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WHEN THE SAINTS GO MARCHING OUT:
THE DECLINE OF PATRONAGE IN MALTA

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Comments will be
appreciated

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Introduction

The growing flux of literature on patronage by political scientists deals chiefly with its utilitarian aspect. It is conceived of as an asymmetrical, quasi-moral relation between a person (the patron) who directly provides protection and assistance (patronage) and/or who influences persons who can provide these services (brokerage), to persons (clients) who depend on him for such assistance. Clients, in turn, provide loyalty and support when called on to do so. A great deal is now known about varieties of patronage, its inner mechanics, its consequences and the way it is modified.

One of the perennial problems remains the question of why patronage has emerged in some countries as part of the social and cultural climate. Its emergence is usually related to the partial penetration of the nation-state. Silverman (1965: 188) noted perceptively that "...the mediator represents a general form of community/nation relationship characteristic of an early phase of development of nation states, a form which regularly gives way as the process of interpenetration of the total society advances." (Cf. Bax 1973, who contests the notion that patronage withers as the state expands.) Others have seen it as an institution linking cultures (Wolf 1956; Bailey 1969).

1) Discussants at a Malta Rotary Club dinner, a Netherlands European Anthropology Association meeting and a seminar at the Department of Social Anthropology of the University of Stockholm kindly criticized earlier versions of this paper. Monsignor Professor Carm Sant and Monsignor Professor Joseph Lupi provided advice on matters religious. The actual research in 1973 and 1974 upon which the discussion is based was financed by the University of Amsterdam. The department of Economics of the Royal University of Malta provided important research facilities.

The world of ideas and concepts in which patronage and brokerage function has all but been ignored. Only a few anthropologists (Kenny 1960; Campbell 1964; Boissevain 1966; Wolf 1969; and Christian 1972) have noted that there is a particularly interesting relation between religion and patronage. Catholicism in particular, with its range of benevolent patron saints intermediate between God and favour seeking, dependent humans, provides an ideological world view which closely parallels a conception of society articulated by political and economic patron-client relations. These anthropologists have argued that religious and political patronage reinforce each other.²⁾ Each provides a model of and a model for the other. The relationship between spiritual and temporal patronage is clearly characterized by the south European custom of referring to both types of patron as saints. The proverb "You cannot get to heaven without the help of saints", thus has religious and political significance. This discussion seeks to explore the relation between social developments, interpersonal relations, patronage and religious conceptualizations in Malta.

Developments in Malta

The Maltese archipelago is composed of three islands: Malta, Gozo, and Comino. They cover a land area of 120 square miles, and have a population of just over 318,000 people. Malta's history has been greatly influenced by its small size and strategic location in the centre of the Mediterranean. For centuries it was run as an island fortress, first by the Knights of St. John (1532-1798), then by the French (1798-1800), and finally by the British, who finally gave the country its independence in 1964.

2) While Foster (1963) draws attention to spiritual patronage, he views it really as a pragmatic extension of patronage relations to include supernatural protectors. He does not explicitly conclude that the two systems of patronage reinforce each other.

Malta's experience of self-rule was limited by the obvious difficulty of giving full self-government to a fortress. For centuries the islands were governed by a highly centralized civil/military administration centered in Valletta, Malta's capital. When necessary, representatives were stationed in the villages and areas remote from Valletta, such as the sister island of Gozo, to see that the politics of the central government were carried out. Following the first World War a system of modified self-government was introduced. Representatives were elected to the national parliament from multi-member constituencies. This provided an institutionalized communication channel between the grass roots electorate and the central government. This highly centralized form of government continued following independence. The Maltese parliament now consists of fifty representatives elected from ten districts. The central government employs some 25,000 persons, who, with the exception of police and teachers, all work in the capital.

The official religion in Malta is Roman Catholicism. All but a handful of Maltese are Catholic, and most practice their religion fervently. The centralized hierarchical organization of the church provides much of the territorial organization of the islands. Each village forms a parish and some of the larger towns are divided into two parishes. The parishes of Gozo and the island of Comino form one diocese with their own bishop, who falls under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan archbishop of Malta. Parish priests, until the advent of self-government, provided the only more or less institutionalized form of communication between village/parish and the central government.

In addition to the increasing autonomy of the central government from outside control following independence, five interlinked trends can be discerned which are relevant for a discussion of developments in patronage: 1) increasing education; 2) industrialization; 3) tourism; 4) increasing communication and mobility; 5) rising standard of living. These trends

have been discernible ever since the turn of the century. Their pace seems to be constantly accelerating. It was boosted by the two World Wars, the sporadic periods of self-government and, finally, by independence.

The push towards public education began just before the turn of the century, at about the same time that the first experiments in limited self-government took place. Prior to that education had been fairly exclusively controlled by the Church. The development of schools increased steadily, though attendance was partial and to a large extent voluntary. Compulsory education until the age of fourteen was introduced on a part-time basis following the return of self-government after the second World War. During the next twenty years the school leaving age was gradually increased to sixteen and school facilities greatly expanded.

During the same period the economy also evolved. The islands' economy for centuries was based on furnishing goods and services to the military and naval garrisons of its rulers. In the early days of the Knights of St. John the Maltese provided food and menial services, including physically defending the island against various aggressors. Members of the professional classes were also employed in the central administration. Under the British increasing numbers of Maltese were employed in the garrison, the naval dockyard, and the civil service. The numbers of professionals and businessmen expanded as entrepot commerce flourished following the opening of the Suez Canal. But the balance of power in the Mediterranean gradually passed from British hands. In the late 1950s this was reflected in a drastic decline of the defense establishment in Malta. Teams of advisors finally began to make serious attempts to find alternative economic possibilities. Foremost among these was converting the giant, over-staffed, naval dockyard to a viable commercial enterprise. An attempt was also made to attract manufacturing industry. In the past the British had systematically kept such industry out of the islands to safeguard the

dockyard and military monopoly of employment for local skilled labour. Attempts were also undertaken in the early 1960s to encourage tourism.

In spite of these efforts, the economy was stagnant when Malta became independent in 1964. Discouraged by the grim economic prospects, and fearful of independence, more than 9,000 emigrated that year, whereas the annual average for the previous five years was around 4,000.

Since independence Malta's economy has proved to be remarkably robust. Though small, the country has become a diplomatic power to be reckoned with, and has been able to increase the rent of its defense facilities from Britain and NATO from £M4 million annually to over £M14 million annually (£M1 = £1.10 sterling). It has also been able to garner various forms of aid from NATO countries as well as mainland China, which at the moment is building a dry-dock to accommodate 300,000 ton vessels. The country has also displayed a phenomenal economic growth. From 1965 to 1969 there was an economic boom sparked off by new industries and mass tourism. Since 1970 boom conditions have been replaced by a slower but steady growth. Many foreign firms, attracted by various incentives, established themselves in Malta, boosting domestic exports from just over £M4 million to nearly £M32 million per annum in just over ten years. Timely measures taken by the newly independent government enabled the islands to capture an important portion of the wave of tourists which in the 1960s began cascading into the sunny Mediterranean from grey industrial centres in northern Europe. Following currency restrictions imposed in 1965, thousands of British discovered in Malta a Sterling island in the sun. Tourism grew from 23,000 arrivals in 1961 to 270,000 arrivals by 1974. The expansion of industry and tourism raised the gross national product from £M53 million in 1964 to more than £M110 million by 1972.

Increasing education, expanding employment, especially for women, and rising wage rates brought with them a considerable rise in prosperity.

Between 1964 and 1972 virtually every Maltese household bought a modern gas cooker, a television set and a washing machine. People began to eat more meat. They also began to spend more on leisure activities.

During the past twenty years there has been a veritable explosion in the means of communication in Malta. Not only have contacts with the outside world increased; the means to communicate within Malta have improved greatly. Between 1962 and 1972 television became firmly established. There is now one set for every six persons. During the same period the number of telephones increased from 11,000 to 26,000, or from one for every thirty persons to one for every twelve. The growth of television has been particularly significant. It has brought Malta into direct contact with Italy, for the two Italian television channels are received clearly. The amount of local sound news broadcast has also increased remarkably. In 1954 only 1½ hours of news was broadcast daily. By 1974 news broadcasts from various sources had increased to 10½ hours a day. A similar expansion in the local press took place. In 1954 there were eight daily and weekly newspapers introducing 172 pages a week. By 1974 the number of publications had doubled and were publishing no less than 700 pages a week. The proportion in Maltese increased from 40% to 58%. Malta is thus better informed about what goes on abroad and also what goes on within the country. Transportation has also improved. During the past decade or so public transport increased markedly, as did private transport. Between 1964 and 1972 car ownership increased from 20,000 to 45,000, or from one car for every eighteen persons to one for every seven.

Changing Social Relations

Interpersonal relations have been affected by the developments touched on above. Relations are becoming less hierarchical and also less many-stranded. These changes can be seen in the family, in the community and in the relations between people in such organizations as the church, unions, and political parties.

Influences are at work which slowly, almost imperceptibly, are reducing power differentials in families/^{which have been} characterized by strong parental, and especially paternal, authority. To begin with, children are generally better educated than their parents. They know more. Their horizons are wider. They can read documents and sign legal forms for their illiterate parents. This decreases the dependency of parents on outsiders to perform these tasks, but it increases their dependency upon their own children. Increasingly, also, girls are finding jobs, and for much of the day are away from the village and the authority of their mothers. Just ten years ago it was usual for unmarried village girls to remain at home. Now, almost without exception, unmarried girls who have left school work outside their place of residence mostly in hotels, and, increasingly, in the expanding light manufacturing industries. The money they earn makes them more independent from their parents for clothing, amusements, and even marriage partners. Just a few years ago many marriage plans foundered because parents refused to provide their daughter a dowry or layout if they did not approve of her choice. Today a girl pays for these herself. She also contributes handsomely to the wedding reception given by her parents. Sons who are better educated and have more prestigious, better-paying jobs than their fathers are also increasingly less inclined to submit to the traditional patriarchal authority. Moreover married children are moving out of the neighbourhood of parents as intervillage marriages increase and as distant housing becomes available. These factors are reducing the traditional hierarchical relations in Maltese families.

These developments are also creating new group identifications and activities, thus affecting traditional community interaction patterns. Bonds of loyalty in neighbourhood, parish, band club associations are decreasing. This is partly the result of increased mobility. Improved transportation, work outside parish limits, housing in distant estates are pulling

people out of the village and neighbourhood of birth. New reference groups are also being created. Young people from all over the island congregate between seven and nine in the evening in the main street of Valletta (or the seaside promenade of Sliema, a nearby, smart suburb). There they see their friends from all over the island, exchanging news, fashions, and companionship. Political party loyalty, especially following the clash in the early 1960s between the Malta Labour Party and the church, has also drawn people from different neighbourhoods and parishes together in various interest groups.

A growing concept of a national Maltese community/nation has followed independence. Before 1964 the primary point of identification was the faction, parish, or party. Now, slowly, a national 'we' feeling is emerging. The development of new reference groups is drawing people out of traditional groups. Moreover, as increasingly more outsiders come to live in the villages, either because they find housing there or they marry there, the village becomes less homogenous. People have less to do with each other. There has been a noticeable decline in the scale and participation in the annual festas celebrating saints important to the villages. Fewer young men are prepared to sacrifice hours of dangerous work to prepare fireworks. They now prefer to spend their free time with (girl)friends at the beach or the cinema. Where just ten years ago young men competed for the honour of carrying the parish saint in its annual procession, the priest today is forced to hire outsiders to do this.

These changes affect the quality of interpersonal relations. In a way relations have become less multiplex, more diffuse, and relations of dependency in the village have consequently decreased.

There has also been a shift in power relations. Not only are relations within the family gradually growing more egalitarian; relations in other spheres of social activity are also becoming less asymmetrical. This is

partly a result of bureaucratization and collectivization. There has been a slow expansion of the degree to which the central government impinges upon the lives of the people. Government is increasingly asked to provide more education, more housing, more industry, more social services, more traffic control, etc. Government departments thus grow and become increasingly more complex. Decision making in government and private business is becoming more collectivized: decisions are increasingly made by boards instead of single individuals. This reflects the growing general ideology of discussion and equality.

Corresponding to the collectivization of decision making at higher levels, collectivities at lower levels are representing the interests of members. In the past twenty years there has been a great growth of membership of political parties and, especially, trade unions. The church lay associations have also grown. Associations of farmers, employers, women and students, defend the interests of their members. The power of persons in authority is slowly being fragmented, distributed over committees and boards. The ability of a single person--whether father, employer, doctor, lawyer, government minister, department head, or priest-- to influence the action of others has been reduced. Extreme concentration of power potentials in the hands of persons is being reduced, as are relations of dependency which bound people to them.

Transformation of Patronage Relations

The transformations which have been touched on have affected the interdependency of people. As power is not monopolized by single individuals to the extent it once was, people are no longer as dependent. Old informants described to me how just forty years ago certain persons in their villages wielded great power. They disposed of local housing, credit facilities, labour. They also had access to important decision makers in the government who would issue licences, local scholarships and provide

employment. They were jealous of their power. They sometimes ruthlessly protected their interests. Such persons have all but disappeared.

But if the power of patrons is declining, the demand for specialized brokers is increasing. The growing demand for influential mediators is not only due to the increasing complexity of government and the collectivization of decision making. It is also a consequence of the availability of new prizes, such as overseas scholarships and licences and subsidies for tourist and industrial developments. These prizes are allocated by scholarship committees, licensing authorities, development boards, which often include foreign experts. Most boards make a valiant attempt to make decisions according to universalistic criteria. It is thus difficult, if not impossible, for people, alone, to influence the decision of such collectivities. This is a task for specialized intermediaries who, ideally, have the backing of organizations.

People are thus finding it increasingly efficient to have their interests represented by organizational specialists. An employee asks his union shop steward to argue his pay claim with his employer. A person seeking a scholarship, building permit, government flat or a transfer asks his local member of parliament to help him. A parish priest who has a dispute with his bishop mobilizes the secretary of the College of Arch- and Parish Priests to help argue his case. The Malta Labour party in particular has sought to strengthen these organizational relations. It has consciously channeled the mass of resources to which it has access as government party through its formal party apparatus. Clients and brokers have thus become part of formal organizations, and their relationship is changing. It is a person's right to be represented by his union secretary, his professional association manager, or his local member of parliament. He no longer has to grovel and display his dependency to obtain this help. It will be evident that the bureaucratization of patron/client or broker/client relations has eliminated

the sense of personal dependency and the moral content which once characterized such relations.

People are now also beginning to sneer at self-confessed clients. Once clients were called parokjan, parishioners of a saint or patron. Today the word bažužlu (teacher's pet, toady) is increasingly used to indicate the abject dependency of personal (political) clients. It is a term of disapproval, of humiliation, of condemnation. The general shift from the use of parokjan to bažužlu to designate personal clients reflects the shift in the content of patronage relations. As opposed to organizational dependency, relations of personal dependency are increasingly being looked down upon. But this ethical condemnation of the patron/broker-client relation is also related to another development. The word corruption is on everyone's lips. Relations which once were accepted as normal are now increasingly regarded as corrupt. This is possibly also a reflection of the growing awareness of Maltese that certain private interests must be sacrificed for the new Maltese state. Just ten years ago Malta was a colony. Military and governmental resources were controlled by Britain. They were fair game. They could be and were plundered on a grand scale without incurring opprobrium. (For example dockyard workers still recount with admiration and awe how a 14 ton bronze anchor was pilfered one night from the "Yard".) With the increasing penetration of a national ideology, a growing separation is taking place between public and private domains. The personal client is condemned as a bažužlu; the patron/broker who personally channels government resources to him is seen as corrupt.

Three Types of Dependency Relations

It would seem that in the past hundred years relations of dependency in Malta have assumed three dominant forms. These may be termed patronage, patron/brokerage, and organizational brokerage. The first is the classical

personal patron/client relation. This is still found occasionally between a wealthy landowner and the family of his farmer tenant or old family retainer. This is a long-term, personal, moral relation. The landowner provides land, advice on investments and influence with important people for his tenant. The latter in turn provides personal loyalty, esteem and small services above and beyond the formal contractual relationship. This relationship was characteristic for people who were bound to the village, as they were more than thirty years ago, as agriculturists.

Farmers and small artisans had very little to do with the remote central government, located far away and scarcely impinging upon their lives.


The second type of dependency relation is that between industrial labourers and local big man, often the notary or parish priest, doctor: the patron/broker. It is characteristic of a period in which big government begins to impinge more noticeably upon the lives of villagers. People are concerned with placing their children in school, finding work for them, obtaining building permits. The local patron can provide ever fewer of these services personally. But he can use his influence with people he knows well in the increasingly complex government who, in turn, dispense those prizes. There is still a personal relation with some moral overtones between the client and his patron/broker. But the relationship is no longer exclusive. The client has several specialized patrons, and is always on the look-out for new persons who can intervene on his behalf. In return he is prepared to bargain his vote and do other small services. But because the relation is unstable and increasingly pragmatic and transactional, it has little moral content.

The third type of dependency relation is that between a person and his member of parliament, the secretary of his local party club, his shop steward, or his union secretary. Both organizational broker and client are members of the same group. They thus share a certain group loyalty.

But both expect support from each other; as members of the same group. Their relations have become formalized in the sense that they may be expressed as rights and duties. The party or union secretary represents the interests of his client/constituent/fellow member to civil-service decision makers. He does this not so much as a personal friend but as a representative. If he does not succeed he can mobilize further pressure on the civil servant through the political party or union apparatus. He does not need to maintain relations with such civil servants to the same extent as the patron/broker. It will be obvious, however, that in a country as small as Malta the personal element in social relations will continue to remain strong. Organizational brokerage is becoming the most prominent type of relation with authorities. It is a more egalitarian relation.

The three types of dependency relations have been sketched below.

DOMINANT POLITICAL DEPENDENCY RELATIONS IN MALTA



Religious Changes

As political saints are being eliminated, so also are religious saints. Following the second Vatican Council there has been a concerted effort to bring about a more Christocentric religious orientation. Increasing stress has been placed by the Church upon the link between man and God. In the various parts of the liturgy where scriptures are read, priests are urged to choose passages which lay emphasis on salvation and on the link with God. There has also been a conscious, some would say ruthless, effort to reduce the importance of saints. Many have been eliminated on the grounds that they never existed. Others have been downgraded. The cult of Mary is being played down drastically. Linked with this there has been an increasing stress on community participation. People are being urged to approach God directly, with their fellow men, as part of a community of equals. The intermediary is being eliminated.

This theological policy was designed to bring the Church in line with developments taking place in the world (Cf. Documents 1966: 122). In Malta one of the first steps was to translate much of the liturgy in Maltese. Parishioners now understand the prayers of their priest. He is regarded as one of the community, a specialist who leads them. People now pray together as a community. Formerly people contacted God individually. They did this as entrepreneurs in highly personal ways: through their own private intermediaries: saints and the Virgin Mary. They planned their own devotions and sacrifices. Many in Maltese churches would conduct their own devotions during the mass, reciting the Rosary in a corner. Today people pray together. The importance of God is directly emphasized.

The changes in the rite of baptism clearly indicate the thrust of these reforms. Before the new liturgy was introduced in Malta two years ago, influential persons who could provide prestige and assistance were often chosen as godparents. This meant they often came from outside the parish.

The baptism was performed privately by the parish priest at the baptismal font behind the main altar. A small group of intimates attended the ceremony, and the child was held by the godmother. The mother remained home. Today godparents are supposed to be chosen from the members of the parish community (though this is not yet taking place everywhere). The child is now held by its mother. The godparents are no longer responsible to God for the child's moral education. As representatives of the community, they are responsible to the community. More significantly, the baptismal ceremony now takes place collectively. In most parishes it is performed once a month. All babies born that month are baptised together during a public ceremony. Rich and poor stand together. Parish priests have noted that in general this new ceremony has been very successful, although their richer parishioners object to its levelling influence. They still wish to have private ceremonies to which their exclusive friends may be invited. They don't wish to stand together with the poor.

The Church has also consciously tried to bridge the gap between priest and parishioner. For example, the priest now meets a couple to be married at the door of the church and escorts them to the altar. Formerly he waited for them at the altar. This new action symbolizes the reduction in the distance between them. They are members of the same community, he merely leads the rites.


These are some of the ways in which the church is consciously stressing its new Christocentric policy. It does this by promoting the sense of equality among the members of a worshipping community, and by downgrading the intermediaries. Communication with God today is less private, less entrepreneurial, more communal. Shifts in the teaching of the church mirror in a striking way the changes taking place in society. Under pressure from bishops from all over the world, the church has consciously tried to modernize itself. In many

respects the church is ahead of developments in Maltese society. The rich feel uncomfortable rubbing shoulders with their poor fellow villagers during baptismal ceremonies. But the conscious efforts of the younger priests to implement egalitarian communalism are slowly having effect.

Three Types of Religious Dependency

The conceptualization of religious dependency relations can also be seen to have assumed three forms. The first is that of the early church, where there was a fairly direct relation between man and God. Salvation was mediated through the intervention of Jesus Christ, who was part of the Trinity. The second form emerged in the Middle Ages, when intermediaries became progressively more important. A man's path to salvation still led through God but was mediated by the saints and, increasingly, by the Virgin Mary.³⁾ She was formally set apart from, and placed well above, all other saints by the doctrine of her immaculate conception in 1854. And, finally, the third form reflects the new developments following the second Vatican Council. Saints and other divine intermediaries have been eliminated or downgraded. The mortal intermediary, the parish priest, has been incorporated into the same community as his parishioners. Salvation is contingent upon collective, not individual, action. This transformation is schematically portrayed below. The similarity to the transformation of political and economic brokerage is striking.

TRANSFORMATION OF RELIGIOUS DEPENDENCY RELATIONS



3) Wolf (1969:296) citing Christian (1966) has noted that the growth of the cult of the Virgin Mary is associated with the growth of the state

Conclusion

In an earlier discussion I drew attention to the similarity between political patronage and the cult of saints and their influence on each other (1966: 30-31). At the time I was unable to establish a causal relationship. It now seems quite obvious that there is a causal relationship between belief and interaction. The ritual and theological conceptualization of religious dependency changes to reflect social behaviour deriving from economic and political activity. In the deliberations of Vatican II this is explicitly formulated. Once introduced such ritual and religious changes also influence behaviour. It thus might appear to be a circle without a causal break. But this is a false impression, as the for-going discussion clearly indicates. Developments taking place at the level at which people interact in family, work place, and political arena generate and modify values, norms, and cognitive maps.



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Patronage

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Many people begin their papers with some attempt to disarm criticism: mine is contextual. The paper may appear to you to be scrappy and inconsequential - but in its proper context these defects are lost. The proper context lies in the future, and what is presented to you here is excerpts from two chapters of work in progress: when it's finished it will be, I hope, a book called Social Anthropology of the Mediterranean - a survey of the work done there by anthropologists and some others. The present Introduction is from a Chapter called Stratification, an account of the distribution of resources and of the representations collectives of differences in wealth and power. The second part is from a chapter dealing with political representation in a less French sense - the ways in which people get their interests taken into account when decisions are being made. Briefly, I argue that each of the three main representations is associated with a mode of representation, so:

- | | |
|--------------|--------------------------|
| Class. | - Class struggle. |
| Bureaucracy. | - Vindication of rights. |
| Honour. | - Patronage. |

In any particular situation, any particular community, these are the main variables which seem to make sense of the data; they are analytical concepts, elementary forms present or latent in varying amounts at different times and places. It is clear that they influence one another: Portuguese rural patronage is different from Italian because, among other things, the bureaucratic system and the development of the class system are different in these societies. It follows that patronage is not treated in this paper as an integral part of bureaucracy - is not coterminous with corruption. Much of the published work on Mediterranean societies suggests that it is, and so have the circulars we have received before this conference: so I thought that some prefatory apology was called for, an attempt to disarm criticism, before getting down to the Introduction - which follows immediately.

Chapter 2 - Stratification

1. Introduction

The societies of the Mediterranean, without exception, exhibit crude differences in wealth. There are none in which wealth is in fact evenly distributed throughout the male adult population. In all of the societies there are socially recognised situations in which these crude material differences are deemed irrelevant: most Mediterranean communities studied by social anthropologists are small, fairly close-knit, and their members meet and co-operate at times when equality is conventionally emphasised. But in some of these societies the social destruction of crude material differences is associated with political activity - not just when football is discussed, say (Lison-Tolosana 1966: 91), but when the members are concerned with decisions and actions which affect them all. These societies are described in the final substantive section of the next chapter, under the heading 'Systems of equality'.

However, for the most part crude material differences are converted into systems of stratification. A system of stratification is a socially construed embodiment of the realities of material differentiation which converts them into guidelines for social action. It is because there is substantial agreement within these communities about the ways in which greater or lesser wealth may manifest itself in greater or lesser power, that these societies, in contrast perhaps with those which have achieved systems of equality, do not rely on brute strength to maintain social order: a system of stratification permits the physically weak - the aged and the self-indulgent - to be powerful. But agreement is agreement: and although all the systems of stratification described do reinforce the position of the powerful - they are not only descriptors of the differentiated allocation of resources but also themselves allocators of resources - they nevertheless limit and control the exercise of power: it is channelled through accepted institutions and thereby limited, made

predictable and to some extent un-arbitrary.¹

There are three main forms of stratification which have been observed in the Mediterranean: bureaucracy, class and honour. Each of them is related to the distribution of wealth, more or less directly. They are, for the purpose of analysis, ideal types, distinct elementary forms which, in substantive polities, are intertwined, mixed in varying degrees, variously important. Each is associated with an appropriate mode of political representation - again, ideal types, elementary forms, which in the huggemugger of actual political activity have variable importance. These are: insistence on citizen's rights; class-struggle; patronage.

The justification for making such distinctions may become clear: it is essential for any comparative task to sort out the main variables and to try to give them weight, if the differences between the political life of different communities are to be explained in any systematic way. As the comparative task proceeds, so the distinctions may justify themselves. It may be as well, nonetheless, to discuss the elementary forms briefly at the outset.

Honour and class are related to individual control of resources. Honour is a moral attribute of groups or individuals; it is derived from the performance of certain roles, usually domestic ones, though in some communities other kinds of role may be assessed. Characteristically, location in a particular position implies an assertion of a particular moral

¹This account is a static more or less functionalist one. That is a pity. While reading the materials carefully, idealistic visions open themselves up of accounts of Mediterranean stratification in which the interplay of ideology and wealth is traced through history, and is shown to produce the current and various relations of these which are found in the Mediterranean. The reader should be warned that to take contemporary material differences as givens, without discovering the sources of them in the allocative functions of earlier systems of stratification, is to tell only half the story.

worth and, equally characteristic, the process of location implies a judgement made by other people, usually neighbours. Successful performance of the roles is related to economic resources because feeding a family, looking after women, maintaining a following, can be done more easily when the family is not poor; but the judgement of relative success and failure is made by a collectivity. It is characteristic of honour hierarchies that they tend to become absolute: an absolute hierarchy is one in which each ranked unit - a person, a family, a descent group, - occupies, or potentially occupies, a unique position, superior or inferior to each other unit. Indeed, when two units occupy similar positions the ethnographer may expect them either to be in conflict, struggling to become unequal, or to be unknown to each other - this is not uncommon in some of the larger agglomerations in the Mediterranean.

Honour is local: it cannot be measured or assessed, except very roughly, by an outside observer. Bureaucratic rank and class position are transferable from one community to another, but for a man to have honour he must live in his own land. It is important that readers from mass societies should realise the small scale of honour ranking systems: for although it does appear to be the case that moral behaviour, assessed to locate persons in the system, is more open, less of the closet in Mediterranean societies, rank is based on thorough knowledge of an individual's family and life-history. There is a deadweight of history which makes upward social mobility in moral terms very difficult; moreover, because honour systems tend towards absoluteness successful mobility displaces erstwhile superiors, whose interest is to resist other people's claims to higher positions. Honour does not, therefore, constitute a moral ladder of an ethical kind: a low-ranking man who attempts to better himself is a threat and those whom he displaces try to vilify him, to deprive him of honour in his own land

which is the only place he can have any.

In certain circumstances, which are more or less identifiable, it is clear that the crude material differences between members of communities are socially construed in a class idiom. The language in which differences in power are talked about is not that of acceptance, of infinitely graded moral worth, but of conflict, and the common interests of people who, in other circumstances, emphasise the absoluteness of the differences between them. What is perceived, what becomes the dominant characteristic of individuals, is their possession of common interests similar or opposed to those of the perceiver. It is characteristic of class hierarchies that people who perceive themselves to share a common interest may group together to pursue collective ends: in elections and in the more unregulated strikes, occupations of land, riots, revolutions. It is characteristic of Mediterranean class hierarchies that they are not permanently dominant: the perception of shared interest waxes and wanes; a magnate is not permanently a class-oppressor, but may be a friend, a patron, a god-father. A client may be one of the best, a decent diligent man of his kind, who every now and then gets carried away by seditious hotheads, and has to be taught his place. It is one of the tasks of this chapter to indicate what may be the correlates of such changing emphasis, such fluctuating perception; and it is another to show that the institutions of class organisation - parties, labour syndicates, co-operatives, - may have the same shifting indeterminacy. In contrast to honour, class is not local: a man may take his class where he goes; and his position, his perception of his interest, may change rather more easily than his honour can.

Why is bureaucracy in this list of elementary forms? It is unlike both honour and class because it springs not from local will, from the fluctuations in local circumstances, but from some centre removed from the ethnographer's

focussed vision. Of course, class hierarchy seems to become dominant partly in response to national and even international factors; class institutions are usually integrated into a national organisation; a Spaniard or Turk who goes to Germany is a Gastarbeiter, but an arbeiter wherever he goes, whose position and interest as a member of a class can be brought forth out of the noumenal, made dominant and active, wherever he may be. But bureaucracy? - It's not of that kind, even, and appears to have no local roots. Bureaucracy is here in the list because it is a manifestation of power at the centre. The integration of local communities into nations is a statement of the power of the centre. It can be done in various ways, but the commonest way in the Mediterranean now is by setting up an administration. This is partly because of the demands of civilised opinion: a Mediterranean government which set up a feudal system nowadays would be regarded as odd by its neighbours. More seriously, it is a manifestation of the state's need to control the outflow of its own resources: taxation, policing - these do not require bureaucratic control so much as education, welfare, public works, development do: bureaucracy is more efficient than any other means of controlling the flow of resources from the centre. Its relevance to local communities is three-fold: first, most of the ethnographers of Mediterranean societies now have to take into account the power of the field officers who represent the state: if they are not in the community, indeed if they are not of the community, they nevertheless play an important part in nearly every Mediterranean society. Secondly, the act of integration brings the local community as a whole into a national power system: the community as a whole is absorbed into a hierarchy of power, almost invariably at a position of utter weakness and insignificance.² Thirdly, the act of will

²Hence, perhaps, the tendency of members of marginal communities to say to Bailey and his pupils what is manifestly false: 'We are all equal here'. Vis-à-vis outsiders, of course, they are all equals, all equally powerless. Bailey 1971a, 1971b, passim.

at the centre, the determination that this or that village or tribe shall be brought within the ^ofield, creates a new mode of political representation within the village. People see themselves from time to time not simply as clients, not simply as a class with an interest to defend or vindicate, but as citizens with rights. The elementary form then has two aspects: people can use their awareness that administration is rule-bound against the administration itself - they can attempt to control the activities of the powerful centre by turning its rules around and against it. Or they can switch their idioms within the local context: they can attempt to control magnates by asserting their equal dignity as members of the same state, they can assert that what they want - a job, a passport, medical treatment - is theirs not by virtue of their personal loyalty to a particular magnate, not by virtue of their ability to vindicate their claim by mass action, but by right.

The effectiveness of such claims is of course extremely variable: indeed, it would be truest to the facts to start from the opposite position - such claims are nearly always ineffective. It is possible that in some areas in the Mediterranean the ability of a labourer to expect sickness benefit or a pension reduces his dependence on magnates, but these are few. However, mention of the effectiveness of the claims is not really relevant to the discussion of bureaucracy as an elementary form of stratification and political representation: that is an analytical notion, necessary merely to explain particular polities, and to compare them.

This chapter therefore begins with an account of what is known about the distribution of resources in Mediterranean communities, and of the difficulties in assessing crude material differences between the members of them. It then proceeds with an account of the nature of honour, with an attempt to describe the different kinds of bureaucracy, and with an account

of those causes which have been said to bring class-consciousness to the fore. If that sounds a formidable promise, its fulfillment is made easier by the paucity of material. The next chapter deals with the modes of representation derived from these elementary forms of stratification, and ends with an account of those systems in which crude material differences are not socially construed but rather destroyed.

2. Patronage

All political representation is concerned with the control and use of power, and the ways in which it is controlled and used depend necessarily on the ways in which the crude material bases of power are cloaked, softened, converted to moral agreement, transformed into social facts. When a weak man is confronted by a strong man he can ally with other weak men, and together they may overcome: the circumstances in which that has occurred in the Mediterranean have been suggested in the first section of this chapter. When the strong man sets up an administration he allows what may be called legitimate representations to be made to him, while he also creates, through his local delegates, new sources of power - legitimate power - in local communities. That has been discussed in the preceding section. It is to the third possibility that this section is devoted: confronted with a stronger man the weak may adopt a posture of deference, may give way, and then salvage what he can by exerting moral pressure - the pressures of acceptance, deference, friendliness, of godparenthood even - to try to control the prepotence of his acknowledged superior. Patronage¹ thus occurs whenever men adopt a posture of deference to those more powerful than they and gain access to resources as a result. It is associated with honour because honour is a moral code in which rich and poor are ranked, in which their interdependence is emphasised as in no other idiom of stratification; because the language of honour is that used by the weak to mitigate the consequences of their helplessness in this relationship; and because honour aids choice: it is at least potentially an absolute differentiator,

¹ Patronage is here used to refer to all the things which other writers have called patron-clientage or patron-client relations, clientage, nepotism, clientelism and so on. But see Weingrod 1967-8. The people involved are either patrons or clients.

and a patron, choosing among several would-be clients, chooses the more honourable. It is in this way that honour is an allocator of resources, and creates conflict among those 'equals' who struggle for a livelihood.

This use of patronage contrasts with that adopted by Peters, who has used the word in a much more restrictive sense: discussing the various kinds of status which he has excluded from his account of patronage in Cyrenaica Peters concludes,

'I will readily admit that the various statuses have common forms of relationships. Dependence is one form they have in common, and protection another. But dependence of one sort or another occurs in practically all sets of social relationships, and therefore lacks all discriminatory usefulness... To place many disparate statuses in one category leads to confusion and misses the sociological significance in them all'. (1968: 186).

What Peters selects to be the identifying characteristics is first that there should be genealogical differentiation of patrons from clients: the tied never have a free man in their genealogy, however far back they may trace it. Secondly, that patrons should be the legal representatives of their clients - clients should have no legal personality when they are tied to a patron: if a client kills a man in another section, it is his patrons who are liable to reprisals or to make composition.

This identification is derived from Fustel de Coulanges and adopts some of the criteria² thought by that writer to describe patronage in classical times (n.d.: 224-8). It may be that the more recent exploration of that topic by Badian (1958) is now a better guide to a definition if indeed a formal definition is to be derived from the ethnography of ancient societies. Badian's account of the relations of corporate Rome and of individual Romans with Italian and other (African, Balkan, Spanish) corporate and individual

²e.g. Peters does not include the inability of clients to make sacrifices in which Fustel de Coulanges saw the inferiority of clients most clearly expressed.

clients could indeed serve as a model of the contemporary politics of community-nation relationships, most happily for Italian cases, but for other northern littoral countries too. True, patrons were possessed of an important resource - Roman citizenship -; true, client status was successible (1958:4); but it would be mistaken to think of a Roman's clients in Sicily, say, as dominated by their client status: they were able to become clients because they were important men in their own land; and they might have more than one patron to represent their interests at the capital (ib. 155 and n.1). Moreover, contractual clientage (ib. 2, 4-10) was not inconsistent with being or having a (Roman) pater, which Fustel de Coulanges takes as the main genealogical qualification of patrons. Finally, emancipation often followed the probationary period of corporate clientage of a defeated or annexed Latin town: the inhabitants then became citizens, voters able to hold office (ib. 18-9).³ The austere formalism of Peters' definition thus excludes some of the most important kinds of Roman patronage, although of course manumitted slaves, clients who succeeded to their status, and perhaps those who applied for client status from gratitude for benefits received in time of need (ib. 8-9) would fall within Peters' definition. Austerity and formality are admirable characteristics but should not be pursued at all costs: Peters would exclude perhaps half the ancient patronage on which he ostensibly bases his definition, and might find that Cyrenaican Bedouin alone provide a contemporary example. His point that dependence and protection are features of most social relationships is well-taken; but if the only formal barrier he can erect to exclude (say) conjugal relationships

³ It may be worth citing Badian's conclusion of his introductory sketch: 'we must not expect foreign clientelae to conform to one pattern, as ultra-formalistic interpretation of the concept might have persuaded us to do' p. 11.

from the category of patronage also excludes everything else except Sa'adi patrons, then he might be charged with placing too much faith in formalism, too little in common sense. This is not merely a verbal quibble: while it would be relatively easy to find another word for relationships of political and economic dependence in which clients retain their legal personality, any categorisation which separates into different kinds those various political relationships in which inferiority is accepted and then defended by moral suasion - any such categorisation does a disservice to the comparative study of Mediterranean political systems.

So, it is argued here that patronage is a sui generis political form. Its essence is an accepted act of submission involving a superior and an inferior. Its purpose is usually to acquire access to resources. In the Mediterranean it usually co-exists with other forms, and is influenced by them: that is to say that while the content of patronage varies, naturally enough, with the kinds of resources which are at stake, it varies, too, with the general political context in which it exists. It can be shown to be different in fascist states and in democratic ones. It is probably⁴ the case that whether the bureaucracy is Roman-law based or Islamic also affects the content of patronage.

Most patronage in the Mediterranean involves individuals. There is one well-documented case in which patrons are a corporate group, and there are hints of others. There is no known case in which clients are a corporate group, but the possibility should not be excluded. On the northern shore, however, the pattern is usually one in which an individual client contracts with an individual patron. Moreover, there is, with the absence of descent grouping, an absence of the ascription of status: there are no

⁴Diffidence here is the proper consequence of anthropologists' regrettable imprecision about kinds of bureaucracy.

groups from which patrons are drawn exclusively, nor none of clients. Characteristically, men are clients to those above them, while at the same time they patronise their inferiors. Hence the phenomenon, which has drawn a lot of attention, of chains of patronage and of networks of influence.

Patronage is sometimes said to 'be' an extension of friendship or kinship or of some spiritual relation. It is none of these. Rather, they are ways in which the autocracy of local magnates is controlled by the weak. The study of Mediterranean patronage thus reveals a series of checks imposed by clients on their patrons' use of power: it may be friendship, or real or fictitious kinship, or spiritual kinship. In some communities all of these are available to clients; in others, some may be conventionally excluded; in a couple of cases (below p.) no moral restraints are available to check the rapacity of the powerful.⁵

This brief sketch is intended to guide the reader through the rather complex passages which follow. For it is distressing to have to reveal, again, that anthropologists have not been very thorough in their study of Mediterranean patronage; nor have they been sufficiently imbued with comparative intent. While relationships of patronage are recognised to be extremely common, while few books about the northern shore fail to mention the subject,⁶ while the southern littoral has its documented examples, while there is a growing theoretical literature, - nonetheless there is a dearth of detailed cases. Authors may say patronage is important, but are recusant in the face

⁵This is an expansion of Bailey's point: '... it is the suppliant who seeks to make the relationship diffuse: to make it a moral relationship... because it is in his interest to do so'. (1966, 395).

⁶These few include Cronin (1970) (where the term appears in the index but not in the text: it is not absolutely clear that the concept is discussed in the text) and Broegger (1971).

of their plain duty to record examples. No monograph exists, not a single one, in which the author has said that the patrons and clients he studied differ in this or that way from those studied by someone else.⁷ At best, the reader is given cursory examples of little value (e.g. Boissevain, 1966a; Davis, 1969)⁸ for making those distinctions which are essential for identifying the range of phenomena. The task is itself crucial.

The one well-documented example of a case where clients attach themselves to corporate groups is Peters' description of the Bedouin of south-west Cyrenaica (1968). All are sheep and camel herders, owning their herds; but one category, the Sa'adi noblemen, claim ownership of all land and water. The rest of the herding population is called generically Mrabtin as-Sadgan, clients of the fee, and in theory they have access to land and water only when it is conceded to them by collective decision of a Sa'adi tribal section: the concession is annually renewed and may be revoked. In fact a large minority, estimated in the '20s at forty per cent., have land and water which they control; and although they acknowledge client status they have a segmentary organisation like the Sa'adi, would defend their territory against them, and are de facto independent: Peters does not say so, but it is unlikely that they perform services for the Sa'adi. The rest of the Mrabtin have no territory; they are dispersed in groups of from three to six tents which are attached by negotiation to Sa'adi tribal sections. When they are attached they

⁷Weingrod (1968) develops a dynamic model of evolving patronage in Sardinia. On a slightly wider, Welthistorische, scale Blok's learned article makes substantially (and almost simultaneously) the same points (1969). The procedure adopted here - an attempt to compare patronage in a varying political environment - is implicit in their work, and has been developed after careful thought about it. See also Davis (1969, 77-9); Colclough (1969).

⁸An exception is Campbell (1968); see below, p.

are treated as creatures of their patrons: they may be involved in feuds, but only as agents, for it is the Sa'adi who are responsible for the Mrabtins' actions. Clients are liable to make contributions to bloodwealth, to wedding and funeral expenses, and occasional arbitrary levies of grain and wool are made; but although these liabilities check clients' accumulation of moveable wealth Peters argues that their exclusion from political activity depends rather from their lack of real estate - 'the core of the distinction is in property rights' (ib.: 175). Sa'adi get their political strength from weight of numbers, among other things, and it is quicker to acquire a following by granting water-rights than by the chancey venture of procreation. Moreover, water-rights can be withdrawn, allowing the owners to match their numbers to the supply. Groups with no water-rights cannot acquire clients; groups without clients cannot discard members when the rain fails to fall. (ib.: 185).⁹

The decision to allow Mrabtin access to water depends partly on what other needs the Sa'adi group may have to meet: matrilinear kinsmen, for example, have a prior claim. A Sa'adi group, too, may have no particular political ambitions, or may have sufficient strength to do without clients. The demographic characteristics of prospective clients are also considered: a Sa'adi group may require men rather than herds, or vice-versa. Although the Mrabtin may thus seem to be in a precarious position they are not obviously in an inferior one: Peters says that they lack precedence on formal occasions, but are otherwise indistinguishable from their patrons in daily life. The association is less variable than the rainfall. A very few Mrabtin - usually the most isolated individuals - marry women from their host groups and their

⁹Peters says little about the relations of the dispersed client families with the tribes of formal client status from which they have presumably been detached by water-pressure. But he allows one to think that these segmentary groups are in process of becoming Sa'adi - a process, familiar from non-Mediterranean literature, by which people who have acquired the 'secondary' characteristics of dominance (territory, water, segmentary organisation) gradually acquire the proper genealogical credentials. See also Gellner, 1969,

descendants thus acquire matrilateral status.¹⁰

Sa'adi patronage happily provides a general model for it exhibits the essential characteristics, while lacking the more confusing complexities of the other well-documented examples in the Mediterranean. The relationship is contractual. People agree and negotiate the relationship, perhaps more explicitly in Cyrenaica than in Portugal, Italy, Greece, where the assumption of client status is tacit. For example, Campbell describes the way in which important Sarakatsani can get credit from shopkeepers or cheese-merchants, or can establish friendships with officials in their winter-pasture villages and can thus acquire help and influence (1964: Ch. 9). But even when there is an explicit contract to sell milk, there is no explicit contract to become a patron or client: the distinction between a would-be supplicant client and an actual one is shrouded in the ambiguity of a relationship gradually established by trial and error. The contract exists but there is no point at which a client is told, 'Tomorrow you may take up your rights and duties'.

¹⁰ Peters mentions, but does not discuss, other kinds of dependence which he is unwilling to call patronage (1968: 168, 186). One of these is between Sa'adi and Mrabtin bi 'l baraka, holy men granted resources for spiritual services. The somewhat similar acquisitions of land by Berber igurramen lineages in the High Central Atlas described by Gellner (1969) and discussed below (p.) do not create relationships which could reasonably be described as dependence. What Berque describes as patronage des Saints (1955: 268-79) would perhaps no longer be called patronage. Maunier is resonantly inexplicit about the protection afforded by tribal groups to travelling traders in the Maghreb at an unspecified period (1937: 39-40). Lineton discusses the relationship of Niklian aristocratic clans to Achamnomeri immigrants in Mani before 1750, but has only scanty evidence to work with (1971: 186s, 231, 245ss). The material is not mentioned by other writers on Mani (Andromedas, 1968 and Mirambel, 1942). Eberhard (1953b, 1963) describes the relationship between newly settled nomadic transhumant tribal leaders and their followers in S.E. Turkey as 'feudal' but does not explore the possibility that the dependent groups retained corporate identity. Gilsenan (1973), on the other hand, does suggest corporate dependence, but is not concerned with patronage. Albanian material is usually of too early a date to consider the topic.

In general it seems sensible to look for corporate patrons or (more rarely) corporate clients in those Mediterranean societies with unilineal descent groups. In bilateral societies commercial and state corporations are sometimes said to exercise patronage but what is usually meant is that individuals within them may contract with individuals outside them - as indeed, individual Sa'adi may contract with individuals among their matrilateral kin, using corporately owned resources to establish relations of personal support and dependence (1968: 176, 183).

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The relationship is also dynamic. Sa'adi may give their daughters and sisters to Mrabtin as-Sadgan, reducing the distance between the parties, making the tie more stable. This phenomenon is nearly universal in the Mediterranean and appears to occur much more frequently on the northern shore than on the southern. A passage from patronage to friendship to some kind of kinship is reported by every student of the matter. Campbell is the only writer, however, to point out that some kinds of patrons - those whose resource consists in market knowledge used on behalf of producer clients - are more reluctant than others to permit the closer intimacies (1968, especially). Once it is said, it is obvious that the distance-reducing dynamic is variable; but it is not a point which has been much studied.

