

FEDERAL TRUST

"THE SECURITY OF EUROPE IN AN ERA OF
DETENTE AND COOPERATION."

16-18 NOVEMBER 1973

DUNFORD COLLEGE
MIDHURST (UK)

(C. MERLINI)

"THE SECURITY OF EUROPE IN AN ERA OF DETENTE AND COOPERATION"
FEDERAL TRUST, Midhurst (UK), 16-18/XI/1973

- (1) list of participants
- (2) Birnbaum, Karl E.: "The East European States and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): current preoccupations and expectations"
- (3) Palmer, Michael: "Towards a new institutional framework?"

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Week-end meeting on
EAST-WEST SECURITY IN EUROPE

List of Acceptances as at 3.10.1973

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The East European States and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): current preoccupations and expectations

Introduction

This paper attempts to identify and analyse some of the current preoccupations and expectations of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) as reflected in their attitudes, declarations and formally adopted positions during the Helsinki consultations and the CSCE itself. To the extent possible, I have tried to base my presentation and arguments on explicit pronouncements of the respective governments and their representatives. In some cases, however, the conclusions have been inferred from the general behaviour of participants in the multilateral consultations and the conference. While I have had full access to CSCE documents and did conduct several interviews with delegates to the conference, my understanding of East European perceptions is at best fragmentary and may well be faulty. All I can claim is that I have done my best to come to grips with them. The paper is in any case meant as an interim-report only. It falls into four sections. In the first I have tried to register very briefly some general trends characterizing the performance of all or most states taking part in CSCE. These reflect concerns shared by both East and West where goals and expectations therefore would seem largely to coincide. In the second section I discuss common notions of the WTO states relating to possible outcomes of CSCE; in the third I have attempted to identify some of the preoccupations of individual East European states and specifically to assess divergencies between the Soviet Union and some of its allies.

In the fourth section, finally, I present tentative conclusions with regard to the conceivable impact of CSCE on inter-alliance relations in the East. Under sections II and III, the positions of the East European states are reviewed in relation to each of the main agenda points ("baskets") of CSCE.

I.

One of the main common preoccupations of virtually all states represented at the CSCE, Eastern, Western and neutral alike, was clearly demonstrated during recent weeks: it was the concurring wish of the participants to insulate the problems of security and cooperation in Europe from extra-European disturbances, to protect whatever improvement in East-West relations that had been achieved against the negative impact of international perturbations not immediately related to the issues on the agenda of CSCE. Thus, the new war in the Middle East had no perceptible repercussions on the course of debates in the different committees and sub-committees of CSCE, and even the "hearings" with Mediterranean states, parties to the conflict, which were agreed to before the war broke out, was not made the occasion of mutual recriminations. Indeed, it could be claimed that by mutual tacit consent the participants at CSCE behaved as if the crisis in the Middle East had not occurred.

This is not to say that there was not general awareness that a protracted conflict in the Middle East might not jeopardize the work of CSCE: had the war continued much longer, the Conference would probably have had to adjourn.

In the event, however, the performance of CSCE-participants seemed dictated by a kind of joint wager that the most acute stage of the crisis would soon be over and that, consequently, it was both feasible and advisable to treat it as virtually "non-existent" as far as CSCE was concerned. This attitude in turn suggests the perception of a common vested interest among participating states in preserving the atmospherics and momentum of East-West détente, and in as far as this is true, it would seem to bode well for the future of CSCE.

Closely related to this view is the notion, which apparently is also shared by the majority of CSCE participants from East and West, that the multilateral negotiations initiated this year must be conceived as stages in a long-term process; that whatever the exact nature and pace of future efforts along these lines, the dialogue and bargaining between East and West in a multilateral framework will continue for many years to come. In the light of earlier Soviet ambiguity on this point, it is of special significance that Moscow too now seems to subscribe to this notion of a continuous, long-term process. These "shared perceptions" of most CSCE participants should be kept in mind, when we proceed to analyse the specific preoccupations of WTO states, collective as well as individual, since they constitute an important parameter of their attitudes and reactions.

II.

With regard to clearly identifiable common concerns of the WTO member states that have surfaced in the course of the Helsinki consultations and the first stages of CSCE one can distinguish between (1) general trends and, (2) common attitudes on specific issues. On the first point, the well-known inclination of virtually all WTO states must be registered to emphasize the importance of East-West interaction on the level of organizations and institutions at the expense of proposals for contact, exchange, agreement and cooperation on

the personal level. In the West, this has usually been interpreted as a sign of anxiousness on the part of governments and party leaders in the WTO states lest an "opening" of East European societies that is not under their full and continuous control may threaten the power position of ruling elites. In the East, the argument supporting this stance stresses the need to protect the East European societies against the onslaught of allegedly subversive Western influence. But there are also some interesting hints that progress can be achieved by practicing a gradual approach and that what is at issue is the pace and magnitude rather than the character of contacts.

