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Discussion Paper:

Western Europe and the Security Conference: the Interconnection of East-West Relations and the Western Alliance

by GYÖRGY HALASZ

Europe hasn't seen war since 1945. Our continent is living in its longest period of peace. But this doesn't mean the disappearance of those contradictions which earlier led twice to world-wide catastrophe. What is more, the contradictions have become even more sophisticated and complicated. In a certain sense the present European peace is only superficial as long as the major European problems are not all solved finally and satisfactorily.

At the same time, the relative calmness in Europe offers a good possibility for fruitful dialogue - in our days already an obligation for the highly responsible-minded leaders of Europe. The goal is double: as a minimal aim the present situation must be maintained, conflicts must not menace with war again. In parallel, further steps are necessary; together with the international relaxation of tension - as part of it and reinforcing it - an institutionalized security system should be established in our continent in order to prevent the outbreak of conflicts.

Reasons for the Conference

For the realization of this aim the allied socialist countries suggested the convocation of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. The Conference is not the aim, it is only the means. The aim is European security itself - but the proposer countries thought that the conference might be the most efficient way leading to it.

In connection with SALT President Nixon has stated for many years that there is no alternative to agreement. The basis for the American President's statement is the fact that the continuation of the nuclear armament race would inevitably lead to war - if the race cannot be stopped. And war cannot mean

a real alternative for mankind; especially in such basically changed circumstances when neither side is in the position to reach decisive superiority.

A balance of forces is only one of the motives in the SALT dialogue, although a very important one. Moreover, at the time of the scientific-technical revolution it becomes even more necessary to make rational use of financial means and to develop multilateral cooperation. This automatically leads to a reduction in expenditures on armament - although this may be of minor importance. The armament race is dangerous first of all not only because it reduces the prospects for resulting in peaceful constructive work; but because it makes every result doubtful. Last, but not least: the Soviet-American talks and the European dialogue could become a reality because both sides recognized this axiom.

Europe is the most neuralgic part of the world: a war here would probably mean a nuclear one. Even those were compelled to realize this who, believing in different "liberation plans", had lived in an illusion as late as the early 60s. Realities must be fully respected. So the most important task of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is to formulate the new facts, to accept the renunciation of the use of force and the essential thesis of equal security as general principles. In the framework of peaceful coexistence multilateral European cooperation could emerge, all-European plans could be made to solve complex technical problems.

In Helsinki the first step was made: the participants outlined the items of the agenda. Even today some argue that the "progress is too fast", and some would like to modify certain points of the Helsinki proposals or try to give another meaning to them. We hear arguments that only the socialist countries are interested in the first point of the agenda (the problem of security), in the second point (widening economic relations) and in the fourth (setting up the permanent bodies of security); and that the capitalist countries are interested mainly in the third point, in the free movement of ideas. We could read articles which said that "the Soviets have to give from the third basket, if they want to take something from the second". This type of argument can even at best only be regarded as an illusion or as self-deceit. Simultaneous and proper arrangements on all the four items is in the interest of all European countries, all participants of the Conference.

Economic ties with the socialist countries do not only serve Eastern interests. One-sided advantageous trade has never existed; such deals are

not called trade. In fact, Western government and business circles are highly attracted by the vast market of the socialist countries.

### Free Movement of Ideas

As regards the problem of the free movement of ideas we have to realize first that interference in the domestic affairs of another country may take different forms, e.g. war, economic pressure or ideological subversion. In Hungary, for instance, the best works of Western literature are published and generally known by the public; theatres present the plays of popular Western authors; Western artists come to the concert halls. If a Western tourist wants to come to Hungary, he can get the visas in hours, he is the most welcome guest in the country. And, on the other hand: - taking also into consideration the noble aim of better understanding among people - the honest Hungarians can travel abroad without political obstacles.

What should be made free then? Suspicion is understandable and right if it is about other issues not included above: these might be those "ideas" which try to alienate people from their government, which can provoke hate towards other nations or can incite war. The diffusion of such "ideas" neither will be permitted in the future - not even by the slogan of "free movement of ideas and people".

A Swiss paper recently put the question in this way: "Is it worthwhile to strive for détente with the Soviet Union if we cannot in exchange promote liberalization?". We should be clear about the aim: is it the institutionalizing of peaceful coexistence or so-called "liberalization"? (Which is seen by some as a good title to interfere with the domestic affairs of certain countries.) In the past, there have been similar plans under other names. Their fate is known.

Is political subversion permissible? Let me mention an example, the French municipal elections. As is known, in this recent event the French Communist Party received the largest number of votes and became the biggest party in the country. But the division of councillors' posts didn't reflect the result: with 23 per cent of the total votes the French communists received 11 per cent of the mandates. The number of the votes and seats was proportional in the case of the Socialists, while the Gaullist UDR received a lot of mandates with relatively few votes. This is basically a question of democracy. The Hungarian press drew a lesson from this for "domestic use", but the French people could hardly hear, in the foreign language broadcast of the radio, any statements indicating that the French government

ignores democracy, so that they would have to rebel against it. Would such a sharp polemic prove beneficial to the friendly French - Hungarian relations? Would it promote the relaxation of tension in Europe? The answer is definitely no - and it is necessary to add that the French President probably would not have changed quickly the distribution of seats as a result of such interference.

No one should conclude from this that for the good of the relaxation of tension an alliance must be made with everybody, without precondition, and all the time. But the consistency of principles does not exclude the necessity and possibility of compromises, the importance of mutual political wisdom and self-restraint on each side.

#### Détente and Alliances

The readiness for agreement should be desirable in the talks about European force reduction. Linking the Security Conference to the Vienna talks is not possible - however connected both of them are with the security. The force reduction talks, because of their complicated and far-reaching character, will probably continue for a long time. Linking them to the Security Conference would mean a considerable delay in the latter's successful conclusion. Besides, the NATO countries have not agreed to invite the non-aligned and neutral European countries to the force reduction talks. The improvement of the atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust would inevitably help the success of the Vienna talks.

