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CIVIL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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The Contemporary Case for Violence

PROFESSOR ALI A. MAZRUI

Violence is often deemed legitimate or functional only if it is oriented towards a social revolution and systemic change. It is because of this persistent - but by no means inevitable - linkage between violence and revolution as rallying political ideas that contemporary perspectives on violence have been influenced so profoundly by Marx and his successors. What have tended to be overlooked are the functions of violence on an evolutionary scale of change. Certain positive changes in societies are achieved not by a sudden eruption of violence, but by the slow process of having to cope with violence over several decades or generations.

We might here then distinguish between the transformative functions of violence and the integrative functions of violence. The transformative functions are those where violence helps to bring about sudden or rapid systemic change. In discussing them, we shall have to bear in mind two variables which Marx and Lenin between them contributed to revolutionary thought - class struggle and imperialism. Though the two variables are inter-related and behind imperialism is the class struggle of the metropolitan countries themselves, in much of the Third World it is imperialism which has had the greatest transformative impact. It is the transformative functions which have produced a tendency to equate political or civil violence with revolution. The integrative functions of violence, on the other hand, are much slower. The role of violence in the evolution of nationhood and enlargement of social empathy is a process which takes several generations. The role of violence in regional integration, across several states, is also an area of gradual rather than sudden change. This paper will concern itself with both the transformative and the integrative functions of violence.

One further factor perhaps needs to be borne in mind. It is a simple point, but not always remembered. Violence is not merely a cause of change, revolutionary or gradual - it is even more often an effect of other social factors. Much of the violence of the twentieth century is the violence of popular causes. From the struggle in Vietnam to the student revolutions in Europe, America and Japan,

political consciousness is at a level that is at once violent and morally inspired. The violence here is perhaps the symptom of the social malaise; the moral fervour is often a prescription of how to cure it. The students are preoccupied with the crisis of relevance in cultural values and social mores. Their tendency to take to the streets in rioting bands of noisy youthfulness, and their uglier tendency to resort to arson and physical brutality against those who disagree, must all be seen as symptomatic. The problem in such cases is not the violence; it is what has gone wrong either in relationships between generations or, alternatively as the students themselves assert, what has gone wrong in the heritage of the society as a whole.

It is because of these considerations that social violence might be regarded as being very often a dependent variable, while the denial of social justice and economic welfare are more basic social determinants. Men fight because there is hunger or economic ambition in the world or because there is injustice in human relations. They are seldom unjust or ambitious because they fight. The direction of social causation has to be clearly understood.

Imperialism as Frozen Warfare

The thesis that the problem of world peace is basically a problem of relations between social groups in individual countries rests on a number of pillars, one of which does in turn rest solidly on Marxist-Leninist assumptions.

The point of departure of the Leninist interpretation of the cause of war is the familiar Marxist concept of class struggle. Class struggle itself arises because of unequal distribution of economic benefits and denial of social justice. The intensification of class struggle could mean civil war.

Civil wars can either be internationalised, or they can be externalised by the participation of other countries in that war, as in the Spanish Civil War, the Nigerian Civil War, and the Vietnam War. When a civil war is externalised, war is frozen domestically while violence is diverted and exported. The country's involvement in an international war casts a momentary blanket of postponement over the domestic cracks.

Cecil Rhodes, the founder of modern Rhodesia, said in 1865: "In order to save the forty million inhabitants of the U.K. from a bloody civil war...you must become imperialists." Lenin was to quote these remarks with relish. In part he found the statement apt in explaining why Marx's prediction that the poor of the capitalist countries would get poorer until they became revolutionary had not been fulfilled. Lenin answered that the exploitation of the British Empire abroad had saved the British worker at home. The capitalists in England exported the phenomenon of exploitation to the colonies of Asia and Africa and the internal divisions in the metropolitan power were prevented from widening for the time being.

But then, following World War II, the British Empire in Asia disintegrated, and barely ten years later the process of disintegration started in Africa as well. The British Empire as a diversionary tactic to keep the workers quiet had now been neutralised. The lower classes should now at last perceive their underprivileged position and revolt against it once and for all.

An eminent African Marxian-socialist, Kwame Nkrumah, the former President of Ghana, has argued that the confrontation in the metropolitan countries can still now be averted not by imperialism in the old sense but by the new phenomenon of neo-colonialism. This new phenomenon allows for the possibility of exploiting other people abroad without actually ruling them. Only when neo-colonialism in turn comes to an end will "the monopolists" in the metropolitan countries "come face to face with their working class in their own countries, and a new struggle will arise within which the liquidation and collapse of imperialism will be complete."(1)

A state of civil war in an economically divided country bears similarities with Hobbes' use of the term "state of war". To Lenin it is not the absence of a system of authority, as in Hobbes, which creates a climate of suspended civil war. It is the absence of economic equity and social justice. But in Lenin as in Hobbes the state of war need not involve a war that has already broken out; it could be a civil war in suspended animation, awaiting the right signal to activate it. That is why latter-day Marxists and neo-Marxists have sometimes described this kind of situation as structured violence.

If a civil war can be frozen, structured, or be in suspended animation, so can an international war. Imperialism itself has come to be seen increasingly as a case of frozen warfare between the imperial power and its victims. Krishna Menon when he was India's Defence Minister first popularised publicly the idea of colonialism as "permanent aggression". Menon started invoking this concept of "permanent aggression" to reporters before he arrived at the United Nations in 1962 to defend India's annexation of Goa. He asserted that the presence of Portuguese colonialism in Goa had been a case of frozen aggression. India's decision to terminate the Portuguese presence in the sub-continent was an act to end Portuguese aggression, rather than itself an aggressive initiative against the Portuguese.

The notion of "permanent aggression" amounts today to a rejection of the old Western notion that aggression was no longer aggression when it was completely successful. According to this older notion, once Goa became a colony of Portugal, Portuguese aggression ended by definition - for one cannot commit aggression against a non-sovereign country. When to this was added the sister notion that

(1) Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London, Nelson, 1965), p. 256.

a state could not commit aggression against its own sovereignty, Portugal's occupation of Goa or Dutch occupation of West New Guinea was legally safe to the Westerner as soon as it appeared "permanent". This reasoning the new actors on the international scene now reject, for since effective colonial control amounts to a permanent violation of racial sovereignty it must remain permanently an "aggression".

This is not to say that they do not concede what may be termed "colonial sovereignty". It is surely on the basis of such a sovereignty that many of the new states could insist on making Britain answerable for Rhodesia as a colonial responsibility. Such concessions to "colonial sovereignty" are considered temporary concessions consistent with the fundamental stand that colonial sovereignty is in violation of racial sovereignty and ought to be speedily terminated.(2)

If then imperialism is frozen warfare, a diversion from the risk of domestic war in the imperial power itself, imperialism is basically an externalised civil war.

Imperial Retreat and Domestic Fragmentation

The trouble with the Marxist position on war at its most orthodox is its insistence that the most important cleavages are those which concern class. That is why Marxists have tended to see the impact of imperialism on the imperial powers mainly in economic terms. But tribalism in Africa, racialism in the United States, and other varieties of militant ethnicity elsewhere have in the modern period been at least as profound as forms of internal cleavage as the class dimension. The re-structuring of domestic arrangements in the days ahead has therefore to take this factor into account, and might at times involve creating new classes in order to mitigate ethnic tensions.

If international wars are externalised domestic cleavages, one would expect a new resurgence of domestic ethnic tensions when international wars are reduced. Does the present world situation lend support to such a thesis?

If imperialism amounted to frozen aggression, and was therefore an externalization of domestic tensions, the disintegration of empires should witness a process of re-internalizing those tensions. This is indeed what has happened. It is not merely the former colonies which, on imperial withdrawal, began to face the danger of fragmentation. So have the former imperial powers in Europe. The reduction of Great Britain to an island power in Europe has been an important contributory factor to the intensification of Welsh nationalism. An even more startling development has been the dramatic rise of Scottish nationalism. The

(2) This concept of "permanent aggression" is discussed more fully in Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition (Weidenfeld and Nicolson and the University of Chicago Press, 1967), chaper 2. See also W.E. Abraham, Mind of Africa (London: Weidenfeld, 1962), p. 152.

United Kingdom, which had for so long been considered one of the most deeply integrated of all nation states, is now facing a real threat of post-imperial fragmentation. The troubles in Northern Ireland are also related to the phenomenon of widening cleavages within the former imperial country following her reduction in stature in world affairs and the shrinkage of her national purpose.

Empires disintegrated partly as a result of the triumph of egalitarianism as a moral imperative in international affairs. This triumph is to some extent dysfunctional for countries which previously externalised their domestic cleavages, because it has discredited territorial expansionism and re-enforced internal cleavages which derived their strength from a sense of relative deprivation. Fragmentation within the boundaries of the imperial powers themselves is, in other words, a special case of the global triumph of self-determination.

Yet even within the ranks of imperial powers some distinctions ought to be recognised. Those imperial powers which were deeply divided internally in the period prior to de-colonisation found, upon de-colonisation, a measure of unifying relief. One major example is France, which experienced a sense of fragmentation more in the course of trying to hold on to Algeria than in the course of relinquishing her imperial role. What had happened in France by 1958 was that domestic cleavages were no longer easily camouflaged by a sense of imperial mission. The discrediting of expansionism, and the long drawn out costs of the war in Algeria, neutralised the efficacy of external aggression as a diversionary tactic to contain internal tensions. Yet even in France - where at least the myth of global grandeur of a neo-imperial kind has yet to die in spite of the departure of Charles de Gaulle - signs of new forms of post-imperial sectionalism are beginning to be discernible.

The Dutch situation in relation to Indonesia was somewhat comparable to the situation of the French in relation to Algeria. The frozen aggression of an imperial role had towards the end of the colonial period ceased to disguise internal tensions and had only served to deepen them. So the loss of empire momentarily mitigated some of the consequences of that deepening cleavage. But basically that loss was bound to release new forms of sectionalism.

Even in the former colonies, the elimination of imperialism as frozen aggression has had the effect of re-opening domestic areas of conflict. The nationalist movements in Africa, for example, included within them the beginnings of a process of detribalisation, as members from different tribal groups joined together in militant opposition to colonialism. Since the imperial withdrawal, there have been signs of a partial political re-tribalisation. In Nigeria, the Ibo, for so long part of the vanguard of African nationalism, found themselves retreating

from early 1966 back into an ethos of the paramountcy of ethnic interests, until the painful drama of conflict and civil war came to an exhausted end in January 1970. In Kenya, Luo ethnicity has probably significantly deepened since independence, partly in defensive reaction to some government policies, and in the absence of the diversionary unifying formula of opposition to an imperial presence.

Again if imperialism was the externalisation of domestic cleavages both in the imperial powers and among the different groups within the colonised countries, the end of empire is in effect a process of re-domesticating a cleavage. Scotland and Biafra therefore both become symbols of this return to the tensions of contiguity and primordial local disparities.

Nationalism itself is often a medium of externalising internal cleavages. This applies to mature nationalism in old states as well as emergent nationalism in new ones. On balance it is probably true to say that Americans are a more nationalistic people than Britons. If this is true, the reason might well be because the United States has been more pluralistic internally than Great Britain. It is relatively easy to see why a country should become more nationalistic if it has a sense of external insecurity. What is apt to be overlooked is that a country can also become more nationalistic if it develops a sense of internal insecurity. Complex heterogeneity multiplies the number of possible conflict situations between groups. The need for devices which would help the resolution of those conflicts becomes greater than ever.

Abduction and International Terrorism

The link between local and international violence lies not merely in the causes of conflict but increasingly also in its methods and strategies. The nineteen-sixties witnessed two innovations which may be of long term significance. One was hijacking and its use in capturing international attention for local causes. The other was the abduction of foreign ambassadors or other diplomatically significant individuals as hostages for the release of local political prisoners or for other local causes. Both tactics are relatively rudimentary and still sparingly used, but they have potential for further elaboration as techniques of internationalising local issues or embarrassing local tyrants.

The freedom movements in Southern Africa are still inexperienced and relatively unsophisticated. But the idea of abducting a visiting President of the Ivory Coast or of Malawi in Pretoria, for capturing the Resident Ambassador of the United States in South Africa, would have great potential for focussing world attention on apartheid.

Raymond Aron once analysed contemporary warfare in terms of a triad, symbolised by the hydrogen bomb, the tank, and the sten-gun. The most comprehensive of these

three types of warfare was, of course, nuclear war, with its power of massive destruction and the capacity to encompass widely dispersed areas. The age itself is called the nuclear age, and yet the warfare represented by it is the least experienced within that age. It is the fear of nuclear war, rather than its experience which has affected the age.

By contrast, warfare symbolised by the tank and by the sten-gun has been very much part of the post World War II period. The tank signifies what is sometimes called "conventional warfare", though what is conventional is itself subject to the mutations of time. The most important outbreaks of conventional wars since the second World War include the Korean War, the Suez Adventure of 1966 when Israel, Britain and France attacked Nasser's Egypt, the June War of 1967 between Israel and Egypt, and the clashes between India and China and India and Pakistan.

An even older form of conventional warfare is civil war. A relatively recent African experience was the Nigerian Civil War, conventional both in its being intra-territorial and in the armaments it used. Another major civil war, which has already cost a lot of lives, is the conflict between West and East Pakistan.

The third type of warfare is guerrilla and terrorist movements, symbolised by the sten-gun, the stealthy steps in the stillness of the night, the sudden spurt of fire on an unsuspecting target. The new version of this last type of warfare was most elaborately conducted by the Palestine commandos in 1970. This was the tactic of attacking civil aircraft, sometimes on the ground but more sensationally in mid air. After earlier, more timid ventures, Palestine commandos hijacked four planes on September 6, 1970 - two American, one Swiss and one Israeli. According to some reports, the hijacking of the Israeli plane was thwarted by a somersault trick performed by the pilot. One of the American airplanes was taken to Cairo and after the passengers had been permitted to disembark, was blown up in one dramatic explosion. The remaining two planes went to Beirut and Amman and the passengers were for a while held hostage, as ultimately successful demands were made for the release of other Palestinians held prisoner in different parts of the Western World.

What do these hijacks carried out by the Palestinians really mean in the history of combat tactics? The Palestinians in their divisions have, for the time being, suspended such operations. But in the years ahead the tactic may be retried - either over Palestine, or over South Africa, or conceivably over some Latin American country.

The aerial terrorism which the world witnessed in September 1970 was guerrilla warfare transferred from the forests to the international skies. As in the case of guerrilla tactics in a domestic situation, the purpose of aerial terrorism is to manipulate fear as a mechanism of combat. The grand design is to undermine

morale, not only among the soldiers but also among the citizen body. An atmosphere of general insecurity, promoted by spectacular acts of destruction, or specially dramatized acts of brutality, is contrived in order to drive the enemy into a desperate readiness to seek a settlement. What the Palestine commandos were doing in September 1970 was to use the international skies as fair ground for terrorist activities, since the streets of Israel were not accessible to them for domestic terrorism.

Aerial terrorism as so far illustrated in its initial phases, is by the very nature of things, international. Either the plane itself might be travelling across territorial boundaries, or the passengers on board might be nationally mixed, or both those forms of internationality might be present.

Aerial terrorism is, in some important respects, symbolic both of the communications revolution in the world and of the conversion of the world into a global village. The communications revolution plays its part both in regard to the degree to which a hijack attains spectacular publicity, and with regard to the greater reliance of influential sectors of humanity on air transport.

But does aerial terrorism not succeed only in alienating world opinion? Questions of this kind miss the whole point. In a propaganda campaign to win sympathy in the more influential parts of the world, the Arabs would be no match for the Jews. Quite apart from the greater sophistication of Jewish communities in the Western world, there is the question of sheer access to the influential media of the international system. The disproportionate Jewish presence among writers and intellectuals and academics in the United States has often been noticed. C. Eric Lincoln refers to the financial resources which have enabled the Jews to exercise considerable influence on news media. The Palestinian purpose of aerial terrorism in 1970 was not, therefore, a quest for sympathetic publicity, but an attempt to arouse popular anxiety. The Palestinian commandos were forcing more and more people - ordinary travellers on civil aircraft - to develop a vested interest in a solution of the Middle Eastern problem. Those people might have hated the tactics that were being used; they might have disliked the Arabs more than ever, they might have been drawn closer to Israel in sympathy; and yet all those tendencies would not have been inconsistent with a growing desire by more and more of the jet set of the world to see this whole Middle Eastern mess sorted out once and for all.

This brings us to the world as a global village. The sten-gun approach in a domestic context conventionally limited terrorism to internal enemies; the sten-gun approach in the skies could globalise guerrilla tactics. The Middle Eastern problem has never been really local. The original cause of the present problems - i.e. the creation of Israel - was an act of the international community, rather than an outcome of the domestic balance of forces between localised Jews and localised Arabs.

The world was involved in the mess from the start. The aerial tactics of the Palestinian commandos in September 1970 were, at least briefly, effective in reminding the world that it was still part of the mess.

In fact at least three unhealthy partitions have caught up with those that brought them into being, at roughly the same period. One was the partition of Palestine, the other the partition of Ireland; and third, perhaps, the partition of the Indian sub-continent. All are haunting the conscience of the world in their consequences. The world entered the decade of the 1970s with sharper reminders of the repercussions of those three partitions.

An alternative possibility is that hijacking might decline in importance in the 1970s, and that other innovation become more important - the abduction of individual diplomats or diplomatically important individuals. In 1971 a visiting American Senator - perhaps even Edward Kennedy himself - could conceivably have been abducted by East Bengalis as a way of getting the release of the Awami League leader, Sheikh Mujibu Rahman, from the shackles of West Pakistan. From South Africa to Brazil, from Bangla Desh to Belfast, the technique of abducting important individuals either for reasons of publicity or for other concessions from local tyrants, will probably escalate in the decade of the 1970s.

Violence and National Integration

We now move from the transformative functions of violence to the integrative functions. Internal conflict within a country is inherently disintegrative, yet, paradoxically, no national integration is possible without internal conflict. The paradox arises because while conflict itself has a capacity to force a dissolution, the resolution of conflict is an essential mechanism of integration. The whole experience of jointly looking for a way out of a crisis, of seeing your own mutual hostility subside to a level of mutual tolerance, of being intensely conscious of each other's positions and yet sensing the need to bridge the gulf - these are experiences which, over a period of time, should help two groups of people move forward into a relationship of deeper integration. Conflict resolution might not be a sufficient condition for national integration, but it is certainly a necessary one.

The process of national integration itself might be deemed to involve four stages of inter-relationship among the different ethnic or cultural groups in a multi-ethnic society. The minimum degree of integration is a relationship of bare coexistence between distinct identities within the borders. These groups need not even know of each other's existence. There are a number of tribal communities in almost every African country which have no idea where the boundaries of their country end, which tribes are their compatriots and which are not. Their co-existence

with a number of other groups in the same national entity is not always a conscious coexistence, but it is there all the same.

The second degree of relationship between groups is contact. Groups have at least some minimal dealings or communications with each other. They need not be on friendly terms. Tribes at war are still in a relationship of contact, and by that very reason are at a higher stage of integration in spite of war.

A third degree of integration between groups is a relationship of compromise. By this time the dealings between the groups have bcome sufficiently complex, diverse, and interdependent to require a climate of peaceful reconciliation between conflicting interests. The groups still have clearly distinct identities of their own, as well as distinct interests, but the process of national integration has now produced a capacity for a constant discovery of areas of compatibility and accomodation.

The final stage of national integration is the stage of coalescence. This is a coalescence of identities rather than a merger of interests. Diversity of interests would continue. Indeed, if the society becomes technically complex and functionally differentiated at the same time as it is getting nationally integrated, the diversity of interests increases as the distinctiveness of group identities gets blurred. Capacity for compromise is still needed at the stage of coalescence, but the conflict of interests is no longer a conflict between total identities.(3)

Conflict develops as the process of integration moves from stage to stage. A relationship of bare co-existence has little conflict potential. By definition, conflict plays little part in converting a relationship of separate co-existence into a relationship of contact. It begins to play a crucial part in moving from contact to a relationship of compromise, and then from compromise to coalescence. It is the cumulative experience of conflict resolution which deepens the degree of integration in a given society. Conversely, unresolved conflict creates a situation of potential disintegration. The groups within the society could then move backwards from a relationship of, say, compromise to a relationship of hostile contact.

At what points in this four stage process of integration is violence most pronounced? There are occasions when violence erupts at first contact, as when

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(3) What is a total identity? Illustration is in this instance the best definition. An isolated tribe in relation to other tribes has a total identity of its own, but the Hotel Workers Union in Uganda, or the American Political Science Association is only a partial form of identity. The process of national integration is a partialization of group identities - as the tribes or communities lose their coherence as distinct systems of life. But the process of national integration is not only a partialization of all their affiliations; it is of course also a quest for a new kind of total identity. Success comes when partially eroded group personalities coalesce to form a new national entity. This part of the paper has borrowed generously from Chapter 5 "Conflict and the Integrative Process"in Mazrui, Violence and Thought: Essays on Social Tensions in Africa (London: Longmans, 1969) Pages 103-105.

a tribal community feels imperilled by the arrival of foreigners, and proceeds to take violent steps of defence. But the move from co-existence to contact need not be accompanied by violence. It is the move from contact to a relationship of compromise that almost invariably entails an intervening period of violent confrontations. Much of the inter-ethnic violence in post colonial Africa is the violence between the stage of inter-ethnic contact and the future stage of inter-ethnic compromise.

Political analysts have sometimes assumed ethnic intermingling would of itself result in reducing ethnic tensions in Africa. Those who have analysed the role of the military in Africa have at times taken it for granted that military life and its opportunities for ethnic mixture provide a model for inter-ethnic fusion. This mixing does of course take place. The error arises in the assumption that ethnic intermingling itself reduces ethnic tensions and animosity. In practice, ethnic intermingling first results in increased tension before it finally reaches a plateau of normalisation and ultimate ethnic integration. Both in Nigeria in 1966, and in Uganda in 1971, we have illustrations of high and violent ethnicity driving its impetus precisely from the tensions of pre-integrative interaction.

Violence can also be an indicator of the stage of national integration achieved. I have had occasion already to draw a distinction between primary violence and secondary violence within the territorial state. (4) The most basic form of violent conflict, judged in these terms, is that which concerns the territorial survival of that state. When one group is so resolutely opposed to another that it resents having to share the same frontiers, political cleavage is at its most profound. It affects not only explicitly integrative issues, but also raises the question of whether a ruler chosen from one particular tribe has a right to exercise authority over any other.

Secondary violence, may be defined as that which does not threaten the integrity of the state, but arises from conflict over its internal organisation, the formulation of public policy, or the distribution of public goods. One of the greatest dangers confronting Africa is that cleavage over such secondary issues is very often tribal in origin, and involves fundamental questions of

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(4) See Mazrui, "Leadership in Africa: Obote of Uganda" International Journal (Toronto) Summer 1970; Mazrui, "Social Cleavage and Nation Building in East Africa" paper presented at the Seventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, September, 1970; also John D. Chick and Ali A. Mazrui, "The Nigerian Army and African Images of the Military" paper presented at the Eighth World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Varna, Bulgaria, September 1970. By extension one might also perhaps speak of tertiary violence, using this as a residual category to cover those forms of violence which have - in the short run at least - no overtly political objectives or repercussions.

group identity. This means that, once secondary violence occurs, it frequently has primary implications as well, and these may, though not necessarily, lead to the dissolution of the state.

Party politics in Nigeria before the first coup was generating increased secondary violence, and yet containing the dangers of primary violence. If the pre-coup regime in Nigeria achieved nothing else, it certainly contributed to the spread of nationally-oriented political activity. The defensiveness of the North against the South had originally taken the form of separatism. Following independence the Northern strategy became that of infiltrating the South. The interest of the North in consolidating its federal power was perhaps the most significant integrative factor in Nigeria's history until that time. But the nationalisation of politics in Nigeria was growing faster than the country's capacity for compromise. The system's ability to resolve conflicts had not become sophisticated enough in Nigeria to cope with the tensions of increased interaction between its sub-units.

Tribalism in Africa is unlikely to disappear within a single lifetime. Pessimistic, as it may seem, the first signs of disappearance might have to be sought in the changing motives of political violence from primary to secondary. Secondary violence is violence between partialised identities, and that itself is a move towards national integration.

Violence and Regional Integration

The four stages of co-existence, contact, compromise and coalescence are, to some extent, applicable to regional as well as national integration, but the factors which initiate change from one stage to another are different. Whereas in relations within a single country the stage between contact and compromise has a high potentiality for conflict, in relations between states it is very often the stage between compromise and coalescence. It is not without significance that the two most ghastly wars experienced by the human race so far started off as European wars. Of the three older continents of the world - Africa, Asia, and Europe - Europe was in fact the most deeply integrated. Yet it is from within the tensions of this integrated continent with centuries of interaction and compromise, that major conflagrations have erupted.

Sometimes the tensions arise because the structure of compromise assumes co-operation, when in fact the structure is a co-operative framework for competitive relationships. Such family rivalries can evoke greater passions than rivalry with a distant enemy. Canadians, for example, probably feel more strongly against American economic dominance in Canada than they do against the more remote danger of Communist China. President de Gaulle in power was certainly more suspicious of "Anglo-Saxon" intentions within the Atlantic Alliance than he was of Soviet policies.

In the East African community, few things have contributed more to, say, Ugandan national consciousness than Uganda's competitive relationship with its immediate neighbours. Each country has not only grown more protective of its own interests as opposed to the interests of the others, it has sometimes developed a more enduring psychological complex and suspicion of the motives of others. This can convert regional economic cooperation, as a stage of compromise, into a breeding ground for economic nationalism within each member state. The degree of nationalism varies with each nation state. Usually it varies in relation to the benefits which each derives from the cooperation. Within the East African Community, Kenya, the main beneficiary, has tended to be less defensively nationalistic in economic matters than either Uganda or Tanzania. But Canada may well be the greater net beneficiary in the economic relationship with the USA, whatever its loss in political autonomy. Yet it is Canada which is the more defensively nationalistic of the two.

East Africans have for quite a while now had dreams about federating into a single state, because they have shared an economic community for a while. Yet the spirit of economic rivalry fostered by the community itself may have harmed the cause of federation. The period of compromise relationships may indeed later generate enough integrative momentum to cross the boundary at last into coalescence. But in the initial phases the tensions of compromise are such that they pull a regional entity backwards towards bare contact.

Similarly, the role of conflict and violence in regional integration is again somewhat different from its role within a territorial entity. Compromise relationships within a multi-ethnic state are stabilised more effectively, as the state moves towards national coalescence, than they can be in a multi state region without a common government. Methods of conflict resolution in a region which has no shared structures of authority have to be more subtle, often more fragile and less effective, than methods of conflict resolution within a multi-ethnic state.

However, violence, with economic interaction, is probably one of the two most effective agencies of interpenetration in the politics of regional political systems. Violence loosens some of the inhibitions against interferences in other people's affairs, and tends to create a compulsive case for allies in a power struggle within each of the states.

If we look at the Nile Valley as an emerging regional system, we see the interpenetration between domestic politics in the Sudan and the Egyptian presence to the North over some issues. Aid in military situations, diplomatic support in moments of political wrangles, have all contributed to deepening a shared political experience between Egypt and the Sudan in the years of independence. Further south, a civil war has been raging in Southern Sudan. That civil war, again, has opened

up opportunities for penetration by others into Sudanese affairs. While in domestic politics it is not conflict, but conflict resolution, which promotes national integration, in regional integration conflict itself could, by being penetrative, also be in some cases integrative. The Valley of the Nile might be converted into a regional political system not simply by the flow of its waters, but also by the flow of blood.

Though not always consistently, Milton Obote, as President of Uganda, aspired to keep out of his neighbours' quarrels. Obote assumed that until Uganda attained her own national cohesion, she could not afford to be involved in other people's adventures. His statement, defensible as a moral assertion, was unsound as a political proposition. It is precisely in situations of amorphous national identity, and imminent social violence, that quarrels of one country spill over into another, and trans-national interpenetration is facilitated by intra-national cleavages. Obote himself kept repeatedly resssuring the Sudanese that in spite of ethnic ties, he did not intend to make Uganda a base for the liberation movements of Southern Sudan. At times Obote fulfilled this promise; at other times he fell short. A Ugandan factor was never entirely absent in the Sudanese civil war.

Now, the question arising with the 1970s, is whether there will be a Sudanese factor within Uganda's own power struggles. The tribe from which General Amin, who succeeded Obote in January 1971, has emerged is the Kakwa the bulk of which is in the Sudan, though it overflows into both Uganda and the Congo. Will General Amin seek to have Kakwa in his army, irrespective of whether they are Sudanese, Congolese or Ugandan? There is even speculation whether General Amin started to recruit Southern Sudanese before the army coup of January 1971. There is some evidence that 600 Southern Sudanese were employed soon after the coup, and many of them became part of Amin's own "palace guard".

