts" (Jeremiah 31:33). John 18:36 goes on: "If my kingdom were of this world my assistants would be fighting to save me from arrest by the Jews. No, my kingdom is <sup>not</sup> from here !". No system of government can do without (the availability of) some form of coercion. This means that whoever tries to make theocracy a political reality, immediately is subject to the prophetic judgment of theocracy.

- The church cannot impose its message on the state, but neither can it claim room ("tolerance") for its message. So-called freedom of religion, guaranteed by the state, is self-contradictory. Or rather: freedom of religion, guaranteed by the state, is contradictory to christian freedom. It makes the church into a sub-system within the state. The price is the loss of freedom, because the church gets a vested interest in recognizing the authority of the "authorities" which provide it with shelter, protection and room.

This doesn't mean that christian freedom exists nowhere where there is freedom of religion. But in principle christian freedom can only be guaranteed by obedience to Gods will. This is the message of the church and this is its only legitimate kind of power.

The number of its membership, the level of its income, and other worldly indicators of power are irrelevant. The only thing that counts is that it speaks the truth. The truth makes free.

My conclusion here is the same as at the end of par. 1 and par. 6. For the church, its most important task ahead with regard to the issues of defense and disarmament is the political education of its own constituency. The Dutch theologian prof. Johannes de Graaf has said: in order to see the political content of the Gospel we should not put on political glasses. We should take off our pietist-individualistic glasses.

Notes

- by one concerned church-member
- 1) A very well-organized action, supported by the Synod in my church, to protest against the U.S. Christmas-bombings in Vietnam resulted in 150.000 signatures. But a much less publicized action to make sure that the Dutch borders would be closed for a Danish movie about "the love life of Jesus" - a movie which yet had to be made! - resulted in 250.000 signatures of worried christians.
  - 2) The difference between christian faith and "realism" is not only that "realism" claims politics as a rather autonomous area, where moral considerations have only limited significance - a reduction which christian faith can never tolerate. The difference is also that "realism" uses anthropology (the selfishness of human nature) as an excuse for sheer political utilitarianism.
  - 3) The conceptual differences between "power" and "authority" - both words can be used to translate the greek "exousia" - are complicated but seem to me rather irrelevant for the purpose of this paper. The difference is greater in Dutch than in English. The reader should also be aware that, for instance, the differences in meaning between the English words "power", "force", "violence", and "authority" are not at all parallel with the differences between the German words "Macht", "Kraft", "Gewalt" and "Autorität".
  - 4) I belong to a calvinist church and in my political convictions I also feel indebted to the marxist analysis. But in Calvin's teaching on Civil Government (Institution, Book IV, ch. XX) there is a fascist element. "Power" automatically gives the right to obedience. Whoever comes to power, in whatever way, can claim this right. Resistance to him is resistance to God. Yes, nobody should dare to do anything, unless under orders. (Fortunately, there are other elements in Calvin's teaching which have inspired those who struggled for liberation). Marx' analysis of morality as reflecting and supporting the interests of the dominant class was (and is), generally spoken, correct (present day soviet Russia included). But fascism looms wherever moral principles are made subordinate to the struggle for "power", and Marx made an adequate description (of the relation between "power" and morality in the bourgeois class) into a prescription (for the proletarian class). Reinhold Niebuhr was right in saying that Marx was a "realist" when dealing with the bourgeoisie but an "idealist" when dealing with the proletariat.
  - 5) This identification of "power" with "national interest" is understandable, because the general reasoning is: you need "power" to pursue your "interest"; "power" can be defined in terms of measurable quantities; and so more "power" is always in your "interest". - It cannot be denied, of course, that nations indeed are pursuing their interest. According to "realism" they do so by nature. That seems true enough, especially when their survival as a nation is at stake. But what does it mean? If "national interest" is to be defined in terms of whatever a particular nation happens to want in a given situation, the "realist" doctrine that nations necessarily pursue their own interest is true, simply because it is a tautology: nations want what they want. The concept of "national interest" is an empty shell always ready to be filled by each power-elite according to its own (presumed) interests. It also should be noted that "realists", with all the understanding they show for politics as the struggle for power and with all their sympathy for the tragic but inevitable consequences of the perennial conflicts of interests (due to human nature), tend to show surprisingly little understanding for "radicals" who try to come to new power

6. Cf. the present economic dependence on the U.S.: the Soviet authorities couldn't even afford to tell their people the truth about Watergate. What a powerful regime ! The lack of power of hated regimes always becomes manifest at some time. Especially in Eastern Europe, where Soviet influence is supposed to be biggest, hatred and contempt among ordinary people towards the Russians seem more widespread than anywhere else, except perhaps in China.
7. Some CADD-participants will remember the paper on "The Future of Europe" which the Dutch delegation presented two years ago. In following discussions in Holland it has appeared that the "small steps", proposed in this paper, are considered dangerous, not because of their military impact as such - they hardly touch the balance of power - but because of the direction in which they point. The risks of the present direction are always mentioned in government statements about defense, but never in connection with any change. Even the recent Defense Statement by the new Dutch government, in which now the Labour Party and the more left-wing "radical" party take part, fully remains within the traditional framework. On p. 1 it says that it sees a double task: security and détente. Is it just a matter of semantics that apparently these are considered two different things ? It is taken for granted that security comes first; then comes détente. My personal feeling is that this order is not conducive to security; I don't feel secure in it.

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Un point de vue français sur la réglementation du commerce international des armes.

En condamnant, dans son homélie du 11 janvier 1976, les exportations d'armes françaises et leurs motivations économiques, le cardinal Marty a attiré l'attention sur un phénomène majeur de notre temps et suscité quelques controverses. L'opposition s'est dépêchée de tirer parti de cette prise de position pour embarrasser le gouvernement, mais sans se soucier des moyens à mettre en oeuvre pour réduire le volume des ventes d'armes. Les dirigeants politiques ont contesté le bien-fondé de l'intervention de l'archevêque de Paris en arguant des exigences d'une défense et d'une diplomatie indépendantes, mais sans convaincre ceux qui voient dans le renchérissement du pétrole le principal ~~facteur~~ facteur de la croissance des exportations d'armes. Quant aux Français, ils s'accrochent pour la plupart au recours à l'exportation de matériel de guerre pour équilibrer la balance des paiements et on conçoit qu'ils ne se soient guère émus de cette querelle. En définitive, la parole de Monseigneur Marty n'a eu qu'un faible écho et le débat qu'elle aurait dû amorcer a tourné court. <sup>Et</sup> Il est à craindre que si les Eglises persistent à aborder ce sujet délicat sur un ton "prophétique" en omettant de donner un fondement solide à leurs jugements et d'indiquer la voie à suivre pour remédier au mal diagnostiqué, elles ne contribuent à démobiliser les esprits et à perpétuer le "désordre établi".

S'agissant du commerce des armes, il importe de marquer en premier lieu son lien avec la sécurité des Etats dans un monde où le glaive demeure toujours le garant de la justice et de la paix et où le désarmement unilatéral équivaudrait selon le pape Paul VI à un "délit de manque de défense".<sup>1)</sup> Par ailleurs, si la France occupe actuellement le 3ème rang au palmarès des vendeurs d'armes, elle est nettement devancée par les deux superpuissances - Etats-Unis et Union soviétique - et, indépendamment de la Grande-Bretagne qui la talonne dans cette

1) Dans son message pour la 9ème journée mondiale de la paix (1er janvier 1976)

compétition, elle subit la concurrence de nombreux Etats, petits moyens, qui se sont révélés au cours des dernières années comme des rivaux redoutables dans la prospection des marchés. Dans un avenir prévisible, la Chine, l'Inde et le Japon sont appelés à jouer un rôle croissant dans l'approvisionnement en matériel de guerre des pays asiatiques. Enfin, on observe que de nombreux pays du Tiers-Monde veulent se doter des armes les plus sophistiquées au risque de compromettre leur développement économique et social et que certains se sont également engagés dans la voie de la constitution d'industries locales pour réduire leur dépendance vis-à-vis des fournisseurs traditionnels ou pour participer à la division internationale du travail dans le domaine de la production d'armements. Si cette tendance se confirmait la compétition des producteurs ne ferait que s'exacerber et le contrôle des flux d'armements vers les zones de tension se heurterait à des obstacles quasiment insurmontables. C'est en tenant compte de ces données ainsi que des motivations des pays acheteurs et vendeurs qu'il convient d'examiner les chances d'une réglementation internationale susceptible de réduire les inconvénients d'une prolifération anarchique des armements de type classique à travers le monde.<sup>2)</sup>

Le rôle, réel ou présumé, joué par les trafiquants d'armes dans l'exploitation des crises internationales et la prolongation des conflits avant la première guerre mondiale avait conduit les puissances de l'Entente à insérer dans le Pacte de la S.D.N. des dispositions destinées à contrôler l'activité des commerçants privés et à organiser la publicité des programmes militaires et des ventes d'armes. Cet objectif avait été partiellement atteint à la veille de la seconde guerre mondiale puisque dans la plupart des Etats industrialisés les pouvoirs publics contrôlaient la fabrication et le commerce des armes et qu'une certaine publicité était donnée aux transactions notamment dans l'Annuaire statistique du commerce des armes et des munitions<sup>2)</sup> publié sous l'égide de la S.D.N.. Certes, ces

2) Nous n'envisagerons pas le cas des armes nucléaires qui ne font pas l'objet d'un commerce. Leurs détenteurs ont d'ailleurs pris des mesures pour empêcher leur prolifération à la faveur du développement des applications pacifiques de l'énergie atomique.

mesures n'ont pas empêché la course aux armements qui a prélu-  
dé au déclenchement du second conflit mondial, mais il n'en res-  
te pas moins que l'emprise de l'Etat sur les industries de guer-  
re a facilité l'effort de réarmement des pays européens menacés  
par le nazisme. En tout cas la substitution progressive des  
personnes publiques aux trafiquants privés pour la conclusion  
des grands marchés d'armement annonçait l'évolution qui s'est  
dessinée entre-temps : les sociétés privées sont reléguées à l'  
arrière-plan alors que les "industriels-commerçants" étatiques  
occupent le devant de la scène.

C'est en vain que l'on chercherait dans la Charte  
des Nations Unies une allusion au commerce des armes. Les deux  
articles qui visent la réglementation des armements et le désar-  
mement (11 et 26) n'en font pas état et les commentateurs s'ac-  
cordent à reconnaître que sur ce point la Charte est en retrait  
par rapport au Pacte de la S.D.N.. Cette omission s'explique  
par l'état d'esprit qui prévalait au terme du second conflit  
mondial et par le discrédit dont souffrait à l'époque le paci-  
fisme de style wilsonien. En outre, le problème ne se posait  
pas avec la même acuité puisque le commerce des armes était  
réglementé dans le cadre des législations nationales et que le  
maintien et le rétablissement de la paix incombait à titre  
principal aux cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité.  
Enfin il était légitime de spéculer sur le succès d'un système  
de sécurité collective qui aurait permis de réduire au minimum  
les dépenses militaires et d'éviter la compétition des marchand-  
s d'armes. Toutefois, le "grand schisme" et la guerre froide ont  
sapé les fondements de cette construction rationnelle et depuis  
lors on assiste à une course aux armements dont le rythme ne s'  
est pas ralenti et qui affecte par contagion tous les Etats, y  
compris ceux du Tiers-Monde.

Durant les dix premières années de l'après-guerre,  
les deux Grands se sont consacrés en priorité au réarmement/de  
leurs alliés européens, tandis que les marchés du Tiers-Monde  
étaient dominés par les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne qui s'  
entendaient pour maintenir les armements à un niveau "raisonnab-  
le" et ne vendre que du matériel "rustique". La vente d'armes



soviétiques à l'Egypte en septembre 1955 et l'entrée en scène de la France marquent un tournant dans l'histoire du commerce des armes. L'accession des Etats colonisés à l'indépendance accroît le nombre des demandeurs<sup>3)</sup> tandis que les pays producteurs se livrent à une concurrence sévère pour arracher des contrats. L'U.R.S.S. étend son influence au Moyen-Orient et pénètre en Asie et en Amérique latine; l'Italie et la France rivalisent avec la Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis sur tous les continents; enfin à partir de 1965, de nouveaux fournisseurs se présentent sur le marché : République fédérale d'Allemagne, Suède, Canada, Suisse, Belgique, Israël, Afrique du Sud, .... La conjonction de tous ces facteurs s'est traduite par une formidable expansion du commerce des armes et la cristallisation d'intérêts acquis qui rendent très difficile une inversion de la tendance.<sup>4)</sup>

En dépit de la réserve des services officiels sur les modalités d'exécution des contrats et sur l'identité des pays destinataires, il est possible de se faire une opinion sur le volume des transactions d'armements, de déterminer les principaux courants d'échange et de percevoir les motivations des parties contractantes. Des Instituts internationaux tels que le S.I.P.R.I. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) et l'I.I.S.S. (International Institute for Strategic Studies) de Londres publient régulièrement des informations sur le commerce des armes et, dans les Etats à régime pluraliste, l'Administration divulgue le chiffre global des commandes et des livraisons. En revanche, dans de nombreux Etats, une conception extensive du secret s'oppose à la publicité des transactions et on en est réduit à des conjectures fondées sur les estimations souvent divergentes des "experts". C'est pourquoi, des initiatives comme celles prises par Malte en 1965 et le Danemark en 1968 en vue

3) De 1945 à 1965, le nombre des Etats indépendants est passé de 50 à 120.

4) On a estimé le montant global des ventes d'armes dans le monde en 1974 à 18 milliards de dollars, ce qui représente une augmentation de plus de 550% par rapport au chiffre de 1964. La part des grands pays exportateurs s'établissait approximativement comme suit : Etats-Unis (43%), U.R.S.S. (30%) France (9%) Grande-Bretagne (8%), autres pays (10%)

de l'enregistrement de "toutes les importations et exportations d'armes, de munitions et de matériel de guerre" et de la diffusion des informations ainsi recueillies par le Secrétariat général des Nations Unies, méritent d'être encouragées. L'adoption de ces mesures dissiperait les obscurités entretenues autour des transactions d'armes, contribuerait à réduire les tensions génératrices de courses régionales aux armements et favoriserait la prise de conscience des risques inhérents à une compétition sans frein dans ce domaine. Toutefois, le débat qui s'est instauré aux Nations Unies sur ce thème a fait apparaître que les Etats ne sont pas disposés à accorder à la communauté internationale un droit de regard sur le commerce des armes. Les vendeurs veulent conserver leur liberté d'action pour promouvoir leurs intérêts économiques et politiques et les acheteurs craignent qu'un système d'observation international ne scelle leur dépendance vis-à-vis des pays producteurs d'armements. De nombreux pays du Tiers-Monde ont fait observer à cette occasion que la publicité des ventes d'armes n'était acceptable que si elle comportait des obligations égales pour tous et s'inscrivait dans la perspective d'une limitation générale des armements.

En revanche, les risques de conflit résultant de l'accumulation d'armes dans des "zones de tension" ont inspiré des tentatives de réglementation régionale du commerce des armes. La ~~zone~~ zone géographique qui a surtout retenu ~~l'attention~~ l'attention est le Moyen-Orient et, en 1950, les Etats-Unis, la France et la Grande-Bretagne ont proclamé leur intention de contenir la course aux armements entre les Etats arabes et Israël dans des limites correspondant aux exigences de la sécurité intérieure et de la légitime défense des parties intéressées. Cet accord tripartite, qui s'apparentait davantage à un partage des marchés qu'à une limitation des ventes d'armes aux pays ~~de~~ de la région, eût pu produire des effets modérateurs si l'irruption de l'Union soviétique dans cette région n'avait mis en cause les bases de l'équilibre recherché. Depuis lors, les armes n'ont cessé d'affluer au Moyen-Orient et les engagements militaires de se multiplier; quant aux tentatives de réglementation des envois d'armes dans la région, elles se sont heurtées jusqu'à présent ~~aux tentatives~~ au préalable d'un règlement politique.

Certes, il n'est pas interdit de penser que le règlement du conflit israélo-arabe serait facilité par un accord entre les principaux fournisseurs d'armements; encore faudrait-il qu'ils soient tous parties à l'accord et qu'un mécanisme international garantisse le respect des engagements pris.

