European Security, SALT and U.S.-European Relations

31 Agosto - 2 Settembre 1972

Ginevra (Morlino)

3572

"EUROPEAN SECURITY, SALT AND U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS3
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Geneva, 31/VIII-2/IX/1972

(1) Barnaby, Frank: "SALT and the strategic balance"
(2) Haagerup, Niels: "The impact of SALT I on european security"
(3) Hassner, Pierre: "Between two ages or between two stools: the implications of political change for european security and arms control"
(4) Rathjens, George: "The future of the strategic arms race and the next steps for its control"

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Conference on

EUROPEAN SECURITY, SALT, AND U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

August 31 - September 2, 1972

Geneva

Friday, September 1 Morning Session

SALT and the Strategic Balance

by

Frank Barnaby

Introduction

The SALT agreements signed in Moscow between the USA and the USSR on May 26, 1972 are the first substantive accords to have emerged from the 127 sessions of the strategic arms limitation talks held since the talks began in 1969. The two previous SALT agreements, concluded on 30 September 1971 - one to reduce the risk of the outbreak of accidental nuclear war between the USA and the USSR, and the other to improve the "hot line" (the USA-USSR direct communications link set up by the 20 June 1963 Memorandum) - are essentially technical and subsidiary in nature. They do not affect the weapons in the possession of the superpowers and are confidence-building rather than arms control measures which could have been concluded independently of SALT.

The Moscow SALT agreements, together with several other documents adopted during the US President's visit in the Soviet Union - on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes; on the prevention of incidents on and over the sea; on cooperation in the fields of science and technology, medicine and public health, and the protection of the environment; and, particularly, on basic principles of US-Soviet relations - may signify the beginning of a steady rapprochement and closer cooperation between the two superpowers. At the very least, the agreements may be taken to imply improved mutual understanding of the other's policies and strategies - a process which will continue during further SALT negotiations. The superpowers themselves will clearly obtain direct benefits from this but there will also be indirect positive repercussions for the cause of world peace due mainly

to a reduction in the likelihood of the initiation of world war. That the SALT agreements have significant international political importance cannot, therefore, be denied even if only through the stimulation of mutual perceptions of increased détente.

Other elements of political importance arise from SALT. For the first time the two most powerful nations discussed in concrete detail, and succeeded in reaching, a measure of understanding on the delicate issue of those nuclear armaments which they consider central for their security. For the first time these powers have agreed to establish ceilings on the production of strategic armaments, overcoming the problem of verification which has plagued disarmament negotiations for years. And for the first time they agreed to accept limitations on their own military arsenals without requiring sacrifices, contributions or obligations from other states.

But from the point of view of actual disarmament the value of the Moscow agreements is less obvious - a fact that will become more widely realized as the euphoria generated by the political significance of the agreements wears off.

Superpower obligations under the agreement

The Moscow agreements are in two parts - the Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and the Interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, with a protocol specifying numerical levels of modern ballistic missile submarines and ballistic missiles launchers on submarines, as well as replacement procedures. These parts are closely interrelated even through their legal status is different. The ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, is subject to ratification and will enter into force upon the

exchange of instruments of ratification. The Interim Agreement and the Protocol have a five-year duration and enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance. Both agreements must come into effect simultaneously - they may also lapse simultaneously. The United States, for example, has made it clear, in a formal statement, that if no agreement leading to more comprehensive strategic offensive arms limitations is achieved within five years, then US supreme interests could be sufficiently jeopardized to warrant a withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

Defensive weapons and radars

The SALT agreements obligate the superpowers not to deploy ABM systems for the defence of their national territory nor to provide a base for such a defence, and not to deploy ABM systems[1] for the defence of an individual region, except as provided for in the Treaty.

---

1) Under the Treaty an ABM system means a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. It currently consists of: ABM interceptor missiles (interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role or of a type tested in an ABM model); ABM launchers (launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles); and ABM radars (radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode). These ABM system components include those which are operational; under construction; undergoing testing; undergroing overhaul, repair or conversion; or in reserve.

According to an American statement a launcher, missile or radar would be considered "tested in an ABM mode" if any of the following events occur. If a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile. If an interceptor missile is flight-tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with similar characteristics to those of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, is flight-tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight-tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which defences are deployed. If a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or with an ABM radar at the same test range.

The US and USSR are allowed under the Treaty to deploy up to 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles, and ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes[1] within an area having a radius of 150 Km and centered on the national capital.

They can further deploy up to 100 ABM launchers and 100 interceptor missiles as well as two modern large phased-array ABM radars, comparable in potential[2] to corresponding ABM radars in operation or under construction[3] on the date of signature of the Treaty, within one area containing ICBM silo launchers and having a radius of 150 Km. This complex can also include up to 18 ABM radars provided each has a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars (three million). Each party can have up to 15 ABM launchers at current and additionally agreed test ranges.

It has been agreed that, within each country, the centre of the ABM system deployment area around the national capital and the centre of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometres. The US missile-defence site will be in the Grand Forks area. The Soviet missile-defence site may be located east of the Urals.

---

1) The permitted area of each complex being circular with a diameter of no more than 3 kilometres.

2) Defined as the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters.

3) The only two large phased-array ABM radars operational or under construction in a deployment area on the date of signature were the perimeter acquisition radar (PAR) and missile site radar (MSR) under construction at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, USA.

The deployment of ABM systems based on new means[1] of anti-missile protection and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are forbidden unless the Treaty is suitably amended.

But the superpowers are allowed to conduct research on, and to develop, current ABM systems (see definition above) provided that they are not sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based.

They must, however, not develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for the rapid reload of ABM launchers. It is understood that the development, testing or deployment of ABM interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead, are prohibited. Apart from these restrictions, the modernisation and replacement of ABM systems or their components is allowed.

Non-ABM missiles, launchers, or radars must not be provided with capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory - an undertaking which would, for example, prohibit the modification of air defence missiles (SAMs) to enable them to intercept strategic ballistic missiles. Non-ABM missiles, launchers, and radars cannot be tested in an ABM mode (i.e., for ABM purposes).

Phased-array radars having a potential exceeding three million, must not be deployed except as specifically provided for in the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as

---

1) Using, for example, laser beams instead of missiles to shoot down incoming ICBMs.

national technical means of verification. Phased-array radars, although currently deployed for non-ABM missions, such as air defence or air traffic control, have an inherent capacity for ABM use.

In future, radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack can be deployed only at locations along the periphery of the national territory and must be outward looking. Existing ballistic missile early-warning radars are unaffected, and no limitation is imposed on radars for national means of verification.

The USA has stated that since the so-called Hen-House radars[1] can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances - and therefore have a significant ABM potential - any increase in their defence by surface-to-air missiles would be regarded as inconsistent with the agreement.

Neither the ABM systems nor their components limited by the Treaty can be transferred to other states, nor deployed outside the national territory of the superpower.

When the Moscow agreements were concluded, the USA had deployed no anti-ballistic missiles. The construction of one ABM complex for the protection of ICBM silo launchers at Grand Forks, North Dakota, was about 90 per cent complete. Another complex - in the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Base in Montana - was at an early stage of construction. The Grand Forks site will now become operational with no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles. The Malmstrom construction has been stopped. The US intends to build an ABM system around Washington, also with 100 launchers and 100 interceptor missiles.

---

1) Soviet ballistic missile early-warning radars.

The USSR has had 64 ABM launchers deployed around Moscow since 1968. Under the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union may now expand the capital defence system to 100 launchers and 100 interceptor missiles and construct one new site with the same number of launchers and missiles to protect some of its ICBMs. There are indications that it will do so.

Thus, the Treaty provides for a possible parity of ABM launchers and missiles. The same applies to radars installed in the deployment areas. Considering, however, Soviet superiority in the numbers of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, the site defence system in the USSR may protect a lesser proportion of ICBMs than it will in the USA.

Offensive weapons

The SALT agreements allow the superpowers to retain the fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers[1] in their possession on 1 July 1972 but the powers must not construct additional ones after this date. It is understood that fixed land-based ICBM launchers under active construction on the date or signature of the Agreement may be completed.

The number of land-based strategic ICBM launchers possessed by the USA at the time the Agreement was reached was 1 054 (1 000 Minuteman and 54 Titan missiles). All were operational, none were under construction. The total number of Soviet ICBMs, operational and under construction, has not been specified by the USSR. The USA estimated this number to be 1 618.

---

1) The ICBM launchers referred to in the Interim Agreement are understood to be those capable of ranges greater than the shortest distance between the northeastern border of continental USA and the northwestern border of continental USSR (a distance of about 3,650 miles).

The USA possesses 41 modern nuclear powered submarines with a total of 656 launchers aboard. The corresponding figures for the Soviet Union were in dispute. The USSR claimed 48 submarines with 768 missiles; the US estimate was less. Eventually, a baseline was adopted for launchers - namely, 740.

Under the agreement, the Americans can deploy up to 710 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers but must operate no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviets can deploy up to 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines but these must include no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

Up to these levels, the United States may add SLBMs to its existing number of 656 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, and the USSR may add SLBMs to its existing 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines (operational and under construction) by replacing equal numbers of ballistic missile launchers of types deployed prior to 1964 or ballistic missile launchers on older submarines. The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the USA and the USSR.

The conversion of land-based launchers for light ICBMs or for ICBMs of older types (deployed prior to 1964) into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs[1] of types deployed after that time is not allowed.

All currently operational ICBMs other than the Soviet SS-9 are either "light" (the US Minuteman and the Soviet SS-11 and SS-13) or

---

1) There is no common definition of a heavy missile although the USA has stated that it would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM.

"older" ICBM launchers of types first deployed prior to 1964 (the US Titan and the Soviet SS-7 and SS-8). Thus, the conversion of a launcher for an SS-7, SS-8, SS-11 or SS-13 ICBM into a launcher for an SS-9 or any new modern heavy ICBM, and also a launcher for a Minuteman or Titan into a launcher for a modern heavy ICBM is prohibited.

The sub-ceiling imposed on land-based launchers for modern "heavy" missiles applies, in practice, only to Soviet SS-9 missiles, of which there are now 313 (according to US estimates), presumably equipped with a 20-25 megaton warhead each, or with three five megaton warheads. (The maximum payload of a US Minuteman warhead is less than 2 megatons).

The Soviet submarine fleet for nuclear delivery is more varied than that of the USA. A ceiling of 62 has been set for the USSR on the number of operational modern submarines. These are now Y-class nuclear-powered submarines (roughly equivalent in performance to the early models of US Polaris submarines). The Soviet ceiling of 950 SLBM launchers is to include all launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, i.e., of Y-class and H-class, and modern launchers on G-class diesel-powered submarines. To reach the permissible limit, the USSR must retire older ballistic missile launchers, specifically those for SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs and those on H-class submarines. It could retain the existing launchers on G-class submarines (with short-range missiles), in addition to 950 launchers on modern submarines, but any launchers for modern SLBMs on these older submarines would be counted against the total of 950. There can be no doubt that the USSR will use the option of replacing old types of launchers by more modern ones; it would seem, however,

unlikely that it would install modern launchers on obsolete boats. The USSR has started to build a modified class of submarines with fewer but longer-range missiles than its current fleet.

Assuming that the USSR takes full advantage of its replacement possibilities, the resulting balance of missile launchers as of 26 May 1977, will be as follows:

	US		USSR	
ICBM launchers	1 054	(unchanged)	1 408	(1 618 - 210)
Submarine-missile launchers	656	(unchanged)	950	(740 + 210)
Total	1 710		2 358	

To achieve the increased number of SLBMs, the USSR would have to use its quota of 62 modern ballistic missile submarines. In addition, the USSR has reserved its right to an appropriate increase in the number of its submarines if US NATO allies should increase their number of modern submarines to exceed those operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Agreement. It accepted that for the period of effectiveness of the Agreement, the USA and its NATO allies would have up to 50 such submarines with a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers. The NATO allies in question are, of course, the United Kingdom - with four modern ballistic missile submarines and no current plans for expansion - and France - which by 1976 may have four comparable submarines and has not yet decided on the construction of the fifth. The United States did not accept the validity of the Soviet claim for compensation for SLBM submarines belonging to third countries, but the question is unlikely to arise. The USA will probably not increase the number of its submarines

within 5 years and the United Kingdom and France, taken together, will not acquire more than eight submarines during this period.

The difference in the over-all numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles is in fact smaller than that indicated above, if account is taken of US preponderance - both numerical (457 against 140) and qualitative - in heavy bombers. These are not included in the limitations but they continue to be a major element of the strategic offensive forces. Moreover, because of geographic reasons and the fact that the USA has bases in Scotland and Spain, the USSR may need three submarines for two American ones in order to keep an equal number on station. The USSR drew attention to this imbalance, but its considerations were rejected by the USA on the grounds that the overseas bases do not provide an advantage not compensated for in the agreements. There are other factors which cannot be ignored in the strategic equation between the USSR and the USA. For example, the strength and the potentialities of their respective allies, and the threats the two powers may face outside their mutual confrontation.

Soviet intermediate range ballistic missile, targetted on US European allies or on other countries, but unable to reach the USA, are not covered by the Interim Agreement nor are those American forward-based aircraft in Europe, and bombers aboard US aircraft carriers, capable of delivering nuclear strikes on the USSR.

The deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers is not explicitly prohibited. On 20 May 1972, the USA agreed to defer the question of limitation of these launchers to subsequent negotiations, but stated that it would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with

the objectives of that Agreement. Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment systems are considered to be included in the Agreement.

The parties agree not to significantly increase the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers, or the number of such launchers for modern land-based heavy ICBMs. Construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for testing and training.

The modernization and replacement of the strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by the Interim Agreement is allowed. In the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM launchers must not be significantly increased - this apparently means that any increase will not be greater than 10-15 per cent of present dimensions.

Under the agreements the superpowers are allowed to conduct research, as well as to develop and test strategic offensive arms.

Qualitative restrictions

The only qualitative restriction in the field of offensive weapons is a freeze on the size of ICBMs. Otherwise, the quality of missiles, both land-based and sea-based, can be improved and research, development and testing can continue.

The most significant omission in the Agreements is the total lack of restriction on the number of nuclear warheads each missile can carry - an area in which the USA has indisputable superiority. Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) are being installed on US Minuteman ICBMs and Poseidon submarine missiles. The USSR has reportedly started to deploy multiple, but not independently guided, re-entry vehicles (MRV), and may have tested a missile to carry MIRVs, but there is no evidence that it has yet tested an actual MIRV device. According to US estimates, it may take the USSR more than a year to develop a MIRV capability. Thus, although the USSR has more missile launchers, including launchers for "heavy" missiles of a type which does not exist in the USA, and while the Soviet deploy a total strategic missile megatonnage about three times greater than that of the Americans, the USA has more than twice as many deliverable strategic nuclear warheads as the USSR (5 700 against 2 500), and by the end of the freeze (in five years time) the USA will have significantly increased this advantage.

There is little doubt that the USSR can, in given time, improve the quality of its missiles, and can deploy MIRVs in quantities matching those of the USA. Given its superiority in the number of missile launchers, the USSR would then gain predominance in the overall offensive strength. This, however, is unlikely to happen within the life-span of the Agreement.

Whatever the relative nuclear strength of the USA and the USSR, and whatever standards are used to measure it, the destructive power accumulated in their arsenals is already many times more than enough to cover every conceivable target on their territories.

Verification

No international control procedures have been provided for in the agreements. To assure compliance with the obligations assumed, the USA and the USSR will rely on their own "national technical means" of verification - chiefly reconnaissance satellites. The parties undertake not to interfere with these means and not to use deliberate concealment impeding verification, for example, by roofing over installations such as submarines pens. Intelligence gathering, hitherto placed under taboo, has been elevated to the rank of internationally recognized and mutually useful activity; the principle of "open skies", which the Americans had been advocating for years, seems now to have been accepted by the Soviet Union. This fact, and the official US admission that modern means of verification at the disposal of the great powers are much superior to and more reliable than on-site inspection to monitor quantitative limitations of arms, are important for other arms control measures.

Unilateral off-site control will probably suffice to check the numbers and types of ABMs and radars, ICBMs and SLBMs deployed. But it will not enable the parties to detect possible violations of the provisions prohibiting the development of certain categories of weapons. Development, however, must be followed by tests, and since the latter are observable by satellites, the risks of evasion are not great.

A standing consultative commission will be established by the parties to promote the objectives and implementation of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The principal function of the commission will be to consider questions of compliance and to clarify ambiguous situation which might generate suspicions regarding compliance. Each party may

voluntarily provide through the commission any information which it considers necessary. The commission is charged with the responsibility to examine questions of interference with national technical means of verification. And it may consider changes in the general strategic situation which have a bearing on the obligations assumed. The parties are to agree, through the commission, on procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the Treaty. The commission may also consider proposals for amendments (which would have to be ratified to become valid), and measures aimed at the further limitation of strategic arms. The strategic dialogue between the two powers will thus be institutionalized.

Pending the establishment of the standing consultative commission, the parties agreed that when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side can be carried out by the two SALT delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for consultations may be made through diplomatic channels.

Conclusions

In summary, the ABM Treaty will result in the deployment by both countries of missiles which were not operational at the time the Moscow agreements were concluded. Moreover, the over-all number of submarine-launched missiles will go up. But a stop will be put to an excessive proliferation of fixed land-based ICBMs the importance of which is, in any case, diminishing as compared to sea-based deterrence.

The concrete net gains in the bargain are: cancellation of the US 12-site anti-ballistic missile programme - a matter of primary concern to the USSR, because these ABMs could reduce the effectiveness

of its offensive missile build-up; and discontinuance of the deployment of Soviet land-based launchers for "heavy" SS-9 missiles - a matter of primary concern to the USA, because these missiles are viewed as part of the Soviet counter-force strategy.

The parties undertake . to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. No such undertaking is explicitly assumed with regard to defensive systems, except for a review of the ABM Treaty to be conducted five years after its entry into force and at five-year intervals thereafter.

There are no restrictions on the improvement of the quality of the weapons in question: their survivability, accuracy, penetrability and range. Better weapons are substituted for those which have become obsolete. The technological arms race is encouraged and even legitimized. In the absence of mutual restraint it is bound to create temptations for seeking a decisive advantage.

Both the USA and the USSR have made it clear that they will go ahead with armament programmes which are beyond the constraints of the agreements. The US leaders have stated their determination to maintain the US technological lead. The Soviet Union has said that it would take all necessary measures in defence of the principle of equal security. The arguments advanced in justification of this course, range from the need to secure the viability of SALT agreements to the need for acquiring "negotiating chips", so that the next round of negotiations could be conducted from the position of strength. Thus the freeze on offensive weapons achieved so far is more apparent than real. No existing or planned US offensive weapons programme will be stopped. The Soviet land-based ICBM programme was, in any case, already grinding to a halt. Only SLBM programmes were under way at full speed and under the Interim Agreement these can still continue to increase for many years.

