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1

The Five Religions of Modern Italy

Robert N. Bellah

I

Benedetto Croce began his well known book, History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, with a chapter entitled "The Religion of Liberty." After describing various features of liberalism as it came to be expressed in the early nineteenth century he writes:

> Now he who gathers together and considers all these characteristics of the liberal ideal does not hesitate to call it what it was: a "religion." He calls it so, of course, because he looks for what is essential and intrinsic in every religion, which always lies in the concept of reality and an ethics that conforms to this concept ... Nothing more was needed to give them a religious character, since personifications, myths, legends, dogmas, rites, propitiations, expiations, priestly classes, pontifical robes, and the like do not belong to the intrinsic, and are taken out from particular religions and set up as requirements for every religion with ill effect.[1]

It is clear that Croce wishes to broaden the definition of religion beyond the traditionally religious elements which he heaps together in the last sentence and which point to Catholicism. Croce's argument is close enough to my own that, following him, I will treat modern Italy as a land not of one religion, as common sense would indicate, but of several. Even the varieties that I will consider are all but one to be found in Croce's book. In his second chapter, "Opposing Religious Faiths," he discusses as competitors to liberalism, Catholicism and socialism, and in his last chapter he discusses a more recent religion which he calls activism and which includes, among other things, Fascism, though that word is not mentioned.[2] I will add a fifth

religion, or class of religions, which I will argue precedes temporally, and in a sense, logically, all the others, and which I will call pre-Christian or sub-Christian religion. But I will not be satisfied, as Croce largely was, to lay out passively and statically the five religions side by side.

Antonio Gramsci criticized Croce's History of Europe for beginning in 1815 and also his History of Italy[3] for beginning in 1870, that is just after but not including the French Revolution in the one book or the Risorgimento in the other, and so excluding "the moment of struggle; the moment in which the conflicting forces are formed, are assembled and take up their positions; the moment in which one ethical-political system dissolves and another is formed by fire and steel; the moment in which one system of social relations disintegrates and falls and another arises and asserts itself."[4] Gramsci's view of the "religions" is instructive because it emphasizes the element of struggle, of process, of politics. His conception of religion modulates from the Crocean to something more recognizably Marxist:

> Note the problem of religion taken not in the confessional sense but in the secular sense of a unity of faith between a conception of the world and a corresponding norm of conduct. But why call this unity of faith "religion" and not "ideology," or even frankly "politics"?[5]

Gramsci sees two major functions of such "religions." One is essentially defensive or one might say "integrative":

> But at this point we reach the fundamental problem facing any conception of the world, any philosophy which has become a cultural movement, a "religion," a "faith," any that has produced a form of practical activity or will in which the philosophy is contained as an implicit theoretical "premiss." One might say "ideology" here, but on condition that the word is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in all manifestations of individual and collective life. This problem is that of preserving the ideological unity of the entire social bloc which that ideology serves to cement and unify.[6]

The other is to provide new forms of consciousness appropriate for new stages of social development. Of particular importance to Gramsci is a religion or ideology which can provide a "national-popular collective will"[7] such as he saw in Protestantism in the Reformation or Jacobinism in the French Revolution. For him the particular problem of Italy arose from the fact that the Rennaissance was not in this respect the equivalent of the Reformation nor was the Risorgimento the equivalent of the French Revolution. It thus remained the task of Marxism ("The Philosophy of praxis corresponds to the nexus Protestant Reformation plus French Revolution")[8] to awaken the national-popular collective will so long dormant in Italy. One need not accept fully the terms of Gramsci's dynamic analysis to see that it usefully supplements Croce's more static structure.

In addition to the theoretical resources drawn from Croce and Gramsci I would like to apply two concepts of my own developed from the analysis of American and Japanese society. In dealing with the religious dimension of American political life I borrowed the notion of "civil religion" from Rousseau and showed the extent to which a rather articulated set of religious beliefs and practices had grown up in the American polity which was independent from though not necessarily hostile to the various church religions that flourish in America.[9] In applying the notion to Italy it becomes important to realize that all five religions are civil religions. This is above all because Italian Catholicism is and has always been a civil religion. Not only is it the nature of Catholicism generally, or at least until quite recently and in certain countries like the United States, to express itself in particular social and political forms, but above all because the papacy, with its ineradicably political implications, has been for centuries an Italian institution. It has

therefore, and again until quite recently, been impossible to challenge the Catholic political system without challenging Catholicism as a religion. It is for that reason that, especially in Italy, liberalism, socialism and activism have had to be civil religions, religio-political organisms, in competition with the Catholic civil religion. The inter-relations and indeed inter-penetrations are important, as we shall see, but the general point still stands. The sense in which the pre- or sub-Christian religions are civil religions is somewhat different and necessitates the application of still another concept, the "religious ground bass."

I developed the notion of the religious ground bass to get at that aspect of Japanese religion that cannot be subsumed under the headings of "Buddhism" or "Confucianism."[10] It is close to what is meant by "Shinto" not in the more formal aspects of that not very formal religion, but at the point where Shinto shades off into the religion of the basic social structure itself, the religion embedded in the family, village, work group, etc. What is evident in Japan just because there is such a thing as "Shinto" is more obscure in Italy but nonetheless important. It is there that I want to begin.

II

As a figure of a much more general phenomenon and as an example of its most extreme form let us consider Carlo Levi's description of the religious life of a southern village in which he lived for a year, a life so alien that he considers it not only pre-Christian but in a sense pre-religious.

> To the peasants everything has a double meaning. The cow-woman, the werewolf, the lion-baron, the goat-devil are only notorious and striking examples. People, trees, animals, even objects and words have a double life. Only reason, religion, and history have clear-cut meanings. But the feeling for life itself, for art, language, and love is complex, infinitely so. And in the peasants' world there is no room for reason, religion, and history. There is no room for religion, because to them everything participates in divinity, everything is actually, not merely symbolically, divine: Christ and the goat; the heavens above, and the beasts of the field below; everything is bound up in natural magic. Even the ceremonies of the church become pagan rites, celebrating the existence of inanimate things, which the peasants endow with a soul, the innumerably earthy divinities of the village.[11]

This passage and the one that follows are interesting not only as descriptions of what Levi saw but of how a cultivated Italian intellectual thought about what he saw. The following is a description of the procession at the local feast of the Virgin Mary:

> Amid this warlike thundering [of firecrackers] there was no happiness or religious ecstasy in the people's eyes; instead they seemed prey to a sort of madness, a pagan throwing off of restraint, and a stunned or hypnotized condition; all of them were highly wrought up. The animals ran about wildly, goats leaped, donkeys brayed, dogs barked, children shouted, and women sang. Peasants with baskets of wheat in their hands threw fistfuls of it at the Madonna, so that she might take thought for the harvest and bring them good luck. The grains curved through the air, fell on the paving stones and bounced up off them with a light noise like that of hail. The black-faced Madonna, in the shower of wheat, among the animals, the gunfire, and the trumpets, was no sorrowful Mother of God, but rather a subterranean deity, black with the shadows of the bowels of the earth, a peasant Persephone or lower world goddess of the harvest.[12]

Not only, for Levi, do the peasants live at a level of "subterranean" intensity beneath the "clear-cut meanings" of reason, religion and history, they are finally and deeply antagonistic to those meanings:

> Governments, Theocracies and Armies are, of course, stronger than the scattered peasants. So the peasants have to resign themselves to being dominated, but they cannot feel as their own the glories and undertakings of a civilization that is radically their enemy. The only wars that touch their hearts are those in which they have fought to defend themselves against that civilization, against History and Government, Theocracy and the Army. These wars they fought under their own black pennants, without military leadership or training and without hope, ill-fated wars that they were bound to lose, fierce and desperate wars, incomprehensible to historians.[13]

I would like to take Levi's description of the pre-Christian or sub-Christian religion of a desperately poor village in the far South of Italy as standing for that particularistic religious life, embedded in the roots of the social structure, that I have referred to metaphorically as the religious ground bass. Here I would include all those loyalties to family and clan, to pseudo-kinship groups like the mafia, to village and town, to faction and clique, that so often in Italy as elsewhere ultimately define reality more significantly for their members than all the formal religions and ideologies combined. The musical metaphor of the ground bass is meant to suggest a deep and repetitious sonority, a drone bass, that continues in spite of all melodic developments in the upper registers, the more formal theologies and philosophies, and not infrequently drowns them out altogether.

While something like a religious ground bass is probably universal, its strength relative to other components of the religio-cultural system is certainly variable -- probably greater in Japan than in China, in Italy than in France or England. Its strength within Italy also clearly varies in time and space -- stronger a century ago than today, stronger in the South than in

the North -- but of the latter contrast I have come to suspect that the South stands not only for a geographical region but for a region in the Italian soul, and that there is something of the "South" everywhere in Italy. The characteristics of the particularistic religion generally can be extrapolated from Levi's description: it is emotional and intense in contrast to the ascetic rationalism of high Italian culture, it is fiercely closed to the outside world (there is not one such religion but as many as there are groups), as opposed to the universalism of high Italian thought, and it is presided over by a woman, an epiphany of the Great Mother of the Mediterranean world, only partially and uncertainly articulated with the Virgin of Nazareth.

To borrow an analogy from the political realm we might say that the religious ground bass has been traditionally the "real religion" and Catholicism the "legal religion." Certainly the attitude toward the church has often been legalistic and external -- one does what one must in terms of the deep loyalties and obligations of the particularistic structure and then squares it as best one can with the demands of the church. The statesman Minghetti, himself a religious man, described the Italian masses in the late nineteenth century as almost devoid of "religious sentiment." For them, he said, "habit counts for more than faith. The latter has little influence on thought, and even less on action."[14] The degree to which a genuine Catholic piety has penetrated the Italian masses has varied in time and place over the last century, but it must certainly be said that Catholic identity has often been more of a shield for particularistic loyalties than an expression of deep inner faith. But then the same thing must be said for the secular religions of liberalism and socialism as well.

Only in this connection can we understand how a society which seems, if one considers its articulate and self-conscious classes so intensely ideological, can show such low rates of political and ideological knowledge and involvement when compared with other modern societies.[15] The gap between intellectuals and masses, between conscious ideology and popular feeling is probably greater than in most Western countries. This can be and has been interpreted in terms of fragmentation and alienation,[16] but we need more than merely negative terms to describe what is going on here. The ground bass religion involves deep loyalties and even a kind of faith. It is understandable as a defensive reaction to a long history of bad government, oppression and brutality, especially in the south, and to the partial failure of mass religious and ideological movements to penetrate the masses. But it is also the expression of a cultural continuity with an ancient past, a form of culture that is not only pre-modern but also pre-Christian and even pre-Roman. In particular there seems to be something very central about the place of the woman in the ground bass culture, a place never quite adequately expressed in the writings of the self-conscious intellectuals. The position of the Italian woman is markedly less equal than in most modern societies, but as the female opposition to the divorce law suggests, there are other rewards for women in the traditional system than equality.

Finally, we may consider the ground bass religion as a civil religion, not of the nation but of the particular group whose essence it expresses. As such it may be a powerful force in combination, alliance or opposition to one of the great rival civil religions seeking dominance in the state. An Italian professor pointed out to me that there is always in Italy a gap between believing and doing and that between belief and action comes the political

calculus. But political here, I think, refers primarily to group interest and group loyalty rather than to civic concerns broadly expressed. The priority of particular group loyalties has protected the Italians from the worst extremes of ideological passion of the twentieth century -- even facism never went very deep -- but it has also operated to undermine a genuine commitment to democratic and liberal values when these did not seem to pay off for particular groups.

III

The presence of the papacy in Italy has always been a mixed blessing for Italian spirituality. It has inhibited the development of a national church in the sense that France or Spain have national churches, religious patterns that are at the same time genuinely Catholic and expressive of the national popular culture. The ablest of the Italian clergy have been drawn into the international bureaucracy of the church, not into the formulation of a peculiarly national expression. At the same time the political priorities of the papacy seem to have inhibited in recent centuries the intellectual and devotional creativity which the church has sometimes shown in other countries. Until a little over a century ago the papacy was itself a temporal power, one of the major states of Italy, and it remains to this day a sovereign state recognized diplomatically by many nations. It is quite impossible to understand the history of modern Italian Catholicism without understanding the politics of the papacy.

Gramsci's analysis of Italian history focussed around the recurrent problem of the isolation of a cosmopolitan intellectual elite from a national-popular base which the structure of the Italian Church exemplified but did not originate. Indeed he traces this phenomenon back to the formation of a class of "imperial" intellectuals in the early Roman Empire.[17] Nor did, in his view, the modern secular intellectuals wholly escape from an analogous position relative to the mass of the Italian people. But in many respects the Catholic clergy remain paradigmatic of the place of the intellectual in Italy and the two-class structure of the church, the clear distinction between the religiously elite clergy and the common people, has had enormous general

repercussions. It is in part to this phenomenon, emphasized especially by the presence of the central organ of the church, the papacy, that I would link the tendency of Italian thinkers of all persuasions to think in terms of elites, of governing classes and political classes, more or less clearly differentiated from the general population.

One of Gramsci's central theoretical problems is the conditions under which an "organic" intelligentsia is formed, that is one which is closely tied to a social group or class, which expresses its inner needs and aspirations rather than as has usually been the case in Italy one that remains isolated from effective social involvement. It is this perspective that explains why for Gramsci the lack of an Italian Reformation is such a significant fact: "The Lutheran Reformation and Calvinism created a vast national-popular movement through which their influence spread ... The Italian reformers were infertile of any major historical success."[18] It is partly in response to that void of an Italian Reformation that we may understand Gramsci's fascination, and not Gramsci's alone but that of almost every major modern Italian intellectual, with Niccolo Machiavelli,[19] the Italian contemporary of Luther and Calvin. Gramsci treats Machiavelli as a Reformer in secular guise, a "precocious Jacobin," with a vision of a people armed, a national Italy, and Gramsci used the figure of Machiavelli's Prince to express the unifying and leading function of the modern Communist Party. Gramsci does not mention that in the Discourses Machiavelli expresses an admiration for the religion of the Ancient Romans, a truly "civil religion" relative to which he found Christianity largely impotent politically. Nonetheless Machiavelli's Discourses were undoubtedly one of the sources for that political faith that Gramsci so admired under the name of Jacobinism.

The Counter-Reformation in Italy has often been condemned for its political and cultural effects, for its final confirmation of absolutism as against any kind of popular sovereignty and for the stultifying consequences of its cultural policy. Its religious consequences were also negative, as for instance in the crushing of Sarpi's "national-popular" Catholicism in Venice.[20] The externality and legalism of Trent encouraged not a deeply internalized piety but only the theatrical and mannered religious fervor of the baroque.[21] Yet within the pores, so to speak, of Tridentine Catholicism other possibilities were growing. The sober and sincere piety of Alessandro Manzoni in the nineteenth century was perhaps only a harbinger of things to come: a serious lay piety that would penetrate and transform the popular consciousness, at least in certain areas of the North.

But long before the fruits of such an inner transformation could become evident the church was, in the middle of the nineteenth century, confronted with a major crisis: the emergence of the national question in Italy and the implications of unification for the papacy and the church. After a brief neo-Guelph flurry in 1847 and 1848, the first years of Pope Pius IX, when Italy was momentarily swept by the wild hope of an Italian Confederation under the presidency of the pope, it became clear that the papacy would not only not lead the process of unification but would vigorously oppose it. The church was ideologically still locked in an encounter with the French Revolution, which it saw as the work of a liberal sect spawned ultimately by the Protestant Reformation, and inimical to the principles of true religion. Throughout the nineteenth century the papacy resolutely opposed every effort to develop a liberal Catholicism and it always felt closer to absolutist regimes like that of Austria than to any liberal polity. It was, after all, one of the firmest

of the remaining absolute monarchies of Europe, and within Italy after 1848 it felt closer to almost every regime than to that of Constitutional Piedmont which was to form the territorial base for the effort of unification. It was not thus surprising that Italy had to be unified in the teeth of papal opposition and that devout Catholics mourned instead of celebrating when in March of 1861 Cavour proclaimed the existence of the Kingdom of Italy. For Italy could not be unified without that large block of territories in the center of the peninsula known as the Papal States, and given its hostility to the nature of the new regime and the continued assertion of temporal sovereignty which it would not relinquish for decades, the papacy would not accept the legitimacy of the new state. The aggreived papacy in effect declared its loyal followers to be without a country. By its famous non expedit decree it forbade Catholics to be electors or elected in the new nation. The Catholic Press referred to "King Victor Emmanuel" (presumably of Piedmont) and not to "the king" (of Italy). The liberal leaders of the new state did not engage in a religious persecution but neither did they fail to take advantage of their moment of triumph over the temporal power of the church. Many religious orders were dissolved and their properties confiscated. Anti-clerical demonstrations were not unknown and a certain anti-clerical rhetoric was common to the more radical liberal politicians.[22] A heritage of ill will was created in the first fifty years of the new nation whose full effects would not be evident until the Fascist period when the church, which on every conceivable ideological ground was antithetical to Fascism nonetheless found in it, at least at first, an ally, on the principle that an enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Finally, we may note that the church consistently referred to its lay opponents as "sects." The issue was not religion versus politics but two kinds of religion and two kinds of politics, or, two kinds of civil religion.

IV

Gramsci would have agreed with the Catholic apologists in seeing the French Revolution and its accompanying ideology as simply another stage of what had already been begun in the Reformation, though for him the valence would have been different:

> France was lacerated by the wars of religion leading to an apparent victory of Catholicism, but it experienced a great popular reformation in the eighteenth century with the Enlightenment, Voltairianism and the Encyclopaedia. This reformation preceded and accompanied the Revolution of 1789. It really was a matter here of a great intellectual and moral reformation of the French people, more complete than the German Lutheran Reformation, because it also embraced the great peasant masses in the countryside and had a distinct secular basis and attempted to replace religion with a completely secular ideology represented by the national patriotic bond.[23]

That aspect of liberalism, as I am using the term in this paper, which Gramsci describes above and tends to call "Jacobinism" with a very positive value, Croce, in whose terms this "secular ideology" was certainly a religion, called "democracy" with a rather negative value compared to the "liberalism" with which he identified. Croce contrasted the "democracy" of the eighteenth century as mechanical, intellectualist and abstractly egalitarian, whereas the "liberalism" of the early nineteenth century was personal, idealistic and historically organic:

> The democrats in their political ideal postulated a religion of quantity, of mechanics, of calculating reason or of nature, like that of the eighteenth century; the liberals, a religion of quality, of activity, of spirituality, such as that which had risen in the beginning of the nineteenth century: so that, even in this case, the conflict was one of religious faiths.[24]

Transferring these general conceptions to the Risorgimento itself we see a characteristic difference of evaluation between Croce and Gramsci. For

Croce Cavour is the great liberal hero of the Risorgimento, the man with a sense of organic continuity, of history, of the necessity of the monarchy. Mazzini, on the other hand is viewed by Croce as a mechanical democrat whose views would have ruptured the natural growth of Italian society and who justly failed. Gramsci sees the victory of Cavour and the moderates as a "passive revolution," a victory of the ruling classes that the moderates organically and effectively represented, but a defeat for the people. His sympathies would have been with Mazzini and Garibaldi had they been able to link their Action Party with the organic needs of the masses, especially the rural masses, but it was just this that they failed to do.

> The Action Party was steeped in the traditional rhetoric of Italian literature. It confused the cultural unity which existed in the peninsula -- confined, however, to a very thin stratum of the population, and polluted by the Vatican's cosmopolitanism -- with the political and territorial unity of the great popular masses, who were foreign to that cultural tradition and who, even supposing that they knew of its existence, couldn't care less about it. A comparison may be made between the Jacobins and the Action Party. The Jacobins strove with determination to ensure a bond between town and country, and they succeeded triumphantly.[25]

Both Croce and Gramsci, it seems to me, underestimate Mazzini, the greatest liberal and popular prophet of the nineteenth century, perhaps because both of them are too imbued with a Hegelian historicism that tends to applaud the winners. In spite of the fact that for nearly forty years Mazzini was the heart and soul of the movement for Italian unity, it was not his ideas that were actualized in 1871 and he ended his days in sadness and disappointment. But Mazzini's significance, as Luigi Salvatorelli has pointed out, is in his effort to re-establish the spiritual unity of the Italian people that had been draining away ever since the time of the medieval communes. His slogan "Dio e popolo" was not an empty phrase but the expression of a deep

national need:

> Every nationalistic conception presupposes the primacy of politics over any other activity of the spirit. The Mazzinian conception of the Risorgimento, on the other hand, completely overcomes the political through the spiritual. Not only is all ragion di stato radically rejected, but politics is integrally subordinated to ethics; and ethics is nothing but the application of religious faith. Mazzini took up the Italian religious problem, with a view toward a radical solution. Here we touch the true depths of the Mazzinian revolution. It does not reside in a political rearrangement (which might allow for gradualness and expediency); nor does it reside in insurrection, which is a simple temporary instrument; rather his revolution resides in this inner religious transformation. He speaks explicitly of a new faith, which goes not only beyond the old Christian confessions he now considers impotent, but also beyond the skeptical and materialist nonbelief of the eighteenth century ... What remains necessary is otherworldly faith, which for him is faith in God, who manifests himself to humanity through successive revelations; one day, all humanity will be called up to God, just as individuals ascend to him in their successive lives. Until such time as social unity is established, ecclesiastical and political authority must remain as independent of each other as possible. But once the new society has really been constituted, there will be no more reason for the separation of Church and state, or of political and religious institutions. Ethics will conform to faith, and will be realized in politics; so, too, the state shall be the Church and the Church shall be the state. No divorce between heaven and earth; our work on this earth is a sacred task, the realization of the reign of God.[26]

In the end, of course, the Risorgimento did not lead to such a grand national regeneration. It was a revolution "from above," a "passive revolution" leaving the Italian masses largely untouched. Cavour's formula of "a free church in a free state" was not only entirely unacceptable to the Vatican, it woefully underestimated the religious transformation that would have been necessary to create the free people for whom the free church and free state could have had real meaning. This is not to say that Cavour's own vision was not ethical and indeed religious in its own right. But it remained the special property of a ruling elite and was not really translated into a national culture.

Even when liberalism became so widespread among the educated classes, as it did by the end of the nineteenth century, that it was almost taken for granted, it was by no means securely institutionalized among the masses, as the rise of socialist, Catholic and fascist parties uncertainly committed or not committed at all to democratic institutions would subsequently show. But even the greatest of the twentieth century Italian liberals, Benedetto Croce, suffered from the elitist restriction that had always characterized Italian liberalism. Again it is Gramsci who makes the point when he criticizes Croce for not understanding that

> the philosophy of praxis, with its vast mass movement, has represented and does represent an historical process similar to the Reformation, in contrast with liberalism, which reproduces a Renaissance which is narrowly limited to restricted intellectual groups.... Croce is essentially anti-confessional (we cannot call him anti-religious given his definition of religious reality) and for numerous Italian and European intellectuals his philosophy ... has been a genuine intellectual and moral reform similar to the Renaissance ... But Croce did not 'go to the people,' did not wish to become a 'national' element (just as the men of the Renaissance -- unlike the Lutherans and Calvinists -- were not 'national' elements), did not wish to create a band of disciples who ... could have popularised his philosophy and tried to make it into an educative element, starting in the primary school (and hence educative for the simple worker or peasant, i.e., for the simple man of the people). Perhaps this was impossible, but it was worth trying and the fact that it was not tried is certainly significant.[27]

Gramsci goes on to criticize Croce's elitist distinction of religion for the masses but philosophy for the educated elite. The following passage from Croce's La filosofia della pratica with its delicately patronizing tone toward the "younger brother" illustrates precisely the weakness to which Gramsci points:

> This function of an idealistic ethical symbol, this affirmation that the moral act is an expression of the love and the will of the universal Spirit, is characteristic of the religious and Christian Ethic, the Ethic of love and of the anxious search

> for the divine presence, which, as a result of narrow partisanship or lack of insight, is spurned and vilified today by vulgar rationalists and intellectualists, by so-called free-thinkers and similar riff-raff who frequent masonic lodges. There is hardly any truth of Ethics that cannot be expressed in the words of traditional religion, which we learned as children and which rise spontaneously to our lips because they are the most sublime, the most appropriate, and the most beautiful of all: words that are, to be sure, still redolent of mythology, yet at the same time instinct with philosophy. Between the idealistic philosopher and the religious man there is undoubtedly a deep rift; but it is no different from that which appears in ourselves on the eve of a crisis, when we are mentally divided, and yet very close to inner unity and harmony. If the religious man cannot help regarding the philosopher as his adversary, indeed as his mortal enemy, the philosopher for his part sees in the religious man his younger brother, himself as he was but a moment before. Hence, he will always feel more strongly attracted to an austere, compassionate, allegorical religious ethic than to one that is superficially rationalistic.[28]

Liberalism as an articulate movement remains elitist in Italy to this day. The parties that remain loyal to it in parliament are small and do not represent the popular masses. Yet who can say that the Catholic and socialist subcultures who do represent the Italian masses have not, over the last century, steadily and continuously felt the influence of liberalism and been in part transformed by it. Perhaps Croce was not wrong after all in his claim for liberalism.

> Because this is the sole ideal that has the solidity once owned by Catholicism and the flexibility that this was never able to have, the only one that can always face the future and does not claim to determine it in any particular and contingent form, the only one that can resist criticism and represent for human society the point around which, in its frequent upheavals, in its continual oscillations, equilibrium is perpetually restored. so that when the question is heard whether liberty will enjoy what is known as the future, the answer must be that it has something better still: it has eternity.[29]

V

Many historians have described the first decades after the unification of the country as a period of mild disillusionment. The great battles of the Risorgimento had been fought and a victory of sorts had been won. Liberalism in the saddle proved disappointing compared to the heroic days when liberalism was in the opposition. The intense moral idealism of Mazzini was gradually replaced by the rise of positivism as the dominant philosophy -- Herbert Spencer was everywhere read and quoted. The unification of the country provided the basis for a gradually accelerating industrial growth, particularly in the North, but this sign of positivistic "progress" seemed to be creating as many problems as it solved. It is these circumstances that make understandable the emergence of socialism as a major force in Italy. As Croce saw it:

> The psychological conditions which we have described, uncertainty with regard to aims, doubt as to means, bankruptcy of ideas, all these symptoms from which Italy was suffering explain how it was that her young men were fired with such lively enthusiasm for the doctrines of socialism. Beginning about 1890, the cult of socialism grew rapidly and continued throughout the decade.[30]

According to Croce at first the work of Karl Marx, "who created the new 'religion of the masses' in the same sense in which Paul of Tarsus created Christianity,"[31] was known only at second or third hand but when Antonio Labriola discovered Marx's writing and popularized his theories "Herbert Spencer, whom every one had read and quoted as the highest authority, was no longer quoted or read, and was allowed to fall into complete oblivion."[32]

But besides having a strong appeal for many of Italy's educated youth, among whom Croce himself was numbered for a while, Marxian socialism early met success among the industrial workers, especially in the urban North. The Italian Socialist Party gradually began to build up not only a network of

institutions -- labor unions, mutual aid societies, cultural organizations -- but a distinct sub-culture, what according to Arturo Carlo Jemolo might almost be called "a new religion." Jemolo vividly describes the quality of that early socialist culture:

> The Italian -- and in general the Latin -- socialist of the first ten years of the century was totally different from his brother of today. He would never have admitted, for instance, that any question of wages was of greater moment to him than a great abstract question. He longed for the moral and material redemption of the poorer classes, but he believed that this should be achieved by a transformation of the world. Depending on his school of thought and the particular concepts of the section of the Party with which he identified himself, he might differ from his fellows as to the manner in which he hoped to effect his regeneration, but his true aim was the complete obliteration of the past. He even had his speical forms of dress, used the appellation 'Comrade,' and wore a distinctive flower -- a red carnation -- in his buttonhole. If he was a fanatical believer in the new ideas he did not even observe the rites of civil marriage, but openly lived in 'sin.' To his ideal system a fundamental reorganization of the economy was not less essential than a humanitarian outlook, anti-clericalism, internationalism, anti-militarism, an aversion to all that had its origin in the military spirit or was infected with that spirit -- whether it was a question of decorations, even for valour, or of duels.[33]

Just as the policy of various ministries ranged over time from vigorous repression of the socialists to tacit encouragement of them, especially in their efforts to unionize the workers, so the policy of the Socialist Party modulated from one of intransigent opposition to the entire "bourgeois regime" to one of gradual acceptance of the framework of democratic institutions. This tendency was set back at the time of the colonial conquest of Libya in 1911 which the socialists bitterly and in some areas violently opposed, and there ensued the dominance for a time of a militantly revolutionary faction led by Benito Mussolini. But all indications were that in the long run the tendency of the Socialist Party to enter the political system and thereby

bring the newly emerging working classes into active participation in political society would prevail. The Great War, however, in Italy as elsewhere, shattered the illusion that this and similar trends were "inevitable" as had been widely believed only a short time before.

VI

The last of modern Italy's five "religions" that I want to discuss is what Croce calls "activism." For Croce, activism, which he defines as "morbid romanticism"[34] and links loosely to /incipient trends in the same direction in the early nineteenth century, is a parody or perversion of liberalism, a sickness of liberty:

> For if liberty is deprived of its moral soul, if it is detached from the past and from its venerable tradition, if the continuous creation of new forms that it demands is deprived of the objective value of this creation, if the struggles that it accepts and the wars and the sacrifice and the heroism are deprived of the purity of the end, if the internal discipline to which it spontaneously submits is replaced by external direction and commands -- then nothing remains but action for action's sake, innovation for the sake of innovation, and fighting for fighting's sake; war and slaughter and death-dealing and suffering death are things to be sought for and desired for themselves, and obedience too, but the obedience that is customary in war; and the upshot is activism. This is, accordingly, in this translation and reduction and mournful parody that it achieves of an ethical ideal, a substantial perversion of the love of liberty, a devil-worship taking the place of that of God, and yet still a religion, the celebration of a black mass, but still a mass.[35]

Such trends were general in Europe in the first years of the twentieth century, according to Croce, but in Italy they focussed around the "morbidly romantic" figure of Gabriele D'Annunzio, whom Croce calls libidinous and sadistic.

It was not an accident that D'Annunzio, who would play the role of John the Baptist to that movement that was to be the fulfillment of activism in Italy, namely Fascism, was a poet. Indeed Fascism attracted many of the leading innovators in Italian literature of the day, men like Marinetti and Pirandello. In this context a remark of Croce about socialism takes on a particular interest:

> Thus not only political opinion but the whole of Italian thought and culture was permeated and invigorated by Marxian socialism. Only on literature and poetry it did not, and could not, have effective influence, owing not to lack of enthusiasm,

> but to its philosophical and practical character, which moved outside the mental process of poetry.[36]

The strictly rational tendency of Marxian socialism was characteristic of Italian thought, since both Liberalism and Catholicism were, each in their own way, highly rationalistic and, in the early twentieth century, unpoetic. In all these traditions reason and intellect were highly valued in part for their ability to control emotion and passion. In this regard activism was closer to the religious ground bass, with its intense emotional commitments and its relative lack of theoretical complexity, than to the other three traditions. However, in the years before the war activism was a largely elite movement appealing to the educated but bored sons of the bourgeoisie, eager for excitement and glory and disappointed in the Italietta, the "Little Italy" of the liberal politicians. It seems likely that without the drastic disruptions resulting from the First World War activism would have remained little more than a literary mood and Fascism as a major political movement would never have been born.

There were, however, even before the war, a few connections between activism as a literary movement and a broader mass following, connections that would be broadened and strengthened when the Fascist movement emerged after the war. One such point of connection was the work of Georges Sorel, translated in about 1909 by Croce and enjoying a vogue in Italy, partly thanks to Croce's efforts, that it never enjoyed in France. Sorel was the socialist closest to activism and also, not accidently, a partial exception to Croce's rule that socialism was not "poetic." Croce's own ambivalent assessment, published after the triumph of Fascism, suggests the importance of Sorel:

> Revolutionary minds, scornful of accomodating reformism and impatient of the flabbiness into which orthodox socialism had fallen, devoted themselves in Italy also to seeking new formulas, better fitted to them; and one was supplied by Sorel with his syndicalism. Sorel assimilated socialism, as he conceived it, to primitive Christianity, assigned to it the aim of renewing society from its moral foundations, and therefore urged it to cultivate, like the first Christians, the sentiment of "scission" from surrounding society, to avoid all relations with politicians, to shut itself up in workmen's syndicates feed on the "myth" of the general strike. It was the construction of a poet thirsting for moral austerity, thirsting for sincerity, pessimistic with regard to the present reality, stubbornly trying to find a hidden fount from which the fresh pure stream would well forth; and tested by reality, his poetry quickly vanished, even in his own eyes.[37]

Among many others Mussolini was infected by the mood of Sorellian apocalyptic activism well before he left the Socialist Party.

According to Gramsci even Marinetti's rather esoteric movement of Futurism held some appeal for the workers. In a series of manifestos and theatrical demonstrations Marinetti declared that all traditional culture is obsolete -- one of his most famous manifestos called for the filling in of the canals of Venice and the leveling of her marble palaces to make way for railroads and factories, the true poetry of the future. Gramsci claimed that many workers before the war "had seen in futurism the elments of a struggle against the old academic culture of Italy, mummified and alien to the popular masses...."[38] Gramsci also claimed that four-fifths of the readers of Marinetti's review Lacerba, with a circulation of 20,000, were from the working class.

But one thing that differentiated all of the activists, D'Annunzio, Marinetti and Mussolini, from a left-wing socialist like Gramsci and a conservative liberal like Croce was their glorification of war, and more particularly, their violent interventionism in the First World War. That war which was traumatic for so many nations was a major disaster for Italy. It seriously

disrupted the economy and set off an inflation which was serious for wage earners and all but fatal for small property owners, while producing at the same time a class of ultra-rich war profiteers. It gravely overloaded the political system with serious problems at a time when it had not fully assimilated the consequences of universal male suffrage which was voted in 1912. One of the new political elements was the emergence of a Catholic Party, the Popular Party, for the first time since the unification of the country. The 1919 elections showed that the two great popular parties were the Catholics and the Socialists and that the Liberals who had ruled Italy for a half century were a declining political force.

In the disturbed period just after the war all the tensions and divisions of Italian society were exacerbated. Class conflict was intense; returning veterans were bitter toward the pacifist workers with their draft exemptions based on their essential occupations; small property owners were afraid of losing the last vestige of gentility in the galloping inflation; the Catholic left, genuinely dedicated to non-revolutionary social reform, did not unite with the socialists, many of whom were coming under the spell of the Russian Revolution, but formed rival "white" labor and peasant unions in competition with the "red" ones. Above all the great wave of strikes and demonstrations of 1919-1920 led to the fear that a Bolshevik revolution was in the making, though nowhere, not even in the best organized Turin group around Gramsci, was there any real revolutionary plan. Under these very severe tensions and pressures Italian politics reverted to its sub-ideological base in the particular loyalties of families and small groups. Only thus can one understand the triumph of Fascism which never gained what Gramsci called ideological hegemony -- indeed which never had an ideology at anything like the level of articulation and sophistication of the Catholics, liberals or socialists.

Fascism in the immediate post-war period was a highly personal movement, an eclectic mixture of whatever Mussolini found that worked. Composed of veterans, former socialists and anarchists, and enraged bourgeois youth, eager to fight the socialists as a substitute for the war they were too young for, it focussed around the leader role that Mussolini copied largely from D'Annunzio, but with effective organizational forms that Mussolini had learned in his years as a socialist. In the beginning its program contained a leftist flavor but the situation itself dictated to Mussolini that he shift to the right for it was the anti-socialist violence of his squadristi that swelled his ranks. In free elections Facism never approached the vote of the Catholics and socialists. It only came to power through the tacit conviction of millions of Italians that Mussolini would protect family and home, property and tradition. At least that tacit conviction created the possibility of Mussolini coming to power -- it took the cowardice of the king and the weakness of the liberal politicians to ensure it.

Even though Fascism remained ideologically eclectic and chaotic -- Gentile's systematizations never had any organic connection with the movement -- and in large measure it was simply the acting out on the national stage of some of the less pleasant aspects of the Italian under-culture -- the band of thugs tied to their leader in bonds of personal loyalty -- it did develop an ideological style and became, once it was in power, a church, as Jemolo describes it:

> Fascism, like Bolshevism was itself a Church, claiming the whole man, in all his waking moments and in all his activities. Even in art and literature it prescribed what he must condemn and what he must admire. It had its uniforms, its epistolary style, its formulas, its gestures of salutation, its rites that accompanied the party-member to the grave: the summons to the burial service, the Roman salute with which the Blackshirt greeted even funerals,

> even religious processions. (For many years the anti-Fascist was easily recognizable by the way he saluted a hearse and by his behavior when passing a cemetary, by his recourse to the traditional forms of greeting and his refusal to adopt the Fascist salute.) As the parish church and its presbytery are a focal point of the activities of the good Catholic, so was the local party headquarters a place of meeting, recreation, and meditation: a place where the new faithful forgathered in the evenings and on feast-days, where all initiatives, whatever their object, had to originate, and where -- after 1935 -- a bride would often go immediately after her wedding to exchange the gold ring which the priest had just blessed for a ring made of iron. The party was a Church that persuaded its zealots to renounce all other interests: a Church that did not concern itself with the life to come, because in the Fascist Weltanschauung, as in the Communist, every aspiration has to be fulfilled in this world and there is no place for a future life in which earthly injustices may be set to rights.[39]

Given the hollowness of his ideology, the meagerness of his successes and the fact that Mussolini never gained the kind of totalitarian control over Italian society that Hitler did over Germany, one must ask about the social and ideological bases of support of his regime. There is no question that the Italian liberal bourgeoisie, convicted of impotence in handling the post-war crisis, surrendered control of the government, though not of the economy, to Mussolini, some of them willingly, some of them reluctantly, but only a few of them going into principled opposition. Even the latter, as long as it remained theoretical, Mussolini tolerated, particularly in the figure of Benedetto Croce who continued to write and publish all through the Fascist years, but in tolerating it Mussolini largely neutralized that opposition. It was the socialists who took the brunt of Fascism. Already in 1921 and 1922, even before Mussolini came to power, socialism's painfully built up network of institutions had been destroyed by the squadristi and many of its leaders murdered. Gramsci himself, by that time the leader of the Italian Communist Party, was arrested in 1926 after his parliamentary immunity was

violated and died in 1937 after years of bad food and maltreatment in a Fascist prison. Nevertheless after the hurricane of terror, it is probable that a sector of the working class grasped what comfort it could from the ideology of the corporative state and gave it its tacit consent. But, ironically for both parties, Mussolini's securest basis of popular support came from his religious policy and derived from the Catholic Church.

Fascism in its earliest days was both anti-clerical and republican, in continuity with Mussolini's earlier socialist position, but the Duce soon learned that he had to swallow both monarchy and papacy to become dictator. The latter was, for him, the bitterest pill of all. After he had worked out the Concordat of 1929 which was to signal the high point of his popularity in Italy, Mussolini stipulated that in his audience with the pope he would not have to go through the ceremony of kissing the ring, and he forbade photographers when he participated in the religious service in Saint Peter's during which he had to pray on his knees. There is no reason to believe that Mussolini ever had anything but contempt for the church in his own personal life. On the other hand there is very little in Fascist ideology to escape condemnation at the hands of religious orthodoxy, had the Church desired to apply rigorous standards. The relations between party and church were indeed not untroubled and the Church successfully resisted Mussolini's efforts, soon after the Concordat, to destroy its lay organization, Catholic Action. After the racial laws of 1938 and especially after the German occupation, the Church became increasingly alienated from the regime, and the role of many of the clergy in the resistance was a heroic one. And yet the fact remains, and needs to be be explained, that the relation of the church to the regime was for many years a close, indeed an intimate one, as can be seen in Jemolo's description:

But the government gained far more from this co-operation than did the Church -- among other things, a sense of legality, almost of divine prescription, such as no Government had ever enjoyed in the past: and that not merely as a Government, but as a regime. It might have seemed of small account that in their processions the boys of Catholic Action walked in threes, in imitation of the Fascist militia, and not in fours, as they had done up to 1922; that they carried their flags with the staffs resting on their stomachs, again in imitation of the Fascists, and not on their shoulders, as had been the custom before the March on Rome; that even the most obscure parish magazines and journals of religious associations showed the year of the regime alongside that of the Christian era; and that Catholics habitually observed all the outward forms of Fascism, beginning with the Roman salute and the conversational use of voi, abandoning, because the Duce so willed it, the age-old use of the third person as the polite form of address. These things might have seemed unimportant, but they were not. Thus, only thus, by drawing a veil over the past, by keeping lowered the curtain which divided the Fascist world from all that lay beyond its frontiers, could the Government assert itself as a regime, as the regime: not merely as a system of government, but as a philosophy of life; one might well say, as a Church.

Nor was it a matter of indifference that the Houses of the Fasci, the shrines of those who had given their lives for the Fascist revolution, were invariably blessed by the local bishop; that no party initiative which sought to create a new way of life, a new outlook, ever lacked the co-operation of the clergy; that a course on the mystique of Facism could be inaugurated with a speech (albeit of strict religious orthodoxy) by a cardinal.

All this went far beyond the idea inherent in the precept 'Render unto Caesar,' far beyond respect for and co-operation with the lawful Government. All this was a sanctification not of the Fascist Government but of the Fascist outlook, the Fascist way of life. The non-Fascist, the anti-Fascist, was approaching a point at which he would have to ask himself whether the parish church was still his church; he was now having to go to mass early in the morning if he wished to avoid the sermon, which too often comprised a full-scale attack on all the democratic, masonic Governments which were opposing the providential plans of the Duce.