The relationship is associated with the control of resources: of land and water, as in the case of the Sa'adi; of land which is rented, share-cropped, worked under management in Portugal, Spain, Italy. State resources controlled by elected politicians or by government officers is another source of patronage. Campbell adds market skills possessed by cheese merchants in Zagori, by fruit and vegetable wholesalers in Athens which may induce shepherds and market-gardeners to contract dependence (1968).

The common characteristic of patronage systems which the Sa'adi - Mrabtin as-Sadgan do not exhibit is the free contract. In that part of Cyrenaica potential patrons and potential clients are identified by the status they occupy. True, any Sa'adi section can contract with any Mrabtin family group, but the Mrabtin are always clients, Sa'adi always patrons. On the northern shore, however, any man may patronise any man who is prepared to accept client status: the status itself is contracted; moreover clients may have lesser clients to whom they are patron. The exhaustive classification of the population in Cyrenaica is obviously related to the existence of corporate descent groups, and to the genealogical or legal fiction that all crucial resources are owned

by one category. Bailey (1971c) and Colclough (1971) describe communities in Italy in which the population is divided by a relatively impermeable boundary into gentry and others, and such social distinctions are found in other northern communities; but it is not the case that this distinction coincides with that between the property-owning and the property-less, nor with that between patrons and clients.

In most of the Mediterranean property is unevenly distributed more or less throughout the population. Moreover, what resources are crucial to any category of the population may vary with its economic position, with the consequence that all the way along the economic scale, the poorer are dependent on the richer.¹¹

As Peters describes them, the Sa'adi can never be clients, nor can Mrabtin ever be patrons.¹² Where patron and client are not ascribed statuses, it is possible for a single individual to be a patron to one man, client to another. That possibility makes patronage systems more complex when there is a series of dependencies, as there is when the population is gradually stratified. So, there can be chains of patronage, linking together a pure patron at one end, a pure client at the other, and with intervening men who are both patron and client. But, since patrons usually have more than one client (as the Sa'adi do not, all the clients of a particular tribal section coming from the same family) the chain may be thought of as a cat-o'-nine-tails. In diversified societies, with different kinds of scarce resource controlled by different individuals or officers, moreover, a man may have several patrons: the cat-o'-nine-tails becomes, in this/more complex than the Bedouin example, but it is not an essential difference.

¹¹Tolosana (1966) describes how the poorest people in Belmonte are dependent on all others for work; but the middle-range land-owners are dependent on wealthier farmers for machines which cannot be justified by the scale of medium farms but which are nonetheless essential if the farmer is to make a profit. See above p.

¹²Or: when Mrabtin become patrons they acquire Sa'adi genealogy.

Some idea of this complexity may be got from the examples of patronage at work given by Boissevain from his research in Sicily (1966a). More importantly, Boissevain's accounts give useful information which is a starting point for the comparative analysis of patronage. A student who needed permission to get his thesis accepted after the closing date used intermediaries to get an introduction to the appropriate professor: he promised to help the professor's electoral campaign, and in return his thesis was accepted, and he passed his examination. This case involved an initial approach by the student to a lawyer who was indebted to the student, and who provided him with the first of a series of four introductions.¹³ The second example is of an older man who wanted a job in his town's council offices. The appointment was approved by the town council but had to be confirmed by a provincial committee. In order to secure confirmation the man applied to his commanding officer from army days, and to a lawyer: these two applied 'pressure' (1966a: 27) to the members of the provincial committee, and the man got his job. In the third example a schoolteacher suspected his colleague of giving his son low marks: the son would thus fail to qualify for university entrance, and the schoolteacher's family's prestige would fall. He was able to discover that his colleague had applied pressure on 'an important decision-maker' to exclude the son from university; and was able to apply counter-pressure, from a still more powerful source, leading the decision-maker to change his mind. It seems to have been a pressure he could not resist (1966a: 28 also 1974: 159-60). All these examples involve chains or networks.

The context in which Boissevain places these examples is composed as follows. The electoral system of proportional representation, firstly, tends to create

¹³ This example is also used in (1966b) and in (1969) where further details are included, and where the whole is given a different theoretical framework. Boissevain's most recent use of this data is in (1974) 150-3.

near-equality between parties at local and regional levels: 'small parties and factions began to play a role out of proportion to their numerical strength' because the larger parties needed support in their struggle to defeat each other (1966b: 228). Electoral support and voting support in councils thus acquire exceptional value, and electors and men who can control electors are correspondingly important. Small parties and factions are similarly able to drive hard bargains by offering or threatening to switch their support. The argument is that the needs of politicians in a particular political system compel them to enter the arena of patronage. They are able to do this because of another ingredient of context, which Boissevain discusses under the heading 'maladministration' (ib.: 231-3). This refers to the possibilities created by 'the lack of tight control over the town's government' (ib.: 232): the argument is that were the checks on municipal administration stronger the politicians would not be able to do what they do do with it: between 1958 and 1963, twenty-one new posts were created to accommodate the clients of important patrons, increasing the establishment by fifty per cent. In the same period the municipal debt increased by one thousand per cent., from 30m. Lire to 310m. Lire, partly the consequence of the inability of a weak administration to collect taxes from a changeable electorate. It is worth noting that the weakness of the state is also said to be the cause root of the power of mafia in Sicily.

The almost perfect equilibrium of this particular mixture of patronage, party and bureaucracy is illustrated by Boissevain's final discussion of the reasons politicians do not use their positions to secure development funds for their towns. Because bureaucracy is weak, decisions are made slowly as conflicting pressures are resolved. Because proportional representation creates weak coalitions, no politician can be sure that he will be in power when funds eventually come through. But if he is replaced by an opponent or rival, that

man will be able to use the funds to extend his clientele and to secure his electoral position. Because votes can be secured by patronage, therefore, no politician is prepared to use his position to provide the means of patronage to his rivals.

This example illustrates the interaction of particular kinds of party and bureaucracy, and to some extent makes the content of patronage relationships in Leone intelligible. In Portugal the state is of a different kind, there is only one party with any weight in the rural areas, and patronage, too, has a different aspect. Cutileiro(1971) describes Vila Velha, an administrative agglomeration of scattered settlements in the grain-growing 'Mediterranean' area of Portugal: it had a population of just under sixteen hundred in 1965.

Apart from 40 men who work in a paper-mill, the population is to all intents dependent on agriculture. The majority of inhabitants have also been dependent on landowners for supplements to their own resources. At the turn of the century magnates were in electoral competition with each other, and to secure votes they used their resources lavishly: in addition to supplying land for sharecropping (which they still do) they paid indemnities to obtain their supporters' children's release from military service, they gave away houses and garden-plots (1971: 214-22). But the consolidation of the Portuguese corporate state after 1926 assured the magnates' local domination,¹⁴ and they used to to prevent changes which might diminish the dependence of the peasantry: they resisted irrigation and emigration; they checked the spread of schools and prevented the establishment of factories (ib.: 189-200). When estates changed hands, the new owner could turn his predecessor's sharecroppers

¹⁴Gower Chapman's account of Milocca suggests that the period following the creation of a fascist state is one in which factions struggle to get control of local party organisation: the motherland is suddenly found to have only one teat, and her children fight over who should sell the milk (1973: 5-10).

distribution of social goods is also affected. Vila Velha magnates demand attainment of moral standards; Leone magnates seek votes. Portuguese patrons can get access to government resources without controlling votes, because the government has no need of votes; and they are able to deny resources to peasants, such as schools, irrigation, factories, which in Sicily are more widely distributed. If Boissevain had been more concerned with workers, less with students, council clerks and schoolteachers, it might have been possible to contrast agricultural contracts and employment in the two communities: but he was not; and the contrast which Cutileiro provides between pre- and post-1926 Vila Velha must be supplemented from other sources.

Pitt-Rivers describes patronage in a one party state at a time when Andalusia had not been fully penetrated by the world market in grains (1961: 35).¹⁵ The land was unevenly distributed, and there were a variety of ways in which Alcalenos got their living from it (above:).

The distinctions between labourers are almost certainly associated with patronage by senoritos, with the attempt to extract favours from those in a position to grant them. In the old days, too, tenants had no legal rights of continuity, and security of tenure was probably then a favour, as access to tenancy was in the '50s. Even the casual labourers employed by small farmers from time to time probably tried to establish moral dependency (ib.: 44-5). Pitt-Rivers is not explicit, however. Pitt-Rivers quotes an old farmer: 'When they ask me to vote, I ask who for, and when they tell me who for, I vote. And if they don't ask me to vote, I stay at home and mind my own business' (ib.: 159). Curiously enough, Pitt-Rivers does not indicate who 'they'

¹⁵The paperbound edition of People of the Sierra contains no direct statement of when the study was made. Such disregard for current convention dates even a timeless classic as from before 1955. The author's biographical entry in the handbook of the Association of Social Anthropologists of Great Britain and the Commonwealth confirms that the fieldwork was done from 1949-52.

are: in Alcala they are probably, as they are certainly elsewhere, the local magnates, patrons.

The population contains a number of men who are senoritos, patrons, employers, bosses: schooled and educated, generous, they hold themselves apart from the pueblo accepting neither drinks nor considerable favours from people who rank lower than they: using the familiar form of address to their inferiors and exacting formality from them. The senorito 'looks after his dependents and uses his influence to protect them. He willingly accepts to be patron to them'. (ib.: 75-6).

What do patrons typically do? Pitt-Rivers is not exhaustive, and does not relate the social distinction of senorito to that of employer and employee, to the ways in which land is exploited. For example, there were some 500-odd labourers in Alcala. A few of these were permanently employed by landowners; slightly more were employed for periods of a week or so; most worked from day to day, contracting with an employer the evening before they went out to work: this majority scrapes along 'working seven days a week when there is work in order to feed a large family, dreading the long weeks of rain when no wages are paid and bread must be begged from the baker on credit' (1961: 59).

A major mill-owner and patron in Alcala was involved in a lengthy dispute over water rights (1961: 141-54) against two main opponents. One of them, Curro, attacked his arbitrary proceedings openly, found his way blocked, and eventually lost. The other, Juanito, negotiated secretly, got compensation and only at the eleventh hour went to court: the mill-owner, out-maneuvred, lost the case. Pitt-Rivers' account is of a wealthy and powerful man who can fix things to his own advantage: municipal clerks reject applications for summonses; Curro's neighbours provide him with information so that he can anticipate Curro's next move (ib.: 207). The powerful patron can use his clients to isolate his enemy and to cut them off from law, as well as from water. Now, although Pitt-Rivers tells his story in a chapter

on authority, as an illustration of the way in which patronage mediates formal state authority, it is clear that the manipulations by patronage in this case were successful because they were based on a general stratum, bedrock, of willing clientage: clients bear tales, farmers and millers need water, labourers need work. Where there is scarcity of resources, men can establish a moral dependence to get access to them - even, if need be, going to church (1961: 51).

Campbell (1964) describes the patronage relationships of Sarakatsani shepherds in Greece; and in a later article (1968) he contrasts some of these with the relationships of peasant market-gardeners and wholesalers in the Athens fruit and vegetable market. Sarakatsani shepherds are transhumant between their summer mountain homes and the plains villages of Zagori where they rent land by contracts which have to be annually renewed. They are dependent on the Presidents of their winter villages for access to the ever-scarcer pastures. They are dependent on the Presidents of their home summer villages for various services, most notably a formal certificate of freedom from debt which they must secure before they move out for the winter, certificates for the Agricultural Bank, and other documents (1964: 224-9), and also on lawyers who settle their disputes, on shopkeepers who give them credit, and on the cheese merchants who grant credit against milk from their sheep. With these, Campbell says, they have no ties apart from common citizenship and shared humanity: 'in Greek society this is not an adequate basis for ... social obligations' (1964: 246). With these, therefore, the Sarakatsani create ties through spiritual kinship (see pp.) gift-giving and their own wary brand of friendship.

Friendship is initiated and maintained by a continuing exchange of favours and goods, which are carefully accounted. It is the Sarakatsani who initiate relationships of spiritual kinship: it is probably the Sarakatsani who initiate friendships with outsiders, and probably most of their friendships are mostly with outsiders: they are normally hostile to unrelated Sarakatsani, and they

do not need to be friendly with their kinsmen. The Sarakatsanos can only offer his vote in exchange for friendship - an unambiguous acknowledgement of dependence on the President. Some Presidents think they are independent of support from Sarakatsani voting power, and treat the shepherds roughly; others use Sarakatsani to swing an election where their local strength is uncertain. A President who needs Sarakatsani friends can assure himself of more votes by choosing them among those shepherds who themselves have followings. For the influential Sarakatsanos documents and certificates arrive without delay; the better grazing land is allocated to them, there are errors in the head-count of sheep when the shepherd's liability to rent is assessed. They drink publicly with the President and, although their inferiority to him is clearly marked, they gain in the eyes of other shepherds who see the outward sign of favour, and envy the advantages which flow (1964: 233).

Shepherds also make routine placatory gifts to Presidents, as well as special gifts when they are in a particular trouble. The gifts, Campbell says, must be presented with finesse: 'a man of honour is not to be crudely bought by social inferiors' (1964: 235). But even so, gifts are less effective means of getting favours than clientage is, especially perhaps because gifts are usually ad hoc.

Similar kinds of relationship are established by some Sarakatsani with veterinaries, teachers, town councillors, members of Parliament. The goods and services exchanged may vary slightly from case to case: the acceptance of subordination does not, nor does the demand for special treatment. With cheese merchants the content of the relationship is much more specific: milk is supplied against credit - essential credit if the shepherd is to maintain good standing among other Sarakatsani. Of course, some cheese merchants are important men with influence on Presidents, members of Parliament and the rest, so that the distinction between cheese merchants and other patrons is not

absolute. Nevertheless, credit is the basis and point of departure of the relation.

The shepherd's year has a number of constraining points: before he moves from mountain to plain (in early November) and from plain to mountain (in early May) he must settle his debts for grazing. The regulations of the Agricultural Bank allow the shepherds to borrow 15s. per sheep, at 6%, but the loan must be fully repaid for a period of twenty days within the period July-October. The sheep themselves are productive chiefly from early February to May, although the sheep produce milk in lesser quantities until mid-July; male lambs are sold off at Easter. Easter and late summer are times for marriages and betrothals. The cheese merchants, by making cash advances twice yearly, permit the shepherds to meet other debts, and to make sumptuary expenditure. So, in August they advance against winter milk, for an accounting which is held in May. This advance allows the shepherd to repay his loan to the Agricultural Bank for the statutory twenty days; and he uses the re-borrowed money from the Agricultural Bank to pay pasturage dues. In May the cheese merchants advance money again, for an accounting in June, and this cash is used to settle the debts for winter pasture, to buy clothes, to payoff debts with mountain storekeepers when the shepherds arrive in Zagori. The merchants' credits thus permit the Sarakatsani 'to live honourably in their traditional way of life', and each party clearly recognises this (1968: 150). The advantage to the merchants of having an assured supply of milk is such that they borrow the money to advance to the shepherds at 10% - an interest which is not passed on.

The merchants may make other loans to the shepherds. In the winter shepherds usually have a lean time, and may try to extract supplementary advances from the merchants. These, when they are given, are given in kind, and the cost of the loan is passed on to the shepherd by charging flour, say, at a higher price than its quality warrants. These different conditions for supplementary loans mark out two aspects of the merchant-shepherd relationship:

the merchants appear to recognise a traditional obligation to support Sarakatsani, to enable them to be Sarakatsani; but they temper this with a reluctance to become too closely tied to them; it is only wealthy Sarakatsani who succeed in getting merchants to accept the diffuse obligations of patronage, although the merchants can make trouble with village Presidents and officials, for a shepherd who crosses them (1964: 254-5).

Campbell's final example is of peasant producers who pay a commission to wholesalers for selling their fresh fruit and vegetables in the Athens market; about three-quarters of all fruit and vegetables are sold in this way. It is well-known that the wholesalers are fraudulent: their expenses are inflated, their bills of sale record lower prices than they received. But the producers have to get their perishable goods sold quickly; and they 'are afraid to take a strong line with their wholesale merchant because they fear that they will lose their market outlet' (1968: 151). The peasant's strategy in this case is to accept the fraudulent procedures of the wholesaler, to continue to sell through him, in the hope of eventually establishing a personal relationship and of consequently being defrauded less. Indeed, says Campbell, the wholesalers may sometimes be constrained by the need to ensure continuity of supplies, and thus 'exercise a small measure of self-restraint' in particular cases (1968: 152).

In these two works Campbell presents fine analyses of what might be called failed approaches to patronage. True, some Sarakatsani may succeed in creating a solid and enduring relationship of subordination to their village presidents or cheese merchants, but most shepherds are uninfluential and have to approach resource-controlling outsiders through other Sarakatsani, through intermediaries; and the Athenian wholesalers appear to have no permanent ties with their clients. For the majority of the shepherds and peasants, the relationships they have are never secure enough.

From the wholesale market in Athens to the desert of Western Cyrenaica, to the plains of eastern Portugal, men take up postures of subordination in order to gain access to resources - to market expertise, to water, to dried milk from welfare agencies. Submission to a patron is commoner in the Mediterranean than bureaucracy, and than fascism, communism, or any of the varieties of democracy: it can exist without any of them, and co-exists with all of them. It is an independent sui generis mode of political representation.

Some writers have written about patronage as if it were one particular manifestation of itself - as if one particular infiltration of the state by patronage in one particular local community were what Mediterranean patronage is. But it should now be apparent that the hardcore of patronage is a contractual act of submission which has chameleon characteristics, indeed taking shape as well as colouring from its surroundings. To say, as so many have done, that patronage is one of its particular forms betrays a regrettable lack of comparative intent.

Another kind of narrow vision results in assertions that patronage is not itself at all, but, rather, kinship or friendship or spiritual kinship, or a mixture of these. So Pitt Rivers speaks of 'lop-sided' friendship:

'It is a commonplace that you can get nothing done in Andalusia save through friendship The more friends a man can claim the greater his sphere of influence; the more influential his friends are the more influence he has So while friendship is in the first place a free association between equals, it becomes in a relationship of economic inequality the foundation of the system of patronage. The rich man employs, assists and protects the poor man, and in return the latter works for him, gives him esteem and prestige, and also protects his interests The relationship of padrino and hombre de confianza is a kind of lop-sided friendship from which the element of simpatia is by no means excluded' (1961: 140).

The theme is taken up by Campbell. The Sarakatsani may have 'true friends' among their cousins (1964: 100-2), but friendship is characteristic of those useful relations of inequality which cross the boundaries of the shepherding community: village Presidents are friends.

'In asymmetrical friendships, since it is assumed that the patron has more favours to offer than the client can return, or that reciprocal favours are so dissimilar in quality that accountancy is difficult, there is often greater stability than in friendships between equals, which are very frequently bedevilled by accusations of ingratitude.' (ib.: 233).

Finally Wolf, in an important article (1966) identified those political groupings which arise in a communities peripheral to complex societies. He contrasts corporate groups with ego-centred coalitions - kinship networks, instrumental friendships, patronage. This last, he says, shares some characteristics of the other two: trust, affection, are necessary to maintain all of them; they are all many-stranded. Patronage is distinguished, however, because 'the two partners no longer¹⁶ exchange equivalent goods and services': it is lop-sided friendship again. It would be hard to deny that there is some similarity between patronage and friendship. Equally, people have pointed out that patron is etymologically related to pater, father; and, in private conversation they can be heard to say that systems of patronage are out-growths of kinship: a kind of extension which is crystallized in those communities where god-parenthood is used as a political form. But etymologies do not make good bases for

¹⁶The locution 'no longer' is echoed elsewhere in his article: 'At this point... kinship merges with ... friendship' (1966: 10); 'When instrumental friendship reaches a maximal point of imbalance ... friendships give way to the patron-client tie' (ib.: 16). It is perhaps suitable to imagine that Wolf is running through a series of categories his analytic eye distinguishes, than that he is getting up a model of the development of a relationship. So, 'merging', 'no longer', 'giving way' 'reaches', would refer to areas of overlap between categories, not to the gradual evolution of a particular patronage tie. It is in this sense that the phrases '... in the first place ... It becomes ...' in the passage just cited from Pitt-Rivers should also be understood.

structural analysis; and to concentrate on particular concatenations of notions does not help to solve problems of comparison. And if patronage is to be called kinship, of one kind or another, what about Campbell's distinction between kinship - which is intra-community - and friendship which (apart from 'true' friendship) always crosses community boundaries, and at the solicitation of the Sarakatsani themselves?¹⁷ Friendship, kinship, spiritual kinship are secondary characteristics of patronage which is fundamentally no more than subordination and superordination by contract: the secondary accretions are a protective colouring imposed by the powerless to mitigate the consequences of their dependence. Such attempts at control are understandably derived from the common moral and religious categories of the communities: and they vary in their mixture and kind so that the extent to which one or other is used is idiosyncratic, particular to villages, nations, religions. They vary, too, in their success: except in those cases where patronage is associated with democratic political systems it is normal for clients to solicit friendship - or whatever - from their patrons; it is very rare for patrons spontaneously to limit their power with moral or spiritual obligations. Campbell's examples of wholesalers and of cheese merchants show clearly that it is clients who try to set the dynamic, distance-reducing forces in motion (above p.). It may be that the peculiarly weak position of political patrons in democratic systems is the reason they

¹⁷ However a careful reading of Campbell does not support the equation of patronage with friendship: some kinship is patronage, too. 'If through wealth or influence a man is in a position to act as a general protector of his kindred, not only is he expected to do so, but this, in most cases, is his wish' (1964: 99). An outside friend expects Sarakatsani clients to mobilise their kindreds on his behalf (ib.: 231). Together with the episodes described at pp. 98-9 and 108-9 this suggests that patronage permeates the Sarakatsani's social relations. Companies (stani) had two terms of reference: they could also be called tselingato 'When the speaker was more concerned with the relations of dependence and co-operation between the tselingas (i.e. leader) and his followers' (ib: 17). And the ideal tselingas attracted 'kinsmen or affines who have no brothers, cannot agree with them, or whose brothers are not sufficiently wealthy or influential to remain together' (ib.: 93). The consequence of such attraction was to enhance the power (in terms of men and sheep) of the leader. So, the easy equation of friendship and patronage, and their distinction from kinship and equality, do not hold.

accept moral ties with their clients; why, too, state resources tend to be more widely distributed in these societies than in others.

Just as the essence of patronage is not caught by the terms nepotist and blackleg, so neither is it caught by kinship, friendship, godparenthood.

There remain three points about patronage which can be dealt with briefly.

The first concerns the ideological basis for patronage. It is sometimes said that the communion of patron saints provides a spiritual justification for earthly corruption (e.g. Boissevain 1966b). There are several objections to this. One is that it ^{is} vague because those elements of social organisation which the panoply justifies are not clearly specified: some patrons, the majority, are local dispensers of goods with no outside contacts, or negligible ones. They are not intermediaries as the members of the communion are. In other words, most Mediterranean people's experience of patronage does not usually involve intermediaries; the argument that heavenly patrons are a reflection or a continuation of mundane ones thus has to obscure a discrepancy between the two systems; and perhaps that is why the argument is so often couched in terms of patronage being the way in which communities are linked to nations. The second vagueness is that eschatology is also variable: descriptions of the panoply is never precise enough for the reader to understand how the variations in the heavenly worlds of the Mediterranean are related to differences round the sea. This is only to be expected: if Mediterranean anthropologists never write that the system of earthly patronage they have studied differs in this or that respect from the one someone else has studied, still less do they compare systems of heavenly patronage. Of course, it would be odd if an accepted cosmology did not correspond in important ways with the accepted ways of getting access to resources; but at the moment the fit between cosmology and practice has not been shown to be tight. Greek Orthodoxy provides no contrast with Catholicism, still less with Islam. The festivals of patron saints in Valdemora (Freeman 1970, Ch. 4)

celebrate the solidarity of a community which has no patronage. Finally the postulate of cosmological continuity or reflection encourages vagueness in the analysis of political systems. Because it is very difficult for anthropologists to discover what does in fact go on in those echelons of party or bureau above the level of local community, they tend to treat, say, the higher cadres of the falange as analogous to saints - unknowable dispensers of goods; they tend to treat the Prefect as a deus ex machina, and the Minister as a version of virgin. This is unfortunate since the unknowability of god and his circle is of a different order from the unknowability of party functionaries, and to assimilate them is relegate to the social construction of reality things which are not merely defined as real (Stirling 1968). It is a fair charge that much more could have been known by now about the reality of what goes on beyond the hyphen of community - nation relationships if anthropologists had not been lulled into vagueness by the doctrine of cosmological continuity (Davis: forthcoming). The second brief point is that those who attribute the origins or causes of patronage to the imperfect industrialization of Mediterranean communities, to their imperfect integration into national economies, (Schneider J. 1971b; Graziani 1974) are wrong. At most, they could explain the particular forms which patronage takes at a particular time in a particular place: at best, by showing the adaptability of patronage they could explain its persistence. Patronage is autonomous and flexible: it existed before national economies seriously impinged on local communities, and was adapted to meet them as they grew in local significance. Patronage, as it is defined in this book, is a near-universal form of manipulation which cannot be explained by referring to its particular manifestations.

The same remarks apply to the explanations of patronage which rely on its functions in articulating community-nation relationships. These explanations are of two kinds: the earlier, originating with Pitt-Rivers, emphasises the functions of patronage within the community: 'Through the system of patronage

the will of the state is adapted to the social structure of the pueblo' (1961: 155). The other, implicit in Wolf, is developed by Silverman (1965) and to some extent by Boissevain (1966b); it emphasises the role of patrons as intermediaries between the rusticity of the towns and villages, and the urbanity of the state: patrons are men who have the ear of provincial and national officer holders, therefore they are important men. The theories seem to rest, in each case, on the recognition that local communities are imperfectly integrated into the nation-state, and that, in a hostile world, the peasantry needs someone to alleviate its harshness. Often not much is said about the harshnesses of the outside world in a way which would allow them to be compared. Those descriptions which exist (Boissevain; 1966b; Campbell; 1964) frequently rely on accounts of the perceptions of the peasantry, seldom attempt to escape beyond the construction of reality. There is, of course, no doubt that patronage does bend the will of the state, does aid villagers in their adventures in the outside world: but this function is pre-dated by others, and the examples given cannot explain more than the particular configuration of patronage at a particular time.

3. Real Politics

What has been discussed so far are instances of the operation of analytic isolates: examples of people trying to influence decisions and to gain access to resources in each of the three modes identified as commonest in the Mediterranean. There is no doubt that shudders will have gone down the spine of any ethnographer who has just read the seamless texture of his or her account of politics in x, or y, or z, so violated in the preceding pages. Such accounts are clearly created with exquisite scrupulosity, an earnest and often successful determination to convey the precise texture, the feel of political activity or of this or that aspect of political activity, in the societies ethnographers have studied and loved. But - but: comparison requires a different approach and it is necessary to try to sort out the reasons why the feel of politics varies from society to society.

It will come as little surprise to any reader who has followed the argument so far to discover that the way to sort out the reasons is to examine the mix of class, bureaucracy and patronage in each of the various communities. To put this crudely - and it would be a lifetime's work to try to put it any other way - some understanding of variation can be got by assessing the salience of each of these three elementary forms in the political activities of any particular community; and by trying to pin down the precise nature of the bureaucracy, the kind of patronage, the sophistication of class struggle, in the various communities.

This section, then, is an attempt to analyse some real politics in these terms, and to show the relation between the analytical concepts and real life political activity: it is scarcely possible or desirable to classify all Mediterranean political life in terms of the weighting to be given to the three factors, under their various kinds; but it may serve to demonstrate a concern with the seamless web of the quality of life, as well as the utility of the analysis, if one or two examples are now presented to the reader.

The first is taken from Cohen's study of Arab villages in Israel (1965: 60-8): it is what he calls the case of the labour exchange office, and concerns the local branch of the Histadrut¹⁸ in Bint el-Hadud. The man appointed secretary in 1951 was 'Uthman Barham, a member of the leading patrilineage (hamula) of the village, and of one dominant family within it: his father, for example, was mukhtar, headman of Bint el-Hadud. The office was new: the Histadrut had only just opened its branch in the village and 'Uthman was able to make what he could of it - he invented the role of Secretary, so far as the village was concerned.

'Within a short time, 'Uthman managed to concentrate in his hands tremendous power, as he became the man who could virtually hire and fire hundreds of village labourers. As an employment officer, he received orders for labour from the regional labour exchange centres, or direct from employers, and he himself distributed the jobs. In due course he became the intermediary between the labourers and the local representatives of the Military governor of the area. His word decided whether or not a man would get a military permit for working outside the border area' (1965: 61).

'Uthman excited resentment, he was said to favour members of his hamula over others, and disappointed labourers complained to their elders, who in turn brought the matter up with the mukhtar at their formal meetings. The mukhtar, 'Uthman's father, took little heed, and the Secretary seemed secure enough in his oppression. However, a slight recession in the local labour market

¹⁸ Histadrut: a syndicate of labour unions, originally limited to Jewish Israeli workers but compelled to admit Arab Israelis who otherwise undercut the high wage-rates achieved by the syndicate. Membership of any Union is achieved only by membership of the Histadrut. Although unions of all political colours are affiliated, it is dominated by the socialist-liberal MAPAI party. It has acquired para-state tasks, running labour exchanges, schools, hospitals and banks as well as farms and factories which in 1959 constituted 30% of capital wealth; 70% of all agricultural produce in Israel was produced on Histadrut farms, and one third of the total population belonged. Cohen 1965: 25, 154.

had the consequence that 'Uthman had to sack a number of men, and when it was thought that here again he discriminated against members of other hamula than his own, he was beaten up by aggrieved labourers, petitions were presented to the Histadrut head office, and delegations called there too: these latter courses were adopted by members of other hamula, some of which had been closely allied to the Barham group for some time, but which now broke away and challenged Barham supremacy within the village. The mukhtar and his son, they said, were Jewish stooges who betrayed the Arabs to enhance their private position. Members of Israeli opposition parties fanned the flames: the mukhtar and his son were supported by MAPAI, they said, and that was a reason for voting against MAPAI when the time came. The MAPAI saw its support dwindling, and curbed 'Uthman: a committee of representatives of all the hamula in Bint el-Hudud was set up; they received notification of the jobs available from 'Uthman, and distributed them pro rata among the hamula, notifying 'Uthman of their decisions: he then reported back to his superiors.

Cohen locates this incident in an elaborate context: the incorporation of the village into the national economy diminished the control of leading families within the village. The general increase in prosperity which resulted caused a decline in the importance of what Cohen calls class, and an increase in egalitarianism: certainly, consumption patterns altered. The declining Barham family relied on state functions, devolved through the Histadrut, to recapture their eroded dominance, but in doing so they made themselves a liability to MAPAI. At the same time, overtures made by opposition parties led the elders of the hamula to realise that they could extract benefits if only they could control votes; and the solution to the 'Uthman problem, proposed by the elders and accepted by the Histadrut, in fact consolidated the position of hamula elders. Together with other incidents, the case of the labour exchange office was part of a general trend away from class towards a re-emergence of patrilineal organisation adopting administrative and electoral

tasks.

Turn now to Bailey's account of the local elections in Losa in 1968 (1973b). There, a mayor (sindaco) had lost the support of those elected to the town council with him, and, in the elections called by provincial authority to remedy the situation, he allied himself with the right wing in competition with his erstwhile supporters who drew themselves up with the left. Various notables - a bank manager, an ex-partisan international business executive - thus found themselves on the same side as local socialists. They denounced the rightists and their leader, for corruption (fairly standard practice, this), proclaimed against the electoral symbol they had adopted (a cross with the motto 'our one hope of salvation'), and fairly justifiably claimed to have more contacts in the higher reaches of government than their opponents. The leftists made one false move which lost them the election, in Bailey's opinion: they tried to insist that there should be public debate, with loudspeakers, in the square, on the issues confronting the electorate and on the record in local government of the two groups. It was a false move because the rightists refused have such a debate, and this provoked the leftists into unseemly behaviour in their attempts to force one on the speakers from the right. There were various episodes, indeed, but Bailey thinks, and there is no reason to doubt his judgement, that the very proposal to have public debates was profoundly inconsistent with local ideas, and created a repugnance which the episodes merely confirmed. It was not the proposal in itself which was offensive, for there are public debates in provincial and national elections; nor was it the probability that debate would promote scurrility: for defamatory scandal circulated, as it always did, by word of mouth and on posters, signed and unsigned. Rather it was the combination of debate, thought quite proper for political occasions, with local elections which was discrepant and innovatory, and offensive. It was offensive because politics - in the restricted sense of electoral activity - was considered inconsistent with village harmony: politics is divisive, and is

in any case associated with the outside world - with the powers seen to be responsible for the decline of a community vis-a-vis the nation as a whole. Losesi were collectively on the defensive against the political world, and here was a group of Leftists (and fairly ambiguously left some were) who emphasised their contacts with provincial authority, who were associated with the (wide-horizoned) partisans, and who attempted to introduce practices which connoted outsiders, men sowing disruption. They voted, therefore, for the inarticulate, graceless, arrogant and bullying rightist, their ex-mayor, and for his neo-Fascist associates.¹⁹

The third and last²⁰ case is that of the attempted coup by the military in Morocco in 1971. This is analysed in detail by Waterbury (1973b), and - although it took him by surprise - it fits in to his earlier analysis (1970) of Moroccan elite politics. Some guidance is also given by Gellner (1973) Coram (1973b) and Marais (1973b). True, Gellner is concerned with rural rebellion, and that in the period before the elite groups involved in the bloodshed at Skhirat were firmly established; but Waterbury's fine analysis of the factional organisation of Moroccan politics (1970, Ch. 3) links Gellner's discussion of local segmentation to the processes of central government. Briefly, the rotation and complementarity of local groups (above p.) provides Waterbury with his 'primordial factions' - ones to which recruitment is by membership of territorial or descent groups or marriage alliance, and occasionally by membership of religious groups. The balance of power which more or less obtains in conditions of 'pure' siba is replicated at analytically higher levels

¹⁹ For similar examples of the unwillingness of villagers to politicize their internal relations see Loizos (forthcoming); Cohen cit.

²⁰ In the final version of this section Littlewood's forthcoming article will also be discussed.

of segmentation; mixed factions are recruited chiefly by reference to objective interests: they are clientele groups borrowing personnel and ideology from primordial groups, but having material goals, and a high proportion of what Bailey would call followers, rather than core-members. As Waterbury points out, such clientele groups may be thought of as the makhzen equivalent of siba-primordial factions - although there is now no particular geographical distinction in the distribution of these two kinds. Finally, interest-oriented factions, again controlled and recruited through clientelae, are those which have the additional form of political parties, labour unions, chambers of commerce and the like, or of currents within them.

The subtlety of Waterbury's account of the coup is that the rebels are shown to have been acting on these three levels simultaneously. The conspirators were mostly Berbers, and they used cadet soldiers, not regular units, to carry out the massacre - which may or may not have been intended; 'the scene as described evokes images of the traditional tribal razzia, the sweeps against decaying regimes so perceptively analysed by Ibn Khaldun centuries ago' (Waterbury 1973c: 410). The chief conspirator appears to have been General Medbuh who had recently returned from a fact-finding mission to the United States where he had discovered that the civilian wing of the regime had been involved in large-scale corruption to which the army had no access, and from which the King took no cut: although doubtless Waterbury is correct when he says that disgust at endemic corruption was an important motive of the conspirators (1973a: 49), it also seems important, to a non-Moroccanist, that this, together with the Swiss ore-exporting fraud, was unofficial corruption (endemic but not planned, in Waterbury's terms); and that the civilians involved were treated leniently (1973c: 401). To a military elite which depended on stalemate (as Waterbury calls Gellner's 'balance of power' when manifest at the higher echelons of factional segmentation), this could only signify that the balance of royal favour was being tipped against them, that their position in the stalemate was

being undermined. Moreover the balance within the Berber military elite seems to have been unstable: regular units were not used in the coup, and there was a suspicion that Arab junior officers were themselves likely to revolt, putting Berber generals at risk. Finally, it seems impossible to imagine that some of the generals' resentment was not expressed in terms of the threat to the professional status of the military. As Waterbury says, senior officers may have accepted their frequent and transitory postings while they were rewarded with the fruits of patronage; but French-trained professional soldiers, with their position in the patrimonial patronage system apparently threatened, would surely have expressed their fears in these terms.²¹

So, the coup-razzia occurred after the military exposure of private civilian corruption and after the lenient treatment of the culprits (Waterbury 1973c: 401); in the name of purity the coup leaders announced, prematurely, that they had destroyed a corrupt regime. The ambivalence of the Berber cadets - were they against the king or against the corruption which surrounded him? - had the consequence that they swung round in the middle of the coup in the palace, and 'betrayed' their officers. Although it was inevitable that the officers should be Berbers (since most officers were Berber),²² the coup displayed characteristic forms of loyalty derived from Waterbury's second and third types of factionalism: some Berber senior officers, pre-empting an expected coup by Arab junior officers, attacked the King to destroy a civilian rival elite group in an incident which clearly got out of hand, turning into a razzia.

²¹So, Medbuhhad already resigned from government in protest at political attacks on the military, in 1960 (Coram, 1973b: 426). Of Ababou, Coram writes 'No doubt he stands for the new generation of officers, without a colonial past or special links to the Monarchy ...' ib.427.

²²cp. Coram 1973b: 425-6. The coup was not solely Berber, nor were all Berbers involved, but, as in the rebellions of 1956-9 and in the Mouvement Populaire, 'the Berbers were there'. So, the influential insistence by Waterbury that it was not 'a Berber coup' seems misguided: there were Berbers who behaved like Berbers; and Moroccans have treated Berbers with reserve since (Marais, 1973c.)

These three case histories are each unique examples of political activity in unique settings: an ethnic minority on a troubled frontier; a declining mountain village in the Italian alps; a political elite group - a rejection of the pretensions of a powerful family to control a labour exchange; an election; a failed coup d'etat: what could be more different? Each incident has its own flavour, its own multiple linkages with a unique political culture and a national society. It would be foolish to suggest that analysis in terms of the three elementary forms proposed here can or should eliminate these differences. Nevertheless, and without claiming too much, it may be helpful to look at them while bearing in mind factors which are not purely Moroccan or Italian or Israeli-Arab ones. An analysis in terms of who does what to whom is not comparative, and the reader is left with three distinct impressions.

So: is it acceptable to compare these three incidents? In the Moroccan coup the state bureaucracy is 'patrimonial' - it is an out and out instrument of patronage, and is officially so: only the military seem to have any inkling that it might be otherwise, and the statements they make to this effect are inspired, not only by their awareness of greater Weberianism overseas, and by nascent professional defensiveness, but by the threat which civilian administrators and entrepreneurs pose to their position within the patronage system. When the officers take action, they mobilise 'mixed factions' - clientele groups which are largely recruited through ethnic and familial relationships. There is no question, yet, of class-struggle, though Waterbury - in an article written ^{before} ~~after~~ the coup - is prepared to predict it for the future. Cohen recounts an incident in which men reject the opportunity offered by a para-state bureaucracy to act as individuals and to become the personal clients of a class-superior. They do not accept the personal claim of 'Uthman and his father to act as intermediaries with the labour organisation. Their method is to present petitions to the bureaucracy itself, asserting their independence of 'Uthman in terms of the bureaucracy's own notions of impartiality - to

invoke the official norms of conduct; and also to interest political parties, with votes at stake in a coming election, in this case which they present as exploitative and unjust action by a government agency dominated by the labour party. Their solution is to set up a committee which will distribute jobs pro rata, according to the numerical strength of descent groups which are given equal representation on the committee. It is a beautiful example of rejection of the differentiation which patronage requires, of the individualisation of class, and of re-affirmation of the significance of group membership and of the construed, nominal, equality of groups. Finally, the Losesi, described by Bailey, maintain a distinction between political elections and administrative ones: they, too, reject the attempt to import state and party patronage into the community: that is the proper consideration in elections to provincial and central government, but it is divisive, and it should stop beyond the threshold of community affairs. The candidates are not presented in party groups, but in coalitions of those who will and those who will not have good contacts with the outside sources of patronage: Losesi opt for the insiders. 'We are all equal here' they say to outsiders.

Now it must be admitted that this is scarcely an adequate analysis: the reader may wish to modify and even to add new elementary forms; and more examples are needed to establish how the shifting kaleidoscopic patterns of class-struggle, bureaucracy and patronage appear within the same political community on different occasions. This is freely admitted. Nevertheless, poor and gauche as it is, it is necessary to insist that some activity of this kind is required if accounts of Mediterranean politics are to be comparable one with another. It is enchanting and stimulating to read a good ethnographic account of politics in x or y, written by a wise and loving anthropologist; but that is not enough, and the jejuneness of the present account may at least demonstrate that.

It is interesting to enquire now whether or not or in what degree the trichotomy is practically useful? Does it help when the analyst is pushed, as he is always sensible of being pushed, into making moral judgements, political

predictions, reassuring noises? In short, when someone says - That's all very well, but what about corruption and nation-building, and modernisation, and political mobilisation and the creation of revolutionary consciousness among the not-yet-for-itself Mediterranean proletariat? What about justice? - when someone, in fact usually different people, asks that kind of question, does the trichotomising analyst cease his wool-gathering, put away his pattern, and become an ordinary moralising mortal again? It goes against the grain to admit it but that does seem to be the case.

In one sense, at least, the anthropologist may be able to resist the temptation to identify patronage with corruption. Kenny started it, with his brilliant epigramme that Ramosierra was governed not by bureaucracy but by amigocracy (1960): for Ramosierra, where the officials are largely disregarded, unintegrated into the community, with no share of the Pine Luck and so on, that phrase seems to capture some truth. But he must regret his joke, for it has not served analysis: the minds of his contemporaries and successors seem deflected by that equation of amigo and bureau, to the extent that Pitt-Rivers' examples of patronage do not include any rural employment, any connections between senoritos and labourers, but only manipulation of courts and offices (above p. and 1961); to the extent that Boissevain has not one word to say about rustic contracts and oppression (above p.). Nor does Stirling (1968) contemplate seriously the prevalence of partiality in any matters other than those where it is out of place, by his standards.

However, it is no use simply saying that patronage is an idiom which anthropologists' ethnocentrism has led them to perceive only where it offends them. Waterbury (1970: Ch. 3; 1973) has shown that it is possible for whole states to be organised on the principle of segmentary clientelistic factions - as Badian (1958) in fact suggests the whole of the Roman Mediterranean was once united and then governed by contracts of partiality, both public and private. 'Don't be ethnocentric' is scarcely a sufficient outcome. The

attempt to show that systems of patronage are not really as bad as they seem - that they carry benefits as well as the costs which ethnocentricity presents to the eye²³ is scarcely adequate either: Waterbury has pointed out it is impossible to be sure what is a cost, what a benefit; and, if it were possible, still difficult to imagine how they could be accounted, what value could be given to them (1973a).

The mention of Waterbury is one clue, providing a thread of hope through the labyrinth of community studies. For just as it is true that ethnographers have not looked sideways, to compare their results with those of others, so it is also true that they have not often looked upwards, so to speak, at the higher levels of segmentation than the one they study. Partly because it is difficult to collect the information; partly because they have the alibi that prefects and ministers are on a par with the Virgin and Saints; partly too, perhaps, because they have tended to think of 'higher levels of segmentation' as more rarefied than the grass-roots, and operating on different principles, - for these reasons, although they may speak of their communities as being progressively integrated into nation-states, and have devined the local consequences, they have not integrated their local studies into national studies (e.g. among many others, Davis, 1973). Waterbury, who appears to have made only fleeting visits to the grass-roots (1972: 108-11 e.g.), makes two points which are relevant here. First, he shows that the higher levels of segmentation, the elite groups as he also calls them, do not necessarily operate on different principles from those observable at lower levels: elite men marry, live in communities, manipulate relationships, in the same way as villagers; although the scale of their operations, the kinds of things they operate with, and the consequences of their politics may be different, nonetheless the building blocks

²³e.g. Nye J. S., Corruption in political development. A cost-benefit analysis. Am.Pol.Sci.R. 61 (1967) 417-27. Leys, C., What is the problem about corruption? J.Mod.Afr.Stud., 3 (1965).

are very similar at all levels of political activity,²⁴ and result in balanced opposition between segmentary units of equivalent structural order - what Waterbury calls stalemate. That is one point. Secondly he discusses the survival of segmentary stalemate, and comes to the conclusion that 'there are important forces at work that will lead to the gradual regrouping of factions in a more conventional class framework' (1970: 74). He argues that the multiplication of potential elites, through education, without corresponding expansion of appropriate elite positions, will lead to disgruntlement among the excluded: they are most likely to phrase their discontent in terms of class-struggle although that does not exclude segmentary factionalism within the class-movement, nor eliminate it at grass-roots levels (ib. 317-21).

Just as Waterbury is the only writer to have used anthropological material to characterize a state entire, so he is the only one to make predictions about the movement of the forces he describes. He does so in terms which are conformable with those used here - the inadequacy of patronage to provide sufficient rewards to secure support and its replacement by a class-idiom. This is because the expansion of education, itself a consequence of increased state intervention and centralisation, creates a category of would-be elite members who are necessarily frustrated. Is this scenario generalisable? Is the movement of all progressing Mediterranean societies one from patronage to class-struggle? It seems unlikely - Weingrod's analysis is of a movement towards increasing penetration of the patronage system by bureaucratic control - of centralisation of patronage: it seems to demand conditions of economic expansion, allowing the continued provision of development resources; but centralised patronage is consistent with a pattern in which it is the relatively deprived groups or

²⁴The point is made also by Bailey, F. G. Stratagems and Spoils, Oxford (Blackwell) 1969, and will be made by Ioizos at this conference.

categories which vote to maintain the patrons in power.²⁵ Similarly it is possible to characterise some northern states as ones in which centralisation and bureaucratisation of the class-struggle has occurred, formalising and administering the interests of one class or another. The combination of class and bureaucracy in Yugoslavia or Spain is paralleled by Waterbury's prediction that class and patronage will combine in Morocco; or Weingrod's insight that the political scientists' kind of patronage (a combination of bureaucracy and patronage) will eliminate the class struggle in Italy. Certainly, the functional organisation of bureaucracy, with offices for this and offices for that, can destroy the hegemony of one or a few local patrons whose position, hitherto vulnerable to peasant revolts, derives from their possession of wealth. When the centralising bureaucracy is open to patronage or encourages clientelism (e.g. La Palombara 1964, 252-348; Rossi, 1965; Rossi-Doria 1963), it destroys class-struggle.

