

SOUTHERN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN:
THE CASES OF ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA
Istituto Affari Internazionali
The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)
Manziana, 20-22/XI/1975

1. "South European countries and the superpowers"
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iai	ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA
n° Inv. 9036	
10.7.1989	
BIBLIOTECA	

Joint Meeting

I A I - CHATHAM HOUSE

Southern Europe and the Mediterranean:
the cases of Italy and Yugoslavia

Manziana, 20-22 November 1975

SOUTH EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE SUPERPOWERS

THE SOUTH EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE SUPERPOWERS (1)

A common political guideline for assessing as a whole the problems of the South European countries can be found only outside of them.

In strategic terms they represent the periphery (or the relatively marginal areas) of vaster systems, gravitating around the USA and the USSR, whose principle fronts are in central Europe and the Middle East.

As far as trade, investments and labour markets are concerned they are connected to the Nine and, in particular, to Germany. The multinationals that still invest in this area do so with an eye to the wider markets of the EEC.

In energy and monetary terms they depend equally on the US (and the stronger European countries) and on the OPEC countries.

Even culturally, Mediterranean unity is a dream which ended over fifteen centuries ago, and which is contradicted by the growing association of their customs, studies and history to those of the rest of Europe, confirming the disintegration of the ancient "Mediterranean world" and the shift north of Europe's cultural "barycenter".

Even among themselves the South European countries have little in common. The number and quality of vertical ties (those which link the single South European countries to

(1) We are referring to Portugal, Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and Turkey, and we consider the other Balkan States and France connected to Southern Europe by special ties.

external powers) are far superior to the number and quality of horizontal ones (those which link the single South European countries to each other).

The internal political life of these countries is regulated by the policy lines of vertical allies, to which their own international programs (of foreign policy, defence, economy, etc.) are linked. There have been no recent examples of Mediterranean politics following horizontal policy lines, except for a few "imperialist" attempts by the Italians during the Fascist period and a few local conflicts (Greece-Turkey). These countries, therefore, constitute neither a homogeneous region, nor a whole in some way coordinated that tends to integrate the different national realities. Nevertheless, together they constitute a "problem" and this problem calls for political decisions which must, at least in part, be homogeneous and interrelated. They require, in other words, common "crisis management".

This affirmation needs explaining. At first glance, in fact, one could sustain that just because of the diversities we have pointed out it would be better to deal separately with each single national case, avoiding useless generalisations that could have harmful effects.

In contrast to this way of thinking, it is possible to sustain that:

- while the political history of the South European countries tends to underline the differences among the various national situations, making any generalisation difficult,
- the vertical ties with external powers tend to assimilate

late the problems in an integrated scenario of crises making it necessary to confront the problems of southern Europe as one whole (and to a certain extent, making these problems one whole).

This conviction is based on the consideration that the crises and changes that southern Europe is going through are only in part the result of the internal evolutions of the local societies and economies. To a great extent they are also the result of more general international crises and of European evolution: that is, they are greatly influenced by the vertical ties which, through the centuries, have become of binding importance to the South European countries. Furthermore, in this postwar period these ties have been greatly strengthened and extended.

Southern Europe's involvement in crises and politics which do not have their origins within the area, makes control over and management of internal crises more complicated.

There are different ways of assessing the situation depending on whether it is seen from the point of view of a superpower or that of a Mediterranean nation. From the global point of view American and Soviet military interest in the Mediterranean is obvious. The two powerful fleets, American military presence in the NATO countries and Spain, the British bases, Soviet and American military aid, the substantial arms sales, are clear indications of the Mediterranean area's strategic importance. Southern Europe, in particular, is closely bound by important military pacts (Portugal, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey by the Atlantic Alliance, the bases in Malta, Cyprus and Gibraltar which are associated with them, Spain's ties with the US), and is directly in contact with the

problems of East-West equilibrium (with Bulgaria and Rumania of the Warsaw Pact; with neutral Yugoslavia and Albania; with the USSR bordering on Turkey). However, the military equilibrium of this region is not determined only by the East-West conflict.

On the contrary, local problems are assuming growing importance. Schematically speaking, one could note two other important parameters besides the East-West conflict: the problem of development (the North-South conflict) and the institutional problem (civil wars, coups d'état, changes of internal political balance). Both of these parameters influence the political choices of the south European countries: often towards objectives different from those which the East-West parameter would desire.

The situation in the Mediterranean is considerably differentiated from that of central Europe. The East-West frontier which divides Germany is at the same time military, ideological, political and represents a division between the two different economic systems. In the Mediterranean the divisions are not so clear. Up until now the military component has seemed to prevail over the others; however, the political evolution of NATO's south flank and the crisis in bilateral relations between the USA and single allies (Greece, Turkey, Portugal... Italy?) no longer permits a solely military discourse.

In that respect, the central European front's gradual isolation from the southern front makes it possible today to consider the two fronts almost fully autonomous. The Vienna talks on the mutual reduction and balancing of troops began by explicitly excluding an examination of the southern sector.

The study recently conducted by the WEU on the consistency of the Central European front (rapporteur: Ulrich de Maizière) makes no mention of a necessary link with the South European front; it concentrates instead on the Atlantic links, without considering an eventual move from the south. It would seem, that is, that from a strategic point of view the World War II experience (when, in Europe, the first big allied offensive started from the south and from Africa) is considered an "accident" owing to particular political conditions and that, in reality, the central front is considered largely autonomous at least of its southern flank.

The entire Mediterranean front of NATO cannot remain indifferent to this view. It follows that its functions tend also to be autonomous of the events of the central front.

In the past years, however, the USSR has greatly altered its military capacity, developing an imposing military fleet and a great number of arms which are half way between tactical and strategic (whose use can be either nuclear or conventional, and whose range of action is often "intermediate"): the SAM missiles (which it also gave to Egypt), the Backfire bomber, the new aircraft carriers, etc.

Many of these forces have been deployed throughout the Mediterranean front and in its immediate surroundings. In fact, it seems that this area is the theatre of a sort of arms race.

We therefore have at the same time: growing military concentration in the Mediterranean, and the detachment of this area from the central European front.