If there is now a Sudanese factor in the Ugandan crisis, just as there has been a Ugandan factor in the Sudanese civil war, the situation is one more illustration of the role of violence in creating opportunities for interpenetration between contiguous nation states. In the African situation, violence reactivates primordial loyalties among peoples with the same ethnic or linguistic ancestry, divided by artifical colonial boundaries. By reactivating such bonds, violence may itself be laying the foundation for deeper forms of integration in the region as a whole. The realities of ethnic interconnections might once again be given due credence in the tensions of regional integration.

Conclusion

Violence plays critical functions not only in revolutionary change but also in gradual and evolutionary social mutation.

The revolutionary schools of violence have borrowed substantially from Karl Marx and his successors. In the Third World an important thinker in recent times has been the late Frantz Fanon, the West Indian psychologist from Martinique, who was drawn towards fighting for Algeria's independence with the National Liberation Front. Within a few years Fanon's name has risen very rapidly to become a leading thinker of the revolutionary school of the Third World, with special reference to movements connected with anti-colonialism and anti-racialism. For Fanon, colonialism itself is once again a form of "structured violence", and must precipitate counter-violence:

> "... colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state: and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence." (5)

Fanon, drawing substantially from African and West Indian experience, also pays attention to the passionate dances and possession by spirits which have sometimes characterised the shadowy phases of black life. These tumultuous moments of abandon, of dancing and son., had been known to escalate in exhaustion into fratricidal combat. Fanon sees in this very phenomenon the stuff of which real violence is ultimately made. He wants these emotions politicised, and given a sense of direction.

> "We have seen that this same violence, though kept very much under the surface all through the colonial period, yet turns in the void. We have also seen that it is canalised by the emotional outlets of dance and possession by the spirits; we have seen how it is exhausted in fratricidal combats. Now the problem is to lay hold of this violence which is changing direction. When formerly it was appeased by myths and exercised its talents in finding fresh ways of committing mass suicide, now new conditions will make possible a completely new line of action." (6)

Purposeful violence to Fanon therefore becomes a purifying experience for those whose energies were before misdirected, and those who suffered under the disruptive impact of colonialism.

Although Fanon was not an African in the usual sense, he was of African descent. He also devoted his own energies to a major African and colonial war, much the most important in the African continent: the Algerian struggle for independence. If the Third World is conceived as a tri-continental entity, consisting of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, we might say that Africa's most important contribution to revolutionary militancy in the Third World is the political thought of Frantz Fanon.

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(5) Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, translated by Constance Harrington, (New York: Grove Press, 1963) page 48.

(6) Ibid., page 15.

Latin America's contribution is, in the final analysis, the political thought of Che Guevara. As a theorist, Fanon is much more original than Guevara. But both Fanon and Guevara knew the experience of being involved in insurrection. Both knew the fear and excitement of violence, and the overpowering symbolism of blood which is politically spilt. Both were aware that guerrilla tactics are the tactics of the underprivileged, the under-armed, the under-financed, the under-nourished. Behind this band of ill-equipped fighters is the invincibility of the people. To use Che's formulation:

> "The guerrilla band is an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people. It draws its great force from the mass of the people themselves. The guerrilla band is not to be considered inferior to the army against which it fights simply because it is inferior in fire power. Guerrilla warfare is used by the side which is supported by the majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms for use in defence against aggression." (7)

As for Asia's contribution to the militancy of the Third World, the most towering figure must for the time being remain Mao Tse-tung. The people of the Third World are the majority of the human race. Mao played up the question of numbers, not only in the moral sense that "the majority are right", but in the military sense that the masses are powerful. As the Peking Review put it once in April 1960:

> "There was a theory current for a time among some people in China before and during the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, which was known as the 'Weapons-Mean-Everything Theory'; from this theory they concluded that since Japan's weapons were new and its techniques advanced while China's weapons were old and its techniques backward, 'China would inevitably be subjugated'. Comrade Mao Tse-tung in his work On the Protracted War published at that time refuted such nonsense...Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that the most abundant source of strength in war lay in the masses, and in the people's army organised by awakened and united masses, the people would be invincible throughout the world." (8)

Violence as an integrative phenomenon has as yet found no such major prophets. For the very reason that violence as a phenomenon within the process of either national integration or regional integration plays its part independently of the intentions of those who initiated the violence, this area of experience has yet to find a Frantz Fanon, a Che Guevara, or a Mao Tse-tung. Violence on the evolutionary scale has the dullness of gradualism, and the banality of unintended consequences. It connotes no anger against class privilege, no militant indignation against imperialism. It is the sum of those slow human

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(7) Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, A Pelican Book, 1961, page 15.

(8) "Long Live Leninism!" Peking Review, April 1960.

experiences in a given society which force men to find ways of resolving their conflicts, and of reducing their propensity to be brutal to each other. As for the violence of regional integration, ranging from the record of Europe as a continent at once deeply integrated and deeply divided, to the experience of the Nile Valley seeking to emerge as a regional political system from the very experience of violent interpenetration, we have again the dynamics of evolutionary gradualism. Out of the blood and ashes, the torment and anger, a region at last finds its own identity, and history assembles the generations together at last.

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CIVIL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

PLENARY SESSION

Friday, 10th September — Afternoon

Civil Violence and the Process of Development

PROF. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

I. The Effects of Modernization on Civil Violence

Both civil violence* and, perhaps more significantly, the glorification of civil violence increased significantly in the 1960s in societies of almost every cultural shape and developmental level. Between 1961 and 1968, 114 of the world's 121 major political units endured some significant form of violent civil conflict. Three-quarters of the countries of the world apparently suffered more political instability - assassinations, coups, riots, civil wars - in the 1960s than they had in the 1950s.[1] This violence was in some cases justified on instrumental grounds; in other cases, as in some of the writings of Fanon, it was held to be virtually good in itself. At least some of the writings of Third World revolutionaries on the subject of violence in the 1960s could have been lifted almost verbatim from the writings of Third Reich propagandists of the 1930s.

This recrudescence of civil violence stimulated various efforts at explanation. One belief which had been widely held, at least in the United States, linked civil violence to poverty. This presumed relationship was often advanced as a major rationale for efforts to promote economic development abroad and to eliminate ghettos at home. Once civil violence began to get serious scholarly attention, however, it soon became clear that there was very little direct relationship between it and poverty. (If there had been, of course, world history would have been even bloodier than it has been.) A satisfactory explanation of civil violence had to be grounded on psychological as well as material conditions. In most cases men resort to violence because they are dissatisfied, and they become dissatisfied because their achievements and capabilities fall below their aspirations. This gives rise to a sense of

*By civil violence I mean violence which differs from international (or, more correctly, interstate) violence in that at least one participant is not a government and which differs from criminal violence in that it is designed to affect the make-up or functioning of the political system.

"relative deprivation", which in the absence of other means of reducing the gap between aspiration and capability predisposes men to violence. This theoretical approach, which was elaborated systematically by Gurr, has dominated most contemporary scholarly work on civil violence.[2]

Given this framework, the next question becomes: in what ways do the aspirations of large bodies of men for social, economic and political goods outrun their capabilities? The most common situations are those in which a group's:

(a) aspirations increase and its capabilities remain constant;

(b) aspirations and capabilities increase, but the latter at a slower rate than the former;

(c) aspirations remain constant and its capabilities decrease;

(d) aspirations increase and its capabilities increase at first and then decline.

Under these conditions the group will be predisposed to civil violence. If, on the other hand, the capabilities of the group increase faster than its aspirations, or if they decline more slowly than its aspirations, or if both aspirations and capabilities remain constant (even though a gap may exist between them), the predisposition of the group to engage in civil violence will be low.

Civil violence is thus more likely when aspirations and capabilities are changing and when the gap between them is increasing. This is, of course, precisely what takes place during the process of social-economic modernization. Changes then occur in the aspirations and capabilities of most groups in society with respect to their economic wealth and income, social status, and political power. Increases in literacy, education, and mass media consumption, exposure to modern values, ideas, and styles of life, increase the desires of the affected social groups. The capabilities of these groups may in some cases remain constant (Case A). More generally the capabilities also increase but at a slower rate than the aspirations (Case B); education outruns employment; mass media exposure grows more rapidly than per capita gross national product. In some cases, as in the early phases of modernization in the countryside, some groups may suffer an absolute decline in material well-being (Case C). In other instances, economic development may proceed at a good pace for a few years but then be followed by a downturn, which may have particularly drastic effects on certain groups (Case D) -- the classic J-curve phenomenon.

More specifically, this theoretical approach suggests four general propositions on the relationship between civil violence and social-economic development or modernization.[3]

(1) <u>Civil violence is more characteristic of societies in the middle of the process of modernization than it is of societies which are either highly modern</u>

or highly traditional. The available empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports this proposition. Modern societies have much less civil violence than transitional societies. To the extent that it is possible to measure civil violence in traditional societies, the available evidence indicates that they are more inclined to civil violence than modern societies but less inclined to violence than transitional societies.

(2) Civil violence is more characteristic of societies with rapid rates of social-economic modernization than it is of societies with slower rates of socio-economic change. Less empirical evidence is available on this proposition, but the preponderance of what there is appears to support it.

(3) Civil violence is more characteristic of societies with unbalanced processes of modernization in which the rates of social mobilization (which presumably increase aspirations) exceed rates of economic development (which increase capabilities). There is much empirical evidence on this proposition, but it is to some extent contradictory. In general, however, the weight of the evidence appears to be in favor of the proposition. For countries at the middle level of social-economic modernization, for instance, it has been shown that the "most detrimental combination of factors appears to be a rapid increase in proportion of the population receiving primary education, but a slow rate of percentage change in GDI per capita. This set of circumstances is most conducive to political unrest among the transitional group of countries."[4]

(4) Civil violence is more characteristic of societies in which the capabilities produced by modernization are distributed more unevenly among social groups than of societies where such capabilities are distributed more equally. The aspirations of one group almost invariably increase if its members perceive that the capabilities of a similar or neighbouring group have increased. Economic development itself often involves increasing disparities of wealth, income, and power among social groups in society. It thus also often promotes civil violence. Again, the moderate amount of empirical evidence which is available supports this proposition.

In the economic field modernization involves increasing urbanization, industrialization, per capita income, non-agricultural employment, occupational diversity. In politics modernization involves the expansion of governmental activity, of contacts between national government and people, of political consciousness, and of the involvement of individuals and social forces in national politics, in short, the expansion of political participation. In more modern societies a larger proportion of the population participate in the political system. Participation, of course, can take a variety of forms. Contacting officials, organizing political groups, propagandizing for candidates, parties, or policies, working in government, implementing party and governmental programs, voting, and, at times, demonstrations are

non-violent forms of political participation. Riots, coups, guerrilla warfare, insurrection, assassinations, and, at times, demonstrations are violent forms of political participation. Individuals and social groups which suffer relative deprivation in the economic area are more likely to resort to peaceful forms of political participation to close the gap between aspiration and capability if channels for such participation are open to them. If such channels are not available or if the deprivation is sufficiently intense, civil violence is likely to result. If their deprivation involves political capabilities - lack of freedom of speech or the right to vote, for example - or sheer personal security, civil violence may well be the only perceptible way in which they can reduce the gap.

By broadening the gap between aspirations and capabilities, social-economic modernization increases the probability of civil violence. By broadening the range of political participation, political modernization increases the scope of civil violence, unless broader institutional channels for peaceful participation also come into being. The combined effect of both social-economic and political modernization, however, is to undermine traditional political institutions and to make it most difficult to create broad-based political party systems and other forms of participatory political institutions. The idea of "peaceful change" or "development without violence" thus becomes almost wholly unreal. There may well be violence without development; but there is virtually no development without violence. In today's developing world, most of that violence assumes one of three forms.

II. The Expansion of Praetorian Violence

Praetorian violence is group violence to achieve specific gains - power, office, money, recognition - from the political system without changing significantly the overall distribution of these values in the system. Praetorian violence is, in this sense, <u>intrasystem</u> violence. In the best tradition of Samuel Gompers, the groups want "more", and they pursue "more" through means of force and violence, which, in turn, reflect the nature of the political system in which they are operating. Unlike revolutionary or communal violence, praetorian violence does not challenge a functioning set of political institutions. It is, instead, testimony to the absence of a functioning set of political institutions. No consensus exists on the appropriate organizations and procedures for channeling participation, selecting leaders, and determining policy. In this vacuum each social group and institutional force uses the special weapons at its disposal to achieve the special things which it wants: "the wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup".

Traditional political systems may be praetorian in character, but, more

generally, such systems do have legitimate structures of authority. If these structures are feudal in character or otherwise relatively decentralized, they may be able to adapt to the expansion of participation produced by modernization. If, however, they are centralized, bureaucratic, or absolutist in character, their adaptation to broader political participation will be difficult if not impossible. They are, instead, likely to be overthrown by a military coup or urban insurrection, which destroys the traditional basis of authority without creating broader-based modern participant institutions. In such systems, the authority of the government depends more on force than on legitimacy, and in the absence of the latter social forces resort to force in order to achieve their goals.

What effects does modernization have on the patterns of praetorian violence? As modernization proceeds, more groups become socially mobilized and involved in politics. As a result, the methods of violence diversify and also become broader in scope. In the early phases of modernization in a praetorian society, politics is conspiratorial and the military coup d'etat is the dominant political technique. It is, however, a technique which can succeed only so long as political participation remains limited. As societies modernize and participation broadens, the coup becomes a less effective and a less frequent form of political action. On a global basis, coups are much more prevalent in countries at lower rather than higher levels of economic development. As societies become modern without becoming peaceful, riots and other forms of mass violence displace coups and other forms of conspiratorial violence. The coups that do occur in more highly developed societies, however, usually involve greater amounts of violence than those which occur in less developed countries.

As political participation expands in a praetorian system, so also does politcial violence. This can lead to any one of three outcomes. It is conceivable that political elites in the society can develop a consensus on a new basis of legitimacy and bring into existence more broadly based political institutions providing channels for peaceful political participation. This reduces the level of violence in the system while at the same time permitting the further expansion of political participation. In particular, societies with democratic political institutions have less political violence than societies lacking such institutions. In fact, however, societies which have reached middling levels of economic development and social mobilization without having developed the institutional structures for more widespread political participation are likely to have extraordinary difficulty in doing so. There are very few cases in which this has happened. Almost invariably, as in the case of Turkey, for instance, the system suffered only a modest amount of praetorian violence between the breakdown of the traditional institutions and the creation of a modern party system.

If political institutionalization does not occur, two other alternatives remain. Conceivably, both the amount of violence and the amount of participation in the system can continue to increase. This would appear to be what has taken place in Bolivia during the years since the overthrow of the MNR government in 1964 - a classic case of a highly mobilized society with each social force intent on getting its goal in its own way. The result is a condition of semi-anarchy in which, among other things, social forces regularly kidnap cabinet ministers as a means of compelling the government to acquiesce in their demands. The alternative path, chosen, for example, by Brazil, is for the government to engage in repressive measures to stop the expansion of political participation. Such governments are generally unable to apply massive coercion against dissent, and the result is an increase in the intensity of violence if not in its scope. (In general, political violence is greater in societies where the government is neither highly permissive nor overwhelmingly coercive.) In its efforts to cope with violent opposition, the government may well, as appears to be the case in Brazil, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, permit or even encourage some forms of unofficial pro-government violence as a counter to the violence of anti-government extremists. In the absence of successful efforts to create participant political institutions, the process of modernization in praetorian systems tends to lead either to more extensive anarchy, to more intensive repression, or to some combination of both.

III. The By-Passing of Revolution

A revolution involves rapid, fundamental, and violent change in the basic values and concepts of legitimacy in a society, in its political institutions, social structure, economic relationships, leadership, and governmental activity, in short, the demolition of the existing social, economic, and political order and the effort to substitute an entriely new one. A revolution, in this sense, means such occurrences as the French, Russian, Chinese, Mexican, Vietnamese, and Cuban Revolutions. Revolutionary violence is <u>anti-system</u> violence. The revolutionary appeal is to social classes, and successful revolutions typically involve a coalition of urban and rural groups, middle-class intelligentsia and the peasantry. A revolution is clearly one way, albeit a relatively rare one, of modernizing a traditional society and of substituting modern political institutions for traditional ones.

The 1960s opened bright with the promise or threat of revolution. Castro appeared to be a model which could be duplicated many times over elsewhere in Latin America. The objective conditions were ripe. Oppressed peasantry, alienated middle class, dictatorial governments, U.S. presence - all these plus soaring birthrates only exceeded by rising expectations seemed to insure that the 1960s would be the Decade of Revolution in Latin America. Nor was

Latin America entirely alone in this respect. The turmoil and conflict that went with independence in Africa created conditions which appeared to make Africa, as Chou En-lai said, "ripe for revolution". In the Middle East and in South Asia, the potentialities for violence, given the inequities in the countryside and the tensions in the cities, also appeared to be extraordinarily high.

Yet The Revolution or revolutions failed to materilize. In Latin America, in particular, revolutionary guerrilla movements flared up in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Uruguay, but by the 1970s almost all these movements had been contained, weakened, and in many cases virtually decimated. The roster of guerrilla leaders killed or captured was impressively long: Che was not alone in his martyrdom. Given the earlier expectations, this absence of revolutionary success would seem to require a major effort at explanation.

In part, of course, the problem may be that the expectations were from the start lacking any grounding in reality. Many revolutionaries and anti-revolutionaries may have been unduly beguiled by the seeming ease with which antiquated establishments could be toppled. If Castro could do it, why not everyone else? Even so perceptive a student of power as Henry Kissinger as late as 1969 could contribute to this image by writing that "the guerrilla wins if he does not lose; the conventional army loses if it does not win." There is clearly some truth in this observation. The government does lose so long as its authority and ability to govern throughout its territory remain under continued armed challenge. But it is also perhaps even more true that the guerrilla loses if he does not win and the government wins if it does not lose. The aim of the government is to remain the government, to continue in control of the bulk of the social, economic, and military resources of the society: which is precisely what the guerrilla wants to achieve. The guerrilla, on the other hand, remains a shadowy, hunted, struggling remnant on the margins of society, often only one ambiguous step away from banditry. Throughout history, most guerrilla movements have failed, and guerrilla leaders usually end up on the gallows rather than on the throne. In the wake of Castro's success, Khrushchev's fulminations, and Mao's doctrine, both the supporters and opponents of revolution in the early 1960s tended to forget that history has not normally been kind to revolution.

Unreal expectations of success, however, do not in themselves explain the reality of failure. There are more substantial explanations, of which five may be particularly relevant.

(1) Urbanization. Almost all modernizing countries experienced massive migrations from the countryside to the city during the 1960s. These population movements gave rise to many immediate social and economic problems in and

around major cities. In the longer run, they may give rise to political problems as well. But in the short run, the migrations reduced the revolutionary potential in the countryside without increasing it in the cities. However horrible the conditions of life might appear in the urban slums and barrios, the overwhelming majority of migrants felt themselves to be substantially better off in the city than they had been in the countryside. The flow out of the countryside did not often mean a net reduction in the rural population, but it did ease the demographic-economic pressure on the land in high density areas and it also served to remove from the countryside many of those elements - especially energetic and ambitious younger males - who might otherwise have become revolutionary cadres. Urban migration in the 1960s, as it had so often earlier in history, served in some measure as a functional substitute for rural revolution.

(2) Land Reform. The appeal of a revolutionary movement to peasantry is almost directly a function of inequality in land ownership and inequity in land tenure. The fear of revolution in the early 1960s prompted governments in Iran, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, and Chile, with varying degrees of commitment and of success, to inaugurate land reform programs designed to bring about greater equality in land ownership. In some cases, as in Peru and Colombia, these programs seemed to come just in the nick of time to counter growing guerrilla movements in the countryside. In other cases, as in the 1969 Land to the Tiller Law of South Vietnam, it would appear that the government learned its lesson a little too late to be truly effective. In virtually all these instances, however, the case for land reform was put very simply on the ground that the alternative was clearly the violent revolutionary overthrow of the existing system.

The ability of Third World governments to carry out effective land reform programs depended upon: (a) the commitment of the political leadership to this goal; (b) the availability of resources (e.g., from oil or aid) to finance the program; and (c) the power of the government to impose the program on the recalcitrant and reluctant groups in the society. This last condition was more likely to exist in dictatorial regimes than in democratic ones. Consequently, a government which is able to remove one source of revolutionary discontent by carrying out effective land reform may be unable to remove another source of revolutionary discontent by opening up to disadvantaged groups more widespread channels of participation within the political system.

(3) Preemptive Nationalism. A successful revolutionary movement needs a foreign enemy as well as domestic ones. Nationalism is the cement which at one point becomes necessary to join urban middle class and rural peasantry into an effective political-military alliance. The extent to which a foreign presence - economic investments, military bases, political influence - is real and visible furnishes popular targets for revolutionary activity. Filipinos

unite!" as one slogan put it, "You have nothing to lose but the Americans!" In the late 1960s, the reduction of the U.S. military presence overseas helped to remove this stimulus to revolution. (As Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew once remarked, the only 100% certain way of promoting a guerrilla insurgency is to invite an American military presence designed to prevent one.) Even before this had occurred, however, Third World governments had moved to assume the nationalist mantle themselves. This was as true of military regimes in Peru and Bolivia as it was of the more conventional Marxist regimes in Chile and Algeria. The change in the character of the Cold War and the domestic opposition in the United States to further foreign entanglements gave governments the opportunity and the courage to act and to talk in nationalist manner which would have seemed beyond the pale a few years earlier.

(4) Counterinsurgency Techniques. Logical consistency is no more likely among the governments of underdeveloped countries than among those of developed societies. Many governments which regularly resorted to nationalist appeals and rhetoric were not above accepting discreet aid and advice from neo-colonial powers on the effective ways of defeating revolutionary movements militarily. The 1960s undoubtedly saw a quantum jump in the effectiveness of counterinsurgency weapons, techniques, and doctrines. Training programs for police and military units, increases in the size of such units, the upgrading of intelligence operations all made life more and more difficult for guerrillas. In Peru, Colombia, Guatemala, the military through a variety of means, not all of them very attractive, effectively decimated and divided the guerrilla movements with which they were confronted. While obviously there were many factors involved in its success (including a prior land reform and the absence of a credible nationalist appeal), even the Bolivian army proved to be a match for Che Guevara.

(5) Revolutionary Doctrine. The 1960s saw the emergence of a new doctrine of revolutionary war which, perhaps more than anything else, played a role in leading to the defeat of revolutionary movements. This doctrine, reflected in the writings of Che and Debray, marked a major Latin American deviation from the classic Asian doctrine of revolutionary warfare as it had been developed by Mao, Ho, and Giap. The new doctrine put the emphasis on the importance of subjective factors of will and dedication as against objective social conditions. It stressed the role of the guerrilla foco itself as against the Maoist stress on the need for popular support. It exalted military factors over political ones, including the significance of the guerrilla force as compared to the party organization. It also, at least in Guevara's formulation, put an emphasis on a continental appeal as against nationalist appeals in individual countries. The extent to which doctrine shapes revolution is open to debate in any particular case, but certainly many of the errors which Latin American revolutionaries committed in the 1960s - including those of Che himself in

Bolivia - could be explained in terms of adherence to this militaristic doctrine of insurgency as compared to the earlier Leninist-Maoist emphasis on political action.*

The lack or success of rural-based revolution in the mid-1960s led to a shift in emphasis toward what is now usually referred to as "urban guerrilla warfare". The great revolutions which have occurred in the modernization process so far have involved parallel and, in due course, cooperative action by urban middle class or industrial workers, on the one hand, and rural peasantry, on the other. The shift in locale of the guerrilla fighters from the countryside to the city raises the question of the possibility of an exclusively urban revolution. Can there be a Great Revolution, comparable in its scope and consequences to the French, Russian, Chinese, or Mexican Revolutions, without the participation of the peasantry?

The answer to this question which the revolutionaries themselves furnish is virtually a unanimous "No". Latin American guerrillas, including those fighting in the cities, view the countryside as the decisive arena in the struggle with the established order. The move to the cities is held to be a temporary detour on the road to rural revolution. The urban struggle enables the revolutionaries to score symbolic victories against the establishment to generate publicity and public awareness of their existence and role, to steal money, to make friends among potential sympathizers (politicians, businessmen, journalists) in the establishment, to embarrass the government (e.g. through kidnapping diplomats), and, perhaps most importantly, to demoralize the forces favorable to the status quo and to impel them to more extreme and brutal measures of repression, which will, in turn, antagonize even their own sympathizers. The ultimate victory, however, most revolutionaries seem to feel, must still be won in the countryside. The countryside, as Brazilian urban guerrilla leaders have expressed it, "will ultimately be the more important arena of battle." Its advantages to the guerrillas are that: (a) "the most exploited class in Latin America is the peasantry; " (b) "the country is a better place to wage guerrilla warfare;" (c) "the machinery of the dominant classes' power is stronger in the cities;" (d) "the working class in Brazil is very small;" (e) "many of the workers have only recently come from the countryside . ..are just entering the consumer economy, which seems a step up for them... /and/ are getting some privileges - they have more privileges than their brothers in the countryside."[6]

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*Paradoxically, this shift in revolutionary doctrine also had a small parallel in the changing emphasis in US counterinsurgency doctrine as applied in Vietnam. Initially, this doctrine, picking up the ocean and the fishes analogy from Mao, had stressed the importance of political action and "winning the hearts and the minds of the people." In the mid-1960s, a "revisionist" counterinsurgency doctrine emerged, primarily from the RAND Corporation, which like the Che-Debray revolutionary doctrine, put the primary emphasis on the military organization and military capability. The dramatic failure of the "military"theory of insurgency in

In a similar vein, Venezuelan guerrilla leaders have argued that a revolutionary army can only be built in the safety of the countryside: "we will have to gather it in the mountains, not the cities; we will have to operate where the enemy is weakest and where we can go on growing, getting stronger, while drawing the enemy out and weakening him." Time, as another Venezuelan urban guerrilla leader put it, "is an implacable enemy in the city while in the countryside it is often on the guerrilla's side ....The basic thing is the development and total stabilization of the rural guerrilla ...."[7]

Here again the revolutionaries could be suffering from the inadequacy and inappropriateness of their own doctrine. Their doctrine says that the revolution has to b made in the countryside, "the weakest link in the imperialist chain"; their experience has shown that it cannot be made there, at least at the present time. The processes of urbanization and development suggest that in most societies the probability of rural revolution is steadily decreasing. Is it now likely that, despite what the revolutionaries themselves may assert, the future of revolution, if it has a future, lies more in the burgeoning cities of the Third World than its depopulated countryside?

The urban revolutionary faces many problems of tactics and organization. But his basic problem concerns the nature of the constituency to which he wishes to appeal. A revolutionary has to have a constituency which he can mobilize for political support and military action. To date, urban guerrillas have notably failed to develop and to maintain a social base with some substantial segment of the urban population. The most promising constituency, presumably, lies in the urban slums and among the large percentage of the labor force which is unemployed. The most recent migrants to the cities, however, are likely to feel better off than they did in the countryside, are more likely than other groups to be employed, and are not likely to be politically conscious. The "second generation" should provide better potential for revolution. But even here the revolutionary appeal has to compete with the possibilities for incremental adjustment and improvement in the cities through public programs and private efforts and the expectations which may remain for still further possible improvement in the future. In the countryside in most Third World countries, the active and ambitious peasant boy, as in South Vietnam, has to choose between "moving to Saigon and joining the Viet Cong." Once in Saigon or any other major city, the alternative of joining the revolution remains but it must now compete with a variety of other real and potential options. Mobilizing an urban constituency thus poses major problems for the urban guerrilla. He is in conditions where, in Debray(s words, he lacks a "social and economic base" and as a result his activity becomes limited to "harassment and

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Latin America may have its parallels in the relative lack of success of the "military"theory of counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia.

sabotage".[8] Urban terrorism, in short, is easy; urban revolution extremely difficult.

The possibility of peasant revolution is fading into history. Even now Che is almost as remote a romantic figure as Zapata. But the possibility of urban revolution cannot be so stringently rejected. In the past, the Great Revolutions have furnished one channel for the modernization of society. Rural reform and urban migration may provide alternative routes which the bulk of the third world countries may follow. They may thus foreclose or severely reduce the probability of future revolutions along the lines of the urban middle class - peasant revolutionary coalitions which have existed and succeeded in the past. Yet urbanization is only an element in modernization and the phenomenon of urbanization without industrialization may open up third world countries to the possibility of new types of social revolution absent from the history of the early modernizers. Such revolutions may be necessary to complete the process of modernization which the urban migration began.

In 1964, a radical Brazilian priest, commenting on the student revolutionary movement, remarked sadly:

> They say it is a question of violence. They say we should be against violence. One kind is to place a bomb in the United States Embassy. Another is to permit a society that murders children by denying them food and medicine, that condemns children to a life without joy because they cannot get into school.
> When students come to me and say they want to make the revolution, I tell them to go ahead. But I don't think they will make it. I think it's too late.[9]

In most third world countries, it indeed may be too late for a peasant revolution; but it could also be too early for an urban one.

