

INCONTRO ITALO - JUGOSLAVO

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1) I rapporti internazionali sono in via di mutamento. Il colloquio russo-americano è divenuto più fitto, sta elaborando una lingua comune e sta raggiungendo alcuni sostanziali risultati. Tutto questo avviene entro i limiti dell'equilibrio internazionale assicurato dal dopoguerra, specialmente in Europa. E' necessario esaminare se tale mutamento di rapporti comporta anche un mutamento dell'equilibrio e quindi della struttura stessa del sistema internazionale, in primo luogo in Europa.

2) La distensione e l'affermarsi della sicurezza europea non sono ancora riconoscibili come un processo continuo senza soluzioni di continuità, e logicamente coerente. Le principali discontinuità riguardano il suo andamento nel tempo (con brusche interruzioni e svolte), il suo allargamento geografico (resterà confinato a "zone" o riguarderà progressivamente l'intera area europea?), e la sua logica strategica (non è chiara la connessione tra strategico e tattico, tra "santuari" e resto del mondo, eccetera). Tutte queste discontinuità influiscono negativamente sui rapporti interni ai due blocchi, tra europei e superpotenze. Si creano situazioni

di crisi che non trovano sbocco, e che quindi si ripercuotono sulla sicurezza europea. Si affermano posizioni difensive e garantiste, chiuse ad un allargamento del dialogo. Si ha un senso generale di incertezza che non può essere alleviato dal semplice proseguimento del dialogo russo-americano, ma che richiede una più completa ridefinizione del sistema internazionale.

3) La distensione in campo militare è accompagnata da un sostanziale aumento di contatti economici. E' però difficile sostenere che tali contatti porteranno alla formazione di un nuovo mercato aperto, o comunque allo stabilimento di un'area economica integrata. I contatti tra i due sistemi economici avvengono tuttora secondo metodi di baratto, che cercano di eludere le esistenti strettoie monetarie. La politica di apertura di crediti fatta dagli occidentali non è sufficiente a garantire una crescente integrazione economica, per la differenza delle strutture. Ove si verifica una maggiore interdipendenza (come nel rapporto Jugoslavia-Europa occidentale: interdipendenza che neanche le aperture di credito sovietiche sembrano intaccare; avviene anzi che esse rimangano disattese) ciò è permesso da una diversa organizzazione della società economica.

4) I crescenti contatti economici possono facilitare una certa evoluzione delle strutture produttive, commerciali e finanziarie orientali. Tuttavia l'attuale impostazione della sicurezza europea esalta, più che diminuire il ruolo dei governi, chiamati a garantire e regolamentare la distensione. La liberalizzazione economica dipenderà quindi sempre più dalla disponibilità politica dei singoli governi.

5) L'attuale corso della sicurezza europea sembra ben delimitato entro i confini dei due blocchi contrapposti. L'attenuazione della guerra fredda può non comportare un avvicinamento dei due sistemi occidentale e orientale. Il rapporto bilaterale USA-URSS riguarda la sicurezza globale. La sicurezza europea è un processo più complesso che vede in primo luogo i rapporti tra europei occidentali e USA, e i rapporti tra europei orientali e URSS. L'andamento di tali rapporti fornisce il quadro particolare della sicurezza europea.

6) Se si considerano le caratteristiche del sistema di sicurezza europeo che al momento attuale sembra delinearsi, si ottengono due quadri differenti, a est e ad ovest. L'URSS è riuscita a riguadagnare pienamente l'iniziativa nel campo socialista: soffocati i tentativi più avanzati di liberalizzazione interna, essa ha preso la leadership dei rapporti con l'occidente, e delle iniziative verso il terzo mondo (in particolare il vecchio mondo dei non allineati: India, Egitto .....). I paesi europei orientali hanno subito questo mutamento di rotta sovietico e non sembrano per ora in grado di proporre linee alternative o correttive. Gli esperimenti più interessanti divengono quelli di politica interna (la liberalizzazione ungherese), sottoposti però a pesanti ricatti economici e politici sovietici. I rapporti interni al blocco orientale si vanno multilateralizzando (crescente importanza del Comecon e delle agenzie integrate), ma tale multilateratismo è pienamente controllato da Mosca. L'integrazione progressiva del campo orientale attorno all'URSS è ormai ostacolata solo da forze nazionalistiche e da forze libertarie. Si ripropone così a est lo schema di alleanze tra libertari e nazionalisti tipico del nostro ottocento. La situazione internazionale è però completamente diversa: il fallimento dell'ideologia nazionale e degli stati nazionali, come piloni di un ordinamento pacifico internazionale,

è fuori di dubbio. Le forze di liberalizzazione si troveranno sempre più di fronte al dilemma tra scelta nazionale e scelta sovietica: una evoluzione interna dell'URSS potrebbe alleggerire in parte questa situazione, ma non risolverla poichè rimarrebbe la differenza strutturale tra le economie dei paesi europei orientali e quella sovietica. La soluzione a tale dilemma risiede in una completa modifica delle istituzioni politiche del blocco orientale che però non pare possibile. In sua assenza assisteremo probabilmente ad un rapido peggioramento della situazione orientale.

