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Some Institutional Suggestions for a System of Security and Co-operation in Europe

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I. Introduction

1. The following suggestions concerning the organizational and institutional aspects of the proposed Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe are put forward in outline only. When agreement has been reached at the political level to hold such a Conference, it will clearly become necessary to think further about the detailed arrangements needed to translate into reality whatever the Conference may decide. Without exaggerating the importance of the institutional aspects of what is essentially a political process, it may not be out of place at the present juncture to present some realistic and fairly detailed suggestions on the organizational and institutional framework of the new system as it evolves, together with a glimpse of subsequent stages. To be helpful, the suggestions should be both flexible and tentative, and be presented in such a way as to serve the actual course of intergovernmental discussions and negotiations on this very sensitive subject.

2. The following stages in the process towards the establishment of a new system of security and co-operation in Europe may be distinguished: (i) preparatory stage, leading up to the first session of the proposed Conference, (ii) the Conference stage, (iii) the post-Conference, transitional or interim stage, and (iv) subsequent stages. After dealing briefly with the preparatory stage, as well as with the system's goals and purposes, its general institutional principles, and relations with the UN system, this report is mainly concerned with the interim stage. It also ventures to envisage possible institutional patterns as the system moves towards a more definitive stage.

3. To the extent the process can be analyzed at this juncture, one may visualize it roughly as follows. After a preliminary stage, includ-

ing, possibly, some initial meetings on particular subjects of a preparatory nature, the Conference itself would be convened. It is expected that this stage will take from now until the latter part of 1972. It is then assumed that the Conference will give rise to a series of similar Conferences in years to come. Such a pragmatic and step-by-step approach should meanwhile enable Governments to work together in a practical fashion through *ad hoc* machinery, on the more urgent tasks of European security and co-operation as agreed upon at the first Conference, even though they may continue to hold differing views on the elements that should ultimately constitute the system, as well as on its more definitive institutional shape. It is however postulated that to the extent that the first Conference gives political impetus to new efforts to strengthen security and co-operation in the region, agreement on more permanent and continuing institutional arrangements, anchored in varying types of intergovernmental accords, might gradually emerge even in early stages, placing co-operation in Europe on a firm and lasting basis.

II. Preparatory stage

4. Against this background, it seems that we are now witnessing a process of preliminary soundings and explorations tending towards more active, purposeful, and systematic preparation.

5. Thus, there appears to be general agreement on the need for such preparation in order to ensure a successful outcome of the first Conference. One way to achieve this objective would be to set up a *Preparatory Committee* at, say, the level of Ambassadors or Deputy Foreign Ministers of the States which are to be invited (i.e. the European countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany and the

security, . . . to ensure . . . that armed force shall not be used . . . and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.

In its Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter (adopted without a vote on the occasion of the twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations),¹ the General Assembly singled out a number of principles the effective application of which within the international community would promote the realization of the purposes of the United Nations, viz:

States shall refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State; they shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means; they have the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, and to co-operate with one another, in accordance with the Charter. They have a duty to respect the principles of equal rights and self-determination and peoples and of the sovereign equality of States, and to fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter.

13. It would be the goal and purpose of the new system of security and co-operation in the European region to apply, through a series of interconnected measures in the political, economic, and related fields, the solemn resolve of the supreme world body embodied in the Charter as well as the set of principles enumerated above, adjusted to the particular needs of Europe. A strengthening of security and co-operation in one of the World's key areas, so long overshadowed by cold war and East-West confrontation, would be a signal contribution to the strengthening of world peace and progress, and thereby also of the United Nations.

14. Just as the United Nations Charter implies that international peace and co-operation are indivisible, it is postulated that a viable security system in the European region must be linked with a system of co-operation among

participating Governments, irrespective of any differences in the economic and social systems of their countries, to ensure stable international relations based on trust and on a common purpose to ensure and strengthen the economic and social advancement and the well-being of the population.

15. Among the guidelines derived from the Charter principles and in part from the Franco-Soviet *Enoncé des principes de la coopération*² which could govern such relations, whether multilateral or bilateral, the following might be mentioned:

(1) Reciprocity of the advantages and commitments of participating countries;

(2) the need to ensure that co-operation is not directed against the interests of any people and in no way affects the commitments of participating countries with respect to third States;

(3) the permanence, continuity, stability, and comprehensiveness of co-operation in both the political and economic fields;

(4) the need to deploy efforts aiming at restoring peace in areas of possible conflict and at the peaceful settlement of disputes, by means of any appropriate forms of consultation and negotiation;

(5) inviolability of the present European borders; non-interference in the domestic affairs of States; equality, independence, and renunciation of the use of threat of force;

(6) need for a long-term policy aimed at abolishing the division of the European region into military-political blocs;

(7) harmonization and co-ordination of national policies to promote the above objectives.

IV. *General institutional principles*

16. It is, then, against the background of these goals and purposes that the general institutional principles underlying a possible future system for security and co-operation in Europe have to be conceived:

(1) The system would be open to *all* States, including the German Democratic Republic

ral be appointed to the Conference, to be resident where the temporary staff concerned with the results of the first session of the Conference will be located. This arrangement would ensure continuing participation of, and liaison with, the UN Secretariat.

18. Furthermore, special arrangements could be made with such bodies as ECE, as well as UNESCO, and with other UN Specialized Agencies, to provide for their continuing participation, both at an inter-agency and an inter-secretariat level, in the activities developing within the framework of the new system. Indeed, a large part of the specialized work in the areas covered by UN bodies of a regional nature such as ECE, would continue to be performed by them, under appropriate co-operative arrangements with the new system. These arrangements should be flexible enough to secure the necessary autonomy of the bodies concerned; but at the same time they should be aimed at transmitting the positive political impulse that might be generated by the new organization with a view to stimulating and widening all-European co-operation in specific sectors.

19. Such an approach should go hand in hand with the political 'overview' and policy-making functions of the new system with respect to *all* pertinent aspects of security and co-operation in Europe (see, e.g., paras. 28 and 42 below) and the possibility of orienting the activities of existing bodies along new directions.

VI. *Interim stage: The first Conference and after*

20. A new and more satisfactory system of European security and co-operation, responding to the needs of the present situation, cannot be built on the basis of a single international act or a single conference. As argued above, it will have to emerge from a gradual process of evolution.

21. In this process the first Conference should serve three paramount purposes: to symbolize the end of the World War II period in Europe; to lessen the mistrust ('confidence

gap') which still prevails in Europe; and to outline a common action program for security and co-operation in Europe. The latter must include first steps toward establishing an organizational structure for the further elaboration of such a program, and its gradual implementation.

22. In order to promote these purposes, the first Conference might agree on

(1) *a basic document* (or series of documents) of a *general* character on security and co-operation in Europe;

(2) *recommendations addressed to existing bodies* of an all-European character – such as, more particularly, the ECE.

(3) *a decision to establish a new body* (or bodies) to deal with all-European security and co-operation. Such a decision may be of an interim character, designed to ensure that the necessary follow-up work is carried out.

23. *The basic document*, which might be referred to as a Protocol, Pact, Declaration or even a Charter (for instance modelled on the Atlantic Charter of 1942 – i.e. a general declaration of principles) on Security and Co-operation in Europe, could include the following elements:

(1) confirmation of the principles of renunciation of the use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in internal affairs, inviolability of frontiers, and, as necessary, other principles of friendly relations or peaceful coexistence. (See paras. 12-14 above.) Thus the basic document would not simply endorse principles acknowledged in the UN Charter, in declarations of the UN General Assembly, and in certain bilateral agreements between European States, but should also elaborate and enlarge upon them. Such a document would be signed by European States, the United States, and Canada and would create a first step towards the necessary all-European political ties which are now lacking. This basic document could also be expected to contribute to the further gradual removal of the still-lingering doubts and distrust of the intentions of each side.

concrete proposals, if so decided by the Conference, or (more probable) some kind of SALT-model approach. In the latter case, the first stage of negotiations is likely to be of a more general and exploratory character with the aim of defining the area in which agreement is possible, and then, at the second stage, negotiations on concrete problems connected with disarmament and arms control in Europe.

27. General discussion of security in Europe as well as a discussion of disarmament and arms control measures relating to the whole of Europe should proceed in an *ad hoc* body comprising all participating States, a kind of 'Committee of the Whole'. But for particular questions of a sub-regional character in the field of disarmament and arms control - relating, for instance, to Northern Europe, to questions concerning the two German States, to Central Europe, or to Southern Europe and the Mediterranean - smaller, *ad hoc* working groups with a limited membership of States particularly concerned might be visualized. The results of such consultations and negotiations, possibly in the form of draft agreements on arms control and disarmament, would be submitted to the Conference.