Another general trend in the positions adopted by the East European states is the sense of urgency and the corresponding insistence on a quicker pace in East-West deliberations. At the beginning of the Helsinki consultations this position induced the Eastern states to decline any discussion of mandates for Commissions to be appointed by the CSCE. In view of Western firmness on this point, which had the full backing of neutral and non-aligned states, the WTO countries agreed to the formulation of such mandates. But they continued to denounce or at least to deplore the alleged slow pace of the negotiations.

Common concerns of the East European states relating to specific issues appeared in discussions under each of the main agenda items. On the first item ("Questions relating to security in Europe"), common East European preoccupations were reflected in the preference for embodying the principles that were to govern the relations among participating states in a treaty rather than in a formally less binding document. This stance presumably was chosen mainly because a treaty would satisfy Soviet, Polish and East German interests in the multilateral formalization of the existing status quo in Central Europe better than a simple declaration. While the Soviet Union - contrary to Rumania - at first showed great scepticism vis-à-vis the Swiss proposal to create a mechanism for

the peaceful settlement of disputes, East European attitudes have lately tended to concur on this point, apparently because such a mechanism is increasingly seen as a conceivable nucleus to a political successor body of CSCE - an idea cherished by the WTO states.

On the second main agenda item ("Cooperation in the fields of economics, of science and technology, and of the environment") the performance of WTO states has been well coordinated, and they have displayed complete agreement on the substantive issues. The emphasis has been put on the need to enunciate and practice some basic rules for the development of East-West cooperation in the relevant fields, including the general application of the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) clause and of principles of non-discrimination in all trade agreements. In addition, the East European states continuously stress the potentialities for and advantages of large-scale and long-term ventures in industrial cooperation, in the joint exploitation of energy resources and the development of transport systems within a pan-European framework. Finally, one can, I believe, register a concurring East European attitude towards the European Community in the sense that faced with West European firmness they have not sustained or followed up their protest against representatives of the Brussels Commission speaking on behalf of the Community, when issues pertaining to Community competence were under debate.* It remains to be seen whether this stand should be seen as further evidence suggesting a trend towards de facto recognition of the European Community on the part of the WTO states.

*Since CSCE is a conference of states the representatives of the Commission are formally members of the delegation of the country exercising the Presidency of the Community (at present Denmark) - an ingenious, but sometimes slightly bewildering practice.

With regard to the third main agenda item ("Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields") the East European states have displayed a distinct sensitivity related to their insistence that all contact, exchange and cooperation between East and West be kept under the control of competent authorities. Time and again, therefore, they tend to re-emphasize those principles embodied in the Helsinki recommendations that would ensure this control, such as "respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty" and "non-intervention in internal affairs". It should be emphasized that the first of these principles is susceptible to both a "static" and a "dynamic" interpretation. In the first case its strict application would imply that any East-West agreements on human contacts, the exchange of information and cultural cooperation must be so tailored as to meet the requirements of existing legislation and administrative practices in the individual states. A "dynamic" conception of this principle, on the other hand, would mean that in the course of East-West negotiations on these issues a review of national provisions and laws should take place in order to facilitate contacts between people, cultural and educational exchanges, the broader dissemination of information, etc. As was to be expected the East European states have so far shown a distinct preference for the "static" interpretation. Yet, it is possible to discern among some East European delegates at least an appreciation of the fact that an absolutely adamant stand on their part is liable to spoil the show and thus to defeat some of the basic purposes of the WTO states in the CSCE exercise.

On the fourth main agenda item ("Follow-up to the Conference") the attitudes of WTO states have on the whole also been in full consonance. While it is well known that the East European states previously suggested the establishment of a body that would deal with questions of security and cooperation in Europe, their tactics on this issue during the

Helsinki consultations and the first phases of CSCE have been rather cautious. This has been in response to Western opposition against any step that smacked of an early commitment to "institutionalize" CSCE. The Western stand, in turn, is due partly to fears that the creation of new pan-European institutions might not only duplicate the work of existing organizations, like the UN Economic Commission for Europe, but also be used as instruments to interfere with and complicate cooperative schemes in the West.

III.

Open divergencies between the Soviet Union and Rumania or significant differences in emphasis suggesting latent divergencies appeared in the context of the preparations for and the first phases of CSCE primarily with regard to procedural issues and the first main agenda item. As is well known from press reports Rumania has demonstrated a distinctly non-conformist position among the WTO states. There is no doubt that the Rumanian attitude was motivated by its government's genuine preoccupation with asserting Rumania's national sovereignty, its equality and independence. But the interesting question in this context is to what extent Rumanian performance in Helsinki and Geneva has been the result of a desire to uphold and sustain the established image of an independent actor and to what extent it has been due to a conviction or hope that significant new ground could be won at CSCE in terms of greater freedom of movement in international affairs for Rumania. While a clear-cut answer cannot be offered, it seems obvious, at least to this observer, that it is not a matter of either/or but rather of how much of each.