In spite of all progress, there are further possibilities for the future. Perhaps the relaxation of tension will continue in Europe. Perhaps there will be a deadlock. We can hear about the acceleration of rapprochement on the basis of different convergency-theories. But this can hardly be reality. Which of the two trends will be dominant? It depends on the degree to which the socialist countries and the truly cooperative Western circles succeed in neutralizing the counter-elements and the theories advocating separation and confrontation.

The East-West dialogue and the process of relaxation of tension are in a relationship of natural interdependence with the changing role of military alliances. On different actual topics the interests of the United States and West-Europe will often differ, but on the vital question of war and peace there is no difference. At a time of relaxation of tension cohesion within the Alliances is less important and grows weaker. But we have to emphasize that these contradictions were not brought about by the relaxation

of tension. West-German minister of foreign affairs, Herr Walter Scheel, made this point when saying: "With the Common Market American economy has acquired an unpleasant competitor. But the once hoped for political development has failed to come about."

The new Atlantic Charter, suggested by the Nixon Administration is intended to change an awkward situation, demanding a more proportional distribution of military burdens. The US spends 7.3 per cent of her GNP on defence, while West European countries spend only 4.4 per cent. What is more, the weakening of the dollar has increased the costs of American troops in Europe. According to some West European sources, the American expenditures are not so sizeable today, given the global policy and the specific European interests of the United States. Nevertheless Washington - pursuing the strategy of real deterrence - may consider necessary and reasonable an increase in West-European conventional forces.

The Soviet-American agreement about the prevention of nuclear war has created many doubts in the West about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee. But the General Secretary of NATO, Joseph Luns, made a realistic assessment of these concerns when saying: "The suspicion and sulkiness of the Europeans is generated by past glory and status".

The military bipolarity is a fact. You may protest against it, may write articles about it, like "Why not try China?" (the title of a New York Times commentary), or may flirt with the Peking leaders who have a certain function in teasing the Soviets in the East. A lot of things can be done - but the fact remains a fact.

Nuclear bipolarity means that the efforts of the two great powers to avoid collisions and to create mutual understanding and cooperation make impossible the outburst of nuclear war in Europe too. The effects of this favourable development in Europe are obvious: increased cooperation and the realization of the principle of peaceful coexistence improves the general international atmosphere in the dialogue between the two systems. Here economic cooperation has an outstanding role because it intensifies the interest of governments and peoples in the creation and maintenance of good relations.

#### Western Europe and the United States

It is not unknown in our country that there is a wideranging discussion in Western Europe about the reorganization of the Western military alliance. Some proclaim that the separation of West European defence from the United

States is utterly impossible, while others advocate an independent regional West-European nuclear force. The real approach should take into consideration that any world role for Europe - even if it is in agreement with the action of others - has to serve the national interests. What is the true national interest of the West European countries in this matter? Presently both the military and the political conditions for setting up a European nuclear deterrent are absent. But even if they existed, the result would be very dubious: the basically bipolar military structure would not be greatly disturbed. An independent nuclear umbrella would not increase the security of the participants; it would deepen distrust in both directions and would hinder the process of relaxation of tension in Europe. The motivation for political efforts at West European unification can be pro-Soviet, anti-Soviet, anti-American, and indifferent. But the strengthening of West European military power would primarily and directly be targeted against the socialist countries.

On the other hand, new problems in the relations with the United States have produced a dilemma. The Common Market is both a rival and an ally; a united economic power to the outside world, and politically structured internally. That may be the main reason for the contradictions. Despite the development in West European integration it is still a fiction to speak about Europe and America as two equal partners as Dr. Kissinger does. Perhaps this does apply in the economic field. In the Western part of our continent some think that it is in the American interest to prevent the economic success of the European Community. Washington may willy-nilly hurt unity in the economic field. But in the political field this is far from true, simply because of the one-sided character of military interdependence.

This may be one of the motives behind the American behaviour which sees Western Europe (it calls it Europe) as a united whole. Psychological motives may not be negligible either. This summer when in the city of Atlanta I had a short rest in a park. A policeman came to my bench and we started to talk. He asked me where I came from. "Europe" I answered, and later somehow asked him who was the Governor of Georgia. The valiant guard of the order stared at me - what an ignorance! - answered immediately and, being a polite man, asked: "And would you tell me Sir who is the Governor of Europe?" Of course, ignorant people exist everywhere in the world. But coming across the ocean is an American coming to France, to Belgium or to Austria? Not at all. He is coming to Europe. While - as Herr Scheel said in his previously quoted speech - "there is no competent European authority on world political questions."



An increase in the number of Atlantic contradictions doesn't mean automatically a decline in Atlantic relations. It can lead to a qualitatively new, reliable alliance if the pendulum moves towards detente and world-wide cooperation. Naturally, in that case the function of the alliance would be quite different. A mutual abrogation of its military character is also conceivable. This step would be of historic importance and would be in full harmony with the real interests of all nations.

But today still other debates can be observed in the enlarged Common Market. Paradoxically, relations with the East have brought to the foreground internal differences with far-reaching consequences. In France we can hear about a Rapallo-complex, about fear of German reunification and the Germans in fury blame French policy for the lack of consistency. It is not difficult to discover that what is at stake is the political leadership in Western Europe. But the sharing of power is a long process, and its lasting stabilization may prove impossible, given the domestic political changes in the member countries.

Lack of homogeneity may be responsible for those theories which regard the American soldiers in Europe as hostages as a guarantee for direct American involvement. But does West-Europe really need it in the circumstances of mutual understanding, useful cooperation and relaxation of tension? The obvious answer has led to the Vienna talks. This area of problems is, in its concrete details, highly complicated.