28. In the field of *all-European co-operation*; no full-fledged machinery might be needed, at any rate not at the beginning of this process. Yet there is a real need for an integrated approach to and an 'over-view' of the whole field of co-operation in Europe, and a need also to give political inspiration and impetus to the work of the existing organs of all-European co-operation. This may be done by periodic meetings, possibly at ministerial level within the framework of the system, to deal with broad areas of co-operation of key importance. This kind of arrangements would meet a real necessity for continuing and direct consultations and contact between policymakers in various fields. On the basis of such consultations the organizations mentioned in para. 7 above (see also para. 18), would be invited to speed up work on specified problems and/or to undertake new tasks in the field of co-

operation. The aim would be to create a more coherent and comprehensive system of all-European co-operation, e.g. by suggesting an expansion of the functions of ECE to fields hitherto not dealt with by this body, or by suggesting the establishment of new machinery if such is really needed (e.g. to deal with the bases of co-operation, or with the question of how sub-regional institutions in the same field could better coordinate their activities).

29. In this initial period one can expect that some form of a very small temporary secretariat or servicing task-force, perhaps based on the nucleus used in the preparatory stage, will be needed which could prepare for, and service, both the future Conferences and the negotiating bodies indicated above. It might function in say, Helsinki or in Vienna. Provision might be made for appropriate liaison with ECE in Geneva. The bulk of the staff required might initially be supplied by the host Governments. Thus, the administrative and institutional arrangements which the first Conference might make with respect to continued consultations and negotiations would be relatively simple and economical.

VII. *Interim stage: an alternative image*

30. In the preceding section, one image of the possible outcome of a first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has been presented. In the present section, a second image will be given which differs from the first in going somewhat further in discussing the possible components of a post-Conference institutional system. This can be seen either as a possible continuation of the initial stage envisaged in Section VI, or as elements that could be assimilated onto and combined with the foregoing presentation.

31. It is again assumed that one of the outcomes of the first Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will be a general will to continue the effort, and more particularly a will to negotiate in concrete terms on problems of security and co-operation. In order to en-

(2) *the Committee of Resident Representatives*, which would act as a continuing body (of the Whole) at the ambassadorial level, fully empowered to negotiate.

(3) *the Secretariat*, to be kept very small and mainly as a technical team, based partly on secondment, especially of officials of the host country, and partly on direct recruitment, with the task of servicing the Conference and the Committee. It may also be desirable to make arrangements for the secondment of officials from the UN system.

36. Existing organizations for all-European co-operation, particularly the ECE, and the main sub-regional organizations concerned with security and co-operation, such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, OECD and CMEA, and the European Communities would participate in a consultative capacity.

37. Sessions of the Conference should also be used systematically for high-level bilateral contacts between the participants. In this way, bilateral relations and multilateral diplomacy would be correlated and would supplement each other in a beneficial and rational manner.

VIII. *Contact with non-governmental organizations*

38. To ensure appropriate liaison between efforts to evolve a new system of security and co-operation in Europe proceeding at inter-governmental level on the one hand and parliamentary and public opinion on the other, it is suggested that at this stage a Committee or Meeting of Parliamentarians be set up, composed of the parliamentarians of participating States, and members of the IPU.³ This Committee might meet before or after the periodic sessions of the Conference to enable parliamentarians to express their views on major problems of security and co-operation facing the region and to urge appropriate legislative action at the national level. This Committee or Meeting might also take measures to keep the public informed and to ascertain the public's

response to actions taken by the Governments. In this way, it may be hoped that a greater awareness of problems of security and co-operation in Europe by the legislators and the public would be generated.

39. The Conference may also wish to consider setting up, at some stage, a NGO Committee open to all international Non-Governmental Organizations operating in the European region in fields within the scope of the Conference, especially to those which already have an all-European membership, and to those which wish to explore possibilities of transforming themselves into all-European NGO's. This category would include professional organizations, trade unions, peace organizations, youth organizations, women's organizations, and others. Annual assemblies of such NGO's might be organized. Their effectiveness would depend on their ability to reflect changes in European societies and their problems and difficulties which may have international repercussions, as well as upon their ability to suggest new courses of action for the future. Since their task would be to ventilate problems before the Conference, not to confirm or reject its decisions, they should not be constrained by strict rules of representation.

IX. *Second stage*

40. The second stage would represent a further consolidation and expansion of the interim stage, with due regard to the general institutional principles outlined above, and working towards further strengthening and widening of East-West co-operation. (For specific examples of such co-operation, see Appendix I.) Needless to say, this stage could materialize only if sufficient political momentum had been built up on the strength of the experience and the results accumulated during the first stage.

41. There are three features envisaged in this stage that are distinct from what has already been developed during the initial stages: the development of the system into a Treaty Organization, a Security Commission for Europe, and a Secretary-General for the Organization.

utive head of the secretariat will be needed, having certain defined functions in alerting governments to crisis situations and in providing his good offices for mediation when required. The secretary-General would be elected for a period of five years, with possible re-election for not more than one term.

48. Apart from the Secretariat and the Committee of Resident Representatives which might be described as internal features of the Organization, the only new elements from the point of view of the international system would be the *periodic* (institutionalized) *Conference* and the *Security Commission for Europe*. To tie these elements effectively to what already exists, some formula should be found whereby the Conference could be related to the General Assembly, the Security Commission to the Security Council (as provided for by Articles 52-54 to the UN Charter), and the Organization as a whole to the United Nations (using perhaps as a model the formulas found for the Organization of African Unity).

X. Conclusion

49. In presenting the above suggestions, of a largely institutional character, for a new system of security and co-operation in Europe, the authors of the present report are fully aware that even the most inventive institutional formulas and schemes are of no avail, if there is no political will to break with the past, and to turn the page of history. At the same time, the political will must ultimately be embodied in arrangements for working together on a continuing basis. Sound and carefully conceived institutional practices and modalities are therefore a not unimportant condition for a satisfactory functioning of the system.

50. While this report is mainly destined for the consideration of the policy-makers, its authors are anxious that it also reaches a wider public, for there can be no political will strong enough and sustained enough to build a viable scheme for the maintenance of peace and security through all-European co-operation unless

it is constantly nourished and renewed by a solemn resolve that all European nations work together in a spirit of genuine concord. It is therefore essential that despite the need for caution, flexibility and gradualism (of which the authors have been mindful throughout), the peoples of Europe should feel that their governments are intent on making a truly fresh start so that they may perceive a vision of safe, rewarding lives for themselves and their children in a diverse but unsevered, all-embracing Europe. The ultimate test of the system therefore is that it evokes a response in the hearts and in the minds of ordinary men and women in all parts of the region.

APPENDIX I

Examples of items concerning all-European security and co-operation

The following list of items, mainly taken from current documents on all-European co-operation, is by no means complete. Its purpose is to illustrate the variety of tasks that all-European negotiating bodies might be able to put on their agenda, provided that the political will is present.

(1) *In the general field of security and political consultation:*

- discussion of strategic doctrines and their implications
- discussion of diplomatic 'warning lights' in times of crisis
- discussion of doctrines of origins of crisis and machineries for crisis management

(2) *In the general field of disarmament/arms control:*

- exchange of advance warning of manoeuvres and troop movements
- exchange of observers at manoeuvres
- freezing of national defense budgets
- negotiations on mutual force reduction

(3) *In the general field of co-operation:*

(a). *Economic, trade and financial questions.*

- removal of obstacles (economic, administrative, and trade policy) impeding the normalization of intra-European trade

- still simpler visa regulations, easier border passage and a system of tourist voucher to overcome currency difficulties

e. *Development*

- stimulation of more triangular East-West-South trade
- triangular development projects, East-West-South
- joint East-West expert technical assistance teams, in a multilateral (UN) setting
- experiments with joint East-West junior expert teams, in a multilateral (UN) setting (UN international corps of volunteers for development)
- a joint European disaster relief corps

APPENDIX II

Some further notes on a Security Commission for Europe

1. The *Security Commission for Europe* would have as members all the States that are signatories to the Treaty (on Security and Co-operation in Europe). The major intergovernmental treaty organizations in the field of security, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, would be invited to be represented in a consultative capacity with the right to speak, but the delegates of States would continue to be the spokesmen of the States.