Rumania marked its position in connection with discussions on the status of participating states and the procedures to be adopted as working principles of CSCE. The Rumanian delegate stressed that he participated in the Helsinki consultations not as a member of WTO, and Rumanian sensitivities were reflected in the compromise formulation finally adopted to the effect that consultations (and later CSCE) "take place outside military alliances". As to procedures Rumania was one of the most emphatic proponents of the two main working principles at Helsinki and Geneva: the rotation of chairmanship and consensus as the basis for decision-making. The adoption of these rules of procedure was seen as a guarantee of the equality of participating states.

More important than these procedural intricacies, however, are the divergencies on substantive matters, which surfaced in the debates on agenda item I. Here again Rumania voiced different opinions from those of the Soviet Union on each of the issues discussed : the basic principles that should guide the mutual relations of participating states, the question of the implementation of these principles and military aspects of security in Europe.

The original Soviet position that the inviolability of frontiers should be declared the supreme principle from which others were to be deduced or to which they ought to be subordinated was opposed not only by the West but also by Rumania. The Western powers were more inclined to attribute top priority to an unqualified commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force and the Rumanians argued that equal dignity should be given to the principle of national self-determination. The outcome of bargaining on this point during the multilateral consultations was the adoption of no less than ten basic principles "deemed to be of particular importance" in the final Helsinki recommendations without an order of priority being

established among them. Under these circumstances the provisions for implementing these principles acquired special significance. Rumania's government officials and its representatives at Helsinki and Geneva have repeatedly emphasized that the simple proclamation of lofty principles is not sufficient, and they have asserted that effective measures ensuring their application are essential. Thus, it was at the insistence of the Rumanian delegate that a sentence was included in para. 21 of the Helsinki recommendations to the effect that Committee 1 at CSCE should "consider proposals designed to give effect to refraining from the threat or use of force". It is not quite clear what type of measures or machinery the Rumanians have in mind in order to give "teeth" to the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force. But it is worth noting that their official spokesmen have reasserted the importance of establishing a new system of security in Europe and of doing away with military blocs.

In the discussions of military aspects of security at CSCE Rumania has clearly placed itself among the so-called maximalists favouring that prior notification of manoeuvres should be given months rather than days ahead, that the critical size of the forces concerned should be under rather than above division strength, and that not only prior notification of manoeuvres but also of major military movements ought to be considered essential confidence building measures (CBM). With regard to all these questions, and especially the last mentioned, the Soviet Union has voiced a distinctly different opinion.

It seems obvious that on these military issues Rumania's performance at the CSCE is dictated not simply by the wish to demonstrate a consistently independent stance but also by the hope of achieving tangible results that would, at least marginally, increase her security.

Compared with the diametrically opposed Soviet and Rumanian positions on the main issues under agenda item 1 all other differentiations of attitudes within the WTO group of states were negligible. The only features worth mentioning (since they may suggest some nuances in preoccupations and expectations) are the different ideas about regional cooperation in Europe, relevant to agenda item 2, which for some time have been circulated by individual East-European states. While no concrete proposals to that effect have yet been formally tabled by these countries, some of their representatives have informally re-affirmed their interest to explore within the context of CSCE the feasibility of such projects as a common environmental policy in the Danube basin (Hungary), joint efforts to prevent the further pollution of the Baltic (Poland) and technical and scientific cooperation within the Balkan region (Rumania and Bulgaria). In each of these cases practical cooperation is envisaged with countries not belonging to WTO, both neutrals and members of NATO.

IV. What does all this add up to in terms of conceivable repercussions of CSCE on intra-alliance relations in WTO? Clearly, it is too early to draw any definite conclusions, since we are in the midst of a process, which has begun to pick up some momentum only relatively recently. It should be easier to make tentative over-all assessments, when the present phase of exploratory discussions on substance has reached an end, which is generally expected to occur by Christmas. The ensuing drafting stage should then give further clues. Yet, the following observations are nevertheless presented with a certain amount of confidence that they will not be proven grossly incorrect by future developments.

It would seem that apprehensions previously voiced in the West that CSCE is liable to consolidate and legitimize Soviet hegemony in East Europe have not been vindicated and are not likely to be in the future. Nor have, on the other hand, the diametrically opposite views been borne out that CSCE would radically exacerbate intra-alliance disputes in the East. The catalogue of principles (the "Decalogue") and the procedural rules adopted by the conference have been an effective barrier against a demonstrative reassertion of Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe through the instrument of CSCE. At the same time Moscow, after initial blunders, was eventually able to achieve a rather smooth coordination of policy among its allies, including the emulation of the Western practice to let different states present well coordinated proposals. If the main Soviet objective in pushing for CSCE was to achieve a multilateral acceptance and formalization of the existing status quo in Europe, Moscow undoubtedly has had to pay a price in terms of countenancing the open display of diverging opinions in an East-West forum on the part of one of its formal allies. There is no denying the Soviet irritation at some of the initiatives and pronouncements of the Rumanian delegation in the course of the multilateral consultations and the first two phases of CSCE. On the whole, however, Soviet reactions to the performance of Rumania have been relaxed, due, it would seem, to the conviction that the over-all impact of CSCE on intra-alliance relations will be marginal, long-term and thus manageable.

