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Scientific Symposium
on the subject

Principles, Possible Structures and Perspectives for a System of Collective Security and Cooperation in Europe

in Vienna on October 14 and 15, 1972

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1. The situation on the European continent is characterized by basic
   positive changes. These changes enable us to speak of the transition
   to a new quality in the relations of European countries, characterised
   by the tendency towards collective security and peaceful cooperation.

   Today a number of bilateral and multilateral contracts and agree-
   ments containing positive commitments with regard to basic problems
   of European security already exist. Undoubtedly the treaties which
   have become effective between the USSR and the People's Republic of
   Poland with the Federal Republic of Germany, the quadrilateral agree-
   ment on West Berlin and the treaty between the German Democratic Re-
   public and the Federal Republic of Germany represent the settlement
   on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence of particularly
   those questions which have for a long period of time heavily burdened
   mutual relationships of the European peoples and states.

   Acting peaceful coexistence between states of different social
   systems, however, does not only imply the reduction of conflict
   areas and tensions, but also the transition to a higher level of
   equal, mutually more advantageous cooperation. Relations between
   the USSR and France and the principles on which they are based, are
   already today convincing evidence of this.

   The changed political climate in Europe is strikingly expressed
   in the fact that the convention of a state conference for security
   and cooperation has the approval of all states on the continent, and
   the USA and Canada as well.

   Despite this indisputable change, it must be stated soberly that
   Europe is still in a phase of transition. Its post-war history
   is finished, but the bases for the new stage in its history have
   not yet been determined in an equally binding and lasting way for
   all states. Obviously opposing forces are also effective which are
   attempting to maintain hostile confrontation and impede the enforce-
   ment of the principles of peaceful coexistence. Theses forces are to
   be found above all among influential politicians and military re-
   presentatives of the NATO bloc.

   The development towards peace, security and cooperation in Europe
   as the determining tendency in European politics does not take
   place by itself, but is a consequence of the action of those national
   and social forces interested in peace and progress.

2. The political structure of present-day Europe is very varied. It is
   characterised by the existence of more than 30 sovereign states of
   opposing social systems which also differ in their political system
   and national idiosyncrasies.

   Socialist and capitalist states exist side by side, developing in
   accordance with the inner specific laws of their social order.

   Some European states belong to military-political groupings, while
   others are not bound by a pact and are neutral.

   There are many economic alliances.

Between the countries of Europe there are also differences with
regard to their size.

This differentiation on the European scene is expressed in dif-
ferent levels of interests. Realistically, problems concerning
the entire continent can only be solved if these differences are
taken into account. Implementing peaceful coexistence will lead
to an intensification of peaceful competition between both so-
cial systems on all sectors.

The creation of a system of collective security and cooperation
must be based on the political and social realities existing on
the continent. Therefore the prerequisite for this process is
the respect of the sovereign equality of all states, the strict
observance of the principle of non-interference in the affairs
of other states and the abstention from any kind of discrimination.

3. The creation of a system of collective security and peaceful co-
    operation in Europe today is the decisive common denominator in
    which the parallel, coinciding and conforming interests of all
    peoples and states of the continent can be combined.

    This is based above all on the following factors, which would
    provide favorable prerequisites for concrete agreements based
    on international law at the European state conference itself
    and after:

    - In view of the international relation of forces which is de-
      veloping more and more in favor of the forces of peace, and
      in view of the special dangers which would result for the en-
      tire continent from a confrontation of military potential
      concentrated in the narrow European area, it is increasingly
      obvious that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence
      and that security regulations in Europe must encompass the
      entire continent.

    - In the interest of maintaining their independence, sovereignty
      and territorial integrity, all European countries are inter-
      ested in the recognition of the inviolability of their borders
      and the renunciation of force. This interest can only be
      effectively protected if the respective principles have uni-
      versal validity.

    - With the internationalization of economic life, the necessity
      for and interest in the extension of long-term economic and
      scientific-technical cooperation increases, also between states
      with different social systems. Moreover, the European area
      offers particularly good prerequisites for cooperation.

    - The creation of such international political relations which
      enable a decrease in armament expenditures is in the interest
      of economic growth, and above all of social progress for the
      peoples.

    - Due to the specific characteristics of the political and economic
      geography of Europe, a number of problems of infrastructure,
      energy and raw material sources and environmental protection
      can only be solved by cooperation with equal rights of the
      states of the continent.   ../..

This coincidence of interests does not cancel out the partly
diverging motives and aims resulting from the social and national
order of the countries of Europe; there is a dialectic reciprocal
relation between the divergence of the systems and their peaceful
coexistence. Corresponding agreements must therefore of necessity
have a compromise character. They can only be lasting if these are
really true compromises with no disadvantage or discrimination for
any state or any group of states.

This would give all states the possibility - irrespective of their
size and possible membership in military-political groups - to make
an adequate contribution, in their own interest, and with equal
rights, to security and cooperation, and to the peaceful economic,
scientific and cultural development of the continent and to have a
share in it.

4. Holding a conference of the states of Europe, the USA and Canada
as soon as possible is the most realistic and promising way to
agreements binding on international law for a system of collective
security and cooperation on the continent.

The proposed conference takes the political structure of present-
day Europe into account; it offers all states the possibility of
participating with full equal rights, and excludes the out-voting
of individual states or groups of states. The form of the states
conference constitutes, due to its flexible structure, the basis
for a gradual transition to a comprehensive continental system of
security and cooperation. The character of the conference will,
under present conditions, also do best justice to the fact that
the creation of a system of European security and cooperation is
a drawn-out process undoubtedly requiring a number of conference.

Just because this conference of states to be convened will only
be the first of a number of conferences, its success will depend
deoisively on concentration on priorities for the peaceful develop-
ment of relations between European states. Starting with the
priority of politics would form the keystone for the successful
continuation and further development of the process to be initiated
by the conference directed towards the general exercising of peace-
ful coexistence and diverse, mutually-advantageous cooperation
between states. In this way the conference would not be burdened
by problems which can only be solved after the creation of the
necessary political prerequisites. This would also prevent it
from adopting the character of negotiations of political-military
groupings as would be the case if priorities were reversed in favor
of military security problems. On the other hand, the flexibility
of the conference character offers the possibility of solving certain
partial problems of security and cooperation by means of special
negotiations parallel to the agreement on basic political principles.
In this way, and still observing priority for political questions,
questions of the reduction of military confrontation and armament
could also be solved more easily.

In the opinion of the socialist states, it should and can finally
also be possible in the course of the development of good neighborly
relations and cooperation between European states in the inter-
est of peace to overcome the division of the continent in military-
political groupings.   ../..

The necessary institutionalization of European security and co-
operation requires a smooth preparation and convocation of the
conference of European states and the USA and Canada. Clarifi-
cation of still outstanding questions - agenda, date, location
and procedure - could best be achieved at a multilateral consul-
tative meeting, proposed by the Finnish Government for late
November, at which all interested states should participate on an
equal basis. All the prerequisites exist for the conference itself
to start work in the first half of 1973.

5. Guaranteeing peace and security on the continent demands a system
of obligations for all European states and concrete measures
which put relations between European states on a new, peaceful
basis.

These basic principles of European security and cooperation are
above all the renunciation of the threat or use of force, inviola-
bility of the borders now existing in Europe and territorial
integrity of European states, development of relations of peaceful
coexistence between states of opposing social orders, development
of good neighborly relations on the basis of absolute equality,
sovereignty, independence and non-interference in internal affairs
and of   mutual advantage in the interest of peace.

The first concrete major result of the negotiations of the con-
ference of states might be a treaty or similar binding document
of international law which, by determining the basic principles
of the relations between states in Europe, would provide the
outline that could be filled in by further concrete agreements
on other areas. The endorsement by international law by all states
of the continent between themselves and with third states to adhere
strictly to these principles would be in full accordance with the
UN Charter and would make the improvement in the situation in
Europe more permanent. Non-recognition of some of these principles,
e.g. of the principle of the inviolability of all state borders
existing in Europe or the principle of equality and non-discrimi-
nation, were the decisive reasons for tension and conflicts in the
post-war period. In the same way, attempts made to give the
character of a provisional situation to realities in Europe and
to keep certain questions open result in the maintenance of fo-
cusses of tension and conflict.

6. The structures and parameters of a developing system of European
security and cooperation must be based on the principle of
sovereign equality of all European states, which are fundamentally
granted the same rights and duties. The safe-guarding of national
sovereignty must be in keeping with the acceptance of all-European
obligations. The suitable starting point for the necessary structures
of European security is therefore the European conference of states
as such, which could take on a permanent character and establish
expert groups for single questions. Existing regional state alliances
could act as consultants to the states of the continent if all
participants agree.

In the interest of cooperation of all states on the basis of equal
rights, irrespective of their membership to such alliances, the
direct participation of such institutions is not expedient. A

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permanent European state conference could also use the services
of European social institutions - for example, scientific societies -
in working out solutions to problems. A system of security and co-
operation of all European states does not exclude the possibility
of more comprehensive bilateral or multilateral relations between
European states and their close cooperation. Such agreements might
even have a propitious influence on relations between all European
states if they do not follow aims directed against European se-
curity and do not include any discriminating regulations against
other states or groups of states.

Regarding the question of the structure of a European system of
security and cooperation, it is decisively important that it is
based on the strict recognition of realities and is flexible enough
for a gradual extension of its contents according to the progress
made in the implementation of the basic political principles of
relations between states in Europe.

In a very general sense, in the creation of a collective system of
security and cooperation in Europe we will be dealing for a certain
period of time with the interplay of a number of constant and dy-
namic factors.

7. The development of peaceful relations between all states on the
    continent on the basis of the general binding principles of inter-
    national law may lead to such generally advantageous cooperation
    between European states that the idea of a joint Europe might change
    from a term to practical reality. This will be possible when states
    respect the national and social identity of other countries and do
    not use cooperation as a means of interfering in internal affairs.
    On this basis, comprehensive cooperation between all European states
    on the economic, scientific and cultural sectors and in the develop-
    ment of the infra-structure - above all of communication and traffic -
    and in solving problems of environmental protection will be possible
    to the advantage of all. If, in doing so, all states strictly ob-
    serve   equal rights and do not allow the exchange connected with
    it to be misused for purposes of ideologic diversion, an atmosphere
    of mutual confidence may be created which will bring the European
    nations closer to each other.

    This cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and mutual con-
    fidence can only develop if differences between the social systems
    are not ignored. It also presupposes the strict observance of
    the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal
    affairs with regard to the decisions of individual states on the
    content, scope and modalities of exchange.

    The development of a system of continental security and cooperation
    in Europa would be extremely significance for the development of
    all international relations. A model would be created for how the
    non-warping, side-by-side existence of states with different social
    orders might be transformed into peaceful co-existence without
    cancelling out the divergences of the social systems. At the same
    time such a development in Europe would be an important prerequisite
    for the European states to make a more effective contribution to
    the solution of economic and other problems in the world.   ../..

8. Inter-state agreements on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe could fortify security on our continent. In view of the concentrated military power of the existing alliance systems, measures for reducting troops and armaments would be particularly necessary and useful. Steps in this direction have been suggested and demanded for years in the various plans and campaigns of European governments for nuclear weapon-free zones and other measures for armament restrictions. Such proposals as are presently being made by some NATO states to MBFR could have a similar effect. It is being increasingly recognized that the escalation of military strength, the so-called balance of terror, offers fewer guarantees for security than a security system based on a reduction of armed forces and armaments, provided these reductions do not grant advantages to one side.

   A priority of political steps of détente as against disarmament measures is an experience out of the practice of present international relations. A multilateral renunciation of force, as might be agreed on by an all-European security conference, would significantly improve conditions for the reduction of armaments and troops. The details of an armament reduction in Europe would certainly not belong to the subjects of negotiations at a European security conference, but they could be discussed parallel to the solution of basic political questions.

   The urgent problem of a reduction of troops and armaments in Europe is insolubly tied to the over-all problematics of the general military relation of forces in the world and is, to a certain degree, even influenced by it, even partially also dependent on it. That is why as many European states as possible should promote the holding of a world disarmament conference, particularly in the interest of solving specific European disarmament questions. They should demand the setting-up of a competent preparatory body for this purpose with the representation of absolutely all nuclear-weapon powers, and help to institute it.