And, after 1929, one would have been hard put to it to find a bishop's pastoral or sermon, an inaugural speech at a dioscean conference, that did not contain the word, the invocation, the blessing, the epithet appropriate to the Duce. And the epithets chosen became progressively more sonorous, and the person invoked tended more and more to assume the likeness not of a Head of Government, but of the pioneer of a civilization.[40]

The only thing that can explain how the Church clung to this strange alliance for so long is the history of bitterness of the first seventy years of the Kingdom of Italy and the fact that the church was at last coming into its own, legally recognized as a central instituion of society, instead of existing in some limbo of marginal toleration and occasional minor persecution. That and the fact that the church was, for many people and in many areas, embedded in and serving the interests of the particularistic groups and their essentially pre-Christian group loyalties, that regarded Mussolini as their savior.

VII

The aftermath of the Second World War was remarkably similar to that of the First World War, though the outcome was radically different. Once again there was the threat of revolution, this time from the armed partisans and workers in the North; once again there was the upsurge of a great fear from all those concerned about family and property, stability and tradition; only this time all such elements coalesced under the leadership of a reborn Catholic party, the Christian Democrats. The 1948 elections were the high water mark of this upsurge, the greatest electoral party victory in modern Italian history.[41] Italy after 1945 was certainly different from Italy before 1922. The Fascist regime itself, whatever its negative features, probably contributed to that "passive revolution" in another of the senses in which Gramsci used the term, in which important social changes can go on even under reactionary and repressive regimes -- the gradual erosion of particularistic and traditional authority structures and the development of more egalitarian social forms -- though it may be in the nature of the less effective Italian Fascist regime to have served more as a guardian for such forms and less as a corrosive to them than in the more efficient fascist regimes in Germany and Japan. In any case Italy after 1945 was neither a mass society nor a very mobilized one. Never having had a Reformation or a Revolution the formal religions and ideologies continued to float on the surface of Italian society, appealing to a mobile educated elite, but not permeating much of the substructure except in certain areas of the country where Catholic piety or socialist fervor were genuine popular phenomena (for example, the Veneto for the Catholics; Romagna-Emilia for the socialists).

A culture of decadence, reminiscent of the pre-World War I activism, was again in evidence in the post-war period, though lacking in vigor and, fortunately so far, in any effective political expression. All of the elements remain, and remain with a viscosity that leads many to despair of fundamental change in Italian society. And yet there are a number of new factors in the Italian situation that give rise at least to the possibility of creative change.

An important contextual factor is a relatively favorable international situation that provides neither the threat nor the temptation of war nor, with the decline of the cold war, any intense external ideological or political pressure either. Thus the kinds of external threats and disturbances that have frequently diverted modern Italian history from what might be thought of as a "normal" course seem to be largely absent at present and in the near future. A serious international economic crisis or a renewal of big power hostility could quickly change this but at the moment there seems to be a greater degree of internal security and autonomy than there has been for a long time.

The electoral triumph of Christian Democracy within the institutional framework of the liberal state has created a new situation with respect to the problem of civil religion. The very logic of the early cold war forced the church into a defense of liberalism and democracy to a degree unprecedented since the French Revolution. The liberal state, instead of being the church's persecutor, was now its defender and so had to be evaluated differently. Particularly now that liberalism was not a major independent political force or contender for rule, its values could be accepted as the legitimate norms of the state and given religious approval. On the other hand, in the immediate

defensiveness of the first post-war years, instead of a rather clearly differentiated liberal civil religion toward which the church could maintain a non-antagonistic autonomy, there emerged a fusion of religious and political values, as the very term Christian Democracy suggests, which led almost to a clerical democratic state. Under John XXIII the tight bearhold union of party, church and state began to be broken on the initiative not of the Christian Democratic Party but of the church. With the "opening to the left," itself made possible by that incipient differentiation of the party and the church in the early 1960's, the possibility of an autonomous liberal civil religion became more real. It would be based on the symbols of the Risorgimento, inevitably, but it would include the celebration of democratic values to which at several crucial points Catholics had also contributed. It would confirm in a non-contentious way that the history of modern Italy is essentially liberal and that, as Croce always maintained, Fascism was only an unfortunate parenthesis.

If such a solution to the civil religion problem does eventually emerge, a solution based on the common acceptance of certain political values rather than a struggle to the death between different religio-political ideologies, it will depend on changes in both the church and the socialist left. Relevant changes in the church have been clearly evident, as we have already mentioned, from the time of the aggiornamento of Pope John. Developments have not been smooth and recent years have seen something of a "reverse course" but the long range tendencies do not seem likely to change. The basic implications of the changes are a greater freedom of the church from party and state on the one hand, and a wider range of political options for Catholics than support of the Christian Democratic Party, options that include

support of more vigorously reformist or radical parties of the left. It is true that the church in Italy has probably not responded as quickly to the new freedoms of Vatican II as have some other national churches -- the habit of authority at the center of power has been too strong -- and opportunities have been missed as when the church responded too defensively and too unsympathetically to the movement of so-called "spontaneous groups" of idealistic youth in the late 60's. But if the church will not lead the way to new freedoms it has already lost its power to maintain strict discipline. A purely negative erosion of authority could prove dangerous for the church and for Italy and there is no assurance that vigorous leadership will again be asserted. But the Italian church in the last fifty years has come a long way out of the wilderness. It faces no formidable secular enemy -- even the Communist Party prefers not to face it head on -- and it has long been close to the sources of secular power. It can afford, as Pope John so well saw, to open up all kinds of new possibilities, not out of weakness, but of strength. Temporary reversals should probably not obscure for us the long term trend toward liberalization.

If the Catholics have, in the last half century, gradually moved back into the centers of power, the same cannot be said of the socialists, who have never held effective power in Italy. Indeed the history of socialism in Italy is a history of persecution from the very beginning, a persecution that reached catastrophic proportions in 1921 and 22 and the long night that followed. Since the war socialists have been harassed rather than persecuted but only in the last few years has a large socialist group, the left-wing Italian Socialist Party, attained a share of political power, and that certainly not the lion's share. If there has been no <u>aggiornamento</u> within the

Italian Communist Party, no equivalent to Vatican II, it is certainly in part because an embattled defensiveness has been objectively warranted. Nevertheless the CPI has a tradition of flexibility, humanism and appeal to intellectuals that is perhaps unique in the Western world. This does not, by any means mean that the party is clearly committed to liberal democratic values, but only that, in the right circumstances, it might be possible to open the door on that question. It is true that there have emerged in recent years a number of groups to the left of the CPI, disillusioned by the flaccidity of the latter, and, if anything, more authoritarian than the orthodox parent. These groups express a left wing activism reminiscent of the Sorellian variety discussed above. At the moment these groups are vociferous but small and seem likely to be important only if serious social breakdown occurs. The main problem on the left, then, remains the Italian Communist Party, the largest excluded group in modern Italian history. The eventual entry of the Communists into some share of governmental power, unthinkable only a few years ago, is already at the stage of discussion. Such an eventuality would create the possibility for the transformation of Communist values in a way parallel to what has happened to the Catholics. But if such a transformation is to be something other than a sell-out that will just produce a new mass alienated party to the left of the Communists it will have to be accompanied by at least the beginning of the solution to some of Italy's basic social problems. In other words the only way to democratize the socialists is to socialize the democracy. How difficult that will be is already evident from the fruits of the first extended period of center-left government.

The rock on which Italian development may founder seems to be the immobilism of particularistic interest far more than fervid ideological differences. The failure of any Italian movement, religious, ethical or political, to penetrate the roots of the social structure more than sporadically may be the greatest liability on the road ahead. Centuries of failure to institutionalize the dreams and ideals which again and again have grown up on Italian soil has led to a certain fatalism if not cynicism. The greatest of modern Italian novelists, whatever their differences -- Manzoni, Verga, Moravia, Silone, Lampedusa -- share a fundamental pessimism about the capacity of humans to alter social institutions. All of them opt instead for a certain dignity and integrity in the individual human soul.

And yet modern Italy has not been poor in individual souls who have had the courage to try to alter institutions. Arturo Carlo Jemolo with his ceaseless struggle to defend religious liberty, critically, polemically and legally,[42] is such an example as is Danilo Dolci with his effort to find, outside of any religious or ideological orthodoxy, forms of social participation that will be neither impersonally bureaucratic nor boss-dominated.[43] Nor should the achievements of many such men, working through parties and independently be underestimated. Croce, who led at several points an active political life, always reminded us of the modest but real institutional successes of modern Italy. And Gaetano Salvemini, another man of conscience who was not afraid to enter the political arena, warned us that there are no paradises on earth and that if we will not settle for some kind of purgatory we are likely to end up in hell.[44] But that does not mean, and Salvemini did not mean it to mean, that we must not work to make it a better purgatory than it has ever been before.

I would like to close with some words of Ignazio Silone which sum up many of the themes of this paper. In them he expresses his faith in Socialism, but it is a socialism that, as Croce said of all true socialism, is a form of liberty.

> Consideration of the experience I have been through has led me to a deepening of the motives for my separation which go very much further than the circumstantial ones by which it was produced. But my faith in Socialism (to which I think my entire life bears testimony) has remained more alive than ever in me. In its essence, it has gone back to what it was when I first revolted against the old social order; a refusal to admit the existence of destiny, an extension of the ethical impulse from the restricted individual and family sphere to the whole domain of human activity, a need for effective brotherhood, an affirmation of the superiority of the human person over all the economic and social mechanisms which oppress him. As the years have gone by, there has been added to this an intuition of man's dignity and a feeling of reverence for that which in man is always trying to outdistance itself, and lies at the root of his eternal disquiet. But I do not think that this kind of Socialism is in any way peculiar to me. The "mad truths" recorded above are older than Marxism; towards the second half of the last century they took refuge in the workers' movement born of industrial capitalism, and continue to remain one of its most enduring founts of inspiration. I have repeatedly expressed my opinion on the relations between the Socialist Movement and the theories of Socialism; these relations are by no means rigid or immutable. With the development of new studies, the theories may go out of fashion or be discarded, but the movement goes on. It would be inaccurate, however, with regard to the old quarrel between the doctrinaires and the empiricists of the worker's movement, to include me among the latter. I do not conceive Socialist policy as tied to any particular theory, but to a faith. The more Socialist theories claim to be "scientific," the more transitory they are; but Socialist values are permanent. The distinction between theories and values is not sufficiently recognized, but it is fundamental. On a group of theories one can found a school; but on a group of values one can found a culture, a civilization, a new way of living together among men.[45]

Notes

1. Benedetto Croce, History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, Harbinger, 1933, p. 18.

2. The book was first published in Italy in 1933 and it was necessary for Croce to be somewhat guarded in his language.

3. Benedetto Croce, A History of Italy, 1871-1915, Oxford, 1929.

4. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, International, 1971, pp. 118-119.

5. Ibid., p. 326.

6. Ibid., p. 328.

7. Ibid., p. 130.

8. Ibid., p. 45.

9. See "Civil Religion in America," in Robert N. Bellah, Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World, Harper and Row, 1970.

10. "Values and Social Change in Modern Japan," in ibid.

11. Carlo Levi, Christ Stopped at Eboli, Noonday Press, 1970, p. 117.

12. Ibid., pp. 118-119.

13. Ibid., pp. 137-138.

14. Arturo Carlo Jemolo, Church and State in Italy, 1850-1950, Oxford, 1960, p. 39.

15. Joseph LaPalombara, "Italy: Fragmentation, Isolation, and Alienation," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, 1965, pp. 286-288.

16. Ibid., passim.

17. Op. cit., p. 17.

18. Ibid., p. 394.

19. Ibid., p. 123, ff. Croce traces this modern interest in Machiavelli to the 1890's and says, "With the Marxists, Machiavelli returned to Italy." (History of Italy, p. 152.) By that he meant that the Marxists were the first Italians since the mid-seventeenth century to take Machiavelli seriously. Croce's own role in reviving Machiavelli scholarship was not negligible.

20. William Bouwsma: Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty, California, 1968.

21. "The Counter-Reformation in Italy was essentially an authoritarian superstructure raised over indifferent individual consciences, a baroque decoration covering the religious and moral void." Luigi Salvatorelli, The Risorgimento: Thought and Action, Harper Torchbook, 1970, p. 19.

22. Jemolo, op. cit., p. 42.

23. Op. cit., pp. 394-395.

24. History of Europe, p. 31.

25. Op. cit., p. 63.

26. Salvatorelli, op. cit., p. 96.

27. Op. cit., p. 132.

28. Cited in Jemolo, op. cit., p. 95.

29. History of Europe, p. 358.

30. History of Italy, p. 145.

31. Ibid., pp. 145-146.

32. Ibid., p. 154.

33. Op. cit., p. 141.

34. History of Europe, p. 343.

35. Ibid., p. 342

36. History of Italy, p. 156.

37. History of Europe, p. 306.

38. Op. cit., p. 93.

39. Op. cit., p. 191.

40. Op. cit., pp. 268-270.

41. For post-war politics generally but particularly for a helpful treatment of the Catholic and socialist sub-cultures see Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, Patterns of Political Participation in Italy, Yale, 1970.

42. See H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy, revised edition, Harvard, 1965, p. 241.

43. My visit to Dolci's headquarters in Sicily and my talks with him in Rome during my research visit to Italy in the spring of 1972 were the most impressive moments of that trip.

44. In Italy from the Risorgimento to Fascism, edited by A. William Salomone, Anchor, 1970, p. 453.

45. In The God that Failed, edited by Richard Crossman, first published 1950. Bantam edition, 1965, pp. 101-102.

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THE USES OF THE TRADITIONAL SECTOR: WHY THE DECLINING CLASSES SURVIVE

by

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Like other advanced industrial states, Italy regards the survival of its traditional sectors as a temporary if necessary evil. National plans, politicians, leaders of the major economic associations all proclaim that the future of Italy has no room for the small-scale, familial, protected economic unit. Advanced industrial societies, so the argument runs, require enterprises that are competitive, geared to profit-making, adaptable to changes in markets and technology, and structured for efficiency in production. And whatever the differences among the extremely diverse actors, firms, and classes that in Italy are usually called traditional, they all have in common a pattern of economic behavior so different from that of the model firm of advanced industrial society that only the most radical and most improbable transformations could save them. Learned opinions diverge on the precise characteristics of a firm that class it as traditional -- size or labor-capital ratio or productivity or management style? It is also debatable whether the use of the term "traditional" to describe these economic actors is appropriate, since in many cases the firms in question are new,[1] and in fact, "backward" and "inefficient" are terms used interchangeably with traditional to characterize the phenomemon. For most political purposes, however, the outcome of these academic quarrels is irrelevent, since all diagnoses and vocabularies converge on the same set of actors: the small shops, the small industries, and the small farms. This disparate group of economic firms and those who work in them are now identified by Italian

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[1] Mediocredito Centrale, Lineamenti dell'industria manifatturiera italiana, Rome: 1972, p. 15.

political elites as traditional, unproductive, and in some sense, parasitic.

Whenever economists or politicians discuss the future of these groups, they are careful to point out the need even in advanced industrial societies for certain kinds of small economic enterprises: for the shop that caters to a special market, for the small electronics firm that is innovative and flexible, for the small farm that raises vegetables near a city, and so forth. It is this hope that allows even the representatives of the traditional groups to join on occasion in the chorus of blame for the small firm that refuses to see the handwriting on the wall and to transform itself for survival. If only small shops pooled their resources in joint enterprises; if only the peasant would switch to animal husbandry specialization; if only the small industry geared its production to the market; then they, too, would move from the camp of traditional firms condemned to disappear into the camp of dynamic modern firms on which the economy of modern Italy will be based. These and the many other reforms that are proposed for the traditional enterprise have been elaborated in abundance and generally without regard for the likely evolution of the already modern sectors of the economy. But even setting aside the dubious efficacy of many of the proposed remedies, it appears that the vast majority of the small shops and farms and industries of Italy today are so unlike any of the firms described as candidates for success in advanced industrial societies that their survival prospects must be regarded as dim by the political elites.

This state of opinion is widespread in other European states as well. What distinguishes Italy are the greater weight of the traditional groups in the Italian economy than in the economies of other advanced industrial

European states, and the Italian equation of the problem of backward economic groups with the regional problems of southern Italy. On the first point, a comparison of the statistics on firm size in Common Market countries is a good indicator of the relative dimensions of the traditional sectors in these states. Italy has four times as much of its industrial labor force working in tiny firms with under ten employees (28% of workforce) as Belgium (7% of workforce), more than twice as much as West Germany (13% of workforce),and substantially more than France (19% of workforce).[2] In commerce 95% of all retail sales in Italy (percentuali delle vendite al minuto, 1960) are made in the shops of small independents (commercio indipendente) as contrasted with the West European average of 79%.[3] In France the number of shops declined 10% between 1961 and 1968; in Italy it increased by 8% and shopkeepers' incomes declined.[4]

Even more important for understanding how the role of traditional groups in the nation has been conceived in Italy is the equation of the situation of these groups with the economic problems of the Mezzogiorno. Few myths can have been as blinding for a nation's self-understanding as the myth of the traditional South and the modern North has been for Italy. For the South the major implication of this conception has been that

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[2] Giorgio Ruffolo, Il ruolo delle piccole e medie industrie nella strategia programmatica, Roma: 27 ottobre 1971, p. 1.

[3] Istituto Lombardo per gli Studi Economici e Sociali (ILSES), Prospettive di sviluppo del sistema distributivo in Italia, Milano: July, 1965, Appendix, p. 5.

[4] From document of European Economic Community, cited in "Italia, zero in commercio," L'Expresso

the South has been perceived as moving along the same line of march as the North but at a slower pace and with considerable lag. The stage the South has reached is therefore presumably one through which the North at some time also passed. Tradition is thus conceived as a by-station on the way to modernity, and the problem of the South is how to propel it more rapidly down the road already traversed by the North. This schematic presentation may be unjust to some of the sophisticated and subtle analyses of southern Italy, but it does express a fallacy common to much thinking about the South: that the best strategy for improving the lot of the southern Italians is remaking their society and economy to resemble that of the North. The experiences with importing large-scale modern firms into the South suggest the relative lack of success of policies inspired by this model of change. In the last few years, these failures have created a climate in which economists and sociologists as well as politicians are rethinking the models of development that inspired the policies of the last quarter century on the South.

What remains untouched in this revision of ideas about the South is the conception of the modern North. In the flood of books and articles on economic dualism in Italy, the traditional sectors are virtually always located in the South. While there are occasional mentions in this literature

of the traditional firms in the North, they are to all intents and purposes treated as anomalies in an economy which in all significant respects is that of an advanced industrial society.[5] What strikes this foreign observer, however, is the strength of traditional sectors in the North and the extent to which the Italian economy in the North as well as the South has developed as a dual economy of modern and traditional firms linked by strong ties of mutual dependence. It is true that in some sectors the number of traditional firms has declined since the war. Particularly in agriculture, the disappearance of small economic units in the North has been dramatic, while in industry there has been an increase in the average dimensions of the firm. Despite these changes, however, one cannot but be impressed by the numbers and strength of the traditional firms that remain and by their critical importance for the modern firms. This interdependence of traditional and modern firms is most striking in the North, for it is here, in the most advanced sectors of the Italian economy that one would have anticipated finding that the traditional firms had become marginal to the economy and dispensable. On the contrary, the economy, society, and politics of even the most advanced industrial branches of the North have apparently been built in ways that make the continued existence of the traditional groups a matter of critical importance.

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[5] See, for example, Vera Lutz, Italy: A Study in Economic Development, London: 1962, and Ferruccio Marzano, Un'Interpretazione del processo di sviluppo economico dualistico in Italia, Milano: 1969.

Morphology of the traditional Italian firm

Which economic units are traditional? In Italy it is clear that this is a matter of political and not economic definition. One could specify a complex of firm properties -- size, labor-capital ratios, market relations, productivity, management practices -- that might be described as a model of the traditional firm. But a survey of postwar economic legislation and interviews with representatives of economic groups and politicians suggest that one criterion above all shapes the elites' conception of traditional firms: that of independent small property. The large firm, no matter how labor-intensive or unprofitable or "traditionally" managed, is not considered a traditional industry, while a dynamic modern retail business owned and operated by a single family will be grouped along with its unproductive small-shop neighbors in almost all analyses, political and economic, of Italian society.

There is, moreover, a certain economic rationale for focussing on the variable of firm size, for firm size is highly correlated with other variables in the traditional/backwardness complex, namely with labor costs, with labor-capital ratios, with intensita degli investimenti in capitali fissi strumentali (misurata dalla potenza disponsibile per addetti), with relationship between value-added and production, with indebtedness, with propensity to produce for export markets, and other key variables.[6]

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[6] See Mediocredito Centrale, Lineamenti dell'industria manifatturiera italiana, Roma: 1972, pp. 34-39; Luigi Bruni, Aspetti strutturali delle industrie italiane, Roma: 1961, p. 51; Stanislaw Wellisz, Two Studies in the Italian Light Mechanical Industry, Center for International Studies, M.I.T.: [1956], p. 18.

But the current definition of traditional social classes as that part of the population earning a living in and from independent small property is so deeply embedded in Italian legislation, in the structures of economic organizations, in the banking and loan system, and in images of the political universe common to parties of both Left and Right that it is hard to imagine any new information on the relative productivity of firms that would significantly alter existing conceptions.

The degree of unanimity that unites all parts of the political class on the contents of the traditional sector of society (even if the labels on the box differ) is remarkable. Despite their different maps of society, Communists, Socialists, Christian Democrats, and Fascists would probably all agree that the relevant social distinctions are between piccola e media industria on one hand, and media-grande and grande industria on the other, between commercio indipendente and the self service stores and supermarkets, between the coltivatori diretti and capitalist farmers. Though the Communists see the small firms as victims of monopoly capital and hence potential allies of the workers, and the Christian Democrats see the small firms as the "connective tissue of the economy" and hence the natural collaborators of large industry, both PCI and DC agree on who their target group is even while they diverge in their analyses of its position in the economy and its politics.

The boundaries laid down by the parties' map of Italian society correspond to economic categories that are given separate organizational

representation in the major professional associations. Within the Confindustria, there is a special organization for the small and medium sized industries: Comitato Nazionale per le Piccole Industrie. Within Confagricoltura, the small farmers have their own very powerful organization: Coltivatori Diretti. Confcommercio has been until recently so dominated by traditional commerce that it is rather the representatives of big integrated commerce that have organized within the Confederation to defend their interests (e.g. AIGID). In all these professional associations the organizational structure both reflects and reinforces a distinction based on firm type and scale -- traditional or modern, in practice, small or large -- rather than on the product manufactured by the firm or its markets (local, national or foreign) or on the firm's regional location. These distinctions (product, market and region) are important foci around which groups of interests within the economic confederations cluster. But the lines of interest they draw across the traditional-modern boundaries are rarely strong enough to pull small firms into their orbit. Perhaps these other distinctions among firms matter more <u>within</u> the modern sector than in creating stable alliances within which both small-scale and large-scale firms are represented.

The traditional social classes identified by political parties and by professional organizations have been authoritatively recognized by the state. In one case, that of the artisans, the boundaries of the category have been set by the state. Artisans were defined by a 1965 law as firms

with no more than 10 employees (excluding apprentices) in which members are all personally involved in work and "work has a pre-eminent role over capital." Significantly, this definition by size represented a shift from the concept of the artisnal firm as one producing particular kinds of goods.[7] Those who qualify as artisans live under a legal regime that distinguishes them from other producers: they have their own credit institutions; their taxes are calculated by a special formula; they pay reduced social security rates. For the other groups in the traditional economy, the criteria of membership have been determined on a more ad-hoc basis, by the eligibility requirements of particular pieces of economic legislation. The special measures of 3 July 1971 to help small and medium businesses defined as eligible for support any firm with a workforce up to 300. The distribution of investment funds proceeds according to criteria of size. The new value-added tax as well as the new fiscal system will calculate taxes differently for enterprises of different scales, as reflected in their volume of trade. To these could be added many other examples of legislation which treat firms of different scale according to different rules. While criteria of eligibility for the government support offered to traditional firms are not identical, it is striking how often the rules are set in such a way as to define virtually the same constituency with the same members.

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[7] "Artisan Enterprise in Italy," Italy: Documents and Notes XX, 1, Jan.-Feb. 1971, Lutz, op. cit., p. 227.

The overlap of political perception, economic fact, and state policy has created social categories that are remarkably invulverable to internal differentiation or to changes in their external environment. In this, the history of the traditional independent classes parallels the history of the working class, which as a political and social entity continues to be a significant focus of political conflict in society at large and continues to shape the behavior of its own increasingly diverse membership -- despite enormous changes in the economic and social situations of its base. Similarly, however heterogeneous the groups identified as traditional are from an economic and social point of view, they are in a certain critical political sense a single entity. This is because the traditional classes, like the working class, are political creations. They owe their existence only in part to real, objective similarities in the economic interests of the members of the class but mainly to the members' common perception of having the same situation in society and to society's perceiving them as the same and establishing rules that identify them as a class. As described above, public perceptions have been given substance in the social and economic legislation of the state and in the structures of the economic associations. Because of the strength of traditional groups in the arenas of state power, they have a major role in shaping the evolution of Italian society and a major opportunity to channel change so as to preserve their place.

Census of the traditional economy

How have the traditional groups been strong enough to ensure their survival in the modern Italian economy? Part of the answer, of course, lies in numbers. The "precensus" of 1969 found that 94% of all industrial firms employed fewer than 100 persons. This calculation excluded the half million artisanal firms employing 1.3 million people, who were counted separately.[8] The Mediocredito study of industry in 1968 used a cut-off line of 150 employees per firm to distinguish the small from the medium and large industries, and found that 45 thousand out of 50 thousand or 90% of all Italian industries fell under the line.[9] If to these small firms are added the 2000 medium-sized firms that employ up to 500, they account together for 55% of all industrial employment in Italy and for 45 % of the prodotto lordo complessivo.[10] Firms employing 501-1500 account for 13% of the workforce and 14% of the prodotto lordo; those hiring over 1500, for 32% of employment and for 40% of the prodotto lordo complessivo.[11] Between 1951 and 1969 the number of small and medium firms diminished by 14% but the population employed in them rose 30%, increasing the percent of the industrial workforce employed in small and medium firms by 10%.[12]

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8 Ruffalo, op. cit., p. 1

9 Mediocredito, op. cit., pp. 12.

10 Mediocredito, op. cit., pp. 16, 24.

11 Mediocredito, op. cit., pp. 16, 24.

12 Ruffalo, op. cit., p. 3.

The strength of the traditional industrial firms even in the heart of the most industrialized parts of Italy suggests how misleading are the analyses of economic dualism that focus exclusively on the differences in industrial structure that differentiate North and South. The South does have more small firms than the North but the differences are not as great as the regional variant of the dualism hypotheses might have led one to anticipate (97.5% of the total in the South and 92.3% of the total in the North).[13] When one considers income, density, and distribution of population, and other variables that sharply differentiate North and South, the industrial structures of these two regions appear remarkably similar. The national character of this phenomenon, moreover, has been quite resistant to differential rates of growth in North and South. In a study of industrial structures based on the 1951 census Bruni found that "la maggior parte delle piccole industrie e diffusa abbastanza uniformemente nel territorio nazionale." [13]

Twenty years and an economic miracle later, the same pattern persists. In the highly industrial region of Lombardy, it is striking that the proportion of the workforce in manufacturing firms with fewer than 500 workers is <u>virtually the same</u> as the national figure (75.5% as compared with 76.9%). Even in the size category of tiny industries employing up to 50, Lombardy is not so far from the Italian national figure (37.2% of total firms as compared with 45.1%).[14] Similarly in

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[13] Bruni, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 24. See also chapter 2.

[14] Ruffalo, p.

[15] Luigi Frey, <u>Le prospettive di occupazione in Lombardia nella prima meta' degli "anni '70"</u>, Milano: Giunta Regionale Lombarda, October 1971, Table 13, Data from ISTAT, <u>Alcuni risultati della rilevazione delle unita locali industriali e commerciali 1969</u> in "Supplemento straordinario al Bollettino mensile di statistica," 1971 maggio, n. 5.

agriculture, though rural exodus has proceeded more drastically in the North, still the structure of the farms that remains has preserved a large number of small units. (For Italy, the average farm size is 6.9 hectares; and 50% of the farms are smaller than 2 hectares.)[16]

In no sector of the economy is the predominance of the small traditional firms clearer than in retail trade. Here the number of tiny units has been rapidly increasing since the end of the war, while the average number of inhabitants per store has fallen.

Tabella N. 1: N° unità dettaglianti, Dettaglio in Sede Fissa (D.S.F.)

	Cens. 1951	Cens. 1961	31-XII-1965
Alimentari	316.304	385.632	427.436
Non Alimentari	185.556	277.390	327.614
TOTALE	501.860	663.022	755.050
N° addetti D.S.F.	957.617	1.332.524	1.520.000[a]
Media addetti per negozio	1,9	2,01	2,01
Consumi privati (in miliardi di lire 1963)	10.365	16.660	20.135
Popolazione residente	47.544.000	50.623.569	52.930.594
N° abitanti per 1 negozio D.S.F.	95	76	70

Source: Carlo Fabrizi, "La razionalizzazione del commercio italiano in rapporto all'urbanistico commerciale," Atti del congresso internazionale commercio e urbanistica, 14-16 ottobre 1967, p. 62. a. Stima

16 Atti Parlamentari, Legislatura V, Senato della Repubblica, Ministro del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica, Relazione generale sulla situazione economica del Paese, (1970), Roma: 1971, vol. I, p. 6.

These trends ran counter to those in other Common Market countries where the number of shops has been declining.

The appearance of supermarkets in Italy has occurred with such delay and on such a small scale that they have barely made a dent in the commercial system. As the figures on the average number employed per shop suggest, the dominance of the family-operated shop has hardly been shaken by the arrival of the self-service stores and supermarkets. As of 1968 sales made in supermarkets in Italy accounted for less than 2% of all retail food sales, in contrast with 13% in Germany (1966) and 14% in France (1967).[17] Once again, while there are differences between North and South, the common features of the distribution networks of both North and South are remarkable. In both cases, supermarkets are islands in a sea of tiny independent shops. Indeed only eleven Italian provinces, albeit Northern ones, have more than one supermarket per 100,000 inhabitants, a figure exceeded by all other Common Market countries (1968).[18]

In sum, in industry, agriculture, and commerce, both in the North and the South, small firms employ the majority of the labor force and they produce a proportion of national wealth (prodotto lordo complessivo) which is somewhat lower than their share of the workforce, but still very high.

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[17] Associazione Italiana delle Grandi Imprese di Distribuzione al Dettaglio, Libro bianco sulla riforma della disciplina del commercio, p. 44.

[18] Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato, e Agricoltura de Parma, La grande distribuzione nell'ambito dell'apparato distributivo alimentare al dettaglio, p. 15.

As almost all analyses of the Italian economy point out, the weight of these small economic units is bound to decline in the long run. And yet, one is struck by just how long the long run promises to be and by how ambiguous the trends in the evolution of the traditional sector still appear in the 1970's. As mentioned above, the numbers employed in small shops continues to grow. Though in agriculture and industry, a gradual process of elimination of the smallest units seems to be taking place, the impact of these changes on the firms that survive has not always been great and the process itself is far from unilinear. In the case of an advanced region like Lombardy, for example, the structures of agriculture and industry are not greatly different from those in regions that lag behind Lombardy. And even in Lombardy, the reversibility, at least in the short-run, of the trends that are reducing the traditional sector has been clearly demonstrated in periods of economic stagnation. Between 1964 and 1965 and again between 1970 and 1971, the number of males employed in agriculture rose in Lombardy, reflecting the decisions of small cultivators to remain in the countryside rather than risk uncertain employment prospects in the city.[19]

No phenomenon more sharply illuminates the ambiguities of the fate of the traditional sector than the survival and recent expansion of what are properly described as archaic forms of work: lavoro a domicilio,

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[19] Ugo Maggioli, Contributo per l'analisi e la previsione dell'evoluzione delle forze di lavoro agricole in Lombardia, Milano: Giunta Regionale Lombarda, 15-16 ottobre 1971, p. 1.

appalto di mano d'opera, and child labor. It seems inconceivable that work at home (lavoro a domicilio) could continue to play a significant role in a mature industrial economy where the savings both from employing machinery too expensive and too large to be used by an individual at home and from the concentration of workers and division of labor possible within factories would seem to rule out the survival of a putting-out system on any significant scale. In Italy, however, there are probably at least one million workers at home (lavoranti a domicilio), according to the Ministry of Labor's calculations,[20] and perhaps as many as two and a half million, according to the estimates of officials in the CGIL.[21]

Statistics on lavoro a domicilio are hardly more than educated guesses, since only a minority of those who work at home are registered by their employers, despite laws requiring them to do so. This is because one of the principal advantages of having work executed outside the factory is that it allows the entrepreneur to escape social security payments for the workers as well as to pay them lower wages than they would receive under nationally negotiated union contracts in the enterprise. About a fifth of those who work at home are in the clothing and textile trades.[22] In these

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[20] Antonio Molinari, relazione, FILTEA-CGIL, FILTA-CISL, UILTA-UIL, Convegno Unitario sul Lavoro a Domicilio, Carpi, 7.2.1970, p. 2.

[21] Interview with Lavrero and Roscane, CGIL, Rome, 17/1/72.

[22] Molinari, op. cit., p. 3.

manufacturing branches about 10% of the workforce is employed outside the factory.[23] It is even claimed that some workers are making parts of FIAT cars at home!

Though the dimensions of the phenomenon are uncertain, it is clear that they are substantial and, in recent years, expanding.[24] The 1972 (Centro studi investimenti sociali) report, "VI Rapporto sulla situazione sociale del paese," noted that small and medium firms "hanno spesso trovato in meccanismi anche strani (aumento del lavoro a domicilio, aumento dell'appalto e del sub-appalto, divisione delle unità lavorative, addirittura in alcuni case "sconcentrazione" delle aziende) una elasticità concreta, quasi un modo di adattarsi a situazioni di crisi non altrimenti superabili."[25] The unions also have claimed a sharp increase in lavoro a domicilio in recent years, one unionist charging "si sta assistendo ad un vero e proprio trasferimento di lavorazione dal loro habitat industriale al domicilio privato."[26] The survival of archaic forms of labor like lavoro a domicilio and their capacity to expand in periods of economic difficulty, the glacial pace of transformations in agriculture and industry, the continuing growth of traditional commerce and the extreme

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[23] Figures on national employment in tessili, vestiario, e calzature pelli e cuoio from ISTAT, Conti economici territoriali per gli anni 1951-1969, Supplemento straordinario al bollettino mensile di statistica, no. 9, settembre 1970, cited in Frey, op. cit. Table 7.

[24] Just how recent is the expansion of lavoro a domicilio is unclear. The findings of the Rubinacci Commission, as reported in Lutz, op. cit., pp. 227-228, on lavoro a domicilio in the fifties also noted an increase.

[25] Cited in Il Manifesto, 18 ottobre 1972, p. 1.

[26] Molinari, op. cit., p. 3; Roscane and Lavrero; Remo de Servi, relazione, above cited convegno.

difficulty of inserting modern forms of distribution into the commercial system -- all these are symptoms of the vitality of the traditional sectors and suggest that these groups may continue to play a significant part in Italian society and economy for the foreseeable future.

Political economy of traditional Italy

The fortunes of the traditional sector reflect not only the value of their economic contribution, but also and chiefly the political services they perform in Italian society. In pure economic terms, small-scale enterprises have certain advantages that account in part for the size of the traditional sector in Italy. As Bruni suggested, small firms that are less capital-intensive may flourish in an economic environment like Italy's, with dispersed markets, high transportation costs, need for direct producer-client relations, and imperfect competition.[27] There are, moreover, economic advantages for large firms in maintaining or even creating around them a dense network of small firms. In some cases these small firms produce parts for the large firm that the latter does not find profitable to produce within the enterprise, either because the demand for these products is too variable to justify organizing production on a large scale or else because the amount of labor involved in the production of the good is high.[28] Other times, the large firm both manufactures a good within the enterprise and subcontracts out to small firms a certain volume of production of the good. The most

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[27] Bruni, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

[28] For these reasons Pirelli is considering divesting itself of certain activities that require a high labor input and, given the unionization of Pirelli workers, high labor costs.

highly developed case of this pattern is Fiat, which for many parts has two sources of provision: one, internal, the other external. Fiat is estimated to deal with some 15,000 independent subcontractors.[29]

In a study of a community near Milan Alessandro Pizzorno discovered that large firms often assisted some of their workers in setting up little enterprises and concluded:

> Grosso modo possiamo dire che il fondamento degli interessi delle grandi aziende a decentrare in questo modo una parte delle lavorazioni, favorendo quindi la piccolissima iniziativa privata sia di due ordini: a) di tipo tecnologico-organizzativo, in quanto in questo modo ci si impegna ad organizzare e razionalizzare soltanto la parte centrale del processo produttivo, senza affrontare il peso di una razionalizzazione piu ampia, che non sarebbe giustificata dalla quantità di produzione; b) di ordine sindacale, in quanto l'operaio all'interno dell' azienda ha più tendenze e possibilità ad organizzarsi ed a porre delle rivendicazioni, mentre il piccolo produttore indipendente sfrutta se stesso ed i pochi operai alle sue dipendenze, dei quali facilmente impedisce l'organizzazione.[30]

The first of the causes noted by Pizzorno is economic, in the sense that it would be likely in any economy to favor a transfer of production from a large capital-intensive enterprise to a small-scale more labor-intensive enterprise. In fact, the tendency for firms to subcontract out that part of its production for which demand is highly variable or for which demand is too low to warrant large-scale production has been observed in many industrial societies.[31]

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[29] See Mario Cervi, "L'Ombra della recessione sulle imprese minori: Fiat: 160 mila auto in meno," Corriere della Sera, 18 dicembre 1971.

[30] Alessandro Pizzorno, Comunità e razionalizzazione, Torino: 1960, p. 79.

[31] For USA, see Michael Piore, "Notes for a Theory of Labor Market Stratification," Working Paper, Department of Economics, MIT, 1972, pp. 28-30.

In contrast, the second cause that Pizzorno observed, namely lower labor costs and greater labor docility in small firms, is preeminently political, for it is in large measure the product of the decisions by the state and by the unions to deal with the small-scale firm in the traditional sector in ways different from those in which they tax, inspect, subsidize, and organize the large-scale firm in the modern sector. The state reduces labor costs in the small firms by taking in charge a part of the employer's social security payments,[32] on a regular basis for artisanal firms and for agricultural employers, and as a frequent instrument of conjunctural policy for other firms in the traditional sector. In July, 1971, for example, governmental measures to assist small and medium industry included a sgravio di contributi sociali amounting to 5% of the employers' payments for artisanal and all other industrial firms employing up to 300. The government helps small firms reduce labor costs not only by paying part of them, but also by closing its eyes to a substantial amount of cheating by the small employers who, by all accounts, get away with not paying a sizeable part of their social security bills to the state. Apparently, this is particularly true of firms in the South and of those small Northern firms that are not unionized.

The presence of the unions in firms of the traditional sector is weak in most of Italy, with the exception of Emilia-Romagna. The unions have concentrated their organizing efforts on workers in the modern sector. Even after 1959, when the provisions of national contracts negotiated by labor and business confederations became binding on all employers, the effect of differential

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[32] Lutz notes that in 1959 the maximum social security payment that an artisanal firm had to make for a day's work by a male was 117 lire, compared with a 330 lire maximum in a large firm. Op. cit., p. 226.

degrees of unionization in firms of different scales has contributed to maintaining lower wages in small firms. Particularly in periods of economic growth, the benefits negotiated at the factory level become a significant part of the wage package. In these periods, the disparity between wages in small and large firms grows, as may the incentive for firms to subcontract out production. In periods of stagnation or recession, large firms are better able to resist the unions' demands for local increases above the national contract. At the same time, they come under heavy pressure from the union to maintain employment within the enterprise and to cut back on subcontracting. The process is different in periods of prosperity and stagnation, but the result is the same: the concentration of union power in the modern sector contributes to maintaining lower wages in the traditional sector.

The political choices that preserve low labor costs in small firms are only one strand in a tangled net of decisions that Italian political elites have been making about the traditional sector since the end of the war. In the interstices of grand national policies for the South, the Common Market, and national planning have been secreted hundreds of decrees and laws on subsidies, tax reductions, credit institutions and so forth through which the fate of the traditional sector has been decided. Looking at the impact of these purportedly ad-hoc and temporary measures, it is difficult not to conclude that the survival of the traditional sector has been willed by the Italian political elites. The active support of the government, the major political parties, and even powerful groups in the

advanced sector has preserved a strong traditional sector, and neither economic factors nor "lag" are adequate explanations of the phenomenon.

No case better illustrates the primacy of politics in the evolution of the traditional sector than the course of commercial legislation in recent years.[33] Since 1926 opening a shop in Italy requires a license which, depending on the size of the store, has been granted by the commune or by the prefect. Increasingly this system of licensing came under attack because of the obstacles it put in the way of reforming the distribution network. The opposition of local shopkeepers to supermarkets often forced the prefect to shelve applications for indefinite periods of time, apparently with the hope that either the promoters of the supermarket or the local opposition would give up the battle. Applications rejected by the prefect could be forwarded to the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Artisanry, where they were also likely to languish. At the end of 1971 it was estimated that some 800 applications to open large stores had accumulated in the Ministry, some of them so old that the promoters had likely long since given up on the project. In the sixties a number of bills proposing to liberalize access to commerce were introduced into Parliament; the 1966-1970 national plan called for replacing the licensing procedure with a simple registration form. The first priority of public action in the commerical sphere, the plan spelled out, must be to reduce costs, and this is best accomplished by assisting the trend toward concentration of retail units and increasing their size, by encouraging their modernization, and by eliminating the obstacles that administrative rules put in the way of these changes. The

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[33] On various projects for reform of commercial legislation see Associazione Italiana delle Grandi Imprese di Distribuzione al Dettaglio, Libro bianco sulla riforma della disciplina del commercio (Quaderni A.I.G.I.D.); Roberto Ariotti, "Pretese corporativistiche ed esigenze di sviluppo nella programmizione del commercio," Il Mulino, 7/8. 1971; and Marcello Marin, "La distribuzione in Italia," Nord e Sud, no. 2, 1971

Consiglio Nazionale del'Economia e del Lavoro (CNEL) moved resolutions in the same sense. The preliminary project for the second national plan (1971-1975) repeated the first in calling for an end to the licensing system and describing the principal goals as encouraging the development of large stores in accordance with the needs of the market and encouraging the modernization of traditional shops.