As far as ABMs are concerned, an uninhibited development of systems more effective than the present ones, capable, for instance, of covering ever larger territories, may gradually undermine the agreed limitations. The withdrawal clause could then be invoked by either side with reference to "supreme interests".

In the areas not covered by the agreements, the development of new sophisticated long-range bombers (such as the American bomber B1A, having better survivability against SLBM attack and higher penetrability of air defences than the existing B-52 bomber force, or such as the Soviet supersonic swing-wing bomber); of submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) flying at low altitudes, so as to escape radar detection; as well as of new means of anti-submarine and anti-satellite warfare, will go on.

"Secondary" nuclear powers, the United Kingdom, China and France, will hardly be dissuaded from retaining, increasing and modernizing their nuclear potential. If anything, the limitation of US and Soviet ABM systems may, to some extent, increase the credibility of their nuclear forces. The Chinese Prime Minister has stated that the SALT agreements have nothing to do with China; the French reception was also cool. Both may seek a new generation of missiles capable of penetrating the superpowers' existing defensives and perhaps even develop their own ABMs. This would create a new threat to the balance of deterrence.

The obligation of the USA and the USSR under the Non-Proliferation Treaty relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament has not been fulfilled. The SALT agreements will hardly weaken the position of the protagonists of nuclear armaments in the near-nuclear countries. But, although there have been speculations

to the contrary, there are unlikely to be any serious moves to combine the Anglo-French nuclear forces into a European deterrent even though the European alliances may well become weaker during the coming period.

The outcome of SALT has no direct bearing on the arms situation in Europe, with the exception of the two powers non-dissemination commitment - not to deploy ABM systems or their components outside their national territories, and not to transfer them to their allies, a commitment which the USA does not consider as setting a precedent for strategic offensive arms. Nuclear weapons, bombers, medium and short-range missiles, installed in Europe and targeted on Europe, remain unaffected. Their reduction or limitation may become possible only as part of a European arms settlement. But due to the political climate generated by the Moscow agreements, the talks on mutual balanced reduction of forces will probably start sooner than had been expected. However, in view of the plurality of interests involved, they may prove even more complicated than SALT. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these talks would take place in the absence of a SALT agreement. Similarly, the SALT agreements will probably make easier the convening and conduct of a European Security Conference.

(2)

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Conference on

EUROPEAN SECURITY, SALT, AND U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

August 31 - September 2, 1972

Friday, September 1 Afternoon Session

The Impact of SALT I on European Security

by

Niels Haagerup

The Immediate Impact of SALT I

Precisely one year and six days prior to the signing of SALT I in Moscow it was officially announced in Washington and Moscow that the SALT negotiaters would concentrate on a treaty limiting ABM systems. Although the precise details of SALT I could not have been forecast in European capitals, the outline of the planned SALT treaty began to become known long before the official signing of the treaty.

This is, however, only one reason why SALT I apparently was registered in Europe without surprise and believed to have no immediate impact on European security. In spite of the disparity in numbers of offensive missiles, contained in the Interim Agreement of 26 May, both the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement appeared to confirm status quo. The lack of apprehension, indeed the very positive reaction to SALT I, which characterized almost all European comments, reflect a widespread belief in the strategic balance - the mutual balance of deterrence of the superpowers - being a very robust one.

It is true that The Economist (of June 3) wrote that there might be fresh doubts among the Americans' allies in Europe about the validity of the Americans' power to deter Russia from seizing ground or advantage in Europe by threatening, in the last resort, to respond with nuclear action. But the paper added significantly that a two-thirds majority of the Senators, and most of the European critics, were likely to recognise that the nuclear calculus is not simple arithmetic.

The Neue Zürcher Zeitung (of 11 June) wrote that because the nuclear threat was becoming less effective the threat backed by conventional

weapons would increase and require stronger defense efforts by the NATO countries. Former British Defense Minister Mr. Denis Healey was not so much impressed with the SALT agreement in itself, though he conceded that the limitation on the employment of anti-ballistic missiles would remove a destabilizing element from the balance of terror and for the time being relieve other nuclear powers of the need to seek a new generation of missiles for themselves. More important, according to Mr. Healey, was the fact that Nixon and Brezhnev were "now psychologically and politically committed to give SALT real meaning by seeking solutions to the problem of limiting strategic research and development. . ." (The Sunday Times 28 May). Lothar Ruehl of Die Welt (29 May) was satisfied that an important element had been added to the conditions for a constructive international security policy, hegemonial relations between the superpowers and their respective allies having been strengthened and the tendencies towards dissolving the blocs effectively countered.

The consultations on SALT in NATO were often praised by the European members of the alliance. When SALT I was discussed by the NATO Council for the first time after the signing in Moscow - the prominent U.S. SALT delegate Mr. Raymond Garthoff participating - it was favourably greeted and no dissenting voices were apparently aired.[1] Without in any way detracting from this positive reception it is worth recalling that the consultations on SALT had been facilitated by the fact that the final decisions on SALT were purely American decisions and not decisions or policy guidelines to be worked out collectively as must be the case for MBFR or maybe even certain aspects of SALT II or III.

While European comments on SALT at the start of the negotiations in November 1969 were generally favorable, certain critical voices could also be heard expressing doubts as to the validity of the U.S. nuclear guarantee of Western Europe and hopes of the Soviet MRBM's/IRBM's being included in any limitation on numbers of delivery vehicles - hopes that were not fulfilled in SALT I.

On the basis of such doubts and hopes in 1969-70 SALT I might conceivably have met with some European criticism. But it did not. The main reason for this - and the basic reason for the almost unanimously positive reaction in Europe to SALT I - is the course of events in Europe during the past two years. SALT I is seen as complementary to détente policies in Europe, policies that may not have been possible without greater superpower understanding, but also policies which are being carried out as a consequence of European initiatives. That applies in particular to the determined efforts of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany to pursue a policy of reconciliation towards Eastern Europe.

One might talk of a European concept of "linkage" corresponding to the interpretation made by Henry Kissinger in a statement to five Congressional committees on 15 June 1972, in which he said,"In recent months,major progress was achieved in moving toward a broadly-based accomodation of interests with the USSR, in which an arms limitation agreement could be a central element. This approach was called linkage, not by the Administration, and became the object of considerable debate in 1969. Now, three years later, the SALT agreement does not stand alone, isolated and incongruous in the relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any moment to the shock of some sudden crisis. It stands,

rather, linked organically to a chain of agreements and to a broad understanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age."[2]

To the Europeans, the elements in this "linkage" are thus the Ostpolitik of the Bonn government, the Berlin Agreement, the increased bilateral contacts with East European countries, the forthcoming Conference on European Security and Cooperation, and the MBFR preparations. It was never denied in Europe that the stability of the superpower relationship was essential, indeed decisive, for European security.

The signing of SALT I at a time, when an atmosphere of détente is felt throughout Europe, and when the cold war is believed by most people to be practically over, SALT I has met with a warm welcome which is likely to have implications for the popular view of the vital elements of European security. Contrary to the German view, quoted above, it is widely believed that SALT I will not increase the hegemonial relations between the superpowers and their respective allies. It is felt, especially in Eastern Europe, that the enhanced stability of the superpower relationship as expressed by SALT I and other agreements, could lead to a greater freedom of action vis-a-vis the superpowers (the Soviet Union). It is disputable from a general European point of view if such a development - in isolation - in fact would increase European security. That would, of course, depend on many other developments, above all the Soviet concept of the role of Eastern Europe in a future all-European security structure.

SALT I and European Nuclear Weapons

The idea of a European ABM shield was briefly considered and then discarded in 1968 for both technical, economic and political reasons. However, if SALT I had turned out differently, and the construction of American and Soviet nation-wide ABM systems had become part of it, some kind of a European protection against Soviet missiles might have been reconsidered at a later date.[3] Instead, SALT I has, for all practical purposes, put Western Europe and the United States (and the Soviet Union) on an almost equal footing as far as ABM is concerned. Apart from the military advantages for British and French strategic forces and possibly some of the American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe - such as the Pershing missile - the psychological benefits of this situation are undoubtedly appreciated in all European countries.

Although it can be argued - and has been argued - that an ABM protected United States would enhance the credibility of the US as a guarantor, European opinion has all along been unanimously unfavorable to any deployment of ballistic missile defenses.[4]

Much attention has already been given to the effect of SALT I that it gives the present generation of the British and French nuclear deterrents a new lease of life, making the acquisition of a new generation of delivery vehicles less urgent. This can arguably be interpreted as slowing down the arms race, and SALT I may very well influence future deliberations on the technical merits of some joint French-British nuclear force or even maybe some day a truly European

nuclear force, although such a force is not in the cards for a very long time.

This is not the place to repeat all past and current arguments pro and con a European nuclear force, a theme to which hundreds of articles and dozens of books have already been devoted. The most prominent European expert on this particular problem during the past ten years, Professor Alastair Buchan, has written in his most recent contribution that, "at the level of strategic power there is no serious question of Europe playing the role of equilibrist. Not only is there no requirement to counterbalance American strategic predominance as President de Gaulle mistakenly assumed, but it is acknowledged, in Paris nowadays as well as elsewhere, that the security of Western Europe still depends crucially upon the continuing commitment of American strategic power - on the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance - and that the development of autonomy on the strategic plane is not on Europe's agenda in the foreseeable future."[5]

In his detailed and carefully balanced analysis of the prospects for Anglo-French nuclear co-operation, Ian Smart wrote last year: "The American nuclear guarantee formally covers all European members of NATO and, less formally, is relevant beyond their borders. But, even if the British and French deterrents were somehow merged into a joint Anglo-French deterrent, and even if, within the framework of a European Community, the guarantee thus provided were intended to West Germany and to other members of the present (or future) Community, it is clear that the area of guarantee would remain much smaller

than that now covered by the American deterrent. In particular, it would be unlikely to cover, with any substantial credibility, either the northern or south-eastern flank of Western Europe..."[6]

In the debate over a European deterrent it is sometimes overlooked that the idea itself meets very strong political opposition not only in the smaller European countries, but also by Labour in the United Kingdom and M. Mitterrand's new left force in France. Though it is unlikely, whatever the political development in the UK and France, that the national deterrents of the two countries will be disbanded, the heated arguments against a European deterrent illustrate the controversial character of the idea.[7] It is obvious that many West Europeans would be afraid that if the idea was given new impetus it could weaken the American nuclear guarantee and possibly hasten an American withdrawal of at least some of the US forces in Western Europe. For reasons identical with those advanced by Ian Smart, in the above quote, any government in Bonn would be opposed to a process toward some kind of a European nuclear force, which would, at the same time, cast doubt over the credibility of the US nuclear protection of Germany and compromise further détente efforts, because of the anticipated sharp Soviet reaction to anything resembling a European nuclear force with a German finger - among others- on the trigger.

The current debate on a European nuclear force - rather tending to stress the difficulties more than was the case a few years ago - is relevant to SALT I insofar as SALT I is unlikely to make European public opinion more favourable to a European deterrent. The likelihood of an American-Soviet agreement to limit ABM systems has been

envisaged for more than a year without it making the prospect of a European deterrent more probable or appealing to the Europeans. The signing of SALT I will not change that. It may rather be changed by the enlargement of the Common Market as of 1 January 1973, but presumably without any decisive political steps likely to be taken for some time. It looks as if the idea continues to excite Americans more than Europeans.[8]

Finally, it should be noted - as it has been in London and Paris, of course - that the Soviet Union has taken the British and French ballistic missile submarines into account when agreeing to the Interim Agreement on offensive missiles, which constitutes part of SALT I. On May, 1972, the head of the Soviet SALT delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov made a unilateral statement to the effect that for the period of effectiveness of the Interim "Freeze" Agreement the US and its NATO allies have - according to the Soviet side - up to 50 modern ballistic missile submarines with a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers thereon. If during the period of effectiveness of the Agreement US allies in NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines they would have operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Agreement, the Soviet Union will have the right to a corresponding increase in the number of its submarines.[9] This Soviet reservation has been rejected by the United States. It was repeated on 26 May 1972 - the day of the signing of SALT I - and again rejected by the US.

An increase in the present British nuclear force of four missile

submarines and the planned five French missile submarines is unlikely within the 5 year period the Interim Agreement is scheduled to run (if not replaced earlier by a new SALT treaty). But the different US and Soviet positions on the role of the British and French strategic nuclear weapons may complicate SALT II.

Possible and Probable European Reactions

Ever since the SALT talks started the debate of their impact has centered around the credibility of the United States guarantee of Western Europe. Mr. McGeorge Bundy wrote confidently in 1969 that "the strength of the American guarantee will be neither increased nor decreased by acceptance of parity, and the level of American commitment in Europe is not a proper topic for bargaining in the SALT talks. It was never the American superiority in nuclear weapons that was decisive in protecting Europe; it was simply the high probability that any large-scale use of force against a NATO country would set loose a chain of events that could lead to nuclear war."[10] Later analyses have not seriously disputed this view even if the mythology of nuclear weapons has made it difficult to absorb the realization that superiority has no practical meaning in any real context, as Marshall Shulman has put it. Shulman goes on to say that the argument that parity would increase the Soviet propensity to take additional risks, or diminish the American resolution in responding, ignores the fundamental inhibitions of mutual deterrence, which are not substantially changed by disparities in the respective arsenals.[11]

On the European side, François Duchene has agreed that doubts

about strategic nuclear parity have proved easy to live with. But in his view the new European doubt about America looks more serious. It is rooted not in nuclear parity, but in a general impression of "potential imparity in political will between the two superpowers, the one all too modern and the other too old-fashioned."[12] Other European comments tend to reinforce Mr. Duchene's point: Neither the SALT negotiations nor SALT I nor parity - or for that matter the disparity in numbers - are seen as a destabilizing factor in themselves. Other developments gradually changing the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States and between the United States and Western Europe - the enlarged Community - are, however, likely to exert a greater influence upon European security considerations.

A main reason for Europeans not to doubt the credibility of the United States guarantee is simply that they do not want to think it has in any way diminished. The two preoccupations of the Europeans are the pursuit of détente and the enlargement of the EEC, and this leaves for the moment little room for far-reaching deliberations concerning possible changes in the present or future security framework of Europe.

This is undoubtedly a short-sighted view, however. A number of factors are bound to influence the security outlook of the Europeans in the years to come - irrespective of SALT I, but possibly affecting the way Europeans - West Europeans - will look at the continued SALT negotiations. The relationship between the United States and the enlarged European Community is rapidly entering a much more competitive phase, as will be illustrated by the forthcoming GATT negotiations in 1973. The question of unilateral reductions of the American forces

in Western Europe will continue to trouble NATO (and become rapidly acute in case of a McGovern victory 7 November).

The problem is, of course, closely linked to the progress of MBFR, to which I shall shortly return. Even before negotiations on MBFR have started with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, it is obvious that there are great difficulties involved for the members of NATO to agree on both procedural and substantial questions more than four years after the original NATO statement on MBFR, the famous Reykjavik Signal of June 1968. It is not a very promising sign that the silent refusal by the Soviet Union to receive the Brosio mission seems to have thrown the whole western diplomatic approach to MBFR into a state of confusion, inevitably fostering European suspicions of a tendency on the part of both superpowers to deal with this problem as exclusively as possible.

Even if the US guarantee of Western Europe is not believed - and certainly not officially professed - to have lost its credibility, it would be logical to assume that the European members of NATO would take a second look at the role of conventional forces in Europe - if not just as a consequence of SALT I then as a result of a combination of factors which may seem to make an early use of nuclear weapons - tactical or strategic - more unlikely in case of a military conflict in Europe. But any increase in the conventional forces in Europe - i.e. NATO Europe - can be considered out of the question, unless the present climate of détente abruptly changes to a climate of new East-West tensions in Europe. Even then, a rapid increase in the number of conventional forces in Western Europe will hardly be possible, as the number of conscripts are being reduced in a number of Western European

countries and the conscription period presently being cut in more than one country.

An increase in West European conventional forces after SALT I can therefore be ruled out. A more promising and more likely development is to be found in the sphere of European defence cooperation, which up to now has been surprisingly limited in view of what Curt Gasteyger rightly calls the growing limitations of national defence capabilities and the potentials of common defence efforts.[13] Even if the Western threat perception - as Gasteyger writes - is determined by the conviction that war between East and West is unlikely and that the status quo in Europe is in no way affected by shifts in the strategic balance (a view not taking into account the dynamics of a shifting balance of forces involving a variety of consequences described by Gasteyger), there are a number of obvious reasons for increasing European defence cooperation.

The most articulate spokesman for increasing such cooperation in a number of ways, François Duchene, has made it clear that a more coordinated West European defence system could not replace the American nuclear guarantee, but it could reinforce it and make it more credible and help in the long run to add a more effective complement to the American navy in the maritime periphery of Europe. A West European defence organization would, according to Duchene, be less likely to increase the number of troops than promise a better use of a smaller number and, even more important, a more cohesive reaction of the Ten to unforeseen eventualities.[14]

Alastair Buchan is convinced that in the next few years the

road forks toward the evolution of a less powerful European grouping within an integrated NATO framework and a more powerful, more autonomous European system under the umbrella only of the collective alliance. It is difficult, he writes, to believe that the 1970s can pass without a radical organization of the structure and probably the strategy of NATO.[15]

This may not be caused or even much affected by SALT I. But insofar as SALT I explicitly is only a beginning, and that a new treaty on offensive missiles is envisaged in five years at most, the preparations for the next SALT round, and indeed for SALT II, will probably have much more far-reaching consequences for NATO and for European security than the preparations for and the completion of SALT I.

Between SALT I and SALT II

As is well known the Soviet Union tried during the first phase of SALT to include the Forward-Based Systems in Europe on the basis of a definition of strategic arms different from that of the United States. This attempt was later given up, but only temporarily, to reach the agreement known as SALT I. It has been pointed out by several writers on the subject that it would be logical to deal with the FBS in an MBFR context or to solve the FBS problem in parallel MBFR and SALT negotiations.[16] Nobody would deny that West European NATO members would have to be directly involved in the decisions concerning the FBS, even if these are mainly or exclusively under American control. The deployment of British tactical nuclear weapons - however limited in number - and the deployment of French Pluton nuclear artillery in 1973 or 1974 would - in addition to the strategic forces of the two countries - undoubtedly also be taken into account by the Russians in any discussion on FBS during the next SALT round.