The military importance of this area is also changing with the changes in armament technology. As the military

forces in this area increase, the importance of the Mediterranean for US strategic forces may diminish. Not only will the new Trident be able to threaten objectives in the Soviet Union from outside the Mediterranean area which today the Polaris and Poseidon could reach only if launched from the Mediterranean, but the development of satellites and new detection techniques diminish the role of the FBS (Forward Bases' System).

In the South European countries the new integrated system of radar and satellites for sighting missiles that the US is constructing, could also diminish the strategic importance of the NADGE, and the tactical importance (for central Europe) of the southeastern branch of NADGE.

Therefore, from a general strategic point of view the Mediterranean is becoming relatively less relevant.

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The Mediterranean's role must therefore be redefined. Provisionally, the following points can be made:

- in order to have a Middle East policy it is necessary to have some control over the Mediterranean;
- the Mediterranean remains one of the main means of communication between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
- Despite changing strategic considerations, the withdrawal of forces from the Mediterranean, or a net advantage in favor of one of the superpowers, would make the credibility of the superpowers' European strategies problematic.

These considerations suffice to explain the presence of such large military forces, but they explain neither their actual composition and armament, nor their employment strategy.

For example, it is not clear whether the Mediterranean

is an area of possible "local wars", or only an area connected with the general East-West theatre (as central Europe surely is). It is not enough to say that it is "in part both". First of all, because we have pointed out the existence of a growing detachment of the central and southern fronts, and it is therefore important to know to what extent this detachment has been considered. Secondly, because this might expose the South European countries to excessive risks to their security without clear compensations.

Already, on the Sixth Fleet and in the single South European countries, there are a great number of tactical nuclear warheads. It is probable that the nuclear threshold of an eventual East-West conflict in the Mediterranean would be very low, and it is also possible that such a conflict would originate outside of Europe, in the Middle East, immediately involving the entire Mediterranean area.

What would be the strategic significance of such a nuclear conflict in the Mediterranean for the South European countries?

The Atlantic Alliance's doctrine affirms that the existence of tactical nuclear arms in Europe allows the "flexibility" necessary to make the Alliance's deterrent credible: the Soviets know that there will be a nuclear volley and they know that it is all the more probable since it will not involve from the beginning the American strategic forces. On the other hand, the Europeans know that the Americans will be involved with their nuclear weapons right from the beginning and that this will compromise them in the defence of Europe in a more direct way than if these arms were not present. The tactical nuclear weapons constitute the necessary link

(what Wohlstetter defines as the 'bridge' and the 'firebreak') between strategic and conventional arms and serve to spread the American umbrella over Europe.

In the Mediterranean this reasoning is more difficult to apply. The lesser centrality of this area, the possibility of confrontation in less populated zones or on the sea, the possibility that an eventual war is concentrated clearly in only one country (while an attack on Germany would be seen immediately as an attack on all of Europe), the possibility, finally, of the crisis beginning in an area not explicitly covered by the Atlantic Alliance or the Warsaw Pact, make one think of the real possibility of limited wars in which the use of nuclear arms would have no sense other than the destruction of the countries of this region.

The development of nuclear weapons could complicate this picture. If, for example, SLBMs were destined for non-strategic uses (that is, to be considered, like the French and British SLBMs, arms destined explicitly for the defence of the European equilibrium and no longer for the defence of the global equilibrium), if arms of ambiguous collocation, between tactical and strategic, were developed, such as cruise missiles or medium range bombers, the uncertainty of the role of the nuclear forces in the Mediterranean could be accentuated, without giving these coastal states more security.

On the contrary they would see the opposing arsenals grow and would receive in return no greater guarantees than they presently have.

In conclusion, therefore, the South European countries have no clear strategic collocation in the East-West picture, even knowing that they will necessarily be involved in any

eventual conflict. In other words, there is a lack of balance between the global point of view of the superpowers and the national point of view of the single South European countries.

Politically this lack of equilibrium is accentuated by the crisis of Atlantic politics in the west and that of the Communist movement in the east. Both of these political focal points are losing their magnetism. The South European countries of NATO, with the qualified exception of Italy in the EEC, have not been integrated in a multilateral western political society and have maintained above all bilateral ties with the US. These relations are in a state of crisis corresponding to internal political crises (Greece, Portugal, etc.) but have not been replaced by anything more stable.

As for the Communist countries, they (with the exception of Bulgaria) have evolved an independent attitude, refusing completely or partially Soviet hegemony. Also the most important Communist parties not in government in the Mediterranean countries have developed in the same way.

Even these political ties are not particularly stable in the long run. In the first few postwar years the political forces of south Europe regarded their preferential ties with the USA or the USSR as a point of strength. Internal political balances in Italy and in Greece were based also on these preferential ties. The division between government and opposition forces coincided ideologically with the division between the blocs. Certainly this situation has changed, at least in two different directions. In Italy, Portugal and Spain the so-called "area of government" has been enlarged and no longer coincides with the divisions of the cold war period. It's almost comical to read from Italy Kissinger's recent

affirmations about the danger of the PC's joining the government: not because one can't agree with his analysis but because what Kissinger sees as an hypothesis to reject, has already been for several years a historical reality and thus requires not decisions of principle but concrete decisions of management.

In Greece and in Turkey the nationalist forces have taken the upperhand so that relations with the USA are utilized no longer to consolidate internal equilibrium but to favor their own foreign policies (and in particular their respective policies vis-à-vis Cyprus). Far from constituting an element of stability, they have become an instrument to favor change.

This analysis comes to an interesting conclusion: even though the Mediterranean is a part of the East-West equilibrium, the internal political processes of the South European countries do not correspond to the needs of this equilibrium: they are, in fact, largely independent of it.

That explains to a great extent the many American and Soviet policy errors made in this area and the problems they must confront.

The superpowers' appraisal of the Mediterranean evolution is necessarily conditioned by global considerations (that is, by how East-West relations are going). They therefore tend to consider everything that happens in the Mediterranean as "eccentric", a risk to stability, a jarring note in the international panorama. They tend to reduce these variables to their policy constants, simplifying their analysis of the Mediterranean nations and basing their decisions on a few fundamental criteria (keeping the "balance of power", distinguishing between communists and anti-communists, etc.)

that turn out to be too far away from the actual internal realities of these countries to be able to work efficiently. There remains, therefore, an atmosphere of general uncertainty.