All these soundings of the general will revealed a large measure of agreement about what would have to change in commerce in order to modernize the sector. Nonetheless, all proposals that embodied this understanding were defeated, and in the spring of 1971 commissions of the Camera dei Deputati and the Senato voted a bill on commerce, the "Helfer project," that far from liberalizing access to trade, further restricted it. Under the guise of planning urban growth, the Helfer law transfers the right of accepting or refusing a supermarket from the prefect and the Ministry down to the communal level. For the supermarket refused a permit at this point, there will no longer be recourse to higher authority. In principle, the decisions of the commune are to be taken in accordance with a plan for urban development which each commune is supposed to prepare. In fact, since the rights of the shopkeepers already in place and of their heirs are guaranteed, the law amounts to freezing the status quo.[34]

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[34] On the Helfer law, see Libro bianco, op. cit., and debate in issues of Mondo economico, January through April 1971.

And though the bitter objections of the supermarkets and their organizations have, it is rumored, been mollified by the concession that many of the applications still held up in the Ministry of Industry will be granted before the new law goes into effect, still it seems clear the expansion of supermarkets has been sharply checked.

Just as astonishing as this reversion to protectionism in face of nationally proclaimed goals of commercial modernization was the virtual unanimity with which the major political parties embraced the measure.[35] Not only the Christian Democrats and the Fascists on their right, but the Republican Party, in contradiction with its programs for the modernization of Italian society, voted for the bill. On the Left as well, the bill received general support. The Communist Party called for rapid implementation of the legislation "in order to block the expansion of monopolistic supermarkets and the proliferation of licenses."[36] The bill was not even debated and voted in full assembly but, by agreement of the parties, decided in commission where the politics of the closed arena guaranteed that there would be no embarrassing confrontations with the lofty ideals of the national plan that the deputies and senators had been discussing the very same year.

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[35] The new commercial law ran counter not only to the Italian Plan goals for commerce but to Common Market principles on open access to professions, and the Commission of the European Economic Community in a letter signed by Malfatti expressed strong opposition to the bill. Letter printed in Il Sole-24 Ore, 25 July 1971.

[36] These demands of the PCI appeared rather paradoxically in a statement aimed contro il carovita, L'Unita, 18 settembre 1971.

The explanation that the parties protected small traditional commerce because, with general elections approaching, each hoped to keep or widen its base of support in the independent small propertied classes is doubtless correct. The Christian Democrats were seriously worried about the rising level of political agitation among the hard-pressed small shopkeepers and feared that the Fascists might be able to mobilize them and break them out of the Christian Democratic fold. The relative success of a small shopkeepers' movement in France in 1971 under a flamboyant leader named Gerard Nicoud demonstrated the potential for radicalization of this group. Even though Confcommercio had so far managed to keep the discontented from organizing outside its ranks, there was reason to fear that the Fascists might succeed in doing in Italy what the Poujadists and the Nicoudists had done in France: to capture a part of the independent small middle class from the conservatives.

The Communists, too, were worried about the historical propensity of the traditional middle classes to support Fascism in times of economic stress. Their vote on the Helfer project reflected, however, not only a reaction to rising support for the Fascists, but also a more long-term interest in driving a wedge between small-scale firms and a modern sector dominated by monopoly capital. Only in Emilia and Toscany do the Communists receive a significant measure of support from the traditional middle classes, and it is doubtful whether they entertain serious hopes of winning over any large part of these classes in other areas.[35] Their purposes seem rather to be to

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[35] On PCI doctrine on ceti medi produttivi, see Stephen M. Hellman, "The PCI's Alliance Strategy and the Case of the Middle Classes," Paper given at Conference on French and Italian Communism, Cambridge, October 1972.

neutralize the hostility of these classes to socialism by stressing PCI support on issues like commerical reform that pit small firms against monopoly capital and to weaken the alliance between traditional and modern firms in professional associations and in the other political parties.

The protectionist choices of the parties also reflect the strength of the traditional groups within them. As Salvati has argued, the interests of both developed and underdeveloped economic groups coexist within all the major parties with the consequence for the Right that the interests representing big business are unable to establish their hegemony over the interests of small independent property and to carry through a rationalization of the economy; the consequence for the Left is that a coherent reform strategy, to say nothing of a revolutionary one, is ruled out by the strength within the working class movement of small property holders.[36]

Why the parties are so sensitive to the problems of the traditional sector is a question that these arguments and those that could be developed to account for the behavior of the other parties on this issue explain only in part. The May 1971 elections demonstrated once again how little mobility there is in the bases of electoral support for different parties in Italy and how little the major parties had to fear any mass defection of traditional middle class electors. What the parties are responding to when they sacrifice the interests of other groups in the population to those of the traditional sector is not only or even primarily the likelihood that traditional electors will defect to radical movements. They are responding to the dangers of a political and social destabilization that might result throughout Italian society were there any real weakening of the traditional sector, for the

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[36] Michele Salvati, "L'Origine della crisi in corso," Quaderni Piacentini, XI, 46, March 1972, p. 22. This is a brilliant analysis of the economic and political functions of dualism in contemporary Italian politics that has the specific virtue of focusing on conflicts of interest between different kinds of firms rather than on the regional dimensions of dualism.

traditional sector absorbs and digests problems that might otherwise tear apart what the political elites perceive as a fragile social fabric.

Of these potentially radicalizing problems none is more critical than employment. As one official of Confindustria put it: "Avere o non disoccupazione; avere o non una certe tensione sociale." The Italian political elites are extremely sensitive to the impact of economic fluctuations on employment, and in periods of stagnation and recession it is not only the trade unions but the representatives of employers' associations who, albeit for different reasons, are obsessed with finding solutions for the economic problems that will rapidly produce results on the employment front. In large measure the willingness of the firms in the modern sector to accept and to pay the price of protectionist policies for the traditional sector stems from a belief that the traditional sector provides such solutions. Small commerce, for example, is above all perceived as a vast reservoir of jobs that can absorb an indefinite number of individuals who either because they are new migrants to the city or because they are unemployed or because they lack skills have not yet or are no longer integrated into the modern industrial system. Even in periods of economic growth, employment in small commerce was often a by-station enroute from agriculture to employment in industry. In periods of industrial recession small commerce serves as a "attività di rifugio,"[37] as a "valvola di scarico per la disoccupazione e la sotto occupazione [che] ha portato ad avallare in sede politica l'idea di un ceto commerciale che,

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[37] Marin, op. cit., p. 70.

in quanto costituito da unità familiari, meriti di essere tutelato e difeso."[38]

Small industrial firms and artisanal firms also mop up the labor surplus created by economic shifts as does agriculture.[39] In 1971 it has been estimated that perhaps as many men went back to the South, presumably to some kind of agricultural employment, as left Southern agriculture for Northern employment. Legislation on land tenure has preserved this cushioning function of traditional agriculture, since by protecting tenants' rights and facilitating the purchase of small property it keeps open the possibility of a return to the farm that is not an option for an unemployed black in the U.S.A., for example, whose departure from Southern agriculture for the city usually coincides with his loss of tenure rights. Thus even where the ranks of agriculture have been severely depleted by rural exodus, still it continues to play this cushioning function in the economy. As Maggioli found in a study of the small agricultural sector of Lombardy: "Vien così da concludere che, malgrado la sua attuale scarsa rilevanza dal punto di vista delle forze di lavoro impegnate, il settore agricolo lombardo funziona ancora quale elemento ammortizzatore delle ricorrenti crisi economiche e quindi anche occupazionali che travagliano la nostra regione."[40]

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[38] S. Ravalli, "La distribuzione al dettaglio," Mondo Economico, 23 dicembre 1967.

[39] Lutz has noted that between 1950 and 1959 non-agricultural employment increased by 2 million but that relatively little of this population (120,000) was absorbed by the modern large-scale sector. "Indeed the small-scale sector -- outside agriculture -- probably expanded more in terms of employment, both absolutely and relatively, than did the large-scale sector." Op. cit., p. 75.

[40] Maggioli, op. cit., p. 3.

It is not so much the absolute numbers employed in the traditional sector that are critical for the stability of the economic system as the traditional sector's capacity to expand or contract its labor force, in times of recession to absorb workers expelled from the modern sector, in times of growth to provide workers for the modern sector. The elasticity of the traditional firms make them the shock absorbers of the economy. For this reason, when the road ahead looks bumpy, the attention of the Italian political elites is rapidly focussed on that part of the economic machine that has in the past protected the engine from shocks that might have destroyed it, that is, they revert to protection of the traditional firms.

Another way of expressing it is that the traditional sector serves to reduce the costs of economic fluctuations and change for the modern sector by allowing these costs to be distributed in such a way that their burden is disproportionately carried by those who own and work in independent small property. In periods of recession like the present one, there is a progressive shucking off of costs in which each firm tries to pass on down to the next as many of the costs, both economic and social, as possible. The process resembles the children's game of hot potato, in which each participant tries to avoid having his fingers burned by getting rid of the hot potato to another player. The hot potatoes in the Italian economy are labor costs and labor agitation over dismissals. In periods of economic squeeze the large-scale firm first tries to avoid firing any of its own labor force for fear of stirring up union agitation and attempts to reduce production by cutting

off its subcontractors. Those workers that are fired from the large firms try to find work in the small-scale firms. When these latter need to compress labor costs, they resort to lavoro a domicilio or appalto di mano d'opera. And when even these branches become saturated, they begin to expel labor from the workforce into unemployment. Women are for these purposes of shifting the workers down through small-scale firms back into homes and then out of the economy a particularly adaptable part of the labor force, as Wilson's study of how women move in and out of the workforce in Lombardy shows.[41]

Italy is not unique among advanced industrial societies in using its traditional sector both to cushion the impact of economic fluctuations and change and to distribute their consequences in a way that shifts the burden off the modern sector. In France, for example, small commerce serves many of the same functions for society as in Italy. In the United States, dual labor markets have developed when powerful firms, that are prevented by the strength of unions in their own plants from transfering the costs of reduced demand onto their own workers, resort to subcontractors whose workers are paid less and have less job security. What is striking in Italy is how reliant the society and the economy are on the traditional sector because of its uses as a shock absorber and how little political attention has been given to devising other means of accomplishing the same ends. Why Italy

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[41] Lynne Wilson, Communicazione su alcuni problemi dell'occupazione femminile in Lobardia, Milano: Giunta Regionale Lombarda, 15-16 Octobre 1971.

might wish to find other solutions is obvious: the current arrangements prevent any fundamental economic and social reforms; they also force the poorest and least well-protected groups in society to bear too many of the costs both of economic malfunctioning and of economic progress. The issue here is not one of replacing the shock absorbers provided by the traditional sector with another set but of coupling the old shock absorbers with some new ones that might distribute the bumps of the economic cycle onto different parts of the system.

Other industrial societies have developed alternatives to the traditional sector for managing economic fluctuations. France and Germany, for example, make heavy use of foreign labor, and in periods of economic retrenchment they can solve their employment problems by sending the workers home. The United States deals with the same problem by accepting a higher rate of unemployment than would be found acceptable in France or Germany and by offering higher unemployment benefits than might be acceptable in Italy. Italy has had little experience and less success with these two solutions: the limitation of migration from the South to the North that was on the books until 1961 did in effect treat southern workers as foreign labor that could be brought into Northern industry as needed;[42] and there is of course a certain amount of compensated unemployment. The former would probably be impossible as well as undesirable to reinstate; an increase in compensated unemployment might

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[42] On the role of regulated migration in creating a dual labor market, see George H. Hildebrand, Growth and Structure in the Economy of Modern Italy, Cambridge, Mass: 1965, Chapter 14.

be advantageous for the firms in the modern sector but it could hardly be considered an improvement for others in the system. One might calculate whether a different mix of employment in the traditional sector and compensated unemployment might not be preferable to the current heavy reliance on the traditional sector. The real question is whether there are not better solutions than these available to Italy and also to other advanced industrial states for dealing with the costs of their own prosperity.

"Pezzullo" del Bonanni per Caracciolo.

MASSIMO BONANNI

3

LA POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE DELL'ITALIA: DUE PREMESSE METODOLOGICHE

1. Molti commentatori si sono spesso chiesti perchè il dibattito sulla politica internazionale dell'Italia sia stato non solo scarno ma anche contraddittorio. Colpa di una politica contraddittoria che mal si presta a sistemazioni a tavolino? Mancanza di adeguati strumenti di analisi? Eccessiva rapidità dei mutamenti che hanno reso inattuali molte dottrine?

Forse si tratta un po' di tutte queste cose. Il che significa che affinchè il dibattito possa svilupparsi e la politica internazionale dell'Italia divenire oggetto di più ampia attenzione, occorrerà che si crei un consenso su alcune premesse.

2. Nel dibattito che ai tempi più recenti si è svolto sulla teoria delle relazioni internazionali è possibile individuare due diversi gruppi di teorie. Vi sono anzitutto quelle che vengono comunemente definite le teorie "realiste" che pongono a base della loro costruzione il concetto di stato, personificandolo e ponendolo al di sopra della società. Lo stato in questa visione sarebbe l'unico operatore di politica internazionale e nello sforzo di personificazione si giunge anche all'indagine psicologica, cercando di individuare lo scopo da esso perseguito: volontà di potenza, lotta per il potere, interesse nazionale...

All'estremo opposto possiamo collocare un numero variopinto di teorie (teoria dei sistemi, della struttura decisionale dell'interdipendenza...) che si qualificano in negativo rispetto alle precedenti. Esse non considerano lo stato come persona né come unico attore, e tendono quindi ad esaminare più da vicino il comportamento dei suoi "grandi corpi" e il modo con cui i loro interessi si confrontano, divengono o si allacciano all'interno ed all'esterno dei vari paesi, Si potrebbe dire che queste teorie hanno come concetto centrale quello di società in tutte le sue possibili forme di aggregazione e in una accezione non

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necessariamente limitata alle dimensioni nazionali.

Questa contrapposizione è riconducibile non solo a diverse paternità culturali (la contrapposizione tra Marx e Hegel sui concetti di stato e di società) ma anche a due diverse esperienze storiche rifacendosi, la prima - più o meno inconsapevolmente - alla dottrina dell'assolutismo, la seconda alla progressiva affermazione della borghesia.

Da questa lotta, la politica estera - l'osservazione è del Tocqueville - resta un po' al di fuori con il risultato che la strumentazione democratica e l'influenza della società si faranno sentire assai meno che in altri campi. Ma ciò non toglie che la progressiva affermazione della borghesia, l'aumento dei traffici e la progressiva importanza del momento economico abbiano ampliato enormemente le componenti della politica internazionale, dando progressivamente maggiore spazio alla società. Questa ~~duplicità~~ contraddittorietà ha pesato molto sugli studi e sulla stessa realtà della politica estera. Gli utilizzatori di teorie realiste finivano col non rendersi conto che la loro strumentazione aveva un'efficacia limitata in quanto spiegava situazioni storicamente residuali: i loro modelli poggiavano su concetti che, anche se storici, erano utilizzati in modo metastorico; il loro pensiero finiva spesso per fare da supporto al pensiero conservatore.

D'altro canto le teorie contrapposte, nel loro sforzo di catalogazione empirica delle varie situazioni, hanno ~~sempre~~ perso di vista non solo quel residuo ma ~~la stessa~~ esistenza di nessi essenziali che permetteva di ricondurre ad una qualche unità atteggiamenti a prima vista disparati. Il "decision-making" si è così spesso disperso nell'esame di casi-studio senza poi ricomporsi in un quadro critico globale.

Se questo è il senso attuale della contrapposizione (e diciamo attuale perchè è anche possibile che in un futuro molto prossimo le teorie realiste riacquistino validità nella spiegazione di certi aspetti

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del totalitarismo delle società industriali contemporanee), la conclusione che se ne può trarre è che la scelta tra i due diversi tipi di approccio non può essere fatta in astratto ma in riferimento alle esperienze storiche e costituzionali dei vari paesi. Essi potranno anche essere usati contemporaneamente o alternativamente, ma è comunque necessario tener presente la loro diversità, la loro capacità a spiegare fenomeni qualitativamente diversi.

Questa premessa ci riconduce al tema. Molti degli equivoci sorgono - sopratutto in Italia - per il prevalente riferimento esclusivo alle teorie realiste. Ciò ha una giustificazione storica non solo per la particolare posizione che la politica estera ha mantenuto nei sistemi democratici ma anche per la storia dello sviluppo politico del nostro paese in cui elementi di assolutismo hanno sopravvissuto più a lungo mentre assai più recente - oserei dire contemporaneamente - è il suo sviluppo borghese. Tuttavia è proprio questo sviluppo - in parallelo con un maggior inserimento nella vita internazionale - che rende necessario utilizzare, se non altro come momento dialettico, schemi di riferimento più ampi di quelli utilizzati in passato.

3. Se l'Italia sia un paese con un sistema politico cosi' legato al passato che la sua politica internazionale possa essere esaminata esclusivamente sulla base delle teorie realiste o se sia un paese che, uscito da un passato mediterraneo, abbia iniziato la sua rivoluzione borghese e la sua politica internazionale possa essere esaminata anche alla luce di teorie che prendono in considerazione anche la società, questa è l'opzione fondamentale su cui bisogna essere d'accordo prima di cominciare.

Questo accordo richiede però - ed è questa la seconda premessa - che si metta l'accento sul nuovo, sul cambiamento, sulle fratture.

Continuità o frattura: due modi diversi di considerare l'Italia, riconducibili a diversi interessi sociali. La polemica è stata spesso esplicita. E' nota ad esempio quella tra l'Anzillotti e il Romano se lo stato unitario dovesse considerarsi una costruzione nuova o il

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proseguimento dello stato sabaudo (e la vittoria andò, manco a dirlo, alla seconda ipotesi). Attuale quella del secondo dopoguerra, se l'Italia nasceva dalla Resistenza o proseguiva il suo corso dopo una parentesi: vincente la prima nella celebrativa ma la seconda nelle coscienze.

A queste polemiche si potrebbero aggiungere quelle degli internazionalisti, monisti o dualisti, a seconda che sostenessero il carattere derivato od originario dell'ordinamento internazionale (e la questione era particolarmente importante per la valutazione dell'ordinamento comunitario). Nella vittoria dei primi si negava non solo la novità per il sistema internazionale, ma anche la frattura col passato degli ordinamenti politici che vi partecipavano.

Questa incapacità della cultura italiana di registrare le fratture col passato, e le sfide che esse comportavano, è stata ~~anch'esso~~ causa di molti equivoci.

L'origine di questa incomprensione va probabilmente ~~va ricercata~~ nel "Risorgimento" (che non a caso non fu chiamato "Sorgimento"). Al momento dell'unità l'Italia appariva come un paese senza una storia comune contemporanea ~~moderna comune~~, non politica, non sociale, non economica. La consapevolezza di questa diversità deve essere stata cosi' forte nei padri del Risorgimento che essa, con una lunga ed efficace azione di propaganda, fu trasformata nel suo contrario. In mancanza di mass-media, si utilizzarono Carducci e gli inni patriottici, Benedetto Croce e la toponomastica (le ~~i nomi delle~~ strade). L'~~Italia diventa~~ una penisola predestinata da sempre all'unità, dove la storia non sorreggeva si risaliva ancora indietro: Petrarca, Dante, l'impero romano, Romolo e Remo.

Nasce cosi', manipolato dall'alto e funzionale ai suoi obbiettivi, il mito della continuità che tanta parte ha avuto nella nostra storia. Un mito che ben si innestava con la cultura delle classi colte, pervase da uno storicismo dolcemente avvolgente - il versante

Alla fine di questa massiccia campagna pubbl./. ctaria (che allora si definiva "cultura nazionale") l'Italia affare

conservatore dell'hegelismo - rispetto al quale l'opera dell'uomo era solo e sempre un'astuzia della storia.

4. Il nuovo, per la verità, c'è stato ma l'unica persona consapevole di esso fu forse lo Sforza (~~molto~~ e un po' meno De Gasperi). Ciò ha fatto si' che il nuovo ha agito più in negativo che in positivo. Il fascismo ci aveva allontanato dai paesi anglosassoni: e la politica italiana sarà filo-americana e filo-inglese. Aveva bistrattato la minoranza alto-atesina: e la politica italiana, sia pure a fatica, si sforzerà di essere liberale. Aveva isolato l'Italia dall'Europa: e la politica italiana sarà "europeista" (e niente più di questo). Era stato colonialista: e l'Italia proclamerà (facendolo rimanere un proclama) una sua particolare vocazione per l'aiuto allo sviluppo. E cosi' via.

Questa inerzia è dovuta forse anche al fatto che l'unica frattura che si poteva ammettere era quella del fascismo e non una più profonda che potesse sconfessare anche la storia precedente.

La scarsa consapevolezza del nuovo, tanto nell'evoluzione della società italiana quanto in quella del sistema politico internazionale, spiega non solo l'inerzia ma anche i ritorni di fiamma.

Analogo al fenomeno descritto dalla psicoanalisi secondo cui l'individuo che non riesce a rimuovere le difficoltà del presente si rifà a modelli di comportamento della prima infanzia, la politica internazionale dell'Italia è sepsso attratta dalla sua storia.

Risorgono cosi' modelli di comportamento che si rifanno ai valori e alla strumentazione politica storicamente derivati dall'assolutismo (politica di potere, diplomazia tradizionale, politica delle alleanze), valori e strumenti dei quali si potrà dire tutto il male possibile ma ai quali non si potrà disconoscere una notevole semplicità di processo decisionale interno ed esterno. E ciò spiega la preferenza che verso di essi manifesta l'amministrazione italiana non appena si profili una qualche difficoltà.

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Era stato antislavo: e l'Italia si sforzerà ~~di~~ (con qualche sovrapposizione di pelle) di chiudere il problema e stabilire rapporti di amicizia con la [illegible]

Che si tratti di ricerca di mercati in alternativa alla politica commerciale comune (ed è ancora nel 1973 che l'Italia concede alla Romania la clausola della nazione più favorita, concessione che non è più nelle sue possibilità, facendo aprire nei suoi confronti un ulteriore procedimento comunitario) o di visioni mediterranee giustificate con una "particolare vocazione" (ma che in realtà sottraggono l'amministrazione italiana alla impegnativa sfida europea); che si tratti di rapporti privilegiati con la Francia (caso Secam e certi ondeggiamenti prima del Vertice) o con gli Stati Uniti (politica monetaria, politica spaziale, caso Intelsat) il fenomeno è sempre lo stesso. E' il fenomeno di un paese che non si vuole riconoscere come giovane (nel senso che il suo attuale assetto segna una profonda frattura con il passato) ma che mette l'accento sulla continuità per usare la sua storia in senso regressivo, inguaribilmente attratto dalla "diplomazia dell'astuzia".

Se la politica internazionale dell'Italia sarà capace di registrare il mutamento che si è verificato all'interno e all'esterno di esso, è questione fortunatamenta ancora aperta. Un modo di aiutare questa evoluzione è una critica che non cada nei suoi stessi errori.

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The art of elusive leadership : the Italian case [tentative title]

François Bourricaud

~~Rough Draft~~

This has to be taken as a very rough draft indeed. It has to be read rather as a list or a guide of meaningful questions and for any of the points here raised I hope that the discussion we have at Torino will help me to go subsequently deeper into the analysis of the relevant issues and the discussion of the specific material.

Starting with the analysis of the motives, for which I have accepted the task to present some observations and some hypothesis about the evolution of the Italian political regime since the end of World War II will make easier for me to make clear the goals and the limits of my work. As any naive outside observer, I have been first struck by the apparently growing difficulties in the functioning of the Italian regime. The frequency of cabinet crises ~~electrify~~, the extremely elaborate and somehow Byzantine Parliamentary ritual could not but evoke for a Frenchman the "jeux, delices et poisons" of our later Fourth Republic. I like to make plain that I don't count myself ~~as a contendant~~ among those especially contemptuous of our penultimate regime. The Fourth Republic certainly will not count among the most glorious periods of our history, but that regime of almost completely unbrittled "souverainete parlementaire" sums up a way of managing public affairs too deeply ingrained in our national tradition to be dismissed scornfully as it is now by our present rulers. More generally the "weakness" of a regime even if it is, as in the case of the Fourth Republic, deeply sensed both by the professional observers and by the general public and even if it touches upon the most essential conditions of its functioning doesn't preclude of the capacity of that regime to live and even to survive its most bitter critics. In a rather old essay of mine[1] I happened to write "the Fourth Republic that has employed all the energy it has in preserving itself and assuring its survival... doesn't seem seriously menaced from within... but a serious political crisis, "a convulsion" cannot be excluded as the result of an African failure becoming more probable every day." According to that very trivial and almost tautological prediction, which, by the way, was quite conform to the expectations of the Fourth Republic arch opponent, General de Gaulle himself, the apparently weakest regime has great

[1] The Institutions of Developed Society, Arnold Rose ed., U. of Minn. Press, 1967, p.463 and 522.

chances to survive unless a first magnitude crisis takes place in the most sensitive areas of its environment.

Obviously nobody can be sure that the Fourth Republic had survived were not its leaders been unfortunate enough to bog down in that horrible Algerian affair. But a few reflections on its fate lead me to the thought that most observers are exposed to two sorts of systematic errors. First they tend to exaggerate the strictness of the "efficiency conditions" to which any political organization has to satisfy, and more generally tend to take a too narrowly technocratic view of political "efficiency." According to them, a regime cannot be "efficient" if it doesn't "solve" the problems presented to the political system by the changing conditions of society itself. But for a complex of reasons aptly described by Bertrand Juvenel,[2] there is no such thing as "problem" that political man would have to "resolve" but only "questions" to which they try to give more or less plausible and consistent answers. Therefore most of observers find themselves at their best to vituperate the incompetence, the bungling and the frivolity of politicians and to foretell any morning the impending doom. "E pur si muove".

I had the opportunity in Latin American, especially in Peru, to observe closely that apocalyptical mood of the political observers who seem to have any reason in the developing countries to prophetize the end of the old world for the next morning. It must be said that in the case of Peru that prophecy has been fulfilled at least partially while if the days of the "socialist revolution" are still to come, Peru knows at least the excitement of a "military revolution" which, by the way, has been in its first days, lavishly heralded by the prophets of doom. But whatever could be the capacity of the weakest regime not only to survive but also to gradually though very slowly and partially absorb the challenge of change, whatever the resources in adroitness the political elite could mobilize, whatever the strengths of its "instinct de combinaison" , a critical element is certainly necessary for it to survive, "when the chips are down": the generalized support that leading group is able to muster among the common people and therefore the nature of the influence relations[3] between the political authorities and the various social categories.

[2] Bertrand Juvenel, De la Politique pur. Appenidce Calman Levy, Paris, 1963.

[3] I take influence in the rather technical sense used by Talcott Parsons.

If I tried to go deeper into the reasons why the problems of survival seem to be more important than the problems of efficiency, I found them I believe in my personal circumstances "yo y mis circunstancias" to speak as Ortega y Gasset, which has always made fascinating for me the instability decay and doom of political regime. It is not difficult indeed to explain why a Frenchman could be interested in that sort of speculation and why he looks in other countries and other situations comparable data which would help him to explain the conditions of his own country and the particularly precariousness of its political life. Nevertheless I do not lose sight of the fact that post World War II Italy is neither the French Fourth Republic nor the Peruvian republic nor any of these "neo-Latin democracies" about which Spengler used to speak with condescension. Comparison is not the same thing as identification. To say that two situations are comparable is not only to say that they exhibit some (more or less) identical elements, it is also to say that they have some very different elements; and the net result of the comparison could be as well to show the importance, the number, the extent of the differences as well of the resemblances. Moreover what the comparison is after is to make visible a few relations or even better a systematic set of relations which could be meaningful independent of the context out of which there have been drawn, which could be validated in other cases than the ones in which they first have been observed. At that stage, I'm not able to list thoroughly nor to methodically specify the relationships that the analysis of the Italian political process after '45 will alow me to pin down. Nevertheless, it seems possible to isolate some of the aspects of Italian political regime to which we shall pay special attention and that we expect to clarify by our subsequent ~~analysis~~ discussion

1-First what is the nature of the compromise out of which the present Italian regime grew? In which measure do we meet around its cradle the same protecting the Christian democrats, the Communists, the socialists, who were also standing by at the birth of the French Fourth Republic? I intend to briefly analyse the logic of the 1946 constitutional arrangement, the expectations of the founding fathers. My starting point would be that the Italian regime would provide us with a good individual example of an individual case of the type that Mirkine Guezevitch called "Parlementarisme rationalise."

2-A second aspect of the Italian regime which begins to show up as soon as Communists and socialists had to leave cabinet posts could be phrased "polarization without alternation." In many ways, that feature became central for the understanding of the way the system works and for any assessment about its chances to survive. Two things are commonly agreed by the observers: D.C. and P.C. succeeded to "hegimonize" large sectors of the Italian society through the very active quality of their "presenza capillare" but, on the other hand, neither the one nor the other has been able to build a real monopoly position over the political area which it is controlling. The first fact allows to speak of polarization meaning that within the same political system two organized forces because of their number, and the relatively constant support they get from the voters have been consistently since the origins of the Republic, the main protagonists of the political game. This statement has to be qualified, first because the two super powers are not strictly equal and second, because each one on its own account has many problems to solve with the "small fry" which is dependant upon them and upon whom they also depend. As the "minor" allied of D.C. and even the socialist party in relation to the P.C. obviously the Italian style polarization is limited and imperfect and anyway far from the regular alternance of the two party model. The imperfection doesn't derive only from the fact that the right forces are not constituted by a single party but by a more or less unstable coalition or from the fact that D.C. looks more like a loose federation of correnti than a strongly unified organization but mainly from the impossibility that seems as plain in the French Fifth Republic to provide for an orderly and timely alternation of right and left in the responsibilities of central government.

[4] (Of course, I am plainly aware that most of D.C. leaders would hate the idea to be relegated to that very unpleasant place, the right; but, for the moment, we shall content ourselves with that rather gross statement and I shall later on explain why D.C. insists so much on its "central" position.

The sheer fact that P.C. is perceived, at least by the non-Communist and probably also by its fair leaders as a party "quite different from the others" makes for it the access to power or even its admission as a partner in a multi-party cabinet an exceedingly difficult operation. According to the conventional wisdom, it is not an easy thing to have a political regime without alternation functioning on a permanent basis. The gross inconveniences of that situation have been spilled over time and time again. But its also true that a party or a coalition of parties have succeeded quite often, staying in office for a long period, as it is shown by the example of Mexican PRI or of the Hindu Congress party. That makes more complex the analysis of the Italian case and more ambiguous the provision about its future is the fact the D.C. finds itself in a situation apparently weaker than the PRI or the Hindu Congress because DC doesn't dispose of a so clear electoral advantage on its contenders nor of a so close control on public administration, both national and regional. We may also interpret that relative weakness of DC as a potential advantage for the regime itself. D.C.'s adversaries mainly the Communist Party are tightly controlling some strongholds at the local level town halls, for instance or Parliamentary commissions at the national level, which contributes to make more tolerable for them their protracted exclusion from the executive branch.

3- Among the major risks for such a regime, is a process of progressive "alienation" which would lead the "pays reel" to feel more and more indifferent to the goings on in the "pays légal". This estrangement is expressed by a lack of communication between center and periphery, by the growing complexity in the decision-making process and by the more and more painful and elusive effort at enforcing the decisions themselves. That situation caracteristic of the "house without windows" has been many times painfully evident on the French political scene and I tend to consider it as the Nemesis of the various French regimes because of the very poor and inadequate structure of our influence system. More generally, it is a permanent threat to any political elite which gets absorbed into "les jeux, les delices et les poisons" of its narcissistic "little world."

In order to assess how serious is that risk, we must discuss how much responsive is the political system in relation to the demands coming from the society, how much is its capacity to maneuver and to turn into allies some of its opponents; and finally how able it is to keep open some avenues for more or less implicit understanding with its most outspoken

opponents. In relation to each of these three criteria, the Italian regime, in any of the successive periods of its history seems reasonably well endowed and certainly better equipped than the Fourth or Fifth French Republic. The responsiveness to the environment maybe assessed from various angles. Two points of view seem particularly relevant here: a) pressure groups and the relation to the political subsystem. b) internal organization of the parties and the problem of "correnti", "sotto correnti", etc. As for the ability of the regime to "bribe" some of the opposition groups the famous apertura a la sinistra would provide us with a very interesting clinical case. Nothing of that significance has been achieved yet by the Fifth or previously even the Fourth Republic. Even more important yet, I would stress the implicit solidarity between "les associes rivaux"[6] DC and PC who share in common at least one fundamental interest, the survival of the system even if their solidarity is blurred more or less purposefully by the abuses exchanged back and forth before the public. On that score too, the advantage of the Italian Republic seems quite marked in relation to the French regime which is also bound to manage some degree of difficulty ~~with existence~~ coexistence with the Communists and of which survival, at least once in 1968 was for a large part made dependent on the behavior of the Communist party.

[6] I take that term from my book Esquisse d'un theorie d'autorite, chapter

4- As for the efficiency criteria they seem especially meaningful when one has been lead to recognize as one has to do in the Italian case the flexible responsiveness of the regime to the most immediate demands from its environment both internal and external. Of course the efficiency, the effectiveness of a political regime cannot be measured by the same rod as the efficiency of a private firm. But without getting into that rather esoteric discussion, it can be agreed that at certain times the ineffectiveness of a political regime is resented bitterly by larger and larger sectors of the public opinion which make the "bungling" of politicians responsible for "everything which goes wrong" and may come to the point where any other regime seems preferable to the "parliamentary mess." That negative way of looking at the problem of efficiency suggests that it is easier to describe the fetters that an ineffective regime puts on the "normal functioning" of a society rather than to assess ~~and prescribe~~ the adequate contribution that an effective regime makes to the achievement of common goals. Nobody seems to attribute a large part to the Italian political regime in the so-called economic miracle of the 50's. Though the question is worth raising at least for two reasons: first, in relation to the relatively high level of economic performance of the 50's, it would be interesting to compare the initial expectations which were common in the Italian ruling class just after the war and it seems that they were significantly lower than the expectations the French dirigeant had about the time when the Monnet plan was launched. And second, it would be interesting to wonder whether the remarkable results achieved by the Italians in the first half of the post war period are not in one way or another due to the ~~very~~ realism limitation of their ambitions, ruling class and the definitely empirical and even perhaps slightly loose way the government and the public administration approached problems of economic recovery and development. On the other hand, it is quite clear that later on, at the turning of the 60's, when things started to deteriorate, the regime and its ineffectiveness" was immanently denounced as the most obvious causes for that "deterioration."

The paralysis of the "system" is imputed not only to the ~~disease~~ confusion and to the rigidity of the constitutional arrangement, to the party system, to ~~their~~ its internal inconsistancies but also to the intrinsic weakness of the state apparatus which seems both uninformed, insensitive and impotent. On this score its important to compare Italy with France because if in the two countries bureaucracy is denounced as a brake checking the development process, the lack in the Italian case of "grand corps a la francaise is certainly a quite crucial difference. In many cases, though, it's getting more and more difficult for it to play that role, the French haute administration has taken the iniative and has proposed if not imposed some reforms even if the enforcement has been far satisfactory and even if many times the reformist initiatives of the haute administration has been presented in such an arrogant style to make the task of pushing and enforcing them almost impossible. But because of the absence of anything similar to the haute administration a la francaise, it is clear that any progressist administration in Italy must rely on an especially delicate equilibrium.

5. It is for the time being easier to see in the Italian case where are the forces that slow down the political process, and make it incredibly complex and confusing, rather than to say where are the propelling forces. But it has not been always that way. During the fifties, a modernist coalition though an extremely heterogeneous one was able to coalesce and to take shape. The cohesion of the various social forces working in that coalition was low; the extent to which they could explicitly agree was limited. But they could for a while define though in a rather negative way the main lines of a developmental policy. Among the partners in that coalition, it is possible to recognize ~~many~~ the following social actors:
a) the big modern private enterprise b) the public sector of participazioni statali c) the middle-sized "dynamic" enterprises supplying the big industries d) public authorities working in the field of regional development. Of course, these various groups were looking after ~~particular~~ their own goals from very different perspectives indeed one from the other. But it was not too difficult at the time to make these various goals compatible. On the other hand, the political subsystem as such even if it didn't contribute to the definition and enforcement of these goals, was not constituting a clear obstacle to their implementation, and ~~on the other hand~~ moreover they were not putting a too strenuous flow of pressures on the political sector itself to a large extent go on with its own. In other words, the Italian development process

in the fifties seemed to have gone largely unfettered, but also unregulated and left the political class free to deal with the merry-go-round of cabinet crisis correnti and sotto correnti, parliamentary coalition building and all the rest.

"Parteien Staat" and "Democratzia progressiva'

In order to understand the constitutional arrangement which still regulates the functioning of the Italian regime it's convenient to start with two historical observations. First, the Italian republic was built on the shambles of Fascism and its founding fathers have taken an active part at a moment or other in the anti-fascist fight. Therefore at least in the beginning of the regime, anti-fascism has constituted a unifying principle though in a very limited way and a common reference to any of the main leaders of the "new political class." Obviously that reference has been most of the time vague and ambiguous and some party leaders were likely, for tactical reasons to drop any mention of it during rather long periods of time. But, the fascist experience and above all its tragic conclusion has certainly provided the political class with a useful caveat. Secondly meanwhile the discontinuity with the fascist episode was stressed, the founding fathers and more clearly the Christian Democrats and the Socialists could claim affiliation with a legitimate democratic tradition which had been broken by the fascists take-over. The conception and to some degree the practice though utterly unsatisfactory of mass democracy constitute a common inheritage from the old "popolari" and socialists who in the elections immediately after W.W.I. constituted the main forces in the political scene. The Italian regime could at that time be characterized by the painstaking emergence of a few great national parties (popolari and socialists) organized on a national basis. The system was also characterized by an electoral law based on proportional representation and by a very elaborate style of bargaining between the general staffs of the major national parties. There two features have been kept by the post 1946 regime.

The main partners in the anti-fascist coalition were not thoroughly unprepared to play the game of the "Parteien Staat." Nevertheless, the coming up of a strong communist party was obviously raising many difficult questions. But, for a complex of reasons, that have to do as much with the way the Communist International was at the time envisaging the political problems of post W.W.II Europe, as with the special reading by the Italian communists of the internal conditions prevailing in their own country, the leaders of the PCI took a rather open and flexible attitude. The main task that they saw for the party was the reconstruction

of the economy and the society on really "democratic" basis. Therefore, they insisted more on the unity of the "popular forces" which they interpreted in a rather comprehensive if not loose way rather than on a strict class-line approach. In the report presented before the Fifthe Congress of the Communist party on Dec. 29, 1946, Togliatti wrote:

> Che carattere hanno le riforme che noi proponiamo? Hanno esse carattere di classe? Senza dubbio, nel senso che tendono ad elevare il Benestere e il tenore di vita delli classi lavoratorici, ma sono nazionali, in quanto sia elevando el benessere delle masse, sia tagliando ogni radice del fascismo, constituono un inizio di rinnovamento economico della nazione.1*

and "the nation" is not only constituted of "peasants" and workers but also:

> schiere dei tecnici, dei ingegneri, dei intelletuali e anche di quegli elementi delle classi possidenti i quali comprendono che possesso di beni non puo e non deve piu significare privilegio esercitato contro gli interessi del popolo nelle interesse-esclusivo di una casta.2*

1*italics mine FB
2*italics mine FB

Statements of that sort, which are common in the writing of Communist leaders between 1944 and 1947 require qualification and explanations. First they lend themselves to comparison with the writing of Gramsci on the "blocco historico." To which extent Togliatti pronouncements are they in agreement with Gramsci views? It is my personal impression that the connection is rather close and that the Togliatti positions cannot be by any means reduced to mere tactical moves. The reference to the "intellectualli, ingenierri, tecnici" evokes a theme central indeed in Gramsci thought which is at the same time focal in the modern discussions of the "post-industrial society." The only question is the extent to which Togliatti's formulation refers to the "new" intellectual stratum or to more traditional groups defined by the adhesion to the traditional "left" ideologies, that he intends to mobilize. As for the exhortation addressed to the "elementi delle classi possidenti" it reminds one of the considerations so frequently heard at that time and even today in the industrializing countries especially in Latin-America about "La burguesia nacional". In Togliatti's text a clear reference may be found to the project of a "progressive coalition" which would take charge of the common interests of all the people. Such pronouncement evokes the logic of a populist movement which would extend far beyond the strict borders of the working class. But it may be understood that the Communist party makes no bones about claiming an undisputed leadership of the coalition. From that viewpoint Togliatti's phrase on "la democrazia progressiva" can be better understood as well as his catchword on "il partito nuovo" which he defines as: "organizzazione popolare di massa a cui guardino gli operai, gli impregati, gli disoccupati, i giovani, le donne, a cui guardi tutta la popolazione*". If the international politics have in Post WW II taken a different course could the Communist party have become "il partito nuovo" to which Togliatti assigns a hegemonic position in a "democracia progresiva" while at the same time it is plainly meant that the party has to remain the working class party? Could the same organization have been

*Italics mine FB

at the same time a class party and a populist coalition? The answer is far from being clear. Anyway, the consequences of the open and flexible attitude taken by the Communist leadership in the first years after the Fascist collapse had left a clear imprint upon the constitution of the Italian Republic. "Noi communisti non rivendichiamo una costituzione ~~socialista~~ Socialista. Sappiamo che la costruzione di un stato socialista non e il compito che sta oggi davanti alla nazione italiana."[4*] A whole set of compromises on the basic points of the new constitutional arrangement were made possible ~~by that statement of Togliatti~~ then. The decision of the Communists to accept that the king could remain on his throne till the question could be settled by a referendum was a good indicator of already their "realism." Later on their decision of not to oppose that the ~~lo terrano~~ Laterano agreements be included in the preamble of the constitution appeased the Vatican and ~~paved the way for~~ made easier the collaboration with DC. Similarly in relation to the right of property which is guaranteed in the constitution the Communists took a "sensible" stand and provided for the defeat of a more radical amendment defended by a socialist deputy. In my view This attitude cannot be thoroughly explained by some sort of Machiavellian calculation. It's grounded in the conviction that the period which began with the fall of the Fascist regime and on the international scene with the triumph of the "Democracies," "corrisponde a un periodo transitorio di lotta per un regime economico di coesistenza di differenti forze economiche,"* To that pluralistic conception of social forces corresponds a pluralistic conception of ideological currents and political parties.