'... we found a plethora of non-corporate social structures (for the most part coalitions) which organised fundamental economic and political activities of a quite modern sort'. (Schneider, Schneider and Hansen, 1972). Any attempt to predict the changing characteristics of a state must examine the location and scope of such coalitions: Waterbury, for example, makes it clear that the local units of loyalty are corporate groups, rather than coalitions, and that the non-corporateness of the groups increases the higher the level of segmentation considered. Cohen's Case suggests that certain kinds of state intervention - what might be called bureaucratic patronage in a time of recession - can re-establish corporate groups at the expense of nascent class-formations, just

²⁵ It is noteworthy that the areas of Italy which regularly vote the Communist party in are those which are among the most prosperous, and which, additionally, have local governments of the left, with considerable local patronage. Similarly, deviant rightist voting, in the case of Naples, seems to be associated with control of local patronage resources. But in small communities the local resources seem insufficient to maintain any one party in power from one election to the next. Allum, 1973; Colclough, 1969; Davis, forthcoming.

as Bailey's description of the Losa election reveals a community rejecting integration into the provincial and national patronage system. Certainly, the outcomes of movement are varied, and there is no place for what the Schneiders and Hansen have appropriately called 'the optimism of the unilinear model' which predicts the move from traditionalism to modernity, from underdevelopment to development, from feudalism to capitalism, to In Italy the actual sequence continues ... state capitalism, which manages to centralise patronage, to overwhelm the periphery with development. In Morocco resources are not sufficient to maintain a stable and centralised patronage system. In Portugal, as Cutileiro makes clear, the state managed to control all expressions of class, and to maintain a patrimonial system without a perpetual erogation of funds and public goods.

* * * * *

There is no way to convert is into ought; the trichtomist perhaps gains in perspective, and can see not a galloping corruption, but rather the way to suggest varying outcomes of processes which are far more complex and far less superficial than a simple account of the area of overlap between bureaucracy and patronage. 'To suggest', only to suggest, for if one thing does emerge with utter certainty from this review it is the inadequacy of the ethnographies: they are deficient in specification, seem designed to prevent comparison; and they are insufficiently integrated into a national analysis.²⁶

²⁶ Is Blok (1974) an exception to this blanketing criticism? He pays more attention than most to the history of Western Sicily, and to the national and regional trends, and is stimulating for these reasons. But a comparison with Waterbury shows his book deficient: it has no ethnography of the higher echelons, segmental levels, rather a framework - derived from Elias - into which Blok fits his analysis: it is a crude exaggeration, and a cruel one, to say that his ethnography of Genuardo thus appears as examples of the consequences of rather abstract 'national processes', but there is some truth in it. That is not the way to eliminate the deficiency: Waterbury's is. cp. Davis, forthcoming, last page.

Another perspective is got from contemplation of the fact that there are always areas of behaviour, institutions, from which politics, strictu sensu, is excluded. Much of the condemnation of corruption seems related to its meretricity: these men attract exchange theory, with its never quite eliminated undertones of moral condemnation, as rotten fruit attracts flies. It is possible to recast the moral matrices. Every Anglo-Saxon anthropologist has at least once despaired of politicians in his own life; every Anglo-Saxon anthropologist has got annoyed at the meddling of bureaucrats in his affairs. To contemplate Baric's diagramme of a family in which the members suppress their different political allegiances - in a communist state, no less - creates a warm sense of approval, of reassurance that eternal values survive domination by politically motivated bureaucrats (1967: 15). Similarly, when Loizos (forthcoming) describes how Kalo men disarm the explosive implications of political difference, and maintain a sense of common membership of a community by so doing, should these men be condemned because they allow their modernised, rational motives for association to be subverted by kinship and affinity? A 'follower' may not be so loyal as a core member,²⁷ but he is loyal - and is loyalty not worthy? A rotten fruit?

²⁷Bailey, F. G. Stratagems and spoils, Oxford, (Blackwell) 1969.

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Some Theoretical Notes on the Study of Patron-Client Structures

Mohammed GUESSOUS

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3

A - Some Latent Dysfunctions of Patron-Client Structures

- Patron-Client Structures (PCS) do perform some integrative functions, e.g. they ^{may} help to provide a modicum of political integration in an otherwise highly differentiated and tension-laden social structure (by linking Center to Periphery, and by performing functions of mediation and interest-articulation in situations where political parties, labor unions and interest groups are not yet sufficiently developed and effective) - They ~~do~~ may also help to maintain a modicum of solidarity and stability by instituting some linkages between ~~some~~ ~~of~~ antagonistic groups and putting some limits on inherent tendencies towards exploitation and inequality (by instituting transactions based on a sense of "brotherhood and kinship", and sometimes guided by more or less explicit norms of reciprocity, honor, charity, filial responsibility, and noblesse oblige which patrons are urged to live up to) - And so on.

However, PCS do also entail many dysfunctional implications which are no less real and important, but which have rarely been studied and pointed out - More precisely, PCS often serve to strengthen political and socio-economic inequality, to maintain class ~~inequality~~ exploitation and manipulation, and to block processes of change and political development:

(1) They often tend to block the development of class consciousness, solidarity and militancy among the underprivileged - by instituting inter-class networks based on primordial ties and exclusive loyalties which tend to blur class lines and antagonisms; by giving the underprivileged personal and seemingly more humane alternatives to political struggle and class militancy as means of achieving some of their most essential goals; by atomizing clients devoted to different and often competing patrons and mobilizing them on issues unrelated to their most vital concerns; by pitting "lucky" clients against other

potential clients in search of suitable patrons, etc.

(2) They often promote the development of a parasitic class of middlemen, brokers, retainers, troubleshooters, etc. who strive to monopolize the function of mediation between the underprivileged and the critical decision-makers, and who have a vested interest in preserving a PCS based on corruption, nepotism ^(and) favoritism, ~~and~~ as the only means for the marginal and underprivileged groups to achieve some of their most vital objectives.

(3) PCS tend to block processes of political development. By means of policy decisions, threats, law, and force, patrons often tend to prevent the emergence of other structures such as trade-unions, class-based parties, competitive bureaucracies, effective legislatures, mass education, etc. which would threaten their monopoly over scarce resources and information. In this manner, instead of being a transitional form between, say, tribal society and industrial society, PCS ^{may} tend to become self-perpetuating and to resist or prevent the development of other potential structural forms (Dixit James SCOTT). Furthermore, PCS ~~tend to~~ often tend to preserve and even glorify regional, ethnic and sectarian cleavages; they undermine any serious concern for broad national and ideological issues, "sacrifice" long-range planning for short-run expediency" (Boemarchand), and often reduce the entire political process to one of "squabbles over patronage rights and boundaries" (Samir Khalaf).

(4) Finally, PCS ~~tend to~~ ^{help} maintain among the underprivileged masses a "clientelistic culture" stressing man's helplessness and vulnerability, the legitimacy of hierarchy and ~~the~~ inequality, the need ~~for protection~~ for protection and intercession, and implying that demonstrations of outward respect, deference, gratitude, submission and filial loyalty are requisites for achieving even the most minimal and vital goals (as opposed to a more modern "culture of autonomy", stressing hard work, self-reliance, political activism, organized struggle, egalitarianism and hope, and demanding collective rights instead of particularistic favors and privileges).

B- Some Structural Conditions for the preponderance of PCS in Society =

- (1) Relative dispersion of economic and political power at different levels (national, regional, local) and in different sectors (agriculture, commerce, industry, public administration ---)
- (2) Low level of institutionalization and generalization of citizenship rights (legal, political, economic rights ---)
- (3) Low level of organizational density (Number of parties, labor unions, cooperatives, voluntary associations, public administrative branches - Degree of penetration of society by various State services - etc)
- (4) Low level of organizational efficiency [structural obstacles to improvement in the capacity of administrative services, parties, unions, voluntary associations, etc. to carry out their proclaimed goals.]
- (5) Relative scarcity of vital resources (land, jobs, goods, administrative decisions) or marked discrimination in the availability of these resources to different social strata
- (6) Highly unequal balance of power between upper and lower classes
- (7) Preponderance of a "clientelistic culture" over a "culture of autonomy" as outlined above.

N.B. = Under such structural conditions, we may even observe the development of ~~clientelistic~~ (a) "Clients despite themselves" [i.e., who do not ~~adhere~~ adhere to a "clientelistic culture", consider their client. situation as humiliating, exploitative, but nevertheless as a necessary evil that must be borne with for lack of better and more effective alternatives]

(b) "Patrons despite themselves" [i.e. who do not subscribe to the "clientelistic ideology", but feel nevertheless compelled to act temporarily and occasionally as patrons in order to help some of their relatives, friends, neighbors, etc. to cope with their most vital and pressing problems]

Under these circumstances, the scope of patronage tends to widen to more and more areas of life - At least for a while, ~~from~~ the "patronization" of one

context creates structural pressures for the "patronization" of other sectors, until the dysfunctional implications of PCS become so manifest that they induce a generalized and sometimes organized process for the "depatronization" of society. This may not prevent, however, the development at a later stage of a new process of "repatronization". This means that patronage may bloom, decline, go under-ground and revive again according to time and space.

C. The Dynamics of Patron-Client Structures

- (1) From dyadic to collective clientelism [or the opposite]
- (2) Widening (or narrowing) of the scope of patronage, within a particular relationship or among different areas of social life
- (3) From expressive patronage [all-inclusive, diffuse, sanctioned by religious and ethical beliefs] to instrumental patronage [involving specific, contractual and business-like transactions] without any shared moral and religious ethos
- (4) Evolution in the functions of patronage = from protection against conscription, over-taxation, expropriation, etc. to the acquisition of new and tangible goods and services (jobs, welfare, administrative decisions about attribution of credit, reclaimed land, etc., winning a court decision, etc.). This shift in the functions of patronage usually goes with a wider mutation in beliefs and expectations; it occurs when a culture based on the premise that "unhappiness is unavoidable and can at best be only minimized" gradually gives way to a more optimistic and activist culture based on the fundamental premise that "happiness is possible and should be maximized".
- (5) Evolution from a situation where clientelism is the ~~primary~~ ^{primary} means of coping with daily problems to a new situation where it becomes only one among alternative forms of individual or collective action (or the opposite?) - cf. Scott on "Class and Clientelism"
- (6) Evolution from monopolistic to oligopolistic to pluralistic patronage, according to the number of patronage networks available in a given context
- (7) Aggravation (or improvement) in the terms of ~~the~~ ^{will vary according to} exchange between clients and patrons. The clients' bargaining position ~~on~~ ^{on the level of} scarcity of valued resources, the availability of alternative ~~means~~ ^{means} of action (other patrons, parties and unions, State bureaucracy, etc), the intensity of elite competition, and the degree

- of concentration or dispersion of economic and political power. [cf. Note by James Scott]
- (8) Evolution of PCS from an official and relatively legitimate institution to a subterranean and quasi-illegitimate custom.
- (9) Evolution from incidental clientelism [limited in time and space, narrow in scope] to structural clientelism [^{so} wide in scope and so durable that it becomes a life-style] (or the opposite)

ADDITIONAL NOTES BY J. SCOTT

Class and Clientelism

1. How unequal, status-laden, ~~variable~~ and durable is the differential in access to resources implied by patron-client structures?
2. What differences does this variability make in the forms, balance, and legitimacy of the exchange relationship?
3. What is the relationship between class and clientship? Are they mutually exclusive forms of political competition?

a. Can a man be both a client and a participant in a class-based organization?
e.g. A trade union member who is a client for other needs?

b. ~~How~~ ^{may} class rights, such as, for example, Black votes for serfs ~~are~~
~~have been~~

~~How~~

b. Can a class and client "mentality" exist ~~simultaneously~~ in the same individual and ~~each~~ ~~apply~~ each apply to a different situational context? e.g. a peasant who votes for his patron at the local level and ~~votes~~ ~~along~~ along ideological lines in national elections.

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c. Can a traditional sense of class rights, which Black implies many French serfs had, influence the norms and expectations of clients about patron-performance.

4. Under what conditions may clientele and class structures coexist side-by-side or at different levels, and under what conditions ~~are~~ are they likely to be antagonistic, in structural terms.

5. What happens in a clientelist political order when, for example, the structure of possibilities changes due to, say, the conferring of citizenship rights, the diffusion of ideology, a shift in the balance of military or class power, or greater ease in class organization.

Questions about the Balance of Exchange

1. ~~Is it possible to describe for many patron-client relationships an overall balance of exchange that is typical for a given area?~~

1. Can we ~~say~~ describe the typical exchanges between ~~a~~ a patron ~~and~~ and client in a given context?
2. Is it possible to show, ^{over time,} a shift in the balance of exchange which favors one partner despite the fact that the exchange involves non-comparable goods? ~~can~~
3. Can such shifts be documented for categories of patron-client dyads such as landlord-tenant relationships or headmen-retainer bonds?
4. What are the political and economic factors which make for an erosion or improvement in the client's bargaining position?
e.g. labor supply, land scarcity, state concentration of power, commercialization of agriculture, elections, creation of central bureaucracy, etc.
5. Can research along these lines tell us something about the distributive effect ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~relationship~~ the legitimacy, the integrative potential, and the durability of patron-client structures?

Selected and Preliminary Reflections on the Conference

~~It is my intention that~~ Josep La Palombara

(4)

It may be of some use for me to limit my rapportage at this point to some impressions I have garnered from this conference and then to respond in a preliminary way to a number of very thought-provoking statements that have been made over the last several days.

My impression is that we share the underlying normative view that patron-client relationships — particularly those that operate in face-to-face relationships at the level of the village and that involve such things as protection, the surrender of rights, distinct patterns of super- and sub-ordination — are undesirable. Ideally, I think, we would prefer less disparity of power between and among people, greater egalitarianism in distributive allocation, more open access to roles involving the allocation of values as well as genuinely universalistic standards in providing life chances that make such role occupancy possible.

I suspect some of us differ regarding how much this more primal form of patron-client relationship can be reduced. I, myself, share Professor Gessons' view that this type of patron-client relationship tends to be eroded as societies move from agricultural to industrial economies, as urbanism emerges, as organizational units we associate with industrial societies come into being. I also believe, as he may not, that newer forms of clientelistic and paternalistic structures emerge in industrial settings. The structure of power within large-scale organizations like unions and cooperatives, the

size and complexity of national bureaucracies, the incomprehensibility of such bureaucracies to average persons, the need of bureaucrats themselves for help in the local implementation of national policies — these are but some of the factors that in my view permit, even impel, patron-client relationships to reemerge.

To be sure this structural arrangement differs from what may have been the more brutal, protection-based format of earlier, more apparent face-to-face relationships at the village level. I am not sure however that the structural change has changed the ~~structural~~ dignity of the individual or improved his chances to control those basic allocative processes in society that profoundly affect his life and future. This question of process is critical and I will return to it again below. In any event, I have the impression that it is we, the social scientists, who seem to prefer that the individual's dependency be centered in organizations, and particularly in those organizations that are class-based and in any case that may serve to reduce false consciousness.

This brings me to comment on the concept of class as it has been only tangentially broached by several participants. Concepts like patronage and patron-client relationships have been dismissed as essentially useless, although there is clearly disagreement about this. Furthermore, it is not my impression at all that class has been shown as opposed to asserted to be a more useful basis for analyzing some of the problems that concern us.

In any event we seem to be somewhat in disagreement as well on the relationship between class, on the one hand, patron-client relationship, on the other. Gussow tells us that the relationship reinforces social stratification systems, Silvert argues that the relationship is a necessary condition for the maintenance of a class system.

I am entirely in disagreement with Silvert on this point, particularly because (like so many statements about the origin of stratification systems, this one is impossible to disprove). On the other hand, I think it can be shown that many forms of ~~then~~ patron-client relationships actually mitigate the more severe consequences of class-bound inequalities, and it is this impact, I think, that leads Gussow to observe that one unhappy consequence (or dysfunction) of the relationship is that it may prevent or retard class consciousness and the organizations that are class-bound and that make claims on the system on the basis of much less fragmented, much more solidary (and I would guess he means) more politically "modern" considerations.

It is important in this regard to have more information on the status of various kinds of patron-client relationships in political systems with strong egalitarian ideologies and particularly in those one-party systems that have had considerable experience with industrialization and with attempts to reduce levels of inequality in various sectors. For example, the evidence is overwhelming that, since 1945, Poland has radically transformed the social origins from which the military officer corps has been recruited. During the same period quite important efforts have been made to improve

the quality of political participation (especially in certain administrative activities) at the local level. Some of the latter is also true of the Soviet Union, and in a country like Yugoslavia very explicit formal statements of policy as well as many efforts in plants and communities have aimed at achieving a much less patron-based set of relationships in political policy allocations that existed in the past. Indeed, the very existence of a single party — not merely in Communist systems but in many other states as well — will itself tend to mean, at the least, that perennial (possibly persistent) patron-client forms must adapt to a quite unusual structural arrangement. In Mexico, for example, it is apparent that local elites in the form of powerful families as well as aspiring trade-union elites, have had to operate ~~with~~ within a hierarchical framework dominated by PRI. It is the party's relative ability to compel that basic allocative processes take place within its boundaries and through its mediation that forms the basis for Samuel Huntington's distinction between successful and unsuccessful single party systems. The level of success achieved here, however, need not and indeed does not imply that basic patron client relationships have been eroded or replaced by something else. In any event, my impression is that the relationships survive even socialist revolution. In the case of Yugoslavia, in fact, I ~~believe~~ believe that the most recent constitutional revision represents not so much a concession to democratizing impulses or demands and does a reluctant recognition that the sub-national structure groups there (with their older patron-client

relationships may have as strong an adaptive capability as do the sects in Albania that Professor Ionescu calls to our attention.

Another dimension of our discussion that struck me as interesting involves the relationship of patron-client relationships to something called "integration." I'm not certain whether Professor Gilsenan would strike down this concept too as essentially useless, but I think he is entirely correct in implying that we should specify some referent for the concept and, in any case, pay more attention than we often do to a concept like disintegration.

Several participants have underscored the disintegrative aspects of patron-client relationships where disintegration refers to the atomization of the protected and exploited as they come within the orbit ~~one~~ of one competing patron or another. This atomization seems particularly striking in situations where there may exist a number of other conditions that might give rise to close solidary feelings. Beyond this however, there are the underlying implications of moral morality, equity and justice.

On the functional side some of us would stress the nation-building and nation-maintaining aspects of patron-client relationships. Integration in this sense might be broken down into a number of analytical dimensions. Grossly put, we may understand it as ~~this~~ a description of the probability that political allocations or public policies enunciated by decision-makers at the national "center" will emanate in

compliant behavior or "be implemented" or "carried out" at the periphery. The evidence is overwhelming that patron-client structures have been deeply involved in achieving this integration for as long as there have been nations, or for that matter large-scale polities like empires. Whether these structures are necessary conditions for national integration, whether one can hypothesize and/or find empirical evidence to show that national integration can occur without such structure is an important consideration. Those of us, perhaps only myself here, who would answer "no" are not unaware that patron-client relationships are neither sufficient conditions for successful national integration, ~~not~~ nor the only factor that may help bring it about.

It is far from clear whether national political elites prefer that patron-client relationships persist, and here I believe that Professor Guesserow is quite right in underscoring that there may be patrons as well as clients despite themselves. We have much evidence that over the centuries many aspiring national elites made concerted efforts to reduce local patron-client structures and/or to turn them to their own instrumental use. In recent years, in North Africa, ~~we~~ we are told by several participants that those who parachuted into the towns from the center did so for ideological reasons, not because the center was unable to extract compliant behavior locally but, rather, because national political leaders had egalitarian norms.

I believe this is an interesting consideration for it may well imply that national elites either wish to remove

patron-client relationships as a matter of basic ideology or that they find the persistence of such structures incompatible with some of other goals they have set for themselves and the nation ~~and~~ for the nation and as a national elite. If this is so, and several participants say it is so, then we should be paying all the more attention to the considerable evidence ~~that~~ (particularly ~~more~~ underscored in the papers of Professors Khallaf and Brown, for example) that patron-client relations, if taken "seriously" then as variables, defy very strong efforts to remove them.

At one point I alluded briefly to earlier efforts of aspiring national elites to impose their wills, needs, policies, extraneous intentions on local elites. In many instances this "national" elite is nothing much more than one geographically circumscribed elite (and patron-client system) extending its territorial reach. In other cases, and particularly at later stages in national development and even more especially in recent (last 100 years) experiences in national development the national elites are less geographically concentrated, may or may not have a strong geographically defined power (patron-client) base, often will be unified by functional/professional considerations.

What strikes me is that essentially local patron-client structures over the centuries set limits to national aspirations, even if it is true (as several participants note) that at moments when the chips come down the nation (national elite? "the people"? ~~prevail~~) prevail.

The finance, law, and military magister of the Roman Empire in the age of the Praetorian prefectures ~~too~~ are examples of such efforts, as were the special corps of administrative troubleshooters Magsaysay tried to use in the Philippines in the early 1950's. Earlier French efforts to use the Intendants are matched by recent French efforts to use decentralization and the creation of "super prefects" as a means of cutting into the entirely predictable relationship that has been shown to characterize ~~the relationship~~ traditional prefects on the one hand local elites (often patrons) on the other. I suspect that what I have called aggregative clientelistic relationships (e.g., in Italian unione, coops, political parties, bureaucracies) never achieve much more than lining side by side with their persistent local structures. In this sense, there is nothing contradictory between what I have said and what Professor Brown tells us about Salé or Morocco.

I will refer here only to one other major impression this conference has produced for me. I refer to the fact that in considering patron-client relationships some of us have emphasized process, others have emphasized outcome. Outcome may refer to existential conditions or present and probable future policies. Outcome may and do lead us to consider questions of ethics, justice, distribution, redistribution of valued things. Process itself is a critically important part and continuing outcome for it represents the structured way in which present and probable future allocations are made.

My further impression is that some participants assume that there would be more equity and justice (in more than the redundant sense) if patron-client relationships were removed. Similarly, some of you have argued with me that distributive policies would proceed on a more rational (whatever that means), universalistic and egalitarian basis if the patron-client relationships were removed. That may be so, but I doubt that equity and justice are easily tied to particular (and empirically provable or measurable) decision-making processes. In any event, it would be extremely interesting to have some descriptions of what the political allocation and policy implementation system would look like if various kinds of patron-client relationships did not exist. In view of the considerable amount of interesting morphological description we have had of local patron-client "systems," such an analytically-centered exercise might have some considerable benefits.

As a matter of preference I am personally taken to stress the process aspect of the relationship and to try to see this as clearly as possible comparatively, across time and space. I wish therefore only to suggest and certainly not to insist that the patron-client structure is no more and no less likely in theory to produce greater equity or justice in political allocation outcomes than would (or does) aggregative clientelistic systems I have described elsewhere or any other particular process of decision-making ~~that~~ ^{about which} I have information. I am open to being enlightened on

This is a point and will welcome it.

Stress on process I believe helps us (keeps me at least) to focus on the service that we are normally concerned with more than the outcome of the exercise of political power. We are also concerned about, interested in perhaps believe in the possibility that greater equality is possible in individual political participation, in the individual's ability — as an individual — to leverage the policies, the behavior of others, the implementation of policies that directly and deeply affect him. I frankly doubt that the road to this end involves removing patron-client relationships, as much as I might share the feeling that the ideal is desirable and worth our best effort. We live in a world where the patron-client structures explicated by anthropologists and the patron-clientelistic structures we find in the organizations and administrative systems ~~the~~ emerging in industrial societies are not only ubiquitous but live quite readily side by side, however widespread may be the feeling that we are either patrons or clients beside ourselves.

The other day I promised to give you my definition of a patron-client relationship. I do so tentatively and add that it seems to me to be primarily germane to political scientists. Patron-client (also clientelistic) relationships exist where the individual's ability to communicate his demands and/or needs, to leverage political allocations, to receive the services the state provides, and to impinge on policies that affect and/or interest him is mediated or controlled by individuals and/or organizations that are not formally ^{recognized} ~~organized~~ (perhaps not morally sanctioned) as a part of the system or

structural arrangements for achieving any of these things.

This relationship, from the standpoint of the individual, generally involves subordination to another person(s) or organization(s). These latter persons/organizations are themselves involved in clientelistic or patrimonial relationships to centers of political decision-making. Concerning them it is not possible to speak of rigid positions of super and subordination, or of permanent or long-enduring patrons as opposed to clients. This system is in my view different from what we usually mean by political patronage, by the "brokerage" function in political systems. The system is, as Professor Cresson says, essentially in the interest of preserving the integrity of the nation, and of the national elite — even if the latter may be more or less open to Patrimonial "circulation."

I am aware that the definition raises more questions than we have time to discuss here, but I must bid you again in the pages of our journals and perhaps at another conference!



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THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
SOCIAL RESEARCH CENTER

THE ROLE OF THE FUTUWWA IN THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE CITY OF CAIRO*

by
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* Data for this paper was compiled from primary sources of history, folk ballads, autobiographical literature, short stories, as well as field research and interviews of futuwwat, conducted by the author.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it seeks to further our understanding of the role of the futuwwa in the Egyptian social structure. Despite the relevance of this role to Islamic institutions and values, to social movements, to urban masses, to Cairene folk structure and values, it has been completely unexplored by contemporary social scientists. Also, historians of the Middle East have tended to deal mainly with the ruling and elite classes, with only scant reference to the common people and their institutions. Secondly, this paper attempts to ascertain the power resources implicit in the informal role of the futuwwa.

The term futuwwa is now used to denote a strong, bold man. However, the concept is not as neutral as that for it reflects the social reality of the culture. Hence the futuwwa is used to identify an outlaw who gets what he wants by force, as well as a person who is courageous and who helps those in need of protection. Historically the concept futuwwa was used to denote a variety of roles, but these may be reduced to two polar types.

Historically the concept futuwwa relates to specific values as well as groups. It served both as a model for groups of a basically religious orientation as well as for groups of criminal and outlaw orientation. In most of the cases it was the domain of the masses

and in a few cases it was adopted by the elite. But in all cases it seems that protection was one of the major characteristics of the role.

In Cairo until the beginning of the twentieth century, each locality in the folk quarters was identified with one or several young men who were strong and who excelled in using cudgels, clubsticks, knives, swords, guns. In Old Cairene quarters, localities were identified by the futuwwa and the futuwwa by the locality.

Some names are still mentioned even now in these quarters, such as Mohamadan of Tulun, Hassan Kuna of Birkit al-Fil, 'Urabi of al-Hussiniya, Mahmoud Subhi of al-Darb al-Ahmar, Filfil of Darb al-Gamaiss and Aziza al-Fahla of al-Migarbilin. By definition the futuwwat (pl.) are young men, yet reference is made of several futuwwa women, such as Aziza. These young men are responsible for the protection of the locality vis-a-vis outsiders. Are these futuwwat a recent phenomenon in the social structure of Egypt? Who are they and what role did they play? Were they only protectors of localities as we find in the beginning of the twentieth century? Are they criminals as is often implied in everyday usage, or gallant men who act as protectors? As a protector, an essential question to be asked is, who does he protect and what are his resources for power, i.e. how does he maintain his dominance over his protectees? On the whole, what are the content and meaning of the role of the futuwwa?

To analyze the role of the futuwwa, as protector in urban Cairene quarters, I propose a simple model that is composed of two polar types on a continuum where the futuwwa lies at mid-point. These types are employed by the people in their everyday existence. One pole is that of the ibn al-balad (son of the country), the other is that of the baltagi (Bouncer, bully). Ibn al-balad as a type denotes more than its literal meaning. It refers to the typical Cairenes, who dwell in Old Cairo, and it is also used as an index for typical traditional Cairene characteristics.¹ The baltagi is not only a bouncer or "tough" but also someone who gets what he wants by force or by the sheer threat of using force (a "shake-down" artist in American parlance).

While in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there was a strong tendency for the ibn al-balad type to predominate, during the first half of the twentieth century the two types co-existed in reality, and now, after 1952, there is a strong tendency for the baltagi type to predominate.

In this paper I explore the role of the futuwwa as a patron in an historical and cultural context without any prior theoretical assumption of Western patronage, but rather along the lines of the meaning of protector.

1. El-Messiri, Sawzan. The Concept of Ibn Al-Balad, unpublished thesis, The American University in Cairo, 1970.

PRE-TWENTIETH CENTURY

The etymology of the futuwwa helps to define its past and present definitions. In pre-Islamic and early Islamic times the term futuwwa was not used to denote a category of individuals. Fata (sing.; fityan, pl.), meaning young man, was the noun used metaphorically to denote manliness, valor and generosity. The fityan epitomized male vigor, courage in warfare, nobility, chivalry, and keeping one's oath even with one's enemy. Generosity was expected from the fata to the extent of self-denial and self-effacement. Protecting the weak was a true expression of manliness and chivalry. These were idealized values in the pre-Islamic Arab community, implied in the term fata. These values were also carried over to Islamic tradition and are spoken of in several verses of the Qur'an and Ahadith.¹

In Islamic times a variety of groups bearing different names identified themselves with the core pre-Islamic values of courage, chivalry, etc., and developed an elaborately structured organization that helped unify and identify themselves. The internal structure was elaborate in rituals, rules for membership and good practices (adab), by which they abided and which formed a sort of internal jurisdiction for settling disputes. These rules and rituals included the drinking of a cup of salt water during a communal meeting, at which a belt was buckled around the new devotees. Members were dressed

1. Sayings of the Prophet Mohammed.

in special trousers, called libas al-Futuwwa. They would then pass through certain hierarchies of ranks.²

This model pertained to the religious sphere. Some mystic groups³ who were concerned with extending their hospitality, fraternity and protection to the needy incorporated the futuwwa model, as did religious and warfaring groups who were involved in protecting the Moslem frontier from the invaders.⁴ In addition to these groups, who seem to have fully adopted the futuwwa model, we find other groups who have a close link with it, yet the exact

2. The literature on the internal structure of the futuwwa institution was obscure until the time of the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Nasir li Din Allah (575-622/1180-1225). He adopted a courtly futuwwa and encouraged the ruling circles to join it. Thus the information we have about the internal structure is from the time of al-Nasir; which aspects developed in which century is indeterminate. (M. Jawad, M.T. al-Hilali, A.B. al-Majjar and A.N. al-Qaysi, Kitab al Futuwwa of Ibn al-M'mar, Baghdad, 1958).

3. For example: al-Ahdath in Asia Minor who were described by Ibn Battuta in the 8th/14th century as brotherhood whose members (fityan) lived together in a monastery "zawiya" under a superior called akhi. They lived in scattered towns but a sense of fraternity united them all. They were hospitable to strangers and were ruthless in their opposition to tyrannical governors and their followers. Arendonk C. Van, "Futuwwa". Encyclopaedia of Islam, p.124.

4. For example: the Murabitin were Fityan who composed the Moslem frontier troupes. The spots in which they settled on the borders were called ribat, a sort of zawiya which was a center for Darwishes as well as a military fort for defending the borders; hence these groups were closely associated with Sufi orders. (Hassanin Fouad, Kitab al-Futuwwa. Cairo, 1959. p.9).

nature of this link requires more research. These groups are the Sufi⁵ orders, craftsmen and tradesmen (i.e. guilds).

Interestingly enough, the futuwwa model was also adopted by rebellious groups in the Muslim world. These groups were mainly associated with the urban illiterate and deprived masses such as the 'ayyar⁶ (vagrant, outlaw) of Baghdad, and the zu'ar⁷ (scoundrel) of Damascus and Cairo. The activities of the 'ayyar ranged from plundering to resistance to the government. They were protecting the poor and weak strata of the society. Their influence seems to have been especially great in times of weak government. When they set up their own courts to protect the lives of al-fityan and the weak. Their help was sought by some leaders in the Abbassid caliphate and they were enrolled in their police force. The role of the zu'ar

5. See Breebaart, D.A., "The Development and Structure of the Turkish Futuwwa Guilds", unpublished dissertation, Princeton, 1961. He discusses in detail the ritual ceremonial behavior and customs observed in the guilds and their link to the futuwwa institutions.

6. The 'ayyar of Baghdad were dressed in libas al-futuwwa and drank from the futuwwa cup. They abided by futuwwa norms and rituals. They organized special troops called "Awiniya, which were responsible for the welfare of the weak and poor classes. They were most powerful from the ninth to the twelfth centuries, until the Caliph al-Nasir came to power and embraced the futuwwa institutions (Hassanein, Fouad. Kitab al-Futuwwa, Cairo, pp. 1012.

7. Organized gangs of young men in the quarters of the city. This label was used for the first time in the fifteenth century. They dressed in a distinctive manner, with shoulder robes and a hair style called gar'ani. Lapidus, I.M. Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1967, p. 154.

ranged from such criminal activity as assassinations, theft and pillaging, to leading and participating in mass protests against food shortages, high prices.

We believe that during the Mamluk era in Egypt the futuwwa model was adopted by a group or groups which have been given various labels (zu'ar, shuttar, 'ayaq, 'assab, and ru'ass al asab). We do not know if these different labels stand for different groups or are synonymous for one group. However, the various (and perhaps interchangeable) uses of the labels in some early epic literature give us a picture of the character traits of the early futuwwa model. He considers himself a hero, and is described as generous, courageous, and has murrawwa (another pre-Islamic value, a variant of futuwwa). He is a protector of the poor and the weak, and he rises up against unjust rulers. He is also noted for his cleverness, mixed with a sense of humor; his cunning and his craftiness; and his ability as a spokesman.

The traits of craftiness, cleverness and a sense of humour are obviously not from the pre-Islamic core values but they seem to be an Egyptian addition. The combination of the pre-Islamic core values and

8. In Egyptian folklore we have collection of tales that is called al-siyar, biographies of heroes such as Abou Zeid al-Halili and al-Zahir Bibars. Parts of these siyar, ten of the groups called al zu'ar, or more usually, al 'ayaq and al shuttar. Sirat Ali al-Zybak which is part of "Thousand Nights" is one of these biographies and it is known for its Cairene setting. There is some evidence that indicates the time in which it took place i.e. the Ottoman rule. (sirat Ali al-Zayak).

and the Egyptian characteristics is unique to the ballads of the Egyptian heroes. For example, since he was a child Ali al-Zaybak⁹ did not permit anybody to degrade, abuse or be unjust to him. He was brave, courageous and generous. He was also cunning and was known for the tricks he played on his teachers to get what he wanted. As a grown man he became a well-known hero who revolted against the rules of different Moslem countries, but his loyalty to the Moslem Caliph (who is Gods representative on earth) was unquestioned. His tools for overcoming his opponents were not only courage and strength but also craftiness, cleverness, shrewdness and intelligence.

The same group or groups that were identified by the folk as heroes were regarded by the ruling elite during the Mamluk and Ottoman period as out-laws and are referred to in derogatory terms. In examining historically the role of these groups in the city's social structure we find that it is associated with the masses of people of the popular quarters of Cairo.¹⁰ In their own quarters it seems that they

9. The name Ali Al-Zaybak (mercury) al-Masry (The Egyptian) is indicative of his traits.

10. Lapidus (in Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages, 1967) sees that the Cairene zu'ar's association with the quarter is superficial but I disagree with him. We find that popular quarters such as al-atuf al-Rimila, al-Hussiniya, al-graffa, al-Hataba, al-Habala bab-al-luq, Ibn-Tulun were associated with popular movements and that the zu'ar, al-shuttar, zu'assa'al'asab show in al Jabarti's histography were associated with these quarters and these movements.

acted as informal leaders who had the support of the people that they were able to extend their protection to various indigenous segments of the society against the foreign elite. For example, Sheik al-Kafrawy, one of the 'ulama, opposed the Mamluk elite on various occasions, but they could not harm him because "he was married to mu'allam Daras' daughter, the butcher of al-Hussiniya, thus he got the protection of the people of the quarter, al-zu'ar and al-shuttar".¹¹ It seems that these groups by themselves were so reputed for their strength and boldness that they frightened some of the ruling elite.

They were associated not only with the people of their localities but also with the indigenous population as a whole, i.e. Awlad al-balad.¹² Thus in confronting the ruling elite they identify with Awlad al-balad against the rulers. This collaboration of the zu'ar with Awlad al-balad was the backbone of massive resistance to the foreign elite in the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The ruling elite at that time (whether Mamluks or Turks) constituted a privileged class that exploited the indigenous population. The

11. al-Jabarti, Abd al-Rahma, 'Aqaib al-Athar Fi'l Tarajim w'l Akhbar Cairo, 1958 (first published in 1980) p.200.

12. In locating Awlad al-balad in the structure of the Cairene society at the end of the eighteenth century, we find that they are identifiable with all indigenous classes: ulama, merchants and artisans. As groups they are internally heterogeneous, but as Awlad al-balad, their homogeneity is derived from a shared origin as to place and a common dialect, religion and socio-cultural tradition as opposed to the various foreign elements in Cairene society. (El-Messiri, Sawsan: The Concept of Ibn al-balad. 1970)

collaboration of the various leaders of the different segments of Awlad al-balad was effective in stopping many of the unjust measures that were carried out, such as imposing taxes, arresting people or plundering towns, villages, or houses. For example, in one of these waves of plundering in the quarters the zu'ar, lead the people of the quarter and joined the leadership of Sheikh al-Dardiri demonstrated and threatened to plunder the houses of the ruling elite. Fearing the consequences of such an act the Mamluks promised the mob to return all the spoils and set a jury for questioning the administrators. In answer to Ibrahim Beys' reapproach the administrator said: "We are all plunderers, you Ibrahim Bey the (Mamluk governor)plunder, Murad Bey (another governor)plunder; and I plunder too,"* This answer is interesting in reflecting the self-image of the ruling elite and in legitimizing the actions of the mob.

When the ruling elite was foreign and non-Muslim the revolt of the masses was accelerated because it became a religious cause as well as a national one. Hence resistance to the French came not only from the Ottoman troops and Mamluk soldiery but also from the masses.

The revolt of the popular quarters headed by these futuwwat was the more vigorous. In view of the new weaponry that the French had used in Egypt and the ignorance of the masses of such weapons, one can

13. This is clearly reflected in the two Cairo revolts 1798 and 1800 against the French.

* *al-Jabarti*, p. 136

appreciate how brave the people of Hussiniya were, although they were defeated, as the following incident indicates:

"..... Many of the ghawgha (mob) united and proclaimed al-Jahad (holy war) and brought their hidden weapons of war and resistance they were joined by hasharat al-Hussiniya (insects of al-Hussiniya) and zu'ar al-harat al-Baraniya. They were shouting God save Islam. They proceeded to the judges' house and were followed by a another thousand or more like them (denoting zu'ar).... when the French knew of their gathering, a French leader with his troops preceeded to their quarters (meaning popular quarters) but the zu'ar were fortified behind barricades and they killed several soldiers and prevented them from entering their quarters The French shelled the Quarters that surrounded al-Azhar and directed their fire to the mosque of al-Azhar. The people of the quarters were alarmed since they had not seen before such bombs and ran away. As for people of al-Hussiniya and al-'Atuf they went on fighting until their gun powder was exhausted and al-Frinj (denoting the French) were constantly firing on them until they exhausted all their weapons and could not continue, hence they left their position to the French".¹⁴

Such incidents were indicative of the role of these groups who among themselves seem to be organized in a way that unifies them in political crisis. They were armed, although not at the same level as the French, but still effective in resistance. Their leadership of the quarters in collaboration with the religious leaders was most effective. The most important example of the effectiveness of the collaboration between ulama and the masses of the people of the popular quarters and the futuwwa was seen in the revolt against the Turkish ruler of Egypt (Taher Pasha), his ultimate downfall and the accession of Muhamed Ali (1805).

¹⁴. Al-Jabarti Abd Al-Rahman, 'Agāib al-Athar Fi'al Jarajim wa'l Akhbār, Cairo, 1958, p.136.

This revolt seems to have been the last effective one in which these groups took a major role in enforcing their interests against that of the ruling elite. With the strong, centralized government of Mohamed Ali we hear no more of these groups in the context of effective resistance or revolt.

THE ROLE OF THE FUTUWWA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN
THE OLD QUARTERS OF CAIRO

Until the beginning of the twentieth century the role of the futuwwa in Old Cairene quarters was still effective. In these quarters the futuwwa is a prestigious person who is usually identified with a locality or hitta. The division of Cairo into localities headed by a futuwwa is not administrative (though the divisions might coincide). The division arises from popular conceptions of physical and social boundaries and identities. Hence the hitta could be the small lane¹⁵ in which the futuwwa dwells or the harah in which this lane falls or the administrative quarter to which the hara and the lane belongs.

15. Hara: harat pl. A hara in Old Cairene quarters is a main street from which emerge several small atafa and zuguq some of which are closed ended. It is now used to denote a small lane with no political significance. During the Fatimid period the hara constituted a major sub-section of the city. Cairo at that time was sub-divided into ten to fifteen harat, and each hara represented a unit of administration and control. With the extension of Cairo as a city its hara increased by the time of the French expedition, 53 harat. During the French occupation they combined the 53 existing harat of Cairo, and created eight large sections each known as a thumn (the Arabic term for one eight). These basic divisions established by the French more than a century and half ago have been retained with, certain boundary modifications in the present administrative organization of the city. Abou-Lughod L. Janet, Cairo 1001 Years of the City Vistorious Princeton, University Press, New Jersey, 1971.

(the futuwwa'ic)

But usually his face to face relations and hence his influence is basically in the neighbourhood where he lives or works.

There are certain characteristics that identify the futuwwa which are also the qualities that characterize the self-image of the people of these quarters. Among these qualities are ones like ¹⁶ 'ayaq, cleanliness, intelligence and alertness. But the basic quality which identifies the futuwwa and is the core of his identity is his physical strength, still indicated today by nicknames such as Urabi, symbolizing the famous Egyptian hero; al-Fahl al-Kebir, the big animal; zalat, the stone, al-Hussan, the horse. They are generally physically imposing. For example, Aziza al-Fahla is described by those who knew her as follows:

"I saw Aziza al-Fahla who was on top of all the futuwwat in al-Midharbilin. A giant lady who possessed extraordinary strength. Around her arms were tons of gold i.e. bracelets. One blow from her hand was enough to throw any man to the ground. A blow with her head would split a stone. She was married to a man called al-Fahl al-Kabir (the large animal). He used to support his wife in any quarrel but this was rare because Aziza was always capable of gaining victory alone. By becoming one of Aziza's followers, I learned my first lesson in fatwana. ¹⁷ (An adjective derived from futuwwa, it implies the brave acts of the futuwwa).

16. 'Ayaq adjective derived from the noun 'Ayaq, which identifies the group of futuwwat in Mamluk times. These 'ayaq were characterized by their extra neatness and good looks. Now the adjective is used for anyone who is well dressed. In the context of Cairene quarters it is associated with Awlad al-balad and with the futuwwa.

17. The narrator of this incident is one of the original inhabitants of al-Magharbilin in the year 1930. He is now a famous actor, Mahmoud al-Miligi, and this is an abstract from his memoirs ~~in 1970, 10 December~~ ~~p.13~~. "Mahmoud al-Miligi and the talk of memoirs" Al-Akhbar, 1970, 10 December, p.13.

Another futuwwa is described as follows:

"He is a great giant in height and breadth with a belly like the dome (of a mosque) and a face the size of Um Zakia' buttocks. He moves on his saddle like al-Mahmal' but he plunges as swift as the wind; he plays the club-stick with the elegance of magicians, and in fights, he fights with his club-stick, head, feet and with the aid of his followers. 18

Though the physical appearance reflects the image of strength, what is important for a futuwwa is courage of the heart i.e. bravery. An admirer of the fatwana in the hitta who was in search of the characteristics he must achieve to join his clique was advised as follows:

"Be careful, don't come close to him in this mien, this smell or that oily garment. Be like pure water and try your luck.

He also said to him: Our futuwwa loves beauty and purity and he is unique in the series of our futuwwat.

Get that clearly.

Abdoun was convinced that the way to al-Dokma (the futuwwa) is easy. Thus he went to the public bath to change his skin in the tub,

18. Ma'fouz Naguib, "Hikayat Haratna" al-Ahram, 1972 July 19, 1974.

prepared a new galabiya and bulgha. While busy renewing himself a friend of his asked him:

- What is it Abdoun? Are you thinking of marriage?
He proclaimed to him his secret and as an honest friend he said: Cleanliness alone doesn't interest al-Dokma; he loves tales.
His secret became known and everyone knew that Abdoun al-Hilwa was preparing himself for al-fatwana (i.e. becoming a futuwwa). Several people took the initiative to advise him, one of them saying:
- Cleanliness is important, tales are important but for al-Dokma bravery is more important than both.
- Bravery?
- Yes, also be careful not to arouse his jealousy for otherwise, he'll get mad instead of satisfied.
- How can I compromise between this and that.
- Another said:
- Strength is also important; you have to prove your strength, you have to prove that you are capable of aiming the final blow and enduring them however hard they are. At the same time you have to prove to him that your strength is not comparable to his". 18

This passage not only refers to certain characteristics that identify one as a futuwwa, but also implies a process by which one achieves futuwwa status.