9. An extremely important factor in the present development in Europe is the public movement for security and coöperation, which is increasing in strength and organization. It is an independent political potential which must definitely be considered in an analysis of the present and future development. A mile-stone in the development of this movement was the Assembly of Brussels in early June, 1972, the most representative meeting of public personalities ever known in the history of our continent. The public movement has many sectors and is composed of members and representatives of various classes, groups and organisations with different political-ideological aims and concepts. However, they are joined together by a common platform, demonstrating the existence of a superiour unity: the strong demand for the immediate convocation of a conference of states.

   The public movement has committed itself to two major tasks: first, it is qualified to promote a constructive exchange of opinions on the ideas of the public and its representatives - members of parliament, communal politicians, scientists and artists, representatives of parties, trade unions, youth and women's organi-

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zations, as well as of business groups, churches and religious
communities, of national and international organizations - and
to formulate recommendations and aid: decisions which can be
submitted to the governments and/or conference of states and
their organs. Secondly, it is qualified to lend the necessary
moral authority of the peoples to the binding agreements according
to international law of the governments and legislative bodies of
states, helping them to become fully effective in the interest
of the whole of Europe.

European security and cooperation is also measured by the peoples
according to the possibilities it opens up for improving the
many-sided conditions of their lives and social progress. Thus
such a system will also enhance social life in the individual
countries, and the feeling of responsibility of their citizens
for peace and progress on the continent, and will further re-
strict the possibilities of reactionary forces to disturb this,
development. Herein lies a decisive dynamic element of the system
of European security and cooperation.

10. Science is in a position to play a positive part of its own in
the favourable result of the European conference of states and for
the development of security and cooperation on the continent. The
development of the scientific exchange of ideas by competent
scholars and scientific institutions on these problems could help
governments to obtain more exact and detailed knowledge of the
interests and standpoints of the peoples and states concerned
and thus reduce distrust. As it is, appropriate scientific in-
stitutions are working out various possibilities for solving
European problems for the politicians and governments of their
countries. Open scientific contact between them is helping to
concentrate the negotiations between the states on real basic
political questions.

Finally, science also plays a key part in working out prognoses
and programs for future development of the continent. Here the
responsibility of the scientist towards society becomes very
apparent, because the course of European history is not an automatic
process, it is determined by the struggle of politically dedicated
social forces. This dedication to a peaceful and substantial
future on the continent cannot be evaded above all by a responsible
science because of the great effect its results might have.

Therefore, it is no coincidence that the initiatives and meetings
of dedicated scientists have great prominence in the movement of
the democratic public of Europe for security and cooperation.

* * *

Johan GALTUNG:

MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction)

No formula should stimulate initial scepticism as much as this one, since this is only a new acronym for what they have always tried to do. But as opposed to the McCloy-Zorin doctrine there is now less mention of control. How significant that is remains to be seen, but there is less talk about the two types of control (control of that which is destroyed/removed, as opposed to control of that which remains) than there was ten years ago. This may be a sign of growing insight in how counterproductive premature insistence on control may be.

We doubt very much that there is much to gain under this MBFR formula alone. For reduction to be _balanced_ there has to be a baseline, a commonly agreed estimate of the military capability on either side. But is any side really interested in having the other side know its capability? Will the other side ever believe that it knows? Why should one suddenly assume that in the early 1970s, governments, for some reason, became honest about their military capabilities? What would make them refrain from cheating sufficiently much to keep that little edge they believe to be significant?

Yet they may proceed without a baseline, just trying to get rid of some of the system. If "balance" is interpreted this way, assuming that they are more or less equal and only trying to cut off the top of the development, it may be more meaningful. In other words, one might proceed on the basis of exact pairing, a dollar for a dollar, a man for a man, a tank for a tank, a fighter-bomber for a fighter-bomber. And one may also develop more complex formulas, taking geographical asymmetries into consideration. In the past this has not proven a **very fruitful** approach, but there may be some more leeway in the system now. More particularly, there may be some possibilities of withdrawal of foreign troops on a balanced basis, "balance" including reference to geographical parameters.

Two special components should be singled out for some attention since they appear frequently in public debates, and since they may represent important pitfalls against which the public should be warned. These are manpower reduction and budget reduction.

Manpower reduction might be the obvious answer to the increasing unpopularity of military service in all countries, as far as one can judge. It may also be a disarmament issue popular in public opinion since its impact is highly visible, both in the families from which the forces are drawn, and in the districts where they are stationed. But few measures can be so deceptive. If disarmament is to mean anything, it must mean a reduction of destructive capability, of the total machinery, not of any single component. And since most organizations in modern societies are accustomed to structural rationalization, to transitions from _labor_ intensive to _capital_

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and research intensive patterns, the military would hardly form any
exception. It is not to be expected that a c.ftpower cut would be
unaccompanied by a hardpower increase: in fact, the two are probably
related so that when one goes down, the other goes up. Where
there is little or no hardware, a 50% software cut would be serious;
with much hardware even a 75% cut might in fact mean increased
destructive capacity.

If manpower reduction would encourage more capital intensive
military machines, budget reduction would encourage more research
intensivity. A cut in the budget would mean a tremendous stimulus
to the imagination and general inventiveness of the top planners
who suddenly would have to obtain the same or more destructive
capability for less money. One way of getting around this would be
to put a ceiling on laboratory capacity, since this is where this
spiral leads us. In other words, any discussion of MBFR that does
not sooner or later involve laboratories should be regarded with the
greatest suspicion. But an MBFR agreement that would set some
ceiling on laboratory capacity under military control, and would
even institute some control mechanism on this, at the same time
as there is manpower reduction and budget cut in the agreement -
such an agreement might start looking serious.

Exchange of Observers and the Movement of Alliances

These are now conventional issues, and have been on the agenda
for a long time, in various forms. One Soviet leader once suggested
that since there were many spies in the world, who in fact derived
their pay from both blocs because they were employed by both, it
would be more rational to agree on a joint salary and exchange
information more directly. The exchange of observers can be seen
as an institutionalization of espionage, but possibly less effective,
and it would hardly do away with espionage. But it might de-mystify
some aspects of the military machine on the other side. On the
other hand, it is also likely to lead to an even greater degree of
homogenization between the military machines.

One item here might be the idea of using third parties as
observers in addition to the exchange of partisan observers, so that
the world community as a whole is also brought in. The third
party could then take the form of UN appointed observers, also from
non-European countries - but with the great risk that they may learn
too much about aspects of the military machines not yet developed
in their own country or region of origin.

Similar comments can be applied to the movement of alliances as
to the exchange of observers. By pressing really hard on these
points, one may get to know more: but one may also create a new
situation where there is more to know, so that the proportion
known/knowable actually decreases. Spy satellites can conceivably
be internationalized and staffed by third parties who relay their

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findings to the world, or the satellites can come in pairs, or there
can be a dually-manned satellite that relays its findings to
both parties. In any case, the result may be the same: stimulation
of inventiveness so as to create more unobserved movement.

In an effort to avoid such pitfalls on the road towards at
least some disarmament, let us therefore try a fresh look at the
control issue.

Control Systems

In the whole history of disarmament, the legal paradigm has
been dominant as a model. The idea has been that one has to arrive
at binding rules defining an arms level or a disarmament process,
and that there has to be a control machinery. The latter would,
roughly speaking, have these components: a detection machinery to
register reports of infractions, a verification process, an adjudication
process and finally some system of sanctions. Experience seems to
speak against this paradigm: the more control, the more motive to
cheat; and if in addition there are sanctions, parties will simply
withdraw from the system.

On the other hand, from the failure of strict control to lead
to disarmament, it does not follow that no control at all leads to
disarmament, either. The control dimension may actually be less
relevant, or (the position we take here) there may be some optimum
point of "soft" control - enough to constitute an incentive to stick
to the agreement and abstain from cheating, yet not enough to
stimulate the development of new weapons systems.

But who is to carry out the control if neither party is
willing to assume that those who entered into the agreement from the
other side could be completely trusted? Moreover, what can be done
if neither side wants to admit the other side close enough to
carry out effective inspection? There are two answers, two by
and large untapped resources: the population on either side, and
third parties.

The population on either side can only be expected to spy on
its own government and report possible infractions to some inter-
national control organ provided 1) it is told to do so explicitly
by its own government, not only by the other side, 2) it is given
access to report channels, and 3) it has some guarantees against
retributions from its own government. None of these conditions
should be ruled out as utopian.

As to the first, not only the right but the duty of any
population to report infractions of an arms control or disarmament
agreement going on in its own country should be worked into any
treaty in a standard clause. The government should pledge itself
to make the treaty known in its country, including this clause, and
to encourage the citizens to cooperate with the government against

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others who might engage in some act of circumvention.

As to the second: this is a technical problem. Some kind of citizens' hot-line might be thought of, some kind of international telephone number that could not be locked locally because of international supervision, but could not be abused for other purposes either because of national participation in that supervision. A system of offices belonging to an international control commission and well dispersed might also be useful, but the problem is of course to guarantee citizens against intimidation from their own government.

As to the third: this is more difficult, but not if the first and second points are taken care of. If not, it would at least constitute a signal to the surrounding world that one of the parties has something to hide.

When it comes to third parties we are, of course, thinking of some non-aligned corps linked to the United Nations, like a UN peace-keeping force. One of their essential duties would be not to report to the other side whatever they might have found of a dubious character inside one of the parties, so as to avoid the use of alleged reports to stimulate arms escalation. Needless to say, they will be spied upon by both parties, for which reason only persons of exceptional integrity could be used, willing to submit to rigorous briefing/debriefing procedures.

As mentioned under zoning, they might also be stationed in special zones. If these are border zones, they might even constitute a cordon sanitaire between the two parties - that might even be extended so as to include naval and air force units. The latter would also have the function of preventing the parties from taking risks when they test each other's warning systems.

Zoning

Zoning is also a component in a disarmament plan, not a complete plan. It should be discussed under two angles:

- domain: the extension of the geographical area involved, and its location

- scope: the extent of the disarmament, which again splits into two: what kind of military capability, and what degree of limitation (freezing, thinning, emptying).

These two dimensions bring in the whole problem of disarmament, which concerns precisely to what degree what kind of military capability shall be done away with. So what is gained, if anything, by bringing in the concept of zoning?

First, there is a certain flexibility because there is one more variable to throw into a bargain, the geographical extension involved. Second, there are zones in the world which are or have been empty

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where some or all kinds of military capabilities are concerned, and
there has been the hope that if one can start with an empty zone and
instituionalize it as empty (e.g. by establishing nuclear-free zones
in outer space, Antarctic, the ocean floor in a certain sense defined
by the concept of "emplacement", Latin America) then there may be a
spread-effect. The theory of the spread effect may or may not be
valid under some conditions; we shall not raise that issue.

However, to freeze what is already empty is non-armament, not
disarmament. It differs from freezing what is not empty in at least
two important respects: when a military capability is present
there is usually a tendency to strengthen it quantitatively, and
there is a similar tendency to strengthen it qualitatively for
inter-system or intra-system reasons. Both processes are relatively
easy, and tempting, when military presence and pressure are already
established. Hence, we shall refer to freezing of non-empty zones as
disarmament, even though at a low level.

Experience does not seem to warrant much optimism when it comes
to a spread effect from the freezing of empty zones. But from the
freezing of non-empty zones some process of escalation might be
expected. Thus, consider this diagram:

In the lower left-hand corner is the present situation; in the upper
right-hand corner the ideal image, "general and complete disarmament"
involving maximum domain and maximum scope, where the whole world
has been emptied of all military capability. The diagram can be used
to illustrate one more way of producing non-results at disarmament
conferences, in addition to freezing empty zones: declarations
about "general and complete disarmament when it is more than obvious
that this does not come about by a jump from the real (corner) to
the ideal (corner). There has to be a process, there has to be
some image of a path, there have to be concrete first steps. And

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And the best must not be permitted to be the enemy of the good.

The major purpose of the diagram is to indicate two such paths, two simple modes of thinking. Both have as a point of departure something very modest: a <u>small</u> territory, and the <u>freezing</u> of <u>one</u> component, but it has to be a component already there. Then comes the escalation hoped for. It may start in either direction, by expanding the territory, or by proceeding with new military components and with thinning rather than freezing. Whatever is done first, the next step will be in the opposite direction; and <u>no attempt should be made to do both at the same time.</u> Further, one should not move ahead "before some experience is gained", a diplomatic way of saying "before forces and interests in favor of rearmament have grown accustomed to the change". Whether one moves along the domain-axis by adding territory or along the scope-axis by reducing military capability depends on what is easier in the concrete situation.