2. Since there are no intergovernmental organizations dealing with all-European security, one would have to proceed with extreme care and very pragmatically. Broadly speaking, the following three interconnected functions may be defined for this Commission:

(a) *Security and political consultations (Crisis management)*. This is partly a question of foreseeing open crises, partly of having a permanent negotiation machinery ready for handling them, and partly a question of supervising the arrangements reached.

(b) *Disarmament and arms control*. This can be defined as all measures undertaken to avoid open conflict by human or technical error or by escalation, and all measures aimed at the freezing, thinning out, or emptying of any or

all kinds of military arms and forces in any part of Europe. Included here would also be parts of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and the plans for mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR). Measures for the control, adjudication, and sanctions in connection with arms control and disarmament would also belong here.

(c) *Co-operation*. This can be defined as surveying and stimulating co-operation measures so as to lessen the probability of an open conflict between European States. The execution would be by such organizations as the Economic Commission for Europe.

3. If it is found appropriate, three sub-commissions may be built around these three functions, with all States as members of all three.

4. The Security Commission would receive its instructions from the Conference, and would, as a part of the Organization, be brought into relationship with the United Nations, and, more particularly, the Security Council, under Articles 52-54 of the Charter. However, since the Security Council of the UN and the Security Commission suggested here are in permanent session a more direct link between them might also be desirable. More particularly, the Security Commission could in some fields be related to the UN Security Council in the same way as the Economic Commission for Europe is related to the ECOSOC. Thus, there would be a duty to report to the Security Council and the Security Council could refer intra-European matters to the Security Commission. There might also be a right of appeal that could be useful under the appropriate political conditions: if an issue becomes deadlocked in the SCE it may be referred to the UN Security Council. The same would obviously apply if the issue can be shown to involve other than Member States.

5. The legal instruments for a Security Commission should be prepared in such a way that other regions in the world might in due course also establish security commissions with which the SCE might co-operate, in a general spirit of decentralisation. However this may be,

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AUF DEM WEGE ZU EINEM DAUERHAFTEN FRIEDEN IN EUROPA

(Auszug)

J. Rachmaninow

In Europa ist eine Atmosphäre des Vertrauens und Verständens im Entstehen, eine Zusammenarbeit zwischen allen Staaten des Kontinents, die an der Erhaltung des Friedens interessiert sind, kommt allmählich im Gang. Dank der Existenz des sozialistischen Teiles Europas entsteht hier zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte ein Übergewicht der Friedenskräfte gegenüber den Kräften des Krieges und der Aggression. Dies schafft eine wichtige objektive Voraussetzung zur Gründung eines verlässlichen Systems der europäischen Sicherheit, innerhalb dessen die kollektiven Anstrengungen aller Beteiligten Frieden und Sicherheit jedes Einzelnen gewährleisten können.

Die Friedenspolitik der sozialistischen Länder strebt stets danach, die Beziehungen zwischen den Staaten, ungeachtet ihrer sozialen Systeme, entsprechend den Prinzipien der friedlichen Koexistenz zu regeln. Die Anerkennung dieser Prinzipien bedeutet in der Praxis der internationalen Beziehungen den Ersatz eines Systems des "Kräfte-Gleichgewichts", das auf Gewaltanwendung oder Gewaltandrohung beruht, durch ein System, welches von der Unantastbarkeit der bestehenden Grenzen, der Gleichberechtigung, der Unabhängigkeit, der Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten und vom Verzicht der Anwendung oder Androhung von Gewalt ausgeht.

Unter der Berücksichtigung der gegenwärtig vorhandenen Fortschritte in der Frage der Festigung der europäischen und internationalen Sicherheit, ergibt sich die Möglichkeit für eine vielseitige Zusammenarbeit auf dem europäischen Kontinent. Dies erlaubt den europäischen Ländern die Lösung einer Reihe wichtiger ökonomischer Probleme, eine Erhöhung ihres industriellen Potentials, eine Steigerung des Tempos der wissenschaftlich-technischen Entwicklung und die Beschäftigung mit den Problemen des Umweltschutzes.

Eine allmähliche Ausweitung des Kreises der gemeinsamen Interessen der Länder Europas, würde andererseits, wie die ausenpolitische französische Zeitschrift "Politique étrangère" betonte, "die Schaffung eines Klimas des Vertrauens zwischen den Partnern und Bedingungen zur Sicherheit in der Zukunft ..." 1) günstig beeinflussen.

Die Entwicklung sachlicher Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Staaten des europäischen Kontinents fördert auch die Auswirkungen der modernen wissenschaftlich-technischen Revolution. Dazu kommt noch

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die in allen Ländern Europas stark ansteigende Tendenz zur Ausweitung der gegenseitigen Wirtschafts- und wissenschaftlich-technischen Beziehungen.

Man kann die spezifischen Interessen der westeuropäischen Staaten, die sie veranlassen eine engere Zusammenarbeit mit den sozialistischen Ländern zu suchen, nicht aus dem Auge lassen. Es geht dabei um die Errichtung von Haupt-Zentren der Rivalität zwischen den USA, Westeuropa und Japan, zwischen welchen sich ein scharfer ökonomischer und politischer Konkurrenzkampf entfaltet.

Zahlreiche westliche Beobachter messen dem eine grosse Bedeutung bei. Nach Meinung des norwegischen Friedensforschers J. Galtung ermöglicht die "Entspannung und der stabile Charakter der Beziehungen zwischen West und Ost" es Westeuropa, die Aufmerksamkeit auf eine andere Front zu konzentrieren - auf den ökonomischen Konkurrenzkampf mit den USA." (2)

Eine neue geschichtliche Phase in Europa

Erstmalig in der Geschichte Europas erhält der Entspannungsprozess langfristigen Charakter mit einer Tendenz zur Weiterentwicklung und Vertiefung. Der Abschluss der Verträge UdSSR - BRD und VR Polen, das West-Berlin-Abkommen, die Vertiefung der Zusammenarbeit zwischen der UdSSR sowie anderer sozialistischer Staaten mit Frankreich, die Ausweitung bilateraler Kontakte zwischen sozialistischen und westeuropäischen Ländern, sind wichtige Marksteine auf diesem Wege. Eine weitere Gesundung der Situation in Europa kann durch die Ratifizierung der Verträge UdSSR - BRD und VR Polen, die Normalisierung der Beziehungen mit der DDR von Seiten jener Staaten, die noch keine diplomatische Beziehungen mit der DDR pflegen, erreicht werden, ebenso durch eine Bereinigung der Beziehungen zwischen der CSSR und der BRD, unter der Voraussetzung, dass die BRD das Münchner-Abkommen von Beginn an als ungültig erklärt.

Das System der europäischen Sicherheit

In diesem Jahr ist genügend deutlich die Einstellung der Mehrheit der Staaten zur Einberufung einer gesamteuropäischen Konferenz klar geworden. Bei Vorhandensein des prinzipiellen Einverständnisses in dieser Frage, rückt selbstverständlich die Frage der praktischen Vorbereitung in den Vordergrund, das Ermitteln gegenseitig akzeptierbarer Grundlagen sowohl was die Organisation der Beratungen, wie auch ihren Inhalt betrifft.

Allgemein wird anerkannt, dass den bilateralen Konsultationen der bevollmächtigten Vertreter der interessierten Staaten die Hauptrolle für die praktische Vorbereitung der Konferenz zukommt. Auf Vorschlag der finnischen Regierung soll diese Konferenz in Helsinki abgehalten werden.

Die Abhaltung solcher Konsultationen gewährleistet eine bessere Vorbereitung und damit auch einen Erfolg der gesamteuropäischen Beratungen. Davon ausgehend, haben die Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages auf ihrer Aussenministertagung vom 30. November - 4. Dezember 1971 beschlossen, ihre bevollmächtigten Vertreter, die gemeinsam mit den anderen Staaten an den bilateralen Konsultationen in Helsinki teilnehmen sollen, zu nominieren, um über die Tagesordnung der gesamteuropäischen Beratung, über die konkreten Termine und Einberufungsverfahren ins Reine zu kommen.

Entsprechend der Erklärungen der Vertreter zahlreicher europäischer Staaten, müsste bei den bilateralen Gesprächen in Helsinki die Tagesordnung ausgearbeitet werden, damit die Beratung mit der Arbeit beginnen kann ohne sich damit oder mit anderen technischen Fragen aufzuhalten. So ist zum Beispiel der englische Experte Palmer der Meinung, dass die Gepflogenheiten der Geschäftsordnung aus der Arbeitspraxis des Abrüstungs-Ausschusses übernommen werden könnten.