18. Mahfouz Naguib, "Hikayat Haratna, al-Ahram. July 29, 1974. p.4.

The futuwwa as an Ibn al-Balad is usually recruited from the people of the hitta and shares their style of life. He is not formally educated. He dresses, like the local people, in the galabiya (flowing gown), lasa (head cover of white cotton), and bulgha (slipper of yellow leather), rather than in Western dress. He is usually associated with the traditional jobs carried on in these quarters, such as butcher, coffee-shop owner, dealer in food stuffs (cart owner), and scrap merchant. A futuwwa of the 1920's, who later wrote his memoirs, described his style of life as follows:

"I was born in streets of Hussiniya. My father and mother dwell in the hara al-Husr. I was brought up among lovers of abuses and scorners of school education. They are the amaterus of education by the meat cleaver. In fact most of the inhabitants of al-Hussiniya are butchers who kill and skin but of course don't read and write. My father who owns a butchery shop sent me to al-Kuttab.²⁰ For three years I attended the Kuttab only by continual spanking. I left the Kuttab after learning just how to write my name and read two lines in the newspaper in an hour or two. My father used to tell me, why bother about al-Kuttab are you going to be a government employee or an 'Abo-Katoo' (avocato-lawyer) or catch a wolf by its tail? i.e. are you going to do something that nobody has done before). What you need is a couple of calves and a shop and God will take care of the rest. I submitted to God's wish and took off the Tarbouch ²¹ and put on the Lasa. Changed the shoe for a bulgha and became a balady (local) lad ... I joined a clique and we used to go every night to a wine shop, or goza (hashish gatherings). My day was spent in a balady coffee house owned by 'Urabi (the famous futuwwa of al-Hussiniya at that time) and from that time I became one of Urabis mashadids (supporters).²²

20. Al-kuttab is the traditional school for children wherettthey learn the Qur'an and are also taught how to read and write.

21. Head cover made of red wool that is used mainly by those who are dressed in a Western dress i.e., the effendi. The effendi title is associated with the educated Westernized bureaucrats where as balady indicate the traditional Gairene classes.

22. Al-Hag Youssif, "Mudhakarar Futuwwa" Lisan al Sha'b, Vol.1. p.3., 1924.

Part of the social identity of the futuwwa relates to the network of activities he is involved in. The futuwwa in his hitta is mainly conceived as the protector of the neighbourhood from rival futuwwat other opponents from the outside, and generally in many fighting situation.

Most of the problems which the people bring to the futuwwa are problems that relate to work situations, problems that emerge from the traditional style of life and the values attached to it. People in these areas in the twentieth century are interacting on a personal and informal basis with no contracts, bills or receipts, where "a man is tied by his tongue", meaning that he is bound to do as he has said. Problems that emerge from this personal style of interaction are solved by the futuwwa. For example, if someone has borrowed money from his neighbour without a receipt and then refuses to repay it and denies that he has taken it, the futuwwa, after investigation, can force him to give back the money. Some clients may take commodities, promising to pay later and then continually postponing payment or refusing altogether; the merchant would then seek the help of the futuwwa. In acting as an arbitrator in financial disagreement the futuwwa might end the dispute by paying what is needed himself.

In addition to looking after the individual interests and problems of the people of the hitta, the futuwwa looks after the welfare problems of the community as a whole. For example, he protects the hitta from

thieves and, in the early 1900's, one used to light the streets for security.

Another duty of the futuwwa is helping to supplying the hitta with scarce commodities, such as oil and gas, so as to save the people from black market prices. For example, a futuwwa in the well-known crisis of 1942 ~~used~~ to procure the gas allotment of his whole hitta, protect it on its way and then distribute it equally in the hitta, without taking on extra piaster.

Most of the futuwat in these localities are concerned about safe-guarding morality, i.e. the attitudes and reputations of the inhabitants especially women. Some of them would insist on ridding the hitta of any socially-undesirable person. For example, one futuwwa is known for not letting any prostitute stay in his hitta. The futuwwa of a locality known as a prostitute zone, such as al-Azbakeya in the thirties would be called by the insulting label "futuwwat of females".

Another aspect of protection is that of protecting the poor in the hitta by being personally charitable toward them. Being charitable is one of the basic values that makes one prestigious and famous. Wealth in itself does not make one popular. What one does with his wealth is more important, how much one spends on the poor, on others, even how much one spends to feed others, is the basis of prestige in the hitta.

Thus, part of the reputation of a futuwwa is his degree of devotion to charitable acts. For example, one futuwwa's popularity and power was that she financed the building of eight tombs for the poor in the hitta, and she refused to take rent for the rooms of her houses from those who cannot afford it. She also lends those who are in financial straits and employs in her business (food dealerships) those without work. Another futuwwa was known for his generosity in that his house was an "open house", in which large amounts of food was cooked for those who want to be fed. The amount of food cooked is a value in itself because it is often used as a criteria of how hospitable (i.e. how important), a person is. It goes back to the "good old days", when good families cooked considerable amounts of food daily which went much beyond their needs so that anyone was welcomed to their table at any time. Such a home is often referred to as an open home (bait maftouh), which implies hospitality, abundance and status.

From the above description, we gather that the futuwat work in financially rewarding jobs which set them above the average wage-earner and which allow them to be generous. Aziza al-Fahla, the most renowned futuwwa in al-Midharbalin, was working as a dealer in food stuffs such as cheese, eggs, fruits, vegetables and beans. She established from this business a wealth that enabled her to buy about eight houses in the hitta, a coffee-shop, and several shops. Similarly, the butchers'

and coffee-shop owners' earning are such that they can afford to be more generous than most.

One of the futuwwa's most clearly defined duties is that of protector in ceremonial occasions such as marriage and circumcision. Part of the ceremony is a procession, or zaffa, in which a large number of the locality gather. In the 20's the zaffa²³ of the bridegroom would move from one harah to another. Before entering another harah, they have to take the permission of the futuwwa of this harah. The futuwwa might be receptive to the procession and answer their saluting tune by dancing in the zaffa or he might refuse to let them pass and attack the zaffa and a fight would start. Any one in the locality who has a ceremony will usually seek the protection of the futuwwa of the harah to safeguard the ceremony from rival futuwat, rival groups or individuals, or even to safeguard the ceremony from the futuwwa himself. A very common spectacle in weddings even now in these areas is that they are an occasion for quarrels. Opponents usually seek ceremonial occasions to express their rivalries and the gathering of the people of one locality in another usually leads to friction. A futuwwa in his memoirs describes the usual incidents of a ceremony in the hitta as follows:

23. A completely male gathering in which the bridegroom is accompanied by his friends and the youth of the harah. A band with a balady singer accompanies them while the futuwwa or futuwat of the hitta leads the procession from one harah to another.

"A zaffa of our rival futuwwa commenced and we were prepared with cudgels in our hands. The zaffa approached and I advanced provoking its futuwwa by asking to dance. In answer he told me to behave myself. Immediately, I and my friends took action and the zaffa became chaos; people were running, its guards (the futuwat) fled and the police came. In the evening we started another fight at the wedding in which lamps and chairs were broken and the guests ran away." 24

Hence the protection of ceremonies by the futuwwa is essential for the continuity and orderliness of the ceremony. The futuwwa's ability as an attacker and defender is established and adds to his reputation. In the case of a less renowned futuwwa, people might appeal to an outsider to guarantee safety for the ceremony.

The futuwwa as a leader does not work alone. His prestige ~~is~~ in the hitta is dependent on the number of his supporters. The futuwwa is usually identified as someone who has 'azwa (from 'aza, which means to trace back). To have 'azwa implies having back-up support in the context of ancestry. The futuwwa has 'azwa in the context of number of supporters. A person in these quarters would have awawa because he has a large number of children (especially sons), or belongs to a rich large, well-known family. He would be identified as someone who has "a back" i.e. he has people who can back him. The extent of the azawa of futuwwa depends on the number of potential supporters. The potential supporters of the futuwwa come from various categories of

24. Yousef al-Haggag, "Mudhakarāt Futuwwa", Lisan al-Sh'ab, Vol.2. 1925.

followers or atb'a: subian (boys), shilla (clique), mashadid and mahasib (those who stand for you). A common threat or challenge nowadays is:

"I will beat you and those who stand for you." ²⁵ There is a good deal of overlapping in these categories because someone could be one of the futuwwa's subian and also from his mashadid or mahasib.

On the other hand, one can draw a line between these categories in certain situations because the futuwwa's mashadid and mahasib are not necessarily his subian or clique. They could be anyone in the hitta who believe in his ability or cause and who follow him. Thus, part of Aziza al-Fahla's power is that she had ten strong brothers, a strong husband, about thirty men who work for her, "boys" in food merchandize, a clique of women sellers who accompany her in the market who are her mahasib and all the people of the hitta who are potential mashadid. All these categories constitute the potential supporters of the futuwwa; the larger their number the more prestigious he or she is. Among the potential supporters the subian, "boys", or those who work for the futuwwa, owe their livelihood to him, and they support him in all his actions. Hence we find several of the prestigious futuwwat in business that involve a large number of apprentices. This implies that being a futuwwa is a large business and a profitable one.

25. Mashadid is a label which seems to be originally associated with a specific category in the futuwwa's structural organization. Al-mashad i.e. to buckle denoting to buckle the futuwwa belt. Ali Mubarak in his description of certain harat in the nineteenth century indicated that youth of these harat were organized under the leadership of a senior whom they call 'kabir' and the senior call those under his leadership mashadid. Ali Mubarak, Al-Khitat al-Tawfiqiyya al-jadida Cairo - Bulaq 1886, vol: 2, p. 84

The futuwat of different localities as well as the futuwat of the same locality are in constant competition to assert their prestige and supremacy. Their relationships are characterized by antagonism, cautiousness, jealousy and rivalry. Conflict is common and they are constantly fighting to stake out their areas of prestige, manliness and power. Their quarrels take the form of feuds. To end a feud between two equally renowned futuwat is difficult because any appeal for reconciliation would be answered by the saying "we are gadaan (courageous men)²⁶ and men do not give up their revenge." In a quarrel it is accepted that a futuwat will beat and be beaten by others. But to be attacked and to run away or not hit back would identify a futuwat as a "mara" (female) which is the most degrading label for a male. Therefore, the feuds of remarkable futuwat would sometimes bring their two localities in opposition. Usually, conciliators who are well-known futuwat trusted and respected by both parties, would interfere to end the feud in a ritualistic manner: both futuwat are investigated and whoever is judged to be wrong would owe the other "a truth", i.e. celebration for all the futuwat. The reconciliation session would usually end by visiting al-Husayn and drinking milk together. Reconciliation is done as diplomatically as possible to lessen the tension between conflicting parties and the shame of the loser. The most important thing is to preserve the honor and manliness of each and to assert that they are both gada'an.

26. See below page 24.

It is in the nature of the futuwwa's activities that he is in constant opposition with the official authorities. Such activities center around fights and "breaking" shops, or closing the shops, streets or an entire locality when a fight breaks out. The futuwat will fight with any sort of weapon, such as chairs, The stronger the futuwwa the more damage he can inflict on his opponents, whether on people or on property. If the opposing futuwwa is strong, he can defend himself as well as his locality by hitting back and throwing the other out of the locality. When a renowned futuwwa fights, the moment he appears everyone closes his shop to avoid him, knowing that, otherwise, the futuwwa will close the shops, by destroying them. Hence, closing shops or a locality is one symbol of the prestige and power of the futuwwa. While authorities define these activities as illegal, the futuwwa defines them as acts of gada'na ²⁶ The term gada'na implies manliness and bravery. The futuwwa as a gada' will not tolerate humiliation and will attack the person who degrades him or ridicules him.

If someone acts improperly with another person in the locality the futuwwa will immediately interfere. If the police interfere in such cases the futuwwa will beat the policemen. In some instances of particularly brutal police interfere, the futuwwa have answered back by attacking the police station and beating up the policemen. The

26. Gada'na ad. derived from the noun gada' (sing. gadan, pl. meaning young men. In the beginning of the century there was a group of young men called gadan who were known for their excellence in fighting. The police used to fear them. Prison to them is an honor that they boasted of. Ahmed Amin, *Qamus al-'adāt wa'l-taqalid wa'l-ta'ābir al-misriyya*, Cairo, 1953 p. 134

futuwwat constantly quarrelling are often caught by the police and imprisoned. However, there is no stigma in being jailed, and the futuwwat often proclaimed that they are not thieves but gad'an, and "prison is for the gad'an". They consider hitting back a moral and honorable act, as opposed to stealing which is an immoral act. In one case in which three futuwwat were charged for attacking a police station, beating the policemen and destroying the shops of the area, the judge was hesitant in his sentencing. The futuwwat's reaction in court to the judge's hesitation was as follows: "I see your sluggishness in a case of quarrelling. You are perplexed and confused as if you are going to compose poetry ... just pass a judgment; long or short, don't bother yourself".

They consider the authorities weak, corrupted and easily fooled. Thus they act accordingly and find ways to fool the authorities and their systems.

A futuwwa who wrote his memoirs describes the following incident of how he escaped from a six months' imprisonment (he had wounded and beat up a couple of men in a quarrel):

"While walking with the policemen to prison I intended to run away. To relax the policeman I started giving him one cigarette after another and then I told him that it is a scandal for a futuwwa like me to walk like a prisoner with handcuffs, so I called a coach and we rode in it.

In the coach the iron cuffs were disjointed and with the plaster (coin money) iron becomes flexible. In front of a coffee-house, I asked the coachman to stop. The policeman asked why we were stopping. I said just "To take care of you (meaning to get him some money) for your help." The policeman's facial expression relaxed and I left him in this happy state and went home. Do you know why I escaped? Afraid of prison? Never. I just wanted to prove to them (the government) that they are stupid." 27

Thus we find that the futuwwa, in all his actions, depends not only on his strength but also on his intelligence and craftiness both of which are characteristics of the people in the Old Cairene quarters.

The opposition of the futuwwa to official authority becomes accelerated when that authority is foreign. The tools of opposition may change. We find that the futuwat in opposing each other depend mainly on their personal merits of strength and skill in fighting. In face-to-face fights they usually use knives, cudgels, swords and club-sticks. With the local authorities, however, they also use craftiness and tricks. But when a foreign authority with overwhelming means of power in their opposition, the futuwat will use deception.

27. Muallam Youssef Abou Hagag. 'Mudhakarāt Futuwwa, Lisā'at Sha'b, 1925.

For example, during the British occupation we find the futuwat (assisted by the people of their quarters) resisting the British by such acts as: throwing hot water on them, killing drunken soldiers at night, digging holes in the paths of soldiers and covering the holes with straw. The futuwat made use of British ignorance of local customs. For example, once the British were searching for weapons in the house of a futuwat and found a sword. They were about to arrest her when she explained that the sword was not a weapon but a symbol that she used in the zar ceremony.

In their resistance to foreign authorities we have no indication of a group action in which the futuwat of different localities unite with the people of the quarters, as did the zu'ar of the eighteenth century in their resistance to the French. Rather, their resistance in the twentieth century is in the form of individual, patriotic acts in their localities.

For example, Aziza al-Fahla used to attract the rural immigrants to work for her instead of the British. She also used to attack and beat those who collaborated with the British.

28. Zar refers both to a ceremony and to a class of spirits. When someone is possessed by a spirit (afrit, sayad) a ceremony is performed in which the possessed person dances to a tune. There is no sword involved.

In general, the futuwwat's political awareness was not as sophisticated as that of the educated classes. They joined such resistance groups as the students' because the students were brave and young men who stood against the British. A futuwwa in the year 1919 reflects in his memoirs:

"I was walking in Hussiniya when I met a large group of demonstration effendi²⁹ students and sheikh students (students of al-Azhar university), who were shouting. In asking about the reason for the clamour, they said the British had imprisoned Said Pasha (The Prime Minister)/. I asked who was Said Pasha. They said he is asking the British to leave Egypt but they imprisoned him. I said he is then a gad'a and immediately I joined the riot. To tell you the truth I have discovered that these students are real men. Among the students there are daring ones who just throw themselves on the British and fight them. I and my clique joined the students and when the British tried to capture a student we tried by all means to release him because after all he is joining men and not women" ³⁰

The other polar type that is associated with the role of futuwwa is that of a baltagi. The baltagi might be from the locality or from outside but he is not closely associated with the people of the hitta.

29. Effendi: a title of address for Egyptian bureaucrats who are usually in Western dress, and who affect Western tastes and values.

21. Mu'allum Youssif al Hagag. "Mudhakirat Futuwwa," Lisan al-Sha'b, Cairo, 1926.

As we have already seen, the futuwat are associated with the awlad al-balad, the people who work in traditional although profitable jobs. The baltagi shares with the futuwwa the core of his identity, which is physical strength and skill in fighting. Achieving these core qualities, and hence the identity, al-fatwana becomes for the baltagi a source of living or just as an expression of power and a business.

The sort of activities they are involved in are different from the futuwwa. They are not associated with the protection of the interests of the hitta. On the contrary, they abuse the people of the hitta, by taking ransom on certain commodities that they sell (such as by imposing higher prices) or getting goods they need without payment. In other cases they are ready to sell their skill, and will accept pay to beat up an opponent, to spoil a ceremony, or to close a shop or club.

They do not abide by the norms and values of the people in their locality. They disregard and abuse the established and traditional role of the futuwwa in order to further their own interests. They impose their leadership on the people of the hitta by exploitation, force, and fear.

In the following detailed description of one of these baltagi by an inhabitant of the harah, one can discern the implied relationship between the futuwwa as baltagi and people of the hitta:

"Ga'alas al Dananini is a dangerous futuwwa and one of the most effective futuwwa in the harah. He sits in the coffee-house like a mountain, or precedes his procession like a huge building. I look at him breathless but my father grabs me by my hand saying:

"Walk straight on you are crazy"

I ask my father,

"Is he stronger than Antara?"

He says, smiling,

"Antara is a tale but this one is a reality and God help us."

His voice is not heard except raging, storming or screaming and always insulting. He addresses his friends by "the son of so and so", he curses religion while going or coming back from prayer. He is never seen smiling even when he is receiving the protection money and listening to the flattery. In all that, he doesn't differentiate between the owner of the Wikala or Hamouda the pimp. In the presence of the notables of the harah he breaks wind or displays his genitals.

A merchant may be unable to pay his protection money and asks for a week's respite, but is refused and the man is forced to remain at home with the "harem" until he is relieved of his financial crisis.

The school principal punishes the son of one of his clients, so he blocks his way back from school and orders him to go home naked. The principal pleads for forgiveness, entreating earnestly with the names of God and the prophet, and Ga'alas, sulky and hot-headed, waits for his orders to be obeyed. The principal, in

tears, is forced to take off his clothes piece by piece. He tries to stop when there is nothing except his underwear but Dananini roars, the man shivers, takes them off covers his genitals with his hands and runs back home followed by the gang's laughter. He disdains established tradition, he doesn't refrain from obliging a person to divorce his wife in order to marry him. He marries and divorces several times and no one dares to marry one of his divorced wives. They are left to face life as lonely as beggars or prostitutes.

He falls sick one day and stays in bed for a week. A fortune teller tells him that his illness is a result of the curses of Ahl al-hara. So when he recovers he orders the people not to celebrate Bayram; even visiting the tombs is forbidden. In the days of the feast the hara is empty, the shops are closed and houses are silent as if we are in mourning.

The baltagi's abusiveness extends to other hittas, and thus his reputation as a brutal man protects the hitta from outsiders. Thus on one hand he abuses the people of the hitta and on the other he protects the hitta from the abuse of others.

"... he also terrifies the neighbouring harat and smashes the futuwat of al-Hussiniya, al-'Autof and al Darasa. Hence the bridegroom's zaffa would proceed from our hara without protection and people would avoid our footsteps to protect themselves from the strongman's rage." 31

As with the futuwat of the ibn al balad type, the baltagi's power is based on having a group of supporters, but supporters of a different breed. The baltagi would have a core group of subian but they, instead of being workmen who have san'a (a craft, or,

31. Naguib Mahfouz, "Hikayat Haratna" al-Ahram, 1917/74 p. 4.

July 19, 1974.

as they say, an honourable source of living) they would be suy'a (jobless). His clique, mashadid and mahasib, would be mainly other baltagi futuwat and rarely people from the hara. Among futuwat the baltagi would be ranked as "a traitor who is paid", meaning that he takes protection money. Hence his azwa (power) would mainly come from his clique and subian and not so much from the people of the hitta.

Today in old Cairene quarters the role of the futuwwa is less effective as an informal leader. His power no longer prevails over a total locality. He is mainly associated with acts of violence in any locality. He protects his interests by force, or, as they often say, "he takes his rights by the arm".

The futuwat's violence extend to the formal authorities to the extent that some futuwat forbid policemen to enter their localities.. In other cases, a futuwwa may collaborate with the policemen by bribing them, so that when there is a case against a futuwwa the police will take his side. This makes it difficult for anyone to oppose the futuwwa and to make a case against him in the police station; the futuwwa is always capable of proving the opposite of what actually took place. A common pattern of behavior among these futuwat is that they purposely wound themselves in quarrels. They know that if someone is attacked and wounded in a quarrel, the attacker would be sentenced more heavily than if both

are wounded. Hence a futuwwa might attack and beat up his opponents, yet they dare not accuse him for he is always ready with wounds and the claim that he is the one who has been attacked.

Their acts of violence range from simply being quarrelsome (way of asserting masculinity) to larger group actions by which they protect their interests. The latter is a very recent phenomenon. One such incident took place recently when the government tried to clear al-Muski street of all peddlers' carts. The peddlers and the futuwat who protect them entered into a fight with the police which went on for two days.

CONCLUSION

From the historical survey we find that the role of the futuwwa in the informal power structure of the masses is one of protector against the formal power of the State. In Egyptian history the role of the futuwwa is shown in association with popular opposition movements. His role as protector of the masses puts him in direct confrontation with the ruling elite.

Cairene society during the Mamluke and Ottoman periods was divided into two major segments: one segment was the ruling elite and the other was the undifferentiated masses of the indigenous population. The political power of the ruling elite during Mamluk times was based mainly on force.

The urban masses distinguished themselves as Awlad al-balad (sons of the country) from the ruling elite. The latter, though Moslems, were conceived of as a foreign and privileged elite in the society. In the midst of such violence, political instability and economic crisis, the masses were in constant revolt against the State. The role of the futuwwa in these opposition movements was idealized as that of the hero, capable of changing rulers and of avenging those who suffered from injustice. Actually, the role of the futuwwa was limited to stopping only some of the unjust measures of the ruling

elite and of protecting the means of livelihood of the masses from the exploitation by the rulers. In other instances, when the rulers were foreign and non-Moslem, the people of the popular quarters, headed by the futuwat, were effective initially in their resistance. However, in the end their power was not comparable to the State's and the people were usually defeated.

In this sense Cairo's mob revolts belong to the classical and pre-political movements. Habsbawn put it thus:

"The mob may be defined as the movement of all classes of the urban poor for the achievement of economic or political changes by direct action - that is by riot or rebellion - but as a movement which was as yet inspired by no specific ideology, or if it found expression for its aspiration at all, in terms of traditionalism and conservatism." (Habsbawn 1971:110).

Although the mob of Cairo had no lasting ideological allegiance it was nevertheless capable of mobilizing behind leaders who were reformist, such as the religious leaders. Hence the indigenous population in mobilizing under the leadership of the 'ulama might be capable of changing the ruler but it seems to me that they did not seek to change the political or social order.

With the rule of Mohammed Ali there came a series of social changes which may have reduced the futuwat's role from that of anti-establishment rebel and protector of the masses to that of protector of a specific locality only. Three processes developed after 1805:

First, more and more government posts could be filled by Egyptians rather than by foreigners only, thus decreasing the immediacy of one of the masses' causes for rebellion. Secondly, Western industrialization broke down the guild system and the close ties among craftsmen within it. It also disrupted one of the unifying factors of the indigenous population, i.e. the indigenous vs. the foreign. The third process is that of State centralization which decreased government in fighting and opposition by the masses less likely. Hence the arena of the futuwwa was narrowed to a specific locality, the harah.

Another aspect of the role of the futuwwa is that his role in the micro-society. As stated previously the futuwwa is associated with popular movements vis-a-vis the State. But what role they performed within these quarters before the twentieth century, is not well documented. The original divisions of Cairo were harat: social units as well as physical and administrative units, in which groups were unified by ethnic religious and/or occupational characteristics. These groups were segregated physically and socially from other sub-groups of the city. Different harat represented different interests and as such conflict between different interest groups might be expected. It seems possible that the specialized role of protector for a locality which we find in the beginning of the twentieth century, might have grown out of a more vital version which existed pre-

twentieth century.

In his locality in the beginning of the twentieth century, the futuwwa's role as an informal leader is implicit and achieved. It is achieved by the specific rights he asserts and duties he performs. How he maintains his dominance in the locality differs widely.

The futuwwa, as ibn al-balad, is a working man, occupied mainly in traditional and profitable jobs that require several apprentices. He is not formally educated; he adheres to the traditional style of life. The qualities that identify him as a futuwwa are part of the characteristics of the people of the locality. What then puts the futuwwa in a position of leadership? What are his sources of power? It seems to me that the futuwwa's resources differ in degree but not in kind from those of his supporters. He simply acquires more of what they have or what they should have.

Th⁴is even the core of his identity as a futuwwa, which is physical strength, is not unique because most of the young Awlad al balad would emphasize physical strength as part of their nature. The futuwwa is pre-eminent, he is the strongest and bravest. The major issue is what he does with this strength. A strong man who abuses his power for his own interest is not a real futuwwa, he is "a traïtor". A real futuwwa is the one who uses his strength to

protect others who are in need of protection. He uses his strength for justice. Accordingly what ever merits he has should be shared. In that context the futuwwa idealizes the core values of the traditional model of manliness. Hence a major source of the futuwwa's dominance is legitimized by tradition and his authority emerges from his role as protector. As a protector the futuwwa is not alone. The possible other rival protectors would be the Ibn al-balad who is not necessarily skilled in fighting but as merchant, craftsmen, or mu'allam has access to greater financial resources and is ready to share his resources with the people of the locality. The religious men (sheikhs 'ulama) of the harah are potential protectors but how effective their role might have been in the beginning of the twentieth century is doubtful. It seems that unless they were financially well off their leadership was limited.

The Ibn al-balad as protector is now an ideal type which no longer corresponds to the existing reality of these localities. The relative homogeneity of the harah in the first few decades of the twentieth century has been disrupted by the wave of rural urban migration which started first by W.W.I. and W.W.II (either for working in the numerous war related industries, or for work in the British camps) has been increasing rapidly after 1952. Migrants from rural areas settle in folk quarters including Old Cairene quarters which are in the midst of Cairo with no space of extension. Thus in A

harah one might find a mixture of upper Egyptians (Saidis), lower Egyptians Bahrawis), people from the oasis and the original Cairene i.e. Awlad al-balad. These different ethnic groups, with different life styles and sometimes different occupations result in conflict within the harah. Another source of conflict is the enormous overcrowding of these areas to the extent that not only apartments are shared but also single rooms within an apartment are shared by whole families.

Along side these conflicting elements of the community there is a change in the standard of living in these localities. The majority of those who dwell in these harat now are very poor and those who are better off are hardly making ends meet. A common comment among the people of these areas is: "Now only the futuwwa is the one who can make a living for himself." This implies that there no longer room for generosity where resources are so limited.

Also a common pattern in these harat now is that whoever becomes richer or better educated i.e. more well off than the rest of the people would leave the harah to a better, less crowded area.

With the existing conditions of conflicting elements, violence ~~is~~ prevailing and the baltagi type who sanctions his power by force is pre-dominant. On the other hand we find that the urena of both futuwwa as an Ibn al-balad and the futuwwa as a baltagi has narrowed from locality leadership to situational and limited influence.

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CLIENTELIST IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL CHANGE:
FICTITIOUS NETWORKS IN EGYPT AND TUNISIA

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Whose Hypothesis of Which Networks?

On June 27, 1970, the bi-annual assembly of Destour Socialist Party cadres of the Tunisian Sahel overwhelmingly reelected as general secretary of the Committee of Coordination for the governorate of Sousse a man whom higher party authorities had apparently forbidden to run.¹ A few weeks earlier he had refused to testify against Ahmed ben Salah at the special trial in which the former planning minister was convicted of high treason and sentenced to ten years of hard labor. Elections were rerun on July 19 to replace the incumbent secretary, who was removed from office. But how, if he was clearly a Ben Salah supporter, had he been re-elected in the first place? Was it not principally Sahel peasants, resenting Ben Salah's policy of forcing them into cooperatives, who had precipitated the latter's removal by demonstrating against them in the village of Ouardanine? Even if these bloody incidents were staged for Bourguiba's benefit by higher authorities opposed to Ben Salah for other reasons, did the fallen minister command such widespread support among Sahel party leaders that, after his downfall, they would reelect his known supporter?

Was the incumbent secretary in fact part of a Ben Salah patron-client network? It is true that he came from the same village as a former governor who had been so politically identified with Ben Salah as to be brought to trial and given

a suspended sentence, also that, before the Ben Salah era, the secretary had been president of the village cell when the governor had been assistant secretary of the Committee of Coordination. But subsequently the latter governed Sfax, not Sousse, and had no direct responsibility for the political affairs of his home province. It is extremely unlikely that he could have engineered the secretary's original election, an action which, moreover, would not have been in character. At most his word might have helped clear the secretary with higher party authorities, though the latter must have been well known, given the Sahelian origins of so many of the Tunisian top elite and their continuous contacts with their home villages.²

I was given a second interpretation of the troubled elections by a principal supporter of Ben Salah four years after the event. Two members of Bourguiba's Political Bureau, including a minister who came from Ouardanine, were trying to put "their" man in office. It must be remembered that at this time the fourteen members of the Bureau were Bourguiba's appointees, not elected in their own right. Since a national party congress was scheduled for the autumn of 1970, the leaders needed grassroots support. The incumbent secretary gathered a large majority of the votes because he was opposing this clan's bid to gain control of the Sahel's party machinery. On this interpretation the two Political Bureau members could easily have been

vying with other Sahel members for control, and hence orders to exclude the incumbent from the June elections may have been ambiguous. Moreover, the patron-client network in this case is easily traced. The new candidate was a veteran party militant, apparently politically inactive since independence, but from the key village of Ouardanine. His family and that of the minister were linked by marriage, and further bound by the help the latter had provided in setting up several of the former's members in little businesses.³ The relationship was not altogether one-sided, for the villagers' resistance against the French in the early 1950's had surely not been irrelevant to the political career of the minister or, for that matter, of his brother, the General Prosecutor of the Republic. Curiously the village's chief resistance fighter had subsequently opposed the brothers' family in politics. But, again in 1969, the villagers' bloody struggle against Ben Salah, whose trial was presided by the minister's brother, was surely not unrelated to the minister's promotion on September 8, 1969, from postal affairs to agriculture.

But why, then, on this second interpretation, did Bourguiba on September 9, 1970, postpone the scheduled congress, claiming, "I cannot run the risk of having it infested with troublemakers who may be behaving themselves while awaiting the right time to throw off their masks,"⁴ in an allusion to Ben Salah supporters who were still in

the party? Apparently Bourguiba had interpreted the initial reelection of the secretary of Sousse's Committee of Coordination as a sign of the survival of a Ben Salah network. Yet my informant, who had definitely been in a position to know the facts and who, four years afterwards, had no interest in hiding them, dismissed this hypothesis as mere propaganda. If, indeed, the alleged network were strong enough one year after Ben Salah's downfall to make a party congress problematic, then it becomes difficult to explain how he fell in the first place. During the intervening year new elections had been held in party cells throughout the Republic, and Ben Salah's principal supporters at higher levels had been removed from political life. On the assumption that a network endured, it would surely have been sufficiently strong a year earlier to have neutralized the intrigues in the presidential entourage which led Bourguiba to reverse policies he had totally backed for seven years. The president's confession of political misjudgment was not quite excused by his various illnesses since a heart attack in March, 1967. He would never have had to make a confession if Ben Salah had generated sufficient support in the party for their policies.

The real "troublemakers" turned out, in fact, to be none other than Bourguiba's interior and defence ministers, two influential politicians from Tunis who were spearheading efforts to strengthen party institutions at the expense of

the presidency, so as to prevent future cases of political misjudgment. In return for their support against Ben Salah, whom one of the ministers had publically attacked in 1968 but opposed bringing to trial in 1970, Bourguiba gave them carte blanche to lead public discussions of the future of the régime and the restructuring of what they agreed should remain a one-party system. These discussions perhaps convinced Bourguiba that he would not be able to dominate a party congress held on schedule, in 1970. As it turned out, even after changing party directors and dismissing his minister of the interior, he was unable to prevent these "liberals" from dominating the proceedings a year later.

A third interpretation, then, of the Sousse Committee of Coordination elections, is that Bourguiba was seeking pretexts for containing the liberals, just after giving them the green light by speaking on June 8, 1970, of the country's need for institutions to supplement a president whose judgment was not always infallible.⁵ It is probable that the party director permitted the incumbent secretary to run for reelection the first time. The minister from Ouardanine, however, would then have had little trouble convincing Bourguiba of the need to rerun the elections. Whether either the minister or the president believed in the existence of a Ben Salah network is immaterial. It could be used by a variety of politicians on the Political Bureau to postpone the national congress and thereby neutralize

the liberals. The alternative candidate for the Sousse secretaryship seemed appropriate from Bourguiba's point of view; after all, the village deserved some recognition for having helped the president to see how much Ben Salah had "betrayed" him. He was defeated at the first election not for being the client of the minister from Ouardanine but simply for being relatively inactive, hence unknown to other local politicians. It was only after 1971, once the Tunis liberals had been eliminated from national politics, that rivalry among Sahel politicians on the Political Bureau would develop and hence that clientelist explanations of local politics, like the one provided by my informant, would become plausible. His interpretation made retro-active the rivalry which surfaced in the spring of 1974 between the prime minister and his deputy minister and also made the unlikely assumption that the latter's relationship with the minister from Ouardanine (who had one been with Ben Salah) was a solid and enduring one.

The Political Theory of Clientelism

In the Tunisian context clientelism was obviously a propaganda weapon used by everybody to label and discredit his opponents. But most of all it was used by Bourguiba, along with tribalism and even riots after soccer matches,⁶ to signify political immaturity and backwardness and thus demonstrate society's continued need of his political

instruction. So also in western academia, the legacy of "patron-client networks" may yet help to perpetuate the colonial burden that anthropology originally assumed, by conserving on paper those healthy clientelist traditions that make any fundamental political change inconceivable and predict stability for client states at minimum cost to policy-makers. Clientelism, it will be argued here, is a concept that has traveled too fast too easily from its original communal nexus to developing polities. What is one to make of Keith Legg's and Rene Lemarchand's statement, for instance, that "Intervening socio-economic changes may fundamentally alter the original basis of patronage and yet have relatively little effect on the clientelistic underpinnings of the regime?" Or that clientelism "may reappear embedded within the bureaucratic structures" of governments which have extensively penetrated society?⁷

The new "ism" seems to be everywhere. It is supposed to "shape" political systems,⁸ explain who gets where in politics, how goods get allocated, and, more basically, what the real units of political activity are supposed to be since they are obviously not the formal political parties and interest groups which native politicians imitated from abroad but could not really adapt to the local scene. The underlying patron-client relationships may have an additional attraction in the eyes of the beholder. They can served to unmask the natives' ideological utterances

by pointing to the networks they are servicing by holding together. Thus the disjunction between theory and practice so evident in most third world declarations has a rational explanation. The slogans are not really intended as guides for action but rather as clothing for patron-client networks. Radical ideologies are not to be taken literally; any proper understanding requires that they be placed in the context of the traditional relationships they are articulating. Cultural relativism -- that methodological prescription not to take what the native says quite seriously -- is given scientific grounding. Politics is reduced one step further than Arthur Bentley's interest groups to the interplay of patron-client networks. And just as the interest groups were once an ideological reflection of the Muckrakers' Movement, so the clientelism reveals that corruption "has displaced and dwarfed all other forms of politics." ⁹ What more fun can a new generation disenchanted with "developing" politics hope for?

But what goes in Morocco does not necessarily travel to Tunisia or Egypt. Eric Wolf says "patron-client relationships operate in markedly different ways," but it is not clear what happens when "the institutional framework is extensive and the ties between multiple sponsors and multiple clients diffuse and cross-cutting". Such a description fits Egyptian bureaucracy but no longer quite corresponds to the paradigm of clientelism elaborated by Lande, Legg, Lemarchand, and Scott. ¹⁰ The paradigm calls for each client to have only one intermediate

patron at the same time -- client monogamy. The relationship is supposed to be asymmetrical, that is, the terms of trade favor the patrons, even though alternative patrons should be potentially available. The relationship is typically multiplex, that is, servicing more than one specific need of the client, and overlaid with sentiments of loyalty and responsibility which make the adverse terms of trade acceptable, indeed not too closely calculated.

Now this paradigm, which may characterize landlords and tenant farmers in some societies,¹¹ gets stretched in two ways when it is applied to developing (or underdeveloping) political systems. First, the patron-client relationships have to be pyramided into networks linking national leaders to, say, the tenant farmers. Without pyramidding -- and the emphasis in the literature is very definitely on the vertical linkages rather than upon horizontal ones between patron-clients at intermediary levels -- the concept of a clientelistic polity would be meaningless, and clientelism would be unavailable to perform the brokerage or integrative functions its enthusiasts sometimes claim for it, much less maintain the system through some sort of balance or conflict among its parts. Secondly, the quality of the relationships is usually admitted to change with modernization. Client monogamy gives way to a sort of successive monogamy akin to polygamy. The scope of exchanges becomes less multiplex, and affective ties become more instrumental. Indeed, even the terms of trade may change, becoming less asymmetrical as patrons rely more on their "second-order"

resources of bureaucratic office or political influence than upon the old standbys of wealth and special wisdom. Scott adds that patron-client clusters within a given network will become more differentiated, with the bureaucrat's following coming primarily from his agency, etc., and that the networks will cover society with less density than in traditional times.¹² But what, then remains of the paradigm? Can we still speak of patron-client networks, in essence hierarchical, under the new conditions which encourage polygamy? When there are changes along each dimension defining the syndrome, what is left of the syndrome? When do quantitative changes -- for one can speak of "more" or "less" affectivity, multiplexity, density, durability, differentiation, and proportion of first to second-order resources -- lead to qualitative differences?

Obviously the durability of any network is inversely proportional to its proximity to political power, since patrons will be more dependent, the closer they are to power, on chancy second-order resources. Durability is also inversely proportional to the degree that power is concentrated, because a leader who concentrates power does so by preventing his lieutenants from acquiring independent power bases. These relationships, however, will hold in any context and therefore do not help to differentiate between contexts where the stretched paradigm may still hold and those where it may not. The key lies, rather, in measuring the degree to which potential resources have become second-order, that is, subject

to political or bureaucratic manipulation. While it is virtually impossible, as Waterbury has argued, to measure the various resources of a sample of patrons, I propose a short-cut for indicating a significant variation between countries that affects the mix of resources available to patrons in national contexts. Table 1 examines the percentage of GDP expended by governments, including the public sectors, of selected Mediterranean countries. As might be expected, the differences between Lebanon or Morocco, on the one hand, and Egypt or Tunisia, on the other, are striking. It may also be significant that the Lebanese have words for a clique (sSbah), a criminal gang (aSaabah), and a clientele (zilm), that they readily employ to describe networks of notables and their followers, whereas the Egyptians do not. In Egypt the gangs are circles of friends, shillal (sing. shilla), which usually do not have a head man. (In Tunisia the word is a derivative of jama9, a group, having more neutral connotations; Waterbury can give us the Moroccan equivalent)

My hunch, then, is that while "clientelism" may offer a reasonably good description of the politics of countries in which government is relatively small, it will be quite misleading in more highly bureaucratized societies, and especially so if power is highly concentrated. It does not follow, of course, as earlier generations of political sociologists argued, that bureaucratization in this sense is accompanied either by Weberian "rational-legal" authority or by modern parties and interest groups.

TABLE 1

General Government Expenditures as a Percentage
of Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost (1970)¹

Egypt	55.7
Iran	51.6
Iraq	44.2
Algeria	42.8 (1969)
Tunisia	40.7
Syria	37.9 (1971 est.)
France	37.4
Italy	35.5
Greece	27.6 (1969)
Morocco	25.6
Spain	19.7
Turkey	18.1
Lebanon	14.3 (1969)

1. Total government budgets, including public monopolies, public sector investments, and operating expenditures of public authorities are included, whenever possible, but the variety of sources used makes it unlikely that the resulting percentages are strictly comparable.

Sources: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Summaries of Economic Data for Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia; UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1972; The Middle East and North Africa, 1969-70 (Europa Publications); OECD National Accounts 1960-70; statistical yearbooks of Iraq and Syria.

In Islamic societies, in fact, a certain distrust of intermediaries built into urban culture may be hindering the formation of corporate groups, though the major obstacle, at least in most Arab countries, would appear to be the degree to which political power has been concentrated. But just because modern "trait groups" do not quite emerge does not mean that we are left with traditional patron-client networks. Modern conditions tend to undermine the asymmetries on which clientelism is founded, whereas the theory assumes personal dependence upon a patron to be independent of changing conditions, as if inequality were a problem for Europeans only.

Innately conservative if not so anachronistic as to be downright reactionary, the clientelist paradigm is likely to mislead the contemporary observer of "bureaucratic-authoritarian" systems like those of Egypt and Tunisia. Inevitably some assumptions have to be made, even to piece together and interpret, as I did, the fragments of available data concerning a minor election. But the paradigm would have oversimplified my task and led me to an unquestioning acceptance of the official version of the events. I would have assumed the incumbent party secretary to be a Ben Salah man, not his own man. I would have accepted Bourguiba's view of a party riddled with a potentially subversive Ben Salah network. I would also have underestimated the influence of liberal tendencies among the party cadres and thus failed to perceive the real constraint upon Bourguiba's power that he was attempting to neutralize. More generally,

the paradigm assumes too much asymmetry, hence dependence of hypothetical clients upon presumed patrons. It may also, in the absence of available data, lead the observer into assuming the existence of dense networks which do not in fact exist. The possibility of mobilizing "virtual", unorganized constituencies by appealing to shared values or interests will be played down, and thus constraints upon the ruler's power in systems of concentrated power may be underestimated. Each of these points will be discussed below in Egyptian as well as Tunisian contexts.

Personal dependence. Obviously, unless they are planning a coup, top-ranking politicians or bureaucrats can have only one patron in systems of concentrated power, whether Egypt, Tunisia, or Morocco. But, as clientelist theory tells us, there are limits to the number of clients a patron may service directly -- maybe 25 or 30, perhaps more if one is an energetic chief of state.¹³ The quality of the relationship, however, is more significant than the quantity of clients. In Morocco the king can make a tie multiplex, in a sense, by maximizing his clients' vulnerability; if asymmetry is in doubt, the client's relevance is immediately questioned, and he enjoys neither security based on a recognition of his merit, nor even the satisfaction of carrying out a given policy. The tactic of revolving doors also applies to Tunisian and Egyptian ministries, but on balance ministers seem to have enjoyed longer tenure and greater security. Technicians may be allowed greater authority

under presidential than under royal monarchies, though the differences should not be exaggerated. 14

It is at lower levels that the patron-client paradigm collapses. To be reelected, the incumbent general secretary did not need Ben Salah's support, nor does he seem to have sought out an alternative patron. Perhaps he should have, but annulling the election was an uncommon perversion of the system. Even in Egypt, where personal connections seem to play a greater role in political promotions at secondary levels than in Tunisia, the principal channel is the horizontally articulated shilla rather than the patron-client pyramid. Of course in both countries, as in Britain or the United States, advancing politicians often try to distribute a share of their rising influence to members of their personal staffs. In Egypt, moreover, the ratio is even more adverse than in North Africa between the supply of educated personnel and jobs commensurate with their abilities, despite the inflation of high positions in the Egyptian civil service and public sector. Hence personal connections are vital to any bureaucrat who wishes to beat the stultifying seniority system. But the vast majority of those who do beat the system cannot be considered personal retainers or "clients" of their administrative superiors or any other single patron. The shilla does not work by hierarchy or presuppose the informal but binding asymmetries that tie client to patron.

The typical pattern is as follows. The son of one of Egypt's

most important contractors became undersecretary of the Ministry of Tourism at an incredibly early age because the minister happened in normal times to be the contractor's principal design consultant. When the minister returned to his professional practice, the son naturally stayed on because the job carries automatic tenure. In the mid-sixties, because of so many such deals, the Ministry of Industry was carrying 28 undersecretaries, and the only way Aziz Sidky could eliminate them, when he returned as minister in 1968 after being fired in 1965, was to promote them. Table 2 indicates the extent to which the bureaucracy under Nasser was bloated with topranking jobs (though the adverse ratio of supply to demand increased during this period). The actual work load is unrelated to the number of such jobs, as many of them were political sinecures. The contractor's son was not likely to be worked by the minister's successor, but he still received his salary. So also did the two professional diplomats purged in 1972 for making anti-Soviet remarks at a seminar held at al-Ahram. One of them became foreign minister shortly before the October War, but the important point to note is that each kept his rank and salary in the meantime. Their patron, in other words, was the state, not any particular notable. Of course they retained their variety of personal contacts, but I do not know who, other than President Sadat, was responsible for the foreign minister's eventual promotion. His protector in 1972, the influential editor of al-Ahram, was removed shortly after the October War, ostensibly for being anti-American.

TABLE 2

Numbers of Egyptian Civilian Officials in Government and the Public Sector (Excluding Companies), 1962-72.

	1962-63	1966-67	1971-72	Percentage Increase 1962-72
Top officials (grade 1 and above)	967	1,544	1,905	97
Grades 2 and 3	9,897		20,433	106
Specialized jobs	71,661	103,587	137,814	92
Technical jobs	126,090	161,031	288,044	128
Administrative and organizational	13,671	14,862	25,281	85
Clerical	63,451	76,011	85,928	35
Total ^a (Total Work Force)	770,312	1,035,747	1,290,538	68 (20)

^a The total number of jobs is not the sum of the preceding, some of which overlap and all of which, except the clerical jobs, are relatively high-ranking and well paying.

Source: Mohammed Sbihi al-Atribi, "The Overgrowth of Bureaucrats within the Past Ten Years," Al-Tali'a, October, 1972, 72-75.