To get such a process started is more important than at which precise point it gets started. The Balkans, the Nordic countries and/or some modified version of the old Rapacki/Gomulka zone in Central Europe (e.g. without Poland) as nuclear-free zones would be excellent, but since nothing of this kind has happened so far, perhaps one reason is that the zones are too big, that one should think smaller. It may also be that the zones should be defined by other than state borders, e.g. by borders that would facilitate some type of control pattern. The Baltic sea with its littoral, as well as the Black Sea with its littoral might perhaps constitute zones for some purposes. So might Berlin; and from Berlin some pattern of concentric expansion, as suggested by Jules Moch many times, might be envisaged. What today is happening with the military machineries in such neutral countries as Austria, Finland, and Sweden are also examples of zones with moves towards freezing (the military budget in Sweden) and towards thinning out (the software component in Austria).

Zoning could also be given a more direct content. There are some pairs of countries where east and west in the traditional European sense border on each other: Norway with the Soviet Union, the two Germanies, FRG with Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria with Greece, Bulgaria with Turkey, and Turkey with the Soviet Union: altogether six pairs. If the border areas on either side could become zones of however limited extension in at least some of these pairs, for instance starting with the shortest ones (Norway-Soviet Union and Bulgaria-Turkey) this might be helpful, but not if it leads to compensatory armament elsewhere. And such border zones might be given a positive content in at least two ways.

First, the zones could be filled with some institutions of cooperation, like summer camps, joint educational institutions on a more permanent basis, even some intergovernmental organization for cooperation (such as canal, rail or road authorities) as distinct from intergovernmental organizations for control.

Second, the zones could house international control forces of one kind or the other. Elsewhere we have argued strongly for the inclusion of non-Europeans and neutral Europeans in such forces and shall not repeat this plea here, only say that this would offer an excellent opportunity to globalize the concern for disarmament and avoid European separatism.

In short, there are advantages to zoning that go beyond general MBFR concepts. One such advantage is that they are conceptually located somewhere between the inter- and intra-system approaches. There are things the parties can do by themselves, and there are things they have to do together. As a variable it can be thrown into an MBFR bargain to give more to play on. It is visible and concrete, unlike the SALT type of agreement which affects very few people directly. And it can be given a positive content: the zone may not only become a zone of negative peace (disarmament) but also a zone for positive peace (cooperation).

Broader Participation in Disarmament Conferences

In principle, the UN is a disarmament conference, but this has proved only one more example of the best being the enemy of the good. In practice the superpowers have had a decisive influence in the field of disarmament, but an intermediate level between superpowers and the UN membership has been injected: the CCD. Participation of non-European states as well as recent colonies is a significant gain, even if it has been at the expense of basic decisions being moved out of the CCD and back to the superpower level. The question is what to do about this.

Again reasoning in terms of scope and domain can be utilized. It may look as if the greater the domain (more nations participating) the lesser the scope (fewer issues discussed, and even fewer and less central decided upon). However, this is to miss the point, for this is a problem not only of decision-making, but also of articulation of issues. When superpowers meet to discuss issues they may decide over the type of issues meaningful to them, which usually means not common issues, but shared issues.

Thus, a strong case can be made that despite many dissimilarities there is also much in common between the US 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic and the Soviet 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia. This is an issue the superpowers have in common, but it is not shared between them. To articulate these as an issue one would need a conference where not only were the Dominican Republic and Czechoslovakia represented, but precisely the social forces which were the targets of the interventions (not necessarily by the same people). And that immediately leads to two different expansions of the issues to be articulated at disarmament conferences, both concerned with efforts to bring in the vertical dimension of disarmament.

The vertical dimension concerns the kind of arms and the kind

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of attack the strong power may make on the weak within its own bloc
or "sphere of influence"; and the kind of arms and the kind of attack
the strong government may make on the weak people within its own
territory. The problem raised is nothing less than this: to
organize disarmament conferences so that there is

- an articulation of the problems of the states reporting a threat
  of intervention

- an articulation of the problems of peoples reporting a threat of
  governmental power abuse

    The problems here are tremendous, and many of them are obvious.
If a state is in danger of being intervened it will probably not
even dare articulate that fear; and if a people - a minority, a
district with some tradition of separatism - feels threatened by
new arms developed or acquired by the government, it will hardly be
permitted any participation and also have considerable difficulty
articulating the fear. For that reason it may often be that others
have to do it for them. This usually means big powers in the other
camp, more than eager to point to sources of dissent within and
between nations. When this form of articulation is utilized, however,
the result is often to reinforce the conflict between the big powers
in question, and to transform the vertical problem of disarmament
back to the traditional horizontal form. And the problem is lost
sight of, at the same time as those are strengthened who, for
various reasons, want to see the world as a stage where only the big
powers perform roles and among themselves.

    Hence something new has to be done. Here are two suggestions.

    The first is <u>a special governmental conference on disarmament,
for small powers only</u> - partly to look into issues involving them-
selves only, mainly to look into issues involving their relation to
big powers. Since the overwhelming majority of these interventions
have taken place in the capitalist world, and have taken the form of
big capitalist powers intervening in small capitalist states (or
small states on the way to becoming socialist) it would not be in-
appropriate if such a conference were not balanced in the conventional
East-West sense. Its findings would be followed with great interest
also in other corners of the world.

    The second would be <u>a special nongovernmental conference of
oppressed minorites or majorites, on the disarmament of governments.</u>
The focus would here be <u>the type of armament governments use against
their own peoples</u>, such as all kinds of eavesdropping devices,
spying machinery, counter-insurgency hardware and software: in short,
the equipment for micro-war. The thesis would not necessarily be to
abolish it all; it might well be that one would agree that governments
have a right, perhaps even an obligation, to keep a minimum. Rather,
the idea would be to discuss criteria for their reduction, upper
limits, documentation on use and abuse, searchlights on research and
development, and so on.

Thus, we would strongly support the idea of a world disarmament conference. However, that conference should be seen in a wider perspective than just as an expansion of the CCD. In fact if that were the only dimension, the expansion, a special session of the UN General Assembly might be sufficient. What is needed is a world disarmament conference that adds the vertical dimension. As to the vertical dimension among nations: this can be done at the governmental level. But the vertical dimension inside nations presupposes participation of non-governments, even of anti-governments or counter-governments - and it is hardly to be expected that this will take place within the conventional setting provided by intergovernmental organizations. If not, all that is proved is how inadequate this setting is, and the need for alternative or at least complementary settings in order at least to articulate the true problems of disarmament.

Non-governmental disarmament conferences

Disarmament is indeed a public concern, but this is not reflected in disarmament conferences. SALT is a typical example of a covenant not openly arrived at - and there are serious doubts as to whether it is an open covenant at all (i.e. whether there are secret protocols). Disarmament conferences are conducted according to the old model of secret diplomacy, yet with an eye to the political impact on the public, particularly in election years. The usual rationalizations are made ample use of: the issues are too difficult for the public to understand, negotiations are too sensitive, too delicate, the negotiators have to have free hands.

Elitism can be attacked as such, but in this case it can also be attacked on the basis of its failure to deliver the promised goods. Hence the call for active and public involvement of counter-elites (elites with views differing from their governments) and anti-elites (the masses, the peoples, public opinion). The question is how to do it.

The model best known so far is the model of counter- and anti-elites exercising pressure on their respective governments. The counter-elite could do this secretly by walking in the corridors of power, establishing itself as a lobby; or openly by organizing as a party, a pressure group, publishing alternative plans, military secrets, and so on. The anti-elites would collect signatures, make demonstrations, occupy offices, destroy some components (such as draft cards) - all of this with or without the counter-elites. All of this has one thing in common: the target of the pressure is the national government, executive, legislative or military branches.

The counter-model proposed here would not be so much to change the methods as to add to the target the intergovernmental level. This immediately splits into two, for intergovernmental organizations can be institutionalized (proper organizations, like the Disarmament Section of the UN, or the CCD for that matter), or ad hoc (conferences

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like SALT). By and large it is only the former that to some extent
have been approached by international nongovernmental organizations,
the latter have been too much left in peace. Their plea for peace
and quiet, even secrecy, has been respected.

It is high time for the public at large to start exercising a
pressure on these intergovernmental organizations, institutionalized
or ad hoc, and at a truly transnational level. By that we mean
a parallel conference or a set of parallel manifestations- not
necessarily an anti-conference, or a demonstration aiming at dis-
rupting any work (or non-work). It should take place at the same
place and at the same time as the governmental conference, be
informal, rich in articulation, prodding and insisting, a way of
airing issues and bringing them to the attention of the public as
well as the governmental delegates. An important part would be de-
mystification of the intergovernmental conference by demonstrating
that technical expertise as well as political will are not mono-
polized by the governmental level and by setting a pattern for
constructive proposal-making as well as basic criticism.

Of course, there may also be occasions where what the
intergovernmental conference deserves is what the world needs: a
genuine transnational demonstration, a confrontation of governmental
with the nongovernmental, of elites with anti- and counter-elites
in cooperation. Needless to say, this will be accompanied by use
(possibly also abuse) of police, with encapsulation of the govern-
mental conference, with cries of anarchy, and so on - which has
always been the case when elite monopolies have been challenged in
a more basic manner. But these would, hopefully, be extreme cases
only.

An International Storehouse of Disarmament Ideas

It is vital to have good documentation of the current state of
affairs in the field of armament, disarmament and arms control - as
is done, for instance, by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI). But it is a major fallacy of empiricism(or
positivism)to believe that by some kind of particular and automatic
mental alchemy solutions to a problem follow from first-rate docu-
mentation of the problem. It is not even obvious that motivation
to solve a problem increases with the quantity and quality of docu-
mentation on it. On the contrary: some may be led to believe that
the problem is insolvable, others that it is not that frightening,
still others that enough is already being done. This, of course,
is no argument against documentation, only a way of saying the
obvious: it is not enough.

What is needed in addition to excellent descriptions of the
current state of affairs, predictions about what would happen if the
system is left unchecked, as well as good theory-construction as to
why it is as it is? Simply stated, two things: some vision of the
goal, a"disarmed world" a "world without the bomb" - but in detail,
with specifications - some vision of how to get there and some very

concrete ideas as to the first steps. All of this is needed: the
ultimate goal without indications of the first steps becomes empty
utopianism; first steps without a vision of the long-term goal
and tactics without strategy becomes empty, bureaucratic pragmatism,
even ritualism.

It is customary to say that there is no scarcity of ideas, that
what is lacking is the "political will". This is a highly misleading
statement, and can only serve those in whose interest it is to be
defended against new ideas and perspectives.

* * *

Attacking the Hardware.

To produce military hardware one needs the same categories of
things as to produce anything else: raw materials, capital and work.
Work is the most immediately human factor, and it splits into two:
<u>scientists</u> to develop qualitatively new weapons systems, <u>workers</u>
to produce larger quantities of already developed weapons systems.
In addition, there are people hiring them and making them work,
through ideological commitment, reward, or punishment. We shall
assume that these people, who presumably also are well represented
at disarmament conferences, are immune to basic change, but that
scientists and workers are not. The question is: what would one
have to do if scientists and workers were to withdraw from contri-
buting to the military machinery?

a. <u>Scientists</u>. Traditionally the scientist has been available at the
call and pay of his government, also to develop weapons, any
weapons. If not <u>all</u> scientists participated, there have always
been <u>some</u>. The situation bears some similarity to slave-merchants
who also professed to work for the benefit of the national or local
economy, in addition to their own. What will make the scientists
abstain from this activity? One might think in terms of three differ-
ent strategies here.

As to <u>ideology</u>: There is now a new generation of scientists
growing up, at least in the west, with an ideology that is much
<u>more critical</u> and also <u>more transnational</u>. The proportion willing
to serve defense research establishments is probably decreasing
(although the absolute number may well increase). A scientific
oath, <u>some kind of Hippocratic oath for all scientists</u>, might be
useful.

As to <u>reward</u>: competitive salaries outside defense industry,
or a premium for scientists who publicly leave defense industry
might also be very useful. And as to <u>punishment</u>: public exposure
of scientists working for defense industry, expulsion from
scientific unions, withdrawal of academic honors, including Nobel
prices, etc., should all be considered.