S'agissant de l'Amérique latine, qui bénéficie depuis 1951 d'une aide militaire importante des Etats-Unis, on a assisté à des tentatives de limitation des livraisons de matériel militaire sous l'Administration Kennedy. La sécurité des pays situés au sud du Rio Grande étant conditionnée avant tout par des facteurs économiques et sociaux, on avait estimé à Washington que seules étaient justifiées les acquisitions d'armes nécessaires pour assurer l'ordre public et réprimer les mouvements subversifs. L'achat d'équipements modernes tels que des avions supersoniques ne pouvait être inspiré que par des considérations de prestige parfaitement illusoire et présentait aux yeux des promoteurs de l'"alliance pour le progrès" l'inconvénient de détourner à des fins militaires des crédits susceptibles d'être affectés à la satisfaction de besoins sociaux. Ce point de vue ne fut pas accepté par certains pays latino-américains qui décidèrent de s'adresser à d'autres fournisseurs et notamment aux Européens pour se doter des moyens militaires qu'ils jugeaient nécessaires à l'affirmation de leur souveraineté. Aussi, cette zone géographique, jusqu'alors "chasse gardée américaine" est-elle devenue le champ clos d'une compétition très vive entre les industriels de l'armement.

Les recommandations de la conférence de Punta del Este d'avril 1967 relatives à une limitation des achats d'armements par les pays d'Amérique latine n'ont pas été suivies d'effet, mais les inconvénients de la course régionale aux armements ont conduit 8 pays - les 6 membres du groupe andin (Bolivie, Chili, Colombie, Equateur, Pérou et Venezuela) ainsi que l'Argentine et Panama - à signer la déclaration d'Ayacucho (9 décembre 1974) aux termes de laquelle ils s'engagent à ne pas acquérir d'armes sophistiquées à caractère offensif. On ne sait si cette déclaration annonce une concertation des pays acheteurs pour limiter le niveau des armements dans la région ou si elle se borne à consigner des vœux pieux. Quoi qu'il en soit, une

réglementation régionale du commerce des armes n'a de signification que si tous les acheteurs potentiels s'y prêtent, ce qui suppose qu'ils aient ajusté au préalable leurs ~~pro~~ politiques de sécurité et de défense en fonction de critères qui leur soient propres. Un système imposé de l'extérieur par les vendeurs d'armes serait ressenti comme discriminatoire et paternaliste et, dans l'état actuel de l'organisation de la société internationale, il serait relativement aisé de le tourner en s'adressant à des fournisseurs qui auraient conservé leur liberté d'action.

L'embargo sur les armes à destination d'un pays dont la politique est condamnée par les instances internationales ou qui se trouve dans une "zone de tension", n'apparaît pas comme un système plus efficace de réglementation. Ainsi le conflit indo-pakistanaïse de 1965 a éclaté en dépit de l'embargo décidé par les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne et les mesures prises pour le limiter n'en ont guère affecté le cours. Bien plus, les belligérants ont interprété l'attitude des Anglo-Saxons comme une trahison de leurs intérêts ce qui a conduit le Pakistan à s'adresser à la Chine et l'Inde à développer sa propre industrie d'armements. Le cas de l'Afrique du Sud illustre également les carences d'une politique d'embargo qui est observée par certains Etats, mais permet surtout à ceux qui ne se sentent pas liés par les décisions du Conseil de Sécurité de s'ouvrir de nouveaux marchés ou d'élargir leurs débouchés. Il n'existe pas d'exemple d'embargo respecté par tous les Etats, de sorte que cette mesure se traduit seulement par une redistribution des rôles, les fournisseurs traditionnels étant remplacés par des vendeurs moins scrupuleux sans que le volume global des ventes d'armes diminue.

La même observation peut être faite à propos de l'embargo sur les armes françaises à destination des pays du "champ de bataille" au Moyen-Orient. Outre que la décision du gouvernement français n'a pas empêché le réarmement à outrance des parties au conflit par les Etats-Unis, l'Union soviétique et la Grande-Bretagne, on a des raisons de douter que l'embargo ait toujours été appliqué ~~par~~ avec une rigueur extrême par les autorités chargées de le faire respecter. En tout cas, il était clair, après les révélations du Président Sadate, en août 1974, sur la présence de "Mirage" libyens en Egypte pendant la guerre

d'octobre 1973, que la clause de non-réexportation des avions vendus à la Libye n'avait pas été respectée et que l'embargo avait perdu toute signification. Aussi le gouvernement en a-t-il tiré les conséquences lors du Conseil des Ministres du 28 août 1974 et a décidé que la vente de matériels militaires aux Etats du Moyen-Orient seraient désormais autorisés après un examen cas par cas. Des contrats portant notamment sur la fourniture d'avions de type "Mirage F-1" ont été conclus depuis lors avec l'Egypte et, en décembre 1975, le Président de la République a indiqué que la France apporterait son concours à la constitution d'une industrie de défense arabe.

En juillet 1975, l'association internationale de recherche sur la paix ("International Peace Research Association" ou I.P.R.A.) a publié un manifeste en faveur du désarmement qui préconise entre autres mesures l'adoption d'un code de bonne conduite pour le transfert des matériels de guerre et un contrôle international du commerce des armes.<sup>5)</sup> Or les expériences du passé ont démontré la vanité de telles méthodes en l'absence d'une limitation générale des armements.

Aujourd'hui, les Etats disposent des moyens juridiques qui leur permettraient de régler le flux international des armements, mais étant à la fois juges et parties ils répugneront le plus souvent à sacrifier des ventes qui contribuent à l'équilibre de leur balance des paiements et à l'extension de leur influence chez les Etats "clients". En outre, la course aux armements entre les grandes puissances a favorisé l'accumulation des armements dans les secteurs géographiques couverts par les alliances militaires. Du fait de leur renouvellement constant, des stocks importants de matériel déclassé sont disponibles dans les pays de l'hémisphère-nord qui préfèrent les écouler dans le Tiers-Monde plutôt que de les "mettre à la ferraille". Par ailleurs, la mise au point des armes modernes entraîne des investissements coûteux dont l'amortissement requiert une production en série et l'ouverture de marchés extérieurs dès lors que la satisfaction des besoins de la défense nationale n'offre pas des débouchés suffisants. Enfin, le renchérissement du pétrole et le souci de réduire le déficit concomitant de la balance des paiements ont conduit les grands exportateurs

5) "Between peace and war : the quest for disarmament" - Bulletin of Peace proposals, Vol 6, N° 3/1975

à prospecter la clientèle des nouveaux riches de l'or noir et à satisfaire leurs demandes les plus extravagantes.

Il ne faut pas davantage compter sur la sagesse des pays acheteurs pour enrayer la prolifération des armes classiques. Lorsque la question d'une publicité des transactions d'armements a été évoquée aux Nations Unies ce sont les pays du Tiers-Monde qui ont opposé la résistance la plus vive à l'adoption d'une mesure pourtant modeste où ils ne voyaient qu'un subterfuge destiné à sceller leur dépendance vis-à-vis des Grands. Le fait que la course aux armements entrave leur développement économique et social ne les dissuade pas d'acquiescer les appareils de destruction les plus modernes pour affirmer leur souveraineté dans le domaine militaire et, loin de condamner la compétition entre les pays producteurs, ils considèrent qu'elle leur offre la possibilité de diversifier leur approvisionnement et de réduire ainsi leur dépendance par rapport à un fournisseur unique ou prépondérant. Même s'il entre une part d'illusion dans cette démarche, on ne saurait dénier aux Etats du Tiers-Monde le droit de se doter des instruments de leur sécurité dans un monde où la paix ne se maintient qu'armée et ce serait céder au paternalisme que de vouloir leur imposer nos modèles quelle que soit la générosité de leur inspiration.

Tout conspire donc à la prolifération des armes classiques à travers le monde, mais les chrétiens ne sauraient s'accomoder d'une situation où le commerce des armes donne trop souvent ~~lieu~~ lieu à des pratiques cyniques, entraîne des dépenses de prestige ruineuses et consolide les impérialismes en entravant le développement des pays pauvres. Dans la mesure où les ventes d'armes sur une grande échelle sont le sous-produit de la rivalité techno-militaire des Grands, on ne voit pas comment celles-là pourraient être limitées aussi longtemps que celle-ci se poursuivra. La réglementation du commerce des armes ne se conçoit donc que dans l'hypothèse d'un arrêt de la course aux armements sinon d'un désarmement général et elle suppose par conséquent une mutation radicale dans l'organisation de la sécurité des Etats et du monde. Au demeurant, c'est la conclusion à laquelle aboutit le Saint-Siège dans la déclaration sur le désarmement général qu'<sup>il</sup> ~~il~~ a transmise aux Nations Unies en juin 1976.

CCADD 1976, The Netherlands

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DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY

Memorandum on the problem of disarmament and  
security, submitted to the Netherlands parliament.

Summary of policy conclusions

On June 19, 1975, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. M. van der Stoep, and the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Dr. P.H. Kooijmans, submitted to parliament a memorandum on the problem of disarmament and security as it presents itself today.

In order to meet requests from interested people and institutions inside and outside the country, the following pages contain the English version of the summary of policy conclusions (Chapter IV of the memorandum).

September 1975



## POLICY CONCLUSIONS

The détente between East and West, which has continued during the past few years, has had little if any effect on the arms race. While it is true that the rapprochement between the great powers, notably the Soviet Union and the United States, has greatly reduced the chances of a conflict being deliberately provoked, the continuous stock-piling of nuclear and conventional weapons means that the consequences of an accidental conflict which cannot be checked at an early stage can only be catastrophic. A conflict of this kind is not inconceivable, since there are several trouble spots in the world where fighting might break out in which, in certain circumstances, the major powers might become involved.

However much the undersigned welcome the détente and the greater sense of responsibility shown by the big powers, they are deeply disturbed at the ever-rising armaments level, and they consider it essential that the détente should be accompanied by substantial reductions in existing arms systems, especially in the nuclear sector. For any large scale use of nuclear arms would have very grave consequences for humanity as a whole. Moreover, these are the very weapons in respect of which the relative stability which has been achieved could be seriously upset by technological breakthroughs. It is therefore in respect of nuclear weapons that it is most essential that effective measures should be taken for arms control and arms reduction. This should be feasible, since the present state of equilibrium permits a considerable mutual reduction of nuclear stocks. Agreements to restrict

new developments in weaponry are also very important. For it is often the fear that the other side will achieve technological breakthroughs which spurs on a country's own efforts in weapons technology.

There are three aspects to nuclear problems which deserve special mention:

Non-proliferation A.1. An increase in the number of countries in possession of nuclear weapons would mean a serious threat to international peace and security. If one state acquires nuclear weapons, other states feel threatened and insecure; this may induce them in turn to provide themselves with nuclear arms. Netherlands policy will therefore continue to aim at promoting that the Non-Proliferation Treaty be accepted as universally as possible. The Conference held recently to review this Treaty has opened up certain ways of bringing non-proliferation policy up to date. Although disappointment is being felt, and justifiably, at the failure of the nuclear powers to fulfil their obligations arising from the Treaty to impose restrictions on themselves, this must not be allowed to obscure the fact that it is of paramount importance for world security that there should be no increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear arms. Once the present psychological boundaries have been overstepped, it will be even more difficult, if not impossible, to control the nuclear armament process.

Therefore one of our main policy objectives is still to promote ratification of the Treaty by as

many states as possible, in particular those whose technological capacities mark them out as potential nuclear weapon states. The Netherlands will also make an active contribution to working out the details of the recommendations which were adopted at the Review Conference.

A.2. The success of the non-proliferation policy will also be considerably promoted if nuclear-weapon free zones are set up in areas where nuclear weapons have not yet been introduced. This is why the Netherlands has taken a positive stand towards the creation of nuclear-weapon free zones in the Middle East and Southern Asia. In the latter region India's nuclear test in spring 1974 is a complicating factor. Although the Indian government has stated that this nuclear test was only being held for peaceful purposes, there is, technologically speaking, no distinction between nuclear explosive devices for peaceful and for armaments purposes. If non-nuclear-weapon states carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, they may therefore be undermining the non-proliferation policy. For this reason the Netherlands has vigorously contributed to it that the General Assembly of the United Nations asked several competent bodies, such as the Geneva Disarmament Committee and the International Atomic Energy Agency, to continue studying the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions.

A.3. The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear arms should also be ensured by means of effective safeguards and regulations regarding the supply of fissionable material and nuclear equipment. The undersigned are therefore pleased that, after

prolonged negotiations, a number of supplier states reached agreements last year on the subject, and they hope that these arrangements will be made more widely effective by the means recommended by the Review Conference.

A.4. It is also essential that measures should be taken internationally to prevent fissionable material falling into the hands of private persons and groups. Now that the use of nuclear energy may be expected to expand and increase in importance, owing to recent events in the energy field, it is certainly most essential that effective and timely measures should be taken to ensure the physical security of nuclear materials. The Netherlands will continue to draw attention to these problems in the relevant bodies.

Thus the Non-Proliferation Treaty continues to be one of the touchstones of Netherlands disarmament policy. Though it is understandable that a number of countries should feel that the treaty's provisions are discriminatory, international security would be seriously jeopardised if the number of nuclear-weapon states increased; therefore this discriminatory element has to be accepted as the lesser evil.

On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the discriminatory effect of the NPT will be the more keenly felt, the longer the nuclear-weapon states delay in fulfilling their treaty obligations to reduce their nuclear arsenals. In this respect it is regrettable that China and France do not participate in the disarmament negotiations, but

it is no less regrettable that the results of the strategic arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States do not come up to expectations.

Curbing the  
qualitative  
arms race

B.1. It is necessary to curb and put an end to the qualitative arms race, notably between the two major nuclear powers, not only in order to strengthen the non-proliferation policy, but also to preserve international security. As we have already observed, a technological breakthrough could upset the equilibrium that has been achieved, whereas the present state of equivalence seems to be the best guarantee at the moment against the outbreak of a nuclear war. At the same time and subsequently, talks could be held about balanced reductions of the existing nuclear weapons arsenals, so that the equilibrium could function at a lower level.

In the opinion of the undersigned, a complete ban on all nuclear tests would be an important contribution towards curbing the qualitative arms race. Hitherto the obstacles to such a complete nuclear test ban have been the lack of agreement as to whether on-site inspection should be permitted, <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ the fact that it does not look as if all nuclear-weapon powers - at any rate initially - would accept such a ban (notably China and France, which did not participate in the 1963 partial nuclear test ban treaty either). However, as the Netherlands has

- pointed -

pointed out several times during disarmament discussions, these objections do not compare with the dangers of continuing the qualitative arms race. This is all the more so now that the increasing perfection of national detection capacities has sharply reduced the chances of evasion of the ban going unnoticed if on-site inspection were not allowed. The Netherlands will therefore continue to press for the conclusion as soon as possible of an arrangement banning all nuclear tests.

B.2. Such a ban should preferably include nuclear tests which are allegedly for peaceful purposes, as long as it has not been demonstrated that such tests can have a useful economic function. Past optimistic expectations on this subject have not been fulfilled during recent years.

If so-called peaceful nuclear tests were not included in a comprehensive test ban, verification of such a ban would become much more difficult, unless on-site inspection were permitted each time. As no distinction is possible between explosive devices for military and for peaceful purposes, another consequence would be that some knowledge might be acquired which could be used for armaments purposes. If it proves impossible to include peaceful nuclear explosions in a comprehensive test ban, there should be strict safeguards to prevent proliferation creeping in under the guise of peaceful

nuclear explosions

Pushing back  
the role of  
nuclear arms

C.1. More generally, the undersigned believe that the role of nuclear arms should be pushed back wherever possible, in order to avoid military conflict developing into a nuclear war. Pushing back the role of nuclear arms, it should be observed, is not only a matter of reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, but equally, if not more, a matter of creating conditions in the international community which will reduce the likelihood of conflicts breaking out, particularly conflicts which may assume nuclear proportions. Such conditions can be promoted by increasing mutual trust, consolidating relations, and achieving greater interdependence, resulting in concrete agreements. For example, it can be said that the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States of 22 June 1973 confirmed and set a seal upon their realisation that the massive use of nuclear arms in a conflict between the two world powers could only lead to mutual annihilation, and that consequently the role of nuclear arms in their relations with each other has been reduced. It is equally obvious, however, that such an agreement does not remove the tensions which could cause these arms to be actually used. Policy should therefore aim at removing the causes of tensions and disputes and at taking confidence-building measures, but equally at achieving agreements on arms control and arms limitation, because this is the way to remove disparities in power which are felt to be threatening.

a. For these reasons the greatest possible importance should be attached to the success of the Mutual Balanced Forces Reductions negotiations in Vienna. If these negotiations should result in general conventional parity being accepted by both sides,

that alone would already reduce the risk of early use of nuclear weapons.

b. At the same time the Netherlands believe that tactical nuclear arms should be included as soon as possible in the negotiations, because a quantitative reduction in nuclear arms can also be an important contribution to create normal relations within Europe. Another reason why it is so important that the MBFR negotiations should be successful is that in that case for the first time in history, groups of countries which have long regarded each other as potential enemies will have exchanged undertakings as regards the size of their armed forces, albeit only for a limited area.