[4*] P.T. Discorsi alla Costituente, p.136

* italics mine (EB).

"Effetivamente c'e stata una confluenza di due grandi correnti: da parte nostra un solidarismo umano e sociale; dall'altra parte un solidarismo di ispirazione ideologica e di origine diversa, il quale però arriva nell'impostazione e soluzione concreta di differenti aspetti del problemo constituzionale a risultati analoghi a quelli a cui arrivgamo noi." As for parties are concerned, Togliatti is careful to make clear that "i grandi partiti costituiti sulla base di idee, di programmi e di disciplina saranno la forza fondamentale del paese...sono la democrazia que si organizza." Obviously the bargain that Togliatti was interested in striking was not limited to merely constitutional matters. He seems to have initially assumed that the multi-party coalition (PSI, PCI, DC) was not a transitory arrangement but corresponded to a rather permanent equalibrium not only of political, but also of social forces: "no e' soltanto una formula matrimoniale o parlamentare...e un blocco di forze storicamente e politicamente determinato... che hanno un lungo tratto di strada da compiere in comune."

Such a situation looks remarkably close to the French tripartisme (MRP, SFIO, PCF) which, between the time when General deGaulle left office and the time when the Communists ministers were ousted from the Cabinet by socialist Ramadier, guided the Fourth Republic in its first two years. In the Italian case as well as in the French case, one may wonder whether the pronouncement by high ranking leaders like Togliatti or Thorez were consistent with the practice of ~~the practice of~~ minor ranking officers within the party. Many times and in some critical junctures, the ouvertures directed toward the non-Communist sectors (the "Catholic workers", the "Republicains de Progres") were followed by shrewd and devious manoeuverings or "sectarian" pronouncements which wrested from the party the moral benefit it could expect from the "liberal" ouvertures, and finally produced a diffused and uncomfortable feeling about the duplicity of its leaders. M. Claude Bourdet[5*] describes in a very vivid way the ambiguous relations between Communists and non-Communists within the French resistance and explains how ~~that increasing mistrust~~ "comment cette méfiance croissante amena le divorce qui mena, d'autres evenements aidant, a un isolement total du parte communiste".

5* Claude Bourdet- La politique interieure de la Resistance

On the side of the DC, the collaboration of the PCI seems to have been felt between '43 and '46 purely not as a pleasant but at least as a necessary condition of the anti-Fascist fight, later on of the early post-war reconstruction. Very rapidly, that collaboration raised a series of idfficult questions but it didn't appear immediately at least as impossible or undesireable. In fact some of the ideological positions held by some of the most prominent leaders of DC were very far from being incompatible with the thesis held by Togliatti.

The views held by the DC leaders derived from the basic consensus worked out in theCatholic circles on the nature of the economic activities and their necessary subordination to the order of ethical ends. The importance of the social teaching of the Catholic Church in that respect is certainly decisive.

In his book, "Historia delle dottrine economiche Amintore Fanfani develops ~~unfolds~~ a severe criticism of the ~~liberal views~~ economic liberalism and he addresses himself both to Adam Smith and to the French physiocrats presented as exponents of what he ~~xxxx~~ calls "economic naturalism". He heavily relies on the social doctrine of the Church in order to stress the necessity of a State intervention which would regulate the "market mechanisma". To which extent that position is radically different from the corporatist orientations whichwere so prominent in the Fascist days? It is a delicate question to raise given the sort of taboo which, since WWII has shrouded any reference to "corporatism" not only in Italy but elsewhere in Europe.[6*] But ironically enough, never have there been more efforts to "organize the social forces and the economic interests to bring the "partenaires sociaux" into the political concert. The basic difference, ~~xx~~ seems to be between the pure corporatist model and the new variant of "economie de consertation" deals with the different roles that public authorities are ready to play in the one and the other context. In the classical corporatist model, they take on a role of arbitration and decision;in the revised version they content themselves with a more discrete role of information, persuasion and go-between.

6* Particularly in France where, though corporatism has been censored as "Vichyite" many attempts have been performed to have the "economic interests" cooperate together either in an informal way through the commission du plan, for instance, or through some official organization explicitly mentionned in the constitution of the Fourth and Fifth Republic as le conseil economique et social or even more explicitly in the last and abortive attempt of Gen. deGaulle to reconstruct the Senate on a "~~Socio-professionel~~ socio-professionel".

Whatever could be the exact content of the position held by Mr. Fanfani on the ~~relationship between~~ the necessary intervention of political and moral authorities in the working of economic life, his insistence on a relatively high amount of political ~~intervention and~~ control over the economy made ~~relatively~~ easier ~~easy~~ for him to reach a position close to the line of the so-called "democrazia progressiva" ~~defended~~ proposed by Togliatti. The formula ~~which~~ inserted by Fanfani which opens the Italian constitution and according to which "la republica e faondata sul lavoro" has a clear populist and socialist overtone which Mr. Fanfani made even more striking in his subsequent speeches before the constituent assembly. The DC leader ~~harped~~ went on harping on the conveniency to organize some sort of representative mechanism giving air to the grevances of the workers and of the consumers; he also suggested in clear accordance with the social thought of the Church to find an institutional device through which the "participation of the workers" could be arranged within the plants and the firms, and he finally and perhaps mainly emphasized the all out responsibility of public authorities ~~in order~~ for achieving a policy of full employment.

One may wonder whether this early version of "participation" would not have awakened from the Communists some suspicion that the real goal pursued by the more socially-minded elements of the DC was in fact to "tame" the "working class". But, obviously in 1944 and 1946, "revolution" and "proletariat" were not the key words in the PC vocabulary. In fact the cooperation between DC and PC didn't last long enough and were not that close that the possible cleavages ~~etc~~ just mentionned had a chance to bring about their most disruptive effects ~~to appear in the open air~~. But the limited and implicit agreement between these two "associes rivaux" made possible the working out of a constitutional arrangement under which since then the Italian Republic has lived.--though as we have to see now the nature of that compromise has been drastically altered by "the practice" ~~of the constitutional text~~ the parties made prevailing after the socialists and communists had left the government.

La Republique du Députés

The main features of that compromise are easy enough to describe; multi-party system, clear predominance of the legislative branch and at the ideological level, some committment from the public authorities to active economic policies. On these various issues, the comparison with the first years of the First Republic is quite easy to make ~~but~~ Following the same paradoxical trend which also repeats itself in the French case, the conditions under which the Italian regime gets into its consolidation phase are almost inverse to the condition which had been initially led down by the Founding Fathers. ~~The~~ A common assumption ~~under which the~~ among French and Italian political leaders of the immediate post War years operate ~~was~~ that the new regime has to be operated through a corporative coalition of ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ "grands partis" within the framework of a "parlementarisme rationalise" in view of a "socialization" and "humanization" of the economic ~~relations~~ life. But, both in France and Italy, the exclusion of the left from the power led into a very different state of affairs, which ~~you~~ one may characterize as a precarious equalibrium around the Center party, and ~~especially~~ in France around the so-called "Third Force" which had a hard time surviving the squeeze between the Gaullists and the Communists. The Italian case shows ~~and infinitely~~ a greater resiliency of the center parties and we have now to dig into the causes and possible consequences of the lasting monopoly that DC was able to exercise. As the reconstruction policy were more and more explicitly relying on ~~xx~~ principles like "productivity," "competition," effective management and as the integration between the various W. European economies was getting closer and closer through the impact first of the Marshall Plan and later of the Common Market, a ~~more and more clear~~ drift was taking place toward the right which was making ~~x~~ obsolete the basis on ~~xx~~ which the "democrazia progressiva" could have been built. The general orientation defended by Einaudi ~~and others~~ in spite of reluctancee and resistances from the progressive sectors on the left of DC ~~with~~ prevailed all during the fifties and at least to the times of apertura a sinistra. Roughly speaking, that economic policy intended to combine three major orientations. In short-run terms, the emphasis was put on the necessity to clamp down the inflation. In a broader perspective, the major goal was defined as the improvement of physical productivity through a better ~~management and~~ and modern

management
~~a modernisation~~ of the firms. Finally, on the international level, heavy stress was put on the necessity "to open" the Italian economy to external capitals, know-how, influence and to increase the part of the exports in the national product. On that rather consistent line, some sort of consensus could be built which obviously went beyond and cut across the conventional alignment within the various partners of the center coalition. It is also clear that in the framing of such policy the political class as such was less influential than the business community ~~elite~~ which seemed very early and very clearly to have all the benefits it could draw from such orientation.

The exclusion of the left from the government didn't only bring about a radical change in the content of the concrete policies. It also meant a re-definition of the rules of the political game and of the very nature of the regime itself. In fact, the "parlementarisme rationalisé," the Parteien Staat didn't rest only on the existence of a few strongly organized "grands partis" but also and mainly on the capacity of the national leaders to strike effective bargains even if the process through which their concensus ~~was~~ could be built would be long and tortuous. In other words, the Parteien Staat scheme cannot be reduced only to the sheer fact of a multi-party system. Probably the most significant feature of the scheme is to be found in the quality of the relation of the parties themselves. In other words permanent bargaining is the main feature of the Parteien Staat. Even if the parties compete at the time of general elections, they also know that when the election is over, they have to get back to business together. ~~and~~ Therefore the electoral process can be better viewed as a device to assess the relative strength of the various partners in the coalition rather than as a formal mechanism to decide which of the majority or of the opposition has won the game.[X] In the Italian case, what to do with the Communists and the Socialists onee they were out. Obviously, the type of bargaining which had previously developed between them was then out of reach. But at the same time it was also impossible to draw back to ~~rely on~~ the alternative model of two-party (or two coalitions of parties) system. ~~Obviously~~, The fact that the Communist party was the core of the opposition was making that solution almost impossible ~~things especially difficult~~. Nevertheless, some observers thought after the election of April 18, 1948, that the Italian regime was getting close to a two-party system. That view is upheld in the first edition of Maurice Duverger's classical book

[X] But what to do when the "grands partis" break up, and get involved in a merciless fight?

on les partis politiques.[1] Galli presents a similar view in the following passage: "della tradizione e dell elettorato socialista sotto la guida comunista; emarginata e meridionalizzata lutta la destra talla D.C. abbiamo in pratica due soli schieramenti su base nazionale, con insediamenti della sinistra democratica quasi exclusivamente al nord e insediamenti della destra sostanzialmente solo al Sud." But Galli himself is well aware that this analysis ~~turned to be~~ was thoroughly inadequate at least for two reasons. The first one that Maurice du Verger on his own side recognizes in the later edition of his work has to do with the nature of the Communist party which in the words of Maurice duVerger remains for all the fifties a "totalitarian party" ~~and~~ making therefore ~~makes~~ impossible the alternation. A second reason which is much less obvious but probably as important is presented by Galli. According to him, D.C. ~~has been~~ in spite of his impressive electoral success, has been unable to fully exercise its hegemonic function over the sectors it~~s~~ pretends to represent and control. At first sight, ~~nevertheless~~, the political participation in Italy seems remarkably ~~strong~~ active and certainly much more ~~strong~~ so than in most of the West. European countries, especially, France. The strength of the political participation can be measured by the number of members each party may claim. But another indicator is provided by what the Italians call "la presenza capillare," including, under that heading, the number of non-political organizations the party is linked to, their effectiveness, their strategic location in the

[1] Maurice duVerger, Les partis politiques, 1951, p.245.

in the broader social context. In the case of the DC, its relation to the various Catholic organizations which during that period remain solidly under the control of the church hierarchy, allows us to assess the quality of its "presenza capillare." But, that indicator is ambiguous. Its relations with the Church organizations are for DC a source of strenth, but also a source of weaknews. DC might count on the Church, but the Church made its support contingent on various conditions and was careful to avoid committing itself thoroughly and consistently in support of DC. That sort of conditional support was made especially costly for DC, by the fact that on its right, it had still to count on groups vis a vis which DC had to shield itself from. Galli writes: "Nella misura in cui il partito non e autonomo, le basi sulle quali nuo esercitare la leadership sono fragili."[1] In other words, freedom of DC was suspended to a sort of "nihil obstat" from the Church. That resulting as from the remote control exercised by the Church brings about according to Galli a very important organizational consequence for D.C. ½ "propio perche el mondo cattolico non vuole che la D.C. sia l unico punto di referimento dell opinione moderata e conservatrice. De Gasperi e continuamente condizionabile all interno dalla destra".[2] But that blackmail from the right side makes possible a counter blackmail from the left elements inside DC. "nella misure in cui e condizionato, e non, sceglie suscita critiche a sinistra."[3] As for the nature of that consequence on the political leadership of DC, this is the way Galli sees it. "E allora la mediazione fra le tendenze diviene il primo compito della leadership."

La "mediazione fra le tendence" becomes a more and more painful job as the internal differentiation of the party becomes more apparent. Here some sort of analysis of the phenomenon of correnti, sotto coreenti etc.

[1]Galli 156

[2]Galli 162

is in order, but the treatment which follows has to be seen as incomplete and quite unsatisfactory. The first principle of internal differenciation within DC derives from the discrepancy between various ideological orientations. The degree to which , for instance, 'the Dossettani' took publicly and critical stand on the economic policies followed during the early 50's is a good indicator of a potential cleavage within the party. Secondly, we must turn to the phenomena related to the complex identification processes, both symbolic and instrumental which take place around some national figures and gives a "personality dimension" to the fight between the various factions. (Morotei Fanfaniani etc.) Other sources of differentiation could be found at the level of economic or professional interests, national, eegional or local. Finally, the more basic alignments crystallize around the tactical x moves and strategic iniatives which are likely to bloom in any political milieu.

In which ex measure the constitutional arrangement , the regulations and procedures reenforce within the parties that tendancy to differentiate? It seems likely that the very broad applicaaton of the proportional representation principle leads heavily into that direction. But it remains as a central and fascinating problem to be seen how the various "correnti" could co-exist inside of one party without making impossible for it to survive. It is true that such a statement has to be qualified at least in two respects. It doesn't apply to the Communist Party which makes a point to condemn the open expression of correnti, and it only applies in a limited way to the socialist party which had its share of secessions and reunions . But DC which rapidly turned out to be a loose confederacy of associated and conflicting factions, is a striking example of how the most strange bedfellows could stay together for an indefinite period of time. I submit that the musical chair game through which the leaders of the various DC factions alternate in the primership could explain at least partly why in spite of their open discrepancies they have been successful in keeping between themselves a sort of working modus vivendi. Another reason is that in the finite but relatively rich world of alliances and "combinazioni" can be justified by the strategy each "corrente" puts foward at a given moment in order to push forward

relatively objective "interests" For example, the various DC factions may make in relation to the party standing its alliances right one of the following choices of which, for DC acexapenxanxthe depends also obviously on the available possibilities which are open on the left. ~~1)assumingxthat DC , communists and socialists must and could be kept in a ghetto~~ 1) it may be advisable for D.C. to have the "liberals" in the majority. Communists and socialist must and could be kept in a ghetto. Even invite MSI to join, but in that case the cost to be paid is not only all out opposition from the left but also some resistance and misgivings within DC itself. Sux

Such a situation evokes the acase of the third Force during the French Fourth Republic. But a striking difference has to be mentionned in the Italian case, "la majorite de la majorite", that is DC, musters vis a vis any of its partners and vis a vis all of them taken together a much greater strenth than the strength on which in the Third force coalition the stronger partner could display vis a vis his weakest all-without mentioning his overall strengh vis a vis the set of his "allies". The elaborate though somehowxsupx spurious formulation of all these "rules" havexsome may have some sort of a stabilizing effect on the game itself. Instead of an unpredictible state of affairs where "anything may produce anything" some sort of patterns tend to emerge and remain.

The blackmail potential of the Italian "liberals" without mentioning MSI or monarchists is weaker than the blackmail potential of the French radicals vis a vis MRP or of MRP vis a vis the Fr. socialists. A for the pressures that any faction can exert upon the other constituent elements of the party, the comparison between the French Fourth Republic and the Italian republic is especially difficult because no party can compete with the Fr. radical party at the game of keeping together the most conflicting tendency and hiving them work together for the promotion of the collective benefits.

If we ~~diecid~~ decide with Roger Priouret to call Republique des Deputes or with Gen. deGaulle Regime des partis, any pluralistic regime which is different both fromthe Partein Staat and from the two-party model, it seems to me that this denomination comes pretty close to the case of the Italian republic. Obviously the weight of DC on one hand, and of PC, on the other checks to some extent the drift of the system toward

an all out dispersion and dissolution of the system into a mere strife of parlamentiary factions. And we have to qualify that sentence of Priouret in relation to a crucial point in orddr to avoid any confusion between the Republique des deputes and "la maison sans fenetres". Most of the analysis of the representation mechanisms and more generally of the influence process, seems to oscillate between the myths of perfect transference and the myth of the absolute blindness of the political subsystem to the demands of the society. It seems to me that a better approach is provèded by tha analysis of teh conditions under which the political system is "responsive" and to what sort of demands it may respond. The responsivenessx of the political system can be assessed by two different criteria. It could be viewed in relation to specific demands that some specialized xx organs of the periphery impress upon the center but it can also be viewed in relation to these overall demands that come out from the external milieu. It's clear that a regime could be extremely responsive to demands of the first kind and relatively blind to demands of the second kind. In the myth of la maison sans fenetres, the first type of responsiveness is stressed; the deputies accused of spending their time at childish games whereas the proper attentionis not given to the "grands problemes". But when the sailing is not too rough, people do not worry too much axx and tend to find solace in the famous dictum by Anatole France, "la republique gouverne mal, but elle gouverne peu." (The republic is a terribly bad government but thanks to God, they practically don't govern at all.) Of course, the benigh neglect and contemptuous condescension are superseded by concern and hostility when

~~xaxcepxbxcquxcxbaugh it goes on governing poorly, insists on governing~~
~~xtxcxcxtxtxcpuxs~~
~~xbaugbx~~ when the deputies, though they ~~xtxtx are~~ perform exceedingly badly ~~bad as usual~~, insist on running the show on a larger and larger scale.

During the fifties, la Republique des deputes in its 'It. version seems to work rather satisfactorily because once the basic orientations of Einaudi line have been accepted, the effective implementation of these policies to a lagge extent escaped the ~~dcxexx~~ control of the political class. To a large extent, the functioning of the economic subsystem ~~is~~ was divorced from the intervention of the political authority. That statement has to be qualified in two respects. First ~~it seems that~~ a large amount of specific pressures and trading of particularistic favors was going on. It is also true at a more global level that a substantial amount of the overall investment was taking place within the framework of the ~~NTTE~~ "Enti". But if we compare the way the economic policy was conducted in Italy ~~xn~~ with the way it was managed in France at the same time, we can't but notice a much lower degeee of integration and control in the first case, than in the second. The enti are ~~much more~~ rather ~~loosely, and~~ freely if not loosely run and each one ~~dexexops~~ tends to develop a policy of its own. That state of affairs can be explained by the almost complete absence in Italy of a high civil service a la francaise by the limited powers ~~x dexx~~ vested upon the planning commission also perhaps ~~to~~ by the relative autonomy of the banking system which doesn't show in Italy the same characteristic subordination to the political authorities and especially to the ministry of finance exhibited in the French case. The lack of to coordination and imperative regulation~~s~~ performed by an active ~~and clearly~~ competent ~~zndcxcxexcy~~ bureaucracy clearly committed ~~xoxexexdcxoxexd~~ to a policy of modernization impinges also on the way the pribate business mangges the ~~fcxmacxe~~ firms recruit its personnel and on the type of relations the business clasee keeps with the higher bureaucratic strata and the political elite. In other words, the lack of a "developmental bureaucracy" ~~combinedcwcxbxthe compounded by the features associated to it~~ seem/to have produced in the It. case a situation in which the entrepreneurs were ~~axe~~ much more free to develop their initiatives and where the political leaders could dedicate themselves to the "jeux, delices et poisons" of party life. That division of labor didn't come to the point of a complete estrangement of one group from the other. Obviously a high level of contacts, interaction and exchange ~~tox~~ was taking place ~~in~~ between the

various strata of the ruling class. As for the nature of their relations two views are usually presented which seem to me rather unsatisfactory. The one presented by Jean Maynaud who describes the Fr. political class as entirely dominated by the business elite. On the contrary, a second thesis which tends to become more and more get larger acceptance as time goes on insists on the lack of communication between politicians and businessmen and stresses the difficulty of the businessmen when they meet when they want to sell their ideas and reform projects to the politicians. In fact the Maynaud thesis does doesn't answer two difficult questions. First the degree of cohesion of the Fr. "bourgeoisie" has to be tested against the variety of the interests it represents and pretends to uphold. It is clear that many times since the early sixties, big business tried to define a line which in many ways clashed with the interests of small and medium-size business. Susan Berger in her paper shows that the distinction between "big" and "small" interests could reconcile themselves and that the distinction between big and small is far from being clear. But growing tensions are also visible and the conciliation seems more and more uneasy. The leaders of small and medium sized firms without mentioning retail trade and craftsmen interests tend to stick to their guns and it seems also that they are receiving a great deal of attention from the political sectors. In fact it seems that In the fifties, it seems, the so-called "monopolies" derived their power from a set of rather varied conditions which are no longer present. One of these conditions resulted from the relative weakness of the working class movement as a consequence of the left being pushed out of the government. So that the early phase of a rapid mobilization process took place without the countervailing force of a working class movement opposing eventually the policies defined by the business class. Moreover, though the interests of the business people, their goals, their values, their method, were extremely different no clear-cut conflict opposed them in a merciless confrontation and it was not too difficult in the ascending phase of rapidly ascending economic development to make compatible the various demands coming from these sectors. The relative euphoria of the fifties made possible the autonomisation of the economic power and reenforced the political class in its

the propensity of the political class

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to specialize in ~~acxtxixtxy~~ the dealing of strictly political matters.

That question is of capital imporatnce and it remains in the background of the current discussion about the convenience to invite the communists to join again the political club. The discussion seems to concentrate on the merits of the PCI, and

Some people argue, of course, that the PCI has not changed a bit and remains today as it always has been a "totalitarian organization". Some people think that the quality of its local me leaders, the flexibility and the intelligence of its national dirigeant, their relative independence for Moscow and the communist international show conclusively that the party is quite xexpecxchtecandcxenostxbe mxxx has now become a quite elegible partner. I am not convinced that thes alternative way to phrase the question xx is adequate.

Suppose that the PCI is really endowed with all the attributes that the most optimistic observers bestow upon it. Even in that case, the essential question would b remain of whether by having the party back into the club either through the main d entrance or through the back door, the chance of building a new progressive coalition are enhanced or or the simply repeats the familiar pattern which end up in the foxmatxon centro sinistra governments. Obviously the PCI and PSI are horses of a different color and today in the a pattern quite distinct from the early sixties, the emergence of a "estra parlamentare opxxxxnex oposizione would make the position of left party sitting in the cabinet relatively uncomfortable. Butcxnxt96 Today as in 1962, the real issue is how compatible are the logic of progressive coalitions and the alogic of parliamentrxx combinazioni.

Was such a role-specialization likely to last? On which basis the ~~xx~~ Republique des deputes could manage to survie? The fundamental ~~xxxx~~ to which the Rgime has to adapt was that a peaceful alternation of two parties or two coalitions of parties, if not impossible, was at least very difficult for a long period of time. In view of that situation, three "game plans" could be devised. 1) the ruling center coalition stays on indefinitely or as the Secretary general of the French UDR is reported saying, "Si nous ne faisons pas trop de sottise, nous sommes en place pour trente ans." 2) The ruling center majority slowly withers away and finally gets defeated by the left opposition 3) The center coalition"opens" itself and adroitly "co-opts" some part of the opposition, or step by step the opposition in its entirety. Each one of these admits variants and some of these variants are really important. But all the three share a common assumption;. The left opposition, or at least the communist hard core of it cannot get back into power without the rules of the game being so drastically modified that the regime goes through a radical redefination. That implicit assumption seems more and more questionnable and it would be of great interest for the functionning of the system to analyse the consequences of its dropping-out.

The first scenario assumes that DC is in forever. Till now the prediction has been fulfilled while all the Italian premiers since '44 have belonged to a faction or other of DC. That real tour de force is quite unique in Western Europe. But at a closer scrutiny, one realizes that since the failure of la legge truffa, the DC majority is becoming thinner and that the coalition building process at the parliamentary level is getting more and more ~~x~~ painstaking. The first signs of tha malaise were already obvious since the mid-fifties. So one is led from the first scenario into the second. DC is no longer as Peter's Church ~~xxxx~~ blessed with the promise of eternity. The domination effect on which it had thrived is fading away, for two reasons. First, the wearing out of DC results from the growing mediocrity of its performances at the governmental level. It's true that the electoral returns of DC remain at a high level around 40% of the popular vote. But the trend points to some sort of levelling out, and it could even be read through the ups and downs of the successive elections as

a very long term downward trend. Moreover, no subsequent election repeats the 1948 miracle and from these successive elections no known faction within DC could grow a clear cut mandate in order to impose a stable firm leadership. It is also clear that the expectations which had been placed on a wearing out of the Communist Party never were fulfilled. If we now combine these three statements 1) slight downward trend of D.C. 2) consistent holding- out of the PCI. 3) growing instability of the center coalition where DC keeps a strong majority but which are more and more difficult for it to arrange and to manage, we get close to the view that a break-down of the control the center parties have over the political system, is likely to happen.

It's true that till now that prediction has been defeated. [illegible] There are two reasons for that protracted domination of DC. First, the relative weakness of the political forces staying at the right of DC makds for it not an impossible task to damn their assault. Second, the decision of co-opteng the forces immediately at its left [illegible] postponed the day when the assault from a strong and unified left coalition would come. It is important to notice that the behavior of DC on its left and on its right is far from being symmetrical. Some of its leaders like Mr. Zoli made eventually tactical agreements with MSI but the party as such didn't commit itself to an all-out and permanent alliance. On the contrary with the Socialists, DC wanted [illegible] and got a formal pact. La apertura a sinistra came out of a set of complex and various initiatives not only from the political quarters but also from various social groups which tried in a more or less independent way to build a new coalition whibh would pull the bog-dowwed cart from the marshes of day-by-day compromises. On a strictly political level, the coming of the Socialists into the"power-zone" fulfills many functions. First, it provides some sort of regularity and morality' the game of coalition building and by pushing the right into the wilderness, it drastically reduces the number of possible cabinet combinazione. Second, it consolidates within DC the relative strengths of some factions. Finally, it isolates the PCI of which hopes to come back into the forefromt are post-poned

Why this brilliant "operation" turned out to be deceptive and it didn't bring about the political dividends that its promoters expected? The extreme slowness with which it was carried out, the elaborate multiple guarantees that the bargaining parties made a point to swap back and forth, were enough to give to the whole affair an unpleasant air of traditional "combinazione". It's also probable that by insisting on the nationalization of electric power the socialists didn't make things very easy and in order to stamp their coming back to the government with unmistakeable character of "left" ideology, they in fact, put quite unnecessary handicap on the center left coalition. But the main trouble came it seems to me, from 2 causes. First, the reform projects elaborated presented by the group of "reformers" who were not clearly tied to any of the parties but expected much from the left center arrangement in order to push forward their pet ideas, were divorced from the more traditional approach projects of the DC and socialist politicians. Secondly, and

(intellectuals, professionals, businessmen)

more essentially, all the left of the center operation rested on a fundamental ambiguity. Was it a <u>openeng</u> in the sense that the political leaders would make a conscious and methodic effort at having the regime better informed of the new necessities, better prepared to deal with them, more responsive to the demands from the various groups especially touched by exhillarating process of mobilization? Or was it a succession of tactical <u>ouvertures</u> through which shrewd politicians were winking at their paths on the other side of the fence and trying to induce them to join the merry-go-round family circle?

5

Active Absence or Passive Presence?
A Trialogue on Italian Foreign Policy

By Stanley Hoffmann
Harvard University

For the Conference on the Future of Italy
Turin, January 1973

Active Passive Presence?
Emann

Scene: a fashionable trattoria near the Piazza Navona

Characters: Annibale Irieni, Italian diplomat: has had several important assignments in NATO countries
Godefroy de Grandegueule, French journalist, former Combattant de la France Libre, Croix de la Libération, orthodox Gaullist, living in Italy, where he once fought
Pompey Smugson, American political scientist, specialized in International Relations, with emphasis on the foreign policy of countries with fine cuisine; now doing research on Italian foreign policy. Tends to lapse suddenly into technical language.

* * * * *

Irieni: Our foreign policy, Mr. Smugson, is really very simple, and indeed exemplary. We are often blamed, in your press or in the French one, for our unstable governments, our strikes, our parliamentary...

Grandegueule (interrupting): "jeux, poisons et délices," as General de Gaulle once said, speaking of the Fourth Republic. Remember what happened to <u>that</u> one? Quel bordel...

I. (unruffled): Well, anyhow, we' ve had only one foreign policy for nearly twenty-five years. We made a basic choice, una scelta di civilizzazione, for European unity and Atlantic solidarity, and we have stuck to it.

G.: Don't be so proud! You did this because it was in your interest. You were a defeated country and, like your former ally, Germany, European integration and the cold war gave you

a splendid opportunity to regain your status in the world and to find a place along with the European countries you had fought.

I. (still unruffled): You mean Mussolini.

G.: Moreover, you didn't even fully exploit your interest. Once in NATO, you've accepted American protection, and been perfectly happy as passive dependents. When I go back to France, and, at the Quai d'Orsay, try to find out about French policy, officials tell me, with varying solemnity, what France's position and aims are. When I go to the Farnesina, I get lengthy discourses about the subtle state of the world, and interpretations of American foreign policy, but rarely more than a few concluding words about Italy's desires. And you call this an exemplary policy?

Smugson (who has been listening with growing discomfort, barely concealed by pipe-puffing): Well, it may not be a policy of grandeur, but haven't Italy's basic options fulfilled several important functions? By shunning neutralism as well as nationalism, Italy has contributed to stabilizing the international system. By helping to turn Western Europe into a pluralistic security community, Italy has contributed to moderating the international system. Within that system, it has sought to optimize her position by maximizing the number of her friends...

G.: De Gaulle once said: a great nation has no friends, it has only interests.

I.: He wasn't a very original thinker

S....and minimizing the number of her enemies. Finally, you must think of the linkages between the international system and the domestic system...

G.: Quel jargon.

S.: and remember that, by anchoring themselves solidly in the West, the Italian political élites have made it possible for themselves to focus their attention on, and to allocate scarce resources to what was obviously Italy's top priority: internal reform and economic development.

G.: There hasn't been much reform, and as for development, man doesn't live by Fiat alone. Why should one have to choose between expansion at home and power abroad?

I.: You see, Mr. de Grandegueule, the difference between your country and mine, and the reason de Gaulle was not a popular figure here, is that we know exactly what a policy of aggressive power-seeking abroad costs. We've had our Crispis and Mussolinis. They too wanted a place in the sun, and demanded respect for Italy, and what did they leave us? Exorbitant military budgets followed by defeats, excessive pretensions leading to ruin. The pursuit of our purely "national interest" got us into World War One--which resulted in internal chaos, and Mussolini. The condition in which Mussolini left us doesn't have to be described. We've been vaccinated. No more nationalism for us! Nor more revisionism! No more theater! You begin standing on a balcony, screaming: Nizza à noi, or Vive le Québec Libre, and you end hanged in effigy in the Quartier Latin, or shot and hung upside down in a town square.

G.: How can you lump together a brutal revisionism that aims at destroying peace treaties for the sole purpose of self-aggrandizement, and a generous revisionism that aims at liberating most nations of the world from the shackles of the "two hegemonies"?

I.: Wasn't that very much in your own selfish interest?

G.: Surely, but it was also in yours. Only you failed to see it--as we say in France, a scalded cat is afraid of cold water. You've gone from one extreme to the other: First, you confused your national interest with aggression, and now you confuse it with subservience. And the reason for it is the insecurity of your bourgeoisie. It has concluded that an active foreign policy creates a risk of domestic turbulence, whereas the passive acceptance of American aid and comfort provides it with the assurance it needs but doesn't have all by itself: The American alliance outside is supposed to exorcise the red peril--real or imaginary--inside. Well, that's true for many of our bourgeois too, those who, in Le Figaro or in the patronat, never forgave de Gaulle for challenging the Americans. But at least, in our political system, the cowardice of the bourgeois does not dictate policy, and the mass of the people has some national pride.

I.: We've had our nationalists too; but here they're mainly on the Left, or among intellectuals. We've been so radically cured of bombastic chauvinism that their nationalism only took the form of a vague neutralism.

G.: In other words, like your leaders, your so-called nationalists were above all looking for a shelter...

S.: Gentlemen, aren't you merely saying that different actors learn different responses from the stimuli of different experiences In the twentieth century, France's experience--up to de Gaulle--had been one of humiliation due to excessive reliance on foreign allies, Italy's has been one of humiliation due to hybris. But I wonder if the fiasco of de Gaulle's ambitious

hasn't led his successors to draw some of the very same conclusions which de Gasperi and Sforza had derived from the débacle of Mussolini's revisionism...

G.: (with a shrug) You're an American: of course you prefer Italy's line: it never causes you any trouble.

I.: (suavely) Mr. Smugson has made my point most eloquently. Moreover, we see no reason to conceal our sympathy for America. Millions of Italians live there. The Americans liberated us from Fascism and Hitler, and we--devoid of illusions about our contribution to the victory of the Allies--have never resented them. Let me only add that I cannot accept the picture our French friend has painted of my country's foreign policy. We do not limit our role to NATO and the EEC. These are only two out of three concentric circles, the third one being symbolized by the UN...

G.: Ah oui, le machin! A circle whose center is in America, the and/circumference nowhere.

I.: We insist on the UN: We have an old universalistic tradition, which people like Mussolini had betrayed. The Catholic Church was, and still is, a perfect example of our universalism. We see no reason why there should be any conflict between the three circles.

G.: Of course you don't! You've never supported de Gaulle's efforts--continued by his successor--to build a "European Europe" whose diplomacy, defense, monetary system and trade would be independent of the Americans; your Europe is one which is tied to the dollar. Remember when your government sought a loan from the U.S., instead of from its Common Market

partners, just at the time when the EEC was trying to define a common position in the Kennedy round bargaining? And what about your present monetary position, which jeopardizes the construction of a European monetary union? As for the UN, either it's just an echo chamber of empty words or else it is an instrument of American policy.

S.: Gentlemen, let me analyze the meaning of your arguments. They reflect two conceptions of world order. One believes in the inevitability of conflict, and states the necessary selfishness and/or hypocrisy of any so-called universalistic design; it sees changes in the international system coming as the result of grand strategic maneuvers; it is a cynical view, characteristic of European Realpolitik. The other recognizes that in the nuclear age, and in an increasingly interdependent world where transnational forces, or even transgovernmental coalitions, are beginning to overshadow nation-states, governments should strive for accommodation, compromise, harmony, community, must recognize that in many issue-areas much of their precious autonomy is lost, and can hope at best for incremental change.

G.: I haven't noticed that Washington behaves as if its autonomy were gone, or that Moscow or Peking invariably strive for harmony.

I.: Maybe not, but your country and mine cannot afford these luxuries.

G.: Even if one needs an ally, national defense is never a luxury. An army "integrated" under foreign command loses its spirit. Or are you telling me that there'll never again be a need to defend oneself?

S.: No, but a nation the size of France or Italy cannot have a national defense: Only a wasteful pretense.

G.: I see: as the Athenians told the poor Melians, the strong do what they can, the weak do what they must.

I.: If you don't like this, why not accept a supranational Europe, which could be as strong as the superpowers?

S.: Yes: why not increase the EEC's institutional capacity through forward linkages and measures aimed at building up identitive and systematic support for it?

G.: My English isn't good enough. (To I): If you want a strong Europe, why do you press for a supranational mishmash dominated by a Commission of irresponsibles and a Parliament of incompetents, and why do you reject common policies that would give Europe an identity of her own?

I.: We've only rejected those suggestions that would have weakened NATO. Only NATO can provide Western Europe with security.

G.: You're proving my point. This also explains why, while talking about a supranational Europe, you, along with the other Atlanticists in Benelux or Germany, pressed so hard for England's entry into EEC, even when England was anything but "European." Ah, ne me brouillez point avec la République--The American Republic.

I.: Not at all. You know very well that there have been nuances in our foreign policy--significant variations on our Atlantic design. As early as 1956, President Gronchi told the U.S. Congress that NATO could not remain just a military alliance, and had to be complemented with "new and intelligent forms of collaboration." He went to Russia...

G.: As I remember, Krushchev wasn't very nice to him.

I.: And we've had a very active policy of détente with Russia and Eastern Europe...

G.: After de Gaulle had taken the initiative, and the Americans had made it clear it was OK.

I.: We have cultural and economic interests in Latin America...

G.: Ah yes! President Saragat went there, and nothing happened.

I.: No more and no less than after President de Gaulle's expedition.

S.: Gentlemen!

I.: And we've often had an active Mediterranean policy, for instance when Mr. Fanfani was foreign minister, and showed his concern for the Arab states' future.

G.: Didn't that audacious gentleman also authorize the U.S. to build missile bases in Italy? And what does your "Mediterranean vocation" amount to? Heading a league of military dictators of all religions?

I.: (still unruffled, but getting a bit redder) In the Middle East, we've tried much more than the U.S. to be "even-handed", and the agreements made by E.N.I. have been very unpopular with the British and American oil companies.

S.: Indeed! A transactional analysis shows that when it comes to the Middle East, both France and Italy have had to cultivate Arab good will for reasons of oil. But France's reliance on state-to-state action channels, as in the case of Algeria, strikes me as much less successful than Italy's reliance on E.N.I. Pompidou's antagonistic relationship with Boumediene looks bad, next to E.N.I.'s recent success with Khadafi.

I.: You're as well-informed as your reputation indicates.

S.: Thank you.

G.: Too bad Mattei's investments in the Sinaï ended up in Israeli hands. But if you're so successful whenever you have dared emancipate yourself, why do you limit such bold behavior to oil deals and arms sales?

I.: Do you resent our competition in these matters? If we've made headway there, or in public works all over Africa, it is because our clients know we have no political afterthoughts.

S.: Isn't one of your oldest traditions trading with the widest possible number of clients? Bilateral diplomacy concerned with such concrete bargaining is practically an Italian invention.

I.: You know our history. And speaking of the convergence of our national interest and the universal good, our commercial policy has not only provided us with markets abroad, and with oil and natural gas at low prices, but it has also promoted our reconciliation with Yugoslavia, contributed to that country's economic development, and made of Italy a champion of the rights of underdeveloped countries on their resources.

G.: Is this why you are so eager, in EEC, to protect the textile industry against the invasion of goods from those countries?

I.: Our aid to the Third World...

G.:...was never very high (especially not public aid) and has been declining steadily.

I.: Like yours! While I am still on the subject of reconciling the national and the universal, our firm Atlantic and European stand has not prevented us from playing a constant role as a

mediator, which is both a way of affirming our presence and of helping mankind.

G.: Parlons-en! One of your own best diplomats has written about your "mania della presenza," said that it becomes a self-sufficient goal, and only serves to conceal the absence of any real foreign policy with objectives and values of its own.[1] What has your "mediation" achieved? You tried to "mediate" in the Fouchet plan negotiations, but dropped your attempt in the summer of 62, just when there might have been a real need for it...

I.: I must correct you: we stopped only because we thought that the new de Gaulle-Adenauer axis would undermine Atlantic solidarity.

G.: You're proving my point again! And did Mr. Fanfani's offer of services on Vietnam get any better results than Mr. Gronchi's on Berlin or Mr. Pella's on the Sakhiet incident between France and Tunisia? Indeed, did you ever dare criticize the U.S. war in Vietnam? How long did it take you to recognize Red China?

I.: Well, we did help solve the crisis over Malta.

G.: It would have been resolved anyhow!

I.: In world monetary matters, the governor of the Bank of Italy is more influential than his French counterpart. Ossola, Carli...

G.:...owe their influence to their closeness to American doctrines. What matters in the world is making one's mark, not being listed as "also present." See what's happening to you in the MBFR talks. We have deliberately refused to take part in what will be one more demonstration of the superpowers' duopoly, but you, who wanted a piece of the action, are reduced to begging

for the right to participate. No, all your mediating and all your assertions of presence are merely a new display of your addiction to the "bel gesto." When de Gaulle travelled, it was a journey on behalf of a vision. When your statesmen travel, it is tourism with grandiloquence, or motion without movement.

I. (with a smile, to S.): You see: our Latin sister continues to refuse to take us seriously.

S. (to G.): You're too harsh. Maybe the desire to mediate is a residue of one of the two traditions of Italian diplomacy: playing the game of the balance of power, gaining some advantages by being apparently uncommitted and courted by rival blocs as a potential balancer. But in the post-war era Italy has been wise enough to play this game from within one of the blocs...