However, it is clear by now that the number of reforms and modernizations in the Western alliance - brought about also by the development of the member states - is only increased by the success of the East-West dialogue. But I wish politicians would only deal with similar "problems".

This year has not seen any changes in NATO. Earlier President Nixon had called 1973 "the year of Europe" in order to establish a new type of relations. Several articles in the West ask today: Where is Europe's year? Perhaps in 1974 ... Let us hope that all this will influence movement in the desirable direction, that is towards the expansion of dialogue, and progress in Europe.

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Eastern Europe and European Arms Control: the Interconnection  
of East-West Relations and the Eastern Alliances

by HUIB HENDRIKSE

Writing about East European concepts and expectations of arms control, its possibility and its political repercussions in Europe, means above all to analyse Soviet attitudes. This is not because there is uniformity of interest in all respects among the Warsaw Pact states, but the field of arms control seems to be largely regarded as one of uniformity of expression with the Soviet Union as the spokesman if not the determinant.

The Soviet Union seeks to become the most powerful protector of two new systems of collective security: one for Europe and the other for Asia. This all too Grand Design was launched in February 1956 by Nikita Khrushchev at the 20th congress of the communist party of the Soviet Union. Shortly before, Moscow had proposed a treaty of friendship and co-operation to the United States. At the 20th party congress Khrushchev pointed out that stable and friendly relations between the two superpowers would have a "tremendous significance" for strengthening peace all over the world. In this regard it can validly be said, that Leonid Brezhnev's foreign policy is not very original, even though his style totally differs from the somewhat impetuous performance of his predecessor. A fundamental difference, however, is that Khrushchev displayed a great zeal for disarmament and at times came out with bold proposals, while Brezhnev is mainly opposed to an "uncontrolled arms race". He used this wording in an important speech on 21 December 1972, whilst not mentioning dis-

armament among the principles on which according to the Soviet Union security in Europe should rest, although the "Declaration on peace, security and cooperation in Europe", which the supreme leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries had previously adopted at Prague on 26 January of the same year, had rated disarmament among the "fundamental principles of European security and relations between states in Europe". During the first gathering of the CSCE it once more appeared that disarmament was deliberately omitted from the address by Brezhnev. On behalf of the Soviet Union Andrey Gromyko tabled a number of principles of European security, disarmament not being among them.

On 11 July 1973, when receiving the Lenin prize "For the strengthening of peace between the peoples", Brezhnev said: "We are firmly convinced that political detente in Europe must also be supplemented by military detente". A few weeks later, on 15 August, he explicitly stated that military detente does not yet mean a reduction of armaments. As one of the most topical obligations in the "struggle for a radical purge of the international atmosphere" he mentioned the "effort for political detente to be supplemented by military detente, for the arms race to be stopped, and subsequently also for practical steps to be taken in order to reduce armaments". These words clearly referred to the situation in Europe.

#### Arms Control: Instrument or Result of Detente?

Such remarks show again that the Soviet Union at this moment takes a very cautious, not to say conservative stand as to arms control in Europe. This only comes second, as something that can wait. The most complicated arms control negotiations ever to take place contributed significantly to better relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Even the war in Indochina evidently did not preclude the development of conditions which the Soviet press characterizes as a "transition from the cold war to peaceful relationships". The reverse, however, -- military detente can only ensue from political detente -- holds for Europe, as the Soviet scholar Daniil Proektor has pointed out. Even if one can understand this approach, the question remains how extensive political detente according to the Soviet Union should be in order to bring military detente in Europe within reach.

When NATO countries express their concern about the military buildup of the Warsaw Pact, their attitude is interpreted as hostile to detente. The imperialists, whenever they have to conceal their aggressive measures, try to revive the myth of the "Soviet threat". Brezhnev said at the 24th party congress. More recently he warned time and again that the aggressive forces in Europe have not laid down their weapons. One gets the impression that the Soviet leaders will not be satisfied with political detente in Europe until the capitalist states have demonstrated they no longer consider the existing powers of the Soviet Union as a potential threat to their security. It is therefore easy to understand that the Soviet Union proposes a simultaneous dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact as a "radical means" to implement military detente in Europe. The rejection of this proposal is explained as proof of a continuing hostility, from the West and as a justification of the further buildup of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. The Soviet Union wisely did never disclose how many troops she would withdraw from Eastern Europe, in case the members of NATO should take heart and consider seriously the idea of mutual dissolution of the two blocs. In Moscow, where political realism is held in high esteem, there is no anticipation nor indeed hope that this will soon occur. The Soviet Union does not like at all to see the shock effects a sudden vanishing of NATO and the Warsaw Pact would produce. Her detente policy, therefore, aims at generating a situation in which military-political alliances will have lost their function and simply fade away. - Mutual Force Reductions (MFR) and the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe can better advance this complicated process, as a Soviet scholar recently characterized it; than negotiations about reducing troops and armaments in Central Europe. If the outcome of such negotiations would not only be a redeployment of American and Soviet forces, but perhaps also certain collateral measures, then NATO and the Warsaw Pact could become lasting instruments in the process of detente. The Soviet proposal to discuss some confidence-building measures in the framework of the CSCE and not of MFR is probably to be looked upon as an attempt to avoid any involvement of alliance machineries.

Although the MBFR-proposal of the NATO members runs counter to the political strategy of the USSR, it was impossible to ignore or bluntly reject it. After a long period of silence Brezhnev on the 30th of March 1971 spoke out in favour of talks about a reduction of troops and armaments in Central Europe, when addressing the 24th congress of the communist party of the Soviet Union. Here was in fact an attempt to annex the MBFR-proposal in order to present it later in a modified form as a suggestion of his own. One of the elements of the Soviet version is the wish "that\* talks on this matter should not be held on a bloc basis (which would narrow their scope), but should be discussed independently in accordance with an understanding between the states concerned", as a Soviet commentator wrote last year.