IV. The Rise of Communal Violence

In communal violence, ethnic, religious, or racial groups challenge not the structure and purpose of the political system, as in revolutionary violence, but rather its scope. Their demand, typically, is for autonomy or independence. In this sense, communal violence is <u>extrasystem</u> violence. In some cases, the antagonism of the communal group is aimed directly at another communal group, and communal groups, like any other groups, can engage in praetorian violence to secure immediate ends. Underlying most communal violence, however, are more fundamental issues. Who constitutes "the people" who are to provide government by the people? Who belongs to "the nation" on which the nation-state rests? These issues had little meaning or relevance in traditional society. They are of critical importance in a modernized, participant society.

Violence among ethnic, racial, and religious groups was on an upward swing throughout the 1960s in societies at all levels of socio-economic development from central Africa and Burma through Malaya and Ceylon to Canada, Belgium, and the United States. Its principal manifestations occurred in

areas which historically have been the meeting places of two major cultures or races along what might be termed the demographic faults of human civilization. Among those larger antagonisms which cut across nation-state boundaries are those between: Malays and Chinese (Malaysia and to a lesser extent Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines); Hindus and Moslems (India, Pakistan); Arabs and Jews (Palestine); Arabs and Balcks (Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia, Cameroons); Balcks and Whites (Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, the United States); Latin and North Europeans (Belgium, Canada); Blacks and East Indians (Guyana, Trinidad); Protestants and Catholics (Northern Ireland). In addition, countries like Burma, Thailand, Ceylon, Pakistan, Iraq, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, and most of the countries of Balck Africa have communal differences which are often no less likely to produce violence for being peculiar to the individual country.

Communal ties are ascriptive, and hence people often think of them as traditional in character. Communal conflict, consequently, is thought of as a more traditional form of conflict than, say, conflict among social classes. In fact, however, communal characteristics may be ascriptive, but communal consciousness is created and malleable. It is, indeed, often intensified by and in some cases initiated by the process of modernization. Social-economic changes which may decrease the probability of revolutionary violence often increase the likelihood of communal violence.

Modernization may stimulate communal conflict in a variety of ways. Through the development of transportation and communication, it tends to break down group isolation and to drastically increase intergroup contacts and competition. This inevitably generates fears and suspicions and makes it possible for groups to compare, unfavorably, their share in values - wealth, power, security, knowledge, respect - with those of other groups. The efforts to create a nation state, where one did not exist before, also raise new issues to inflame group conflict. So long as the state did not penetrate the society and the people did not participate in the state, many of these problems could be avoided. Once the state begins to play a more important role in society, questions concerning national symbols, language, education policy become of critical importance. The fact that national unity itself becomes a goal of government policy and organization stimulates conflicts among groups as to what their roles should be in a unified society.*

*There is an interesting parallel here to what happened, in the United States at least, in the efforts to unify the armed forces. The intense interservice rivalry of the late 1940s and early 1950s was primarily the product of the "Unification" Acts of 1947 and 1949. Less intense efforts to achieve unity among the military would have produced more harmony among the military.

passage

As a modern economy emerges side-by-side with the traditional economy, the extent to which different communal groups share in that economy also raises issues of training, jobs, pay, and housing, which did not exist when all groups had only a traditional sector in which to participate. Economic development often changes previously existing economic and political relations among groups. A communal group which has played the dominant role in a primarily agrarian society finds itself threatened by a previously subordinate group which is better able to assume leadership roles in commerce and industry. Or a group which was previously rural moves into the cities (French Canadians, U.S. Negroes, Malays) and increasingly sees itself the victim of discrimination or exploitation by the groups which had earlier established a dominant role in the modern economy.

The initial phase of modernization, moreover, usually sees the emergence of a metropolitan or cosmopolitan modern elite of civil servants, military officers, businessmen, and professional men who have been abroad and who share an understanding of and commitment to modern ideas. Latest phases of modernization see an expansion of social mobilization and political participation to broader strata of the population many of whom do not and cannot share in the cosmopolitan culture. As they become more urban and literate, however, these people often become more fervently committed to their communal culture. The elites which earlier had been united by the modern culture of the colonial power find it necessary to become increasingly responsive to and identified with the culture of the communal groups in their society.

More generally, most forms of rapid social and economic change engender feelings of uncertainty, insecurity, and alienation in people. They produce a need to have a reassuring identity, and the most immediate, fundamental, and unchallengeable identity for a person to emphasize is precisely an ascriptive one which is his by birth and which consequently cannot be taken away from him by the social-economic changes which may threaten or lead him to change his occupational, geographical, and social class identities. In the nationalist phase before independence and immediately afterward, communal differences are submerged in the struggle with the colonial power. After independence, a charismatic leader often establishes primacy and offers leadership with which large elements of the population can identify. In this phase also, social goals - the achievement of Arab or African socialism - often provide a temporary focus for loyalty and enthousiasm. When these goals are not achieved, however, when the leader loses his charisma, when the nationalist struggle fades into the past and the social revolution recedes into the future, communal identities come to the fore.

Communal violence comes in many forms. The urban riot typically involves direct attacks by members of one communal group on the persons or property

of members of another communal group. It is, in large part, inter-group conflict. The government may be and indeed usually is dominated by one of the groups, but it is not usually the direct target of a group. It is generally perceived as biased by one or both parties to the conflict but it also usually defines its own role simply as the protection of public safety. The maintenance of law and order, as conceived by the government, usually has a differential impact on the contesting groups, but in the primary instance, at least, the conflict is among the groups rather than between one group and the government. Communal-based urban terrorism, on the other hand, is usually directed primarily against the government. So also is the separatist war, which takes the form of an uprising in a remote geographical area on behalf of independence or autonomy.

Communal violence has several characteristics which distinguish it from praetorian and revolutionary violence. In the first place, it is characterized by a high degree of polarization. It involves fundamental questions of identity, and the we-they distinction is clear-cut and overriding. In other forms of social violence, memberships in competing groups can be of varying degrees of intensity, and large numbers of people in the society may not identify with any of the parties in the conflict. In most non-communal civil conflicts, more people are neutral than participant. But in a communal conflict, individuals have no way of being in the middle or adopting a neutral stance. One is either balck or white, Moslem or Hindu, Chinese or Malay, Protestant or Catholic, and as the conflict becomes more intense and violent, there is no way in which a neighborhood, or a family, or an individual, can escape the consequences of his unescapable ascriptive identity. And since identities are inflexible, so too are commitments. In a social, political, or ideological conflict, positions can be modified and conversion is possible. A revolutionary can make his peace with the establishment; a bourgeois can adapt to life in a socialist society. In a communal conflict, on the other hand, compromise is difficult and conversion impossible. Identities and commitments can seldom be abandoned and almost never merged.

Second, communal violence is normally ideologically ambivalent. Revolutionary and praetorian violence are rationalized and explained in political and ideological terms which can be used to win support from hesitant groups. A rural revolutionary war, for instance, can be usefully thought of as a militarized election campaign to win, through promises and threats, the support of peasants in the countryside. Non-participants, in turn, can evaluate the struggle in terms of their ideologies: conservative, liberal, socialist, communist. Except in one or two special cases, however, the political ideologies furnish little guidance as to who is right and wrong in communal conflicts. The one clear-cut exception is where a communal minority excludes from political and economic power a communal majority. Liberals and probably most leftists wouuld normally find their ideology leading them to support the

majority. But the reverse case where a communal majority discriminates against a communal minority poses greater difficulty, as do the many instances where smaller communal minorities want autonomy or full-scale independence from control by larger communal minorities. Where is the line drawn between self-determination and balkanization? If the Ibos have a right to secede from Nigeria, do not the Efiks, Ibibios, and Ijaws have a right to secede from Biafra? Political theories and political ideologies, whether Marxist, liberal, or conservative, have no easy answers to these questions. Attitudes towards who is right and who is wrong in communal conflicts are, hence, likely to be more highly influenced, as one would expect, by communal affinities with one side or another, or in the absence of these, by simple considerations of power politics.

With rare exceptions, in short, political ideologies provide no sure guide to who are the good guys and who are the bad guys in communal conflicts. In part for this reason, the participants in many communal conflicts often try to make the conflict look ideological. This is particularly true in national independence movements. The Malayan insurgency was often portrayed as more communist than Chinese, and the insurgents in Portuguese Guinea as more nationalist than Balante. In these and other cases, communal minorities within a colonial territory attempted to dress up particularistic interests in universalistic terms. Throughout much of the Third World what appear at first glance to be ideological-revolutionary conflicts often turn out to be grounded in ethnic, racial, or religious differences. The communal wolf dresses in ideological sheep's clothing.

This tendency is in turn related to a third characteristic of communal conflicts, which is precisely the extent to which they are particularistic and hence isolatable from broader concerns. Communal wars involve discrete peoples not generalizable interests. They do not raise issues which are perceived as directly relevant by peoples lacking affinity with the communal groups. Hence the great powers can be more detached about communal wars than they can be about revolutionary or even praetorian conflicts. If, for instance, Nigeria had suffered the same amount of violence in the form of a social revolution rather than a communal conflict, it is virtually inconceivable that both the United States and the Soviet Union could have been as unconcerned as they were about the outcome of the conflict. With rare exceptions, communal wars during the last twenty years have not received a large amount of world attention, despite the prolonged duration and extensive casualties which some of them have involved. It is, indeed, rather striking that the label "forgotten war" has, quite appropriately, been independently applied to the Shan and Kachin struggle against the Burmese government, the Kurd's war against Iraq, and the southern tribal insurrection against the Sudanese government. Biafra and Bengal are exceptions to this pattern, which may

reflect a growing international concern about communal wars or simply the fact that Nigeria and Pakistan are, after all, reasonably important countries. To the extent that communal conflicts are isolatable and hence ignorable, they pose fewer threats to general world security than other types of civil conflict.

Fourth, communal conflicts typically involve large amounts of violence and often particularly vicious forms of violence. The word "genocide" has been bandied about rather loosely lately, but it is in this type of conflict that it may still retain some relevance. If the enemy cannot be converted, he must be eliminated: such is often the logic of the participants in these conflicts. Statistics on the casualties in communal wars are notoriously imprecise, but it is reported, for instance, that something like a million people were killed in the Moslem-Hindu struggles at the time India received its independence, that 100,000 died in the Karen fighting against the Burmese between 1948 and 1952, that another 100,000 were killed in the fighting of the Nagas against the Indian government, that the dead in the war between the Kurds and the Iraqis numbered a quarter of a million between 1945 and 1968, that twice that number of people were killed in the fighting in the Sudan between 1955 and 1968; that three or four hundred thousand were killed in Nigeria; and that the deaths in the Bengal War will soon approximate that level.

A fifth characteristic of communal conflicts, particularly when they take the form of separatist wars, is their long duration. The typical communal war drags on for an almost interminable length of time, with the level of violence at times very low or non-existent but then flaring up again. Compromise settlements in such conflicts are extraordinarily difficult to arrive at and when they are negotiated, they often break down - witness the periodic collapse of the agreements reached between the Kurds and the Iraqis or between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus. To be sure, the Biafra conflict was one of the few wars of any sort (communal or non-communal) in recent years which came to a definite, nineteenth-century style end, with the formal surrender of one side. But this is a clear exception to the usual pattern. The communal insurrection is normally located in a remote part of the country, where the government may well have difficulty exercising its authority even in the best of circumstances. The governments of underdeveloped countries can usually fight only underdeveloped wars. Undoubtedly this fact, more than anything else, has made genocide less common than it might otherwise have been. The wars, however, drag on, since it is beyond the power of either side to win militarily and beyond the power of both to compromise politically.

These characteristics add up to a rather bleak picture of communal conflict. The resolution of such conflict is extraordinarily difficult, particularly for governments which are themselves deficient in legitimate authority and bureaucratic effectiveness. Where there is sustained violence

between a territorially segregated communal group and the government, the least costly means of resolving the conflict will often be separation into two distinct nation-states. Where people are intermixed, population transfers and then territorial separation may be the answer. In general, the dangers of balkanization have been overestimated as against the costs involved in attempting to keep two very different peoples in one integrated state. If that effort is to be made, it normally requires: (a) a certain measure of political decentralization, and (b) some formal sharing in the central institutions of power.

Democratic regimes and communist regimes appear to have been more successful than narrowly based authoritarian governments in maintaining communal peace. A communist system, after all, furnishes an ideological basis for governmental legitimacy, and hence there can be, for instance, a Yugoslav state without the pretence that there is a Yugoslav nationality. Democratic systems, on the other hand, provide a recognizable formual for sharing in power and a familiarity with the requirements for compromise among groups. The point is often made - and it is often valid - that competitive elections can inflame communal feelings as demagogues and extremist groups appeal to what appear to be the most easily mobilizable constituencies. Electoral competition, however, can also be structured so as to minimize the effectiveness of communal appeals, and decocratic systems have a reasonably good record in keeping communal violence at low levels. A case can be made that in Malaysia, India, Ceylon, Lebanon, Guyana, communal violence might well have been much worse if it had not been for the opportunities provided by the electoral process. In these systems, indeed, the old cliche that homogeneity and consensus are necessary prerequisites for achieving democracy may be stood on its head; instead, democracy may be essential for minimizing disunity.

V. The Effects of Civil Violence on Modernization

The processes of development or modernization in the Third World, thus, seem likely:

(a) to produce increasing anarchy or increasing repression in societies which have been characterized by praetorian violence;

(b) to reduce significantly the probability of revolution involving a coalition of peasantry and urban middle class, but to open the possibility of a new-style urban revolution;

(c) to stimulate further communal violence.

If this be the general influence of development on violence, what effects are these patterns of violence likely to have on development? Some forms of political violence clearly stimulate political mobilization, institutional development, economic growth, and social cohesion. External wars often do all of these things, and in the Third World in recent years, high military expend-

itures have been associated with high rates of economic development. A successful revolution is itself a manifestation of a high level of political mobilization and in the twentieth century has usually produced greater social cohesion and led to the creation of a stable and highly institutionalized system of one-party rule. The effects of revolution on economic development have been somewhat more mixed, but by and large post-revolutionary societies have attained highly respectable rates of economic growth. In some measure, both foreign war and internal revolution seem to have significant positive consequences for development.

At the present time, however, these are not the forms of political violence which the processes of development seem most likely to produce. Praetorian violence, political repression, and communal conflict are much more likely to ensue. In some instances, a repressive authoritarian government may, as in Greece and Brazil, be able to maintain a substantial rate of economic growth. The more general impact of both praetorian and communal violence on social-economic modernization, however, can hardly be anything but deleterious. Communal conflicts in third world countries are likely to be prolonged, debilitating struggles with little prospect of a resolution satisfactory to either side. Communal identities are malleable, but the tendency appears to be toward the emergence of narrower and more particularistic identities instead of broader ones. At its worst, praetorianism can lead to a total breakdown in public order, such as has occurred in Guatemala and Bolivia and appears to be occurring in the Dominican Republic and Uruguay. In these cases, the revolutionaries-turned-urban-terrorists contribute to the disruption of existing society with little pretense of contributing to the development of a substitute. The result is a Hobbesian world without security, without trust, and without hope. The civil violence which development produces is not the violence which produces development.

Reference Notes

1. See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 3; Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," Jour. of Conflict Resolution, 10 (Sept. 1966), 253-54; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 2-4.

2. See Gurr, op. cit., passim, and, for further elaborations of this approach, Huntington, op. cit., pp. 53-56; Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, Betty A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (New York, Bantam, 1969), pp. 632-87; James C. Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution," Amer. Sociological Rev., 27 (Feb. 1962), pp 5-19, and "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Graham and Gurr, op. cit., pp. 690-730.

3. Evidence relative to these propositions can be found in the works cited above in notes 1 and 2 and in the works cited in those works.

4. Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold in Graham and Gurr, op. cit., pp. 666-67.

5. American Foreign Policy: Three Essays (New York, W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 104.

6. See "The Politics of Violence: The Urban Guerrilla in Brazil," Ramparts (Oct. 1970), pp. 32-34.

7. Mario Menendez Rodriguez, "Why We're Rebels," Atlas (July 1967), pp. 30-32.

8. Regis Debray, "The Long March in Latin America: Guerrilla Movements in Theory and Practice," New Left Review (Sept. - Oct. 1965), p.47.

9. Quoted in the New York Times, July 7, 1968, p. 2E.

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Civil Violence and the Pattern of International Power

M. PIERRE HASSNER

One of the few assertions with any claim either to general validity or firmness which I feel entitled to make on civil violence and the pattern of international power relationships, is about the diversity and elusive character of civil violence, the complexity and contradictory character of international power relationships and hence with the essentially indirect, ambiguous and largely unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of the connections between the two. For instance, this summer of 1971 is characterised by both a proliferation of civil violence (from coups d'état to ethnic wars, from Ulster to Pakistan) and a major shift in international alignments. The first would seem to show the limits, if not the hollowness of interstate diplomacy, the second shows its powerful reassertion in the case of the world's three largest powers as against the old missionary ideology. Which of these trends is more important or (perhaps more relevant question) what is the relationship between them?

The answer is made even more difficult if one believes, as I do, that the most decisive element for the evolution of the international system, in the light of which all others have to be seen, is the retreat of the United States from the global role it assumed after World War II. This trend, which started several years ago and has barely begun to unfold, is not directly related to civil violence as such. But it has its immediate occasion in the experience of the United States in Vietnam i.e. at the very least in guerrilla war if not with people's war and revolution, and its deeper cause in the decline of governmental authority and domestic consensus, and the general atmosphere of frustration in the American public with America's international role. The fate of diplomatic alignments, of the military balance and of the intervention of outside powers in civil conflict may be affected above all, even though in an indirect and diffuse manner, by the diverging trends of political authority, of popular attitudes and of trans-national communications in different types of regimes and societies.

Obviously the power of great powers cannot be divorced from their successes and failures in influencing the rest of the world. Even if one considers only the mutual relationship of the two super powers in the strictest economic and military

terms, the allocation of their resources, and their strategic posture towards each other, will be affected by their respective relationship to China. Ultimately, while only the most adventurous speculator would envisage a civil war in the United States triggered by its experience with revolution abroad, or (less fantastic scenario, to be found in Amalrik's book) a civil war in the Soviet Union triggered by a war with China, the possibility of involvement abroad leading to civil unrest at home, the fear of the contagion for the metropolis of revolts in an empire are classic preoccuptations which are as relevant today as any diplomatic or military calculus. But they are much more difficult to analyse, predict and check.

Side by side with the physical balance of power, there exists a psychological balance based on intangibles of value and belief "The presuppositions of the physical equilibrium have changed drastically; those of the psychological balance remain to be discovered" (Henry Kissinger).

Two questions, then, seem to emerge. The first is about facts, about the combination, in the present world, of civil violence and diplomatic manoeuvers about the respective roles and importance of intervention and escalation, interference and mediation, revolution-making and peace-making in civil strife. The other is about the global evaluation of these facts, about the degree to which they really matter for the balance of power.

There are two current views of the international world, each of which provides a coherent answer to both questions taken together. For the first school, civil conflicts affect the international balance because they are part of one international civil war. This view stresses external influences in civil strife through the notions of subversion, revolutionary war, indirect aggression, counter-revolution, etc. It sees them as part of one protracted conflict which, like the arms race, is a search for victory through indirect means as a substitute, or preparation, for direct war. For the second school, widespread today, this global struggle which made every domestic situation internationally relevant, was a myth. Both the causes and the importance of civil conflict are essentially local. Domestic regimes are, in their own way, as unmanageable as nuclear weapons. Domestic instability and nuclear stability are best left to themselves. They do not really affect the international game which is a classical or dramatic power play of national interests moderated by their very diversity and by a common concern for not rocking the boat.

Predictably, this paper takes a third, more empirical, view based on the multiplicity of ways in which the elements emphasised by the first two - the global and the local, the national and the ideological, the material and the psychological - are combined from case to case.

It does seem plausible, as the second view asserts, that diversity in international communism and multipolarity in the international system on balance encourage the dimension of state versus party, of national interest versus missionary ideology and that the strength of nationalism does make imported revolution and counter-revolution more difficult than either side originally believed. Yet the multiplicity of communist powers may lead, in Brian Crozier's formulation, to "competitive subversion" rather than abstention: state and party, national interest and ideology, oppose but also exploit each other. We all know by now that a territorial state necessarily bends its ideology, no matter how universalistic, to its specific perspectives and, conversely, that in an interdependent world without an accepted centre of legitimacy, conceptions of national interest are influenced by subnational and transnational feuds and solidarities. Civil violence may not be engineered from outside but it may be propagated by the force of example and exploited for diplomatic and strategic purposes. The fate of Vietnam or Rumania, Israel or the Sudan, the state of the nuclear balance, even of the moon race, all have effects on the feeling of confidence or impotence of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., on their hostility or co-operation, effects which can be neither calculated nor ignored.

A few distinctions

A few distinctions are necessary to point up some of the lines of communication along which civil conflict and the international balance interact.

A first distinction would involve the forms of civil violence in degrees of intensity one may distinguish between civil conflict, civil strife and civil war. In terms of means, one could go from individual violence (which can have important political consequences) through terrorism to insurrection, guerrilla, or even internal conventional warfare between a state and a rebellion. Obviously developed societies, like the United States, are experiencing civil conflict and the spread of individual and small-group violence but not, so far, civil war or revolution.

An even more obvious distinction is between phases. A classic question is whether international involvement is more operative in initiating civil warfare (the "push" theory) or in transforming or terminating it, through generalisation or mediation (the "pull" theory). What matters is that we should distinguish between preoccupation with civil violence as such and preoccupation with its causes and effects.

One of the reasons why it is so difficult to speak of the way civil violence affects the balance of power is simply that, strategically or economically, civil violence is as important as the country where it occurs. Of course

violence as such, or its toleration, has important psychological effects. But, in the first instance, the great powers will be interested in the alignment of a given country because of the importance of its geographical location or weight of resources. What matters most to them is to secure or deny access to what it offers and, if this is important enough, they will try to influence its development, irrespective of whether it is threatened by external aggression, civil violence or even, in some cases, peaceful change.

Their attitude, in this case, will be determined above all by the pattern of international alignments and by the place within it of themselves and of the country where civil violence occurs. Two dimensions of the international system can be relevant and affected: the power structure (or the number and heirarchy of the powers) and the relations of conflict and co-operation among these powers. Combining the criteria of number and of the prevalence of conflict or co-operation, we have:

Empire	-	Federation
Bipolarity	-	Condominium
Balance of Power	-	Concert of Powers
Unit Veto System	-	Collective Security
(everyone for himself)	-	(each for all, all for each)

Given its multiple dimensions the present system combines elements of all these types with a prevalance of bipolarity and condominium evolving towards a multipolar balance, and concert, of powers. In addition, some great powers find it harder to control or isolate some smaller ones, and this brings in elements of self-reliance and collective-security.

Another distinction between systems which are homogeneous or heterogeneous from the point of view of legitimacy, adds to the confusion. Each of the two classic types, the multipolar balance of power of the 19th century and the cold war confrontation of the 1950s, was based on one of these opposite principles of order. Today, we have both, so that the lines between camps and spheres are blurred. Powers are both allied and enemies. The multipolarity of the system makes their commitments ambiguous, yet its division in camps makes their involvement in domestic conflicts inevitable at least to the extent that they will be subject to appeals from parties to civil conflicts, which, for the sake of their own legitimacy, they cannot completely ignore. The Soviet Union and the Sudan is a case in point. One can see instances of increased triangular competition, of mutual neutralisation giving greater freedom of action to a country with internal conflict, but also to greater claims, at least on the part of some powers, to a more exclusive authority in their own region. Multipolarisation may mean regionalisation or a carving up of the globe between regional leading powers.

On the other hand trans-national trends towards global communications and solidarities, to national mobilisation in under developed countries to domestication in developed liberal societies and conservative authoritarianism in developed communist ones, may lead to different results. At the level of trans-national turmoil, the distinction between violence and politics or domestic and international issues becomes very difficult to make because they all seem to be part of the same contradictory social process which sometimes takes evolutionary, sometimes revolutionary forms, sometimes subterraneous, sometimes explosive ones.

Hence, in trying to link types of civil strife and types of international systems, we must pay attention, as Mitchell pointed out, to two types of linkages: the rational active ones by which states and international structures influence civil violence, and the social-psychological ones, by which its waves are transmitted to other societies. To the first category belongs the whole scale of intervention, formal or informal, through diplomacy, force, money, instruction, propaganda etc. Different powers may try to isolate the conflict or to generalise it, to support the government or the rebels or to mediate between them. The interaction between their attitudes towards civil wars and towards each other may lead to four types of pattern :

International Civil War: Support of each other's rebels

Holy Alliance: Mutual support of governments

Concert: Attempts at mediation, arbitration etc.

Abstention: Refusal to be involved

To the second category belong the links between societies, either between groups linked by ideological, economic, racial, ethnic, religious, or other forms of solidarity or dependence, leading to prior involvement or interpenetration - or the contagion still imperfectly understood, of spontaneous moods, limitation, emulation etc. These may lead governments against the calculations of national interest or the balance of power, to intervene one way or the other, thereby indirectly modifying the pattern. Then the nature of civil conflicts, the character of the groups or views involved, and the structure of transnational society, particularly in ideological and economic terms, become crucial for the operation of the international balance of power.

So far, there has been a rough coincidence between the central strategic balance and the industrial world, between strategic and social stability. The Third World has, again roughly been nonaligned and the scene of the great majority of violent conflicts domestic and international. Within this broad generalisation, two things are certain: first, so far, within the bipolar system, one can distinguish three types of regions. First, there are those directly linked to the central nuclear balance, where conflict has not come into the open because it would have

meant immediate escalation and general war (e.g. civil war in Germany). Intervention to prevent it would have been certain, but the character of societies and regimes made it in general unnecessary.

Second, there have been those at the other extreme, as in Africa, where societies have been very unstable but the great powers have not been directly involved. Here from coup d'état to genocide, violent conflict has been able to follow its whole course without provoking escalation or large scale intervention or affecting the balance of power. Third, there have been those areas, like Asia or the Middle East, which were sufficiently important for the super powers to be involved, yet where their presence was sufficently ambiguous for nobody, including themselves, to know in advance the degree of their control over their allies, of their commitment to them, or of the risks of confrontation they were willing to run against each other. These are, of course, the most dangerous regions because unstable societies and territorial disputes coincide with strategic importance and with great power involvement.

The second certainty is that this situation is changing. The balance of power is less strictly bipolar. Even between the two super powers it is shifting, if not at the nuclear level at least because the territorial and political sides of the balance (a tight control of the Soviet Union over the communist world, versus a more flexible and diffuse dominance of the United States over the rest of the world) has been attacked from various sides. In addition, industrial societies are attacked by forces of erosion in the West and explosive ones in the East. What is the possible impact of these two basic phenomena - the multiplication of centres of power and the crisis in the outer circles and perhaps the centres of the super power spheres - upon the danger map in the internationalisation of civil violence?

A few trends

The Cold War started with a civil war in Europe; it sank into the general consciousness of Western public opinion with a coup d'état also in Europe. The issues of foreign intervention against subversion, of outside help to insurgents, of the communist technique of bloodless seizure of power assisted by the threatening proximity of the Red Army were very much alive in 1945-48 on the European continent itself. However, in spite of propaganda and economic warfare obviously designed at least at weakening each other's regimes, the sense that in Europe the lines were drawn and that the real struggle was fought in Africa and Asia, over the fate of colonial and post-colonial regimes, became widespread on both sides in the middle fifties and probably reached its peak, under Kennedy and Khruschev, in 1960-61. By and large, the picture of stalemate in Europe and war by proxy in the Third World has been an adequate one. But this notion of competition

for the Third World has been changed to a double realisation (not always on the same side at the same time) that underdeveloped countries were both less easy and less important to control than one thought. As usual, with the exception of Khrushchev's successive enthusiasm and disillusionment with Africa, the switch seems to be more pronounced in the case of the United States which seems to oscillate between direct, physical involvement and disengagement than in the case of the Soviet Union which, in spite of numerous errors and setbacks, seems to have been more cautious but persistent.

Both in retrospect and today, it is difficult to separate fact and myth in the attitude of the great powers to Third World revolutions and their involvement in local conflicts. It is remarkable that while the domino - theory and the notion of a world-wide struggle have been increasingly unpopular among Western Liberals they are voiced today with even more conviction by Guevarist revolutionaries and radical historians than by French colonels or their American successors. They see a struggle between imperialism and revolution dating back at least to 1917; in a more discriminating way, they see the United States constantly engaged against revolution either in order to protect its economic interests, or defend the status quo, or oppose communism. Perhaps the "game of nations" is still played as actively as ever in Washington in spite of the changed mood there. Certainly, the other side sees the hand of the CIA in the wave of "right wing" coups in 1965-67 (Ghana, Algeria, Indonesia, Greece etc.) and probably in the present turn to the right in the Arab world.