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b. <u>Workers</u>. Traditionally workers have always been regarded as
vulnerable, as strategically weak: they must earn their living
from somewhere. But if this were the entire truth, there would
never have been trade unions and political fights, often with
tremendous achievements. But why do workers in general not fight in
order not to produce for the military? For the simple reason that
they are not motivated for this fight. Defense industry pays; and
defense industry aimed at production of hardware to be used against
workers in other parts of the world, particularly in colonies, does
not pay worse than any other defense industry. If this is to
change, workers have to change: they have to see more clearly the
impact of what they are doing and throw away such rationalizations
as mentioned above.

To argue that it is impossible to expect strikes among workers
against defense industry, not because of salaries, nor because of
working conditions or participation, but simply because of the pro-
duct itself is, in a sense, to argue that anything workers could do
is impossible. This is an insult to workers, and as such it enjoys
a curious popularity among many intellectuals to the left (that
intellectuals to the right also engage in this type of thinking is
not surprising since so much of their ideology is based on the
notion of the worker as inferior).

A higher level of consciousness among workers would be one pre-
condition so that they could go on strike against the production
(and transportation) of at least some types of weaponry - for
instance that used against other workers in other countries, or in
their own. A reward and punishment system of the types indicated
for scientists might also have some function. However, at this
point there is one basic difference between workers and scientists:
fewer workers may just lead to more automation in the production,
whereas low or no availability of scientists may stop the qualitative
arms race. It may be argued that there will always be <u>some</u>
scientiat available, which is probably true. But it is very
important whether they belong to the élite class or to the intellectual
riff-raff among scientists - the possibility of a sustained arms
race may depend on ..... (three or four words missing)

Attacking the Software

To make military hardware work, persons are needed, human
beings. We shall distinguish between officers and soldiers. In
addition, there are people higher up, hiring them and making them
work. Once more we shall assume that they are immune to basic
change, whereas officers and soldiers are not. The question is: what
would one have to do if officers and soldiers were to withdraw from
the military machinery?

<u>Officers</u>: Officers are persons who have chosen a military career.
This career should be made less attractive, even to the point of
being discredited, at least in countries that show persistent

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tendencies to engage in repressive military activity. For this
to happen there are two strategies which may be less contradictory
than they seem: isolation, even to the point of ostracism
(as when the US ROTC was thrown out of the Ivy League colleges)
and a higher level of critical awareness. However, officers,
unlike scientists, workers, or soldiers, have chosen this career,
have opted for it rather than just drifting into it, so it is
not to be expected that this will yield much in terms of reduced
software capacity.

Soldiers: We are here thinking of volunteers as well as professionals,
except for the truly committed professional who is more similar
to an officer. What makes a soldier shoot, kill? He may be
motivated through some indoctrination, for which reason persistent
fight against war propaganda, against instilling hatred of other
groups and nations (also of the members of other classes, as
persons) should be outlawed. Cinema glorification of violence
as is done in most capitalist countries falls into the same
category. A higher level of consciousness so as to discriminate
between wars, at least so as to develop criteria, would be
essential.

Soldiers also kill because they are paid to do so, and because
they are punished (as deserters, as disobedient) if they do not
kill. A world campaign against mercenaries of any kind, against
killing for money, a higher awareness among people so that they
regard that kind of money the same way as one would today regard,
say, money obtained by selling slaves, would be useful. And
correspondingly with punishment: the right of military to have their
own judiciary and even exercise capital punishment must be
attacked. The abolition of the whole system of military courts
would be tremendously useful in this connection. If military
machines cannot function except by a combination the carrot and the
stick, and even big money for big killing and big stick for
failure to kill - then the military machine is certainly itself
the major enemy even if it carries one's own national color.

Conscientious objection to military service must also be
mentioned in this connection, although today it stands as one among
very many strategies. It raises the problem of whether those who
have the "critical awareness" mentioned above should leave the
military or "work from the inside". This is a fine theoretical
problem but in practice probably a problem of both-and rather
than either-or. Thus, some will leave, some will make anti-war
propaganda on the inside, hand back medals given them in a dirty
war, and so on. There is one danger with this approach, however:
that it degenerates to empty trade unionism aiming at better
conditions for the soldiers rather than at the military machine
itself. The result may be a stronger military machinery rather
than any weakening from the inside. However that may be, what is
advocated here is not a solute pacifism, but a critical attitude
which would make it impossible for any leadership to expect

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obedience relative to <u>any</u> order. What is argued here is the impera-
tive necessity of developing military personnel at least capable
of making a distinction between wars of aggression and wars of
defense, and between wars for or against repression. Once that
distinction is made, one would also expect them to develop sufficient
integrity to obey, or disobey, accordingly.

Attacking the Budgets

We have mentioned before that budgets might be included in the
inter-system approach both under the MBFR and the zoning approaches.
However, since the budget is essentially under national control,
a discussion of the possibilities also belongs here.

There are many ways of approaching the problem of the military
budget, and all of them are complicated by the circumstance that the
military budget is hard to isolate. Like hardware production, it
can consist of all kinds of civilian components put together for a
military purpose with the knowledge of only a very few. But with a
high amount of critical awareness in society this may become more
transparent than today, so let us assume that it is nevertheless
meaningful to talk about such a thing as a "military budget" - that
this term has an empirical referent, so to speak.

In that case, a first task must be to <u>freeze the budget</u>; and
this must be done <u>in absolute terms</u>, not in relative terms. To
peg the budget on a percentage of GNP, national income, or central
government expenditure has nothing to do with freezing, unless the
country has zero economic growth and/or a stagnant public sector.
(Such countries are rare, and particularly rare among the countries
whose military budgets matter in this connection.) Of course, there
is the problem of salary adjustments and inflation, but then
the formula for freezing the budget should be based explicitly on
such factors and not on a general assumption that the military
sector has the same right to expand as the economy as a whole or the
public sector.

The second task would be to look more closely at the
<u>composition of the budget</u>, and most particularly at the allocation
for research and development. If they are not subject to cuts, but
regarded as sacrosanct or even permitted to expand, then even
with a budget that otherwise may be shrinking little or nothing
is gained; what looks like a gain might even be a loss to the
cause of disarmament.

The third task would be to think and act in terms of <u>cuts</u>
<u>in the budget</u>. Some of this may be negotiated internationally as
part of an MBFR. Much, perhaps most, will have to be done inside
the countries, and not necessarily in institutionalized forms. Thus,
one can make the military budget a major issue and organize against
decision-makers who do not go in for cuts. Or, one can take
recourse to such methods as tax withdrawal, refusal to pay taxes

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in the amount of the percentage corresponding to the military
sector. The latter is difficult in capitalist countries with pay-
as-you-earn taxation, and in socialist countries because of the
very low level of taxation anyhow. In both systems heavy punishment
would be the likely result since such decisions are seen as the pre-
rogative of the decision-makers; and if military taxes are in the
focus an element of military adjudication would probably also enter.

Publication of Military Secrets

The concept of the "spy" has so far been reserved for a person
who, often under great danger to self, gets military secrets from
one side and hands them over to the other - with or without handsome
material rewards to himself. This type of spy is inseparable from
the whole war system. He is needed both to estimate the destructive
power on the other side and to enhance one's own, as well as to find
vulnerable spots on the other side and to conceal one's own.

This type should be contrasted with a new, transnational type
of "spy" whose emergence one might hope for: the"spy" who gets
military secrets and publishes them to the world at large, to
humanity. He does it for no material reward, although his job
would be so useful that he might also very well be paid for it,
from some transnational fund if that could be made available.

His task would be to expose the military machine, much as Daniel
Ellsberg did with the Pentagon when he published the Pentagon Papers;
or like the group in England that some years ago exposed the secret
hiding place (in case of war) of the central government. Again, the
point would not necessarily be to advocate the publication of
everything, but to publish the secrets about the excesses of the
war system. What constitutes an excess has to be discussed and
discussed thoroughly, and the whole society has to participate in
this discussion. Since the military appears as a society within
the society, also equipped with its own judiciary as well as its own
control apparatus and means of violence, somewhat exceptional methods
have to be utilized to stop it from growing further in the cancerous,
uncontrolled way we have seen during recent years. And one of
these methods is precisely to make use of one of the idiosyncracies
of the military machine: its dependence on secrecy.

How will the military react? Probably by repressive means and
by rebuilding and reshaping in an effort to stave off the
effects of making their secrets public. This, however,may be
so cumbersome and so expensive, and also so dangerous, that the
military leaders may prefer to come to some kind of deal with the
Ellsbergs - much like the US military have to do with theirs.

Nitz =

blabla — What come first
security or cooperation?

Cannon z discriminazioni
Cee → soluzione necessaria
sulle base di
uno accordo
comune est-ovest

GDR-Inter
zone
trebe

functional approach?

Sugger - dinamiche proprie ~~il~~ problema di sicurezza
a monte politica
problema della
cooperazione
est-ovest
going on
da integrazione
nei due blocchi

I think that we are now analyzing
a situation of interaction between
the two existing dinamic process
in Europe — There are the
two integrative process end
there is the security process
zone)
- differences of structural
difference
- these was only e first contact
but for analytical reason of summarizing
for , or

Political problem
Rapporto posizione of
Common bodies
REGC

- primary importance of
integrative (in case of those)
- we have to
find security objective
general attitudes
integrative process

questione delle
dinamiche
ado noi
necessario trovare
vi e che coincidono
con le dinamiche
interne —

regional policy

development policy
in the Mediterranean
& complex - Human esperience

Joint
Ventures

Prof. A.L. NAROCHNITSKY (Moscow)

ON PRINCIPLES AND STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN
COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

To begin with, I would like to say that I have studied with great interest the substantial report by our esteemed colleague, Dr. Dieter Senghaas, and I agree with him when he says that the policy of deterrent and confrontation of military blocs in no way promotes European security. I also regard his opinion that in capitalist industrialised states the arms race is facilitated, apart from the foreign political situation, by the domestic influence and the interest of the administrative, military, industrial and scientific groups providing for measures to be undertaken in case of a war as well founded. It is also true that these groups more often than not resort to lobbyism whose methods need no comment.

The author also speaks about the certain "oligarchy" and "elite" dealing with armaments and technological improvement in this sphere. These ideas of the report may be easily confirmed by facts indicating that a number of capitalist monopolies are interested in the arms race and in fanning up the danger of war. That these quarters exert a strong pressure on the governments of a number of western states is beyond doubt. I support the idea of Dr. Senghaas that the control on armaments and on their balance could give useful results for the cause of peace not as such, but only within the framework of definite policy pursuing peaceful aims. This is a very productive idea.

However, I cannot agree with Dr. Senghaas when he says that the above-mentioned factors operate, though in different ways, but with equal results in capitalist and socialist countries, and that the difference in the social systems do not matter here. I would like to stress that under socialism there is no such factor as quest for profit by capitalist monopolies manufacturing weapons and servicing armed forces by other technical means.

I think it necessary to emphasise that under the conditions of the socialist ownership of the means of production, planned economy and the carrying through of the great programmes for peaceful economic and cultural progress, the expenditures on armaments in the state budgets of socialist countries are much below that of the capitalist states. Besides, with the centralised guidance of all aspects in the development of socialist society there can be no such isolation or opposition of interests among the departments

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or groups concerned with military preparedness and with the
general line of securing the most efficient peaceful economic and
cultural development which takes place in conditions of private
enterprise.

The author obviously shares the concept of the so-called
industrial state. There is hardly any sense in a general argument
about this concept. But I would like to note that, in my view, its
weakest point is precisely in ignoring the differences and specifics
of the social structures of industrial countries in the world today.

The vital interest of socialist states in consolidating
security in Europe and the rest of the world, and the absence in
their social structure of stimuli for war are clearly demonstrated
by their initiative in proposing and supporting all steps in that
direction. It is common knowledge that there is no lobbyism in
the social and political life of the socialist states. Dr. Senghaas
is hardly correct in stating that the arms race between the west and
east is still in full swing. I believe that, as a result of the
policy pursued by the USSR and the influence of the realistically
minded quarters in the United States, the governments of both
countries signed the agreements which, to a certain extent, already
restrict the growth of the strategic systems of the most powerful
weapons, and this favourable change must not be ignored. In
expressing some disagreement with Dr. Senghaas, I consider that his
report introduces a good deal of interesting elements in the dis-
cussion and I am far from ascribing the strive for peace and
security to socialist countries alone. On the contrary, I am
deeply convinced that all nations of Europe and the rest of the
world are vitally interested in the security of the European
continent and the entire globe. It is important that there would
be a growing number of people, including public figures and
politicians, in all countries who would clearly realise the vital
importance of collective security in Europe and the whole world, and
that, for all the differences in the social systems and ideologies,
we would correctly understand each other.