In such a situation of uncertainty the safest choice appears to be a flexible, ad hoc approach to the single problems. For example, the US seems ready to support the Yugoslavian communists, oppose the Italian ones and support the persecution of the Spanish ones. The USSR contemporaneously theorizes the "Cunhal line", supports the conservative Greek government (as it previously supported the colonels) and has good relations with Spain.

All this increases the already accentuated bilateralism which characterizes the international relations of Southern Europe with the Superpowers.

In times of profound crisis or change such bilateral relations are insufficient to guarantee the stability of either the alliances or the South European governments.

The inadequacy of the superpowers' criteria for judging the situations and the subordination of their appraisal of the internal development tendencies to the needs of the East-West equilibrium make "realpolitik" options (brusque, at times surgical, often unpopular) preferable to more open, long-term politics. The result is a double crisis: internal rapidly followed by international (as has happened in Cyprus, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Portugal and as will happen in Spain and possibly in Italy).

This error of perspective committed by the superpowers is partially justified by the reality of the South European countries. As we have said, they have very few common ties and it is difficult to imagine a multilateral system of

security and stability less dependent on external intervention.

Any "collective security pact" in the Mediterranean or even only in Southern Europe, would not only be an illusion but a risk as well. There is no real force on which to base it, capable of resisting determined external pressure. The political situation and the institutions of the single states are not sufficiently stable and are therefore exposed to all winds and capable of unexpected policy reversals. Finally, there is no common economic basis that could make this region independent of Northern Europe, the superpowers or Arab oil.

To think in only Mediterranean terms is therefore nonsense. In fact, no country does and this is why we have underlined the importance of vertical political ties.

This does not mean, however, that such a situation could not evolve in the future. Certainly, the contradiction between the internal evolutions of these countries (that are the necessary premise for their real economic development) and superpower politics is too great to remain unresolved.

Bringing it down to these terms it would seem that there were few ways out: a period of internal agitation followed by a realignment (either following traditional patterns or according to new alliances). In this realignment even Yugoslavia's neutrality (or, mutatis mutandis, Italy's) might find room: in fact, such neutrality would represent but one of the many unknown factors in the area and would be compensated (in the eyes of the superpowers) by the realignment of other countries. There would not be room, however, for an entire flank of neutral South European countries because of the previously mentioned difficulties.

In such a situation the problems of Southern Europe would

remain unresolved. In the first place, the problem of economic development, because the key issue of cooperation between the developed north and the developing south, without which the impoverishment of the South would continue, would not be resolved (or would be resolved negatively). Secondly, the problem of freer political evolution, because the international framework would continue to work as a limit to internal political evolution: the South European countries have to adapt themselves to norms which are not compatible with their internal needs (this goes for eventually neutral nations as well: Yugoslavia's internal evolution is blocked by Tito's having to avoid a political crisis that might lead to Soviet intervention or of the breaking away of the richer, more westernized republics).

In other words, this formula does not offer the political leaderships of the South European countries prospects of development and integration in a vaster international context, even though it keeps alive the reality of all those transnational currents and international needs which hang like dead weights over the life of the South European countries when instead they should be integrated and better controlled by them.

In a certain sense we are today faced with a dilemma analogous to the one in '48-'49. In that period there was a current of thought in the State Department (cf. the opinions of Kennan) which held it more advantageous to maintain bilateral ties with Italy and the other Mediterranean countries, without fitting them into the vaster multilateral context of an Alliance between the USA and central-north Europe. Today the problem is similar. Kissinger's policy exalts the "flexibility"

of ad hoc relations, which in the short term can facilitate relations between the USA and the countries of south Europe but which does not offer these countries a equitable future prospective for integration in an area of not only strategic, but also political and economic stability.

Nevertheless it would be erroneous to reduce South European prospects to a dilemma between subordination or chaos. Especially in the past few years a third alternative has been taking shape, one which has been widely discussed and analysed by the political forces of these countries: western Europe.

It already represents the other pole to which the South European countries are attracted (economically and politically). The Italian experience has shown that the prospect of growing European integration has worked as a stabilizing factor on the political forces. Whereas the decisions made in '49 (for or against the Atlantic Alliance) had created an internal split corresponding to the international one, the European prospect gradually gained the support of new political forces, and today constitutes a largely unitary (and therefore stabilizing) factor in the Italian political panorama.

In these past years EEC policy towards Greece first and towards Portugal and Spain later, proves that they are more aware of the internal evolutions and the long-term possibilities of these countries. And so today the Common Market represents in a way the most important political link between these countries and the West, an alternative (and at least partially, a substitute) to Atlantic ties which have been weakened or are in crisis.

The flexibility shown towards Yugoslavia and Rumania opens the way to better political relations with these countries as well.

From an economic point of view, integration of northern and southern Europe poses the big problems characteristic of relations between developed and less developed (or developing) areas: a striking example is southern Italy. Nevertheless, it is evident that such difficulties remain also because of the absence of political integration: we need only look at the tendencies in commerce, investment, worker migration, etc. Political integration can not but work as a corrective to such tendencies; studies and proposals by the EEC commission have already been made. The political will to actuate such plans has not yet fully matured: that, however, will also depend on the type of proposals and reactions coming from Southern Europe.

It is clear, however, that the European prospect represents a new element and is a way out of the problems of Southern Europe.

This prospect, however, can not be only economic. The military (security) dimension, until now absent, will have to in some way be confronted. Without such a dimension, in fact, a new contradiction would develop between superpower and European presence, with new risks both for the stability of the area and above all for the coherent development of all aspects of Southern Europe.

In conclusion it seems possible to maintain that:

- Southern Europe is in a state of crisis and is changing rapidly;
- it is not possible to "isolate" southern Europe in the

Mediterranean area and neutralize it in some way;

- it is however possible to adjust the international relations in this area, making them more consistent with the internal evolutions, if greater western European political intervention is developed;
- if this does not come about, the external needs and, above all, those of the superpowers and the strategic-military ones, will increase the divisions between the single countries and will make their development more difficult.