As the current difficulties in organizing an appropriate allied negotiation framework for future MBFR talks with Warsaw Pact countries amply demonstrate, it is extremely difficult to visualize a smooth handling of the FBS issue in parallel SALT and MBFR talks. Any changes in the role of the FBS will profoundly affect current NATO strategy, and, as Robert Hunter has pointed out, considerable opportunities are open to the Soviet Union to play the United States and its allies against one another, thereby weakening the Atlantic alliance.[17] It is obvious that NATO's strategy cannot be adjusted more or less automatically to the contents of a bilateral Soviet-American agreement concerning arms directly involved in the defense

of Western Europe such as the FBS. This was clearly recognized by the United States, when the Soviet demand to include the FBS in SALT was rejected. But unless SALT II will be limited to confirm the Interim Agreement on offensive missiles in treaty form, it is logical to expect the coming SALT rounds to uncover many more points in common with NATO than has hitherto been the case in SALT.

The problem of including the FBS in any new SALT agreement may not be much facilitated by the inclusion of the Soviet MRBMs, though it would be logical to assume - and certainly expected by the West Europeans - that a reduction in the number of the MRBMs would be part of a more comprehensive SALT II involving at least part of the FBS. There are believed to be about 570 operative MRBMs in the western parts of the Soviet Union, installed in 1959-61. Half of them are unprotected, their precision is low, and in a tense situation their vulnerability might be particularly problematic.[18]

Their military value is therefore rather limited and so is their value as a trade-in for FBS in Western Europe. It is true that the large number of U.S. nuclear warheads - 7,200 - and of the nuclear delivery means in NATO - 2.250 (many of which have a dual capability) - can presumably be reduced as part of an arms control agreement without dangerously undermining Western European security. But the FBS are closely associated with the presence of the U.S. military forces in Western Europe, and a considerable reduction in their numbers could have not only military but psychological disadvantages harmful to European security.[19]

These problems must be seen in conjunction with what is after all the crucial - and most uncertain - part of the question on the impact of SALT on European security: How will SALT I and the preparations

for SALT II be interpreted by the Soviet leaders? The disparity in numbers of missiles is not important from a purely military point of view, and would only become significant, if the Kremlin tried to exploit it externally by putting pressure on for example some non-aligned or Western European countries out of a - false - sense of newly gained strategic superiority. When the U.S. technological lead (MIRVs etc.) and the non-inclusion of long-range bombers are taken into account, the disparity in numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs may even seem reasonable from a balanced balance of force point of view! It is also possible that the Soviet numerical superiority - and superiority in megatonnage - has been used as an argument inside the Kremlin by Brezhnev to convince the Soviet "hard-liners" of the advantages to the Soviet Union of SALT I.

Although it is customary for Soviet military and political leaders to talk of the Soviet armed forces as "second to none," no boasts have been heard of a Soviet strategic superiority vis-a-vis the United States. Parity has been claimed, on the other hand, and there seems to be no reason to dispute the view by Professor Roman Kolkowicz that the main reason for Soviet interest in SALT is the desire to stabilize an expensive and counter-productive arms race at desirable level, while gaining greater freedom to pursue policy opportunities in other areas.[20]

But even if this is the case - as the author of this paper believes - no account is being taken of what Curt Gasteyger calls the growing political-strategic asymmetries in the position of the two superpowers vis-a-vis Europe[21] and what Duchene refers to as a "subtle shift in the European environment which does not look like a passing phase and is no less important for being partly unavoidable.[22]

Any evaluation of the impact on European security of SALT I - and even more so of the preparations for SALT II - may therefore take into account on one hand the changing territorial balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and what Pierre Hassner has called the diminishing American physical and psychological engagement[23] and on the other hand the hoped-for tangible results of the continued pursuit of détente in Europe.

SALT I is almost unanimously held to be good for the world and believed by almost all Europeans, by implication, to be good for Europe. But the circumstances arising out of SALT I and its aftermath cannot be ignored. Neville Brown writes in his analysis of European security in the 1970's that one can assume that the contemporary world scene, characterized by fluidity, will either be regulated within an arms control framework or else one of the two blocs will after all achieve some kind of ascendency or else the whole situation will slide into war.[24]

This supports the view of Professor Coffey that mutual and balanced reductions in theatre nuclear forces - and possibly the curbing of the development of non-strategic weapons - may be an essential concomitant to the imposition of quantitative and qualitative constraints on strategic delivery vehicles as far as European security is concerned.[25] The demands of the evolving European situation may go even further if maximum security value is to be derived from SALT I and what may come after it.

Johan Holst has talked of a more comprehensive European force limitation agreement and called for a European scheme for regulating the balance of asymmetries in Europe on a lower level than existing today.

If efforts to achieve such follow-ups of SALT I should fail, and if the planned MBFR negotiations get stalled, the security impact of SALT I on Europe may turn out to be much less reassuring than they are believed to be today.

Footnotes

1. Report in Atlantic News No. 443, 21 June 1972. - A report by Flora Lewis in the New York Times from Bruxelles a month later reflected alleged widespread European criticism of "current American disregard for NATO and for the procedures that have become a customary and expected part of the alliance as an Atlantic institution." However, the reported European criticism was not directed at SALT I, but at the Declaration of Principles signed in Moscow, the wording of which - according to the article - differed from drafts - not yet agreed upon - currently under discussion in the NATO Council.

2. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, News Release, 20 June 1972. Documentation on the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements, p. 31. - For examples of earlier European apprehensions of a SALT agreement see J. I. Coffey: Strategic Arms Limitations and European Security, in International Affairs (Chatham House, London), October 1971.

3. Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt had said to Die Welt, February 16, 1970, that the question of the protection of Europe against missile attacks or threats of such attacks should be discussed by the Soviet Union and the U.S. in case SALT did result in an agreement to establish ABM defenses in the U.S. and the Soviet Union (J.I. Coffey in International Affairs, October 1971, op. cit. p. 702.

4. Why ABM - Policy Issues in the Missile Defence Controversy, edited by Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr., esp. the chapter by Johan Holst on Missile Defence: Implications for Europe (pp. 187-203), Pergamon Press, New York, 1969.

5. Alastair Buchan: A World Restored, Foreign Affairs, July 1972.

6. Ian Smart: Future Conditional - The Prospect for Anglo-French Nuclear Co-operation (Adelphi Papers, No. 78, July 1971, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London). For a slightly different view see Neville Brown: European Security 1972-1980 (Royal United Services Institute, London) April 1972, - see also Andrew J. Pierre: Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France and America, in Foreign Affairs January 1971, and - for the suggestion that SALT be enlarged to comprise all nuclear powers - Michel Tatu: Le Triangle Washington-Moscou-Pekin et les deux Europe(s) (Casterman, Paris, 1972).

7. See the article by Alun Chalfont, "The Dangers of a Nuclear Europe," in the New Statesman, 16 April 1971.

8. See the article by Walter F. Hahn, "Nuclear Balance in Europe," in Foreign Affairs, April 1972, and two articles by C. L. Sulzberger in the International Herald-Tribune 8 and 11 August 1972.

9. News Release, Bureau of Public Affairs, op. cit. p. 27.

10. Foreign Affairs, October 1969.

11. Foreign Affairs, July 1971.

12. Foreign Affairs, October 1971. - The overall political as well as the technical-military effect of parity on NATO is likely to be limited, Mr. Walter Slocombe concludes in: "The Political Implications of Strategic Parity," Adelphi Papers, No. 77, May 1971.

13. Curt Gasteyger: Europe and America at the Crossroads, The Atlantic Papers 4, 1971, published by the Atlantic Institute. Proposals for expanding European defence cooperation are contained in Walter Schütze: European Defence Co-operation and NATO (Atlantic Paper No. 3, 1969) and René Foch: Europe and Technology (Atlantic Paper No. 2, 1970).

15. Foreign Affairs, July 1972.

16. See Robert E. Hunter: "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Next Step in Détente?" in International Conciliation, No. 587, March 1972, and Herbert Scoville, Jr.: Beyond Salt One, in Foreign Affairs, April 1972, and Andrew J. Pierre: The SALT Agreement and Europe, in The World Today, July 1972.

17. International Conciliation, March 1972, op. cit. p. 56.

18. Se Johan J. Holst: Sikkerheten i Europa og de taktiske atomvåpen: Adferdsregler og doktriner, NUPI/N-35, April 1972 (The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs).

19. For the fullest and most balanced analysis of this problem, see U.S. Troops in Europe, Issues, Costs, and Choices. By John Newhouse with Melvin Croan, Edward R. Fried, and Timothy W. Stanley. The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1971.

20. The conclusion quoted in book review in Survival, July-August 1972, p. 201.

21. Gasteyger, op. cit., p. 42.

22. Foreign Affairs, October, 1971.

23. Pierre Hassner: The New Europe: From Cold War to Hot Peace, in International Journal, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. XXVII No. 1 Winter 1971-72.

24. Neville Brown op. cit., p. 137.

25. Coffey in International Affairs, op. cit., p. 700.

(3)

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Conference on

EUROPEAN SECURITY, SALT, AND U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

August 31 - September 2, 1972

Geneva

Thursday, August 31 — Morning and Afternoon Sessions

Between Two Ages or Between Two Stools: The Implications of Political Change for European Security and Arms Control

by

Pierre Hassner

I. "Plus c'est la même chose plus ça change."

Europe is the most stable of continents. Among the dimensions of the European situation, the military one is the most stable of all. Why, then, raise the problem of European security and arms control?

The only short-run verifiable and inevitable answer is: in order to have a conference in Geneva. Beyond that, speaking in purely strategic or arms control terms, it is difficult to disagree with the logic of the position - most powerfully expressed in two articles by Frederick Wyle[1] - according to which there is neither any serious danger to the present conventional and strategic stance (whether through SALT or through Soviet superiority) nor any serious prospect of changing it whether through negotiations with the East or through substituting totally or partly a European deterrent for the American one or nuclear weapons for conventional forces.

The problem arises when one goes from the short to the long run, and from technical realities to political perceptions and dynamics. If one defines stability less in terms of military security than in terms of popular consensus and confidence and of diplomatic alignments and their reliability, if one sees military postures and arms control arrangements primarily in terms of their influence on the maintenance, management or manipulation of these political structures and processes, then symbolic moves and ambiguous moods cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to

the realities perceived by hard-headed bureaucrats. The old platitude that in politics, appearances become real if they are believed in acquires an added validity just because precisely in a stable nuclear environment, strategy becomes concerned less with the avoidance and management of war than with that of crisis and second because this peace-time crisis management and manipulation is no longer solely in the hands of a self-contained, if self-torn, bureaucracy of rational planners or self-perpetuating organizations. It increasingly interacts with domestic pressures, economic constraints and trans-national trends.

European security and arms control objectives have to be seen in the light of the dialectical relationship between these three dimensions: the balance of military power, the interaction of foreign policies and the evolution of societies.

Recent or likely shifts in the first are, at least in Europe, certainly meaningless in terms of winning a war and almost certainly in terms of avoiding it, but they can have an indirect impact on the other dimensions. Conversely, diplomatic initiatives and social turmoil have had little impact , so far, on the structure of a European system which is ultimately based on the mutual balance and the joint superiority of the two superpowers. But the changing character of their relations with each other, with their allies or satellites, and with their own societies, are certainly altering the salience or the visible importance of the military balance;

they may, in the long run, alter not only its political function and significance but its very structure.

In 1967, we thought that for the coming years, European security would be more a theme for political discussions and maneuvers than the object of a genuine search for alternative arrangements. Just as the tenuous detente and cooperation form part of a language on which each party tries to foster his own political objectives and to show that they are the best contribution to that particular value, so the debate on European security may turn not so much on the best way of achieving security as on who should achieve it against whom and in what framework. European security may constitute one of the languages and one of the forums for discussing the political future of Europe, of the German nation or of East-West relations. If this is so, even such concrete issues as the Soviet MRBM or a European BMD system will probably take on this symbolic meaning in the continuing strategic debate between Western Europe, the United States and Russia - in the case of the European security system as of the nonproliferation treaty, "there may be in the making a permanent, very slightly veiled political discussion on the reordering of both the international system and the European one.

"The security dialogue will start by having the meaning of a signal in a double sense: it will indicate both the level reached by the economic, social, ideological and political transformation of Europe, and

the limits beyond which this transformation cannot go without endangering the whole structure. If and when this last point is reached, the discussion about a European security system, which today is about the political future of Germany, of Europe, and of their relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, may yet turn to a new and surprisingly fresh subject; the problem is security."[2]

Are we approaching this point? Or is the function of the security dialogue still symbolic and subordinate? The answer cannot help being ambiguous, like the situation itself.

In terms of preoccupations, there is no question that the security dimension of European relationships (both East-West and West-West) and the European dimension of strategic relations between superpowers are returning to the centre of the stage after a relatively long eclipse.

After the end of the Berlin crisis and the exhaustion of the NATO debates (subsequent to the death of the MLF and the storm over NPT) a separation occurred between East-West relations in Europe and the problems of security and arms control.

There was a separation between European détente, conducted mainly by West European powers (France, then Germany) with the East (Eastern Europe and, increasingly, the Soviet Union) on non-military terms and superpower relations, first partly frozen by Vietnam, then focusing mainly on the global strategic relationship rather than any re-

gional one, with the exception of the Middle East. Precisely because they seemed to concern essentially the superpowers themselves, the SALT provoked much lower European anxieties than NPT. As for the U.S.-West European relation, it was frozen by Gaullist obstruction, American studied indifference and preoccupation with Vietnam, and Germany's new interest in the East. Now all these separate directions seem to come to life again and to converge.

The development of several bilateral relationships leading to bilateral agreements and to a multilateral one on Berlin, lead to a new multilateral phase which raises the problem of their common framework. Ostpolitik and SALT were two relatively separate undertakings. But their respective achievements lead to their mutual Europeanization between CSCE, MBFR and SALT II, immediate connections or overlaps, possible confusions or conflicts and necessary coordination are much more obvious.

On the other hand, new trends in the United States and in Western Europe reopen the problem of a new balance in Western defense and, perhaps, of a new transatlantic relationship.

All these perspectives and debates retain more than ever, however, their character of shadow-boxing. The most striking aspect of the "era of negotiation" is that it consists mainly in recognizing the status quo. In Europe, the "era of negotiation" has begun in earnest only since 1969 when, in contrast to earlier periods where polycentric attempts

failed against the rigidity of the system all the main actors (the Soviet Union, West Germany, the United States, and, however reluctantly, East Germany) have started to talk to each other. But the theme of the talks is much more "the recognition of existing realities" or "of the results of World War II" than "the dissolution of the blocs" or the creation of a European security system.

The Soviet Union feels confident to embark on a Westpolitik including Germany precisely because, through the intervention of Czechoslovakia, she has gained recognition for the firmnest of her resolve to keep Eastern Europe, if necessary by force. She can gain ground in her dialogue with the West because she no longer presents a direct challenge to Berlin's link with the FRG, the FRG's with the Common Market, and Europe's with the U.S. Germany can embark on a dynamic Ostpolitik precisely because its substantive content consists of recognizing her division, and, on the other hand, because she leaves no doubt on the maintenance of her West European and Atlantic ties and on the need to keep the American military presence in Europe. Even France has become the most extreme advocate of this presence and of the military status quo. For the U.S. itself, the Berlin agreement certainly was a reconfirmation of the status quo; whatever else the SALT may be or become, they certainly are, before everything, a recognition of parity and of mutual deterrence. This, certainly for the present administration, implies a scrupulous (and,

if anything, excessive acceding to critics) attention aimed at maintaining an overall strategic and European balance and at avoiding unilateral concessions or signs of weakness. Hence the solid resistance against pressures for unilateral troop withdrawals and a very cautious approach to MBFR.

Finally, as regards relations between the U.S. and Western Europe, while a shift of attitudes does exist (as witnessed by the remark attributed to H. Kissinger "The Kennedy administration had it all wrong: it encouraged European economic unity which could hurt American interests and discouraged European military independence which could favor them.") it is likely that neither real economic conflict nor real military devolution will take place. Here too then, the prospect is for the continuation of the present system, but with changes in atmosphere and in style, in emphasis and in balance.

The real question, now even more than in 1967, is whether these marginal or external changes are not in the long run likely to produce qualitative or structural changes in the system itself. If the main effect of negotiation is to recognize the status quo, the main effect of this recognition may well be to unleash forces which will undermine it more irresistably than either military pressure or diplomatic bargaining. As long as each side did not recognize the other, both were held together by the mutual challenge of ideological and military confrontation; the situation was being

frozen by not being accepted. Once everybody accepts the status quo, the real game for indirect influence or for competitive resistance to disintegration begins.

This does not mean that the forces of internal change or of inter-penetration will necessarily win; various combinations are possible, from repression to regeneration, on one or on both sides. The point is that contrary to a frozen bipolar confrontation or to a give-and-take negotiation, the competitive-cooperative management of a contradictory process of detente is essentially unpredictable, and that this long-range uncertainty - while not necessarily harmful to the deterrence of nuclear war - does create new problems for a security system based on alliances and alignments born in a different age and environment. In the East, it may create the dialectics of communication and Abgrenzung, of emancipation and repression. In the West, it may encourage the dialectics of "decoupling" and "finlandization", or the reciprocal fear of unilateral accommodation.

The central characteristic of the European security system is the continuity between, so to speak, Berlin and the strategic nuclear balance: the correspondence between, on the one hand, the geographical division and the ideological opposition of the two Germanys, the two Europes, the two social systems, and, on the other hand, the military balance between the two superpowers materialized by their alliance organizations, their

physical presence and their nuclear weapons - any trend which puts into question the unity of the respective sides, their mutual opposition or the relevance of the military balance to this opposition obviously creates problems of adaptation. Not only a bureaucratic organization like NATO but the security system it is part of can, in the long run, be made to look anachronistic by detente with the East, by dissension within the West, and, more generally, by the transformation of the international system (whether in the direction of multipolarity or of superpower condominium) and of the relations between society and defense, or between domestic trends and foreign policy.

The first direction may make defense establishments and opposing alliances look either obsolete or positively harmful to the process of reconciliation. To Europeans the American connection or a defense effort to supplement or replace it, may appear an obstacle to further progress toward reunification; to Americans the objections of European allies may appear as an obstacle to further progress toward bilateral arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

The second direction, even if it does not lead to separation and should rationally not supersede the real elements of convergence in security interests between the two sides of the Atlantic, still encourages an increasingly divergent perception of these interests. A security link seen by both sides as a necessary evil standing in the way of more positive-

ly appealing aspirations may continue through inertia or prudence, but cannot help being affected negatively in its credibility and its efficiency. NATO - including a certain American presence in Europe -- may remain; but the level of U.S. troops, the character of NATO strategy, the possibilities of constructive reform in the respective American and European roles would certainly vary. Technical issues (involving, for instance, nuclear collaboration) would be decisively influenced by what might appear as political atmospherics.

Whether East-West or West-West, these problems, which have always existed, are obviously magnified by the widely analyzed change in values or priorities within developed liberal societies.

At a minimum, the decline of East-West confrontation and the emergence in each Western country, but particularly in the two crucial ones, the United States and West Germany, of new age or social groups with different formative experiences and interests and of newly acute domestic problems, challenged the role of defense, the primacy of foreign policy, and the ideological consensus on which the present system was based; they appear as new constraints which must be both fought and accommodated by the security system in order to fulfill the same function at lower cost and visibility.