As a Soviet man, I see my task in expressing the idea con-
cerning the principles and structure of European security, repeatedly
proposed by representatives of the Soviet public and widely dis-
cussed in our country. I would like to note that people in our
country are getting ready to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the
Soviet Union and they are satisfied to see the growing recognition
of the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different
social systems and increasing international cooperation in the
sphere of technology, economy, science and culture. It is especially
significant for all Soviet people since expansionist or aggressive
tendencies are alien to Soviet society, and our people are striving
to fulfil the new peaceful plans for economic and cultural develop-
ment.

It is for this reason that the Soviet people, joined in the
union of equal nations, do not tolerate attempts to use force

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or other means of pressure, direct or indirect, when international
problems are solved, and they welcome the ideas of banning nuclear
weapons once and for all. In this sense I am more optimistic than
my esteemed colleague, Dr. Senghaas, and I would like to emphasise
that the warlike tendencies of the military industrial complexes of
capitalist countries are counterpoised by the tendencies of modern
developments in the world which for the first time in history provided
a number of new objective conditions for strengthening collective
security and countering aggression and violence in international
affairs.

The influence of the foreign policy of peace followed by
socialist countries, the vigorous safeguarding of peace by the broad
masses of the working class, the Communist and Workers' Parties
and broad sections of the West European public, as also the awareness
of the danger of a nuclear war by realistically-minded groups in
capitalist states and the growing isolation of the most aggressive
circles in Europe provide new real opportunities for setting up a
system of European collective security. The fact that the socialist
countries have assumed the historic initiative of working out
measures on ensuring peace and security in Europe is, in my view,
an outstanding phenomenon of our epoch.

The Soviet people are unanimous in their support to the
course for consolidating European security and for a mutually
advantageous cooperation of all countries in Europe charted by
the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. This course
is a direct continuation of the initiative of the Warsaw Treaty
countries which proposed at the Bucharest meeting in 1966 a broad
programme for creating a system of European collective security
which would replace the existing military and political groupings
and be based not on a "balance of fear" but on a peaceful
cooperation of all countries. The next moves of the Warsaw Treaty
countries continued and developed that proposal. Of special
significance was the Prague Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty
countries issued in 1972.

Recent years have seen important developments which have had
a positive effect on the political climate in Europe. They include
the signing by West Germany of the treaty on the inviolability of
borders with the USSR and Poland and its subsequent ratification,
and a number of agreements on West Berlin. The processes of
normalising relations between the FRG and the GDR is going on.
The promotion of Franco-Soviet cooperation is of great significance.

European security is not merely a problem of one continent.
It is of a world-wide importance. Any military conflict in Europe
can easily grow into a world conflict involving the United States
and a use of nuclear missiles and chemical and bacteriological
weapons, as it is indicated by the Vietnam war. The Soviet people
are convinced in the indivisibility of the world, that questions
of European security are closely associated with universal security.
For this reason measures to strengthen general security and limit

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strategic arms also facilitate the consolidation of European security.

Early in the seventies there emerged the basic signs of European security. Probably this system should provide for a strict observance of contractual obligations and be confirmed by an establishment of an all-round European cooperation, and by expansion of economic, scientific and technological relations among European states. I believe that the chief principles of European security should include: stability or inviolability of the state borders fixed in Europe after the second world war, including the frontier between the GDR and FRG and the FRG borders in the west, north and south; renunciation of the use of force in solving disputes, a consistent carrying through of the principles of peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist states, establishment of good-neighbourly relations and cooperation, facilitation of the solution of the disarmament problem and support to the peace efforts of the United Nations. The necessary earnest ensuring European security, in my view, is a recognition of the two sovereign and equal German states of the GDR and FRG, and their admission to the UN and other international organisations. A significant move towards consolidating European security would be made if all countries, including the FRG, would join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which has not yet been ratified by the Bundestag. The consolidation of material requisits may be facilitated by a mutual expansion of trade, growth of scientific and technological ties, a peaceful utilisation of atomic energy, a rational use of other fuel and power resources, mutual exchange of cultural values, measures on joint conservation of the environment and on combating diseases.

The Soviet people welcome both the partial measures in these directions and the idea of providing a general legal contractual system of European security and even a setting up of a permanent body which would see to it that all states fulfil the commitments they assume upon themselves. An international legal basis for European security could be provided by a treaty, or a system of treaties, concluded in accordance with the principles stated above. Such a treaty might provide for a non-use of force when international disputes are settled, inviolability of the borders for the present period and the future, etc.

The Soviet people, naturally, are convinced that such a treaty should make provisions for a full equality of the sides without any advantages for one of them, and that the terms of the treaty should not be directed against the third countries or harm the allies of the states that are signatories to the treaty and the countries friendly to them. Alongside with political terms, such a treaty might provide for an expansion of economic and cultural relations. Such a system of relations might be confirmed by the activity of public organisations in various European countries working for peace, and their cooperation.

The Soviet people highly value the peace efforts of the United

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Nations and are confident that the system of regional European
security should correspond to the United Nations Charter. As is
known, this Charter (Article 52) points to the expediency of
regional agreements among organisations to maintain international
peace and security on the condition that these agreements are in
line with the goals and principles of the UN.

The principles stated above fully correspond to the basis of
UN activities. When setting up a collective security system in
Europe it would be possible, in my opinion, to specify many issues
giving rise to disputes.

The Soviet press, representatives of the Soviet public have
repeatedly supported the idea of setting up a permanent body whose
mission would be to supervise the maintenance of the collective
security system. Such a body, naturally, should be given certain
independence in solving regional European problems, and at the same
time to work in close cooperation with the UN. It would be difficult
to specify the details concerning the structure, functions and rights
of such a body in advance, but it is obvious that in the process of
its setting up it would be reasonable to study the precedents and
the practice of regional organisations in other parts of the world.
In doing this one should take into account the specifics of European
regional security organisation, since it would be the first attempt
of a joint partnership of socialist and capitalist countries in the
solution of collective security problems. In all probability, among
the functions of its permanent body there could be working out
recommendations on political issues and on questions of cooperation.
An important feature of a regional system of security is that Europe
is the seat of a largest concentration of armed forces and weapons
of opposed military groupings. Therefore the setting up of a
collective security system in Europe could pave the way to dis-
banding the military organisations of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty
with a subsequent abolition of the two opposed groupings and their
replacement by a broad system of cooperation.

Of late, those who insist on a delay in providing European
collective security repeatedly stress a need for a preliminary
mutually balanced arms reduction. The Soviet people realise the
importance of these questions, and they are confident that the speed-
iest convocation of a European conference on collective security
would facilitate more than anything else their solution, and that
one should not invent new pretexts to delay a European conference
on security. On the contary, it should be convened as soon as
possible. It seems that some items of the report by Dr. Senghaas
lead us to just this conclusion, which I fully agree with.

All nations of the world are vitally interested in European
security. A system of European collective security should also
promote security on other continents, including Africa and Asia.
The struggle waged by the peace forces in Europe against the danger
of war restricts the forces of aggression throughout the world. The
main line of the cold war runs across Europe. Therefore, as it

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has been already stated, the turning of Europe from a seat of war danger into a peace zone is the most important aspect of strengthening international security as a whole. This renders fully inconsistent the assertions of the enemies of peace and relaxation of international tension that the system of European collective security may be directed against other regions of the world. On the contrary, every victory scored by the European forces of peace is also a victory in the struggle for peace all over the world.

Thank you for your attention.

RÜSTUNGSBESCHRÄNKUNG UND ENTSPANNUNG
IN EUROPA

Von Urs SCHWARZ

Nach zwei Weltkriegen, nach dem Erwachsen einer neuen
Staatenwelt auf den Trümmern der einstigen Kolonialreiche, an-
gesichts der Konvulsionen, welche dieser Neubeginn mit sich bringt,
und inmitten der Wachstumskrisen, welche die zweite technische und
wissenschaftliche Revolution über die Menschheit gebracht hat, ist
es natürlich, daß sich die Völker nach Frieden wenigstens im zwi-
schenstaatlichen Bereich sehnen. Dabei wird Friede nicht mehr bloß
als das Fehlen kriegerischer Verwicklungen verstanden, sondern als
Frieden in Sicherheit. Alte und neue Nationen sehnen sich nach der
Gewißheit, oder doch der annähernden Gewißheit, daß sie nicht von
außen angegriffen werden. Wie der Begriff des Friedens hat sich
auch der Begriff des Angriffs erweitert. Er beschränkt sich nicht
mehr auf die Vorstellung einer feindlichen Armee, welche die Gren-
zen überschreitet, sondern umfaßt alle offenen und verborgenen
Formen des fremden Zugriffs, wie Drohung und Druck, psychologische
Kriegsführung, von außen genährter Terrorismus, Infiltration und
Subversion, bis zur eigentlichen offenen Aggression.

Die Vorstellung des äußeren Friedens, der friedlichen Welt,
nach der man sich sehnt, kann durch den Vergleich mit der Vor-
stellung des inneren Friedens verdeutlicht werden, wie ihn der gut
funktionierende Rechtsstaat gewährleistet. In ihm wird ja eine an-
erkannte Rechtsordnung erst durch die weitgehende Bereitschaft zur
Respektierung anderer Interessen und Meinungen, durch gegenseitigen
guten Willen, durch Kompromißbereitschaft ergänzt und verwirklicht.

Eine Atmosphäre des Friedens in Sicherheit gerade in Europa
zu schaffen, ist ein Anliegen von weltweiter Bedeutung. Obwohl
Europa seine einstige beherrschende Stellung eingebüßt hat, kommt
seinem Zustand doch allgemeine Bedeutung zu, und das wegen seiner
strategischen Lage, wegen der in und um Europa zusammengeballten
Macht, wegen seines kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Beitrags an die
gesamte Menschheit. Auch ist hier die Möglichkeit, Frieden und
Sicherheit zu gewinnen vielleicht größer als in anderen Bezirken,
weil die Völker Europas und mit ihnen diejenigen jenseits des
Atlantischen Ozeans durch die Bande gemeinsamer Kultur, des gemein-
samen Erleidens ähnlicher Schicksale, durch Verwandtschaften der
Sprachen, durch enge wirtschaftliche Verflechtung und gegenseitige
Abhängigkeit unauflöslich verbunden sind.

Der Wege, mehr Sicherheit zu gewinnen, sind viele, der Hinder-
nisse auf diesen Wegen noch mehr. Seit der Plan einer Konferenz für
Zusammenarbeit und Sicherheit in Europa Gestalt angenommen hat, sind
auch die Probleme bekannt, die gelöst werden müssen, wenn man dem
allgemeinen Ziele näher kommen will. Es fehlt nicht an Vorschlägen
für das Lösen solcher Probleme und an Ideen, wie dem einst Erreichten

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Dauer verliehen werden könnte. Unter ihnen sind vor allem zu nennen die Vorschläge zur Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen, der kulturellen, der wissenschaftlichen Beziehungen und des entsprechenden Austauschs, ein Vertrag über den Verzicht auf Gewalt in den zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen, dauernde europäische Institutionen zur Verwirklichung der Prinzipien eines solchen Vertrags, die Befreiung des Austauschs von Personen und Informationen von bestehenden Fesseln, Maßnahmen der Rüstungsbeschränkung im weitesten Sinn. Alle sind mehr oder weniger geeignet, auf das Ziel hinzuführen, weil sie alle einzeln und in ihrer Gesamtheit dazu beitragen, Vertrauen als die Voraussetzung größerer Sicherheit zu schaffen. Sicher aber ist, daß nur Tatsachen, greifbare Beweise des Willens zur Verminderung der bestehenden Spannungen einen Sinn haben, nicht aber bloße Worte und Absichtserklärungen.

Von besonderer Bedeutung sind in diesem Rahmen alle Bemühungen zur Beschränkung und Herabsetzung der militärischen Rüstungen in Europa. Die Hindernisse, die sich solchen Bemühungen entgegensetzen, sind bekannt und in hunderten von Sitzungen von Abrüstungskonferenzen zu Tage getreten. Ein Erfolg auf diesem besonderen Gebiet wäre gerade darum von hohem Wert: Er wäre ein Unterpfand des Willens, sich in einem neuen Geist diesen Fragen zu nähern. Er würde rein materiell die Möglichkeiten der Konfrontation und der Friedensbedrohung vermindern. Er würde politisch und psychologisch die eigentlichen Quellen der Furcht, der Gefühle der Unsicherheit, des Mißtrauens verschließen. Der mit Abrüstungsmaßnahmen notwendigerweise verbundene Informationsaustausch und ein System der Inspektionen würde zugleich internationale Zusammenarbeit erfordern und den Willen zu vertrauensvoller Zusammenarbeit auf die Probe stellen.