Although the Soviets usually tend to imagine disarmament problems as in essence relatively simple - "the way to disarm is to disarm", Maxim Litvinov taught in the thirties - they have never saved words when repeating that the question of reductions in Central Europe is highly complicated and that it will take a long time for results to be yielded. This is just another way to stress the point that military detente in Europe must play a secondary part.

This attitude sharply contrasts with the pressing manner in which the Soviet Union in her campaign for the convocation of the CSCE has depicted the potential menace of war. The paramount reason for detente in her view is the need to prevent thermonuclear war. It is rightly pointed out on the Soviet side that even a minor clash in our heavily armed continent could rapidly lead to general war. That is why the capitalist states are urged to adopt the rules of conduct which the Soviet Union summarizes in the term peaceful coexistence. In order to prevent thermonuclear war from breaking out, Moscow says, it is necessary to accept peaceful coexistence. There is just no other choice.

Arms Control and peaceful coexistence is essentially a doctrine for the regulated hostility between socialist and capitalist states. This is typically a theoretical product of a

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superpower, which is sufficiently strong to consider a great many states as her permanent foes. A weak socialist country like Yugoslavia is also an active supporter of peaceful coexistence, but she fills this notion with a different, far less antagonistic substance. Though the Soviet conception of peaceful coexistence allows for the possibility, or even requires, many form of co-operation between socialist and capitalist states, a lasting and even fierce hostility is held inevitable. Brezhnev speaks about a continuing struggle in the political, economical and ideological fields. Conflicts, at times even serious ones, will sill arise, but they must not lead to armed clashes and wars.

Europe is the only region in the world where the main capitalist and socialist states confront each other heavily armed along a stretched line of demarcation. For the Soviet conception of peaceful coexistence in Europe to materialize - i.e. for the risks to be reduced that even a sharp conflict might lead to war - a lowering of the armaments levels is a prime condition. The Soviet Union has repeatedly said so herself in the past and uses this now as an argument for the MFR-talks.

In the fifties the Warsaw Pact countries took the view that such reductions constituted an independent factor promoting detente. In spite of the fact that in 1957 the United States decided to instal tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe, and although there was concern about the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany, the member-states of the Warsaw Pact announced in May 1958 that their forces would be reduced by almost half a million men. By that time their troop numbers had already "dropped by 2.5 million men since 1955, more than two million of whom belonged to the Soviet forces. In May 1958 Soviet troops were stated to be withdrawn from Rumania. The NATO members were summoned to cut their forces likewise and thus to show "by acts" that they wanted to strengthen peace and security in Europe.

But the quite different attitude of wait and see, adopted today by the Soviet Union nowadays with regard to the problem of reducing troops and armaments in Europe, can be explained by a combination of factors. It is one of the paradoxes of the present time that the importance to the Soviet Union of her conventional force has also grown now that a climate of general detente has developed in Europe.

First of all there is a tendency in the USSR to give credit to the increased military and economical power of the Warsaw Pact states and in particular of the Soviet Union for the improvement of the situation in Europe. Even without a thorough look into the Soviet economy it is easy to see that the emphasis thereby lies in the military aspect.

This reasoning - more Soviet power means more peace - is based on the view that the capitalist states will only by sheer necessity opt for a more "realistic" ( i.e. reasonable) behaviour towards the socialist states. The foreign policy of the capitalist states is characterized, not only by ill-educated propagandists but also by prominent Soviet scholars, as a "policy of war, violence, pillage and repression". Marxism-Leninism, the ideology of all Warsaw Pact states, teaches that aggressiveness is a permanent feature of the capitalist states, which are often collectively designated by the word imperialism. The aggressiveness of imperialism is in the first place directed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, which are - with the ideologically unaccountable exception of China and Albania - peaceful by nature. Imperialism to the thinking of men like Brezhnev and Gromyko keeps hoping to be able to solve the "historical controversy between capitalism and socialism" by military power. The one bright spot in this grim outlook upon the world is that imperialism generally reacts in a rational manner to the power of its foes. In a recent book on Soviet foreign policy D.G. Tomashevsky, a senior research associate of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations in Moscow, writes: "If the balance of forces is unfavourable to imperialism, then the possibilities for launching imperialist aggression remain limited. Imperialism as a rule shrinks back before superior power. For the sake of self-preservation imperialism is compelled to take full account of reality".

It is forbidding military strength combined with a flexible foreign policy that forces the capitalist states to behave in accordance with the rules of peaceful coexistence. One need not be surprised, therefore, that in this period of diminishing tension and preparatory meetings on East-West troop reductions there is constant talk in the Soviet Union of its increased military power, since this is "one of the main instruments of our peace policy". It is asserted that the preservation of world peace is due in the first place to this impressive military ma-

chine which has a "sobering" effect on the hotheads of the imperialist camp. Notwithstanding these successes the greatest vigilance remains imperative and the continuous strengthening of the forces in an "objective necessity". Brezhnev speaks in this context about a "sacred duty".

### The Importance of the Warsaw Pact

This excessive appreciation of one's own military apparatus clearly does not promote a positive attitude towards disarmament and arms control. The fact is that one cannot at the same time worship a sacred cow and mutilate it. Yet the attitude towards arms control may well be affected to a still higher degree by the importance that conventional military force has for the Soviet Union in maintaining the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact. In a strategic sense, the European allies of the Soviet Union serve a twofold purpose. They are a vanguard in the process of detente with Western Europe and they form the rear in the bitter conflict which opposes the Soviet Union to China and is increasingly seen by the Soviet Union as a political and military controversy. The European allies of the Soviet Union are thus in an almost ideal position to emancipate themselves into more or less independent allies, who can demand that their interests and desires are taken into account to a considerably greater extent than is now the case. The Soviet Union alleges that the Western states as well as China try to rouse nationalistic feelings in Eastern Europe and try to drive a wedge between Russia and the European "brother-countries". Moscow also complains about phenomena such as "isolationism", "separatism" and "national selfishness" in Eastern Europe.