Hier muss die Verbindlichkeit des Erreichten nach dem Prinzip der Gleichberechtigung erfolgen und jederlei Möglichkeiten von Methoden des Aufzwingens sind auszuschliessen. 3)

Kürzlich wurde eine Reihe von Erwägungen und Vorschlägen in bezug auf die Tagesordnung, mögliche Abschlussdokumente und Beschlüsse der gesamteuropäischen Beratungen ausgesprochen. Die konkreten Vorschläge der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten zu diesen Problemen wurden nach der Prager Beratung der Aussenminister im Jahre 1969 und dem Memorandum von Budapest 1970 an die anderen interessierten Staaten weitergeleitet.

Auf Grund realistischer Überlegungen haben die sozialistischen Staaten vorgeschlagen, mit der Behandlung jener Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit zu beginnen, in denen bereits ein genügendes Mass an Einverständnis erreicht und somit auch Aussicht auf Einigung besteht. Gleichzeitig sind sie der Meinung, dass man sich auch so bedeutenden Fragen zuwenden sollte, deren Lösung ein Schritt vorwärts zur Schaffung eines gesamteuropäischen Sicherheitssystems wäre.

Bei der Festlegung der Tagesordnung sind die Folgen eines Krieges in Europa im Zeitalter der Raketen- und Atomtechnik ins Auge zu fassen. Die Anwendung von Massenvernichtungswaffen würde für den dichtbesiedelten Kontinent mit seinen grossen Industriezentren ungeheure Zerstörungen und Verluste an Menschenleben bedeuten. Daraus folgt, dass das Schwergewicht der Problemstellung für die europäische Sicherheit darauf gerichtet werden muss, jede beliebige Möglichkeit der Entstehung eines Krieges oder einer Aggression in Europa von vornherein zu verhindern. Deshalb müssten die Bestrebungen bei der Schaffung eines Systems der europäischen Sicherheit vor allem darauf abzielen, Massnahmen und Verpflichtungen zu setzen, welche jede Androhung oder Anwendung von Gewalt in den zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen Europas ausschliessen.

Ausgehend von den Überlegungen und unter Berücksichtigung der Ansichten anderer Länder, haben die Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages ihre Formulierung für den ersten Punkt der Tagesordnung der Konferenz vorgeschlagen. Dabei wurden Erfahrungen aus der Geschichte der verschiedenen Systeme der kollektiven Sicherheit berücksichtigt. Alle bekannten Völkerrechtler wie zum Beispiel H. Kelsen, Ch. Rousseau und andere, sind der Meinung, dass die Hauptbedingung jedes Systems der kollektiven Sicherheit die Verankerung des Prinzips der Achtung jeglicher Anwendung oder Androhung von Gewalt ist. 4)

Im Verlaufe der Kontaktaufnahme zwischen den sozialistischen und anderen interessierten Ländern gelang auch in dieser Frage eine Annäherung der Standpunkte. Man vereinbarte, auf der Konferenz eine Reihe von Grundprinzipien der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen zu empfehlen, deren strikte Einhaltung die Gewaltanwendung sowie das Entstehen von Kriegen auf diesem Kontinent ausschliessen würde, wobei das Dokument über die Prinzipien der Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Sowjetunion und Frankreich als Vorbild diente.

Eine von den Beratungsteilnehmern akzeptierte Verpflichtung der Einhaltung der Prinzipien der friedlichen Koexistenz in den zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen, unabhängig vom gesellschaftlichen System, wäre eine feste völkerrechtliche Grundlage für das gesamteuropäische Sicherheitssystem, in erster Linie auch bei der Schaffung regionaler Organisationen zu Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit.

Im Kommuniqué der Warschauer Tagung der Aussenminister der sozialistischen Länder, ist auch von der Annäherung der Ansichten der europäischen Länder in der Frage der Ausweitung der ökonomischen, wissenschaftlich-technischen und kulturellen Zusammenarbeit die Rede. In unseren Tagen geht die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen den europäischen Staaten immer mehr über den traditionellen Rahmen der Handelsbeziehungen hinaus, auch Gebiete der technisch-wissenschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit, der industriellen Kooperation, Fragen des energetischen Gleichgewichts, des Gesundheitswesens und andere werden davon erfasst. Neue Perspektiven der Zusammenarbeit eröffnen sich mit dem Aufbau einer gesamteuropäischen Infrastruktur und Massnahmen für den Umweltschutz.

Die Ausweitung der Zusammenarbeit auf immer neue Gebiete verlangt die Festlegung der Zielsetzungen und Prinzipien der Weiterentwicklung sowohl auf bilateralem als auch im gesamteuropäischen Masstab. Das setzt die Notwendigkeit voraus, ein Abkommen und eine Konvention auszuarbeiten, die die künftige Entwicklung der wirtschaftlichen, wissenschaftlich-technischen und kulturellen Beziehungen zwischen den Staaten Europas auf der Grundlage des gegenseitigen Vorteils, der Achtung ihrer Souveränität und die Nicht-einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten regelt.

Gegenstand sachlicher Beratungen in zahlreichen europäischen Ländern war auch der Vorschlag der Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages, auf der gesamteuropäischen Konferenz ein Organ für Probleme der Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa zu schaffen.

Zur gleichen Zeit, als man auf der Suche nach gegenseitig annehmbarer Lösung ist, sprechen auch einige Leute im Westen, vor allem die Anhänger der Politik "der Position der Stärke", sich auch für andere Standpunkte aus. Kurz gesagt ist ihre Meinung die, dass die NATO ohnedies die "Sicherheit" ihrer Mitglieder gewährleistet und deshalb angeblich auch keine Notwendigkeit bestünde, eine andere Organisation der europäischen Sicherheit zu schaffen.

Es ist absolut klar, dass ein derartiger Vorschlag von der wirklichen Sorge um die europäische Sicherheit und die Zusammenarbeit sehr weit entfernt ist.

Bekanntlich haben die Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages mehrmals ihre Bereitschaft gezeigt, diesen Vertrag gleichzeitig mit dem NATO-Pakt zu annullieren - als ersten Schritt zur Liquidierung beider militärischer Organisationen.

Abschliessend kann man feststellen, dass in letzter Zeit eine gewisse Übereinstimmung der Standpunkte der Länder des Westens und des Ostens in zahlreichen Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit bemerkbar ist. Das bezieht sich auf die Konzeption der europäischen Sicherheit selbst, die nach allgemeiner Meinung folgenden Forderungen entsprechen muss:

Schaffung eines Systems von Verpflichtungen, das die Sicherheit aller europäischer Staaten garantiert und die friedliche Koexistenz, gegenseitiges Verständnis und Zusammenarbeit fördert. Die Konferenz ist ferner dazu berufen, ein Organ zu schaffen, das für alle Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit zuständig ist und Massnahmen mit dem Ziel einer Neugestaltung der Beziehungen zwischen den Staaten Europas und die Teilung des Kontinents in zwei militär-politische Blöcke zu überwinden, die Grundlagen für eine Ausweitung der Handels- und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, der wissenschaftlich-technischen Zusammenarbeit und des Kulturaustausches zu schaffen. All dies würde auch ein besseres Klima für die politische Zusammenarbeit der europäischen Staaten zur Folge haben.

Aus "Meschdunarodnaja Shisn" Nr. 2/72, S 3

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Anmerkungen:

- 1) "Politique étrangère" 1967, Nr. 5-6, p. 490.
- 2) Adelphi Papers, November 1970, Nr. 71, p.16.
- 3) M. Palmer, The prospects for european security Conference, London 1971.
- 4) H. Kelsen, Collective Security under International Law, Washington, 1957.

ON PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS OF THE STRUGGLE
FOR DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

Dr. Václav REGNER, CSSR

Disarmament has become the most crucial and most difficult problem of our times. Annual world expenditure for military purposes is estimated at 200 billion dollars, that is more than the annual national income of all developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America put together. The armament race instigated by the imperialists, with military expenditure absorbing about 7% of mankind's gross income, is constantly being escalated and this expenditure is doubled every 15 years. The work of thousands of highly qualified specialists is used against the interests of humanity - 25 million people serve in armies, 50 million people work directly or indirectly for the military. And this in a situation where 500 million people in the world go hungry, where over 1 billion are undernourished, and 800 million are illiterate.