7) Nel blocco occidentale il rapporto USA -Europa è arrivato ad un bivio. I negoziati euro-americani in corso muteranno l'intero panorama: Kissinger ha sollevato questo problema nel suo discorso per una nuova carta atlantica. L'Europa potrà divenire un "interlocuteur valable", per gli USA, solo se saprà darsi una voce univoca nei prossimi mesi. Altrimenti sarà un alleato regionale della potenza globale americana. Il processo di sicurezza europeo dipende dalla scelta dell'Europa occidentale. Nel primo caso infatti acquisteranno maggior peso i negoziati euro-sovietici, e ciò potrà portare ad un mutamento del sistema internazionale. Nel secondo caso invece l'URSS continuerà a mantenere buoni rapporti con i singoli stati europei, ma il sistema internazionale sarà amministrato per i prossimi dieci anni almeno da USA e URSS.

8) Mentre l'Italia partecipa alla scelta europea occidentale, i Balcani restano una regione più periferica dei blocchi. Essere alla periferia in questo sistema internazionale significa essere più insicuri: vi è un maggiore pericolo di guerre politiche e militari, di crisi economica eccetera. Sinora la capacità di "crisis management" delle due superpotenze si è manifestata là dove massima era la tensione: al centro, non alla periferia. La proposta di "neutralizzare" i

Balcani o di stabilire un " patto di sicurezza" specialmente valido per quest'area ( sul modello di ciò che è avvenuto per la Germania), si scontra contro questa realtà. "Congelare" oggi i Balcani è tanto più difficile perchè gli interessi e l'impegno delle superpotenze non sono ancora arrivati al limite massimo. E' quindi probabile che tale regione resti in una condizione di generale incertezza. Un elemento nuovo potrebbe essere rappresentato da una attiva politica europea occidentale. In sua assenza i Balcani diverranno sempre più un elemento di collegamento tra situazione mediterranea e situazione centro-europea, subendo le negative conseguenze di ambedue ( il disordine mediterraneo e la politica rigida del centro-Europa).

Stati come la Jugoslavia o la Romania si trovano a dover compiere delle scelte importanti. Essi possono puntare sulla politica intra-balcanica, ma in questo caso dovranno ricercare un accordo tra USA e URSS che non potrà non limitare gravemente la loro libertà d'azione. Oppure potranno aggregarsi all'uno o all'altro dei due blocchi, rischiando però di dover rinunciare alla loro originalità politica. O infine potremo tentare di mantenere una posizione più o meno non-allineata, che sarà però sempre più priva di alleati (a meno che non nasca una " alternativa europea").

# The Balkans and European Security

LEO MATES

The favourable turn of events in the central part of Europe in the past two years, and in particular the progress made in the sphere of East-West relations in and around Germany, has opened new vistas for security in Europe. This central region used to be the centre of strife and contest which led to the high tensions of the cold war. It is, therefore, understandable that improvement in this area should awaken hopes for a general settlement of all troubles and conflicts in Europe.

Attention has now been focused, naturally, on the Balkan Peninsula, which has been known in the past as 'the powder keg of Europe'. This region remains basically unaffected by the advances in the East-West relations. As a matter of fact, these developments have had only an indirect effect on the south-eastern portion of the Continent. The basic pattern of relations there remains unchanged and still produces tremors and occasionally substantial tensions.

Trouble in the Balkan Peninsula began with the breaking up of the empires of Eastern Europe during the later part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The struggle between the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia over the domination of the Peninsula gave way to the belated emergence of national states in that region. This development attracted the attention of the great powers of the period and a new era of confrontation and strife began. Then the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed in 1918 and the political pattern within and around the area changed again.

It is significant that after World Wars I and II the Balkan Peninsula became a stumbling-block for the peace-makers. The significance and role of the Balkans as an area of confrontation between the great powers after World War II was greatly over-shadowed by the intense confrontation in the central part of the Continent, and the division of Germany, the dispute over the western

boundary of Poland, and the debate over the future of Austria, became the main post-war problems in the relations between East and West.