The USSR considers the political polycentrism in the imperialist camp an advantage, but inside the Warsaw Pact she wants to preserve the principle of so-called monocentrism. Her reaction therefore is that a solid welding of the members of the Warsaw Pact in the military, economic and ideological fields is of still greater importance than is used to be. The threat of a military attack by NATO is believed to be neutralized by the strong military organization of the Warsaw Pact, but now a new menace is decried in the so-called "silent contra-revolution": by means of peaceful instruments such as trade, industrial co-



operation, and scientific and cultural contacts. Western countries try to expand their influence in Eastern Europe. Imperialism, it is said, proceeds with extremely subtle methods. Communism is no longer decried in the old-fashioned way, but advice is given as to how communism can be "improved upon". Forms of "national communism" are encouraged by the ideologists of imperialism. The events in Czechoslovakia, the Soviets would argue, have shown whereto this "silent contra-revolution" can lead. They have also shown that political and economical pressure are insufficient to restore "proletarian discipline". The rapid military occupation of Czechoslovakia was a demonstration of Soviet power, but from a political point of view this was also an impressive display of impotence. Besides, this operation seems to have made heavy inroads on the financial means the Soviet Union has available for the modernisation of her economy. A non-official, but fairly reliable source in Moscow writes that the total costs of military action against Czechoslovakia (introductory manoeuvres, occupation, military pressure against Rumania) amounted from five to six billion roubles. Thus it is also for economical reasons they must try to circumvent the need to repeat a similar intervention. So the slogan of a simultaneous dissolution of the two military-political blocs in Europe is coupled with an intensive effort to further strengthen the Warsaw Pact. Attempts to make the Warsaw Pact an unpenetrable fortress, which is only open to "businesslike co-operation", render comprehensive measures in the fields of arms control impossible. It is characteristic of the fortress-outlook, which for that matter can also be found on the Western side, that one feels one's own security increased as the insecurity of the foes decreases. This mood makes even minor reductions of troops and armaments a very difficult matter. Since the military situation in Europe is fairly stable at present, those sharing the fortress-mentality lack an incentive to react otherwise. They are quite prepared to declare with full conviction that they renounce the use of force or any threatening with force, provided the instruments of violent action remain intact. Only after much sighing on both sides they might eventually lower the level of armaments under the strict supervision of a computer.

### A New System of Collective Security ?

On the other hand, the pursuit of a collective security system in Europe proves that the USSR thinks the preservation of this frozen state of affairs in the longer run undesirable. Maybe there is not the faintest illusion in Moscow that the Soviet Union could ever become acceptable to all European states as their most powerful protector. Still the system of collective security she aspires to is more than a mere functional utopia.

Ever since the scheme of a collective security system in Europe has been introduced in 1954, the main problem of European security has remained the same for the Soviet Union. That problem is, to put it briefly, how to contain the Federal Republic of Germany. This question is considerably harder to solve than it was in the fifties, when China still was an ally, when the Soviet Union and her European allies could still afford a policy of isolationism, when distrust against the Germans was still pretty widespread in Western Europe, and when the FRG was economically and technically unable to become a nuclear and weapon state. The treaties Bonn has concluded with the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR, have brought a solution of this problem no nearer.

Just as in the past, the Soviet Union and, perhaps, her allies believe that the European security situation will be at its best when all American forces will have left the continental soil and the FRG is kept free of nuclear weapons. Liquidation of foreign bases is, more or less, a standing disarmament proposal of the USSR, which pretends not to have bases in foreign territory herself. But, the Soviet leaders do prefer close co-operation with the United States regarding European security, as long as there still is a risk that the FRG might in any form get control over nuclear weapons. This is why they are advocating a system of collective security in Europe which must first of all create conditions of friendliness and of extensive, but supervised co-operation in the fields of economy, science, technology, energy supply, environment and culture. Then, it is hoped, the "myth of the Soviet threat" will no longer give an impulse to nuclear aspirations of Western Germany and will eventually dwindle.

The desire of the Soviet Union and her European allies for a period of stability in Europe is without any doubt sincere, but one cannot solve the problems of military confrontation simply by ignoring them for the time being. Yet this is the way the Soviet Union would like to have it. The illusion of security should precede real security.

The undue weight given to an acceptance of broad principles in the Security Conference bears witness of what one might call a bureaucratic approach to European security. The other members of the Warsaw Pact, with the one exception of Rumania, seem to endorse this Soviet attitude. It is pointed out on the Soviet side that the process of political detente should not be hampered by trouble between antagonistic states about complex matters of disarmament. But at the same time there is an awareness of this view being inconsistent, since it can hardly be denied that military detente would favourably affect the course of political detente. Progress made in arms control indicates to what extent the parties are prepared to trust each other and to translate into practical reality their solemn declarations not to use force against each other. The apparent inconsistency between the desire for broad principles and a reluctance to reduce forces is certainly not only embarrassing for the members of the Warsaw Pact, but no less so for the NATO countries.

The Soviet Union hopes she can take advantage of her improved relationship with the USA for solving what to her mind is the most urgent problem of military security in Europe: to prevent the FRG from obtaining control of nuclear weapons. According to a recent Soviet publication SALT II can only bear fruit if the United States take the initiative of dissolving NATO's Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. Anyhow, Moscow wants the Americans to tell their European allies in unambiguous terms that they are opposed to a West-European nuclear force.