C.2. Besides these policies, all of which imply already a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons, there should be the closest possible vigilance to prevent any developments that could result in increasing the significance of nuclear weapons or accentuating their role in ensuring security. This means in concrete terms:

- a. The formation of a West European nuclear force must be regarded as a serious disturbance of the political and military equilibrium which has been achieved. There must be continual checks to make sure that certain developments or measures cannot intensify a movement towards the formation of such a force.
- b. If replacement or modernisation of the existing arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons is being considered, the greatest care must be taken to ensure that this does not result in a greater nuclear potential, or in added significance of nuclear weapons in maintaining security. In particular the modernisation process must not result in the



dividing line between nuclear and conventional weapons becoming blurred.

Therefore the miniaturisation, as it is called, of nuclear arms is rejected.

- c. The highly structured deterrent system should be restricted to the area to which it now applies. There should therefore be no extension of the treaty area of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation nor should any additional tasks be entrusted to it, if this should ever be considered in the future. Certainly it cannot be denied that the strategic balance between the two major nuclear powers also makes itself felt in other areas where their interests conflict, but if the spheres of action of the two alliances were extended, this would only make it the more difficult to find a solution for the present problems in these areas.
- d. Policy should continue to aim at détente between East and West by means of arrangements and agreements which may result in common interests being consolidated, trust being restored and differences solved in a peaceful and harmonious way. At the moment the negotiations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are particularly important for the achievement of these objectives.

Notably, these talks should ensure that the recognition of the diversity of the political and socio-economic systems in the European countries does not mean that they are doomed to be divided. For if this were so we could never do more than freeze the status quo, without, by doing so, removing the deeper reasons for distrust and lack of understanding. In this

context it is essential to make it clear that it is not our intention to upset the present relations, since this would seriously threaten our own security.

This is why the Government is especially concerned that the rapprochement between East and West should not only be apparent from improved relations between governments, but also from more contact between the peoples. She is convinced that existing differences in the various systems do not rule out such contact, but that a new security structure needs this better understanding if it is to be viable and proof against unexpected setbacks. For one must try to cultivate such relationships that military confrontation can be gradually reduced, and to achieve a security structure which requires a minimum of armed force, because it has other means of settling disputes and conflicts of interests. This is only feasible in a climate of mutual trust between governments and peoples.

This approach, together with successful MBFR talks for achieving general conventional parity, will lay the foundations for a European security structure, whose final shape cannot be predicted at the moment but which could move towards a balanced level of conventional armed forces based on mutual agreement; while nuclear arms, if they cannot be completely abolished, could serve as a guarantee that the other side would not use them nevertheless at some time or another. In this context it could also be considered whether agreements could be made about no-first-use of nuclear arms and about the establishment of certain areas within which these arms may not be stored. It is obvious, that we are only just setting out on the road which must lead finally to

the security structure described above. The present stability, which should not be underestimated, requires us to consider carefully each further step to ascertain that it will not irresponsibly jeopardise this stability. Dissatisfaction with the means by which this stability is maintained compels us, however, to search energetically and persistently for ways and means of establishing security on a different basis.

Arms trade; law  
in armed con-  
flicts

D. Our understandable anxiety as to the nature of the present security structure in Europe must not be allowed to detract from our efforts to combat the factors that threaten world security. Here too it should be recognised that the concept of security cannot be split up into sections, but that a distinct improvement in world economic security, for instance, which will be the subject of various discussions in the coming months, would fundamentally promote political security by removing some major causes of tension. More specifically from the point of view of disarmament, there are also a number of problem areas here with which the undersigned are particularly concerned.

1. Our policy will continue to look for openings for curbing the international arms trade. As explained in this memorandum, it is practically impossible as yet to obtain the cooperation of the major producer and receiver countries for this purpose. Nevertheless, the Netherlands should take every care within the means at its disposal to prevent armaments industry in the developed world from coming to depend for its survival on its sales potential in other countries,

- particularly -

strengthening in conventional arms.  
defense posture of Nato will be strengthening with the same  
money through standardisation

in favour. 1) we need

2) radical

competition in arms trade

EPG

Off. della Nato attuale l'integrazione fa parte allora  
Conf. 56 nel EPG il Gruppo di ministri fa parte di  
particolarmente in the Third World countries, as this  
would make the armaments industry an autonomous factor  
in escalating the international arms trade.

2. The development of new weapons - including  
new conventional weapons - should be continually  
reviewed in the light of the present rules and  
criteria of the law applicable in armed conflicts.  
Our policy will therefore continue to aim at the  
observance and where necessary the adjustment of  
these criteria, as is being done at present by the  
Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law Applicable  
in Armed Conflicts which is being held in Geneva  
under the auspices of the Swiss Government. So long  
as the evil of war cannot be banished, efforts  
should be made to keep the human suffering involved  
to a minimum.

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Tutto  
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Comite

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attraverso le ispezioni in loco, perche off. la scienza  
sismica non permette esplosioni di rilevanti scarse  
potenza vengono.

OK European defense ~~force~~ policy.

NFR - principle doctrine non-first  
not-first use declaration bilaterale  
nel momento in cui noi proponiamo di  
ridurre le ANT

NFR interessa molto agli europei dell'est  
feuti dopo il pluriamento per il di Helsinki  
per l'URSS presenza delorsene da nuovo  
C.B.M.

## How stable is "stable deterrence"?

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prepared for the CCADD Conference  
St. Maur, Sept. 5-9, 1975.

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### Abstract

This paper is a summary of a longer article which has been published in Dutch. It is argued that the introduction of nuclear weapons in the relations between states has led to a reversal of the traditional weapon functions: while in the case of conventional weapons the functions of offense and defense are emphasized, in the case of nuclear weapons the emphasis is placed on their deterrent functions. The relevant doctrine of mutual assured destruction is supposed to be a factor of peace preservation. However, the ethical (the consciously created vulnerability of the civilian population) and political (the unavailability of nuclear weapons for political purposes) problems and dilemma's this creates for policy-makers, results in pressures to return to the traditional functions of offense and defense, summarized in the concept of damage limitation. One has to take into account the possibility of having to wage a nuclear war and the price of preventing a nuclear war through mutual assured destruction is an ongoing nuclear arms race.

I. The introduction of nuclear weapons in the military stockpiles of nations has markedly changed the relative importance of the traditional weapons-functions. As regards conventional weapons the traditional functions are offense and defense, although conventional military power has always had a deterrent function. Deterrence, however, is generally regarded as the specific function of nuclear weapons.

Already in an early stage of the arms race one had accepted the existence of a "balance of terror" between the most important opponents, the Soviet Union and the United States: both countries were deterred from attacking the other out of fear for nuclear retaliation. There is now emerging a widespread mode of thinking according to which this situation - for the benefit of world peace - might be perpetuated by stabilizing the relationship of mutual deterrence in having on both sides a stable = invulnerable deterrent. This "stable deterrence"-relationship should consist of two complementary components: (1) an "assured destruction" capability: an intentional war would be made unthinkable by the ability of safe and secure retaliation, which would be the prerogative of 2 or 3 super powers, (2) Measures of "arms control": an unintentional war - which could result from human or technical errors - could as much as possible be prevented by measures of arms control.

On the basis of this formula stable deterrence = assured destruction + arms control one could strive for political détente (war prevention, crisis management and disarmament). Although no one can deny a certain détente in the relations among the super powers, which seem to become institutionalized through the European Security Conference, MBFR and SALT, the nuclear arms race continues almost unhampered and disarmament is considered to be destabilizing as soon as the costs of the employment of force no longer are prohibitive.

The proposition that a situation of stable deterrence has helped to prevent an otherwise unavoidable war between the US and the SU is tenable - although unprovable and unrefutable which is the reason for its popularity. That this concept of stable deterrence provides a useful and acceptable basis for political détente is debatable, because peace is based upon weapons technology and not on human efforts and is continuously threatened with worldwide destruction. But that such a concept is compatible with a stable armaments level is not only historically untrue, but also intellectually incredible: the concept of "stable deterrence" is a contradictio in terminis, because it contains - as used nowadays - a number of inherently unstable elements which make the term contradict itself.

II. Strategic options can be seen as resulting from three choices concerning

(1) the posture of nuclear weapons (counterforce vs. countervalue)  
(2) the time of reaction (automatic vs. delayed), and  
(3) the scope of reaction (massive vs. limited), which results in a series of  $2^3 = 8$  options. These can be brought together in two main categories of strategic doctrines: "assured destruction" and "damage limitation". In the first category nuclear weapons are aimed mainly at cities and used for purposes of deterrence and retaliation; in the second category nuclear weapons are aimed at the opponent's nuclear arms and used for fighting purposes. Presentday strategic doctrines stress the deterrent and retaliatory functions of nuclear weapons to the detriment of offensive and defensive uses. The relationship of mutual deterrence - since SALT I legitimized as the governing strategic doctrine in the relation between the US and the SU - contains certain elements which ab initio destabilize the relationship, thereby creating strong pressures to change to strategic options of damage limitation, this leads to pressures to arms production which makes the concept of "stable deterrence" as regards this aspect of the arms race a contradictio in terminis.

Strategic options which we summarized in terms of "assured destruction" and "damage limitation" have an offensive and a defensive component:

strategic doctrines of	(a) assured destruction	(b) damage limitation
consist of		
x a defensive component to protect	one's own strategic weapons	one's own cities
and		
xx an offensive com- ponent aimed at	the cities of the opponent	the strategic weapons of the opponent
which results in the operational capabili- ty of a	"second strike" (retaliatory attack)	"first strike" (disarming attack)

Undoubtedly, the arms race has many causes of which the conscious effort to reach or maintain strategic superiority is not the least important, because superiority increases the number of options past those implying deterrence and retaliation. The armament stimulating factors which are inherent to strategic options of assured destruction are two-fold:

- (1) those factors which are part of the strategic doctrine and which are our main preoccupation; and
- (2) factors which concern the translation of strategic doctrines in concrete weapon systems; these are:

x the concept of assured destruction is not directly translatable into nuclear weapon systems: there is a considerable difference between what is necessary for minimum and maximum deterrence, and for direct and extended deterrence. Within these margins an enormous expansion of nuclear armaments is possible, which - indeed - has occurred since 1962 in the US and the SU;

xx the retaliation is measured in terms of what the opponent considers as "unacceptable damage" ( $M_c$  Namara:  $1/5 - 1/4$  of the population +  $1/3 - 1/2$  of the industrial capacity) and is an extremely flexible concept;

xxx the retaliatory power that is safe and secure in the sense that it is invulnerable, is not a constant entity but results from the effectiveness of offensive and defensive weapons systems, which change constantly and rapidly with changing technology;

xxxx finally, there are numerous asymmetries in the strategic positions of the SU and the US and the effort to attain parity on all levels is a strong upward pressure on the arms race.

III. But however important these factors, our main preoccupation is with the armament stimulating factors implicit in the doctrine of "assured destruction":

- x the doctrine of nuclear deterrence by threatening retaliation starts from the assumption that the opponent only can be deterred from a - although never clearly stated - range of political and military activities by threatening complete destruction as punishment. Such a doctrine implies the identification of the opponent with the devil, because only the prospect of total destruction deters him from carrying out his aggressive ambitions. But mutual nuclear deterrence means that this capability of total devastation is also available to the opponent and once cannot trust him of being - in all situations - equally reasonable and insightful so that one may be confronted with the fact of nuclear warfare;
- xx the doctrine of nuclear deterrence through assured destruction also implies the readiness to renounce at a certain level of costs the use of nuclear weapons as an instrument of political pressure, that is: at the level where the damage (costs) may become unacceptable. But at which point is that level reached? There is a large degree of uncertainty as to which actions the threatened use of nuclear weapons is credible, vide the present discussion about the contents and value of "the American nuclear guarantee" to Europe and its operationalization in the doctrine of flexible response. Consistent perseverance in a policy of political immobilism as imposed by the threat of nuclear extinction does not accord with the active and often competitive involvement of the great powers in the affairs of this world. That is why they keep trying to escape from a political immobilism implicit in a situation of mutual deterrence by organizing their nuclear potential so as to serve political purposes;
- xxx the mutual acceptance of the concept of nuclear retaliation - as is said to the main fruit of Salt I - also implies the acceptance of retaliation in the second instance and placing the question of one's own survival in the hands of the opponent in the first instance. Pure deterrence means that one offers the opponents the most vulnerable parts of one's political system - the cities and industrial concentrations as a pledge for one's own good conduct, while the survival of the political system is the principal mandate of each government. The moral and ethical problems this raises would in themselves be sufficient to create strong pressures to get out of this dilemma, but it is also evident that to equate the enemy with the devil and at the same time to acquiesce in the absolute vulnerability of one's population conflict emotionally and psychologically. The assumption of rational behavior of the opponent does not fit with his equation with the devil in a situation in which national survival is at stake;
- xxxx the doctrine of an invulnerable, but only for purposes of retaliation useable nuclear force implies that one reacts to actions of the opponent and retaliates for the initiative he takes. Even if one assumes that the opponent will not be so foolish as to use all his missiles in the first attack and thereby disarm



himself unilaterally, in general one does not tend to wage war on the conditions and in the circumstances the opponent determines. Besides, the circumstances in which nuclear weapons may be used do not spring into existence, but are part of crisis situations in which the use of nuclear weapons becomes a factor. If one expects nuclear war on the initiative of the opponent, there are strong pressures to pre-empt on the assumption that who takes the initiative has the benefit of surprise;

xxxxx and finally, no one can guarantee that deterrence will not fail - for whatever reason - and in such a situation it is unacceptable to have only the capacity to retaliate.

The history of the nuclear arms race illustrates that one has constantly endeavoured to get out of the dilemma's of assured destruction by looking for an escape route to damage limiting measures, which make a nuclear conflict again imaginable. If human failure to control nuclear technology puts us in a situation of possible mutual retaliation which is ethically, morally and politically unacceptable, one will persist in trying to get control of nuclear technology. The problem is, however, whether we will try this through nuclear disarmament or through a continuing arms race.

Summarizing what has been said thusfar, from the doctrine of "assured destruction" almost inevitably pressures result to put nuclear weapons at the service of purposes of damage limitation, with which would accord an offensive posture of nuclear weapons aimed at the missiles of the opponent and measures of city defense. If deterrence fails - for whichever of the five abovementioned reasons - it would be illogical to retaliate, because this would mean self-destruction. By trying to wipe out as much as possible of the opponent's weapons, one has not only the chance to "win" a nuclear war but it also is the only means to prevent one's own destruction (the 'second strike' - scenario assumes a counter force first strike of the opponent). If both parties aim at this, the recipe for nuclear arms race is given and there will be no pause in the arms race.

Theoretically such a pause is possible in a situation in which both parties are content with a counter city retaliatory force. Cities and industrial concentrations are immobile and extremely vulnerable objects for an attack in retaliation and they offer a limited and constant (that is: not rapidly multipliable) number of targets, which may be destroyed with a limited number of missiles. But missiles themselves constitute a rapidly increasable number of targets and if the accuracy of fire-ratio is not one to one - which it is positively not - there is no pause in the arms spiral. That is why it is not relevant to emphasize arms control as a complement to assured destruction, but why it is necessary to emphasize disarmament as an alternative to assured destruction.