G.: Which makes the whole exercise absurd...

S.:...and the reliance on America may be no more than a rejuvenat form of another tradition: making Italian objectives compatible with those of the dominant Mediterranean actor. It used to be England, and is now the U.S. All of this is perfectly functional It provides both security and rewards.

G.: It may have been functional, as you say, in the late 40's and early 50's when de Gasperi (like Adenauer) used the U.S. both as an elevator lifting Italy far above a punitive peace treaty, and as a milking cow. But now? Italy's "basic choice" has become a Procrustean bed, an excuse for passivity, and, in my eyes, it embodies two traditions that aren't at all those you mentioned. One is a frantic desire to be noticed, which has expressed, ever since Italy's unification, the weak latecomer's fear of being left out. The other is a desire--shown by Crispi and Mussolini--to be on the side of the strongest, and in this respect it is not England to which America succeeds, but Germany, which used, for

many years, to be the sun around which Italy turned.

I.: Can you deny that there was a Soviet peril after the war, and that NATO and European integration were the only ways to strengthen our nations against it?

G.: Can you deny that this peril is fading, and that neither NATO nor European integration provide you with any guidance about East-West relations, or the Middle East, or Asia, or the future of the relations between the rich and the poor?

S.: True enough, but wouldn't you yourself recognize that if Italy had wanted to play a game of traditional power, she would have found the process of interaction already preempted by Britain, France, and a careful but far more powerful Federal Republic?[2] Italy just didn't have the cards for that kind of game--and today the other three West European countries are recognizing that even their cards aren't worth all that much.

(G. is heard muttering, in French, an incantation containing such words as "démons de la décadence" and "sirènes de l'abandon")

S. (anxious to avoid an incident): Let us talk about something else. I am interested in bureaucratic politics.

I.: What is that?

S.: It used to be called decision-making. Our vocabulary changes as our theory progresses. How do you play your decision games?

MAE → I.: I see. Well, precisely, our diplomatic corps is the oldest, best-trained and most competent branch of our bureaucracy. There

is a tough competitive exam for entrance into the foreign service...

G.: It's obsolete! Only people with legal training can get in--we used to have the same disease, before the Ecole Nationale d'Administration. And it's also quite undemocratic. Only the sons of the wealthy can afford the lengthy preparation to the concours. Anyhow, a diplomacy dominated by its bureaucracy will always rate caution above boldness, "continuity" above initiative, and "negotiation" above self-assertion. Especially when so many of the officials began their careers in the days of Fascism! They have a lot to be modest about.

I.: It's better than the subordination of professionals to amateurs, as under Fascism.

S.: I sometimes wish we had such a career service in America. In any decision system flooded with feedback information and compartmentalized into elite subgroups, a structure of professional effectors allows one to survive periods with weak foreign ministers, and to do without the kind of mini-State Department which has grown in our White House.

G.: Don't believe it! When the Foreign Minister has ideas of his own (good or bad) like Fanfani, he has to hide them from, and act outside, his bureaucracy,[3] and when the Foreign Minister is weak, it isn't the professionals who take over, it's the pressure groups.

I.: (stung, for the first time) You exaggerate. It is the Foreign Ministry which determines Italian foreign policy, the other Ministries (including Foreign Trade) only prepare decisions...

G.: But since the training of your diplomats is so general or legalistic, expertise, which is elsewhere, easily dominates, and

the technical ministers are spokesmen of special interests. Would you deny that ENI, IRI, Fiat, the Bank of Italy, make their own decisions?

I.: Sometimes, but only insofar as they are in Italy's best interest

S.: Are you implying, both of you, that Italy has a non-directive subsystem dominant political system?

I.: Certainly not, whatever that may mean. The cabinet may not be too important, but I cannot let you forget the role of the President of the Republic.

S.: Even I forget him occasionally. What does he do?

I.: Often, he has his own line--like Gronchi's neoAtlanticism, or Saragat's firm commitment to a democratic, enlarged EEC. Sometimes, he sends directives...

G.: Like Mr. Auriol. Remember how it ended?

I.: Can you deny that we've had very impressive foreign ministers, with forceful ideas? Sforza...

G.: All right. I'll grant him. He knew the world.

I.: Pella, Fanfani, Moro, Nenni...

G.: You know why they had ideas? Because, as Foreign Ministers, they were supposed to have some. The distinctive sign of an Italian foreign minister is not that he does something, but that he has his own nuance. Otherwise, he couldn't be identified.

I.: He has a difficult job of coordination--that's true in every country, isn't it?

S.: Oh yes: we've heard of it even in Washington.

G.: But rarely is it as badly done as here. Between the verbalism of traditional diplomacy, and the highly concrete but disconnected moves of business, there is nothing, no coherent strategy to which both could be subordinated.

S.: What about your Parliament? Doesn't it play an impactive role in shaping and supervising foreign policy? Does it have positive affect relationships with the ultimate decision-makers?

I. (eagerly): Well, the Atlantic pact was the occasion of a thorough debate in Parliament, and so, later, was the MLF.

G.: You forget to add that debates on Europe seem to interest no one, that your Parliament, for ten years, neglected to send representatives to the European Parliament and that the only parliamentary initiatives are those that are "suggested" by interest groups. Only recently, a delegation of members of the Foreign Affairs Committee didn't even know whether Italy had ratified the non-proliferation treaty or not! Your governments show so much faith in Parliament that they've always asked for the power to implement each new phase of the EEC by decree.

I. (haughtily): If only a small number of deputies and senators take a deep interest in foreign policy, it is because of the vast consensus on the subject, in the public and in the parties.

S.: (undiplomatically) I don't find the average Italian very much concerned with foreign affairs. I have read surveys and statistics that show he's poorly informed. His decisional input is tiny.

I.: Well, isn't that true everywhere?

S.: Yes, more or less. It appears more true in Italy. Why is the level of socialization of Italians in foreign affairs so low?

G.: Read the newspapers: press reporting on what goes on outside is pretty bad, with a few exceptions.

I.(huffily): Well, we don't go around telling all the state's secrets to a privileged corps of reporters.

S.: Maybe you should begin to teach international relations more systematically in your universities. We could send you lots of lecturers. We are filthy rich in theories, pre-theories, meta-theories, and pre-post theories, operationalized with predictive capabilities along a differential range of heuristic relevance potential.

I.: Anyhow, the mass public doesn't matter all that much. But take the parties. Today, even the Communists have stopped really objecting to NATO, and--unlike the French CP--they accept the EEC. They're travelling the same road already taken, a dozen years ago, by the Socialists. You can't deny that our Communists are more flexible than the French ones.

G.: The reason Moscow allows them greater leeway is that Italy matters less than France in international affairs. Also, since Italy has nailed herself to the Atlantic mast, unlike France, the best way for your CP to come closer to power is to look as if it accepted "reality". Our CP doesn't have that headache.

S.: There may be another reason too. In Italy, the Communists can reach power only through accomodation with the Christian Democrats--and this presupposes a softening of differences on foreign policy. In France, the CP can come to power only by

replacing the Gaullists, and thus by maximizing their differences with the ruling coalition.

I.: Whatever the reasons, the result is a consensus.

G.: Rather fragile, your consensus. Think of the silly row, this summer, over color television--whether Italy should stick to the German system or adopt the French one!

I.: It wasn't so silly. I told you earlier that there were nuances in our foreign policy. The switch to the French system was interpreted in some quarters--for instance by former President Saragat and by the Republicans--as a step toward a less Atlantic and West European policy (after all, SECAM has been adopted only in France, in Egypt and in the Soviet bloc). Those who want above all a Western orientation, and less attention paid either to Eastern Europe or to the underdeveloped countries, wanted to stay with PAL.

G.: Vous n'y êtes pas du tout! Of course it was a symbolic issue, and one of the problems of your politics is that everything has to be decoded. But--and that's a much bigger problem--the reality behind the symbol is domestic politics, not foreign affairs. Your weakness--a corollary of your brand of parliamentarianism--is to subordinate foreign affairs to domestic politics. What was at stake was not the orientation of your diplomacy, nor really the color TV system, but the color of your government. A switch to SECAM would have been symbolic of a lasting "centrist" formula, PAL meant the old--and perhaps a future--"opening to the Left." Some years ago, a hard pro-Nato line stressing the Soviet threat meant: I want a Center-Right coalition, a softer line, stressing détente rather than security, meant a preference for the Center-Left.

S.: How fascinating! Our French friend sounds like the academic "revisionists" who, in my country, keep rewriting history of the

cold war in terms of domestic interests...

G.: I don't know about the U.S., but foreign policy, in Italy, has never meant "acting in the world," it has been only a verbal instrument for creating, freezing, and marginally changing a domestic majority.[4] Your "choices of civilization" meant the exclusion of the Left from your government, and "Atlantic solidarity" has been a way of preventing any major shift toward the Left. Indeed, when your Center-Right coalitions had exhausted all the possibilities of immobilism and a Center-Left opening became desirable for domestic reasons, the symbol of Socialist "acceptability" was their resignation to NATO, and a piece by Nenni in Foreign Affairs. If the MLF was so hotly debated, even though there was really no passion for or against it en soi, it was because the enemies of the Center-Left could use Socialist repugnance toward the MLF as an argument against an opening to the Left with Socialist participation. Today, despite your vaunted consensus, Atlanticism, which has rather little foreign policy content or meaning, still has an internal role: to exclude the Communists. Too bad they're Atlantic too, now.

S.: Very interesting. But why are you so critical? In the first place, as one of my colleagues has written, in a revolutionary international system, and for a state that is ideologically heterogeneous, internal and domestic politics are inextricably intertwined, any foreign policy choice creates an internal cleavage, any domestic stand has an external repercussion (the language is a bit old-fashioned because he is a follower of Raymond Aron, but he may be right anyhow).[5] Secondly, isn't this symbolic use of foreign policy perfectly functional for the domestic system? For it diverts discussions and divisions from the explosive issues of social change, regional balance, party politics, etc..., to the much more academic ones of world affairs--academic precisely because a nation like Italy has little control over them. Thus the resort, by tacit consent, to a "foreign policy" code contributes to the cooling off of an otherwise easily overheated political and social system. Thirdly, there

is positive congruence between the operational code at home and external value orientations; in both instances, homeostasis is the goal: debate rages only over the question of whether the domestic or the world equilibrium should be more or less "advanced", as you say in Italy. At home and abroad therefore, system--maintenance...

I.: How subtle! Com'é ben trovato! As one of our leaders would say, there is a parallel convergence.

G.: You American social scientists, you're really funny! You end up rationalizing everything. I wasn't talking of "intertwined" politics, I was pointing out the subordination of foreign affairs to internal calculations and concerns. Foreign policy is being degraded. Instead of dealing with the nation's influence and power in the world, it becomes a kind of label or rather a subtle bouquet of esoteric but ineffectual allusions, a "declaration of intent" that allows each faction within one or the other of the ruling parties to distinguish itself from the other factions--knowing full well that, should its hour of triumph come, it would still have to govern with those others, and could not carry out its intent even if it had once meant to do so. For a system both fragmented and at the mercy of small shifts in Parliament can only practice immobility in foreign and domestic affairs. When the Socialists finally became acceptable, it was because the social change their participation would allow was clearly going to be no more than marginal. It is not equilibrium, it is stalemate that is more or less "advanced" depending on the coalition.

I.: I don't know a single country in which foreign policy isn't sometimes used as an instrument for domestic purposes. De Gaulle's opening to the East was a way of neutralizing the French Left...

G.: But that wasn't why he did it.

I.: He talked of "great enterprises" abroad as a way of off-setting internal divisions.

G.: But he didn't just talk: he undertook.

S.: Ah, but do not confuse verbal activity and action activity! To get back to the point: Surely our support of Israel has domestic origins and purposes, or the Republicans' "roll back" theory of 1952...

G.: Ah, but you can afford it: your Presidents can act, once elected. Not here. What you call functional, what I call instrumental uses of foreign policy issues, ends up being doubly disastrous. It freezes domestic reform--for any such reform would require a drastic opening to the Left, which Atlanticism rules out. And it paralyzes foreign policy--for any active policy would upset the delicate balance of the factions: all they can agree on is the lowest common denominator of their nuances, I mean the status quo.

I.: I cannot agree with you. I agree with the colleague Mr. Smugson quoted. For instance, for us NATO has been both a sword that insures our security (and we, unlike the French, are on the front lines, both in Central Europe and in the Mediterranean) and a shield behind which we've been free to rebuild and reform (a bit) our country. We may have factions, and the Christian Democrats may have been in power all the time, but the need to govern with several other parties and the choice which our dominant party has among possible coalitions have saved us from another kind of immobility: that which results from one man, or party, governing alone too long. Both the French kind of monolithic Gaullist rule, and the General's "opening to the East" which has given back to the French Communist Party a legitimacy it

had lost, may result in the Communists coming to power in France long before they do in Italy. We've done exactly the opposite. Here, domestic flexibility (including regional reform) and external "orthodoxy," as you call it, are keeping the Communists away, and mellowed them.

G.: Our Communists aren't anywhere near power, and we've had as much reform as you (or as little). But we also have, thanks to de Gaulle, a political class that is both realistic and concerned with France's figure in the world. We don't feel we have to make a choice between domestic and external action, whereas each time you have a government that wants to concentrate on the home front, foreign policy disappears from its program: Moro, in November 1963, spent only a page and a half of 25 on the foreign policy of his Center-Left Cabinet,[6] Andreotti barely mentioned it at all. Your political class--especially the Christian Democrats--is a bit like our late Radicaux: intensely parochial and ignorant of the outside world. Only, in your case regional differences and provincialisms are even stronger, and serve to keep the outside world at even greater distance.

S.: Well, many of our Congressmen are of the same kind.

G.: But in your country as in mine the impulse comes from the Executive. And there is still another reason why Italian politicians must be cautious, at home and abroad: the Vatican.

I.: Can you really pretend that the Pope dictates the Italian Republic's policy?

G.: No, but I can assert that his consent is indispensable before any major initiative. De Gasperi had to get it before he could overcome Christian Democratic resistance to entry into NATO, the opening to the Left became possible only when Pope John XXIII changed the course of the Church, and your opening to the East had to wait until the Vatican had begun its own rapprochement with the powers-that-be in Eastern Europe. The Vatican has a

universal policy; you don't.

S.: Let me see whether we couldn't all agree on this. On the surface, Italian foreign policy doesn't have high global saliency (I mean, it looks quite pale), and if the criterion of success were the amount of noise one makes in the world (or even one's reputation), all the indicators and correlations would be negative. But if the criterion is: the maximum of satisfaction of the nation's most pressing interests, at the lowest price, then Italy's system performance is good. It reflects a sound decisional calculus of opportunity costs and capability factors, and it encapsulates beneficial trade-offs between utility functions. Italy's security is largely provided by us, that's true, and she has no force de frappe. But ultimately all of Western Europe's security depends on our nuclear guarantee and our maximum assured destruction capability; a small force de frappe makes very little difference (although it costs a lot of money). Italy is a member of the NATO nuclear planning group, and her influence in the alliance is not disastrously lower than Bonn's, even though Italy's military budget is much smaller.

G.: In other words, you consider that the discrepancy between Italy's Atlantic commitment, and her actual performance as an ally is an achievement?

I.: Isn't your own criterion "sacro egoismo?"

S.: In the EEC, Italy, while usually upgrading the common interests, has bargained for and obtained all sorts of rewards and special treatments--for instance, a recent commitment of her partners to a regional policy that will greatly help the Mezzogiorno

G.:...Even though, often enough, EEC directives or recommendations, or even court decisions in conflict with Italian practices were

disregarded, and Italian ministers failed to attend important Common Market meetings. Scandalous! It is Gaullist France that is always singled out as a trouble-maker and obstacle to integration,-whereas we've always stressed, and practiced, cooperation,--while Italy, that champion of integration, has really treated it as a one-way street.

S.: In banal English, the collective good of security has been obtained on the cheap, alliances have been used for economic profit, trade has been expanded all over the world, foreign investments have grown, and the only thing Italy has given up is the right to pursue visions for which no single European nation has the necessary means, and the right to try to build up means of external action that would fail anyhow to be on the required scale, would have to be diverted from pressing domestic needs, and would put a stressful load on the capabilities of the political system. (Do I make myself clear?)

G.: I know your tune! Whether you are politicians or political scientists, all Americans, or almost, have been singing it. Only a united Europe, etc...Let me not ask you whether you'd like such a Europe once it starts competing with you: Mr. Connally has already answered. Let me only point out that Italy, by treating foreign affairs only in connection with domestic dosages, has actually foregone the opportunity to play a leading role toward West European unification (except verbally, of course). Where are her initiatives? Where are her contributions? Whatever happened to Count Sforza's proud boast that Italy must be for Europe what Piedmont had been for Italy?[7] It is an Italian, Mr. Spinelli, who has made the most vigorous "Federalist" case. I disagree with his conviction that the nation-state is obsolete, but his conclusions are in conformity with his premises. And yet, when has Italy really followed his exhortations? If

the EEC has never been much debated in Parliament, it is out of indifference--since all potential governing parties agreed on it, it was of no symbolic use as a source of domestic product differentiation among the factions.

I.: Our French friend assumes that traditional behavior on the diplomatic-strategic field (I've read Aron too) is still the only possible form of conduct for states. He is wrong. On the other hand, as long as we're in a world of states, we must look after our interests.

G.: "The business of Italy is business."

S.: Why shouldn't it be? You sell the Mirage to all, don't you? I would submit that Italy's behavior output expresses a correct perceptual pattern. I mean, Italy, out of necessity--a lost war, a fear of social subversion through adventurism abroad, the effects of its political system--has understood the limits and the possibilities of middle powers...

G.: What about Japan?

S.: Not a middle power, economically, and, unlike West European states, not so tightly constrained either by the two superpowers' grip or by the presence of neighbors with comparable resources and similar interests.. I continue, in unprofessional language once more: Italy has understood those limits and possibilities better than France, but since it has a corps of career diplomats, and since foreign ministers have traditions, and since parties find it convenient to argue in foreign affairs lingo (just as Russia and China, in the days of their quarrel but before their final split, chose to discuss their divergences in terms of Albania), the residue of a bygone past is the pretense, or itch, of "presence," "mediation," "vocation." At least in Italy's case, since no deeds follow the words, the pretense is harmless.

G.: What you're really saying is that Italy is a nation without a state; but since it has a political façade and a professional bureaucracy, it has to go through the verbal motions of the pretense. Believe me: in so dangerous a world, Italy may have much to pay, some day, for having entrusted her essential interests to others, who look primarily after their own and may not always care about meeting Italy's needs...Dependence breeds an illusion of vicarious strength. In the long run, it produces both weakness and irresponsibility.

I.: What about the illusion of independence?

G. (to S.): What you Americans are telling us is: "Leave high politics to the big boys, and behave, at your level, as if foreign policy were nothing more than sound economic management (which includes, of course, free play to U.S. investments)".

S.: But even the dominant actors discover that they must move from the strategic-conflictive to the economic-cooperative polar extremity of the interaction spectrum. This is how negative feedback has worked in their goal-seeking steering process.

I.: I will tell you a fable. After a big storm, Noah's Ark sank. Miraculously, four animals were guided back to land by a huge eagle, who held in his claws both a bunch of arrows and a money bag. One of the four, a lion, said: "I have old friendly relations with the eagle--he once had his nest in my lair--and I used to have hunting grounds all over. I shall become the King of animals again by reasserting my authority on my old domains and by becoming the chief adviser of the eagle." The second animal, a rooster, said: "I used to have hens all over the world, and I owe nothing to anyone. I'll fly from barnyard to barnyard, and my proud cry will make me the rallying point of the weak, and the equal of that upstart, the eagle." The

third animal was a bobbered bull, disliked by the other beasts. He had lost his horns in the shipwreck, and he had only skin left on his bones. He gave up any thoughts of splendor, accepted the eagle's protection, counted on him to find the lost horns somewhere, and worked hard, although he spoke only German. Finally, there was a flea-bitten, soaked, diarrhetic fox, who also put itself under the eagle's protection, borrowed flea-powder from him and went looking for some pill that would settle his stomach. Twenty-five years passed. The eagle, still proud, had grown a bit weary of dragging everywhere the biggest load of arrows and the heaviest money bag on earth. But fatigue, and an ample loss of feathers in Asian rice paddies, had not made him any more willing to abdicate his power. The lion had lost all his far-away lairs, along with much weight, and most of his pride; for the eagle never once took his advice. The rooster, having found that his hens had joined the movement of female liberation, had tried to claim credit for their emancipation, but he had cried himself hoarse, only to discover that nobody thought a mere rooster could compete with an eagle. The bull had become big and fat again, but it never got his horns back, and , despite his awesome muscle power, he still felt that he desperately needed the eagle to protect him from a neighboring bear. The fox now had a shiny fur, a quieter stomach, and a hearty appetite. A nominal tribute to the eagle allowed him to roam the countryside, quietly, and to find suitable food. One day, the four animals met. Three of them looked harassed, their eyes were dazed, their spirits low. Only the fox appeared content, despite occasional cramps. Two had lost their ambitions, three had lost their illusions, and the fox which had had neither illusions nor delusions, was not the worst off. So they decided to form a league, to pool their domains, to be content with cultivating their gardens in common...

G.: And to have a single rope binding their four collars to the claws of the haughty eagle. Speaking of fables, have you ever read La Fontaine, Le Loup et le Chien ? I'd rather have my

country play the wolf, to your dog (or fox) on a leash; or even play la chèvre de M. Séguin, you know, Daudet's proud goat?

I.: Non ha capito niente.

S.: Waiter! Another tartufo...

NOTES

1. Pietro Quaroni in Istituto Affari Internazionali, La politica estera della Republica Italiana, Milano 1967, Vol. III, pp. 801-820

2 Cf .H. Stuart Hughes, The U.S. and Italy, Cambridge, 1965, pp.250ff

3. Cf. Norman Kogan, The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy, New York, 1963, p. 118

4. Mr. de Grandegueule owes his analysis to: Primo Vannicelli, Interactions between the European Community, the Italian political system and the Atlantic Alliance (unpublished ms., Cambridge 1972)

5. S. Hoffmann, "La nation: pour quoi faire," in Mélanges en l'honneur de Raymond Aron, Science et Conscience de la Société, Paris, 1971, vol. 2, p. 315

6. F. Roy Willis, Italy Chooses Europe, New York, 1971, pp.278-9

7. Quoted in: Luigi Graziano, La politica estera italiana nel dopoguerra, Padova 1968, p. 97

(6)

ITALY AT THE ECONOMIC CROSSROADS

by C.P. Kindleberger (*)

(This paper was intended for a conference in April 1972. The conference has since been postponed, for perhaps as much as a year, and it did not seen worthwhile therefore to polish it currently. In order to get the benefit of the views of experts, however, it is being circulated to a limited group in its present rough state, for which apologies are offered. Correction of fact and differences of interpretation will be most welcome).

(*) The writer, no expert on the Italian economy, but one who undertook the assignment of preparing the present essay in order to learn, is indebted for information and opinion to a long list of persons, other than those cited in references, who have kindly discussed these issues with him. The list is too long to reproduce, and the distinction of inclusion in it is at best dubious, given the use to which information and opinion are put. It is important, however, to exonerate this distinguished group of economists and public figures from responsibility for the ideas set forth in the text, which while largely appropriated from other may well have been malformed or transformed in the process.

1. Introduction

Italy's economic performance since World War II, brilliant to 1962, has increasingly given rise first to anxiety in 1963-1964 and again in 1969-1970, and most recently to alarm. Whereas 10 years ago there was discussion only of the economic miracle of the country, which emerged from the destruction and upset of the war and post-war disruption into rapid economic growth, today the words used are "crisis", "chaos", "anarchy", and in some extreme versions, "collapse". The economic problem implied in these strong terms has little to do with the political impasse: on the contrary, it is regretted that the political crunch should have come on questions of divorce and anticipated elections rather than economic reform, the choice between private and public goods, reorganization of the bureaucracy to enable it to discharge economic functions, a voice for labor in the management of industrial plant, the economic future of the South, and the like. This paper reviews the course of Italian economic development since World War II, attempts to formulate the most pervasive issues of choice facing Italian economic leadership, seeks to analyze the extent to which these are matters of choice for economic policy or have roots which go deeper into Italian social structure and history, and finally sketches briefly alternative economic scenarios for the future in which the country embraces Communism or Fascism, on the one hand, or struggles along under the weight of its problems for another decade while avoiding these blind alleys.

2. The Course of Economic Growth, 1950-1972

Average real income in Italy rose from $ 650 of 1970 purchasing power in 1950 to $ 1,070 in 1960 and $ 1,685 in 1970 (1). For the period from 1955 to 1968, which has been more closely studied, Italy had the highest gain in total real income of any country in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 98.3 percent. The largest contributions to growth were made by shifts of resources between sectors (36.2 percent, the highest in the OECD), the growth of industrial productivity (34.8 percent, below the highest in the OECD, 44 percent, but far above the lowest, 14.7 percent for the United States); and growth of productivity of services (27.4 percent, the

highest in the OECD). The numbers fail to capture the nature of the process: after the war, Italy first cleaned up destruction and got the economy going, and then proceeded to convert an archaic industrial machine to the mass-assembly processes used in other developed countries. It did more than spready assembly methods, which had been used for the first time in Italy by Fiat in 1936; it developed products of new and appealing design: automobiles, the scooter, typewriters, sewing machines and refrigerators from the Golden Industrial Triangle running from Genoa to Turin and Milano; and high-style clothing, especially shoes from Florence, knit-goods from Venetia, and haute couture from Rome. Italian literature and especially cinema took the leadership in European cultural competition. Workers were drawn to the Northwest and light industry into the Northeast and Center. Only the South remained quiescent, and this despite the attempts of government to introduce forced development into the area.

In the South the Cassa del Mezzogiorno, created in 1950, started off to produce development through a supportive structure of public works, needed before industry could get going. Initial plans called for investment solely in agriculture (77 percent), aqueducts and sewers (11 percent), road construction and improvement (9 percent) and tourism (3 percent). In 1957, the concept was modified from exclusive emphasis on infrastructure, to include 12 percent of funds to invest in industry. Ten years later, in 1966, the program was embodied in the first five-year plam for all of Italy, covering 1966 to 1970, with a further change from incentives for industry to actual investments by the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), and the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI, the nationally-owned firm in petroleum and petroleum products, including petro-chemicals). None of the phases produced much in the way of economic growth in the South. Labor moved north and to foreign countries. The economic miracle, which reached a peak in the years from 1958 to 1962, was largely private and northern, supported from the South only by a flow of labor, along with other flows out of Northern agriculture and to a lesser degree Northern mini-industry and services.

In an earlier investigation, I concluded that Italy illustrated beautifully the Lewis (or Marx) model of "growth with unlimited supplies of labor", in which changes in productivity went to profits, rather than wages, because of an elastic supply of new entrants into the labor force, with resultant continued widening of investment, increases in productivity faster than wage increases, more profits, more investment. This process of supergrowth needs outlets for the produce: in the case of Italy they were provided by the European Economic Community (EEC) and liberal tariff policies in the United States. Productivity increases were translated into lower export prices which expanded volume, profits and productivity. The process came to an end only when the system ran out of unlimited labor of the appropriate skills. This the Italian economy did in 1963 (2).

Application of the Lewis model to Italy has not gone uncriticized (3), and reallocation of resources from low- to high productivity occupations can take place within sectors and regions as well as between them. Moreover, the heavy movement of labor out of the South - possibly 3 million workers in 20 years - did not produce the self-sustaining investment in agriculture which sometimes comes from removing disguised unemployment in that sector and bringing productivity of its workers up to the level of their pay. (The movement of labor off the farms of the Po valley into Milanese industry, however, sharply raised productivity in Northern agriculture, in the same way that the loss of labor stimulated rationalization of agriculture in France) (4). But the exhaustion of readily available supplies of labor, particularly skilled labor, in 1963, produced a sudden sharp rise in wages which marked the and of supergrowth, and the resumption of cyclical fluctuations in business of the sort known between the wars. Recessions were of the "Japanese" type, however, a slowing down in the rate of growth rather than an absolute decline in output.

The causes of the interruption of the economic miracle in 1963 went beyond the exhaustion of skilled labor.In 1962 the Socialists entered the government, and achieved an old political goal, nationalization of the electrical companies of Italy. Together with the rise in wages this

disturbed private capital, which sought refuge abroad in large amounts. Interest rates were raised to discourage the outflow adding a third discouragement to investment in industry. Domestic demand decline, despite the rise in wages, or because of the unemployment produced by the rise in wages. Italian industry sought further outlets for goods abroad, especially in the Common Market.

The increase in wages was gradually absorbed by steady gains in productivity, relieving the strain on profits, and investment picked up. Modest recovery by 1966, however, ensured that the wage settlement of that year was a moderate one, on the three-year schedule following the wage explosion of 1963. The result was still greater profits in the following years, leading to a renewed and greater outburst of labor unrest in the "hot autumn" of 1969. There were other issues than wages: acute dissatisfaction with the snail's pace of reform in the fields of housing, health, schools, taxation, transport, recovery in the South, and the like; a certain amount of unrest in assembly-line industry over the alleged attempt to increase productivity by a speed-up, after the wage increases of 1963; Southern workers crowded into bulging village of the North, and paying exorbitant rents for inadequate quarters were particularly dissatisfied. The extra-Parliamentary labor groups, of Maoist persuasion, pushed regular union leadership to unusual militancy. Unions and workers began to be interested in the quality of life in the factory, and demanded the elimination of overtime, and of extra-shift work, piecework, break-up of the assembly line, slowing down of the allowances for particular jobs, monthly pay, and the like.

When the national agreements of 1969 were negotiated at the factory level in the following months in 1970, agreements on overtime and double shifts were included in many contracts, reducing the possibility of productivity gains to offset the wage increases. The national agreements had already reduced the work week from 46 hours in 1969 to 43 hours in 1972 and 40 by 1973. Many factory owners expressed alarm at the intrusion of labor interest into matters which had been within the purview of management's decision. In the short run,

employment was expanded by the need to reduce overtime and double shifts: a 2 percent increase in employment in the Milan area served as a magnet to attract more labor from the South, with the 1971 inflow reaching a postwar high. Over the longer term, some firms cut investment, whether from fear of the new forms of labor drive, from shrunken profit margins and difficulties in obtaining external financing, or an exhaustion of the entrepreneurial spirit, and such investment as did take place, for example, in Olivetti, was higly labor-saving (5). A certain amount of production was abroad to lower-wage areas (6). Labor-intensive occupations like leather and knit-goods found difficulty in selling abroad, but large firms turned again to foreign markets at the and of 1971, to make up for the loss of domestic demand. One or two of these large firms reported losses amounting to as much as 30 billion lire ($ 50,000,000). Medium and small firms surrendered to foreign takeovers, sought help from IRI, and from special agencies of assistance, such as GEPI (Gestioni e Partecipazioni industriali) or succumbed to bankruptcy. Confidence drained out of the system. The economy was in crisis, in chaos, or at the crossroads.

3. The Economic Issues

a) Macro-economic Policies or Structural Reforms

A deep division runs through Italian economic analysis as to whether the impasse of 1972 arises from mistakes of macro-economic policy or is the result of failure to achieve reform. A corollary issue turns on whether optimal macro-economic policy today can lead Italy out of difficulty, whether they are necessary, but not sufficient, or whether the antecedent requirement, before adequate macro-economic policies can be applied, is reform of the machinary for government spending, and in some versions, reform of the Italian capital market.

It is possible to criticize Italian monetary policy for having been late in applying the brakes in 1963 and 1969, applying them perhaps too hard, and being slow in releasing them in 1964 and 1970. It may have been that the Bank was too concerned with balance-of-payments weakness on occasion,

when the trend position was one of great strength, so that the Stop-Go policies of Britain found an echo in Rome. A more subtle point can be made that in providing credit to government in 1970, the Bank tightened private credit, with a result that was overall deflationary since the private brakes held while the public accelerator did not get gasoline to the carburetor. The Bank would claim in its defense that the monetary aggregates were reasonably stable; and that its capacity to manage monetary supply and interest rates in an open economy, where banks have access to the Euro-dollar market are at best limited. Few Italian economists, moreover, are dyed-in-the-wool monetarists of the Friedman stripe. The faults of macro-economic policy lie predominantly in fiscal policy.

Here faults are legion, but edge over from policy to structure. The government certainly accelerated the inflation in 1963 by its two wage increases for civil servants, 24 percent in May 1962 followed by 22 percent in February 1963. The Constitutional requirement that monies cannot be appropriated without provision for financing them - a form of the "natural budgetary reaction" described by Myrdal and said by Bent Hansen to apply especially to Italy (7) - has resulted on numerous occasions in the 1960s in deflation, as taxes to finance take hold, but expenditure is slow in getting under way. The German Finance Minister, Karl Schaeffer, in the early 1950s deliberately followed a policy of raising taxes for military purposes in advance of their expenditure, showing a balanced budget on the books while running large cash surpluses (8); Italian fiscal practice achieves the same deflationary result when it is not sought. Bureaucratic controls on government spending make it virtually impossible to vary government capital spending counter-cyclically. Hansen's study for the OECD shows that Italian discretionary policies (as contrasted with the automatic stabilizers in taxes, benefits, and transfers which are strong and well-timed) are pro-cyclical (9).

The use of changes in taxation to even out effective demand over the business cycle runs into the Galbraith thesis - which blocked tax reduction of 1964 in the United States for two years - that private consumption is less

desirable than public investment, a position staunchly held by Italian Socialists and by some less doctrinaire observers interested in capital formation and economic growth. Moreover, the effectiveness of tax policy is said to be dampened by the practice of tax officers to work with targets for receipts which they do not alter cyclically: higher tax rates will, it is said, enable them to reach the target more quickly, whereupon they become less avid in squeezing the last lire out of taxpayers with they are negotiating; reductions in rates, contrariwise, lead to greater zeal in collections. But this effect is difficult to see in the data.

To the structuralists, the mistakes in monetary policy fall well within the range of acceptable human error, while the difficulties in fiscal policy are less in analysis than in the system and in the bureaucracy,i.e. in structure. They go further: the economic miracle of the 1950s was a brilliant accomplishment, to be sure,but it was achieved by ducking the hard questions. Business in the North took the bit in its teeth, found markets abroad, but ignored the age-old problems of reform which have plagued Italy since unification and before. Spending for housing, schools, universities, hospitals lagged scandalously behind need, and reform of taxation, the bureaucracy, urban planning, the capital market, etc. was either evaded, tackled without carry-through, or muddled. In particular, it is suggested in some quarters, that the business elite in the North, largely lay, and engrossed in business expansion, had only scorn for government and its problems, while the Catholic South, typified by DeGasperi, thought to leave major social problems to the moral solutions of the Church. Nothing effective was done when the opportunity presented itself after the war (excepting the program for the Mezzogiorno), and nothing can be done now for fear that it night go too far. The historical analogy is with the German bourgeois which drew back from Constitutional reforms after the Revolution of 1848, missing its big chance to limit the monarchy and the aristocracy, partly from fear of being unable to contain reform, given the excitement of the proletariat, and partly because in the 1850s, there was too much money to be made in business (10).

Reform was undertaken, but without much positive result. The budget reform of January 1965 changed the presentation of the budget to conform to macro-economic principles, but left the "natural budget reaction" unaltered, and appropriations passed by the Parliament still bottled up by bureaucratic red tape. Health reform was sabotaged by doctors, hospitals, church organizations, labor unions, and pharmaceutical companies, according to Minister Mariotti, who claimed that the additional funds put in by the State were offset by contributions withdrawn by others - the perennial problem of the donor who wants his contribution to count (11). The health reform also provided one measure long sought by labor: the elimination of the right of the firm paying for such leave to have its doctor examine the applicant. The task was turned over to the health service, which is unable to discharge it. The result has been an increase in sick leave from 7 to 12 percent, producing an additional fall in labor productivity. Twenty years after the provision was included in the postwar Constitution, decentralization of some of the powers of the State to specially designed regions was undertaken, but initial experience suggests that there will be difficulty in getting the central bureaucracy to let go (12). A law for overcoming the chaos of private residential construction in urban areas through zoning had the unfortunate effect of almost completely stopping private building in the designated areas while procedures for implementing the law are worked out. The Socialist measure of nationalizing electricity produced a small gain in efficiency through interconnections among the separate local companies, but too generous a pay-off for the private stock-holders, it is now felt, and an enormous increase in expenses when the low salaries of the private companies - who like the Edison company used their monopoly rents to generate savings for investment in other industries like chemicals - were raised to the level of the municipal and public companies which had used their monopoly rents less for rate reduction than for local patronage (13).

The macro-economic policies for raising effective demand and structural reform were not necessarily alternatives. With more demand, more employment, higher profits, taxes, etc., reform will be easier to put through, so say the macro-economic analysts. Short-run macro-economic policies

are necessary, but not sufficient for reform. On the other hand, if monetary policy is limited by internationally joined money and capital markets, and Socialist doctrine prevents expansion of effective demand through tax reduction, reform of bureaucracy and budget procedures may be necessary, though not sufficient, for decent stabilization and employment policies.

b) Planning vs. the Market

SVIMEZ, the Cassa del Mezzogiorno, the Vanoni plan, the Pieraccini Plan of 1966-70 which followed it, and the new plan for 1971 to 1975, still waiting to be announced a year after it had begun, all testify to the intense interest of Italy in planning. There is less success than interest. Planning in the South, as already indicated, has followed three phases of infrastructure (1951-1957), incentives (1958-1963), and investment by quasi-governmental agencies (1964-1970), without getting economic development on a self-sustaining basis. The regional economists who believe in poles of development, backwash effects, inter-firm linkages, and the like find at each stage one missing ingredient needed to get the effort air-borne. The latest requirement appears to be prohibitions on private business expansion in other locations (14), and incorporation of the South in the overall national plans for 1971-75 and Project '80. It is difficult to see that either instrument is much more than a slogan. Infrastructure, emigration, incentives, investment by para-statal companies have all produced some growth, but nothing comparable to that sought or planned for. The South is beginning to be aggrieved that it is the repository for big dirty industries like steel, oil refining, and primary chemicals, which are capital-intensive in a labor-intensive region, work for export, rather than stimulate local enterprise, and in fact compete with local firms for the best labor, and for access to capital. New direct capital investments by Alfa Romeo in Naples, and by Pirelli and Fiat in the South may change the industrial mix and bring some employment, just as the Autostrada from Naples to Reggio Calabria has accumulated a scattering of small-scale enterprise near its access routes, in a miniature replics of Route 128 around Boston. More, ironically, may come from the new energy of labor unions in the North to the extent that it

stimulates industry to look for more peaceful labor conditions - but here the danger is that the firm may go abroad like Innocenti to India, Zanussi to Yugoslavia, Olivetti to Spain and Argentina, rather than south.

The fact is that the South is a difficult place to operate an industry working for populated markets (in the North and across the Alps) and requiring skilled labor, which is not abundant. Assembly-line workers can be trained quickly enough, but must be supplemented by machinists, maintenance engineers, foremen, and the like, who are not readily brought down from the North. It is of some significance that a number of American firms in the Mezzogiorno, attracted by tax holidays and capital subventions, have failed and withdrawn. More than one case is regarded suspiciously as close to a swindle, where the firm took advantage of the benefits in one lump sum, and later went bankrupt leaving debts behind. Others were the result of gross errors in research, the belief that a particular local material could be used for a given purpose, when in fact it could not. When such firms as Union Carbide, Rheem, Raytheon and Celanese cannot successfully undertake to establish manufacturing subsidiaries in the area, however, and subsidiaries of other well-managed companies are known to be losing money, it is not evident that any amount of planning, unbacked by consistent subsidy, will enable the area to turn the corner.

The Cassa del Mezzogiorno is widely attacked in Italy today - for having shared out the goodies, for clientelismo, for having run out of ideas, declaring intellectual bankruptcy. The fact seems to be that the human and natural resources are still insufficient to convert the area into another California. There will doubtless be successes, like Finsider at Taranto which exports steel to foreign markets, however, rather inseminating the area with mechanical industries. (For a while it had no mills for cold rolled steel needed by the mechanical industry), Alfa Romeo, Fiat and Pirelli may make their plants work - when the American investors, using Italian experts, have failed. Twenty years have failed to fulfill the high hopes of the pioneers.

The Vanoni, Pieraccini and 1971-75 plans cannot be said to be distinguished even in a world which is now more cynical about planning. The Vanoni 10-year plan was buried long before its terminal year had come. The economic miracle in the private sector diverted attention from it. The Pieraccini plan for 1966-70 similarly misfired, understating private consumption, overstating public consumption, and missing out by more than 10 percent on the international sector (15). The 1971-75 plan, and its extension to 1980 have not yet been released, although portions of it are being discussed in the press.For 1972 it is anticipated that housing will decline 5 percent in real terms, and exports rise by 6 percent. A 7 1/1 percent increase in foreseen in business investment. Perhaps.

Italian planning is without teath or as stated by Pietro Armani, planning without money in the pocket (16). The transfer of responsibility for the plan to the Ministry of the Budget was a useful step, and for a while under Giolitti it looked as though the ministry would build a powerful staff. Soon, however, it became clear that the political parties required the patronage of appointments to the staff, which failed to help; and the regular ministries are still in charge of appropriations to carry out plans. The high hopes for economic planning entertained by such a political scientist as La Palombara, based on the debate from 1962 to 1964 which preceded the Pieraccini plan, have faded (17).

Midway between market and government in Italy is a series of parastatal economic organizations which defy simple ideological characterization, IRI, ENI, IMI (Istituto Mobiliare Italiano) and their numerous subsidiaries. IMI and IRI were started during the depression to make up at one stroke the chronic undercapitalization of Italian industry. Owned by the state, they are anathema to unreconstructed laissez-faire opinion; profit-making in purpose - albeit in ways which are qualified by public goals, they are disliked by Socialists, within and without Italy (18). Only of late has the model begun to interest Socialist states in Eastern Europe, desperately in need of guidelines for improving efficiency in the use of resources.

