

"SESSION ON MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY PROBLEMS"  
Council on Christian approaches to defence and disarmament (CCADD),  
St. Maur-Angers (France), 5-9/IX/1975

- (1) programme and list of participants
- (2) Aliboni, Roberto: "Security in the Mediterranean"
- (3) CCADD: "The dynamics of armament and disarmament"
- (4) Baudissin, Wolf von: "Comments on the CSCE"
- (5) Dumas, Andre: "Le levain evangelique dans la pate des relations internationales"
- (6) Gessert, Robert: "Problems of Western defense: military aspects concerning the central front"
- (7) Geyer, Alan: "The nuclear question explodes"
- (8) Gueritz, E.F.: "The Mediterranean: zone of conflict and of influence"
- (9) Leurdijk, J.H.: "How stable is 'stable deterrence'?"
- (10) Michael, Louis: "Progress in MBFR"
- (11) Skjelsbaek, Kjell: "The Artic Basin: a new strategic hot spot"

ABBAYE DE SAINT-MAUR

49350 GENNES (FRANCE)

COUNCIL ON CHRISTIAN  
APPROACHES TO DEFENCE AND DISARMEMENT.

XIII<sup>e</sup> SESSION 1975

Programme

Vendredi ♦ Friday 5 septembre

PRESIDENCE

18 h. - 19 h. Arrivée et accueil des participants  
Arrival and reception of the participants

19 h. 30 Dîner ♦ Dinner

Samedi 6 septembre

9 h 30. Première séance ♦ First sitting

FRANCE

Rapports nationaux ♦ National Reports  
Etats - Unis ♦ United States Geyu  
Pays - Bas ♦ Netherlands Schut

~~Prière ♦ Prayer~~

~~Samedi 6 septembre~~

~~10 h 30. Petit déjeuner ♦ Breakfast~~

11 h 30. Deuxième séance ♦ Second sitting

GREAT - BRITAIN

Rapports nationaux ♦ National Reports  
Mezle France République fédérale allemande Kunst  
German federal Republic, Finlande ♦ Finland

16. 11 h. Troisième séance ♦ Third sitting

NETHERLANDS

Rapports nationaux ♦ National Reports  
Grande Bretagne ♦ Great Britain  
Norvège ♦ Norge ♦ Italie ♦ Italy

12 h 30 Déjeuner ♦ Lunch

14 h. Visite de l'Abbaye de Saint-Maur ♦  
Saint-Maur Abbey's Visit

16 h. Réunion du Comité de direction  
Stirring Committee Meeting

Heure 18 h 30. Quatrième séance ♦ Fourth sitting

R. F. A.

Thème N°1 ♦ First topic : "La défense militaire  
de l'Occident" ♦ "West military Defence".  
Rapporteur : Robert A Gessert (U.S.A)

Security and  
The Mediterranean

19 h. 30 Dîner ♦ Dinner

Alban  
Guentz

20 h 30. Cinquième séance ♦ Fifth sitting

Thème N°1 (suite) ♦ First topic (following)  
Rapporteur : Pierre Dabezies (France)

22 h. Prière ♦ Prayer

*Dimanche ♦ Sunday 7 septembre*

- 8 h. 30      Petit déjeuner ♦ Breakfast
- 9 h.          Office Oecuménique ♦ Oecumenical Service
- 10 h. 30      Départ pour le Château de Montgeoffroy ♦ Departure  
to visit Montgeoffroy Castle
- 12 h. 30      Déjeuner ♦ Lunch
- 14 h. 30      Départ pour l'Abbaye de Fontevraud ♦ Departure  
to visit Fontevraud Abbey
- 18 h.          Apéritif chez Marcel Merle, au Thoureil ♦ Stop  
and drinks to Marcel Merle's Home, at Le Thoureil
- 19 h. 30      Dîner ♦ Dinner PRÉSIDENCE
- 20 h. 30      *Sixieme Séance ♦ Sixth sitting*  
Thème N°2 ♦ Second Topic : "Sécurité et coopé- U.S.A.  
ration en Europe" ♦ "Security and Cooperation  
in Europe"  
Rapporteur : Général von Baudissin (R.F.A.)
- 22 h.          Prière ♦ Prayer
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*Lundi ♦ Monday 8 septembre*

- 8 h. 30      Petit déjeuner ♦ Breakfast
- 9 h. 30      *Septieme Séance ♦ Seventh sitting* GREAT BRITAIN  
Thème N° 3 ♦ Third topic : "Aspects éthiques des  
problèmes internationaux" ♦ "Ethical Approaches  
of international Problems".  
Rapporteur : André Dumas (France)
- 11 h.          *Huitieme séance ♦ Eighth sitting* FINLANDE  
Thème N°3 (suite) ♦ Third sitting (following)  
Rapporteur : Laurens Hogebrink (Netherlands)
- 12 h. 30      Déjeuner
- 16 h.          Réunion du Comité de direction  
Steering Committee Meeting
- 16 h 30.      *Neuvieme séance ♦ Ninth sitting*  
Thème N°4 ♦ Fourth topic : "Méditerranée,  
zone d'influence et de conflits" ♦  
"Mediterranean Sea, conflicting Area"  
Rapporteur : Roberto Aliboni (Italie)
- 19 h. 30      Dîner: Dinner
- 20 h 30.      *Dixieme séance ♦ Tenth sitting* U.S.A.  
  
Thème N°4 ♦ Fourth topic (following)  
Rapporteur : Admiral Gueritz (G.B.) R.F.A.
- 22 h.          Prière ♦ Prayer

*(Le déjeuner est déplacé  
multiplication de la p. 1)*

Mardi ♦ Tuesday 9 Septembre

PRESIDENCE

8 h. 30     Petit Déjeuner ♦ Breakfast

9 h.        Onzieme séance ♦ Eleventh sitting

C.C.A.D.D.

Résumé des travaux : aspects politiques ♦  
Summary and conclusions : political aspects  
Rapporteur : G. Ecclestone (G.B.)

10 h. 30    Douzieme séance ♦ Twelfth sitting

C.C.A.D.D.

Résumé des travaux : aspects religieux ♦  
Summary and conclusions : religious aspects  
Rapporteur : Bischof Kunst (R.F.A.)

12 h.       Déjeuner ♦ Lunch

14 h.       Départ du car pour Paris-Invalides ♦  
Leaving by bus to Paris-Invalides.



COUNCIL ON CHRISTIAN APPROACHES TO DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

XIII<sup>e</sup> SESSION ABBAYE DE SAINT-MAUR (FRANCE)

(5-9 septembre 1975)

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## SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(2)

Owing to a particular combination of political, military and economic conditions at both a regional and a global level, the security of the Mediterranean poses problems which are both delicate and complex. The aim of this paper is the examination of those factors which lie behind Mediterranean instability and the evaluation of the present situation in terms of security. The factors to be considered will be primarily political and military.

What lies behind the high degree of instability in the Mediterranean? Two principal reasons may be adduced: namely the everpresent risk that purely local conflicts in the area might precipitate conflict on a world scale and the political fragmentation of the region which prevents the effective use of normal methods of conflict management. Neither détente nor deterrence in the Mediterranean function as efficiently as they do at a world level.

So far as concerns the risk of escalation one is obliged to emphasize the direct presence and to varying degrees the involvement of the superpowers in the defence and security of the states of the region. On account of this most conflicts in the area become rapidly polarized along East-West lines.

The tactical presence of the Soviet and American fleets gives concrete form to the potential dangers of conflict inherent in the Mediterranean. Both fleets are large and technologically advanced. Both confront each other on a day to day basis. Their surface vessels are exposed to the risk of tactical surprise attack and are thus in a state of continual alert, this in a highly unstable area of the world in which the states in conflict have close relations with the superpowers and where, during recurrent periods of crisis, there exists uncertainty as to the future of these relations.

The difficulties of controlling this situation of direct superpower involvement are rendered even worse by the uncertainty which exists as to the frontiers between the zones of influence and between the vital interests of the superpowers. The fluctuation in the Soviet presence in Egypt is an example of this.

At the same time conflict in the Mediterranean, despite its East-West polarization, lends itself only with great difficulty to the normal forms of conflict management (i.e. détente and deterrence) used in inter-superpower relations. It is in fact generally difficult to translate these superpower relations onto a regional level. If détente appears as a reasonable objective in Europe this is because more than in other regions the divisions of the continent run along classic East-West lines. (What is more, in the last few years the experience of negotiations such as the European Security Conference has shown that the degree of détente is inversely proportional to the degree of reciprocal interference between East and West). In the Mediterranean on the other hand there exists no clearly defined and stable East-West regional division.

Parties, States and movements enter into conflict and thus form alliances along East-West lines; the latter are however unstable and attempts at détente (in terms of East-West divisions) are rendered inope-



rative. It should be added that, this model, relevant today, principally in the Middle-East, could soon become of relevance to Southern Europe if the recent political difficulties of NATO in this area should worsen.

If the use of détente as a form of conflict management poses problems, so deterrence may also prove ineffective. At a certain danger level, Soviet-American intervention, with the objective of avoiding a direct showdown between the superpowers has aimed at avoiding violent confrontations (such as the various Arab-Israeli wars). This deterrent function is however too limited to succeed in overcoming the internal economic and political problems at the origin of the various Mediterranean conflicts. The effect is to "freeze" crises without eliminating their underlying causes.

The basic reasons behind the particular instability of the Mediterranean area seem to lie within the region itself. For this reason crises may not be definable in East-West terms. The presence of the superpowers nonetheless forces these local crises into the framework of world confrontation. At the same time the local roots of these crises render their resolution along the lines used by the superpowers in their own relations impossible. The result is that the superpowers, while risking involvement at a world level in conflicts with purely local origins and while succeeding, on occasions, in "freezing" such conflicts, fail to resolve them.

It is this contradiction which renders the Mediterranean not only locally unstable but dangerous to world security. What alternatives are there to the present situation?

There are many possibilities (a standstill, an increase in the superpower presence, the diversification of the latter, superpower disengagement). We will seek here to discuss certain hypothesis only, namely those concerning the disengagement or diversification of the superpower presence.

The possibility of disengagement exists above all at a strategic level. The US strategic presence in the Mediterranean is at present represented by missile-bearing submarines, the so-called SSBNs (Strategic ballistic missile submarines). The missiles carried by the latter, with a range of 2,500 nautical miles, are capable of reaching from the Mediterranean cities such as Moscow, Sverdlovsk and Tashkent. The new generation of Tridents, scheduled to become operational between 1978 and 1982 has a range of 4,500-6,000 nautical miles. The same cities would thus come within range of missiles launched from the Atlantic; at the same time the operational capability of SSBNs in the Indian Ocean would be increased.

It is clear that the development of SLBMs constitutes a factor working towards a devaluation of the strategic importance of the Mediterranean, at least in so far as regards the defence of US territory. This renders possible a US disengagement in the area and inessential the use of bases such as Rota. One should at the same time bear in mind that with the development of satellite based intelligence systems the present NADGE network may be expected to lose some of its importance.

From a strategic point of view a US disengagement is thus conceivable (together with a parallel disengagement by the USSR). Such a development does not, however, necessarily imply tactical disengagement,

on the contrary it could well lead to the reinforcement of the tactical presence of the superpowers. It would perhaps be useful to examine this point more closely.

A possible tactical disengagement of the superpowers from the Mediterranean would pose serious problems, partly military but above all political. The dimensions of a tactical withdrawal might be such, moreover, as to imply new strategic problems.

The most serious questions which would be raised by a withdrawal of tactical forces from the Mediterranean would concern existing alliances. The significance of any withdrawal of the American sixth fleet to Europe and to Israel may be clearly defined. From a military point of view one might argue that, especially if the Russians were at the same time to confine the operations of their fleet to the Black Sea, the stationing of the sixth fleet in the Eastern Atlantic would not reduce its capacity for tactical intervention in the Mediterranean via the Straights of Gibraltar. Nonetheless, from a political point of view, there can be no doubt that the respective allies of the superpowers would regard their withdrawal from the Mediterranean as a sign of a reevaluation in a negative sense of existing alliances.

So far as Europe is concerned, especially following the development of détente in the central part of the continent, the Mediterranean (even if this would not appear to US strategists to be the case) is now of greater strategic importance than ever. The present balance of power in central Europe and (as a result of current talks) the prospect of force reductions or the freezing of forces at their present levels has led to an increase in the importance of the flanks over the traditional central front between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Europeans will naturally be worried if a freeze or reduction of forces on the central front is accompanied by American disengagement on the South flank particularly in a highly unstable zone such as the Mediterranean.

Pressure from allies might well in the future constitute a strong factor inhibiting any American tactical disengagement in the Mediterranean. In this case the presence of the superpowers (implying the deployment of cruise missiles, the perfecting of Poseidon and Polaris for tactical use, the maintenance of MRBMs in Italy, Greece and Turkey) could be maintained.

At the same time the superpowers might themselves show an interest in strengthening their tactical presence in the Mediterranean (reinforcing for example, not only their tactical nuclear capacity, mentioned above, but also the strength of their conventional forces), and thus allowing themselves the option of a more flexible nuclear strategy. The Russian fleet would find it extremely easy to adopt such a role in the area. In this case the Mediterranean would take on a new kind of strategic significance, linked, if the superpowers should abandon their direct engagement in the area, to a new strategy on the part of the latter.

There are, however, factors which tend towards the weakening of the effectiveness of any pressure the allies might exert on the United States. Present developments in Southern Europe: in Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy make any American presence, whether bilateral or multilateral, more difficult rather than easier to maintain. The reaction of the allies during the Kippur War leads one to believe in a weakening of the alliance. It cannot be denied that these developments could lead to a disengagement of the United States. The problem would

then become that of knowing whether this would constitute a unilateral act, an agreed withdrawal within the framework of negotiations such as the MBFR or rather a shift in the front between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The hypothesis of Mediterranean MBFR talks would pose even more complex problems than those created by their Viennese equivalent. The second hypothesis of a shift in front might involve a strengthening of US positions in Iran and in the Indian Ocean and the setting up in the Eastern Atlantic of the framework for a net of new Arab and African alliances. This possibility appears less improbable when one considers that the principal route for oil transport continues to pass round the Cape of Good Hope.

It is however, difficult, at least for the moment, to formulate any equation between superpower disengagement and Mediterranean security. It is true that the withdrawal from the area of the USA and the USSR would allow the depolarization of conflicts and might thus constitute a basis for their resolution. It is however necessary to realize both that the vacuum created would hardly be filled by a sudden influx of peaceful feeling and that disengagement could have severe political implications at a bilateral level. It might result in rapid nuclear proliferation (many Mediterranean states have yet to sign the NPT). At the same time a loosening of multilateral links between the countries of Southern Europe and the US might be paralleled by a strengthening of bilateral relations, this in turn implying a reduction in the freedom of action of those countries concerned.

To conclude, one should note that the prospects for security in the Mediterranean might appear brighter if Europe and the Arab States together constituted a political and economic force sufficient to fill the vacuum left by the superpowers. A solution of the Middle Eastern problem would in this case involve European participation and thus the necessity for Europe to make certain political choices. It would at the same time be possible to see within the framework of a renewed European engagement a return of the French to the Mediterranean (either simply to replace British forces or, alternatively, to fill the vacuum left by US disengagement).

Whether or not this occurs one can see that the disengagement of the superpowers can produce those positive effects expected of it only if accompanied by the growth of Mediterranean political development poles. Without this, the prospects for the future are more than uncertain.

Roberto Aliboni

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THE DYNAMICS OF ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT (Continued)

At the conference in Norway two years ago, I was asked to introduce a session on "The Dynamics of Armament and Disarmament". In the course of my opening remarks, I said that I took it for granted that the process of arming or disarming could acquire a life of its own, a self-momentum, a tendency to self-perpetuation almost, not taking proper account of actual threats.

In informal discussion after the session, several military experts challenged part of my assumption. While they agreed that disarming might, in certain circumstances, acquire self-momentum, they considered that arming could not do so because arming costs money, and the checks on public expenditure in a democracy prevent wasteful or unnecessary spending, even in such a sensitive area as national security; and several colleagues said they knew of no cases in their own countries where work had continued on a weapons system once it had been realized that it was not actually needed. Indeed, the danger was precisely the contrary of that part of my assumption: that excessive cuts in defence expenditure would endanger national security.

These informal comments raised interesting questions. First of all, I have always contested the view that disarmament will necessarily save money: the cost of national and international verification may be substantial, and even in a disarming world, R and D will surely continue for a time, if not indefinitely. But that was only a by-way to the main issue, even if an important one. The main issue, according to my critics, was to unearth a single case of work continuing on a weapon or weapons system once its utility had been found wanting.

I was able, of course, to list numerous British military projects which had been terminated (TSR2, P1154, Bluestreak, Skybolt) but, according to my critics, the very fact that these projects had been cancelled proved that British Ministers had not hesitated to halt a project once it had become apparent either that its cost was excessive and/or that it could not be justified on objective military grounds.

✓[Research  
and Development]

It is the essence of research that all possible avenues to a predetermined goal should be explored, and it is no disgrace to say later that path C proved to be cheaper or more efficient than paths A or B. But human nature being what it is, one would expect Ministers and officials to cover up any wasteful or unnecessary expenditure. (By use of the expression "cover up" is not meant in any derogatory, Watergate sense, but only to suggest that decision-makers convince themselves and others of plausible explanations for spending money which, in the light of subsequent knowledge, may seem to have been extravagant or unnecessary.) It is for this reason, among others, that it is difficult for someone without access to classified defence information to produce actual examples of the arming process acquiring unnecessary self-momentum.