The beneficiary of a shilla may often need only a one-shot pay-off to be boosted beyond the normal confines of bureaucratic seniority. But once in orbit he is likely, if he wishes to avoid early paid retirement (without entertainment allowances), to require a succession of patrons to reach the President. (It is said that Nasser personally vetoed the appointments of all public sector company managers, but it is unlikely that he alone, even with the help of or under pressure from Marshal Amer, recruited them all). Take the following career, which must remain anonymous because it has probably not yet ended. In 1959 our subject, a young university lecturer, was unable to complete his fourth academic year teaching in Baghdad because President Qassim cracked down on the Baath and repatriated Egyptian technical assistants. Cairo University no longer had an opening for him, but Zakariyah Mohieddine, the patron of overseas operations for, and subsequently against the Baath, was probably already taking an interest in our subject's career. It is possible that he intervened with Egypt's first atomic energy commissioner to obtain for his former agent an administrative position in applied research. Definitely the Mohieddine connection helped post our man abroad four years later as a cultural attaché (to organize Egyptian students against the Baath). It also propelled him into his next job, undersecretary in a ministry headed by Prime Minister Mohieddine's brother-in-law. But this minister was less fortunate than most: he lasted only as long as his

patron's cabinet survived -- less than a year. Meanwhile, however, our undersecretary avoided being temporarily "parked" in his sinecure by latching on to Ali Sabry's bandwagon and helping him reform the universities. Though Mohieddine and Sabry were bitter rivals by the time, the undersecretary successfully jumped shillal, so to speak. But with the defeat of 1967, university reform became a dead issue, and so Sabry sent his loyal "client" to the Arab Socialist Union, which he had been attempting to build up as a power base since 1965, first against Marshal Amer, subsequently, in a sense, against Nasser himself. When, in 1969, Nasser purged Sabry to deter the Russians from meddling in internal Egyptian politics, our subject proved his capacity for political survival. He had meanwhile developed a close relationship with the ASU's new general secretary, Anwar Sadat. When, after succeeding Nasser, the new president consolidated his power by liquidating Sabry's network, most of which was concentrated in the ASU's "secret organization," our subject became a minister. And though his ministry was abolished in a cabinet reshuffle within less than a year, he retained his rank in a new academic post, a relatively safe position at a time when Sadat's was insecure. It proved an effective springboard to a top office in an international agency.

Such personal odysseys are not uncommon in Egyptian politics; they are the mark of a successful politician. Note that the ostensible client remains his own man, dependent not on any one

patron but only on the system. Neither Mohieddine, Sabry, nor even Sadat could "buy" our subject because their favors, second-order resources, were one-shot affairs. In a sense the system converts them into first-order resources, private property in the form of tenured office, for the client. Top officials retain their salaries even after they are retired. In 1973, according to a leading member of parliament, 154 individuals were receiving salaries as vice-ministers, and over 200 were receiving ministerial pay (and allowances). Their security undermines the sort of asymmetry characteristic both of the patron-client paradigm and court politics in Morocco. To be sure, these officials may also, as in Morocco, be involved in illicit deals, but they seem less vulnerable to blackmail than their Moroccan colleagues because corruption is less centralized than in the situation Waterbury depicts. If corruption is as pervasive in Egypt as in Morocco, it works laterally, paralleling the structure of the shilla, rather than vertically, as indicated by a patron-client structure. The president is unable to control lucrative exchanges between top government and public sector officials, because the structure is too immense, the shillal too interwoven, for any single man, however pure and disinterested, to control it without relying on a staff that is equally penetrated with shillal.

The shilla is not a permanent group, nor need it be. It may last just long enough to promote one official, or provide him a villa at the expense of the public sector in exchange for

protection. Any individual may have as many alternatives as his friends multiplied by their friends can provide, as long as they have the time to form a friendly circle, meeting occasionally although not always necessarily together, to cement their mutual transactions. Durable shillal are generally the furthest removed from power, homogeneous, centered perhaps on classmates or colleagues at work in uncompetitive positions. Robert Springborg documents one case of five classmates, functionaries in the Ministry of Local Government, who slowly worked their way up to grade two by sharing their contacts and experiences. But to move further, they would need to join less homogeneous shillal.¹⁵ Most effective are those that link the strategic offices of a variety of ministries, public authorities, and public sector companies, especially in lucrative areas such as contracting. But these may be volatile.

The most notorious shilla in recent Egyptian history could only have coalesced with Nasser's death and lasted barely six months until Sadat locked up most of it to "correct" the Revolution. The leading members of the alleged conspiracy were Ali Sabry, Sami Sharaf, and Sha'rawi Goma'a. Nasser had used Sharaf, his personal secretary and, in 1968, minister of state, to run an intelligence network keeping Sabry in check. Goma'a seems to have owed his promotion to Minister of the Interior in part to his friendship with Sharaf. But in 1970-71 they enjoyed the common interest of turning the president they had helped elect into a figurehead of the ASU which Sabry controlled.

Sabry was to be Sadat's Nasser. In addition to a number of ASU leaders placed by Sabry, they counted on the support of the Minister of Communications, the Minister of Housing, the Minister of Electricity, and, marginally, the Minister of Transport. Apparently, too, they enlisted the support of the Minister of War shortly before Sadat exposed their "conspiracy".

Ostensibly, in addition to plotting, the shilla was one big inter-related family. While owing his position to Sharaf, the Minister of Communications was married to Ali Sabry's niece. The Ministers of the Interior, Housing, and Electricity were married to sisters. One of the Minister of Electricity's brothers, moreover, was married to the daughter of the Minister of the Interior. Sharaf's wife was indirectly related (through the Foreign Minister, whom Sadat spared) to the Minister of War, and one of her very close friends was the wife of the Minister of Transport.

A political anthropologist, however, might trace similar connections among almost any random sample of leading Egyptian politicians -- beginning with those friendly antagonists, Nasser and Amer, a brother of the former having married a daughter of the latter just one year before the principals' final break. To reify a shilla can be as misleading as assuming, say, that the secretary of Sousse's Committee of Coordination had been a client of Ben Salah. There was, in fact, no hard evidence of any conspiracy in May, 1971, other than Sadat's carefully planned coup of May 13 to eliminate his rivals. Still, some personal

connections, usually based on a complementarity of interests as well as kinship or friendship, are more durable than others. The further removed these interests from presidential manipulation, the more likely they are to endure.

Hypothetical networks. Patron-client networks are supposed to permeate society, thus linking center to periphery and performing functions of mediation and social integration that interest groups are alleged to do in more organized societies. When a patron at the center gains or loses wealth or office, reverberations are therefore likely further down the line. Conversely, as Gellner has suggested of independent Morocco, local dissidence may be testing the strength of a central politician's network.¹⁶ But these relationships are not easy to discover in either Tunisia or Egypt.

In Tunisia leading politicians are reputed to have personal followings. The general secretary of the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), for instance, is supposed to have "his" network of loyal trade-unionists. With its help he was able, encouraged from above, to divide the movement in 1956 and, on two subsequent occasions, take control of the entire organization. When he was purged in 1965, the UGTT underwent a fairly extensive housecleaning. Some Tunisian politicians argued in the summer of 1974 against rumors of another purge that his network was too valuable to the regime to be smashed. The UGTT had, after all, supported Bourguiba's

campaign in 1971 and 1972 against the liberal opposition in the party. In return, the UGTT's businesses, taken away from the secretary and his collaborators in 1965, had been restored to them. On a patron-client view of union politics, the secretary had regained the resources needed to service his network. The network was bound to remain "tame" and do its best to ensure social peace for the regime because its members had learned in 1965 just how precarious their union enterprises really were.

Clientelism assumes networks of this sort to be relatively stable and extensive, "natural" growths subject only to manipulation from above, either directly or, as in the case of 1956 scission, reflected in internal struggles. The idea of autonomous trade-unionism in Tunisia is thus reduced to a competition of heteronomous clans for the spoils union officials may obtain. Institutional interests are reduced to personal loyalties cemented, perhaps, by dubious financial transactions.

But empirically it is virtually impossible to locate many clients of the general secretary, much less clients of the clients at the local level. And the small number of identifiable clients would hardly have justified the extensive purge, preceded by the infiltration of party cells into key enterprises, that took place in 1965. Political explanations of that event need not assume hypothetical networks. To carry out its economic goals, the regime had to tether the trade unions. Smear tactics

against its leader were employed to mask the fact. The assumption of extensive clientelism, however, served to justify the purge. As we have seen, the same assumption -- this time of a Ben Salah network -- served Bourguiba's tactical designs in 1970, when he wanted to give his new prime minister time to build up support in the party against the liberals, not the followers of Ben Salah.

In fact, concerned in 1973 over the adverse foreign publicity his authoritarian regime was receiving, Bourguiba grossly exaggerated the dangers of Planning Minister Ben Salah's alleged plotting four years earlier. He claimed that his minister, believing Bourguiba to be on his death bed, had arranged for his officials in the cooperatives to take over the party.¹⁷ But in 1970 much of the political elite, including the liberals and the incumbent prime minister, had not wanted Ben Salah to go on trial at all, and only six of his supporters were indicted, of whom five were convicted. If, among them, the ex-director of the Cooperative Union was one of two actually jailed, he was not accused then of plotting to take over the party.¹⁸ Another indication of the flimsiness of Ben Salah's network, once Bourguiba withdrew his support, was the composition of the new Committees of Coordination. For Tunis only 5 members were changed out of 25 by June, 1970; in Sfax, where one of the Ben Salah Seven had been governor, only 6 were changed out of 20.¹⁹ In each election there were more than twice as many candidates as posts to fill,

and electors from the cells had themselves undergone reelection beforehand. No wonder Bourguiba could subsequently complain to the liberal party director that he had not adequately purged the party of Ben Salah supporters -- on the assumption of a dense network!

So also in Egypt, while shillal seem omnipresent, networks are evanescent. Too many crosscutting possibilities virtually preclude fixed vertical linkages, much less ties at one remove. "Clientelism" in the sense of appointments from above, for instance, was endemic in the ASU but could rarely guarantee the client's loyalty. As a close observer of local Egyptian politics points out, power struggles at that level were discontinuous with those at regional and national levels. 20 Until 1965, the locally elected officers reflected the balance of forces within the village but operated in an organizational vacuum. According to Nasser's alter-ego, "The facade of the political organization rises, represented by the Socialist Union, but its nervous system still has to be completed." 21 What was needed was a vanguard. At first, Nasser's philosophy of the new revolution was to have each of his close collaborators find a few friends who would in turn find friends, etcetera, all of whom would constitute the vanguard. 22 Eventually, however, he adopted Ali Sabry's suggestion of building the vanguard as he had once organized the Free Officers, in clandestinity. The "Secret Organization" founded in 1966 grew to over 1500 by

the time Sadat smashed it in 1971.

Clandestinity had the advantage, perhaps, of protecting the annointed militants from shillal that might otherwise have diverted their attention from building socialist society. Nasser's efforts to stay informed suggest he was not always told whom Sabry recruited. After the June defeat, the latter probably retained the largest disciplined network outside the army, although Amer's suicide made it no longer in Nasser's interests to retain such a strong civilian counterweight. Clandestinity had another principal advantage for Ali Sabry. It meant that the offices he bestowed on his "clients" were not readily convertible to administrative posts under other patrons. He sometimes promoted people Nasser purged, but any client who switched loyalties would have to trade on his overt rank and office.

It would seem, however, that many did so, once Sadat arrested the principals (along with those who had spied against them for Nasser). His "correction" of the Revolution put less than two hundred behind bars, and most of them were released in a matter of weeks. Some members of the Secret Organization, coopted either personally by Sabry or by a close collaborator, retained positions even as minister. It may have been in Sadat's interest, unlike Bourguiba confronting Ben Salah, to minimize the degree to which the Secret Organization had penetrated society. Certainly there were considerably more than two hundred people who feared for their careers and

freedom when the president announced the "correction". Still, such disintegration of five years of organizational effort suggests that the networks had little cohesion. It would take considerably more research to estimate their density, by examining the impact Sadat's consolidation of power had upon the composition of various elected bodies. In the professional syndicates, for instance, the percentages of new officers varied from 85 to 38 in 1971, and turnover may be a rough measure of the density of Sabry's network. 23

"Virtual" constituencies. Clientelism renders political thought superfluous; though actors may voice slogans, what counts are the private transactions between patron and client to which any political system is reducible. Given the apparent incoherence, often, of the slogans, and given, too, the usual disjunction between theory and practice in many third world countries, the reduction of public appeals to private relationships may appear plausible. On this view ideological pronouncements are not intended to sway publics or guide public policy but to identify clients with a patron and perhaps camouflage the other ties between them. It would be misleading to dignify the clienteles with consistent political ideologies or points of view that might link them with broader constituencies. At most, as in nationalist movements, a public may be made to identify with a symbolic patron such as Mohamed V, Bourguiba, or Nasser. (After independence unsuccessful leaders might sometimes still qualify, eg. the late Allal al-Fassi.)

Such a perspective denies that a public can be mobilized for political activity unless it is penetrated with networks or symbolically linked with a charismatic figure. Thus those who opposed Bourguiba were "Youssefists" (after Salah ben Youssef), members of the Ben Salah clan, or other wayward individuals, together with their personal followings. By personalizing his opposition, a leader can discredit its ideas. Clientelist theory thus serves to demobilize the public. The fact that followings usually tend to evaporate when opposition leaders are suppressed lends support to the theory. They were obviously not in it for the principle. Low literacy rates, controlled mass media, and other limits to freedoms of speech and association lend further support to the theory, in that it is difficult for opponents to articulate principles.

Now obviously even the most hardened devotee of patron-client explanations of national politics will make some exceptions to cover behavior in the most "modern" sectors of society. Persistent student demonstrations and wildcat strikes, for instance, are not usually reducible to clientelistic explanations. But they are peripheral to the bulk of society and easily manageable as long as the regime's principal networks remain intact. Even when it proves impossible to coopt spontaneous leadership into the networks, workers can be paid off and students can be isolated.

But more difficult to manage, theoretically if not practically, was the liberal current of opinion prevailing at

the Destour Socialist Party's congress held at Monastir in October, 1971. At the time Bourguiba did not dare castigate Ahmed Mestiri and his allies for dominating the congress; in fact he told the delegates the final day that Mestiri might one day be president of the Republic.²⁴ But three months later he accused him of packing the congress, and the following year, after first attacking some of his colleagues for actions committed two decades earlier, he singled out the liberal leader as a "subversive element" for his "machinations" at the congress.²⁵

In actual fact Mestiri was chief of the "liberals" only in the sense that he was the principal spokesman for a coherent set of ideas about the role of the party in Tunisia's one-party system. He advocated freedom of expression within the party, free elections at all levels, and the institutionalization of its principal instances so that they might have a genuine impact upon government policies. At Monastir debate had focussed on whether the Political Bureau should be elected by the congress or designated by Bourguiba. The liberals offered as a compromise resolution that the Central Committee elected by the congress should in turn elect the Political Bureau. Despite opposition from the president's entourage, the motion carried, and the liberals also prevailed concerning the selection of Bourguiba's successor in the event that the president could not complete his term of office. In the elections to the Central Committee, the prime minister

Bourguiba had dismissed and Ahmed Mestiri received the most votes, while the incumbent prime minister got almost 20 per cent fewer. The congress represented a clearcut victory for Mestiri and his allies--so much so that Bourguiba not only ignored its resolutions but tried to discredit the congress.

The way to discredit it was to explain away its decisions as the work of Mestiri and a few followers, a "clan" or clientele. But how could this clan have possibly packed the congress? Bourguiba had dismissed Mestiri as minister of the interior one month before the congress, and his principal ally, the defense minister, had lost his post as party director the previous year. While Mestiri nominally presided the commission created in 1970 to restructure the party, Bourguiba had slipped other members on to the commission to neutralize him and, moreover, had appointed a party director opposed to Mestiri to organize the congress. Bourguiba subsequently accused Mestiri of packing it with sympathetic observers, but one of the latter's colleagues indicated to me that the organizers had tried to tamper with the votes of almost one-fifth of the 1070 delegates.²⁶

The simplest explanation of the liberals' success at Monastir is that their ideas reflected those of a large majority of party cadres, and that no faction of national politicians had been able either to preselect the delegates or to control their voting. An official survey of the party's 998 cells taken in 1970 had indicated considerable sentiment

in favor of free elections at all levels inside the party. Two hundred ninety-two cells expressed this view on their own initiative in answering the open-ended questionnaire.²⁷ Extensive public discussion further articulated it during the summer of 1970. Mestiri and company had no need of a personal network at Monastir. He and two allies posted at different points in the hall were sufficient to check their opponents' efforts to control the proceedings. Further organization might even have been counter-productive. They and their closest personal supporters, coming from Tunis, might have projected a regionalist image if they had attempted a greater degree of coordination.

A clientelist view of politics would not have predicted the groundswell of support for the liberals at Monastir, and it would probably underestimate the latent support for their views in 1974. In the intervening three years Mestiri, after losing his ministry, was excluded from the party and eventually removed from parliament. Resigning in solidarity, the defense minister declined subsequent feelers about returning to office. Strong support for them in Tunis deterred the authorities from organizing elections for the city's Committee of Coordination until July 1974. But a number of ministers who had sided with the liberals in 1971 and resigned from their posts subsequently sought Bourguiba's pardon and returned to office. One militant liberal even accepted office shortly after Bourguiba violated the procedures

agreed at Monastir for electing his Political Bureau. He subsequently returned to the liberal fold after being sacked for voicing protest inside the party against an arbitrary expansion of the Central Committee. His political fluctuations further illustrate the fluidity, however, of any Mestiri "clan". By 1974 it was reducible to a handful of individuals, none of whom could be counted on as unconditionally loyal to the others.

But I would still argue that it represents a significant force in Tunisian politics, in that the views of its members coincide with those of a majority of party cadres whenever the latter are permitted to express themselves freely. The cadres are ageing, and the party enjoys little support among educated Tunisians who have come of political age since independence. Consequently the future of the Tunisian single-party system is not assured.²⁸ The liberals, moreover, are too aware of the party's weaknesses to remain confident in their original view that the party might provide an institutional framework for political expression. But they represent party orthodoxy and thus retain a virtual constituency, however eroded and disorganized it may appear, and Bourguiba most probably takes it into account in his political calculations.

In Egypt, too, though political life is less structured than in Tunisia's forty year old party, it is still not quite reducible to the evanescent shillal. Most audiences may be less politicized than Tunisian party cadres, but, even apart

from workers and students, some virtual constituencies can be identified. In 1972, for instance, anti-Soviet feeling among Egyptian army officers was running high. There is no evidence that the Minister of Defence, whom Sadat had appointed in May 1971, had been able to develop a clientele comparable to that of Marshal Amer before 1967. But he achieved considerable popularity by making nationalist, implicitly anti-Soviet speeches to his men. The strength of his virtual constituency emboldened a shilla of retired conservatives to write an anti-Soviet letter to President Sadat, although none of its members seems to have been in direct contact with the defence minister. Sadat shrewdly dismissed the army's 20,000 Soviet advisers, the focus of his officers' discontent, before sacking his minister.

Even the ASU seemed after 1965 to be discovering and developing a constituency which transcended the cliques of politicians at the top centering around Ali Sabry and Sami Sharaf. The Youth Organization, ideological institutes, and production committees in large public enterprises were training new cadres to subject the gigantic state bureaucracy to political control and enlarge its social bases. Their socialist ideology, lacking the intellectual rigor of Marxist-Leninism (except among certain communists who joined the ASU after disbanding their parties in 1965), admitted a variety of interpretations, but a general tendency was evident. Agrarian reform was to be extended, workers were to have more say in

management, and "workers and peasants" were to be redefined so as to ensure more effective representation of their interests. The lengths after 1967 to which Nasser went to neutralize the ASU--temporarily disbanding the youth organization, eliminating the ideological institutes, limiting the roles of the production committees, permitting landowners 50 rather than an expected 25 feddans, reorganizing agricultural cooperatives to exclude illiterate leaders, depriving ASU leaders of ministerial responsibilities, encouraging Sharaf and Heykal to oppose the ASU leadership, and finally purging Sabry--suggest that the virtual constituency, no longer counterbalanced by Marshal Amer's clientele, was becoming too influential to suit the president.

In fact after the June defeat, Nasser, and subsequently Sadat, looked for support to two other constituencies, Islam and an upper middle class of managers and administrators. In place of "scientific socialism", Sadat stressed "science and faith" as the twin pillars on which to erect the modern state. While the slogan lacks the clearcut connotations of Mestiri's liberalism or even Sabry's socialism, it was translated into a number of policies designed to enlist the support of the pious and the new urban elite. Leaving piety aside, such policies as desequestrating property, liberalizing the importing of luxury goods, and restoring to office judges purged by Nasser do not appear explicable by clientelism; rather they were designed to placate the administrative establishment

even before Sadat had built up a reliable network of personal supporters. This establishment was the very one Sabry's virtual constituency had been threatening. Were it ever permitted full possession of the public sector, to own as well as to manage, then the character of Egyptian politics might change as new forms of clientelism based on first-order resources developed. But such change is unlikely to go far, because any Egyptian president must take the socialist constituency into account.

Constraints on power. On the clientelist view of politics, a leader is constrained only by his need to balance off clients against one another so as to prevent any coalition of them from limiting his options and thereby undermining the asymmetry of his relationships. Such balancing was practiced as much by Bourguiba and Nasser or Sadat as by King Hassan II. In fact, on this view of politics, the Tunisian and Egyptian leaders enjoyed greater latitude than the Moroccan because they legitimately commanded a greater proportion of society's resources, and because their immediate clients were less likely to own substantial fortunes and command dense networks of supporters. Apart from Marshal Amer, who seems to have commanded a state within the state, every Tunisian and Egyptian political lieutenant was expendable, a fact that Bourguiba propagated on numerous occasions.

Indeed, clientelism offers an attractive explanation of presidential politics in both Egypt and Tunisia. There have been

no evident constraints (excepting Amer) on the leaders' power. They are not institutionally accountable, and they have not had to bargain with organized pressure groups. Their tactics can be described in terms of balancing factions of clients so as to neutralize potential challenges to their personal power. The only theoretical constraint on their power, in this view, is that the clients are rendered ineffective by being systematically deprived and isolated from their administrative clienteles. The presidential balancing act prevents the political coordination needed to implement complex policies. Ministers become abject pawns, corrupted morally if not literally by their need to stay in favor. Certain Tunisian and Egyptian opponents of the respective regimes would probably agree with such an analysis.

Political activity on this view is inherently corrupting, and the asymmetries between the top patron and his clients are akin to those prevailing among a pack of thieves, with Bourguiba and Nasser presiding over the booty and blackmailing their followers. Corruption performs those socially integrating functions that Kornhauser ascribes to organized groupings in healthy pluralist societies: the ambitious bureaucrat is kept so busy playing the game that "he has little time left over to think about the 'system' as a whole".²⁹ Certainly prominent examples could be cited in Egypt and Tunisia as well as Morocco of leaders playing on the moral and economic vulnerabilities of their subordinates.

But corruption alone is less likely to sustain the asymmetries required of clientelist theory than to drag the leader down to the level of those he is blackmailing. To stay in power leaders also require legitimacy, or at least a semblance of it sufficient to keep their ostensible clients in awe of them--and hence clients. Even on a strictly clientelist view of the relationships between Nasser or Bourguiba and their respective lieutenants, the patron's principal resource was his authority, unquestioned as long as he was considered legitimate. By whom and by what criteria? On a strictly clientelist view only the core of clients count, and indeed most people, especially in semi-literate societies, are unlikely to raise questions of political obligation. But there is a certain circularity in arguing that clients alone accept presidential authority and thus remain clients. Legitimation rests on broader constituencies, though they are not necessarily organized. It may even be immaterial whether a client actually believes in his patron's claim to rule, as long as he believes that politically critical constituencies do. Thus the interests and shared values of wider communities have to be smuggled back into even a clientelist view of politics, unless corruption (or terror, Idi Amin style) really does dwarf all other aspects of public life. The interests and values in turn may constrain rulers in ways that a strictly clientelist account of their balancing acts would obscure.

The analysis of these interests and values in countries like Egypt and Tunisia is unfortunately fraught with considerable difficulty, because the constituencies which might articulate them are, for the most part, unorganized and "virtual". Only at the Monastir Congress, for instance, did the liberal constituency postulated and articulated by Mestiri manifest itself. In retrospect, however, Bourguiba's gambits in 1970 to delay the congress can be interpreted as indicating his anticipation, too, of such a constituency. In fact his initial tactic in 1970 for regaining authority, which his illnesses coupled with the Ben Salah affair had eroded, was to appeal to this constituency. Similarly, when Nasser in 1966 finally came out in favor of "scientific socialism", he was not just indicating his support for Ali Sabry but also appealing to a constituency in the making. His political choices were constrained by his need to conciliate its interests and values with those of Marshal Amer's officers, without allowing either to paralyze a new managerial class from running the public sector. One curious result of his efforts to square the circle was the Committee to Liquidate Feudalism, presided by Amer, to carry out an ostensibly leftist campaign with the help of military tribunals which sabotaged it.

It is not always easy for a ruler to cast aside or ignore the interests of a virtual constituency he has helped to create, even if it is not sufficiently organized to exercise obvious pressure. To retain his authority, he will require

alternative constituencies, as Bourguiba demonstrated in 1970-71 by building up both labor and private enterprise to counter liberal party orthodoxy. So also in Egypt, Sadat completed a virtual reversal of alliances begun by Nasser in 1967 by appealing to the upper class. But unlike Bourguiba or Nasser who could rely, at least up to a point, on a fund of support and legitimacy for their past achievements, Sadat remained in dire straits until the October War. Strikes at Helwan in August 1971, followed by student demonstrations in 1972 and 1973, seriously eroded his authority.

Presidential lieutenants are also sometimes linked with but hardly reducible to external constraints upon the ruler--foreign sources of support. Unlike virtual constituencies at home, needed for legitimacy, the foreign ones are organized but may also undermine or enhance the ruler's authority. The Russian presence in Egypt after 1967 diminished Nasser's in two ways. Comparable to the British presence before 1952, it jeopardized his nationalist credentials. By supporting the new socialist constituency, it limited Nasser's latitude to shift alliances at home. Conversely, his acceptance of Saudi and Kuwaiti aid after 1967 may be related to more conservative domestic policies though there was also the more immediate need, after Amer's demise, to find counterweights to the ASU. In 1969, Nasser purged Sabry--whose ties to the Russians the president had earlier forged quite deliberately--as a signal against Soviet involvement in internal Egyptian affairs, but

he did not thereby eliminate Russian influence; ironically, he was subsequently pressured into reinstating Sabry. On a clientelist reading Sabry would be the principal political force whereas in fact it was the Russians. Whether or not he was their client, he had become a symbol of their presence.

External constraints seemed less confining in Tunisia than in Egypt, once decolonization ended with the take-over of all remaining settler lands in 1964. To effect decolonization, however, Bourguiba had relied heavily since 1957 on American support. While the United States intervened less visibly in Tunisian internal affairs than did the Russians in Egypt, there was some impact. In 1965 the American ambassador signalled his country's desire to see Tunisia take an understanding attitude toward the Vietnam War. Bourguiba obliged, and U.S. economic assistance was diminished less than in many other African countries. Bourguiba's support of the United States became a principal student grievance against the regime in 1966 and thus contributed, marginally, to the party's inability to recruit substantial numbers of the generation educated since independence. Another possible instance of external constraints concerns Algeria, not the United States. Almost immediately after signing an agreement in 1974 with Libya's President Qaddafi to merge their countries, Bourguiba changed his mind, delayed ratification, and after three months claimed that he had signed a mere "declaration of intent". The merger was unacceptable to Algeria. But

it was also opposed by influential Tunisian politicians who calculated that their foreign minister would gain an edge over his rivals from such a merger in the eventual race to succeed Bourguiba. In this instance a clientelist analysis of the original decision and its reversal is not misleading, in that the principal political force appears to have been the foreign minister, whom Bourguiba fired two days after signing the agreement, as much as Libyans or Algerians. The foreign minister, incidentally, tried to explain away his dismissal as due to American pressure (whereas in 1973 Pompidou had prevailed upon Bourguiba to keep him in office).

But politics were also involved. Playing upon the ideas of Islam, Arab unity, and forthright support of the Palestinian cause, Libya's President Qaddafi attempted to build constituencies in both Egypt and Tunisia that might constrain Sadat and Bourguiba to accept integral union on Libyan terms. Though not a Muslim Brother, he was tapping its potential audience in Egypt while appealing in Tunisia to the audience Salah ben Youssef had once mobilized. If in both instances he failed, each effort was a political one that cannot be explained simply in terms of building client networks in the respective countries. While it is true that he did temporarily buy off the Tunisian patron, not enough political work had been accomplished for the relationship to stick. Indeed, the art of buying off foreign politicians which clientelistic explanations of national politics may encourage probably works only

in societies where a sense of national community is extremely low, or when the service purchased is either marginal to the interests and values of any constituency or congruent with those of a dominant one.

Conclusion. Politics still is, to some extent, explicable in Egypt and Tunisia in terms of presidential clients, and their clients, jockeying for position. Neither country has evolved the strong political institutions which would render active and visible the virtual constituencies to which actors appeal for support and legitimacy. Politics to some extent is a shadow play in which clients may be ordered, like Ali Sabry, to represent a constituency, and later purged for their efforts. But an exclusive preoccupation with the shadows would leave us, like Plato's cave-dwellers, without an appreciation of the potentials for political change in either country.

The more heavily bureaucracy weighs upon society, the more likely it is that vertical patron-client networks give way to horizontal shillal. In Egypt the shillal tend to be serviced primarily by governmental rather than private resources, and corruption appears to be both extensive and top-heavy. While a strong leader like Nasser can attempt to control it by mobilizing alternative constituencies, mobilization from above is likely to be ineffectual. As bureaucracy becomes heavier, it is likely to become more corrupt, especially near the top, in the absence of effective

political coordination and supervision. Thus state socialism, Egyptian style, may increase disparities between the haves and the have-nots even while undermining traditional patron-client relationships based on first-order resources. Extensive corruption, in turn, may release the resources needed to feed new networks which link the public sector with private enterprise. It does not follow, however, that these networks will be primarily based on private enterprise, despite recent talk in Egypt of "opening up" the economy. The new Egyptian patrons, even and perhaps especially when they become ministers, remain highly vulnerable and dependent upon shillal to retain their influence, without which their business empires would collapse.

The shillal Sadat has done so much to cultivate since he came to power--and understandably so, to grasp the hydra-headed administration and consolidate his power--cannot substitute for the more formal political organizations needed to articulate and dampen social pressures. If patron-client networks are supposed to "integrate" society and prevent class conflict, shillal certainly cannot. Consequently Sadat faces choices about the direction of political change in Egypt that no combination of shillal can really circumscribe. He may permit the new public sector entrepreneurs and their friends to convert their second-order resources into private property by liberalizing the economy and dismantling the public sector--but at the risk of igniting class conflict. He may tolerate the status quo--but at the risk that corruption

becomes so salient as to endanger his newly won legitimacy. Or he may try to replay Nasser's game of mobilizing the socialist constituency--but at the risk that Egypt goes broke for lack of foreign investment. (A fourth alternative might be to mobilize a Muslim constituency against profiteers and still receive Arab investments--but at the risk of igniting confessional and cultural conflict which would make this alternative least appealing to most educated Egyptians.)

Bureaucracy and corruption have weighed less heavily on Tunisia than on Egypt. The Ben Salah purge terminated Tunisia's "pyramidal structure" of agricultural cooperatives before they could take hold, and the subsequent government released to private ownership substantial amounts of settler land, public industry, and foreign and domestic commerce. Consequently Tunisia has already chosen the first of the alternatives outlined above, and indeed the conversion of influence into property is already visible in the hills above Gamarth blanketed since 1972 by sumptuous villas. When coupled with the defeat of the liberal trend inside the party, the rise of new and visible wealth makes it unlikely that the Destour will retain its political monopoly once Bourguiba departs. The new bourgeoisie will either accept the party's protection, and perhaps deprive it of its national character, or finance alternative parties engendered by regional as well as class conflict. Political choices will not have been explained by clientelistic analyses.

Footnotes

1. Abdelfattah Amor, Le Regime Politique de la Tunisie, these de doctorat en droit, Universite de Droit d'Economie et des Sciences Sociales de Paris, April 4, 1973, makes the point that the incumbent secretary had been forbidden to run for office. But since a new party director took over in Tunis only four days before the elections, the lines of authority may have been confused.

2. Of the 96 top officials studied by the Centre de Recherches et d'Etudes sur les Societies Mediterraneennes, 25 per cent came from the Sahel. See the Center's La formation des elites politiques maghrebines (Paris, 1973), p. 187.

3. C. H. Moore, Tunisia Since Independence (Berkeley, 1965), p. 138, n. 13.

4. Cited by Amor, op. cit.

5. The relevant portions of this important speech are published by the Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1970 (Paris, 1971), p. 865.

6. See Bourguiba's speeches (Secretariat of Information, Tunis) of July 24, 1971, especially pp. 13-16; February 24, 1973; March 13, 1973; and May 7, 1973.

7. Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," Comparative Politics, IV, 2 (January 1972), 159, 163.

8. Comparative Politics, VI, 3 (April 1974), 425.

9. John Waterbury, "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime," World Politics, XXV, 4 (July 1973), 534.

10. In addition to Lemarchand and Legg, op. cit., see James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review, LXVI, 1 (March 1972), 68-90, and Carl H. Lande, "Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics," APSR, LXVII, 1 (March 1973), 103-127. Wolf is cited by Lemarchand and Legg, p. 154.

11. Lande, op. cit., p. 119, argues that tenants seek patrons when land is scarce, but that "compulsory clientage" may occur when labor is scarce relative to land.

12. Scott, op. cit., 106-7.

13. Cf. ibid., 95; Waterbury, on the other hand, seems to suggest that the king can personally manipulate the entire political elite.

14. For a discussion of the influence on policy-making of Egyptian engineer-technocrats, see C. H. Moore, "The New Egyptian Technocracy: Engineers at the Interstices of Power," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, forthcoming.

15. Robert Springborg, The Ties that Bind: Political Association and Policy Making in Egypt, Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science, Stanford University, June 1974, pp.

16. Ernest Gellner, "Patterns of rural rebellion in Morocco during the early years of independence," reprinted in E. Gellner and C. A. Micaud, Arabs and Berbers (London 1972), pp. 361-74.

17. Speech, August 1, 1973, p. 6.

18. The parliamentary commission which first investigated

the case did, however, describe the cooperatives as "a pyramidal edifice on a national scale duplicating the party and national organizations, and even certain administrations". See L'Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1970, p. 856. Ben Salah's former chef de cabinet, who became party director in late 1968, brought only one new assistant with him into the party's central offices. Fifteen of the old staff were released, but on orders of the prime minister, not Ben Salah, and for budgetary rather than political reasons.

19. Interview, 8 June 1970, with a member of Party Director Hassib ben Ammar's staff.

20. Iliya Harik, "The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement: the Case of Egypt," World Politics, XXVI, 1 (October 1973), 87-88, 98-105.

21. Cited by Gerard Duprat, Revolution et Autogestion Rurale en Algerie (Paris, 1973), p. 188.

22. See the minutes of the meeting between Nasser and his principal subordinates reported in al-Tali'a, March 1965, pp. 9-26.

23. C. H. Moore, "Professional Syndicates in Contemporary Egypt: the 'Containment' of the New Middle Class," American Journal of Arabic Studies, forthcoming.

24. Speech, October 14, 1971, p. 9.

25. Speeches, January 12, 1972; May 7, 1973, pp. 15-23.

26. Only 878 delegates voted, out of a total of 1070. This fact was cited by my informant to substantiate his allegations. He claimed that some delegates had been deprived

of their ballots but that he had foiled the organizers' attempt to use them.

27. Destour Socialist Party, Political Bureau, General Results of the Consultation of Destour Cells Concerning Political, Organizational, Economic, Social Matters, mimeo. 3 pp., n.d.

28. In his speech of October 6, 1973, p. 7, Bourguiba voiced concern over the absence of any membership statistics in his party director's official report.

29. Waterbury, op. cit., 547. Cf. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Illinois, 1959), p.



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LEGITIMACY AND PATRONAGE:
A Victims Perspective

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Exploitation in Rural Class Relations:

A Victim's Perspective

Introduction: Toward an Operational Moral Economy

What is exploitation? What do we mean when we say that landlords exploit peasants? Are some agrarian systems more exploitive than others? If so, how would one set about showing that this was the case?

At the core of the notion of exploitation is the idea "that some individuals, groups, or classes benefit unjustly or unfairly from the labor of, or at the expense of, others."¹ Embedded in this minimal point of departure are at least two characteristics of exploitation which both socialist and non-socialist schools of thought would accept. First, exploitation is to be seen as a relationship between individuals, groups, or institutions; the existence of an exploited party implies the existence of an exploiter. Second, exploitation is an unfair distribution of effort and reward, in turn requiring some standard of distributive equity against which actual relationships may be judged. The existence of injustice implies a norm of justice. Beyond this small, shared terrain, however, agreement evaporates and, particularly on the question of what the criteria of justice should be, there are about as many answers as there are social scientists reckless enough to venture onto such treacherous conceptual ground.

Once the criterion for what constitutes a fair or equitable relationship has been provided, it becomes possible, in principle at least, to say something about how exploitative any particular relationship is by judging how far it departs from that standard. The problem, of course, is that others may not accept the standard as valid. For those within the Marxist tradition, for example, the labor theory of value supplies the conceptual basis for evaluating the level of exploitation. Inasmuch as all value flows ultimately from labor, the surplus value appropriated by the mere ownership of the means of production in the form of rent, profits, and interest provides a measure of exploitation. One hardly need subscribe to the labor theory of value, however, to see exploitation as an objective relationship that allows us to distinguish less exploitative from more exploitative situations. Is there not a difference, Barrington Moore asks, between a landlord who takes a third of the harvest and one who takes nine-tenths?² Under almost any conceivable definition of exploitation, then, some relationships are so much more massively unequal and coercive than others that they can hardly fail to be recognized as objectively more exploitative. Such stark contrasts in the human condition make an objective approach to exploitation very appealing.

Nevertheless, concepts of exploitation that begin deductively by creating an abstract standard of equity suffer from two inherent difficulties. The first, of course, is the degree of acceptance of the moral principles on which the criterion of justice is based. The labor theory of value is, after all, not the only

touchstone available for building a theory of exploitation. To take a rather extreme example, marginalist economists in the laissez-faire tradition would equate the normative value of labor with the price it could fetch in the market -- whatever that price happened to be. From this narrow perspective only relationships founded on fraud or naked coercion -- as distinct from market forces -- could presumably be considered exploitative. Any a priori conception of justice thus presupposes a normative, if not an analytical, tradition. Those who operate outside that tradition will, if they accept the notion of exploitation at all, apply different standards. Ultimately, such disputes over what is exploitative and what is not, are appeals to a normative tradition and not matters to be settled by empirical inquiry.

Even within the confines of a single standard of equity, value problems reappear. Let us assume, as many exchange theorists do, that a relationship is exploitative to the extent that it departs from the principle of equal exchange or balanced reciprocity. How would we evaluate, for example, the feudal relationship between lord and serf in this context? How many gifts or how much labor from the serf represent a "fair" payment for the lord's protection against bandits or outside armies? How many chickens or baskets of grain, if any, would be fair compensation for the lord's judicial services in settling local disputes? It is certainly true, as Moore claims, that a gross disproportion in what the lord takes and what he gives are obvious to any reasonable observer. Still, the exchange of non-comparable services does allow for widely divergent conclusions about equity within the same normative framework.

A second difficulty with deductively reached concepts of exploitation is, I believe, far more serious because it compromises their analytical power. This difficulty hinges on the fact that such theories rarely provide any conceptual link between an a priori notion of exploitation and the subjective feelings of the exploited. In the absence of this conceptual bridge, any similarity between the level of exploitation as determined by the theory and the sense of exploitation among victims is largely fortuitous. This potential disparity is not a serious inconvenience if the goal of the theory is merely to classify situations as more or less unjust regardless of the views of participants. If, on the other hand, it is hoped that that exploitation as uncovered by the theory and exploitation as felt by victims will have some relationship to each other, the inconvenience is far more serious. One way of saving the theory when a disparity appears is by erecting another theory to explain the gap. This is precisely the function served by the concept of ^{false}~~class~~ consciousness. When the perceptions, assuming they can be accurately gauged, of workers or peasants whom the theory tells us are exploited fail to accord with their "objective situation" they are said to be in a state of false consciousness. The misapprehension of their true situation by some or all of the exploited provides, then, one of the key tasks of the typical revolutionary party which aims to demask the social myths or religious doctrines that prevent people from seeing things as they are. For the sake of consistency, the term false consciousness should also be applied to the reverse of

the situation just described. That is, it should also cover cases where the theory finds no exploitation but where there is nonetheless a lively sense of social injustice among the population in question.³ In terms of theory there is just as much misapprehension of the true state of affairs if people sense exploitation where there is none as when they fail to sense exploitation when it exists.

If the analytical goal of a theory of exploitation is to tell us something about the perceptions of the exploited - about their sense of exploitation, their notion of injustice, their anger - deductive approaches will not carry us very far. Founded, as they are, on abstract conceptions of justice, they have no necessary relation to the values of flesh-and-blood actors. The weakness of deductive theory at this level is again strikingly apparent in the doctrine of false consciousness. Any discrepancy between how people feel about their situation and what the theory says their situation is becomes, in a sense, a measure of their inability to perceive reality. Since the actors view of his condition is, by definition, mistaken, concern then shifts to the forces which prevent his appreciation of things from moving closer to the revealed truth of the theory. For its part, the theory remains untouched by its encounter with real actors.

The concept of false consciousness overlooks the very real possibility that the actor's "problem" is not simply one of misperception. It overlooks the possibility that he may, in fact, have his own durable standards of equity and exploitation --

standards that lead him to judgements about his situation that are quite different from those of an outside observer equipped with a deductive theory. The actor, to put it bluntly, may have his own durable moral economy. If this is the case, the failure of his views to accord with those of theory is not due to his inability to see things clearly, but to his values. One may choose, of course, to call these values a form of false consciousness as well. But to the extent that they are rooted in his existential needs, to the extent that they are resistant to efforts at "reeducation", to the extent that they continue to define the situation for the actor, it is they and not the theory which serve as reliable guides to his sentiments and behavior.

If our goal, then, is to explain the feelings, opinion, and behavior of real actors, a study of exploitation must begin, not with an abstract normative standard, but, with the values of real actors. Such an approach requires that we start phenomenologically, at the bottom, and ask what the peasants' or workers' definition of the situation is. When a peasant considers twenty percent of his harvest a reasonable rent and forty percent on unjust rent, we must ask how he arrives at this judgement -- what criterion of fairness he uses. On this basis it should be possible to construct the operational moral economy of a subordinate class.

The aim of this article is to develop the rudiments of such a phenomenological theory of exploitation for a portion, at least, of one class: the peasantry. In particular, the analysis focuses on the relationship between the owners of land

and their tenants.⁴ For reasons that will become obvious, I confine my attention to poor tenants who are not far removed from the subsistence level. The effort throughout will be to discover the constituent elements of the peasantry's conception of equity and exploitation in its relation with landlords.

The choice of landlord-tenant relations is not entirely one of analytical convenience and interest. In the still largely agrarian third world, the relation between the tillers of land and its owners represents the predominant class dyad -- the locus of the livelihood and material well-being for much of the population. It goes without saying that it has also been the historic locus of explosive class tensions. To speak of exploitation in the third world is to speak often of landlord-tenant relations. As a student of nineteenth century Chinese history notes, "By far the most important conflicts between common peasants and persons in better economic and social positions were the feuds between tenants and landlords"⁵ If the landlord-tenant relationship is but one of many inter-class dyads, it is perhaps the most salient.

One cautionary note is necessary. The phenomenology of exploitation in landlord-tenant relations amounts to a study of peasant values rather than peasant action. That is, a knowledge of the conditions under which peasants consider themselves to be exploited can tell us little, by itself, about how they can or will react to that exploitation. It is possible, even likely, that much of the world's peasantry labors under circumstances it considers as unjust but has little choice but to knuckle under. While the presence of sensed exploitation is perhaps a necessary condition for peasant protest or revolt,

it is hardly a sufficient condition. For this reason the analysis that follows is not so much a contribution to the study of peasant rebellion as it is a study of peasant notions of justice -- of their moral claims on the social order.

There is at least one major objection to phenomenological approach to exploitation. By taking, as our guide, the perceptions of participants, do we not thereby risk having as many definitions of exploitation as there are participants? If exploitation means just what people say it means, this implies that each epoch, each culture, each class, perhaps even each individual, will have to be treated separately. The Indian peasant and the Chinese peasant may have different notions of exploitation, these notions may change over time, they may vary from individual to individual within the class. While a phenomenological analysis of exploitation may thus bring us closer to the real values of actors, this advantage may entail a corresponding sacrifice in its range of applicability.

This objection is not without justice. The decision to proceed phenomenologically does, in principle, exclude a timeless and culture-free notion of equity and exploitation. This need not mean, however, that we are reduced to taking individuals one by one. Any existing social order, after all, creates clusters of shared values and institutions that may persist for long periods. For a class as a whole, moreover, the fact of sharing an analogous place in the larger social structure may produce some common values that hold across culture. The new industrial workers of nineteenth century England, France, and Germany are a case in point. Facing

similar problems of welfare and security, it is possible to discern something of a shared moral economy in their demands and protests. Much the same may be true for peasants who also find themselves in the same structural boat. That is, the shared problems of subsistence, rents, and taxes and the common existential dilemmas of crop production may create the basis for a shared opinion about which social arrangements are more or less just and which are exploitative. The actual extent to which a given population shares a common moral economy is, of course, a matter for empirical inquiry. There is nonetheless good reason to believe that structural uniformities encourage the growth of common values.