Armament and the accumulation of all types of weapons still constitutes a permanent threat of war. The relaxation of tension and lesser risks of conflicts in Europe are hardly compatible with the presence of high concentrations of armed forces and armaments on the borderline of the two military blocs. In addition, the armament race increasingly hinders the solution of urgent questions facing humanity in the context of the scientific and technological revolution in economically advanced countries, and in the developing countries where over 25 million dollars are spent each year on armament. In the case of the socialist countries the military expenditure for the defence of socialist achievements also represents a heavy burden imposed upon them against their will.

The socialist countries are convinced that the problem of disarmament is one that can be solved, the only question being whether goodwill to do so exists everywhere. Our final aim is total and general disarmament which is, of course, a highly complex phenomenon to be achieved through the patient efforts of peace-loving forces in many partial negotiations and agreements in the sphere of disarmament.

Conditions for Disarmament in Europe

The basic question for the reduction of armament and armed forces is whether there exists a possibility to make Europe a continent free of armed conflicts and military groups, whether there

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are realistic prospects of establishing a system of European security in which states with different social systems would have a chance to achieve permanent peaceful cooperation in politics, economy and culture.

At the present moment Europe is standing at an important historical crossroad of its development, where it has to choose between either taking serious action or becoming the instrument of its own destruction.

Thanks to the efforts of the socialist countries and all peace-loving forces, a climate of détente and increasing co-operation in the political and economic sphere has been created on our continent. Problems that had long poisoned European relations have been and are being solved. In this situation it was possible to achieve some progress in the sphere of agreements on some concrete measures leading to disarmament. These are the agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing, the agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the agreement on the prohibition of deployment of weapons of mass annihilation in outer space, on other celestial bodies and on the ocean floor. An agreement was reached between the USSR and the USA on the prevention of the incidental outbreak or unintentional provocation of incidents with the use of nuclear weapons and an agreement on the improvement of the "hot line" between the two countries created in 1963. Negotiations are going on between the USSR and the USA on the prevention of incidents between ships, planes and helicopters of both parties at sea and in outer space. Apart from the successful negotiations carried out between the USSR and the USA on strategic arms limitation (SALT), the Soviet Union proposed a conference of the 5 nuclear powers. The world conference on disarmament proposed by the USSR as one of the items of this year's 26th UNO General Assembly programme should unite the efforts of all states on this vitally important problem. The General Assembly should appeal to all states to agree by 1972 on the date of a world conference on disarmament and on its agenda. On the basis of such an agreement it would be possible to proceed further, namely:

1. To the rapid and complete application, as well as the improvement, of already existing agreements (for example, the signing and ratification of the agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; the extension of the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty to the last remaining testing area, that is underground; the extension of the pending prohibition of bacteriological weapons to chemical weapons, etc.).
2. To further negotiations bearing on the very essence of disarmament.

On the other hand, action is being taken and forces mobilised in the capitalist world to counteract the favourable trends of

development in Europe and prevent real disarmament. Under the slogan of maintaining the balance of power in Europe these forces try to render permanent the system of blocs in Europe. Socialist states never considered the existing military blocs in Europe as indispensable, but rather as an obstacle between states. It is well-known that the Warsaw Pact as a defence community of socialist states originated after the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO. The idea of a Europe without military blocs was emphasized once again at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as an essential step towards relaxation of tension in Europe. It would of course mean financial loss to the military-industry complex, particularly in the USA, but greater independence for West European countries without threat to their security. Anti-peace forces use demagogic arguments about the so-called security of capitalist countries to support the preservation of a nuclear and conventional deterrent. They realise that in order to impose an armament policy they must have some ideological support or the passive agreement of the masses. That is why the struggle for disarmament is at the same time a struggle for the understanding of the wide popular masses, a struggle for the elimination of their artificially created prejudice. According to these forces, the so-called deterrent must be achieved by increased armament in capitalist countries. For the last two years we have witnessed a dangerous trend. The USA have started to develop new armament systems for the 'eighties. In December 1970, at the NATO Council meeting in Brussels for the adoption of Plan AD-70, European NATO member countries increased their military contribution by 920 million dollars in the course of 5 years. In the FRG draft budget for this year it is proposed to increase the Defence Ministry budget by 3 billion marks to 26 billion marks. At the Conservative Party Congress of Great Britain in Brighton last October, the Minister of Defence Carrington, when speaking of the necessity of creating a "deterrent force" as a condition for the relaxation of international tension, announced the project of extending the production of warships by 2 destroyers, 4 frigates and a larger number of support vessels, and of increasing land forces by 4 battalions. For the financial year 1971/1972, the USA Senate and Parliament approved 213 billion dollars for armament purchases. According to American estimates, the present Pentagon budget of about 80 billion dollars should increase to 84 billions by 1984. Post-war military expenditure in the USA had already reached the fantastic sum of 1216.3 billion dollars in 1970. NATO military expenditure for the same period is estimated to be about 1500 billion dollars with an ever-increasing trend - 18.7 billion dollars in 1949 and 102.8 billion in 1970. At the last meeting of the NATO Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Brussels, the American delegate, J. Irwin, expressed the hope that the savings achieved by an eventual reduction of armed forces and armament in Europe would be used by member-states for a qualitative improvement of their existing forces and equipment.

The Opening of Talks on the Reduction of Armed Forces
and Armament in Europe.

Proposals for negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and the creation of a zone of limited armament in Europe, put forward by the socialist states, go back to the 'fifties and appear again in the documents of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact (Bucharest 1966, Budapest 1969, 1970). A more concrete reaction of NATO to these documents emerged in 1968, when at the NATO Council meeting in Reykjavik, in June, a document was adopted under the title "Declaration on Mutual Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces". NATO, however, never explained exactly how it envisaged the whole matter and only attempted to gain unilateral advantages.

A more concrete impetus was provided by the Soviet appeal contained in the speech made by L.I. Brezhnev on 14 May, 1971, on the Soviet Union's readiness to open talks on the reduction of armed forces and armament. Since then several months have elapsed and the western states are still avoiding serious negotiations. NATO states, it is true, essentially accepted the Soviet proposal at the NATO Council meeting in Lisbon in June, because they could not take the risk of an eventual negative attitude in the political sphere. But they use obvious tactics. NATO wants to "clarify" with the socialist countries whether conditions for such talks exist. This, then, implies tactics, the setting of conditions and questions and essentially mistrust towards socialist countries. It is, from their part, a "new" type of diplomacy, where they ask socialist countries to "put their cards on the table" first, that is, to provide concrete answers to questions raised by NATO states, leaving it to them afterwards to decide whether or not they are willing to play the game with us in such an important question as disarmament in Europe. Such diplomacy is irrelevant because the standpoint of individual countries can only emerge in the course of negotiations. From this point of view this attitude is intentional propaganda, as reproduced in the western press, that the socialist states refuse to reply to NATO requests for information on the reduction of armed forces and armament - propaganda aimed at covering up the fact that NATO states have not yet clarified the question between themselves.

The proposals of the socialist countries for the initiation of talks on the reduction of armed forces and armament in Europe are based on the following principles:

- 1) Talks will be held on a "non-bloc" basis, both in essence and in form, thus complying with the wishes of all interested countries in Europe, of the USA and Canada.
- 2) The talks can be held separately from the Conference on European security, but in the case that this Conference be/..

convened before the opening of the talks on the reduction of armed forces and armament, socialist states have no objection to these questions being discussed in the permanent body for questions of security and cooperation in Europe to be set up as a final result of the conference. It would not be correct for such a complicated item as the talks on the reduction of armed forces and armament to be the first point on the agenda at the security conference.

- 3) The socialist states have submitted a choice of themes for negotiation, namely talks on the reduction of located and national armed forces and their equipment on European territory.
- 4) It is necessary to deal with the question of reduction of armed forces and armament in Europe as a geographical whole, because this represents a unit from which it is difficult to separate the area of Central Europe, for instance, though this may be the zone of highest concentration of armed forces and armament.
- 5) It is advisable to give full support to the formulation contained in the communiqué of the talks between L.I. Breshnev and W. Brandt in the Crimea in September 1971, namely that the talks must be held "without prejudice to the participants", that is, the principle of equal security for all countries must be strictly respected, from this point of view the projects of "mutual and balanced reduction of armed forces" of capitalist countries are highly unrealistic. These plans are based on the asymmetric reduction of armed forces and armament to the detriment of socialist countries.
- 6) Talks may include the reduction of nuclear weapons and conventional weapons; in view of the fact that the sphere of strategic weapons is being dealt with by SALT, it remains to discuss the operational and tactical part for nuclear weapons; on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany there are about 7,200 warheads of various kilotonnage (rocket nuclear warheads), atom bombs, nuclear tactical weapons, nuclear mines. Talks on these weapons are of considerable importance in view of the fact that individual NATO bodies in the period 1969 to 1971 had worked out concrete plans for a nuclear conflict in Europe. For instance, at the December meeting of the NATO Council in 1969 directives were adopted for the initial use of nuclear tactical weapons. In October 1970, the NATO Group for Nuclear Planning in Ottawa stipulated the conditions under which NATO armed forces would make use of nuclear weapons in Europe and discussed plans for the location of nuclear mines in potential crisis areas. At the same time a detailed "scenario" of limited nuclear war on the European continent was worked out. In the same way, at its May meeting in Mittenwald and at its October meeting in Brussels, this Group of Nuclear Planning discussed the basic rules for the hypothetical use of tactical nuclear

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weapons against socialist countries; this group of weapons today represents the most dangerous systems of weapons in Europe. Apart from this, it is necessary to deal with other types of conventional weapons to be included in the reduction.