Margaret Gowing, in her monumental study of the British nuclear programme, gives several instances of the process that I had in mind. Perhaps the most telling took place in 1950-1. The British Chiefs of Staff had in 1950 conducted the first over-all strategic review since 1947, and had concluded that top R and D priority should be given to guided missiles, improved tactical aircraft, sea defence, and anti-tank weapons; atomic energy should be given second priority.

This advice went to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. Sir Henry Tizard, Chief Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence, had always had reservations about making British nuclear weapons, and he deployed the familiar arguments. A. V. Alexander, Minister of Defence, urged that guided weapons must have top priority, even at the expense of the nuclear programme. Attlee, who had taken a proprietary interest in nuclear matters since becoming Prime Minister in 1945, favoured making no change in the priority given to the nuclear effort. Bevin, Foreign Secretary, took a similar view, believing in particular that nuclear energy would be essential for Britain's industrial recovery. "In the end, guided weapons and the atomic energy project received joint overriding priority ... Lord Portal [Controller of Atomic Energy in the Ministry of Supply] had in effect won, and he withstood new attacks on his project in 1951 ... [H] is

project, this extraordinary collection of gifted scientists and engineers, had developed its own momentum and its very existence had almost become the reason for its existence" (I, pp. 233-234). One result was that when the first British atomic bomb was ready in 1953, Britain did not possess appropriate means of delivery: the first V-bomber went into service in 1955, and the first squadron became operational two years later. "Atomic bombs without aircraft suitable to carry them could serve no immediate purpose" (I, p. 235).

Sydney D. Bailey

15 June 1975

*présenté de  
von Brandt*

## COMMENTS ON THE CSCE

CCADD, Le Thoureil, France, 05.-09.09.1975

(4)

### Historical Background

The desire to normalize and formally regulate international relations in post-war Europe has occupied the victor powers since the early fifties. Already in 1954 an agreement on collective security and the establishment of joint institutions was discussed at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Berlin. A series of Eastern initiatives followed such as the Rapacki Plan (1964), the Bucharest Declaration on Peace and Security (1966), and the Appeal from Budapest - complete with suggestions for topics for discussion - to convene a European Conference (1969). The Western Powers have long rejected these proposals. They see the real problem in the solution of the Berlin problem and the improvement of relations between the FRG and the GDR; they resist any attempt to confirm the status quo, which they regard as a source of perpetual conflict.

First the improvement of relations between the World Powers, the winding up of SALT I as well as II and, finally, the German Ostpolitik have opened the way to a multilateral dialogue between the 35 governments. The way has been forged by manifold bilateral East-West contacts and the development of unified positions within the alliances.

After long months of unproductive discussions a change has been noticeable since the early part of this year. The USSR shows greater flexibility. The time schedule presumably makes concessions compulsory. Before the XXV. Party Congress in February 1976, the CSCE, SALT III, and the Conference of Communist Parties in Europe are supposed to be successfully brought to an end.

### Timetable:

November 1972	Preparatory consultations in Helsinki;
July 1973	Declaration of principles and approval of the final recommendations as conference guidelines (Phase I);

September 1973	Beginning of the consolidation and revision of the guidelines (Phase II) in Geneva;
End of July - September 1975	Passing of documents (Phase III) in Helsinki.

### Intentions and Expectations

Despite or just because of the profound disparity of interests and the incompatibility of ideologies, all of the participants are concerned with obtaining as much security as possible against the use of military force to solve conflicts. Even the most adamant proponents of antagonism can no longer afford to deny the reality of nuclear strategies.

Apart from this - if you wish - negative aspect, the governments have been brought to the conference table by quite different and to a certain extent contradictory intentions:

- the USSR is above all interested in obtaining political recognition and legal guarantee of its political sphere, in securing its borders to the West and, thereby, obtaining greater freedom of action in other parts of the world, especially in Asia, and also - certainly not lastly - in stabilizing its hegemony in East Europe. The leadership of the USSR hopes to further expand its economic development by means of specified cooperation with the West as well.
- East European and non-aligned governments assume that a relaxation of tensions in East-West relations broadens their freedom of action and that multilateral institutions extending beyond the alliance system will offer possibilities for co-determination in European questions in the future. Such structures could be of significant importance precisely in periods of restraint and intensified internal controls.
- the USA has taken a sceptical stance to the conference from the very beginning - surely because it was originally supposed to curtail the American influence on Europe - and limited itself for the most part to the role of an observer. Only bilateral interests - such as SALT or the Near East - have forced it



to actively influence the negotiating positions of their allies.

- despite various differences of opinion in questions of subject matter and methods of procedure, the EEC states are united by their efforts to keep all possibilities for West European integration open. Under the pressure of negotiations they have developed a concept for a joint Ostpolitik.
- the FRG views the conference as a significant instrument in safeguarding its politics with reference to Western, Eastern and all-German affairs. Expressed negatively: it wants to avoid everything which might anticipate a peace treaty and include conditions which could temper the results of its agreements with Eastern Europe in terms of international law.

#### The Baskets

The multiplicity of the baskets' contents bears witness to the diversity of the expectations and interests of the conference participants. But exactly this multiplicity is essential for the success of the conference, because it offers possibilities for package deals and various compromises. In addition, it is of relevant importance for détente that - depending upon the subject in question - different coalitions and fronts can take form. The degree to which interests diverge, of course, merely allows for agreements on declarations of intent, not in any way for contractual obligations.

Basket 1 creates in its 10 principles - negative/restraining as well as positive/associating - prerequisites for less hostile relations between European states and is, thus, also inducive to intensive cooperation. These principles do not establish any kind of new international law and in some ways even fall short of corresponding articles in the UN Charter. Their political value lies in the pressure they place on governments whose future behaviour will be measured according to the declarations of intent so tediously worked out in Helsinki. The settlement of conflicts has also been restricted to more formalized and objective ground. Surely, new frictions and conflicts are concealed in the recognition that principles will be

granted varying degrees of political weight, that their interpretation will depend on given ideologies and that a binding court of arbitration is lacking. Nevertheless, offenses will be rated differently; they could very well become self-defeating as a result of increased interdependence.

The political merit of the baskets in terms of security is slight, although the West has always maintained that the inclusion of military questions was a vital interest. The road to Helsinki went only by way of Vienna (MBFR). The Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) - the exchange of maneuver observers and the registration of maneuvers of a certain strength in a given area - are at best guideposts which point to the importance for détente of military potentials and arms control. A declaration of principles would be of greater value which, for example, obliged members to check on strategic stability, to jointly reduce strengths and to accept a form of mutual transparency.

At present the path for agreement on the CBM seems to be clearer. A compromise was also found between the principles of the invulnerability of borders - a basic demand of the East - and peaceful change - a special West German interest - by way of the clause giving all principles equal status. Now principle 10 - the fulfillment in good faith of obligations relating to international law - still causes some difficulties. In this regard the FRG is concerned with the Four Power Agreement; Yugoslavia and France would like to give priority to the UN Charter in order to moderate obligations arising from "proletarian internationalism".

Basket 2 deals with cooperation in different areas ranging from trade and industry, science and technology to environment and tourism. Accords on these matters are the first to be arrived at - simply because these areas are of central importance to the USSR. To be sure the fulfillment of the Soviets' demand for the most favoured nation treatment still stands out. An equivalence of advantages and obligations is difficult to define in view of the disparate natures of the economic systems. Cooperation has its rough edges. Therefore, both sides should not overestimate the possibilities for cooperation; disappointments tend to have a hampering effect on détente. Trade with the East will moreover only be a fractional part of the West European foreign trade; yet a limited exchange can indeed have a

stabilizing function in times of economic crisis. Joint ventures still seem to promise the most success. East-West cooperation might very well strengthen the East European states' dependence on the USSR, which is above all interested in technological know-how and financial assistance. In any case, East and West confront a complicated learning process, for which these agreements afford useful premises.

The introduction of basket 3 is founded on a Nato decision dating back to 1970. According to the West's conception of détente more peaceful international relations will only then develop when an unhindered exchange of information and expansive possibilities for contact between the members of both societies can take place. This opinion is rendered questionable by two facts:

Only stable systems risk the process of détente. The desired opening to the West, however, must - subjectively as well as objectively - have a destabilizing effect and, thereby, cause renewed demarcation if not confrontation.

Beyond this, peaceful coexistence is only a rejection of the use of military means to overthrow capitalism. The international class conflict continues with unmitigated intensity. Thus, the USSR is only conditionally interested in a reduction of the political and ideological tensions between the societal forms.

Nevertheless, the situation of the negotiations seems to have changed in this sensitive area, too. A British suggestion apparently caused the breakthrough. The working conditions agreed upon for journalistic correspond to a large extent to Western expectations. Regulations arranged to facilitate travelling, freedom of movement, cooperation in the information sector and the such, of course, are overshadowed by the preamble of the basket. Still the political value of these results is already to be seen in the fact that such internal matters have at all become the subject of international negotiations.

Basket 4 - the follow-up agreements - has remained up to now the most void. From the beginning the West has been fearful that a joint European organ for political cooperation might ease interference in

West European problems or else its planning would be a welcome reason to postpone the regulation of inopportune conference problems until some undetermined future date. Soviet interest also seem to be subsiding. Occasional diverging positions of East European allies as well as the behaviour of neutral governments apparently advise caution towards an institution in which all the members would have the same political weight in an internationally respected forum. The real protagonists, thus, remain the neutral and non-alligned nations; they certainly can count on the sympathy of those East European governments which just after the completion of the West German treaties with the East are interested in a multinational organ. Hence, the Danish proposal - an agreement upon a pause for reflection or rather a postponement of this discussion for about two years - probably has the best prospects.

Nevertheless, the question of structures for the continuation of the dialogue and crisis management should be seriously pursued. Every form of cooperation creates its own kind of frictions and conflicts. If their preventive or early treatment does not become a routine, purely technical questions acquire political dimensions. Not only does real cooperation necessarily suffer as a result, but the political climate also takes on more and more the character of confrontation. Thus, the establishment of commissions with purely technical competencies in the individual areas of cooperation seem to me to be worthy of consideration. Just in the last few weeks the American-Soviet Standing Consultative Group proved its merit. It was able to invalidate the reproach that the USSR had repeatedly violated the SALT I Treaty.

Phase III, the winding up of the conference, has always been a subject of debate. The USSR strived for a brief conference and, as a result, - above and beyond the recognition of the status quo - a declaration of principles which would be as unbinding as possible. The West Europeans, in contrast, demanded thorough negotiations and made their termination dependent on the concluding results. With this strategy they occasionally fell into discord with the bilateral interests of their American ally.

After consensus on the time and form of the closure seems to have been reached, a new problem has arisen. Whereas the West and probably also

most of the neutral countries want to sign a declaration affirming the politically binding nature of the contents of all of the baskets, the USSR now proposes that the baskets either be approved of individually or else that B 2 - B 4 be drawn up as an annex to the principles of B 1. If the USSR is successful, then the cohesion of the baskets will suffer; for the West, essential results will lose in political weight. The total character of the conference will be decisively changed.

### The Conference's political Implications for Security

The CSCE has brought together most of the industrial states of the northern hemisphere and has allowed their inter-state behaviour to be defined. In Helsinki the developments in Europe since 1939 will be brought to an end and the realities recognized; consequently, the East's need for security will have been done an important service. At first glance, it looks like the West has given more, especially the Federal Republic, than they have obtained in terms of security - the results of the MBFR and SALT III still excluded.

Yet not all of the USSR's plans have been fulfilled. The baskets contain much detail which puts psychological chains on Soviet power politics. In addition, the dilemma gains weight between opening and demarcation or rather between the demands of intensive cooperation and the postulates of peaceful coexistence. It is all a matter of more or less security.

Judgements of the consequences of the conference oscillate between euphory and deep-seated scepticism. Some promise themselves a sudden new era of peace; others prophesize a Finlandization and the end of the democratic order. Both extremes fail to recognize the character of the process of transformation and the meaning of conferences. Without a doubt the CSCE is a symbol for the common will of the governments involved to end the dangerous confrontation; it provided the impetus to analyze the European problems and to make them conscious; it creates important instruments with which the number of crises can be lessened and the degree of joint security increased. If and how these chances will be used depends on the will of the governments involved and that of their supporting strata. The politics

of détente require an ordering in the process of détente, that is, the deferment of interests and modification of goals which infringe upon the security needs of the other side. Allowance must be made for certain - even internal - security risks. In order to calculate these risks rationally, a sober inventory and careful weighing of the possible threats are needed - but, above all, the formation of a cooperative understanding of security.

Je vais d'abord réfléchir sur le type de rapports que la parole évangélique entretient avec la réalité du monde au milieu duquel elle est annoncée. Je décrirai ensuite l'état des relations internationales, tel que je l'entrevois dans la situation européenne actuelle. Je préciserai enfin quelques points d'action possible. Mon exposé sera ainsi successivement systématique, descriptif et exhortatif. Puisse-t-il l'être de la façon la moins hachée possible entre des parties qui se succèderaient sans s'interpénétrer, mais qu'au contraire chaque élément apporté serve à mieux agir, car agir sans voir n'est que naïveté et fanatisme, tandis que voir sans agir tourne au scepticisme.

### I Le levain dans la pâte

Il y a plusieurs façons d'envisager les rapports entre l'Evangile et les sociétés. L'histoire de nos Eglises montre que ces façons ont toutes été pratiquées autrefois et que nous les retrouvons aujourd'hui.

a) Christ et César. Chacun a un rôle différent. Le tout est de respecter cette différence entre le rôle de l'Eglise et celui de l'Etat, du spirituel et du temporel, de la morale et de la technocratie, de l'inspiration et de l'organisation. Mais, justement, la différence est loin d'être claire: s'agit-il de la fin ou des moyens? Mais une fin sans moyens reste un vœu et des moyens sans fin ne sont qu'un processus. L'efficacité de la parole évangélique risque de disparaître en tant que finalité de la politique. A notre époque surtout, où la compétence de l'Evangile est fort disputée, ce modèle de rapports tend à reléguer Christ dans le domaine du subjectif, individuel et privé, tandis que César occupe tout le domaine institutionnel, collectif et public. Le libéralisme moderne, avec politesse, et le marxisme, avec autoritarisme, se rejoignent ici pour préconiser la même différence séparatrice. En fait, le célèbre passage de Matthieu XXII, 15-22, sur lequel s'appuie cette tradition de la différence, avait une toute autre portée. Il exhortait le groupe d'adversaires politiques, pharisiens et hérوديens, venus embarrasser Jésus, à "rendre" autant à Dieu qu'ils rendaient, déjà, en fait, à César. Leur hypocrisie, démasquée par Jésus, consistait à le contraindre à se déclarer soit comme un rebelle au pouvoir, soit comme un infidèle à Dieu. Jésus, en réplique, démasque leur tiédeur vis-à-vis de Dieu, alors qu'ils se prétendent "contestataires" sourcilieux de César.

b) Jérusalem et Babylone. Ici, chacun a un rôle antagoniste. Babylone symbolise la vie des nations qui exploitent, corrompent, mentent et tuent. Au contraire, la Jérusalem à venir symbolise un monde fraternel, véridique, les portes ouvertes à toute race, toute classe, toute tribu. Il faut fuir Babylone pour gagner Jérusalem. Cette fuite peut être de nature intérieure (monacale ou puritaine), isolationniste (sectaire ou anabaptiste), futuriste (millénariste ou utopiste). Ce modèle donne une plus grande importance que le précédent aux exigen-

gences collectives de Dieu, mais ses difficultés sont évidentes: est-on sûr qu'il faille abandonner à la mauvaise Babylone tous ceux qui ne font pas partie du groupe en fuite? Est-on sûr que la nouvelle Jérusalem n'est pas un leurre et que l'on ne va pas y retrouver les tentations et les pratiques de la vieille Babylone? Surtout, est-on sûr que la contre-société, la contre-culture, le contre-pouvoir prennent en charge les relations globales de l'humanité, sans constituer seulement une marge, ce qui inciterait par contre-coup, à conclure que son Dieu, lui aussi, est en marge de la réalité du monde? Le célèbre passage de Matthieu XIII, 24-30, sur le blé qu'il faut ne pas séparer encore de l'ivraie, rappelle que Jérusalem et Babylone restent mêlées jusqu'à la fin de l'histoire et qu'un tri prématuré arracherait aussi le blé. Le premier modèle met en lumière l'hypocrisie des "politique d'abord", le second, celui des "spirituel seulement".

c) Le levain dans la pâte. C'est pourquoi j'ai choisi le troisième modèle, tel qu'on le trouve dans la parabole de Matthieu XIII, 33, "Le Royaume de Dieu est semblable à du levain qu'une femme a pris et a mis dans trois mesures de farine jusqu'à ce que la pâte soit haut levée". Dans ce modèle, nous trouvons quelques indications significatives. L'Evangile du Royaume est, au premier abord, indiscernable, petit, mêlé à une lourde pâte. Pour qu'il pénètre, il faut un long travail de brassage dont le résultat n'apparaît pas en cours de travail. Pourtant, la parabole annonce que la pâte entière lèvera, si le levain y a été réellement mêlé. C'est donc un modèle, non de face-à-face, ni de fuite, mais de brassage. C'est un modèle qui confie aux croyants un travail de pénétration, le levain lui-même étant ce que Dieu nous confie. Enfin, il comporte une annonce de banalité, bien que le résultat ne soit pas visible au cours de la route. Je crois que c'est un bon modèle pour insérer l'Evangile dans la réalité des relations internationales plutôt que de dresser face-à-face deux compétences dans deux domaines artificiellement séparés ou encore d'imaginer un monde qui serait déjà un Royaume, mais un royaume sectaire, ayant renoncé à faire lever la pâte toute entière.