Indeed, it is hard to imagine that in the foreseeable future, CSCE as such could develop dynamics of its own that would create new or significantly exacerbate old divergencies within WTO. The allies of the Soviet Union have been anxious to avoid giving the impression that they wished to constitute a distinct caucus at CSCE not including their major ally. On the other hand, they

have at times been willing to associate themselves with individual Western or neutral states on specific issues even without explicit Soviet backing. This suggests that to the extent that there is a common denominator in the perceptions of Moscow's WTO allies, they see CSCE mainly as a useful diplomatic machinery, with the help of which they can promote specific interests in the realm of East-West relations and marginally enhance their intra-alliance bargaining power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Federal Trust Weekend Meeting
Dunford 16-18 Nov.

16 NOV. 1973

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TOWARDS A NEW INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK ?

By

Michael Palmer

There is little use in planning to establish a permanent East-West body following CSCE unless the Conference itself is regarded as sufficiently 'successful' by a majority of participating countries to warrant the institutionalisation of their wishes: (a) to diminish tensions between themselves and other participants; (b) to develop co-operation with them, on a multilateral basis, concerning one or more subjects; (c) to extend their influence, either positively or negatively, through the exploitation of multilateral institutional machinery. If, as seems possible, for these or other reasons, a number of the countries taking part in CSCE consider that they could derive benefits from the establishment of permanent East-West institutions it is likely that they will press for 'the establishment ... of an organ for questions of security and co-operation in Europe' (Warsaw Pact Agenda proposal). It has been decided, however, at Helsinki, that the question of the establishment of a permanent East-West body should be held over until the final ministerial phase, when it is possible to judge how much progress has been made on substantive issues in the current expert talks in Geneva.

MORE A PROCESS THAN AN EVENT

It is doubtful whether a single CSCE will be able to resolve, however well-prepared, and even in conjunction with MBFR, the outstanding differences between the two parts of Europe or that it will be able to grasp all the many different opportunities to create a network of East-West contacts, in a wide variety of fields which would enable all-European co-operation to be developed wherever this was considered useful by the Governments concerned. This being so, it seems to me that, unless the initial CSCE breaks down or becomes an exercise in polemics, it would be useful to aim at a series of conferences held at suitable intervals over a period of years whose work could be given continuity and substance between plenary meetings, by permanent institutions. I do not see the CSCE so much as a single isolated event from which 'results' are to be extracted as part of the process of detente and, if given continuity, a dynamic motor element in it. For me, therefore, the most useful single output of CSCE would be the launching of a permanent multilateral dialogue involving the countries of Europe and North America.

INSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS

A number of proposals have been made concerning institutional arrangements. I have myself, like some others, proposed the establishment of an autonomous commission staffed by directly recruited international civil servants. Such a commission could report to a ministerial council meeting once or twice a year and chaired by participating countries in rotation. A system of permanent representatives backed up by national diplomatic delegations representing member governments on a permanent basis between ministerial sessions of the commission would seem to be a useful feature of such a body.

A role might possibly be found for a parliamentary assembly as one of the institutions of a standing commission. An assembly of this kind could debate annual reports from the commission, and from any agencies it might establish, besides addressing questions to the ministerial council and taking initiatives in the form of recommendations or resolutions addressed to the commission's governing body.

A standing commission might delegate its work on the promotion of contacts in specific fields to a series of committees of governmental experts which would meet regularly and report back to the commission itself. Examples of committees that could operate in this way are ones dealing with: (a) European security; (b) European economic contacts (including the consideration of ways and means of overcoming the problems of the convertibility of Eastern European currencies); (c) European environmental problems; (d) European scientific and technological co-operation; (e) European cultural contacts; and (f) European legal co-operation.

An East-West agency for the control of armaments could perhaps be set up and might be connected with or partly based on the existing WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments, in Paris. It has also been suggested that a commission might be given some degree of competence in human rights and that it might develop, eventually, some form of East-West crisis management machinery. Another suggestion is that a co-ordinated pan-European policy of aid to the developing countries could be worked out in EWCSA (The Development Aid Committee of OECD is already competent for aid questions as far as the West is concerned).

Other proposals concerning institutions have been made by a number of scholars in the West, notably Timothy Stanley, Alting von Geusau, Johan Galtung and Gerda Zellentin.

Timothy Stanley has suggested that one of the primary roles of an East-West Commission might be 'to improve international dialogue on the increasing challenges of the global environment'. Alting von Geusau sees the need for a 'standing regional conference with a permanent secretariat' as being greater than that for a single conference, or even a series of conferences. He sees the main aims of this standing conference being pursued by three commissions on: arms control; the peaceful settlement of disputes; the German question, together with a fourth which could be an expanded ECE including the GDR. Alting von Geusau also proposes the establishment of a joint clearing house for industrial, scientific, technological and cultural relations.