In both cases, Western liberals would be inclined to see little in common between the various situations and to believe that American involvement and the indirect effects of American policy (for instance the influence of firmness in Vietnam over the outcome in Indonesia) are less important than local factors. Similarly, the old belief that all civil conflicts have been based or fomented in Moscow or Peking is subject to re-evaluation. Three parallel debates have taken place among Western specialists:about Stalin's attitude in the early postwar years (particularly towards China, Greece and Western communist parties), Khruschev's speech of 6 January 1961 about ways of liberation and the Lin Piao "encirclement of the world's cities by the world's countryside" statement of 1965.

Of course if one leans towards the non-activistic interpretation of these controversies, one must emphasize that the moderation one posits in the actual behaviour of Moscow and Peking is based on a realistic, perhaps even over-cautious evaluation of the risks of escalation of conflict. Nobody should impute to Stalin a lack of desire to use military power for changing other countries' regimes, to Khruschev disbelief in the progress of revolution or to Mao a rejection of violence. Indeed, for the Soviet Union any conflict within the "Socialist Community"

is in principle a civil conflict where the imperial power is entitled to intervene and re-establish authority. For China, the more passive the encirclement strategy appears, the more seriously we may have to take the character of the international civil war: the aim is less to conquer this or that country than to win the global battle at the centre, psychologically to encircle the "cities" by demoralising them and to demoralise them by inciting them to overextension and then moving to replace them when they disengage.

All this means that, either because they are more cautious, or have better local allies, or are more confident in the ultimate trend of events, communist powers have generally been able to fight their wars by proxy. This has made local successes more likely and local failure less compromising and costly. By contrast, the United States, while more defensive politically, has been more directly and openly interventionist militarily, even in civil conflicts where the dangers of communism, let alone of foreign intervantion, were only potential, as in the Lebanon (1958) or San Domingo (1965). In the third world, during the decolonisation and early post-colonial period, communist movements have usually been on the same side as nationalist ones, even when they have not dominated them as in Vietnam. To the extent that it protects the status quo, the United States has to intervene more directly because it backs the weaker, or at least less organized, side.

In Eastern Europe, by contrast, the Soviet Union has repeatedly intervened militarily because in civil conflicts nationalism operated against it. In Western Europe, nationalism is weaker; United States domination is more flexible, more indirect, or less political; transnational ties and solidarity compensate for political divergencies: and the social forces allied to the United States are in general stronger than those opposed to it. Hence while more adventurous than the Soviet Union in the third world, the United States has been infinitely more tolerant in its own "sphere" with its industrialised allies. Is it because it did not have to intervene by force or because of a greater respect for the political process of Western countries which made overt manipulation less acceptable? The record in relations with Latin America is too mixed to warrant a categorical answer.

If Europe became more unstable, veering to revolutions or civil wars, would the attitude of the United States remain the same? Conversely, if, in the third world, splits between post-colonial, nationalist governments and communist or revolutionary movements develop (as in the Sudan), where the Soviet Union and even China have more conventional state interests and more conventional military means, would their attitude to civil conflicts change? I am not predicting a general turning of the tables - a revolutionary Europe, a conservative third world, a regionally restricted United States, a globally

interventionist Soviet Union and a Holy Alliance-oriented China - but certainly there are enough trends in these directions to make it worth looking at their impact as one problem.

Third Worldisation of the West?

The post-industrial West and the post-cold war Europe are experiencing the rebirth of some of the problems earlier periods seemed to have left behind; most of these relate to the effect of domestic instability on international politics.

The essential meaning of the year 1968, with abortive revolution in Prague and abortive civil war in Paris, was to show that the deepest cause which made impossible both the hostile status quo of cold war and the cooperative status quo of détente, which created both the erosion of alliances and their forceful reassertion and produced the pressures towards rapprochement and reactions against it, was the domestic instability and fragility both of developed Western societies and of totalitarian communist regimes. By challenging the stability which in the West had seemed to rest upon the decline of ideology and in the East upon its triumph, 1968 had raised the spectre of "third world-isation". Certainly, advanced industrial societies have acquired some of the characteristics associated with developing ones: domestic instability, criminal terrorism, the breakdown of law and order, a resurgence of minority conflicts, the irrelevance of political institutions, a direct political role for students and the army, a variable and uncertain control by the super powers. One is also brought back to some of the uncertainties of the beginning of the cold war in 1947 and 1948. Europe is divided yet some marginal positions are still, or again, contested; the internal stability of the two Europes cannot be taken for granted; one wonders whether the French Communist Party has ceased to be revolutionary or continued to be prudent; one speculates about the result of Italian elections, about the extent of Czechoslovak submission, the relations of Yugoslavia with the Soviet bloc and the respective stability of the two Germanies. The degree of conformity imposed by the Soviet Union in the East, the permanence and solidity of the American presence in the West, the security of neutral and non-aligned countries and those of the whole Balkan and northern Mediterranean area are more open to question, again, than during the 1950s and early 1960s.

There is one relevant difference, both with the third world and with the Europe of 1947: the preference of outside powers for the status quo has become much more clear. In 1968, it was the status quo which was the great victor: every outside power, certainly including both the United States and the Soviet Union, favoured de Gaulle's victory over the May revolution; the

Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia met with no serious challenge from other powers. The lesson of 1968 was the contract between the stability, even rigidity, of the European system and the new instability of European societies. Since then, the bloody events in Poland, tensions in Yugoslavia, in Turkey, on Cyprus and in Spain, polarisation and small-group violence in West Germany have shown how short-sighted it was to think that "normalisation" of Germany's relations with the East would suffice to pacify Europe. At the same time, even in the troubled Balkans, the improving relations of the Greek regime with all communist regimes testify to the prevalence of intergovernmental diplomacy over revolutionary subversion, at least in the calculations of states. While societies may be becoming more unstable, a mixture of Holy Alliance (or Brezhnev doctrine) politics and abstention seems, at least in the short run, to preserve the international system from its consequences.

A conservative Third World?

This is also becoming the case in the third world. In Latin America Soviet and lately even Cuban support to insurrections have been notably weaker than US support to their suppression, and Latin American governments have tended not to interfere with each other's domestic violence.

More to the point is the case of Africa. The Middle East is different: there the rule has been for Arab governments to encourage subversion in each other's countries in the name of the Arab nation or of the fight between progressive and traditional regimes. But in Africa, with the temporary exception of Nkrumah, the rule has been the Holy Alliance one, at least as far as the territorial status quo is concerned. The solidarity of regimes for the maintenance of existing borders has led to quasi-general support for the Federal side in Nigeria, or to de facto agreements not to support each other's irredentists, as between Ethiopia and the Sudan. Even the outside powers, after a brief period of competition in the Congo, seem to have settled for either supporting the same side, as in Nigeria, or backing their respective client-states. Till recently, as the Soviet Union became more state-oriented, China promoted a line more favourable to violent insurrection or in automatic opposition to the U.S.S.R., as in Biafra or Ruanda-Burundi. But with the diplomatic re-emergence after the cultural revolution China too has relied more on existing states. It has supported the Sudanese government against its Southern rebels.

Even more remarkable, in defeating the "guevarist" or trotskyite rebellion in Ceylon, Mrs. Bandaranaike's popular front government has enjoyed the support of literally all the interested foreign powers, from the United States and Great Britain to the Soviet Union and China. On Bangla Desh, while China and the Soviet Union tend to be on the opposite side of the Pakistan-India dispute, they both seem to be trying, at least on the surface, to prevent it from exploding into war.

One is then tempted to see a succession of three patterns since the war. First there was the bipolar civil war, where every civil conflict seemed part of the Soviet-American war. Second, Soviet Russia progressively shifted to an inter-state approach and to a preference for stability, with China taking over the flag of revolution. Third, China, too, emerging as a "mature power", is now playing predominantly a balance of power game, mixing competition with "Holy Alliance" and "concept of powers" aspects when she happens to share an interest in stability with her rivals.

It would seem then that everywhere in the world, civil violence and conflict are on the increase, but that the willingness of great powers to foment or exploit them is on the decrease. In its more extreme forms, as in Ceylon, this duality between explosive societies and the trade union of governments could be seen - as an anarchist or ultra-leftist interpetration would see it - in active terms: a collusion of reactionary governments against revolutionary peoples. Yet, in general, the main preoccupation of governments is not to repress their peoples but, especially in the third world, to play against each other. In particular the Soviet Union and China are actively engaged in a struggle for influence, first against each other, then against the United States and any other potential candidate, like Japan, for filling the power vacuum left by the American retreat. They are trying to gain, by diplomatic means or, for the U.S.S.R., by the exploitation of economic and conventional military power, a primacy which they once sought-or were thought to seek-by direct or indirect aggression. In so doing, they increasingly observe the constraints of the state system.

The game of states and the turmoil of societies

The main division, then, would be less between camps or even between regions than between the world of the game of states and the world of the turmoil of nations.

If it is true that the manipulation of civil conflict will tend to seem as difficult and rebarbative a task to great powers as territorial conquest, all there will be left to influence will be the external orientation of states, meaning mainly the great powers themselves or those states which have strategic importance for the great power relationship. In practice, this would mean the creation of an inner core of industrialised nations interlocked in limited competition under the shadow of nuclear weapons while developing nations would form the periphery and be left to their own instability and conflicts. For while the opposition between the system of states and the turmoil of societies exists in both cases, each level is more unstable in the developing areas. The social problems are of a different magnitude. Especially in Asia, religious,

ethnic and economic conflicts take on a dimension of urgency and violence that could overwhelm any international system - let alone one which, with the emergence of China and Japan, the tendency to American withdrawal, Soviet expansion, and the unknowns of Indo-Pakistani relations, is in a process of rapid and unpredictable change. One feels that, like the Soviet Union in the Sudan and perhaps, earlier, China in Indonesia, all powers combine a general attitude of prudence with a certain degree of involvement in civil conflicts which can still lead them to misadventures. Even when they give priority to the state game, they try to use it in order to progress towards, in the long run, taking control of societies. There are priorities and contradictions between conspiracy and diplomacy, or armed and legal struggle, in Latin America, but it is impossible to abandon the one for ever in favour of the other since circumstance may once more bring it to the fore. The Soviet Union does not initiate wars of liberation, she may find them much too risky and, as in Vietnam, stand to lose, at times, by her inability to protect her friends. Nevertheless, she has benefitted enormously from the war's consequences for the United States. In Asia or the Middle East, revolutions and wars do happen, nations do collapse or are created. Risks cannot be altogether avoided and opportunities neglected, even though developments such as Soviet-Arab tension after the Sudan coup may give the Soviet Union in a milder way a lesson in those limits of control painfully experienced by the United States.

In Europe, the international system is more rigid and societies more stable. Yet slowly, even here, in its original home, the bipolar system is starting to break down: the beginnings of America's disengagement and its economic conflicts with Western Europe, the beginning of a Chinese presence in the inter-state game, show that new imbalances and, potentially, new alignments are in the making. Here the game is about the evolution of societies and their comparative ability to resist the trends towards disintegration accelerated by communication. This is all done in a low key, where the essence is not to conquer and not even actively to subvert the other side. It consists in hoping that it will be weakened or transformed by its own inner contradictions without bringing the whole common structure down.

A new stage of "hot peace" has replaced the cold war. In a way, it holds the same relationship to its predecessor as the cold war itself to hot or violent war: it is still a conflicted relationship, but one stage further removed, in terms of ends, from a direct challenge to the other side's possessions, institutions, regimes, and, in terms of means, from the use of physical force. The challenge and the threat are still there at least in part, but they come as much from within as from without, they take an even more indirect and less explicit character.

It may still, however, be wrong to assume that the farther one gets from war and propaganda the closer one is to peace and reconciliation.

In the new phase of ambiguity situations may get unfrozen without being solved, isolation may be broken in favour of asymmetrical penetration or of imbalance rather than of reconciliation. There may always be enough social ferment to prevent stabilisation through freezing, enough rigidity to prevent stabilisation through adaptation, enough communication and convergence to prevent stabilisation through isolation, enough separation and divergences to prevent stabilisation through integration.

Perhaps, then, a state of agitated immobilism rather than either revolution or integration is characteristic of the post-cold war system as it seems to be of the post-industrial society, diplomatic activism being the equivalent of social unrest and both being the expression of the gap between a declining legitimacy and persisting structure.

The most characteristic aspect is neither force nor co-operation but the mutual influence of societies within the framework of a competition whose goals are less and less tangible, whose means are less and less direct, whose consequences are less and less calculable precisely because they involve activities rather than strategies and because these activities are important by their effects on what societies <u>are</u> as much as on what they <u>do</u>.

In the long run, dynamic processes of one kind or another are likely to set in; they may reinforce or cancel each other out, or, again, they may coexist and lead to differing results in different countries or alliances, thereby introducing unpredictable changes in the overall balance of the system.

<u>Erosion, expansion, explosion</u>

In the relations between rebellious or dynamic parts and a system which as a whole is conservative a protracted but unstable coexistence can lead to an integration of the parts by the whole, or to its own erosion under their influence, or to a mixture of the two processes, that is to a mutually reinforcing decay. A direct clash can lead to repression or to revolution, or, again, to both and to their mutual frustration in some uncontrollable catastrophe.

In relation to the outside world, both successful absorption or repression and continuing erosion or a cyclical succession of unsuccessful rebellions and repressions may lead to either expansion or retraction of the system (or of its leaders).

Finally, among states or alliances, especially when they are in a situation of contiguity or of competition, classical notions like, precisely, expansion or the struggle for power and security, or the balance of power must be seen in the light of these domestic and transnational processes and conflicts.

The real race may be less to increase one's comparative power than to decrease one's comparative vulnerability, to manipulate not only an opponent's weaknesses but one's own, to encourage exported erosion or to control contagious explosions, to modify or maintain not so much territorial borders or even diplomatic alignments as what might be called the balance of will and the balance of expectations.

In Europe, we are witnessing such a race resulting from the crisis of leaderships and institutions within states and alliances having caught up with the conflict between them but interacting with it rather than superseding it. Hence a situation of "competitive decadence" (to use Mr. Leo Labedz's felicitous expression) where, for instance, one side's expansion is helped by another's erosion but may increase its own need of repression and its own risks of explosion.

By and large the pressures for expression, erosion and retraction seem to be more prevalent in the West, the chances and risks of expansion, repression and explosion more likely in the East.

This seems to be valid both for the two types of countries and the two types of alliances. Just as the Western alliance is in perpetual discord but manages somehow to survive, while the Soviet bloc seems to know no middle ground between monolithic unity and the brink of war, so Western countries seem to have entered a phase of chronic civil unrest but which, so far, does not seem to go beyond lawlessness and "expressive violence", while communist countries, and particularly the Soviet Union, are much better able to impose law and order but at the cost of more violent explosions (as in Poland) and at the risk, one day, of revolution or civil war.

This provides a perspective on the relations between what one can perhaps still call, although with less and less accuracy, the three worlds: large-scale civil violence and uncertain organisation and power relationships in the developing world; low-scale civil strife and flexible organisations and power relationships in the West; permanent structural repression and very rare civil violence, with rigid organisations and power relationships, in the communist world. The great questionmark is whether the latter will develop (through erosion or regeneration?) into Western-type flexible disorder, or whether it will explode into third-world type violent praetorian conflicts of self-determining or territorial varieties.

For the time being, clearly it is the Soviet Union (and, since the end of the cultural revolution, China) who have the greater freedom of action in foreign policy, in military intervention and in policing their own states and spheres of influence. The evidence of present erosion and retraction in the West is more obvious than the evidence of future over-extension or explosion in the East. In particular, U.S. interventions abroad after Vietnam would provoke strong divisions at home, where they would be felt by many to clash with the legitimacy

of American democracy; Soviet interventions, after Czechoslovakia, would be felt by Soviet leaders to be required by their own legitimacy and would not, if the past is any guide, cause much domestic opposition. The United States and all Western democracies find conquest more difficult because of their general values and mood and because, conversely, developing states are more mobilized than before without having lost their military ethos. Opportunities and temptations for American intervention may well arise - through civil war, in Latin America or in Mediterranean Europe. It is likely that they will be resisted (except in the Caribbean) and that attempts to deal with those emergencies in other ways would not be followed by military escalation. It would, for instance, be fervently hoped that American money and covert influence, Nato membership, the diffuse effect of the EEC, might keep Italy in the Western fold in the event of communist accession to government; but it is hard to envisage U.S., Nato or West European troops intervening in Italy after the fashion of Soviet troops in Prague or even of Egypt and Libya in the Sudan.

On the Eastern side, on the contrary, the Soviet Union would have no trouble using force in case of domestic strife in her empire, even in East Germany. The empire presents the anomaly of several relatively "western", urbanized countries being dominated by a more traditionally military power. The same cannot of course be said of Soviet intervention in China - even at times of civil conflict like the cultural revolution. Even in Europe, most countries would offer resistance, and the Soviet Union has very little besides force and, to a limited extent economic leverage, to hold its bloc together. While she can live with it in the short run, repeated use of force still must have its domestic costs and, of course, creates long-range hostility along with short-range submission.

One of the U.S.S.R.'s essential weapons is to be able to exploit civil conflicts inside her sphere. This is even more the case in the "grey areas" whose status relative to the "socialist community" is ambiguous. One of the few things one is able to say with some confidence about the future of Yugoslavia and of its relations with the Soviet Union is that a purely external Soviet aggression against a united and defiant Yugoslavia would be most unlikely. But if social erosion and national explosions were to lead to civil war and to some participants actually welcoming Soviet support, this support would be forthcoming.

This leads us to two contrasting conclusions about various types of unity and conflict in their relation with world order. First, attempts to maintain the "monolithic unity" and isolation of spheres of influence are immediately dangerous and ultimately doomed. In the abstract, they would seem to provide the safest solution: where one great power and only one intervenes, there is less

danger of escalation than when two intervene on opposite sides. Not only the breakdown of the bipolar order, but the needs for trans-national and trans-bloc communication, the aspirations to national independence, the democratisation of violence and its unplanned consequences, make an empire maintained mainly by force a dangerous proposition. The only way to reconcile independence and communication is by interpenetration. As Marshall Shulman implies, mutual access by great powers is, from the point of view of world order, the only guarantee against unilateral intervention.

But it is certainly no substitute for the unity of nations, big and small, in the face of external threats, since internal breakdown and conflict is today the main occasion for foreign intervention, direct or indirect.

In a world where change is more and more unavoidable but less and less manageable, where dominoes are falling but in the most unexpected directions, the strategic uses of "competitive subversion" are declining; but the importance of maintaining as good a balance as one's rivals between the vital needs of internal diversity and external unity is the most important task for any nation or organisation, alliance or empire, if it is to survive the international politics of "competitive decadence".

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C O M M I T T E E I

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Rural and Urban Guerrilla: Latin America

DR. LUIS MERCIER VEGA

The guerrilla movements which went under the label of "Castroists" or claimed to be such, would seem, in 1971, to be dying out. Their only remaining centres are in Guatemala and Colombia.

The time is therefore ripe to try to clarify those factors which are truly common, and those which are individual, in a series of developments which have been hastily grouped together under the same ideological banners. In spite of the propaganda efforts which tend to present them as expressions of a single movement, it is hard to establish elements of continuity, or even of similarity, between the Cuban revolution, the theories developed from it by Ernesto Guevara and Régis Debray, the attempts to repeat the experience in Peru and Bolivia and the situations in Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina and Guatemala.

The special conditions of the collapse of the Batista régime in Cuba are now common knowledge. There was the internal collapse of the regime and its lack of a popular base, the range and complexity of the victorious anti-dictatorial front, reflected in the "26 de Julio" movement, and the subsequent take-over of power by the military-political units directed by Fidel Castro, which entailed the elimination of the social strata and mass organisations unwilling to accept the centralising and radical-authoritarian character of the leadership.

These characteristics of the Cuban case were not really taken into consideration by the author of La Guerra de Guerrillas, un método,[1] nor by the author of Revolución en la revolución,[2] who presented the doctrine of the technique of a counter-state, applicable to any Central or South American country. According

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(1) Ernesto 'Che' Guevara

(2) Régis Debray

to them, three main principles, slightly adapted to the specific circumstances of each country, ensured the triumph of courageous revolutionaries. These principles are: "Popular forces can win over the regular army"; "It is not always necessary to wait for all the conditions required by a revolutionary situation to be present at the same time; an insurrectional centre can help create this", and finally "The country areas supply the ideal ground for armed fighting".

The fallacies in the doctrine were revealed in 1965, when various revolutionary groups, with their main focus in Lima, decided to apply its method in three or four rural regions: the Peruvian army rapidly encircled and crushed the insurrection. Much later, and without in any way repudiating his revolutionary convictions, one of those who escaped - Hector Béjar - was to draw the following conclusions from the incident: "So long as it does not entail other social contradictions by initiating other forms of action which must combine with it, guerrilla fighting does not constitute a danger for the ruling classes". And "...to succeed, hard and fast rules must be broken; to keep to a single method of action is always dangerous and leads the guerilleros to unilateral and isolated fighting, exclusive and sectarian, depriving the guerrilla of any possibility of growth. We must recognize that hard and fast rules characterise rather the propagandists of armed fighting than the participants themselves."(3)

Ernesto Guevara certainly had some practical experience. Yet the failure of his Congolese odyssey was followed by the disaster of his operation in East Bolivia. No subsequent heroic literature can efface the impression left by a reading of Che's Journal which notes, day by day, the sad disenchantments of failure, right to the death of a man who was a lonely figure in spite of the adulation and historic deeds associated with his name.

It is more difficult to bring the armed insurrections in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala and Argentina within a rigid frame of definitions, no doubt because they are embedded in specific national realities. Thus, the Colombian maquis are primarily a residue of the tide of violence, producing hundreds of thousands of victims, which swept over the country during the terrible years of 1949 to 1957 rather than the product of revolutionary "laboratories." Again it is important to remember the military origin of the Guatemalan guerrilla movements, which were created by young officers following a classic putsch which failed in 1960.

The progressive abandonment of the foquismo method can be explained to a great extent by the successive defeats or damping down of existing guerrillas. The declared opposition of the Communists to such forms of fighting and Castro's subservience to Soviet policy, in spite of moments of defiance or ill temper, worked in the same direction.

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(3) The Peruvian guerrillas of 1965, Ed. Maspero, Paris, March 1969

New insurrectionary fighting tactics appeared, or more accurately reappeared, in the towns this time, with urban guerrilla warfare and its various forms of terrorism.

Naturally, the choice of ground for a rebellion depends not so much on theoretical concepts as on the social nature of the revolutionary cells and the actual conditions for a violent struggle obtaining in urban or rural areas. In Caracas for example, it was the difficulties encountered by the underground organisations followed by the massive popular participation in the 1963 elections (wiping out all hope of a hardening of support for anti-parliamentary violence), which led the ringleaders to seek out a new terrain in the mountains out of reach, at that time, of the police and the army. In Argentina, spasmodic attempts at guerrilla warfare were launched from Buenos Aires or Córdoba, mainly in the North-West (1964) and showed an obvious lack of organisation and very poor knowledge of the lay of the land. In Uruguay, more recently, after seeking to mobilise the agricultural workers in the North and failing to create a maquis in a virtually flat country, the Tupamaros emerged in the capital, few in number, but bold and careful not to flout public opinion, as the sole exception to a whole host of impotent and verbalistic revolutionary sects. The mentality and behaviour of guerrilla leaders, whether arising in towns or in the campo are much easier to understand if the social background is taken into consideration.

Although revolutionary manifestoes often use the terminology of the 'worker' or 'peasant' and are drafted in a language loaded with Marxist and nationalistic phraseology, most guerrilla movements are conceived, organised and directed by intellectuals from a bourgeois or middle class background. The rank and file generally include a high proportion of students. The centres of organisation, communications and refuge are frequently in the Universities where special regulations or tradition often protect them from police supervision.

For urban guerrilla, the social background of the participants explains to a great extent the techniques used. Generally young, belonging to the middle or civil servant classes, they can think out, then carry out with the aid of small groups from a lower class , operations which aim at persons or organisations from their own milieu. Many of the raids carried out by the Tupamaros in Montevideo (kidnapping of well-known personalities, confiscation of commercial files) require an exact knowledge of persons and their offices, habits and intentions. The targets chosen denote not the existence of a well informed group, but the presence of active elements, informers and accomplices within the "enemy" camp. One cannot imagine how workers or peasants, no matter how convinced they might be of the value of a revolution, would obtain information as to exactly where compromising financial documents are kept. It is difficult also to imagine a worker of the frigoríficos in Buenos Aires, or a huaso of the central valleys in Chile, hijacking an aeroplane or negotiating at an international level the exchange

of a kidnapped diplomat. No doubt the spread of illegal action and repression can rapidly alter the methods chosen and widen recruitment. Often, after a period of activity marked by participation of the young and romantic, a harder phase follows, with the arrival of elements of military origin or of those attracted by a spirit of adventure. In Brazil - according to the press and official communiqués - nearly all the 150 guerrilleros arrested in 1969 were between 20 and 25 years old, and of the following social classes: students 38%; army (mainly deserters) 20%; liberal professions 17%; salaried workers 8%. In his recent work on the guerrillas in Latin America, the German sociologist Robert Lamberg quotes the communiqué of the Brazilian chief of staff Antonio Carlos da Silva Murici stating that the 1970 guerrillas consisted for more than 50% of students, with only 4 to 5% workers and hardly any peasants at all.(4)

Are these active minorities the passing product of circumstance, or do they express violently a social urge with larger implications than themselves? May not the attention given to guerrillas, rural or urban, distract attention from a wider phenomenon, the formation of a new ruling class, which escapes all European or North-American classical models?

A number of facts support this hypothesis. In the first place, there is the character of the leaders and propagandists of change, whether they are reformers or revolutionaries. They are neither workers nor peasants. Second, there is the community of views between guerrilleros and epigenes of the Mexican, Cuban or Chilian models, regarding the essential part to be played by the State, and their identical disdain for forms and methods of action emanating from mass movements. Third, there is the consensus on the special role of Universities, where policies and direction must be the exclusive perogative of professors and students, the conquest of the top jobs in Faculties and Universities appearing as a first stage in the conquest for power. Finally, there is a certain identity of general aims: the mobilisation of national resources for the highest degree of economic and political independence; anti-imperialism, essentially directed against the presence and privileges of the United States; the elimination of social groups considered impotent to solve the problems of development; and the need for planning.

A decadent oligarchy, a bourgeoisie occupying only restricted sectors and often dependent on the State, a minority working class without an aggressive spirit, unorganised peasants without any aspiration to play an influential part, leave the door open to a class corresponding to a large tertiary, or service, sector, fed continuously by secondary and higher education but without a basis of economic

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(4) Robert F. Lamberg: Die castristische Guerilla in Lateinamerika, Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, Hanover, 1971

development, which wants and considers itself able, to take up the challenges thrown up by an ever more competitive and interdependent world.

The diversity of this social current must not obscure the elements which are common to it. The diversity of methods and tactics must also not obscure the fact that the new ruling class has a unified conception of its role.

The most disturbing aspect of this is the intervention of the Armed Forces either as an absolute political power in its own right, or as a partially or wholly favourable channel for the special designs of the new class. Any surprise vanishes if we ask ourselves who the military are stripped of their uniforms and what they represent, when there is no war or threat of war. The answer to the first question is that they are also intellectuals and to the second that they are the most structured permanent element in the State, seeking to act as a kind of political entity.

The extreme fluidity of the active intellectual elements in the political factions and parties, passing with ease from one to another, shows how very thin are the ideological links between them, and how powerful those which connect them with a single class ready for action [in the French: "disponible"]. The same observation applies to fighting units, latent maquis, where one can find, to take Argentina as an example, neo-peronists too young to have known Peron, trotskyists very far from the classical themes of Leon Davidovitch, nationalists of the Rosist tradition, admirers of Castro, anti-Semites...

This does not in itself explain the wave of violence which feeds the headlines in Latin American countries. Purely quantitatively, there are no more - and probably less - dead and wounded in the skirmishes between revolutionaries and government forces today than in the social turmoil at the turn of the century. Most of the "coups d'Etat" in Argentina in the past ten years succeeded without a single shot being fired. There is no comparison in the loss of human lives between the skirmishes of the army and guerrillas in Colombia now, and the endless massacres of the civil war between Liberals and Conservatives in the 1950s. Even in the Peruvian or Bolivian fighting-zones, at the time of the foquist adventures, losses were small. On the other hand, the impact on international opinion is considerable, because of the speed and multiplication of mass media. This is illustrated by the fact that, in countries where the tradition of violence is strong and active, but where the authorities have complete control over the means of communication, as in Mexico, most of the bloody clashes, so long as they take place outside the capital, are internationally unknown.

To oversimplify, one could argue that former forms of violence, seen as revolt "from the bottom" of workers against governing forces at the top, have been replaced by new methods, more technical, which are exerted from the outer edge of the establishment. This is accompanied by an astonishing apathy of the masses, who generally remain mere spectators.