At a maximum, these changes herald a more dundamental transformation in the relations of state (and of the inter-state system) and society (domestic and trans-national), in the role of military power and

the meaning of security: from diplomacy and strategy to development and adaptation.

Obviously, the answer is complicated by the difference between "a less governmental west and the rest" (T. Hughes). As Francois Duchene put it, the West (including the United States if not the Nixon administration) may be reacting to the same challenges more as a society and the Soviet Union more as a state.

Perhaps, then, the fundamental issue is seen more clearly when looking beyond immediate East-West and U.S.-European issues, to their global context: are we at the beginning of new international system and of a new international (or rather multi-national) politics? If our conception of security and the organizations which are based on it were born of the needs of deterrence in an age of hostile bipolarity, should both the concept and the organization survive, disappear or be adapted in an age of greater multipolarity, greater cooperation between former enemies, particularly between the two superpowers, and more civilian (if less civil) societies? Are these various directions (more multipolar, more cooperative, more domestic) compatible? Which should have priority?

We shall ask these questions, going from the general to the more specific, with a view to the indications of broader changes in the international system and in the European situation for European security and arms control more narrowly defined.

II. The New International System and European Security

Seldom have abstruse and abstract notions about the nature of the international system been a theme for general political discussion as in the past year. This is due mainly to America's current reassessment of its place in the world and to the Nixon Administration's flair for diplomatic initiatives and taste for theoretical rationalizations. The Nixon doctrine had indicated the general direction of a limited disengagement based on an ambiguous acknowledgment of the limits of American power and of international bipolarity. The Peking trip materialized the triangular character of the superpower game; together with the August 15, 1971, decisions, it may also be seen, in a sense, as the signal for the eventual emergence of a five-power world, by demonstrating - through a kind of American declaration of emancipation from their allies - the possible divergence of interests between the United States, Japan and Western Europe.

The Moscow Summit, with the SALT agreements and the Soviet-American Declaration on Basic Principles, close the circle by showing that the news of bipolarity's death was vastly exaggerated; it had only undergone a conversion, from hostility to cooperation, from the struggle for supremacy to the joint management of world affairs.

At the same time, the Indo-Pakistani crisis showed the fallacy both of judging local situations primarily from the point of view of the global game between superpowers, and of assuming that the latter, particularly the Soviet Union, would necessarily exercise their influence at the side of restraint. Conversely, events in Vietnam and the Middle

East, seen in connection with the Moscow Summit have shown both how far in the new triangular situation the two Communist powers could go in giving precedence to their relations with the United States over their support of their allies, and how far smaller countries like North Vietnam and Egypt could go in refusing to comply with the conservative consensus at the top.

Whatever else it is, then, the new international system is not simple. Two great roads seemed to be open out of the hostile bipolarity of the Cold War: cooperative bipolarity - or a reconciliation of the two camps, led by the two leaders, in the name of interdependence, convergence and common interests - (this could be called the Kennedy or the Monnet road); and multipolarity - a new balance of power based on the reassertion of national interests and on the combinations of independent diplomacies (this could be called the Gaulist and, to some extent the Nixon-Peking road). The first road could lead to new bipolar divisions - superpowers against middle and small powers, or developed North against underdeveloped South. The second road could lead to new conflicts, or at least unpredictabilities, between the participants to the new multipolar game as well as to tensions between them (or the big league players) and the others.

Obviously, today, we have elements of all these systems. The old East-West opposition, the new bipolar cleavages, and different types and levels of multipolarity: nuclear, economic, and political.

The single view of a five-power balance has been torn into pieces by critics like Buchan, Brzezinski, and Hoffmann, who have rightly shown the inequalities between the five and the multiplicity of types

of power, and of cooperation, competition and conflict according to issue areas and to regions. Perhaps there was some overkill, since the formulations under attack were only indicating one of the directions of an American policy whose puzzling characteristic was precisely to operate at different places and times under different assumptions. This could come from day-to-day pragmatism disguised under successive and incompatible rationalizations, or from a more subtle and complex attempt at establishing a new, differentiated concert, which would operate according to different rules and with different participants in different regions and on different issues, but with the United States always in a direct or indirect, single or joint, managing or balancing role.

What matters for Europe is that from each of these points of view her situation becomes more ambiguous and potentially more uncomfortable, although she may yet turn ambiguity into opportunity and discomfort into challenge.

From the point of view of the persisting elements of Soviet-American bipolarity, the prevalent European impression is that the trend has been toward a shift in the military balance from American superiority to parity and, in some respects, Soviet superiority (either because the perception of Soviet regional superiority is no longer compensated by that of American strategic superiority, or even because some elements of the strategic equation itself, like the asymetry in the number of offensive launchers allowed by the Moscow Interim Agreement, or the open possibility for the Soviet Union to combine, in the future, MIRV technology with a greater number of launchers and heavier payloads,

give to some, rightly or wrongly, the impression of present or future Soviet strategic superiority).

In terms of relative dynamism and commitment, while both sides pursue an active diplomacy, the Soviet one has been much more active in Europe. More generally, American initiatives are seen as brilliant tactical moves covering a strategic retreat, while the Soviet Union is not only much more engaged in Eastern Europe than the United States is in Western Europe, but is genuinely expanding its diplomatic influence and military presence in various areas, of which the Indian subcontinent is the most spectacular; but her presence in the Mediterranean, her access to Middle East oil, the successes of her German policy are no less important. However, in the last year the Middle East has witnessed something of a turn of the tide. But it remains more generally true that, while both leaderships look to foreign policy successes as a compensation for domestic problems, international leadership is seen by important forces in American society as opposed to America's values and rightful priorities, while it may be indispensable to the legitimacy and authority of the Soviet regime.

Finally, the relationship between the two superpowers, while containing elements of conflict, of competition, and of cooperation has taken a most important turn toward the latter with the Moscow Summit. The existence of a mutual interest of the superpowers in preventing nuclear war and in limiting the arms race has, of course, been widely recognized and welcomed by Europeans; but the contractualizations of this common interest and of the cooperation designed to implement it,

the creation of a bilateral Standing Consultative Commission, have revived a feeling which had been created by NPT but had been remarkably low so far during the SALT negotiations: the fear of "nuclear complicity" (Kissinger) or condominium.

Even more important, perhaps, the "Declaration of Basic Principles" suggests through much of its language that a "common strategic ideology" (Coral Bell) is emerging which is, for both, spilling over from strategy to politics; some of the language of the Declaration, with restraint and peaceful coexistence replacing self-determination and socialism, and with the "no unilateral advantage" formula, suggests a preference for the status quo over their respective objectives. The Vietnam context, the failure to mention any disagreement of the Middle East, the fact that on issues relevant for Europe (like MBFR and the Security Conference) the American position either was held in reserve until, or was modified by, the summit meeting, all this suggests a primacy of superpower cooperation over their multilateral links with their respective allies.

If one accepts the distinctions drawn by Hedley Bull between a) joint management and joint government, and b) joint management limited to the control of nuclear weapons and comprehensive joint management, and c) twin or parallel hegemony, and joint hegemony, and d) de facto and formally agreed joint management, one must admit that the Moscow Agreement represented in each of these cases a step beyond the first alternative in the direction of the second.

If one combines this impression with the two earlier ones, of Soviet strategic equality, local superiority, and stronger interest and commitment, one ends up with a condominium weighted on the Soviet

side, at least as far as Europe is concerned.

There have been times when many Europeans have learned and feared an excessive American superiority, excessive American involvement in their affairs, and dangerously hostile relations between the superpowers; today the predominant fears are in the opposite directions. The ideal superpower relationship from the point of view of Europe is an intermediary one. U.S. sufficiently superior and sufficiently involved to protect Western Europe credibly and to marginally restrain the Soviet Union in marginal areas, a superpower relation of peaceful competition, equally removed from condominium and confrontation, thus giving third parties an importance and a role.

The loss of American superiority by itself would not have created a crisis of confidence; Europeans have lived under the assumption of qualitative U.S.-Soviet parity long before it was officially recognized. But parity plus disengagement (of troops or of attention) plus a changed relationship with the Soviet Union - namely, as Henry Kissinger put it, "a new relationship in which on both sides, whenever there is a danger of crisis, there will be enough people who have a commitment to constructive programs so that they could exercise a restraining influence," does raise the spectre of a situation in which the U.S.-European gap in the appreciation of what constitutes dangerous or unacceptable Soviet behavior and what response, involving what risks should be initiated to deter it, is such as to give the Soviet Union a freedom of action comparable to that of the United States when it blockaded Haiphong. The Europeans would appear as weak but immoral, also malevolent, spoilers of superpower harmony; they would have to normally convince themselves of the most reassuring interpretation of Soviet behavior, precisely

because they would not be reassured.

It is too late, however, for a world jointly managed or governed by the two superpowers; the triangular aspect, perhaps overstressed at the time of the Peking visit, tends to be neglected after the Moscow one. Yet the first visit probably is one of the main keys to the success of the second. The existence of China does decisively influence Soviet attitudes toward the rest of the world and, conversely, the bargaining power of other parties toward the Soviet Union. Is this also the case for Europe? Should she look for a Chinese strategy, to balance the Soviet Union, or have the relations of the latter with both Europe and the U.S. become permanently peaceful because of the Chinese threat?

Again, much depends on how reassuring a view one takes of Soviet behavior. One can distinguish four interpretations of its priorities in this respect. For the most optimistic view, the Soviet Union wants peace and stability, détente and disarmament (or at least force reductions) with the West because of her conflict with China.

For the second view, the Chinese threat does constitute the main consideration, but this precisely leads the Soviet Union, given her definition of stability, to a more rigid and intransigent view of her rule in Eastern Europe and of her security toward the West: precisely because of China, she cannot afford to run any risk or suffer any diminution of power in Europe.

The third view - definitely a minority one, but defended by one of the most penetrating specialists, Michel Tatu - reverses the first two; for him, periods of tension with China have not coincided with

periods of detente with the West. The period of maximum tension with China (1963-69) was relatively rigid in relation with the West - since the end of 1969, she has sought a certain stabilization with China, in order to pursue a more active policy toward the West. The main thrust of her dynamism lies in expansion toward the West and the South, and particularly toward gaining decisive political influence on West European foreign policies.[3]

Finally, a fourth view, which seems to the writer the most plausible one and is buttressed by impressive evidence,[4] starts from the premises of the first two views but reaches the conclusions of the third - the Soviet Union sees the conflict with China as the main one, and as leading quite possibly to a major confrontation; but this leads her to an active policy of encircling China and of trying to control as much as possible the behavior of her potential partners, to encourage American withdrawal in order to become the center of a world-wide, anti-Chinese system. Just as the United States has consciously or unconsciously used the containment of Russia to expand her presence and influence throughour the world in the late 1940's and the 1950's, Russia is on a course which she may see as defensive against China but which is as expansionist, if more realistic, as a revolutionary one.

Europe can see its role neither in encircling Russia with the help of China nor in becoming a passive instrument of the latter's encirclement by the former. Any thought of an active Chinese alliance aimed at putting pressure on Russia or on protecting Eastern Europe would only bring insecurity. On the other hand, Europe has a common interest with China in preventing the superpower condominium and, in particular,

Soviet hegemony. Chinese interests in encouraging Western European unity and in establishing a certain presence in Eastern Europe coincide with the latter's interest in avoiding an exclusive tête-à-tête with the Soviet Union. Conversely Europe has an interest not only in gaining some additional bargaining power in her detente dialogue but also in the multilateralization of the nuclear dialogue and of arms control in general, hence in China's presence as well as in meeting the Chinese concern that the Security Conference and troop reductions in Europe should not be used as instruments to increase pressure on her.

The really difficult and obscure problems concern less the triangular aspect of world politics than its supposedly "pentagonal" one, of the role of Japan and of Europe itself in the system. Here the doubts concerning the intentions of American policy in promoting the "five-power world" idea are matched only by the ambivalence of the Europeans themselves.

Can one be half a world power, or a second class pole? Does the United States really want Western Europe and Japan to become full-fledged independent military, hence nuclear, powers? Do they want it themselves? Would a pluralist Europe qualify? Would a five-power nuclear balance be more or less safe than a bi- or a tri- polar one? On the other hand does the evocation of the classical balance of power and its flexible alignments mean that the United States has no more permanent and intimate links with her allies than with her former opponents? The suspicion is that the United States does not really expect or encourage a real five-power world from the nuclear point of view, but that it uses

the idea both to justify a certain withdrawal of her protection and to encourage a greater effort from the Europeans (but in a framework defined by the triangular relationship) and to launch a tougher economic competition against them.

Critics like Z. Brzezinski point out that rather than one five-power world one should consider two triangles, a strategic one (the U.S., the Soviet Union and China) and an economic one (the U.S., Western Europe and Japan) which is based on cooperation within the same system. But today, economic ties breed competition as much as cooperation - indeed, once the ideological confrontation has abated, relations with opponents, especially nuclear ones, can be stabilized and basically cooperative; crises and conflicts are more likely to arise in relations with allies. The management of the Western capitalist system may be intrinsically more crisis-prone than that of nuclear deterrence - money may be harder to control than arms.

The same Europeans who have been criticizing the bipolar world now seem more worried by the danger of separation from the United States than flattered by their verbal promotion to their great power league. They fear that the old, U.S.-centered system may be receding more rapidly than their ability to unite their willingness to make sacrifices and run risks for defense, and the constraints of the Soviet attitudes allow them to replace it.

Indeed, more than a time lag may be involved. Europe's (and, in a different and ultimately lesser way) Japan's willingness and ability to play an independent great power role may be d cisively affected by the new relations of States and society in the developed liberal world.

She may be as affected as the United States by the combination of "neo-isolationism and neo-transnationalism" (T. Hughes). Also in a more decisive way since she has an uphill battle for political unification and military power to wage.

Yet a certain West European consciousness is growing, the Common Market does exercise a powerful external influence. Diplomatically, the European scene has been transformed by the German-Soviet dialogue as much as the world scence by the U.S.-Chinese one.

There is, then, a strong case for and strong inclination to, Western Europe and Japan specializing in the non-military forms of power, becoming, in François Duchêne's expression, "the world's first civilian centre of power."[5]

The dilemmas of solidarity and flexibility, of power and dependence, etc. are insoluble for Europe in the framework of a world of threats, pressures and conflict. They may be mitigated if the general framework is a cooperative one, if it is less that of a bipolar or of a multipolar balance of military power than that of a concert where different actors make different contributions in different roles to the management of interdependence, whether in the arms control, the diplomatic, or the economic sphere.

Yet, while Europe has every interest in a general de-emphasis of military power, being a civilian power in a world of military powers does not, when the chips are down leave you with much civilian power either. Similarly, neither security nor independence may be fully accessible for anybody nor be the highest goal of politics; but a precondition for playing other roles is not to be significantly less secure or more dependent than your partners in the concert.

Europe's political unity, economic power or diplomatic influence are highly vulnerable as long as her security is entirely dependent upon American protection or Soviet good will. How to build up a third element of security which should mitigate the possible decline or unpleasant consequences of the other two without jeopardizing their existence, how to work both atimproving and at deemphasizing the military balance; how to be in a position to choose détente and cooperation rather than being dragged into them by lack of choice, this is the ambiguous problem with which Europe is inevitably confronted by her ambiguous status.

The American side of this same dilemma has been well defined by Stanley Hoffmann: "we are caught between our own desire for détente and the fear that it would be compromised if we build up those of our allies whom our adversaries most suspect. Our rivals' game is to improve their relations with us in so far as we tend toward disengagement without substitution - which case, our self-restraint could benefit them.

"Two requirements for a new balance of power - relaxed relations with ex-enemies and greater power for ex-dependents - are in conflict. Such will be America's dilemma as long as our interest in 'flexible alignments' are met by our rivals' search for clients . . . Whether or not Western Europe and Japan become major actors, Eastern Europe and East or Southeast Asia will remain potential sources of instability."[6]

No less important, then, than the problem of relations between the two, the three, and the five is that of the relations between this concert of great powers, whatever their number, and the rest of the world.

By and large Nixon, Brezhnev, Chou En-Lai and, one may add, Willy Brandt, and probably Tanaka, have been quite successful in normalizing the relations between actual or potential great powers. What remains negative or in doubt is the impact on small and middle powers, whether within the spheres of influence of the great powers or in the Third World. The consequences of the Moscow Summit for Vietnam and for the Middle East are not yet clear. For the time being, it still seems to this writer that the weakness of the Nixon Administration and, in general, of great power diplomacy is to see in the planetary game the key to local situations, thereby minimizing the autonomous role of social instabilities and national wills. Not new in this respect the highly ambiguous first two paragraphs of the Moscow Declaration, where the first looks like expressing Soviet philosophy (including the notion of peaceful coexistence) and the second the American one (restraint, preventing situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, and above all, renunciations to "efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly") do seem to imply a primacy of great power interests over those of the local states or populations, especially if one remembers the absence of any reference to self-determination or to free movement.

Any autonomous evolution in any country's social regime or diplomatic orientation can be interpreted as meaning a direct or indirect unilateral advantage to one of the great powers. Does this give the other a green light for repression to reestablish the status quo or a claim to compensation, to establish an equivalent one?

Raymond Aron has remarked that the only way to implement the "no

unilateral advantage" rule would be either a division into exclusive and intangible spheres of domination, or a mutual disengagement and disinterest of the great powers from the rest of the world.

In practice, two half-way houses are more likely - a combination of the two formulas (disengagment from disputed areas but increased insistence on their own spheres) or, in disputed areas, a joint management or the working out of common solutions, by the great powers, in the tradition of the 19th century conferences. Certainly for ambiguous regions, this is better than either unlimited competition or a passive backing of their respective allies. But local conditions are likely to frustrate attempts at imposed solutions.

On the other hand, where one great power is clearly preponderant, an order based on domination rather than on consent is possible at the risk of explosions. This raises the crucial problem whether the effect of multipolarization is going to be the multiplication of spheres of domination (each of the three or five dominating one region) and their consolidation (since they would no longer be challenged by a global ideological struggle), or whether it means a multiplication of opportunities for satellites or small allies to mitigate their subordination by increasing relations with outside powers without being accused of selling out to The Enemy, and a loosening of territorial and internal barriers through general interpenetration.

Military stability as such would seem to militate in the first direction, which clearly has the favor of the Soviet Union and an increasing degree of acquiescence of the United States. But, as Marshall Shulman and others have pointed out, the trends of modern society would

seem to make a broader and more tolerant conception of security, based on non-intervention and free access, the only one compatible with peaceful change, which in turn is the only acceptable and, in the long run, the only accessible form of stability.