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It would be futile to nurse the illusion that talks on the reduction of armed forces and armament in Europe will be a simple and short-term matter. But the very fact of the initiation of the talks would have the same importance as the opening of the talks on strategic arms limitation which have become a decisive turning point in negotiations on disarmament. The beginning of the talks is naturally not a guarantee of their success, but it is at least one of the conditions for the achievement of successful results in the sensitive and delicate sphere of disarmament. The talks could last a fairly long time, if we take account of the experience of the talks on the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing (five years) or on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (six years). Peace-loving forces would surely succeed in bringing the talks, once started, to their rightful conclusion.

The reduction of armed forces and armament in Europe, a continent in which two world wars started, would not only be in the interest of our continent but in the interest of world peace.

We have said that Europe is now standing on a historic crossroad. It is in the interest of all peace-loving people to increase activities for peace and disarmament so that the year 1972 may go down in history as a year of fundamental success in that sphere, that 1973 may be the year of the convening of the World Conference on Disarmament, and this decade may be the decade of total and general disarmament. Such aims are worthwhile fighting for.

4

Disarmament Problems in Europe

Andrzej Skowronski, Warsaw

I

The problematic of European disarmament became a subject for international negotiations in the second half of the 'fifties. This can be noted in connection with three political manifestations:

- 1) As a solution of all the questions was not possible, various countries attempted to put into effect partial regional disarmament proposals. In this respect, European disarmament was to take on, apart from its immediate advantage for Europe, the function of an experiment enabling experience to be gathered which would make a more overall solution possible and create a favourable climate for it.
- 2) Initiatives were taken for the limitation of military confrontation on German territory, the most dangerous post-war area of confrontation between the two political groupings. This problem became most urgent when the Federal Republic of Germany was integrated into the North Atlantic Treaty on 5 May, 1955, and the West European Union, which meant a development in its military potential. The first disengagement concepts for Central Europe arose in this period, and all were concerned at least with the two German states. The implementation of such steps was meant to facilitate a solution of the so-called German question or, at a later date, improve relations between the two German states.
- 3) Alongside détente between east and west, the interests of the states grew to implement steps towards disarmament in Europe as one of the most important preconditions for collective security in this region. Diminishing military confrontation along the line of contact between both political military groupings and the creation of conditions which would not permit an intensification of confrontation again would lead to the improvement of mutual security in the relations between east and west, as well as lessen the dangers of military-political events.

II

In the course of the discussion on disarmament in Europe so far we can differentiate the following basic phases:

In the years 1955 to 1958, discussion was based above all on various unofficial (Gaitskell Plan, Kennen Plan, Ollenhauer Plan) or official (Eden Plan) disarmament proposals. They combined the disarmament problematic with elements of a settlement of the "German question". In this phase, the initiatives of the USSR

represented a second category of proposals aiming at implementing concrete steps towards disarmament in Europe within wider conceptions of disarmament and affecting the four big powers (the proposals of 10 November, 1955, 26 April, 1956 and 18 March, 1957).

In the years 1958 to 1965, the Polish proposals of 14 February, 1958, for the creation of an atom-free zone in Central Europe, and of 29 March, 1964, for the freezing of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons were the main items of discussion. The basic aim of these proposals was to create preconditions for security in this region neuralgic for world peace by implementing steps to diminish military tension in Europe.

The discussion of these plans led to a number of results, although they were not implemented on account of the point of view of the western powers:

- 1) It led to the popularisation of the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on a regional level.
- 2) It helped to define the conception of certain steps towards nuclear disarmament, especially such elements as the conception of atom-free zones, the model of the states' responsibility, and the system of security methods, which comprised controls as well as guarantees.
- 3) They led to a wider discussion of themes to guarantee mutual security in relations between east and west in Europe.

In the years 1965 to 1968, the problematic of regional disarmament in Europe was linked to the broader theme of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Negotiations on such a treaty raised a number of questions directly connected with European disarmament: agreement on the non-proliferation formula which does not allow new nuclear structures along the lines of the previously discussed conception of NATO on multi-lateral and Atlantic nuclear power to be admitted; the establishment of a suitable control system for the non-production of nuclear weapons, as well as further disarmament steps, among them regional steps in Europe after the ratification of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This point of view found expression in the generally accepted view at that time that the treaty on non-proliferation would clear the way for further steps towards disarmament, on a regional level in Europe also.

The years 1968 to 1970 were characterised by attempts of the NATO countries to begin talks with the socialist countries on the question of the so-called balanced mutual reduction of armed forces in Europe. The political function of this concept was complicated. For some smaller western European countries it was motivated by the fear of the financial and political

consequences of a possible onesided reduction of American armed forces in Europe and linked with the endeavour to secure for themselves favourable conditions for diplomatic activity. According to the socialist states, however, the general motive was to create a balance of power more favourable for the west in the military- political field, as well as to achieve better conditions for a dialogue with the socialist countries which would push the problem of an all-European conference into the background. The discussion on mutual and balanced reduction of forces (MBFR) at that time had an almost exclusively bloc- internal character in the NATO and pointed to a number of antagonisms in interests and views of the individual western states which impeded, among other things, the elaboration of a model of disarmament in NATO which could have served as a basis for a dialogue with the socialist countries.

The present phase in disarmament policy began with the memorandum of the consultation of Foreign Ministers of the States of the Warsaw Treaty of 21-22 June, 1970. In this memorandum the socialist states expressed their willingness to start talks at the European conference, or at any other specially created forum, on the reduction of foreign troops on the territory of the European countries.

NATO did not answer this proposal directly but underlined in the communiqué of the Council of Ministers of 4 December, 1970, its endeavour to reach a mutually balanced reduction of armed forces and referred in this connection to the declaration of Reykjavik (1968) and Rome (1970).

Later on the socialist states further developed their point of view on the peace programme, which was formulated in the report given by the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, at the 24th Party Congress on 30 March, 1971, and elaborated in his speeches on 14 May and 11 June, 1971. The readiness of the Soviet Union also to start talks on steps for partial disarmament in Central Europe was expressed in these speeches. In the communiqué of the meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers in Lisbon on 3 and 4 June, 1971, the NATO states greeted this declaration of the Soviet Union "with satisfaction". They omitted, however, to officially declare their readiness to start concrete negotiations immediately; instead they stressed their wish to receive additional explanations clarifying the point of view of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on this question.

III

Present European reality holds a number of factors favouring a dialogue on the question of steps towards partial disarmament in Central Europe. In the political sphere these are, above all:

the conclusion of treaties between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany and between the People's Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1970, the 4 - power agreement on West Berlin on 3 September, 1971, the agreement between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany and between the German Democratic Republic and the Senate of West Berlin which were initialled on 12 December, 1971, as well as the move towards détente resulting from the dialogue on the conference on European security and cooperation. In the field of disarmament, we can note among these factors the SALT meetings between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and the ratification of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The importance of SALT for disarmament in Europe must be dealt with from various aspects. The political weight of these talks rests mainly on the fact that they are based on the principle of equality and reciprocity of the security of both sides. One of the results of these talks were the agreements signed on 30 September, 1971, between the Soviet Union and the USA on diminishing the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war and improving the direct communication line. The results and experience gathered during the SALT negotiations may create new models for talks on steps towards partial disarmament in Europe and provide a basis for eventual treaties in this field. It can be assumed that in the present military-political situation, the treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and the USA will also have positive consequences on reducing military confrontation in Central Europe. This can also be said of the treaty cited above which was concluded between the Soviet Union and the USA on 30 September, 1971. This treaty is applicable in particular to areas of direct confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries where nuclear weapons are being stored. The coming into effect of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on 5 March, 1970, has so far had only limited consequences for Europe as this treaty has not yet been ratified by the member-states of Euratom. When the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe comes into effect, it will have the following consequences:

- 1) The implementation of the partial freezing of nuclear and other weapons through the obligation of European nations to accept from anyone directly or indirectly nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive installations or to exert control over these weapons and such explosive installations; not to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive installations and not to obtain them or attempt to obtain them by any means and not to accept any help in the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive installations.