International Implications

The part played by Communist China seemed important for a short while. Lacking all diplomatic contact with the Latin-American nations - except Cuba after September 1959 - China exerted a considerable political and propaganda effort to acquire a footing in the continent after 1956. One may ask, with François Joyaux,(5) whether this effort did not aim to influence the Latin American Communist parties, all faithful to the Soviet Union, by detaching them from Russian priorities. The Chinese revolutionary programme could offer attractions to areas where the peasant element was greatest, the population booming and anti-imperialism popular. In 1956, Stalin's following had been shaken by the "revelations" of the XXth Congress. Also, the conflict between Moscow and Peking had not reached its peak and remained within the limits of tactical discussion. Reviews in Spanish, friendship associations with Popular China, trips by activists to China all prepared the ground.

The setting-up of the Castro régime gave the Maoists the chance they had been seeking to implant themselves. The Chinese press devoted many articles to the Cuban Revolution. In September 1960, there was an exchange of ambassadors between the two capitals. Ernesto Guevara visited Mao Tse-Toung, and President Dorticos followed in September 1961. It is not clear whether the main aim of the Chinese was to replace the Russians in Havana, to compete with their influence, or to reach South America, via Cuba. Whatever it was, and despite the grist to Chinese mills provided by the crises in Soviet-American relations concerning Cuba (the Bay of Pigs, the missile crisis), and the increase in the current of sympathy towards Peking in Latin-American revolutionary centres, the results in the end were limited.

The Struggle between the Chinese and Russians to obtain the support of the local Communist Parties, won by the Soviets, who were already well implanted, produced in some Latin American countries considerable divisions and the creation of new "Marxist Leninist" parties (Brazil, Peru, Chile, Colombia). The creation of these pro-Chinese parties, consisting of a handful of militants, corresponded with the period of expansion of Castroist influence and the high point of fashion of foquist theories. If Chinese themes were fashionable at the time, this was because they gave the partisans of immediate subversive action a confirmation in theory and the feeling of belonging to a broad inter/national movement. From the organisational point of view, there was nothing which could be considered as remotely Chinese. Peking itself did not always recognise those organisations which lined up under Mao's banner. Even before the failure of the main guerrilla

(5) "La política china en América Latina" in Mundo Nuevo No. 57-58 March-April 1971

movements, the cumulative alignment of Fidel Castro on the Russian positions on international questions marked the decline of Maoist influence. (His speech at the meeting of the Tricontinental Conference in January 1966 contained abuse against Popular China, guilty of reducing their deliveries of rice to Cuba). If subsequently, relationships between Peking and Havana were to some extent regularised, this was on a commercial and cultural rather than political basis.

In short, it is difficult to find serious signs of Chinese influence in the insurrectional movements, except through ideological propaganda. When a guerrilla action was initiated in Peru, in 1965, the local pro-Chinese Communists' local organ, Bandera Roja, kept silent. They were not "participants".

The Soviet Union, however, has been present in various ways, as of right. The Soviets have kept their influence over Communists whose leaders remain faithful in spite of the abrupt turns of Soviet foreign policy. They have also seized any and every opportunity to set up diplomatic relations with one Latin-American country after another, whatever the political shade of the régime, and to initiate or develop commercial links. Similarly their delegations of technicians have clocked in whenever and wherever a government gives the impression of wishing to eliminate all or part of the local influence of the United States.

The Soviet Union does not encourage violent insurrection; and if perchance one of the national parties is forced to take part - as was the case in Venezuela - it makes sure that the lifelines to the "legal country" are kept open, favouring the return to such forms of fighting as may later reintroduce the Communists into the general political game. In the most extreme cases, they seek to maintain the centres of armed fighting as one means amongst others and not the main one, of exerting pressure on the power structure.

Soviet policy in Latin America towards the revolutionary splinter groups and organisations which threaten to outflank Communist parties on the left consists in preventing their birth and growth, in encapsulating them in various carefully controlled "fronts", in denouncing the "intrigues" of the "pseudo-revolutionaries" who lack practical experience, in preserving trade unions as much as possible from any extremist contagion and in using them against the "irresponsible petit bourgeois intellectuals". Stress is unremittingly placed on the seriousness, the sense of proportion and realities, in short on the resolute but reasonable character, of the Communist parties. Thus, negotiations can be initiated at all levels, including internationally, without hindering the positioning of trustworthy men in key jobs, as soon as the circumstances allow, and also without having any effect on the prudent but constant progress of Soviet diplomacy.

In Venezuela, although the leaders faithful to Soviet policy and its directives have gone through difficult periods when one might have judged them to be completely

by-passed by events - e.g. by the rise of new generations; by the pressure from extreme-left groups to force the Communist party to follow the pro-guerrilla current; and by the attempt on the part of the guerrillero militants within the Communist party itself to overthrow the Political Bureau whose members were either in prison or in exile - it was still, in the end, the disciplined party apparatus which came out on top.

The most recent development, in Chile, shows a Communist Party obviously opposed to "extremists" such as those of the MIR. Far from refraining from repression (in so far as it controls the police) or from physical violence to eliminate competitors, it is quite prepared to justify these procedures in the name of the necessary unity of all left-wing forces.

The superiority of the Latin American Communist Parties over the infinite variety of groups and revolutionary movements, which emerge, vanish and are reborn, plainly resides in the permanency of their leadership, that is, finally in their allegiance to the Soviet Union. Left to themselves, they would probably not survive the crises which periodically engulf them, or the ardour of the proselytes of the "groupuscules".

Partly as an organiser, but mainly as a beneficiary of the vast anti-imperialist upsurge which supplies the themes for most nationalist campaigns, the Soviet Union is like a fish in water in the maelstrom of anti-yankeeism. Not that the Soviets can offer their own models as examples - there is no enthusiasm for existing Socialist models -but they appear as the obvious ally, if only on the psychological plane, of any assault directed against the hegemony of the United States which figures as public enemy Number 1.

For their part, the United States, having entered a phase of negotiated withdrawal, are giving gound before the first rough experiments of the new nationalist régimes. They are beginning to refuse at least in the South of the continent, to undertake industrial or financial enterprises on a wide scale on their own. They are trying to weather the storm by participating in the most anonymous international companies to be found, and discovering the depth of the feelings of frustration of the social categories who consider themselves called upon to modify the structures and mobilise the material and human resources of the Latin American nations. Their greatest surprise is no doubt to find within the Armed Forces and in the teams of technicians frequently trained in their own schools, resolute adversaries who will bring a methodical coolness to the fulfilment of their plans and so be far more difficult to manipulate than groups of idealistic youths embarking on revolutionary adventures, or anxious to play the role of the leading élite.

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What conclusions and forecasts can we reasonably make in the light of our experience so far with rural guerrilla and the renewal of urban violence?

First, not one guerrilla movement has managed to seize power by its own unaided efforts. Success would call for the backing of a major power with hegemonial appetites and this in turn would imply an extreme degree of international tension and direct confrontation between rival patrons.

Second, campaigns of violence conducted by groups of revolutionary intellectuals have everywhere failed to detonate mass working class or peasant movements.

Third, rural and urban guerrilla have on the contrary stimulated and accelerated the advent of strong governments dedicated to the ouster of the old privileged elites which seem to them impotent to tackle broad problems of development. The governments also confer the leading role on the classes associated with the tertiary sector, which are attracted by the management rather than ownership and are the very ones from which the leadership of groups practising violence is drawn.

Against such a background, one may well ask whether the prospect open to the Tupamaros in Uruguay may not merely be to pave the way for the victory of a left-wing coalition at the next elections. This is admittedly far from a negligible achievement, but it is out of all proportion with the guerrillas' apocalyptic hopes of a socialist revolution.

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The lack of interest currently shown by the United States in Latin American affairs can be compared with the modest and ingratiating manner of Soviet attempts to be accepted there. The facts seem to show that, for the time being, Washington and Moscow are steering clear of confrontation south of the Rio Grande until the internal transformations which are taking place in virtually all the Latin American nations work themselves out, and the new dispensations there can be assessed.

It is always possible, of course, as one of the best connoisseurs of Latin American conditions, Luigi Einaudi, has observed, that some mistake or aberration might break the tacit rules of the game. "The United States would only react forcefully if, for instance, the Soviet Union managed to establish a military base in Chile. But this hypothetical military base could only take shape if the United States were to exercise pressure or directly attack Chile. For this reason, and to protect their own security, the United States will aim not to provoke a confrontation of this kind". (3)

In view of the inability, in the foreseeable future, of Mainland China to play a leading role in the area, and of Western Europe's lack of interest in Latin

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(3) Statement to the Peruvian review Caretas, Lima, July 1971.

America, the political transitions under way are likely to be shaped more by domestic factors than by international rivalries.

Without speculating too wildly, one might well ask whether there are forces, old or new, which might grow to the point where they modify the pattern formed by the actors currently occupying the stage. Two plausible hypotheses suggest themselves. First, the traditional orientation of South America, influenced by Europe and the United States, may change as a result of growing intercourse with the Pacific region, Japan being the principal but not the sole beneficiary.

Second, the rapid economic and demographic growth of Brazil will sooner or later upset the present balance of Latin American states. ~~This balance is the con-~~ sequence of their relative isolation and not of their positive relationships with each other. Once the development of the north-east, now under way, and that of Amazonia which is planned, are both complete, the opening-up of Brazil will be virtually over. Then the aspirations currently confined to the National War College may spring to life, and a new era of expansionism begin.

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CIVIL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

C O M M I T T E E 2

Saturday, 11th September — Late Afternoon

Civil Violence and External Involvement: the Indian Sub-continent

MR. G. S. BHARGAVA

This paper deals with civil violence in India, Pakistan and Ceylon and for the purpose of the paper the term 'civil violence' will mean all categories of conflicts other than those between two regular armed forces, even if one or the other may not be in uniform and not operating overtly. Within the scope of this discussion, therefore, comes the liberation struggle launched in East Bengal, though except in strict legalistic terms, it has, in fact, to be treated as an anti-colonial war. The Janata Vimukti Perumana (JVP) (meaning People's Liberation Movement) insurgency in Ceylon and the extremist violence in India, popularly known as Naxalite violence, will more appropriately come within the scope of this discussion.

While it is possible to trace some superficial common features between the extremist violence in India and the JVP insurgency in Ceylon, there are very few common features between these two and the struggle in East Bengal regarded as anti-colonial by the Bangla Desh Movement. In spite of the fact that both JVP insurgency and Naxalite violence claim Marxist background and Maoist inspiration, (the Naxalites claim stronger allegiance to Mao and in turn they have been endorsed by Peking) one of the fundamental characteristics of the Maoist line of action, namely mass base, mass support and mass involvement, has not been in adequate evidence in these two cases. On the other hand, the Bangla Desh movement has a very well developed mass base, mass support and mass involvement. But the model and inspiration for this mass movement is not Maoism; it is more Gandhian in origin.

While the first two movements, Naxalism and the JVP, have accepted the basic policy of use of violence in order to reach their objectives, and in fact have sought to denounce others who had not subscribed to this basic tenet of the inescapability of violence, in East Bengal, violence was imposed on the movement.

Another common feature between the Indian and the Ceylonese situations, is the conscious attempt on the part of both Administrations to absorb the dissidents into the existing system and the Administrations' ready admission that there was adequate justification for protest against the injustices and shortcomings of the

existing system and their promise to rectify the injustices and shortcomings in an evolutionary way, given the time.

In the Bangla Desh situation, however, the accent is on use of mass terror to suppress the movement. The deliberate attempt to liquidate leading elements of the Bengali intellectual elite and the subsequent campaign to replace the Bengali culture by an alien culture add dimensions to the struggle in East Bengal which are not present in the other two situations.

The external involvement in all the three movements has been negligible, if not altogether absent. In the case of Ceylon, the Government has denied external involvement, though the North Korean embassy was ordered to be closed down, since it was felt that its activities indirectly encouraged insurgency. In the case of India, while the formation of the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) was hailed by Peking and, during the years 1969-70, there were Chinese broadcasts endorsing its line, there has been very little evidence of external material support of any significant magnitude.

In the case of Bangla Desh, the White Paper published by the Government of Pakistan devotes one whole chapter to India's role. Indian influence, sympathy and moral support, which are undeniable, have to be viewed as distinct from Indian involvement.

The Bangali language provides a very powerful link between East and West Bengal and in the case of hundreds of thousands of families, links were maintained across the border. It has been estimated that between 1.5 and 2 million people out of the 8.5 million who have spilled out of East Bengal are staying with their own relatives and friends in West Bengal and Tripura states of India. Today the border between India and East Bengal has become exceedingly porous with the Pakistani army being unable to man all the checkposts. Consequently, there is a good deal of transit to and fro across the border. Though there are strong pressures in India for recognition of the Bangla Desh government and extension of large scale military aid for the Bangla Desh resistance forces, the Government of India has till today resisted this demand. However, there have been frequent exchanges of fire between the Indian and Pakistani security forces.

Against this general background, we may now consider in detail the three case studies:

1 Bangla Desh

The most remarkable aspect of the Bangla Desh struggle is the total mass mobilisation achieved by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League Party in the period prior to the military action by the Pakistan army.

The Awami League captured 160 out of 161 elective seats allotted to East Pakistan in the National Assembly and 288 out of 300 elective seats in the Provincial Assembly. When the Pakistani military junta arbitrarily postponed the National Assembly session, scheduled for inauguration on 3rd March 1971, the Awami League called for a general strike, which proved total. Between 3rd and 25th March, the administration of East Bengal was virtually in the hands of the Awami League leadership. The League started a civil disobedience movement. The entire population of East Bengal, including government officials, obeyed its directives. On 15th March, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman announced that he was taking over the administration of East Bengal and directed that West Pakistani troop ships should not unload in East Pakistani ports. The extent of Mujibur Rahman's control over East Bengal was such that the Pakistani army's massive surprise assault against the movement began with an attempt to disarm and destroy the East Bengal Regiment of the Pakistani armed force, the East Pakistan Rifles and the East Pakistani Armed Police. Those who survived the assault became the hard core of the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Forces) of Bangla Desh.

Even after the massive repression and killing (estimated between 200,000 to 500,000), Pakistani military authorities have not been able to win over to their side enough collaborators from among the members of the National Assembly and Provincial Assembly. The most optimistic estimate of the number of National Assembly members likely to collaborate with the military regime is 20 out of 160.

The military action of the Pakistani army in the very first phase attemped to eliminate the intellectual leadership of the Awami League. A number of foreign correspondents have testified to the troops going around with lists of university men, doctors, lawyers and other professionals in various towns and shooting them in cold blood. One of the first institutions which was a target for the Pakistani army was the Dacca University. The Bengali military officers and civil servants were also shot out of hand. As a result the Mukti Bahini insurgency forces comprise mostly young men of the educated middle class. In this respect the Mukti Bahini is somewhat similar to JVP.

The Pakistan army appears to have decided from the middle of April to launch a programme of terror against the minority population, the Hindus in East Bengal. According to the 1961 census, the Hindus constituted 18.4 per cent of the population of East Bengal, which is now about 75 million. This has resulted in a large number of Hindu refugees coming out of East Bengal.

The Pakistan government today has 45 battalions of infantry, around two brigades of artillery, two regiments of armour and two squadrons of aircraft in East Bengal. In addition, it has started inducting policemen from West Pakistan. Quite a number of top officials have been imported from West Pakistan to replace Bengali officials.

The non-Bengali Muslim population in East Pakistan, which in 1961 was 800,000 (and will be around 1 million now), are being armed by the Pakistani military authorities to constitute a para military force called "Razakars".

Peace committees have been formed in various towns and villages consisting mostly of Bengali Muslims, who were earlier opposed to the Awami League and had strong loyalties to fanatical Muslim groups, and the non-Bengali Muslims.

The Mukti Bahini has substantially stepped up its insurgency activities. It is estimated that the Pakistani army is suffering an average casualty rate of at least 40 per day. The power supply to towns like Dacca and Comilla has been sabotaged from time to time. The road and rail transport systems are working only to a very small fraction of their previous capacity. Industrial activity continues to be very low. By and large all the educational institutions are closed. Taxes do not seem to be collected. According to many foreign correspondents who have been visiting East Bengal, the Pakistani army itself does not venture outside urban areas after nightfall.

The unique features of the Bangla Desh insurgency, which distinguish it from other insurgencies at present are:

1. The dominant middle-class leadership of the Mukti Bahini with a liberal democratic value system.

2. The total mobilisation achieved by the Awami League prior to the military crackdown and the continuing mobilisation thereafter; and

3. The anti-colonial nature of the struggle as seen by the Bangla Desh movement. Till now colonialism was associated with industrial powers.

2 The J.V.P. Insurgency

The JVP insurgency in Ceylon is one of the very few instances of a major countrywide insurgency in a functioning democratic country. Most insurgencies are launched in societies where there are considerable restrictions and dissent has to be kept secret. That is not the case with Ceylon. It is a free and highly politicised society with fairly well-developed mass media and transport systems which provide access to the furthermost areas of the interior. Moreover, the present Ceylonese government is a leftist united front which includes, apart from the dominant Shri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) of Mrs. Bandaranaike, the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaj Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party of Ceylon. The JVP itself had campaigned actively in the 1970 elections, on behalf of the United Front.

Its former association with the SLFP may be responsible for inadequate attention being paid to the JVP's preparations. The scale of the insurgency and the coordination achieved in striking at different parts of the island simultaneously indicate very

detailed and sophisticated planning. There is now considerable evidence that contingency planning and training of cadres had been going on for over a year, with indoctrination courses, weapon training and training in tactics imparted in jungle camps. The insurgents fought with stolen small arms, some imported materiel the origin of which is yet to be clearly established, and hand-made bombs with locally-made demolition charges. They exhibited a high degree of commitment.

The JVP insurgents have been estimated at 20,000. At the end of June over 13,000 alleged insurgents were in detention camps and the insurgent casualties were officially estimated at 500 to 600. Home Minister Felix Bandaranaike estimated that there might still be 1,500 insurgents holding out in forests. Despite these heavy losses the organisational structure of the insurgents does not appear to have been fully uncovered and the bulk of the leadership has succeeded in masking its identity.

Though the JVP derived its inspiration from Marx, Lenin, Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh and Che Guevara, its leaders were keen to emphasise that their revolutionary concepts as well as movement were purely indigenous. Some observers have noted a degree of chauvinism in the JVP movement with its anti-Tamil and anti-Indian overtones.

The Ceylonese government has absolved the Chinese government of any responsibility in the insurgency (and the Chinese have issued statements condemning it). But the government ordered closure of the North Korean embassy within 24 hours, on the grounds that it indirectly contributed to the insurgency. This appears to refer to the large sums of money (too large for a country the size of North Korea) spent in Ceylon in newspaper advertisements and other publicity disseminating Kim Il Sung's thoughts and works. No evidence of direct North Korean involvement has so far been cited.

There are various views of the root causes of the insurgency. Some observers (with whom the Ceylonese government seems to agree) believe that the rapid extension of the educational system in the last 20 years, which led to rising expectations among the rural educated without commensurate employment opportunities, is one of the factors. Others believe the management of the Ceylonese economy, which has been characterised as carrying the concept of welfare state to an extreme in a developing country, had a significant adverse impact on savings and investment which alone could have led to a continuous growth in employment opportunities.

The insurgents were mostly young people in their teens and early twenties; and of these the majority came from lower middle class families. According to Major General Sepala Attygalle, 90 per cent of the insurgents belonged to the age groups 16-20. According to a study published in June by the Central Bank of Ceylon, 58 per cent of the unemployed came from the age groups 14-25. Moreover 83 per cent

of the unemployed had received education for more than 6 years (42 per cent having completed school). There is, in fact, a correlation between age distribution among the educated unemployed, the semi educated unemployed and the ethnic distribution of high unemployment on the one hand and the age distribution of the insurgents and the areas of intensive insurgency, on the other. It is, however, difficult without further data and analysis to come to the conclusion that it was purely a revolt of educated unemployed youth, especially in the light of the participation of a significant number of young men employed in government and the private sector.(1) However there are indications of alienation between the vast majority of the youth educated in Sinhala and the leadership of various parties educated in English.

The small Ceylonese armed forces were not geared to dealing with such a widespread, organized insurgency and the government appealed for foreign assistance.(2) India, Pakistan, United Kingdom, United States, UAR, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia came forward with help of various kinds.(3) In view of the very high sensitivity in Ceylon about the presence of foreign troops, all foreign personnel left Ceylon immediately operations were concluded. There were no reports of any foreign personnel having been used in operations.

3 Civil Violence in India

In India today, civil violence has become a recurrent phenomenon mostly in the city of Calcutta, though the rest of the State of West Bengal is also affected to a lesser extent. It has been estimated that from March 1969 to the middle of July 1971, there were 2,800 political murders in West Bengal. On one day, 12-13 August 1971, more than 20 people were killed as a reprisal for the murder of a local leader. Unofficial estimates put the figure much higher.

Though the violence in the city of Calcutta and in West Bengal is generally associated with left wing extremists, popularly known as the Naxalites, a general atmosphere of violence prevails and killings are now caused also by personal feuds, hired thugs or rival gangs and parties other than the Naxalites, that is, Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist).

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(1) The Finance Minister, N.M. Perera, disclosed that among the insurgents who were captured 20 per cent were unemployed graduates, 20 per cent were students in Universities and schools and about 50 per cent were employed in government and private sector.

(2) Army: 6,700 regulars, 2,000 volunteers; Navy: 1,980; Air Force: 800; Police: 11,000.

(3) India: 5 frigates, 6 helicopters, arms/ammo for 5,000 armed personnel, 150 men to guard Bandaranaike airport and man helicopters. Pakistan: 2 helicopters, 1 frigate, arms and ammo. Britain: Sterling carbines, 6 helicopters. Soviet Union: 6 MiG-17s, 10 armoured cars, 2 helicopters, arms/ammo.

A brief account of the origin of the CP (M-L) may help to put their crucial role in perspective. The Communist Party of India split into two in 1964 when the majority accepted the general line of the Soviet-led international communist movement, denounced by a minority as revisionist. The minority organised itself as the Communist Party of India (Marxist)--CPM and in the elections of 1967, came out as the largest single element of the United Front coalition which formed Ministries in West Bengal and Kerala.

In the summer of 1967, while the United Front Government was in office, in the Naxalbari area of West Bengal the subsistence farmers and local tribesmen led by local CPM elements drove out the landlords and proclaimed a liberated area. After some attempts at negotiation, the State Government, of which CPM was the dominant partner, used the security forces to suppress the movement.

At this stage, on 5th July 1967, the Peoples' Daily came out with an authoritative article entitled 'Spring Thunder over India'. The article saw in Naxalbari the "emergence of a red area of revolutionary armed struggles". It prescribed the Maoist revolutionary model for India and exhorted the Indian revolution to rely on the peasantry and establish its bases in the countryside and encircle the cities. Peking also denounced the leaders of the CPM for taking the road of Parliamentary Cretinism. Throughout 1967-68, in Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, a number of CPM members started questioning the party line. In April 1968 the CPM in its Burdwan session came out against revisionism, but refused to accept the Maoist prescription in Indian conditions. Thereupon, members who thought Maoism was appropriate for India left the party and formed the Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)--CP(M-L) - in April 1969. The formation of the new party was hailed by Peking. However, all those who left the CPM did not unite into a single party. In fact, it would appear that the extremist elements tended to form small groups in each state around some local leadership, rather than owe allegiance to a leadership at the national level.

During 1969-70, in the hilly areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh, some of the extremist elements led the local tribesmen in an armed rebellion against the landlords. This tactic of attacking landlords was named 'annihilation campaign'. The movement was in an area of about 800 sq. miles and the number of people involved in the incidents was around 800. In 1968-69, in Gopiballabpur in Bengal, inhabited mostly by aboriginal tribes, similar insurgent activities were initiated. In both cases, the security forces were able to bring the situation under control; and in Andhra Pradesh the state government initiated large-scale socio-economic measures. The violence sporadically in evidence in Kerala in 1968-69 also declined in 1970.

As late as October 1970, Peking Radio claimed that the Indian guerrillas had spread the revolutionary flames started in Naxalbari to vast mountainous and plains areas of 12 states in the country's 16 states. Peking has been silent since then.

Most of the leaders of these extremist groups have either been killed in encounters with security forces or have been captured and are awaiting trial. Only Charu Mazumdar, the leader of the CP (M-L), is still at large, and his activities are considerably restricted.

In fact, while from time to time tensions have been reported in rural areas like Midnapur, Birbhum and certain districts of Bihar, the major focus of violence has since shifted to the urban area of Calcutta.

For reasons mentioned earlier, it is difficult to analyse the profile of violence there. Earlier, when the United Front Government was in power, with the CPM as the dominant partner and the CPM leader, Jyoti Basu, as the Deputy Chief Minister and Minister of Police, there were allegations that violence was deliberately perpetrated to strengthen the CPM. This led to the breakup of the coalition. The CPM, on its part, has alleged that a large number of its workers (as many as 400 in the last year) have been killed in the period following the collapse of the second United Front Government in March 1970. Though this figure is disputed, it is generally agreed that a large number of CPM cadres have been killed in the last 16-17 months.

The violence in the streets of Calcutta is generally in the form of attacks on individuals with firearms, locally manufactured pipe guns and knives. There have also been instances of individuals being clubbed with iron bars. These types of murders are committed by small bands of young people in their teens and early twenties. One member of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of India, Mohit Sen, describes the violence of this group in the following terms:

> 'What Eric Hobsbawm said in his "Primitive Rebels" about the role of ritual in terrorist groups fully applies to them. And the ritual includes training to brutality. The cult of violence, the constant harping on the 'cleansing' role of shedding blood, the emphasis on the need to dehumanise and desensitivise oneself have produced their evil fruit. Some of the Naxalite young men are exactly the prototypes of the characters portrayed by Conrad in his "Under Western Eyes" or Dostoevsky in his "Devils". There is more than a touch of sadism in the way they are taught to deal with, and the way they do actually deal with, their own doubting comrades. "Do what your most savage instincts instruct, after all you are only a little cog in Chairman Mao's machine".'

Mohit Sen is a biased observer, but his remarks by and large sum up the Naxalite behaviour.

Most of those involved in this violence are educated young men of the lower middle class who have received either in full or in major part their collegiate education and become frustrated. There is also a certain number of young men from the upper middle class who have joined the group of Naxalites out of romantic

idealism. The sense of alienation of this group of people from their own background and their hatred for it are illustrated by the fact that 331 schools and colleges in West Bengal were ransacked and 450 educational institutions were affected by Naxalite activity last year.

Of late, there have been reports of a further split in the ranks of the CP(M-L). It would appear that an important leader of the party, Ashim Chatterjee, operating in Calcutta, has questioned the wisdom of continuing with the present type of urban guerrilla activity there, and provoked a likely split with Charu Mazumdar, the Chairman of the party. (Ashim Chatterjee is reported to have been killed in a recent encounter with the police.)

The Naxalites have not exhibited the organisational talents of the JVP. Their attempts in annihilation strategy, without first preparing a mass base and mass support, ended in disaster in Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and the rural areas of Bengal. Even in Calcutta, if recent reports on the split in CP (M-L) have any basis, the Naxalites would appear to be on the retreat. Peking's silence is perhaps an indication of the way things are moving.

However, the general social and political impact of the Naxalites has gone far beyond what their numbers would warrant. Government leaders themselves have warned that unless radical land reform measures are urgently undertaken, the 'green revolution' might turn another colour. A sense of radicalism is noticeable in the post-election atmosphere of India.(4) While it would be difficult to ascribe credit for this to the Naxalite movement, there is no doubt that the Naxalite challenge has been one of the factors in bringing it about.

4. International Implications

Pakistan by its actions in East Bengal has caused well over 8 million refugees to flee to India. The 5.5 million refugees in Government camps cost nearly Rs 330 million per month for the basic requirements of shelter and food. The Indian Parliament has so far voted Rs 2,600 million for refugee rehabilitation and it has been estimated that this amount will be exhausted by the end of the current calendar year.

So far $110 million of aid has been pledged of which barely 10 per cent has reached India so far. It is obvious that even if the full amount is received, it will constitute less than a third of the total funds required by India up to December 1971.

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(4) An employment programme of Rs 750 millions has been taken up this year. A Constitutional amendment, which will make it possible to carry through early land reforms and impose urban property ceilings, has been passed.

In the current year, the Indian government originally provided for deficit financing of Rs 2,500 million; with the additional Rs 2,000 million for refugee rehabilitation the deficit is likely to be of the order of Rs 4,500 million. The impact of this has already been felt and in the last three months the price rise in India has been about 2 per cent per month. The number of refugees is continuing to increase at the rate of 40,000 per day. It is expected this will go up further when the flood waters recede and when the Pakistani Army steps up its counter-insurgency operations and its attempts to dissuade the civilians from collaborating with the Mukti Bahini. The U.S. AID and F.A.O. officials have predicted that scarcity pockets are likely to develop, with near total disruption of the communication network and a fall in agricultural production in the current year, and this in turn will also increase the flow of refugees. Senator Kennedy has estimated that the number of refugees may soon reach the 12 million mark. This will mean a burden of another Rs. 2,000 to 2,500 million on India before the close of the current financial year in March 1972, and a burden of Rs 10 billion in the next year and every year thereafter.