Es sei hier betont, daß, wie im Communiqué von Moskau vom 29. Mai 1972 über die amerikanisch-sowjetischen Besprechungen ausgeführt wird, die Verhandlungen über die gegenseitige Verminderung der Streitkräfte und der Bewaffnung vor allem in Zentraleuropa "auf ein besonderes Forum" verlegt werden können. Es sei aber auch festgehalten, daß die technischen Probleme der Rüstungsbeschränkungen im engeren Sinne der Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) wohl von der Traktandenliste der allgemeinen Konferenz abgetrennt werden, daß sie aber als politisches Problem erster Ordnung prominent auf ihr figurieren müssen. Auch wenn man versuchen sollte, sie nicht zu berühren, würden sie als der steinerne Gast der Konferenz beiwohnen.

Die Rolle der physischen Macht, wie sie in der militärischen Bereitschaft der Nationen und in ihrem militärischen Potential zum Ausdruck kommt, die Bedeutung des Machtgleichgewichts können nicht aus den grundsätzlichen Betrachtungen einer Sicherheitskonferenz ausgeklammert werden. Das Machtgleichgewicht wirkt in den innereuropäischen Beziehungen in zwei Richtungen: Einerseits verleiht es, wenn es als stabil erscheint, ein Gefühl der Sicherheit und dient so der Entspannung. Umgekehrt aber ist es, weil es auf Kräften der Zerstörung beruht und sich aus ihnen zusammensetzt, eine Quelle der Sorge, der Beunruhigung, der Furcht, ja der Angst. Am deutlichsten tritt uns diese Doppelnatur des Gleichgewichts der Macht im Bild des nuklearen Gleichgewichts zwischen den Weltmächten, dem sogenannten strategischen Gleichgewicht, vor Augen. Es hat während Jahrzehnten einen großen Krieg verhindert und hängt doch wegen der ihm immanenten

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Unstabilität wie eine drohende Wolke über der Menschheit.

Man kann nicht von Entspannung, von Sicherheit sprechen,
ohne dieser Tatsachen zu gedenken. Die Doppelnatur des Machtgleich-
gewichts weist, sofern sie richtig erkannt wird, auch die Richtung,
in der nach erhöhter Sicherheit gesucht werden muß: Einerseits soll
das Maß gegenseitiger Bedrohung herabgesetzt werden, damit Beruhigung
und Vertrauen wachsen können, anderseits soll aber ein Gleichgewicht
der Macht beibehalten werden, ohne welches totale Unsicherheit ein-
tritt. Ohne ein Gleichgewicht zwischen den Weltmächten und ohne einen
damit verbundenen Gleichgewichtszustand unter den europäischen Teil-
nehmern am Weltgeschehen würden sich diese alsbald im Netz einer
Großmachthegemonie gefangen sehen. Diese Feststellung bezieht sich
natürlich nur auf unsere heutige Welt, so wie sie tatsächlich ist,
und schließt nicht aus, daß eine stabile Weltordnung und Freiheit
und Sicherheit der Nationen, die durch andere Mittel gesichert sind,
wie etwa durch eine Weltregierung, wenigstens theoretisch denkbar ist.
Ein System der konstruktiven optimalen Spannung im Zeichen des Gleich-
gewichts, wie es heute angestrebt wird, ist keine ideale Lösung, aber
eine brauchbare Hilfskonstruktion, mit der die Menschheit sich Jahr-
zehnte des Friedens sichern kann.

Auf dem Gebiet der Fernwaffen und der Systeme der Massenver-
nichtung, die allgemein als strategische Waffen bezeichnet werden, ist
der Auftrag, das Gleichgewicht stabil zu gestalten und es auf einer
tieferen Ebene zu erhalten, von den Weltmächten Sowjetunion und Ver-
einigten Staaten von Amerika übernommen worden. Ein erstes Ergebnis
ist in der ersten Phase der Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT)
erzielt worden. Die Gespräche gehen weiter. Eine Konferenz für Zu-
sammenarbeit und Sicherheit in Europa wird sich mit der Tatsache
dieser Gespräche auseinandersetzen und von ihren Ergebnissen Kenntnis
nehmen müssen. Da an ihr sämtliche europäische Nationen teilnehmen,
ob groß oder klein, ob mit nuklearer Bewaffnung oder nuklearem Po-
tential oder ohne solche, kann hier das Interesse der kleineren
Staaten an erhöhter Stabilität und Herabsetzung der den nuklearen
Rüstungen der Großen innewohnenden Gefahren kraftvoll zum Ausdruck
kommen.

Von der Konferenz muß der Appell an die Weltmächte ausgehen,
alles daran zu setzen, um in der neuen Phase der SALT neue Fort-
schritte zu erzielen. An die bereits ausgehandelte Begrenzung der
Zahl gewisser Lenkwaffen soll sich nur eine qualitative Begrenzung
anschließen. Vor allem ist an die Begrenzung der Zahl der Versuche
mit Missilen zu denken, an die Forderung, daß derartige Versuche vor-
her angezeigt und nur in vorher vereinbarten Gebieten stattfinden.
Auch könnte die Erprobung von Mehrfachsprengköpfen (MRV und MIRV)
begrenzt oder sogar verboten werden. Eine weitere nützliche Maßnahme
wäre die Ausdehnung des teilweisen Verbots von nuklearen Versuchs-
explosionen, also des Teststop-Abkommens, auf unterirdische Explo-
sionen. Damit wäre die Erprobung von Nuklearsprengköpfen vollständig
ausgeschlossen.

Die Rolle der kleineren und nicht nuklearen Staaten in diesem
Zusammenhang braucht sich nicht auf diejenige des Zuschauers zu be-
schränken, der von der Tribüne aus die Spieler anfeuert. Sie können
Vorschläge für wirksame Überwachung der Versuche ausarbeiten und sich

allgemein für Inspektions- und Überwachungsaufgaben zur Verfügung
stellen.

: Nach der Natur der Sache werden die Möglichkeiten einer all-
gemeinen Sicherheits- und Zusammenarbeitskonferenz, auf dem Gebiet
der Nuklearwaffen vermittelnde Funktionen zu übernehmen, beschränkt
sein. Wirksamer wird sie sich der Frage der Herabsetzung der kon-
ventionellen Rüstungen widmen können, weil alle Teilnehmer unmittel-
bar interessiert sind. Dabei ist erneut daran festzuhalten, daß die
vorgesehene allgemeine Konferenz nicht mit der eigentlichen Lösung
der vielschichtigen Fragen der Rüstungsbegrenzungen betraut werden
soll. Diese muß einem besonderen Organ übertragen werden. Ihre Auf-
gabe besteht nur darin, ein solches Organ ins Leben zu rufen, also
die im Communiqué von Moskau vom 29. Mai 1972 genannten Vereinbarun-
gen zu entwerfen und allgemeine Richtlinien für dessen Tätigkeit
niederzulegen. An Vorbildern für solche Grundsatzerklärungen fehlt
es nicht. Zu erinnern ist an die amerikanisch-sowjetische Erklä-
rung vom 20. September 1961 oder wieder an das amerikanisch-sowje-
tische Communiqué von Moskau, in dem Prinzipien festgelegt werden,
wie z.B. daß eine gegenseitige Verminderung der Bewaffnung und der
Streitkräfte in Zentraleuropa auf keinen Fall die Sicherheit der
einen oder der anderen Seite vermindern dürfe.

Die Richtlinien würden sich vor allem auch mit der Rolle der
kleineren Nationen bei der notwendigen Überwachung der Erfüllung
vertraglicher Verpflichtungen befassen. Eine Wiederbelebung der
im Jahre 1959 gemachten Vorschläge ist nötig, die weitreichende
Inspektionsmaßnahmen vorsahen. Unter ihnen waren Maßnahmen von be-
sonderer Bedeutung, welche die Befürchtungen von Überraschungs-
angriffen zerstreuen helfen. Es war damals von der Überwachung von
Verkehrsknotenpunkten die Rede, von einer Meldepflicht für größere
Truppenverschiebungen und Manöver, von Beobachtern im Gebiet der
Gegenpartei, von Luftaufklärung, von entmilitarisierten Gebieten.
Gelegentlich waren sich damals die Vorschläge der verschiedenen
Seiten nahe gekommen, doch nie nahe genug. Eine Vereinbarung kam
nie zustande. Seit zwölf Jahren haben sich aber die Verhältnisse
erheblich geändert. Heute stehen weit wirksamere technische Ver-
fahren zur Überwachung zur Verfügung, wie elektromagnetische Sen-
soren verschiedenster Art, "Black Boxes", Satelliten etc.

Die Rolle einer Konferenz für Zusammenarbeit und Sicherheit
in Europa ist es gewiß nicht, komplizierte militär-strategische,
technische und politische Fragen zu lösen. Aber sie hat die Probleme
und Ziele zu nennen und die Aufgaben zu umschreiben. Sie hat darauf
hinzuweisen, daß sich gerade im Zusammenhang mit der Abrüstung ein
Gebiet der Zusammenarbeit öffnet. Die gemeinsame Verwirklichung von
Maßnahmen der Rüstungsbeschränkung fordert die Zusammenarbeit einer
großen Zahl von Regierungen, besonders auf dem Gebiet der Inspek-
tionen. Aus dieser Zusammenarbeit lassen sich Schlüsse auf den guten
Willen der einzelnen Beteiligten ziehen, aus dem Erfolg des Zusammen-
wirkens größeres Vertrauen ableiten.

In zweifacher Beziehung ist es also nötig, daß die geplante
Konferenz neben ihrem übrigen weitgespannten Programm auch die
Probleme der Rüstungsbeschränkungen, wenigstens richtungweisend,
aufgreift. Einmal um diese Probleme einer materiellen Lösung näher
zu bringen, dann aber auch, um ein weites Gebiet zu bezeichnen, auf
dem sich der Wille zur Entspannung und zur Zusammenarbeit sichtbar
bewähren kann.   * * *

Armament Dynamics as Restrictive Conditions for Changes in the East-West Conflict

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That the international arms race between East and West has
not yet ceased is well known and does not require any particular
comment. That this arms race is presently still in full swing
despite the many attempts to reach a kind of détente between
East and West and despite the fact that these attempts seem to
have been far more successful in most recent years than ever
before constitutes already a more relevant observation. Neither
the détente policy per se nor the ongoing arms race per se re-
quires presently any particular explanations; what has to be ex-
plained today is the combination of a self-sustained growth of
armament policies and the simultaneous pursuit of détente
strategies. In this connection specific emphasis has to be put
on the analysis of arms control measures since these have been
very often interpreted as the linkage between a conventional
security policy (which leads to an ever growing stock of highly
diversified armaments) and the various attempts for a détente.

Under the condition of the Cold War, the rationalization
of the conventional armament policy and its security rationales
have been usually pretty simple. The traditional explanation of
the arms race dynamics has been based on the very simple assertion
that armament policies can only be interpreted as reactions to
actions of the opponent, respectively. The action-reaction scheme
has been widely accepted up to the present day not only in the
self-presentation of political and military elites; it has not
only dominated the description and rationalization of armament
measures in the mass media; even the scientific discussion on
the causes and the evolution of the post World War II arms race
between East and West has been dominated by this scheme for nearly
twenty years.

The action-reaction theorem conceives armament policies as dictated from the opponent or as <u>other-directed</u>. It is asserted that particular armament measures of one side are directly geared to the armament measures of the opponent. Since both antagonists behave, at least according to the self-image they propagate, equally other-directed, it is assumed that a <u>reciprocal escalation</u> <u>spiral</u> necessarily emerges in the process of which weapon systems are invented, numerical plateaus fixed and in which the super- session of old systems by qualitatively higher ones is determined. This line of argumentation is too well known so that we do not have to repeat it here in detail. As much research on the bio- graphy of weapon systems has shown, one can clearly state on the basis of the known evidence that the action-reaction scheme is, if not completely false, at least highly dubious. The main trends of the international arms race between East and West have developed quite differently from what has been asserted in the action-re- action theorem.