1) Compare "Blätter", No 11/1971.

- 2) In this connection, the creation of an appropriate system guaranteeing the non-production of nuclear weapons by the European non-nuclear signatories to the treaty.

The coming into effect of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the European area would thus fulfil a number of functions which are contained in previous plans, including Polish plans, on partial nuclear disarmament measures in Central Europe.

Guaranteeing the effectiveness of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe would complete the already standing obligation of states in connection with the non-production of nuclear weapons. This is important in connection with the obligations of the Federal Republic of Germany as contained in the Paris treaties of October 1954.

The ratification by the FRG of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would guarantee:

- 1) The extension of the addressees towards whom the FRG has obligations not to produce nuclear weapons - according to the principle of reciprocity - to all signatories of the treaty on the non-proliferation, among them the European socialist states.
- 2) The extension of the sphere of obligation for the FRG in respect to the non-buying and non-acceptance of nuclear weapons and in the field of the prohibition of production also in connection with the activity carried on by the FRG beyond its state frontiers.
- 3) Perfectioning the control system of the West European Union by securities of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

After agreement on the question of the mandate which Euratom reached for talks with the International Atomic Agency on 20 September, 1971, the European public expects, particularly in the countries which have signed and ratified this treaty, its ratification by the five western European countries in the near future. This would not only be an important contribution to the process of normalising the European situation in the field of the peaceful application of atomic energy, but would also be at the same time a test for the integrity of western European intentions regarding further steps towards disarmament in Europe.

Alongside these positive factors conducive to talks on the subject of reducing armed forces and armaments, there are also negative factors in the European situation. Here they are summarised in four points:

- 1) The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not as yet being implemented in the European area. This creates, among other things, a state of inequality in the mutual relations between the individual potential treaty partners, some of which will be burdened with obligations resulting from the treaty while others will not be tied to such obligations. This also creates a state of mistrust in the effectiveness of the treaties concluded regulating the separate problem of disarmament.

- 2) The military policy of NATO, especially of the USA, in Europe is characterised by two factors. On the one hand, through the effort to strengthen the operativeness of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as expressed, among other things, in the regulations published by the nuclear planning group of NATO in November 1969. This tendency increases the danger of a nuclear conflict on the line of contact between the two military political groupings. On the other hand, a tendency of the USA to strengthen the western European military potential is noticeable - independent of their own plans of reducing American armed forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. This tendency is expressed in the endeavour to increase the financial commitments of western European states in the arms race of NATO, as well as in considerations which preclude the creation of new European military structures in, for example, the form of western European nuclear armed forces. There has recently been a considerable increase in the operative ability of American units stationed in Western Germany. Such tendencies are incompatible with the ever-increasing demands of the progressive European public and political circles to apply effective means aimed at the lessening of the military tension between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

- 3) In western countries there are strong tendencies to link progress in the field of disarmament with political demands. In part, this method, applied above all by the CDU government in the Federal Republic, has made more difficult negotiations on various problems of disarmament, among them Polish plans, and at the same time has not facilitated the solution of political questions. At present, this tendency manifests itself above all in the fact that the speed and results of talks on disarmament are subordinated to political solutions; in addition, the question of the reduction of armed forces is made a pre-condition for the preparation and convening of the European security conference. There is undoubtedly a close connection between the problem of regional disarmament and lasting security in Europe. Steps towards disarmament represent an important factor in guaranteeing international security and are one of the elements of the system of collective security. The procedural interdependence on political solutions, however, such as, for example, coupling the convening of the conference with the problem of disarmament, does not - considering the generally accepted complexity of the problem -

accelerate the convening of the conference. On the contrary, the task of the security conference would be complicated if the theme were to be extended to questions not directly connected with the convening of an all-European conference.

- 4) Western groups attempt to subordinate the dialogue on the possibilities of disarmament in Europe to the narrow-minded demands of a "military balance". This was expressed, among other things, in item 3a of the declaration on the mutual and balanced reduction of armed forces accepted at the meeting of the NATO council in Rome on 26-27 May, 1970. It is also demanded in this item that the reduction of armed forces must not entail unfavourable consequences for any of the sides, taking into account the differences as a consequence of geographical or other special conditions. In this connection, the NATO states have envisaged in their internal preparations, among other things, asymmetric models aiming at greater disarmament contributions from the state of the Warsaw Pact both in the geographic and material fields.

IV

An analysis of the political-military situation in Europe against the background of the general relation of strength and general security of both political social systems leads to the conclusion that the so-called military asymmetry is an expression of the different concepts of defence of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO. The differences stem above all from divergences in political aims, as well as from objective conditions for the implementation of these concepts. Thus asymmetry in Europe cannot have a one-sided favourable or unfavourable character for one side because it has a reciprocal character. This asymmetry is part of the global parity which characterises at present the general relation of strength between both systems and is accepted by both these systems.

It is exactly this phenomenon, the so-called military asymmetry in Europe, which makes it unacceptable as a factor determining the method of limiting armed forces and armaments in this area.

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The Problem of Peace in Europe and Disarmament

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The campaign which is currently developing for the creation of a lasting system of security and cooperation in Europe places a number of important political, military and economic problems on the agenda. As is known, during the conferences of foreign ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries in October 1969 in Prague and in June 1970 in Budapest, the Socialist states put forward several sets of questions which could be discussed at a European Conference. They are: (1) the conclusion of a treaty on the renunciation of the use of force as a basis for normalizing the political relations among European countries; (2) the bringing about of an agreement on broad economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation; (3) the creation of a permanent organization dealing with the problem of European security and cooperation.

These are proposals oriented on obtaining immediate results and the regulation of questions on which agreement would be relatively easiest to achieve in the present situation in Europe. It is clear that this program does not exhaust all the plans which the Socialist countries link with the realization of the idea of an all-European conference. It is possible that a whole series of other problems the regulation of which lies in the interest of peace in Europe should be the subject of the deliberations of the European countries - if not at the first conference of this kind, at least in the near future.

In this context the question of disarmament ranks among the first. It should be recalled that concerning the continent of Europe there has long existed a considerable number of important projects for disarmament with a greater or lesser significance and content. The former plans for disengagement proposed by Eden, Moch and Gaitskell were subsequently further developed by the lastingly valuable conceptions such as the Rapacki Plan, the Kekkonen Plan and the Gomulka Plan. Further proposals of a regional character have been made by the German Democratic Republic which last year demanded the elimination of nuclear weapons as well as biological and chemical weapons on the territory of the two German states.

In the recent period opinions according to which the Socialist countries have allegedly reduced their action in favour of disarmament measures in Europe and that at present they are no longer as interested in the implementation of their proposals as they were a few years ago appeared in the columns of the Western press. That does not correspond to the truth. These theses have been nullified by numerous

declarations by leaders of the Socialist countries and of Poland in particular, which on many occasions have stressed that despite of the constant opposition to those plans by the Western powers, such measures as the Gomulka Plan for the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons have not lost their topicality.

At the same time in the West much publicity is being given to the declarations on a so-called mutual and balanced reduction of forces (MBFR) of the NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty countries. Declaration of this kind without concrete suggestions were raised with considerable force at the conclusion of the NATO sessions at the end of 1969 and in May 1970.

In what does this disproportion between the so-called "passivity" of the Socialist countries - states which have traditionally put forward disarmament projects - in the field of disarmament initiatives for Europe, and the "activity" of the NATO countries which traditionally opposed these disarmament plans?

This disproportion is illusory. In reality the attitude of the Western great powers, especially of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany - towards genuine disarmament proposals such as the Gomulka Plan or the Rapacki Plan are in fact just as negative as in the past. These powers are still not ready for disarmament in the field of nuclear weapons although they seek by the subterfuge of slogans about the balanced reduction of forces, which the Western press only too gladly seizes upon, to acquire a certain confidence on the part of European public opinion.

It is obvious that the proposals for a mutual and balanced reduction of forces do not have the same meaning when they come from NATO countries such as the USA, the FRG and Great Britain on the one hand, or from France, Belgium and also Denmark and Holland on the other.