The Soviet Union holds the view that America is morally committed to such a course of action by virtue of the agreement

on the prevention of nuclear war. This document was hailed by the Soviet press as the most important result of Brezhnev's visit to the USA; much stress is laid upon the fact that it has been signed on a symbolic date - exactly 32 years after the day Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. And yet the benefits the intimate bilateralism between both superpowers has so far achieved for the security situation in Europe have fallen short of what the Soviet leaders have expected. In the Federal Republic of Germany as in other Western European countries complaints are heard that the American nuclear umbrella now unmistakably shows holes. In Moscow there is considerable concern about this phenomenon. Such talk from "opponents to detente" and "enemies of peace" is feared to produce the effect that inside the Europe of the Nine more and more voices will be raised in favour of military co-operation. It is taken for granted by the Soviet Union that such co-operation will be the start of the setting up of a Western nuclear force, which eventually would bring a German finger to the nuclear trigger.

The dread of a West-European or West-German nuclear force is shared by many in the West, and indeed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Opportunities for obviating such a development should be better than ever before. But these are to be grasped first of all by a positive and even daring attitude towards arms control. As the main military power in Europe, the Soviet Union must demonstrate that she can more or less understand other European states when they feel unable to look upon her forces as a huge peace corps. This problem must be tackled. Otherwise there is a danger that the MFR-talk will deepen rather than overcome feelings of frustration and exasperation about the security situation in Europe. The result could well be in Goethe's words that "The evil which you fear becomes a certainty by what you do".

C O R R I G E N D U M

to the discussion paper by Huib Hendrikse

C o r r e c t i o n s

Page 4 - line 3 from the bottom:

The Soviet conception of peaceful coexistence  
is essentially ...

Page 8 - line 9 from the bottom:

As the security of the foes decreases ....

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Discussion Paper:

Western Arms Control Policies in Europe and its Implications;  
Eastern Perception

by W. MULTAN and A. TOWPIK

The history of international relations knows many situations where Peace depends on the proper understanding of acts and even more of motivations of one party by another. It can be admitted that during the whole period of "cold war" besides the evident elements of substantial antagonism in the attitude and acts of the countries of opposite social and political systems, there were also elements of mutual fear and hostility arising to a great extent from the misunderstanding of intentions. Such elements, enlarged by the propaganda machinery, have formed a power destroying all that has been sound and normal in mutual relations. Many a time, it took years to waive aside certain myths based on irrational premises, by revealing truth and the diabolic power created by them was at last overcome.

Now, when both social and political systems dispose of almost unlimited means of destruction the proper perception of acts and intentions of the other party is of enormous importance, especially during the tension periods on the international arena. The correct understanding of the other party's steps and intentions is also of no lesser significance for the normalization of the relations among countries separated by contradictions which for many years seemed to be insurmountable. Conventionally speaking, the proper understanding of the other party's steps and intentions as well as of its interests is also of greatest importance both for the détente and for the search of a better, more rational security arrangements for the whole of Europe.

x x x

In view of socialist countries the position of the West concerning the reduction of armed forces in Europe has undergone a substantial evolution for the period after the Second World War. And the suggestion of so called mutual and balanced force reduction which has appeared in the last few years was undoubtedly a new phenomenon in the position of the NATO countries regarding both disarmament in general /the approbation of the earlier rejected possibility of implementation of regional disarmament in areas of particular tension and concentration of arms, as for an example in Europe/ and the European security /the acknowledgement of the problem of armed forces reduction as an essential independent element for the détente in Europe/. What is more, the problem of "mutual and balanced force reduction" has become not only a new matter of interest for the West countries but has also grown to the position of one of the main postulates whose solution was to condition the future détente in Europe, as well as the fate of the CSCE and later - its course and results.

At the same time, however, along with the emphasizing of the significance of this problem and along with discussion on the "MBFR" - the problem itself has not become clearer in regard to its contents. It is difficult to state that the prenegotiation position of the NATO countries on this subject has been univocal even without taking into account the special attitude of France to this matter. It may give the impression that although the NATO countries managed to bring about the formulation of a general concept which could be accepted nearly by everyone this, however, did not mean that the views on its specific contents were the same.

One can assume that this was also related to the variety of factors which have brought about the raising and maintaining of this concept; factors which were not always these same for particular NATO countries.

A brief look at these factors seems to be worthwhile since they can continue to influence the position of particular NATO countries. In general they can be divided into three main categories:

Intra-alliance considerations - embracing first of all the variety of internal pressures that were felt in NATO countries towards the reduction of armed forces. These pressures were felt first of all in the USA but also could be observed in some European members of the NATO. In this situation the "MBFR proposal" - especially as it was assumed that the Warsaw Pact countries were not interested in it - was to serve as a convenient instrument to keep NATO members from reducing their forces unilaterally. This interrelation could be observed particularly in some statements made by the US administration. It was underlined that no reduction of US forces in Europe, apart from that as agreed upon within the "MBFR", would take place unless the allies decided to reduce their own forces.

The suspension of the reductions, especially of the US forces in Europe, did not mean, however, an abandonment of an intention or less necessity of such reductions. On the other hand, it gave time to open discussion on this problem within the NATO and to come to certain conclusions which would not deteriorate the intra-NATO relations. Simultaneously, the advancement of the reduction problem to the plane of East-West discussion gave the possibility either to obtain also a certain reduction of the other party forces or to gain significant propaganda effect in case the other party refused to start negotiations on this problem. The intra-alliance discussions over the reduction of armed forces could also serve a wider purpose - a new distribution of the "defence burdens" within the NATO, i.e. mainly to increase in relative if not absolute terms the "defence contribution" of European NATO members.