I myself do not consider as realistic the idea that a standing commission might include a regional juridical mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes, under Articles 52 to 54 of the UN Charter, on the grounds that neither Western nor Eastern states are yet prepared to allow the others to interfere in their sub-regional affairs.

The establishment of a standing commission, as outlined above, could help to provide the important element of continuity that is needed to transfer the holding of a single security conference into a continuing political process.

Johan Galtung has proposed, on a number of occasions, the establishment of not just one European Commission but a whole series of regional security commissions, one for each major region of the world, under the auspices of the UN and modelled on the UN's regional economic commissions. Whereas there does seem to be a need and specific uses for a European commission, at first sight it is by no means clear that there is a comparable need for parallel institutions in other parts of the world, where international political and security problems are very different.

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In her paper for a Chatham House meeting in November 1972 Gerda Zellentin has pointed to proposals for permanent commissions to deal with:

- (1) disarmament, arms control, disengagement, renunciation of force;
- (2) economic and technical co-operation;
- (3) the free exchange of people, goods and ideas including cultural exchanges and the expansion of human rights.

Gerda Zellentin considers that cultural tasks could be assigned to UNESCO and the European offices of the UN Specialised Agencies in Geneva, etc. She points to the 'spill-over' effect which might result from East-West economic co-operation and to the need -to animate East-West trade by providing convertibility facilities for payments and financial transactions. She proposes that the administration of East-West economic projects could be assigned to the ECE, which could act as a clearing house for all-European payments and which might manage a Fund for European Development and Co-operation, to which all participants in the standing commission would contribute according to their national wealth. The aims of this Fund would be to channel investment to under-developed regions and to agreed sectors of the economy, to promote the convertibility between Eastern and Western currencies, and to bridge the technological gap. Gerda Zellentin considers that the Fund 'would be the main vehicle of growth of the European system, the financial focus around which the interest groups, big firms and national administrations would crystallise'.

A LINK WITH THE UN

A Working Group on European Co-operation and Security, based on Geneva and sponsored by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, has pro-

(1) Published in 'The World Today', Jan. 1973.

duced proposals, published in the 'Bulletin of Peace Proposals' (Oslo) suggesting a carefully constructed institutional framework for developing East-West co-operation, similar in many respects to the suggestions reviewed earlier in this paper. The distinctive characteristic of the Working Group's suggestions is that any new system of security and co-operation in Europe be linked to the UN system. Suggested links range from the presence of the UN Secretary General at preparatory sessions of CSCE, to some kind of inter-Secretariat co-ordination, to the more direct, if as yet ill-defined, legal link based on Articles 52 to 54 of the UN Charter or on the model of the ECOSOC-ECE relationship.

Jeanne Laux and myself have argued against such links, in the 'Bulletin of Peace Proposals', on the grounds that the hierarchic structure of the UN, particularly the power of veto possessed by permanent members of the Security Council (now including China, a non-European power), is inimical to state rights and to an egalitarian concept of intra-European relations. To rely on a security commission in Europe linked to the UN Security Council is to abandon the legal equality of sovereignty before the process of working out mechanisms to minimise the consequences of real power-inequalities between states has begun. I also consider that the powers of intervention and enforcement implicit in the establishment of a juridical mechanism charged with the peaceful settlement of disputes under Articles 52 and 53 of the UN Charter are not consistent with the principle of non-intervention which is one of the fundamental bases of the CSCE idea.

Thus although a link with the UN could provide prestige and might seem logical in view of the valuable work carried out, for more than twenty years, by ECE in improving East-West economic contacts, and although it would relate the process of pan-European co-operation to that of world co-operation, I would prefer a standing commission to be an autonomous body which could, through decisions arrived at by consensus, constitute the highest authority governing the decisions and activities of participating states. In effect, the states taking part in the permanent institution should themselves be the final arbiters of whether they should or should not take certain decisions, and if they do so, what form these decisions should take.

Further arguments against a UN link include the financial problem: it seems unlikely that the UN General Assembly will leap to vote to support the financing of a new rich white man's club in Europe.

RUMANIAN IDEAS

Although the idea of creating a permanent institution has consistently received official support from the Warsaw Pact Governments and has in general met with scepticism on the part of NATO Governments, and harsh criticism on the part of successive Secretaries-General of NATO, most of the detailed proposals concerning such a body have come from Western scholars. Nowever, Nicol Ecobescu and Sergiu Celac have, in Rumania, proposed that the aims of organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe could be: 'to establish international peace and security...; to foster the realisation of the legitimate aspirations of the peoples for freedom, independence, dignity, etc.; to create an atmosphere of international detente and understanding...; to develop mutual confidence, friendship, co-operation and good neighbourly relations among all the nations of Europe...; to intensify and strengthen political realism among

the political parties...; to promote the pre-eminence of the rule of law in relations among nations...; to create favourable conditions for the elimination of the threat of, or use of, force in relations between states...; to encourage the settlement of outstanding issues and disputes only through peaceful ways and means; to discuss, negotiate and adopt effective measures for military detente and disarmament on the continent of Europe; to foster the development of economic co-operation...; to expand technological and scientific co-operation...; to expand exchanges... in the fields of arts, culture and education ...; to develop co-operation for the protection of the human environment ...'.