On peut maintenant préciser avec plus de détails ce que contient cette pâte et ce en quoi consiste le levain, sans entrer encore, cependant, dans une analyse plus située, comme je le ferai par la suite. La pâte du monde comporte évidemment des conflits. Dans les Evangiles, ils sont de multiples natures: conflits idéologiques avant tout, si l'idéologie est l'attitude d'ensemble d'un groupe face à la réalité qu'il vit et les schémas d'interprétation dont il dispose pour réagir à cette réalité. Il y avait, par exemple, au temps de Jésus, quatre grands groupes idéologiques: les pharisiens, laïcs scrupuleux, modernistes et opposés intérieurement à Rome; les sadducéens, plus sacerdotaux, traditionnels, composant politiquement avec Rome; les esséniens, ermites messianiques, réfugiés au désert, attendant le jugement de Dieu contre Rome; enfin, les zélotes, activistes religieux, emmenant le jugement de Dieu sur cette même Rome. Comme toujours, la foule suivait



plus ou moins les écoles idéologiques et se ressentait aussi abandonnée et silencieuse. On pourrait, naturellement, citer encore d'autres sources de conflits: doctrinaux (sur la résurrection, par exemple), moraux (sur l'observance de la loi), sociaux (sur les riches et leurs clients, les pauvres), géographiques (sur les provinces pures ou impures), etc.... Mais, j'ai préféré m'en tenir à une description idéologique, qui a l'avantage de recouper plusieurs réalités actuelles.

La pâte du monde comporte également des alliances tactiques, en vue d'un but temporaire, entre des partenaires méfiants. On peut, par exemple, toujours du temps de Jésus, envisager deux de ces groupes: celui des pharisiens-sadducéens qui obtiendra du pouvoir romain, la mise à mort de Jésus, ou, inversement, dans le groupe des disciples, celui des zélotes vengeurs ~~et~~ des publicains méprisés, adversaires qui accepteront pourtant de suivre ensemble Jésus, à cause de l'espoir d'un Royaume qui libèrerait les uns et accueillerait les autres. Ces alliances tactiques disparaissent une fois le but atteint ou l'objectif manqué. Il ne s'agit donc pas de paix, mais d'un changement d'ennemi ou d'ami principal et d'une modification de la stratégie à mener à son égard.

Telle est la pâte; que peut en être le levain?

Je lui vois essentiellement un double rôle, en m'en tenant aux analyses évangéliques choisies. D'abord, la chasse à l'hypocrisie, quand elle prétend qu'un groupe idéologique est fondamentalement plus pur que l'autre, alors qu'en réalité, il se justifie en privilégiant telle valeur, tel projet, et en omettant les autres. Jésus démasque la vie des groupes en conflit qui avaient chacun une haute idée de son appartenance et de sa mission. Il les contraint presque à ces alliances tactiques qui leur font connaître le mensonge de leurs ~~position~~ prétentions à l'auto-justification, ou encore leur révèlent une fraternité dont ils ne voulaient pas entendre parler. Le jugement, c'est la mise à nu des hypocrisies, la mise à la lumière des options et des pensées cachées. C'est le caractère corrosif du levain.

Mais l'Evangile n'est pas seulement critique (ce qui deviendrait la nouvelle hypocrisie de la dénonciation universelle sans repentance personnelle). Le levain évangélique est aussi une obligation de vivre ce que l'on dit, sans utopie, sans contrainte par le devoir d'Etat, sans discours sur le passé ou le futur. Jésus ne demande pas ~~à Pilate~~ à Pilate de croire en lui, mais de le reconnaître judiciairement innocent. Il ne demande pas aux pharisiens de transgresser les lois de Moïse, mais d'en vivre la finalité, ni aux zélotes de renoncer à leur combat, mais de réfléchir aussi à la violence, fille de la violence. Jésus ne paraît pas avoir d'idéologie alternative aux autres, mais plutôt une théologie de l'honnêteté de l'idéologie par rapport à elle-même. Cette exigence a été jugée par tous insupportable, ce qui a provoqué sa mort. La foi chrétienne, c'est, à cause de la résurrection, la reprise de ce double levain évangélique, démasquer les hypocrisies, mettre en oeuvre les déclarations. Ce programme politique peut

paraître vague et moralisant. En fait, il est salubre, car le levain n'est pas là pour supprimer la réalité de la pâte; mais pour la brasser et la faire lever, afin que l'histoire internationale ne soit pas seulement celle des multiples conflits et des alliances tactiques rendues inévitables par les situations variables, mais aussi celle de la clarté et, si possible, de la réalisation de rapports plus vrais et plus productifs entre les nations.

## II Immobilisme et incertitudes dans la situation européenne actuelle

a) Il y a, me semble-t-il, trois facteurs majeurs d'immobilisme dans la situation présente. D'abord, bien sûr, la détention de l'armement par les superpuissances qui tendrait à remplacer la guerre par la dissuasion, l'affrontement, par l'avertissement, l'usage des armes, par l'indication de leur possession, on pourrait presque dire l'action, par la stratégie de l'espionnage. On signale que telle superpuissance n'admettra pas telle modification de l'équilibre acquis à la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale. A certains égards, cette situation de stabilisation <sup>est aussi rassurante</sup> qu'une police mondiale, effectuée par deux patrouilleurs, coordonnant plus ou moins leurs rondes de surveillance. A deux autres points-de-vue, elle est oppressante: au niveau des dépenses militaires qui sont devenues une escalade rituelle en temps de paix, d'autant plus que le marché des armements représente désormais, pour plusieurs pays dont la France, une donnée importante de l'équilibre du commerce extérieur, du marché de l'emploi et de la concurrence industrielle. D'un autre point de vue, cette immobilisation des frontières est factice dès lors qu'un pays change intérieurement d'orientation idéologique et que les pressions à son endroit ne peuvent pas être directement militaires, mais nucléaires. D'où, à côté du sentiment de sécurité précédemment évoqué, également un double sentiment de gaspiillage effroyable et d'étouffement inquiétant chez toutes les nations, moyennes ou petites, qui cherchent l'indépendance contre la domination des super-grands.

Ensuite, la persistance des nationalismes et, souvent, la réapparition des régionalismes. Nous ne paraissions pas aller vers des fédérations politiques plus solides, parce que les peuples ne sentent pas leur appartenance commune à des ensembles trop grands, à moins qu'une histoire vraiment vivante n'ait forgé ces ensembles. Certes, l'Europe est une entité économique de première importance et elle garde une mémoire émue de son rayonnement ancien, mais elle connaît tant de divisions (et pas seulement depuis 1945) que l'on voit mal comment elle représente une réalité supra-nationale. Elle n'a pas d'objectif politico-idéologique commun et elle ne pratique pas une solidarité économique durable, surtout en période de crise et de difficultés internes à chaque nation.

Je verrai enfin, dans une certaine répétition idéologique, le troisième facteur de notre immobilisme. Les références aux modèles sont devenues assez rituelles. On est passé de la mobilisation à la légitimation, qui cache souvent une grande démobilisation. Ainsi, les économies au marché libre ont recours aux

garanties de l'Etat, aux ententes de prix et aux monopoles transnationaux, tandis que les économies à planification centralisée ont, de leur côté, recours aux intéressements des initiatives, à l'élargissement des échelles de salaires ainsi qu'aux capitaux et aux technologies provenant de l'économie capitaliste. Tout cela demeure une analyse sommaire. Mais, plus encore que sur l'impureté de chacun des deux modèles, je veux insister sur leur pragmatisme, dans l'espace européen au moins, qui est le seul où ils se cotoient dans un immobilisme souhaité, semble-t-il, de part et d'autre, afin d'y garantir une zone de sécurité alors qu'ailleurs grandissent les incertitudes.

b) Les incertitudes grandissent sur ce fond d'immobilisme. Il y a d'abord les incertitudes des pays du Sud de l'Europe, où l'on est devant des mutations de régimes d'autant plus considérables que le conservatisme, l'autoritarisme, le régime policier ont régné en maîtres pendant des années sans conquérir le soutien populaire. Le Sud est également loin des lignes du Nord et de l'Est où se sont stabilisées les zones d'influence à la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale. Enfin, elles n'appartiennent ni aux pays de social-démocratie, où le communisme est marginalisé, ni aux démocraties populaires, où c'est le socialisme qui est absorbé. Il y a donc de fortes chances pour que l'immobilisme n'y joue pas aussi fortement que dans le reste de l'Europe.

Il y a les incertitudes à l'intérieur-même des espaces nationaux. Elles sont difficiles à analyser car on y retrouve une protestation contre le travail et la production en série ( le côté libertaire plus que libéral du printemps 1968 ), mais aussi une anxiété sur le marché des emplois et des salaires (depuis la crise inflationniste accentuée par l'augmentation des prix du pétrole). Les deux malaises ne vont pas ensemble, puisque la protestation suppose une marge de manoeuvre assez considérable pour favoriser la qualité de la vie, tandis que l'anxiété se lie à l'expérience beaucoup plus ancienne de la survivance difficile de la cité. Mais, pour le moment, ces deux crises s'ajoutent l'une à l'autre et créent une désaffection interne à l'égard du système où l'on vit, surtout parmi les jeunes générations et, peut-être, autant à l'Est qu'à l'Ouest.

Il y a, enfin, l'incertitude beaucoup plus générale sur le prix à payer pour le progrès technique, pour les pays qui n'ont à offrir sur le marché mondial ni matières premières suffisamment rares et indispensables, donc coûteuses, mais seulement de la main d'oeuvre à bon marché et des matières premières exploitables au double sens du mot. Ce prix à payer pour le Tiers (ou le Quart-) Monde, représente la mauvaise conscience de l'Europe. Je crois cependant que le rôle de cette mauvaise conscience a diminué au cours des dernières années: la crise renforce l'égoïsme national tant chez les gouvernements que dans l'opinion publique. Il faut ajouter que les Européens sont moins sûrs que par le passé de ce pourquoi on paie et on fait payer le prix. La mise en doute de l'universalité du modèle industriel, qu'il soit lourd ou sophistiqué, est, certes, encore restreinte à des minorités,

souvent privilégiées. Pourtant, c'est une immense incertitude qui rend de l'importance à la variété des cultures, face à l'uniformité des techniques.

J'ai donc esquissé trois zones d'incertitude, par rapport à un arrière-plan d'immobilisme qui règne depuis trente ans en Europe. Il faut maintenant préciser quelques points d'action possible. Je ne suis pas certain qu'il s'agisse chaque fois du levain évangélique dans la pâte européenne! Je voudrais en tout cas les aborder sans hypocrisie ni logomachie.

### III Que faire ?

Prenons d'abord la division centrale de l'Europe, celle qui a fait l'immobilisme et qui fait ressurgir les incertitudes, la division Est-Ouest, qui peut devenir beaucoup plus complexe: Sud-Nord, etc.... L'hypocrisie réside sans doute dans le jumelage de la coexistence pacifique avec l'autoritarisme idéologique pour les uns et la défense du monde occidental avec le commerce Est-Ouest, pour les autres. Le mot hypocrisie est sans doute trop fort, car ces jumelages valent assurément mieux que la guerre froide, mais les limites du bénéfice que les populations tirent de ces échanges sont vite atteintes. Il y a des Eglises chrétiennes considérables dans les deux parties de l'Europe et j'aurais tendance à croire que la chrétienté dure serait plus souvent à l'Est qu'à l'Ouest. Dans les pays de l'Ouest il y a des chrétiens qui votent pour les deux camps. Je ne crois pas à une sorte de troisième voie, neutraliste, sans contours assez définis pour être un pôle d'attraction. La stabilisation en Europe va favoriser les échanges entre l'ordre (l'Est) et la libéralisation (l'Ouest), car il vaut mieux poser ainsi les deux pôles actuels, plutôt que d'opposer exploitation capitaliste et révolution socialiste, ou encore dictature des masses et parlement des citoyens. Il y a là un levain possible pour la pâte européenne. J'y verrais une certaine mutualité de reconnaissances possibles: ici la sécurité et la moralité, là l'initiative et la liberté d'expression. Je n'ignore pas les grandes difficultés que rencontrent de telles reconnaissances et n'envisage pas la création d'aucun vacuum militaire ou idéologique. Mais je suis convaincu qu'une certaine mutualité de reconnaissance est ~~ad~~ ad ~~avantages~~ possible et bénéfique aujourd'hui en ce domaine précis et essentiel.

Quelles institutions peuvent et doivent dépasser le cadre national; non pour en faire disparaître le sentiment d'indépendance dans un conglomerat équivoque, mais pour unir les potentiels nationaux en vue d'une tâche qui dépasse chaque pays? A l'évidence, des accords entre puissances industrielles et pays producteurs de pétrole, non pour réserver des circuits privilégiés, mais pour lutter en commun contre la misère du Tiers-monde, sont et seraient des accords ~~for~~ for fondamentaux, capables, je pense, de réunir un consensus populaire, en dépit de leur caractère technocratique et, forcément, lointain. Là aussi surgit une tâche possible, où le vouloir moral manque sans doute plus que le savoir technique.

Enfin, il faut poser la question des normativistes, ce mot abstrait où l'on s'attend à ce que le moraliste décolle définitivement du rêve. Me souvenant de l'arrière-plan évangélique que j'ai développé, je dirai que la première normativité reste la mise en oeuvre de ce que l'on dit, ce qui oblige la parole à l'exactitude et aussi, la conduite à l'énergie. Justice et liberté sont certes essentielles. Chacun les revendique. Mais, la vérité est presque prioritaire. Son absence crée la méfiance que la puissance ne suffit nullement à dissoudre. Les églises chrétiennes devraient être des lieux, certes, de générosité et de justice, de critique et de prophétie, de consolation et de promesse, mais, avant tout, de vérité, quoiqu'il en coûte à nos solidarités nationales, idéologiques et culturelles. Celui qui a "la vérité fera de vous des hommes libres" (Jean VIII, 32) Jésus l'a dit justement à des interlocuteurs qui affirmaient n'avoir jamais connu la servitude! Pour vérifier la vérité qui vient de Jésus Christ, il nous faut avouer chacun pour notre part, reconnaître les servitudes que nous ne croyons pas avoir et oeuvrer pour le combat incessant et coûteux de la vérité, dont dépend la confiance et, par elle, la paix, par elle, la justice. La priorité de la vérité n'est pas une chimère, mais le levain pour nos vies comme pour nos nations.

(6)

PROBLEMS OF WESTERN DEFENSE:  
MILITARY ASPECTS CONCERNING THE CENTRAL FRONT

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INTRODUCTION

With problems of inflation-recession and economic recovery still plaguing the members of the Atlantic Alliance, with other pressing domestic problems competing for the attention of national political leadership and scarce national resources, with civil unrest and civil war stalking much of the globe, with frightful new dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation, with the Mediterranean competing for attention as the flash point for East-West and North-South competition and conflict, and with the aura of detente uneasily confirmed by the Helsinki Conference and continuing negotiations on SALT II and MBFR, one might well wonder why military aspects of Western defense on the Central Front should appear early on the agenda of the Thirteenth Annual Conference of CCADD.

Perhaps the simplest and most adequate answer is that members of CCADD come largely from countries deeply involved on the Central Front. The portions of national defense budgets allocated to forces committed to the Central Front would alone justify serious annual attention to whether such national commitments of resources are necessary or desirable and whether they are being husbanded in a responsible manner by our political and military leadership.

During the twenty-six year history of NATO—a history marked by tension and crisis between East and West and within both East and West—the military balance or ratio of forces has played a perhaps unknowable role in maintaining an unusual, if uneasy, degree of international peace and stability in the region. If our discussions appear at times to keep coming back to problems of Western defense that we have faced before, it is perhaps because, in the

nature of the case, all our national and multinational solutions to them have a degree of compromise and tentativeness that leaves us intellectually and morally dissatisfied with any solution we have arrived at. If we keep looking for new dimensions of the problems and new devices—technological, military or political—for solving some of them, it is perhaps because we are restless for better, more permanent solutions that can allow us to get on with other pressing problems.

Of course, there is also a continuing and changing external reason for being concerned with—if not obsessed with—problems of Western defense on the Central Front. That is the presence of some twenty-seven Soviet divisions in the German Democratic Republic, in Czechoslovakia, and in Poland together with over thirty-one similarly structured and equipped divisions of those countries. However much we—and the East—may long for reduction of forces as well as of tensions, the existence of those forces, their apparent design for offensive blitzkrieg-type of operations, their constantly improved equipment, their degree of readiness, and the intentions that appear to lie behind this commitment of resources on the part of the East must be taken into account by Western leadership and planners.

In this brief paper, I will try to set the stage for another CCADD discussion of where we are and whither we are tending with our commitments of national resources to Western defense on the Central Front. I will begin with what appears to me to be one of the most thorough and comprehensive of European assessments of where we are and where we should go. That section will be followed by some comments on apparent trends in American thinking and planning and a final section on the status and need for military and political coherence in the Western defense posture.