This human mass, which is equivalent to the population of a number of countries in Europe, cannot be absorbed in the State of West Bengal, with a population of a little over 45 millions and one of the highest population densities in the world, and with its economic, social and political structure already under tremendous strain. Nor is it possible, for various reasons, to disperse the refugees in the rest of the country. Local people in other states will be resentful if large expenditure is incurred on rehabititating refugees in those states. It may be noted that the present expenditure of Rs 2/- per day per refugee is slightly above the average per capita income in India. The majority of the people of India are living below this level.

The overwhelming majority of these refugees are from the minority community of East Bengal, who are the majority community in India, namely Hindus. In the past, whenever there were communal disturbances in East Bengal, often initiated by the non-Bengali Muslims there, these always produced violent communal repercussions in West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa states. This time, largely due to the appreciation that Pakistan should not be permitted to exploit any communal tension in India, and due to the secular character of the Awami League and the expectation among the Indian political parties that Bangla Desh is a national issue, there has, fortunately, been no communal disturbances in India. If for any reason communal violence does break out in India, it is, at this stage, likely to be very difficult to control.

Both for India and for Pakistany the prolongation of the Bangla Desh struggle for years will have serious repercussions for security along the borders and the maintenance of internal law and order. General war could become a tempting way out though the Government of India has so far resisted pressures in that

direction. In April, Pakistan transferred 2½ divisions to East Bengal, to re-establish its military control and to carry out the purge of the Hindus which took place from the second half of April. There is, therefore, a sense of guilt today in India for not having applied military pressure on the West Pakistan borders to prevent this transfer. There is every likelihood that as the Mukti Bahini steps up its activities, Pakistan may try to transfer more troops from West Pakistan: already it is suffering casualties at an average rate of 40 per day. This, therefore, will compel India to take a stance of confrontation on the Western borders to prevent the transfer of further troops to East Bengal. There have already been reports of a general state of alert order having been issued to the Indian armed forces.

Pakistan itself may decide to escalate the Bangla Desh situation into a general Indo-Pakistan war in order to save its own face. The military junta, if it loses its prestige by losing the war in East Bengal, will find it difficult even to hold West Pakistan together. It may, therefore, prefer to lose East Bengal as a result of a general war with India.

China's attitude has so far been ambiguous. Formally, it has pledged support to the Government of Pakistan, in what the Chinese Government described as an Indian attempt to intervene in East Bengal. Recently in his interview with James Reston, Chou En-lai has described the Bangla Desh struggle as a Soviet-Indian conspiracy. Nevertheless, it seems likely that China will not intervene directly but hope to gain from the prolongation of the conflict.

As for the USSR, Bangla Desh has hastened a formalisation of the Indian-Soviet alignment. The American attitude over East Bengal and the decision to maintain leverage in Islamabad has alienated opinion and made it easy to sign the Indo-Soviet 'Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation'. If, however, the treaty were to impose quasi-permanent Soviet restraints on Indian policy towards East Bengal, much of the present popular support for it would evaporate. On the other hand, India's dependance on the USSR for military supplies will further increase because of the arms race that is likely.

The Pakistan army is raising two more divisions to cope with its manpower requirements and reports indicate the possibility of a further expansion. This in turn may lead to further expansion of the Indian armed forces and may start an arms race in the subcontinent. The additional funding required for increased defence preparedness, on top of the cost of refugee rehabilitation, will further increase the economic burden on India.

The Indian Prime Minister has characterised the Bangla Desh problem as the most serious security crisis faced by India in its 24 years of independent existence. The pressures on India are building up. No other anti-colonial war has produced refugees on such a scale. Although General Yahya Khan's recent interview to 'Le Figaro' would appear to rule out the prospect of a political solution in the foreseeable future, India has carried this burden in the hope that the international community will be able to act by putting pressure on Pakistan to reach a political solution to the problem.

Ceylon

In Ceylon, about 1,000 to 1,500 insurgents are believed to be still holding out in the forests of the south-central part of the country. The government has announced plans to expand its security forces, but the precise numbers have not yet been made public. India has already transferred the equipment required for 5,000 soldiers. The Ceylonese air force is also being expanded.

Given the geographical situation of the country, easy external intervention on any significant scale in support of the insurgents is not possible. If there should be fear of any such outside intervention, the type of sealing-off action taken by the Indian Navy will most probably again be sought and the request granted. It is quite likely that Ceylon will now take steps to strengthen its internal intelligence apparatus to keep the potential insurgency under continuous watch. The Ceylonese authorities will be able to depend upon a number of friendly governments to assist them in training the required security personnel.

While the current insurgency came as a surprise with regard to the number of people involved, the timing, and the intensity and skill of organisation and coordination exhibited by the leadership, it is rather difficult at this stage to foresee such a large-scale insurgency being launched again in the near future. Being an island country, the effects of the insurgent activities are not likely to spill over.

Though the Russians have recently accused the Chinese of complicity, the Ceylon Government has reiterated that there was no foreign involvement in the insurgency. There are no reasons to believe that this denial was made for diplomatic reasons. The Ceylon Government has also not found it necessary to make any modifications or adjustments in its foreign relations. One may perhaps venture to say that the insurgency has brought Ceylon nearer to India, without at the same time affecting Ceylon's neutrality either on Indo-Pakistani or on Sino-Indian issues.

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CIVIL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

C O M M I T T E E 3

Saturday, 11th September — Late Afternoon

Civil Violence and External Involvement: East Africa

DR. SELWYN RYAN

This paper will examine some of the root causes of the conflicts that have developed in East Africa, and evaluate their potential for provoking international collisions. It will attempt to identify those powers which have become involved in or provoked conflicts in East Africa and assess the likely pattern and consequences of these and future incursions. Finally, an effort will be made to explore the strategies which might be open to African states to minimise the risk of having their domestic conflicts become ensnared in great-power rivalries.

I. The Sudan

The civil war, which began with the mutiny of Southern troops in Equatoria in 1955 and which has claimed the lives of anywhere from 500,000 to 1,000,000 people, has the distinction of being the most protracted conflict in independent Africa. The Sudan is one of the major testing grounds for the continental controversy over the meaning of the concept of "Africaness". Southerners who demand either secession or autonomy claim that the Arabs of the Sudan are not Africans, but are imperialists and racists who wish to maintain the social consequences of their enslavement of Africans. They feel there is a natural grass curtain separating the North and the South, which for over a generation (1922-54) was isolated from the North by Britain's Southern policy, and that although the South is economically underdeveloped, race, religion, historical memories, and geography have combined with contemporary Arab oppression to provide the preconditions for a separate nation, if not a full fledged state.

Although some Northerners recognise the reality of the cultural and historical differences between the North and South, it is often argued that the Sudan is more homogenous than Southerners pretend and that many Southerners are influenced by Arabic culture. It is also noted that many Southerners oppose secession and

cooperate to varying degrees with Khartoum. Moreover, it is sometimes impossible to tell by a simple examination of facial type just who is or is not an Arab in the context of the Sudan.

Northern elites who oppose autonomy for the South do so for two basic and at times interchangeable reasons, religion and ideology. Radical elites (both communists and Arab socialists) accuse Southerners of being accomplices to imperialism, and of being conduits for Israeli penetration of the Southern flank of Arab Africa.

The Khartoum Government claims that the "rebels" are being assisted morally, financially and in terms of propaganda by Christian missionaries who following their expulsion from the Sudan in 1964 use Uganda, Ethiopia and the Congo as bases. It is also asserted that the "mutineers" receive assistance from Christian Democratic elements in West Germany, Belgium and Italy and from the old Biafran lobby. Ethiopia and Uganda have been accused of allowing their territory to be used as channels for Soviet and Chinese arms captured by Israelis after the six-day war. Needless to say, the American C.I.A. has also been implicated in what is seen as an "anti-Arab conspiracy". It is not always possible to map out the exact nature of Western intervention in the Southern Sudan, however, since much of it is very clandestine.

Khartoum did not join the loose federation formed between Libya, Syria and Egypt because of strong opposition from secular nationalists, communists and Southerners, but Numeiry clearly feels that the Sudan's future destiny lies with the Arabs to the North and East rather than with Africans to the South. Khartoum has benefitted immensely from Soviet support of the Arab cause in the Middle-East conflict. The Soviets in fact became the largest supplier of arms to Khartoum, and committed a substantial number of military personnel. Egypt, Libya, East Germany and at times China are also said to be providing support of one kind or another. According to the Anya Nya:

> "The Soviet government extracts compensation from the client state in the form of political support but, more tangibly, warm water naval bases - in this instance, Port Sudan and Suakin on the Red Sea - and air bases at Wadi Saidna and Juba. The latter base thrusts deep into East Africa, outflanking Ethiopia and Kenya and within easy bombing range of Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and much of Congo Kinshasa." (1)

The Southern Resistance Movement has tried to intensify the scare caused by Soviet involvement and its propaganda machine now lobbies effectively in many

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(1) An Open Letter to Comrade Alexei Kosygin and Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, Joseph Lagu for The Anya Nya Aegis Committee.

capitals to mobilise western opinion on its side. It is also attempting to exploit the race theme in the same way as did the Biafrans in the later stages of the Nigerian civil war. This attempt may be aimed not only at guilty white consciences, but also at the members of the O.A.U.

Ethiopia

As in the Sudan, the conflict in Ethiopia has become an extension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The secessionist movement in Ethiopia began in 1962 when the Eritrean National Assembly decided that Eritrea, which had until then been in a federal relationship with Ethiopia, should become an integral province of the Ethiopian Empire. In religious terms, the struggle between the Imperial Government and the Eritrean Liberation Front is the reverse of the situation in the Sudan and in a sense is a continuation of a conflict between ancient Coptic emperors and Islamic invaders. Here, it is a Moslem minority which complains that it is being oppressed by Christians. Like the Southern Sudan, the population of Eritrea is not culturally homogeneous though estimates vary as to the size of the Moslem population. The Ethiopian Government claims that only 13.6 per cent is Moslem. In 1952, however, the British estimated that there were 514,000 Moslems as against 510,000 Christians. The E.L.F. claims that this majority has increased to a point where 60 per cent of the population is now Moslem. The ELF is divided as to what it wants from Ethiopia. Some elements demand that Eritrea be detached from Ethiopia and recognised as a separate nation. Others simply want autonomy, 'UN legality' or restructuring of the monarchist government of Haile Selassie. The Ethiopians on the other hand claim that the separate identity of Eritrea has long since eroded and that in any event it had been an integral part of the Empire before it was occupied by the Italians in 1891.

Despite the massive involvement of the Ethiopian armed forces in the conflict (two thirds of the army is said to be committed to the war) the 10,000 strong guerrilla force has been able to achieve notable gains. The guerrillas have destroyed major communications systems and successfully ambushed and killed the commander of the Ethiopian Second Division on December 16, 1970. Alarmed by the growing strength of the ELF, the Central Government declared a state of emergency in most of Eritrea in December 1970 and stepped up its aerial and ground attacks on guerrilla bases and civilian centres alike.

The Ethiopian conflict involves more or less the same foreign parties which are operating in the Sudan with which Ethiopia shares 1,400 miles of border. The growing strength of the ELF is in large part due to the training, weapons and sanctuaries which it receives from Syria, Libya, The People's Republic of Yemen, Iraq, Sudan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Al Fatah. The Soviet Union, China, and reportedly Cuba also supply guerrillas with arms. For the Arabs and the

Soviet Union, the stakes in Eritrea are quite high and integrally related to the conflict in the Sudan. The Arabs and the Soviets would like to be in a position to have monopoly control over all ports on the Red Sea littoral, but especially those which command the Southern entrance to that waterway. The Soviets already have free access to the Yemeni port of Hodeida and use the island of Socotra for paratroop training. The stakes are equally high for the Ethiopians, Americans and Israelis. Eritrea is Ethiopia's only access to the sea and 70 per cent of its exports flow through the ports of Massawa and Assab. Djibouti, through which the rest of its seaborne traffic now flows and which is the terminus of the railway from Addis Ababa, is under French control and is being claimed by Somalia which has strong ties with both the Chinese and the Soviets.

The Americans' military involvement with Ethiopia is substantial. They maintain a major military base in Eritrea (Kagnew) which contributes about $4 to $6 million to the Ethiopian economy. "The high altitude base is a primary relay and spy station for America's worldwide communication system and an air force base strategically located in relation to Africa and the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.... If /Eritrea/ were independent, the Red sea would be totally controlled by Arabs. As it is, Ethiopia is the only country in the area in which the U.S. has overflight, landing and port rights. It is an enclave which the U.S. does not want to lose in the Middle East Struggle".(2) The U.S. has admitted that it has supplied bombs and ammunition used against the ELF. Ethiopia receives the bulk of annual American military assistance to Africa. In 1970, the amount was $12 m or almost two-thirds of the allocation, a major dividend for a country which spends about 31 per cent of its budget on security. Nearly half of the Africans trained in the U.S. under various military assistance programmes are Ethiopian. There are also about three to four thousand American military personnel in Ethiopia some of whom are detailed to train the 40,000 members of the Ethiopian army. American advisors help to instruct the Imperial Police Force and the Ethiopian Navy while American educators have been heavily involved in school programmes at all levels. The U.S. also buys 70 per cent of Ethiopia's main export crop - coffee, and 40 per cent of its total exports. Twenty per cent of Ethiopia's imports come from the U.S. and through TWA, the U.S. participates in the operation of Ethiopian Airways.

The Israelis are also heavily involved in Ethiopia, and American and Israeli military personnel work closely together. The latter is responsible for training the Ethiopian commando police force which fights the guerrillas as well as the

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(2) "Ethiopia and the U.S. - Partners in Imperialism" African Research Group Africa and the World, April 1971, p. 15.

security police. Israeli and American military experts also serve with Ethiopians in the field, and have helped to organise the port of Massawa. Israel quite naturally wishes to ensure that there is a friendly country with ports on the Red Sea and considers Ethiopia vital to her strategic needs. Her involvement with Ethiopia however makes the latter a natural foe of the Arabs.

Tanzania

Although there is at present no civil conflict in English speaking East Africa comparable to those in the Sudan and Ethiopia, the region has known major upheavals which have led to foreign involvement. The most dramatic events have been the 1964 revolution in Zanzibar which led to Chinese penetration of that island, and the army mutinies which took place in the same month in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The fact that the British had to be invited to restore order in the three countries was a matter of grave embarrassment, especially for Tanzania. The British were quickly replaced with an OAU force consisting of Ethiopians and Nigerians and subsequently by Canadians, Israelis and Chinese.

President Nyerere's acceptance of Chinese military aid provoked hostile responses in the West and in Africa, and fears were expressed that Tanzania would become the first major Chinese satellite in Africa. Nyererеasserted that he was not afraid of the Chinese, and that he was merely taking the principle of non-alignment to its logical limits. One of the most dramatic developments in the relationship between China and Tanzania, and indeed China and Africa as a whole, was China's agreement to help finance and build the $400 million railway which will link Zambia's copper mines with the port of Dar-es-Salaam. The 13,000 Chinese technicians working in Tanzania have been said in the West to be members of the Railway Engineering and Signal Corps of the People's Liberation Army, and Chinese army personnel in Tanzania was therefore assumed to be larger than the 10,000 Tanzania People's Defence Force. Chou en Lai has denied that China has ever sent any soldiers abroad.

Whatever the truth of the matter, there is little doubt that the Chinese have now become the major military influence in Tanzania and the largest source of military equipment and training for its army and air force. China is now constructing a naval base in Dar-es-Salaam and has also been involved in training freedom fighters for the struggle in Southern Africa. Tanzania seems to have concluded that given her terrain and the type of struggle she may have to wage in the future, the Chinese would make better advisers than Canadians or any other Western small power whom she can trust. There are also reports, which are denied in Dar-es-Salaam, that Tanzania and Zambia have entered into a joint defence agreement with China. The Chinese are said to be building weapons depots at twenty mile intervals to be manned by Tanzanians and Zambians under Chinese officers.

Tanzania's neighbours are visibly worried by China's presence there as are Western Governments. As Zambians and Tanzanians see it, by agreeing to help build the railway, the Chinese have struck a major blow in the war against Southern Africa. There is a strong possibility that the railway might be a prime target for sabotage as conflict deepens in Southern Africa, and there is a growing feeling in some radical circles that some sort of defence agreement must be entered into between the Chinese and Tanzania and Zambia as a counter weight to the informal alliance which is seen to exist between the West and the racist regimes in South Africa. As Nyerere himself warned, the imperialists will try to strangle Tanzania and Zambia now they have disposed of Obote.

Kenya

Kenya and Malawi have always been very perturbed about China's presence in Tanzania and what they consider to be her interference in their internal politics. In Kenya, China has been accused of circulating subversive literature and of supplying money and arms to dissident groups. Chou en Lai's declaration that "Africa was ripe for revolution" and his attack on "so-called federations" rigged by imperialists to serve their own interests also angered the Kenya Government. The Kenya Government believed that Chou was suggesting that people like Kenyatta, Obote and even Nyerere, who "talked out of both sides of their mouth about socialism", should be overthrown and replaced by "scientific socialists" like Odinga.

Russian officials in Kenya were also accused of supplying money and arms to the same elements and of using the Lumumba Institute (which they financed) as an instrument to train revolutionary cadres and to spread an ideology foreign to Sessional Paper No. 10 which defines Kenya's official ideology. Odinga was accused of being the major instrument of these plots, a charge which both the Chinese and Odinga heatedly denied. Kenya's non-alignment was a myth, Odinga charged. "Kenya was a capitalist country with military arrangements with Britain".(3)

There is little question that Kenya is important to British and American strategy in East Africa. As part of the Kenya independence agreement, Britain was given facilities for the "training" of British troops in Kenya, landing rights for British warplanes at Kenyan airfields, and the use of the port of Mombasa for the British Navy. It was under this agreement that troops were sent to Kenya during the Singapore conference on the eve of the Uganda coup.

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(3) Not Yet Uhuru, Heinemann, 1967, p. 286.

France has also begun to show great interest in Kenya. Reportedly, France has entered into secret negotiations with Kenya to supply AMX-13 light tanks, aircraft and radar defence equipment similar to those being sold to South Africa. Dr. Mungai, the Kenya Foreign Minister, has apparently been told that if the arms deal is concluded, substantial amounts of French financial and technical assistance would follow. The Israelis too are lavishing a great deal of attention on Kenya. In the words of Abba Eban, "there is a trustful co-operation between us. In the past ten years, about 1,000 Kenyans have been trained in Israel."(4)

Uganda

When Milton Obote was toppled from power on January 25, 1971, he heatedly charged that the whole thing had been masterminded by the Israelis. Obote also claims that Israel has acquired a military base in Uganda from which it plans to conduct its operations in the Sudan. It is noted that Obote was beginning to lean more towards Khartoum, and that he was becoming less tolerant of the activities of Sudanese rebels and Israeli officials whom he accused of assisting them. It is well known that the Israelis were to be phased out of their roles as military specialists in the Uganda army and air force and the claim is that they worked through Major Amin, the Minister of Defence, Felix Onama and others to undermine and finally otherthrow Obote. The fact that the Israelis were visibly delighted by the coup as were the British, and the noticeable closeness between the two countries and the new regime, is also seen as evidence of their complicity.

Although Israel and the British stood to achieve benefits from the coup, it does not follow that they were instrumental in planning or executing it. They might simply have taken advantage of a strategic and diplomatic windfall. To say that every coup in Africa was an indirect attack engineered by imperialists is to subscribe to a naive theory of African powerlessness and passivity. Moreover, Israel must have been aware that if it became known that it was involved in planning the overthrow of a popular pan-Africanist, its hopes of eliciting a more favourable image among the progressive elites of Africa would be set back.

II. One of the striking things about the civil conflicts in Eastern Africa is the number of countries that are involved either in supplying arms, training, troops, advisers and financial and propaganda assistance. The basic reasons why foreign powers become involved in the intra-statal and inter-statal disputes of African countries are strategic, economic, and prestige.

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(4) Daily Nation, May 29, 1971.

Strategic

Perhaps the overriding reason for foreign involvement in East African politics is strategic. Israel, for example, considers Ethiopia, the Sudan and the East African littoral as a "second ring" of the Middle East theatre and would like to see in power friendly regimes which could provide her with diplomatic support in the conflict with the Arab world.

The U.S. and other Western countries also have strategic goals in Eastern Africa. The aim is to counter-balance the growing power of the Soviet Union and China in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Western powers are naturally anxious to protect their oil supply lines which the Soviets are accused of seeking to monopolise and their bases in Ethiopia and Kenya which are considered to be pivotal states in Eastern Africa. France is keen on maintaining a strategic presence in the area as her support of Tombalbaye in Chad indicates.

The tensions in Eastern Africa are closely linked to those in the Indian Ocean. Alec Douglas-Home has asserted that Simonstown is essential to NATO and to deter militant communism from taking over the assets of the free world. His argument and that of other pro-Western spokesmen is that the Soviets are not concerned about maintaining the naval balance, but are seeking to change it. The Soviets agree, but do not accept the notion that they are threatening anyone.

Each side is arguing that the other is seeking a monopoly while it is in favour of balance, and the Soviets have the better of the argument. The British Government is less concerned about Soviet naval threats or the economic benefit to be had by selling arms to South Africa than it is to give legitimacy to South Africa where Britain has substantial economic interests.

Economic

Strategic considerations are often linked to economic considerations, but the two are not always identical. The growing involvement of Japan, France and Italy in East Africa appears to be more economic than strategic, and Italy's willingness to withdraw from the Cabora Bassa Scheme was due to the fact that in the long run she stood to lose more economically by remaining in it. In the case of Britain, strategic considerations are as important as the purely economic ones. In fact, the former are considered essential to the preservation of the latter. But Britain's insistence on selling arms to South Africa may be costly in economic terms if some African states retaliate.

Israel's interest in Eastern Africa is economic as well as strategic. As Efram Sigel notes: "East Africa holds 'enormous possibilities' for the expansion of Israeli commerce"(5)

With respect to China and the Soviet Union and especially with the former, it could be argued that economic considerations are not paramount. Both the Chinese and the Soviets have, however, found valuable markets and sources of raw materials in the area, and the barter arrangements which often form part of these trade agreements at the same time yield valuable increments of foreign exchange for the socialist countries.

Prestige

The search for prestige is an important dimension of great power rivalry in Africa. A "presence" in Africa is important as an index of power, prestige and national interest, and fluctuations in "presence" are a gauge of how well one is doing vis-a-vis one's competitors. While there is a strong element of national chauvinism and rivalry between the Soviet Union and China in their foreign policy towards Africa, there is also a strong sense of ideological rivalry. China in fact began its career in Africa by supporting groups with radical potential. While China still continues to support radical regimes and train guerrillas in Southern Africa, like the Soviets, they now find little difficulty reaching accomodations with pro-Western regimes such as Ethiopia and Israel. The thaw in American-Chinese relations will no doubt increase China's legitimacy in Africa, and it remains to be seen whether a Sino-American detente will lessen China's revolutionary ardour any further.

III. The probable explanation for this widespread interest in the region is that it is viewed as a crucial extension of two major theatres of conflict - the Middle East and Southern Africa. Whether or not the conflicts remain local or develop into major international crises therefore depends very much on what happens in these two primary conflict zones. In themselves, the conflicts do not seem to have the potential for escalation into major international crises. The Eritrean-Ethiopia conflict although seemingly a structural one in the sense that the ELF is attempting to alter the boundaries of the Ethiopian political system may well defuse itself when the Emperor dies. Haile Selassie's successors may well feel constrained to loosen Ethiopia's military relationship with the U.S. when the lease on Kagnew expires in 1978, and may also take up a much less anti-Arab posture. Ethiopia, like most East African countries, is anxious to have the Suez Canal re-opened since its closure increases freight costs by over

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(5) "Israel and Africa" African Report, February 1971, p.8.

40 per cent, and reduces the competitiveness of their goods in Europe and the U.S.A. The U.S. is also trying to change its image as an anti-Arab power, and may encourage closer relations between Ethiopia and her Arab neighbours and a scaling down of the Israeli linkage. Such a posture, coupled with some gesture of conciliation to the Moslems of Eritrea such as a measure of autonomy, might well take some of the steam out of the conflict by reducing the military capability of the ELF. The ELF in fact appears to be operating on these assumptions.

The Sudan conflict is also structural and appears to be more intransigent. Given the intensification of rivalries between the communists and the Arab nationalists following the abortive communist coup in July 1971, it is quite possible that little time or resources will be spent in placating the South. One can in fact expect a much closer relationship between the Sudan, Libya, Egypt and Syria, and Numeiry might now feel obliged to fulfill what he considers to be the "Arab destiny" of the Sudan. Although Israel was not happy about a communist government in Khartoum, recent developments will no doubt encourage it to step up assistance to the South in an attempt to make it more difficult for the Sudan to increase its deployment of troops along the canal zone. On the other hand, Uganda may well wish to restrict Israel's activities in the North, since she has a great deal to fear if the Sudan encourages the activities of pro-Obote elements along its southern borders.

Khartoum's persecution of communists may well force Russia to reconsider its military assistance programmes. Although Russia has expressed strong concern, it may yet feel that its commitments in the struggle against Israel must be given precedence to its fraternal obligations to communist parties in the area. But it is equally possible that given Numeiry's experiences with the Soviets and the deterioration of the economy he might want to rely more on China or even the West. In the event of a rapprochement with the West, he might feel constrained to make conciliatory gestures to the Anya Nya, especially since it might be considered imprudent to do battle with the Anya Nya and the communists at the same time. It is clear that what happens in the Sudan in terms of the scale of external involvement hinges a great deal on what happens in the Middle East.

Involvement on the part of the Great Powers and their allies in the internal conflicts in Eastern Africa has so far been restrained. Following upon the conflicts in Congo and Nigeria, there seems to be a tacit determination to prevent these conflicts from becoming major cockpits of great power strife. Given the low profile which seems to typify the rivalry of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in Africa, the incipient thaw in relations between the U.S. and China, and the determination of African states to maintain the existing nation state system, there seems little likelihood of any major international clash, at least

not in traditional cold war terms. But given the fluidity of politics in Africa and the fragility of African states and political coalitions, it is difficult to predict where critical conflicts will erupt or reappear.

IV. But can anything be done to fulfill those early hopes that the continent would not be the object of a second scramble? A number of suggestions have in fact been given. They include (a) the creation of an all-African High Command to police conflicts between and within African countries. (b) greater use of OAU mediation facilities. (c) banning of all arms sales or gifts to African countries. (d) cutting those economic links to the West which encourage "protective" intervention.

The first two solutions are popular with radical pan-African states such as Guinea and Tanzania and continue to have some attraction for elements in moderate states such as Nigeria. But while the OAU has had some success in mediating disputes such as that between Ethiopia and Somalia, its impact on other disputes such as that in Nigeria where the stakes were high, has been marginal. OAU efforts are likely to be welcomed by incumbent elites but not by claimants for power. It is worth noting that the OAU has not made any major effort to bring the warring parties in the Sudan together, and it is to be wondered whether the OAU might not attempt to trade off its support of the Arabs in the Middle East conflict in return for a gesture on the part of Khartoum towards the Southerners.

An all-African military command designed to maintain a Pax Africana would have the same built-in difficulties as the OAU. Actions which the High Command might wish to take will certainly not be approved by all African states, let alone the parties to the conflict. If this High Command has to take its instructions from a Defence Commission consisting of the defence ministers of forty states and can act only with the approval of the government of the State in question, it will be paralysed in most cases. Not even in a contest with racist and offensive regimes in Southern Africa can one count on unity since there will always be Bandas, Boignys, Busias, Bongos and Bokassas in Africa. Moreover, there are logistical problems involved in mobilising an all-African military force quickly which may prove difficult, though not impossible, to overcome. In spite of these difficulties, however, some sort of all-African peace-keeping military presence is clearly a goal towards which African energies ought to be directed in the near future. But its effectiveness might well be limited to inter rather than intra-state disputes and to confrontations with the remaining colonial powers or minority racist regimes.

The suggestion that the traffic in arms to Africa should be stopped, and that no further aid should be given to support military budgets is an attractive one, but it is idealistic just the same. It is true that without outside budgetary support, many African countries could not support their present levels of defence spending. Countries such as the Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia commit a large proportion of their resources to armies and armaments which are badly needed for development projects. But even if aid is transferred from military to civil projects, states can still redirect their own resources into military channels if they consider it paramount to bolster their security services. And as Geoffrey Kemp notes, "despite a marked degree of correlation between high defence budgets, large armed forces and incidents of conflict, it cannot be argued that the arms cause or contribute to the conflict."(6) An increased supply of arms may exacerbate a conflict, but it could also shorten it if the increase is decisive.