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THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF ITALY AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: A PERSONAL VIEW

by

Pierre Hassner

QUESTA PUBBLICAZIONE È DI PROPRIETÀ
DELL'ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF ITALY AND THE

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT : A PERSONAL VIEW

Being neither Italian, nor a specialist of Italy, nor a scenario-minded futurologist, the writer is three times protected from any illusion of competence in answering questions about plausible evolutions of the Italian scene during the next few years. He can only throw the questions back to the group. Moreover whether cast in the interrogative the affirmative, the conditional or the imperative, these random notes are essentially impressionistic rather than systematic. Their only value may be to reflect the reactions of a relatively distant and uncommitted observer, whose only originality may be in tending to agree more with Signor Moro, Signor Berlinguer, and (according to a recent poll) with the Italian people, than with some of ^{his} own colleagues, be they right-wing German-American or left-wing Italian intellectuals. [Never has the well-known paradox of the irresistible force meeting the unmovable obstacle seemed more relevant than in looking to Italy's situation. The irresistible force is made of changes in the economy, the social structures, cultural attitudes and political perceptions which lead away from the existing political and social coalition lead by the D.C. towards an alternative "bloc" which in some way or other would mean a shift to the left and in some way or other would include the communist party as one of its main partners if not the dominating one. The unmovable obstacle is made of an unfavourable environment, particularly economic and international, and particularly under present circumstances. The political force which, by its record and its strategy, has put itself in the most credible posture as an alternative to the corruption obscurantism and inefficiency of the D.C. is the PCI

At the same time from Togliatti's use of the Greek example to Berlinguer's use of the Chilean one, it has shown itself remarkably aware of the seriousness of the ^{danger} obstacles represented by the combination of domestic polarisation and external intervention. It has hoped, however, to overcome these obstacles above all through the prudence of its strategy and through the reassuring evidence of its own evolution, but also through favourable conditions in the domestic and international environment : prosperity, East-West détente, calm in the Mediterranean, progress in European integration, which would reduce the hostility of domestic and, above all, international forces or provide a screen against them. To-day, while domestic political conditions seem to show the PCI was too pessimistic and has tended to underestimate the evolution of the Italian people and its own strength, general economic and international conditions tend to justify its worse fears rather than its hopes : instead of managing growth in provisional harmony with Agnelli and the Pope, with the blessing of ^{the} dynamic European Community, with the benevolent abstention of the superpowers, and in the framework of an Italian-inspired West European Communist strategy, it may have to manage unemployment and inflation, with more direct responsibility for a more dismal heritage than expected, with Italian and multinational corporations being pushed to intransigence or to emigration by objective conditions as much by fear of communism, with the United States and the Soviet Union both hostile, the former adamantly so, due to its troubles elsewhere and to its enhanced priority of stability in the Mediterranean, the latter insisting on ideological struggle and on the unity of the communist movement, finally with other Western communist parties and countries offering more a deterrent than a help.

All these elements combined with the deep reluctance of the respective rank and file, make the favoured communist strategy of "historical compromise" unlikely to succeed. But they do not make the success of any other any more likely, at least in the sense of achieving their respective objectives.

All King Henry's, King Lear's ("I shall do such things, Which they are I know not, But they shall be the terror of the earth") and King Canute's exhortations and exorcisms will not succeed in "revitalizing" the aging demo-christian Humpty-Dumpty, nor will the denial of visas by the United States be taken as a denial of legitimacy by the Italian people. On the contrary, as shown by the two last electoral consultations, a strategy of intransigence towards the PCI is likely to benefit the latter and a refusal of collaboration with him is more likely to advance precisely the left-wing alternative which is feared both by him and by his opponents. The example of Naples, where the prevention of a grand coalition municipality by the right-wing of the DC had led to a left-wing one headed by a communist may be symbolic.

Conversely, anticipated elections and the choice of a revolutionary or of a frontist alternative run the gravest risks, even in case of victory, to produce first the very thing which the non-communist proponents of the alternative fear, i.e. domination by the communists, and then what the communists fear, i.e. a process of chileanization or portugalisation through what L. CAFAGNA has called "la tenaglia delle aspettanze" (i.e. uncontrolled growth in worker's hopes and demands, and in capitals fears and evasions), leading to right-wing reaction encouraged directly or indirectly by the United States to neo-stalinist or neo-fascist repression and to economic isolation.

While these dialectics (or rather this vicious circle) of polarisation seems more likely than any optimistic scenario, they are much less the inevitable result of objective contradictions between social trends and political environment than the probable outcome of preventive reactions and over-reactions, of self-fulfilling and self-denying prophecies. The winds of change do, unquestionably, blow over Italy as over the whole of Southern Europe; and there is, undoubtedly, a contradiction between change and security. But, to borrow Chairman Mao's vocabulary this contradiction need not by any means be an antagonistic one.

For instance, among the international consequences of communist participation in power, one must distinguish between those which are inevitable (but which, while real, are likely to be marginal : problems for the NPG, for relations with Israel, perhaps, under certain circumstances, consequences for Yugoslavia) and, those which would stem from reactions to the hostile reactions of the US, the Federal Republic, or multinational corporations.

While there may be some illusion (voluntary or not) in the PCI's apparent belief that one can reach a fundamental reform of society (let alone a revolution) without ~~depending~~ ^{oppressing} anybody, I believe it is shown by polls and elections, that in most auro-mediterranean countries a broad majority of the population (as distinct from powerful minorities on the political-economic-military right or the political-intellectual-military left or pseudo-left) tend towards a moderate left, i.e. aspire neither to the status quo nor to revolution but to modernizing and democratic social reforms - which do imply a break with present practices but not a fundamental break with the Western type of society

nor with the Western system of alliances. I also believe that these aspirations are more realistic in terms of the functioning of their respective societies than the belief in the status quo or in revolution. Finally, while each of these countries has its own identity crisis, and while their autonomous evolution would lead to a certain diversification both domestic and international, from social democratic to military regimes, or from certain forms of atlanticism to certain forms of non-alignment, these variations would be compatible with the European balance and with the functioning of Western organizations like the Atlantic alliance and the Common Market provided these, in turn, would adapt, through diversification division of labor and devolution to the challenge of diversity and change. More pronounced national identities within the Mediterranean, a more pronounced mediterranean identity within Europe and European identity within the West, could be compatible with a new and more flexible multilateralism, in which the role of intermediary institutions, groupings or parties (like the European community between the United States and non-aligned countries, or social democratic and socialist parties between capitalism and Western pluralistic communism) would be particularly crucial. But this implies on all sides the "end of either-or", i.e. instead of the dilemma of uniformity or conflict, a balance between diversity and compatibility. It is likely that the mutual intransigence of blind conservatism and blind adventurism as well as the almost inevitable difference of their parallel struggles in different countries will, rather lead, to some countries moving towards the right and some towards the left or some towards a close bilateral link with the United States and some towards a strident anti-americanism. This, indeed, is the most worrisome scenario for the risks both of violent conflict and of paralysis for West European integration as well as