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PROGRESS IN MBFR

Prepared for the conference of the

Council on Christian Approaches to Defense and Disarmament

Louis G. Michael

August 25, 1975

In about two weeks, following the 1975 CCADD conference, representatives of 19 states will reconvene in Vienna to pursue discussion of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe. This will be the seventh session in two years of negotiations by eleven direct participants and eight special participants<sup>1/</sup> in these talks.

It was my hope to report to CCADD on the status of these negotiations and, more importantly, to benefit from the conference discussions of MBFR, CSCE, and western military defense. Unfortunately, the Washington schedule of preparations for the upcoming Vienna talks has made this impossible. The result is a personal disappointment, and I very much regret missing the opportunity to join your most worthwhile deliberations.

I have taken the liberty of asking Professor Parrent to make available this brief paper on progress in MBFR. Coverage of the negotiations in the open literature has been scant and these notes are offered to provide a background to stimulate questions for discussion. The facts presented are as I know them. The opinions are largely my own and do not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. Government.

The MBFR negotiations concern force deployments in an agreed and limited area<sup>2/</sup> which is circumscribed by the Federal Republic of Germany, the Benelux nations, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. As the negotiations have progressed we have come to realize that questions of enduring limits on forces in this specified geographic area are as important as questions of mutual reductions of specific forces -- although

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<sup>1/</sup> Direct participants are the U.S., UK, Canada, the FRG, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, USSR, GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Special participants are Denmark, Norway, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.

<sup>2/</sup> Known as the NGA -- the NATO Guidelines Area.

the character of balanced reductions is of vital interest. The outcome of "mutual" and "balanced" force reductions means quite different things to the different MBFR participants. For the U.S., the USSR, the UK and Canada the prospect of MBFR is the effect in terms of limits on certain forces these nations would be permitted to deploy in Central Europe.<sup>3</sup> There would be no comparable reductions or limits of the armed forces of these four nations<sup>3/</sup> as a whole -- there would be no effect on the totality of their forces.

On the other hand, for the FRG, the Benelux nations, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, MBFR could come to mean limits on the totality of their military manpower or armed forces. Thus, while for some nations the talks could result only in restrictions of deployments -- for others the outcome could mean restrictions or limits closer akin to disarmament.

These different implications as well as a variety of other different perspectives of the political and military aspects of MBFR are an indication of how different motivations and interests engage those involved in the MBFR talks. Indeed common ground is not easy to find. However, coordination of a common position within NATO at Brussels has been remarkably good. And beyond the NATO forum although there has been no conclusive agreement between East and West, it would probably be unfair to characterize the Vienna negotiations as "deadlocked." The parties have been involved in an exploratory effort -- essentially a learning process. Both sides have laid out serious proposals and have engaged in probing discussions with a view toward gaining substantial understanding of one another's positions.

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<sup>3/</sup> France is not involved in the MBFR negotiations but there are implications for the French forces stationed in Germany. About two divisions of French forces are counted in the NATO computation of Allied forces in the area of reductions. There has, however, been no proposal on the part of any MBFR participant to reduce French forces.

These discussions have been generally free of polemics and have focused the major issues between NATO and the Pact. There are essentially three:

- First, the West believes MBFR must be negotiated in two phases. Phase I would involve only U.S. and USSR reductions. Phase II would address reductions including forces of all other direct participants, and progress would depend on an assessment of the implementation and results of Phase I reductions. For their part, the East -- interested in imposing limits on the Bundeswehr -- seeks to negotiate at the outset what it is that all parties would reduce -- although actual implementation of negotiated reductions would be in three phases under the Warsaw Pact plan.
- Second, the West is seeking equity of outcome through reductions resulting in a common ceiling on ground manpower on both sides. The East, on the other hand, wants equal number and equal percentage reductions designed to maintain the local "correlation of forces" which favors the Warsaw Pact.
- Third, the West wants to focus reductions on ground forces, while the East is seeking comprehensive reductions of, and limits on all types of forces, units, and armaments, including nuclear weapons.

These differences reflect historical efforts by East and West (stemming from the 1940's and early 1950's) to neutralize what are perceived to be the most potent forces and weapons of the other side. The Soviet Union sought early to halt German rearmament, to keep the FRG out of NATO, and to legitimize the maintenance of large Russian land forces in Central Europe. The East has also sought to expel U.S. air and nuclear weapons bases from the continent. At the same time the United States has worked for more

than twenty years on means to neutralize the potential impact of dominant Soviet land power deployed within 50 miles of the West European heartland.

In recent years we have diligently worked within NATO to put to use the where-with-all possessed by the Alliance to strengthen its conventional force capability. And in the 1970's, as the Allies considered the pros and cons of MBFR, the NATO approach to the negotiation was designed to target three disparities which we consider critical:

- First, the Warsaw Pact maintains a simple ground force manpower advantage of 925,000 to 777,000 in the area of immediate confrontation.
- Second, this preponderance of deployed ground manpower can be readily reinforced from the Soviet Union only three or four hundred miles from the borders of NATO -- while any U.S. reinforcement of the Alliance would have to reach Europe from 3,000 miles away -- across the Atlantic Ocean.
- Third, the character of the Eastern deployments poised in the area is offensive in nature -- this is manifested by the fact that the Warsaw Pact maintains two and a half times as many tanks in Central Europe as do the obviously defensively oriented NATO forces.

Consensus has been reached by all the participating states that MBFR address only the forces in a limited area which has been defined by mutual agreement. Any MBFR agreement about forces in this area which failed to adequately treat the disparities outlined above could create serious risks for stability by suggesting an illusion of reduced tension while in fact contributing to an improved Soviet military and political posture which could in fact be destabilizing.

The West seeks improved stability at lower levels of forces through meaningful reductions in a way which take into account the significant disparities favoring the East. The Soviets, on the other hand, argue that the existing force relationship (including these disparities) has maintained stability.

The World Disarmament Conference of 1932 is said to have failed because of the impasse with respect to the ratio of armaments. The Germans wanted equity and the French wanted to maintain security through maintenance of the status quo. For one of the major parties in Europe to give up a demand for equality would have resulted in codification of disparities it perceived to be unacceptable. For the other major party to give up demands for "security" by foregoing the existing "correlation of forces" would have meant relinquishing a position of superiority which it considered impossible to do.

MBFR may eventually be faced with a similar dilemma. However, the current Western reduction proposal offers a prospect for solution to the classic impasse.

- The approach which provides for the withdrawal of forces of the U.S. and the USSR from a narrowly defined area does not impose a requirement for the Soviet Union to reduce or limit the overall level of its forces in any way -- thus affording an ample guarantee that no legal MBFR constraint will prevent the Soviets from maintaining any correlation of forces it chooses on the continent.
- The concept of a common manpower ceiling on forces in Central Europe assures NATO that it need not legitimize a position of inferiority in the area of immediate confrontation.

The Soviet Union could easily withdraw 75,000; 100,000 men; or more from the NATO Guidelines Area without weakening its security situation or even having any significant impact on the political role played by its forces in Eastern Europe. This would still leave about twice as many Soviets in Central Europe as Americans.

What then does the NATO Alliance have to gain from MBFR? With the right kind of agreement we have the prospect of constraining Soviet offensive deployments on the borders of NATO. The result we are seeking is increased stability at lower levels of forces (a level of Soviet deployments comparable to the situation prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia is not an unreasonable starting point). From a Christian perspective this should contribute toward preventing misunderstandings in an area that has had a poor record for peace over the last 100 years.

Of course we are not seeking peace at any price. NATO's capability to build and maintain a stalwart defense must not be degraded -- without adequate defense the right to achieve the Christian ethic becomes highly theoretical. For this reason NATO should be wary of accepting enduring limits on its forces without a perceptible change in the current situation. In discussing detente recently, President Ford has suggested that "it means mutual respect and reciprocity, not unilateral concessions or one-sided agreements." We cannot accept a one-sided agreement which did not take account of the objective military disparities that now exist -- or even worse, tended to codify those disparities.

NATO is seeking improved stability at each step in MBFR, and the Allied proposal contains three elements designed to contribute to such stability:



- 1. Phased negotiation of reductions
- 2. Negotiated measures for verifying withdrawals and reductions.
- 3. Negotiated stabilizing measures.

The recent Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has resulted in declarations of intent for moderate and restrained behavior on the part of the Helsinki signatories.<sup>4/</sup> The "security" component of the CSCE declaration provides for certain voluntary measures designed to build confidence among the CSCE parties that their military activities are actually consistent with the principles to which they subscribed. These measures include pre-announcement of certain military maneuvers, and the exchange of observers at exercises.

In MBFR we are seeking more binding measures with a view toward strengthening the prospects for building confidence that stability can be enhanced on the NATO--Warsaw Pact border. NATO is seeking to negotiate (1) measures for adequately verifying compliance with an MBFR agreement and (2) measures similar to the CSCE voluntary confidence building measures. The CSCE precedent suggests that the MBFR participants should be able to agree to associated measures in MBFR.

What are the prospects for an MBFR agreement? The Soviets are certainly aware that very substantial withdrawals of their forces from Central Europe would not deprive the USSR of its capability to field massive active forces plus large reserves of trained manpower, were that required in the defense of the Soviet Union. Risks to Soviet security are difficult to identify.

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<sup>4/</sup> All the MBFR participants subscribed to the Helsinki declaration and almost all the direct MBFR participants made some reference in their national speeches at CSCE to an interest in giving attention to MBFR negotiations.

The real objective military risks must be borne by NATO. The Alliance must consider the implications of collective manpower ceilings on the continental West European powers. Agreement to a common ceiling on NATO and the Pact ground manpower in the area has been judged after careful deliberation by the Allies to make the risks acceptable. The Allied judgment however is that the risk of armament limitations in an area where the Pact has a tank superiority of about 16,000 to 6,000 over NATO would be a different matter.

NATO is seeking meaningful withdrawals of Soviet armored forces in the first instance, and is willing to withdraw an equal percentage of U.S. forces from the area. Further manpower reductions by the Pact and NATO would have to lead to manpower equality in the form of a common ceiling in the limited area of reductions. In view of the existing disparities, and the narrowly defined area of reductions this is a reasonable and logical proposition.

You might wish to weigh the prospects for progress in the negotiations in terms of these questions:

- What are the Soviet goals in MBFR? What are the risks?
- What can NATO gain from MBFR? What are the risks?
- With or without an MBFR agreement, how can NATO maintain a credible defense and deterrent on the continent?

PLAIDOYER POUR DES ARMEMENTLe Vatican répond aux Nations Unies

La réaction à la Résolution 3484 B-XXX; le Saint-Siège a présenté le document suivant à la Commission spéciale pour l'étude du rôle de l'ONU dans la question du désarmement. (Osservatore Romano, juin 1976)

I. LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS

Elle est à condamner sans réserves.

Même lorsqu'elle est inspirée par un souci de légitime défense, elle est, en fait, de par la nature des armes modernes et du fait de la situation planétaire (paralyse des puissances nucléaires: tout conflit majeur étant exclu dans leurs relations mutuelles, les conflits limités se multiplient à la périphérie de la zone de stabilité nucléaire):

1. Un danger, soit d'emploi, total ou partiel, soit de menace - la dissuasion, poussée jusqu'au chantage, étant prise pour norme de relation à l'égard des autres nations (1.)
2. Une injustice. Elle constitue en effet:
  - a. une violation du droit par le primat de la force: l'accumulation des armes devient le prétexte de la course à la puissance (cf. Infra) (2);
  - b. un vol. Les budgets fabuleux affectés à la fabrication et au stockage des armes constituent un véritable détournement de fonds de la part des "gérants" des grandes nations ou des blocs favorisés (3).

La contradiction évidente entre le gaspillage de la surproduction des engins militaires et la somme des besoins vitaux non satisfaits (pays en voie de développement; marginaux et pauvres des sociétés riches) constitue déjà une agression à l'égard de ceux qui en sont victimes. Aggression allant jusqu'au crime: même lorsqu'ils ne sont pas employés, par leur seul coût les armements tuent les pauvres, en les faisant mourir de faim (4).

On comprend la condamnation du Concile, reprise par le Synode 1974: "La course aux armements est une plaie extrêmement grave de l'humanité et lèse des pauvres d'une manière intolérable" (Gaudium et Spes, 81, 5). "Elle est un scandale" (Populorum Progression, 53).

3. Une erreur. L'un des principaux arguments ordinairement invoqué en faveur de la course aux armements est celui de la crise économique et du chômage qui résulteraient de la fermeture des usines et arsenaux militaires. Cela serait vrai s'il s'agissait d'une mutation brusque. Mais, dans le cas contraire, les sociétés industrielles ont prospéré malgré de constantes reconversions. La reconversion des usines de fabrication et des marchés militaires en usines et en produits civils se relève tout aussi possible, si on prend la peine de la planifier dans le temps. Elle est d'autant plus réalisable qu'elle procurerait des emplois en permettant d'entreprendre les grands travaux qui s'avèrent nécessaires pour la sauvegarde de l'environnement, etc.....
4. Une faute (cf. Infra). Le refus de cette reconversion "s'oppose radicalement à l'esprit humain et encore plus à l'esprit chrétien" car "il n'est pas admissible qu'on ne puisse trouver du travail pour des centaines de milliers de travailleurs qu'en les employant à construire des instruments de mort" (Paul VI, allocution au Corps Diplomatique, 10 février 1972; cf. Infra).

5. Une folie: ce système de relations internationales fondé sur la peur, le danger, l'injustice, constitue une sorte d'hystérie collective; une folie que l'histoire jugera. Elle est un non-sens puisqu'elle est un moyen qui n'atteint pas sa fin. La course aux armements n'assure pas la sécurité.
- Au niveau des armements nucléaires, elle ne confère pas un surcroît de sûreté puisqu'il y a déjà surabondance d'instruments (overkilling); elle crée des risques supplémentaires, en introduisant des instabilités susceptibles de rompre "l'équilibre de la terreur" (5).
  - Quant aux armements de type classique, leur prolifération, notamment dans les pays du tiers-monde (commerce des armes) crée des déséquilibres régionaux et, à ce titre, peut être génératrice de conflits ou alimenter les conflits en cours.

En toute hypothèse, qu'il s'agisse des armes nucléaires ou des armes de type classique, des grandes ou des petites Puissances, la course aux armements est devenue un processus cumulatif, qui a sa dynamique propre, indépendamment des sentiments d'agressivité, et qui échappe au contrôle des Etats. C'est une machine devenue folle (6).

On dit souvent du désarmement que c'est une "cause usée", "fatiguée" (du fait de ses nombreux échecs: on en parle, dit-on, depuis trop longtemps et on n'en voit pas les résultats).

Mais ne serait-ce pas plutôt la cause de l'armement qui serait usée? N'est-ce pas le postulat de la course aux armes qui donne chaque jour davantage la preuve de sa vétusté, de son caractère ana-chronique? Si l'on prend pour norme de succès ou d'efficacité des armements la paix qui en résulte, ne doit-on pas plutôt parler d'échec?

#### L'Eglise condamne la course aux armements.

Aussi le Concile est-il catégorique. Il condamne radicalement l'emploi des armes de destruction massive. C'est même la seule "excommunication" que l'on y trouve.

"Faisant siennes les condamnations de la guerre totale déjà prononcées par les derniers Papes, ce Saint Synode déclare: Tout acte de guerre qui tend indistinctement à la destruction de villes entières... avec leurs habitants est un crime contre Dieu et contre l'homme lui-même, qui doit être condamné fermement et sans hésitation".

Quant à la dissuasion, "si elle a pu servir, d'une manière paradoxale, à détourner des adversaires éventuels" (G.S. 81, 1), on peut tout au plus y voir "un délai qui nous est concédé d'en haut" (G.S. 81, 4); bref, un répit qu'il nous faut "mettre à profit" (id.) et très vite. Car, ici le temps ne travaille pas pour nous. "Par l'accumulation des armes... bien loin d'éliminer les causes de guerre, on risque au contraire de les aggraver peu à peu... Au lieu d'apaiser véritablement les conflits entre nations, on en répand plutôt la contagion à d'autres parties du monde" (G.S. 81, 2).

On ne peut donc voir dans cette compétition armée qu'une formule de transition entre "l'antique servitude de la guerre" (G.S. 81, 4) et un nouveau système, une solution neuve, de nouvelles "méthodes qui nous permettront de régler nos différents d'une manière plus digne de l'homme" (ibid.).