In the circumstances, it was generally assumed that the regulation of these problems would bring to an end the political tensions and the sense of insecurity for Europe as a whole. In a sense this was true for the central and northern parts of the Continent. The Balkan situation was, however, not a mere reflection of the East-West confrontation centred around Germany. It had certain specific features which derived from its history, its geographic position, its domestic political conditions, and its social structure. In particular, the comparatively late formation of national states in the Peninsula resulted in a high degree of national sensitivity and enhanced rivalry in their mutual relations. (One could, of course, say the same of the new states in Central Europe, but there is a difference between the two areas, because of the concentration of a greater number of new states in the Balkans. Relations in the Balkan area have developed into an intricate web of confrontations within a cluster of states, all of them in many ways differing one from the other.)

The complexity of inter-regional relations has been made even more intricate by the growing interest in the area of the great powers. The combination of this political tangle and the geographical position of the Peninsula must be taken into consideration in examining the Balkan scene. The situation there is the product of multilateral relations within a cluster of highly sensitive small states, is strongly affected by different foreign influences and suffers severely from the stresses of the dominant tensions on the world scene.

The great powers, and in particular the two major powers, have, since the war, made considerable efforts to gain reliable and decisive control over the Balkan area, or at least over some part of it. It had already become apparent during the war that influence over the Balkan Peninsula would have to be shared between the

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Soviet Union and the West. Consequently, both sides tried to expand and to strengthen their control there. It was, of course, impossible to assign the percentages or territorial reaches of influence around a conference table, as attempted by Winston Churchill in Moscow in 1944;\* the issue remained open.

But fortune on the field of battle and internal developments in the region defeated all plans concerning the distribution of influences. During the first two years after the war it looked as if Stalin had won full control over all Balkan countries except Greece and Turkey. This was, of course, a great disappointment to the West. The Soviet Union was even speculating about the possibility of gaining decisive influence in Greece. Britain had found it necessary to intervene militarily in Greece at the end of the war. Later, the Truman Doctrine was designed to regain and strengthen the influence of the West in that country.

Three years after the war the pattern started to change, and the Soviet Union had her share of disappointment. The influence of the Soviet Union was weakened by a succession of events beginning with breakaway of Yugoslavia. At the same time, the West could not take advantage of these new developments. In fact, not one Balkan country changed sides during the cold war. The region has turned out to be rather unmanageable from the point of view of alliances. The Balkan states have not fitted well into the patterns of alliances established around the great powers, nor have they successfully developed a stable pattern of relations among themselves.

In the Balkan Peninsula there are today six independent states: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia. They have so far succeeded in climbing to six different levels of economic development ranging from the early-industrial-development stage to the stage of a combined agrarian-industrial economy with an annual GNP of around \$1000 *per capita*. More significant, however, is the fact that the division of the area between the two blocs after World War II did not produce a durable bipolar pattern of relations.

\* Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Triumph and Tragedy*. London: Cassell; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953. p. 227.

Yugoslavia was the first to disrupt the bipolar pattern, breaking away from the Eastern Bloc in 1948. After a period of self-imposed isolation, Yugoslavia developed significant and widespread relations with the Third World and became one of the most active states in the movement of the non-aligned and underdeveloped countries of the world. She was the first country to leave a bloc.

The next move came in 1961 when the strains in relations between the Soviet Union and Albania which had been building up for sometime finally caused an open rupture. At the same time Albania developed close relations with China, siding with China in the conflict between Peking and Moscow. (Lately, with the new change in the Chinese attitude towards world affairs, Albania has begun to improve relations with her neighbours, Yugoslavia and Greece.)

The bipolar pattern was further affected by the increasing independence, in diplomatic and economic spheres, of Rumania during the 60s. Closer ties were developed both with China and with Western nations. Diplomatic relations were established with the Federal Republic of Germany, against strong opposition from the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. Since then Rumania has developed very friendly relations with Yugoslavia. This is at present the only instance of untroubled friendly relations between states in the Peninsula.

Finally, the relations between the two Western-oriented states, Greece and Turkey, have remained strained ever since the outbreak of the conflict over Cyprus. Both governments have appealed for help and support to individual Western powers, without much visible result. The situation on the island and relations between Greece and Turkey remain tense.

Bulgaria alone has retained intact her alliances with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. She has participated faithfully in all diplomatic and military activities of the alliance. She is the only Balkan state to have maintained undisturbed relations with its centre of alignment during the whole of the post-war period.