## I. A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

This session of the Thirteenth CCADD Conference could profitably be devoted solely to a discussion of the recent study conducted by General Ulrich de Maiziere (Retired Inspector-General of the Bundeswehr) with the assistance of Mr. Pieter Dankert of the Dutch Parliament for the Assembly of the Western European Union (Ref. 1). It deals with one of the hardest perennials on the historic agenda of NATO, namely, "The Rational Deployment of Forces on the Central Front," and was published in April 1975.

The basic charter for General de Maiziere's study was adopted by the Assembly on 21 June 1973 although the recommendation that the study be conducted and its general terms of reference had been prepared by the Committee on Defense Questions in November 1971 (Ref. 1, p.3). General de Maiziere was appointed to conduct the study in December 1973. The study was one of five originally envisioned by the recommendations of the Committee on Defense Questions. The others included: (1) "a rational distribution of defense tasks between countries," (2) "a concerted long-term programme for standardized armaments procurement," (3) "collective logistical support," and (4) "a comparative study of the structure of national defense organizations" (Ref.1, p.3). Since the question of the "maldeployment of forces" on the Central Front had become almost a cliché in NATO circles and since an authoritative study of possibilities for improving that deployment would provide background for the other studies, the Assembly decided to begin with General de Maiziere's study on an urgent basis.

The terms of reference for the study called for first, a description of the relationships between permanent (or peacetime) locations of the forces committed to the Central Front; second, whether war locations assigned to these forces correspond to an optimum considering their military and political effectiveness for the strategy of flexible response and forward defense and future possible changes in the level of forces committed; third, possible models for optimum deployment; fourth, any desirable and feasible changes in permanent locations of forces deriving from the foregoing and in view of costs involved; and, finally, a review of any proposals for a more nearly optimum deployment in war locations deriving from the feasibility of changing permanent locations (Ref. 1, p.7).



It would be hard to fault General de Maiziere's credentials for conducting such a study or the thoroughness and openness to proposals and balanced statesmanship with which he carried out his task. Any summary of his findings and views is bound to do injustice to his comprehensive study; nonetheless, I must try to summarize them.

With considerable detail as well as perspective, General de Maiziere describes the present permanent locations of the forces of the Federal Republic, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Canada. He shows clearly how these locations, with the exception of those for the Bundeswehr forces, derive largely from World War II and not from operational military planning. He also describes the war locations that do derive from military planning to implement the strategy of flexible response and defense as far forward as possible. With the exception of the French forces, whose commitment is reserved to the President of France, these locations provide a "layer cake" pattern at the FRG borders with the GDR and Czechoslovakia in which forces from six allies, organized in eight corps plus the Canadian brigade-size force, all have an immediate role in forward defense as well as defense in depth.

To get from permanent locations to wartime locations, national forces must move across widely varying distances from west to east and some from north to south and others from south to north. Clearly, at least the permanent locations could be described as a maldeployment since their relation to wartime locations complicates movement planning and logistic support, which remains a national responsibility. From a strictly military point of view, the wartime locations also seem non-optimal since the corps sectors vary in width, concentration of forces, and ability to accept reinforcement and resupply, and since only the two adjacent US corps provide a larger than corps sector through which the reinforcements and resupply of one nation can flow (the three German corps are non-adjacent). However, as a "layer cake," the wartime locations do give political effectiveness to the Alliance by ensuring that the forces of several allies would inevitably be involved in defense against any conceivable attack that would be larger than corps size.

In reviewing various proposals to straighten out or make more rational the wartime locations or the peacetime locations, General de Maiziere does not find much opportunity for significant or major changes. Basically his assessment rests on the substantial costs that would be involved in any peacetime shifting of national forces. Heavy construction costs would likely be involved in major shifts that could significantly improve deployments both for barracks and other permanent facilities and for infrastructure. Incurring such costs would likely reduce funds available for other important defense programs such as R&D, procurement, manpower, training, logistics and maintenance and have the net effect of reducing overall military effectiveness rather than improving it. Moreover, since warning time and careful military planning can substantially reduce the impact of many maldeployments, and since wartime locations have been reassigned in the past as NATO strategy and posture have evolved, gains in the relation of peacetime to wartime locations may not have a permanent validity. This is not to say that some opportunities do not exist for improving deployments, and General de Maiziere makes some recommendations for minor adjustments. It is to say that the basic opportunities and needs for improving the overall NATO posture on the Central Front lie elsewhere.

Framing his conclusions in the context of the judgments that NATO forces, "including the nuclear means, which are now stationed in the central region are just adequate--to ensure deterrence" and that "in conventional warfare, a major aggression can be resisted only for a limited period of time, unless the currently available land and air forces are reinforced," General de Maiziere emphasizes several things that NATO can and should do at reasonable cost. These include, principally:

- (1) Making "preparations for a conventional reinforcement of combat-ready forces in times of tension or wartime" by greater efforts to establish army reserve units by the continental European partners and to move in air force and army reinforcements from overseas, especially from the US. This suggests "a special NATO infrastructure programme mainly for the purpose of preparing for the reception of air forces" (Ref.1, p.56).

- (2) Getting "binding commitments and agreements in the operational sphere" as to "in what numbers and with what mission the French units (stationed on both sides of the French-German border) will join in the common defense" (Ref. 1, p.57).
- (3) Maintaining the priority of the "layer cake" principle in the General Deployment Plan "over all other operational considerations as long as it remains the main strategic objective to preserve peace by deterrence." "This does not preclude individual adjustments" (Ref. 1, p.57).
- (4) Since the "decisive deficiency of the defense structure of the central region" is "the lack of compatibility and interoperability of the forces," the "ideal aims to be pursued are the complete standardization of materiel, an extensive specialization within the Alliance and the integration of logistic responsibility with the NATO commanders" (Ref. 1, p.58).
- (5) Recognizing that reaching this goal of "rationalization through specialization and standardization" will "take a long time," General de Maiziere recommends for consideration:
  - (a) efforts to improve national defense structures and step by step measures to realize specialization and standardization
  - (b) initiation now of an AD75 (Allied defense study for 1975) comparable to AD70 "with the objective of giving a decisive impulse for promoting the idea of rationalization"
  - (c) continue efforts, using "the appropriate political and military organizational structures" to foster and develop Western European integration, since "the more firmly such a Europe speaks the same language the more effectively will it be able to represent its interests, and the more willingly will the United States wish to maintain its ties" (Ref 1., pp.58,59).

In his Preface to General de Maiziere's study, Mr. Pieter Dankert correctly points out that the General's main conclusions support the need for "the remaining four topics for study--which the Committee (on Defense

Questions) proposed in its initial report" (Ref. 1, p.4). It is also clear that both in its concepts and in its conclusions, this study makes a strong case for rationalization as in part a feasible alternative to and in part a concrete step toward Western European union.

## II. SOME CURRENT AMERICAN EMPHASES

### Standardization

Concern with rationalization, particularly in its standardization aspects, has recently become a major preoccupation of US defense planners as well. The urgent need for economies in defense spending and the rising costs of weapons procurement combined with the need to replace obsolescing weapons and equipment in the face of sustained modernization of Warsaw Pact forces have contributed to this preoccupation. If US planners do not all agree that lack of standardization and interoperability is "the decisive deficiency in the defense structure," most do recognize that there is some significant, if uncalculable, loss in combat effectiveness due to such lack. General Andrew Goodpastor, until December 1974 SACEUR, is frequently quoted for his assessment that NATO loses something like 30-50 percent of its potential combat effectiveness by lack of standardization.

Pentagon interest in standardization is paralleled by and partly stimulated by US Congressional interest. The Nunn Amendment (after Senator Samuel Nunn of Georgia) to the Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975 (Ref. 2) requires the Secretary of Defense to "undertake a specific assessment of the costs and possible loss of nonnuclear combat effectiveness. . . caused by the failure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, including the United States, to standardize weapon systems, ammunition, fuel, and other military impedimenta for land, air, and naval forces."

Not much can be said in a paper and discussion of this scope about standardization and lack thereof. Suffice it to say that all members of NATO appear to be increasingly concerned about NATO's record of failure in this respect as member nations have for years pursued relatively autonomous procurement programs, logistic policies and even force structure, training,

and doctrine. While operational planning for use of forces and command-control of them do come under the joint commands, the nature and equipment of forces remains a national prerogative subject to cooperation, compromise and negotiation among the partners. As national interests among the arms producing members—particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—prevailed, earlier efforts at NATO-wide standardization were essentially abandoned by 1960. Since then, however, bilateral and multilateral efforts have been pursued with varying degrees of intensity and success. Besides the bilateral and multilateral efforts at cooperation in research and development and in co-production, information exchanges have taken place under the auspices of the NATO-wide Conference of National Armaments Directors. As the recent selection of the F-16 to replace the aging Starfighters in the air forces of Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway has shown, collaboration among consumer countries in procurement can be as effective as collaboration among producer nations in effecting standardization. Finally, recent initiatives of the Eurogroup show some promise of balancing American and European interests in a way that is more effective in harmonizing individual national interests of the European countries than ad hoc bilateral or multilateral programs.

Much will depend in the future on the extent to which European interests in arms production and procurement, including the French, can be coordinated within a forum like the Eurogroup and the extent to which similar US interests over the long term can be harmonized with European interests. Standardization cannot succeed over the long term if it means "buy American" to Americans and "buy European" to Europeans.

#### Conventional Force Structure

Besides concern about lack of standardization, there is clear interest in the Pentagon in other ways to improve NATO's conventional capability. Again this interest finds a parallel in the US Congress. The Nunn Amendment already referred to also directed the Secretary of Defense to replace some US support forces deployed in Germany with combat forces to increase the combat-to-support ratio for the forward deployed forces and strengthen their

immediate combat potential. Two combat brigades have been added to the US forces in Europe during the past year in exchange for an equivalent number of support forces. This is compatible with Mr. Schlesinger's well-known interest in improving NATO's conventional capability—US and European—to establish a "stalwart conventional posture" so that resort to nuclear weapons need not be automatic to any significant Warsaw Pact attack.

There is a school of thought within American defense circles that something approaching comparability with the Warsaw Pact in conventional capabilities is within reach. In the 1960s and into the early 1970s Alain Enthoven was the principal spokesman for this point of view (Ref 3). More recently Steven L. Canby has become an interesting and challenging advocate of this point of view (Ref 4). Other authors, more restrained in their optimism, such as Colonel Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record have advocated significant changes in US and NATO force structure that would, according to their view, significantly reduce the present imbalance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in conventional capabilities (Ref 5).

Such authors have not yet convinced the Pentagon, or even less Europeans, that conventional comparability is within reach or that it would be an unequivocal blessing. Mr. Enthoven's arguments rested heavily on his attempts to reduce Soviet capabilities to size and on his comparisons of the collective resources of the Alliance and the Pact, including portions of populations and GNPs committed to defense efforts. As Steven Canby has pointed out (Ref 4, pp 4-15) there were significant weaknesses in the Enthoven argument that ignored differences in force structure and the kind of war the two forces were designed to fight. Moreover, Mr. Enthoven's arguments were formulated at a time when Europeans still firmly believed that NATO's best deterrent depended on and still appeared to enjoy the luxury of an early and perhaps massive first use of nuclear weapons. Finally, most military analyses and war games tended to show that, with current capabilities in the forward area, NATO forces could well be overrun in the first few days or weeks of a Pact attack before all the resources Mr. Enthoven counted in his equations could be brought to bear.

The Canby and Lawrence and Record arguments address this latter point directly. Canby especially argues that Pact forces are designed for a short,

blitzkrieg type of war with an apparent aim, if war comes, of overrunning NATO forces before reinforcements could arrive and long before the heavy support forces designed for a long war could serve many useful purposes to the NATO combat forces. American Army forces, in particular, he argues, are designed as general purpose, expeditionary forces requiring a large support-to-combat ratio. Such forces would be useful in NATO only if they could screen, delay, fall back, and regroup with reinforcements to conduct offensive operations to regain lost territory. In short, in Canby's view, US forces almost appear to be designed to make introduction of nuclear weapons necessary to prevent being overrun (not in the US interests and probably not in European interests) and/or conduct a protracted counter-offensive campaign (not in European interests and probably not in US interests).

The Lawrence and Record arguments—not as detailed or as emphatic—rest on similar grounds. Both sets of arguments propose restructuring US and other NATO forces with a much higher combat-to-support ratio, taking advantage of recent advances in the technology of non-nuclear weapons, greater emphasis on immediate availability in the forward area, and tactics and doctrine tailored to counter armored and motorized blitzkrieg tactics. The thrust of such arguments is based on both military and political grounds. Militarily, redesigned forces could provide stiffer forward resistance to even a major conventional attack by Pact forces. With adjustments in the theater/tactical nuclear posture, conventional operations based on such redesigned forces could probably be made more compatible with the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons should that appear necessary and desirable. Politically—especially if accompanied by alterations in the US strategic posture that do provide for limited strategic options including the possibility but not the necessity of first use—a strengthened, combat-heavy and support-light conventional capability would appear to lend credence to the implied link among strategic nuclear, theater/tactical nuclear, and conventional forces.

#### Theater/Tactical Nuclear Posture

The Nunn Amendment also confirmed the existence of widespread dissatisfaction with the theater/tactical nuclear posture of NATO and a growing debate about that posture. Two recent contributions to the public literature on this subject have attracted attention both in Europe and in America and

seem to me also to be moving in the right directions militarily and politically to shore up the deterrent/defense posture in Europe in a way that is compatible with both US and European interests.

The first is another monograph by Jeffrey Record of the Brookings Institution, entitled, "US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Issues and Alternatives" (Ref 6). Record reviews and identifies what he considers to be the principal weaknesses in the present deployment of some 7000 theater/tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The present deployment appears in Record's view neither to serve the interests of deterrence nor the interests of defense. From a deterrence point of view, the stockpile is considered excessive and contains many weapons that are either vulnerable or on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) or both, tending to invite preemption. From a defense point of view, the large number of weapons, including, for example, many artillery-delivered warheads, would appear to be extremely difficult to command and control. Record examines four broad alternatives to the present posture, including: (1) a more-or-less arbitrary reduction in the size of the deployment to about 2000 weapons; (2) a similar reduction in size but one that focuses on reducing weapons that are either particularly vulnerable, targets for preemption, or excessively hard to control; (3) a posture that exploits recent technology (particularly miniaturization of tactical nuclear weapons) to develop a better war-fighting capability; and (4) elimination of the forward deployment.

Basing his conclusions heavily on "the great political importance of deployed US tactical nuclear weapons to Europeans, for whom the US nuclear presence on the continent (although not necessarily the current deployment) represents the most visible proof of the US strategic guarantee," (Ref 6, p 68), Record comes down in favor of a reduced deployment (about 2000) that relies heavily on battlefield and long-range missiles, would terminate the QRA, eliminate artillery-delivered weapons, and limit yields to the 0.5 to 10 kiloton range.

Lawrence Martin in a recent issue of Survival also examines the status of the current theater/tactical nuclear posture and examines two principal alternatives (Ref 9). Noting the manner in which the current posture evolved without benefit of a coherent doctrine for their use but with growing



political importance to Europeans, he also examines both the military and political constraints as well as reasons for alteration now. The two alternatives he examines—both of which would have rational coherence from a military point of view—are (1) a posture that would give a nuclear-orientation to in-theater or battlefield defense by emphasizing miniaturized nuclear weapons, and (2) a nuclear covering force that, in contrast to (1) would respond to the overall military situation rather than to local tactical circumstances. Both postures would emphasize a significant role for theater nuclear weapons in containing or defeating an attack, including a conventional attack. Both would also attempt to restrict damage by focussing on military targets, restricting yields, emphasizing target identification, and using precision guidance.

Besides the principal military difference noted above between defeating the enemy in detail and responding to the overall military situation by, for example, undertaking relatively close interdiction missions, the two alternatives would have rather radically different political significance. The first alternative would be politically unacceptable to Europeans who would see it as an attempt to decouple theater nuclear war from strategic nuclear war and thus undermine the US strategic guarantee. The second alternative, which Mr. Martin recommends, provides most of the defense-orientation that the first alternative provides—and perhaps even better—but also would be in keeping with a strategy that emphasizes deterrence and the linkage between conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic capabilities. The military advantage that the nuclear covering force provides is that it clearly would supplement and not replace conventional capabilities, either immediately as the miniaturized nuclear alternative would tend to do, or after conventional forces had been defeated as the current posture would tend to do. The political advantages would not be confined to reassuring allies, they would also consist in conveying to the Soviet Union both the determination of NATO and the restraint with which it was prepared to respond to an attack on Western Europe.

### III. MILITARY AND POLITICAL COHERENCE

#### Relation to the US Strategic Posture

At this conference last year we discussed the recent changes and new emphasis in the American strategic posture and doctrine and examined some of the reasoning that apparently lay behind them. These changes and emphases had to do with moving away from "sole reliance on mutual assured destruction" toward a greater capability for "selective response options." In my interpretation, this shift responded to three principal concerns: (1) to provide an alternative to intentional mass destruction that would yield some hope of controlling conflict if deterrence should ever fail; (2) to "shore up" deterrence for the "long haul" against threats to its stability from new weapons development and deployment in the absence of effective arms control; and (3) to preserve to ourselves or to counter for the other side the political utility of strategic nuclear weapons (Ref. 9, pp.7-16).