Sinon cette course folle entretient une fausse paix, une fausse sécurité. Elle devient une fin au lieu d'être un moyen, comme elle en avait l'illusion. Elle institue le désordre établi. Elle constitue une perversion de la paix. (7).

A temps et à contre-temps, les chrétiens, à la suite du Vicaire du Christ, ont à dénoncer cette préparation scientifique de l'humanité à sa propre mort. Ils doivent alerter l'opinion, également sur les périls grandissants qui résultent des excès nucléaires (explosions) ainsi que du transport, des stockages et de la dissémination des armes atomiques. "L'humanité, déjà en grand péril, risque d'en venir malgré... une science admirable, à cette heure funeste où elle ne pourra plus connaître d'autre paix que la paix redoutable de la mort" (G.S. 82, 4).

On comprend dès lors la sévérité du diagnostic. Aux jeux de l'Eglise la situation actuelle de prétendue sécurité est à condamner:

1. Au nom de la paix, qu'elle n'assure pas. En particulier, en raison des armes atomiques: "Que soient bannies ces armes déshonorantes" et "que soit poscrit... cet art terrible qui consiste à fabriquer la bombe, à la multiplier et à la conserver, pour la terreur des peuples... Prions pour que cet engin meurtrier ne tue pas la paix en la cherchant". (Paul VI Message pour le 20ème anniversaire d'Hiroshima, 8 août 1965, D.C. 1965, col. 1452) (8).
2. Au nom de la morale naturelle et de l'idéal évangélique: la course aux armements (aux armes A.B.C., mais aussi aux armes conventionnelles modernes, en raison de leur capacité de destruction scientifique); est contraire à l'homme et contraire à Dieu. Cette course folle est donc à poscrire au niveau de l'éthique. Et cela, pour deux raisons principales:
  - lorsqu'il n'y a plus proportion entre le dommage causé et les valeurs qu'on cherche à sauvegarder, "mieux vaut subir l'injustice que de se défendre" (Pie XII).
  - Du moins que de se défendre par ce moyen. Car le droit et le devoir demeurent d'une résistance active, quoique sans violence, à l'injuste oppression et cela, au nom des droits de l'homme et de sa dignité (9).

Il ne s'agit donc plus seulement de guerre froide, mais d'une action offensive, d'une agression et d'une oppression inadmissibles: "La puissance des armes ne légitime pas tout usage de cette force à des fins politiques ou militaires". (G.S. 79, 4).

- Elle constitue une provocation qui explique - psychologiquement, économiquement, socialement et politiquement - l'apparition et la multiplication d'une autre compétition: la course aux petits armements. Le terrorisme, en effet, se présente souvent comme l'ultime moyen de défense contre cet abus de pouvoir des grandes nations et comme une contestation violente de la situation d'injustice créée ou entretenue par l'emploi ou la menace des Etats les mieux armés.

- Cette utilisation des armes dominantes par les nations industrialisées a également pour effet d'engager les pays en voie de développement dans une course similaire aux armements. Une part grandissante des budgets militaires de certains pays défavorisés retarde encore davantage leur croissance économique. La montée de régimes politiques autoritaires dans le tiers-monde est à la fois la cause et l'effet de l'accroissement des achats (et donc des ventes) d'armes par les puissances industrielles.

- Cette utilisation des ressources financières à des fins militaires entraîne, en contre-partie, un ralentissement ou une diminution de l'aide. Elle rend plus difficile le transfert, maintes fois souhaité et demandé par Paul VI dans son Message de Bombay (4.12.64 - D.C. 1965, col. 15) par Populorum Progressio (N.53) ainsi que par Gaudium et spes (81, 2-3): désarmer pour développer.

Il n'en serait pas de même si les nations qui disposent des plus grands moyens dans le domaine de l'armement acceptaient enfin de ralentir, puis de stopper, cette course aux armes comme moyen d'hégémonie et non pas seulement de protection des biens et des vies de leurs ressortissants.

L'adjuration de Paul VI aux représentants des peuples du monde entier, dans son discours à l'ONU, le 4 octobre 1965, reste plus actuelles et plus valable que jamais: "Laissez tomber les armes de vos mains".

Ainsi, le devoir est aussi clair que le diagnostic:

- Il faut stopper la course aux armements.
- Il faut réaliser la réduction des armements.

## II. LA REDUCTION DES ARMEMENTS

Il ne suffirait pas d'en rester au niveau actuel des stocks et des forces armées. Il faut en outre entamer un désarmement progressif, et contrôlé à toutes ses étapes, pour garantir la sécurité.

### Pourquoi la réduction des armements?

Elle amorce un processus inverse de la course aux armements: elle est à la fois le signe et l'agent d'une diminution de la peur et d'un retour à la confiance.

Elle donne une plus grande crédibilité à l'interdiction de la force dans les relations internationales. Elle permet de mieux assurer le respect du droit international et de fonder la paix sur la justice, aussi bien entre les nations qu'à l'intérieur de chacune d'elles.

Elle permet d'assurer la sécurité à meilleur compte et d'affecter à des fins pacifiques les nouvelles sommes ainsi économisées.

### Comment désarmer?

Les documents du Magistère indiquent un certain nombre de critères pour que le désarmement soit à la fois juste et efficace.

COMMENT GIVEN BY CARDINAL ALFRINK AS INTERNATIONAL PRESIDENT  
OF PAX CHRISTI, ON THE VATICAN DOCUMENT. THIS COMMENT IS  
PUBLISHED IN THE DUTCH MAGAZINE "DE TIJD" OF AUGUST 13, 1976.

PLEA FOR DISARMAMENT.

The Vatican makes an urgent appeal and asks for new initiatives.

On June the 3rd last the Osservatore Romano published the text of the reaction of the Holy See on Resolution 3484 B of the United Nations. In this resolution all the member States have been requested to make suggestions in order to strengthen the role of the UN in the question of disarmament. This reaction was received with expressions of deep satisfaction, both by the Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and by a great number of Nations.

In this reaction the Vatican condemned the armaments race in unprecedented strong language. Terms like folly, a mistake, a form of theft, an injustice and collective hysteria, are characteristic of the way in which the situation we have drifted into, is spoken of. The ever increasing armament is characterized as a machine gone mad, a process which has its own dynamics and which escapes the control of the States. It is stated that this mad race must be outlawed.

Impressive and penetrating document.

It seems to me that, for various reasons, this publication of the Holy See is of great value. This document gives an impressive survey of what has, so far, been formulated on this question, both before and after 'Pacem in Terris' (1963) and 'Gaudium et Spes' (1964: Vatican Council), in official Church documents and in pronouncements of the Popes. It also gives a fascinating analysis of the armaments race, of the term 'security' and of the possibilities of freeing ourselves from what is called 'this mad race'.

In referring to earlier and recurrent appeals from Rome to bring about disarmament, a sort of mosaic of quotations is put before us for further reflection. Questions and suggestions are added to this, which seem to me of such importance as to enable and oblige us to use them as material for studies, discussion and consideration for the coming years.

No Utopism.

In spite of the very sharp tone in which the armaments race is condemned the analysis given in this document shows a sober sense of reality. This prevents the strength of the argument from being weakened to what might be considered a vague idealism. It is quite evident that one realizes very well that disarmament is only possible as a gradual process leading to a simultaneous, mutual, supervised reduction of armaments. This cannot be realized from one day to the next, negotiations are necessary for this and an agreement must be reached, with genuine, effective guarantees. With a reference to 'Gaudium et Spes' (79,4) the right of legitimate defence and the duty to ensure the safety of the people is explicitly mentioned.

But there is a question attached to this, whether, in fearing that disarmament would lead to insecurity, it is not rather the progressive armaments race which means a greater insecurity. This question confronts us with a very important aspect: what are the limits of this security and how must 'security by means of defence' be balanced against the capacity and destructive power of the means

that can be used for it? The important point is the weighing of risks, the possibility of breaking through the spiral effect of armament by taking small stops with limited risks attached to them. It seems to me that all initiatives and suggestions going in this direction, and thus setting in motion the détente, will have to be seriously considered.

#### What is 'security'?

The Vatican is quite clear on 'security'. Among other arguments the armaments race is rejected for the very reason, that the nature of modern weapons ensures no security. It is stated that every day gives further proof that security depending on armament is 'antiquated and anachronistic'. In reality a false peace and a false security is maintained by this. This false security has become an end in itself and perpetuates the existing dis-order.

The armaments race has gone on with undiminishing force and matters have got completely out of control. It seems to me that this finding should be taken as the central fact in the tackling of the security problem. Therefore this realization, that there is in fact a false security, will have to penetrate into a much wider circle. And here lies a task for the Church: to make people conscious of the reality we have drifted into. The Dutch Bishops have made an appeal to this effect in their statement of January 13, 1976. It will be very important, in the light of the recently received publication from Rome, further to examine and discuss this statement.

#### Balance of power and deterrence by means of nuclear weapons.

The Vatican document states that the balance of power, by virtue of the nature of modern weapons, leads to 'paralysis' of the Nuclear Powers, while limited conflicts (partly because of this) proliferate and are intensified. And naturally there is the other additional, great, and already existing, danger of a speedy increase of the number of nuclear powers, making the situation even more dangerous.

Apart from the folly of the surplus-armament (overkill) the Vatican points out the dangers of the armaments race because of its becoming the cause of instability and thus upsetting the 'balance of terror'. It is stated that if this deterrence has indeed had a preventive effect, this can at most be considered as a 'delay granted us from on high' (Gaudium et Spes 81,4). But then we, quickly, shall have to use to advantage this chance of putting our affairs in order, for time is not on our side.

I should like to state here that so far a general consciousness of this factor of time has not been much in evidence. One rather gets the impression that people have grown accustomed to the situation and lag behind the facts, instead of developing really new initiatives.

#### Ethical aspects of nuclear weapons.

Referring to the message of Pope Paul VI on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Hiroshima (1965), it is said that the manufacturing and stockpiling of nuclear weapons should be outlawed. Also in another part of this document the Vatican not only speaks about the threat of nuclear weapons - which for that matter is characterized with the term of blackmail - but also about the growing dangers of transporting and stockpiling these weapons.



Remarkable in this context is a quotation of Pope Pius XII: 'when the damage caused is disproportionate to the values we are seeking to safeguard it is better to suffer injustice than to defend ourselves'. And added to this: 'rather than to defend ourselves by such means'.

And as an alternative the Vatican document points to the necessity of paying more attention to the possibility of an active, though non-violent resistance. With regard to nuclear weapons I should like to say that, in my opinion, the whole set of problems round the balance of power and the deterrence-strategy with the help of what has been said in this new document, will have to be reconsidered in the light of the ethical aspects, both as regards the use of these weapons and the threat with them, as well as the attending dangers of stockpiling and transporting them.

For the very reason of our christian attitude towards life, we must put these questions and have the courage clearly and concretely to formulate our standpoint. The Christians must not keep silent when this most fundamental matter of life and death, of our very existence, of the possible destruction of other nations and of our responsibility for the generations coming after us, is at stake.

#### Taking initiatives and opening up new perspectives.

I should like to call this document a sign of hope. It offers a moral support to all those who in some way or other are dedicated to peace and security. We are not impotent; but can exert our influence to the good. In spite of many disappointments and failures to bring about disarmament, we feel strong to proceed on this road: 'not working for disarmament' is a 'worn-out or tired' cause, but armament is.'

We must renounce antiquated conceptions, face reality, and learn to think in a new way about the question of security.

That means the willingness to cooperate in building new world structures, which will make possible a real transformation and in which national security will be subordinated to international security.

The Vatican also recommends, already to take action even though the international institutions needed for this are still in a preparatory stage. We must break out of the vicious circle, feeding the automation of the armaments race. We must get rid of standards and conceptions that were applied in the past, but no longer hold good now. Rightly the question is posed here if not especially the Church should go further in its recommendations and, consequently, will have to fulfil the function of a pioneer, I am also thinking here of the initiative taken by Pax Christi and the Interchurch Peace Council, to organize, in the Netherlands, a National Peace Commission, which will make projects possible that contribute to the information and conscientization of a wider public, on this question of security.

#### Political will and public opinion.

In this document it is stated that the possibility for starting a peace-strategy depends on the political will. And this political will will to a great extent be determined by the public opinion. Christians must alert the public opinion before it is too late. Only through the pressure and the common sense of the public opinion can a turn for the better be expected. The politicians, who are directly addressed in this document, will be able and will have to take constantly renewed initiatives in this question, to open up the road to a common reduction of armaments. If the political will exists the conversion of war-industries for civilian purposes is also possible. The Vatican combats the opinion that such a conversion would lead to unemployment. But, like the whole disarmament process, this process too will have to be gradual.

### The role of science.

An urgent appeal is made to science. The great necessity here for coming to a totally new way of thinking and acting, has recently been shown by a report from SIPRI, the international institution for peace research in Stockholm: in total about 40% of the best engineers and scientists is involved in armament. The Vatican's comment on this is that the time has come to denounce mankind's 'scientific preparation of its own demise'. Against this may be set the role of peace-science.

### Arms production and trade.

In this document of the Vatican a connection is made between industrial and economic techniques on the one hand, and 'political techniques' on the other hand. The transfer of armaments-industries to other products is dependent on the 'disarmament strategy'.

Sometimes it seems as if nowadays we are only reminded of the system of armaments production and -trade when a scandal accompanying these transactions is made public. But we should go much more deeply into this production process as a whole, with all its attending legal implications.

Just because of the present technological development in the field of arms, weapons are designed years ahead. This means that their purchases are also prepared a long time in advance. This makes us inclined, in this purchase and in the substitution of the existing armament, rather to follow the application of technical capacities than to determine ourselves.

Consequently the Vatican states that armament cannot be envisaged separately but forms part of a larger whole, which requires techniques, disciplines and people. Naturally peace-science can fulfil a very important role here. Means will have to be supplied for this and experts to be invited.

### Initiatives and alternatives.

The document strongly urges the taking of new initiatives. Suggestions are made to this effect, especially as regards the role of the United Nations. An important role is also allotted to theologians: profound reflection concerning such concepts as self-defence and national sovereignty.

Mention has already been made above of the non-violent forms of defence.

At the end of the Vatican text the necessity of alternatives, of substitute for the present armament and waging of war, is mentioned. I think this appeal of the Vatican will encourage those who are working in this difficult field. It seems to me that a condition for ensuring the success of these efforts must be, that in a wider circle the conviction will grow that these non-violent alternatives are no form of pure idealism or world-alienation, but are showing a realistic insight into the situation of our world.

### Facing reality.

I should like to conclude these reflections with the hope that this appeal of the Vatican will rouse us. We have, partly through the gradual progress of our armament race, grown accustomed to the seeming matter-of-factness of the enormous quantity of weapons and the immense amounts of money spent on them. Annually about 300 milliard (or billion) dollars are spent for this purpose, that means over 2 milliard (or billion) guilders a day, or 80 million guilders an hour. The spending of this money is called a form of theft by the Vatican: we have been appointed as managers of what has been entrusted to us and we are abusing this power.

In order to grasp the meaning of this document, one has to realize that it is directly addressed to the Organization of the United Nations in New York and through them to the rulers of the nations and to the whole community of nations. It is a passionate appeal to those who control the future of mankind concerning the dilemma of war or peace, of survival or demise, to build up a strategy of disarmament, because without such a strategy peace has become a utopism. And it is an appeal that brooks no delay. It is a question of NOW.

It is no appeal to some nation or other, to some government or other. It is an appeal to all nations at the same time, to all rulers of the nations and to the organization of the United Nations.

It would appear that the Vatican has wanted to say that this joint strategy for disarmament is the first and foremost mission of the UN, if it wants actually to realize its aim - peace in the world. Every other occupation of the community of nations is extremely important, but it remains peace-work,

Naturally it is not possible in this brief-space to discuss the many aspects attached to this most important question. I have therefore confined myself to some thoughts occurring to me on reading this document. I would like to recommend to every one the reading of the full text, and to bring it up for discussion everywhere.

Bernard Cardinal Alfrink.

Le désarmement doit être conçu de telle sorte que la sécurité qui en résulte soit au moins égale à celle qu'assure la situation actuelle.