Nicolae Ecobescu and Sergiu Celac relate their proposed Organisation to the principles of the UN Charter and other UN declarations though they do not make proposals to link this body specifically with the UN institutionally. They state that relations among the European states and the structure of the Organisation to be created will have to build on respect for the following principles: national sovereignty and independence; the equal rights of peoples and their right to decide their own future; the sovereign equality of states; the territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of their frontiers; non-interference in the internal and external affairs of states; non-resorting to the threat of force or use of force ...; renunciation of any action aiming at the partial or total dismemberment of the national unity and of the territorial integrity of any state; resolution of international differences exclusively by peaceful means ...; the duty of states to co-operate both bilaterally and within the Organisation; fulfilment in good faith of the obligations they have taken.

Nicolae Ecobescu and Sergiu Celac stress the need for decisions of the Organisation to be taken by consensus.

POLISH IDEAS

The proposals of these two authors would seem to reflect some of the main preoccupations and predicaments of the Rumanian government, resulting in particular from its geo-political situation. They are not, therefore, representative of Eastern European thinking concerning a Conference. The Polish Government, on its side, has, in the past, urged the creation of a 'Collective European Security System', a fascinating but ambiguous concept which has not been clearly defined by the Poles. The Polish ideas have, in practice, become subsumed in more general Warsaw Pact thinking concerning a 'standing organ', and in pact statements, such as the Prague declaration of January 1972, which proposed a number of 'fundamental principles of European security and relations among States in Europe.'

Richard Davy has summarised these principles as follows: '(1) The inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of European States should be 'unconditionally respected'. (II) Force or threats of force must not be used and all disputes should be solved by peaceful means. (III) Differences between socialist and capitalist systems should not constitute insurmountable obstacles to the all-round development of relations, which should rest on a basis of understanding and co-operation; (IV) Good-neighbourly relations should develop on the basis of national sovereignty, equality, non-interference, and mutual advantage so that it will 'become possible to overcome the division of the

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continent into military and political groupings'. (V) Mutually advantageous contacts among European states must develop 'on a broad scale in the economic, scientific, technological and cultural fields, as well as in the fields of tourism and protection of the environment'. (VI) European states must assist the solution of questions of general and complete disarmament, and especially of nuclear disarmament, as well as the realization of measures aimed at the reduction and termination of the arms race. (VII) European states should support the United Nations.' (2)

The principles established by the Eastern European countries apply primarily to CSCE, but the nature of the problems involved is such that they relate more to a long-term process than to a single meeting or conference. They would thus seem to constitute Warsaw Pact suggestions concerning the work of a standing body.

MILITARY PROBLEMS AND MBFR

The 'security content' of CSCE has been subject of controversial debate ever since the idea of a Conference was first mooted. Whereas the Warsaw Pact countries have tended to interpret 'security' not only in a military and political sense but also as encompassing economic and social matters that NATO powers would consider as contributing only indirectly to 'security', NATO states have stressed the need for a conference to deal with politico-military questions. As a result of NATO pressures exploratory talks on a separate mutual and balanced force reduction negotiation in Europe have been held earlier this year and formal negotiations will open shortly. NATO has hinted that it considers some aspects of military security appropriate for discussion within CSCE, notably advance warning of manoeuvres, ceilings on the levels of troop movements, the emplacement of observers to report on military movements, etc. While some of these more general military questions may be discussed at CSCE, MBFR will tackle the detailed problems of force reductions in Europe. It seems probable that fewer countries will take part in MBFR talks than in CSCE. Thus NATO has proposed that participation in MBFR should be mainly limited to the countries of Central Europe and those countries maintaining forces there.

Regardless of the detailed breakdown of 'security' problems between CSCE and MBFR, it would seem useful for a standing East-West commission to concern itself, at least in part, with 'security' questions, thus, as suggested earlier, one of the committees of inter-governmental experts set up by a permanent commission could deal with aspects of European security and a specialized agency might verify levels of forces and armaments in the context of reductions made in MBFR. If MBFR negotiations were to drag on for a number of years, which is possible, there might be some formal linkage between MBFR and EWCS, possibly in the form of progress reports being sent to the Standing Commission.