It is even possible that folk notions of exploitation, for all their subjectivity, may actually satisfy some of the conditions for what we have called deductive theories of exploitation. An illustration will clarify what I mean. The study of grain and bread riots in eighteenth and nineteenth century England and France has uncovered an intimate connection between the popular doctrine of "the just price" and protest.⁶ Prices of bread or flour were considered tolerable so long as a poor workingman's wage allowed him to buy his family's accustomed daily or weekly ration of this major staple. Once the price reached a certain threshold level in relation to the going wage, the urban poor regularly took matters into their own hands, seizing markets, raiding granaries and mills, or forcing bakers and grain traders to sell at the popularly-determined just price.⁷ As consumers, the urban poor had a definite collective view of what was a fair price -- a view

that was based on common subsistence standards and which held local authorities as well as millers and sellers responsible for its maintenance. The folk test of exploitative prices was therefore, in many respects, an objective test. It could be applied impersonally by an outside observer to determine when popular outrage could be expected. Municipal authorities in fact applied this test. They were quite aware when the relationship between bread prices and wages had entered a danger zone and they often intervened to increase the supply of bread and grain, to control prices, and, of course, to check the anticipated public outcry if their measures failed.

If peasant conceptions of exploitation can also be shown to contain such durable principles of evaluation, it may be possible to have our cake and eat it too. That is, the test of exploitation used by peasants may, at the same time be objective enough to be applied by an outside observer. Like the urban officials in charge of local markets, we may then be able to forecast the conditions which a large public will find exploitative.

The remainder of this article is devoted to the meaning of exploitation as it is experienced by tenants. The analysis is thus limited to a single relationship found in societies with private ownership in land. It concerns, furthermore, only tenants living at or near the subsistence level for whom tenancy is the principal, if not sole, means of livelihood. These last restrictions are necessary to define a population whose welfare

problems and social experience are coherent enough to potentially foster a common view of landlord equity.

Within this context, I begin by describing the dependency and exchange that are often central features of landlord tenant systems. Second, a number of possible criteria of "fairness" which tenants might apply to the relationship are evaluated. I then argue in some detail in the main body of the paper (Section 3) that notions of balanced reciprocity and the right to subsistence form the moral basis of peasant judgements about exploitation. The norm of reciprocity governs most interpersonal relations in peasant society and is implicit in the justification of virtually any system of stratification. Within the context of reciprocity, the right to subsistence constitutes the critical obligation of elites who control the means of production. On the basis of the existential needs of subsistence-oriented tenants I argue that the stability and security of subsistence income are more critical to the tenant's evaluation of the relationship than either his average return or the portion of the crop taken by the landlord as rent. The implications of this criteria of fairness for systems of tenancy are then discussed. Throughout this section I present evidence to show how both principles are at work in the concrete preferences and choices of peasants. Fourth, I indicate how the right to subsistence and the norm of reciprocity structure the tenants understanding of the landlords moral obligation -- how they place normative boundaries on the role behavior of landlords generally. The next to last section contains a schematic description of how more exploitive

forms of tenancy actually developed in Southeast Asia and their consequences for agrarian class relations. Finally, the empirical question arises of how to distinguish false deference from real deference -- how to tell if peasants judge themselves exploited when the level of oppression makes it impossible for them to speak or act openly. In such cases, I indicate how it may be possible to find indications in the language, religion, and culture of subordinate classes that their deference is coerced and not voluntary.

I. The Landlord-Tenant Dyad

Land is the defining material link in the landlord-tenant relationship. However variable the link may be, it originates in the transfer of use-rights by the owner in return for some form of payment from the tenant. At a minimum, then, it is an economic exchange based on inequality in the ownership of land.

The inequality in control over scarce resources implied by the categories landlord and tenant is a variable, not a constant. Where land is abundant and labor scarce, the tenant may in fact be in a stronger bargaining position than the owner. For the most part, however, the situation is reversed and the landlord, as the owner of the scarce factor of production, has the upper hand. In the absence of tenant organization or state intervention to redress the balance, most landlord-tenant systems are characterized by an imbalance of power; the tenant needs the landlord more than the landlord needs the tenant. Stated more formally, $P \rightarrow t \gg P \leftarrow t$, where

P = power, l = landlord, and t = tenant. The disparity in power ($P_{l \rightarrow t} - P_{t \rightarrow l}$) becomes, then, a measure of the relative dependence of the tenant on the resources controlled by the landlord.

The more dependent the tenant is on the owner for the supply of land, the more the landlord can potentially charge for its use. Since land is the key subsistence resource in an agrarian economy, demand for it is rather inelastic and the dependence may be very onerous indeed. The actual bargaining advantage of the owner will vary directly with the importance and scarcity of land as a subsistence resource and inversely with the importance and scarcity of tenants as a labor force. The analogy here with the economic forces of supply and demand should not conceal the political basis for dependence. Ownership of land is ultimately a political fact, backed by a legal system and its coercive sanctions or by private power. The scarcity of land may also be politically reinforced by denying tenants the right to migrate or to clear new land. A balance of power between landlords and tenants is thus as much a political creation as an economic given.

Inasmuch as landlord-tenant relationships typically involve disparities in power and dependence, is it possible to say that they are thus inherently exploitative and will be seen as such by tenants? A case could certainly be made out for this position, citing the preference of peasants for the economic autonomy that comes with landownership and their avoidance of personal subordination where possible. One might, on the other

hand, also make a case for the satisfactions of dependence. Under certain circumstances, at least, the compensating advantages of dependency in terms of economic security and protection may make it relatively more attractive than autonomy.⁸ While I am inclined to the position that the landlord-tenant relation does start out, as it were, under a moral cloud because peasants do prefer autonomy (other things equal) to dependence, this is not a question I propose to resolve here. Instead, I take the dependence ^{that is} built-into the landlord-tenant dyad as a given and ask what forms of this dependence ~~are~~ ^{are} regarded as more exploitative or less exploitative by tenants and what are their criteria of judgement ~~are~~ ^{are}!

Apart from its basis in economic inequality, the second constituent feature of the landlord-tenant relationship is exchange. At a minimum, this involves only the provision of land and the payment of rent. This stripped-down version of tenancy is approximated in the case of the absentee, rentier landlord whose interaction with the tenant begins and ends with the collection of rent. A tenant who asks himself whether such a relationship is just has only to decide whether the rent he pays is reasonable or unreasonable.⁹ Typically, however, the landlord-tenant link is not so one-dimensional. The landlord may, for instance, provide (at a cost, to be sure) plough animals, seed, fertilizer, production loans, and food rations for the tenant family. He may require the tenant to send him firewood or vegetables, to do household work, or to cart grain to market. As the economic exchange becomes steadily more

complex and multi-faceted, the rent can no longer serve as an adequate barometer to the relationship. Many of these exchanges are reducible, in principle, to cash values and thus might still be aggregated into a single, overall balance of exchange. When we move to the social dimensions of the relationship, though, it is not so simple to find a common measure of exchange value. The landowner may expect the tenant to support him politically or militarily, to farm as he directs, to seek his permission before anyone in the tenant's family marries or takes employment elsewhere. All of these demands involve social costs, the value of which is difficult to calculate. If the landlord, on the other hand, defends the tenant against outsiders, provides local schooling, sponsors local ritual and festivals, and so on, how are we to measure the value of such presumed social gains? At a practical level, this problem is a serious one inasmuch as tenancy in the third world typically contains "pre-commercial" features which are not expressible in terms of an objective standard of value. The point here is simply that the more complex the pattern of exchange, the more arbitrary becomes any means of judging its exploitiveness that does not consider the values and preferences of tenants.

II. Alternative Standards of Fairness

What standards of fairness might tenants reasonably apply in judging the legitimacy of landlord demands? Before proposing a standard which I believe reflects both the existential dilemma of peasants and their values, four alternative standards

are discussed. Each is proposed as a potential assumption about justice that tenants might actually employ and is then evaluated in those terms.

Standard of Living: Conceivably, the tenant's view of equity in exchange with a landlord might be a direct reflection of his standard of living. A system of tenancy which leaves the peasant relatively well-off would then be seen as generally benign while one that barely provided for his minimal needs would be seen as exploitative.

This simplistic formulation is not without some merit. For a man at the very edge of subsistence, the basket of grain taken by the landlord represents a far greater sacrifice than it would for a man with a modest surplus. One would expect the former to bitterly resent even a small rent while the latter would find a larger rent perhaps burdensome but not a direct threat to his family's survival. Conditions of tenancy which are thus at least tolerable for some, may be intolerable for others. In this sense, it is hard to conceive of any standard of exploitation that is not related to the material conditions of peasant life -- to ~~what~~ the human consequences of a given claim on the resources of a tenant family.

Granting that a tenant's standard of living will necessarily color his vision of exploitation, it is unlikely to be his only guide. There is, in addition, the relational aspect of exploitation to consider, since even tenants at the same level of penury may have markedly different relationships with their

landlords. These differences are likely to influence their judgements as well. What happens, for example, when the conclusions a tenant might draw from his standard of living diverge from those he might draw from his exchange relationship with his landlord? The two-by-two table and examples given below illustrate the analytical difficulty.

Figure 1

		<u>Landlord-tenant Exchange</u> →	
		Improving	Deteriorating
Standard of Living	Improving	A unambiguous	B ambiguous
	Deteriorating	C ambiguous	D unambiguous

For tenants whose cases fall in cells A or D, there is no analytical problem since both indicators point in the same direction. In cell A we assume that the terms of exchange are moving in favor of the tenant (i.e., the goods and services the tenant owes to the landlord are diminishing, the goods and services he receives from the landlord are growing - or both) and his standard of living is improving. The situation, though the tenant may still consider it unjust, is becoming less exploitive as the net demands on him fall and his capacity to meet these demands increases. Cell D is the mirror image of cell A; net demands are rising and the consequences of those demands are becoming more painful. By both criteria, the situation is

becoming more exploitative.

For tenants whose cases fall in cells B and C, however, the standard of living criteria, taken alone, may be misleading. Both situations are, to complicate matters, historically common. Take, for example, a near famine due to crop failures in which landlords forego their claim to rent and actually provide tenants with food from their own granaries until the next crop is harvested (Cell B). Here a likely decline in the absolute standard of living of tenants is accompanied by improved terms of exchange with landowners. Something like this occurred regularly in Southern India, according to Scarlett Epstein, where landowning families shared the existing grain supply equally following a poor harvest.¹⁰ She claims, in addition, that the division of food supplies by need in lean years was a key factor in legitimizing the highly stratified caste system in that area. In such instances it is likely, or at least possible, that tenants will feel less exploited despite the fact that their standard of living is declining.

The inverse situation (Cell C), where a rising standard of living is combined with worsening terms of landlord-tenant exchange is also possible. It may, in fact, be quite common, where the growth of markets and commercialization occur within a semi-feudal agrarian system. There is little doubt, for example, that the average real income many French peasants was improving during the eighteenth century. What peasants resented, and what moved many of them to revolutionary action, it is argued, was the effort of the landed aristocracy and the

church to reimpose or increase an array of feudal charges which had fallen into disuse.¹¹ Despite the fact that peasants might have been better off materially than before, the new burdens imposed by elites prompted a growing sense of exploitation and resistance. Peasant resistance to what is known as the "second feudalism" in Eastern Europe lends itself to a similar interpretation.¹²

The standard of living of the peasantry taken alone, then, seems an inadequate basis for a phenomenological theory of exploitation as it ignores the relational character of class linkage. It is true that we cannot expect to know whether a tenant will find a given claim on his resources tolerable or intolerable until we know how precarious his subsistence is. It is equally true, however, that a well-off tenant may find some claims which do not jeopardize his subsistence exploitive and that a poor tenant may find some claims tolerable.¹³ At a minimum, an adequate theory of exploitation must consider not only the tenant's standard-of-living but also the nature of the exchange that links him to the landlord.

The Next Best Alternative: Another way by which the tenant might judge the legitimacy of the landlord tenant relationship is to ask what he stands to lose if the relationship ends. How much worse is his next best alternative? Here the argument is that the tenant is a realistic man: he compares the net advantages of his present tenancy with the net advantages, say, of becoming an agrarian wage laborer. The difference he

perceives is a measure of how fortunate he is, of his relative preference for his present role over the next best alternative and, thus, an indication of the legitimacy he is likely to accord his status as a tenant.

If peasants actually applied this test of fairness, however, they would accord legitimacy to almost any conceivable relationship. For all except those at the very bottom of the social order, there is, after all, a next best alternative which would be even more disadvantageous than their current situation. When the alternative to near starvation is outright starvation, does this mean that the tenant finds near-starvation acceptable or legitimate? Obviously not. It may tell us how dependent he is on a relation that at least keeps him alive, or how willing he may be to comply with its terms to avoid a worse fate, but dependency and compelled compliance are hardly the same as legitimacy.

One might just as logically argue the reverse: namely that the tenant compares his situation with those immediately above him in the social order and draws his conclusions on that basis. This procedure would lead to the opposite result. Everyone, except those at the very apex of the society, would be relatively deprived in comparison with those immediately above them and would thus consider themselves exploited. The fact that virtually any individual can point to someone comparatively better-off may tell us something about his aspirations but it does not forcibly mean that he regards himself as exploited.

At another level, however, there is something to this argument. What is considered a tolerable relationship and what is considered exploitative do have some connection with concrete experience and the range of existing possibilities. Notions of value and justice that are formed in a given temporal and social setting are bound to carry the marks of their historical origin. When that setting changes substantially, we would expect a corresponding change in the view of what is fair and equitable. The factory worker's idea of what constitutes fair wages and working conditions, to take a case in point, are obviously, today, far different from what they were at the turn of the century. Justice, as peasants see it, is subject to the same historical forces. The human toll of the Black Plague, for example, paradoxically improved the lot of the serfs who survived it by making labor scarce.¹⁴ As these improved conditions worked their way into local expectations, peasants bitterly resisted any effort by the aristocracy to reinstate the previous terms of serfdom. The famous Wat Tyler revolt of 1381 was a part of this resistance. It is apparent, then, that standards of equity are not immutable, that what is considered minimal justice today may become rank exploitation at some later date.

To infer from this, however, that the sense of equity is infinitely variable according to local conditions would be equally in error. That would amount to making what is just, solely a function of what exists. As the examples above imply, it would seem easier to raise norms of justice on the basis of

experience than to lower them. There is no reason to suppose that a tenantry condemned to semi-starvation by well-fed landlords will find their treatment equitable merely because it is, in empirical terms, normal or permanent or because things used to be even worse. The irreducible quality of human requirements for rest and nourishment, if nothing else, create nearly universal limits to what is a legitimate claim on tenant labor and crops.

Reciprocity or Equal Exchange: Many exchange theorists would claim that a landlord tenant relationship will be judged to be exploitative or not, along with any other human relationship, depending on whether it satisfies the norm of reciprocity.¹⁵ At bottom, the moral idea involved is that one should return "favours" out of gratitude and that, consequently, equal exchange defines a fair relationship. Landlord tenant relations characterized by balanced reciprocity would, in this view, give rise to feelings of gratitude and legitimacy while unequal exchange favoring the landlord would give rise to moral indignation and injustice.

The status of this argument, for our purposes, depends in part on whether the norm of reciprocity is an empirically verifiable moral sentiment. Some evidence exists for the case that it is. Gouldner, in this connection, cites Durkheim's analysis of law and ethics and Malinowski's studies of traditional societies as indications that the norm exists across cultures.¹⁶ In peasant society too, as we shall show later, the notion of reciprocity seems to undergird basic patterns of cooperation and alliance among households.

Assuming, for the moment, that the norm of reciprocity is a common moral standard, how can it be applied to landlord-tenant relations? The major problem, of course, centers around the definition of "equal exchange" which the norm requires. This is the familiar difficulty, noted earlier, of comparing "apples and oranges". How much protection, for example, would represent a value equal to twenty percent of a tenant's harvest?

One solution to this dilemma is to take the participant's -- the tenant's -- actions as a guide to his values. What portion of his harvest is he willing to hand over in return for the landlord's protection? The tenant, after all, is the best judge of how much he needs and values protection and its importance to him can, in turn, be measured by what he is willing to give up to get it. As Gouldner notes, the value of a service "varies with the intensity of need when the benefit is given." "A friend in need is a friend indeed."¹⁷ This approach at least has the advantage of avoiding abstract standards of value and focusing instead on the values implied by concrete social choices.

The fatal shortcoming of this procedure, however, is that it confuses the choices which circumstances force on people with choices which they find legitimate. For a tenant on the point of starvation, the value of food will be enormous and he may be willing, under the circumstances, to surrender all his next harvest, his land, and perhaps even his children in order to survive. Assuming he pays the price exacted, one may wish to call this "equal exchange" -- he presumably could have chosen to starve instead. But we can hardly imagine that a tenant would regard such an exchange as anything but sheer

extortion. The value of food for the starving tenant is, after all, established by a degree of need that is itself a social product of the existing distribution of wealth and power. He may have little choice but to comply, but he is surely not obliged to accept as legitimate the social arrangements which force such inhuman choices upon him. To reason otherwise would fly in the face of common sense and would legitimize any and all of the degrading alternatives which a system of power may impose.

It is clear that the power of some and the vulnerability of others make for bargains which violate common standards of justice. If we take the exchange of equal values as a touchstone of fairness, we cannot then take the actual bargains men are driven to as an indication of value and, hence, of equity. A tenant's need for food may be a measure of his dependency and of the power those who control the supply of food can exercise over him, but it can never be a measure of the legitimacy of that power. Tenants, as others, have no trouble distinguishing what is just from what they must accept under duress. We must, in other words, assume that there are genuinely normative standards of value in exchange that are, to some degree, independent of the actual alternatives available in a given context.

Just Price and Legitimacy: It may still be possible to take the concept of equal value in exchange as a basis for feelings about equity, provided that the notion of value is not derived from the "going rate" of exchange which circumstances impose. This is the position taken by Peter Blau in the following passage which is applicable, in principle, to landlord-tenant relations:

But if the power to command services and compliance comes from the supply of needed benefits, its exercise may not be experienced as disadvantageous. If the benefits are greater than what the social norm of fairness leads subordinates to expect in return for their services and compliance, they will consider their position advantageous and express social approval of the ruling group which fortifies its power and legitimates its authority. If subordinates expectations are barely met, they will neither feel exploited nor express firm legitimating approval of the group in power. If, however, the demands of the ruling group with a monopoly of vital resources far exceed what social norms define as fair and just, subordinates will feel exploited and will seize any opportunity to escape the ruling groups power or oppose it, inasmuch as their situation is, basically, no different from that of groups subject to coercive force.¹⁸

Blau distinguishes between actual rates of exchange and the norms governing fair value. The distance between the two becomes, in effect, the criteria by which men judge the equity or injustice of a relationship. A surplus above fair value in exchange fosters a response of legitimation; a deficit provokes a sense of exploitation.

The justification for assuming that "social norms of fairness" exist apart from actual terms of exchange seems substantial. Durkheim reminds us that ". . . in every society and in all ages, there exists a vague but lively sense of the value of the various services used in society and of the values, too, of things that are the subject of exchange."¹⁹ This "true" price "very rarely coincides with the real price, but these [real prices] cannot go beyond a certain range in any direction without seeming abnormal."²⁰ The existence of a "fair price" or "true value", is implicit whenever we feel offended by bargains which have been made under duress. A man who surrenders his child for a loan or who sells his birthright for a mess of

^{potage}
~~potage~~ are extreme examples. The needs of the weaker party have allowed the stronger to impose an exchange that violates the true value of things; the bargain is thus unjust and extortionary. Even contracts which have been freely consented to do not satisfy our test of fairness if one party has been driven to pay a price which offends our sense of fair value. Minimum wage laws, as Durkheim notes, arise from just such sentiments of fair value. They are designed precisely to preclude employers from taking advantage of their power to force "unjust" bargains.

Evidence for the notion of "fair value" comes not only from such reflections on moral sentiments, but also from concrete historical movements. The venerable tradition of taxation populaire and hunger riots in France and England are a striking case in point. There was a shared popular notion of what constituted a fair price for bread, which, when it was exceeded, provoked moral indignation and the seizure of markets. "The central action in this pattern is not the sack of granaries and the pilfering of grain and flour, but the action of "setting the price." "21 It was not uncommon for rioters to actually pay what they regarded as a just price in lieu of the market price. Such crowds and agrarian rioters as well saw themselves as law-givers (one group called itself "the regulators") who enforced a popular moral consensus. (24)

In any particular agrarian order, there is likely to be a similar moral consensus among tenants. Some balance between what tenants provide in goods and services to landlords and what they receive in return will be seen as reasonable and any substantial departure from that norm in the landlord's favor

will appear exploitative. Naturally, such norms will vary from place to place and from one period to the next. Despite these variations, however, there are some constants. First we are dealing with but a single inter-class dyad that everywhere originates in an exchange of land-use rights for rent. Second, if we further confine our attention to tenants near the subsistence level, it is likely that the common problems of welfare and security which they all, perforce, face, may foster common moral expectations about landlord behavior.

III. Reciprocity and the Right to Subsistence

There are two active moral principles in peasant life which, I believe, form the basic normative framework within which systems of tenancy are judged. The first of these is the norm of reciprocity. It serves as a central principle of interpersonal conduct both among peasants and between peasants and elites. The second principle is the right to subsistence. This principle, in effect, defines the minimal moral obligation incumbent on the stronger party when reciprocity occurs between unequals, as in the landlord-tenant relationship. Evidence for the operation of each may be found in ethnographic studies of peasant values, in concrete patterns of action, and in the existential givens of peasant life. Although much of the evidence introduced below is drawn from the context of Southeast Asia, with which I am most familiar, I believe the argument is applicable to tenancy system is much of the third world as well.

Reciprocity

The principle of equal reciprocity is at work in a host of peasant activities. It is best observed in villages where differences in wealth are not pronounced, for only in such villages can we assume that social patterns are more a product of collective opinion than an accommodation to power. Thus, in the more traditional villages of Southeast Asia, for example, a web of reciprocity underpins the typical pattern of labor exchange during the transplanting and harvesting of wet rice. Those who are "invited" to help a villager in his field know, as does the villager who invites them, that they thereby acquire a claim on their host when they need help with their crop. Reciprocity figures at marriage celebrations and other rites de passage when ceremonial obligations exceed a families immediate resources in labor or kind. Those who are called on to assist know likewise, that they can expect a comparable return of services at some later date. Finally, the same principle often structures exchange of food resources within a village. A family that has lost part of its crop will ask help from those who fared better, knowing that, when the situation is reversed, they will be obliged to return the favor. Anthropologists, noting the importance of mutual exchange among peasants in such diverse contexts as Latin America, Europe, and Asia have often been persuaded that reciprocity is the norm governing social relations among villagers.²²

The pattern of reciprocity, it should be emphasized, is not at all motivated by altruistic sentiments of "all for one

and one for all," which are sometimes mistakenly attributed to traditional villagers.²³ This misunderstanding is furthered by the efforts of nationalist leaders, such as Sukarno, to appropriate terms like gotong - rojong (mutual help) and to see in them a symbol of selfless solidarity. In fact gotong-rojong and other such forms of reciprocity are normally based on a lively sense of mutual self-interest in which each participant is fully aware of what he is owed and what he owes.²⁴ Between equals, such exchanges are largely self-regulating. One peasant assists another because he knows that, only in this way, can he elicit the services he himself will need later. Obligations are thus enforced not only by the sanctions of village opinion but also by the concrete reciprocal needs of cultivators. Much of the need for reciprocity is then inherent in the agricultural and ceremonial cycle. Although the exchanges cited involve the exchange of identical goods or services, this is not necessarily the case. What is required is rather the exchange of comparable values as defined by village norms. A villager, for example, who is skilled in making ploughs may supply them to others and accept an equivalent payment of rice in exchange.

This brings us to the question of reciprocity between unequals. What is expected of those relatively wealthy villagers whose resources put them in an advantageous bargaining position? Almost without exception, judging from the anthropological literature, the position of well-off villagers is legitimized only to the extent that their resources are employed in ways

which meet the broadly defined welfare needs of villagers. Most studies repeatedly emphasize the informal social controls which tend to either redistribute the wealth or to impose specific obligations on its owners. The prosaic, even banal, character of these social controls belies their importance. Well-to-do villagers avoid malicious gossip only at the price of an exaggerated generosity. They are expected to sponsor more conspicuously lavish celebrations at weddings, to show greater charity to kin and neighbors, to sponsor local religious activity, and to take on more dependents and employees than the average household. The generosity enjoined on the rich is not without its compensations. It rebounds to their growing prestige and serves to surround them with a grateful clientele which helps validate their position in the community.²⁵ It represents, in addition, a set of social debts which can be converted into goods and services if need be.

What is notable, for our purposes, is that the normative order of the village imposes certain standards of performance on its better-off members. There is a particular rule of reciprocity -- a set of moral expectations -- which applies to their exchanges with other villagers. Whether or not the wealthy actually live up to these minimal moral requirements of reciprocity is another question, but there can be little doubt that they exist. Their normative character is apparent in the reaction provoked by their violation. In village Thailand for example,

A farmer with money is in a position to exert pressure on many other farmers. He is the phujaj [big man] in the

phujaj-phunauj big man -- little man relationship. It is to him that others must often turn in order to borrow and to rent tools, to obtain cash loans and land to farm. Once the transaction is made, the debtor is obligated in many small ways throughout the year. However, wealth without the proper behavior results in contempt and malicious gossip and receives only token respect in the poor farmers moment of need.²⁶

A wealthy man who presses his tactical advantage does so at the cost of his reputation and moral standing in the community. The same reaction was noted by Firth in his study of a Malay fishing village.

These two features [small and ephemeral differences in wealth], combined with the practice of charity enjoined on the rich probably account to a considerable extent for the absence of any marked feeling of resentment towards the wealthy on the part of the poorer elements in the community. . . . Where resentment and criticism do enter is when the rich man does not show himself generous, when "his liver is thin," when he does not practice charity to the poor, build wayside shelters, or prayer houses, or entertain liberally.²⁷

Such moral injunctions are hardly confined to Southeast Asia; they seem rather to be typical of the normative order of the peasant community. The principles involved are perhaps most clearly expressed in Julian Pitt-Rivers' analysis of an Andalusian village.

The idea that he who has must give to him who has not is not only a precept of religion, but a moral imperative of the pueblo. . . . The successful patron, thanks to his wealth acquires great prestige within the orbit of his influence and escapes, thereby, the condemnation which is reserved for los ricos.

The resentment [of los ricos] aims not so much at the existence of economic inequality as at the failure of the rich man to care of those who are less fortunate; at his lack of charity. It is not so much the system which is wrong, it is the rich who are evil.²⁸

Clearly, neither the power of the wealthy nor the dependency of others which it implies is self-justifying. Such power is condoned only insofar as its possessors conform to the standards of service and generosity expected of them. When they use their wealth in ways which villagers judge to be benign and protective, their status is reinforced and it becomes possible to speak of legitimacy and patronage. When they use their power to violate local norms, they engender hatred and condemnation. They may still be able to have their way but their behavior is no longer regarded as legitimate.

The normative process by which disparities in power are either legitimated or repudiated is hardly unique to peasant society. It is but a special case of a more general phenomenon. For any stratification system, the question arises, "Why should some be placed above others." The explanation may in part be prescriptive: "He is king because he is of divine birth." Without exception, however, it seems that all such justifications contain a dimension of performance and reciprocity. Thus a king may be responsible for bringing rain, for the first ceremonial ploughing which assures good crops, or for victoriously leading his people in battle. It is largely by reference its contribution to the welfare of the group that power is legitimated and becomes authority. The notion of reciprocity and obligation is, as Georges Balandier notes, a universal corollary of any system of authority.

Certain economic privileges (land rights, labour levies, market rights, etc.) and certain economic obligations (of generosity and assistance) are associated with the exercise of power and authority. . . . Power is necessary,

but is confined within precise limits. It requires consent and a certain reciprocity. . . . In a more general way, it might be said that power must justify itself by maintaining a state of collective security and prosperity. This is a price to be paid by those who hold it, a price that is never wholly paid.²⁹

The difference between power that is validated and power that is endured thus rests on some shared conception of its just use.

Normative claims on powerholders have quite practical consequences in society. Kings might be overthrown if the crops fail to ripen; Russian priests, we are told, were beaten if the rains did not come;³⁰ and emperors lost the "mandate of heaven" when famine stalked the land. The tendency for the electorate to turn out any government that has presided over a sharp economic depression is, more speculatively perhaps, another instance of the same phenomenon. Even the widest expressions of authority in society thus imply a normative structure of obligations for those who claim society's privileges. These duties, which are often quite specific, in turn form a standard of reciprocity by which the justice of power -- its demands and perogatives -- may be judged. The failure to meet these obligations necessarily undermines the normative basis of power.

In society at large as in the village, then, the legitimacy of the claim to a disproportionate share of wealth, land, or status is conditional, not automatic.³¹ While the landlord's or wealthy villager's control of scarce resources may be incontestable, his claim to legitimacy is accorded only insofar as the balance of his claims and services satisfy the moral requirements of reciprocity which his community applies to him.

The Right to Subsistence and Exploitation in Tenancy

The minimal moral requirement of reciprocity which peasant tenants make of landlords may be summed up in the phrase, "the right to subsistence." This constitutes the core demand of those whose most pressing problem is the ecological precariousness of their ^{subistence upon} or those who control the basic means of agrarian production. The first question a tenant asks of a tenure system is: To what extent does it guarantee my family's minimum subsistence even in bad years?" An affirmative response does not necessarily assure the system's legitimacy, for the costs of that guarantee may also be enormous. A negative response, however, does virtually assure that the system will be seen as exploitative.

"Safety-first" and the Economics of Subsistence:

. . . the position of the rural population is that of a man standing permanently up to his neck in water, so that even a ripple is sufficient to drown him.³²

Tawney was describing China in 1931, but his graphic simile could as easily be applied to much of the peasantry throughout the third world. Living near the thin edge of subsistence, the capital concern of peasants is necessarily with the security of their food supply. That food supply is menaced, on the one hand, by a variety of more or less impersonal forces: the vagaries of weather, the quality of the soil, the existing level of techniques, the risk of illness, the availability of arable land. It is menaced, on the other hand, by a variety of social claims which are not impersonal: claims of rent, taxes, and debts. Even if the crop itself is sufficient for subsistence, the claims on it

by others may make it insufficient.

Put starkly, the central economic preoccupation of low-income cultivators is to reliably feed their household. This is a pre-occupation which, as we shall see, knits together a large number of economic and social choices. At the root of this concern is the specter of hunger and dearth which forms an integral part of the experience of most third-world peasantries. Hunger is, in fact, often an annual experience, in that time of scarcity before a new harvest is ready when peasants must tighten their belts. It is periodically aggravated following a crop failure which may force a shift to poorer foods and a reduction in consumption for an entire year. A bad crop might not only mean short rations; the price of eating may entail the humiliation of an onerous dependence or the sale of land and livestock that reduce the possibility of achieving an adequate subsistence the following year. It is when scarcity gives way to famine, however, -- when physical survival itself is at stake -- that the ultimate fears of the peasantry are realized. The living memory of many third world peasantries includes such times of great scarcity when the very young and very old perished and others were reduced to eating seedgrain, roots, and bark.³³ If the great depression of the 1930's left an indelible mark on the fears, values, and habits of an entire generation of Americans, we can begin to imagine the impact of periodic food crises on the fears, values, and habits of ^{a subsistence} ~~the third world~~ peasantry.³⁴

The distinctive economic behavior of the subsistence-oriented family arises from the simple fact that, unlike a capitalist enterprise which can liquidate itself, it is a unit of consumption

as well as a unit of production. The family begins with a more or less irreducible consumer demand based on its size which it must achieve in order to continue to exist. To meet these minimal human needs, peasants are often driven to ~~eat~~^{act} in ways which defy standards of economic rationality established to explain the behavior of capitalist firms. Peasant families which must feed themselves from small plots in over-populated regions will, for example, work unimaginably hard and long for the smallest increments in production -- well beyond the point at which a prudent capitalist would move on. Chayanov calls this "self-exploitation."³⁵ In parts of Viet-Nam and Indonesia this pattern of "agricultural involution" came to characterize whole sectors of the rural economy.³⁶ That the marginal return to his additional labor is miniscule is of little matter to the capital-poor, land-short peasant who must wring the family's food from what he has.

Family subsistence requirements impel peasants to many other choices which are anomalous in terms of classical economics. Focusing unavoidably on the here and now, they may have no choice but to sell their crop when prices are low. They may also be willing to pay more for land or to offer higher rents than capitalist investment criteria would indicate. A land-poor peasant with a large family and few labor outlets is rationally willing to pay huge prices for land or "hunger rents," as Chayanov calls them, so long as the additional land will make even a small net addition to the family larder. In fact, the less land a family has the more it will be willing to pay for an additional piece -- a competitive process that tends to drive out capitalist agriculture.³⁷

The primordial economic goal of most peasant households is thus to avoid falling below what we might call a subsistence danger level. This level is not, strictly speaking, defined by the minimum food supply necessary to sustain life. It is better envisaged as a threshold below which the qualitative deterioration in subsistence security, family cohesion, and even social status is massive and painful. To fall below this level is as likely to mean having to turn from rice to millet and root crops, to sell plough animals and land, to beg, to send one's children to live with relatives as it is to mean outright starvation. It is the difference between the "normal" penury of peasant life and a literally hand-to-mouth existence. Such a threshold will, of course, not be entirely uniform across culture. Thus a poor Thai peasant's notion of the bare essentials of life would probably be slightly more luxurious than what a poor Vietnamese or Javanese peasant would consider rock bottom. Peasant living standards in much of the third world, however, have remained close enough to the basics that these thresholds are not far removed from brute subsistence levels.

Given the social reality of the subsistence danger level, it makes eminent sense for peasants to follow what Roumasset has called the "safety-first" principle.³⁸ In the choice of crops, seeds, and techniques of cultivation this simply means that the cultivator prefers to minimize the probability of having a disaster rather than to maximize his average return.³⁹ That is, he does not gamble any more than he has to with his subsistence. He thus avoids taking risks that might raise his income if those risks increase the possibility of falling below the subsistence

danger level. The rationality of this strategy flows directly from the fact that peasants are already up to their necks in water and cannot afford the human consequences of such risks.⁴⁰

In one form or another this risk avoidance principle has been noted by most economists who study low-income agriculture in the third world. The four statements which follow are taken from the major collection on subsistence agriculture and express the basic accord on this point.

For near subsistence peasants risk aversion may be quite strong because the returns above expected values may not offset the severe penalties for returns below the expected values.⁴¹

Special value tends to be attached to survival and maintenance of position as opposed to change and the improvement of position. . . . The economic basis for an attitude which is conservative . . . lies with the high risks associated with change in traditional agriculture and the potentially high penalties for failure in change.⁴²

The principle is also invoked to explain the preference for subsistence crops over non-edible cash crops.


it is quite rational for peasants in "over populated" countries with very little margin for taking risks above their subsistence level to be content with a lower return for subsistence production than to choose the higher but riskier returns from cash production.⁴³

The most careful formulation, however, is that of Leonard Joy:

We might postulate that farmers' willingness to innovate for an increase in the long-run average net return is subject to the condition that the risk of reducing the net return in any one year not exceed some given value. Further we might postulate that the degree of risk that farmers are willing to incur is related to their nearness, in some sense, to "biological subsistence," We thus have a hypothesis that subsistence farmers may resist innovation because it means departing from a system that is efficient in minimizing the risk of a catastrophe for one that significantly increases this risk.⁴⁴

The dilemma for the subsistence household may be illustrated in more concrete terms in the choice between seeds, and techniques for rice cultivation shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1



The vertical axis represents the annual rice yield, with a total of 80 baskets defined as a subsistence danger level. Let us assume that line "T" represents the crop yield figures over thirty years for the traditionally planted variety on a typical smallholding. Here, the important point to note about the traditional varieties is that their yields only once plunge below the subsistence level, though they skirt it for much of the time. With traditional cultivation, the risk of disaster can be calculated from past experience (assuming it is representative) as one in thirty. Technique "T" is contrasted in Figure 1 with alternative technique (seed, mode of cultivation) "N". Using this technique the cultivator could anticipate a substantially higher return over a thirty year period. The trouble is that peasants using technique "N" would rarely survive past year five to enjoy their bumper crops. Technique "N" plunges a family below the subsistence danger level not once but eight times; the probability of going under with it is over twenty five percent while the comparable figure for "T" is less than four percent. Under "safety-first" assumptions, subsistence-oriented peasants would rationally prefer their low but steady yields to the risks of the higher-yielding technique. Utilizing this model Roumasset compared the risks associated with four rice varieties: three strains of "miracle" rice and traditional varieties whose yield was two to three times inferior. Setting a disaster level and a permissible level of risk, he then predicted ^{which peasant cultivators would be willing to plant} ~~the probable patterns of adoption and~~ ^{higher-yielding varieties.} ~~non-adoption.~~ ⁴⁵ The results in fact explained actual adoption patterns in parts of Central Luzon where data was available.

Only in irrigated areas, where water supply lessened the risk considerably, did smallholders make the switch. In rainfed areas, ^{however, the new varieties materially increased the risk of crop} ~~where their adoption courted disaster, smallholders were~~ ^{failure, and smallholders were unwilling to abandon traditional varieties.} (46)
~~unwilling to change.~~

In Southeast Asia and elsewhere, the distinctive features of the safety-first rule are strongly evident in the common observation that peasants are reluctant to strike out for profits when doing so might mean upsetting stable subsistence routines which have proved adequate in the past.⁴⁷ The goal of a secure subsistence is expressed in a wide array of economic choices: e.g. a preference for crops that can be eaten over crops that must be sold, an inclination to plant several seed varieties so as to spread risks, a preference for stable, if modest ^{yields.}~~yields.~~⁴⁸ Safety-first does not imply that peasants are creatures of custom who never take risks. What it does imply is that there is a defensive perimeter around subsistence routines within which any unnecessary risks are avoided as potentially catastrophic. If this line of analysis is correct, it indicates that the stabilization of income is, for those close to subsistence, a more powerful goal than achieving a high average income. It indicates that we will know more about how peasants view their social order if we ask not merely how poor they are but also how precarious their subsistence is.


The Right to Subsistence in Tenancy: The subsistence ethic is as applicable to systems of tenancy as it is to the economic decisions of smallholders. It provides us with a perspective from which the tenant views the claims made on his resources by the

landowner. Above all, it implies that such claims are evaluated less in terms of their absolute level than in terms of how they complicate or ease his problem of staying above the subsistence danger level. A high rent after a good crop, for example, may be experienced as less onerous than a low rent following a crop failure. The criteria of peasant judgement tends to be more sharply focused on what is left after the claim is met -- whether it is sufficient for subsistence -- than on the level of the claim per se.

At the risk of belaboring the obvious, Figure 2 represents two hypothetical claims on peasant resources. Line "A" reproduces the crop yields of Figure 1, while the horizontal line at 80 units of rice indicates the subsistence danger level. Lines "B" and "C" then reflect two vastly different forms of extraction which may be thought of as varying forms of land rent or, for that matter, taxation.

Line "B" represents the impact on peasant subsistence of an unremittingly fixed rental claim. Year in and year out a steady twenty units of rice is taken from the yield; the effect is simply to retain the shape of the yield line but to lower it twenty units. The net remaining for consumption plunges not once but thirteen times below the danger level. Its impact on peasant life is massive. The risks of yield fluctuations are, in this case, borne entirely by the cultivator -- and at a level that is increasingly insupportable. By contrast, the landlord (or the state in the case of taxes) has stabilized his (its) income at the expense of the peasant household.

Figure
~~Figure~~ 3



Line "C" represents the polar opposite of a fixed claim.

Each year grain is extracted in variable amounts that leave the peasant household five units above the subsistence danger line. On two occasions when the yield line falls below 85 units, this implies an actual subsidy to the peasant household to raise it back to that level. Here the qualitative changes in peasant life are enormously reduced as the subsistence crisis level is never reached.⁴⁹ The central ligaments of peasant life remain intact. In this example, the risks of agriculture are borne by the landlord whose income fluctuates to steady the net resources ^{available} left to the peasant household.

The key element in the peasant's evaluation of the extractions which are an inevitable part of his life is how they affect his "right to subsistence." This is not necessarily identical, by any means, with what might be called the average extraction of resources by agrarian elites. The total resources squeezed from a tenant under variable claim, "C", that stabilizes his income, is actually, in this example, greater than under the fixed levy, "B". If we were to use, as the standard of exploitation, the average take of the landlord from the tenant -- i.e. the average surplus value -- then the stabilizing claim would qualify as the most ~~exploitative~~ ^{exploitative}. Our argument, however, is that given the subsistence precipice along which the typical peasant treads, the stabilizing claim (though it may end by taking more) is less resented and is seen as less exploitative, inasmuch as it avoids the outcomes which peasants fear most.

Thus the manner of exploitation makes all the difference in the world. Who stabilizes his income at whose expense is a critical question. Forms of "exploitation" that tend to offer a built-in subsistence guarantee and which are, in this sense, adopted to the existential dilemma of peasant economics, are, and are seen to be, much less damaging than claims which are heedless of minimum subsistence needs.⁵⁰

The first question a peasant implicitly asks of a tenancy system is, "Does this institution safeguard my minimal social rights; does it provide me a subsistence living regardless of what the land may yield this season?" In this context, land tenure systems can be located along a continuum according to how each distributes risks between the landowner and tenant. Figure 3, below, compares the protective value of three simplified forms of tenure.

Table 1

Distribution of Risk in Tenancy Systems⁵¹

Landlord Assumes Risk A	Risk Shared B	Tenant Assumes Risk C
e.g. Traditional (feudal) systems of subsistence insurance	e.g. Equal-Shares sharecropping	e.g. Fixed-rent tenancy
- cultivator's minimal return fixed and guaranteed	-cultivator's return a fixed <u>share</u> of crop	-cultivator assumes risk and profit of cultivation
- landowner assumes risk and profit of cultivation	-landowner's return a fixed <u>share</u> of crop	-landowners return return fixed and guaranteed

The continuum essentially contrasts the extent to which a tenure system insulates cultivators from crop losses that might ruin them. Toward the "A" end of the continuum the landlord ensures the tenant's livelihood while, at the "C" end, the tenant, in effect, underwrites the landlord's income come what may. We assume, with good reason, that most low-income tenants will prefer arrangements which relieve them of risks which they can ill-afford. This preference will be strongest where plots are small, yields highly variable, peasants quite poor, and where few alternative subsistence opportunities exist. It will be weaker where large tenancies, stable yields, a well-off peasantry, and ample outside economic opportunities greatly reduce the likelihood of ruin. The situation of most tenants in the third world more closely approximates the first set of conditions.

The relative legitimacy of tenure systems that embody subsistence guarantees springs from the fact that the cultivator's needs are taken as the first claim on the harvest. His income is steadied and the risk of the enterprise is shifted to the shoulders of the landlord who is better able to absorb occasional losses. A full subsistence guarantee must, of course, go beyond the tenant's prior claim on the crop -- for what is the total crop will not provide for his minimal needs? Thus, complete subsistence insurance implies a personal commitment of the landowner to the basic welfare needs of his tenant. The terms "patron" and "patronage" become applicable here inasmuch as the relationship is ultimately focused on the tenant's needs as a consumer and not on an impersonal economic bargain confined only to the disposition of the crop. In such arrangements, the cultivator is

likely to be more than just a tenant; he is likely to be a "client" tied to his landlord by bonds of deference.

The test of tenancy systems in "safety-first" terms is what they will do for the cultivator in a bad year. The traditional system, barring a total disaster, will keep his head above water; fifty-fifty sharecropping may or may not. Although the tenant and sharecropper share equally the risk of yield fluctuations, there is no assurance that fifty percent of the yield in any given season will meet the tenant's basic needs.⁵²

Fixed rents -- in cash or in kind -- are even more damaging to the tenant's economic security.⁵³ The full amplitude of crop fluctuations is reflected in the cultivator's income. While sharecropping, at least, claims no rent if there is no harvest, a fixed rent system takes its inexorable due regardless of whether a single grain matures. A brief hypothetical example illustrates what happens in good and bad years under both systems.

Table 2

Comparisons of Crop Division under Sharecropping
and Fixed Rent

50-50 Sharecropping

Yield	100	200	50
Landlord's Share	50	100	25
Sharecroppers Share	50	100	25

Fixed Rent (fixed at 50% of average year)

Yield	100	200	50
Landlord's Rent	50	50	50
Tenants Return	50	150	0

In this example shares are divided fifty-fifty and the fixed rent is set at half the yield in an average year. Let us assume that 40 baskets of grain are minimum subsistence needs of a cultivating family. In an average year both systems net the peasant fifty baskets of rice, a small margin over minimal needs. In a bumper year, of course, the tenant does well under both systems, but exceptionally well under fixed rent. Let the total yield fall below 90 baskets, however, and every subsequent basket handed over as fixed rent comes directly out of the tenant's subsistence needs. In a poor season when the total yield is only 50 baskets, the tenant is left with absolutely nothing.⁵⁴ The chances of going under are thus maximized with the fixed rent system. There is every reason for marginal tenants to regard such an arrangement as exploitative inasmuch as it is heedless of their elementary needs and asks the weak to guarantee the income of the strong.

The existential dilemma of peasants, we have argued, imposes upon them a particular conception of their minimal social rights within tenancy. In the exchange relationship with landlords, the key reciprocal service which they claim in return for their labor is the social guarantee of subsistence security. Arrangements which honor this central need are likely to retain a modicum of legitimacy. Arrangements which abrogate this right, which fail to meet the elementary needs of tenants, are justifiably seen as unfair and exploitative. To ask if the balance of exchange protects subsistence rights, directs our attention not simply to the balance of reciprocity per se, but to its effects on the

consumption patterns of the tenant household. The balance of exchange may actually remain the same and yet suddenly constitute a direct subsistence threat. For a landlord to demand the same share of the harvest or the same amount of grain after a crop failure as he demands in an average year may well be, as we have shown, insupportable. The criterion of the subsistence guarantee is based not on what the landlord takes, but on what is left. Similarly, a tolerable pattern of landlord exactions may become intolerable when other circumstances change. ^{Many} tenants in nineteenth century China, for example, found their customary rents unbearable when the handicraft employment, which had once provided a margin of economic safety, disappeared. Landlords ~~were~~ were not taking any more but the impact of their traditional claim was now catastrophic.⁵⁵ The loss of common grazing land, a sudden rise in the price of consumer necessities, or a marked reduction in the size of tenant plots may, in the same manner, render tenancy arrangements that were once acceptable, suddenly unacceptable.⁵⁶ We must ask, as the tenant surely does, not only what the terms of tenancy are, but what effect they have on the constituent elements of his livelihood.