Le désarmement doit être progressif, le passage d'un état à un autre étant subordonné à la constatation de l'accomplissement des obligations contractées (10).

Il doit être contrôlé: grâce à des systèmes de vérification internationale aptes à garantir le respect des engagements pris.

Pour devenir une réalité, il ne doit pas se faire d'une manière unilatérale, mais à la même cadence, en vertu d'accords, et être assorti de garanties véritables et efficaces" (G.S. 82, 1).

A) L'histoire de ces adjectifs et de quelques autres (désarmement mutuel, simultané, institutionnellement garanti) est liée à un contexte précis caractérisé par la conception de la souveraineté des Etats. Elle est inspirée par un climat de méfiance réciproque qui justifiait, par le fait même, la possession d'armes et une prudence certaine.

Cette vigilance se comprend encore de nos jours. "Tant que l'homme restera l'être faible, changeant et même méchant qu'il se montre souvent, les armes défensives seront, hélas, nécessaires" (Discours Paul VI à l'ONU, 4 octobre 1965).

"Quelle inconscience subsiste parfois au coeur même de certaines manifestations qui se veulent pacifistes! Et que de mensonges ou de manoeuvres dominatrices se cachent derrière certaines prétentions de paix" Ce rappel de Paul VI au réalisme (Allocution aux anciens combattants des pays d'Europe, 20 nov. 1971, D.C. 1972, pages 64-65) rejoint l'affirmation de Vatican II. "Aussi longtemps que le risque de guerre subsistera, qu'il n'y aura pas d'autorité internationale compétente et disposant de forces suffisantes, on ne saurait dénier aux gouvernements... le droit de légitime défense. Les chefs d'Etat.... ont donc le devoir d'assurer la sauvegarde des peuples dont ils ont la charge..." (G.S., 79, 4).

Mais si la suppression entraîne l'insécurité, la possession exagérée des armes en entraîne une autre, aussi grave. Il ne s'agit donc pas de suppression, mais de réduction.

B. Faut-il pour autant s'en tenir littéralement aux critères traditionnels du désarmement, quel que soit par ailleurs leur bien fondé? L'échec du désarmement ne provient-il pas d'une répétition pure et simple des critères juridiques et politiques d'hier? D'une sorte d'entité juridique immuable, que les Puissances concernées gardent en réserve, pour ajourner cette question délicate? L'Eglise, pour sa part, peut-elle en rester à ce point de ses recommandations et de son enseignement?

N'y a-t-il pas d'autres solutions à trouver, pour sortir de ce cercle vicieux, et échapper à l'envoûtement de la méfiance? Dans ce quart de siècle qui a suivi la dernière guerre mondiale, un certain nombre de réconciliations n'ont-elles pas mis en cause le postulat suivant lequel la sécurité reposerait seulement sur la force militaire? Historiens et politiques n'ont-ils pas été surpris de voir que les motifs de ces chocs historiques catastrophiques se réduisaient à peu de chose, et comment il a fallu peu de chose également pour changer l'hostilité en collaboration? Si la guerre est la conjonction de deux peurs, la paix ne résulte-t-elle pas de deux confiances rétablies ou à rétablir aussi vite que possible, avant et afin d'amorcer le processus de l'escalade militaire?

L'heure que nous vivons n'est-elle pas l'heure favorable à ce genre de perspective?

Les peuples qui se livrent à la course folle des armements, quantitatifs et qualitatifs, ne vont-ils pas, comme les coureurs du stade, s'arrêter par épuisement?

Le moment n'est-il pas venu, d'utiliser les contraires, et de transformer l'excès de guerre ou de menaces en conquête et en maintien de la paix?

Le désarmement n'est pas une réalité distincte, un "en soi" séparé. Il fait partie d'un ensemble. Sans doute, doit-il être envisagé en lui-même et avec ses méthodes propres, dans un souci de clarté scientifique, juridique, politique et spirituelle.

Il appelle et requiert des techniques, des disciplines, des hommes appropriés. Mais il doit, à tout moment, être envisagé et réalisé en intime liaison avec les deux autres grandes réalités d'aujourd'hui: le développement et l'organisation de la Société Internationale. Désarmer, développer, institutionnaliser: un seul et même problème, une seule et même solution.

### La Paix par le Droit

Désarmer c'est donc s'arrêter et réduire. Mais c'est aussi et surtout transférer. On ne détruit que ce que l'on remplace. Il s'agit de transposer, du moins pour la plus large part la sécurité nationale et ses instruments militaires, jusqu'ici liés à la volonté de chaque gouvernement, en sécurité internationale (11).

Ceci, par le recours confiant au droit, comme cela se fait pour les affaires qui concernent la vie intérieure de chaque Etat civilisé.

#### A. Une structure mondiale: l'ONU et le désarmement (12).

L'Encyclique *Pacem in Terris* insiste fortement sur l'impérieuse nécessité d'une "autorité publique de compétence universelle" (13). La constitution *Gaudium et Spes* reprend mot pour mot la même idée: Une autorité publique universelle reconnue par tous, qui jouisse d'une puissance efficace susceptible d'assurer à tous la sécurité, le respect de la justice et la garantie des droits (81, 1).

A cette institution indispensable, le Concile assigne une fonction, soutenue par une opinion publique éclairée; "Préparer.... ce moment où de l'assentiment général des nations, toute guerre pourra être absolument interdite." (id.).

Le Synode d'octobre 1971 se fait plus précis. Il nomme l'organisation existante, en disant ce qu'on attend d'elle: "Que les Nations Unies - qui, en raison de leur fin propre doivent promouvoir la participation de toutes les Nations - et les Organisations Internationales, soient appuyées comme l'amorce d'un système susceptible de freiner la course aux armements, de faire abandonner le commerce des armes, de réaliser le désarmement et de résoudre le conflit par des moyens pacifiques d'action légale, d'arbitrage et de police internationale. Il est absolument nécessaire que les différends entre nations ne soient pas résolus par la guerre, mais que soient trouvés d'autres moyens conformes à la nature humaine; ...".

Paul VI est tout aussi explicite: "Nous avons foi en l'ONU; Nous avons confiance dans ses possibilités d'étendre le domaine de la paix et le règne du droit dans notre monde tourmenté, Nous sommes prêts à lui donner notre entier appui moral. La cause de la paix et du droit est sacrée. Les obstacles qu'elle rencontre ne doivent pas décourager ceux qui s'y dévouent; qu'ils proviennent de circonstances adverses ou de la malice des hommes, ils peuvent et doivent être surmontés". (Allocution à M.Kurt Waldheim, 5 février 1972; D.C. 1972, p.208).  
Et bien d'autres textes pourraient être invoqués dans le même sens.

#### B. Conventions et Accords bi-ou multilatéraux (13).

Mais il ne faut pas attendre que cette "autorité publique de compétence universelle" soit instaurée, pour agir dans le domaine du droit. Les trois derniers Papes ont beaucoup écrit et parlé à ce sujet.

Le 30 juin 1964, une Lettre du Secrétaire d'Etat le Cardinal Cicognani, à M. Houari Souiah, délégué algérien de la Conférence pour la Dénucléarisation de la Méditerranée (D.C. 1964, col. 960-970) mentionne: "Le Saint-Siège a encouragé (notamment) les initiatives de désarmement, surtout celles visant à prévenir le péril atomique, et souhaite que l'humanité parvienne à (s'en) prémunir par un accord, sincère et général, qui seul peut rendre ses efforts efficaces."  
... "Il souhaite que cet appel soit entendu par tous les responsables du destin des Nations..." (D.C. 1964, col.970).

Trois ans plus tard, le 27 août 1967, il précise comment il a approuvé le traité de Genève sur la non-prolifération nucléaire "en dehors de tout sous-entendu politique" parce que "il marque un premier pas... et instaure un épisode de concorde et de collaboration internationales sans lesquelles il est impossible d'espérer la sécurité et la paix du monde." (D.C. 1967, col. 1647).

Le 24 juin 1968, le Saint-Père revient sur cette idée. Il se réjouit de "l'approbation par les Nations Unies d'un texte d'accord international mettant fin à la prolifération atomique et à la course aux armements nucléaires". Résultat encore imparfait, mais "premier pas" sur une voie qui devrait mener "jusqu'au banissement total des armes nucléaires et au désarmement général et complet".  
(Allocution au Sacré Collège, 24 juin 1968; D.C. 1968, col. 1270).  
(Signature du Traité de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires par le Saint-Siège, le 25 février 1971).

C. Enfin, ces accords et conventions devraient aboutir à la création d'institutions nouvelles spécifiquement consacrées au désarmement. Elles constitueraient autant de pierres d'attente pour l'instance mondiale d'arbitrage et de police internationale impatiemment attendue (organisations régionales).

#### La volonté politique (14)

Lois et conventions resteront lettre morte si elles ne sont pas animées du dedans, par une volonté politique assortie d'une stratégie pacifique.

A) Il s'agit d'utiliser non des armes militaires, même justifiées par la défense du Droit et de la Civilisation, mais des armes politiques.. pour promouvoir l'union des peuples". (Paul VI, discours au Collège de l'OTAN, 30 janvier 1971; D.C. 1971, p.204).

Un an après, le Saint-Père reprend la même idée, devant le même auditoire: "N'est-ce pas le vœu général de l'humanité et son profond intérêt que les rapports militaires se transforment de plus en plus en rapports civils?" (Au Collège de l'OTAN, 3 février 1972; D.C. 1972, p. 261).

- Cette tâche revient, évidemment, en priorité aux gouvernements. Jean XXIII les "adjure de n'épargner aucun effort "en ce sens" (Pacem in Terris, n.117). Le Concile fait sien son appel. "Les Evêques du monde entier, rassemblés et ne faisant qu'un adjurent les Chefs d'Etat et les autorités militaires de peser à tout instant une responsabilité aussi immense." (G.S., 80, 5)

- Mais, là encore, "les Chefs d'Etat... sont tous dépendants des opinions et des sentiments de la multitude... d'où l'extrême nécessité d'un renouveau dans la formation des mentalités et d'un changement de ton dans l'opinion publique" (G.S., 82, 3). La technicité des problèmes de la sécurité nationale et de l'exercice de l'autorité par suite de la "socialisation" de l'existence (cf. Semaine Sociale de France, Grenoble 1959) crée le risque que le pouvoir isole du peuple. Les Gouvernements se trouveraient facilement enfermés dans leurs déterminismes propres et entraînés, presque malgré eux, à ne plus vouloir, ni pouvoir réaliser des désarmement si la pression de leurs peuples respectifs ne les obligeait à remettre en question les postulats héréditaires de la défense armée ou sur armée.

- Seuls la pression et le bon sens de l'opinion publique peuvent empêcher que se créent deux histoires parallèles et souvent contradictoires: celle des civilisations et celle des techniques militaires ou civiles déshumanisantes.

Le rôle des formations politiques (partis au pouvoir ou dans l'opposition, presse d'opinion, etc. ...) devrait être décisif pour orienter la politique étrangère de leurs gouvernements dans un sens pacifique.

- Dans cet "assentiment général des nations grâce auquel toute guerre pourra être absolument interdite" (G.S. 82, 1), une place toute spéciale revient aux savants. Paul VI leur lance un appel pressant (15): Que l'humanité se ressaisisse, qu'elle sache trouver en elle-même, dans ces chefs, dans ses maîtres, la force et la sagesse de rejeter loin d'elle l'usage maléfique de la science destructive... Qu'elle aille plutôt demander à la science le secret de se faire du bien à elle-même" (Discours à l'Académie Pontificale des Sciences, 27 avril 1968, D.C. 1968, col. 868).

Le désarmement notamment, n'est pas seulement affaire de bonne volonté. Il ne s'improvise pas. Il coûtera cher. Comme lorsqu'il s'agit de détruire un vieil immeuble pour le remplacer par un neuf. La reconversion des industries et du commerce des armes, en particulier, relève des techniciens. Elle exige "des études approfondies et courageuses" (G.S. 82, 3).

- Techniques industrielles et économiques, mais aussi techniques politiques.

"Que les Assemblées les plus hautes et les plus qualifiées étudient à fond le problème d'un équilibre international... à base de confiance réciproque..., de loyauté dans la diplomatie, et de fidélité dans l'observation des traités"... Pacem in Terris, n. 118).

B) Il s'agit donc pour les responsables du Bien public, à tous les niveaux, d'élaborer une stratégie de Désarmement et de la Paix, scientifiquement fondée, sur des analyses objectives et complètes, et seule capable d'assurer sa crédibilité.

A l'heure actuelle, pour rendre crédible toute parole ou message sur le désarmement et l'accorder aux "signes des temps", il faut, semble-t-il:

- d'une part, reconnaître la difficulté grandissante de certaines formules ou programmes, tels que le "désarmement pour le développement":

- en raison de l'intensification de l'aide militaire que laisse prévoir la montée de systèmes politiques autoritaires dans le tiers-monde;

- en raison de l'augmentation de l'équipement des polices et des appareils de sécurité interne justifiés par la lutte contre le terrorisme, susceptible aujourd'hui de s'institutionnaliser en guerre civile larvée, etc...

- d'autre part, avancer quelques suggestions qui vont dans le sens de l'aspiration contemporaine à une politique de désarmement, par exemple:

- le renforcement du rôle de police internationale de l'ONU:

- l'institutionnalisation, à l'échelle internationale, des mesures de police contre le terrorisme, en diminuant ou en évitant la création de dualités de forces armées, durant cette décennie;

- l'accès des pays sous-développés aux négociations sur le désarmement, comme "partenaires" des conjonctures éventuelles de désescalade;

- on suggère aussi, pour décourager la tendance à la course aux armements: l'interdiction d'accès au "droit de tirage" des nations sous-développées qui augmentent leurs budgets militaires; à l'inverse, l'accès prioritaire aux financements internationaux des pays qui réduisent leurs dépenses militaires à des fins sociales; le détournement, en vue d'une utilisation pacifique, du revenu des brevets d'armements pour constituer des fonds de développements, etc,

C) Une "stratégie du désarmement" ne peut pas se limiter à des critères d'efficacité ou de rendement. Elle doit s'appuyer sur une vision éthique, culturelle et spirituelle. Elle appelle, dans les années qui viennent, la réflexion approfondie des philosophes et des théologiens, en particulier sur la notion de "légitime défense", sur le concept de "nation", de souveraineté nationale, trop souvent conçue en termes d'autarchie absolue, etc....

Elle aura besoin aussi de "prophètes" - à condition qu'ils soient authentiques - de grandes voix, de "hérauts" et de rassembleurs, de "mystiques", au ././ précis du mot, pour entraîner et nobiliser les énergies et leur potentiel d'unité, de dialogue et de coopération. Bref, le désarmement a pour fondement et pour moteur la "confiance mutuelle". On ne peut remplacer le recours à la guerre que par une "dynamique de la paix". -

././ sens large et au sens



Le désarmement des armes exige, comme condition première, non la suppression, mais la sublimation des instincts guerriers de l'homme (chasseur, pillard, dominateur), en engagements au service "de la construction civile de la paix" (G. S. 82, 2).

Il faut trouver des substituts à la guerre; en donnant des guerres à gagner. Le désarmement n'est pas séparable des autres objectifs d'unité, de justice, de concorde et de développement de toute la "famille humaine".

La victoire du désarmement n'est pas autre que la victoire de la paix. Son unique chance, c'est de s'incorporer au grand Dessein, à la "nouvelle histoire" de l'humanité (Paul VI, discours à l'ONU, 4 octobre 1965).

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## NOTES

N.B. Les citations "D.C." du texte sont empruntées à la revue LA DOCUMENTATION CATHOLIQUE (5, rue Bayard, Paris)...