The result of these developments has been the formation of a regional multi polar pattern in the Peninsula. No two Balkan countries can be considered to be truly bilaterally aligned. Moreover, with the exception of the relations between Yugoslavia and Rumania,

all bi-lateral relations are for the most part strained, if not openly hostile.

The varying tensions in this region have not, however, grown into serious confrontations. They have been kept below the threshold of open crisis by two factors: the relatively low level of military power; and the interest of the major powers to prevent an open crisis in this critical area. The power level has not permitted independent local military action and disregard for interferences from outside, and the high degree of great-power interests has ruled out the possibility that the major powers would be able to remain out of a Balkan conflict.

The scene has been dominated, therefore, during the post-war years, by local tensions, combined with a concern about outside interference. This concern was, of course, intensified by the growing East-West confrontation of the cold war. In fact this confrontation contributed to the growing of intra-regional tensions in some cases (between countries divided by differing ideology or alignment), but did not contribute to the lessening of tensions between others (those which were on the same side of the fence in the cold war).

The Balkan Peninsula has thus become a kind of small world of its own, but remains highly influenced by those strains and stresses which have, since World War II, dominated the world scene. It has, as a consequence, developed into a kind of a miniature image of the world—a microcosm. The rise of non-alignment, as well as the cold war, and later the formation of the power triangle among the super-powers, have been faithfully reflected in this miniature. But the Balkan Peninsula has not merely reflected the world; it has remained a sensitive part of the world, and in particular of Europe.

The Balkan Peninsula has also been the area which has proved the most bitter disappointment to the great powers since the last war. It has been, in a sense, an area of political activity in which all the major participants have been losers, but not one has behaved like a good loser. Their actions in the area always looked defensive to them, or at least designed to protect some acquired interest, while the action of others appeared always as threatening or offensive.

This particular type of controlled but relentless tension within the area itself and in its relations with the outside world was caused, and has been

maintained, by the geographical position of the Peninsula. In this respect two features should be pointed out as significant. The first is the location of the area on the periphery of the main zone of contact between East and West in Europe; and the second is the position of the Peninsula in the Mediterranean area.

This latter has greatly contributed to the special role of the region in European and world politics. But there is more to the story. The Mediterranean is in itself a delicate theatre of confrontation between East and West. In view of the perennial Arab-Israeli conflict and of Soviet-American naval rivalry, as well as of other forms of conflicting or rival interests, this wider region south of Europe can neither regain tranquillity (if it ever had it), nor be permitted by the major powers to become the opening stage of another world war.

The Balkans, in fact, should not be primarily considered as an area lying between the two major military alliance systems, but rather as a stepping stone for each of the alliances towards wider areas. Through this area extend the land route from the north-east Europe to the Mediterranean, and the route from central Europe to the Middle East. It is the stepping stone between Europe and Africa.

The Peninsula has somehow been destined to become a zone of special, multiform and frequently controversial interests. Tensions and strife are the natural outgrowths of this condition and of the geographical position of the region, but it is also an area wherein it was too dangerous to allow open conflict to develop in the nuclear era. Tensions in the Balkan Peninsula reflect the general state of current world politics—subdued tensions and controlled confrontation.

Peace and security in the Balkan area is, therefore, not a regional problem, or the concern of the Balkan countries alone. Security in Europe cannot be attained if the situation in the Peninsula continues to be regarded as only a peripheral concern of European politics. Security in Europe cannot be attained by settlement in one part of the continent alone.

Central Europe is the place where the two alliances meet directly, and are divided only by a line of demarcation, a boundary. There, the direct balance of forces, or the 'balance of terror', is maintained by the understanding that

neither side can change the line dividing the blocs. Somehow, this is the line where only a 'trench cold-warfare', a confrontation based on firm territorial positions, could be waged, if tensions should mount. The South-East, the Balkan Peninsula, is on the contrary, 'open country', it is open-ended, leading to other important regions and not strictly divided into two political or military camps. If ever tensions should mount there, any conflict is more likely to take the form of sweeping movements, than confrontation based on fixed positions.

Unless this potential theatre of strategic moves and manoeuvres is stabilized, the stabilization in central Europe will remain sus-

pending in mid-air, without a firm foundation. Changes in the balance in the South or the South-East can easily upset the precarious balance in the centre and set it into motion as well. It is not easy to define the main element of stability or security in Europe, but it may be true that one of the weakest spots in the structure is the situation in the Balkan Peninsula. Unless the general trend towards *détente* in Europe brings more stability to this area it is probable that the small controversies of the Peninsula may again erupt into gigantic clashes between the great powers. Only a truly pan-European, multilateral settlement in Europe could extend security and stability also to the Balkan Peninsula.