Even if it were possible to get the large arms suppliers to agree to deny "sophisticated" and offensive arms to developing countries, there will still be problems determining what exactly is an offensive weapon, and policing the activities of small suppliers. As Amelia Leiss observes: "A country that is determined to acquire arms regardless of the persuasion of its mentor has the option of many suppliers of roughly comparable systems to which to turn...It is increasingly a buyers market."(7)

The notion that disengagement from world economic systems is an effective way to curb interventionism on the part of foreign powers is quite prevalent in radical circles, particularly in Tanzania. The argument is that foreign aid and investment creates opportunities for access and leads to the establishment or strengthening of link groups which then provides pretexts and justifications for intervention. In the words of Okwudiba Nnoli: "Africanisation of the linkage groups reduces the impact of external influences...This is a genuine reason for the nationalisation of expatriate enterprises in African states."(8) Self-reliant

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(6) "Arms Traffic and Third World Conflicts". International Conciliation, No. 577, March, 1970, p.9.

(7) "The Transfer of Conventional Arms to Less Developed Countries". Arms Control and National Security, Vol. 1., 1969, pp. 46-54.

(8) "Some Implications of Contemporary World Politics for African Development" The African Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1971, p. 52. For a radical analysis of the role of link groups in Tanzania, cf. Shivji, Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle, mimeo. Paper presented to the Social Science Conference, Dar-es-Salaam, December 1970.

economic development then is the key to the problem of foreign intervention. Development which relies on foreign initiative and capital ultimately leads to the intensification of domestic conflicts and economic retrogression.

This is an interesting formulation, but it nevertheless contains a number of basic weaknesses. It assumes, for example, that if Tanzania "disengages" from imperialism, imperialism will therefore cease to intervene (directly or indirectly) in Tanzania since it has no link groupts to protect. But unless links are severed on a continental basis, and more or less at the same time, there is still the likelihood that foreign powers would seek to restore them in Tanzania to prevent the "infection" from spreading. This is precisely the situation in which Tanzania finds itself at the moment. We are thus back to the argument of Nkrumah for continental unity. Nkrumah's argument is that if African states did not unite they would be picked off "one by one".

Some exponents of the disengagement theory limit it to capitalist states and call for greater linkages with the socialist bloc not only to accelerate socialist development, but to secure it. But as Cuba, the Sudan and Eastern Europe illustrate, reliance on the Soviet Union or China also gives rise to complaints about great power domination. African elites, like many in Eastern Europe, might well feel that rather than leading to economic retrogression and a loss of real freedom, competition among foreign countries of all ideological persuasions increases their options. As such they will always feel threatened if any one foreign power achieves a monopoly of influence. As the late Sylvanus Olympio once observed, "we have so much to ask for and so little to bargain with". Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect African states to cut links with either of the great economic systems when they are so dependent on these for markets for their primary and secondary products. The disengagement theory assumes that options which are available to large countries with a varied resources base (both human and physical) are equally open to small states with a skewed resource base.

Given the weaknesses and liability of African states, one can expect no abatement of internal conflict in the near future whether of the leadership or the structural variety. Given the proximity of the states in Eastern Africa to two major areas of international rivalry, one can also expect capitalist and socialist powers to continue to try and influence the outcomes of these conflicts whether invited or not. In such confrontations the Soviets and the Chinese will always appear to Westerners and Africans whose class interests are served by the Western link to be the agressors, since the former do not want to maintain the post-colonial balance which favours the West, but to change it. Most of the regimes which have been overthrown in the last few years have been left-leaning and constituted threats to the Western economic interests

in Africa. The likelihood therefore is that the Western powers will do whatever they can to undermine Tanzania and Zambia, the only remaining "radical" states on the borders of Southern Africa.

Uganda has now moved closer to Britain on the South Africa issue, to Israel, Kenya and Ethiopia, and it would not come as a great surprise if tacit defence agreements are negotiated between Uganda and Britain and/or Israel. Given the siege mentality which now prevails in Lusaka and Dar-es-Salaam, it would only be natural for greater reliance to be placed on the Chinese. The latter would have strong incentives to maintain the security of the railway and might well function as a deterrent to Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia if they feel tempted to punish Zambia and Tanzania for giving assistance and sanctuary to guerilla groups.

Finally, it is worth stressing that African elites have so far not allowed themselves to be bound to any one foreign power or group, and that they have changed alliances or emphases in dependence when it suited them. Tanzania and Uganda shifted away from reliance on Western military support and Uganda is now in the process of reverting to Western dependence. The Sudan and Ethiopia might well reduce their dependence on the Soviet Union and the United States respectively as regimes change or new developments arise. African politics must be a nightmare to game-players in foreign chancelleries and defence establishments who expect consistency from their "client" elites.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

13TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

CIVIL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE 4

Saturday, 11th September — Late Afternoon

Civil Violence and the Political Balance: Italy and Europe

MR. ARRIGO LEVI

The aim of this paper is to assess the influence of civil violence on the political stability of Italy, and to attempt an evaluation of the consequences, for international security, of domestic upheavals there. Will Italy's democratic institutions survive and flourish, or might totalitarian forces of the Left or Right, peacefully or non-peacefully, take power? How safe a member of the Atlantic Alliance is Italy? Moreover, Italy should not be seen alone in Southern Europe. It is the pivotal area in terms of possible social upheavals and of future international security on the Western European side just as neighbourly Yugoslavia is on the Communist one. The geographic contiguity of these two nations, the strength of economic and even political ties between them, make it inevitable that a crisis in either Italy or Yugoslavia would have strong repercussions in the neighbouring State. The whole European balance would be affected by a serious crisis either in Italy or in Yugoslavia.

The level of civil violence

It has been said that only four people died in Italy, during the seven years of the Saragat Presidency, in clashes involving the police. (1) This may very well be true. Even though 13 people were killed in the anarchist bomb explosion in a Milan bank in Autumn 1969, Italy has known nothing even remotely similar to the prolonged bloodshed in Northern Ireland. Nor has anything comparable to the French *événements de mai* ever taken place, in spite of the fact that the Students Movement in Italy became highly organized and developed a revolutionary ideology earlier than in France. Nevertheless, the variety and frequency of violent acts is impressive.

These have included, "football riots" (Caserta); regional popular riots, of very confused but sometimes right-wing or neo-fascist political background, in Reggio Calabria and elsewhere in the Centre-South (the Reggio Calabria months-long

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(1) C.S. Sulzberger, N.Y. Times, 21 July, 1971

riots of 1970 were strongly reminiscent of popular anti-State rioting in Southern Italy in the decades following the country's unification); various and numerous examples of "urban guerrilla", organized mostly by extreme Left students, as well as frequent clashes between extremists of Left and Right, in many of Italy's bigger cities of the Centre-North; and sporadic violence, including some acts of sabotage, accompanying prolonged strikes in the biggest Italian factories, both State-owned and private, in Turin, Milan etc; even banditism in Sardinia and Mafia violence in Sicily and Calabria have been recognized as having some social and political significance. In sum, Italy has known, in the late Sixties and early Seventies, both the kind of violence existing in other advanced, highly industrialised societies and some of the more primitive violence always present in the most backward regions of the country.

As far as extreme Right violence is concerned, the planned "golpe" by a small group of nobodies led by Prince Valerio Borghese in December 1970 has never been taken seriously. In 1964, during President Segni's last summer in office, plans were made, at a certain moment, by General de Lorenzo (then Defence Chief of Staff, now a neo-fascist member of Parliament), for Carabinieri intervention against left-wing political leaders, as a precaution against anarchy prevailing in the country. A later investigation and trial seemed to prove that preparation for what might have become a semi-legal "golpe" by the military (and the President?) never went very far. The Italian armed forces appear, on the whole, to be little involved in politics, though they seem to be less detached today than in the past.

The level of civil violence of all sorts has consistently been high enough to justify a widespread feeling of uneasiness and tension, at least during the last three or four years. Left-wing violence, of course, breeds right-wing violence, and vice-versa. However, the great majority of political observers and public opinion still consider that the Republican institutions, though relatively young, are not likely to be destroyed by either organized or spontaneous violence in the foreseeable future, and that the political and institutional forces defending the Republic have still reserves of power which are amply sufficient to counteract desperate acts by minority groups of any political connotation. Let it be clear that the most likely scenario for Italy, in the general view, is still a "democratic" though troubled one.

Political forces with an avowed programme of civil violence

None of the major political movements or parties in Italy formally favours violence to further its aims. Two, however, the Neofascists (MSI) and the Communist Party (PCI) have historical and/or political and ideological connections with movements which accept or have accepted violence as a declared tool of political action. Ties between the MSI and the more extremist right-wing violent

"gruppùscoli" are thought to exist. No connection has ever been claimed to exist between the PCI and the extreme left-wing, maoist, anarchist or other gruppi and gruppùscoli: relations are anything but friendly. Nevertheless, the language of the PCI's daily propaganda is as violent as ever, and the party is still prone to ride the tiger of every violent protest. Violent revolution, in order to "destroy the system", is the declared aim of gruppi and gruppùscoli both of the extreme Left and of the extreme Right. Police and judicial action has occasionally been taken against some of their leaders and publications, but on the whole their near-illegal activities have not been made difficult, in the very liberal and permissive Italian atmosphere.

Some collusion has taken place between groups of the "Extraparliamentary" Left and Right, as the extremes are called in Italy. Both firmly believe that violence is good. Even violence by opponents is helpful, since it leads to a general atmosphere of tension hopefully conducive to one's own "revolution".

General public opinion is very clearly against violence: but a teeny bit of violence by one's own political or social side, or by one's own trade union, is still considered to be within the rules. Indeed, the belief is widespread that without a little violence - like stopping traffic in Rome or on an autostrada, occupying a factory or a public office or a university building - the huge and cumbersome machinery of the State will never respond to just grievances and redress real or imaginary wrongs. This philosophy has created a certain sympathy for the gruppùscoli, although no self-declared violent group has much chance to win significant parliamentary representation.

The left-wing gruppi (the main ones, "Lotta Continua", "Il Manifesto" and "Potere Operaio": are all nation-wide movements) have definitely helped to push the trade unions on to a very militant path, and to maintain a very tense atmosphere in Italy's industries. The economic and political consequences, since the "Hot Autumn" of 1969, have been very serious. Italy's present economic crisis has largely grown out of this situation. The gap between popular expectations and economic achievements has been made wider; a feeling of great insecurity has spread among industrial "entrepreneurs" and managers, and economic initiative has greatly suffered. The left-wing gruppi have also greatly strengthened right-wing trends among the urban middle classes, tired of continuous strife and strikes: they are, to a large extent, responsible for the MSI's electoral success of June 1971.

What the left-wing gruppi have done among students and young workers in the North, right-wing groups and the MSI have done or tried to do in the depressed towns of Southern Italy, by-passed by the "miracle". The major example has, of course, been the many months of rioting "against State and Parties" in Reggio Calabria.

The social, economic, and political background

Italy is a nation of "late development": while underdeveloped nations can be stable, nations of late development, that is to say, rapidly growing nations which have become acutely aware of their backwardness relative to their neighbours, tend to be unstable. Furthermore, it is a nation of exceptionally uneven development. The North is relatively developed (on the level of the advanced Central and Northern European states), but the South is spectacularly backward. The state has attempted, through a number of brave plans, to close the gap, but has so far only succeeded, at the most, in preventing it from widening.

The progressive social ideology of Italy's Repubblica basata sul lavoro, ("Republic based on work") has made the citizen keenly aware of his rights and aspirations for social and economic betterment. Television has brought images of progress and affluence into the depressed homes of the South, images which are tantalizingly near, yet so difficult to reach. Progress itself, particularly in Northern Italy, has had unexpectedly high social costs: explosive urbanization and heavy industrialization are a very mixed blessing for the first generation of people involved in such processes. Finally, due to the lightning speed with which cultural and psychological attitudes spread in today's world, some strata of society (the young) have quickly come to share all the disappointments which are typical of the most advanced and blasé consumer societies. Italy has rightly been compared to a Centaur, so that, when ill, one does not know whether to call a doctor or a veterinarian. There is reciprocal enhancement between rebellious moods of very different social and historical origins: the result is an atmosphere of contestazione generale. Finally, a multiplicity of protests ends by wearing down the capacity to react of political institutions. Where the prestige of the State and national cohesion between social classes are, for historical reasons, already weak, as in Italy, the "institutions" can withstand all these tensions only with great difficulty: a sense of impending doom is rarely absent.

There are no quick remedies for the growing pains behind the present civil violence in Italy. 'Get rich quick" is an economically productive state of mind; it also leads easily to an impatient mood which breeds violence. Even the most capable, efficient and well respected political class and institutions (and Italy is far from ideal in this respect) would find the going very heavy, for a generation or so. Later, the situation might stabilise. But for the foreseeable future, one must reckon with outbursts of civil violence, which could threaten the country's present institutions.

Scenarios for violence and its international consequences

Though most observers expect Italy to remain on an even keel, scenarios for violent upheaval have been seriously discussed. The kind of multi-farious violence prominent during the last few years, by increasing in intensity could contribute to a general crisis. Production would come to a near-stop, unemployment increase dramatically, leading to still greater tension and violence, and Italy become "ungovernable". In such a chaos, the democratic parties and institutions could break apart. This would lead either to a right-wing take-over with more or less legal forms, or to an invitation to the Communists to join Italy's Government, and even become the leading party in a new left-wing coalition.

Perhaps because right-wing scenarios are dull and repetitive ("a new Fascist Italy"; a new "Colonels' Greece"), but probably due more to the general feeling that the Communists and near-Communist left are much stronger, politically, than the extreme right, the possibility of a Communist take-over has aroused much the most interest (though this could be a serious and dangerous mistake). It is usually believed that though violence might create the climate for a Communist take-over, the take-over itself might well be peaceful and wholly legal. Nevertheless, there are great and well-founded fears that in the end this would only turn out to be a peaceful road to greater civil violence.

I personally believe [2] that the Communists will act very cautiously, for fear of a "shift to the right" (which may, indeed, be already underway). The Communists appear to be available to play various roles in the 1970's. They could be a "converging" and almost loyal opposition, junior partner in a wide "antifascist" and reformist coalition, or the mainstay of a new left-wing majority. They will mostly react to events, so that the crux will be the capacity of the democratic parties to control the situation. Should the democratic parties fail, the communists might take over constitutionally, Allende-fashion, though this would require a split of the Christian Democrat party and a much greater political upset than was necessary for the Marxist coalition to win in Chile. Once in power, it is unlikely that a Communist-led Government could prevent an acute economic crisis. It would then be strongly tempted to acquire even more powers to confirm its hold. Such a "Chilean scenario" would be as unpredictable in its later developments as the Chilean situation today: but it is just as unlikely that the original ambiguous balance might be held for long and a violent trial of strength avoided. Such a situation would be an ideal setting for more violence, spontaneous or organised.

The consequences for Italy's foreign policy and for the European balance

(2) Arrigo Levi: "Pci, la lunga marcia verso il potere", Etas Kompass, 1971.

would, in all probability, be immediate and dramatic. A Communist Italy would quite soon begin withdrawing from NATO. Harsh reactions by Italy's allies, even if only diplomatic would make it easier for it to move quickly to a neutral position, somewhat akin to Yugoslavia's. The PCI has consistently proclaimed, even when most critical of Moscow's policy, that it will never move over to the "Anti-Soviet camp". It is difficult to imagine that the Party's Russian ties, which are still strong, would weaken at a moment of great difficulty for Italy's Communists, when the only obvious friends would be the Communist nations. As for the European Economic Community, the Communists' declared aim is not to withdraw from it but to transform it into a "regional economic organization" of the UN, purely commercial in function and long range aims, and including both Western and Eastern European nations.

Should the present foreign policy of the PCI, with its official anti-bloc philosophy, become Italy's national policy, it would weaken or destroy the Western bloc, while leaving the Eastern bloc intact: it would strike a formidable blow to the present political and strategic balance, and would definitely upset it in favour of Russian hegemony over Europe. Of course, it cannot be excluded that, once in power, aiming at the development of a "national Communism" and being so near Russia and so far from America, the Italian Communists might realistically modify their present policy. However, it would be somewhat optimistic to count too much on such a possibility, or to expect that, should they want to do so, they would easily succeed, against the formidable pressures of events, and having to deal with a Russia committed to Brezhnev's doctrine.

This scenario of a Communist take-over in Italy, summed up in the Sulzberger formula: "spaghetti with Chile sauce", has lost much of its credibility, in Italy, after the June 1971 administrative elections in Sicily, Rome and other centres. A clear "shift to the Right", in favour of the neofascist MSI, cost the dominant party, the Christian Democrats, heavy losses, while the Communists too lost ground. The whole political atmosphere in Italy seemed to change abruptly under the shock of these results. The Christian Democrats stiffened their anti-Communist position and hardened their attitude towards their Socialist (PSI) partners in government; the Socialists themselves watered down their demands for "new, more advanced, political balances" (which actually meant including the Communists in a new coalition). In the summer of 1971, the general feeling was that the future might soon bring a deliberate turn to the Right by the Christian Democrats.

In August, the renewal of Soviet pressures on Rumania and Yugoslavia made a "Communist scenario" in Italy even less likely. Threats to Yugoslav independence in themselves increase resistance to a shift to the Left in Italy.

Should Yugoslav institutions disintegrate, or fall prey to Soviet pressures, before the present situation changes in Italy, a Communist take-over in Rome, or even a cautious "opening to the Communists", would become nearly impossible and a shift to the Right would be facilitated. If, on a different hypothesis, the Communists were already in power in Rome, they might be pushed, in self-defence, to a more "Western", maybe even to an Atlantic, position.

In the Summer of 1971 all this sounded rather far-fetched. The fact that the Communists continued to behave as a very loyal opposition, allowing some key reforms to go through Parliament, gave some continuing credibility to the hypothesis of a further "convergence" between the PCI and the government parties. The step from being a "loyal" or "converging" opposition, to becoming an "outside supporter" of the Government would not be too long, and might prepare the ground for future participation of the PCI in a democratic Government coalition. The Communists are aware that their neutralist and pro-Soviet policy, as well as their strong party-ties with Moscow, still represent extremely strong obstacles to such developments. However, they have done nothing, so far, to soft-pedal their "Soviet" priorities in order to facilitate agreement with Italy's democratic parties. This is probably due to their feeling that, the more they become a "moderate" party in domestic affairs, the more they must confirm their ties with Moscow: otherwise, the unity of the party would be endangered, or the party might lose much of its electoral support in favour of more extremist forces (either already in being, or new).

Under present conditions, a DC-PCI coalition is inthinkable without a major crisis and a split in either, or both, of Italy's great parties. This makes any forecast impossible. The final result might well be a full scale Communist take-over. At the other extreme, we might witness the disappearance of the great challenge from the Left, such as we have known it all through the last 25 years. Repercussions on Italy's foreign policy could be just as wide-ranging.

The extreme alternative hypothesis of a right-wing take-over would require a state of anarchy prevailing in Italy, leading to a general crisis and break-up of democratic parties and institutions. A President in such a crisis could decide to "restore order" with the help of the Army, of which he is the Supreme Chief. A "Colonels' Italy", or a "Neofascist Italy", or a "Gaullist Italy" (these are the main possibilities, and they might turn out to be rather different from one another), would probably maintain Italy's alignment with the West. At first, Italy could even look more safely "Atlantic" than it is today. But it is reasonable to think that in the long-run a right-wing, strongly nationalist Italy, would become an uncomfortable ally, liable once again to develop Mediterranean ambitions. A democratic Central-Northern Europe, closed in by a Fascist South (from Spain via Italy to Greece) and a Communist East would be much less vital and secure. Such a Europe might easily fall apart, each nation

separately seeking national reassurances and insurances from America, or Russia, or indigenous nationalism.

Should all these more extreme hypotheses prove unjustified, we would be left with much the same old Italy as before, just as vital and unstable. This is considered by most the likeliest scenario. This would not mean being "stuck" for ever with a "Centre-Left" coalition of Christian Democrats and Socialists. A centre-right coalition of Christian Democrats, Social democrats, Republicans and Liberals (the coalition which ruled Italy through most of the Fifties) is once more on the cards since the "traumatic" experience of the June 1971 administrative elections. Both a centre-left and a centre-right Italy would carry on much the same foreign policy as before. Could, however, internal upheavals press future democratic governments of Italy towards a more neutralist or passive position in East-West relations? This might be so, should the tendency to an "opening to the Communists" gather strength once more. The extremely anti-Soviet attitude of Italy's New Left, and its quixotic pro-Chinese position, seem by themselves incapable of influencing Italy's foreign policy in any way.

Western Europe's Unification and Europe's South

This paper has so far tried to show that violence is today an important contributory factor to the political instability of Italy; that the roots of violence are deep and receive new nourishment by the great structural changes taking place; that the political forces now in power, and the present institutions, should be able to stand the strains of such a situation; but that the alternative of a violent break-up cannot be ruled out of court.

It seems self-evident that any abrupt change in Italy would leave Europe worse off than today. This would be true of a 'Neo-Fascist Italy", while a Communist take-over could precipitate a general European crisis and contribute to overall Russian domination of the Continent. In recent years, the worst conceivable scenario had three preliminary conditions: institutional crisis in Yugoslavia, institutional crisis in Italy, and failure of the EEC negotiations with Britain. The fact that the third premise of this "pessimistic scenario" has not apparently materialized, makes it less likely that the other two will transpire.

The dangers are still there. The fourth and fifth pre-conditions of a "pessimistic scenario" (Russia's forward foreign policy, and America's neo-isolationist tendencies) are very much in evidence. So, the situation is not particularly promising for Western Europe in the Seventies. That is why the strongest nations of the West ought to do all they can to help prevent a deep crisis in Italy and Yugoslavia. What such a policy should consist of, is open to debate. The first thing would be to recognize the need for it. The near-blindness of most Western European nations to the very serious economic plight and pleas of Yugoslavia

(Italy perhaps being less blind and deaf than the others), is a serious sign of how far we are from having a co-ordinated and well planned Western European foreign policy. Just as typical is the total lack of an "Italian strategy" in the economic policy of the EEC, where the main effort has been aimed at helping France's rich farmers. Although it is very clear that the potential political dangers created by the existence of other depressed sectors in the Community are much smaller than those connected with the plight of Italy's Mezzogiorno, there has been no planned, all-European, policy in favour of the development of Southern Italy, no concrete recognition of the fact that a faster growth in Italy's depressed areas is a common interest of the whole of Western Europe and that it should engage the powerful economic forces of the more advanced Western European nations.

Today more than ever, the problems of Italy and Yugoslavia ought to enjoy a clear priority on the political agenda of the new "Europe of the Ten". Only with a stronger Southern flank can Western Europe face with any confidence the long run trial of political and strategic strength with the Soviet Union. The development of Eastern Europe, which is sure to be troubled because the region is plagued by national, economic and institutional problems, would offer better prospects if Yugoslavia's innovating Communism and Italy's democratic institutions were adequately strengthened.

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In questo Mediterraneo, [illegible] c'è politica comunitaria passiva [illegible] di + rotto [illegible] È una politica [illegible] della comunità passiva per l'Italia

Politica estera dominata [illegible] atlantica

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

13th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

CIVIL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE 5

Saturday, 11th September — Late Afternoon

Political Violence in Industrial Societies

M. GILLES MARTINET

As far as the political life of the continental European countries is concerned, the current trend of resorting to violence represents a return to the past rather than a new development. One has only to recall the tide of violence of the inter-war years, marked by the rise to power of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany, the civil war which was only just averted in France and which later did actually break out in Spain. In sheer quantity, the political violence of the 1930's greatly exceeds that of the 1960's. The most striking characteristic of the more recent wave of violence is its 'quality'. In this respect we are faced with a new phenomenon quite different from anything which existed before the war.

At that period there were two main driving forces behind political violence: widespread poverty (aggravated by the economic crisis of 1929 to 1933); and nationalism (stimulated by the Versailles peace settlement). Both still exist, but as distinct from the developing countries where they are still active, in the highly industrialised countries they now play only a very minor role. The exception which proves the rule is the American Black workers, and even here the concept of poverty is very relative.

In the present wave of violence, the old stereotypes of the starving unemployed, the ruined petit bourgeois, and the neglected war veteran have been replaced by those of the worker newly conscious of his 'alienation', the scientist dissatisfied with the use that is being made of his skill, and that privileged person, the upper middle-class student. All this has led a certain number of observers to come to the conclusion that whereas the pre-war troubles were bound up with a social and political crisis, those of to-day are symptomatic of a crisis of civilization.

This diagnosis needs tempering. The lines are never clearly drawn between social tensions, political conflicts and cultural change. The one thing that

is plain is that it is always a bad sign for an 'establishment' when some of the privileged join movements of revolt, as on the eve of both the French and Russian revolutions.

The surprise created by the revival (and in some countries introduction) of political violence was all the greater for its breaking out where it was least expected. For years the ruling circles in Western countries had been equating political violence with Communist subversion, but now the Communists themselves were thrown off balance by the new kinds of civil strife. This was particularly striking in France and in Italy, the two countries with powerful Communist parties, which naturally attempted to regain control of the youthful revolutionary elements which had broken away from them. This turned out to be an extremely difficult task. The fact is, in France and Italy, the Communist parties occupy positions similar to those held elsewhere by Labour and Social Democrat parties, in that they not only influence, but are also influenced by, the working classes, which in the main are not at present revolutionary in outlook. Hence the violent denunciations of 'left-wing extremism'. This ironic situation was quickly exploited by politicians (and also industrial magnates), who until then had been extremely hostile to the Communist organizations, but who now began to make overtures to the Communist-controlled trade unions and to make attempts to open discussions with the parties themselves. It is not necessary to dwell on these overtures, but only to point to one of their results: Western ruling circles have tended to take over the Communist critique of the new forms of civil violence, and to attribute them solely to "left-wing extremism", thus merely moving from one over-simplified formula to another.

In reality, the phenomenon is highly complex with manifold and even contradictory elements. To grapple with them one must make a preliminary analysis of the social and ideological origins of the unrest.

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1 - THE SOCIAL GROUPS INVOLVED

The most radical questioning of society is taking place amongst intellectuals, but it is difficult to talk about 'the intelligentsia' as such, since this term covers a wide variety of groups. Three groups are of particular relevance.

1) The traditional intelligentsia, whose culture is essentially literary (writers, artists, some teachers). For many of these, politics are still a source of emotion and a subject of discussion. They find the problems of industrial society confusing, especially those involving economics and technology.

They feel by-passed by the new developments and resent the loss of influence they have undoubtedly suffered. Accordingly, they are inclined to welcome anything or anyone from demonstrators to guerrillas, that strikes at industrial society and re-instates Man unencumbered by the machine. At a deeper level, the concept of solidarity with the 'people' dominates the attitude of these traditional intellectuals. The notion that the 'masses' will one day sweep away all those who occupy leading positions in industrial society -- and not just capitalists for whom their hatred often remains purely theoretical - is both inspiring and comforting. It allows them to look forward to the ending of the humiliation they currently endure - though usually in comfort and occasionally in fame - and the restoration of the values in which they believe.

2) A similar reaction is to be found in many respects amongst the sub-intelligentsia, the social stratum created by the enormous growth in the university population. In several European countries, students without degrees and graduates without jobs suited to their qualifications are the victims of the university world's inability to adapt to changing conditions. Nevertheless it would be an error to link this problem too closely with the crisis in the educational system, for in fact it concerns the whole system of production and patterns of work.

3) On the other hand the situation of the technological intelligentsia is very different, since it is much better integrated in the economic system than the other two groups. Nevertheless it contains a number of explosive elements. The events of May 1968 in France were particularly revealing in this respect, since the strongest challenge to existing methods of staff organization and management techniques came in the electronic and chemical industries, where cadres and engineers comprise over 40% of the total labour force. The same phenomenon obtained in town planning departments and medical laboratories.

On the other side of the picture we have the groups which feel most exploited and threatened by the industrial society, that is on the one hand the low wage-earners from the countryside or under-developed areas, and on the other certain categories of shop-keepers and peasants.

The large-scale strikes which shook Northern Italy in 1969 and 1970 would never have been so serious if so many of their leading participants had not been workers originating from the South. Similarly, the exceptional militancy of workers in the West of France (the scene of the first occupation of factories in 1968, and since then of most of the 'dispossessions' of owners) is largely due to the presence of peasants who had only recently become factory-workers. In this context it would also be interesting to study the influence of emigré

workers on recent developments in the West German and Swedish trade union movements, and in the case of the United States, to examine from the same viewpoint the special rôle played by Black, Puerto-Rican and Mexican workers.

The unrest amongst the peasants and some groups of small shop-keepers has been more limited, less organized and more sporadic. In these cases, it is less a question of trying to bring about changes in working conditions (though this question is discussed in some quarters amongst the peasants) than of a struggle for survival. When this seems to be assured, action tends to take traditional forms, but as soon as it is threatened, there is frequent and sometimes spectacular recourse to violence.