for pan-european détente : for example a right-wing Spain and a left-wing Portugal, a right-wing Germany and a left-wing Italy etc.. The scarce effect of Portugal on the 15th of June elections of Italy shows that, provided they are dealt with intelligently, contagiousⁿ effect^s can be deflected. But it is likely that the effect (whether of ^{im}itation or of reaction) of events in France over Italy or - in both directions - between Italy and Yugoslavia would be greater. Even more important are the reactions of great powers - mistakenly equating different situations and thus paradoxically preventing by their reactions the positive convergence which could take place. In spite of its limited chances of success, however, the idea of European socialism as a bridge between the North and the South as well as between the West and the East of Europe remains just plausible enough to be a valid standard by which to judge national developments, including Italian ones.

THREE GENERAL QUESTIONS WITH ONE "TRANSFORMIST" BIAS

A/ On social structure cultural attitudes and political coalitions

as divided Analysts of Italy, particularly on the non-communist left, often draw political conclusions from a dualistic presentation of Italian society between the forces of progress and those of reaction. I wonder to what extent this dualistic perspective is not either too broad or too narrow if one wants to apply it directly to politics, and whether the two camps notion must not be combined both with a more global structural view and with a more flexible, differentiated political analysis and strategy.

Two examples : the opposition between the new, modernist, secular, individualistic Italy and the old, traditional, religious one *of the two churches!*

the opposition between the productive Italy and the parasitary - financial - speculative or bureaucratic - one.

Both are true. But the first has misled many sympathizers of the socialist and radical parties into believing they would collect in June 1975 the fruits of the May 1974 referendum - whereas political organization and tradition and issues like efficiency and corruption have a much more direct political impact.

The second leads to identifying all the evils of Italian society with one social stratum expressed by one party. Again this has a broad truth but on the one hand parasitism, clientelism, retributive juggle seem more diffuse, widespread and structurally entrenched than that, on the other hand some important social groups, in particular among the new middle classes are not easily located on one side or the other of the fence. Their economic role and political orientation can vary according to institutions or be understood only by combining the productive-parasitary opposition with other^s like public-private, urban-agrarian, catholic-non catholic etc. Hence a number of controversial questions : where are the new middle classes going? Are they available for fascism as well as for the left ? On what bases can they form a new alliance or bloc with the working class ? (cf. Sylos-Labini, Alberoni, etc..). What about the "bad" state bourgeoisie, demo-christian clientele, etc. ? What would become of them under a new coalition ? Would a different political leadership suffice to turn the same institutions and the same strata to productive purposes ?

In short, has the new social bloc already emerged or does it have to be constituted progressively through differentiated political alliances charting a course between proletarian sectarianism and unanimistic immobilism ?

B/ On domestic and international politics

To a foreign observer the way the U.S. government feels entitled to publicly authorize or forbid a given political solution in Italy and the way the right and the left, including the communists, seem to compete for American endorsement in their domestic competition by offering greater loyalty or greater stability and efficiency, is a source of permanent puzzlement. While understandable in terms of historical precedents and of harsh ever-present realities, such a situation also seems to involve a great deal of misunderstanding and, at the very least, of pathological elements which cannot help but poison the future both of American-European relations and of Italian politics.

It has to do with the widespread partly justified but partly obsolescent feeling that the influence of the international environment about the evolution and the very survival of the domestic regime ^{is} are greater than the ability of the latter to influence the former. Hence the central paradox (but also, possibly, the central misunderstanding) concerning the relation between domestic and international politics in Italian preoccupations : there is no country in the West where there is such a great priority given to domestic over foreign politics, yet there also is no country in the

West where the international considerations play so great a role in domestic politics. On the one hand, domestic politics occupy a much greater place than international ones in the political decisions, moves, strategies, combinations, writings or speeches of politicians and of the public. Even more important, the foreign policy, attitudes decisions and moves not only of political parties but of Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers invariably have their motivations in domestic politics : either they are to be simply explained by a search for popularity or publicity or they constitute a subtle signal towards this or that party or fraction on the domestic chessboard. But on the other hand, the question of the international environment and of its reactions, more precisely, the question : what will the U.S. do ? dominates speculations about political alignments (like about the "opening to the left" in the early sixties and about the communist proposal of a "historical compromise" with the Christian-Democrats to-day) or about elections, including the recent local ones.

What the Italians really are interested in and care about, is domestic politics; but at the same time they take it for granted that the international environment, and, above all, the United States, has a decisive say in these domestic politics : they look at it, according to faction and to circumstances, as a threat or as a protection. Some are trying, timidly, to create, in the margins of Italy's international position, a little elbow-room for domestic evolution. Others, sometimes the same, are appealing to the constraints of the international environment to block a domestic evolution they dislike.

To-day, in particular, there is a feeling that we are again at a turning point, as were the "opening to the left" (i.e., the creation of a center-left coalition) with the encouragement of the Kennedy administration and Italy's entrance into NATO. Some of the ambiguities of the latter seem to be emerging again after having been covered up, in more stable times, by the routine functioning of the alliance.

At the time people like Kennan, Saragat and Brosio perceived that both from an American and from an Italian point of view the problem was one of Italy's strategic position and of her domestic socio-political order, with her military contribution to collective defense against a Soviet threat coming as a poor, almost negligible third. What the United States wants from Italy is essentially access to military bases and a non-communist regime. What Italian elites want from the United States is essentially bilateral help and protection and a framework symbolizing and materializing the socio-political choice in favor of a Western democratic or capitalistic regime. Neither is contradictory with the deep-seated passivity, pacifism, or, at any rate, "domesticism" of a vast majority of the public, or with the vague aspirations to a diplomatic and rhetorical gaullist, non-aligned or mediating role of many political leaders. The military choices of Italy reflect this situation : one of the lowest defense budgets (around 3 %) with one of the highest proportions to personnel costs (around 80 %), one of the highest proportions of superior officers, one of the highest proportions of men assigned to the defense of public order, a deployment also emphasizing the threat from within and the control of the communist-dominated regions in Central Italy, everything seems to point out towards the primacy of political considerations : giving

satisfactions to the military but holding them, so to speak, out of sight, keeping them in reserve for domestic troubles, whereas a real fighting capability involving a raise in the defense-budget and a genuine integration would antagonize this divided and potentially hostile public opinion one wants to appease.