From this point, again, Europe is in a complex and ambiguous situation. Western Europe has neither the independence of the great powers, not the two forms of independence accessible to the Third World - either by geographical location and lack of attractiveness to great power presence or by political movilization, self-reliance, and readiness to fight alone. She is too directly involved with the two superpowers, in terms of interests and physical presence, to have the freedom of flexible alignments, yet too strong and domestically autonomous to be a simple satellite. By contrast, Eastern Europe is the most directly run sphere of domination in the world, yet is increasingly open to economic, and to some extent human, contact which brings in return a tightening of central authority.

Southern Europe is politically or socially unstable; parts of it, like Yugoslavia, are caught between the Soviet sphere of domination and a Third World situation. Local divisions and tensions make outside direct or indirect interference possible, national traditions make popular resistance likely. Those European areas which are domestically unstable and not tightly integrated in an alliance system share the dangers of other regions of the world with the difference that they are closer to the interests of the great powers and of their more stable neighbors.

A look at the complexities of the European map, at the delicate

shades from the pro-Soviet neutrality of a Western-type society to sui generis membership in NATO and possibly the EEC, which compose the Nordic balance at the cases of Yugoslavia, associated both to the EEC and to Comecon, whose social evolution draws her toward the West and whose political difficulties bring her back closer to the East, or in the case of the G.D.R. - the champion of Eastern integration and of separation from the West but also a member of the Common Market through the intra-German trade, is enough to show the impossibility of dividing Europe into two rigid spheres of influence, according to the logic of bipolar deterrence, cooperation or control. From the point of view of military security proper, the danger comes precisely from the ambiguity or the blurring of the lines which is encouraged and welcomed by the social communication and European political objectives. The logic of military security, as that of "no unilateral advantage" would be a clearcut separation either between the two Europes or between the European theatre and the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. West European interest in and influence on Eastern Europe and Soviet interst in and influence on Western Europe cannot help being part of the picture.

Similarly, the condition most favorable to a military freeze and eventual reduction would be a freezing of the political status quo. The nightmare of planners in both alliances must be a crisis provoked by domestic evolution or revolution leading to changes in diplomatic alignment, even if they occur on the opposite side. Yet the forces for change cannot be permanently stifled, especially in the countries which combine a problem of personal succession, of political fragility

of social tension and of external vulnerability. They are, however, influenced by the external environment.

We are back, then, to the contradictions between the rigidities of the security system, and the dynamics of social evolution, and the uncertain combinations of diplomatic objectives. To reconcile them means increasing the political confidence of Western Europe, caught between a cooler and less engaged United States and a stronger and more active Soviet Union; encouraging the limited political autonomy of Eastern Europe and its equally limited opening to the West by helping to make it safe for and from the Soviet Union; helping northern and southern Europe to overcome the dangers both of isolation and of unwanted interference, by protecting an exposed military situation in the north and an explosive national and social evolution in the south.

These policies would probably increase the over-all security of the continent, including, ultimately, that of the superpowers. But they do correspond to given political objectives and European ones, which are not universally shared. They do raise questions of priority and of feasibility. They indicate a direction; they cannot provide a solution to the question of the relations between the general trends of the European situation, and the objectives of the different powers, let alone the specific arms control measures which may be applied or considered in the coming negotiations.

III. European Priorities and Arms Control Objectives

In East-West relations in Europe, two main developments have been important - the political dialogue between West European countries and the East; the strategic dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. In U.S.-West European relations, two dimensions have been dominant: the military link and, increasingly, the economic strains.

In both cases, the two aspects are coming to be linked. The nature of this link will be decisive for the security and the political future of Europe. In both cases, they may be linked by an uncontrolled psychological process or by a deliberate political effort. The same applies, even more, to the relations between the two directions - East-West and West-West as a whole - where a problem of compatibility and priority will increasingly arise; involving the character, the orientation, and the role of the new Western Europe. The Soviet Union has a clear interest in keeping as much as possible the distinction between her bilateral strategic dialogue with the United States and her continental dialogue with Western Europe; she has an even clearer interest in having both give priority to this dialogue with her over their dialogue with each other.

Being a partner to both, she has an interest in enjoying the advantage of unity, especially since her objectives in both relations are not so incompatible as to force her to embarrassing choices: European policy no longer has the anti-German and anti-American emphasis characteristic of earlier periods.

The Soviet Union used to have a double dilemma: priority to her rule in Eastern Europe or to her influence in Western Europe, encouragement to a "Gaullist" Europe without the U.S., or to a bipolar Europe run by the superpowers.

She has provisionally solved the first dilemma by the use of force in Czechoslovakia, the Western acceptance that the dialogue with Moscow had precedence over the dialogue with East European capitals, and her own attempts at "grooming her sphere for détente" through a more flexible but no less firm control of its organizations and of their communications with the rest. For the first time, she is able successfully to have her East European domination and eat her Western détente too.

The security conference is meant above all to symbolize and reinforce this reconciliation between the status quo (and not only territorial but also political, including unity under Soviet leadership) in Eastern Europe and cooperation with the West. Of course this entails risks to this very status quo, but the competition for mutual influence is not necessarily lost for the Soviet Union, especially in the two Germanys and especially given the changing character of the American presence.

This is the key to the solution of the second dilemma. The Soviet Union no longer asks (or pretends to ask) for the dissolution of the blocs and the withdrawal of the United States. She wants, within the existing structures, to encourage a shift in the psychological balance in the comparative unity and dynamism of the two superpowers, the two alliances, the two Europes, the two Germanys, the two Berlins. She counts, according to the Inozentziev report quoted by C. Gasteyger and M. Tatu and strikingly confirmed by the trend of events, on the trend to American withdrawal, on the social and cultural crises in the West - particularly in the U.S. and the Federal Republic, and on the contrasting unity, and military, political, and moral strengthening of the Socialist Camp. Her preferred solution is an American presence real enough to exercise some control over Germany and to prevent military efforts in

Western Europe and false hopes in Eastern Europe, yet declining and uncertain enough to create doubts in West European countries, again especially in Germany, and to prompt them to look for reassurance in accommodation to her. She no more wants to expel American troops than she wants to blockade Berlin or to attract the Federal Republic out of the Common Market. But she seeks to encourage as much of a long-term loosening or erosion of the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, the Federal Republic and Western Europe, and Europe and the U.S., as is compatible with the avoidance of crisis.

As a minimum, she wants to discourage anything which might go against favorable existing trends and challenge the status quo by, for instance, creating a new center of power in Western Europe - she accepts the European economic integration, which may increase tension with the U.S., but fights West European political and military unity, which might deprive her of the fruits of these tensions. She probably sees European arms control as a way to decrease the American military presence while minimizing the risks of a West European military defense effort.

Negotiations conducted primarily with the U.S. and covering all nuclear weapons stationed in Europe would best serve this purpose; conversely, pan-European institutions negotiated primarily with the Europeans and where the U.S. and Canada would be present but might increasingly appear as marginal participants or tolerated guests, could also serve as vehicles to protest against the organization of a European defense.

Today it is the United States, much more than the Soviet Union, which is faced with a conflict of priorities. The détente, domestic, economic, and psychological pressures, the ending of the draft, nuclear parity producing increasing reluctance to face the remaining risks of

escalation to strategic war, the sheer wastefulness and irrationality of the present number and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, all this makes some change in American posture and doctrine highly likely in the coming years. Even if the decision and moves were in fact unilateral, some kind of negotiated framework or fig-leaf would be almost indispensable. The question is whether this negotiation would take place primarily with America's allies or with the Soviet Union.

At a time when the Soviet Union appears as a forthcoming arms control partner, the Common Market ~~acts~~ appears as an irritant economic competitor and a political/military Europe as "a dream, and not even a beautiful one," the case for superpower bilateralism has never been stronger.

In arms control terms, SALT I, SALT II, and MBFR would form a continuum. After having straightened out their strategic nuclear relationship, the United States and the Soviet Union would straighten out their tactical nuclear one. After a start on the risks of strategic instability and the control of the arms race, they would place an emphasis (already indicated in The Basic Principles) on the risks of escalation and on the control of those allied forces which might contribute to start it. The removal of FBS through SALT II or MBFR would give both a physical and an official sanction to the distinction, already existing in practice, between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; it would mean acceptance of the Soviet (and increasingly American) definition of "strategic," hence of the "sanctuarization" of the territories of both superpowers.

A non-transfer clause for offensive missiles, on the model of the one on ABM, would also not only physically hamper the prospects of a new U.S.-European collaboration on defense, but do it in a way which would be symbolic of the primacy of U.S.-Soviet ties.

Finally, mutual troop reductions arrived at in this context would, especially if they were not accompanied by collateral measures designed to protect the interests of smaller allies or of outside powers, be also symbolic of the new status of a "decoupled" Europe.

From the arms control decoupling of SALT from the political relations, one would arrive both at the political decoupling of U.S.-Soviet relations from the evolution of Europe and at the military decoupling of the strategic balance from the European theatre.

Many features of present American practice and doctrine (see Secretary Laird's use of the distinctions between "theater" and "strategic") go in that direction, although other shifts would go in the opposite one, like the more favorable attitude toward the French and British nuclear forces. Many more proposals (for the complete removal or for the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons, for a "no-first-use of nuclear weapons" declaration, etc., seem to originate in arms control circles but to carry the same political implications.

As for the U.S.-West European relation, bilateralism has its own temptations. The old trade-offs between economics, politics and security (the U.S. accepting short-term economic disadvantages for the long-term political advantages of European integration, Europe accepting the primacy of the dollar because of the protection of American troops, etc.) - are functioning less and less well, but precisely for this reason there is an appeal to playing upon special relationships with different partners in order to maintain a central position.

The case for American unilateralism or bilateralism against the primacy of the alliance or the encouragement of an emerging Europe would be unanswerable if either the United States could maintain its global or central position in the world's different functional or regional systems,

or if it could withdraw into isolation either because other great powers were doing the same or because it had no serious interest in the structure of the world it left behind. But if it is true both that domestic pressures and international trends make a certain American retreat, disengagement, decommitment, decoupling, "lowering of the posture," etc., etc. necessary or desirable, and yet that the world is still an inter-dependent and unequal one in which power has to balance power and peace has to be managed, then there is no substitute for devolution, rebalancing, and regionalization.

Even in economic trans-Atlantic relations, it may be that the central role of the U.S. is no longer in its interest or within its reach, that for instance, the monetary system while remaining a common system has to turn from a U.S.-centered into a bipolar or pluralistic one, for which the emergence of a European monetary bloc zone or policy, however annoying in the short run, is a necessary condition.

In security terms, the Nixon "doctrine" - while disastrous if translated mechanically into Vietnamization or Europeanization - nevertheless has its inescapable logic. A diminution in America's role may be caused by domestic forces and justified by changes in her perception of her rival; it must, unless these changes are so radical that not only the threat of these rivals but also their power have disappeared, be supplemented or substituted by regional forces. A universalistic management of the world (universal, joint or parallel) could be the basis of an intransigent non-proliferation policy. In a more complex world where a less powerful and global America cannot offer the same protection, she obviously must accept the risk that smaller potential or actual nuclear countries rely on their own forces, whatever they are

worth. If she wants to prevent them or to channel their efforts in the least dangerous directions, she must rely on a differentiated regional alliance "proliferation-limiting" policy rather than on a universalistic condominial "non-proliferation" one.

In Europe a decoupling strategy aimed at removing any risk of escalation from local to strategic war would ruin the very basis of deterrence as it is seen now at least by the Europeans.

It is true that today, already, "the implications of U.S.-U.S.S.R. parity for nuclear deterrence in Europe" are such that "the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic nuclear force relationship compensates less now than ever for such local European imbalances as might develop" and that "it is plain - both from the U.S.-U.S.S.R. balance and from the way we have structured our forces - that the U.S. has two concurrent strategies of deterrence: one strategy for prevention of political coercion or military attack on the U.S. itself, and one strategy for prevention of coercion or attack on NATO Europe." But it is also plain today that nuclear deterrence "rests not on a nuclear threat but on a seamless webb of deterrent systems ranging from the professional infantry man, through tactical and theatre nuclear forces actually located in Europe, up to sea-based and U.S. land-based missiles. And it is plain that the deterrence provided by these military systems rests ultimately on political solidarity, and unity of political-military intention. One principal effect of deterrence is uncertainty. The political-military intention is to prevent war or coercion in Europe by preventing the Warsaw Pact's military planners being able to assure their political authorities (or even themselves) what the response would be in case of an incursion into Western Europe."[8]

The "unity of political-military intention" may already (in spite of, or possibly as shown by, discussions in the nuclear planning group)

be a myth; but it too partakes of the ambiguity and the uncertainty on which deterrence is based. The search for eliminating any risk and any irrationality, characteristic of American arms controllers, may be doubly self-defeating. It is arguable that by removing what Bernard Brodie has called "the de-escalating effect of the threat of escalation" one makes escalation less unlikely; by removing uncertainty about escalation, one may be removing the certainty of non-aggression, since the European theatre becomes a conventional one among others, subject to the same uncertainties as in other times and continents; one would certainly create political uncertainty among European allies. They would seek reassurance either in gaining their own accommodation with the Soviet Union (a likely consequence of any bilateral disengagement which, for reasons of geography and ideology would necessarily be asymetrical) or in trying to re-create uncertainty by a nuclear strategy.

Certainly, faced with a combination of U.S.-Soviet strategic parity, removal of tactical nuclear weapons and reductions of American conventional forces, their reaction would not be to reestablish a conventional balance by themselves.

The only way to make European reactions to U.S. military changes and arms control agreements compatible with U.S. and arms control interests, is to make these changes and agreements compatible with European perceptions of their security and interests to begin with. And the only way to achieve that is by putting them in the framework of a new trans-Atlantic discussion, possibly involving a new relationship between American and allied nuclear efforts, strategic and tactical, a new conventional strategy, a new negotiation either of NATO or of relations between the U.S. and the four European middle powers. But this obviously involves a minimum of agreement between Europeans themselves.

For military and arms control measures as for pan-European security talks and institutions and for economic and monetary matters, an intra-Western dialogue is an urgent prerequisite to the East-West dialogue, and an intra-West European community agreement or at least convergence is a prerequisite for a fruitful dialogue with the United States. But isn't this West European element always going to be the missing link in these various dialogues? Do the West Europeans themselves agree on this order of priorities between negotiations among themselves, with the U.S., and with the East?

The answer has to be cautious and tentative, but less negative than in other periods. While the years 1963-1968 were the years of maximum divergence, the pivotal years 1969-1972 are beginning to produce a certain convergence of attitudes toward the outside world. This is reflected at the level of personalities (compare the relations between Mr. Wilson, General de Gaulle, and Chancellor Erhard with those between Mr. Heath, Mr. Pompidou, and Mr. Brandt) and of institutions: while one cannot speak of a common European policy toward the East, much less toward monetary and economic relations with the U.S., even less toward military affairs because of French absence from NATO, it is nevertheless true that the Davignon committee has made more progress toward concerting policies on the security conference, the meeting of ministers of the community on monetary issues, and the Eurogroup on common projects and points of view in defense and U.S.-European issues than skeptics had expected.

These are only timid beginnings. Divergent domestic evolutions (dramatized by social conflict and by forthcoming elections) can challenge them at any moment. On the other hand, even if the progress we expect in the coming years does materialize, the harder options would

come even later; especially if the external environment presents unpleasant or dramatic alternatives, the priorities of key West European countries may well be shown to differ. Meanwhile, in spite of many nuances and inconsistencies, a common West European consciousness and an emphasis on West European priorities are on the increase.

They are fed above all, it would seem, by a new feeling of West European loneliness. This comes from a certain sobering of expectations, or cooling of excitement, toward the East after the successive French and German euphorias, a certain discovery of diverging interests with the United States, after the August 1971 shock, and a certain feeling of helplessness or of passivity in light of the superpower dialogue, after the Moscow meeting.

With the East, after the Gaullist preface and the German normalization, what is left to do seems either very long-range (the process of reconciliation, inter-penetration and mutual influence possibly leading to structural changes beyond our control) or fairly marginal (electoral benefits at home, increase in economic trade and cooperation, discreet attempts to improve the freedom of movement of persons and ideas between East and West without angering Eastern European governments, and the freedom of action of these governments without angering the Soviet Union).

The French know that Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals has been postponed for the foreseeable future after the Prague invasion; indeed, they have come to fear a Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic. French authorities point to the growth of Soviet power, to the necessity not to hamper the military balance through MBFR, to the desirability of increasing defense budgets.

German policy toward the East has been based for some years on the principle: to change the status quo one has to accept it. But before Prague this meant accepting certain aspects of the status quo in order to actively change certain others. Since Prague the emphasis is much more on accepting the status quo today (not only the territorial but also the political one) and hoping for the process of cooperation and communication to change it one day. Faith in history takes the place of practical bargaining, particularly since the attempts at influencing the evolution of the East German regime have, so far, been successfully resisted by the latter's policy of Abgrenzung. The German government has all the more reason to moderate the hopes of her population and to find other policy goals since the need of practicing a certain ideological Abgrenzung itself is made even more obvious by the atmosphere in academic and "young Socialist" circles.

Both France and Germany, moreover, cannot help feeling that the happy days when they enjoyed the initiative in détente and were the subjects of the curiosity and worries of their allies are superseded, as soon as the subject is military, by a return to the old situation: As in the Kennedy or the NPT days, it is the United States who deals with Moscow and reassures its allies that they are not being forgotten or betrayed. Some, in Bonn or Paris, would like to recapture the initiative and beat the U.S. to Moscow bilaterally or within the context of the CSCE, which they see as a "second pillar of SALT." But the prevalent interest, for the time being, is more on the new Paris-London-Bonn triangle and on the old problem of the character of relations among Western European countries and between them and the United States.

Indeed, we are back to the issues of 1962-63 (Fouchet Plan, British entry, Partnership, Kennedy Round) with important changes in the situation and disposition of all parties involved. The most obvious difference is that now Britain is in the Common Market and her relations with France are good. If East-West relations in Europe can ultimately be seen as an episode in the historial "struggle for Germany," American-West European relations can, in a way, be described as a "struggle for Britain." Only Britain can lead the way out of the sterile opposition between a "European" and an "Atlanticist" Europe toward a progressively more independent Europe in conjunction with the United States.

The latter's new attitudes towards the Common Market, and its more general new unpredictability has shown to even the most Atlanticist Europeans that in some respects the European construction, if it is to progress, must do so not necessarily against the United States but against its opposition or objections. On the other hand, while the logic of American leadership under Kennedy and strategy under McNamara was hostile to European military independence and to British-French nuclear collaboration, the logic of the Nixon Doctrine and of Henry Kissinger's ideas is more ambiguous; so are the messages issued by the American administration. By and large, as Jean Laloy points out, while the Soviet Union opposes less Europe's economic integration than her political-military union, the United States has increasing objections toward the former and decreasing ones against the latter.