The main antagonists - the big powers and their allies - have been, on the average, in the last twenty years far more autonomous in the self-determination of their specific armament policies as most commentators used to assume. Their main decisions have been far more geared to the needs of various segments of their societies still to be specified in our paper later on. They have been mainly <u>innerdirected</u> and far less dictated by external forces. The <u>self-</u> <u>centered imperatives of national armament policies</u> have been for stronger than those which have resulted from the reciprocal inter- action with the so-called <u>potential</u> enemy.

This alternative theorem can be empirically verified. Since it is highly relevant for the understanding of the present si- tuation and particularly for an assessment of armament dynamics as a restrictive condition for changes in the East-West-conflict, we shall formulate certain arguments and present some evidence on which this theorem is based. Our observations refer particularly to the nuclear-strategic area of the present arms race. The reason for this emphasis is not that the nuclear arms race and nuclear weapons have been and still are the most dangerous and potentially most destructive war potentials; our emphasis on the nuclear-stra- tegic arms race is of paradigmatic value since certain key aspects of contemporary types of arms races can be particularly well ana- lysed in that area. But at the some time we have to emphasise the very characteristics of the strategic arms race which cannot be transferred to an analysis of other types of arms races and weapon systems.

The nuclear arsenals have <u>not</u> yet been applied in international conflicts, whereas practically all other types of weapons below the nuclear threshold have been used in one way or another in many war theaters. The paradigmatic relevance of the nuclear area for an analysis of armament dynamics, however, consists in certain key factors which particularly characterise this area but which can also be identified in non-nuclear areas. We are going to discuss some of these essential factors immediately. But before doing that, we would like to outline certain <u>general</u> characteristics of the present arms race.   ../..

The most outstanding characteristic of the present arms race
between East and West consists in the fact, that this arms race
has been more than any one before a continuously qualitative one.
Most of the arms races before 1945 were primarily quantitative
races. Although there have been many qualitative innovations in
weapon technology during the last two centuries, the life cycles
of weapon systems were quite longer than this has been the case
after 1945. Therefore it is reasonable to label the pre-1945 arms
races in the first instance as quantitative races, and in the
second instance as qualitative races, while this relation funda-
mentally changed after 1945 and particularly in the last 10-15
years. The basic characteristic of the present arms race shows up
in a permanent stream of technological innovations which, besides
other causes, set the pace for contemporary armament policies;
the reverse of this continuous innovation consists in the tremen-
dous propensity to obsolescence of weapon systems once they have
been procured. The many abortive weapon systems of the last twenty
years are another sign of the same trend. In contradistinction to
the armament policy of previous decades the present arms race ex-
tends not only to one type of weapon system or to a few, but
rather to the entire spectrum of destruction potentials which are
in the possession of the political and military apparata today.
The range of this spectrum begins with the subversive activities
of intelligence agencies; it comprisis counter-insurgency warfare,
conventional war potentials, tactical-nuclear and strategic-
nuclear weapon systems as well as instruments of political propa-
ganda and psychological warfare. The spectrum reaches out into a
variety of new horrendous weapon programs related to types of war
theaters so far unknown in warefare (like laser systems). All these
programs are subject to what can be particularly observed on the
nuclear strategic level: the continuous modernisation of existing
systems and the forced innovation of new ones. Both measures, the
modernisation of old systems and the elaboration of new ones,
have aimed at the improvement of the quality of weapon systems e.g.
the improvement of their precision, their reliability, their in-
vulnerability and so forth. The lead-time requirements of con-
temporary weapon systems planning, e.g. the time from research
and development to the implementation of new systems turn the
future into history: as in very few segments of highly industrialised
societies the range of options for decisive political action in the
future is continuously narrowed down by decisions in the present.

The intensity of technological innovations has been speeded
up, though not caused, by the prevailing security doctrine of
mutual deterrence. This doctrine is based on the paradoxical, al-
though very traditional premise, that the outbreak of violence and
wars in international politics can be prevented with the help of
deterrence policies by the continuous improvement of the means of
war. Under present conditions the attempt to prevent war by de-
terrence policies, however, leads not only potentially or with
high probability but rather with necessity to its very extensive
preparation, simply to guarantee mutual retaliation. In this con-
nection, the so called worst-case doctrine which has been one of
the most fundamental strategic orientation motivating the variegated
contingency planning of the political and military apparata has
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functioned as a speeding-up mechanism for national armament po-
licies. This doctrine which is oriented towards future potential
"catastrophic gaps" in the weapon arsenals is based on the com-
bined assertion of the worst possible intention of the enemy and
its best ability to develop new military strategies and weapon
technologies. The unprecedented differenciations in the political
and military contingency-planning, a result of a deterrence policy
which has been pursued for twenty years, are no random product but
the combined result of this doctrine and the social forces fixated
to it. The same can be said about the propensity to overperception,
overreaction and overdesign in contemporary military strategy.
As long as deterrence policies are pursued, the military con-
tingency-planning will be geared to the expectation of the worst
possible. As a consequence the image of the enemy has a functional
value in this policy, although the degree of fixation to the
enemy is quite variable. Most recently, the previously observable
militant fixations to the so-called potential enemy have been,
quite obviously, less articulated than in previous years; and the
military apparata have been, at least partially, distargeted; and
there have been even explicit attempts to come to some modus
vivendi by a détente policy. While all this happened the national
efforts to arm and rearm have not particularly diminished, as we
observed at the beginning of this paper.

It has been asserted that the intensity of technological
innovations has been speeded up, though probably not exclusively
caused, by the specific security policy doctrine of mutual de-
terrence. Other factors have been as responsible for the main-
tenance of this policy and the perpetuation of the arms race.
After the preceeding general observations we shall now delineate
some of these specific factors in the following paragraphs.

As a first important factor we have to emphasise the multipli-
cation of armament-oriented interests, both with respect to num-
bers and to segments of the societies affected by contemporary
armament policy. The political and social interests on which de-
terrence policies are based are as much differenciated as the
existing weapon systems and the contingency planning related to
the prevailing escalation doctrines. Specific military missions
of the armed forces are coordinated with administrative segments
of the civil and military administration, with research and de-
velopment laboratories and with the production plants for weapon
technology and weapon systems. There is presently much talk about
a military-industrial complex, the existence of which can hardly
be denied in highly industrialised capitalist and socialist so-
cieties, particularly in the USA and the SU. However the infra-
structure of this complex is rather composed of a series of
important partial alliances which sometimes are mutually exclusive
and sometimes highly interlocked. Therefore it makes more sense,
with respect to the infrastructure of this complex, to talk about
the existence of administrative-military-industrial-scientific
complexes. This interest-structure of contemporary armament
policy has led to a militarisation of international politics
since the vested interests of those social groups and political
institutions which participate in the planning and production of

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software and hardware devices for the military have been, in most cases, incomparably better organised and stronger than the activities of other groups which have also a stake in foreign policy. The only really relevant exception to this, at least in capitalist countries, is represented by the socio-economic groups involved in foreign economic policy.

If one wants to understand the impetus of the contemporary international arms race, one has, in the first instance, to recognize this particular kind of interest-basis of armament policies. To put a great emphasis on the manifolded interests, including psychological interest fixation, is of vital importance in the evaluation of this decisive factor on which arms races are built up and which contributes to the speeding-up of the international arms race. But one has equally to emphasize the tremendous hierachisation of decision-making processes related to armament policies so that one can justly speak of the existence of a security policy oligarchy or an armament policy power elite, respectively. Despite this uncontestable enormous hierarchisation of the political deliberation and decision processes in the area of security policies, one has to understand the incrementalist basis of the political deliberation process by which certain aspects of the momentum built into military apparata can be explained. The latter aspect particularly holds for the countries in the West in which the well-known rivalries between administrative organisations, military services, scientific laboratories and the production plants of weapon systems have been quite openly fought through. But such conflicts do not end up in an inroad into the various activities of the military apparata; they rather contribute to their inflation. It is for more easier for those interest groups and interest coalitions which are intrinsically involved in national armament policies to come to an agreement on the largest common denominator than on the smallest. In the representation of their collective interests (for example with respect to an increase of the share of military expenditures from public budgets) all these groups tend to agree, despite their rivalries, about the modalities of how to implement basic policy postures. The interpenetration of these interest groups and their tight coordination justify to call these a security policy power elite. These power elites have in most societies in the post two decades been less exposed to public control than those segments of ruling elites which had an at least as prominent position in civil areas of industrialised societies as the elite groups related to security affairs. Not until very recently has there been a casual intensification of the public control of military security measures.

The second essential factor which contributes to the explanation of the innovation intensity of the contemporary qualitative arms race could be named as the impulse resulting from technology (technology-impulse) and as those organisational imperatives which emerge from it. There has been much writing about the tyranny of weapon's technology; the latter does not require here any further comment, except one fundamental statement: that the direction and the speed of technological

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innovation processes do <u>not</u> represent autonomous data which
could be adequately analysed apart from the concrete interest-
configuration in which innovation processes are institutionalised.
The direction of technological research and the intensity in
which innovations have developed are essentially dependent upon
particular political premises which are actual givens for a
natural science and weapon technology research within the context
of predetermined political and budgetary priorities. Within such
a context, innovation processes might assume a life of their
own which, in the last instance, leads to the very strange fact
(very congenial to all weapons designers), that the so-called
threat to the nation tends to be measured by the development
stage and at the technological niveaus of one's own armaments or
by the potential technological progress of one's own weapon
technology and far less by armaments and technologies of the
opponent. <u>In military technological research and innovation pro-
grams the action-reaction theorem particularly fails as an expla-
natory device.</u> Let us here refer to a report of the Secretary-Ge-
neral of the UN from October 1971 in which the following is per-
tinently stated:

"On the <u>surface</u> it would seem that the effort to improve
the quality of armaments or to defend against them, follows a
logical series of steps in which a new weapon or weapon-system
is devised, then a counter-weapon to neutralize the new weapon,
and then a counter-counter weapon. But these steps neither usually
nor necessarily occur in a rational time sequence. <u>The people
who design improvements in weapons are themselves the ones who
as a rule envisage the further steps they feel should be taken.
They do not wait for a potential enemy to react before they
react against their own creations.</u>"

Organisational imperatives are particularly developed by
those apparata which on the basis of an exclusive specialisation
(like in the case of the aerospace industry) have been active
at the most advanced front in the development of better armament
technologies. As has been proved by empirical analyses, the
research, development, experimenting, production and implemen-
tation phases of major weapon systems do follow a very rigid
sequential scheme within given research and production plants,
not affected by the vicissitudes in the development of inter-
national politics. The theorem of the so-called follow-up im-
perative attempts to circumscribe this fact; it explicitly states
what has been taken for granted in the context of the pre-
vailing security policy and what has led to a forced arming of
the participants, respectively: namely that defense administra-
tions and those social forces involved in the security and de-
fense business usually put much effort into the maintenance of
keeping once established research and production plants going
since an interruption of the work in these institutions is con-
sidered intolerable by the political and military elites due
to the long lead-time requirements of modern weapon technology.

The interdependence of interest alliances and technological
innovation impulses, which to a large extent are predetermined

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by those interests, has to be interpreted as the most decisive
link in the configuration of social forces, political institu-
tions and publically relevant ideologies which all together con-
siderably determine armament dynamics today.

The order of magnitude of armament policies, at least in
highly industrialised societies, has led in many instances to an
auto-dynamic growth of the security apparata to a degree which
sometimes does not even make any more sense within the conventional
security policy rationales. The problem of overspending and
underaccomplishing is, apart from the general cost explosion,
intrinsic to the military apparata of the given size. It is not
so much a problem of civil-military relationship but rather the
impossibility of an effective control of organisations whose
size is, in budgetary terms, in most instances larger than the
GNP of many advanced countries. This can also be clearly seen
in an analysis of contemporary defense planning. The latter
tends today to be fairly reactive to developments which result
from the interconnections between interest alliances and tech-
nological progress; it has hardly any operative function in
such rational discussions of security policy options in which
the substance of the discussion would deliberately not remain
fixated to the premises of the conventional doctrines of mutual
deterrence and threatened retaliation. As long as segments of
the military apparata are not going to be completely eliminated
under an increasing cost-pressure, and manifold missions of
the armed services will be perpetuated also in middle-sized
states, defense planning necessarily leads to a policy of
muddling through. Also in Europe such a costly muddling through
can be increasingly observed in the existing apparata. It will
be intrinsic to them as long as there is no incisive reorien-
tation both in missions and in the organisation of the military
built up during the Cold War.