IMI was created in 1931 when the major banks were threatened by closure. IRI was formed the following year to take industrial securities out of the banking system. It was initially regarded as an expedient, like the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the United States which it antedated, and in 1937 sold off its industrial assets, only later to start again as an industrial holding company (19). In the immediate postwar period, IRI was concerned particularly with sick industries like shipbuilding and shipping, but operated also in steel, air transport, banking, mechanical industry, motion pictures. A special subsidiary was established for building autostrade in competition with the authority, ANAS (Azienda Nazionale Autonoma delle Strade) in the Ministry of Public Works.

ENI came into being when it was decided to exploit the natural gas in the Po Vallay by state authority, rather than private concessions. Dominated by the personality of Enrico Mattei, who challenged the private giant oil companies for a place in world industry, it spread into petrochemicals, synthetic textiles, engineering, fertilizers. ENI finances itself with debt, plus an equity of 20 percent provided by state endowment and plowed back profits - needed, it is said, as a counterwsight to the old cheap leases of the private international oil companies, on which they earm a monopoly rent. ENI is charged with developing a national energy policy - and would be pleased to participate in a European energy policy if one were finally to develop - but its purpose is cheap energy, rather than glory or participation in the world oil market among the giants. When AGIP's distribution network in Britain proved unprofitable, it was sold off.

IRI and ENI's subsidiaries, but not ENI itself, usually share the equity with the public. In addition, IRI and IMI are likely to have participations in private companies, acquired in the course of other operations. Private investors, however, are not disposed to look with great favor on IRI, ENI or IMI companies; profits may be affected by public considerations, such as the 1957 requirement that put 60 percent of new plant and 40 percent of total investment in the Mezzogiorno, and dividends are typically niggardly. Debt funds are borrowed on national and international capital markets.

Trade unions have agreed not to take advantage of their political strength in dealing with operating subsidiaries of the government companies, in exchange for an IRI-ENI withdrawal from the employer group (Confederazione Generale dell'Industria Italiana - Confindustria). IRI and ENI compete with private enterprise within the limitations put on them by government, but earn a modest return on many of their investments undertaken for social reasons, such as Sardinian coal. It is difficult to see why government should be engaged in the production of luxury automobiles through Alfa Romeo, but when IRI is given a firm to rescue, it does so without asking philosophical questions.

IRI, ENI, IMI and their subsidiaries may be compared with Italian private industry on the one hand or with government on the other. There is little perhaps to choose between large-scale Italian industry (and banking?) and the autonomous corporations, though they are evidently more competent than most medium and small enterprise. The enormous advantage they have is over government. Their attack on problems is practical, rather than juridical. They are relatively unhampered by law, tradition, political patronage: the necessity to earn a return furnishes defense against intrusion from politics. There are recurrent rumors from time to time that IRI, ENI, IMI etc. are sinking into the bureaucratic mire about them. Thus far the threat has been turned away. Different from typical nationalized industry which is subject to political pressure and works for social ends largely with public funds, and different from state organization like Volkswagen which seek to substitute private for state ownership, IRI, ENI, IMI et al. pursue their unique knife-edge route between planning and the market.

The choice between planning and free markets is linked not only to the problem of the South, the need for infrastructure, and the peculiar role of the parastatale agencies; it turns in part on the efficiency of factor markets. The dualism in the market for labor will be discussed below under the openness of the economy. A significant issue associated with the parastatals agencies and macro-economic policy is how efficiently the capital market functions.

The answer is that the Italian capital market performs badly. In 1936 banks were forbidden any longer to make industrial loans, and required to pattern themselves after the joint-stock banks of Britain. Italy, however, lacked the London equity market and the tradition of merchant banking. Moreover, the separate banks did not link up with separate companies even for short-term loans, which could be rolled over into longer obligations. Firms typically borrowed from 5, 10, or 20 banks, which meant that no bank was responsible for carrying such a firm in a period of stringency, and each one could call its loan in the knowledge that its repayment, in itself, would not be critical. The State dominated the market for bonds, and consistently withdrew equities from the market through taking over majority ownership of the telephone, steel, shipping, etc. industry through IRI, all of domestic petroleum through ENI, and 51 percent of petrochemicals and synthetic textiles, all of electricity through the Ente Nazionale dell'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), not to mention the major banks, Alfa Romeo, and so on. Foreign takeovers removed still further blocks of Italian equities from the market. The most active stock exchange, Milano, had less than 200 shares listed, 50 of them dormant. An investor has primarily a choice between a government or parastatal bond - not particularly inviting in a period of inflation - and going aboard. Many of them chose capital exports, a form of strike of capital undertakem at the time of the nationalization of electricity, and again following the strikes of labor in 1963-64 and 1969-70. Capital exports in the form of banknotes wers dried up primarily by more rigorous exchange control, although perhaps partly by marauding bandits who patrolled the major motorways to Swiss banking centers. Some part of the capital exports was matched by opposing inflows, as companies sought to get "black cash" accumulated in tax evasion on the books to make good losses. But the Italian economy presented the bizarre picture of a country borrowing abroad through the sale of Euro-dollar bonds by ENI, IRI and their subsidiaries, and open to foraign investment, including takeovers by foreign firms, at the same time that it was exporting capital. The net export of capital doubtless assisted in the development of an export surplus through the transfer mechanism.

In the theory of direct investment, the valid arguments for restriction of foreign investment within a country, as contrasted with those based on fallacious economic reasoning, have been equated to the valid arguments for tariffs: largely non-economic or based on the theory of the second best (20). It is legitimate to restrict imports or foreign investment within one's borders for reasons of national defense, nationalism (although one should know the price one is paying), the preservation of cultural values, such as those in agriculture in the like, or because of an imperfection of functioning which prevents the market from reaching an optimum, and cells for interference in the market. The threat of monopoly may be such an imperfection, or the infant-industry argument which would not be called for if markets were perfect and perfectly forecast the long-run decline in costs. If markets function badly, it may well be a mistake to let them function at all, as suggested by the United States action in preventing direct investment in Germany after World War II prior to the monetary reform of June 1948.

Foreign investment has been welcomed in Italy until the last few years when there has been the beginning of an effort to resist takeovers of major Italian firms - such as Carl Erba in pharmaceuticals which was snatched from the grasp of Merck, Sharp and Dohme and bought with public and private money for incorporation in the Montecatini-Edison empire. The dramatic struggle over Bastogi between Pirelli, Fiat and IRI on the one hand and the Westdeutsche Landesbank on the other is perhaps not another example, as the German institution is widely believed to have been a front for other Italian interests. Major Italian companies are, to be cure, interested in foreign acquisitions or transnational mergers, as suggested by the Fiat Citroën deal, or the Pirelli-Dunlop merger. The trend is too weak perhaps to be firmly established, but it appears that in Italy foreign takeovers are acceptable in the weaker portions of the equity market, where firms with high debt-equity ratios and inability to raise more equity capital are vulnerable to offers from abroad, failing which they may have to be bolstered by IRI or other special credit institutions; whereas among the firms, where the capital market functions more effectively, such tendency as exists for foreign takeovers in beginning

to be resisted, largely on neo-mercantilist grounds of the sort long evident in Japan, France, Canada.

Limiting foreign takeovers on second-best grounds, because the Italian capital merket functions badly, is clearly and inferior course of action to improving the capital market. Italy has been committed in the EEC to steps to integrate European capital markets. Like France and Germany, it shows no enthusiasm for such a course, preferring the roundabout linkage through the Euro-currency money and capital markets, insofar as the authorities concern themselves with the problem at all. It is perhaps a mistake to call these attitudes an example of the clash between planning and the market, since there is no planning evident in this factor market, but rather occasional ad hoc intervention.

c) The Openness of the Economy

Not unconnected with these issues of macro-economic measures vs. structure, and planning vs. the market is the question whether Italy has not gome too far in depending on foreign markets for outlets for its goods, and for capital for investment. Little question is raised about the dependence on foreign labor markets for employment, for while Italy has 1 1/2 million workers (?) abroad, the rate of increase is negligible.

In 1960, roughly 10 percent of national income was earned through exports of goods and services. In 1970 the figure reached 20 percent. Comparison in often made with Japan which has an export ratio of 10.8 percent, rather than with Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Austria, which are all over 40 percent, Switzerland at 35, or Sweden and Germany near 25. The concern is more with the rate of growth, rather than the level, and the fear that export are a) an escape from facing the problem of infrastructure and reform; b) risky; and c) producing distortions in the Italian economy which store up trouble for the future.

On the first score, it is worth recalling that expansion of exports can lead to growth or away from growth. Italy furnishes a widely cited example of export-led growth (21). As noted earlier, growth with unlimited supplies of labor

requires outlets for goods, and in Italy these were furnished by exports, largely to the Common Market. In the inflations of 1963-64 and 1969-71, exports were initially hurt by increases in wages and costs, but quickly recovered, long ahead of domestic demand, to help stabilize the economy. The initial surge of exports was based on Italian style leadership, developed in part by a domestic luxury market abetted by skewed income distribution (22), and in part by labor productivity increases faster than rising wages. But exports can also lead away from growth, as the case of England after 1870 shows. Britain postponed the restructuring of domestic industry to divert goods cut off from Europe and United States markets to the Empire (23). Foreign trade can be a blind alley if it postpones the necessity to face up to problems which prove ultimately inescapable.

Emphasis on foreign trade is risky to the extent that Italian comparative advantage rests on low wage rates, and there are other countries whose wage rates are lower. Within the industrial countries, Italy is a "leader" (in the sense that it is among the eleven industrial countries, up to 3, with the largest relative export share in a given category) largely in labor-intensive industries. Of 22 groups in which it is a leader, fifteen (leather manufactures, furs skinned and tanned, cork manufactures, textiles yarn and thread, woven textiles ex cotton, made-up articles in textiles, glassware, furniture, travel goods, clothing ex fur, fur clothing, footwear, artificial plastic toys and jewelry) are likely to be labor-intensive (24). Only five of these groups fall into the two highest categories (of five) in terms of speed of growth. These labor-intensive exports are not as important for Italian exports as some of the other groups in which Italy is a leader, such as office machines, or as groups in which Italy does very well without leading - e.g., automobiles, machinary, electrical appliances and the like. Moreover they are industries in which Italy's advantage is only partly in labor costs and largely in style leadership in fields of rapid changes in taste, an attribute which requires nearness to the market. Nonetheless, the risks of depending on low wages in a country bound to raise its wages rapidly to the European level are evident. The problem is underlined by the beginnings of a movement of Italian manufacturing abroad.

The suggestion that foreign trade is responsible for the distortion in the Italian labor market known as dualism comes from Augusto Graziani and his collaborators, who have produced a book. Lo sviluppo di un'economia aperta (25). The theme of the study is that exports to developed countries, which provide the bulk of Italy's export markets, must come from the modern sector, using capital-intensive methods of production. This produces dualism. Firms that work for the home market may use labor-intensive methods, but the requirement of foreign markets is modern goods made with modern methods. Graziani and his collaborators do not deplore the impact of foreign trade on Italy. Exports are a means of modernization. Just as, after World War II, Italy did not respond to its loss of capital and growth in population by holding back on wages and shifting its output to labor-intensive methods, preferring to adjust factor proportions to factor prices rather tham the reverse, so now Italy evades the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson basis for foreign trade, which would call for it to export labor-intensive goods, and adjusts factor proportions to trade rather than vice verss. The disequilibrium between factor proportions and the pattern of exports stimulates growth, along the lines suggested by Albert Hirechman.

There is much to the Graziani theory of dualism, although it neglects the close to 30 percent of exports formed by SITC classes 1, 3 and 4 (Food, drink and tobacco; textile materials and products; and clothing and shoes). The pattern of exports has been less a response to dualism and factor proportions than a stimulus. But there are surely limits to how far it can go, limits which are partly geographical, partly political. In geographical terms, the capital-intensive export areas have bean two: the Golden Triangle of Turin-Milan-Genoa and the new heavy industry installations in the South, notably chemicals and steel. The former have begun to reach limits of crowding and labor unrest; the letter provide only limited employment. Exports from Central and Northwestern Italy are either labor-intensive, as in the categories of textiles, clothing and shoes, or like the chemical and aluminum industry of Porto Marghera, threatened with displacement to less crowded areas with lower electricity rates. It is possible that expansion of exports could take place by extending the mechanical engineering

industry from the triangle to Emilia-Romagna, or to Naples and Palermo. The former would involve also some shrinkage of labor-intensive exports; the latter would require overcoming the existing handicaps to effective rooting of modern industry in the South. The push of exports has extended the modern sector of Italian industry at the expanse of the traditional, but there remains a grave question whether the process can be relied upon to go all the way.

The issue becomes especially critical when instead of a model which runs from increased exports to higher profits, more investment, expansion of employment and ultimately to higher wages, the economy reverses the process and begins with higher wages, profits squeeze, unemployment, then expanded exports to make up for the decline in domestic demand. To keep going in the latter model, one must have more investment, leading to greater productivity. In the first place there is the danger that capital markets are inadequate to finance the necessary investment on the necessary scale. In the second such investment as does take place may be highly labor-saving, rediviging the modern sector into more and less capital-intensive portions, rather than taking the traditional sector into the modern one. For an economy that must worry about employment of more than one million out of a work force of less than twenty million, it is not clear that the Graziani model can be pushed to its ultimate conclusion.

4. Economic Policy or Institutional and Social Factors

If a choice of economic policy is made between stabilizing effective demand or achieving structural reform, can the policy chosen in fact be carried out? Is the issue one of choosing optimal policies, or does it lie deeper in the institutional and social fabric of Italian society, with the consequence that brilliant as its performance has been to date, the Italian economy now confronts a major block to further advance in the unwillingness of various interest groups to give up acquired interests or to turn from collision courses with other groups. The issue can be summarized in the question whether Italy has the social cohesion to emerge from the present impasse. Its ramifications

can be illustrated with reference to tax reform, reform of the bureaucracy, and the respective positions of workers, petty bourgeois and bourgeoisie.

a) Tax reform

Tax reform has been on the agenda of Italy since 1919. The original taxes of 1863 and 1864 were levied on goods (including bread and salt), instead of on persons and personal income, and were highly regressive. A reform of 1919 moved in the direction of personal taxee, a movement continued in the Vanoni reform of 1950. The Raffaeli reform of October 1970, which does not take full effect until 1973, wes the result of a long study by the Cosciani commission, appointed in 1962, and took advantage of the EEC pressure on Italy to shift from a turnover tax to the tax on value added. The question is whether tax evasion is the result of the former undeveloped state of the Italian economy, with limited accounting, and the important fact that inflation forces income tax payers in a progressive system into very high rates from which thay inevitably seek to protect themselves; or whether evasion is more fundamentally a symptom of a lack of willingness of Italians to share. The issue is a critical one: if Italians are in general willing to pay their due share of taxes, but all have resorted to evasion because of the accident of unduly high rates, then tax reform and an appropriate setting of lower rates will work. If on the other hand, the difficulty is more deep-seated, the niceties of fiscal expertise will avail little and the system will go on with various groups in positions of strength - professionals, executives paid with "black cash", taxpayers who bribe tax inspectors, etc. - holding out.

The foreigners, the system of bargaining between company and the tax authorities is highly anomalous, and many an America, direct investor complains that his Italian competition pays less in tax than does a foreign owner. The difficulty is more the difference in approach to the Italian tax system than in discrimination by Italian authorities. Tax bargaining - not about rates but about what is and is not included in the definition of income or allowed by way of deduction - involves little in the way of inequity if all do it, and follow the same broad rules. But tax reform provides an opportunity for all to change the system to

one which is more readily understood in objective terms. And in particular it affords an opportunity to overcome the gross inequity between the ordinary employee who could not escape the personal income tax withholding, and higher executives (to the extent they were paid outside the system), but especially the liberal professions.

The values-added tax which replaces the turnover tax is likely to improve corporate reporting, and reduce sharply selling without invoices. To claim credit on taxes paid, a firm must have invoices on goods purchased. This will improve record keeping throughout the system. Moreover the liberal professions are subject to the tax on value added, as they were not to the turnover tax, which will improve record keeping in this notoriously evasive field. Much simplification takes place in personal taxation, with two taxes substituting for five. The critical question remains: with a more efficient and equitable system - and lower rates which make it possible to pay one's share without suffering - will the Italians continue the progress toward a civilized system of taxpaying, or will the evasion - and the necessity to charge exorbitant rates - continue?

b) Bureaucracy

At the time of unification, Italy needed a strong centralized bureaucracy to pull the various parts of the Kingdom together. Inspired by French models and led by the Piedmontese, this centripetal force was provided. But with rapid industrial growth in the North after 1900, Piedmont influence at Rome waned and the Southerners took over. It is as if in Germany, the Prussian domination of state offices had been voluntarily stopped and the dominant role assumed by Bavarians. In France, citizens from the Southwest always dominated the bureaucracy in numbers, but largely as police and postmen; the direction at the top was national and in the hands of the graduates of the grandes ecoles. Italy had no such tradition. The Southerners substituted juridical principles for practicality in the running of government, and used government, via the patron-client relationship, as a means of compensating through genteel employment for the absence of industrial opportunity in their region. The result was a highly

formal, overstaffed, power-hungry bureaucracy, which Mussolini used in the 1920s as a power base, and which De Gasperi bought off in 1946 rather than attack (26).

The nature of the necessary reforms has been touched upon in part above: the simplification of routines which would enable government to discharge its functions in providing infrastructure, such as schools, hospitals, housing, etc. and the yielding of powers to the regional authorities. At a more philosophical level, the philosophy of the bureaucracy must be altered to move from the Fascist theory that government was designed to protect property in a rural society and to uphold the authoritarian view of the state (27). At a more mundane level, the government offices should be slimmed down. More than one commentator has talked of the state offices as a South American Army, with masses of officers and few enlisted men (28). It may well prove expansive.Early retirement is thought of as the means, and the expression in Italian is "golden bridges", equivalent to the British usage of a "golden handshake" for the president of the company being pushed into oblivion (29).

The fundamental question, however, is whether it is possible. Islands of political power have great potential of resistance, as anyone who thinks of J. Edgar Hoover in the United States can recognize. While the Southern bureaucrats - "burosauri" as they have been referred to - are largely supported by the Christian Democrats, the other parties have their own servitor-dependents in the system (30). The appointment of Remo Gasperi to reform the bureaucracy in the Colombo and Andreotti governments may not be followed up in future: weak ministerial government solidifies the position of the bureaucracy. And there are arguments on their side: the need for a juridical approach in a country with a record of corruption, plus the need for centralized direction and leadership for areas which cannot by themselves develop (31).

What happens when a reform which in necessary proves impossible? One possibility is to create new mechanisms, like IRI, IMI, ENI and the like, to operate as a second or third bureaucracy and get things done. The case of IRI and the Autostrade, which ANAS could not undertake,

furnishes one illustration. IRI was ready, however, to c create a subsidiary to build schools, but this offer was declined. A source of practical efficiency, like the Bank of Italy, may find it necessary to release the well-trained talent it has acquired to other ministries, or some minister may find it possible to restore the Ministry of the Budget to the efficient organization it was before its doors were flung open to patronage. Informed opinion holds that such a flanking attack on the bureaucracy is unlikely, and except in highly special circumstances, impossible. It is difficult for an outsider to judge.

c) Social cohesion

Economists have no business discussing the capacity of a society to solve its problems through the exercise of political will, having its roots in social cohesion and purpose. Nonetheless, it is widely recognized by economists that this capacity in critical to effective economic policy, and that their profession gets little help from political science or sociology when it comes to its qualitative and quantitative analysis. In the case of Italy, in 1972, the crisis in economic life lends itself with particular force to the investigation of the question whether the major groups in Italian society are prepared to regard existing social and political arrangements as legitimate and worthy of support.

On one showing, the problem is the inadequate experience Italy has had with democracy, and the real enemy of reform is not corruption but scepticism. Universal suffrage was introduced only in 1911, and lasted only briefly until World War I, when it was quickly followed by Fascism. The Italian people have never had the experience of effective democracy, and are deeply suspicious of any attempt at reform. On another view, Italians have had to fight so strongly for survival that they developed "amoral familism", an incapacity to cooperate for civic purposes because of the inability to make sacrifices from a thin margin above subsistance(34). Few if any sociologists subscribe to the Banfield thesis, nor find much to explain why a South Italian village differs from a Kansas town with its cooperative institutions. It is still possible, however, to recognise

that broad social groups can become so concerned about their own interests, and in some cases, about the historical record of injustice to its concerns, that they find it difficult to cooperate in the general interest.

Take first the Italian workers. Suspicious of government, political parties, business management, and even their union leaders, they are a fairly easy prey to Fascist revolutionary tactics. The legitimate grievances of labor vis-à-vis all four groups listed, and especially with regard to the 1960 speed-up, and its success in raising wages in 1963-64 and in the "hot autumn" of 1969 have made the unions less concerned for the body politic. Short-run maximizing tactics are adopted, despite an awareness of possible dire long-run consequences; The concern for the quality of work, at whatever cost to productivity and the return to other factors of production, threatens the success of the Italian miracle. And even the old-line union leadership-trying without great success to unify across political lines, and fearful of the siren songs sung by the tiny group of extra-Parliamentary Maoists - has given up trying to understand how an Italy poorer than the rest of Europe in capital, natural resources and productivity can have real wages per capite equal to the European level.

One important vector of the problem in the deep gulf in feeling between the Turinese and the Southern immigrant workers. Turin, unlike Milan, has always been a closed and exclusive society. The Southern workers, short and dark, are looked down upon in terms which are close to racial. Taking advantage of the discrimination against them in inputs, the Communist Party has had an easy time in organizing support among the disaffected Southern workers of Turin. It is ironic that the Calabrian or Sicilian worker in Germany is far happier than his compatriot in Turin. The reason, of course, is that the Southern worker in Germany compares his position not with those about him but with those he left behind in his village; the Southerner in Turin after a few months is acutely conscious that he is less well off than the North Italians with whom he works.

The petty bourgeoise, including the lower ranks of the bureaucracy, are beginning to hanker for a return of Fascism, perhaps not along the lines of Mussolini's corporate state, but at least on the model of the Greek colonels: law, order, a place for everything and everything in its place. The petty bourgeoisie seek to resist change even when it adds to total out-put, shen their small stores, small workshops, and comfortable government bureaus are threatened with fundamental adjustment. There can be no doubt that economic growth is upsetting. The point was made years ago by Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation (33) and recently by Edward Thompson in The Condition of the British Working Classes (34) that industrial change is disturbing to social organization, although both authors romanticize the stability of the past in agriculture and guild organization of handicrafts. In political terms, the nearest parallel to the nostalgia for the past, but less serious, is the Poujade movement in France.

Finally there is the entrepreneurial class in Italy, on strike in its turn, as the labor unions play with one and two-hour and one and two-day strikes, taking its capital out of the country, moving business operations abroad, and holding back on investment, or investing when it does so, only in the most labor-saving fashion for fear of strengthening the unions. In simple-minded Marxian terms, the bourgeois elite run the government. Nothing could be farther from the fact in Italy, as the Communist Party, increasingly Fabian and cooperative, appears instinctively to recognize. Society to function needs legitimacy, which requires leadership. This the Italian business classes have almost altogether abdicated from providing. The difficulty is not that the Italian capitalist class is working its will in Italian Society; it is rather that it has no will.

It is thus impossible to separate the outlook for the Italian economy from the question of politics, not politics in the marrow sense of the formation of cabinets, elections and parties, but at a more fundamental level. Are the unhappiness of the South, many workers, bureaucrats, petty bourgeoisie, and the lack of a sense of purpose of Northern business so great that the system will be prey to a Putsch?

From which direction would it come if it came, the right or left? And if it came, which group would end up on top? One even hears the suggestion that the extreme right is financing the extreme left, cynical in ideology, and confident that if the Maoists bring down the system, they will inherit the pieces.

5. Conclusion

The outside economic analyst is forced to conclude that the problems in Italy are social and political, more than they are economic. Effective macro-economic policies which started attacking domestic unemployment would help, but more exports, to finance further capital investments abroad, or tax reducitons which financed domestic consumer spending, would both be less useful than a successful reform of the bureaucracy which made it possible to go forward with public works. Whether such bureaucratic reform is possible, as it is necessary, is beyond the capacity of this observer to judge.

Social trust takes time to build. A successful outcome of the tax reform and progress in bureaucratic reform, plus public spending for schools, hospitals, housing and regional works such as transport, would dilute but not necessarily overcome the heritage of years of suspicion. Meanwhile the pragmatic efforts of the Italian parastatal agencies - ENI, IMI, IRI and their offspring - are needed to prevent widespread bankruptcy of medium-size business, along with provision of continued investment in labor-using industry in the South, modified social purposes and modified profits. These agencies, moreover, are beginning to become a training ground for cadres that go into business, as Eugenio Cefis left ENI for Montecatini-Edison. One would need to know the situation more closely to decide whether there is a chance that their pragmatism would one day infuse governmental agencies more widely.

The fear of the bourgeois, that the system is threatened from the extra-Parliamentary left, is more an excuse for inaction and lack of leadership than a realistic weighing of the most probable outcome. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that in a world of positive feedback, the

extra-parliamentary left with the unwilling toleration of the Communists and the trade unions, and possibly the active instigation of the neo-Fascists, can let loose a chain of developments which they cannot control.

Any forecaster is leery of predicting drastic changes, and the most sensible forecast is always that tomorrow will be more like today and yesterday than it will be different. One can recognize that Italy is in economic crisis, and facing an economic crossroads, without being obliged to conclude that a turning is inevitable. Accordingly we conclude that progress will be made on many fronts: tax reform, bureaucratic reform, social cohesion, including the tapering off of the capitalist strike, but without suggesting that Italy will be out of the woods in the 1970s.

1) Organization for Economic Development and Development, Growth of Output, 1960 to 1980, Paris, OECD, 1971,p.33.

2) See my Europe's Postwar Growth: The Role of Labor Supply, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967, esp. pp. 36-41.

3) See for example, G. Vaciago, "Alternative Theories of Growth and the Italian Case" Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, June 1970, no. 93, pp. 180-211.

4) See "Lohnende Landwirtschaft in der Lombardei: Vom bitteren Reis zum einträglichen Reis; Mit rationallen Methoden und gut organisierten Genos-senachaften kommen Norditaliens Bauern zum Erfolg" Suddeutsche Zeitung, N.5, 313, December 31, 1971, p. 8.

5) See, L'Espresso, February 6, 1972: "Olivetti: aumentano i robot e diminuisce il personale".

6) See, L'Espresso, January 26, 1972: "Innocenti: solo l'India farà la Lambretta".

7) See, Bent Hansen, assisted by Wayne W.Snyder, Fiscal Policy in Seven Countries, 1955-1965, Paris, OECD, March 1969, p. 306. One ironic informant stated that the large regional floods of 1966 induced the government to raise taxes, well in advance of the expenditure for reconstruction, as if to appease the gods.

8) See Patrick M. Boarman, Germany's Economic Dilemma, Inflation and the Balance of Payments, New Haven:Yale University Press, 1964, p. 256. Schaeffer's surplus was referred to as the Juliusturm, after the Julius tower in Spandau where part of the French gold indemnity payments of 1871 was stored away.

9) Hansen, op. cit., pp. 316-17.

10) See, e.g., Helmut Böhme, Prolegomena zu einer Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands in 19. und 20. Jarhhundert, Frankfurt-an-Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968, Chapter 3, pp. 41 ff.

11) Corriere della Sera, January 26, 1972, p.3 "Nostra intervista col Ministro Mariotti: perché la legge sanitaria segna il passo".

12) See Corriere della Sera, February 5, 1972, p.7 "Il passaggio dei poteri dallo Stato alle Regioni: la falsa resa dei 'burosauri'", an interview with Piero Bassetti, president of the Lombardy region.

13) See Francesco Forte, La strategia delle riforme, Milano, Etas-Kompass, 1968, p. 129.

14) See S.K.Holland, "Regional Under-development in a Developed Economy: The Italian Case" in Regional Studies, vol. 5 (1971), pp. 71-90. The government has in fact imposed a fine of 1,000,000 lire ($1,667.00) per employee on additional investment outside the South, but Augusto Graziani indicates that this is far too small a penalty for projects where the capital labor ratio is likely to run 15 to 20 million lire ($25,000 to $33,333) an employee.

15) Giorgio Fuà, "Breve consuntivo dal primo programma quinquennale", Mondo Economico 50, Anno XXVI, 18 dicembre 1971, pp. 19-25. The rate of fulfillment in the public sector was 35 percent in the field of public transport, and 34 percent in school construction (see Corriere della Sera, February 22, 1972, "Il 'Crack' dei trasporti pubblici").

16) See Corriere della Sera, February 5, 1972, p.5 "I "piani" senza soldi in tasca", a review of a book, Finanza pubblica e programmazione.

17) Joseph La Palombara, Italy: The Politics of Planning, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1966.

18) See for example, M.V. Posner and S.L.Woolf, Italian Public Enterprise, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1967, which refers, e.g., p. 131, to IRI's "masochistic evocation of the beauties of a private market economy".

19) Ibid, p. 23.

20) See, for example, the essay by H.G.Johnson in C.P. Kindleberger, ed., The International Corporation, Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1971.

21) See, e.g., Robert M. Stern, Foraign Trade and Economic Growth in Italy, New York, Frederick A. Prager, 1967.

22) Luigi Frey, applying to Italy the model developed by Steffan Burenstam Linder in An Essay in Trade and Transformation, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1961, makes the point that Italy proved in the domestic market the products it later sold abroad. See "Espansione della domanda interna e espansione delle esportazioni, con particolare riguardo ad aspetti della realtà industriale italiana", a memorandum written for the Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1972.

23) See C.P.Kindleberger, "Foreign Trade and Economic Growth. Lessons from Britain and France, 1850-1913", Economic History Review, vol. XIV, No. 2 (December 1961), pp. 285-305.

24) M.Panié and A.H.Ragan, Product Changes in Industrial Countries' Trade: 1955-1968, London, National Economic Development Office, NEDO Monographs No.2, April 1971, p. 54.

25) Naples, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1969.

26) Istituto per la Scienza dell'Amministrazione Pubblica, Dipartimento di Sociologia, La Burocrazia Centrale in Italia, Analisi Sociologica, Milano, Giuffré, 1965, esp. Chapter 1.

27) See "Reform and Red Tape", The Economist, March 18, 1957, "Italy Catches Up", a survey, pp. XXXIX-XLII.

28) See L'Espresso, January 30, 1972, "La strage dei burocrati", and Forte, op. cit., p. 147.

29) L'Espresso, loc. cit., and Forte, loc. cit., p. 150.

30) In interviews, one informant referred to the ministers as dinosaurs and paleolithic,and another to "Paleo-socialists".

31) Note that in New England, one is for decentralization from Washington, but that when it comes to social questions involving discrimination against blacks, decentralization of responsibility to Mississippi is less attractive.

32) Edward C. Banfield, Moral Basis of a Backward Society, Glencoe, Ill., University of Chicago, 1958.

33) Philadelphia, Blakiston, 1934.

34) Vintage Books, New York, 1963.

ARRIGO LEVI

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Il fine diplomatico, dal nome bellicoso, e dal cognome pacifico, al quale Stanley Hoffman ha affidato la difesa della politica estera dell'Italia, hasvolto il suo compito più che adeguatamente: soprattutto perché ha puntato tutto su una carta, quella della coerenza, o se vogliamo della semplicità, delle due scelte fondamentali della politica estera italiana: la scelta atlantica, la scelta europea.

Al di fuori di queste due scelte, la politica estera della Italia è stata forse debole, o inesistente, o velleitaria; allo interno di esse, è stata poco attenta, o incapace di trarre dalle scelte medesime tutti i vantaggi che forse erano auspicabili e possibili. Tutto questo può essere vero, anzi è senz'altro vero: ma non ha meno ragione, a mio parere, l'Annibale Irieni diplomatico quando rivendica l'importanza, non soltanto per l'Italia ma per l'Europa, delle nostre "scelte fondamentali".

Basta pensare a ciò che sarebbe accaduto se almeno a quelle scelte l'Italia non fosse rimasta fedele; o se, per esempio, non avesse perseguito con tenacia l'obiettivo dell'allargamento della Comunità Europea alla Gran Bretagna. Immaginiamoci una Cee ridotta, per lunghi anni, a un difficile dialogo franco-tedesco. E chiediamoci se l'adesione inglese sarebbe stata possibile se, nei lunghi anni dei veti francesi, con la Germania sempre esposta al ricatto "strategico" gollista, la difesa dell'"idea" dell'Inghilterra nel Mec fosse rimasta affidata a Belgio e Olanda.

Dunque, le scelte di fondo furono giuste è importanti. E tuttavia, proprio di questi tempi l'Italia è più che mai sotto accusa, per una certa svogliatezza della sua politica europea, o addirittura per essersi, non si sa se per caso o per disegno, messa ai margini della Comunità. Chi la definisce'Paese associato", o compagno di viaggio; chi si domanda se non siano venute meno le

necessarie pre-condizioni economiche per la nostra appartenenza alla Cee, se non sia cioè scomparsa, o non stia scomparendo, la nostra "competitività" nei confronti dei soci-rivali; chi appresta documenti per dimostrare come l'impegno europeo dell'Italia (dal numero - zero - delle sedute di consiglio dei ministri dedicate esclusivamente ai problemi europei, al modo con cui si assunse e non si mantenne l'impegno di adozione dell'IVA, e con cui non si preparò, al momento opportuno, la sua entrata in vigore, all'incapacità di apprestare gli strumenti amministrativi interni che avrebbero dovuto permetterci di approfittare della politica agricola comunitaria e di ridurne il costo, altrimenti pesantissimo), sia sempre stato superficiale e colpevolmente inadeguato.

Questo recente dibattito (dell'inverno 1973) suggerisce alcune riflessioni, di carattere forse più generale.

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La prima osservazione riguarda lo scompenso quasi sempre esistente fra le "scelte fondamentali", giuste, e gli atti concreti politici e amministrativi che avrebbero dovuto tradurre in pratica quelle scelte, o seguirne gli sviluppi fino a trarne i necessari frutti.

E' luogo comune dire che, nell'amministrazione dello Stato italiano, il Ministero degli Esteri è ancora un esempio di efficienza, che il livello di preparazione dei funzionari è mediamente più elevato che in qualsiasi altro ministero, tanto da saper produrre un numero non trascurabile di uomini di elevata capacità, tale da rafforzare la presenza dell'Italia negli stessi ambienti internazionali. Basta citare i casi di Brosio segretario generale della Nato, o ricordare le carriere e il prestigio di uomini come Cattani o Colonna o Quaroni o Ducci. Tuttavia non sarebbe

difficile dimostrare che il ministero degli esteri italiano (come del resto quelli di molti altri Paesi) ha una capacità limitata di preparare quadri specializzati, laddove il complesso mondo d'oggi richiede invece, accanto ai grandi "generici", appunto le squadre di funzionari specializzati.

Come il giornalismo italiano ha alcuni articolisti, ma anch'essi, appunto, "generici", ed è invece privo di "specialisti" (quali hanno i grandi giornali o le grandi riviste politiche inglesi, francesi, tedesche o americane), così anche la diplomazia italiana, non priva di uomini di alto intelletto e specchiato impegno professionale e ideale, è povera nei "quadri".

Sorge a questo punto il dubbio (giacché stiamo pur parlando del migliore dei nostri ministeri, il più ricco di tradizione: il livello, ahimé, scade subito se dagli Esteri, o dal livello "Banca d'Italia-Tesoro" si scende ai ministeri settoriali, esecutivi), che la debolezza della politica estera italiana sia soltanto il risultato di una certa assenza di profondità, di spessore, nell'intero tessuto culturale della vita italiana.

In questo giudizio sono coinvolti il mondo della politica, la burocrazia, la cultura propriamente detta, ossia le università e gli istituti di ricerca culturale. Ricordo una volta (saranno passati dieci anni, ma certo le cose non sono molto cambiate) di avere appreso che all'università di Bari, già allora folta di trentamila studenti, vi erano state, nel corso di un intero anno accademico, in tutto due, dico due, conferenze "extracurricolari"; né vi erano "debating societies", gruppi o circoli culturali, e direi nemmeno associazioni sportive. So anche di avere, da allora, cercato più d'una volta, attraverso i pochi istituti di ricerca italiani che si dedicano alla politica estera, di stabilire un contatto fra essi e le facoltà di scienze politiche, povere di mezzi, di uomini, di corsi aggiornati su Paesi e conti

nenti vicini e lontani: furono tutti tentativi falliti, e non certo perché non vi fosse chi aderiva a questi suggerimenti e riconosceva questi bisogni, ma proprio per la difficoltà di spremere le necessarie iniziative da un mondo culturale troppo piccolo, troppo impegnato (fino all'esaurimento nervoso per i più attivi, chiamati ovunque da cento diverse imprese), troppo povero, peraltro, di mezzi finanziari, lesinati, ai centri di attività culturale, da uno Stato in altri campi assai dispendioso.

Ricordo un lungo viaggio, al seguito di un presidente della repubblica e di un ministro degli esteri, che erano due fra gli uomini migliori, di più larghe visioni, della nostra storia contemporanea, in un continente a noi vicino per legami d'immigrazione e quindi di sangue e di cultura, anche se lontano nello spazio. Durante quel viaggio fu annunciata con gran pompa la costituzione in Roma di un istituto che avrebbe legato l'Italia a quel continente, o semicontinente, e che sarebbe stato un "unicum", ponendoci in una posizione di singolare privilegio, anche nei confronti dei nostri soci comunitari, per tutto quanto riguardava i rapporti fra Europa e il continente in questione.

Passò non molto tempo, e l'istituto venne inaugurato in fastosissima sede, ricco di mezzi, di personale, di libri, e ahimé anche di dirigenti, giacché il numero degli ambasciatori corresponsabili della direzione dell'ente era tale da render quasi impossibile ogni rapida decisione. Gli inizi erano comunque promettenti; poi cambiò ministro degli esteri, l'istituto continuò a cercare una sua funzione precisa, senza mai trovarla, e rimase una specie di elefante bianco, un monumento alla grandiosità di visioni, e all'assoluta inadeguatezza nella "tenuta di giuoco" nell'esecuzione amministrativa, della politica estera i

taliana.

Anche in quel caso, ogni tentativo di stabilire fecondi e ricchi rapporti fra Istituto e mondo universitario, fra Istituto e mondo economico, anche se intrapreso da alcuni volonterosi, produsse risultati scarsi o nulli.

Purtroppo, in questo caso, come in altri, la conclusione a cui si doveva giungere é che lo "spessore" della vita culturale italiana era sottile, inadeguato a reggere solide strutture "amministrative" e di organizzazione culturale: incapace anche -per fare un discorso più pratico, ma di fondamentale importanza- di garantire "una carriera", un avvenire, se non precario, a quei giovani che volessero appunto dedicarsi agli studi specializzati sui problemi di politica internazionale.

Al tempo stesso (e qui si chiama in causa l'intero sistema universitario italiano, il tipo di preparazione che esso dà ai giovani), troppo volte è capitato di constatare, in convegni internazionali, o in confronti facili a farsi in quelle organizzazioni internazionali dove si incontrano giovani funzionari di varie nazionalità, l'inadeguatezza e il provincialismo di non pochi fra gli Italiani. E non è chi non sappia che la nostra rappresentanza alla Comunità Economica Europea, a livello funzionari, è sempre stata debole, pur con le ben note lodevolissime eccezioni.

Chi facesse una paziente raccolta di esempi di inadeguata presenza italiana, in convegni (dove, chissà perché, i delegati italiani, all'ultimo momento, sono sempre assenti, e fra i presenti c'è sempre qualcuno che, per insufficienza di conoscenza di lingue, o per limitatezza di cultura, fa figura di provinciale e d'inetto), in organismi internazionali, in congressi o incontri o simposi di qualsiasi genere, si troverebbe alla fine

con una casistica interminabile e rattristante; nella quale anche i nostri politici apparirebbero sovente modesti, o meschini, o parolai, o assenti.

Chi non ha presenti quei convegni nei quali la delegazione italiana, nell'elenco ufficiale dei partecipanti, è più che decorosa, ma dove, in pratica, l'onorevole Tizio compare per quella mezz'ora necessaria al suo intervento, e poi scompare, il senatore Caio comunica all'ultimo istante che un'importante votazione gli impedisce l'auspicata partecipazione, e il ministro Sempronio dimentica perfino d'inviare un telegramma per spiegare che un'inaugurazione in Calabria l'ha trattenuto dall'essere presente?

Questa regola dell'"assenza" italiana è culminata in alcuni casi clamorosi, in cariche, pur importantissim , della Comunità Europea. Abbiamo avuto alcuni grandi commissari, ma quando la "grande Commissione" della Comunità a nove s'è costituita, l'Italia ha occupato i suoi due posti con un degnissimo ma poco noto deputato di provincia, privo, certamente per suo merito, di autentico peso politico nei consigli del suo partito, la democrazia cristiana; e con un amatissimo e autorevolissimo idealista, che anch'egli, tuttavia, poco pesava nella dura realtà del mondo politico romano. Il fatto da notare era per l'appunto il modo distratto e disattento con il quale il potere politico italiano, i partiti dominanti, avevano mancato l'occasione di far rappresentare l'Italia a Bruxelles da personalità politiche di primissimo piano, come avevano fatto gli altri Paesi.

Del resto, il ritiro, pochi mesi prima, del presidente italiano della Commissione, per l'anticipo delle elezioni parlamentari italiane, aveva già dato occasione di notare -a chi scrive- come l'urgenza e il premere delle preoccupazioni interne facesse trascurare quel fronte remoto -e pur anch'esso di prima linea, e a parer mio vitale- che era il fronte europeo: tanto da indurre un politico giovane e sensibile, un uomo intelligente e un Eu-

ropeo attento come l'onorevole Malfatti, a sentire che "il suo posto" era, in quel momento di crisi, nella provincia elettorale italiana e non a Bruxelles.