The course which Europe will be able to steer among these obstacles and incentives will obviously depend both on her main countries' respective priorities and on the evolution of their common situation.

For the time being, France maintains a completely contradictory position. She wants to keep the American military presence, but wants to

do nothing - either in terms of specific contributions or of general policy - to help prevent or slow down the disengagement she fears. She wants complete economic and monetary independence from the United States and blames her European partners for not sharing this attitude enough, yet she does nothing to help provide an alternative to the security link which limits the possibility of European independence by giving the U.S. a decisive leverage, especially toward Germany. Being reluctant to speak either about European defense or about European arms control, she seems to be entirely conservative in military matters and revolutionary in terms of economic relationships, without making any efforts at finding a compromise between the two.

Germany, by contrast, professes to see no conflict between being wholeheartedly attached to European integration, to the Atlantic alliance, and to détente with the East. She is second to none in the first direction, but is likely to be more sensitive than most to American and Soviet objections against Europe's economic or military course. While active in Eurogroup activities she is also among the most sensitive to domestic pressures against defense, and tends to prefer the MBFR route to the European defense one as a means of preventing American troop reductions or of compensating for them if they do occur.

Britain, at least under Edward Heath, seems to have the clearest set of priorities: Western over pan-European, increasing importance of the European link as compared to the Atlantic one, but without prematurely compromising the latter.

The countries on the northern and southern flanks of the Atlantic alliance have a primary interest both in the maintenance of the American presence which is the unifying link with the center, and in détente and

arms control to the extent that they diminish the dangers of their exposed position. To the extent that the American presence is weakening - their main concern is to avoid isolation through a regionalization of the Central European defense. Their link with the EEC would, then, become increasingly important for their security.

Finally, Eastern European countries know, especially since the treaties with Germany, that their only security problem is with the Soviet Union. They would welcome arms control measures which might marginally make Soviet intervention more awkward and security talks or institutions within which they would be less confined to a tête-à-tête with their leader than in real life. Beyond that they know that Western Europe, especially Germany, has a greater interest in interpenetration versus the political status quo than the United States and they welcome an active West European ostpolitik. They are favorable to West European integration if it encourages it, hostile if it deflects from it. They are interested in avoiding a Soviet superiority over the continent, which would still increase their dependence; in a situation of balance, some indirect and marginal deterrence through uncertainty may still be available, at least to some of them. Hence they are interested in keeping the American presence or faute de mieux, in the creation of the European balance to replace it. Nobody, except possibly the Soviet Union, has an interest in an abrupt choice between the Atlantic, the West European and the East-West direction. Everybody has an interest in the continuation of the American presence, and of détente, and in the growth of a West European role of responsibility and initiative. In the long run, the desirable order would be from East-West (i.e., above all American-Soviet and Germany-Soviet) stabilization, through growing West European unity

and influence. East European autonomy and Soviet tolerance based on domestic transformation, to a new multilateral system of balance and cooperation, which would de-emphasize both the presence of the superpowers and the role of military force.

Unfortunately, however, the dynamics of Europe's security problem originate much less, today, in the progress of either West European integration or pan-European cooperation than in the trends to American disengagement or decoupling, which revive the old European fears of the late 1940's and early 1950's ("we want to be defended, not liberated") and of the 1960's ("we want deterrence, not defense, because any war on the European soil would be disastrous").

Today, there is no denying that Europe's security is increasingly distinct from and inferior to, that of the United States: she has fallen between the two stools of complete Atlanticism (which would mean the complete identification of her territory to that of the United States, as in Kennedy's Berlin statement, and the meeting of any threat to her security with the same threat of retaliation to the Soviet Union itself as a threat to the U.S. - again, as in Kennedy's Cuban missile crisis statement) and complete Europeanism (which would mean having herself this ability to credibly threaten retaliation over the Soviet Union itself).

If her present security - inferior but acceptable - which rests on ambiguous deterrence and uncertain escalation coupled with East-West detente - is put into question, she becomes either a zone of potential conventional conflict (the Gaullist nightmare of the two superpowers sparing each other's territory and fighting, directly or indirectly, over Western and Eastern Europe) or a militarily passive, quasi-neutralized zone of reduced armaments supervised by the superpowers.

To avoid these two unpleasant situations, she must try to maintain all three elements of her present security, while changing their respective proportion in the light of circumstances.

After all, if Europe in spite of the most unnatural territorial divisions and the starkest ideological oppositions has not known the equivalent of the Korean, the Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli or the Indo-Pakistani war, it can be only for three reasons: the direct physical presence of the superpowers, the presence of nuclear weapons, and the more peaceful or satisfied character of societies. Each of these three features, if taken in isolation, would be inaccessible, or insufficient, or dangerous.

The first would mean perpetuation of the division of Europe, complete renunciation of an independent Western Europe, and a degree of identification with the United States which trends in the latter itself would no longer permit, even if the Europeans wanted it.

Trying to substitute European nuclear deterrence for the American one would, if it meant a full-fledged European deterrent, be conceivable only in case of dire need, if the feeling of abandonment by the U.S. and of threat by the Soviet Union were sufficient to overcome the internal resistance to political unity and defense expenditure as Ian Smart has remarked. The very conditions which would create the new separation from the U.S. and hostility from the Soviet Union would be worsened at least in the short run by the solution and, at any rate, makes its implementation more difficult.[9]

Finally, banking on the obsolescence of considerations of military balance and deterrence because of collective security, the dissolution of blocs, European reconciliation or the primacy of civilian values, would ignore both the structural problems created by the predominance of

actual Soviet and potential German power on the European continent, the potential for violent crises in developed societies, and the nature of domestic and inter-state relationships in the Soviet world.

There is no alternative, then, from the point of view of security itself, to:

1) keeping as much of the present deterrence and defense structure for as long as possible. This means for the U.S. not to remove essential features of it or to underline its weaknesses in the name of détente or of arms control, and for the Europeans to contribute more actively (financially and by their general policy) to its prolongation;

2) progressively, under the umbrella of the present structure, reinforcing the European elements and their coordination with the corresponding U.S. ones. This means for the Europeans not to match eventual U.S. troop reductions by reductions of their own, and to take steps toward a conventional defense community; to add an element of "uncertainty of non-escalation" by the deployment of British and French tactical nuclear weapons, in coordination with American ones; to proceed with steps toward the coordination of French and British nuclear forces and the creation of a European NPG provided it is made compatible with a restructured Atlantic alliance. For the U.S., it means opening a serious process of discussion with European allies about possible changes in NATO strategy prompted by reduced American troop levels,[11]; it means accepting a dialogue about and possibly coordination with and help to European nuclear efforts, tactical and strategic, if and when the Europeans, including the French, show a real interest in practical cooperation and structural reform.

3) pursuing an active policy of détente, cooperation and interpenetration with Eastern Europe, while knowing that its limits are various and

its fruits are distant. Emphasizing non-military aspects like economic and cultural contacts and the political guarantees of their regular course. Within political and military relations, emphasizing non-intervention, crisis-management, verification codes of conduct, all the kit of collateral "confidence building" or rather "confidence-substituting" measures, rather than arms limitations and changes in the security structure of Europe. These should be involved in the last stage of European reconciliation, not in the first. Similarly, the discussion around the conference on security and cooperation and the institution of standing pan-European commissions should be considered as positive channels for a peaceful transformation of the continent as long as they do not interfere with the process of West European integration and with the theoretical possibility of its political and military consequences, which should have priority. Indeed, it is only if West Europeans are confident in their resolve to progress toward unity that they can and should run the risks of interpenetration and favor institutions which present dangers but also opportunities.

All this seems to leave fairly little scope or role in Europe for arms control proper. It is more for others to judge whether this is so. What this analysis does imply, however, is that there is no positive value to arms limitations as such, divorced from their political context. Arms control, in the most general sense, does have two basic universal goals which are positive by themselves: the avoidance of war and the limitation or decrease of defense expenditures. As soon as one asks what war, and what expenditures, and negotiated by whom, one enters into the decisive political questions of relations between superpowers, alliance systems, and individual small and middle powers. Arms control

can be an excellent bureaucratic ideology, used to manipulate wrong-headed military services or obnoxious allies into submission; it can also be used by smaller allies to limit the control of their leaders.

MBFR - to take the most salient European example - can be seen as an anti-Mansfield device or as the continuation of Mansfield by other means; it can be seen, as by the French government, as a way for the Alliance leaders to reassert their control or, as by the German government, as a way for alliance members to have a voice in a process which, if it did not take place on a multilateral basis, would still proceed on a unilateral or bilateral one; or it can be seen, as in the models of the French Centre de Politique Etrangère as a way of undermining "the blocs" by delineating the beginnings of an alternative security system.

Similarly, in the East, it can be seen as a pro-Warsaw Pact device entirely controlled by the Soviet Union, or as a way for individual countries to get - through collateral measures - some of the security which already exists between alliances; essentially an "anti-Prague invasion" device.

Finally, from the point of view of non-central regions, it can increase their exposed situation if it is limited to central or, as suggested by J. Holst connect the three security zones and thereby reemphasize the notion of the indivisibility of peace in Europe.

In our own view, the issues of participation and priorities are essential. CSCE and SALT will proceed and possibly with good results provided the marginalization of American participation in pan-European institutions is avoided in the first, and provided SALT is Europeanized when talking about matters involving Europe. European nuclear powers

should be present in its standing consultative commission, as a step toward a long-range multilateralization of SALT to include all nuclear powers.

MBFR - apparently the exercise most favorable to the West - may be the most ambiguous one. It may come too late or be too slow to forestall or slow down domestic American pressures for unilateral reduction; and it may come too early for a new security system. It may serve a useful function if it leads to bilateral reductions multilaterally arrived at and not, as seems at least as likely, to multilateral reductions bilaterally arrived at. Above all, it will have been worth the trouble and the risks if, by becoming a permanent feature of the process of East-West communication, it contributes, directly or indirectly, to modifying the behavior of its participants in the direction of restraint. For, more than mutually balanced force reductions, what European security needs is a process of mutually balanced interpenetration and non-intervention, and a mutually balanced reduction in the role of force.

Footnotes

1. "Is European Security Negotiable?" The Roundtable, April 1970, and "The United States and West European Security," Survival, January-February 1972.

2. Change and Security in Europe, I. The Background. Adelphi Paper 45, February 1968.

3. M. Tatu, "Le Triangle Washington-Moscou-Pekin et les deux Europes," pp. 28-29.

4. Cf. Luigi Valsalice, "I Rapporti Cino-Americani e L'Unione Sovietica Civitas," 1 January 1972, pp. 3-13.

5. F. Duchene, "Europe's Contribution to World Peace," in R. Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow, 1972, p. 43.

6. S. Hoffmann, "Weighing the Balance of Power," Foreign Affairs, July 1972, pp. 628-629.

7. Cf. Tatu, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

8. Robert Ellsworth, "Deterrence in Europe in the 1970's, Washington Attitudes," The Roundtable, April 1972, p. 147.

9. Ian Smart, "West European Deterrence," The Roundtable, April 1972, pp. 197-198.

10. See R. Rosecrance, Some Notes on Problems of European Security. Proceedings of 21st Pugwash Conference, Sinaia, August 26-31, 1971, pp. 340-343.

11. For different possible models, see the papers presented by Kenneth Hunt and Uwe Nehrlich to the Fletcher School conference on the "Nixon Doctrine and European Security," April 1972.

(4)

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Conference on

EUROPEAN SECURITY, SALT, AND U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

August 31 - September 2, 1972

Geneva

Saturday, September 2 Morning Session

The Future of the Strategic Arms Race and the Next Steps for its Control

by

George Rathjens

The Future of the Strategic Arms Race and the Next Steps for its Control

I.

Any inquiry into the future of the strategic arms race ought perhaps to begin with an enumeration of its motivating forces.

Those who have followed the recent literature relating to it - and particularly what is probably the richest source, the presentations to, and inquiries by, American Congressional committees - will identify three major factors in American policy: concern lest adversary weapons programs might make a nuclear disarming attack, a so-called "first strike", a rational option in a crisis; concern lest an adversary might achieve some kind of quantitative or qualitative superiority that could be exploited politically or militarily without triggering a full-scale nuclear exchange; and a desire to be in a strong bargaining position with respect to arms control and disarmament negotiations. Although there is almost no information publically available regarding Soviet motivations, it seems likely that the same factors, and particularly the second, have been important in determining Soviet policy. In addition, limiting damage that might be inflicted on the Soviet Union in the event of a nuclear war has apparently also been a major Soviet objective at least up until the late 60s.

Those who favor organizational explanations of decision processes will argue that the existence within both the United States and the Soviet Union of military industrial complexes and the desire of the

bureaucracies to extend their power and missions have also been important factors in the strategic arms race.

As we look to the future, the strength of these forces, and others, that will determine strategic arms policy will be conditioned by a changing international political environment; by the experience with the recently concluded round of strategic arms limitation talks, SALT I; and by changes in domestic attitudes and politics. In this last connection, changes within the United States and the outcome of the forthcoming American presidential election will be particularly important.

II.

Critics of the recently concluded strategic arms limitation agreements have argued that the agreements do not go far enough, that their effect will be to legitimatize the arms race or channel it into new dimensions, and that an acceleration of it may even be the result. Not even SALT's critics, and certainly not its supporters, will argue that the environment for strategic arms decisions will be unaffected by the recent negotiations.

The effects can be considered to be of three kinds: those that are inhibiting, deriving from the agreements and interpretations per se; the channelizing and escalatory effects; and the effects on bureaucratic and diplomatic processes.

The effects of the first kind are quite obvious, by and large non-controversial, and have been much written about. Nevertheless, summarization seems appropriate here.

The most significant agreement emerging from SALT I is the limitation of ABM systems to militarily meaningless levels, an agreement

that has several important effects.

Firstly, it can be interpreted as indicating acceptance by each of the super-powers of the fact that for the foreseeable future its population will be held hostage by the other. Thus, deterrence is enshrined, for better or worse, as the major rationale for strategic force policy for both.

Secondly, the treaty should allay concerns that either the Soviet Union or the United States may, in the future, find it advantageous to attack the other since under no circumstances would such an attack be a rational course: with large scale ABM systems proscribed, there could be no realistic expectation of preventing devasting retaliation.

Thirdly, if effective ABM defenses are truly out of the picture, each offensive missile has enhanced utility. There will be no degradation due to interception and larger explosive payloads can be carried since penetration aids can be dispensed with. Accordingly, the treaty diminishes any <u>military</u> rationale for proceeding with new strategic offensive systems, and most specifically the case for continuing with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) programmes.

Fourthly, the treaty establishes a precedent for future negotiations for curtailing other defensive, or to be more specific, damage--limiting systems - systems to limit damage to population and industry.

Finally, including, as it does, such proscriptions as those on the development and test of sea, air and space-based ABM systems, the treaty weakens the position of those who argue generally against including limitations on military research and development in arms control agreements.

Far less significant than the ABM treaty is the interim agreement relating to offensive systems. It may have some inhibiting effects on Soviet programs, although it is unclear whether Soviet missile force levels would exceed the allowed limits within the five-year span of the agreement even in the absence of its constraints. It will not have any direct effects on US programs, as has been made clear. However, one might have expected, perhaps naively, that there would be indirect dampening effects since some of the expressed fears about a continuing Soviet missile build-up will presumably have been diminished, and with them the pressures to react. Regrettably, there is, as yet, no evidence to support this hope.

On the contrary, spokesmen for the Nixon Administration have made it clear that they favor continuing with all of the strategic offensive weapons programs that were underway before the agreements were negotiated, and have gone out of their way to emphasize that there must be no curtailment. In this connection, cynics argue that, far from limiting the arms race, SALT may serve simply to change its course somewhat, possibly with acceleration. There are two mechanisms that are of concern, both related to bargaining.

Internal to each government there are those favoring new weapons programs who can be expected to demand that certain concession to their interests be made as the price for their support of an arms control agreement. This has been most clearly brought to light in the case of the present agreements in demands made by the Chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff for "assurances". From the perspective of this paper, one of the two most significant is a demand that the United States "maximize strategic capabilities within the constraints established", an assurance, which if complied with literally, would imply a vastly expanded qualitative and quantitative arms race since American economic and technical resources are far from being maximally used at present on strategic arms programs, and since there is ample scope for expansion within the framework of the agreements, particularly

as bombers and air-to-surface missiles are not covered at all by them. The other "assurance" that has a particular potential for leading to an accelerated arms race is the demand that there be a vigorous US research and development program so as to "maintain technological superiority".

One can surmise that demands for similar "assurances" might have been made by those within the Soviet bureaucracy who favored continuing with major military programs, or that even if they were not, those at the decision-making levels might have given suitable undertakings in order to assure support for the agreements.

The large number of US nuclear tests since 1963 may be an example from the past of the fact that the effect of an agreement may be a more vigorous weapons program at least in certain areas, than would obtain in its absence, the Kennedy Administration having assured Senator Jackson in that case that the nation would have a vigorous underground nuclear test program in order to gain his support and that of others for the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

The other concern about bargaining is with respect to the intergovernmental situation. It became prominent in the case of SALT I when Nixon Administration spokesmen, unable to make a persuasive technical or military case for the Safeguard ABM system, were reduced to arguing that it should be supported because it was required so that the United States would be in an acceptable bargaining position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The process is being repeated with Administration spokesmen now arguing that the success of SALT II is contingent on the United States' going ahead with the new strategic offensive weapons programs, notably the B-1, a new bomber, and Trident, a new missile launching submarine. Since considerable political courage, if not foolhardiness, is required to expose one's self to the possible charge of sabotaging an arms control agreement, the "bargaining chip" argument undoubtedly was persuasive to at least

a few members of the US Congress in the case of the ABM program; and it is likely to be so as regards some of the offensive programs.

Thus, "bargaining chip" arguments, like the demands for "assurances" can be used to secure support for programs that would otherwise not be approved. Particularly if negotiations are protracted, the programs may acquire a momentum and a constituency that will make them difficult to stop. The results are likely to be, if not a net escalation of the arms race, at least a change in emphasis. With the recently negotiated agreements imposing limits on force levels, it is widely feared that there will be a greater emphasis on qualitative racing. It is also possible that there may be more emphasis on bombers and cruise missiles as no constraints are imposed on them although the tendency to move in that direction will be attenuated since air defense are also unconstrained.

When the strategic arms talks began, there were those who, discounting the likelihood of any early agreement, nevertheless argued that they could be important simply as a vehicle for improving understanding on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States of each other's motivations in developing and deploying strategic arms. No doubt understanding has improved at least to some degree, and the mutual education process may even have resulted in some convergence of view on critical issues, e.g. on the futility of defense, on the importance of national means of verification and the importance of non-interference with them, and possibly even with respect to such concepts as nuclear sufficiency. One ought not, however, to attach too much weight to the likelihood. Certainly, there is little evidence that American views with respect to these questions have been much influenced by what the Soviet Union has had to say. Soviet views have probably been more influenced by American arguments, and the shift in the Soviet position regarding limitations on defensive systems is probably the best example. Even in that case, however, the timing

would lead one to believe that the shift began before SALT.