- 1) GAUDIUM ET SPES (A.A.S. vol.58, 1966, p.1103): "...si l'on utilisait complètement les moyens déjà stockés dans les arsenaux des grandes puissances, il n'en résulterait rien moins que l'extermination presque totale et absolument réciproque de chacun des adversaires par l'autre, sans parler des effets funestes découlant de l'usage de ces armes".
- 2) Allocution au Comité Paix de la CPJP, 22.3.75 (A.A.S., 67, 1975, p. 201):... "la production et le commerce des armements continuent à croître, à alimenter les conflits et à multiplier les risques de guerre..."
- 3) Lettre à U Thant, 1966 (A.A.S., 58, 1966, p. 136): "Mais on ne peut le nier; chaque jour qui passe fait apparaître plus clairement qu'aucune paix stable ne pourra s'établir entre les hommes tant qu'il ne sera pas procédé à une réduction effective générale et contrôlée des armements. Chaque jour qui passe rend également plus douloureux et plus dramatique le contraste entre l'énormité des sommes englouties dans la fabrication des armes et l'immense et croissante détresse matérielle de plus de la moitié de l'humanité, qui attend encore de voir satisfaites ses nécessités les plus élémentaires ....".
- 4) Radiomessage de Noël, 22.12.64 (A.A.S., 57, 1965, p. 180): nous osons souhaiter que les gouvernants sachent suivre avec prudence et magnanimité la voie du désarmement et veulent bien envisager généreusement pour l'avenir l'application, au moins partielle et graduelle, des budgets militaires à des fins humanitaires, et cela, non seulement à l'avantage de leurs propres Etats, mais aussi au profit des pays en voie de développement et qui sont dans le besoin. La faim, la misère, la maladie et l'ignorance appellent sans cesse au secours....".  
- Appel pour le désarmement: Lettre à U Thant (A.A.S., 58, 1966, p. 135): "En élevant la voix en faveur de la grande cause du désarmement. Nous avons conscience de suivre fidèlement la voie tracée par nos prédécesseurs.....".
- 5) Allocution au Corps Diplomatique, 11.1.75 (A.A.S., 67, 1975, p. 98-99): "Cette "terreur" dont on essaie laborieusement d'assurer une sorte "d'équilibre" a même été et est couramment considérée comme la principale sinon peut-être l'unique garantie contre des aventures qui paraîtraient elles-mêmes trop périlleuses à ceux qui se sentiraient, par hypothèse, suffisamment forts pour espérer pouvoir les surmonter en survivant à leurs adversaires."
- 6) Message de Noël, 1969, (A.A.S. 61, 1969, p. 55): "Le pouvoir de destruction de l'homme moderne est incalculable et la fatale probabilité que ce pouvoir soit appliqué à dévaster la cité humaine dépend de causes tragiquement libres, que ni la science ni la technique ne peuvent par elles-mêmes dominer. Il arrive alors qu'à l'espérance succède l'angoisse".
- 7) Allocution au cours de la Messe du 5 oct. 1966 (A.A.S. 58, 1966 p. 900): (Or:) "On voit se répandre de plus en plus la conviction intime que la paix vraie et durable ne peut être fondée sur la puissance d'armes exterminatrices ni sur la tension statique d'ideologies contraires.....".

- 8) A.A.S. 67, 1975, p. 670: "Si la conscience de la fraternité universelle arrive à pénétrer vraiment le coeur des hommes auront-ils encore besoin de s'armer au point de devenir assassins aveugles et fanatiques de leurs propres frères, innocents en soi, et de perpétrer, en hommages à la paix, des massacres d'une violence incroyable, comme à Hiroshima le 6 août 1945?"
- 9) Message de la "Journée de la Paix" 1976: .... "ou bien le désarmement est le fait de tous, ou bien c'est un délit de manque de défense: dans l'ensemble de la communauté humaine historique et concrète, le glaive n'a-t-il pas sa raison d'être, pour la justice, pour la paix?"
- 10) Allocution à l'Association européenne des cardiologues pédiatres, 22.5.67, (A.A.S. 59, 1976, p. 619). "... une possibilité ou amorce de solution ... consisterait dans la réduction progressive, simultanée et généralisée des armements militaires. En mettant fin à cette course épuisante, devenue à l'heure présente, comme nous l'avons dit ailleurs, un "scandale intolérable"....
- Message pour la Journée de la Paix 1976 (A.A.S. 67, 1975, p. 669, N. 1): .... "le désarmement militaire devrait être commun et général pour ne pas constituer une erreur impardonnable, conséquence d'un optimisme impossible et d'une naïveté aveugle, tentation pour la violence d'autrui. Ou bien le désarmement est le fait de tous ou bien c'est un délit de manque de défense."
- 11) Allocution au Président Fort, 3.6.76 (l'Osservatore Romano, éd. Ital., 5 juin 1975, p.1): "Nous ne fermons pas les yeux sur la réalité des rapports de force qui s'établissent entre les nations et leurs blocs et qui posent continuellement des problèmes d'équilibre et de déséquilibre. Mais nous devons élever **notre voix pour** rappeler aux peuples que ce n'est pas sur la force que peut être fondé un ordre international pacifique et humain, mais sur un critère de justice, sur le respect et la compréhension des droits et des besoins des autres...."
- 12) Message pour le XXVème anniversaire de l'ONU (A.A.S. 62, 1970, p. 685): "Puisse votre inlassable obstination, mise au service de toutes les initiatives de désarmement réciproque et contrôlé, assurer en notre ère industrielle la réalisation de l'annonce de l'ancien prophète des temps agraires et employer les ressources rendues ainsi disponibles au progrès scientifique, à la mise en oeuvre des immenses ressources des terres et des océans, et à la subsistance de tous les membres de la famille humaine en perpétuel accroissement: que jamais le travail des vivants ne soit utilisé contre la vie, mais au contraire tourné à l'alimenter et à le rendre vraiment humaine!"
- 13) Appel pour le désarmement: Lettre à U thant, 1966 (A.A.S., 58, 1966, p. 135): "Au moment où le "Comité des Dix-huit pour le Désarmement" va reprendre ses travaux à Genève. Nous voulons vous adresser un pressant appel inspiré par le désir de voir les activités de ce Comité aboutir à un résultat positif et concret, et marquer ainsi une nouvelle étape vers la réalisation du désarmement, si unanimement attendu et souhaité. Nous nous sentons encouragé dans cette démarche par la récente prise de position de plus de 2.000 évêques catholiques réunis à Rome en Concile oecuménique. Nous nous y sentons encouragé également par l'écho qu'a trouvé, auprès de la Commission du désarmement notre appel de Bombay, et par l'accueil favorable réservé, dans l'opinion mondiale, à notre discours aux Nations Unies."

- Message à la Conférence d'Helsinki, 30.7.75 (A.A.S. 67, 1975, pp. 478-479): "Instruits par la tragique expérience de deux guerres épouvantables qui allumées en Europe en l'espace de trente années, consumèrent comme dans un brasier tant de millions de victimes, dévastant des régions étendues et florissantes et entraînant dans la lutte fratricide beaucoup d'autres peuples non européens, ces représentants veulent établir une entente qui repose sur des principes clairs et fermes de droit international et mettre l'Europe et le monde à l'abri de la menace de nouvelles expériences de destruction et de mort infiniment plus terrifiantes. En même temps, ils veulent tracer les lignes d'un début de coopération, en consolidant la paix qui concourra à multiplier avec plus d'intensité les échanges des valeurs qui forment la force spirituelle de l'Europe.

La Papauté, tout en étant investie d'une mission religieuse ouverte sur l'universel, à toutefois son siège en Europe... la reconnaissance de l'interdépendance de la sécurité entre les Etats, confiée aux engagements solennels du renoncement à l'emploi et à la menace de la force, de l'accomplissement en bonne foi des obligations internationales."

- Au Collège de Défense de l'OTAN (A.A.S., 63, 1971, p. 143):  
... "Votre Institution se définit comme un Collège de défense. Puisse son existence même ne servir qu'à la défense de la Paix. Que la formation qu'elle donne prépare à utiliser non des armes militaires - même justifiées par la défense du droit et de la civilisation - mais des armes politiques, et cela, non pour fomenter la division entre les peuples, mais pour promouvoir leur union..."

- 14) Angelus, Dimanche 27 Août 1967: Insegnamenti di Paoli VI, vol. V, 1967, pp. 891-892: "En cette minute spirituelle, nous évoquerons le fait positif de la présentation du texte du traité de nonprolifération nucléaire. Ce fait nous semble positif parce qu'il démontre que les responsables ont conscience du danger redoutable et parce qu'il marque un premier pas - non pas décisif, certes, mais initial, pour conjurer ce danger, qui pèse sur l'humanité toute entière."

- Message de la "Journée de la Paix 1976": "Nous voyons avec satisfaction et avec espérance progresser l'idée de la paix. Elle grandit en importance et en dimension dans la conscience de l'humanité; avec elle se développent les structures nécessaires à l'organisation de la paix; les célébrations qui engagent et les célébrations plus académiques en sa faveur se multiplient;.... la paix gagne du terrain. La conférence de Helsinki, en juillet - août 1975, est un événement qui donne des espoirs dans ce sens."

- 15) Allocution à l'Académie Pontificale des sciences, 27.4.68 (A.A.S. 60, 1968, p. 275): "Que toute mesure soit prise, tout engagement assumé dans le but de prévenir et de conjurer la fabrication et l'emploi des armes nucléaires, des attaques bactériologiques....".

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/, du règlement pacifique des différends,

\* , et incalculable des armes nucléaires, et

(14)

Council of Christian Approaches to Defence and DisarmamentLeiden, Netherlands, 3.-7.9.1976

Die Rolle der taktischen nuklearen Waffen:

Entwicklung und politische Verantwortung

Ulrich Scheuner

I. Die strategische Bedeutung taktischer nuklearer Waffen

1. Die Bemühungen zur Entwicklung nuklearer Waffen mit geringerer Wirkung haben in der nuklearen Rüstung von Anfang eingesetzt. Schon 1953 wurde die Absicht der amerikanischen Regierung ausgesprochen, solche Waffen zu verwenden. Der NATO-Rat nahm 1957 ihre Anwendung in Aussicht. Eine neue politische Bedeutung erhielten diese Waffen indes erst mit dem um 1960 sich vollziehenden Übergang der amerikanischen Verteidigungskonzeption von der Theorie der "massive retaliation" zu der Lehre von der "flexible response". Der Gedanke, daß einem Angriff der anderen Seite nicht alsbald mit dem Einsatz aller Mittel, sondern stufenweise entgegengetreten werden sollte, setzte voraus, daß die Abwehr zunächst mit konventionellen Waffen unternommen würde, und sich dann in einer nächsten Stufe zu der Heranziehung taktischer nuklearer Waffen steigern könne, dabei aber immer noch begrenzt bleiben würde. Die taktischen nuklearen Waffen erhielten damit eine neue Funktion. Sie sollten angesichts der deutlichen Überlegenheit der konventionellen Macht der kommunistischen Staaten in Europa der westlichen Verteidigung ein Mittel der Abwehr geben, das einen Angriff zum Halt bringen könnte und damit eine Möglichkeit der Beilegung des Konfliktes eröffnete. Ihr Charakter in der westlichen Verteidigung ist also wesentlich defensiv. Sie stellen eine Stufe in einem System der Eskalation dar, mit dem einem massiven Angriff begegnet werden kann. Ihre Bedeutung liegt darin, die Eskalation vorzunehmen, aber auf einer geringeren Stufe zu halten.

Diese Bedeutung hat sich bis zur Gegenwart erhalten und eher in neuerer Zeit verstärkt. Die Erklärung des amerikanischen Sekretärs für Verteidigung Schlesinger vom 10. Januar 1974 über eine Doktrin der

beschränkten nuklearen Optionen (doctrine of limited nuclear options) hat diese Funktion der taktischen nuklearen Waffen in besonderer Weise herausgearbeitet. Nach dieser Auffassung soll die militärische Gegenwehr in allen Stufen dem Prinzip einer begrenzten Anwendung entsprechen. So sollen auch die interkontinentalen Waffen nicht entsprechend einer älteren Lehre gegen die gegnerische Bevölkerung in städtischen Zentren, sondern vorerst gegen militärische Ziele gerichtet sein, und können daher selbst auf dieser Stufe noch zu begrenztem Einsatz gelangen. In diesen Gedankengang fügt sich die Abschreckung durch die Verwendung taktischer nuklearer Waffen in einem regionalen Konflikt ohne weiteres ein. Zusammenfassend ist die strategische Rolle der taktischen nuklearen Waffen daher ein Bestandteil einer flexiblen Abwehr massiver Vorstöße von der anderen Seite.

Im europäischen Feld bestehen die Mittel der taktischen nuklearen Verteidigung in den etwa 7000 atomaren Sprengköpfen, die hier in Zentraleuropa unter amerikanischer Kontrolle gelagert sind und die durch Flugzeuge oder Raketen (Missiles) zum Einsatz gebracht werden können. Diese Waffen stehen unter amerikanischer Kontrolle. Weitere solcher Waffen befinden sich in Südeuropa und in der Verfügung der 6. Flotte im Mittelmeer. Zusätzlich verfügt Großbritannien über solche Waffen, die durch Flugzeuge eingesetzt werden würden. Frankreich hat in neuerer Zeit solche Waffen in Gestalt der "Pluton" entwickelt. Sie werden durch Artillerie zum Einsatz gebracht. Frankreich hat soeben drei Artillerieregimenter aus der Bundesrepublik zurückgezogen, um sie künftig auf französischem Boden mit diesen Waffen auszustatten (Le Monde 28.7.1976).

2. Das strategische Gewicht der taktischen nuklearen Waffen äußert sich in ihrem Wert für Verteidigung und Abschreckung (deterrence). In der Verteidigung sollen sie gegenüber einem vor allem in der Panzerwaffe überlegenem Feind das Vordringen aufhalten und die zahlenmäßige Ungleichheit kompensieren. Ob diese Aufgabe gelöst werden kann, bleibt zweifelhaft. Auch die sowjetischen Truppen sind mit taktischen nuklearen Waffen ausgerüstet, die ihre Offensive stützen sollen. Die

Sowjetunion hält in den letzten Jahren an ihrer Doktrin, daß jeder Krieg zwischen nuklear bewaffneten Systemen notwendig ein nuklearer Kampf sein würde, nicht mehr <sup>von per se</sup> streng fest. Aber die nuklearen taktischen Waffen gehören bei ihr zur Ausstattung der offensiv vorgehenden Kräfte. Ob der Übergang zu diesen Waffen also im Kampf den westlichen Kräften wesentliche Vorteile bringen könnte, bleibt offen. Dieser Einsatz dient aber zugleich als ein Mittel der Abschreckung. Solange diese Waffen in amerikanischer Hand und damit in Verbindung mit dem Potential einer Supermacht bleiben, bedeutet ihre Verwendung eine <sup>avertissement</sup> ernste Warnung, daß ihr der Gebrauch der strategischen nuklearen Macht folgen kann. Daher erscheint es vom europäischen Standpunkt aus wichtig, daß auch bei einer Verringerung oder Konzentration dieser Waffen eine Anzahl von ihnen unter amerikanischer Kontrolle in Europa verbleibt. Ohnedem würde <sup>l'ennemi</sup> die amerikanische Deckung näher an den Einsatz der großen atomaren Waffen heranrücken. <sup>in aversible</sup> 1) Hierin liegt die Bedeutung eines Systems vorwärts gerichteter Verteidigung (Forward Based System FBS) in amerikanischer Hand.

3. Es kann nicht ersetzt werden durch die Verweisung auf den fortschreitenden <sup>potentiellement</sup> Ausbau europäischer taktischer nuklearer Waffen in der Hand Frankreichs und Großbritanniens. Die Waffen Englands sind in das amerikanische System eingebunden. Angesichts der größeren Verwundbarkeit europäischer Länder würde die Verwendung europäischer Waffen andere Probleme bringen. Würden sie sie <sup>seulement</sup> nur zum Schutz des eigenen Territoriums einsetzen oder auch in der Abwehr gegen einen Vorstoß <sup>attacco</sup> außerhalb? Der Umstand, daß Frankreich nicht zur NATO gehört, würde zudem eine vorherige Verständigung zwischen ihm und dem Lande, in dem ein Einsatz möglicherweise erfolgen würde, der Bundesrepublik, erschweren.