The Claim to Subsistence as an Operational Value: Abstractly, we have shown how it is logical for most peasant households to maximize the security of their subsistence even if that security entails a sacrifice in average income. Concretely, many of the economic decisions of smallholders seem to make sense only in this context. The logic of the subsistence ethic, furthermore,

allows us to draw inferences about the perceived equity of various systems of tenancy which would not otherwise be obvious. If this line of reasoning is correct it should be possible to observe the safety-first ethos at work in concrete social values and choices. The evidence from Southeast Asia, at any rate, seems quite persuasive on this score. Subsistence values permeate both village social relations and the attitudes of peasants toward different forms of economic dependency.

At the village level, the subsistence ethos seems apparent in the redistributive pressures described earlier. They operate to ensure that, insofar as village resources make it possible, village families are accorded a subsistence niche. Again, it is instructive that the protective power of levelling pressures has been greatest precisely in those areas where the village was most autonomous and cohesive -- i.e. where the social values of poorer villagers was backed with a modicum of social power. Thus, in East and Central Java this has meant the growth of a Byzantine tangle of sharecropping, labor, and gleaning rights which have, until recently, provided most villagers with a bare subsistence, albeit at declining average levels of welfare. Much the same could be said for Tonkin, Viet-Nam, prior to World War II. Gourou tells of a Tonkin commune in which only the even distribution of hunger in a period of famine prevented anyone from starving.⁵⁷ Elsewhere such guarantees were less reliable but they generally helped "poorer families to manage through periods of difficulty."⁵⁸

In some areas, notably Tonkin, Annam, and Java, subsistence rights were reinforced through the institution of communal land which was occasionally redistributed or rented to village poor.

More informally, local landowners were typically obliged by social pressures to let tenancies or provide jobs to the poor of their own village before outsiders. A popular tradition of local rights to harvest labor, gleaning privileges, and the expectation of generosity normally supplemented these local subsistence rights. Most important, the force of local custom also favored tenancy arrangements that protected the cultivator against the effects of a poor harvest. Thus in Tonkin, the normal division of the grain was, by custom, waived after a crop failure and the entire harvest was left to the sharecropper.⁵⁹ Early rubber share-tapping practices reflected the same concern for the prior subsistence claim of the tapper. Under the bagi dua (roughly "half-shares") system in Indonesia, the tapper actually got less than half the proceeds when the price was high and a good deal more than half when the price was low.⁶⁰ More generally, there was a popular expectation of remissions, or "tolerance," as it was known in Viet-Nam, in rent collection whenever a poor harvest threatened tenant subsistence.

The primary of subsistence concerns are also mirrored in the preference of peasants for a stable if poor tenancy over an occasionally higher but much riskier return from wage labor. In parts of Central Luzon, according to Takahashi, peasants remained tenants on small patches of land that yielded them very little only because of the economic insurance the landlord provided.

So long as they remain tenants they can expect to borrow living expenses from their landlords, in other words, the minimum level of livelihood is ensured by the landlords.⁶¹

For sharecroppers, Takahashi explained, "Farmland was not so much a means of creating a profit from agricultural production as the means of having a dependable patron in the person of the proprietaryo."⁶² A study of tenancy in Pangasinan, also in Central Luzon, reaches almost identical conclusions about the importance of subsistence security for cultivators. "Tenants under the traditional system [of sharecropping] seem willing to put up with its injustices for this compensating security."⁶³ Even in the Mekong Delta of Viet-Nam, where tenancy was less stable than in Central Luzon, it was nevertheless valued for the security which its fringe benefits provided.

. . . Small tenants are not much better off than simple coolies; the land they rent provides them only . . . 48% of their total resources. . . But the great superiority of the small tenant over the coolie is his certainty of getting advances if he needs them. While the coolie does not inspire the confidence of the moneylender, the tenant has an assured credit source in his landlord. The life of a small tenant is not much more brilliant than that of the coolie, but he is better protected against the blackest misery.⁶⁴

The tenant's claim to subsistence security in Southeast Asia is strikingly evident, as well, in the general resistance to fixed rents following a poor harvest. Noting the many suits brought against tenants in Lower Burma who withheld their rents in the 1920's, an official concluded,

a large proportion of the suits had to be filed because the tenant considering that he was not receiving fair treatment in years of crop failure, refused to pay the rent in full.⁶⁵

Comparable instances might be multiplied, but the point is clear. The preference for even marginal tenancies over wage labor was predicated on the relative economic security it often afforded in the form of remissions of rent, pre-harvest loans, and crisis

help. When that security was violated, tenants resisted as best they could. Such subsistence services were what tenants minimally expected in return for the onerous dependence and labor which tenancy implied.⁶⁶

The centrality of subsistence concerns is finally and remarkably illustrated in Luzon where the Philippine government has recently attempted to transform rice sharecroppers into fixed-rent tenants.⁶⁷ In an effort to make the switch attractive, rents were to be fixed at a figure that corresponded to one quarter of the average net yield (after subtracting seed, harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling, and milling costs) prior to the date of the change. Sharecropping rents had been one half of the gross harvest with the landlord and tenant typically splitting production costs fifty-fifty. Under the new system the tenant could thus expect to realize roughly double his previous income in an average year and, with the use of new seed strains, perhaps more than that. Despite the considerable gain in average income which the new system promised, many peasants were reluctant to switch.

The reasons for this reluctance, it is clear, were the new subsistence risks inherent in tenancy reform. First, there was the risk of a fixed rent after a meagre crop.

For while under share tenancy he paid a percentage of whatever he managed to reap in a particular year, good or bad, under leasehold he must pay the same amount whether the harvest is abundant or not, and what he cannot pay at harvest time will accrue as debt to be paid at the next crop harvest.⁶⁸

While the tenant might do far better in a good year, the new leasehold arrangements shielded him less against disaster. Second, and most important, leasehold frequently meant the end of a wide array of landlord services that were critical to tenants' subsistence security. These included the landlord's share of production costs, low interest production loans, food loans, help in time of illness, access to bamboo, wood, and water from the owner's holding, and the right to plant hillside and vegetable crops. On the one hand, the tenant could thus choose leasehold with a low, legal rent and greater autonomy but at the cost of most previous landlord services and an unvarying charge on his harvest. On the other hand, he could remain a sharecropper paying a high, non-legal rent which nevertheless varied with his yield and could expect a continuation of landlord credit and assistance.⁶⁹ The options were agonizing ones for peasants and many preferred to remain sharecroppers or to sign "compromise leases" which retained much of the security of the old system. Actual patterns of choice, moreover, reflected the subsistence concerns of tenants. Those moving to leasehold were precisely those for whom the shift was least threatening; they farmed in areas where yields were steadiest, they rented larger and more profitable tenancies which reduced their need for credit, they tended already to have landlords who were strict and who granted them few customary rights, and they were more likely to have outside employment to fall back upon. For these tenants, the risks were minimized. Sharecroppers with small plots, variable yields, no savings or steady outside employment, and lenient landlords, by

contrast, had most to lose in terms of subsistence security and were most reluctant to change. As one such tenant explained, "I will have to pay higher rent all my life [under sharecropping] but I can at least get food to live on now."⁷⁰

Both the patterns of choice and the values which peasants brought to bear on that choice betray a constant preoccupation with subsistence risks. The overriding goal was "security" and "food and money for subsistence."⁷¹ When leasehold involved no greater risks it was naturally very attractive, but where it threatened to undercut the existing subsistence guarantees of share tenancy, its potential rewards seemed, and were, a dangerous gamble.

V. Justice and the Organization of Social Roles

An analysis which begins, as this one has, with the givens of peasant's household budget and deduces his needs and interests from them, runs the risk of what has been called "methodological individualism."⁷² To be sure, the goal of assuring subsistence exists as an irreducible given in the lives of most peasants. But to stop there is to miss the critical social context of peasant values. The difference between the "need" for subsistence and the "right" to subsistence lies ultimately in a set of social role expectations. While a need can exist more or less independently of society, a right presupposes some agency which is responsible for its observance and enforcement. That agency may be the kin group or village, in which case the right imposes certain obligations on relatives and fellow villagers. If that agency is the landlord, the right similarly creates a set of normative expectations about how landlords should behave.

The essential point here is that while peasant rights vis-a-vis landowners grow out of peasant needs, these needs are socially crystallized as concrete role expectations which are applied normatively to landlords both individually and collectively. The role expectations thus created have a life of their own and are passed on as a part of the institutional tradition. They provide a kind of moral boundary to the role of landowner -- a boundary formed of shared norms by which any performer of the role may be judged.⁷³

The Good Landlord in Central Luzon: Thanks to a large scale opinion survey of cultivators in Nueva Ecija, Central Luzon, it is possible to construct the moral-economy of tenant-landlord relations from the perspective of the subordinate classes there.⁷⁴ The results of this survey are very much in keeping with two of the major themes in our analysis. First, they show clearly that there is a shared, normative conception of the landlord role among tenants which serves as a criterion for their judgements. Second, the substantive content of landlord obligation is very sharply focused on his responsibility for the minimum welfare needs of his tenants.

Peasants were asked directly what qualities a "good landlord" should have. Taken together, their responses amount to a phenomenological standard of justice in agrarian class relations. The landlord is expected, first, to help with farm expenses. Most tenants do not have the financial wherewithal to shoulder all production costs and they thus expect landlords to provide their fair share of the cash needed to see a crop through to harvest.

This expectation is, moreover, an integral conceptual part of the kasama system in which both the crop and production expenses are equally divided. The next major expectation among share croppers concerned "fringe benefits" -- really a misnomer given their critical value to the cultivating household.⁷⁵ Included in this category were medicine and medical services, free housing and house lot, a subsistence food ration (rasyions, abasto, or bugnós), and pre-threshing rice allowances (agad). Finally, share tenants demanded the provision of "credit" including lenient terms following a poor harvest. The expectations of "fringe-benefits" and "credit" represent what we have called "the right to subsistence" -- the belief that tenancy arrangements should provide a guaranteed food supply to the tenant and make allowances for his capacity to pay rent in any given year. Subsistence pre-occupations are also reflected in the major complaint against landlords and overseers (katiwala): namely that they were too "strict".⁷⁶ By strictness, tenants meant the rigid enforcement of tenancy terms regardless of the yield or the difficulties of the cultivator.

There is thus a direct link between the economic needs of the peasant and the role of landlord. As the tenant is habitually short of cash, the landlord is expected to supply a portion of production expenses while the tenant supplies the labor. As the tenant's livelihood is precarious, the landlord is expected to adjust his terms to the tenants' minimal needs and to assist him in a crisis. One imagines that the clear formulation of these role obligations is in part a consequence of the fact that they are increasingly violated in Central Luzon. If such norms were

universally honored, one would expect them to remain unconscious and latent. Once they are broken, however, -- once they become problematic rather than assumed -- they are likely to find conscious articulation as rights to be defended. The active defense of these rights is observable in Central Luzon in tenant strategems to deceive strict landlords, in tenant-initiated court cases, and in the growth of tenant movements. Where they can, it is also clear that tenants enforce their vision of decent landlord behavior. Thus in the swampy areas of Bulacan which have a long history of agrarian violence, landlords and overseers are afraid to be too strict in the division of the crop or the collection of debts for fear of physical reprisals.⁷⁷

As in any agrarian system, the Filipino tenant has a moral conception of the duties and responsibilities of his landlord toward him. These duties are not particular to a single relationship but are inherent in what tenants take to be the social role of the landlord. The link between duties and role is nowhere clearer than in this statement by a Nueva Ecija sharecropper:

A man of his [wealthy landlord's] means was supposed to loan his tenants rice and help when times were hard. That's part of being a landlord.⁷⁸

A landlord who fails to reciprocally honor his obligations becomes a "bad" landlord. So long as the failure is an isolated case, this judgement will reflect only on the legitimacy of that particular landlord and not on the category of landlord as a whole. Once the failure becomes general however, it then calls into question the collective legitimacy of landlords. Thus the legitimacy of a given tenure system or landlord class depends

ultimately on how closely the modal behavior of landowners approximates what the tenantry takes to be their moral duties.⁷⁹ For Filipino tenants as for tenants ^{in similar circumstances} elsewhere in the third world, the central criteria of judgement hinges on the right to subsistence.

If sharecropping arrangements are such that subsistence is assured, then it is seen as a good system. For the major complaint about share tenancy is not the dependency which it implies, but that often the share is insufficient to meet subsistence needs.⁸⁰

Dependence with Subsistence: There is good reason for believing that the nexus of dependency with the right to subsistence (or protection) is a classical feature of traditional systems of subordination. A study of life in pre-industrial England reminds us that all cottagers and rural poor could expect, at one time or another in their lives, to need economic relief. The permanent threat of scarcity made the search for social arrangements which would ensure an adequate food supply a paramount concern.⁸¹ Feudal society in the West was itself a prototype of this nexus. Both physical and economic insecurity compelled much of the population to seek the shelter of personal subordination. The system of feudal subordination involved both personal deference and dues in labor or kind, on the one hand, and a more reliable livelihood and military protection on the other. As Marc Bloch has shown, the feudal bond implied a diffuse and therefore comprehensive duty on the part of the lord to see that his men were defended and taken care of.⁸² His obligations were his men's rights, owed them as repayment for their labor and allegiance, and stoutly defended against violation. Essentially, this pre-capitalist normative order was based on the guarantee of minimal social rights

in the absence of political or civil rights.⁸³ Peasants expected of elites the generosity and assistance which they imposed on their better-off village neighbors⁸⁴; social rights were, in this sense, village morals writ large.

The economic protection which peasants require of elites in an avowedly paternalistic social order are often precisely those duties which the rhetoric of the ruling class itself accepts. In the feudal order the denial of political and civil rights was justified by the elite by reference to its social responsibility (noblesse oblige) for the material well being of subordinates. The very logic which excluded lower class political participation therefore added moral force to the right to subsistence. Feudal elites typically recognized their duty to "do all that is necessary to ensure their [serfs] being, in return for labor and attachment, properly fed, clothed, housed. . . ."⁸⁴ The paradigm of dependence with material security is perfectly echoed by a Vietnamese landlord recalling the good old days:

In the past, the relationship between the landlord and his tenants was paternalistic. The landlord considered the tenant as an inferior member of his extended family. When the tenant's father died, it was the duty of the landlord to give money to the tenant for the funeral; if his wife was pregnant, the landlord gave money for the birth; if he was in financial ruin the landlord gave assistance; therefore the tenant had to behave as an inferior member of the extended family.⁸⁵

The picture painted here is how elites would have it seem, not necessarily how it was or is. We must not, for that reason, miss the power of the rhetoric. It represents a standard of performance by which elites themselves justify their rule and to which they can, by the same token, be held accountable. The very

terms "patron" or "lord" convey a general responsibility for the basic welfare of subordinates. In China, the central court was quite aware of the duties of agrarian elites and of the dangerous consequences likely when the minimal social rights of the poor were violated. An eighteenth century court edict advised rural gentry accordingly -- albiet in vain

As soon as famine occurs, destitute people freely plunder and rob -- those families that have made their fortune by unkindly methods invariably suffer damages before all other [property owners]. For this reason we advise all wealthy families to give, in their everyday life, sympathetic considerations to the poor. They should be reasonable and accommodating toward any tenant family in their neighborhood that is in need, confronted by a bad harvest, or hard pressed during the season when last year's grain has been exhausted and the new crop is yet to come. They should never refuse to extend a helping hand to it.⁸⁶

In any agrarian system which contains both stark poverty and personal subordination, the right to subsistence is likely to form the logical compliment of dependence. This right is embodied in a pattern of moral claims which peasants make on those who control scarce resources. To say that subsistence rights are implicitly a part of dependence is not to say that such relationships are not exploitative. They generally are. There is, however, no contradiction between the insistence on the important residual rights which exist in an exploitative context and the recognition that the context is, after all, unjust. Factory workers, for example, may consider the system of authority and rewards in industry as unfair and might support a fundamentally new structure of power if the opportunity presented itself. But this hardly prevents them from defending, at the same time, their existing rights or appealing to the obligations of employers within

the existing system. Similarly, tenants may chafe at the dependency and burdens of their status, but this hardly prevents them from ferociously protecting what they take to be their basic rights to food loans or relief under existing tenancy arrangements. In almost any agrarian system, there is some standard package of moral rights which represent, at the same time, the minimal standards of obligations for which elites are morally accountable. The right to subsistence is classically at the core of these rights because it is central to peasant life and because it is morally embedded in most stratified agrarian orders.

The Moral Polarities of Power: The power that the control of land and its product confers on landowners has, as does any form of power, a double face. While its effects may be inescapable, it may either be seen as legitimate and even beneficial or as illegitimate and extortive. For subsistence-oriented tenants, the normative test of power tends to center around its use to shield them from inevitable crises of food supply.

The moral dimension of the landlord role is evident in the terms which tenants employ to label both the owners of land and their behavior. The power wielded by landlords is potentially "seen in terms of two opposed and complimentary notions, one entirely benificent (an order that ensures peace and prosperity) and the other dangerous (a superiority acquired at the expense of others)."⁸⁷ When landowners are described by tenants in terms of patronage and protection and when their behavior is seen as open-handed, their status and legitimacy is validated. When, on the other hand, they are described as land-grabbers and as cruel

and exacting, the image becomes one of immoral power which may be suffered but not condoned. This moral polarity of power is remarked on by Pitt-Rivers in his discussion of patronage in Andalusia.

Patronage is good when the patron is good, but like the friendship upon which it is based, it has two faces. It can either confirm the superiority of the *senorito* or it can be exploited by the rich man to obtain a nefarious advantage over poor people. It covers a range of relationships from noble protection of dependents in accordance with the moral solidarity of the *pueblo* to the scurrilous coercions of the later period of caciquismo. The system is, clearly, only to be judged good insofar as it ensures that people do not go hungry.⁸⁸

Landowners who transgress the moral boundaries of "patronage" roles are no longer patrons; they are caciques or simply los ricos. In Argentina, large ranchowners may be favorably seen as the clase alta or la familia, or unfavorably labeled the oligarchia. The label applied is, in effect, a description of role behavior. Elites are accorded the status of clase alta only to the extent that they actually live up to the standards of economic assistance and generosity that are expected of them.⁸⁹

The role labels which tenants attach to landlords is thus a good indication of whether they view the relationship as generally fair and collaborative or as unjust and exploitative. In some cases the term may remain the same while its connotations change to reflect a new reality. The word "cacique" in nineteenth century Luzon, for example, had a generally favorable emotive content in keeping with the reciprocal assistance and protection which tenants could generally expect from the local principalia. As landowners imposed more rigid terms of tenancy and withdrew from the *barrios*, however, the word cacique became a "term of

opprobrium for the first time."⁹⁰ The term for sharecropping in Central Luzon has undergone an analogous transformation. Kasama may be translated as "partners" or "sharing together" and implies a relationship of egalitarianism and friendship. As share tenancy has become increasingly one-sided, however, the term has become more and more dissonant with reality. To cope with this social fact, tenants in some areas increasingly use the traditional term ^{only} when addressing landlords or authorities directly. Among themselves, though, they add a cynical suffix which mocks its literal meaning and makes it clear that they hardly consider the bargain fair or equal. When they may talk safely, the tenant's view of sharecropping thus reveals a contempt and ridicule for the pretensions of the word kasama.

* * * *

The need for subsistence is not simply, then, a physical fact; it is a perceived right which finds social and moral expression in the organization of role expectations within tenancy. Deference and subordination are justifiable only to the extent that landlords actually meet the reciprocal obligations which their claim to status implies. These obligations are apparent in the Filipino sharecroppers vision of the "good landlord", in the classical association of dependence with social rights, in elite homilies, and in the moral ambivalence of power roles. The need for subsistence alone does not define any social responsibilities or moral obligations. The right to

subsistence, on the other hand, is both an ethical and relational claim and provides the basis for the moral indignation which its violation arouses. By refusing to honor the basic social rights of tenants, a landowning elite forfeits any moral claim it may have had to peasant production and, in effect, dissolves the last normative basis for continued deference. Defiance is now normatively justified though it may be impossible in practice. A tenant whose subsistence hangs in the balance thus faces more than an economic problem; he faces a social failure. The social and moral context of his judgement is critical. It implies that the tenant, as a political actor, is more than a statistical abstract of available calories and outgoing rent charges -- more than a consuming organism whose politics may be deduced from his daily food level. It confers on him, as we confer on elites as a matter of course, a political consciousness and a perception of the moral structure of his society. It implies, then, that his sense of what is just allows him to judge others as morally responsible or not for his plight and to act, not merely to restore his subsistence, but to claim his rights.

VI. Structural Change and Exploitation in Southeast Asia

Actual patterns of landlord tenant relations in colonial Southeast Asia tended to become progressively more exploitative in terms of both the balance of exchange and rights to subsistence. The explanation for this deterioration is to be sought in a combination of demographic and political factors which steadily

undermined the relative bargaining power of the tenant. Inasmuch as analogous forces lay behind the evolution of tenancy in much of the third world, they merit brief, schematic treatment here. This discussion is meant to capture only the main structural changes which increase the potential for rural exploitation and thus glosses over much regional variation.⁹¹

If we ask how much more the tenant needs the landlord than the landlord needs the tenant, we have a rough gauge of the potential for exploitation. Throughout the colonial period, the major changes in agrarian life produced a growing tenant class that was increasingly at the mercy of landowners for its livelihood and security. The growth of markets and the cash economy meant new instabilities in tenant income due to price fluctuations. At the same time, redistributive pressures within the village became less reliable forms of subsistence inasmuch as more land was owned by absentee landlords who could ignore local norms with relative impunity. Perhaps the most decisive factor in the colonial transformation, however, was the growth of population and the closing of the agrarian frontier connected with it. As demographic pressure on arable land mounted, and as a growing class of landless competed for tenancies, the landowner could use his tactical advantage to impose more onerous conditions. Nor must we overlook the central role of the colonial political order in making new levels of exploitation possible. Through its legal system and coercive force, the colonial state enforced

contracts, put down unrest, and made it politically possible for the landowner to extract the maximum advantage from his economic power.⁹²

The bargaining advantage of the landlord was reflected in the evolution of tenancy. Rents took an expanding proportion of the crop and production costs were shifted increasingly to tenants. It is in the changing forms of tenancy and the revocation of subsistence guarantees, however, that the full impact of landlord power was felt. Flexible sharecropping was replaced by a more rigid division of the crop and share tenancy itself increasingly gave way to fixed rents in cash or kind that were collected irrespective of the harvest. Apart from the question of rent itself, other forms of subsistence security deteriorated. In one area landlords might refuse customary pre-harvest loans, in another they were no longer lenient if the tenant fell ill, in another gleaning rights might be suspended. The signs varied to suit the peculiarities of each region, but they all pointed in the same direction. The balance of exchange moved steadily in favor of the landlord and, in the case of absentee, rentier landlords, it is hard to speak of exchange at all except for the rental of land at a high and invariable rate. Landowners generally succeeded in stabilizing their income at the expense of tenants and in stripping away most of the subsistence rights that had once provided some economic security.⁹³

The stiffening of tenancy terms was accompanied by signs of tension and unrest in class relations. Whenever possible, tenants manifested their disapproval by refusing to pay rents, by insisting on their rights to loans or "tolerance", and by devising

stratagems to evade the full impact of the tenancy system (e.g. harvesting and selling a portion of their crop secretly). As defiance grew, landlords relied more heavily on the courts and colonial police to maintain order and hired bands of toughs and watchmen to enforce the terms of tenancy. Indications that the legitimacy of the tenancy system had seriously eroded were apparent by the 1920's in much of the region. The year 1930 marked a watershed, however, since the integrative force of the world market had, for the first time, made possible the large-scale failure of subsistence guarantees which occurred then. Landlords themselves were hard-pressed by the economic crisis and tried to stay afloat by passing on as much of the cost as possible. They called in existing debts, refused further loans, tightened tenancy provisions, and dismissed defaulting tenants. These new hardships often constituted a direct threat to subsistence, for they came on top of a collapse in crop prices and subsidiary employment opportunities. Peasants also faced colonial head taxes which, like rents, had become an onerous claim on their resources that did not vary with their ability to pay.

The response to these new subsistence pressures was often violent. Major rebellions developed in Burma, Viet-Nam (both Cochinchina and Annam), and in the Philippines. In each of these rebellions, the major targets were the colonial tax system and landowners -- the two principal sources of fixed claims on declining peasant resources. Delays or reductions in taxes were demanded on the basis of the hardship created by the crisis.

Failing that, tax rolls were burned and collection resisted. Tenants demanded financial assistance from landlords and more lenient treatment which, if refused, led to attacks on owners' granaries and the withholding of all or a portion of the rent. The implicit theme in most of the tumult was that neither the landlord's nor the state's claim on peasant income was legitimate now that it directly threatened subsistence. ^(93a) In this sense, the uprisings represented, as do most, peasant rebellions with which I am familiar, a largely defensive effort to protect existing subsistence rights.

VII. False-Consciousness Revisited

Our analysis raises one final problem that is of both conceptual and operational importance. How are we to establish the existence of a sense of exploitation among tenants and peasants in situations where repression makes it especially dangerous for them to speak or act openly? Let us assume, for example, that a given tenantry is exploited in the sense in which we have defined that term. Let us assume, further, that the power of the state and landlords makes defiance virtually impossible. At least the divergent interpretations of this situation are possible. It could be argued, on the one hand, that tenants accept this exploitation as a normal, even justifiable, part of the social order. This explanation for the absence of dissent -- for passivity -- rests on the peasantry's fatalistic acceptance of the social order -- on what Marxists would call "false-consciousness". Mystification of this sort is invoked as the reason for resignation particularly in societies such as

India where a venerable system of stratification is reinforced by religious sanctions and elaborate social codes. The same explanation is invoked in Java as well where a tradition of passivity and deference is presumed to represent a cognitive obstacle to dissent. It could be claimed, on the other hand, that the reason for passivity is to be found, not in values, but in the relationships of force in the countryside.⁹⁴ Is there an empirical solution to this thorny issue; is there any way of deciding, in a given context, what weight to assign values as an obstacle to dissent and what weight to assign repression? How can we tell the difference between false deference and real deference when the relative weakness of tenants may make dissimulation necessary? Without underestimating the problems involved, I believe there are a number of ways in which this issue can be attacked.

The argument for mystification or false-consciousness depends, in fact, on the symbolic alignment of landlord values and peasant values -- on the assumption that the peasantry accepts the landowners' vision of the social order. What does mystification mean, if not a group's belief in the social ideology which justifies its exploitation? If, indeed, mystification is the major reason for tenant compliance, it should be possible to substantiate this by reference to peasant beliefs and values. If mystification is not the problem, however, that too should be evident from an examination of peasant culture. The evidence will seldom be cut-and-dried inasmuch as any group's values will contain diverse and even contradictory currents. Despite this problem, it is conceivable that a careful examination of peasant values

can tell us just how harmonious their values and elite values are, and along what dimensions contradictions exist. A few brief illustrations will help point to the kinds of evidence which would be relevant to this issue.

At the level of language, we might look at the terms used to describe landlords and tenancy arrangements. The changing connotations of kasama and cacique, for example, are a strong indications that rural class relations are regarded as exploitive. Inquiries into class relations that begin at this level can tell us much about the symbolic alignment or opposition of landowners and tenants. The study of proverbs, folksongs, oral history, and jokes can similarly help us gauge the symbolic distance between classes.⁹⁵ Since the freedom of peasants to elaborate their own culture is almost always greater than their capacity to remake society, it is to their culture that we must look to discern how much their moral universe overlaps with that of the elite.

The religious beliefs and practices of the peasantry offer us another rich field of evidence. Folk religion may undergo a transformation which places it in sharp symbolic opposition to the social doctrines of the elite. Around the turn of the century, for example, the Saminist sect in the Rembang area of Java explicitly rejected the existing social hierarchy. They refused to pay taxes on principle, insisted on their rights to take wood from the forest, and abandoned all status-laden terms of address -- instead employing "low" Javanese (ngoko) and addressing all as "brother".⁹⁶ Their religious doctrine and practices had much in common with the egalitarian and plain-talking sects of

seventeenth century England which also explicitly rejected the social and agrarian order of their day.⁹⁷ In contemporary ^{Java,} to cite another example, ~~Java~~ it is reported that Buddhism had made strong inroads among peasants in areas most decimated by the repression of late 1965. Not much is known about this religious transformation yet, but it seems likely that many poor peasants have chosen to formalize their opposition to the dominant and often well-to-do Moslem community by leaving Islam altogether. As a symbolic expression of withdrawal and cleavage, in the wake of political disaster, its significance cannot be underestimated.

For any agrarian system one can identify a set of key values which justify the rights of the elite to the deference, land, grain, and taxes which they claim. It is largely an empirical matter whether these values find support or opposition within the sub-culture of subordinate classes. If we find that bandits are made into folk heroes, that fallen rebels are treated with reverence, that poaching is celebrated, that defiant tenants are admired, this constitutes good evidence that, at a minimum, violations of elite norms evoke a vicarious sympathy among peasants. If the forms of outward deference and homage toward landlords are privately mocked, it is evidence, at a minimum, that tenants are hardly in the thrall of a naturally-ordained social order. If peasant sects proclaim the equal division of wealth and the right of all to the land and its product in the midst of a society in which things are very much otherwise, it is, at a minimum, evidence that their notion of social justice does not correspond with the existing distribution of resources.

The problem of whether peasants submit to exploitation because of mystification or because they have no other choice is, then, not an analytical cul de sac. It can be resolved in large part by asking whether the values of tenants do, in fact, accord with the dominant values embodied in the existing system of land-ownership and tenancy. For it is especially at this level of culture that a defeated or intimidated tenantry may nurture its stubborn moral dissent from an elite-created social order.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lewis L. Lorwin, "Exploitation," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, VI, (New York: MacMillan, 1931), p. 16.
2. The Social Basis of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 471. Moore's question assumes, of course, that the services the two hypothetical landlords provide to tenants are more or less comparable.
3. Such a situation would be quite unlikely since the distorting values that presumably lead to false consciousness are the products of a ruling elite and therefore tend to distort perceptions in the direction of non-exploitation.
4. I include here both sharecroppers and cash rent tenants.
5. Kung-Chuan Hsiao, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960), p. 427.
6. See for example, George Rude, The Crowd in History, 1730-1848, (New York: Wiley, 1964) passim; E.P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," Past and Present, No. 50, (February, 1971); Charles Tilly, "Food Supply and Public Order in Modern Europe," in Tilly, ed., The Building of States in Western Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
7. In principle, the target of protest could just as easily have been the wage-rate as the price of bread, but most observers agree that consumer prices rather than producer wages were most often the focus of anger.
8. In the early feudal period peasants often sought the protection of a lord, figuring that the physical security he provided was well worth the grain and labor he might claim. See Marc Bloch, French Rural History: An Essay on its Basic Characteristics, Translated by Janet Sondheimer, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), Chs. 1 and 2.
9. His judgement, of course, will also depend on how rightful he considers the owner's claim to land in the first place.

10. Scarlett Epstein, "Productive Efficiency and Customary Systems of Rewards in Rural South India," pp. 229-252 in Raymond Firth, ed., Themes in Economic Anthropology, (London: Tavistock, 1967).
11. Moore, The Social Basis of Dictatorship and Democracy, Chapter on France.
12. Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), passim.
13. It is conceivable too, for example, that the relative well-being of the landlord vis-a-vis the tenant may influence the justice or injustice of his claim as viewed by the tenant. Thus a landlord who is as poor as his tenant may be seen as less exploitive than a wealthy landlord, though his claim on the harvest is identical.
14. See, for example, Karl de Schweinitz, England's Road to Social Security, (New York: Barnes and Co., 1961), Originally published in 1943, p. 5, and Marc Bloch, French Rural History, pp. 119-121.
15. Among others, see Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," American Sociological Review, 25:2, (April, 1960), 4
16. Marcel Mauss: The Gift: Its Form and Function in Archaic Societies, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958) is also relevant here.
17. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity. . .", p. 171.
18. Peter Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life, (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1961), p. 229.
19. Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 209.
20. Ibid., p. 210.
21. E.P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," Past and Present, No. 50, (February, 1971), p. 108.

22. See, for example, Herbert Phillips, Thai Peasant Personality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); George Foster, "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntzan: Patron-Client Relationship," American P.H. - Rivers, The People of the Sierra, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961) pp. 60-61; J. Campbell, Honour Family and Patronage (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); Fredrik Barth, Political Leadership Among the Swat Pathans, London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology, No. 19 (London: Athlone Press, 1965), Ch. 1; and Eric Wolf, "Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client Relations," in M. Banton, ed., The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies (New York: Praeger, 1966).
23. Clifford Geertz, "Rotating Credit Associations: A Middle Rung of Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change, X:3 (April, 1964).
24. ~~Koentjaraningrat~~, translated by Claire Holt, Some Social-Anthropological Observations on Caring-Bajeng Practices in two Villages of Central Java (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961).
25. We should also recall that where strong outside guarantees for wealth and position do not exist, the standing of local elites depended ultimately on the following they could muster in a showdown. There are thus very good reasons for local powerholders to build sizeable clienteles in such circumstances.
26. Howard Keva Kaufman, Banghuad, A Community Study in Thailand, Monographs of the Association of Asian Studies, No. 10 (Locust Valley, N.Y.: J.J. Augustin, 1960), p. 36.
27. Raymond Firth, Malay Fisherman: Their Peasant Economy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 295.
28. Rivers, op. cit., pp. 63, 204.
29. Georges Balandier, Political Anthropology (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 34, 39, ^{translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith}
30. Barrington Moore, Jr., Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), pp. 53-54.

31. It is worth noting that the voluntary grant of status to a member of a group is not simply a sign of approval but also a form of social control. The weaker members of the group confer status on the strong in part to persuade him to use his power for the benefit of the group rather than against it. See, on this point, Richard M. Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations," American Sociological Review, 22:1 (February, 1962), pp. 39-41 and John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups, (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1961), p. 231.
32. R. H. Tawney, Land and Labour in China (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), first published in 1932, p. 77.
33. Within Southeast Asia the twentieth century has seen such famines in Annam, Tonkin in Viet-Nam, and near famine in Northern Burma, Northeast Thailand, and Java. As recently as the spring of 1974 the signs of famine were appearing in Annam once again. See Le Monde, May 22, 1974, "Où va le Vietnam du Sud," ~~by~~ by Patrice de Beer, Le Monde, May 9, 1974.
34. The subject of dearth was a preoccupation of the peasantry of Western Europe not too long ago as well. R.C. Cobb, in his study of the popular mentality at the time of the French Revolution, found that was the central issue among the poor. "... dearth appeared a subject more suitable than any other, for a number of reasons. It was the problem to which the common people, at all times, devoted the most attention; no other topic took up so much time in popular debate, no other could inspire fiercer passions, greater fears, more hysteria, more envy, more violence, and more unreason. One can find no better illustration of the process of myth and rumor; and attitudes toward dearth conditioned popular attitudes to everything else: government, the countryside, life and death, inequality, deprivation, morality, pride, humiliation, self-esteem. It is the central theme in all forms of popular expression. Nor were the common people living solely in a world of myth and panic fear; for dearth and famine were in fact the biggest single threat to their existence. The Police and the People: French Popular Protest 1789-1820. (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. xviii.
35. A.V. Chayanov, The Theory of Peasant Economy, Edited by Daniel Thorner, Basile Kerblay, and R.E.F. Smith (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. for the American Economic Association, 1966), originally published in 1926.

36. This term was coined by Clifford Geertz in his brilliant study Agricultural Involution, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963).
37. Chayanov, op. cit., pp. 10, 28.
38. James Roumasset, "Risk and Choice of Technique for Peasant Agriculture: Safety-First and Rice Production in the Philippines," Social Systems Research Institute, University of Wisconsin, Economic Development and International Economics 7118 (August, 1971).
39. There are a number of knotty operational problems in applying this predictive model. What does the peasant regard as an unacceptable risk? Roumasset puts it at .025, or one failure in forty crops. I suspect it is a bit higher. How much additional risk will peasants run for what increment in expected return? How do peasants judge the risks of techniques and seeds with which they have little experience? One expects they inflate the risk of a given technique in proportion to their ignorance about its performance. Each of these questions is answerable in quantitative terms only for specific categories of peasants whose situation is known. For our purposes it is enough to know that the marginal peasant has a high relative preference for security over profitability. If the two coincide, so much the better-- that is the technocrat's dream -- but they are more likely to diverge as we shall see.
40. It goes without saying that when subsistence routines are themselves failing to provide for minimal needs and when, therefore, continuing to do the same thing promises ruin, risk taking again becomes rational and is in the interest of survival.
41. Jere R. Behrman, "Supply Response and the Modernization of Peasant Agriculture: A Study of the Major Annual Crops in Thailand," in Clifford B. Wharton, ed., Subsistence Agriculture and Economic Development (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 236.
42. John W. Mellor, "The Subsistence Farmer in Traditional Economies," in Wharton, ed., op. cit., p. 214.
43. Hla Myint, "The Peasant Economies of Today's Underdeveloped Areas," in Wharton, ed., op. cit., p. 103.

44. J. Leonard Joy, "Diagnosis, Prediction, and Policy Formulation," in Wharton, ed., op. cit., pp. 377-378. Joy refers to data from the Punjab that confirm this hypothesis.
45. All of the new seed varieties, moreover, required much larger investments of cash for hiring non-family labor in transplanting and harvesting. In a bad year the impact of these fixed costs was enormous since a larger yield was required merely to meet sunk production costs.
46. One might ask why the smallholder does not use the surplus of the good years to tide him over the bad years. There are several problems here. First, unless the initial years are good, there is no surplus. Second, there is an inevitable storage loss for rice which is kept long. More important, however, within the peasant community, much of a man's surplus is siphoned off to aid his less fortunate kin and neighbors, or in ceremonial obligations that he avoids only at his peril. Finally, of course, peasants do store up some wealth in plough animals, pigs, gold -- all of which are thrown into the breach in a poor year -- but their savings are typically meagre.
47. See, for example, the excellent study of a northern Thai village by Michael Moerman who concludes, "However acute the peasant's entrepreneurial ambitions, peasant rationality precludes planting commercial crops which threaten subsistence." Agricultural Change and Peasant Choice in a Thai Village (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 69. Also, Lucian Hanks, Rice and Man: Agricultural Ecology in Southeast Asia (New York: Aldine Atherton, 1972), p. 48; Pierre Gourou, L'Utilisation du Sol en Indochine Française, Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Travaux des groupes d'études - Publication XIV (Paris: Paul Hartmann Editeur, II rue cujas, 1940), p. 240; M.G. Swift, Malay Peasant Society in Jelabu, London School of Economics Monographs in Social Anthropology (London: Athlone Press, 1965), Ch. 3; Kamol Odd Janlekha, A Study of the Economy of a Rice Growing Village in Central Thailand, (Bangkok: Division of Agriculture Economics, Office of the Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Agriculture, 1960), pp. 43, 173; and J.H. Boeke, The Structure of the Netherlands Indian Economy, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942), pp. 30-31.

48. Such risk-spreading techniques are not confined to peasants. Fishermen and petty traders living close to the margin also spread risks to help ensure a steady income. Petty traders will, for example, try to develop a number of steady customers to whom they give small "breaks in order to stabilize the relationship. They will avoid selling all their goods to a single customer which would concentrate their dependence as sellers. cf. Sidney Mintz, "Pratik: Haitian Personal Economic Relationships," in Jack M. Potter, et. al., eds., Peasant Society: A Reader (Boston: Little-Brown, 1967), pp. 98-110.
49. In fact, it is conceivable that the peasant might actually prefer "c" to his original smallholding status, inasmuch as he may be willing to pay a large income premium in order to be guaranteed help in bad years.
50. This conclusion is in keeping with a substantial body of sociological evidence which suggests that an insecure poverty is far more explosive and painful than poverty alone. See, for example, Maurice Zeitlin, "Economic Insecurity and the Attitudes of Cuban Workers," American Sociological Review, 31:1 (February, 1966); John C. Leggett, "Economic Insecurity and Working Class Consciousness," American Sociological Review, 29:2 (April, 1964); and Gaston Rimlinger, "The Legitimation of Protest: A Comparative Study in Labor History," Comparative Studies in Society and History, II:3 (April, 1960).
51. In this illustration we have focused primarily on the provisions for dividing the crop. A more accurate scheme for the distribution of risk would also have to include the distribution of production costs. If the landowner provides all equipment, seeds, plough animals, and other cash costs, he assumes this risk while, if these costs are shifted to the tenant, the tenant then assumes an even greater risk than the arrangements for dividing the harvest would indicate.
52. The labels, "sharecropping" and "fixed-rent" are often only an indifferent guide to the actual tenancy relation. The traditional "kasama" tenancy system in the Philippines, for example, nominally describes fifty-fifty sharecropping. In practice, however, owners in some areas often soften the terms considerably in poor years while, elsewhere, no mercy is shown. The key is the actual content of the relationship -- the actual pattern of reciprocity -- and not its formal terms. Sharecroppers who can count on interest-free food

loans prior to a harvest, who are given more than their nominal share of the crop in a bad year, who get help in case of illness, and who can count on petty favors from the landowner have a substantially stronger subsistence guarantee than one would infer from the nominal division of the crop.

53. ...Particularly fixed cash rents as they expose the tenant to the risks of the price system as well as to the risks of yield fluctuations.
54. As with sharecropping, a nominal system of fixed rents might approximate sharecropping to the extent that the landlord gave remissions in poor years.
55. Hsiao-tung Fei, China's Gentry: Essays on Rural-Urban Relations, pp. 116-118.
56. The reverse is also the case. That is, a threatening tenancy arrangement may suddenly become more tolerable if, for example, alternative employment and subsistence opportunities became available. The same landlords claim, under the circumstances, no longer constitutes an immediate threat to subsistence though it may remain as stiff as before.
57. Pierre Gourou, Peasants of the Tonkin Delta, Vol. II, translated by the Human Relations Area Files (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1955), p. 659.
58. Swift, Peasant Society in Jelebu, op. cit., p. 153.
59. Yves Henry, Economie agricole de l'Indochine, Gouvernement Générale de l'Indochine, Publié a l'occasion de l'Exposition Coloniale de Paris de 1931 (Hanoi: 1932), p. 35.
60. J.H. Boeke, The Structure of the Netherlands Indian Economy, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942), p. 45.
61. Akira Takahashi, Land and Peasants in Central Luzon, (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1969), p. 137.
62. Akira Takahashi and Brian Fegen, "Two Views of the Kasama-leasee Shift in Bulacan," Philippine Sociological Review 20: 1 and 2 (January and April, 1972), p. 130.

63. J. H. Anderson, "Some Aspects of Land and Society in a Pangasinan Community," Philippine Sociological Review, No. 1 and 2 (January and April, 1966, p. 58.
64. Pierre Gourou, l'Utilisation du sol en Indochine Française, Centre d'Etudes Politique Extrangère, travaux des groupes d'études - Publication No. XIV, (Paris: Paul Hartmann, éditeur rue Cujas, 1940), pp. 404-405, all translations mine unless otherwise noted.
65. Report of Inquiry into the Conditions of Agricultural Tenants and Labourers, by Mr. T. Couper, ICS (Rangoon, Superintendent of Government Printing, 1924), p. 41.
66. Within the category of wage labor a similar preference schedule may be detected. The rural poor tend to prefer work by the season or by the year with meals provided over day labor which is far less secure. Similarly, in rural Europe not so long ago the shepherd, the permanent farm laborer, or the domestic gained economic security at the cost of average income. See, for example, Pitt-Rivers, People of the Sierra, op. cit., Ch. 2 and F.M.L. Thompson, English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 194. Where a capitalist labor market exists, one might even measure the relative preference for security over average income by the wage premium sacrificed for successively more secure positions, inasmuch as employers can take full economic advantage of the subsistence ethic.
67. See the articles in the Philippine Sociological Review, 20, 1 and 2 (January and April, 1966).
68. Brian Fegan, "Between the Lord and the Law! Tenants' Dilemmas," Philippine Sociological Review 20: 1 and 2 (January and April, 1972).
69. Ibid., p. 119. It should be added that landlords were wary of the switch as well, for they feared losing the profits of new high-yielding varieties under the fixed rent system. For this reason they often penalized those who made the change as severely as possible. The crop yields that were to be used to calculate the fixed rent were often the subject of prolonged litigation which also added to the tenant's problems. Finally, the success of the reform hinged on the provision of state credit to replace landlord funding. From the tenants' comments one gathers that state credit was too meagre and too late, if it arrived at all, thus jeopardizing the financial stability of the new leaseholders.

70. Ibid., p. 124.
71. Romana Pahilanga - de los Reyes and Frank Lynch, "Reluctant Rebels: Leasehold Converts in Nueva Ecija, Philippine Sociological Review 20: 1 and 2 (January and April, 1972), pp. 37, 46.
72. Hamza Alavi, "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties," Journal of Peasant Studies, 1:1 (October, 1973), pp. 22-62.
73. On role expectations and legitimacy, see Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1967) pp. 62-75.
74. Pahilanga and Lynch, "Reluctant Rebels . . .", op. cit.
75. Ibid. Production cost-sharing was first among lease-tenants too, but their second expectation was that landlords be "pleasant, cordial, and soft-spoken." This may reflect, in part, the strict and impersonal treatment generally accorded those who switched to leasehold. It carries also the connotation of a desire for lenient understanding landlords who would make allowances for tenant problems in difficult periods.
76. Ibid., p. 23.
77. Fegan, "Between the Lord and the Law. . ." op. cit., p. 114.
78. Ben Kerkoliet, Peasant Rebellion in the Philippines: The Origins and Growth of the HMB, MSS, Ch. 1, p. 12. It is worth noting that the sharecropper defines the social duty of the landlord by reference to his "means" much as the social duty of wealthy villagers is also defined by their "means" and the needs of their neighbors.
79. Pahilanga and Lynch note in this connection that "for most respondents their opinion about share tenancy will depend closely on the kind of landlord involved in the relationship. Relatively few object to the system as such." op. cit., p. 28. When the authors say that "relatively few object to the system as such" they refer to share tenancy in which the landlord does, in fact, meet the normative claims upon him.