Politically, the seemingly paradoxical line of "pacifist atlanticism" seems to be the lowest common denominator which alone has been capable of absorbing the contradictions between and within Italian political attitudes : a passive acceptance and a political utilization of NATO, compensated by a rhetorical search for peace, détente and an overcoming the blocs, and by feet-dragging on collective obligations. The great debate between atlanticism and neutralism is thus being absorbed by a combination of the two, whereby successive waves of atlantic converts accept the organization but in a "strictly defensive and geographically limited sense" (the formula used by the Charter of Socialist reunification) and by the PCI to-day) and as a contribution to détente; hence coupled with a great reluctance towards any increase of the military burden or of political constraints.

This basic situation still provides the only framework that Italian society can tolerate.

But it has two negative potentials. The first is a potential for misunderstanding. If, besides the military bases, the real preoccupation both of the US and of Italian elites has been Italy's domestic regime more than her military or diplomatic role, the latter may serve as an alibi of

which the very people who use it may have become the victims. Dr. Kissinger invokes the problems for NATO, in particular the NPG, ^einvolving from communist participation; several Italian politicians (including Saragat and La Malfa) have said that the main objection to the latter was no longer domestic but international. If it is true that these considerations are second to that of domestic stability and prosperity and if it were true that these objectives were, to-day, better served by a reform coalition corresponding to the wishes of the Italian people and involving the PCI than by obstinately clinging to the DC formula, would it not follow that both the U.S. and some Italian politicians are victims of their own rhetoric, deftly manipulated by the right wing of the D.C. ?

The second is a potential for passivity. Both the traditional emphasis on keeping the communists out and the possible revised emphasis on saving Italian economy and society from collapse imply (from the U.S. to the communists) an essentially status quo or passive foreign policy. This neglects the new problems and opportunities present in Europe and, in particular, in the Mediterranean. Reactions to them involve the other traditional great debate of Italian foreign policy - between a Europeanist and a Mediterranean orientation.

There is an analogy here with the atlanticist-neutralist one : Italy has chosen Europe but, within Europe, has become increasingly aware of its Mediterranean or Southern dimension of situation. As Suzanne Berger points out, this situation implies opportunities which should be welcomed by the U.S. In many of the conflicts in the Mediterranean, American interests

are not served by reducing our allies to more or less^{er} loyal assistants in a design of our making. But for Italy to play - on something more consequential than a rhetorical level - any other part would require both greater political will and resource, in Rome than are currently available and a new American understanding of the possible contributions of Italian initiatives in foreign policy". (Forthcoming paper for Rockefeller project). I would add a third indispensable mediating element: European political will and resource^s, at the level of the Community of the Federal Republic, of Mediterranean Europe proper.

In spite of the conflicts between Italian evolution and the international environment, isn't it the case that the post-war tradition of the former and the requirements of the latter converge in avoiding stark choices between loyalty and rebellion and in favoring - rather than a dilemma between atlanticism and neutralism or between Europeanism and Mediterraneanism or third-worldism - a ^{drift} ~~strift~~ towards a more independent and a more Mediterranean-oriented policy within an Atlantic and the Europeanist context ?

C/ On models for ^{political} change

Isn't there a similar parallel concerning domestic evolution between the Italian tradition of connubio, trasformismo, neo-trasformismo, and the possibilities for social change in Western industrial societies. Percy Allum has noted "that a grand coalition between a major bourgeois party and a major opposition party representing groups hitherto excluded from government has been the way, historically, that major working class parties have entered government in Western Europe and because^{of this} legitimized as alternative government

parties" (World Today, November 1974). True, a grand coalition, let alone a historical compromise, has often been a recipe for immobility through mutual paralysis, and the Italian tradition of trasformismo is seen as coopting or absorbing new elements into the system rather than transforming the system itself. But this depends on the strength of the respective parties and the pressure of social forces for change. The alternative to immobility or the road towards an alternative bloc may be precisely via a grand coalition whose orientation would be progressively transformed through a shift in the relative power and cohesion of its respective components and in their alignment. As in international politics, power transitions may be at work in a "tectonic" way (to use Ray Cline's expression) through shifts and changes in proportion leading from the hegemony of one party or bloc to that of another under the protective umbrella of a common structure.

At any rate, all other alternatives short of technocratic or military restauration or of stalinist dictatorship involve like a viable grand coalition itself, the reform, regeneration and growth either of the D.C. or of the P.S.I. or of both. Time may give each or both a chance, although scepticism is in order, just as the Communist responsibility for impossible local administrations may tarnish their image. ^{of the P.C.I.} At any rate the only road to peaceful change seems to lie in gaining time through the continuation of the confronto with the P.C., and its progressive penetration in the area di governo - leading - whether through an ambiguous blend of centre-left and of de facto grand coalition or through an actual grand coalition in case of national emergency - to a left-wing alternative in a relatively distant future. Whether the change is peaceful or not, and whether it can be accommodated by the international environment depends on this environment itself as much as on the evolution of Italy.

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DISCUSSION PAPER

PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVES FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN JUGOSLAVIA UP TO 1980

AND THEIR FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

by Chris Cviir

But should we be speculating about Yugoslavia at all? The question is in order because after more than a decade of intense "after-Tito-what" speculation and ever gloomier scenarios, Yugoslavia is still there, still independent and committed to its own way. Tito is still there too and may linger on for some time, perhaps even a few years. As long as he stays around, it is probably wrong to expect big changes of any kind. But even after he is gone, things may stay very much what they had been, as Tito himself keeps reassuring westerners who worry about Yugoslavia. Now a few of those, especially among professional "Yugoslavia-watchers", sympathise with that view in any case, and they can derive some support for that view from the European Experience of that past few decades.