At present it can be said with conviction that for many countries in Europe, including France, the conception of a certain reduction in the armament ceiling and that of the armed forces as well as military expenditures is a concrete proposal. The desire to reduce the armament ceiling results from the understanding by smaller countries of the actual situation in Europe where war has become unthinkable and where, however, the burden of armaments is very disproportional to the real need for the maintenance of security.

The decisive role in fixing the models for the mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe, nevertheless, always falls to the USA and its strongest NATO allies, that

is to Great Britain and the FRG and not to little countries like Belgium or Denmark. It seems that even France has only a limited influence on the MBFR models being prepared. In the final analysis the content of the NATO plans for reducing armaments depends on the attitude of the United States. That requires a precise analysis of the motives which guide and will continue to guide this super-power in launching projects for a mutual and balanced reduction of forces which are at present fashionable.

The reply to the question about the motives which move the United States to propose the MBFR cannot be unequivocal. It requires taking into consideration the whole context of the presently multi-layered disarmament negotiations as well as of a whole series of factors of an internal and external character which influence the attitude of the USA.

The integral parts of the present disarmament negotiations are as follows:

- 1) The negotiations between the USA and the USSR in course in Vienna and Helsinki on the subject of limiting strategic weapons.
- 2) The negotiations within the framework of the Disarmament Commission in Geneva on a broad range of problems of the prohibition and utilization of the bottom of the sea for the stock-piling of weapons of mass destruction and the prohibition of bacteriological and chemical weapons.
- 3) The initiatives actively prepared by the member states for the 25th jubilee session of the United Nations General Assembly.
- 4) The debates aimed at the application of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and its control provisions.
- 5) The special initiatives of various countries such as those of Poland, the GDR, Belgium and Rumania proposing various disarmament measures.

It is undeniable that in the broad range of questions negotiations on the reduction of strategic weapons have priority. The direct discussions between the USA and the USSR more or less submerge all other initiatives appearing on the agenda of the disarmament bodies. Public opinion concentrates on the two super-powers. The results of the Vienna negotiations will determine for many years to come the progress in the regulation of other disarmament questions of a partial character. It is no secret that in the case of an eventual agreement between the two super-powers on the limitation or at least the freezing of essential types of

offensive and defensive strategic weapons the world will have, at least for a certain time, the assurance that there will be no change in the so-called strategic equilibrium or nuclear parity. If a change in this parity is prohibited as a result of the SALT agreement on strategic weapons on the global scale we will have a good foundation on the regional European level for the inviolability of the status quo concerning local armaments. The connexion between the SALT strategic armaments negotiations and the status of the European armaments is more than obvious. The fixing of global criteria for the stopping of strategic armaments should have repercussions on the armament situation in Europe. It can thus be inferred that it is worth while waiting for the results of the SALT negotiations in order in the future to deal more energetically than up to now with the problem of reducing armaments in Europe.

Europe has its own specific problem. The characteristic tendencies of the arms race on our continent since the application by NATO of the strategy of flexible response are the rapid development of tactical nuclear weapons and of conventional forces. Let us add that the development of the conventional forces of NATO has more of a qualitative than quantitative importance. If we take, for example, the development of the Bundeswehr it appears that what is essential for this army is less the numerical increase in soldiers than the development of the officer corps and technicians, its equipment with modern nuclear weapon carriers, the reorganization of its reserves and system of mobilization. A similar development can likewise be observed in other NATO armies where the formula "greater combat capacity with fewer personnel" is becoming a current motto.

It thus appears that below the strategic level a regrouping of tactical and conventional potentials is taking place in Western Europe the directions of which are not yet fully clear, but they are unquestionably leading to a qualitative perfectioning of Western military potentials. If we confront these tendencies with the MBFR formula of the mutual and balanced reduction of forces then a very curious phenomenon emerges: the NATO countries advance the proposal for a reduction in arms the essential content of which consists in a quantitative reduction in conventional forces while at the same time they are engaged in qualitatively perfecting their armies, fire power, their operational capacities, their capacities to utilize conventional weapons and tactical nuclear weapons, warheads and other combat means of this type.

For their part, at the foreign ministers' conference of Warsaw Treaty member states held on 21 and 22 June of this year, the Socialist countries examined the question of

reducing armaments and stated in the concluding memorandum that "the examination of the question of reducing the armed forces on the territory of the European countries would favour relaxation and security in Europe. For the purpose of creating as rapidly as possible the most propitious conditions for examining the questions appropriate to the European conference and in the interest of a constructive examination of the problem of reducing foreign armed forces, this question could be discussed in the body which it is proposed that the European conference should create, or by some other procedure which would be acceptable to the interested countries".

At the moment this proposal has but a limited scope because it concerns only the armed forces of the four great powers and of Canada stationed primarily in Central Europe. Nevertheless, if this process came about and it led to a reduction of the foreign armed forces, particularly of the United States and the USSR in the zone of confrontation, it is certain that it would lead to other disarmament measures. Poland is of the opinion that this offer is only a point of departure on the road to regional disarmament.

The plan for regional disarmament which could be written in the near future among the measures for the consolidation of peace, security and cooperation in Europe should be a program of partial measures which would have as a point of departure:

- 1) the reduction of the foreign armed forces on the territories of European states;
- 2) the results of the SALT negotiations in consideration that they could lead to a freezing and the limitation of certain types of strategic armaments of the two super-powers.

The other aims of the program for disarmament in Europe should be:

- 1) the realization of the Gomulka Plan for the halting of nuclear armaments in Central Europe. That would be the logical application of certain conclusions and results of the SALT negotiations to the regional level.
- 2) The gradual transition from the freezing of nuclear arms in Europe to reducing them, beginning with the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons of low strength, in other words, the lower level of tactical nuclear weapons should be raised to prevent them from being put at the disposal of combat units.

3) The gradual reduction in national conventional forces and arms and, in connection with this, a reduction in military expenditures; the freezing of the number of officers in the smaller countries, the renunciation of chemical and biological weapons, the renunciation of the development of new types of nuclear weapon carriers.

In such a program it is important to pay attention to measures limiting the qualitative development of armaments. If we take into consideration, for example, the possibilities linked with NATO's universal development of the use of combat aircraft worked out by a West German, British and Italian armament consortium or the results of a similar consortium of West German, British and Dutch firms for obtaining enriched uranium U-235 by the gas centrifuge method, or the project for the construction of underground hangars for pursuit aircraft in Western Europe, or the shifting of the NATO naval forces to a new type of propulsion, then everyone should recognize that these projects introduce a new dimension into the arms race on our continent. Starting now it is necessary to prevent the implementation of certain of these projects or to subject them to adequate international control so that the Europe of tomorrow can live in peace and can get out of the arms race.

Under present conditions in Europe the problem of disarmament should not be lost sight of. On the other hand, however, this process cannot be accelerated artificially, detached from the political situation in which normalization and the relaxation of tension are proceeding so slowly and with such difficulties. Nor can disarmament in Europe be considered apart from the progress of the negotiations on the most general schemes for disarmament being worked out presently within the framework of the SALT discussions and those of the Disarmament Commission. Moreover, there is the serious problem of consolidating the results already obtained in disarmament negotiations and, in particular, the final implementation of the tasks arising out of the coming into force of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is notorious that the FRG and a number of other countries are delaying the ratification of this treaty and are dragging out the negotiations on a system of controlling their atomic industry. Poland, along with Finland, was among the first countries to approve of negotiations on the rapid application of the system of control of the International Atomic Energy Agency guaranteeing the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes alone. The great pressure of European public opinion is still necessary to make the FRG subject its industry and in future also the gas centrifuge installations under construction to the international control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is also necessary to exert decisive pressure

to force Israel finally to respect the norms of international law instituted by the treaty and to renounce the production of nuclear weapons.

As can be seen there is a considerable number of tasks in the field of negotiations on disarmament. The lasting guarantee of peace in Europe will depend on the implementation of many of the already existing projects as well as on new conceptions. The commandment of the day is a cool, cautious and concrete approach to each of these projects. This concrete approach to the question of disarmament in Europe will continue to characterize the foreign policy and disarmament diplomacy of Poland which, as in the past, will be active in the field of disarmament negotiations. The Polish Peace Movement and the scientific centres in the service of peace research are attentively following the development of the world and European arms race. They draw scientific conclusions from it which will serve the practical objectives of our diplomacy - the elaboration of concrete disarmament initiatives based on the real situation in Europe.