Probably more important for the future than the effects of inter-governmental exchanges have been the effects of SALT on intra-governmental processes.

In the case of the United States the existence of the strategic arms talks have involved additional people in consideration of strategic arms policy, enhanced the role of others, made necessary communication between groups that otherwise would have had little reason for it, and undoubtedly has forced both newcomers and those who previously had had responsibility to look at the issues from a changed, and generally broader, perspective. Thus, the negotiations have given the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the US/an entree for consideration not only of the ABM treaty, with respect to which it has a constitutional responsibility, but also of the several weapons development and acquisition programs being advocated by the Administration. The result has been informative not only for members of that committee but for the Congress and the nation as a whole. The military establishment, having been forced to argue its case with respect to a number of issues with arms control proponents, has doubtless improved its understanding of the character of the threat against which it assumes it must plan, and the strategic concepts which the nation will accept. The roles of Dr. Kissinger and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency within the bureaucracy have been enhanced and that of the State Department diminished by parts they played in the negotiations. The constituency for arms control by negotiation has been strengthened, possibly at the expense of those favoring the exercise of unilateral restraint. Decisions with respect to weapons development and procurement that would in the past have been made at the middle levels of the bureacracy have been, and will continue to be, of concern at much higher levels if they are related to the subject of the agreements. And, development of positions for SALT has forced a more serious

consideration of the relative effectiveness of national intelligence collection capabilities and of possible on-site inspection arrangements.

In summary, the negotiations have had a major, and probably lasting and desirable, effect in opening up the issues of American strategic arms policy to broader and more informed discussion.

The effects on Soviet policy processes can only be surmised, but it is likely that they have been even more profound since there has in the past been much less lateral communication between the various parts of the Soviet bureacracy that would necessarily have had to have been involved in back-stopping the Helsinki and Vienna negotiations: the military, the technical people, and those from the foreign office.

III.

Far more important than the effects of SALT I on the future of the strategic arms race are the changes in domestic attitudes and the international political climate.

This is not the place for lengthy commentary about them but an enumeration of the major changes (which are certainly not independent of each other) and their consequences as regards strategic weapons policy may be useful.

Firstly, there is the demise of the bipolar world with the emergence of China, Japan, and Western Europe as increasingly independent and important power centers.

Secondly, the Cold War is being increasingly seen as an anachronism, particularly as the crises over Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Berlin and Cuba become more distant.

Thirdly, within American society there is a substantial alienation, particularly among the young, and a turning inward, in

large measure consequences of the tragedy of Viet Nam and frustration about lack of progress in solving domestic problems.

Fourthly, there is the fact that military strength has declined in importance in international affairs relative to economic strength, partly also a consequence of the demonstrated inability of the United States to use its military power to further what it has perceived to be its interests, but probably more fundamentally a result of increasing economic interdependence.

Finally, there is the likelihood that with each year of their non-use, nuclear weapons are losing credibility as instruments of policy.

The consequence of these developments most relevant to the issue of strategic arms policy is, from an American perspective, and that is the one from which I must write, the diminution in public and Congressional support for the military establishment. Reductions in force levels, particularly in conventional forces, pressure to reduce overseas commitments, the move toward an all-volunteer army, and the questioning of major new weapons programs are manifestations of the change.

With this, with the rejection of an imperial role by a large proportion of the population as arrogant and unwise, and with economic strength increasing in importance in international affairs, but with that of the United States diminished relative to that of the rest of the developed world, the ability of the nation to play an international leadership role is eroding. The diminution in capability will be accentuated as the last vestiges of American nuclear superiority relative to that of the Soviet Union disappear, and as the Soviet threat to those who in the past have relied on American strength and leadership is perceived, as noted below, to be less worrisome, if not unreal.

While the environment for American foreign and military policy has changed because of a multiplicity of external and internal developments, in the case of the Soviet Union a single one, the development of conflict with China, seems, at least to an outsider, to be dominant. This has undoubtedly been a factor favouring rapprochement with the West, and it will be a factor in determining how far the Soviet Union will be willing to go in arms control and particularly in arms reductions.

The Sino-Soviet conflict, and the not unrelated improvement in Soviet-Western relationship, will also have its effect in Western Europe. The threat from the East will appear less worrisome, and the cement that holds NATO together accordingly will be weakened. So too will be the pressures for maintaining and building independent European nuclear capabilities, at least in the short term. In the long term, if Soviet policy should become more bellicose, such pressures could become strong again, assuming a diminished US presence and diminished confidence in the credibility of a US response to Soviet pressure in Europe.

IV.

With the environmental factors that will bear on future strategic arms policy identified, one can proceed in an attempt to describe the prospects for the future.

Just what motivates Soviet strategic arms policy remains, despite SALT, unclear at least to the outsider. Nevertheless, the nature of Soviet weapons programs, of the agreements reached, and of the difficulties which proved unresolvable in SALT I permit a few inferences.

Firstly, the Soviet Union, like the United States, seems to have accepted the idea that the building of defensive forces is not worthwhile in the context of a Soviet-American strategic arms race.

Secondly, it seems likely that the Soviet Union is less concerned

about the possibility of the United States developing a "first-strike" capability, then vice-versa. This may be because in the past the United States had something very close to such a capability, and did not use it; it may be because the Soviet Union would plan on launching its missiles based on radar warning of attack; and most likely it is a reflection of a belief that an out-of-the-blue "first-strike" is simply not the most credible one for initiation of nuclear war.

Thirdly, any kind of inferiority is obviously troublesome, and measures which would have the effect of freezing the Soviet Union in such a position would be unacceptable, or if acceptable, only if there were very large compensating US concessions. As the Soviet Union has generally been behind the US, and still is, with respect to almost all areas of technology relevant to strategic weaponry the effect is likely to be general resistance to restraints on development, a resistance that also probably has a more deep-seated basis in Soviet philosophy.

Finally, there are the questions of encirclement and forward based systems, concerns for which the United States has no anologues. These are issues which are likely to prove particularly troublesome in any efforts to negotiate permanent limits on offensive force levels or air defenses, or if large reductions in the longer range offensive systems are ever seriously discussed.

There may be dramatic changes in Soviet strategic arms policy, but with no inkling that these are in the offing, it is assumed that the bases for such policy will remain essentially unchanged, the excepted factor being possibly increasing concern about China. Also, as noted earlier, the policy is likely to be more thoughtfully developed and implemented, a consequence of greater lateral communication

deriving from the SALT experience and the resulting somewhat greater responsivity of the system to a multiplicity of internal influences.

In contrast to that of the Soviet Union, American policy regarding strategic arms is at an obvious branch point, the branch to be selected being one of the major issues to be resolved by the November election.

It is clear that to a substantial degree President Nixon and his supporters see him as the conservator of traditional American values, including specifically greatness as measured by America's ability to project its power and to influence events on a world scale. The President has wisely recognized that policy must accomodate itself to realities. The so-called Nixon Doctrine is evidence of this: in recognition of the diminishing acceptability of commitments abroad, he has made it clear that in the future, outside NATO, others must carry the burden for defense against conventional attack, the American commitment being limited to serving as a guarantor against nuclear threats. But the fact remains that a reelected Nixon Administration would fight something of a rear-guard action against the tides of change, modifying policy, hopefully, skillfully and imaginatively as required, but nevertheless using whatever instruments it could to avoid turning its back on traditional values.

A McGovern Administration, on the other hand, would clearly resist those tides much less strongly. Indeed, a more modest American role in international power politics would be accepted not only as expedient but as a preferred course.

The difference between the two views of the world and American interests are sufficiently different to justify two alternative analyses. The odds at the moment favouring the re-election of Mr. Nixon, that alternative is discussed first.

V.

The Nixon Administration's approach to strategic arms questions is likely to be, as it has been in the past, within a framework defined by three basic beliefs about the strategic balance: firstly, an acceptance of the view that, in the Soviet-American confrontation, defensive or "damage-limiting" measures are not only hopeless but undesirable; secondly, a belief that the strategic balance is fairly delicate, a balance that could quite conceivably be upset by technological developments; and thirdly, rejection of the concept of nuclear sufficiency, at least as it is commonly defined, much rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding.

The first belief is the least controversial. The arguments are straightforward. (1) As long as the offense dominates the defense decisively, the only realistic way of coping with the possibility of attack must be in deterrence rather than in defense. (2) Defenses may introduce large uncertainties in the calculus of both sides; and conservatism or "worst-case" analysis, the tendency to give one's adversary the benefit of all doubts and one's self the benefit of none, is likely to induce one side to enlarge or qualitatively improve its offensive capabilities in an over-reaction to adversary defenses or their prospect. (3) Therefore, defenses can greatly stimulate the arms race; and severe constraints on them will allay concerns and remove a major incentive for escalation in offensive force levels. There are ancillary arguments. Limitations on offensive systems that are not accompanied by limitations on defenses as well are likely to prove non-viable: if one nation makes a major effort to develop or deploy defense, or both, the time will come when its adversary will become so concerned that its deterrent capability is jeopardized that it will feel obliged to strengthen its offensive forces

either clandestinely or after denouncing the agreements limiting them. Finally, preferred tactics for defeating defenses are likely to involve saturation or rapid expenditure of one's offensive weapons in time of war. Accordingly, it is argued that the chances of any nuclear exchange being limited would be diminished by the existence of defensive capabilities.

Notwithstanding such arguments, there are a few who generally oppose limitations on defenses: in the United States, Don Brennan and Senator Buckley for example. However, the arguments against them have now gained wide acceptance, including in the Soviet Union; and this means that limitations on air defenses and anti-submarine warfare systems, as well as on ABM systems, may be acceptable, at least in principle.

The importance of limiting defenses will depend on the size and composition of strategic offensive forces. If the latter are large, variegated and sophisticated, quite substantial defenses might be tolerated without there being concern about the adequacy of offensive forces for deterrence. By the same token, within the framework of deterrence, even quite modest defenses may be a serious impediment to drastic arms reduction. The importance of limiting defenses will also increase, the more delicate one believes the strategic balance to be.

Information as to the views of the Nixon Administration with respect to the last point is somewhat ambiguous. Presidential statements contain remarks to the effect that the strategic balance is not sensitive to moderate variations in force levels, but others to the effect that it is very susceptible to being upset by technological changes. In its defense

of the Safeguard ABM proposal against domestic critics and its approach to SALT, the Administration has emphasized - many would say exaggerated - the likelihood that a few years hence American deterrent forces might be vulnerable to a Soviet "first-strike". It may be, however, that this emphasis was at least, in part, rationalization: in the case of the defense of Safeguard just one of many arguments adduced to "sell" the ABM; and as regards SALT, an argument brought forward for limiting the growtih of Soviet missile forces in areas where there was no US counterpart - the concern perhaps having its basis as much in the political-psychological impact if the Soviet weapons as in the likelihood that they could in fact be effective as disarming weapons. It is perhaps fair to conclude that the Administration's expressed concerns about the delicacy of the strategic balance are real but have on occasion been overemphasized with other purposes or concerns in mind. In part, the emphasis is undoubtedly related to a rejection of the concept of nuclear sufficiency.

Before turning to a discussion of that rejection it is pertinent to point out that belief in the delicacy of the strategic balance is likely to be a very important determinant of American policy with respect to both arms control negotiations and weapons development and acquisition decisions. Very high priority will be given to minimizing the vulnerability of American strategic offensive forces. This means that the continued retention of a "triad" of strategic systems, each with somewhat different vulnerabilities, will be favoured, and the maintenance of US technological superiority in strategic weaponry will be a sine qua non of policy as the best hedge against destabilizing breakthroughs. In the balancing

of strategic objectives, reducing "first-strike" vulnerabilities will command high priority as compared with others: reducing the risks of war by accident, miscalculation, escalation or failures of command and control; reducing damage, should war occur, either by reducing force levels or making early termination more feasible; inhibiting nuclear proliferation; and reducing the level of resources allocated to strategic arms. In this connection, even those who believe that the possibility of a "first-strike" is not the greatest threat to survival, and that accordingly some of the other objectives ought to command higher relative priority, will be moved to support measures that reduce the vulnerability of strategic retaliatory forces. They will do so out of recognition of the fact that, even if groundless, the fears of others, and particularly of the Administration, will, unless allayed, have undesirable effects on policy: the pressure for new weaponry will be difficult to resist; the "triad" will be retained to the point where some of its components may be obsolete, excessively expensive or even an important factor in making nuclear war more probable; and other objectives will continue to be slighted. In short, they will accept the view that the delicacy ghost must be exorcised if there is to be more meaningful progress in arms control and disarmament. Yet, acceptance of this view, and action based on it, will almost inevitably lend support to the delicacy theory; thus, there is a difficult philosophical dilemma for unbelievers.

At least as important for strategic arms policy as the delicacy question, and hardly completely separable from it, is the question of nuclear sufficiency. The concept has its basis in the fact that modest

numbers of thermonuclear weapons will suffice to inflict levels of damage on nations that would be unacceptable under all circumstances, and that the same, or larger, but still relatively small, numbers will suffice to destroy whole societies. The overriding implication of the concept is that, beyond a certain level, conventional thinking about force levels and characteristics - that which has governed military policy since the beginning of recorded history - is simply irrelevant. Beyond this level, increases in strength have no utility. Therefore, there is no point in being concerned about adversary increases, nor in trying to maintain equal or superior levels. Particularly as tactical nuclear war concepts and the limited use of nuclear weapons have lost credibility as realistic policy options, the concept of sufficiency as applied to nuclear weaponry, and particularly to strategic forces, has gained adherents.

At the beginning of the Administration, President Nixon seemed to be one. Thus, his first "state of the world" message contained these words:

> Formerly, any additional strength was strategically significant; today, any additional power threatens to outstrip rational objectives.

However, in his second message in the series he made his rejection of "sufficiency", at least as conventionally defined, unambiguously clear. Thus, one reads,

> Our strategic forces must be numerous enough, efficient enough, and deployed in such a way that an aggressor will always know that the sure result of a nuclear attack against us is unacceptable damage from retaliation. That makes it imperative that our strategic power not be inferior to that of any other state.

The second sentence is clearly a non-sequitur to the first, is clearly inconsistent with the idea of sufficiency, and can be explained only by relating the need expressed in it to a broader range of objectives than spelled out in the first. The first, incidentally, would seem to be a reasonable definition of Robert McNamara's "assured destruction" criterion for strategic force planning, a criterion that the President has explicitly rejected as inadequate. In his third "state-of-the world" message the President, in effect, rejecting "sufficiency" as normally defined, reinterpreted the word to suit his purposes. Thus he said,

> Sufficiency has two meanings. In its narrow military sense, it means enough force to inflict a level of damage on a potential aggressor sufficient to deter him from attacking ... In its broader sense, sufficiency means the maintenance of forces adquate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced. Thus, the relationship between our strategic forces and those of the Soviet Union must be such that our vital security interests will not be underestimated. I must not be - and my successors must not be - limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole response to challenges. . . . It would be inconsistent with the political meaning of sufficiency to base our force planning on some finite - and theoretical - capacity to inflict damage presumed to be unacceptable to the other side.

What is one to make of all this rhetoric? Despite a substantial amount of confusion, it would seem that one can fairly conclude, and the conclusion is supported by actions, particularly in the Administration's approach to SALT, that the Administration believes that strategic nuclear forces have utility for other than deterring all-out nuclear war; and that with strategic nuclear forces, as with conventional ones, "more"

is somehow better, and in particular, that substantial numerical or technological superiority in strategic weaponry on the part of the Soviet Union would be unacceptable. Implicit in these beliefs is the possibility that nuclear power can to some degree be substituted for conventional strength.

Notwithstanding the fact that there seems to be a trend of increasing disbelief in such views, the Administration's statements and actions make it clear that it sees strategic nuclear strength as an important instrument of policy. The view may have its basis in, or be reinforced by, the difficulty that the United States will have in the years ahead in playing a world leadership role based on economic and conventional military strength; and because the Administration would clearly resist renouncing such a role. In addition, domestic support for nuclear, and particularly strategic, forces is likely to be more easily obtained than for conventional strength and overseas deployment of troops. In the light of the fact that there is little connection seen between such forces and the unhappy Viet Nam experience, it is perhaps not surprising that the US budget for strategic forces is increasing while that for general purpose forces is declining.

The implications for strategic arms policy and arms control efforts relating to strategic arms are profound. The demand for technological superiority will find support in rejection of the sufficiency concept as well as in concern about the delicacy of the balance. Pleas of the military for nuclear "war-fighting" capabilities that might arguably make the flexible use of nuclear arms more credible will not be discounted lightly although such qualities are hardly required for "assured destruction".

Examples are demands for systems that can deliver nuclear ordnance with timeliness, reliability and precision. Finally, /the approach to SALT will be, as it has been, to a substantial degree, from a competitive rather than a cooperative perspective: in technical jargon, from that of a two-person game, if not a two-person, zero-sum game, where one side's advantages are to be balanced off against the other's. With such a view, hard bargaining will be the rule for future negotiations, and the accumulation of "bargaining chips" will be an important part of the game.

Turning to SALT II, the concerns that will motivate the American approach, assuming the reelection of Mr. Nixon, are likely to be almost unchanged from these that applied to SALT I: concern about the potential vulnerability of American strategic forces to a "first-strike" and about the possibility of Soviet superiority in strategic arms that might be otherwise exploited militarily, or politically. That the first concern will still be a serious one, in the light of the ABM Treaty, may seem astonishing since the demands imposed on a "first-strike" capability will be much more stringent when the would-be attacker has no ABM system to blunt a retaliatory blow than when he has one; and since it would seem reasonable to assume that the negotiation of the treaty would have allayed Administration concerns about the likelihood of a massive Soviet ABM defense. Yet, the "first-strike" concern is likely to continue to be serious. The Administration's insistence, during the SALT I negotiations, on coupling limitations on offensive systems with the ABM treaty made it clear that it viewed Soviet offensive weapons programs as more worrisome than the prospect of large Soviet ABM defenses. Subsequent remarks, including the formal declaration that the US would regard failure to convert the interim offensive forces agreement to a permanent one a basis for

withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, emphasizes the fact that Administration continues to be troubled by the same concerns that were instrumental in its apparoch to SALT I.

Thus, a Nixon Administration agenda for SALT II might logically have as its highest priority items a permanent limitation on offensive force levels to replace the interim agreement, and measures that would delay or reduce the likelihood of Soviet attainment of counter-force effective capabilities, including specifically sophisticated multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Force reductions might be included but primarily because of their possible utility in rectifying inbalances or in facilitating agreements on force ceilings rather than as major steps toward disarmament. Soviet interests would require addition of the forward based systems to the agenda. With the exception of possible limits on additional defensive systems, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and air defense systems, and the likely inclusion of aircraft in limits on offensive systems, the problems would be those that defied resolution in SALT I.