European states no longer seem to break up unless they have first been invaded and occupied. It took four years of war and a military defeat to smash Austria-Hungary. It was the Axis invasion that finished the first Yugoslavia off in 1941. Both may have been "doomed" to extinction, as once used to be thought, but this is a view that cannot be supported so easily any more. Since the second world war, too, most successful coups and revolutions in Europe have been directly or indirectly connected with lost wars, as in France in 1958 and in Portugal in April, 1974, or with humiliating political intrigue injurious to national interest, as in Greece in July, 1974. There seems to exist a certain international bias towards the maintenance of the territorial status quo which of course, is directly related to the fear of complications with unforeseen consequences that any redrawing of maps could cause. The state too has shown itself more resilient and less vulnerable to attack from within, than had been thought until recently.

Yugoslavia has, during the Cold War years, used competing power blocks to keep itself independent of both and to get them both to treat it seriously. Non-alignment has become popular with the people of Yugoslavia so that it could be said that whoever follows Tito has the mandate to continue it. During those years, Yugoslavia has made not unimpressive economic gains. Over the past 20 years, its annual economic growth rate has averaged 7.7%, while that for industrial growth has been 9.8%. National income per head of population was \$375 in 1955, \$795 in 1968, to reach \$1,211 this year and possibly surpass \$2,000 by 1985. There have been disparities too, Industrial growth has not been properly co-ordinated; agricultural growth has been slow; and the gap between the industrially developed and under-developed regions has widened rather than narrowed. More recently, there has been the rampant inflation which has reached the 30% mark while unemployment has also reached and passed the 500,000 mark. But these exist in other countries too, and right at the moment federal Ministers claim that the inflation rate is slowing down and that the balance of payments deficit may be smaller than had been expected.

Apart from the economic successes, there has been political stability combined until very recently with a wide measure of freedom surpassing anything existing in other communist countries. Even now that this freedom has been somewhat curtailed, Yugoslavia still remains the freest communist country and also one of the quieter corners of that increasingly turbulent continent. Human nature being what it is, these positive features of the Tito régime are not always readily admitted by its beneficiaries. Nevertheless, its achievements are among the factors that will help to keep Yugoslavia remaining on its present course in the transition period after Tito.

The continuation of a titoist régime after Tito would be welcome to the western powers. In fact, it would probably be true to say that the Tito régime has no warmer supporters than those it has in various foreign ministries. At the time of the recent settlement with Yugoslavia, the Italian government made it clear that it regarded the existence of a peaceful, stable and independent Yugoslavia as an important objective of its own security and therefore worth some unpopularity with the ultrarightists. Conversely, this means that no NATO power would be willing to do anything that would weaken the Yugoslav régime or undermine Yugoslavia's territorial integrity or unity. Nationalist movements within Yugoslavia seeking support from western powers would receive no encouragement. It would probably be no exaggeration to say also that although in an ideal world NATO powers would prefer to collaborate with a liberalising and reform-minded Yugoslavia, they would settle for a non-liberalising anti-reform one, provided it stayed independent. And so, whatever might occasionally be said by party leaders in Yugoslavia, their country is not threatened from the western direction. In fact, western leaders hope and pray that the present set-up continues for as long as possible. So do Yugoslavia's non-communist neighbours. In the past few years, various western countries have shown that they are willing to underpin this policy of encouraging Yugoslav leaders to stay independent with loans and grants and diplomatic support. The EEC is gradually emerging as the channel through which the west could provide much of the support for Yugoslavia that it considers necessary to keep it afloat.

By the same token, Russia cannot be happy with the situation. It refrained from bringing Yugoslavia back into its camp by force in 1948 after the Tito-Stalin conflict, but that may well have been due, as Khrushchev implies in his memoirs, to Stalin's fear of American retaliation. America then still had the nuclear monopoly. Formally, too, Russia has recognised Yugoslavia's right to an independent road to socialism, as demanded by the Yugoslavs as the price for their reconciliation with Russia. The so-called Belgrade declaration of 1955 has been the corner stone of Yugoslavia's policy towards Russia. But it seems that the Yugoslavs have recent evidence for the belief that the Russian acceptance of Yugoslavia's right to go its own way in its economic and political development has once again become qualified. In a speech earlier this month, Mr. Todo Kurtovic, a secretary of the Yugoslav communist party's executive bureau, referred to "circles which regard the Belgrade declaration and similar documents as part of a past historical epoch" that has been superseded. But why should Russia not accept Yugoslavia on the same terms as the west accepts it?

It is, first of all, very likely that the Russians who had always trusted Tito not to allow the political development to go beyond a certain point, may not feel so sure of his successors in this regard. They may feel that under those successors the country might become unacceptably liberal and reformist, indeed irreversibly so, and thus present a new danger to Russia's own ideological position in eastern Europe. A newly invigorated titoist heresy would be a serious cause for concern by itself. Russia may also see it as a possible ideological preparation for a slide towards the west, resulting in a shift in the balance of power in southern Europe. That part of Europe has become more important to Russia from the strategic point of view. Yugoslavia has fine, natural harbours which the admiral commanding the Soviet Mediterranean fleet would probably dearly love to be able to use. Yugoslavia could also be an important glacis for a more forward Soviet policy in western Europe one day. In other words, what was at the time of Yugoslavia's defection from the Soviet block in 1948 still a relatively unimportant area - certainly not to be compared with East Germany or Poland - has now become an area of growing strategic importance. A Yugoslavia that denies its territory to the west is certainly a minimum Soviet objective. A Yugoslavia that allows Russia the use of its military facilities and possibly also collaborates with it in other ways could well become an objective in the not too distant future, especially if Russia embarks on a more militant foreign policy.

already there

Russia would therefore have the motive that the defensively and sometimes even defeatist-minded western powers do not have, for wanting to increase its influence in Yugoslavia in a substantial way, perhaps even to crown this with the final absorption of Yugoslavia into the Warsaw pact and Comecon one day. Its geographical proximity would give it the chance to attempt to do so in a variety of ways.

A military invasion is perhaps the least suitable method for the achievement of the long-term Soviet objectives in the area, though a quick grab at a time of some world crisis distracting America and other western leaders cannot be excluded. It is true that the Russians would probably be reluctant to get embroiled in a partisan war in Yugoslavia but they may be tempted to think that in fact Yugoslavia was not as ready for such a war as it is making out to be. The Russians could calculate that the fire had gone out of the old partisans and that overwhelming Soviet strength would suffice to deal with Yugoslavia quickly and efficiently and before anybody noticed or could do something about it.