In the past twenty years the inflation-like growth of
the military apparata has been legitimised by general doctrines
which were supposed to represent a common denominator of many
specific strategic programs. Essential parts of these programs
have been motivated, apart from the already mentioned doctrine
of deterrence, by so-called balance of power doctrines and the
doctrine of stability, and in the West particularly by the
doctrine of superiority and most recently of parity and
sufficiency. To a large extent, these doctrines are not new;
they have been already common frames of legitimisation of
national military policies before 1945. The partially operative
function they had before World War II has, however, been lost
in the face of tremendously increasing overkill capabilities
in the last 10 to 15 years. So the attempt to reach some level
of superiority has become, even in terms of contemporary
military strategy, irrational; nonetheless the continuous arming
and rearming has been legitimised by simple rationaliations
like that a once achieved position of strength and superiority
should not be given up, and that numerical inferiority can not
be tolerated (which is absurd on the given level of overkill
capabilities).

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It must be clearly noticed that the doctrines of military balance and military stability have, at various points in the last twenty years and under most different contexts, justified completely different concrete security policy measures. This can easily be understood if one considers these doctrines as psycho-strategies and not so much as strategies related to precise hardware calculations. Strategic doctrines are best understood as political weapons. So nuclear-strategic superiority has in the West been assumed as the basic criterium for stability and balance which has then turned the United States into an over-sophisticated pacemaker of the international arms race for nearly 20 years; otherwise the many lamentos of representatives from Western defense administrations in the face of massive Soviet nuclear strategic and navy deployment programs after 1967 cannot be understood. The achieving of a kind of numerical-quantitative nuclear strategic balance between East and West in the late sixties and early seventies has been thus in the West quite consistently criticised as a serious undermining of "stability" and "balance". Other examples could be added. They all show that those doctrines do not have, in any strict sense of the term, an operative meaning; they rather represent ex post facto rationalisations of those situations which in one form or the other favour either numerically or just politically the very side which happens to propagate these very doctrines. They thus represent instruments of propaganda and means of legitimisation, not guidelines for a rational argumentation about security problems.

At this point we would like to ask whether the characterisation of the contemporary arms race as a prominently qualitative one and whether the discussion of the factors which fuel national armament policies are a sufficient basis for the explanation of armament dynamics.

If one could clearly interpret the arms race and the national armament inputs into it only as a function of certain subsystems of the nations involved in it, the question could be easily answered positively with no restriction. But even if one would assume certain additional or even essential nonmilitary societal functions of armaments as basic impulses of the arms race the three factors mentioned above could still partly explain the direction and the intensity of armament policies and to a certain degree also the size of the defense apparata. We should explicitly state here that these phenomena can presently be equally observed both in capitalist and in socialist countries. These factors are quite clearly not system-independent in their origin, but their practical consequences and implications, in the frame of an ongoing political, ideological and socio-economic antagonism between East and West, can be labeled as system-neutral. Their effects are independent of different conditions of societal reproductions; concretely speaking, they are independent of certain basic premises of capitalist and socialist social orders.

There are, of course, certain very important specific im-
pulses of armament dynamics which cannot be compared across the
borders of different social orders and which constitute additional
momenta of inertiae in the growth patterns of armament policies.
For example there has been much discussion on socio-economic
functions of armaments in capitalist states, and such function
have been well documented; there has been also some discussion
on the rule-preserving and disciplining functions of military
apparata in capitalist states. Rule-preserving and intra-societal
and inter-national disciplining functions of military apparata
in socialist countries have been observed at many instances as
well as the particular interests of the party personel in power
to use the military apparata for their own aims. An empirical
approach to further analyses of such societal functions of mili-
tary apparata could start with a functional analysis of armament
expenditures and with a discussion of the actual use as well
as the threatened use of the military to be implemented under
certain qualified conditions. The postwar history offers for such
analyses rich intrasocietal and international materials. A de-
tailed analysis of these functions of armaments is not the ob-
ject of our present study since we are more interested in the
analytical elaboration of congruent and less in the analysis of
specific armament dynamic impulses. Such a limited orientation
in our arguments can be particularly justified by the fact that
the defense apparat in all major societies have become tremendously
insensitive to the undeniable political changes in the East-West
conflict. We well know that such a substantive restriction in
our arguments is very problematic; but we would like to emphasise
that it is not at all arbitrary. In as much as conflict poten-
tials with warlike implications have also developed among so-
cialist states, this type of analysis merits also special atten-
tion in studies which are considered Marxist.

Let us summarise our arguments elaborated so far. The
resumé of what can be known today about the making of armament
policies and about the dynamics of the international arms race can
be stated in two general observations.

1. The international arms race is far less dictated from the
   outside than has been propagandized by the defense apparata,
   and it has been far less other-directed than most social
   scientists have assumed in the fiftieth and sixtieth; essenti-
   ally the international arms race has been inner-directed, e.g.,
   it has been more fueled by internal than by external forces.
   By implication, the arms race has been hardly a competition
   between two antagonists closely synchronised by a reciprocity
   of their behaviour; it has been not so much a race between
   two antagonists but rather a race of the participant states
   with themselves, respectively: a race which has taken place
   in the frame of the specific national armament programs bet-
   ween those civil, military, industrial, administrative and
   scientific groups involved in national armament policies. Such
   characteristics have been particularly a result of the on-
   going qualitative arms race. What can be hardly observed

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between the antagonists, namely a tight action-reaction spiral,
can be documented in many respects <u>within</u> particular nations.
Action-reaction processes, which have been the core of so many
arms race models, do exist, but not in the context in which they
have usually been assumed so far. The action-reaction scheme
rather characterizes the development of certain types of weapons
systems (like bombers vs. missiles) or the development of indi-
vidual armament technologies within certain weapon systems (like
the development of Minuteman-I to Minuteman-II to Minuteman III-
missiles). The action-reaction-scheme also characterizes the
manifold political, military, strategic, administrative and
industrial processes which can be observed within military
alliances. To summarize, this scheme characterizes such
types of <u>internal</u> interaction patterns far more than the
<u>transnational</u> or <u>international</u> interaction patterns <u>between</u>
the antagonists.

2. The second observation which can be formulated about the present
international arms race consists in its <u>redundant causation</u>. The
emphasis on such redundant causation is of great importance since
redundantly caused phenomena can not be altered by working on <u>one
or only a few</u> of its constitutive causal impulses. Transformation
strategies which aim at overcoming the present arms race have
therefore to be more broadly conceptualised than conventional arms
race control measures. In as much as the loosening-up of enemy
fixations does not presently lead to an inroad into the growth
patterns of the defense apparata, the conventional arms control
measures are not apt at restricting the <u>qualitative</u> perpetuation
of these apparata.

Aside from this type of redundant causation, a further notion has
to be mentioned to which we would like to refer as the <u>configura-
tive causality of the growth patterns of defense apparata</u> (and
thus, by implication, of arms race dynamics). Conventional causal
schemes have conceptualized causality in terms of the sequential
interaction of independent, intervening and dependent variables.
Configurative causality is quite different from that type of one-
dimensional causality in as much as synchronous and diachronous
analyses about total phenomena like the contemporary defense
apparata show that all possible causal interactions and causal
sequences (for example between the three decisive variables of
armament policies like armament interests, armament technologies
and armament ideologies) can be observed simultaneously with
no clear-cut, one-dimensional rigid sequential patterns pre-
vailing. Naturally, in the biography of <u>individual</u> weapons
systems a clear weighting of these factors in terms of conven-
tional bi- or multivariate causal models can nevertheless be
determined. So it can be clearly shown in the biography of some
weapon systems that industrial interests were very decisive in
initiating a new weapon program and that the technological in-
novation has been the result of such a development, whereas in
the development of other weapon systems very often just the
contrary can be observed, namely that a once achieved technolo-
gical innovation will be occupied by specific armament interests
which then formulate certain contingency plans with the help of

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which this program looks indispensable to fill certain gaps in the existing weapon arsenals. The fact that all of these types of interactions do take place at one and the same time and over time between the political and military administrations, the armed services, the armament industries, the technology and scientific laboratories and so forth represents a real challenge for any kind of conventional causal explanation of armament dynamics. We try to come to grips with these phenomena by the notion of <u>configurative</u> causality, the understanding of which is very decisive for an adequate analysis of the growth patterns of armament policies, as well as for the understanding of the inertiae and momenta built into these apparata.

This observation has an important and highly relevant implication. Arms control policies which are aimed at real decreases of armament efforts can only be successful with respect to such configuratively caused as well as sustained political and social institutions like the defense apparata if, and only if, <u>they combine a plurality of measures and steps.</u> The war system has its own redundantly caused dynamics. Where <u>isolated</u> arms control policies are pursued within such a system, they naturally remain affected by this dynamic. <u>Arms control then does not represent any counterweight to the arms race, but it rather remains a mere reflex of the prevailing armament dynamics.</u> If arms control policies <u>would</u> aim at the <u>structural</u> change of the context of security policies, this would only be possible if on the basis of a <u>comprehensive strategy of peace-promotion,</u> first elements of a <u>peace structure</u> would be built up which themselves would have to develop a dynamics of their own. Such strategies which finally would promote the changing of traditional security policies have to approach the problem at many spots and in many directions. They have to be more complex than the traditional deterrence and security strategies. They have to take off from rather <u>variegated action premises:</u> from unilateral, multilateral and gradualistic. They have to be <u>many-dimensional</u> since it can be expected that the growth of peace structures will only be successful against the resisting forces of the armament system if it will be deliberately promoted by many political, social, economic and social-psychological, including individual, impulses.

The conventional arms control policy equals at the best a palliative. In the case of the most recent arms control treaty, the so-called SALT-agreements from spring 1972, it can be demonstrated, like in previous cases of arms control measures, <u>that the autonomous probability of the development trends of the arms race have not been affected very much;</u> one might even argue that this agreement will constitute a lever for the ongoing <u>qualitative</u> arming of those nations which signed the agreement.

Arms control policies could constitute one of several direct strategies for the solution of imminent armament and security problems, if they would really reach a dynamics of their own within a policy of peace promotion deliberately aspired to.

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Under present conditions this would be only possible with the
help of massive interferences into the research and development
programs by which so far the arms race has been continously
pushed ahead. One could only talk about successful arms control
measures if these qualitative dimensions of the contemporary
arms race would be really controlled with the final result of
a containment and cut down of national armament policies; e.g.
arms control measures have to be evaluated not on the basis of
their symbolic value, but by the degree to which they really
represent an effective inroad into those factors which were ana-
lyzed in the previous paragraphs.

Even in that instance, arms control policies will only over-
step decisive thresholds if such a strategy is part of a com-
prehensive peace policy which will have to be composed of many
componants, among others also of so-called round-about strategies.
By these the armament sector will not be affected directly; they
rather aim at the build-up of peace-promoting structures without
which a distargeting of the defense apparata will not come about.
In this respect we particularly think about peace-promoting
measures in the area of socialization and about reorientations in
the allocation of social resources geared to new societal pri-
orities.

If one accepts most of the observations which we have made
in this paper so far, the question remains of course why there
have been any détente efforts at all in the face of such a
policy of ongoing armaments. How is the one affected by the other
and how have arms control measures of the conventional type to
be evaluated in this context? We would like to give here only
a very apodictic answer. In the face of a growing critique of
traditional arms race rationalizations, arms control measures
of the conventional type have basically two essential functions.
First, they contribute to the further pursuit of given armament
policies and particularly of the qualitative modernization of
existing weapon technologies; second, they serve a symbolic
function in as much as they contribute to a new basis of legi-
timacy for an old policy. If this interpretation tends to be
correct, then arms control policies and also parts of the dé-
tente policies would not represent a transitional phase from
the Cold War to a worldwide or European peace order but rather
an instrument for the preservation of conventional security
policies and the present defense apparata. In that case all
these enterprises would finally only contribute to new rationales
for old doctrines and existing apparata. If this is so, there
would be tremendous limits for any structural and contextual
change.

This thesis needs not to be completely correct in its
apodictic formulation; nevertheless it can not be too easily
falsified, not because it would be principially impossible to
prove or disprove it, but rather because there are too many
empirical observations including those summarized in this
paper which seem to justify caution about any kind of optimism
with respect to deep changes in contemporary military strategies
and armament apparata.   * * *