Nevertheless, the problem itself of the force reductions in Europe and especially the problem of reductions of the US forces in Europe, seemed to be a result of some objective factors; that is of the general trend which could be observed mainly in the USA - to reduce the troop level, increasing at the same time a standard of their training /professional soldiers/ and improving their equipment. In other words, the reduction of quantity of troops was looked upon as a way to obtain means for raising their quality. It was hardly believable that this general trend would not also affect the size of the American forces in Europe.



Certain changes in the international situation can be also mentioned as objective factors which influenced the position of the NATO countries on the European disarmament problem. This refers first of all to the indirect influence of the growing détente process and the change in perception of the other party's intentions /inter alia, the fall of the myth of "communist danger"/ as well as all-the-more wider plane of the East-West negotiations.

Another change having a direct influence on the possibility of undertaking realistic discussions on problems of European disarmament was the change of the Western attitude towards the "German problem". The solution of this problem in line with Western demands was not longer considered as a condition for any disarmament measures in Europe.

These major factors which led to the acceptance by the NATO members of a new position on the European disarmament problem can be complemented also by a range of considerations of a tactical nature - considerations determining, in the first place, the moment of putting forward the "MBFR" postulate /one can assume that it has been done prematurely/ and secondly, the way of "playing this card" in European discussions. Along with the above mentioned considerations <sup>went</sup> the eagerness to present the "European programme" of the NATO which would compete with the programme of the socialist countries and especially with the proposal of the Conference on Security and Co-operation. The emphasis on the particular significance of the "MBFR" postulate served at the same time as convenient instrument of controlling or affecting the direction and the pace of the détente process.

The above factors which were of great significance for the formulation by the West of the "MBFR" postulate and for its maintenance as an item of discussion in Europe will also further affect the position of the NATO states in this question. One can assume at the same time that the factors of "objective character" can both produce real pressures in the direction of reaching an agreement on appropriate reductions and create favourable conditions for reaching such an agreement. Factors of tactical nature - i.e. the desire to take advantage of the reduction postulate and use it for other purposes instead of for limitation

of military potentials in Europe - can give negative effects both on the process of negotiating over the problem of reduction and on the general détente atmosphere in Europe; whereas the intra-alliance considerations from which follows, first of all, the necessity of intensive consultations rather within the framework of NATO than on the plane of East-West relations, can bring about a relatively slow process of East-West negotiations, particularly as regards the reduction of indigenous forces. An additional element which must be taken into account in consideration of both the rate of the intra-NATO consultations and the character of settlements following from them is the actual close link between military, economic and monetary problems of the NATO, mainly on the plane of Western Europe-USA relations. Still it is difficult to predict how it will influence the time and the contents of a new general US-Western European "contract" as well as in what way such a "contract" will influence the problem of force reductions in Europe.

As a whole the position of the NATO countries before the opening of the negotiations is not quite clear. There were contradictory opinions as to the necessity to open at that moment East-West discussions on the reduction problem, /an example of which is not only the negative attitude of France but also the restraint of other NATO members - eg. Great Britain/ as well as the difference of aims, interests and priorities. The main difference seems to lay between the interest of the US to reduce the existing balance in Europe to a level lower and less expensive for them while the main interest of European NATO members is directed towards keeping the US military presence at a relatively high level, combined with a wide programme of so called "military constraints". The purpose of these constraints, as assumed, should be first of all "to limit the political rôle of military forces in European relations". Without going into detail it can be accepted, however, that these contradictory views and interests within the NATO do not necessarily mean a lack of possibilities to come to a certain common platform which can lead to a successful ending of the negotiations.

It could include different special interests of NATO countries - that is reductions of US troops, some reductions of national forces as well as a certain category of "military constraints" corresponding to the scope of reductions and the state of intra-European affairs. Such an attitude, taking into account on the other hand, constant and wide interest of socialist countries in reductions of both foreign and national troops and their willingness to discuss "stabilization measures" and "confidence-building measures" could create a certain common ground for negotiations and their positive outcome in not a distant future.

As far as the further stages of disarmament discussion in Europe are concerned, the problem seems to be more complex and dependent on some additional factors.

On the one hand - apart from the factors hitherto existing - new ones can arise which can increase the interest of the NATO countries in the armaments and armed forces reductions in Europe. Such factors can be: the wider acceptance by the main Western countries of the concept of peaceful coexistence; further intensification of the détente process in Europe and the normalization of relations between countries with different social and political systems; the effect of Soviet-American talks on limitation of strategic armaments. The importance of SALT for the future talks on disarmament in Europe can be approached in two ways. First, from the viewpoint of the significance of possible SALT settlements or agreements as a factor facilitating the European discussions on concrete disarmament problems. And, secondly, from the viewpoint of SALT agreements contribution to the general atmosphere and as an indication of the necessity and possibility of undertaking negotiations and reaching agreements in a so delicate problem as military questions are.

On the other hand, however, looking at the problem realistically one must take also into account the probability that some other factors may divert the attention of the NATO states from European disarmament problem towards entirely different direction. First and foremost it could be the revitalization of "cold war" and anti-détente forces, the result of which would be a substantial increase of the NATO's armament efforts. Such a development could make the European dialogue on disarmament purposeless. Secondly, equally negative influence on prospects of further European disarmament could have the intensification of NATO

efforts to exploit undertaken negotiations for other purposes than the sincere pursuit of reduction of military confrontation in Europe. It could be connected, first of all, with the intensification of already perceptible tendencies to treat the discussion of European disarmament:

- as a means of pressure or as a lever for controlling and setting back the progress of détente in Europe and first of all the course and the results of the first Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe;

- as an instrument which should help to bring about political changes in Eastern Europe;

- as a convenient pretext to intensify the efforts in the sphere of political and military integration in Western Europe including efforts aimed at the creation of a form of European nuclear force.