Nevertheless, Russia would have to worry about the effects this kind of a grab would have on its relations with the west. Even now with the cloud hanging over the detente, it is difficult to see the Russians risking a full-scale confrontation with the United States over Yugoslavia. Even if Yugoslavia was not considered a vital strategic matter for the Americans, they could choose to regard a new burst of Soviet activism there as a sign that a confrontation was on the way anyway and that they had better be prepared to respond to the Russian challenge elsewhere where it might hurt Russia. Being invited by a friendly Yugoslav government would be quite another matter of course, because nobody could formally object to that. But that is another development considered later on.

It looks very much as if Moscow would regard the military weapon as the last resort and would rely on political and possibly also economic pressure first in an attempt to browbeat the Yugoslav leaders into submission. But a political challenge requires organised political measures of support within the country that is being challenged. Russia would need some sort of a reasonable political base if only to avoid the repetition of the fiasco in Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, when lack of preparation of the modalities of the intervention was in such striking contrast to the excellence of the military planning that had gone into it.

The creation of a friendly political base inside Yugoslavia would be hindered if Russia was at the same time using threats and pressure against Yugoslavia, so the right strategy would be to combine a low-profile in inter-party and inter-state relations with the encouragement of clandestine groups preparing an alternative to the present leadership. It may just be that it is against the building up of that pro-Soviet base that the present Yugoslav anti-communist campaign is directed.

Apart from recruiting supporters among the hard core of the old cominformists who opted for Stalin in the quarrel between Tito and Stalin in 1948 when Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, Russia could also seek and find a measure of support among a variety of discontented officials who had fallen by the wayside during the reforming years in the 1950s and 1960s. Also among young people disillusioned with the darker side of Yugoslavia's road to socialism, yet unaware of the still darker side of Soviet-style socialism. Here also indirectly the Russians could benefit from the fact that the present rather more centralist and orthodox party line in Yugoslavia can be used as a basis for demands for more full-blooded socialism to be established. In other words, it is the party's critics who can appear to be more orthodox than the party leaders.

Alternatively, Russia could support one or more of the nationalist movements in various republics: the Croats, the Albanians, the Serbs. The Serbs can be wooed by promises of a strong centralised Yugoslavia that would stop the further disintegration of the Serbian nation outside Serbia proper: 40% of Serbs in Yugoslavia live outside Serbia proper. The Croats could be encouraged to think that Russia might be prepared to grant Croatia independence in return for its support and military bases. It is more likely, simply because the Serbs make up nearly 40% of Yugoslavia's population and have had closer links with Russia in the past, that they rather than the Croats who are only just over 20% of the Yugoslav population, would be more interesting to the Russians. But there would be nothing to stop the Russians from using their alleged support for the Croats to frighten the Serbs into stronger support for state centralism and closer ties with Russia, as may have happened in 1970 and 1971.

All this is merely intended to show that Russia has several cards that it can play if it should decide on a more interventionist policy in Yugoslavia and that military intervention is probably only the ultimate sanction. Yugoslav leaders have several options too. One would be to go to the western powers and ask for direct support. This is unlikely for-

various reasons, not least because this would give the Russians the pretext to invoke Brezhnev doctrine against Yugoslavia and thus bring about the very intervention that they have been trying to avoid. They could themselves introduce a tough internal régime designed to withstand Russian pressure while simultaneously avoiding the danger of a liberal resurgence. The army could play a role in this kind of solution if the politi could not agree on modalities. It is perfectly possible that such a solution might appeal to a number of people in Yugoslavia. The army is a well-organised force that had stood aside from national and social conflicts. It is at the moment intelligently and ably led by well-paid officers not compromised by corruption and scandal. The conservative forces in the country might rally round a direct or indirect army rule and this could have the effect of neutralising the pro-Moscow forces to a certain extent. In fact, this looks very much how things might go if the politicians do not achieve an economic stabilisation and then have to cope with serious economic unrest with political undertones.

But the difficulty is that problems would not stop overnight just because the soldiers, however competent, have taken over, and so the army itself could come divided rather as it has done in Portugal. These divisions would probably run along national lines and this would then disrupt the army's rule and eventually endanger the unity of the state as Croats, Serbs and the others clashed with each other in and out of uniform. This, rather than the widely rumoured though nowhere documented pro-Soviet feelings of Yugoslav generals would be the real danger of army dictatorship in Yugoslavia. Far from saving Yugoslavia from the Soviet challenge, it could fatally weaken its ability to withstand such a challenge.

Alternatively, there could be another attempt after Tito is gone to achieve a deal among leaders of various republics representing legitimised nationalities. That looked like beginning to happen in 1970-71 when various republics had leaders enjoying public support and with genuine constituencies behind them. Most of those leaders have been purged but they are around. Even if they are not called back at some stage (though there is no reason why some of them should not) they could be used to support a broadly based effort as arriving at some sort of a national consensus which is far more important for the survival of a nationally mixed country like Yugoslavia than any other type of consensus. Such negotiations would be tricky and dangerous and might easily be sabotaged. They would undoubtedly bring out more nationalist agitation with fears of where this might lead. This would certainly have its dangers. But ultimately by bringing these antagonisms into the open and harnessing them to political groupings, it may-just may - be possible to control them and integrate them into broad support for a broadly based Yugoslav federation. For ultimately either such a federation is a federation of all its peoples more or less equal with each other or it is condemned to stay a dictatorship, and moreover one that would, because of its rejection by a sizable opposition be driven to seek support from outside - which could only mean Russia. So in a way, the future of Yugoslavia does depend on what the Yugoslavs do among themselves - whether they negotiate and deal with each other realistically, recognising their national and religious differences but also their common interests, or whether they deliver themselves into somebody else's safe keeping through sheer inability to work out a lasting arrangement among themselves.

- a) Yug - West all white }
 b) Yug - USSR all black }

→ then will be new report West - 1990

- a) assumption of a bit of post-Tito
 b) same assumption excluded when USSR } political development

interview between a) and b)

What the West should do?

What the West is for Yug.

US
 EEC
 NATO

Does the same Western East has any influence?
 Eur. countries.

Economic problems