Guardando alla politica estera italiana, si deve beninteso osservare che la nostra presenza (economica, in particolare) è largamente superiore a ciò che le "strutture" e le istituzioni potrebbero farci mai sperare. Supplisce una certa istintiva capacità d'iniziativa, una spontanea vitalità della società italiana, che consente un "rayonnement" assai superiore a quello che emerge da iniziative e da enti ufficiali: questi sono anzi spesso timidi protettori degli imprenditori in difficoltà, solo che siano in giuoco problemi politici, facilmente si spauriscono di fronte alle minacce d'un ambasciatore autorevole, e cercano sempre d'evitare "la grana", secondo il costume burocratico.

Per il passato, dunque, l'improvvisazione ha spesso compensato l'assenza di organizzazione, l'iniziativa privata ha sostituito la presenza ufficiale: in avvenire, è ragionevole chiedersi se questo "miracolo" possa continuare; può darsi invece che, nei tempi lunghi, la debolezza della "società organizzata" finisca per farsi sentire, e che noi finalmente scontiamo pesantemente i peccati d'imprevidenza, d'impreparazione, di cui siamo largamente colpevoli.

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Ritorniamo al punto di partenza, al discorso sull'estraneazione dell'Italia dalla Comunità Europea. Qui vorrei seguire un filo di ragionamento, uno schema d'interpretazione, del tutto diversi, e porre anzi una "problematica" più larga, che non riguarda soltanto l'Italia. Giacché, al di là dei fatti "sovrastrutturali" di cui ho finora discorso, questa crisi del rapporto Italia-Cee riguarda le strutture produttive, la competitività, la capacità dell'Italia, vaso di coccio, di navigare indenne fra tanti vasi di ferro: un problema vecchio, che aveva sover

chiato come un incubo la decisione iniziale di entrare nella Cee (contrastata, si ricorderà, da tutte le "forze economiche"), e che poi sembrava misteriosamente svanita, come nebbia al sole del mattino, per l'eccezionale bravura dei nostri imprenditori, o per l'eccezionale modestia dei salari dei nostri lavoratori.

La crisi è riaffiorata in concomitanza con la fine del "miracolo italiano", ossia con l'inizio di un travaglio che, -oggi dev'essere chiaro anche ai ciechi- non è cosa passeggera o "congiunturale", ma una vera e profonda trasformazione strutturale della società e dell'economia italiana: una straordinaria rivoluzione, forse addirittura un cambiamento di "modello", fatti spontaneamente, come prima, altrettanto spontaneamente, era stato compiuto il "decollo" industriale italiano, emergenti quindi da una tormentata dialettica delle forze sociali, restando le "sovrastrutture" politiche quasi assenti o inerti di fronte a tanti mutamenti.

Il processo è incompiuto, e noi non sappiamo come si concluderà: ora soffriamo le pene di un parto, può darsi che domani godremo nel veder nascere una società forse più giusta, o meno angosciata di quella della crescita miracolosa. Ma lasciamo per un momento da parte questa problematica italiana, e poniamoci il problema generale: ed esso è, come possa conciliarsi con la continuazione del processo di costruzione dell'unità europea l'autonoma evoluzione nazionale, spesso su linee divergenti, o su linee parallele ma a velocità assolutamente diverse, delle società che compongono l'emergente Comunità Europea.

Questo problema si è presentato con particolare evidenza (dimenticando per un momento l'Italia), nel corso della lunga e incerta campagna elettorale francese del febbraio-marzo 1973, conclusasi, come si sa, con la sconfitta di misura, e quindi, con la vittoria mancata di poco, della "gauche unie". Il proble

ma poteva essere posto così: fino a che punto l'adozione, da parte d'uno dei grandi Paesi europei, d'una politica economica socialista, o di "democrazia economica avanzata", sarebbe stata compatibile con l'unificazione economica europea?

Perdendo la "gauche", il problema rimane, per ora, teorico: a meno che non si voglia accettare la mia tesi che il problema è già in atto nel caso dell'Italia: che noi, cioè, forse senza volerlo o senza accorgercene, abbiamo già attuato o stiamo già attuando una rivoluzione ampia quanto quella meditata dalla "gauche" francese; che il "programma comune" (mutatis mutandis) è da noi già realtà o lo sta diventando, e che le conseguenze sul rapporto fra un Paese "rivoluzionato" e la Comunità sono esattamente quelle che vediamo fra Italia e Cee.

L'esempio italiano certo prefigura in qualche modo il problema che, in Francia, veniva posto in sede teorica, e che subito dopo le elezioni è stato enunciato con particolare chiarezza da uno fra i più colti intellettuali francesi di sinistra, Gilles Martinet, in un saggio pubblicato da "Nouvel Observateur".

L'obiettivo di questo saggio era di dimostrare che la sinistra si era presentata alle elezioni con un programma pieno di contraddizioni pericolose, se mai si fosse dovuto applicarlo. La sinistra, in particolare, non spiegava come avrebbe potuto realizzare la transizione da un "modello" a un altro "senza disordine grave, senza una crisi economica di primaria importanza, che, prolungandosi, impedirebbe ogni transizione di carattere democratico"; la sinistra non spiegava come portare avanti l'espansione economica e insieme sottrarre alle imprese i loro profitti; come promettere aumenti di produttività, e insieme sottoporre le imprese ai controlli dei lavoratori, i quali avrebbero rifiutato "tutto ciò che fosse suscettibile di provocare nuove tensioni e

nuove fatiche" (si noti che tutto ciò può applicarsi quasi a pennello all'evolversi di fatto dell'economia italiana, a partire dal 1969: Martinet parla della Francia che sarebbe potuta essere, dell'Italia che è stata ed è).

Infine, Martinet veniva al rapporto fra una Francia così rivoluzionaria e la Cee, dicendo: "Una Francia in evoluzione verso il socialismo non può spezzare i legami che si sono tessuti allo interno della Comunità europea. Ma se questa Comunità rimane interamente sottoposta alle leggi del mercato, allora è certo che questa evoluzione verso il socialismo sarà, presto o tardi, compromessa."

Come risolvere questa potenziale serissima contraddizione? Rispondeva Martinet: "Si offrono diversi indirizzi di ricerca. Il primo riguarda il controllo dei movimenti di capitali, il secondo concerne l'eventuale 'europeizzazione' di certe società multinazionali, il terzo la realizzazione di progetti industriali comuni, il quarto l'istituzione di un embrione di pianificazione su scala continentale, il quinto la fissazione di grandi obiettivi sociali, da realizzarsi nei prossimi dieci anni nello insieme della Comunità (in primo luogo, la riduzione generalizzata della durata del lavoro e la liquidazione progressiva del lavoro alla catena), il sesto le condizioni di elezione al suffragio universale di un'assemblea europea".

Questo enunciato, anche sintetico, è pregevole, perché rappresenta un primo sforzo di far fronte a un problema, anzi a una contraddizione che è nella natura delle cose, e che io definirei così. Anzitutto, è vantaggio generale che il processo d'unificazione europea consenta una gamma di sperimentazioni nazionali la più larga possibile. Non si può desiderare nulla di diverso, perché proprio nel pluralismo sta la forza storica della democrazia: è necessario ch'essa porti avanti quella che taluno ha definito

"la rivoluzione borghese permanente".

Essendo, ancora oggi, gli Stati nazionali realtà concrete, con ritmi di sviluppo diversi, anche la creazione d'istituzioni europee non deve frenare la molteplicità degli esperimenti nazionali, necessari per migliorare i modelli di società industriale oggi esistenti: nessuno può auspicare che organismi sovrannazionali impongano alle varie società europee, e alle forze politiche che in esse si esprimono, un'assoluta uniformità.

Al tempo stesso (ecco la contraddizione) non ci si può assolutamente augurare che "sperimentazioni" di modelli nazionali divergenti portino a una rottura dei crescenti legami inter-europei. I motivi economici sono evidenti: nessun Paese potrebbe ormai uscire dalla Comunità Europea senza rischiare seriamente di cadere in una sorta di medioevo economico; esiste già oggi un "imperativo commerciale" (come dice uno degli economisti socialisti francesi autori del "programma comune" della sinistra, Chevenement) che non può essere ignorato. Ma anche i motivi politici dell'europeismo sono ancora fortissimi e determinanti: l'unificazione è condizione del mantenimento delle libertà in ciascun Paese, e della pace nel Continente. Perfino la sperimentazione di sinistra più ardita, quale l'auspicano i partiti comunisti della "regione latina", è pensabile soltanto nel quadro di un'Europa occidentale sicura e protetta dagli imperiosi insegnamenti che, mancando quest'unità, verrebbero ahimé da Oriente.

Dunque, la contraddizione, ripeto, è nei fatti. Martinet, in sostanza, propone di risolverla, o per lo meno di attenuarla, anticipando, a livello comunitario, alcune di quelle radicali "riforme" che la sinistra vorrebbe sperimentare in sede nazionale. Questa proposta non contrasta con gli stessi obiettivi ufficiali dell'unificazione europea in questo decennio, quali essi sono stati enunciati all'ultimo vertice di Parigi: tutt'al più com

pleta quel programma e lo arricchisce, definendo certi obiettivi sociali che erano in esso soltanto impliciti, o enunciati in modo generico.

Un po' cinicamente, si è tentati di dire che la caduta nei tassi di espansione o nelle potenzialità produttive, che accompagnerebbe una riforma-rivoluzione, qual'era contemplata nel programma della sinistra unita e quale è in corso d'attuazione in Italia, diventa meno penosa, o più facilmente sopportabile, se si generalizza a tutti partners comunitari. Non potendo esportare in Germania l'inquietudine scioperistica, o la volontà rivoluzionaria, dei nostri sindacati, esportiamovi ufficialmente, tramite la Cee, quegli elementi di riforma che oggi, attuati da noi soltanto (in quello che è, per di più, il più debole dei soci), rischiano di farci uscire dall'orbita comunitaria per cadere, chissà, in quella africana, o in quella euro-orientale.

Ovvero, più pietosamente, si può porre la questione in questi termini: visto che le nostre strutture amministrative non sono capaci di guidare in modo costruttivo la volontà di rinnovamento propria della società italiana (e in sé più che comprensibile), cerchiamo di ottenere o di farci imporre dalle strutture amministrative comunitarie, quelle direttive e quelle riforme che noi da soli non possiamo darci: sicché noi oggi abbiamo tutti gli svantaggi, e pochissimi fra i vantaggi, della rivoluzione che stiamo subendo.

Ci dica la Comunità con quale ritmo si può ridurre l'orario di lavoro; quali servizi sociali dobbiamo istituire e come organizzarli; quali debbono essere i limiti di "socializzazione" dell'uso dei capitali; come fare programmi economici nazionali che siano rispettati, e magari anche quali siano i tassi di crescita dei salari compatibili con la profonda trasformazione strutturale

occorrente per far nascere la seconda, e migliore, società industriale.

Mantenga anche in vita, la Comunità (di questa esigenza Martinet non mi sembra abbastanza conscio) quel tanto di mercato competitivo che occorre per impedire un crollo, altrimenti troppo precipitoso, dell'efficienza produttiva generale. Non dimentichiamo che il "piano" senza il "mercato" diventa uno strumento di deterioramento dell'economia; quanto più piano, tanto più mercato (rovescio così una sentenza che mi diceva un giorno un grande, vecchio economista leningradese, Novozhilov, negli anni in cui sembrava che le economie dell'Est stessero abbandonando la pianificazione rigida, di comando, per passare al "mercato socialista": ben venga il mercato, egli affermava, ma quanto più mercato avremo, tanto più avremo bisogno di un piano forte, efficiente, organizzato). Del resto -è una curiosità che merita di essere ricordata- non a caso all'origine del primo piano "occidentale" (il "plan" francese), come del primo piano di dimensioni sovrannazionali (la Ceca), come dell'idea del mercato europeo, necessario a ristabilire elementi di concorrenza nella vita economica, è sempre lo stesso uomo, quella gran mente che ha nome Jean Monnet.

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In questo nostro rivolgerci costantemente alla Comunità come punto d'appoggio e di riferimento, che ci stimoli a far meglio, è beninteso la coscienza di tutto ciò che avevo detto prima, di quella certa "assenza di spessore", che è propria anche della nostra nuova economia industriale, nata da un'esplosione, più che da una costruzione lenta e graduale, in una società che non aveva avuto tempo di completare certe "accumulazioni sociali" (basta pensare alle grandi ferrovie metropolitane sotterranee costruite a Parigi e Londra sei o sette decenni fa), o di attenuare certi squilibri

interni, come altre società di industrializzazione "primaria" erano riuscite a fare.

Noi siamo sempre un po' speciali. Siamo gli ultimi dei primi, e i primi degli ultimi. Siamo un centauro (che quando è malato, non si sa se chiamare il medico o il veterinario), con la testa in Europa e i piedi nel sottosviluppo mediterraneo. Da questa straordinaria situazione emergono anche, con particolare forza, certe istanze rivoluzionarie che sono peraltro presenti anche in Paesi più "stabili", più immobili, più tranquilli. In questo senso, noi siamo forse, contemporaneamente, più indietro e più avanti dei nostri partners europei; e la crisi così disagevole che stiamo attraversando risulterà forse, alla fine, più ricca di aspetti positivi di quanto oggi non ci sembri.

Certo la crisi sarà meno pericolosa se rimarremo europei. E qui ritorna il motivo di fondo della nostra politica estera europea, perfino la ragione di certi cedimenti, di certa incapacità di farci dare dai nostri soci talune cose, come una seria politica regionale, che era giusto ci dessero: alla fin fine, l'essenziale era sempre rimanere dentro, impedire che la Cee si sfasciasse, perché con essa ci saremmo sfasciati anche noi. Così camminavamo certe volte in punta di piedi, per paura di provocare disastri.

Oggi però ci accorgiamo che, così facendo, si erano sopravvalutate le nostre potenzialità economiche. Per aver chiesto troppo poco all'inizio, ora ci troviamo a fare i bizzosi, a voltare le spalle, a tirarci indietro dalle iniziative comuni dicendo: non siamo pronti, non siamo all'altezza.

Così, è forse giunto il momento di porre il "problema italiano" in tutta la sua serietà, in tutta la sua complessità, e non un

pezzo alla volta, chiedendo ora una deroga, domani un'eccezione, e posdomani mancando a una promessa. Occorre oggi, alla politica estera italiana, nel quadro della sua scelta fondamentale, quella europea, una visione d'insieme del problema italiano. Non so se essa l'abbia, temo anzi che non l'abbia e che continuino a esserci diversi settori incomunicanti di politica europea italiana, senza che vi sia chi è capace di vedere insieme tutto il quadro e di imporre la discussione generale di tutti i nostri problemi.

Ma siamo così daccapo al 'provincialismo' dei nostri politici, all'impreparazione dei nostri burocrati, all'insufficienza almeno quantitativa, talvolta qualitativa, dei nostri uomini di cultura; anche ciò che vi è di più moderno in Italia, le nostre grandi imprese, hanno, del resto, molto spesso, visioni parziali e settoriali, faticano a produrre esse stesse, come accade altrove, "sovrastrutture" culturali adeguate, o quando lo tentano riescono spesso soltanto a metà nelle loro iniziative.

I difetti e le mancanze della nostra politica estera finiscono sempre per apparire, non tanto come il frutto di grandi errori, ma come il portato di una certa incompiutezza della società italiana, che è tipica di questa epoca storica, e che è certo irrimediabile, se non nei tempi lunghi.

Arrigo Levi

Roma, 21 marzo 1973

(8)

Enrico

ITALIAN POLITICS: A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE.

by

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ITALIAN POLITICS: PAST AND FUTURE

Introduction

After reading a small library of books and articles on Italian politics and knowing the large one still to be read, and after many fruitful conversations with Italian politicians and intellectuals, I feel quite hesitant to undertake my assignment. It is certainly beyond this essay to review the many insightful interpretations of the Italian situation and it would be pretentious to aspire to offer a new one in competition with distinguished colleagues. To describe and interpret the past in all its complexity is impossible and to talk of the future, hazardous. However, I will take up the challenge because as an outsider and a non-expert, Italian politics is for me a passionating subject on several accounts. As a Spaniard faced with the prospect of a prime minister appointed for five years after the death of Franco, Italian democracy appears as a model we might not attain and the besieged democracy appears as a bad omen. As a political scientist interested in the stability, breakdown, and consolidation of regimes, the Italian case could not be a better site for research./ In the Spring of 1970 Italians have been asked (by Demoskopea) the question:

> Se un suo amico straniero le chiedesse come lui giudica l'attuale situazione italiana cosa direbbe: "ci sono ancora molti problemi da risolvere, pero in complesso non possiamo lamentarci" o "la situazione diventa sempre piu grave, non si puo continuare cosi."

The answers, 53.7 in agreement with the first alternative and 45.6 with the second, provide together with the electoral returns, the violence of the neo-fascists and the gruppetti, and the sophisticated analysis of intellectuals, the Italian background of this essay. If the respondent to the Demoskopea interviewer would have said before answering the question; "I would like to know what my foreign friend would say", I probably would have choosen the first alternative.

But after seeing the answers of the Italians tabulated, particularly after knowing that 50% of the men would agree with me, I would have become more dubious. Obviously, in search for more evidence upon discovering that 54.7 of those under 25 agree with the first statement and that only 51 percent of the workers and farmers agree with the second, I would feel more confident of my answer. But leafing through the Demoskopea report, I find a second question:

> Quale, fra quelli qui elencati è il problema piu urgenti da risolvere nei prossimi mesi?

I find 43% choosing "assicurare l'ordine al paese." Certainly the list offered: to approve the divorce law, to make the regions work, to really bring the workers to the government of the country, to prevent the evasion of capital, and to form "un governo piu forte," was not the best. The 29.6% opting for that last response can mean many things. Many of those choosing that alternative would probably agree with those answering in the affirmative to a DOXA question:

> Se si trovasse un uomo onesto, disinteressato ed energico, preoccupato solo del bene di tutti gli italiani, lei voterebbe per daggli temporaneamente pieni poteri allo scopo di attuare le riforme piu urgenti?

With an average of only 26.5% saying clearly, no, ranging from 30.9 among PSIUP supporters, and 12.9 among MSI supporters, and 24.4 among the DC, and 21.7 among the PCI, I start feeling sympathetic with the intellectuals who write about an embattled democracy. Fortunately, among those 65.7 willing to opt for a more or less authoritarian solution, 59.6 say that such a man does not exist, and another 27.4 admit his existence but cannot give his name. Perhaps I was precipitious in saying "fortunately" because under certain circumstances, that I hope would not arise, turning to such a unique man, a charismatic leader, committed to democracy, can save a regime, as the case of France with de Gaulle shows. In the absence of a truly charismatic figure, above parties, or at least acceptable to people in all or most parties, we know that our discussion has to focus on the role

of parties and party leaders within the system. Whatever crises emerges in the near future, they will have to be handled by the classe politica. I have not seen questions about an institution which in other countries has for some sectors of the society a charisma of being honest, disinterested, energic, and concerned with the good of all the citizens; the army. But neither reading the political discussion, in conversations with Italians, or turning to the historical tradition, do I find this institution taking a central position.

The data we have quoted and many others that might be marshalled suggests a widespread but leaderless and largely inarticulate passive alienation from the regime or at least its efficacy, if not its legitimacy. Before we turn to the electoral data it is important to realize that these symptoms are not found only in the principled opposition on the Right or the Left, nor in the parties that have participated almost continuously in the exercise of power.

The sense of crisis that these responses and the political climate reflected in the degree of support given by public opinion to prime ministers over time, as well as the constant more or less violent forms of protest, convey to the observer, contrast with the relative stability of the electorate of the parties, election after election. In spite of important shifts, none of the major parties or tendencies has lost practically its whole electorate since the first election in 1946, and the succession of some parties by others, as it happened with the secular democratic bourgeois center in the Weimar Republic. Neither the number of voters nor of valid votes has fluctuated more than 2% since 1948, compared to 5.5% between 1928 and July 1932 in Germany. In addition, the number of non-voters has remained below 8% and that of invalid votes low, leaving therefore few to be mobilized for the first time in a future election, except the new voters. In Weimar that proportion was, in 1928. one-fourth of the electorate. Obviously the shifts in the electorate have been in the direction predicted by Sartori's model of extreme and polarized pluralism with its bi-lateral oppositions and the

operation of centrifugal drives eroding slowly its center base. Whatever conclusion we might reach about the antisystem character of the PCI, it is certainly not yet the party of the system,or at least in the system,and its integration even in the form of the grande coalizione or repubblica conciliare remains problematical. A gain of 8.3% vote over its strength in 1946 and of 4.6 since 1958 in that context cannot be ignored, particularly if we consider the secular trend and the appearance of small groups at its Left. Il Populo, wanting to see things in a more optimistic light, may counter that in the last election the PSIUP dropped from 4.5% to 2.6. The centrifugal tendencies on the Right which were so decisive for the final crisis of the polarized pluralism of the Weimar Republic have no parallel in Italy in terms of votes. But we cannot close our eyes to the continuing slow growth of support for the MSI from the 2% in 1953 or even the 5.8 in 1958 to the 8.7 of the Destra Nazionale and the continuing crises of the more traditional monarchist extreme Right. The system party par excellance, the DC, obtained votes beyond what we would expect on the basis of Sartori's theory and its many internal problems. Electorally at least, has been able to retain its dominant position in the center with few losses, if we ignore the high point it had reached in 1948. Apparently, on the electoral level, political change is slow and limited, a fact that is the more surprising in view of the great economic and social changes that have taken place since the first election after fascism. In fact, despite of all those changes, the added strength of the PCI and the Partito Socialista Ufficiale in the last free election before the march on Rome (28.3%),is not far below that of the PCI, PSIUP, and the Manifesto, and the Partito Communista (Marxista-lenista) Italiano (30.4) in 1972. Obviously the PSI with its 9.6% is larger than the other socialists with 0.6 in 1921. In spite of a continuous trend in the electorate and even more in the climate of opinion and the cultural and intellectual life toward the Left, toward socialism in all its variants, its gains in this century, electorally speaking, have not been spectacular. Italy and France, in

this respect, contrast with Germany. However, it is not exact to compare the Reich before Hitler with the Bundesrepublik. The German Left had reached already unusual strength before World War I and in 1919 the independent socialist and social democrats reached 45.5%, a figure that the socialists would surpass only in 1972, after the added KPD and SPD vote in 1932 had been 37.3 of which 16.9 were for the KPD. After World War II, the SPD started at a relative low 29.2% but in each succeeding election it has managed to increase its strength up to 45.8 in 1972, overtaking the CDU/CSU which in 1957 managed to get an absolute majority of the votes. This contrasts with the stability and even decline of the PCF in France and the slow increase of the PCI. Social democracy with its catch-all appeal has achieved a real bipartitismo while even the added strength of the PCI, the PSIUP, the non-communist extreme Left, and the PSI, if they could work together, would still be representing only 39.4% of the Italian electorate. Certainly, such a coalition would be a great step toward a bipartitismo imperfetto under the assumption that the DC could establish a firm coalition of all other parties except the Destra Nazionale, and perhaps make inroads into it, faced with such a challence. But this is certainly not, or at least not yet, the case. France in the forthcoming election with the socialist communist alliance and the dominant position of the Gaullists, might fit that type. From this discussion, we shall retain a basic difference between the two European democracies created by the allied defeat of fascism, West Germany and Italy. The first has become a two-party system, or at least a slightly modified two-party system, or in any case a limited and moderate multi-party system. An interesting question will be why and how the party systems of the two democracies have developed so differently. After all, the pre-fascist party systems were not that radically different. In both countries, the Marxist heritage had produced a maximalist current within the socialists, even when the social democratic tendency was much stronger in Germany. The KPD had reached greater strength than the PCI and its founders were as distinguished

While emerging in a different context and with a quite different ideological outlook, the Catholic sub-culture in both countries had created parties of similar strength which re-emerged after the crisis of liberal and conservative secular parties to incorporate much of their following that had given support to fascism. A basic difference has been the total failure of KPD and the post-war success of the PCI. Another less visible, in electoral terms, is the different reaction to and vitality of their respective neo-fascisms. However, the most important difference has been the capacity of the CDU/CSU at least until 1972 to aggregate an increasing of the non-socialist electorate with the exception of a permanent liberal minority. A major question a comparative analysis suggests is, why was the DC unable to make greater progress on the Right and among supporters of the like middle class parties? Giorgio Galli's latest book, Il difficile governo, rightly emphasized, among other things, the important role in Italian politics of minor parties and the paradoxical way in which the major parties have contributed to their survival. I guess that Giovanni Satori would attribute much of the difference between West Germany and Italy to the electoral system and perhaps to the constitutional arrangements for the formation of governments in the Bundestag and Montecitorio. I also imagine that he would agree with me in stressing the very different relationship to the Church and the Catholic sub-culture of the DC and the CDU/CSU. Despite the similarity of the relationship of the German christian democrats with the Catholic sub-culture, the presence of a strong Protestant component in the party and the less intense anticlericalism of the like middle classes and intellectuals, partly due to the very different relationship between the Church and Nazism compared to fascism, account for the different expansive capacity. Perhaps as Giorgio Galli has noted, the DC on account of its ideological origin, the late economic development of Italy, the importance of a public sector in the economy, has taken a different position in relationship to bourgeois capitalism. The explanation of that difference cannot be found in the

presence of Christian trade unionists in the party since both DC and CDU/CSU had such support. In spite of its actual policies, in many respects initially more conservative than those of the CDU, the DC did not manage to become the conservative party. The unresolved Kulturkampf and the persistence of traditional anticapitalist sentiments are two possible explanations for the limits in the expansion of the DC, despite of the similarities in post-war policies and the roles of Adenauer and De Gasperi. A question that remains open for the future is wether the weakening of the Catholic organizational world as a nursery for DC leadership and the distacco of the Church from the party, will facilitate an evolution in the direction toward a more secular conservative party. The illegitimacy of capitalism sustained by the intellectuals and the insorgenza populistica despite the achievements of Italian businessmen, are however likely to be continuing obstacles to such a clarification in the party system. The incapacity of the DC to publically identify itself with a dynamic capitalism as the CDU did with its advocacy of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft, assures the persistence of the PLI, particularly of its northern strength. The appeal of PLI as a free enterprise party in turn, in addition to many other factors, makes any consolidation of the right middle class parties unlikely. The quite different place of neo-fascism in both countries is another cause of the persistent extreme pluralism in the Italian party system, absent in Germany. Once the foreign veto had disappeared, there were grounds to expect that some right wing extremists nationalism would reappear in Germany. Such sentiments had perhaps deeper roots in German political culture than fascism. The division of the country represented a deeper frustration and the impact of the denazification on the little Parteigenossen was greater than on those who had joined the PNF per necessità familiare. The impact of rapid economic development on certain marginal middle class and peasant sectors must either not have been/that radically different to provide a poujadist base to such movements. We should know more about the memories and meaning of the fascist

experience for Italians and be conscious of the difference in this respect between Nazism and fascism. First of all, it needs to be stressed that neo-fascism has been successful in areas where the original fascism movement after World War I had not penetrated, in contrast with neo-Nazi parties in Germany. Whatever the feelings of the antifascist, Italians cannot respond to Mussolini as Germans to Hitler and the SS Staat in all its monstrosity. A "civilized" neo-fascism has some chances once Italy has renounced as all other European powers to colonial imperialism as a nationalist anticommunist movement. In fact, I suspect that the antifascism except of the working class Left of the resistance and in the territories dominated by the Republic of Salò, cannot be compared with the appeal of antinazism to most Germans. This should explain the possibility of an opening to the neo-fascists under Tambroni and the potential for integration under some circumstances of the MSI into the system, as well as the more aggressive and sectarian character of antifascist protest, which paradoxically can contribute indirectly to strengthen fascism. The PCI fortunately is not unaware, as some of its policies rejecting the maximalist style and tradition of 1919 indicate, of the potential for a fascist resurgence. The failure in the early post-war years to use the legal possibilities to prevent or limit the emergence of neo-fascism is one of the factors accounting for the extreme pluralism in Italy and its absence in Germany. I have insisted on discussing, some of the factors outside of the Left that have sustained that type of party system but obviously the history of the relationship between the PCI and PSI in exile in the resistance, particularly in the North, and the different response to the post-war international situation together with the complex internal politics of non-communist socialism is the major factor distinguishing Italian politics from those of other European countries including France. The possibility of both the unity of action pact and later the apertura a sinistra and the split between the PSI and the PSDI account for the uniqueness of Italian politics. In the Western world only Chile offers a parallel.

Some sociologist friends might be probably by now surprised and disturbed that I should have made so little reference to the social structure of Italy and to the relationship between social cleaveges and the party system. However, as the research of the Il Mulino shows a traditional sociological analysis is of limited value in accounting for the survival and support of the minor parties and the differences between the communist and the socialist electorates, and particularly the division among the socialists. Obviously, a more sophisticated sociological analysis that includes organizational variables, historical explanations like the resistance and the the pre-fascist past and local leadership structures, goes much farther. The great continuity in electoral behavior despite of demographic social and economic changes points to the limits of the social basis of diversity or ballots as an instrument of class struggle type of interpretation. This limitation poses many difficulties to a futurible analysis based mainly on social economic changes as has been undertaken in other societies. The social scientist in Italy has to combine a more politico-ideological, institutional and organizational analysis with a more strictly sociological one. The changes in party support and public opinion seem to me to have been more the results of the policies of the parties of their organizational capability and the impact of business cycles, than/of the consequences of the profound changes in social structure in the last decade. This as the absence of a charismatic challenger or a powerful institution above parties creates a range of opportunities for the political class but also a special responsibility. It is no accident that so many of the best analyses of Italian politics focus on the interaction between parties, on the schieramenti, on the crises and changes in ideology of functional organizations, and/on the role of personalities. In my view, it would be a mistake to attribute this only to the nature of the party system, to the importance of the correnti and parliamentary politics and clientilism. Those aspects are a reflection but also to some extent a cause of the stability of the link between parties and the society, due to the

organization of the sub-cultures and the absence of a large pool of independent voters responding to particular issues and coalitions formed for particular purposes, like the often invoked schieramento riformatore. At least at present, it seems as if any coalition to undertake many of the specific and possible reforms will have to be worked out between politicians rather than emerge from shifts in the electorate. In a sense, the grande coalizione imperfetta, to the extent that it exists occasionally in parliament, belongs to this type. Undoubtedly, such coalitions without an explicit support and commitment by an electorate can be and have been in the recent Italian past effective in carrying out successful policies, whose importance tends to be underestimated in the search for basic structural reforms desired by intellectuals and ideologues. However, they present the clear identification of those to be credited with the success and blamed with failure and only to a small extent legitimize the parties, the system, and the regime. This consideration might lead to second thoughts about the often expressed desire for more unified and disciplined parties. Perhaps as the government instability was the motive for change in France, the ad hoc support in parliament might be the Italian mechanism. Unfortunately, a certain degree of government stability and authority is needed to implement those legislative changes, particularly in the absence of a highly competent and perhaps elitist higher bureaucracy.

While an analysis of the social structure and its changes does not seem prima facie to be fruitful to understand the future political dynamics, despite the responsivness of the political class to even minor shifts in the electorate (not only national but administrative and local elections), future developments do not depend only of the strictly political arena of the party congresses, parliamentary groups, and coalition government. Politicians certainly would like it to be that way and symptomatically the PCI has been far from happy with the growing autonomy of the CGIL, the growing strength of the industrial federations and the cooperation at the trade union level between its followers and the Catholic

unionists. The reaction to the direct contacts between the trade unions and the government to press for a program of reform analyzed by Pizzorno is an example. It has been said by Matteucci that "L'Italia corporative ha vinto l'Italia Politica," and certainly the interdependence between interests groups and the parties has been an element of rigidity in the system. It is not always clear to me to what extent the parties or important blocs in them were mediatized by the interest groups, and to what extent the interest groups could not perform their function effectively because of their dependence on the parties. The first was probably true for some of the groups represented in the DC, particularly the coltivatori diretti and Catholic groups in educational and other problems affecting the Church. Certainly the second was true for the trade unions before '68 in their relationship with the communists. Much of the change we can expect in Italian politics will come from the different roles that interest groups will take in the future in relationship to the parties and in the conflict within civil society. That changing role offers opportunities for a more dynamic and pragmatic process of change, something that is to be welcomed. But it can also become a source of serious social and political instability. In principle, the greater autonomy of interest groups like the trade unions from the parties, their more direct access to the government, the opportunities for more direct negotiations between interest groups, could certainly serve to unfreeze the political process and to shift attention from ideological debates about / "incisive" and "advanced" reforms to specific reforms, sometimes finding support across party lines. Unfortunately, I am not fully optimistic on that process. The emergence of new forms of contestation bordering on violence, new forms of the revival of old forms of labor protest in a climate of widespread alienation from the state and the government of the day, are likely to undermine the power of arbitration and control, and the capacity to institutionalize conflict of the government. As Durkheim, despite his corporativist inclination, already noted a model of pluralistic group conflict also re-

quires a strong authority of the state to prevent the abuses of such groups against their members, the society as a whole, and the average citizen. The ideological climate that in part has made possible the greater autonomy of interest groups, particularly of trade unions, also encourages a challenge to the authority of the state rather than a process of controlled delegation of its powers. The revival of syndicalism and "spontaneity" as we find it in the Manifesto together with the new techniques of contestation can create a climate of political crises. If we add that the traditions of a bureaucratic state of Napoleonic character the economic interventionism and the importance of a public sector inevitably direct much of the activity of those interests toward, if not against, the state, the political implications are quite different from those of the multi-tier democracy in Scandinavia. If we add that despite of the loosening of ties between interest groups and the parties they will continue visibly tied, parties will not escape from being made responsible by public opinion of the more or less irresponsible actions of groups that escape their control. Such a pattern is likely to complicate the relationship between parties in the strictly political arena of parliament and government, national and local, particularly if parties feel obliged to stand behind groups identified with them , or with whom they might feel a vague ideologically based sympathy, even when they do not fully approve of their actions. The PCIs long range strategy of the Via Italiana, of the conquest of civil society, and of support of the social coalition strategy, using the public power positions held by the party, is likely to place the party in difficult situations. Any analysis of the process of the shift from negative integration through the communist sub-culture to the possible integration into the political system through the transformation of the party, is likely to be endangered by such processes. Paradoxically, a loosening of the authoritarian control by democratic centralism, personal unions through overlapping leadership, a common party line for the many organizations in the communist aegis, rather

than fostering change in the party, might reinforce the commitment to an authoritarian tradition that many of its leaders would like to change. In my view, apparant contradiction between the intra party outlook of Amendola and his national political perspective, and the reverse patterns in the behavior of Ingrao might be understandable from this perspective. Changes in a variety of social organizations and the freer expression of many social interests are ultimately likely to complicate the already difficult tasks of the parties. While changes in the social structure have no direct and immediate reflection in the electoral alignments, they seem to have a very direct impact on a large variety of traditional and emergent intermediary structures whose relationship with the parties at an organizational and leadership level become more complex. I doubt that those changes in the intermediary structure will be soon reflected at the electoral level. The limited success in the last election of the MPL with 0.4 of the vote and the success in the preferential vote of the Left of the DC, particularly Forze Nuove and Donat Cattin, is partial evidence for that statement. The position taken by the UIL at its recent congress also suggests limits to the process of formation of interest groups across party lines. The emergence of a more autonomous expression of interest of the society for specific purposes, not controlled by the parties but not clearly independent from them in the present ideological context, particularly the syndacalist tradition of thought and the slow process of electoral realignment is likely to complicate the political process in the near future in ways requiring study. My analysis, that will focus largely on the role of parties in a democratic system, is weakened by the incapacity at present to take fully into account such changes.

Political scientists have paid little attention to the impact on party systems and the role of parties on the national scene in societies with federal or decentralized representative institutions and governments emerging from them. The

Anglo-Saxon countries with a federal constitution, due to their two-party systems, the character of those two parties in the United States and Canada, and the almost simultaneous emergence of federalism and the state, provide few insights to understand the future impact of the region on the Italian political system. Other federal states in Latin America are for quite different reasons, of no help either. Switzerland, is certainly for historical reasons, not comparable. Only Germany, with its Länder legislatures and governments both under Weimar and Bonn can help us to ask some relevant questions. Those who analyze Italian politics from the perspective of the slow but inevitable transformation of the PCI into some kind of social democratic party will certainly point to the West German experience. German federalism provided the minoritarian SPD with a unique opportunity to share in power at the Land level, reducing its level of frustration, allowing it to gain experience in government, to train its leadership and to gain the respect of many of those not voting for it in national elections for a variety of reasons. From that perspective, the implementation of the regions would be a factor of integration of the PCI into the democratic system. Some support to these interpretations is provided by the fact that the Red Belt leadership of the PCI has been among those pressuring most for a rinovamento of the party and that, as Giorgio Galli noted, the PCI leadership has been reluctant to give to it a role in the party top echelons commensurate to its membership and electoral strength. However, if we turn to the experience of societies with a polarized extreme multi-party system, like Weimar Germany, rather than to the incipient two-party-system of Bonn, a quite different analysis can be made. Parties with an ambivalent identification with the political system or regime, or in power in regions with quite distinct interests in such a party system, might be tempted in crisis situations, particularly under the pressure of activist groups, to see their power position as a resource for pressure or a base against a central government controlled by other parties. In case of compromises made at the central level distasteful to those in control of the regional government, the temptation exists to use their vast power resources to challenge that decision.

Under Weimar the Bavarian government in the early 20s, some of the Left controlled governments like Saxony, governments with Nazi participation in Thüringen, Braunschweig and other smaller states in the last phase of the Republic, contributed much to the atmosphere of crisis as did the unjustified intenvention of the Reich government in crises at the state level, like that of Papen against the Prussian Weimar type coalition government. Certainly the tradition of intervention in municipal politics by the Ministry of Interior exists in Italy. The multiple coalition patterns that can emerge with regional governments is likely to introduce new flexibility into the political process, create new linkages between parties, make it less difficult to break up old ties as a continuation of some PSI/PCI coalitions in local governments during the apertura a sinistra did, forcing the PCI to give the PSI a greater role. But it also can create strains making the collaboration between parties at the national level more difficult. This is no doubt an area that deserves close watch in the near future. One of the dubious gains of decentralization is the multiplication of elections. Bracher in the analysis of the breakdown of the Weimar Republic and myself in the work on Spain in the 30s found that frequent elections, particularly in a crisis period, contribute to the alienation from the political system and complicate its management. I have been already impressed of how much politicians and analysts of Italian politics are affected by the frequent elections. It seems as if each party, after each election, even an administrative one, were forced to reanalyze its position at a party congress often with a change of leadership and unable to act effectively between the election and the party congress. It would seem desirable, in a democracy, that the politicians should be responsive to the changes in mood of the electorate, but I have the feeling that in Italy they are over responsive to basically minor shifts, localized changes like those of the 13 giunio. The complex process of presidential elections, their

has similar effects.
preparation and aftermath,/We can see how the electoral process limits the efficacy of government. It would seem to me that the process of decentralization might have fewer undesirable impacts on the national political process if national and administrative elections would take place at the same time. It has been argued that regional authorities can act in the defense of democratic institutions when they are threatened at the center. Such a position was adopted by the regional Catalan government in the crises of 1934 when the Catholic party, whose loyalty to the constitution could be doubted, entered the national government. I can imagine situations in Italy in which extremists would attempt to push regional authorities to take that stand against a fascist threat or a situation defined in those terms, or use such a power base against the presumable communist threat or a participation of the communists in government. I do not think that such a possibility, with its dangerous implications, should be ignored by those who stress the integrative function of participation in regional government.

The Future

An analysis of the Italian political system in the 70s can be built on at least three hypothetical models, and in my view there is evidence supporting any of them. The choice of any of the three ultimately will depend of the personality of the observer. I am sure there would be a correlation between optimism and pessimism as well as ideological preferences in finding one or another model convincing. The three basic models we can imagine would be:

1. Continuity of the present political system of more or less extreme polarized multipartism with changing overt and covert coalitions around the DC. The basic alternatives are by now well known, from minority monocolore governments, to centrismo, to centro-sinistra, to the covert grande coalizione imperfetta.

   A crisis of such alternatives might be sustained by the use of emergency or presidential powers with the toleration of all major parties.

2. The development toward a bipartitismo imperfetto resulting from a capacity of the DC to absorb votes on the Right and in the Center as a more secularized conservative party, capable of establishing a permanent, even electoral coalition, with minor parties on the center of the spectrum. Parallel to such a development would be the emergence of a popular front alignment uniting the PCI with the Left socialist party or parties in a challenge to the DC dominance, approaching a situation not too different to the one emerging now in France.

3. A situation in which the slow but continuous erosion of strength of the DC and its center allies and flanking parties would place the regime coalition in a minority or extremely weak situation. A gain in votes

of the MSI simultaneously with the PCI could certainly lead to such a situation, implicit in the model of Sartori. In some respects this situation would have analogies with the Weimar Republic in the 30s, even when the analogy should not be pushed too far.

Such a situation can naturally lead to a series of different outcomes. One would be the return to the coalition of all antifascist parties with the full integration of the PCI into the system, either by supporting the government or entering it. Implicitly, much of the discussion about the schieramenti piu avanzati, the grande coalizione, the republica conciliare, are based on this prospect. However, I feel that for a variety of reasons, the possible consequences of such a solution have not been made explicit in the discussion. An alternative that has received much less attention because implicitly everyone excludes it, except in the form of a coup d'etat type of crisis, is government with the support of the Destra Nazionale. I have the feeling that such an alternative is excluded on account of historical memories and of the fear of polarization on the piazza and ultimately, perhaps as a result of it, of authoritarian solutions or civil war. Significantly enough, the integration of the PCI into the system is not excluded but seriously considered without much explicit concern, except on the part of the real Left, for its consequences. I imagine that on the Right of the DC such concerns also exist but are not made equally explicit. Implicit in some of the duscussion of a grande coalizione is the belief that it might serve as a transition to a moderate, not intensely polarized multi-party system that could function in some respects approximating a two-party, or at least two-coalition system.