There is no need of further consideration of the possibilities of the misuse of discussions on disarmament as an instrument to set back or to condition the process of détente in Europe. There were examples of this kind of activity in the practice of the last few years. The likelihood of such activities in the following years should not be ignored. However, attention should be paid also to the fact that such attempts ~~should~~ are likely to not only "successfully" hamper the détente process in Europe but also to become the cause of the reduction negotiations' failure. The previous experience and the failures of the similar NATO attempts in the past, e.g. - the inefficiency and the disservice of subordinating the problem of disarmament to the realization of Western postulates, connected with the German problem - may prevent from establishing a junctim among the complicated European problems. The artificial establishment of such a junctim can prove to be an effective method for the hampering of whatsoever progress on both the planes.

In the opinion of some Western statesmen, another purpose which should be served by the European negotiations on disarmament and by agreements reached in their result, is to help to change the political status quo in Eastern Europe.

Leaving aside the possibilities of realization of such an aim /it seems that some authors while discussing the political

stability of the socialist states, fall into what one may call "wishful thinking", which has no connection with the reality/ the mere setting of such an aim has a highly prejudicial influence. It introduces into the negotiations an element of suspicion as to the true intentions of the other party- and what more, it averts the attention from the cardinal problems of disarmament and European security.

The tendency of taking advantage of the mutual reductions problem for intensification of efforts directed at accomplishment of military and political integration of Western Europe is something like the other side of this same coin. These efforts are also meant to bring about the change of the present military and political status quo and create another one - more favourable for the NATO countries. What is amazing in the Western considerations of this question is both the minimalization of the negative effects that such policy may bring about and the assumption of a relatively indifferent position of Eastern Europe on this problem. One cannot leave that problem aside without making at least some observations.

The propagation of the idea of Western European military integration which is based on emphasizing the alleged military superiority of the Warsaw Pact, actually shakes the possibility of any disarmament negotiations in Europe, at least until such integration is brought into life. What more, in this case, the maintenance of the "mutual reduction" postulate by the NATO seems to be irrational if these "mutual reductions" are meant to be a subject of working discussions and mutual concessions and not to be a demand of the other party's capitulation. If negotiations on arms reduction are opened and carried on, the trend towards the military integration will undoubtedly influence the negotiation positions of both sides. On the one hand, the major subject of interest for the Western partners in the discussion will be not so much the consideration of possible agreements from the point of view of their significance for the European security as from the point of view of their probable influence on or conformity with the integrational efforts. Their major preoccupation, in general, will be directed towards military integration; the question of ~~integration~~ reduction will be only a possible and not necessary function of this trend.

On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact states while defining their negotiation position will not be able to neglect such a substantial fact as the simultaneous efforts of their partners to increase their military potential. Whatever may be said about the purposes of such an integration - about the "greater rationalization of the military efforts" of the Western Europe, about "new distribution of the defence burden in the NATO", about "structural and organizational changes within the framework of the NATO" - the major purpose of the integration remains the increase of the effectiveness of the military potential of the Western Europe.

/The mere fusion of potentials will not mean a new quantitative but a qualitative formation and thus the existing military configuration shall be subjected to changes/.

As to the consequences of such integration, it is scarcely possible that the position of the Warsaw Pact members - as it is often accepted - would be indifferent. It concerns in particular the position of the smaller Eastern European countries as well as of all smaller European countries in general which would find themselves outside the integration framework. It would mean for them that they would be facing a new, great European power, even if still in statu nascendi, possessing, however, behind it centuries of great power and imperialistic policies and behaviour, and with ambitions /already admitted or not/ to conduct such policies in the future. It would also mean a new stage in European politics contradictory to the present tendencies, towards a new system of security, the realization of which would be of significant importance, especially for the smaller European countries. This would also be a step towards the strengthening of military blocs. From the point of view of the socialist countries it would mean the establishment of a new military grouping remaining in an alliance with the USA and contributing to the general increase of the military potential of the West.

Of course, it can be maintained, as it is often done in Western Europe, that the drift towards military integration as well as the special interest in implementation of all kinds of "military constraints" results mainly from the desire to guarantee Western European security not so much against an open attack /which at present is rather unlikely/ as against the political consequences

of a lack of military balance in Europe, i.e. the lack of balance between the military potential of the Soviet Union and the Western European countries, especially in conditions of weakened US engagement in Europe. Even if it is assumed that this kind of argument reveals the actual fears of Western Europe and that it is not a convenient and tactical platform of reasoning, serious reservations can be made both as to the assumptions on which it is based as well as to the conclusions following from it. The possibility that the USA will withdraw from its engagements in Europe and from its alliance commitments towards Europe is quite unlikely. The security of European countries is based not so much on the existence of regional balance /Western Europe vs. Warsaw Pact/ as on the global balance /NATO vs. Warsaw Pact/. Thus, the present anxieties to search a regional balance is actually an anxiety to upset the global balance. The preoccupation with the limitation of the role of military forces in the European relations and at the same time the consideration of the future picture of Europe in categories of the maintained if not strengthened confrontation of military blocs is internally inconsistent: the essence of any balanced of power system is the political role played by military power.

One can believe, therefore, that the policy of the Western European countries based on the above mentioned apprehensions should take rather a thoroughly different direction - of gradual building of a new security system in Europe which in its nature would limit the role of the military forces in Europe and would make possible their gradual elimination; a system which would increase the importance of cooperation and economic interdependence and diminish the military division of Europe; a system members of which, apart from the European countries, could be the USA and Canada. In other words, this kind of apprehension should rather induce the Western European countries to accept the invitation of the Warsaw Pact countries to begin a discussion and to work out together new principles for organizing European security. The NATO members have tried to avoid such a discussion hitherto, while trying to achieve temporary aims which in fact do not solve any of essential European problems /both for the NATO and Warsaw Pact/ and which can make only European situation more complicated.