Despite the fact that these changes and emphases appear to be consistent with NATO's official strategy of flexible response, when the first intimations of them were reported in Europe on the basis of comments Mr. Schlesinger made following a speech in January 1974, reactions among Europeans concerned with defense were rather jittery. In the first place, the pending US changes seemed like another unilateral US initiative, bound to affect NATO, for which adequate ground-work of consultation in advance had not taken place.

Beyond this normal—and probably not totally avoidable—reaction, Europeans initially appeared alarmed at new talk of limited or limiting nuclear war. Europeans have never had the same interest in limited nuclear war concepts that have been present in the American defense community. To them limited nuclear war raises the specter of limiting nuclear war to the immediate battlefield or even to the European theater while leaving the territories of the US and USSR sanctuaries. Almost no matter what US spokesmen say, the fear remains somewhat constant that it could be in the US interest to raise the threshold at which the full US strategic arsenal would become engaged in the defense of Europe so high that the US strategic forces would become effectively "decoupled" from the defense of Europe.

There has, of course, been enough in what US spokesmen have said and urged on Europeans to give some basis to this fear. The concerted push in the early years of the Kennedy Administration to raise the conventional capabilities of

NATO in the forward area was strongly motivated by a desire to raise the nuclear threshold to avert nuclear war. Little matter that Americans conceived this to be in the interests of Europeans to provide a credible deterrent to conventional attack against them, most of them felt that for a complex of political, economic, and military reasons conventional parity was not within reach, and, even if it were, they would not welcome the possibility of a major conventional war in Europe. The ultimate deterrent against such a war remained to them the implicit or imminent possibility that the US strategic arsenal would become engaged almost immediately rather than the assurance that a conventional potential existed to hold for a few days or weeks or even to regain lost territory after months or years of conventional warfare. To imply escalation to the nuclear level was more important than to guard against its necessity.

Europeans, and particularly Germans, now appear to accept that—if based solely on mutual assured destruction—the US strategic deterrent loses some credibility for the defense of Europe. In this respect the initial jitteriness about innovations in the US strategic posture has been assuaged and it is recognized that such innovations may strengthen rather than weaken deterrence of conventional or nuclear attacks that are initially aimed at Western Europe. The retargeting aspects of the Schlesinger emphases thus are tending to become accepted if still not enthusiastically embraced, while judgment is more reserved on new weapons programs that still seem potentially inimical to prospects of maintaining sufficient superpower stability that the interests of Europeans are not lost in US preoccupation with the bi-lateral US-USSR deterrence/detente interaction.

#### The NATO Triad

From the vantage point of Europeans—especially Germans who occupy the most exposed position—security rests on a triad of strategic nuclear capabilities, theater/tactical nuclear capabilities, and forward, immediately available conventional capabilities. These three must supplement each other; one cannot substitute for another or compensate for its weaknesses. Full conventional capabilities cannot significantly reduce ultimate reliance on the US strategic capabilities especially in the deterrence role. On the other hand, no amount of flexibility in the US strategic posture will prove credible as the initial response to an attack that is confined to Europe.

Tactical nuclear weapons cannot be used successfully to keep a war at the border nor can they be used to regain territory that has been lost to blitzkrieg conventional assaults. Neither can they adequately substitute for the possibility, indeed likelihood, that US strategic weapons would become engaged in deterring an initial or a sustained attack against Western Europe.

Mr. Schlesinger's visit to Germany in early November 1974 and the announcement that the US was increasing the combat-to-support ratio of its ground forces in West Germany seemed to do a great deal to improve European acceptance of US strategic innovations as aiming at strengthening rather than weakening the US commitment to NATO. The two-brigade increase in deployed US strength—among other things—appears to have helped the Germans at least to sustain and improve their conventional contribution to NATO, although there is still strong doubt as to whether conventional comparability with the Warsaw Pact is either possible or necessary. Even the desirability of full conventional comparability with the Pact is still very much in question, since the question of decoupling always lurks in the background whether it arises from talk of limited nuclear war or from talk of achieving full conventional comparability or balance with the Pact. The Germans in particular have become staunch advocates of "flexibility of response" by which they mean to confront the USSR and other Pact countries with the real possibility that a NATO response to an attack on Western Europe may be either conventional or nuclear depending on the circumstances. Perhaps stated more precisely, the USSR must be confronted with real uncertainty about the nature of a NATO response to either a conventional or a nuclear attack. This latter point, of course, accounts for German reserve or reticence to do as much detailed debating in public about strategy as Americans are wont to do.

In the past ten years—during which time the conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact was not achieved and even seemed periodically more threatened by the US public and Congressional concerns with balance-of-payments and other problems associated with maintaining sizable forces deployed in Europe and, at the same time, the credibility of the US strategic deterrent for Europe appeared to be eroding—Germans in particular took comfort from the presence of the 7000 theater/tactical nuclear weapons in Europe to confront the USSR with the uncertainty discussed above.

While presenting many privately acknowledged problems of command and control, of security, of reduction of vulnerability, and of reducing the temptation for the Pact to preempt in wartime, the 7000 theater/tactical nuclear weapons (about 5000 of which are deployed in West Germany) have served two unequal purposes in the minds of Europeans. In the first place, they have appeared in part to compensate for deficiencies in the conventional posture in providing for a forward defense that could disrupt a massed Pact attack. However, this purpose has been as much a source of Alliance friction and military uncertainty about when to introduce nuclear weapons and on what scale as it has been a genuine comfort to Europeans. The second more important purpose has been to serve as the critical link or coupling device that connects the forward defense of Europe with the US strategic arsenal.

Because of the importance of this second purpose, there has heretofore been extreme reluctance on the part of Germans in particular to contemplate serious revisions or reductions in the theater/tactical nuclear posture. There are indications now that Germans as well as other Europeans and Americans are increasingly willing to reexamine the extent to which the theater/tactical nuclear posture of NATO optimally meets the requirements for deterrence and defense in the central region.

#### Political Cohesion

This paper has focussed on military aspects of Western defense on the Central Front. An implicit premise of this discussion has been—as in General de Maiziere's study—that sufficient cohesiveness exist within at least the countries of NATO with forces committed to the Central Front to maintain a viable basis for rationalization through standardization if not specialization and for mutual cooperation and trust in other efforts to improve conventional capabilities, make the theater/tactical nuclear posture more rational and responsive to NATO doctrine, and ensure the credibility of the US strategic guarantee.

At times when inflationary and recessionary pressures threaten significant cuts in defense budgets and as public attention to and concern with the substantial Warsaw Pact threat on the Central Front wanes with apparent or real progress in detente, it has seemed that NATO was in danger of becoming a bi-lateral German-American alliance. It could hardly be in the interests of other Western Europeans to allow this to happen,

nor would it appear to be in the long-term interests of Germans and Americans to allow it to happen. For this reason and for reasons alluded to in the discussion of rationalization in Section I, increased participation in and the viability of the Eurogroup ought to be encouraged on both sides of the Atlantic. At least one other Western European development ought also to be encouraged and nurtured and that is the increased consultation and coordination of French military planning and programs with the NATO military structure and the maintenance of an open door for possible return to full participation in that structure.

During recent months there has been much talk of the deterioration and disintegration of NATO in a political sense. The subjects at least of Portugal's role in NATO, the unsettled Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, the threatened withdrawal of Greek forces from the NATO military structure, the Turkish-American embroglio over military sales, and the assumption by the Turks of control of American bases in Turkey are subjects that are likely to be covered in other sessions of this Conference of CCADD. It cannot be denied that they are all high on the political agenda of NATO and raise serious problems of its overall viability as a military/political alliance. Such problems are so severe a distinguished member of this Conference, Wolfram von Raven, was quoted by Newsweeks magazine as having said that "the real southern border of NATO has become the Bavarian forest" (Ref. 9, p.13).

In more simplistic terms, Professor Brzezinski of Columbia University was quoted in the same editorial-review article as saying that "Political fragmentation rather than a dramatic alteration of the balance of power is the real danger to NATO" (Ref. 9, p.14). The issue cannot be put so simply. Without sufficient political cohesiveness, the military posture and the balance of power may indeed be altered dramatically; without sufficient attention to the military posture and problems, at least in the vital center, the balance of power may alter significantly and political fragmentation proceed more rapidly.

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(7)

# The Nuclear Question Explodes

Alan Geyer

WORLDVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1975

During the three decades since Hiroshima and Nagasaki the ethical discussion of nuclear weapons has been preoccupied with the morality of using, or threatening to use, arms of mass annihilation. There has been a relative neglect of the ethics of nuclear arms control and disarmament. Moreover, since the late 1960's widespread complacency about the presumed efficacy of mutual deterrence and the ostensible progress of détente have tended to dissipate the nuclear anxieties of ethicists, politicians, and other citizens who attend to world affairs.

Against this background of complacency there began to circulate a couple of years ago the first reminders of a scheduled 1975 review conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Since the treaty seemed to have succeeded in halting nuclear weapons spread following its effective beginning in 1970, surely the half-decade review conference mandated by the treaty would be a rather routine affair.

The sudden emergence of a many-faceted new nuclear crisis in mid-1974 transformed the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva last May into what the Secretary-General Ilkka Pastinen (Finland) called "the largest and most important disarmament conference since 1945." Among these facets are: (1) India's nuclear explosion in May, 1974, which revived the specter of "Nth countries"; (2) the massive turn to nuclear energy after oil supplies became more vulnerable and much more costly; (3) the attack upon the hazards of nuclear energy by "concerned scientists" and Naderites; (4) the uncertain protection of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons deployed by the U.S. in Europe, especially in politically unstable countries all across NATO's southern flank;

(5) the threat of theft and nuclear terrorism by political movements and criminal syndicates; and (6) growing apprehension that the SALT talks were not really succeeding in reversing the superpower arms race, especially in view of the aggressive development and deployment of new generations of strategic weapons and the fixing of "limits" above, and not below, current weapons levels.

So the NPT was seen to be a very limited and fragile instrument after all. The Geneva conference would have to do what it could to strengthen this international regime for containing nuclear weapons, and do so in the face of multiple threats to its viability.

Whatever the limitations of the NPT, it does provide the most significant political and ethical framework for coping with nuclear questions. It is not only the most important disarmament agreement now in effect. It is an omnibus compact that comprehends virtually every aspect of the new nuclear crisis: proliferation, nuclear energy development and trade, international safeguards, peaceful nuclear explosions, testing, the strategic arms race. This conjunction of problems and of accountability for them makes the treaty a veritable covenant for human survival, development, and peace—which is not to say that the Ford Administration or any other government actually accords such a priority to the NPT.

The treaty is essentially a solemn bargain between nuclear and nonnuclear states. At the heart of that bargain is a "balance of obligations"—a term invoked very frequently at the review conference, especially by the majority of states that have sworn off nuclear weapons altogether.

It must be recalled that it was the USA and the USSR that originally drafted and promoted the NPT in 1967-68—and that the price of the treaty's acceptance by nonnuclear states was a pledge not contained in the first superpower drafts. That pledge became Article VI: the "good faith" promise

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to pursue effective measures to end the arms race "at an early date" and to pursue nuclear disarmament. If the very existence of the treaty was unavoidably discriminatory (only the immediate and total renunciation of nuclear weapons could have averted nuclear discrimination), the nuclear "haves" could at least join the "have-nots" in early and significant moves toward renunciation. The treaty envisioned such obvious moves as "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time," the cessation of manufacture of such weapons, and the progressive liquidation of nuclear stockpiles.

Discrimination under the treaty was thus legitimized only in a provisional sense. There was an overriding imperative of equity. *In a world infused by an increasingly vigorous ethos of egalitarian nationalisms the satisfaction of claims to equity is a matter of political realism.* A lack of diplomatic sensitivity to this egalitarian ethos, particularly in relation to such ultimate matters as the peril and promise of nuclear power, can be catastrophic. Lincoln Bloomfield has argued recently that political considerations of prestige and nondiscrimination are fundamental to any universal agreement on nonproliferation: "In an era dominated by demands for identity, respect, equity, and participation, it seems reasonable to ask whether, with the best will in the world, the present NPT system of discrimination, denial, and second-class citizenship will in fact achieve its aim of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons" (*Foreign Affairs*, July, 1975). Unfortunately, the Ford Administration is not exuding much good will these days toward nonnuclear and nonaligned states. It has declared a rhetorical war on the Third World. Its delegates at the review conference appeared to be under firm instructions to yield nothing to the Third World's "veritable obsession with eradicating the stigmata of inferiority" (Bloomfield again).

The balance of obligations under the NPT also extends to the sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions (Articles IV and V). There is, however, a double standard written into the treaty concerning safeguards and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency: Nonnuclear-weapon states are obliged to submit to IAEA safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials to nuclear weapons (Article III). Nuclear-weapon states are not subject to such monitoring of their nuclear activities.

Not directly dealt with by the NPT itself is the very difficult question of security assurances by nuclear-weapon states to nonnuclear-weapon states. A Security Assurances Resolution (255) offered by the USA, USSR, and U.K. was adopted by the U.N. Security Council on June 19, 1968, and provided for immediate (unspecified!) Council action should a nonnuclear NPT state be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. But that resolution did not explicitly include nonnuclear states (such as India, feeling threatened by China)

within the perimeter of deterrence, nor did it disavow all use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states. This latter deficiency is perhaps the most blatant of the stigmata still born by NPT parties that have themselves renounced nuclear weapons. Does all this really add up to a genuine "balance of obligations" under the NPT? Many governments remain convinced that it does not. More than forty, in fact, have yet to become parties to the treaty. A clear majority of NPT parties were convinced, by the end of the Geneva review conference, that the treaty is, in operation, a very one-sided affair.

China and France, of course, have never accepted the proposition that this U.S.-Soviet-sponsored regime is an instrument of either justice or peace. In fact, they have repeatedly made the shocking claim that nuclear proliferation could actually contribute to world order by imposing increasing constraints upon superpower hegemony. Chinese and French cynicism about the NPT was hardly relieved by U.S.-Soviet conduct at the review conference; these two nuclear outsiders found multiple vindications of their own views, and remain more estranged from the NPT regime than ever. (I confess that, having spent the entire month of May at the review conference, I cannot now muster a very good argument against the Chinese position, although I remain committed to the effort to strengthen the NPT regime.)

Although nobody expected that Geneva would make NPT converts out of the French or the Chinese, there was a hope that the conference would provide some fresh incentives for additional nonnuclear states to join up. To nobody's surprise five Euratom countries (West Germany, Italy, and Benelux) ratified the treaty just prior to the conference, as did South Korea. Libya, Gambia, and Rwanda acceded during the conference, bringing the total to ninety-five. So it may be said (and frequently was said by U.S. delegates trying to get others to think more positively about conference results) that the very fact of holding the conference stimulated some governments to act on the treaty.

But India? Pakistan? Japan? Israel? Egypt? South Africa? Brazil? Argentina? These are all critical threshold countries in areas of regional rivalry and tension.

Egypt has signed, but won't ratify until Israel does.

Japan has signed, but reacted so negatively to the review conference that the bill of ratification was recalled from the Diet in June.

All the other countries mentioned above are not even signatories. None derived any visible incentive from Geneva to sign up; some may even have felt pushed closer to the threshold of nuclear weapons. Altogether, the conference failed badly to make the treaty more credible to outsiders. The nuclear superpowers must compensate for that failure in the very near future if the world is to avoid nuclear promiscuity and escalating probabilities of nuclear war. The United States, in particular, was in rather poor shape morally and politically after Geneva to complain about June's

multibillion-dollar German-Brazilian nuclear deal, which, although legal under the treaty and accompanied by IAEA safeguards, will equip Brazil with all the elements of the fuel cycle to become a nuclear-weapon state—if that's what Brazil really wants. The exhortatory power of the U.S. was further enfeebled by commercial jealousy of the German nuclear industry.

What might have been done in Geneva to reinforce the political and moral authority of the Non-Proliferation Treaty? The fact is that neither the U.S. nor the USSR seemed able to grasp that the very legitimacy of the treaty was under review—that, without significant measures on their part to give effect to the balance of obligations, the authority of the treaty would be squandered. Equity had become a prerequisite of efficacy.

The issue of equity and good faith was raised most pithily by Ambassador H.V. Roberts of New Zealand in the opening general debate in Geneva:

It is the view of my delegation that the most valid test of progress is simply to ask whether or not there are fewer nuclear weapons now than there were in 1970; whether or not there has been any significant abatement in nuclear weapons testing during that period; and whether or not there has been any halt in the further refinement and sophistication of those weapons of mass destruction. The answer to all three questions is patently no.

Ambassador Roberts then observed that it is "small wonder that the countries outside the treaty remain unconvinced that the nuclear weapon parties are serious in their intention to give effect to their treaty undertaking."

This writer will now abandon all pretense of objectivity in testifying to a losing effort to modify the official U.S. stance at the review conference. As chairman of the U.S. NGO Council for the NPT (the impotent, nondescript, nongovernmental caucus in Geneva), I helped to draft a document titled "An Unofficial U.S. Policy on Nuclear Proliferation." That statement, circulated to all delegations, the press, and groups back in America, urged "more responsive and realistic policies" concerning the NPT. It focused on Article VI questions and noted that, since signing the treaty in 1968, both superpowers "have multiplied their deployments of nuclear warheads and have proceeded to develop a stunning array of costly new weapons systems." The statement called for three "measures of good faith" by the U.S. and the USSR as the most urgent actions which could be taken to make the NPT a "more balanced and secure instrument of peace." The three measures were: (1) a U.S.-Soviet agreement to sign a comprehensive test ban in the immediate future or, agreement failing, a U.S. test moratorium for a definite and substantial period; (2) an



August 6, 1945 (RNS)

announced schedule for a significant reduction of strategic nuclear weapons; and (3) a pledge never to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states parties to the NPT.