My feeling is that in the short run the odds are strongly in favor of the first alternative. I am sure that the classe politica, more than the intellectuals,

hopes and will work for that alternative. It also corresponds to that 53.7% of the population that says that "there are still many problems to solve but in complesso we can't complain." However, in the long run, and here we might remember the dictum of Lord Keynes, "In the long-run, we are all dead," the others cannot be excluded. I am slightly surprised that my Italian colleagues have not devoted more efforts to ask realistic questions about how the other alternatives could emerge and develop. I am sure they have good reasons to do so, but much of their scholarly analysis, like that of American students of Italian politics, is centered on changes of and in the PCI and to a lesser extent in the DC, that implicitly are oriented around such alternatives. I see a certain intellectual and even political danger in such analysis that leave the implicit consequences out of the discussion.

Social scientists have developed a great skill in the sociology of elections and political parties and Italians and others have contributed much to our knowledge at that level, but we know much less about decision making in crisis situations. I, myself, have been involved in a comparative study of the breakdown of competitive democracies in Europe between the two world wars and in other countries after World War II. Perhaps that perspective will color some of my analisis. To introduce such a prospect is never welcome and the scholar is obviously on thin ice when he tries to analyze potential crisis situations. Almost by definition, crises are unpredictable if not the probability of crisis situations, at least the sequence of events in crisis, In such situations the by now almost standard sociological units of analysis, classes, interest groups, institutions, trade unions, parties, are not capable to act in the ways the attitudes of their members, the ideology and previous traditions of behavior would lead us to expect. Confronted with new problems, they often feel at a loss and inaction or delayed action combine with sudden emotional responses. In addition, the crisis situations introduce different patterns of communication between the elites, different time spans in the decision

making which often are reflected in a narrowing down of the decision making group and the appearance and pre-eminent role of what Daniel Bell called in our joint seminar, "the small c's", conspiracies, cliques, cabals, clubs, etc. , in addition to the important role of neutral powers to take over the expression of Carl Schmitt, the courts and above all the presidency or king. In such a situation obviously the role of personality factors becomes more important than in normal times. In studying such crises, I have been impressed by the lack of visibility of the process going on to even major participants. In view of all that, to make futuribles on such situations would be even more risky. But some thought about them might illuminate the considerations that go into the dicision making of the main actors on the political scene of Italy, even in normal times, that would escape the scholar limiting his attention to the day-by-day parliamentary tactics of the schieramenti or the deterministic perspective of much of political sociology based on the analysis of social structure and parties at the mass level.

Unstable Stability

When confronted with the question of the future of regimes, Robert Dahl wrote, the safest bet about a country's regime a generation from now is that it will be somewhat different, but not radically different from what it is today. This is probably also true for Italy and perhaps even for its party system. The frequent elections have shown, relatively speaking, a considerable stability of the electorate, despite of internal realignments, within the Socialist electorate and on the right frontier of the DC. The continuous but slow growth of the Communist electorate since the early '50s, 8.3 percentage points since 1946, and the not too spectacular growth of the Destra Nacionale, even if extrapolated into the coming years, still leave the decision in the hands of parties that have participated more or less regularly in government. However, the capacity of those parties to form alternating coalitions, capable of satisfying the expectations of different groups of voters, and in the process to find pragmatic solutions to different sets of problems as the parties of the Fourth Republic did,with the exception of colonial problems, is not assured. As Sartori has rightly pointed out, the dominant position of the DC and its character imposes serious strains to that process as the divorce issue illustrates. A number of considerations suggest that centrifugal tendencies will operate within this restricted and partly embattled arena. Foremost of all, is the withering away of the definition of the PCI and the MSI as antisystem or disloyal parties. That withering away will limit the capacity of parties in that spectrum to appeal to the electorate in terms of defense against both Communish and Fascism, even when the 1972 election waged by the DC shows that this formulation can still be used. This competition on two fronts when it was bitter as in 1948, could serve to cement a relatively strong coalition and justify patterns of consociational politics among otherwise diverging parties, ignoring to some extent the ideological positions and interests of many of their supporters. As the definition of the PCI and the MSI as anti-

system parties is weakened, the willingness of the minor parties and of correnti within the DC to consider various forms of collaboration, including ultimately the entry into the government of those parties, will grow. The expression of the arco constituzionale, coined by La Malfa, the discussions about the grande coalizione, the speculations about a DC collaboration with the PCI surrounding the Fanfani candidacy, the talk of the schieramenti piu avanzati, and the increased willingness to use the MSI votes in certain situations, for example the election of Leone, are clear signs of that process. However, that shift in attitudes, both of the elite and to a lesser extent in public opinion, is not likely to apply equally to the PCI and the MSI in the minor parties and among the correnti of the DC. It is therefore likely to increase the tensions between the minor parties and a dominant faction within the DC, taking a different position, as well as reducing the internal unity of the DC. The difficulties in the decision making about the presidential candidate in 1971 between the DC and its traditional allies and within the DC itself are evidence of this process. Ultimately, the opening of the political system to parties originally defined as outside of it, must lead to polarization within the parties originally defined as democratic. It also reinforces the centrifugal tendencies of some parties. Certainly the neo-centrismo after the aperture a sinistra reinforces the old longing toward the Left and cooperation with the Communists of the PSI. The greater the adaptability of the PCI, the stronger the tendencies in this direction, particularly in view of the opportunities for collaboration at the local and regional level.

The weakening of the polarization between system and antisystem parties and the consequent greater opportunity for polarization between the original system parties would be all to the good if it could ultimately lead to the legitimate participation of all parties in a relatively moderate multi-party system. We will discuss later the many difficulties for such a development, prognosticated by many for the PCI. Paradoxically, such a development would probably require a

similar change in the MSI and in the attitude toward the MSI, and that seems to me more difficult for those parties, organizations, voters and elites identified with the Resistance. It offers particular difficulties in the north of Rome and the areas where the memory of the Republic of Salò persist. The illegitimacy of the MSI is a factor often ignored in the analysis of the process of integration of the PCI into the political system. Ultimately, the PCI cooperation with the PSI and perhaps with a minority splinter on the Left DC implies pressures toward a greater opening of the DC and its allies toward the Right. That prospect, on the other hand, makes the cooperation developing in the form of the grande coalizione imperffeta or a non polarized bipartitismo imperfetto based on a frontismo more difficult. In my view, the effort to include the PCI into some form of grande coalizione with the DC, the constant emphasis by the PCI on the open hand toward the Catholics, the strategy of social coalitions including the Catholic working class organizations, the talk of the blocco storico (rather than a dynamic and new emphasis on the patto d'azione and the union of the Left on the part of the PCI), and the continuous search for the apertura a sinistra on the part of the DC, are all based on the desire or the need to isolate the MSI. I feel that some of the basic differences between French and Italian politics in the recent past and even more in the near future are determined by the historical memory of the rise of Fascism, its rule, the Resistance, and the constitution making processes after the War. It is also a major factor in the unwillingness of the PCI and to a lesser extent of organizations under its control or influence to create crises that might push voters and elites toward the Fascist. The presence of the MSI and the memory of the fate of the Populari has been a constant factor in the DC's attitudes toward the Socialist Left. However, the competition between the DC and MSI for the same electorate and the progressive sociological differentiation between the DC and the PCI electorates work in the opposite direction.

The ambiguous consensus within the center, broadly or narrowly based, opening

toward the Left or toward the moderate Right, increasingly tolerated by the PCI in exchange for influence at the national level, power at the local or regional level, and the advantage of not having to take decisions that might endanger its own cohesion, can continue for a long time under certain conditions. It certainly can continue unless there are important shifts in the electorate and/or on the parliamentary level. It can produce governments even when of limited efficacy and probably effectivness in handling many problems of the rapidly changing society.

The model of multipartism with two extreme parties considered loyal, or at least semi-loyal, by part of the system parties themselves moderately polarized, might be workable under conditions of normality, but is exposed to serious strains when groups not identified for only partially controlled by the party engage in direct action, requiring effective responses from the government. In such a situation, the ambiguous consensus might easily turn into ambiguous dissensus. Sympathies and links of parties perceived as semi-loyal with such groups will lead to accusations that will lead to angry rebuttals which in turn will be used by those interested in undermining the growing integration of that party into the system and to shift the governing coalition in their direction. The simultaneous extra-parliamentary direct action and/or terrorist pressures in the model of ambiguous consensus rather than bringing the system parties together and/or amplifying the parliamentary basis of a government, can lead to increase instability and ultimately polarization. In such a context, a government becomes dependent on the prestige and impartiality of the police and the judiciary and the trust of a broad spectrum of public opinion across party lines. I am not sure that those conditions are fulfilled in the Italian political system as the events in the last few years, like the bombs of Milano, the Valpreda case, the Feltrinelli affair, the riots in the south, etc. show. The growing autonomy of interest groups, particularly the trade unions, from the parties and the new techniques of social conflict of the Contestazione cannot be ignored in a dynamic analysis of the model

of ambig ous con ensus and centrifugal competition among the system parties with non-commital support of partly legitimate, partly illegitimate, partly integrated, partly excluded parties.

The model outlined requires, in addition to a growing latent concensus in the political elite, a restraint in the public manifestations of all participants in extra system crisis. Its absence can easily turn into instability in the parliamentary and governmental arena, even against the desires of the participants caught in their rhetorical accusations and contribute to a growth of the sector of opinion that feels that la situazione diventa sempre più grave, non si può continuare cosi, and that gives priority to assicurare l'ordine al paese. Such a climate of opinion would not be conductive to efficient and effective government and slowly or rapidly erode the legitimacy of the system. The disappointed hopes of growing integration in the PCI, the activation of the fear of Fascism and the basic distrust of the center Right could force the PCI to take positions that would be perceived as disloyal or threatening, particularly in view of its strong and legitimate power basts, like the regions.

It can be argued that this model is unlikely because the leading participants have strong memories of the situation that led to the breakdown of democracy in the years after the First World War and the costs for the labor movement of such a situation.

I have deliberately ignored in this discussion the impact of economic crisis both in Italy and in the countries with which its economy is interdependent. Such a crisis would obviously affect the political alignments and activate pressures for hasty alliances whose consequences might not have been analyzed and forestalled, alliances that will place heavy strains on the already purely integrated parties. Another variable in such a situation would be the international context and events in other neighboring countries.

The prediction of more of the same with more shifting and competitive coalitions

among system parties with imperfect support on the flanks, holds only under the assumption of continuing economic progress and control of extra system violence. Since those conditions are not fail-proof and the return to the model of the 50s which united the system parties by a concensus in defining the extremes as disloyal oppositions is impossible, the search for new formulas is likely to continue. No one would have asked in the 50s the question posed by DOXA in April, 1970;

> Qualcuno dice che in Italia non e possibile fare un governo stabile senza i comunisti, che sono i piu forti dopo i democristiani. Altri invece affermano che coi communisti nel governo ci sarebbe dopo un po la dittatura e la perdita della liberta. Ecco qui varie frasi:

	Vera	Falsa	Non so nessume risposta
A) E impossibile un governo stabile senza i comunisti	24	51	25
B) I partiti al potere devono mettersi d'accordo coi comunisti, ma senza farli entrare nel governo	27	44	29
C) I comunisti non devono andere al governo, ma e inutile intensificare la lotta contre il PCI	24	41	35
D) I comunisti non solo non debonono entrare al governo; ma devono essere combattuti con tutti i mezzi.	32	41	27

The answers, even if we assume a considerable insincerity among the respondents, show that the considerations that have led the politicians to consider the grande coalizione are not shared by the population at large. Certainly 51% feeling that stable government is possible without the Communist are not an overwhelming but strong support for continuity with the present, even when that figure is probably lower for males only. Paradoxically, the grande coalizione imperfetta based on the support in parliament of particular bills has not crystallized in a broader support for understanding between government parties and the Communists without entry into the government. There is not either, and this is quite surprising in view of other data and might reflect the formulation of the question, strong support for a relenting of the opposition to the Communists. On the other hand, an intensive and active anticommunism today finds only one-third of the electorate supporting it.

These responses should not lead us to ignore some fundamental changes in the legitimation of the Communist party that have taken place since 1953 and particularly since the 60s. In 1953, 67% answered in the negative to the question,, si puo essere nello stesso tempo buoni comunisti e buone cattolici? In 1970, that figure has been reduced to 44%, while those answering in the affirmative had risen from 21% to 44%. The Vatican Council certainly contributes to open the door to the republica conciliare, or at least to a separation of the opposition to the PCI based on class and other reasons, those on religious motives. That change has afected even the supporters of the DC. In 1953, 73% of them answered in the negative and now it is 63%, while those answering in thepositive were 16% and now 27%.

Unfortunately, we have no comparable data on the attitudes toward the MSI and therefore we do not know if the definition of that party as a disloyal opposition continues, and particularly if there is a change in the DC electorate in that respect.

To conclude this part of our analysis, we should stress that while the present system is likely to continue under normal circumstances, the changes taking place within it, particularly the slow legitimation of the PCI and with it the greater opportunity for moderate cleavage and alternation of coalitions within the system, defined in its original terms or those created after the apertura a sinistra, has rightly led the politicians to explore cautiously alternative models. It is more than probable that those models will not be seriously considered, except in a crisis situation, even when from the point of view of the system, it might have considerable advantages to try them out in a non-crisis situation. In some respects, there is a similarity with the apertura a sinistra where the cautious and slow progress toward a formula that was to become necessary took from the cauti sperimentazioni suggested by Moro in 1959, four years to crystallize. As Giorgi Galli noted, by then the conditions which favored it, like the changed international climate, and the accellerated economic development of 1960 to 1962, had changed. Without question, changes of the system, within the system, require great skill in the timing and in this case particularly in relationship with both the business cycle and the international situation. But as Schumpeter already noted in his analysis of democratic politics, the conditions favorable from a policy point of view for the integration of Socialist parties into the government do not coincide with those in which electoral and/or political circumstances favor such a process. Let us turn now to a very hypothetical, exciting but risky analysis of some of the problems posed by further integration of the PCI in the arco constituzionale.

From Negative Integration to Where?

The role of the PCI and its future in the Italian political system is central not only to the study of Italian politics but to the understanding of several Western democracies, France, Finland, Chile and perhaps in the future Greece and Spain. In recent years, Italian and foreign scholars have contributed much to our knowledge of the PCI and I hope to refer to their data and insights in a more extended version of this paper. Here I intend only to outline a broad framework in which I think the problem can be analyzed. A comparative perspective certainly would be useful to distinguish several quite distinct levels of analysis.

(1) The first level would be/the different Communist parties in the context of to see the now more or less polycentric Communist movement and of an international political system with Communist states. Such a focus is likely to be somewhat neglected when social scientists work with the analogy of the evolution of Socialist parties, particularly Marxist Socialist parties from antisystem, more or less revolutionary parties, into social-democratic parties in the last hundred years. That analogy which we will see is extremely fruitful ignores the fact that there was no model or leading Socialist state or states capable and willing to influence the internal development of Socialist parties in other countries, nor foreign policy implications of the relationship of national parties to the international Socialist movement. Even a national Communist party, set out to follow an independent policy in terms of its own interests within a given political system, cannot ignore the internal strains to which it will be subject in charting its own course as a result of the presence of one or several points of reference in the international Communist movement. Even assuming that neither Moscow nor Peking would make a major effort to support tendencies or factions sympathetic to their ideological views and/or policy interests, any Communist party will aim at minimizing

the strains resulting from those external points of reference and therefore retain a considerable degree of ambiguity that the opponents will easily label as dupplicita. Even if a Communist party follows an independent course from the international movement, no one can blame its opponents to make use of the international connection in questioning its internal role, and the cautious efforts of disidentification from the international movement, given the internal pressures, are not likely to go far and fast enough to eliminate that problem. Situations in other countries, for example, Chile and France, will affect the Italian political process in ways that no analysis based on an intensive study of the PCI and the reactions to it of the other participants in the Italian system could predict. The work of Donald Blackmer shows the complexity of the unity in diversity solution of Italian Communism to these problems within the Communist party. Future research would have to pay considerable attention to the perception of other participants in the political game in Italy of events elsewhere, even when the provincialism of Italian politics might reduce somewhat their impact.

(2) A second level in which scholarship has made considerable progress has been the analysis of the internal dynamics of the PCI, and its insertion into Italian society. A number of thorough monographs on the party at local levels, on its electorate and militance, on its strategies in relationship to other groups, like its policy toward the ceti medi produttivi, the relationship to the Catholics, the conception of the blocco storico, the role of municipal Communism, and somewhat less, its relationship with the trade unions and the labor movement and the role of Communist legislators in Montecitorio, have given us a more objective, complex and empirical view of the party. However, we have not reached the point at which we can use intelligently that wealth of information. We would need to know much more about the politics at the top of the party, among leaders and higher functionaries and their thoughts

about alternative strategies at the national level. In addition, the monographic research lacks theoretical, comparative, and historical perspective, and therefore might lead the unwary reader to unfounded and misleading conclusions. Many of the scholars engaged in this type of research work with the simplistic dichotomy of a Bolshevik organizational weapon type of party and a contemporary Western social democratic party. The use of those two ideal types as well as a symplistic distinction between Leninism in any of its variants and reformism can serve as a first approximation but also obscures many problems. The Marxist theoretical heritage and the historical experience of socialism offers a much broader range of strategic and tactical alternatives. A comparative historical perspective can sensitize the observer to many problems that a unilinear evolutionary model would ignore. Certainly, no historian of European Socialism in the early decades of the century would be satisfied with an analysis focused on Lenin and Bernstein, ignoring Kautsky and the Austro-Marxists, both at the level of theory and practice. In a complex movement like Communisms with its emphasis on ideology and the constant interaction between theory and praxis, an analysis of futuribles would require a dynamic consideration of the probable consequences of theoretical positions in a variety of probable historical social situations. Such an imaginative reconstruction of possible and probable future situations on the basis of our knowledge of past historical social situations is tempting but enormously risky. I feel, however, that such models of the future should be included in the research on the attitudes of political actors now in progress.

(3) Another perspective is given by the historical background of massimalismo, the occupation of factories, the red dominance in the Po Valley and the Fascist reacion, as well as the resistance and the first years of the Republic. Pizzorno and other accute observers are right in emphasizing the

deep historical consciousness of the PCI leadership and probably of many of its antagonists. A consciousness that sets parameters that would not be provided by the two perspectives noted before. The fear of resurgence of Fascism and the different interpretations of the Fascist phenomenon are of central importance in understanding both the positive and negative strategies of the PCI. That fear is closely tied with its view of the Italian social structure, of the questione meridionale, of the relationship with the trade union and labor protest, its attitudes toward certain forms of extra parliamentary contestazione favored by the spontaneist new Left, etc. Unfortunately, we know much less about the historical memory of other Italian political forces and elites of the Fascist experience, which would undoubtedly help us to understand their potential response to authoritarian alternatives. The historical memory or interpretation of the first post world war and its implications for today, among the political elite, would be another variable to study.

(4) The three perspectives outlined above would need to be complemented by a dynamic analysis of the Italian economy and social structure in the next decade. The political factors sketched will become effective in particular social situations created largely by the economic process and its impact on particular strata. The size and characteristics of crisis strata, to use the expression of Sigmund Neumann, is crucial in the study of stability and crisis of political systems. Certainly, we would need to know more about the probable rates and incidents of unemployment, not only in the country as a whole, but in particular cities, industries, and even factories. We would need also to know the impact of economic and social changes on the peasantry in different parts of the country, and the likely growth of the intellectual proletariat and its regional distribution. The problems created for the political system, and even more for the PCI, of the transition from one or another type of negative

integration to participation in the system with vocation du pourvoir, depend largely on those economic and social changes in the near future.

(5) The social scientist can contribute much in the four problem areas listed above. There is, however, one dimension on whichhis knowledge is scant and his predictive capacity even lower. The role of active and violent minorities on the fringes of the political system, uncontrolled by large scale organizations, like parties, trade unions, etc. In a non-polarized political system in which the system and the institution charged with its defense, particularly the police and the judiciary, enjoy widespread and relatively strong support and legitimacy, the action of individuals and small groups on the fringes are disturbing but not an important variable. In a system like the Italian today they can contribute to force major actors to take in a particular situation positions that interfer with their long term strategy, push them back to disloyalty or at least semi-loyalty to the system on account of latent affinity on ideological grounds with such groups, as well as activate the latent distrust of the opponent. Typically, the fear of Fascism serves as a broad unifying appeal based on the memories of the Resistance but also creates an exaggerated suspicion of the state and its authority. The same is true for the recent use of the scare of the brigate rosse, at the time of the last election. In such situations, as Pareto already stressed, the legitimacy or tolerance granted by the uncommitted citizens and opinion making elites to the violence of one or another gruppuscolo and the agents of order, becomes increasingly important. In this context, the findings of a DOXA survey in February 1969, posing the question:"Alcuni parlamentari hanno proposto che la polizia e i carabinieri, in servizio d'ordine pubblico durante scioperi o manifestazioni sindacali, devono essere disarmati. Lei e favorevole al disarmo?",a policy advocated in April by the Secretary General of the CGIL, Agostino Novella, are significant. Only a small proportion of the populatinn

has no opinion, 6.9% among males, or is indifferent, 5.5% among them. The proportion favoring disarmament among whom those distrustful of the police and/or the state, must be found, was 26.5%. The differences by region, outside of the south and islands were not great. The class differences were more marked: 31% of a heterogenious grouping of workers, artisans, merchants, and white collar, but not excessive, while those by age reflecting different generational experiences and memories, quite large: 32% of those 16 to 34 years old, with an opinion, favorable, versus 21% of those over 54. Systematic trend data on the reaction to crisis signs in this area for different segments of the population and the elites, as well as data on the incidence and etiology of violence, should be on the agenda of scholarship. It should compensate for the tendency of political sociology to center its attention on the large social structural and political processes, ignoring the impact of events in structuring political situations, an insight not lacking in the calculation of extremist movements on all sides of the spectrum.

I hope that the reader will not expect me to develop a series of models of the political future, specifically on the future role of the PCI, incorporating all those perspectives. I will, however, sketch some consideration which I hope to expand after further discussion and research.

The basic framework in which I would place the problem is a two dimensional space, constituted on the one hand by the expectations of the PCI of the benefits and costs of different forms of integration under the arco constituzionale of the competitive democracy in which power is gained and lost through elections and in parliament. And on the other hand, the fear of political crisis and takeover of power, and the economic and social consequences of that integration process, compared to the gains in stability or "domestication" expected from it. It would be useful to place the elites as well as the population, and even better, different elites, in this attribute space. The five major perspectives outlined before should lead to empirical hypotheses about how the different

actors would place themselves in a limited number of probable hypothetical situations. Ultimately, the actors have in mind two extreme situations, neither of which seems at present likely but neither of which can be excluded. One is based on the model of the long term historical path followed by Western European Socialism from its utopian hope to create a new society (on the basis of a permanent majority of the proletariat, breakdown of capitalism, disappearance of other social cleavages, either by democratic means or a brief dictatorship of the proletariat, in a transition) to its present participation in power on the basis of a catch-all Volkspartei, aggregating a variety of interests in a mixed economy and leaving room for capitalism. A party exposed to the shifts in the electorate and reforming an existing society. Many of my colleagues see the PCI moving more or less rapidly in this direction. Some of them hopefully, others with some regrets. Most Communists, even those embarking on such a course would not approve of such a model. It seems to me almost impossible that any responsible PCI leader would publicly identify himself with such a model for the future role of his party. Even if the scholars working at the periphery of the party discover that many voters, and even activists, implicitly accept such a model (as Max Weber was perceiving in 1905, the SPD and the German trade unions and historical scholarship has shown in detail) such a development is not likely without serious strains. After all, the European socialist movement around and after World War I did not manage in many countries such an evolution. Even in Germany, where we find significant parallels between the SPD and the present PCI in Italy, that process took decades and no one should forget the roles of Spartakists, the USPD and KPD, nor should we forget the Austro-Marxists, in attempting to extrapolate the history of Western democratic socialism. The evolutionary model for which certainly many conditions in Italy are favorable, assumes a constellation of factors on the six dimensions outlined above, not easily fulfilled.

The other model present in the minds of many political actors is that of the quasi-legal takeover of power in a crisis situation, creating a power vacuum, with the support of semi-loyal parties and "naïve" democratic leaders, hopeful of domesticating a mass party without whose participation governing becomes difficult. A party whose organizational capacity and control of the piazza allows it to take power, step by step, particularly if an ill advised critical event forces it or offers the opportunity to assume full power. No one expects in the second half of the 20th century in an advanced industrial society with a modern state, and particularly in a democracy, a classic revolutionary take-over of power. Only a few romantics who would not have a place in the PCI can dream of that. The quasi-legal take-over of power is a well tested model and despite of all the implicit and the more or less ambiguous or explicit commitment to competitive democracy of the PCI leadership, I cannot imagine that there would be absolutely no situations in which they would be tempted to turn to it. I would be willing to go even as far as to say that if the PCI leadership has fully excluded such a temptation from its present thinking, it might well feel constrained, almost forced, in a particular situation to turn back to this model. In its theoretical heritage, as the Leninist party, it will find good arguments in some situations to turn back to it, rather than to that of evolutionary reformist social democratic ideas. The politico-historical situation therefore will be a decisive variable, irrespective of the internal developments in the PCI ideology, organization, strategies, and tactics. The model of quasi-legal, planned or accidental take-over of power obviously is also in the minds of other political actors. This historical awareness can be a positive factor in skillful engineering of any process of integration, but can also lead to false historical extrapolations that can prevent an evolutionary process within a stable democratic framework.

The two dimensions, expectations of the PCI and fears of those opposed to it, specifically in the DC electorate and leadership, emerge against the background of those two ideal types of evolutionary integration and quasi-legal take-over. Things would be simple if the PCI could fully commit itself publically and in the innermost beliefs of its leaders to an evolutionary model, and if those today anticommunists could convince themselves of the sincerity of the PCI leadership. Failure on either side to reach that point is the real problem. Approximations to that point under favorable circumstances and timing are possible and it is the task of social scientists to discover the conditions leading to them or standing in their way.

Leaving aside any agreement in the body politic on the two extreme models of an easy transformation of the PCI into a social democratic party, and the dated model of a party inequivocally committed to a quasi-legal take-over to establish its dictatorship, we have to explore a complex set of intermediary alternatives. The PCI faces the problem of moving in an evolutionary direction (that its opponents on the Left would call reformism)but it is unlikely that it will publicly and unequivocally admit such a process. I would even argue that the gains for stability of democracy, of the integration of the PCI into the system, would largely be lost if it were to do so. On the other side, despite of changing attitudes of elites and probably to a lesser extent of large segments of public opinion toward admitting the integration of the PCI into the system, there will remain considerable resistance to such a prospect, reinforced by the remaining elements of dupplicita, or at least ambiguity. The strategy of the PCI in the last decade or so has been aimed at neutralizing those fears, along the six dimensions noted above.

(1) The emphasis on polycentrism, the via italiana al socialismo, the cautious critique of specific Soviet policies, the attitude toward the Common Market, and perhaps a shift in attitude toward Italy's foreign policy.

(2) Internal changes in the party, particularly a shift in emphasis from a cell structure to one based fundamentally on sections, a still minor change in tolerance toward greater freedom in the party, an emphasis on local and regional politics, greater room for constructive opposition in parliament, etc.

(3) A continuous emphasis on policies based on the social strategy and the presenza in the society, attempting to retain loyalties in a changing social structure, and to neutralize the appeal of other parties, particularly the MSI to certain crisis strata.

(4) The use of the historical heritage and memories of the Italian past to define strategies, the fear of Maximalism and its potential consequence Fascism, the emphasis on alliance in the Resistance, and the constitution making period

are important to build bridges with other parties and to assure the isolation of the extreme Right.

(5) The so-called social strategy, the insertion into civil society, its presence in many occupational and semi-corporative structures, including those in which it shares it influence with the Left Socialist, is one of its key sources of strength, but is likely to create difficult problems if the party should be called to share in government. It is the basis of a sub-culture which assures the loyalty of voters and members. For many observers, this insertion has been the basis for adaptations and ultimately should lead to reformism. Other have rightly noted that the social milieux dominated by the party might well have been socialized into its ideology and might well limit its freedom of action at the strictly political level. In addition, those social and interest bases might well force on it contradictory demands as it comes closer to power, and limit its capacity to act as a spearhead of reforms demanded by the modernization of Italy. A concrete case is its appeal and policy toward the ceti medi produttivi, studied by Hellman. This strategy is in part a via Italiana response to the importance of the modest self-employed in the Italian social structure, and of the historical interpretation of their relationship to the rise of Fascism. The proportion of the one-and-a-half million party members who are artigiani, commercianti, esercenti e piccoli imprenditori is 7.6%, which contrasts with the 3.4% of technicians and clerks reported in the 1972 Dati sull organizzazione del PCI. These figures suggest a certain lack of attention to the white collar and cadre middle classes of the society of the future, and contribute to account for the regional patterns of growth of the PCI appeal in recent years. I have already stressed the serious political implications of the changing relationship of the labor movement with the political parties, particularly in 1968, with the growing intensity of labor conflict, the importance of non-economic demands, the emphasis

on work organization. And above all, the emergence of new forms of representation that accompanied those changes and finally the emergence of federations uniting workers of different political background. Pizzorno has analyzed the complex implications of those changes for the policy of the party. Its shift from a cautious support for the lotta per le reforme to reclaim the monopoly of political direction for the party. The changes on the labor front and the danger of the appeal to spontaneity of the Manifesto pose the alternative of a more socialist interpretation of mass mobilization of protest, rather than the search for a more political approach coming closer to the government and mediating between the working class and those in power. The strategic choices involved will be particularly significant for the process of political integration of the PCI we are discussing.

(6) I fell that the problems posed to the party by the emergence of the Manifesto, the grupetti, and more or less isolated acts of terrorism in the process toward integration into the system have been neglected. It is not so much the threat of schism in the party of loss of members, and even loss of voters, but the position to take toward them, particularly in the case of approaching a share in governmental power. A clear distacco is likely to alienate some of its intellectual supporters, to expose the party to criticisms of reformism and internal difficulties. A clear stand on these problems could easily become a difficult condition for future participation in the system and ambiguities in this area would be a powerful argument in those committed to consider the PCI a disloyal, antisystem opposition.

On the six dimensions, we have noted how the party is moving toward positions that will neutralize much of the anticommunist sentiment, continue the insertion of the party into the society, and through it, into the political system, in fact, require in the long run, a further integration, build bridges with other parties, and particularly interest groups influential in other parties. However,

each of those policies cannot be carried too far and formulated too explicitly without weakening the party. Internally, any such weakening makes overt or covert coalitions with it less valuable for the stability of the system, and therefore less likely. Further weakening of the ties with the world Communist movement, and even more explicit breaks with it, would weaken the mistique of the party. Internal changes that would allow greater party democracy would take away from the PCI one of its unique strengths to be a party without factions or correnti. Certainly, the experience of the Socialists and other parties is a strong deterent toward developments in this direction. I have already noted how the broad social strategy might be an obstacle when coming close to government. In view of all those difficulties, I would expect the party, as an organization, to act in a conservative way that would put into question its image as an renewed party and reinforce the fears its control of important sectors of Italian life and its sub-cultural character arouse. To abandon that emphasis on control, unity, consensus, on the other side, would weaken its value as an ally in an effort to stabilize government and society in Italy. The party leadership is probably right in some respects in rejecting a reformist self-image and in limiting the autonomy and internal democratization within the movement. The question is ultimately, how much change without losing its acquired identity, without serious splits, without a loss of control; and at the same time sufficient change to warrant the trust as a new type of party of the other participants in the political system. To find such a point of equilibrium between its own tradition and change will take time, probably cannot be done without some loss of strength and would be much more difficult in a period of social tensions and economic crisis than in a period of stability. Changes in the party also have to have some tangible payoffs, and those require access to governmental power, directly or indirectly. In their absence, forces advocating a reaffirmation of a principled opposition position of sectarianism,

even when of a very different type than in the 1950s as part of the international Communist movement. The proximity to power, particularly to government, will create difficult problems for the party and therefore we can expect a considerable hesitancy if not reluctance to move in that direction, except in the case of a power vacuum in the democratic center.

Should the party in the future face the choice to support or enter into a government or be forced into such a situation by a simultaneous growth of its vote and that of theMSI, it will face a difficult, even dangerous situation. The question would then become similar to that experience by the PSI: what policies, reforms, positions of power should it demand. Then, the real question of a commitment to reformism or quasi-legal take-over of power, or at least the temptation of it, will re-emerge. A way out would be indirect support or opposition, not imposed but voluntary, as a more comfortable position. If the entry into government were a real possibility, the PCI would have to consider what policies it could bargain for that would be consistent with its positions, satisfy fairly immediately significant numbers of its supporters, and be acceptable to its partners and not disrupt the economic system of Italy in the context of Common Market Europe. I am sure that there are reforms of that type that would alienate only minorities in the party and whose success would quiet the cries of reformism and sell out. However, a mistake in that moment would create an even greater disillusionment as the presumptive failure of the apertura a sinistra and would immediately be reflected in defections on the Left, and loss of control of organizations and conflict with the trade unions,

Often the analysis of the integration of the PCI into the system is limited to an intensive study of changes in the party, its ideology, appeal, internal organization, relationship with the social structure, role in public bodies, etc. All those changes, however, are insufficient to assure the transition from opposition to government, unless the party would win an electoral landslide, without the cooperation of other parties. There are obviously three types of coalitions: a popular front, uniting the PCI and all the Socialist parties; and two versions of the great coalition: one uniting the PCI and the DC, leaving out the PSI and PSUP; or a new version of the old antifascist coalition from the DC toward the Left.// The first alternative offers fewer ideological obstacles for both partners, would be reinforced by the emerging French model and build on the traditions of the action pact, and could be seen as a step toward some form of fusion of the Marxist parties. One great disadvantage is that unless the electorate changes appreciably, it is not likely to lead to power in Rome. In addition, it would be in contradiction to some of the basic assumptions that have guided the Via Italiana. The effort to reach the Catholics, and particularly the Catholic working class, the policies aimed at neutralizing the fears of the ceti medi and arousing the latent Fascism of Italians, of pushing the DC toward closer collaboration with the Destra, and ultimately a polarization in Italian society. It is one thing to work together in the CGIL in local and regional governments, another to assume the responsibility of government. On the part of many PSI leaders to enter such a coalition would also encounter many resistances, on account of the fear of absortion or dependence on the stronger partner in the coalition and the loss of room for maneuver in the political arena. Electoral considerations would also enter into the picture, given the slow erosion of the Socialist electorate by the PCI and the risk of losses on the Right toward a PSDI unwilling to enter. But above all, the electoral prospects for a Fronte government do not seem great.

The second combination about which speculation has not been lacking, does not seem to me very plausible. Ideologically, there are serious obstacles in both the PCI and DC and both will risk schisms or at least strong internal opposition that would make the alliance unstable. It would also cause serious strains in all those sectors of Italian life, trade unions, municipalities, regions in which the PCI has been working closely with the PSI. Such an alliance could only be on a basis of considerable equality between the two partners and there are too many obstacles to that in matters like foreign policy and those affecting the organizational interests of the interest groups linked with the DC. The issues linked with secularization would not be probably an obstacle since on that point the PCI has decided not to make a fight. The allocation of cabinet seats in such a government would not be an easy matter and could arouse deep fears in many sectors of the society. To formulate a government program for such a coalition that would sarisfy the electorates of both parties seems impossible. Such a coalition can only be made for particular situations, perhaps the election of a president of a republic to foster the third governmental alternative, but not for a parliamentary government.

The great coalition including all or most parties from the Left of the DC, an expanded apertura a sinistra, excepting the PSDI, cannot be by contrast, excluded. It could happen to a complex consideration in a parliament with the composition not too different from the present, particularly with the somewhat larger PCI representation and a somewhat weaker DC. I do not think it is a realistic alternative in the near future, but I feel that the conditions for its success within a democratic framework should be explored. Such a coalition, however, is more likely in the case of a simultaneous growth in strength of the PSI and the Destra, without a previous process of legitimation of the MSI. Since such a process presents many difficulties, noted above, the return to a

great antifascist coalition cannot be excluded. The costs and dangers for each of the participants, however, are great and therefore other alternatives are likely to be used in such a crisis situation, particularly the covert coalition of a government with PCI parliamentary support without participation. For the PCI there would be enormous advantages of such a participation if it were decided to either a reformist course that would ultimately lead to the hated reformist party or a favorable judgement of the opportunities for quasi-legal take-over of power. Since I feel that the PCI is not committed at present to either of those two alternatives, particularly because unless the crisis in Italian society would reach a high point, the second is not viable. There are, however, other strong reasons for the PCI to give serious consideration to such a great coalition. One, the opportunity to deliver to its supporters gains that would consolidate its position and expand its electoral base, in addition to providing further patronage opportunities to its functionaries. Secondly, to influence Italian foreign policy in a direction that would satisfy the Soviet Union. Third and foremost, to achieve full legitimacy as a system party and thereby enhance the opportunity for a Marxist socialist government in the future. The same than the great coalition of the SPD/CDU improved immensely the opportunities of the SPD to rule, an Italian grand coalition would, if successful, change radically the position of the party and perhaps reinforce it electorally. It is more dubious what advantages the DC could find, as long as it is capable to govern with other allies, in such a coalition. But we should not forget the tendency of demochristian parties and the DC toward broad coalitions, even beyond the necessary parliamentary bases. De Gasperi already set an example in this direction, looking toward the future. Under favorable conditions, DC strategists might feel that such a move would contribute to consolidate the democratic regime by forcing the PCI to abandon any ambivalences toward it. They might also feel, thinking in more machiavelian terms, that

such a move would weaken the PCI among its supporters. Similar considerations would enter into socialist support for such a coalition. Last, but not least, such a government might be able to implement some reforms otherwise blocked. Internal cleavages within the DC and personal ambitions might enter also into the calculations.

As I said before, such a grand coalition, however, is likely to emerge, if ever, in a moment of weakness of the center, either in parliament or more likely on the piazza and in the factories. In such a situation, the PCI support and preferably the entry into the government might be seen as a way to stabilize a situation getting out of hand. But, in such a moment it seems doubtful that it would be in the interest of the PCI, particularly if the trade unions continue becoming more independent, to assume that task. The costs would be too high, internally and perhaps even electorally, especially since the emergence of a Left opposition to the party, with an ideology and program suited to such a situation. There could be a social and economic crisis that would force the party to take positions that its recent history and general evaluation of the Italian situation makes undesirable, but would lead it to feel in its own interest to participate in such an effort of stabilization. No one can predict without a knowledge of how such a situation would develop, what the party would do as a coalition partner. At this point, the reactions of other segments of society, the evasion of capital, Fascist violence, the threat or reality of an anticommunist coup, real or suspected foreign intervention, etc. could unleash a chain reaction of incommensurable consequences. It is not certain whether a grand coalition in a crisis situation would act as stabilizer or as precipitant of an even deeper crisis. My guess is that the talk of a grand coalition in more stable times is consciously or unconsciously based on the fear of the need to turn to it in a moment of instability or weakness of the center. Only from that perspective does it make sense. Another implicit assumption of all the talk of the grand

coalition is the conviction of the impossibility of a more or less grand coalition on the Right. The memory of the reaction to the Tambroni experiment, the successful mobilization of antifascist sentiment together with a vague feeling of illegitimacy of the MSI in the DC, have convinced large part of that party of the inviability of an apertura a destra including the MSI. I would expect, therefore, in the near future, experiments on the part of some DC politicians with an apertura a destra to test the reaction of the country. The same than regional governments had served to contribute to legitimate the PCI, I would expect further experiments in that direction with the MSI. After all, it should not be difficult to the MSI to reduce its romantic Fascism and to become more what it already is to a large extent a mixture between clientlistic and protest party. The legitimation of the MSI would reduce the interest in normal times in a grande coalizione toward the Left.

The consolidation of centrismo with alternating support and occasional alternation with a centro sinistra would end the hopes of a great coalition. The end of those hopes would favor a return to a Fronte, if the PSI would decide that the share in government and sotto governo with an apertura a sinistra does not pay, or to the role of an opposition party sharing in power at local and regional levels, and occasionally exchanging its votes in parliament for measures satisfying its clientel. I wonder if such a prospect in a less totalitarianly controlled party and network of organizations with a less isolated subculture would not produce serious crisis in the PCI. Such developments could benefit the emergence of a stronger opposition to the party on its left, or a turn toward a more militant social political action rather than an electoral activity ultimately aimed at a share in power in a democratic context. I wonder if the fear of such a development is not influencing some DC politicians.

In spite of the integration into the society, the adaptive processes, the

integration into the political system at certain levels, the PCI faces an uncertain future of quasi-negative integration. A future that despite of all its strength, success, stability, capacity to overcome crisis, must create serious doubts about the strategy to follow in the PCI leadership. It is in this long range perspective that despite of all its difficulties and dangers to all participants and not least of all to the PCI, the grande coalizione cannot be excluded from the political horizon. It is not probable, it might lead to disaster, but skillfully managed by all parties and well timed, it might contribute to a stable and progressive future for Italy; but I doubt that the timing and the execution would be right. In view of all that, the best bet is still more of the same and the 54% saying that "in complesso non posiamo lamentarci" are probably right. Italians have to find other solutions than through politics to many of their problems, muddle through politics with shifting parliamentary alignments, as long a government is capable of its primary function, "assicurare l'ordine al paese", with a somewhat lax interpretation of the word order.