80. David Christenson, "Reflections on the IPC/BA Econ Study," Philippine Sociological Review 20: 1 and 2 (January and April, 1972), p. 169.
81. Peter Laslett, The World We Have Lost, (New York: Scribners and Son, 1965), Ch. 2 and pp. 116-118.
82. "In the Frankish period, the majority of those who commended themselves sought from their new master something more than protection. Since this powerful man was at the same time a wealthy man, they also expected him to contribute to their support." Feudal Society, Translated by L.A. Manyon, Vol. I (~~New York~~ Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1961) p. 163.
83. The right to subsistence is emphasized by many scholars of pre-industrial Europe. Thus Alan Everitt states, "For since man occupied an appointed place or degree in the body politic, every man had a claim on that body to provide him with the means of livelihood. Transactions or contracts that militated against his right to subsistence, however arrived at, were unjust and invalid. For most people, the ultimate appeal was to social, in contrast to economic duty." "The Marketing of Agricultural Produce," in Joan Thirsk, ed., The Agrarian History of England and Wales, IV, 1540-1640, pp. 569-570, cited in Charles Tilly, "Food Supply and Public Order in Modern Europe," Charles Tilly, ed., The Building of States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). See also, Anton Menger, The Right to the Whole Product of Labour, Translated by M.E. Tanner, (New York: Augustus Kelley, 1962), Reprints of Economics Classics, (originally published 1899).
84. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order, (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1969), p. 49.
85. Robert L. Sampson, The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1970) p. 29.
86. Hsiao, Rural China, op. cit., p. 392. For an example of how tenants in a later period attempted to create a relationship with their landlords which would shield them from the worst misfortune. See Morton H. Fried, The Fabric of Chinese Society: The Study of the Social Life of a Chinese County Seat, (New York: Praeger, 1953), passim.
87. Georges Balandier, Political Anthropology, op. cit., p. 104.

88. Pitt-Rivers, People of the Sierra, op. cit., p. 204.
89. Arnold Strickon, "Folk Models of Stratification, Political Ideology, and Socio-Cultural Systems," The Sociological Review Monographs No. 11 (1967), pp. 93-117.
90. David R. Sturtevant, The Last Shall be First: Millennial Movements in the Philippines 1840-1940, MSS, Chs. 4 and 5.
91. I have attempted an extended discussion of this variation in The Political Economy of the Peasant Subsistence Ethic in Southeast Asia, MSS, Chs. 2-4.
92. All of these changes are discussed in more detail in Scott, "The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds in Rural Southeast Asia," Journal of Asian Studies, XXXII:1 (November, 1972), pp. 5-37.
93. Marx, in the European context, was particularly attentive to the question of the loss of economic security under agrarian capitalism. "But on the other hand these new freedmen became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of production and of all the guarantees of existence afforded by old feudal arrangements. And the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire." Capital, Vol. 1 (New York: New World Paperbacks, 1966), p. 715.
- 93a. For a lengthy account of the breakdown of patronage and the rebellions which followed, see my The Political Economy of the Peasant Subsistence Ethic, m
94. Occasionally when those relationships of force suddenly change there is a sudden and spontaneous explosion of peasant violence that suggests that prior passivity was a matter of repression rather than of false consciousness. Rebellions that have followed, for example, the fall of a repressive government or a defeat in war, are often of a scale that provides post hoc evidence for the repression theory.
95. The content of peasant folksongs in Vietnam, for example, reveals a growth of bitterness and anger toward grasping landowners and tax collectors. See Hong Giap Nguyen, La Condition des paysans au Vietnam pendant la période coloniale à travers les chansons populaires, 3^e cycle, Paris VII, Lettres, 1971.
96. Harry J. Benda and Lance Castles, "The Samin Movement," Bijdragen tot de Taal - Land -, en Volkenkunde, Vol. 125, Part 2 (1969), passim.
97. cf. Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution, (London, 1971), passim.



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8

PATRONAGE AS MYTH

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Society

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NOT FOR QUOTATION

We have been invited in this conference to comment, each from our particular perspective, on "the phenomenon" of patronage. Our conveners define "it" as a certain kind of social and political relationship, and undoubtedly each of us has come prepared with our own definition of what "it" is. I would like, however, to begin several steps before this: I don't know that we are agreed upon the kind of phenomenon we are interested in nor that we are dealing with "a phenomenon" at all. Are we talking about something "out there" in observable actions, in something in the heads of our informants, or in an analytical scheme in our own heads? Whatever answer each of us may have, I think it important to make it explicit. In my view, our failure to do so and to deal with these different stances separately has impeded our development of good theories of patronage and our communication both within and across disciplines.

In the context of the northern Mediterranean, there is also a linguistic source of confusion. We need to be able to distinguish the "patron" of our theory from the padrone or patrón our informants talk about. These may be one and the same, but they may not be; we cannot know unless we have first defined them separately.

The first issue here is methodological: on what grounds do we identify patterns in our data and call them "patronage"? Do we look at behavior and the effects of action, or do we ask people what they think is happening and how they feel about it, or both? If we do both, is this a matter of summing up diverse kinds of information, or are we to "weight" them differently? And how are we to handle discrepancies in different kinds of information?

Then, there is the issue of the theoretical status of ethos or value.

The usual treatment, and that which is followed in our Seminar Prospectus, is to assume congruence between behavior and value. "The relationship has moral overtones"; the exchange of benefits is "confirmed or rationalized by an ethos"; patronage forms a system of hierarchies and networks which "receive their recognition" in a certain "moral climate". But are we to assume congruence in advance? Is the congruence an artifact of our method--that is, are we defining the patronage "relationship" and the patronage "ethos" each in terms of the other? The real problem is, how can we discover the extent to which congruence exists? All this is part of a more general theoretical issue: where do we seek explanation? What kind of causal model do we use in accounting for the "relationships" and "moral climates" encompassed by the concept of patronage?

My concerns derive, of course, from dilemmas I have encountered in my own work. Such dilemmas may simply be the consequence of my particular ethnographic situation or of my own limitations. However, they have led me to rephrase the questions I have been asking of my material, and I have found the avenues of inquiry intriguing. Although they have taken me backward into history rather than forward into contemporary change--I will have little to say about the current political scene or prospects for the future--I think they have some bearing on both the problems and the possibilities in the study of the "phenomenon" of patronage.

I have studied patronage in a small commune in the province of Perugia in Central Italy, which I have called Colleverde. In 1960 when I first went there, the community's agricultural production--its economic base--was still organized within the mezzadria system, the share-farming pattern that had characterized much of Central Italy for centuries. The mezzadria contract

bound a landlord (called padrone) and a peasant family into a relationship that defined a series of reciprocal rights and obligations concerning the joint agricultural enterprise. Particularly when the landlords lived in the community--in the towns around which the farms were dispersed--the relationship was readily extended to a wider range of functions. Thus, the landlord-tenant relationship was itself, almost by definition, on a patron-client model, and the language for it merged with the language of patronage. That language also applied to certain other interclass relationships, which seem to have been important until after World War II and which I included in my analytical category "patronage". Clearly, there was a concept of patronage--the idea of a padrone who had certain rights and obligations--that was meaningful to the Colleverdesi and that was relevant in a variety of contexts; for instance, these were often the terms in which people regretted or welcomed changes in the present. For all these reasons, my description of the traditional social and political structure of Colleverde placed a strong emphasis upon patronage, and I felt that the decline of patronage (of the traditional kind) marked a significant change in the contemporary period.

When I returned to Colleverde several years after my initial fieldwork, however, I began to see the matter in another light. The more I delved into evidence on the traditional patrons, the more I was struck by how limited was the actual extent of reciprocity; within relationships defined (by the natives) as patronage, the actual downward movement of goods or services was rarely very substantial. I could not easily quantify the exchanges, but what seemed clear to me was that whatever was the "reality" of patron-client relationships in Colleverde, patronage was also a "myth"--a set of assumptions and evaluations used by the people themselves. This is not to say that people were not aware

of discrepancies between the myth and the reality of patronage; on the contrary, the language of patronage was often used ironically to point up such discrepancies. What all of this suggested to me was that the myth (or ethos or value, if you prefer) of patronage was a phenomenon different from the structure of relationships; that it would be incorrect to read off one of these phenomena from the other; but also that myth too was "real" and had to be explained.

In seeking an approach to this problem, I found it useful to follow up the distinction between "etics" and "emics" that has had considerable currency in anthropology during the past decade. The distinction is between two modes of analysis, between two methodological strategies, between two kinds of phenomena that correspond to different definitions of culture. In this paper, I would like first to show how I think the etic/emic distinction applies to the study of patronage. I would then like to explore the emic dimension of patronage by using Colleverde as an illustrative case; I want to ask how the emic myth of patronage might enter into a historical analysis of political and social action. Finally, I would like to draw some general conclusions about how the etic/emic distinction might contribute to a firmer grip on our own theories about "the phenomenon" of patronage.

Etics and Emics

The opposition between "etic" and "emic" approaches to cultural analysis derives from linguistics, especially from the work of Kenneth Pike (see, e.g. Pike 1954). It is an analogy drawn with the distinction between phonetics and phonemics. Phonetics is concerned with the description of articulatory behavior as it can be detected by an observer, and with the classification

of articulatory behavior in ways that can be applied to all languages and agreed upon by a scientific community of observers (linguists). Phonemics, in contrast, is concerned with discovering those phonetic distinctions that are recognized as significant by the speakers of a language, and with classifying them so as to represent the patterns of a particular language; the "cross-language" study of phonemics compares not articulatory events but the patterning of meaningful distinctions. (For example, a linguist can describe the different articulatory behavior that produces "l" and "r". To a speaker of Japanese the difference is meaningless, for these are variations within a single phoneme. To a speaker of English the difference is significant--"grass" means something different from "glass".)

The analogy to cultural analysis developed in anthropology during the 1960's with the so-called "new ethnography". This approach revived the view of culture as cognitive processes and set itself the task of describing certain cultural domains (e.g. kinship, curing, ethnobotany) in terms of the patterns of meaning--the distinctions significant--in a particular culture. The "emicists" met with skepticism from other anthropologists who questioned the possibility of "getting inside the natives' heads". The most vigorous of these opponents, Marvin Harris, took the extreme etic view, asserting that a science of culture could be based only upon observable behavior--ultimately, muscular action and its effects upon the environment (see Harris 1964). The outcome of this debate was perhaps more important than the achievements of either the committed emicists or the extreme eticists: the recognition that these represent two kinds of analysis which are complementary to each other but whose results are not isomorphic. Neither type of phenomenon can explain the other directly; neither can be reduced to the other.

Etic analysis is based on phenomena which can be identified and studied independently of the natives' cultural judgment; emic analysis aims for an orderly and explicit representation of cognitive patterns (after Harris 1971:147). The difference is above all a matter of method, i.e. where the analyst seeks verification. In etic analysis, the reference point for verification is the community of scientific observers; the usefulness of methods of observation and units of analysis depends upon their applicability to all cultures and all observers. In contrast, the adequacy of an emic analysis is judged by the responses of the natives themselves. This is not a matter of asking the natives to do the analysis or to evaluate it. Rather, the analyst tests his own representation against the natives' responses in the same way that a linguist would check his representation of grammatical rules against the speakers' judgements of what is grammatical speech. Though emic phenomena are "subjective" and culturally specific, they can be studied with objective methods, and with appropriate modes of analysis emic patterns of different cultures can be compared.

It is worth pointing out, too, that while the emic/etic contrast is rooted in the difference between idealist and materialist theories of culture, it is not the same thing as the contrast between the "ideal" and the "real" as these terms are usually used in anthropology. Etic analysis is concerned only with the way people actually behave, but emic analysis takes in more than ideals: it is concerned with cognitive patterning both of what is supposed to happen and of what does happen (which is not the same as what can be observed to happen). Thus, the emic study of patronage is not only what people think patrons are supposed to do. The more relevant question would be how the natives think it is appropriate for patrons to behave (assuming one has already learned

what "patron" means); appropriateness includes both what is expected of a patron and how he might be expected to not do the expected.

My basic point is that patronage ought to be studied both from an etic and an emic point of view, and that our ultimate aim should be to investigate the ways in which the etics and the emics of patronage might be related. To look at relationships between them requires that the two kinds of analysis be done independently in the first instance. If one describes the behavior of patrons and clients on the basis of what informants say, or alternatively if one describes ideas about patronage on the basis of one's inferences from behavior, then one has relinquished the possibility of asking how ideas and behavior are related, whether they conform or diverge, and why.

The etic study of patronage involves at least two kinds of tasks. First, there is the structural description of relationships and networks. What kinds of patron-client relationships are there in a society? (The operational questions are: what kinds of behaviors can we observe? what patterns do they fall into? what are the effects of each of these patterns?) What kinds of exchanges do they involve (described independently of the values attached to the goods and services exchanged)? Second, it is necessary to deal with patronage as a variable. What is the actual frequency, or density, of patron-client relationships? Perhaps most pressing, what is the quantifiable exchange of goods and services? In other words, what does the "reciprocity" fundamental to so many patronage theories consist of in specific cases? (See Kaufman 1974:307-8). This is the problem that needs to be addressed in answering Dalton's question, "How exactly are peasants 'exploited'?" (Dalton 1974). We need not follow Dalton in throwing our hands up in despair and concluding that since lots of people might be considered "exploited" the concept is only

a value judgement. "Exploitation" can be measured; at some point an unequal exchange becomes something other than reciprocity.

The emic study of patronage is of a different order. It is concerned with the way in which people conceptualize, talk about, or rationalize behavior-- perhaps the behavior that the social scientist identifies as "patronage", but more particularly, behavior that is defined as "patronage" (or something like it) in the native idiom. The more difficult part of the task lies in discovering implicit meanings and cognitive patterns. Difficult but not impossible. Methods have been developed for studying other cultural domains which might be applied, and we have already learned something about the pitfalls; for instance, we know that we must expect as much individual variation in culturally patterned cognition as in culturally patterned behavior. However, some emic phenomena are quite explicit. Many of the cultures in which we have worked have public ideologies of patronage. Although not everyone in the society "believes" them with equal conviction, such ideologies (or myths) have an existence of their own. Since they are readily accessible to study without probing deeply "inside heads", this may be a useful place to begin.

The Patronage Myth in Colleverde

There are several grounds for saying that traditional Colleverde had a public ideology of patronage. The important landlord-peasant relationship was couched in an idiom of patronage. The same idiom (and the assumptions it carried) was extended widely to other relationships between unequals. Furthermore, it applied also to the idea of a public patron. That is, certain members of the local elite were defined, and defined themselves, as protectors

and benefactors of the community. According to the ideology, these persons bestowed material benefits, political advantages, and glory upon the community as a whole; they in turn were entitled to the obedience, respect, and loyalty of the community. This role was not defined in terms of a contract. It was a counterpart of the patron's identification with the community, as a devoted citizen of his native paese. His prestations were part of an obligation to glorify the community, assert its uniqueness, defend its special identity.

This public patronage was extolled in official proclamations, on tombstone inscriptions, and in local folklore. Yet on closer inspection the actual contributions of the public patrons appear to have been very limited. As in the case of the landlord-padrone, the downward movement of real goods and services was magnified and elaborated in rhetoric. A "myth" was perpetuated that was disproportionate with the ethics of the situation. Why should this be so?

I think the answer to this question lies in the economic, political and social context of patronage in Colleverde as it developed over time. This history may be summarized in terms of major phases. The first coincides with the age of the communes, from the twelfth to the early fourteenth centuries, and the period of the signorie (lordships) that followed. For most of this time Colleverde was held within the territory of the powerful city-state nearby. However, like many other small towns and castella, its internal organization replicated that of the urban communes and it attempted repeatedly to become autonomous. Given the multicentric political structure of the region, a degree of autonomy could be attained by alliance (or submission) to other cities or to the Pope or Emperor, and by playing off these different powers against each other.

The theme of autonomy recurs throughout Colleverdese history, in abortive form almost to the present day. It is clear that it had an economic counterpart: it served the interests of the local landowning elite. From the communal period until unification, autonomy meant that the community remained outside the laws of the nearby city; for the landowners this meant maximum flexibility in selling their grain on the urban markets of the region. The quantity of surplus grain and other commodities varied over time, but this fundamental consideration did not. To achieve this autonomy, the local elite followed a twofold strategy: on the one hand, they tried to manipulate alliances and connections within the wider political sphere of the region; on the other hand, they tried to maintain undisputed control over the local sphere.

A second phase begins with the consolidation of the Papal State in the sixteenth century. Colleverde's effective autonomy vis-à-vis the nearby city was strengthened, and it shared in the growing agricultural commerce of the region. At the same time, a process of colonization of the countryside began, as peasant families were settled on the land on farms which they created and cultivated under mezzadria contracts. Town-landlord and peasant were drawn into ties based on the mezzadria, and the patronage role of the landlord was elaborated. The turn of the nineteenth century marks a highpoint for the local landowning elite, economically and politically. They benefited from the population increase and agricultural revival of the late eighteenth century, and at least one family acquired substantial Church lands. At about the same time, they won favorable administrative status for Colleverde, first under the French and then under the restored Papal regime. This success seems to have been accompanied by lavish expressions of the ideology of public patronage.

A third phase is marked by the unification of Italy. New links with the outside afforded new opportunities for the landowning elite, but the stresses in the mezzadria system and the challenges to elite control that followed upon unification were threats to their position. Their response was to widen the system of patronage by assuming positions of mediation between Colleverdesi and the nation-state (see Silverman 1965). At the same time, bureaucrats and professionals brought into the community were absorbed into the local elite. While knowledge of and connections with the national political system became the marks of successful patrons, the emphasis upon local identity--autonomy within the larger system--remained strong, if anything increased.

Fundamental change in the role of the local elite and in the patterns of patronage came only after World War II. The mezzadria system began to break down; new forms of articulation with the national system developed; labor organizations, political parties, and intermediaries from within the bureaucracy and the Church replaced the traditional patrons. In this situation, the idiom of patronage has come to be restricted to specifically political contexts. For instance, it forms part of people's descriptions of the ideal sindaco and of expectations about how political parties should operate, but it is rarely applied to multiplex social relationships. At the same time, the ideology of patronage has become overtly polemical. The major political factions in the community (which are activated mainly by the DC and the PCI) express different assumptions about the value of patronage: the DC advocates refer to the benefits of vertical connections and the obligations that accompany power, while the Left challenges this view and appeals to an ideology of horizontal, class-based alliance.

We may return now to the question, why did the myth of the local patron persist so long in Colleverde? This question inquires into the relation between the emics and etics of patronage: why should there be an ideology that exaggerates both the frequency of relationships that an observer might define as patronage and the actual exchanges these involved? For me the "why" means, how might the ideology of patronage have entered into social and political action?

From the point of view of the local elite, I think the ideology served the strategy for achieving effective autonomy. The emphasis upon public patronage, in particular, formed part of a myth of "community" which backed up claims to autonomy. Throughout early Colleverdese history, the symbols of local identity provided moral underpinnings for the claim that "Colleverde ought to be subject to no other authority than that of the Holy See itself". National unity did not fundamentally alter the claim but rephrased it in terms of local interests within the nation. The themes of patriotism towards Italy and devotion to Colleverde--both expressed by the single term "paese"--became mutually reinforcing. The "community" was, in fact, the landowning elite, who pursued their interests in the name of Colleverde. The acts, but even more the rhetoric, of public patronage served these interests by underlining the uniqueness and glory of the community. (Needless to say, the process involved is anything but unique to Colleverde. Each town constituted a local center of its own and insisted upon its own uniqueness; minute differences between one town and another were--and still are--exaggerated, while "local traditions" were everywhere nurtured.)

For the landowning elite, too, maintaining the boundaries of the community was important in staving off challenges to their internal control. Herein

lies a further significance of the myth of the patron--the local figure who looks after his own better than any outsider could.

But why should this ideology be voiced also by the non-elite, especially those who knew all too well the discrepancies with reality? For them, it was a way of making claims on their landlords and other accessible persons of high status and power. The claim might pay off only occasionally and even then only in minute favors, but it cost little; it was an investment made in resources that the peasant had in ample supply--family labor, deference, and of course, talk. Moreover, it did not necessarily exclude other avenues of action. Even at the time of my first fieldwork, it was quite common for peasants to use the language and rituals of clientism towards their landlords while at the same time to actively support the Communists with votes, contributions, and participation in strikes.

The discussion thus far has emphasized patronage as it applied to landowners. It should be pointed out that the local patrons also included minor professionals, bureaucrats, and shopkeepers; typically, in fact, such occupations were combined with ownership of mezzadria farms. This phenomenon of urban or small-town bourgeois landownership is as old as the communes in Central Italy, and the paternalistic phrasing of relationships between these townsmen and the peasantry is probably almost as old. Yet after the unification, the local elites saw many newcomers, a result of the expansion of the bureaucracy and the national-level recruitment of professionals and administrators. In Colleverde, such new arrivals became the most conspicuous padroni and the most vigorous advocates of public patronage; they married into local landowning families and became strongly identified with the community. From the viewpoint

of the Colleverdesi, the ideology of patronage was a means of drawing these high-status outsiders into local commitments. From their viewpoint, on the other hand, it was a way of building a local power-base. To the extent that the symbolic expression of localism contributed to maintaining the boundaries of community, this too served them, for it enabled them to play a brokerage role between the relatively cut-off lower class and their own higher-level patrons and other connections outside.

This discussion of the emics of patronage in the history of Colleverde has looked only at the more superficial aspects, the public myths; historical data do not easily lend themselves to the more subtle emic analysis of cognitive patterning. My purpose has been to show that the myths are not mirror images of social reality, nor in any direct way either "expressions" of or guidelines for the relationships that prevail in a society; I have tried to show, however, that they may form part of the strategies for social action, just as actual patron-client relationships may form part of such strategies. I think that field studies designed for the purpose can say a great deal more than this about the emics of patronage. Moreover, I think that developments in emic analysis make it possible to assume a more dynamic perspective than has often been associated with studies of "subjective" phenomena.

For one thing, the study of emics does not require that one assume congruence or uniformity within a society in cognition or values; on the contrary, the kinds and degree of disparity that exist, and the social regularities they are related to, should be one of the objectives of study. Similarly, there is no reason to suppose that society is held together by consensus rather than conflict; one might well wish to inquire into the

conditions under which emic differences may manifest themselves in conflict. Furthermore, such study need not be ahistorical; we need not assume stability or timelessness either on theoretical or methodological grounds. The processes of emic change are fascinating in themselves: how "inside views" respond to changes in a social or political order, and how ideologies are manipulated to effect or resist social change. Above all, an interest in emic phenomena does not mean that one seeks explanations of action in cognition, values, or individual calculation. Rather, both action and cognition must be understood in relation to environmental and structural constraints.

Theories of Patronage

In this exercise, I have tried to show that etic and emic analysis of patronage are both valid undertakings, that they are complementary but inherently independent, and that it is productive to try to systematically relate emic phenomena to analyses of social action. In practice it is very difficult to keep etic and emic analysis separate, and it must be admitted that in anthropological work in general, those studies that have come closest to doing one or the other exclusively have achieved purity at the expense of triviality. Nevertheless, I think it is important to keep the distinction clear. "There is no error more common or devastating than to confuse what people say, wish, dream, and believe they do with what they actually do" (Harris 1971:149). At the same time, what people say, wish, dream, and believe may have implications for what they do. What these implications are is a matter for empirical investigation, and it cannot be settled by a priori statements to the effect that one kind of phenomenon "reflects" or "determines" the other.

The etic/emic distinction can, I believe, contribute to our theoretical effort by sharpening our awareness of the requirements of both etic and emic analysis. In these comments, I refer to a few of the treatments of patronage in the literature; I do not intend to criticize them as such but use them only as examples of some approaches to the concept of patronage.

Definitions of patronage as a particular kind of relationship generally build upon two basic elements, reciprocity and inequality. Since these elements can be described behaviorally, they lend themselves to etic analysis. Such analysis is needed not only to "fill in" specifics but also to improve our concepts. For example, if patronage is defined as a reciprocal relationship in which one person "uses his influence to assist and protect" another (Boissevain 1966:18), it is necessary to specify how much this would have to happen and with what effect for any particular relationship to conform to the definition. The notion of inequality raises other problems. Paine has made the important points that hierarchy cannot be presumed to exist: in some contexts rank difference may be absent or irrelevant; it is not always clear who is patron and who client in a relationship; and it is not always the case that the patron makes the larger prestations (Paine 1971). While his critique of hierarchical definitions of patronage is not compelling in the context of traditional Mediterranean societies, it does seem apt for some of the contemporary forms of political patronage. Paine's solution is to define the relationship as one of "directed reciprocity", in which the patron is distinguished from the client in that "only values of the patron's choosing are circulated" (1971:15). This, however, seems to me to introduce new problems by confusing etic and emic phenomena.

The tendency to define or explain behavior in terms of values, and vice versa, appears in other forms in patronage studies. The appeal to "political culture" is, I feel, especially unfortunate. Powell, for instance, presents a persuasive account of how patron-client relationships (described as patterns of interpersonal behavior) can build up into larger-scale clientelist political systems, but in his conclusion he resorts to a view of clientelist behavior as an element of political culture (Powell 1970). The concept of political culture exemplifies the confusion of etics and emics in two ways: by merging the two dimensions--as in definitions of political culture as "attitudinal and behavioral propensities" (Almond and Verba 1965:32)--and by giving values causal significance for etic phenomena.

More subtle appeals to value also need to be examined. For purposes of our discussion here, I cite two of the conference participants. Jeremy Boissevain has claimed: "Patronage is to a very large extent a self-perpetuating system of beliefs and action grounded in the society's value system" (1966). In his paper for this conference, John Davis defines patronage as "political relationships in which inferiority is accepted and then defended by moral suasion" (p. 4). My concern is that we set forth our concepts in such a way that we can investigate the interplay between morality and relationships, between value and action.

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This paper is addressed to two principal themes.

First, I plan to show that questions of power have not been prominent in previous anthropological studies of patronage. This is a curious fact, and I shall attempt to explain why power has been a neglected topic. Second, I also hope to indicate how placing power at the center of attention can provide some fresh understandings of patronage. The aim of the paper, in other words, is both to examine how patronage has been analyzed in the past and then to propose some different formulations.

How has power figured in the analysis of patronage? The best way to answer this question is to first examine several cases of patronage behavior as these are described in the literature. We can proceed inductively by studying some case materials-- some data-- and then considering how these have been used or analyzed.

II

Cases or instances of patronage behavior are not hard to find in the anthropological literature. It is a common practice among anthropologists to introduce a study by presenting one or several cases drawn from field research that

depict or epitomize the phenomenon under consideration.

A good place to begin is Jeremy Boissevain's well-known article on "Patronage in Sicily". Boissevain opens his study by depicting three brief cases of patronage behavior. These three can provide the beginning data for our analysis of power and patronage.

Since these cases are well-known it will be adequate to briefly abridge them here. The first is the case of the student, Salvatore, who was in search of a special favor from a Professore in Palermo. Salvatore's immediate problem was to gain an introduction to the Professore. This he accomplished by first approaching a local small-town politician who owed him, Salvatore, a favor. The politician put Salvatore in touch with a cousin in Palermo, and the latter in turn contacted an assistant to the Professore who then arranged the appointment. Salvatore's favor was granted, and he, in exchange, promised to campaign for the Professore who was standing for election.

The second example of "patronage" centers upon Calogero, who was anxious to be appointed to a post in a Sicilian municipality. Calogero succeeded in having his name proposed

by the local town council, but he was concerned that his nomination be acted upon favorably by the provincial commission that screened and passed upon all candidates. Calogero therefore contacted two prestigious acquaintances, the one being his former military commander, the other a lawyer who he retained for a fee, and asked that they intervene on his behalf. These two discreetly contacted their acquaintances on the commission. Soon thereafter Calogero received the appointment.

Boissevain's third example is slightly more complicated. Professor Volpe suspected that a colleague of his was secretly seeking to block his son's entrance to the University as a means of bringing dishonour upon the Volpe family. He therefore arranged to have the colleague followed by "clients" of his and of his brother, an "important man" in Palermo. His suspicions aroused further, Professor Volpe's brother had a "key decision maker" contacted and their combined pressure was adequate to defeat the design of the enemy: Professor Volpe's son was accepted at the University. Some months later, moreover, the conflict between Professor Volpe and his colleague broke into the open when the colleague

insulted the Professor. Volpe turned to an old family friend, a local mafioso, and the latter discreetly threatened the colleague with "unpleasantness" unless he apologized. Soon thereafter the Professore received a written apology.

The three cases related thus far are by no means unusual: the anthropological literature includes a fair number of comparable episodes. For example, the work of Michael Kenny in Spain, John Campbell in Greece, or Sydel Silverman in Italy, each presents instances of "patronage behavior" similar to these. Patronage "stuff", it would seem, involves the kind of behavior or the kinds of contexts indicated by these instances.¹

If we were to take these as the data, what conclusions might be drawn regarding "power" and "patronage"? There are a number of rather obvious questions to be asked. How is power used in patronage relations? How is power gained or lost, and what are the consequences of either process? How are inequalities in power managed by those persons who are involved in these relationships? These are merely several of the many questions that might be posed.

Before turning to these issues it will be helpful to first provide some contrasting data. Once again, "data" refers

to an episode contained in the literature. Like the others, this new case is also well-known: I refer to Julian Pitt-Rivers case of a dispute over water rights as presented in his book The People of the Sierra. The difference between this case and the others is instructive, and it is for this reason that it is presented here.

This episode is long and complicated (Pitt-Rivers devotes fourteen pages in his book to the details and analysis of the incident) and it can be compressed as follows. The principal actor is Fernando Pinas, one of the two major political figures in the Spanish town of Alcala. Fernando, a bachelor and son of a tenant farmer, had risen rapidly in local society and was described as a "wealthy miller and farmer, a syndical chief... close friend of the mayor and a person of local consequence". One year Fernando sent workers² to repair the major stream-bed that supplied water to his land and the adjoining land of Juanito, a small farmer who had no clear title to the land he worked. The result of the repair was that Juanito lost water for his land and he therefore complained bitterly; others supported Fernando, however, since the new channel meant more power for the grain and olive mills located below the watercourse. The next year Fernando moved

again; but this time he proposed a major change in the downward flow of the stream so that it would provide even greater power for his own mill. In order to make these changes he had secretly entered into negotiations with Juanito and paid him a good price for his land. The difficulty, however, was that Curro, a second landowner, would lose water for irrigation, and, in addition, the millers further down in the valley feared that the changes would also adversely effect them.

Curro, who had formerly been an admirer of Fernando, protested and sought to organize opposition against the plan. Fernando offered to pay him compensation for the loss of water, but this Curro proudly refused: he would seek "justice". Curro appealed to several of his friends, but they failed to appear at his side. He asked the Mayor and the local Civil Guard to intervene, but their reply was that the issue could only be decided by the Hydrographic Commission in Seville. Finally, Curro approached Don Antonio, the rival of Fernando Pinas for leadership in Alcala, and asked him to intervene on his behalf. Don Antonio offered advice, but it soon became clear that he was not "prepared to become involved in any way himself". Finally, Curro engaged a lawyer and brought suit against Fernando.

The case was tried in the local court. Fernando won the case, and Curro, the loser, was "outraged, humiliated and ruined". All the while Fernando had continued with his project of diverting the water, and soon the new system was in operation. Fernando did suffer some loss, however. It appears that he had not strictly observed the contract made between himself and Juanito, and in a later court action Fernando lost the case and was required to pay damages and court costs.

III

What can be learned from these cases? What conclusions can be drawn regarding "patronage" and "power"?

If we are to judge first from the data presented by Boissevain, patronage consists of mobilizing various contacts in order to gain one's ends; "clients" search after a "patron" who agrees to press their particular interest. Locating the patron presents problems, but once the proper "connections" are made the client's desires are advanced.

This logic is straightforward: since in society all persons are arranged at different points on an overall stratification hierarchy, and also since they have differential

access to the resources controlled by bureaucratically-organized groups (such as government agencies), it follows that informal social networks can become pathways through which persons arrive at decision-making points and thereby, if successful, gain their objectives. Thus, in the first case the student Salvatore arrived at his objective, gaining entrance to the Professore, by first approaching a local lawyer, just as Professor Volpe made certain that his son would be accepted at the University by manipulating social networks that brought him into contact with the "key decision-maker". In brief, according to this formulation personal ties and social networks are the essential features of patronage.

Moreover, since from this perspective the critical problem is to make the proper connections, among the key actors are those persons who can make the contacts or pass the messages. In each instance the person who is seeking a favor turns first to someone who presumably can connect them to those who make decisions. To use the familiar vocabulary, these intermediaries can best be thought of as "brokers"-- they are specialists in bringing the more and the less-powerful into contact. Defined in this manner patronage

studies will emphasize the "broker" role.

Finally, it is clear too that the "clients" rather than the "patrons" appear at the center of Boissevain's cases-- the student Salvatore, Calogero the office seeker, and even Professor Volpe, are each clients in search of networks that will lead them to the powerful "decision-makers". How these clients calculate and then unfold their schemes is well-stated; but how those who make decisions or who grant favors behave, or what their calculations may be, is mentioned hardly at all. This absence is bound to distort the analysis since, at the least, the clients themselves may be responding to the patron's suggestions or manipulations. To put it broadly then, the behavior described and analyzed is more concerned with types of social ties than with the uses of power.

Indeed, it is fair to conclude that in studies such as these the issues posed by power and its use are hardly raised at all. Intuitively, without for the moment defining what ^{the term,} will be meant by ~~power~~, there is little behavior described in these cases that can immediately be recognized as an expression of "power". The main characters in these episodes are mainly shuttling about making their contacts, and there is little

systematic attention given to how power accumulates, or how it becomes dispersed, or the types of exchanges between the more and the less-powerful. The one exception is the incident in which the mafioso threatens Professor Volpe's opponent. But this too is not spelled out or analyzed systematically. Thus we may conclude that the uses of power is not a theme much elaborated in these studies.

This conclusion contrasts sharply with the incident described by Pitt-Rivers. This latter dispute over water-rights is developed not so much in terms of social networks and contacts (although some attention is also given to these topics) but rather in regard to how one of the most powerful men in a community asserts his power successfully and thereby at least temporarily gains in strength. Here the emphasis is not upon "passing messages" or the intervention of intermediaries, but rather how the ambitions of a strong man were able to overwhelm and defeat a lesser figure. Moreover, the central actor in this vignette is the patron himself-- Pitt-Rivers develops this case not so much from the perspectives of the "clients" but rather from the vantage point of the

"patron". Indeed, we learn something about a "power contest"-- Fernando's main rival chose to remain neutral in this dispute rather than to have his own strength tested, and Curro's "allies" deserted him-- and we observe too how some of the other villagers attach themselves to the principal antagonists. In brief, in this case it must be intuitively clear that the use of power is a main theme.

The surprising thing is that there are few cases comparable to this one in the anthropological literature. In general, studies of patronage have been concerned with social networks and "broker" relations rather than with exploring power relations. How can this be explained?

This neglect of power, I suggest, stems from the fact that most anthropological studies of "politics" are not so much about how power is distributed and used as they are concerned with problems of social integration or social cohesion. Whether it be a symptom of intellectual feebleness or, on the contrary, the single-minded pursuit after the most basic issues, the problems posed by Emile Durkheim more than seventy years ago continue to be the major themes in most anthropological studies of politics. This can be

seen in those "recent classics"-- the work of, among others, Evans-Pritchard, Leach and Gluckman. For example, the intellectual issues that lie behind the analysis of fission and fusion among the Nuer, or the "mayu-dama" relationships in the Kachin Hills, are basically about social integration and the maintenance of norms and social institutions.

To be sure, "power" in the form of coercion or tactic may lead to one or another type of integration; but these analyses have instead emphasized shared values or overlapping social networks as the key features. The study of "politics" has thus been reduced to an interest in familiar sociological issues.

Moreover, this theoretical stance has also been transferred to more recent studies of social networks in what are usually termed "complex societies": contemporary work in politics has focused upon uncovering underlying processes of social integration in societies that are highly differentiated and populous. For example, F. G. Bailey's fine attempt at reconceptualizing the anthropological study of politics (in his Strategems and Spoils) is also developed in regard to an overall theory of social integration. Thus it is no surprise

to find that studies of patronage continue to emphasize "brokers" and types of social networks-- these are conceived of as links that yield solidarity or some form of integration. The neglect of power, in other words, is the result of a long-term theoretical orientation.

IV

What is meant by power? What are the elements of a social-anthropological study that will explicitly concern itself with the problems of power?

The problems of studying power are many and complex, and the social science literature is all too murky and vague regarding this concept. In recent years, however, social scientists such as Dahl, Balandier, Parsons and Crozier have all made important contributions to understanding the power dimension in social relationships. Three topics from among the many posed by studying power can be briefly considered in this essay: hierarchy and exchange, the uses of power, and the volatility of power.

Power can be defined as the capacity or the ability to determine the outcome of an event or of a related series of events. A municipal election, say, or the decision to regroup village lands, are two examples of an "event". Power is a

measure of effectiveness-- a "powerful person" or a "powerful association" is one that can control or direct the changing flow of situations. Uncertainty and unpredictability are important elements; to "determine the outcome of an event" is typically so complex a problem that the actors cannot be secure that their behavior or designs will be successful.

This definition is similar in certain respects to the one offered some years ago by Dahl: "The power of A over B is the capacity of A to make B do something he would not have done without the intervention of A".⁶ Dahl seems to be referring to interpersonal relations (the famous case of "ego" and "alter", one supposes) and yet power relationships certainly obtain between organized and informal groups as well. Indeed, the events principally at issue in this essay have to do with public rather than domestic matters-- relationships between a wealthy landowner and a village official regarding taxes, for example, rather than contests between a father and son within a household. For our purposes the events to be examined are those that take place within or between large collectivities or groups.

Power is not an absolute, in the sense that some persons have it while others do not; to take the extreme case, prisoners in a jail often have some control over events that concern them and hence they too possess power. Power in this regard is better thought of as a matter of degree and variation. To be sure, it is hierarchical-- some persons or groups have greater control over the outcome of events than do others. This does not mean that there is a single form to power relationships-- that they inevitably become centralized, for example. A major problem is to understand the genesis, maintenance and transformation of different power hierarchies.

Exchange is a closely related concept. As Crozier has recently emphasized, power relationships are "negotiated"-- they emerge following a "measure of exchange and mutual adjustment" between the actors. ⁷ Persons at different points in the hierarchy must negotiate exchanges as they join together in pursuit of their goals. It would appear therefore that this concept is particularly relevant for the study of power-- "teams", cliques and other power groups surely are founded upon exchanges.

This concept must be applied cautiously, however.

First, exchange seems all too purposive and instrumental a formulation, whereas in fact persons typically combine with one another without first calculating what they may be "exchanging" or "negotiating". Second, the awesome generality of the concept (are tangibles being exchanged? or intangibles? or both?) blurs its powers of explanation. Nonetheless, within these limitations "exchange" can still be a useful analytic idea.

Concepts of hierarchy and exchange are helpful in analyzing relationships between the more and the less powerful. Yet this is only one dimension of the phenomenon of power and it is by no means the most interesting or most important feature. How power is used-- that is, those acts that determine the outcome of events-- is a second broad topic.

The uses of power cannot be separated from some measure of coercion or persuasion. Since power is applied in social contexts it is clear that the interests or beliefs of one person or group will be pressed against those of others; to gain one's own objectives some measure of coercion or persuasion therefore becomes necessary. A number of alternative strategies

may be selected: in certain circumstances physical force may be applied, in others bribery may be attempted, and in still others argument and threats of punishment may be effective. These strategies have organizational consequences. For example, in order to retain power it often becomes necessary to engage assistants who have some measure of independence. The form of coercion is likely to shift between situations, and even more broadly, to differ between cultural contexts. A basic problem for study is therefore to discover the unfolding forms of coercion.

This is, at best, only a partial statement of an exceedingly complicated problem. The use of power by one person or group almost inevitably calls forth counter-useages by others. Strategies and tactics unfold on both sides as the contest develops, and, consequently, understanding power's use must involve the analysis of the choices made by the various actors in the contest. Undertainty is a critical motif in the uses of power, and the outcome of events is often beset by unforeseen dilemmas and paradox.

Tactic and maneuver are continuing features of the power game. F. G. Bailey's recent Strategems and Spoils

is the most important recent attempt to present a coherent social-science description of political tactics. This work and others (Machiavelli, Mao, Lenin) provide helpful categories for conceptualizing the active phases of power's use.

There are, finally, a broad range of problems connected with the volatility of power. This point is well-known: power does not rest, fixed and firm, at one point, but instead tends to shift between competing individuals and groups. Competition over the direction of events leads to continual shifts in relative power as the strength of one group or the next rises or falls. For example, success in a contest may lead to increased power-- new supporters or allies are won, and the fame of success also lends an enhanced sense of effectiveness. In this fashion power is often said to "grow" from one successful contest to the next. At the same time, however, success also produces unforeseen stress and liabilities; the new supporters need to be rewarded in some fashion, fame may lead to an illusory sense of potency, and more important still, the "defeated" are likely to band together in order to undermine the more powerful. To cite one example: in Pitt-Rivers episode regarding water rights, Don Antonio, the rival of Fernando Pinas, refused to become

involved in this particular contest; he stood quietly to the side waiting for a better moment to attack his rival, anticipating that Fernando's apparent rise would also breed quiet opposition within the pueblo and hence make him vulnerable. Analyzing patterns of ebb and flow are especially significant for the study of power relationships.

V

We can now return to our major theme. What difference will it make if, to cite one example, patronage studies focus more upon "power hierarchies" than "social integration"? What is to be gained, in other words, by emphasizing the power dimensions of patronage relationships?

Patronage is by all accounts a power relationship par excellence. It may also be, to use Pitt-Rivers' term, a "lopsided friendship"-- but the meanings of patronage are by no means entirely depicted by this innocent-sounding definition.⁸ Patrons are among those persons who can control or determine the outcome of events; it is for this reason that clients make appeals to them, while they, in turn, are involved in plans or contestations that advance or sustain their own ambitions. Hierarchy and exchange are among the defining features of patronage relationships: persons of unequal power are joined

in the contexts of patronage, and transactions or exchanges are assumed to solidify their relationships. The patrons are, moreover, expected to make use of their power in order to gain certain objectives-- varied forms of coercion, tactics and complicated schemes are all utilized in order to attain the desired outcomes. The links between patrons and clients also are potentially changing and short-lived; in the "ebb and flow" of power the dependents or supporters may switch their allegiance, just as the more powerful themselves may elect to cast-off their former allies. For example, when faced by a conflict with Fernando Pinas, Curro's erstwhile friends and supporters slipped aside and vanished. In brief, power is surely at the heart of patronage relationships.

The patron's role is a pivotal one, and yet it has not received sufficient attention. How patrons make use of their power in order to reward their followers, or how they advance in strength at the expense of rivals, or the ways in which patrons are able to maintain assured pools of support, all raise interesting problems for description and analysis. Examining these problems from the patron's perspective underscores some characteristic dilemmas. Patrons are faced by critical choices regarding which claims to honor,

deciding how much coercion may be required in order to succeed, or in estimating the risks involved in contests with rivals.

"To accept a man as a client" writes Campbell, "commits the patron to protection instead of exploitation, and to that extent it is a restriction on the free exercise of his power".¹⁰ The dilemma is clear-- only some social ties can be accepted, and not all claims can be honored.

In addition, as noted earlier it must be clear that without first understanding the patron's aims and ambitions it is frequently impossible to make much sense out of patron-client relationships. Clients are, after all, often manipulated by their patrons, and thus it is necessary to understand how they relate to the patron's own schemes.

Studying the behavior of the powerful raises difficult research problems. How can one collect accurate information regarding remote persons whose hallmarks are mystery and secrecy, and who typically conduct their affairs with the wink of an eye or a phone call on a private line? There are no simple answers to this question. Still, anthropologists and political scientists pride themselves in being able to collect just this kind of data, and it therefore seems plausible that good material can be forthcoming. The time factor poses a

related methodological problem: the "events" being studied often take months or years to become concluded, and for this reason considerable time depth will be needed in order to study power relationships.

Patronage is a kaleidoscope of political interventions, social ties and networks of contact, episodic struggles and "power plays". On one level it is a fair example of a "dyadic contract"-- yet at the same time the particular links between a client and his patron inevitably become connected to other associations and interests. Contestation is a prime reason for this mingling of persons and of interests. Contestation refers to the fact that rival patrons often challenge one another and vie for greater control, or that clients and supporters of a particular patron may also struggle for position or prestige within the patron's camp itself. Bands or teams of leaders and their followers are consequently linked to one another as they compete for enhanced position and force. These ties or links may be re-defined in the course of the contest-- not only do allegiances shift, but the norms that govern and define the relationship ("we are brothers", "we are one family") also are likely to change. Power interests thus bring about new forms of social relationship.

There are, moreover, organizational problems involved in power's use. As described in the literature, patronage seems to be a ^{'loners'} ~~lonely~~ game-- a person of modest status quietly solicits the attention and then the intervention of a powerful patron. Yet in fact, patronage networks are often lengthy and cumbersome. Not only does a "broker" frequently connect the client and patron, it is equally the case that patrons themselves cooperate and compete with one another. The teams that emerge in contests require constant attention-- coercion is used in order to gain one's objectives, and rewards also must be distributed in order to maintain organizational effectiveness. Paradox often accompanies the flow of an event. The ambitious patron will scurry to collect ever-wider pools of support-- but the spread of promises and supporters requires some organization as well as the continued ability to "deliver". Such a patron is hence locked on to an ascendent spiral that will, if not carefully nurtured, collapse from the weight of claims. As an alternative, building an organization will require the granting of power to subordinates, and this process too is filled with unanticipated consequences.

more and the less powerful, the types of settings in which they interact, the style or etiquette of these encounters, both within the raw political field itself as well as in specially designed or contrived situations. Patronage, in other words, can be seen to be a series of performances. In considering this perspective we enter into an inviting new field of inquiry.

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