Senators Hubert Humphrey and George McGovern both inserted our "unofficial policy" into the *Congressional Record*, but Administration policy didn't budge on any of these measures. If *any* of them had received even proximate support—or if the U.S. and USSR had agreed to help poor countries finance the costs of safeguards so fervently advocated by the nuclear powers—the conference might have been catalyzed toward a more general strengthening of the NPT. But none of these things happened.

Our NGO positions were neither original nor lonely: Most U.S. organizations holding NPT study conferences had already advocated them, and a majority of official delegations in Geneva supported such measures.

What, then, really happened at the review conference? The action had two poles, two "sides," two different perspectives. A few days prior to the review conference, one side, the Depositaries (U.S., USSR, U.K.), caucused in London. They apparently consulted on conference strategy: they were never visibly at odds with one another in Geneva, either substantively or procedurally. (The British delegation seemed abashed at being so rigidly identified with the superpowers.) The Depositaries also concocted a draft declaration in London, originally intended for very restricted circulation in Geneva, in anticipation of what the conference should finally say about the treaty after five years. As copies of that draft leaked to less submissive delegations and even NGOs, the Depositaries were chagrined to hear that it was widely regarded as the sleaziest document ever offered by major governments to an international conference. It was called (deservedly, I fear) complacent, self-congratulatory, repetitious, platitudinous, superficial, and graceless in the extreme. The draft did marvelously lend itself, however, to parody—which was cheerfully provided by one of the literary-minded NGO leaders under the title, "The Peacock Papers," referring to the splendid strutters on the grounds of the Palais des Nations. Whatever the stylistic deficiencies of the draft declaration, it made plain the resolve of the superpowers not to bend from their superordinate posture over the treaty. There were no signs of good faith in the Peacock Papers. And there was none in the conference itself.

The "other side" at Geneva was led by Mexico. U.N. Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles was clearly the center of conference action: he was at once the articulate and tactical leader of the nonaligned, non-nuclear states and the lightning rod for U.S.-Soviet attacks upon all criticisms of their handling of the treaty.

Garcia Robles was joined by seventeen or eighteen other delegations in introducing draft protocols on the same three issues which NGOs called "good faith measures": test ban, reduction of nuclear arsenals, security assurances. (This coincidence led to a charge by the acting head of the U.S. delegation, David Klein, that the NGOs had really prepared the working papers for "certain delegations." We felt grossly flattered—but the truth is that Garcia Robles and his colleagues had done their own homework thoroughly and were very helpful in keeping NGOs informed about the less visible action at the conference. It was also reported that Garcia Robles, in the preparatory committee, had taken the lead in arranging for the participation of NGOs in the conference, over the initial resistance of the U.S. and USSR.)

The Mexican protocols were aimed directly at the balance of obligations. They were imaginatively designed to encourage mutually reinforcing incentives between nuclear and nonnuclear states. Two of them linked horizontal nonproliferation (halting nuclear

weapons spread) with vertical nonproliferation (halting the nuclear arms race between the superpowers). One of these provided for a ten-year test moratorium when the number of accessions to the treaty reaches a hundred; the other provided for a phased reduction in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals as the number of treaty accessions reaches a hundred and beyond. Thus incentives to join the treaty would be coupled with incentives to unwind the strategic nuclear arms spiral. If the superpowers really wanted and expected additional countries to enlist in the NPT regime, they had to take significant measures of good faith under Article VI, albeit within their own balanced structure of nuclear parity.

A third draft protocol involved a solemn undertaking by Depositaries never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear treaty parties whose own territories were devoid of the nuclear weapons of any other country. In addition, Depositaries would pledge to refrain from first use of nuclear weapons against any other nonnuclear parties to the treaty.

The three draft protocols would probably have gotten a majority (but not the requisite two-thirds) of votes if they had ever been put to a vote. Garcia Robles had at least thirty out of fifty-six delegations in essential sympathy with his proposals; most of the thirty-eight absent parties to the NPT were Third World countries, which would have augmented the votes of the nonaligned.

The joint U.S.-Soviet opposition to these and similar proposals was fierce and unrelenting throughout the conference. This is David Klein replying to the protocols: "We cannot and will not accept the imposition of rigid and artificial deadlines. Arms control involves technical problems beyond any simple exercise in arithmetic. We believe that the actions of the United States in the past five years have been fully consistent with Article VI. Criticisms of SALT under Article VI greatly and unfairly underestimate the significance of SALT." Klein, who succeeded ACDA director Fred Iklé as head of the U.S. delegation after the first week, held out hopes that the implementation of the Ford-Brezhnev accord at Vladivostok ("capping the arms race") would be followed by actual arms reduction. (That implementation has already been twice delayed. U.S. preoccupation with Trident submarines, B-1 bombers, cruise missiles, and a new generation of "counterforce" weapons has not only turned the strategic weapons budget sharply upward again; it has caused the USSR to raise public doubts about U.S. fidelity to détente, even while rapidly deploying its own MIRVs and developing other new strategic systems. Strange contrast, this: collusion in Geneva and outer space; resurgence of nuclear arms rivalry.)

Ambassador Issraelyon of the USSR not only put down both the substance and the form of the Mexican protocols: he objected even to the discussion of them. He scathingly reproached Garcia Robles for not consulting on his proposals with the USSR and the USA

("they are the countries most interested") in advance of the conference. The Soviet bloc repeatedly urged nonnuclear states to divert their criticisms of the superpowers to the nuclear powers that had refused to join the NPT (China and France).

There were curious moments when, following criticisms of U.S. policy by such countries as Mexico and New Zealand, the U.S. was defended by East Germany and other Soviet satellites as a "responsible power." Romania and Yugoslavia, however, remained steadfastly behind Garcia Robles and in the camp of the nonaligned. Five international NGOs (based primarily in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), which had joined with nearly forty other organizations in a pre-conference appeal for a test ban and a reduction of nuclear arsenals, were forced to withdraw their names from that document; all such groups vanished from the conference itself after the first week.

What price détente? The superpowers heatedly objected to "meddling" with the agenda of the SALT talks. Article VI of the NPT apparently has no serious standing with the U.S. and USSR in matters of strategic disarmament; there must be no "unwarranted interference" in such matters. If obligations are to be balanced, the superpowers will do the balancing on their own terms and in accordance with their own timetable, treaty notwithstanding.

A mix of moral and technical claims was erected to fence off this trespassing by nonnuclear states on private strategic property. The moral claim was that only the U.S. and USSR are fully "responsible" and "mature" in handling nuclear issues; other claimants to nuclear power and wisdom are only "mischievous." It was the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 that earned these moral credentials for the superpowers; only they have really "looked into the nuclear abyss." The technical pretenses were similar: Only the U.S. and USSR can really know the complex problems of managing and reducing nuclear arsenals. At the same time, technical proposals for safeguards (such as regional, multinational fuel cycle centers to facilitate physical security) were given highest priority by the U.S. delegation.

**T**he impasse over Article VI and the balance of obligations was never resolved at Geneva. The superpowers and the nonaligned each held more than a "blocking third" of delegations, preventing not only a consensus but also a two-thirds vote on any important action. Committee I, on political questions, was the primary arena for Article VI issues, and got essentially nowhere. But Committee II, dealing with such technical questions as safeguards, also became politicized as the nonaligned states were at last unwilling to buy the technical agenda of the superpowers without good faith measures on political issues.

At the final session of Committee II Garcia Robles made a dramatic move that highlighted the equity controversy. He opposed consensus on any and all techni-

cal proposals until they could be considered together with political matters. "Since the contents of the final document to be produced by the conference would form a single whole composed of very closely interconnected parts," his delegation could not take a position on any partial text.

This refusal to isolate technical from political questions is a vital contribution to ethical integrity in disarmament—as in any area of policy. The manipulation of technical issues to obfuscate political issues has plagued the fields of defense and disarmament ever since 1945; it is a game the superpowers were still playing in Geneva in 1975.

With neither the two main committees nor the drafting committee able to reach consensus, conference president Inga Thorsson (Sweden's formidable undersecretary for foreign affairs) submitted her own draft declaration on the penultimate day. The concerns of the nonaligned, somewhat vaguely stated, were sprinkled with shreds from the Peacock Papers. That draft (with some modifications and reservations) was eventually adopted as a summary of deliberations—but it did not constitute any clear-cut decision to strengthen the NPT regime.

While the U.S. and USSR were positively relieved at this result, the nonaligned were not pleased. Ambassador Clark of Nigeria, who had chaired Committee I, declared his "deep sense of disappointment and disillusionment at this conference." Peru asserted that the balance of obligations had not been honored and that the treaty constitutes a "perpetuation of hegemonies and consolidates the nuclear status quo." Syria described the declaration as only a "quarter of a loaf, not even half a loaf." Romania, notably bold in criticizing the superpowers throughout (almost with a Chinese accent!), complained that the declaration was "exceedingly unbalanced." And Yugoslavia spoke darkly of "reexamining" its attitude toward the treaty and "drawing corresponding conclusions."

The treaty thus survived the conference, but the struggle for nuclear disarmament suffered a severe defeat. Could it have been otherwise, after all?

**S**ome persist in believing that the review conference might have been more productive had it been more visible. It came at an unfortunate moment as the U.S. was completing its disengagement from Indochina (and proving its manhood over the *Mayaguez*). Liberal senators and congressmen were regressing, at least temporarily, to cold war rhetoric. In the middle of the conference the U.S. conducted its biggest nuclear test (of all things!) in over two years, talked about using nuclear weapons in Korea, legislated big new arms budgets, and sent Ford and Kissinger to Europe for NATO, Franco, and Gromyko meetings (carefully avoiding Geneva). Neither the President nor the Secretary of State said anything to the American people about nonproliferation for many months prior to the conference or even during the

conference. The U.S. and USSR both dispatched virtually anonymous delegations to Geneva; one junior official said frankly that the NPT simply was not a high priority for this Administration.

The U.S. NGO Council for the NPT did what it could to make the conference and its issues more visible. It pronounced, publicized, lobbied, phoned, cabled, and corresponded. It cooperated with international NGOs in declarations, evaluations, briefings, consultations, and press conferences. It encouraged Senator Edward M. Kennedy to come to Geneva, having in mind a very good speech the Senator had given **at an NPT seminar in April. He came and delivered** at an extraordinary unofficial session attended by several hundred participants. Urging a break with the "old habit" of seeing the arms race only from the perspective of superpower relations and the SALT talks, Kennedy called for a test ban and a reduction in offensive arms as means of coping with the problem of NPT incentives. He warned that too great a reliance on functional and technical safeguards could obscure the essentially political reasons impelling nations to acquire nuclear weapons. He asked the superpowers to "play down the importance of nuclear weapons in assessments and assertions of their own national power," adding: "No one can ask nuclear have-not nations to forswear these weapons—for whatever reason—if the superpowers continue to overplay the bomb's importance for political power and prestige." Many felt that the Kennedy address was the brightest hour in a dark month.

An ad hoc Non-Proliferation Action Committee was activated in the United States, which worked with other senators, several citizen organizations (notably SANE), and the press to focus more attention on the conference. These belated efforts met with only modest results, as did attempts to recruit additional governmental delegations and nongovernmental organizations to attend the conference. Many of the foundations and policy groups that had sponsored their own advance NPT study conferences and publications failed to show up in Geneva—a default yet to be adequately explained.

Not a single U.S. religious group sent a representative, although some (like the National Council of

Churches and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops) were prodded from Geneva to do so. Even the World Council of Churches (headquarters: Geneva) was unrepresented through most of the conference. The World Conference on Religion and Peace was represented through its secretary-general and veteran U.N. disarmament hand, Homer Jack, who served as cochairman of the international NGO group. (The Holy See, having acceded to the treaty—no nuclear weapons in the Vatican!—participated as an official delegation. It maintained a very low and cautious profile, but did declare that the "critical point" in the NPT is the balance between vertical and horizontal proliferation and that, in practice, the "imbalance of obligations" was the main obstacle to a more effective treaty.)

The churches' lack of steadfast interest in defense and disarmament issues is an old, sad story that cannot be retold here. They ought to be prime channels for focusing the ethical dimensions of disarmament and human survival—but they continue to be preoccupied with presumably more important concerns.

In short, if the official U.S. position in Geneva was largely unresponsive to the political issues of nuclear proliferation, the American public at home was almost completely lacking in political awareness and engagement on these same issues. The Administration, the Senate, the press, and NGOs (including religious groups) can all share the onus for that deficiency.

It has once again been painfully demonstrated that ethics must begin with politics in matters of disarmament and almost everything else. There is a critical need for a much more substantial constituency for political action on disarmament issues in the United States. Such a constituency requires an empowering and sustaining center. Existing institutions and associations seem too limited in scope or inhibited in style or preoccupied with other agendas to provide the leadership here proposed. Having initiated a similar effort seven years ago—an effort that nearly got strangled by an unseemly ecclesiastical hassle and that eventually expired for lack of funds—I would welcome some fresh visions as to how such an empowering, sustaining center may now be more firmly established.

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C.C.A.D.D. CONFERENCE 1975

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THE MEDITERRANEAN: ZONE OF CONFLICT

AND OF INFLUENCE

Paper submitted by Rear Admiral E.F. Gueritz.

St. Maur.

September, 1975.

## THE MEDITERRANEAN: ZONE OF INFLUENCE AND OF CONFLICT

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The title of this paper could legitimately have been selected as the subject for a review at many times in past history. However, there can have been few moments when the zone displayed so many possibilities of conflict, and such variety of influences at work as we see today. The fluidity of situations and the tempo of events leave the writer lagging in his efforts to fix some foundations of assumption on which to build a review for discussion and debate. The context of the review is intended to centre on the interests of CCADD in relation to the next ten years.

### Basic Assumptions.

The primary assumptions which have been made relate to the world setting into which the Mediterranean Zone is seen to lie. The first assumption is of the continuing conflict between communist and non-communist forms of Government and society. Negotiations on international security matters, statements and declarations on them and on the doctrine of detente cannot obscure the basic enmity of Communism towards any other form of ideology. Sadly enough for members of CCADD, as for believers in all other spiritual faiths, one cannot avoid the ugly difference between acceptance of the human spirit and the denial of its existence; nor can one ignore the imperialist motivation which sustains communist evangelism from the Soviet Union. Therefore the first basis for conflict is that which has loosely been called "East and West", but means the US and her Allies versus the USSR and hers.

The use of the word evangelism and the East/West allusion lead naturally to the second assumption, that of continuing enmity and rivalry between the two Popes (or Curiae) of Communism, in Peking and Moscow. The presence of the heretic Tito in the Adriatic would be bad enough, but the outpost of the Chinese interpretation in Albania must be profoundly unsettling for the Soviet leaders. They have, on one side of the world, the literally fearsome fact of the Chinese People's Republic on their borders, and on the other, immediate evidence of evangelistic failure. The second basis for conflict, therefore, is between the adherents of two variants on an ideological theme, with all the traditional violence and intolerance of co-religionists in dispute. Moreover, the territory of the principals is contiguous, without the room for manoeuvre or the uncertainties inherent in the situation on the Soviet European frontiers. The dangers of this conflict are compounded by the fears that can be generated in the minds of the Soviet Leaders, both individually and collectively, by the threat to Russia's domination, present and prospective, and to their own personal power positions. Fear in Moscow is a most disturbing element in international relations, and it need not be expected that the Mediterranean area will be spared its repercussions.

The third assumption relates not to competition between Super-Powers and ideologies, but between aspiring leaders of areas, as in the case of Iran, or of racial groups, as in the case of Egypt and the Arabs, or of continental organisations, as in the case of the Organisation for African Unity. Personal or national vanities and ambitions will stir up enmities and sustain the rivalries of men, of parties and of racial movements. The kaleidoscope of relationships will be tilted by the influence of poverty and plenty, of industry and oil prices, of politics and population, of aid and conservation or, in brief, the sharing of resources. The whole international atmosphere will resemble that of European societies earlier this century as social structures developed and adapted (or collapsed), in response to new ideas of justice, tolerance and humanity. Different solutions, different lines of approach to the same solutions, anarchistic ideas and idealistic impracticalities vied then for predominance making strange allies, corrupting sympathy and alienating natural

supporters. On an international scale the disturbance will be magnified in size and complicated in relationships by the factors inherent in the first two elements of conflict which have been assumed.

#### Old Enmities.

One of the particular tragedies of the past year has been the open rift between Greece and Turkey, with Cyprus as the main but not necessarily the only cause of discord. Using the word 'discord' in the same breath as Cyprus after the events of the past year may seem to indulge in unfeeling euphemism. It is done advisedly to make the point that discord may have to be accepted as a recurring factor in the relationships of neighbours, but need we now accept armed conflict also? The tragedy of Cyprus, in the writer's mind, lies not only in the death and destruction, but also in the failure of the United Nations to maintain the integrity of the racial zones. The sight of the UNFICYP blue berets and armoured cars may have seemed bizarre against the background beauty of Kyrenia or Mount Hilarion, but it brought hope that this apparent achievement and success was the true example to set against the sorry story in the Sinai. However, ideas are all turned upside down and, if reports are to be believed, UN forces again will have a key part to play in the search for stability between Israel and Egypt. Any review of the Mediterranean in the past twenty years would have focussed sharply on the Middle East and the relationships between Israel and her neighbours. Here is an area in which two Super-Powers may meet by proxy or in person. The decline of Soviet influence in Egypt and the accompanying reduction in Soviet military presence on the ground is of interest; but so is the report that US policy had to be adapted when it was apparent that Soviet naval forces outnumbered the Sixth Fleet. If the UN forces can provide security for Israel and Egypt this time, they may in effect be standing between the two Super-Powers in one of their most sensitive areas.