RELATIONS WITH EXISTING INSTITUTIONS

If the participants at CSCE were to decide that any standing commission should be small in size and restricted in competence, the work of existing international organisations working in the field of East-West relations would not seem to be greatly affected by the creation of this body. Thus ECE would continue to have the main competence in East-West economic relations (apart from the role played by the Commission of the European Communities in East-West commercial relations and concerning some aspects of agricultural

(2) See The World Today, July 1972, pp.291-2.

and transport policy) and UNESCO in cultural contacts, with, perhaps, the Council of Europe beginning to move into the fields of East-West educational and legal affairs. In any event the members of the EEC are determined to maintain the integrity of the Communities' activities, whatever changes might occur in East-West relations. It is likely that Comecon will continue to have a major influence on economic planning and co-operation in Eastern Europe.

However, if the European Governments wish to create a major new institutional structure to foster East-West relations across the board, they must re-think their approach to the whole complex of the institutions concerned, otherwise a major thrust to improve economic relations in EWCS would inevitably supplant or duplicate the work of ECE. Similar problems would arise in the cultural field vis-a-vis UNESCO. Neither would the staff of ECE be happy in a situation in which an intergovernmental economic committee of experts and a standing East-West commission were to give ECE instructions as to its working programme. It already has a considerable input of suggestions and ideas for future work coming from its member governments.

THREE APPROACHES

- There would seem to be three approaches to this institutional dilemma.
- 1) The first would be for governments to put their money on a major new institution with wide-ranging powers and responsibilities, which would involve running down or winding up the work of some, at least, of the existing institutions.
 - 2) Second, any new East-West institution could be deliberately kept low-key, with a skeleton secretariat, acting as a clerks' office and basically restricted to administration and maintaining contacts as well as doing some work of co-ordination among existing institutions between the ministerial sessions of reconvened CSCE. One of the prime tasks of a low-key institution could be the collection and dissemination of information concerning economic policies, industrial production, commercial activities, trade balances, etc. EWCS could, in this role, act as a clearing house for economic and business information and could process and reply to enquiries in this field - and perhaps in others.
 - 3) Third, another approach might be for governments to create, in the first instance, a small secretariat with somewhat fluid terms of reference, beneath a strictly defined political ceiling, leaving it for time to judge whether its work was sufficiently valuable for them to wish to build further on this modest beginning, and, at some future date, to reconsider, if necessary, relations between the standing commission and other international institutions.

Although, earlier in this paper, I have come out against an institutional link between EWCS and the UN, there would nonetheless clearly have to be some form of link, even if only the transmission of an annual report, for information, from the standing commission to the world organisations. Less than this would be to arouse accusations of European separatism. More than this could, for the reasons I have outlined earlier, be unwise.

For their part, members of the enlarged European Communities will clearly be careful that developments in a standing commission do not adversely affect

EEC as made
in EWCSL
and NATO?

either their present competences or their future development in the political and possibly the defence fields. In trade, even though Eastern European condemnations of the effect of Community policies on East-West trade have become more subdued in recent years, a strong feeling that the tariffs and quotas imposed by EEC on its imports from third countries constitute 'discrimination' still remains in Eastern Europe. Thus Mr. Brezhnev, in his Moscow speech to the Trade Union Council of 20 March 1972, acknowledging the reality of the Common Market, stressed that the condition for better relations between Eastern Europe and the countries of the Community was that the latter should 'recognize the realities existing in the socialist part of Europe, specifically, the interests of the member countries of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. We are for equality in economic relations and against discrimination'. At a CSCE and in EWCSL pressures are therefore likely to be exerted on the Community countries to adopt a liberal attitude towards East-West trade. The EEC could perhaps profitably consider easing the access of the products of the Comecon countries to the Community market. (3) Offers of this kind (4) could improve the political climate of East-West relations and might improve the image and status of EEC in Eastern Europe. Members of the Communities would perhaps be well advised, in their approach to members of Comecon, whether inside or outside the framework of CSCE and the Standing Commission, to refrain from taking action which would interfere with the dynamics of developments in Eastern Europe. Whereas the Communities should rightly give priority to their own interests and policies, they should not try to impose particular lines of approach to themselves on the countries of Eastern Europe.

Members of NATO, for their part, will be concerned to watch jealously for any development within EWCSL that might derogate from the competences of the Alliance or for any move that could result in the Soviet Union or non-member countries of NATO being able to intervene in Western European sub-regional affairs. It is therefore likely that members of the Alliance, if they approve of the creation of EWCSL, will stress that it should complement the NATO and Warsaw Pact Alliances rather than replace them, at least in the foreseeable future, while differences of ideology and political and social and economic organisation, together with mutual fears, make it improbable that members of either of the blocs would consent to the dismantling of their own system of military security. At the same time it is to be hoped that the political dialogue resulting from CSCE might control and minimise the antagonism resulting from the different Eastern and Western European systems and from the different aims pursued by the NATO and Warsaw Pact groupings.

In the long-term antagonisms and mutual fears might be sufficiently diminished, and mutually rewarding co-operation sufficiently built up by means of intensified multilateral and bilateral East-West contacts to permit of a shift from the present polarised two bloc system to some form of collective European security system as has been advocated by the Polish Government, but this is not for tomorrow.