## II. Das politische Gewicht der taktischen nuklearen Waffen und ihre Stellung in der Rüstungskontrolle

4. Für die gegenwärtige <sup>essentielle</sup> europäischen Verteidigung kommt den taktischen nuklearen Waffen mithin eine wesentliche Rolle zu. Sie sind ein Instrument, das die konventionelle Überlegenheit der östlichen Staaten

1) W. Heisenberg, The Alliance and Europe  
Part. I Adelphi, Papers Nr. 96 (1b 73)

*Explanations*  
auszugleichen sucht und bilden ein notwendiges Element in der Konzeption einer stufenweise Eskalation. Die Richtlinien der Ministerkonferenz in Brüssel vom 22./23.5.1975 drücken dies wie folgt aus:  
"Der Zweck <sup>des</sup> der taktisch-nuklearen Schlagkraft besteht in der Verstärkung der abschreckenden und defensiven Wirkung der NATO-Streitkräfte gegen einen konventionellen Großangriff. .... Ihr Ziel <sup>objektiv</sup> besteht darin, den Aggressor davon zu überzeugen, daß jede Art des Angriffs zu sehr schweren Verlusten für seine eigenen Streitkräfte führen könnte und nachdrücklich die Gefahren <sup>notwendiger</sup> zu betonen, die in der Weiterführung des Konfliktes liegen, indem ihm das Risiko klargemacht wird, daß eine derartige Situation außer Kontrolle gerät und bis zum allgemeinen nuklearen Krieg eskalieren kann."

X In ähnlicher Weise äußert sich das Weißbuch zur Verteidigung der Bundesregierung von 1976 (Europa-Archiv 1976 S. D 95).  
Aus dieser Funktion der taktischen nuklearen Waffen <sup>konsequenz</sup> folgt, daß ihre Aufgabe nicht allein eine militärische, sondern eine politische ist. Ihr Vorhandensein ist ein wesentliches Moment in der Überlegung eines Angreifers. Hier liegt ein Grund, weshalb die Stationierung solcher Waffen in amerikanischer Hand für die Wirkung der Abschreckung von hohem Gewicht ist.

5. Es kann darauf hingewiesen werden, daß der Einsatz der nuklearen Waffen vor allem deshalb nötig wird, weil die westlichen Länder in der konventionellen Verteidigung eine Unterlegenheit <sup>inferiorität</sup> aufweisen. Eine Verstärkung der westlichen konventionellen Verteidigung auf das erforderliche Maß erscheint aber kaum möglich. Angesichts der inneren Lage der Regierungen dieser Länder und ihrer wachsenden Neigung sozialen Zielen <sup>priorität</sup> den Vorrang vor der Verteidigung zu geben, ist eine Erhöhung der Kräfte der westlichen Länder nicht zu erwarten. Es bleibt daher für Europa - und hier liegt im tieferen Sinne ein moralisches Problem freier <sup>dependance volontaire</sup> williger Abhängigkeit und politischer <sup>mobilität polit.</sup> Unbeweglichkeit vor - nur der Weg offen, bei den gegenwärtigen Planungen der Verteidigung zu bleiben.

Gegenwärtig stehen im Westen 12 gepanzerte Divisionen 31 solcher Divisionen im Osten gegenüber, die rasch auf etwa 70 - 80 Divisionen



verstärkt werden können. Bei Hinzuziehung anderer nicht gepanzerter (armoured) Divisionen ist das Verhältnis <sup>proporz</sup> 27 zu 68. An Panzern stehen 7000 Einheiten des Westens 19 000 Panzer des Ostens gegenüber. Bei den Flugzeugen besteht ebenfalls eine erhebliche Überlegenheit des Ostens.<sup>2)</sup>

6. Die große politische Bedeutung der taktischen nuklearen Waffen tritt auch in der Stellung hervor, die ihnen im Rahmen der Gespräche über Rüstungskontrolle zukommt. Die sowjetische <sup>usforisch?</sup> Bemühung, das ameri- <sup>stano</sup> kanische System der Vorwärts-Verteidigung dessen Reichweite teilweise <sup>rapido d'azione</sup> bis in die Sowjetunion geht, in die Diskussion über die strategischen Waffen einzubeziehen, ist in SALT I (Abkommen vom 26.5.1975) nicht <sup>Accordo</sup> erfolgreich gewesen. Die Unterhaltung von Wladiwostok vom Herbst 1974 über SALT II hat diese Fragen noch offengelassen. Es könnte für die Vereinigten Staaten Anlaß bestehen, im Zuge einer umfassenden Ab- <sup>present. il nostro ruolo</sup> machung auch diese Waffen einzubeziehen. Eine solche bilaterale Bindung <sup>accordo</sup> die zur Verringerung oder Entfernung dieser Waffen aus Europa führen könnte, würde freilich das Vertrauen der europäischen Verbündeten <sup>scuolare</sup> erschüttern können. Es besteht größere Wahrscheinlichkeit, daß Verhandlungen über diese Waffen im Rahmen der gegenseitigen Rüstungsbeschränkung (Mutual Force Reduction MFR), die in Wien geführt werden, auftreten wird. Am Ende des Jahres 1975 haben die westlichen Mächte Vorschläge gemacht, die eine Verringerung dieser taktischen nuklearen Waffen in Europa mit einer Verminderung der Zahl der Panzer der Sowjetunion im zentralen Gebiet <sup>intere a collegare</sup> verbinden wollten. Die Sowjetunion hat diesen Plan zurückgewiesen, weil sie an einer numerisch gleichen Reduktion vorerst festhält. Eine Verminderung der Zahl dieser Waffen von Seiten des Westens wäre möglich, zumal wenn sie durch neuere Typen ersetzt würden. Doch erscheint eine Verringerung nur dann zweckmäßig, wenn für sie <sup>delle contropartite</sup> Gegenleistungen erreicht werden können. In jedem Fall <sup>crea</sup> wirft jede Veränderung Probleme des europäischen Vertrauens in den Schutz der Vereinigten Staaten auf. Die Frage weist auf eine neue Kon- <sup>indica</sup> zeption der Verteidigung Europas hin, die der heutigen Lage entsprechen müßte.

2) ILSS, Military Balance 1975/76  
S. 95ff

### III. Das Auftreten zielgelenkter Waffensysteme

7. Hat die Situation durch die neueste Entwicklung zielgelenkter Waffen eine Änderung erfahren? Die Frage kann noch nicht mit Sicherheit beantwortet werden. Erst am Ende des Vietnam-Krieges sind zielgelenkte Waffen (Precision-Guided Weapons PGW) eingeführt worden. Die USA haben mit vom Flugzeug gelenkten Bomben erhebliche Erfolge erzielt. Die Streitkräfte Nordvietnams verwendeten sowjetische Anti-Flugzeug-Waffen. Der umfassende Einsatz solcher Waffen fand indes erst im Nahost-Krieg des Jahres 1973 statt. Sowohl die Ägypter konnten ihren Vormarsch über den Suez Kanal durch den Einsatz gelenkter Raketen gegen Flugzeuge wie gegen Panzer abdecken, wie später die Israelis mit großer Wirkung amerikanische Anti-Tank-Waffen einsetzten.<sup>3)</sup> Aus dieser Erfahrung kann heute mit Vorsicht eine Stärkung der Verteidigung vor allem gegen Panzer hergeleitet werden. Die Mängel dieser neuen Waffen - teilweise Abhängigkeit von Sicht, Möglichkeit der Abwehr vom Objekt her - werden ausgeglichen durch die Möglichkeit weiter Anwendung dieser Waffen, die von einzelnen Soldaten oder von Fahrzeugen aus angewendet werden können, soweit sie nicht zum Abschuss von Flugzeugen aus bestimmt sind.

Es besteht seither die Möglichkeit, daß die taktischen Bewegungen der Streitkräfte erheblichen Veränderungen unterworfen sein werden, daß aber vorerst eine gewisse Verstärkung der konventionellen Verteidigung ergibt, die es möglich machen wird, die Verwendung nuklearer Waffen hinauszuschieben. Ob die taktischen nuklearen Waffen durch solche zielgelenkten Mittel ganz zu ersetzen sind, muß aber offenbleiben. Im Ganzen wird man aber die neue Entwicklung als eine Verminderung des Gewichts der Panzer und als einen Vorsprung der Verteidigung ansehen können.

### IV. Moralische Aspekte der Verwendung taktischer nuklearer Waffen

8. Die ausgedehnte Debatte über die Verwendung nuklearer Waffen, die innerhalb der Kirchen geführt worden ist, hat dies Problem stets

3) Vgl. James Digby, Precision-Guided Weapons, Adelphi Papers Nr. 118 (1975)

als Ganzes betrachtet. Die nuklearen Waffen werden in ihr insgesamt behandelt, ohne daß die Form ihres begrenzten Einsatzes hierbei näher erörtert worden wäre. Im Vordergrund der Überlegungen steht der große Atomkrieg, dessen vernichtende Wirkungen als wirksames Argument dienen. In der deutschen Öffentlichkeit liegt der Höhepunkt der Debatte um die Verwendung nuklearer Mittel schon länger zurück, am Ende der 50er Jahre, und die damals eingenommenen Positionen haben sich seither kaum verändert. Es traten sich, wenn man von den konsequenten Pazifisten absieht, zwei Richtungen gegenüber. Die eine sah in dem Aufkommen dieser Waffen eine grundlegende Änderung des Krieges gegeben, der in seiner zerstörenden Wirkung nun nicht mehr gerechtfertigt werden könne. Daher sei auch die ältere Lehre der protestantischen Doktrin vom gerechten Krieg nicht mehr anwendbar. Eine Verwendung nuklearer Waffen müsse nicht nur hinsichtlich des ersten Einsatzes, sondern überhaupt abgelehnt werden und auch ihre Herstellung als Mittel der Abschreckung sei moralisch zu verurteilen. Demgegenüber sprach eine andere Auffassung dem Christen das Recht zur Verteidigung seiner Familie, seiner Heimat und seines Volkes nicht ab. Von diesem Standpunkt aus erkannte sie auch die Möglichkeit an, nukleare Waffen als Mittel der Abschreckung zur Erhaltung des Friedens zu besitzen, lehnte aber auch in der Verteidigung ihren Einsatz nicht ab.

Diese beiden Auffassungen stehen auch heute noch grundsätzlich einander gegenüber. Eine spätere Äußerung der Evangelischen Kirche in einer Denkschrift<sup>4)</sup> stellt sie gegenüber, ohne Betonung des großen Risikos, das in der Politik der Abschreckung für eine Gefahr des nuklearen Krieges liege zu einer einheitlichen Anschauung zu gelangen. Man hat in der Bundesrepublik daher hier von einer gegenseitigen Ergänzung dieser Meinungen gesprochen, die hinzunehmen sei, solange dieser Gegensatz nicht überwunden werden könne. Die Situation hat sich seither nicht viel verändert. Die am Ausgang der 60er Jahre aufkommende Friedensforschung hat sich gegen jede Art von Abschreckung als "Drohpolitik" gewandt und hat die Notwendigkeit einer aktiven Friedenspolitik unterstrichen. In den letzten Jahren haben sich auch gewisse Wandlungen ergeben.

4) Vgl. Der Friedensdienst der Christen 1970  
S. 15ff

Manche Gegner des Krieges treten heute für eine Durchsetzung der Selbstbestimmung mit Gewalt ein, und nehmen damit eine Haltung ein, die den Begriff des gerechten Krieges für eine gerechte Sache wieder einführt.<sup>5)</sup> Andererseits haben Christen, die den Verteidigungskrieg anerkennen, sich gegen jede Übung des Widerstandes mit Gewalt gegen ein ungerechtes Regime gewandt. Daher hat sich in den letzten Jahren die Diskussion stärker diesem Problem der Gewaltanwendung zur Befreiung zugewandt.

9. Eine Stellungnahme zu der Rolle der taktischen nuklearen Waffen wird sich im Rahmen dieser grundsätzlichen Auffassungen bewegen. Wer die Verwendung nuklearer Waffen überhaupt ablehnt, wird auch die Bestrebungen, diese Waffen in einer begrenzten Form zu verwenden, nicht annehmen. Wer dagegen das Recht der Verteidigung anerkennt, und die Verwendung nuklearer Waffen in diesem Zusammenhang nicht ausschließt, wird bei seiner Stellungnahme die besondere Funktion der taktischen nuklearen Waffen, einer Abschreckung mit begrenzten Mitteln zu dienen, in Rücksicht ziehen. Er wird nicht übersehen, daß das beschränkte Risiko den Einsatz nuklearer Waffen erleichtern könnte. Er wird andererseits den Gedanken anerkennen, in einer Lage, die nukleare Mittel notwendig macht, nach einer Kontrolle der Situation zu streben. Dabei bleibt freilich ein Bedenken darin, daß in dieser Konzeption die westliche Seite als erste einen Einsatz nuklearer Waffen vornehmen würde. Die weiteren Überlegungen werden sich daher auch dahin richten, wie dieser Zwang zu nuklearer Kriegsführung überwunden oder verringert werden könnte.

Der bisherige Verlauf der Wiener Gespräche gibt nicht viel Hoffnung, daß man in den Verhandlungen über gegenseitige Abrüstung zu einer Lage gelangen kann, in der die Überlegenheit der östlichen Staaten in konventioneller Hinsicht abgebaut werden kann. Ein anderer Weg, eine Erhöhung der konventionellen Anstrengungen der westeuropäischen Länder, ist nicht gangbar aus Gründen der inneren Politik.

5) Zur Wiederkehr des "gerechten Krieges" in den neueren Stellungnahmen der Vereinten Nationen und eines Teils der internationalen Öffentlichkeit siehe Stephen E. Schwebel in J.M. Moore, Law and Civil War in the Modern World Baltimore 1974 S. 450

Die Entfernung der taktischen nuklearen Waffen aus Europa ist angesichts ihrer Entwicklung in England und Frankreich nicht mehr möglich. Sie nur aus einem bestimmten Raum Europas zurückzuziehen, würde das Gewicht der Abschreckung schwächen und durch die eintretende Diskriminierung Spannungen unter den beteiligten Staaten hervorrufen können. Ein Verzicht auf diese Waffen würde es notwendig machen, einem Angriff alsbald mit stärkeren Mitteln und einer höheren Stufe der Eskalation entgegenzutreten.

10. Je mehr die Gefahr einer militärischen Verwicklung in Europa zutrifft, destomehr verringert sich auch die nukleare Problematik in diesem Raum. Dafür gewinnt sie an Gewicht in anderen Teilen der Welt. Seit der Zündung der ersten indischen Bombe am 18.5.1974 sind die Befürchtungen gestiegen, daß auch andere Schwellenmächte nach nuklearer Bewaffnung streben, und daß dadurch das Ziel des Sperrvertrages (Non Proliferation Treaty NPT) vereitelt würde. Die am meisten in Frage stehenden Staaten, etwa Israel und Südafrika, haben dies Abkommen von 1968 nicht gezeichnet, auch andere Staaten sind ungebunden. Bedenken haben sich in letzter Zeit dagegen gerichtet, daß in zunehmendem Maße Staaten außerhalb des Kreises der hochindustrialisierten Staaten mit nuklearen Anlagen, diese erwerben. Es kann darauf hingewiesen werden, daß dort, wo bei einem solchen Abkommen die Sicherungsbestimmungen der IAEA zur Anwendung gelangen, die Überführung angereicherten Urans zur Herstellung von Waffen ausgeschlossen sein dürfte (solche Sicherungen bestanden nicht in Indien). Eine weitere Sicherung würde nach einem Vorschlage des Staatssekretärs Kissinger darin liegen, daß künftig Anstalten zur Anreicherung von Uran nicht mehr in nationaler Verfügung, sondern als regionale Unternehmen unter entsprechender Kontrolle errichtet würden. Die Besorgnis vor der Ausbreitung nuklearer Waffen hat insbesondere auch auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent Ausdruck gefunden; die O.A.U. hat sich bemüht, ebenso wie die All African Conference of Churches, die europäischen Staaten von einer Überlassung nuklearer Anlagen an Südafrika abzuhalten. Den Bestrebungen zur Stärkung des Nichtverbreitungsvertrages wird in Zukunft besonderes Gewicht zukommen. Das wird freilich auch von Seiten der nuklearen Mächte größere Bereitschaft fordern, ihrerseits stärker als bisher zur Einschränkung der Gefahren beizutragen.

In dieser Verlagerung der Probleme zeigt sich, daß in Europa die Situation, wenn auch auf einem zu hohen Niveau der Rüstung, stabil geblieben ist. Die Spannungen der Weltlage zeigen sich nun außerhalb des europäischen Raumes und es wird ebenfalls eine Aufgabe der politischen Zusammenarbeit in Europa sein, sich diesen Vorgängen und Gefahren stärker zuzuwenden.