#### New Arms.

Whatever deployments may be maintained by the Super-Powers and by their Allies, the arms trade seems likely to be a continuing factor in the Middle East and across the North African littoral. It has been implied by some commentators that the price of oil stimulates the desire to sell arms to Arabs and so to retrieve some of the lost dollars, pounds or francs. Certainly oil millions are being spent lavishly on modern arms, and the moral dilemma must trouble all of us. In seeing hope of a solution to one of the most dangerous world situations, we cannot ignore the implications of a modern arms race over the whole area from Kurdistan to Aden, and from Hormuz to Beirut. Delegates to this Conference will know the economic factors which urge their Governments to support arms sales. On the other hand, none of us need much telling about the ways in which they may be used to settle old scores or advance new ambitions by neighbours in Africa and Arabia. Moreover, the acquisition of conventional weapon systems is not the only avenue to power, and 'power' is the mot juste. Since India exploded a nuclear device, and whatever the outcome of the Arab-Israeli disputes, anxiety must centre on the latest possibilities of nuclear proliferation. Iran and Libya, Egypt and Israel are each as capable as India of acquiring the necessary material for nuclear devices, and the two latter presumably could provide the means of delivery. In terms of NATO strategy it is accepted that reductions in conventional armaments make the possibility of nuclear war more likely. It would hardly be surprising, therefore, if the Egyptians and the Israelis, for example, countered a reduction in the supply of conventional arms from the US, USSR and Europe



by placing reliance on nuclear weapons. Not all the prospective arms suppliers will necessarily be altruistic enough to forego the possibilities of money or of influence by accepting a complete embargo but, even if they were, that apparently simple solution to the arms traffic could open some extremely disagreeable possibilities of nuclear confrontation.

#### Changed Days.

A prophetic book published in South Africa in 1948 was entitled "When Smuts Goes". For commentators on European politics there has been a long-lasting vogue for reviews on the line of "When Franco Goes" - substituting Tito or Salazar according to preference. We are now in the continuing aftermath of the latter's departure from the scene, and the collapse of order in the Colonies may only be the distant warning of the storm to come at home. The left-wing opportunism in the post-Salazar situation was predictable. The natural pendulum effect after so many years of right-wing autocracy seems aggravated by the key position of Portugal in the NATO strategic structure. The outcome of events in Portugal will affect those in Spain even, perhaps, before we face the reality of "When Franco Goes". If post-Franco Spain were to adopt a form of Government which West European socialists could accept, then the flank of NATO would be strengthened. The struggle in Portugal, and perhaps later in Spain, will not therefore be for or against new Communist states to record on the world score-board. It will be a matter of profound importance in relation to the Atlantic and Mediterranean flanks of NATO and, therefore, the stability which the NATO strategic stance has achieved. Spain's relationships with Morocco over disputed territory, and with Britain over Gibraltar, will be among the many complicating factors if, as the writer believes, the Peninsula stabilizes, after many violent tribulations, in non-Communist democracy.

The post-Tito prognostications have been upset by the worsening of relations between Greece and Turkey, and the disruption of the fragile South-East shell of NATO. By contrivance and manipulation of the racial elements in Jugo-Slavia, Soviet Communism will find opportunities for advancement out of chaos and confusion. The degree of evident Soviet involvement will be the factor of international risk, with a typically Balkan situation of traditional enemies and protectors, of jealousy and pride, and the manoeuvres of Imperial Powers. The roles and actors may change, with China and NATO as characters of major interest in place of Germany and Austria-Hungary, but the explosive nature of the situation is hardly less dangerous diplomatically than it was in 1914, and militarily it is potentially more catastrophic.

#### Modern Times.

Beside the prospects of immediate conflict in the Middle East, in Iberia and between Greece and Turkey, the problems of the states on the North African littoral and of their neighbours across the Middle Sea seem less dramatic. In fact, these problems could warrant a full study on their own. In brief, both France and Italy with well-established native Communist parties might at any time upset the European balance of power of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. If the alternative to Communism is Christian or Social Democratic rule concerned only with 'economic growth', with standards of living at home, and with materialism in general, it will be hardly surprising if Communism, as the ultimate in materialism, wins in the end. If, on the other hand, the EEC, and NATO and other Western groupings, can turn their eyes outwards to world problems of food and agriculture, a new motivation might prevail. If this were so, relationships across the water would be fair. Countries from the Suez Canal to the Atlantic may not agree among themselves, and power blocs will merge and split as personalities come and go. However, the North African rulers, as with states associated with former imperial powers, can affect deeply, for good or ill, the relationships of others across the continent. 'The Third World' is now a pejorative term suggesting and old-fashioned paternalism and should

be dropped. If organised society is to continue, we need a great development of international relationships. The achievement of this development could provide a more challenging and rewarding target for individuals and for peoples in Europe than the ultimately fruitless search for worldly possessions. For those in Africa and elsewhere, it could mean almost literally the difference between life and death. The alternative, to take once again the example of the world of 1914, would be bloodshed, destruction and human suffering as the travail for new social attitudes. Here, then, is the greatest possibility for influence that even the Mediterranean has seen, with all the glories and diversities of achievement which its people have already produced for the advancement of Mankind.

#### Conflict and Influence today.

What then can we draw from this swift review of the Mediterranean Zone, which seems to stand again as a focus for conflict and a centre of influence? Firstly, it seems that we should be concerned with the ability of the UN to provide the means for the physical separation of antagonists, principally for their own good but also in the interest of a wider harmony. Secondly, we have a new phase in the Arms Trade story and the expectation of new struggles for power locally in Africa and the Middle East. The alignment of allies and of Super-Power support may shift and vary, but Soviet involvement can be relied on as an aggravating factor. Thirdly, we are reaching the long-awaited crises in the Balkans and, immediately, in the Iberian Peninsula. Super-Power declarations on interference in Portugal leave no doubt of the engagement of their interests in the latter case, but the geographical position of Jugo-Slavia makes hers a potentially more crucial trial of strength. Lastly, there is the problem of vitalizing an acceptable alternative to Communism. Appropriately for CCADD, the solution which the situation seems to demand is one based on unselfishness and care for others.

In all, it seems that we are reaching a point of decision when we must face materialism as an ideological doctrine, and materialism as an aberration of civilized society. The struggle will be world-wide, but in the Mediterranean we have areas of conflict just past or yet to come, and the source of the influences upon which our future will depend.

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How stable is "stable deterrence"?

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prepared for the CCADD Conference  
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Abstract

This paper is a summary of a longer article which has been published in Dutch. It is argued that the introduction of nuclear weapons in the relations between states has led to a reversal of the traditional weapon functions: while in the case of conventional weapons the functions of offense and defense are emphasized, in the case of nuclear weapons the emphasis is placed on their deterrent functions. The relevant doctrine of mutual assured destruction is supposed to be a factor of peace preservation. However, the ethical (the consciously created vulnerability of the civilian population) and political (the unavailability of nuclear weapons for political purposes) problems and dilemma's this creates for policy-makers, results in pressures to return to the traditional functions of offense and defense, summarized in the concept of damage limitation. One has to take into account the possibility of having to wage a nuclear war and the price of preventing a nuclear war through mutual assured destruction is an ongoing nuclear arms race.

I. The introduction of nuclear weapons in the military stockpiles of nations has markedly changed the relative importance of the traditional weapons-functions. As regards conventional weapons the traditional functions are offense and defense, although conventional military power has always had a deterrent function. Deterrence, however, is generally regarded as the specific function of nuclear weapons.

Already in an early stage of the arms race one had accepted the existence of a "balance of terror" between the most important opponents, the Soviet Union and the United States: both countries were deterred from attacking the other out of fear for nuclear retaliation. There is now emerging a widespread mode of thinking according to which this situation - for the benefit of world peace - might be perpetuated by stabilizing the relationship of mutual deterrence in having on both sides a stable = invulnerable deterrent. This "stable deterrence"-relationship should consist of two complementary components: (1) an "assured destruction" capability: an intentional war would be made unthinkable by the ability of safe and secure retaliation, which would be the prerogative of 2 or 3 super powers, (2) Measures of "arms control": an unintentional war - which could result from human or technical errors - could as much as possible be prevented by measures of arms control.

On the basis of this formula stable deterrence = assured destruction + arms control one could strive for political détente (war prevention, crisis management and disarmament). Although no one can deny a certain détente in the relations among the super powers, which seem to become institutionalized through the European Security Conference, MBFR and SALT, the nuclear arms race continues almost unhampered and disarmament is considered to be destabilizing as soon as the costs of the employment of force no longer are prohibitive.

The proposition that a situation of stable deterrence has helped to prevent an otherwise unavoidable war between the US and the SU is tenable - although unprovable and unrefutable which is the reason for its popularity. That this concept of stable deterrence provides a useful and acceptable basis for political détente is debatable, because peace is based upon weapons technology and not on human efforts and is continuously threatened with worldwide destruction. But that such a concept is compatible with a stable armaments level is not only historically untrue, but also intellectually incredible: the concept of "stable deterrence" is a contradictio in terminis, because it contains - as used nowadays - a number of inherently unstable elements which make the term contradict itself.

II. Strategic options can be seen as resulting from three choices concerning

- (1) the posture of nuclear weapons (counterforce vs. countervalue)
- (2) the time of reaction (automatic vs. delayed), and
- (3) the scope of reaction (massive vs. limited), which results in a series of  $2^3 = 8$  options. These can be brought together in two main categories of strategic doctrines: "assured destruction" and "damage limitation". In the first category nuclear weapons are aimed mainly at cities and used for purposes of deterrence and retaliation; in the second category nuclear weapons are aimed at the opponent's nuclear arms and used for fighting purposes. Presentday strategic doctrines stress the deterrent and retaliatory functions of nuclear weapons to the detriment of offensive and defensive uses. The relationship of mutual deterrence - since SALT I legitimized as the governing strategic doctrine in the relation between the US and the SU - contains certain elements which ab initio destabilize the relationship, thereby creating strong pressures to change to strategic options of damage limitation, this leads to pressures to arms production which makes the concept of "stable deterrence" as regards this aspect of the arms race a contradictio in terminis.

Strategic options which we summarized in terms of "assured destruction" and "damage limitation" have an offensive and a defensive component:

strategic doctrines of	(a) assured destruction	(b) damage limitation
consist of		
x a defensive component to protect	one's own strategic weapons	one's own cities
and		
xx an offensive com- ponent aimed at	the cities of the opponent	the strategic weapons of the opponent
which results in the operational capabili- ty of a	"second strike" (retaliatory attack)	"first strike" (disarming attack)

Undoubtedly, the arms race has many causes of which the conscious effort to reach or maintain strategic superiority is not the least important, because superiority increases the number of options past those implying deterrence and retaliation. The armament stimulating factors which are inherent to strategic options of assured destruction are two-fold:

- (1) those factors which are part of the strategic doctrine and which are our main preoccupation; and
- (2) factors which concern the translation of strategic doctrines in concrete weapon systems; these are:

x the concept of assured destruction is not directly translatable into nuclear weapon systems: there is a considerable difference between what is necessary for minimum and maximum deterrence, and for direct and extended deterrence. Within these margins an enormous expansion of nuclear armaments is possible, which - indeed - has occurred since 1962 in the US and the SU;

xx the retaliation is measured in terms of what the opponent considers as "unacceptable damage" ( $M_c$  Namara:  $1/5 - 1/4$  of the population +  $1/3 - 1/2$  of the industrial capacity) and is an extremely flexible concept;

xxx the retaliatory power that is safe and secure in the sense that it is invulnerable, is not a constant entity but results from the effectiveness of offensive and defensive weapons systems, which change constantly and rapidly with changing technology;

xxxx finally, there are numerous asymmetries in the strategic positions of the SU and the US and the effort to attain parity on all levels is a strong upward pressure on the arms race.

III. But however important these factors, our main preoccupation is with the armament stimulating factors implicit in the doctrine of "assured destruction":

- x the doctrine of nuclear deterrence by threatening retaliation starts from the assumption that the opponent only can be deterred from a - although never clearly stated - range of political and military activities by threatening complete destruction as punishment. Such a doctrine implies the identification of the opponent with the devil, because only the prospect of total destruction deters him from carrying out his aggressive ambitions. But mutual nuclear deterrence means that this capability of total devastation is also available to the opponent and once cannot trust him of being - in all situations - equally reasonable and insightfull so that one may be confronted with the fact of nuclear warfare;
- xx the doctrine of nuclear deterrence through assured destruction also implies the readiness to renounce at a certain level of costs the use of nuclear weapons as an instrument of political pressure, that is: at the level where the damage (costs) may become unacceptable. But at which point is that level reached? There is a large degree of uncertainty as to which actions the threatened use of nuclear weapons is credible, vide the present discussion about the contents and value of "the American nuclear guarantee" to Europe and its operationalization in the doctrine of flexible response. Consistent perseverance in a policy of political immobilism as imposed by the threat of nuclear extinction does not accord with the active and often competative involvement of the great powers in the affairs of this world. That is why they keep trying to escape from a political immobilism implicit in a situation of mutual deterrence by organizing their nuclear potential so as to serve political purposes;
- xxx the mutual acceptance of the concept of nuclear retaliation - as is said to the main fruit of Salt I - also implies the acceptance of retaliation in the second instance and placing the question of one's own survival in the hands of the opponent in the first instance. Pure deterrence means that one offers the opponents the most vulnerable parts of one's political system - the cities and industrial concentrations as a pledge for one's own good conduct, while the survival of the political system is the principal mandate of each government. The moral and ethical problems this raises would in themselves be sufficient to create strong pressures to get out of this dilemma, but it is also evident that to equate the enemy with the devil and at the same time to acquiesce in the absolute vulnerability of one's population conflict emotionally and psychologically. The assumption of rational behavior of the opponent does not fit with his equation with the devil in a situation in which national survival is at stake;
- xxxx the doctrine of an invulnerable, but only for purposes of retaliation useable nuclear force implies that one reacts to actions of the opponent and retaliates for the initiative he takes. Even if one assumes that the opponent will not be so foolish as to use all his missiles in the first attack and thereby disarm

himself unilaterally, in general one does not tend to wage war on the conditions and in the circumstances the opponent determines. Besides, the circumstances in which nuclear weapons may be used do not spring into existence, but are part of crisis situations in which the use of nuclear weapons becomes a factor. If one expects nuclear war on the initiative of the opponent, there are strong pressures to pre-empt on the assumption that who takes the initiative has the benefit of surprise;

xxxxx and finally, no one can guarantee that deterrence will not fail - for whatever reason - and in such a situation it is unacceptable to have only the capacity to retaliate.

The history of the nuclear arms race illustrates that one has constantly endeavoured to get out of the dilemma's of assured destruction by looking for an escape route to damage limiting measures, which make a nuclear conflict again imaginable. If human failure to control nuclear technology puts us in a situation of possible mutual retaliation which is ethically, morally and politically unacceptable, one will persist in trying to get control of nuclear technology. The problem is, however, whether we will try this through nuclear disarmament or through a continuing arms race.

Summarizing what has been said thusfar, from the doctrine of "assured destruction" almost inevitably pressures result to put nuclear weapons at the service of purposes of damage limitation, with which would accord an offensive posture of nuclear weapons aimed at the missiles of the opponent and measures of city defense. If deterrence fails - for whichever of the five abovementioned reasons - it would be illogical to retaliate, because this would mean self-destruction. By trying to wipe out as much as possible of the opponent's weapons, one has not only the chance to "win" a nuclear war but it also is the only means to prevent one's own destruction (the 'second strike' - scenario assumes a counter force first strike of the opponent). If both parties aim at this, the recipe for nuclear arms race is given and there will be no pause in the arms race.

Theoretically such a pause is possible in a situation in which both parties are content with a counter city retaliatory force. Cities and industrial concentrations are immobile and extremely vulnerable objects for an attack in retaliation and they offer a limited and constant (that is: not rapidly multipliable) number of targets, which may be destroyed with a limited number of missiles. But missiles themselves constitute a rapidly increasable number of targets and if the accuracy of fire-ratio is not one to one - which it is positively not - there is no pause in the arms spiral. That is why it is not relevant to emphasize arms control as a complement to assured destruction, but why it is necessary to emphasize disarmament as an alternative to assured destruction.

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PROGRESS IN MBFR

Prepared for the conference of the

Council on Christian Approaches to Defense and Disarmament

Louis G. Michael

August 25, 1975



In about two weeks, following the 1975 CCADD conference, representatives of 19 states will reconvene in Vienna to pursue discussion of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe. This will be the seventh session in two years of negotiations by eleven direct participants and eight special participants<sup>1/</sup> in these talks.

It was my hope to report to CCADD on the status of these negotiations and, more importantly, to benefit from the conference discussions of MBFR, CSCE, and western military defense. Unfortunately, the Washington schedule of preparations for the upcoming Vienna talks has made this impossible. The result is a personal disappointment, and I very much regret missing the opportunity to join your most worthwhile deliberations.