(3) Rumania requested the EEC Council, in February 1972, to include her amongst the (less developed) countries that benefit from generalized preferences. Clearly most of the Eastern European states could not reasonably claim to be economically less developed countries.

(4) Though Gatt rules would mean the adoption of a 'country by country' and 'product by product' approach unless generalized preferences were offered on a global basis.

differs in USA - Europe

EEC AND NATO - POTENTIAL DIFFERENCES?

Mention of NATO leads me to touch on the point that the development of East-West relations through CSCE or EWCS could lead to tensions between EEC and NATO, especially if EEC were to extend the scale or scope of the work of its Political Committee (known as the Davignon Committee). Preparation of the EEC approach to CSCE in the Sub-Group and the Ad Hoc Group of the Political Committee has been carried out in very close consultation not only with the national diplomatic delegations of the Nine to NATO but with the delegations of NATO's other members. It is interesting to speculate whether these ad hoc links between the Political Committee and NATO might influence favourably or prejudice the development of a European political union. Can the countries of the enlarged Community speak with "a voice of their own" if their joint foreign policies are influenced from the very start of their formation by non-member states in NATO? Should the countries of the enlarged Community first work out their own policies - if they wish to have an independent "European" attitude to foreign policy issues (1) and then coordinate their views with those of their allies in NATO?

USA -
yes

CONCLUSIONS

In the short-term warm and cold winds are likely to blow simultaneously in East-West relations. The warm winds could be assisted by intersystemic penetration in fields where this is mutually beneficial - joint industrial ventures, joint action to protect the human environment, etc. - and some of the sting might be taken out of the cold winds by a political structure vaulting over the two blocs, which might, hopefully, manage to reduce some of the existing political, military and ideological tensions. Whatever form new standing East-West multilateral institutions take, following CSCE (and there is also a possibility that none at all will be set up) their work will be arduous and their successes probably not spectacular but hard won over the long-term.

(1) In this respect Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, stated in his address to the Foreign Press Association in London on 31 March 1972: "I welcome the increasing intensity of political consultation among the old and future members of the European Economic Community. It reflects their resolve to create a Europe which speaks with one voice. I do, however, see a need to harmonise consultation processes in the EEC with those in NATO It is the North Atlantic Treaty which embodies the interdependence of our two continents and which unites Western Europe from Iceland to Turkey in the common interest of safeguarding peace and security. Therefore in all matters of political and military security in Europe, firm policies should emerge only after full consultation is undertaken within the North Atlantic Council."

Walden

TRAVEL GUIDE

Dunford,
Midhurst,
Sussex.
(Tel: Midhurst 2384)

BY TRAIN FROM LONDON (weekdays only)

Depart Waterloo	16.50 hrs.	17.14 hrs.
Arrive Haslemere	17.47	18.15

BY TRAIN TO LONDON (Sunday)

Depart Haslemere	1 minute and 26 minutes past every hour
Arrive Waterloo	Approximately 55 minutes later (These timings are often substantially delayed due to engineering works)

(Transport between the station and Dunford will be arranged by car or taxi)

BY CAR FROM LONDON

Take the A3 out of London as far as Guildford. Bypass Guildford and follow the A3 as far as Milford. Turn left in Milford onto the A286, signposted to Haslemere. Follow the A286 through Midhurst, turning sharp left in the centre of the town (signposted to Chichester). Two miles beyond Midhurst (and about 200 yards beyond the Royal Oak pub), take a very sharp left turn, and then a right turn almost immediately. Follow this lane for about $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile. Dunford will be seen up a short drive to the right of the lane.

FROM THE CONTINENT

Please book a flight landing before 16.00 hours so that we can arrange transport which will get you Dunford in time for dinner at 19.00 hrs. Unless alternative arrangements are made, you will be met at the Airport Information Desk by the Customs Exit in TERMINAL I. Return flights should be booked leaving not earlier than 17.00 hours on Sunday.

QUESTIONNAIRE

Please complete and return as soon as possible to Penny David, Federal Trust, 12A Maddox Street, London W.1.

I shall be arriving on Friday before 18.30 hrs.

* BY CAR at approximately ... hours from London/ (elsewhere) and could give lifts if necessary to ... participants

* BY TRAIN at Haslemere Station at ... hours (see attached time-table) but would prefer a lift from London/ (elsewhere)

* BY AIR at Heathrow Airport on Flight no. ... from at ... hours.

I shall be present at the following meals:

Friday dinner

Saturday breakfast

lunch

~~dinner~~

Sunday ~~breakfast~~

~~lunch~~

Saturday

I shall be leaving on ~~Sunday~~ at approximately ~~14.30~~ hours

* BY CAR to London/ (elsewhere)

* BY TRAIN from Haslemere Station at ^{18⁰¹} hours - 5

* BY AIR from Heathrow Airport on Flight no. ... at ... hours

I have made other travel arrangements (please give departure time)

.....

NAME Tel: no.

* please fill in where applicable