The interim agreement on offensive missiles is awkward in that it permits the Soviet Union a potential superiority in strategic offensive missiles that would be large and possibly even significant from the Administration's perspective and that of many others. A defense of the asymmetry can be made on two grounds: firstly, that potential Soviet advantages can not be realized within the 5-year time frame of the agreement-in particular, that the Soviet Union can not deploy MIRVs extensively within that period while the United States will; and secondly, that American advantages in areas not covered are offsetting - in particular, that the United States has an advantage

in intercontinental and carrier-based bombers, and an advantage in having overseas bases from which shorter range bombers could strike the Soviet Union and which make possible an improvement in the efficiency of operation of missile launching submarines. The American advantages are, however, in varying degrees, wasting assets. The overseas bases may be lost, and, in any case, will diminish in importance as both aircraft and submarine-launched missile ranges increase; the carrier force may be reduced in size; and the relative worth of bombers as compared with missiles may diminish both because of their high cost and because defenses against them may improve while those against missiles are limited to militarily insignificant levels.

The major problem from the American perspective will be the Soviet ICBMs' having a capacity for delivery of much more "throw-weight" than their American counterparts because of their larger size and greater number. This means that if Soviet MIRV technology catches up with that of the United States there will be a disparity favoring the Soviet Union in the weight of attack deliverable by the two powers that will be substantial no matter how measured - in numbers of warheads or "megatonnage". Compounding the asymmetry will be the fact that target systems in the United States will likely require fewer weapons for destruction than their Soviet counterparts: fewer if the targets are missile launchers because the United States will have only about two-thirds as many as the Soviet Union, and fewer if the targets are population and industry because the United States is more urbanized.

Two mechanisms of adjustment are likely to be considered: establishment of limits on total "throw-weight" and preferential phase-out of larger missiles. But where is the quid pro quo for Soviet

concessions? It is hard to see it except in substantial bomber reductions, i.e. bringing American intercontinental bomber levels down by a factor of three or four to match those of the Soviet Union; in somehow getting at the forward based systems problem; or both. The ABM example notwithstanding, it would seem unlikely that "leveling-up" will be the solution. After years of operating a fairly small intercontinental bomber force, and in an era when bombers are generally seen to be out-dated as compared with missiles, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would have much enthusiasm about making a huge investment in new intercontinental bombers. Similarly, after having scrapped most of its large ICBMs in favor of smaller ones, and with ICBMs being seen by many, particularly in the United States, as obsolescent as compared with sea-based missiles because of their increasing vulnerability, the United States would be unlikely to favor building more ICBMs, or replacing those it has with larger ones, or both, even if such changes were permitted. Thus, the only reasonable solutions, within the framework "parity", to the problems inherent in the interim offensive missile agreement are likely to be those involving reductions of forces and those that interact with the European security problem.

Bargaining away the American superiority in intercontinental bombers to obtain Soviet concessions on ICBMs would likely be relatively painless. Whether rightly or not, the B 52 fleet is seen as outdated, and the prospect of a relatively modest force of B-1s to replace it and the FB-111 could well serve to minimize most of the internal objections to such a move.

For the Russians to accept major reductions in ICBMs would likely be more difficult, the large expenditures in their production having been so recently incurred.

Although a matter of lower priority for the United States than eliminating the asymmetries in the interim agreement regarding ICBMs, elimination of those pertaining to submarine-based missile systems will presumably also be an American objective. However, there are no obvious "bargaining chips" that the United States could play to secure Soviet concessions. In this connection, it would seem unlikely that Trident, once it is well underway, would be lightly bargained away even if support for it had been secured by the use of the "bargaining chip" argument.

Perhaps the most difficult problems of all that will arise in any effort to extend the interim agreement to cover other weapons systems are those relating to the forward based forces. These can hardly be dealt with without involvement of the NATO powers, and even if withdrawals of American forces could be agreed to, this would not likely satisfy the Soviet Union because of the possibility of redeployment. Reductions in inventories of dual purpose aircraft, i.e. the land and carrier based ones that are seen by the United States primarily as general purpose forces but by the Soviet Union as being appropriate for inclusion in SALT because they can reach it, will force consideration of the whole question of conventional force reductions.

All things considered, there would seem to be powerful forces working against an <u>early</u> offensive force level treaty and not much of a constituency for it.

The favorable auguries are in the development of increasingly strong arms control constituencies in the two bureaucracies, in the desire for economic savings, and in such fear as there may be on the part of proponents of large and modern strategic forces that trends in public

opinion and political leadership may be running against them. SALT can help assuage the latter concerns because of the "bargaining chip" argument. As long as there is a reasonable expectation of some agreement, demands for "bargaining chips" may serve to keep programs such as the B-1 and Trident, and very likely their Soviet counterparts, alive even in the absence of any urgent military need, and even if public opinion and other demands on the budget would dictate their demise or curtailment.

It is by now a widely held belief that even if the interim agreements on offensive systems can be converted into a permanent and possibly more inclusive treaty, the opportunities for qualitative improvements may mean that the arms race will go on - perhaps with some change in character, but without abatement. Therefore, limitations on development are increasingly believed to be a matter of high priority.

However, the expressed conviction of the Nixon Administration that the United States must maintain technological superiority in strategic arms coupled with the deep-seated, and demonstrated, reluctance of the Soviet Union to enter into agreements freezing it in an inferior position would seem to cast doubt on the likelihood of achieving such limitations. Indeed, the conflict would seem, in its general sense, irreconcilable. There is some basis for hope, however. It is in the possibility that agreements with regard to particular military areas can be negotiated without the United States renouncing its insistence on overall superiority in strategic arms technology and without the Soviet Union's conceding it. The necessary condition is that in the specific areas the capabilities of the two nations be comparable. The best precedent is in the partial nuclear test ban treaty.

Probably the most interesting prospect for the future is a missile test limitation agreement. Subject to exceptions to permit the peaceful exploitation of space, one can envisage an agreement limiting the number of missile tests to some low annual quota; or alternatively, or in addition, one severely constraining the kinds of rockets and reentry vehicles that could be tested. A particular interesting possibility of the latter is a proscription on tests of all kinds of vehicles not already operational by some specified cut-off date. Agreement(s) along these lines could have the general effect of dampening interest in, and greatly slowing down, development in strategic missiles. More specifically, depending on the details, such an agreement(s) could allay concerns about the possibility of adversary attainment of missile capabilities that could be effective in a disarming strike. Among other things, what is required for such a capability are high reliability, adequate accuracy, and great confidence in both - qualities not now characteristic of either nation's missile forces and which can be realized only through extensive test programs.

Because of the great attention paid to MIRVs, and some would say their significance, it is unlikely that missile test limitations could be agreed to until the Soviet Union has demonstrated at least a rudimentary capability. After that, however, a missile test limitation agreement would appear to be one of the more feasible major strategic arms control steps on the horizon, particularly if both nations have by then made enough progress with the development of longer-range sea-based missiles so that their deployment would not be precluded.

The other major agreements that are at least in principle of interest are those affecting defensive systems.

The possibility of limiting air defenses can probably be dismissed because of asymmetry - the Soviet Union has extensive defenses, the United States relatively little; because of the difficulties of differentiating between some kinds of defenses that have dual purpose capabilities, i.e. utility in both protracted conventional war and against a nuclear strike; and because of difficulties in verification of compliance with some kinds of proscriptions.

Limiting anti-submarine warfare activity will also be difficult because of the multi-mission role of such forces, because of verification problems, and because nations other than the Soviet Union and the United States have such forces. Nevertheless, there is more promise than in the air defense case. The hope is in part in the fact that some of the requirements for destroying or reducing the effectiveness of missile-launching submarines are likely to be quite different from those for protracted war at sea. Thus, there is the possibility of certain agreed limitations that could reduce concerns about the future survivability of submarine-based deterrent forces without there having much effect on the ASW capabilities that one normally thinks of as appropriate to the protection of shipping and naval task forces. An example would be the prohibition of peacetime trailing of submarines. Such an agreement could reduce the likelihood of a whole missile-launching submarine force being suddenly destroyed by surprise attack. On the other hand, the proscription would be irrelevant during a protracted war: it would hardly be complied with.

Yet, the prospect for early constrainment of ASW activity can not be counted large. Some proscriptions, the foregoing example included, have the unfortunate quality of being suseptible to rapid

abrogation without their being any very acceptable counter. Others, e.g. limitations on ASW force levels, which would require a substantial time interval following abrogation before significant changes in capabilities could occur, would degrade not only ASW capabilities against missile-launching submarines but also those appropriate to protracted war at sea. There would likely be considerable opposition to limitations such as those on ASW force levels in both the Soviet and US Navies because of the overlap problem. In addition, opposition in the US Navy to limitations on force levels and operations, and opposition in the Soviet Navy to limitations on development, would be likely because ASW technology of the former is probably superior to that of the latter. (It is quite probable that the failure to make progress in limiting MIRVs during the last couple of years, another technology where the United States has a lead, can be attributed to similar reactions by the two powers: little interest in deployment constraints on the part of the United States and little interest in development limitations on the part of the Soviet Union.)

Discounting pressures not now foreseeable, it would, on balance, seem unlikely that negotiations with respect to any of the issues discussed could be brought to a successful conclusion within the next couple of years.

However, by 1975 or 1976 interest of the Nixon Administration in reaching agreement is likely to have increased substantially because of the imminence of the termination of the interim agreement on offensive systems, because of the likelihood that the Soviet Union will be well on its way to exploiting, through MIRV development and deployment, the opportunities permitted it by that agreement for achieving a superiority in ICBM strength, and because of the likelihood that

Mr. Nixon will want to leave behind as part of the legacy of his Administration, in addition to the ABM treaty, another lasting arms control agreement of major proportions. In a sense, what is being said is simply that the negotiations for SALT II will consume the time available just as was the case in SALT I. Whether agreement will be reached will depend not only on how far the President will feel he can go toward meeting Soviet demands, but also on Soviet interests which are quite unpredictable. The time frame for negotiating a major new agreement could well be shortened if either power had an over-riding interest in concluding one before about 1976, but there are no such obvious interests in sight.

One can say that if SALT II is a failure the result will likely be not only disillusionment, but, because of the reliance on a bargaining from strength, arms levels substantially greater than would have been realized without the negotiations. There is a question, therefore, of whether SALT II negotiations are worth beginning if the approach can only be in an environment where the accumulation of bargaining chips is the order of the day for one or both sides.

Behind the approach to SALT II, and even aside from it, there will be, for both sides, the "triad" question - whether to try to maintain a strategic force consisting of a mix of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers.

Concerned as it appears to be about the delicacy of the strategic balance, the Nixon Administration is likely to be strongly disposed to retain all three components as providing maximum insurance against the possibility of the Soviet Union's acquiring a "first-strike" capability. Because of the difficulty of the Russians' coordinating a strike against all three, this will likely be true even if the Soviet Union develops a capability of employing highly accurate MIRVs which might appear to make the American ICBM force by itself vulnerable.

Retention of a "triad" would seem to be less important for the Soviet Union, and a continued phasing out of intercontinental bombers would not be surprising.

Introduction of land-mobile ICBMs by it might be in the cards since they could combine some of the more attractive features of both SLBMs and fixed ICBMs: the relatively low vulnerability to attack of the former with the lower cost, and greater reliability and simplicity of communications of the latter. It is to be noted that development and deployment of such forces is not precluded by the interim agreement on offensive forces (although the United States, in a non-agreed interpretation of the SALT I agreements, has stated it would view such deployment inconsistent with their purposes).

VI.

If one takes Senator McGovern's statement on national defense at face value or anything like it, the whole framework for consideration of strategic arms issues is dramatically different.

One might argue that in the event of his election to the Presidency, the responsibility of the office and pressures from the military establishment, the Congress and others would result in some shift of the Senator's position so that the break with the past would not be as sharp as his campaign statements and position papers suggest. The argument is unpersuasive. It is hard to imagine a McGovern electoral victory without the composition of the Congress changing as well so that his programs would be more acceptable than to the present membership. And even if there were Congressional pressure for larger defense

programs, it would likely be unavailing: the Congress can refuse to go along with presidential programs but it is difficult to get a president to spend money he does not wish to spend. Certainly, there would be changes in detail in the McGovern defense program, but the underlying philosophy and the major themes of his position would suffer little erosion.

Like President Nixon, Senator McGovern accepts the fact that the policies of China and the Soviet Union will be actively hostile to American interests, and he accepts the necessity of having strategic forces which, by virtue of their ability to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation, are adequate to deter a nuclear attack against the United States. He rejects development and deployment of counterforce and defensive forces as an exercise in futility and worse: fuel for the arms race, and dangerous.

Beyond this point, Senator McGovern's and the Administration's positions appear to diverge sharply. Nuclear superiority is seen by the Senator as pointless and dangerous, and he makes no claim that it is imperative that the United States maintain a lead in technologies relevant to strategic weaponry. He accepts nuclear sufficiency, narrowly defined, suggesting "that the guaranteed capability to deliver some 200 one-megaton equivalents on separate targets in both the Soviet Union and China accomplishes at or near the maximum that the United States can expect from a strategy of deterrence". He rejects the "delicacy theory" of the strategic balance, and specifically what he regards as hysterical concern about a "first-strike" threat that might be inherent in the development and deployment by the Soviet Union of SS-9 missiles. He criticizes the bargaining chip approach to weapons acquisition and linkage with arms control negotiations stating, "A desire to negotiate

from strength should not compel arms outlays that will be inappropriate even if negotiations fail".

The McGovern position as regards the "triad" is one of less than unalloyed enthusiasm. The bomber and ICBM components would merit retention but clearly not larger investment at this time to enhance their survivability. On the contrary, the fact that the existence of a "triad" would complicate an adversary's problem in attempting a "first-strike" is seen as making early decisions to strengthen its several components unnecessary.

Thus, the McGovern program calls for a halt in the construction of Safeguard defenses for American ICBMs, a reversal of the decision for prototype development of the B-1 bomber, and a discontinuation of the conversion of American ICBMs to accomodate MIRVs.

These differences between the Nixon and McGovern positions, and particularly the fact that the latter apparently does not see nuclear weapons or strategic forces as useful instruments of policy, not to mention his more modest aspirations for American leadership in international affairs, suggest that in a McGovern Administration, American nuclear policy would move rapidly and far toward what is often referred to as one of "minimum deterrence".

What of the question of strategic arms control negotiations? From the perspective that has characterized SALT, th ey would seem almost irrelevant. If strategic superiority in all its manifestations is held to be meaningless, and if concern about a "first-strike" is regarded as something of a hysterial aberration, why engage in hard bargaining to obtain assurance that certain adversary force levels or performance characteristics are not exceeded? Dr. Kissinger has said of SALT I,

"Devising an equitable agreement on ABMs proved extremely difficult". Later, in discussing possible deferral of construction of a second American ABM site he decried the possibility that the Soviet Union might have had two sites to one for the United States. In a world of sufficiency, "equity" becomes meaningless as an objective, and the difference between one and two ABM sites irrelevant.

Yet, the very different McGovern views on the role of nuclear weapons in world affairs does not mean that the Soviet Union and the United States with a McGovern Administration would have nothing to talk about as regards strategic arms. The game-theory, bargaining approach would be muted, and questions of cooperation would become prominent. Concern would be focused less on those aspects of the nuclear threat that have their basis in the adversary aspects of the Soviet-American relationship and more in those that are a function simply of the existence of the weapons themselves. The objectives of allaying concerns about adversary exploitation of nuclear strength and the possibility of a disarming attack would, to a large degree, give way to reducing the risks that war might be initiated by other mechanisms - escalation, accident, failure of command and control, or as a result of nuclear proliferation; and to reducing damage levels in the event of war, including eventually getting beyond "minimum deterrence".

The last prospect must, regrettably, be regarded, however, as a distant one. While a McGovern Administration would surely want to explore the problems, there is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union, its advocacy of general and complete disarmament notwithstanding, would be prepared to accept even "minimum deterrence" at this time,

much less that it would consider seriously going beyond it in strategic force reductions. In this regard, its views concerning strategic weaponry are likely to be much more akin to those of the Nixon Administration than to those of Senator McGovern, those relating to the question of the delicacy of the strategic balance possibly excepted.

VII.

Is there, then, a reasonable basis for hope that the trends of the last twenty years toward greater numbers and sophistication of strategic arms will be reversed? In summary, assuming no change in government in either the Soviet Union or the United States, the answer must be a highly qualified "yes".

There is little evidence that the governments of either the Soviet Union or the United States, as presently constituted, would exercise much unilateral restraint. Thus, assuming they continue in power, the strategic arms race is likely to go on with some change as a result of SALT I but with little, if any, abatement in the absence of further agreement.

Further negotiations, particularly if protracted, could have the effect of encouraging the race by muting those voices that would favor some unilateral restraint. This is certainly likely in the case of the United States where demands by the Administration for "bargaining chips" can be used to silence Congressional critics of expanded arms programs. It would be surprising if similar behaviour did not characterize the Soviet system.

Since the problems for SALT II, as seen from the perspective of the present governments of the two countries, appear to be formidable ones, early agreement on major measures of limitation or reduction can not be realistically expected. There is, then, a very real question of whether entering into such negotiations will be worth while: there is a good chance that the net effect will be counterproductive as regards arms control.

Where then is the hope, absent a change in Administration in the United States? It is in the fact that there are competitive demands on resources in both the Soviet Union and the United States; a trend, at least in the latter, toward better informed and more searching questioning of military policies; the development of procedures and constituencies in the bureaucracies of both countries more conducive to arms control; and in the rather specific motivations that the Nixon Administration may have to conclude major agreements in 1975 or 1976.

With all of these factors in mind, both the negative and the positive, it is to be hoped that an approach to SALT II will be one with rather grand objectives. Since the negotiations are likely to consume the next three or four years almost regardless of their content, only rather substantial agreements could offset the escalation in arms that must be expected between now and then and to which the negotiations will have contributed.

A change in Administration in the United States would open up a very different perspective.

The objectives which appear to have been the major motivations for SALT I, reduction of concern about an adversary "first-strike", removal of incentives for strategic arms escalation, and prevention of adversary attainment of advantages in force levels or characteristics

that could be exploited, would be all but irrelevant, at least to the United States. That being the case, further arms control talks would offer an opportunity to focus on the non-competitive aspects of the nuclear threat, aspects which have been much in the background in SALT I, and which would continue to be so in SALT II absent a change in the American Administration. Certainly, with a McGovern Presidency, negotiations would be much less likely to contribute to further arms escalation.

Regardless of negotiations, American strategic weapon programs would be much curtailed. Whether or not there would be any reciprocation by the Soviet Union is totally unclear.