I have taken the liberty of asking Professor Parrent to make available this brief paper on progress in MBFR. Coverage of the negotiations in the open literature has been scant and these notes are offered to provide a background to stimulate questions for discussion. The facts presented are as I know them. The opinions are largely my own and do not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. Government.

The MBFR negotiations concern force deployments in an agreed and limited area<sup>2/</sup> which is circumscribed by the Federal Republic of Germany, the Benelux nations, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. As the negotiations have progressed we have come to realize that questions of enduring limits on forces in this specified geographic area are as important as questions of mutual reductions of specific forces -- although

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<sup>1/</sup> Direct participants are the U.S., UK, Canada, the FRG, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, USSR, GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Special participants are Denmark, Norway, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.

<sup>2/</sup> Known as the NGA -- the NATO Guidelines Area.

the character of balanced reductions is of vital interest. The outcome of "mutual" and "balanced" force reductions means quite different things to the different MBFR participants. For the U.S., the USSR, the UK and Canada the prospect of MBFR is the effect in terms of limits on certain forces these nations would be permitted to deploy in Central Europe. There would be no comparable reductions or limits of the armed forces of these four nations<sup>3/</sup> as a whole -- there would be no effect on the totality of their forces.

On the other hand, for the FRG, the Benelux nations, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, MBFR could come to mean limits on the totality of their military manpower or armed forces. Thus, while for some nations the talks could result only in restrictions of deployments -- for others the outcome could mean restrictions or limits closer akin to disarmament.

These different implications as well as a variety of other different perspectives of the political and military aspects of MBFR are an indication of how different motivations and interests engage those involved in the MBFR talks. Indeed common ground is not easy to find. However, coordination of a common position within NATO at Brussels has been remarkably good. And beyond the NATO forum although there has been no conclusive agreement between East and West, it would probably be unfair to characterize the Vienna negotiations as "deadlocked." The parties have been involved in an exploratory effort -- essentially a learning process. Both sides have laid out serious proposals and have engaged in probing discussions with a view toward gaining substantial understanding of one another's positions.

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<sup>3/</sup> France is not involved in the MBFR negotiations but there are implications for the French forces stationed in Germany. About two divisions of French forces are counted in the NATO computation of Allied forces in the area of reductions. There has, however, been no proposal on the part of any MBFR participant to reduce French forces.

These discussions have been generally free of polemics and have focused the major issues between NATO and the Pact. There are essentially three:

- First, the West believes MBFR must be negotiated in two phases. Phase I would involve only U.S. and USSR reductions. Phase II would address reductions including forces of all other direct participants, and progress would depend on an assessment of the implementation and results of Phase I reductions. For their part, the East -- interested in imposing limits on the Bundeswehr -- seeks to negotiate at the outset what it is that all parties would reduce -- although actual implementation of negotiated reductions would be in three phases under the Warsaw Pact plan.
- Second, the West is seeking equity of outcome through reductions resulting in a common ceiling on ground manpower on both sides. The East, on the other hand, wants equal number and equal percentage reductions designed to maintain the local "correlation of forces" which favors the Warsaw Pact.
- Third, the West wants to focus reductions on ground forces, while the East is seeking comprehensive reductions of, and limits on all types of forces, units, and armaments, including nuclear weapons.

These differences reflect historical efforts by East and West (stemming from the 1940's and early 1950's) to neutralize what are perceived to be the most potent forces and weapons of the other side. The Soviet Union sought early to halt German rearmament, to keep the FRG out of NATO, and to legitimize the maintenance of large Russian land forces in Central Europe. The East has also sought to expel U.S. air and nuclear weapons bases from the continent. At the same time the United States has worked for more

than twenty years on means to neutralize the potential impact of dominant Soviet land power deployed within 50 miles of the West European heartland.

In recent years we have diligently worked within NATO to put to use the where-with-all possessed by the Alliance to strengthen its conventional force capability. And in the 1970's, as the Allies considered the pros and cons of MBFR, the NATO approach to the negotiation was designed to target three disparities which we consider critical:

- First, the Warsaw Pact maintains a simple ground force manpower advantage of 925,000 to 777,000 in the area of immediate confrontation.
- Second, this preponderance of deployed ground manpower can be readily reinforced from the Soviet Union only three or four hundred miles from the borders of NATO -- while any U.S. reinforcement of the Alliance would have to reach Europe from 3,000 miles away -- across the Atlantic Ocean.
- Third, the character of the Eastern deployments poised in the area is offensive in nature -- this is manifested by the fact that the Warsaw Pact maintains two and a half times as many tanks in Central Europe as do the obviously defensively oriented NATO forces.

Consensus has been reached by all the participating states that MBFR address only the forces in a limited area which has been defined by mutual agreement. Any MBFR agreement about forces in this area which failed to adequately treat the disparities outlined above could create serious risks for stability by suggesting an illusion of reduced tension while in fact contributing to an improved Soviet military and political posture which could in fact be destabilizing.

The West seeks improved stability at lower levels of forces through meaningful reductions in a way which take into account the significant disparities favoring the East. The Soviets, on the other hand, argue that the existing force relationship (including these disparities) has maintained stability.

The World Disarmament Conference of 1932 is said to have failed because of the impasse with respect to the ratio of armaments. The Germans wanted equity and the French wanted to maintain security through maintenance of the status quo. For one of the major parties in Europe to give up a demand for equality would have resulted in codification of disparities it perceived to be unacceptable. For the other major party to give up demands for "security" by foregoing the existing "correlation of forces" would have meant relinquishing a position of superiority which it considered impossible to do.

MBFR may eventually be faced with a similar dilemma. However, the current Western reduction proposal offers a prospect for solution to the classic impasse.

- The approach which provides for the withdrawal of forces of the U.S. and the USSR from a narrowly defined area does not impose a requirement for the Soviet Union to reduce or limit the overall level of its forces in any way -- thus affording an ample guarantee that no legal MBFR constraint will prevent the Soviets from maintaining any correlation of forces it chooses on the continent.
- The concept of a common manpower ceiling on forces in Central Europe assures NATO that it need not legitimize a position of inferiority in the area of immediate confrontation.

The Soviet Union could easily withdraw 75,000; 100,000 men; or more from the NATO Guidelines Area without weakening its security situation or even having any significant impact on the political role played by its forces in Eastern Europe. This would still leave about twice as many Soviets in Central Europe as Americans.

What then does the NATO Alliance have to gain from MBFR? With the right kind of agreement we have the prospect of constraining Soviet offensive deployments on the borders of NATO. The result we are seeking is increased stability at lower levels of forces (a level of Soviet deployments comparable to the situation prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia is not an unreasonable starting point). From a Christian perspective this should contribute toward preventing misunderstandings in an area that has had a poor record for peace over the last 100 years.

Of course we are not seeking peace at any price. NATO's capability to build and maintain a stalwart defense must not be degraded -- without adequate defense the right to achieve the Christian ethic becomes highly theoretical. For this reason NATO should be wary of accepting enduring limits on its forces without a perceptible change in the current situation. In discussing detente recently, President Ford has suggested that "it means mutual respect and reciprocity, not unilateral concessions or one-sided agreements." We cannot accept a one-sided agreement which did not take account of the objective military disparities that now exist -- or even worse, tended to codify those disparities.

NATO is seeking improved stability at each step in MBFR, and the Allied proposal contains three elements designed to contribute to such stability:

- 1. Phased negotiation of reductions
- 2. Negotiated measures for verifying withdrawals and reductions.
- 3. Negotiated stabilizing measures.

The recent Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has resulted in declarations of intent for moderate and restrained behavior on the part of the Helsinki signatories.<sup>4/</sup> The "security" component of the CSCE declaration provides for certain voluntary measures designed to build confidence among the CSCE parties that their military activities are actually consistent with the principles to which they subscribed. These measures include pre-announcement of certain military maneuvers, and the exchange of observers at exercises.

In MBFR we are seeking more binding measures with a view toward strengthening the prospects for building confidence that stability can be enhanced on the NATO--Warsaw Pact border. NATO is seeking to negotiate (1) measures for adequately verifying compliance with an MBFR agreement and (2) measures similar to the CSCE voluntary confidence building measures. The CSCE precedent suggests that the MBFR participants should be able to agree to associated measures in MBFR.

What are the prospects for an MBFR agreement? The Soviets are certainly aware that very substantial withdrawals of their forces from Central Europe would not deprive the USSR of its capability to field massive active forces plus large reserves of trained manpower, were that required in the defense of the Soviet Union. Risks to Soviet security are difficult to identify.

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<sup>4/</sup> All the MBFR participants subscribed to the Helsinki declaration and almost all the direct MBFR participants made some reference in their national speeches at CSCE to an interest in giving attention to MBFR negotiations.

The real objective military risks must be borne by NATO. The Alliance must consider the implications of collective manpower ceilings on the continental West European powers. Agreement to a common ceiling on NATO and the Pact ground manpower in the area has been judged after careful deliberation by the Allies to make the risks acceptable. The Allied judgment however is that the risk of armament limitations in an area where the Pact has a tank superiority of about 16,000 to 6,000 over NATO would be a different matter.

NATO is seeking meaningful withdrawals of Soviet armored forces in the first instance, and is willing to withdraw an equal percentage of U.S. forces from the area. Further manpower reductions by the Pact and NATO would have to lead to manpower equality in the form of a common ceiling in the limited area of reductions. In view of the existing disparities, and the narrowly defined area of reductions this is a reasonable and logical proposition.

You might wish to weigh the prospects for progress in the negotiations in terms of these questions:

- What are the Soviet goals in MBFR? What are the risks?
- What can NATO gain from MBFR? What are the risks?
- With or without an MBFR agreement, how can NATO maintain a credible defense and deterrent on the continent?



THE ARTIC BASIN: A NEW STRATEGIC HOT SPOT<sup>+</sup>

by

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Background paper to be presented at the thirteenth Conference on Christian Approaches to Defense and Disarmament, St. Maur, France, September 5-9, 1975.

One of the traditional concerns of the Soviet (and formerly Russian) security policy is to get access to the warm seas. Sea routes to the world outside the Euro-Asian continent proved to be of vital importance during World War II. The supply route north of Norway to Murmansk on the Kola peninsula in the north-western part of the Soviet Union is of particular significance from our point of view. It is in this area that we today find the largest Soviet navy base. In 1944 the Soviet foreign minister Molotov suggested to the Norwegian foreign minister Trygve Lie that the treaty of Svalbard, the large archipelago north of Finmark, be renegotiated. These islands came under Norwegian sovereignty in 1925 on the conditions that they remained demilitarized and there would be no discrimination against foreign economic interests. Now Molotov demanded an outright secession of Bear Island (midway between Svalbard and Finmark) and a Norwegian-Soviet condominium for the rest of the Svalbard archipelago, the military status of which should be ended (Udgaard, p. 67). In short, the Soviet Union wanted land bases for the control of the sea route to and from the Kola peninsula. However, negotiations were never opened, and the subject was apparently dropped by the Soviets (Østreng, 1975 a, pp. 68-70).<sup>1</sup>

With the advent of the cold war, the passage between Northern Norway and the Svalbard archipelago hardly lost its

strategic importance. Norway joined the enemy alliance, the Soviet Union increased its naval strength, and the control of the seas, particularly the North Atlantic, became a crucial element in the competition between the super-powers. The lesson of World War II was that interception of trade between the Western powers was an important navy objective. In addition, the neutralization or elimination of NATO aircraft carriers was and probably is a significant element in Soviet forward defense strategy and part of the war role designed for the Northern Fleet.

However, the Northern Fleet does not only play a tactical and defensive role, it also has strategic objectives. Approximately 50 of the 70 strategic submarines of the Soviet Navy belong to the Northern Fleet (Ingebrigtsen, p. 4). The ballistic missiles of these submarines (SLBMs) should be compared to the ca. 650 US Navy Polaris missiles. If either superpower in a pre-emptive strike succeeded in eliminating all ICBM systems of the opponents, there would still remain a sizeable enemy force of SLBM ready for retaliation. The important factor here, is the lack of symmetry which nevertheless characterizes the present strategic situation. We have already mentioned the relative land-lockedness of the Soviet Union. Her submarines have to move far from their bases in order to come sufficient close to the target areas. It has been estimated that the present Soviet SSBNs need to travel for 80 hours to be able to cover the major North-American cities (Ingebrigtsen, p.5). In contrast, the US submarines can operate not only from the North-American continent, but from a number of bases in foreign countries. In addition, the US weapon system is more advanced. The missiles have much larger range (4500 - 6000 NM) which permit 270° coverage of Soviet territory.

In this situation, the Norwegian sea and the coast of Northern Norway seems to be important for the Soviet Union for two reasons. First, control over this area will make their SSBNs more valuable as a second strike force. Second, US aircraft carriers will be kept at a longer distance from Soviet territory. However, the control of this area is not easy to obtain for the Soviet armed forces. It is relatively easy for NATO countries to make a submarine barrier between Greenland, Iceland and the Faeroes. Because of assumed air superiority in the area, the NATO forces will also have an edge anti-submarine warfare north of this barrier. The NATO air superiority is supposed to outdo

the better artillery on Soviet surface ships. Consequently, the Soviet Union finds herself in comparatively uncomfortable situation and must be expected to look alternative ways of strengthening her deterrence and defence capability.<sup>2</sup>

A logical step from the Soviet point of view would be to increase the range and the accuracy of their SLBMs. Then they could deploy their SSBNs in areas closer to their bases which would be advantages both in terms avoiding detection by NATO forces and in terms of communication with submerged vessels. The current range of the Soviet SS-N-8 missiles and the basing of Delta-class submarines in the Murmansk area, have reduced the Soviet need to exit the arctic basin at all (Østreng, 1975 b, p. 19). A SS-N-8 launched at Murmansk can hit Miami or Los Angeles. According to one observer:

...the really significant feature of the SS-N-8 is its range. Previous Soviet strategy based on missiles with a more limited range, entailed capturing Northern Norway to guarantee the Soviet fleet reasonable chance of safe passage into the mid-Atlantic, from where missiles would be launched. NATO's strategy has therefore been largely concerned with confining Soviet vessels to the Barents Sea. But the longer range of the SS-N-8 must force a change in this strategy.

The fleet of SS-N-8 carrying submarines will of course not be concentrated in Murmansk, but will be dispersed and cruise in the Arctic basin. The Arctic Sea is largely covered with ice, but the ice is in constant motion, and there are cleavages in the sea-ice canopy. In addition, SSBNs can break through one meter of ice which in the winter time may cover some of the cleavages in the more permanent ice pack. (Østreng, 1975 b, pp. 5-6). The Circular Error Probability of the SS-N-8 missile is thought to be in the range of 1,5 - 2 km. This is good enough to permit a certain error in the position fix as a result under-water communication.


In conclusion, the Norwegian Sea is likely to lose its role as a deployment area for Soviet SSBNs.

The question then is whether this sea territory will retain its value for other parts of the Soviet navy. The answers to this question depends very much on one's general assessment of the present military-strategic-political situation in the Northern Hemisphere. For instance, the intercepting of supply routes between Western Europe and North America has meaning only in scenarios of conventional war between NATO and WTO. Another possible role of the Soviet Northern Fleet, or parts of it, is to support amphibious operations on the northern flank. Such

operations could be directed against Norway, Bear Island, Jan Mayen, the Svalbard archipelago or Greenland. However, if the Soviet SSBNs were deployed in the Arctic Sea rather than the Norwegian Sea, there is little reason why the Soviets should attempt an amphibious operation south of the above mentioned islands. The only parts of Norway and Greenland that could have any interest, would be the very northernmost sections. Such operations would have meaning only if Soviet control with these territories could substantially enhance the safety of the SSBNs in the Arctic Sea.<sup>4</sup> However, with further technological advance in the communication and navigation sector, the strategic importance of these islands may also decline, at least as long as NATO powers also do not use them for military purposes. In addition, the Soviet Union will hardly risk anticipated strong negative international reaction in an era of detente.

Finally a note about the Svalbard archipelago. At long last the Soviet Union consented to the Norwegian plan for an air field on the main island, Spitsbergen. This can be taken as an indication of certain degree of trust in the repeated affirmations by the Norwegian authorities that this installation will not be used for military purposes. It will probably be in the interest both of the Soviet Union and of Norway that the latter strictly observes the demilitarized status of the archipelago.

# NORTH POLAR REGION.



From Østeng (1975 b)

## NOTES

+) This is a non-expert paper as the author never did any research in this field. I am grateful to Finn Sollie and Willy Østreng at the Fridtjof Nansen Foundation, Polhøgda, for letting me discuss the subject with them. The article can be identified as PRIO-publication no. P-72 from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.

1) Soviet troops liberated parts of Finmark in 1944 and withdrew after the armistice in May 1945. Østreng (1975 b, p. 70) is of the opinion that the Soviet government thought that Svalbard was occupied by British, and not by Norwegian forces during the war.

2) The possibility of radio-communication with submerged submarines is, of course, a crucial factor in this game. Another technical problem is noise. Many of the Soviet attack submarines are quite old and hence noisy. This is discussed in greater detail by Østreng (1975 b).

3) *New Scientist*, 3 July 1975, p. 273.

4) Amphibious operations would probably not be necessary for an attack on part of Finmark. The landscape is ideal for the Soviet armory, and the Norwegian forces in the area rather negligible.

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