11 - YOUTH

However, it is not sufficient to confine oneself to analysis of the radical movements as social groups, since it is also necessary to introduce another element-the younger generation. Of course this element has always played a part in all periods of contemporary history, but never before has it assumed such importance.

The younger generation in industrial countries have not experienced poverty like preceding generations; they embark on their professional careers much later than their elders did; and in ever-increasing numbers they work their way up an educational ladder which was originally created for an élite and not for a mass society. These differences of situation lead to differences of behaviour, and although the older generation are aware of the phenomenon they do not know how to respond to it. They try to avoid open confrontations, abandon the attempt to impose their traditional moral code on the younger generation, and make one concession after another. Middle-class and lower middle-class families make it possible for their sons and daughters to pursue their studies indefinitely; working-class families give their children free board and lodging whilst they are on strike. In all classes, the older generation want to give their children <u>security</u>: they find it hard to take in that what the young are above all looking for is <u>responsibility</u>. By continuing to give boys and girls, who reach maturity much earlier than ever before, the social status of children, the generations in power are turning an age-group in many of its forms of behaviour into a social class. This explains why so many young people from middle-class backgrounds figure prominently amongst the young rebels.

111 - THE IDEOLOGIES

There can be very little homogeneity amongst a mass of rebels which consists of intellectuals who feel uneasy, workers, peasants and shop-keepers who consider themselves to be the victims of industrial society, and young people and technologists who want more responsibility. If, in addition, one bears in mind that in most cases one is dealing with minority movements, it is difficult to imagine how these would produce a major crisis, or, in other words, a real revolution. However one has to reckon with the possibility that these various groups might come together (all revolutions have been the result of a convergence of groups with more or less disparate interests), and also with the force of ideologies.

For the moment there is no common 'unifying' ideology of revolt. Its beliefs are expressed either through a type of neo-communism (Trotskyism, Maoism) which is in opposition to communist orthodoxy or a sort of neo-Rousseauism of 'spontaneity', or a neo-evangelicalism which excercises a profound influence on one section of the younger generation of Christians (mainly the Catholics). Curiously enough, all three currents of opinion mark a return (or, if one prefers, a 'regression') to doctrines or ideologies of the past. The most influential of the three is certainly the Christian current, because it provides the link between the impassioned revolt of the young supporters of the 'spontaneity' and the rationalist revolt of the dissatisfied technologists. At all events, the establishment feels itself to be most directly and closely threatened by the criticisms from the Church and by the opposition of the bourgeois young.

As long as opposition expresses itself in purely negative forms, it is possible to believe that what is involved is only a lack of capacity to adapt to the changes in society caused by the rapid progress of science and technology, since it is a well-known fact that mental processes evolve more slowly than economic and social structures. Hence the rejection of the new industrial society and the rehabilitation of the natural life and the old human values. But this is only one aspect of the situation, expressed in its extreme form by the hippie movement and by certain types of 'anti-culture' in the United States.

Connected with this rejection there is also a search for a new society, which takes into account the opportunities created by scientific and technological developments. This leads to the condemnation of political systems which are considered to be incapable of making use of those possibilities. From this point of view, the ideologies derive their inspiration not so much from a regret

for things past as from an expectation of things to come. Should not man's leisure time one day exceed his working hours? Should not educational developments be conceived in such a manner as to enable people to become qualified for several different jobs which they would do in rotation, thus breaking with the monotony of working life? Could not the decentralization of decision-making in companies be extended to the point where each worker would feel he was playing his part in management and indeed self-management? Could not this kind of participation break down/one of the main types of alienation of our age, by gradually whittling away the distinctions between those who make decisions and those who carry them out? Is not the constant advertising of consumer goods harmful in the long run, and the pursuit of ever increasing wage differentials degrading? Should one not attempt to create a certain equality in living standards?

Most of these ideas are derived from Marxist critiques of capitalist society, but there exists also a crisis within Marxism itself owing to the contradiction between these theoretical prospects and actual practices as it is found/in the various Communist states. This explains why Christian revolutionary trends, or ones inspired by Christianity (in France, the majority of 'Maoist' militants are of Catholic origin) have tended to take over, and why they have adopted parts of the Marxist system whilst continuing/strongly to place their emphasis on moral values.

The majority of politicians and, in particular, trade union leaders are still very sceptical of these ideologies. They do not deny the value of some of these visions of the future but they are pre-occupied above all with what can be achieved in the immediate future. However, their attitude could change if it became clear that the new ideologies had gained a strong hold on the younger generation, for no political action can completely dispense with ideology, that is with a view of the world necessarily containing a number of myths.

IV - THE NEW VIOLENCE

To make sense of the revival of political violence in the modern industrial world one has to admit that/the idea we are living in a pre-revolutionary situation, which is not to say that a revolution with a capital 'R' will take place or that revolutionary changes may not occur peacefully.

There is no doubt a lunatic fringe of violence and outbreaks of it which are not easily explicable and probably will not be lasting. Nevertheless, in general the new forms of violence are related to a desire to break the existing system of values and to the discovery of the obstacles and limits against which this desire must necessarily press.

When demonstrators decide to take no account of an official denial of permission to hold a demonstration, when students prevent the holding of exams or occupy university premises, when strikers refuse to honour the procedures agreed by their own trade union leaders, or when workers on their own authority change their conditions of work, occupy their plant, or even lock up the managers, there is not only a violation of the law, but an effort to oppose a new order (even if the greatest confusion exists on exactly what that order is) to the established rule of things, a future authority to the present powers that be.

For a time, the history of the Cuban revolution or, rather, the interpretations of it, inspired the progenitors of political violence. The aim was to impress and then mobilise opinion by exemplary acts carried out by small but active minorities on the pattern of Castro's few hundreds of guerrilleros in Cuba. This "Guevarist" vision has considerably receded. There still remains, however, an aggressive spirit which is in marked contrast to the timidity of the traditional Left.

Yet today, the main cause of violence is less the aggressive spirit of the rebels than the resistance which their various opposition movements are encountering. Even the most liberal societies are based in the last resort on a system of constraints. As long as there is a general consensus within the society, these constraints are not actively felt. As soon as the consensus disappears and the principles on which the society is based are questioned, the situation changes and the polarities of "attack-defence", "provocation-repression" define the context. A new process is set in train.

The fact is, Western society is in a transitional stage. The traditional values are under attack but the new values are extremely ill-defined. A "creeping" crisis exists without alternative solutions appearing with any clarity. This is the kind of situation which could last for a long time, but which should nevertheless finally produce very profound changes indeed. Violence is not the principal characteristic of the process. It is only a symptom, though a very interesting one.

The political mechanisms of Western societies are, of course, designed to absorb violence, to canalise conflict towards compromise solutions, and to arbitrate between opposing forces through the electoral system. These are the mechanisms of any democratic society. But they have lost a great deal of their old effectiveness. This is not the result of sinister plots; it is the symptom of a crisis and of the disintegration of the old consensus.

V - INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

The opposition movements in Western society are, by definition, hostile to the two great alliance systems which have dominated the world for the last 20 years. One would be tempted almost to call the rebels 'pacifists' if heroic postures were not so evident in their ranks. The fact is that war is not only an evil. It also remains a need. Most of the observers of my generation are astonished by the violence of the younger generation. It is their astonishment which surprises me. How could one expect the young to be content simply to listen to our reminiscences of wartime experiences?

Moreover, the two Indo-China wars, the Algerian War and the crisis in the Middle East have shown that the balance of military force is no longer necessarily the decisive element in an armed conflict. The relationship between war and politics, which seems stronger today even than in the time of Clausewitz, has struck revolutionary youth and led to a revival of the love of conflict. The slogan "Peace in Vietnam" was very rapidly replaced by the slogan "Victory for the FLN".

The opposition against the policies of Western governments undoubtedly has roots in a weakening of nationalist sentiments both in Europe and America. But it is not at all sure that this will lead to any real understanding between the youth of these countries, in one setting, those of the Third World in a second, and those of the Socialist countries in a third.

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CIVIL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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Civil Violence and International Order

HEDLEY BULL

The questions I propose to raise in this paper are as follows:-

(i) What is civil violence, and in what sense are we living in "an age of civil violence"?

(ii) What is the impact of this civil violence on the international community?

(iii) How should the international community in general, and the Western powers in particular, respond to it?

Underlying these questions there is a deeper one which all of them beg. What is most striking about the political violence prevalent at the present time is not its "civil" character, but the way in which it cuts across the distinction between what is "civil" and what is "international". This distinction, which derives from convention and not from nature, is basic to the system whereby for the last four hundred years some element of order has been maintained, first in the political universe of Europe, later in that of the world as a whole. The deepest question raised by contemporary political violence is whether the distinction between civil and international affairs can and should be preserved at all, and if not what should replace it.

CIVIL VIOLENCE

By civil violence I mean the use of force to affect the civil or domestic political process. I exclude acts of violent crime that are without political motivation, but include a spectrum of violence ranging from sporadic individual or group acts intended simply to express a political grievance or register a political protest, through organised and sustained rebellion, to insurgency and revolution. I exclude a purely international or interstate war but include "internal wars" or civil wars that involve outside powers or that are not restricted to the territory and personnel of the civil society whose political process they are intended to affect. Finally, civil violence should be taken to include the use or threat of force by established political authorities to counter acts of violent protest, rebellion, insurgency or revolution, as well as these acts themselves. (1)

(1) It may also be taken to include the use or threat of force by established authorities to affect the civil process in circumstances in which they are not confronted by any violent challenge. But civil violence in this latter sense is a permanent feature of all political societies.

It is often said that we are living in "an age of civil violence" but it is not clear what this means. Sometimes what people who state this have in mind is the period since 1945, about which it is commonly said that it is an era in which civil violence has been more prevalent than international violence, or in which internal wars have been more numerous than inter-state wars (Harry Eckstein, for example, says that the New York Times reported 1,200 "internal wars" between 1946 and 1959 (2)). At other times people have in mind more particularly the period since about 1960, and the prevalence in it of civil violence in the poor parts of the world (Robert McNamara in his much-quoted Montreal speech of 1966, which was intended to demonstrate a connection between the incidence of violence and poverty, said that in the period 1958 - 1966 there had been 164 "internationally significant outbreaks of violence", of which only 15 had been conflicts between states.) (3) Finally, sometimes the statement refers to the period since 1968, and in this case reference is being made to the increase of civil violence in the advanced countries, as exemplified by racial violence in America, separatist violence in the United Kingdom, Canada, Yugoslavia or Spain, and student violence throughout the advanced countries as a whole.

It would be difficult to demonstrate conclusively that the present period in any of the above senses (post-1945, post-1960 or post-1968) is uniquely marked by civil violence among periods of comparable length in modern times, and it may be doubted whether such a proposition is true. All periods are marked by civil violence, and probably also by greater civil violence than international, at all events if one compares the numbers of outbreaks of political violence, rather than the numbers killed, the resources expended or the dislocation brought about. David Wood tells us that there were 55 "internal wars" in the twenty years after 1945, as against only 20 in the period 1919 - 1939. (4) But comparisons with earlier periods are made difficult by the lack of records comparable with those that exist for the present.

What we can state with much more confidence is that the post-1945 period is one of unprecedented and steadily increasing awareness or consciousness of the civil violence that is going on in the world. Acts of political terrorism or of repression of terrorism, insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, tribal or ethnic wars, which even in the interwar period would have gone unnoticed in the world's press, are now instantly reported to millions of people. The world's consciousness of civil violence remains imperfect and distorted. But it is a new state of affairs in which any person with access to one of the mass media is likely to know at once about the latest violent act of the Weathermen, the Tupamaros, the P.F.L.P. and the I.R.A.,

(2) Harry Eckstein ed.: Internal War, p.3. This includes "civil wars, including guerilla wars, localised rioting, widely dispersed turmoil, organised and apparently unorganised terrorism, mutinies and coups d'état."

(3) Robert S. McNamara: The Essence of Security p.p. 145-7.

(4) David Wood: Conflict in the Twentieth Century, Adelphi Papers No. 48, June 1968.

if not of the Karens and Kachens, the Huks, the Ustashi and the Eritrean Liberation Force.

This growth of our awareness of civil violence reflects not only the growth of communications that has made it technically possible, but also the political activisation of masses of people previously politically passive or inert, which has supplied a motive for acquisition and dissemination of the information. Acts of political violence would today fail in their purpose if - like tribal rebellions in the remote frontier provinces of European empires in the last century - they remained unknown except to those immediately affected by them.

This heightened importance of the communications dimension of political violence not only makes it essential to the success of violent protestors, rebels or insurgents, or of governments combatting them, that information is disseminated so as to affect appropriate target publics in appropriate ways. It also in some measure determines the strategy and implementation of the political violence itself, the cardinal purpose of which has to be seen not in terms of the tactical results of the ambushing of a government patrol, the terrorisation of a village community or the bombing of a police headquarters, but in terms of the effect of knowledge of these events on the major public actors not directly involved in them.

If this is "an age of civil violence" in the sense that there is rising awareness of such violence, it is also in the sense that, especially since the early 1960's, there has been an increasing prominence of doctrines or ideologies advocating political violence. The Marxist - Leninist - Maoist ideologies which we have inherited from earlier periods call for violence only as an instrument of class struggle, wielded by the communist party when the objective conditions are ripe. The doctrines of Guevara and Debray, by contrast, do away with these limitations, pointing the way to political violence which is independent of the control of any political party and which itself creates the conditions for its success. There is no hint in the communist classics that violence, in addition to being a means to an end, is itself ennobling or therapeutic: but this is just the element that is reintroduced by Sartre's notion of violence as "man re-creating himself".

It is in this area of the value attached to violence as a way of life that we may find such elements of unity as exist within the great variety of political groups that are at present committed to civil violence. These include movements of the right and the left; movements bred by poverty and deprivation and movements that have their source in the problems of affluence; groups whose objectives are nationalist or racist, and groups that seek to unify continents or the world as a whole; groups that seek to accelerate "development" and groups calling for a halt to it. Within such a diversity of outlooks there is no common political philosophy, nor is there any common doctrine about the method or technique of violence. But there are certain common attitudes and values: contempt for legality and established institutions;

commitment to radical change and to violence as the means of bringing it about; and enjoyment of violence as a culture or life-style.

THE IMPACT OF CIVIL VIOLENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

Civil violence creates problems for the countries in which it takes place. But why need the international community be concerned about it? It is obvious that the civil violence taking place within many states today is intimately linked both to the domestic affairs of other states and to relations among them. There is nothing new or unusual in this state of affairs: political and intellectual movements have always straddled the boundaries of states, and it is the division of a human community into sovereign states that is often contrived or artificial, not the attempt to consider that community as a whole. What is new in the international dimension of civil violence at the present time is the world-wide nature of its links across frontiers, this being only one of a number of signs of the emergence in the twentieth century of a single, global political system, of which the global diplomatic system or system of states is only part. The impact of civil violence on world politics takes three main forms: the contagion of civil violence as between one country and another; the internationalisation of civil violence, as a consequence of the embroilment of outside states in it; and the emergence of civil factions as violent actors in world politics in their own right. (5)

(a) The Contagion of Civil Violence

Civil violence in one country is linked in a number of ways with civil violence in another. One sort of link between civil factions in a number of countries occurs when they are all directed or stimulated by the same external agent or agents. Clearly, the civil violence taking place in the world at present is not the consequence of any single, global conspiracy. Indeed, in movements for national liberation or national regeneration evidence of outside control or direction can prove a fatal handicap, a fact well understood by Mao and Lin Piaio, who have often insisted on the need for national self-reliance in revolutionary movements. There are, however, a number of centres - Peking, Hanoi, Havana, Algiers, Damascus, Dar-es-salaam - which within the limits imposed by the intractability of national political systems to outside manipulation and control provide moral comfort, sanctuary, guidance, training, arms or personnel to support armed violence against established governments abroad. Equally, there are centres, the most conspicuous being Washington, which provide support to a number of governments in resisting these challenges.

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(5) In an earlier draft of this paper I included a fourth form: the impact of civil violence on the balance or pattern of power among states. For example, one of the factors at present making for a shift in the balance of power away from the United States and towards the Soviet Union, is the fact that the former power is visibly experiencing civil violence whereas the latter is not. I have excluded discussion of this fourth form because unlike the other three it raises questions only about the current state of international politics, not about the structure of international order.

Another kind of link is collaboration among civil factions which may have grown up quite independently of one another, and which have quite different aims, but which have some common objectives or at least common enemies. The Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity, the Organisation of Latin American Solidarity, the Tricontinental Solidarity Organisation, the offer of the Black Panthers to supply troops to the Vietcong, exemplify collaboration of this kind. To it there correspond the examples that may be given of co-operation of governments against common anti-governmental antagonists: the collaboration of Malaysia and Thailand against communist insurgents, of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal against African liberationists, of many Latin American governments against guerilla movements, or of the communist governments of eastern Europe against "the restoration of capitalism".

A third kind of link is provided by emulation. The student rioters in Japan in the early 1960's have found imitators in universities all over the world. The Tupamaros in Uruguay have spawned the "Turkish Tupamaros" and the "Tupamaros West Berlin". The Black Panthers have led to the White Panthers, the Chinese Red Guards to the Japanese Red Guards, the Front de la Libération Nationale in Algeria to national liberation fronts of countless nations and would-be nations. Poor or Have Not nations, transposing the Marxist language of class struggle, see themselves as "proletarian" nations. Dissident groups within the Have countries, in turn, model themselves on the anti-imperialist campaigns of Third World countries. Real revolutionaries are imitated by pseudo-revolutionaries and mock-revolutionaries, whose apotheosis is the Che Guevara Coffee Shop or the Watney's Red Revolution. Sometimes the imitation is simply of nomenclature, style or rhetoric. At other times specific techniques quickly multiply, when it is shown that they produce results - most notably the rash of diplomatic hostage-taking that followed the successful blackmailing of the Brazilian government by the kidnappers of Ambassador Elbrick in September 1969, and the proliferation of aircraft hijacking from early 1968 on.

(b) <u>The Internationalisation of Civil Violence</u>

Civil violence is internationalised when foreign states become embroiled in it, and as a consequence of this, embroiled with each other. Some forms of foreign intervention in civil conflicts are a normal and inevitable concomitant of power relationships among states; international society accepts them as everyday practice, and in any case can do nothing to prevent them. The concern of international society has always been focussed upon a particular form of intervention: dictatorial interference, by force or the threat of force, in the internal affairs of foreign states. International law lays down a general prohibition of intervention of this sort, while at the same time it recognises certain exceptions. International law is, of course, subject to different interpretations, but on some views it prohibits dictatorial intervention only when it is forcible, not by invitation of the government concerned, and not overridden by the right of self-defence, the right to protect nationals abroad

and the right of humanitarian aid, to which some would add (following the practice of anti-imperialist states in the UN) the right to enforce self-determination, at least against colonial states, and (following the "Brezhnev Doctrine") the right of the socialist states to defend their "socialist gains".

The primary function which the principle of non-intervention has been intended to fulfil has been to defend the sovereignty of states, the foundation of all international order, against the threat of outside interference. However, there has also been a secondary function, which in the years of anxiety about preservation of the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, has assumed a prominent place. This has been to remove the danger to relations between outside states posed by their intervention on opposite sides in a civil conflict. The practices which appear necessary for fulfilment of the first function are in conflict with those employed for fulfilment of the second. Thus defence of the sovereignty of states against dictatorial interference by an outside power depends not simply upon the rule of non-intervention but upon the possibility of counter intervention by another outside power, on the willingness of a third state to enter into conflict with the intervening state by itself intervening, or threatening to intervene, in the name of non-intervention. Likewise, mitigation of the danger to relations between outside states such as the nuclear super powers at present, of embroilment on opposite sides in a civil conflict, has led to practices which jeopardise the sovereignty of small states, viz. spheres of influence understandings and resort to intervention by the United Nations as a substitute for unilateral intervention of the powers themselves.

It may be argued that the danger to relations between the super-powers stemming from their backing of opposite sides in a civil conflict is at present in decline. For one thing, the United States and the Soviet Union fully appreciate the danger, and the ground rules that they have worked out to contain and limit their global conflict include understandings that reduce the likelihood of collision in this area. For another, both the super-powers have drawn back from the proposition that their national interests are inseparable from the outcome of "the ideological struggle in the Third World". They are not nowadays always involved in civil conflicts; and when they are, it is not always on opposite sides.

This does not mean, however, that intervention in civil strife is less widespread than it was at the height of the cold war. It simply embraces a great many conflicts other than the communist/anti-communist one, and a great many intervenors other than the United States and the Soviet Union. The patterns of intervention are complex and sometimes surprising. In the Nigerian civil war the federal government was backed by Britain, the Soviet Union and a majority of African states, and Biafra by France, Portugal, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia, with the moral support of much of the European Left. The "Guevarist" rising in Ceylon was crushed with the support of the United States, the Soviet Union and, after some hesitation, China, thus uncovering some

element of unity in the outlook of these governments, previously lost to sight in the war of words.

In some turbulent areas of the world the whole conception of a distinction between domestic and international affairs, and therefore of intervention and non-intervention, is challenged by ideas which reject the legitimacy or the relevance of the division of mankind, or of some part of it, into separate nations or states. International relations in Latin America are complicated by pan-continental revolutionary movements. African states and nations in the making have to compete with tribal and also with pan-African and racial sentiments. Ali Mazrui has written of "the principle of racial sovereignty" which, in the view of some black Africans, overrides ordinary norms of interstate intercourse so that e.g. Belgian intervention in the Congo in 1960 was a violation of domestic jurisdiction, whereas interference by one African country in the affairs of another is not. Ideas of "aggression" as between one African country and another, or of "treason" by a Nigerian on behalf of Ghana, according to Mazrui, "do not command immediate comprehension".(6) From a perspective which is ideological rather than racial the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine similarly suspends ordinary norms of sovereignty and non-intervention by reference to concepts of "socialist legality" and the rights of the "socialist commonwealth".

(c) Civil Factions as Violent International Actors

Civil violence affects the international community when civil factions use violence not only against other factions within their own countries with which they are in conflict but also against foreign governments and civil societies, thus becoming violent actors in world politics in their own right. Sometimes this international use of violence by civil factions is directed against the territory of a specific foreign enemy, as in the case of the Egyptian-based fedayeen raids against Israel before the 1956 war, or in the case of the entry of Pakistan irregular forces into Kashmir in 1948. Sometimes the struggle against the foreign enemy is extended into the territory of third states, as in the case of the attacks carried out by Arab guerrillas against El Al aircraft and offices in Greece and Switzerland. It is a further extension of this process when violence is applied directly against the representatives of foreign states not involved in the conflict, as in the case of the kidnapping of foreign diplomats by Latin American and Quebec urban guerillas, or is applied to ordinary citizens of such foreign states, as in the case of the hijacking of civil airliners by Palestinian guerrillas and holding of their passengers and crews as hostages.

These instances of the international use of violence by civil factions take place in a technological environment that is new, but they are not without historical precedents or at least analogies in modern times, some of which I shall discuss below. Moreover, it can be argued that they have so far done no more than create a series of nuisances for the international order, and that they would have to be taken much

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(6) Ali Mazrui: Towards a Pax Africana, P.38

further if they were seriously to disturb it. But potentially the emergence of civil factions as violent international actors presents as great a challenge to the modern international order as the contagion of civil violence or the breakdown of inhibitions to intervention, for it implies a return to the mediaeval idea of private war. It strikes at one of the most basic presuppositions of the states system, which is that only states may legitimately employ violence against each other, and then only in accordance with prescribed rules and procedures. International law does provide, through the device of recognition of the "belligerent status" of parties to a civil war, that civil factions may sometimes be accorded the right of states, but this is only in circumstances in which they have in fact come to resemble states (for example, in that they occupy and administer a substantial proportion of territory, have organised armed forces responsible to an identifiable authority, and conduct armed conflict of a general and not merely local character), and it implies that along with the rights of states they accept the duties, including the duty to respect the sovereignty of neutral powers.

The notion that the modern states system has produced simply war and anarchy overlooks the extent to which violence has been confined by the principles that war can be legitimately waged only by a public authority, and that the only kind of public authority competent to wage it is a state or an entity resembling a state. If these principles were to be undermined the door would be open to a kind of anarchy that has not been seen in Europe in modern times, the more unbridled to the extent that unlike the private war of the Middle Ages it would not be subject to the sanctions of religion, chivalry, and papal and imperial authority by which private war in those times was circumscribed.

THE RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The international community, if by this one means all or most states, does not embody sufficient consensus to be capable of a common response to the challenges posed by "an age of civil violence". But it is possible to ask how the Western powers should seek to shape the response of the international community, in what directions they should seek to move it.

The contagion of civil violence as between one country and another, the breakdown of restraints upon intervention and the emergence of civil factions as violent international actors threaten the foundations of an order built upon mutual recognition of sovereignty as the original compact of coexistence. It is possible to argue that this development is really a constructive or progressive one, that the breakdown of the old order comes in response to the stirrings of a new one, or at all events that the decay of concepts of sovereignty, non-intervention and the state's monopoly of legitimate international violence provide a welcome opportunity for the propagation of new rules which would provide a different and firmer foundation for the political organisation of mankind.

In positive or descriptive thinking, as opposed to thought about norms or rules, the distinction between domestic and international affairs has already lost much of its usefulness. Whether or not it is important in international law and diplomatic convention to distinguish an act of violence that is domestic from one that is international, in actual experience the distinction is often artificial. It can be argued that law and diplomacy should be made to conform more closely to experience.

Such a view would be consonant with a number of strong tendencies in contemporary thought. Some international lawyers contend that international law in the sense of the law governing relations among states should give place, or even that it has given place, to world law in the sense of the common law of mankind. In such a world law state sovereignty would disappear, intervention of all kinds would be legitimised, and the state would be deprived of its privileged position as regards the exercise of violence. We are constantly being told in the most solemn terms, not only by international lawyers (to whom, after all, no one pays much attention) but also by economists, military planners, European integrationists, ecologists, futurologists, population experts and Barbara Ward, that in this world of ever-increasing interdependence national sovereignty is obsolete and an obstacle to the solution to our problems. There is some justice in the complaint of Soviet publicists that those in the West who condemn the Soviet Union for its occupation of Czechoslovakia are the same persons who with every other breath proclaim the obsolescence of national sovereignty.

The actual position is that international order continues to depend vitally upon mutual recognition of sovereignty. If the classical or Westphalian normative system were now to break down, it would not be replaced by the different normative system of "world law" or of a "new mediaevalism" for there is no general agreement as to what this new system would be. Within particular regions or blocs - the Soviet bloc, Western Europe, for other purposes the Atlantic world or the West as a whole - a consensus exists about much more than the elementary rules of coexistence. But if we focus our attention upon the international system as a whole, within which the states belonging to these blocs and other states have to live together, it is clear that the problem of international order is not to advance beyond cuijus regio eijus religio but to prevent this principle from falling into decay, or to establish it where (as may be the position outside the countries of European tradition) it has never been fully assimilated. This is the perspective from which I shall consider specific aspects of the problem.

(a) Containing the Contagion of Civil Violence

To some minds the above phrase will suggest an exchange of information among governments on such subjects as tear gas, thumb prints and aluminium shields, if not a full-fledged Holy Alliance against revolution. But the maintenance of internal order around the world is not the charge of the Western powers or of the international

community. International society does not nowadays deny the right of revolution: the world has changed a good deal since 1912, when President Wilson thought it a useful contribution to propose an international convention whereby no government could be recognised if it came to power by non-constitutional means.

A great deal of what I have called the contagion of civil violence is either legitimate as far as most states in the world are concerned or beyond their power to control, or both. It is possible to seek to contain this contagion within the minimum rules of coexistence by upholding the idea that the external direction of civil violence, transnational collaboration among violent factions and the emulation of one faction by another in violent techniques should not be a normal accompaniment of the relations between states. The fact has to be faced, however, that in many parts of the world it is such a normal accompaniment.

The Western powers have the problem of preserving order in their own societies in circumstances in which this contagion exists. Western societies cannot be insulated from intellectual, social and political changes in other parts of the world. Not even the partial insulation achieved, for example, by Burma or by the Soviet Union, is available to the open societies of the West. The maintenance of internal order in Western societies cannot be separated from the maintenance of order in other countries, including those of the Third World.

(b) Limiting the Internationalisation of Civil Violence

Largely as the consequence of pressure from Third World states anxious to assert their autonomy in relation to the great powers, international society is now extravagantly committed to the principle of non-intervention: instruments like the Charters of the O.A.S. and the O.A.U., and the U.N. General Assembly's Resolution No. 2225 of 1965, give the principle a more extreme and unqualified statement than it has ever received before. On the other hand (one thinks here of Martin Wight's observation that the theory of international relations seems always to sing a kind of descant over and against its practice) in their actual behaviour states display widespread and systematic contempt for the principle, not least those states mainly responsible for recent flamboyant statements of it.

This gulf between principle and practice has caused some to favour reformulation of the principle so as to make intervention legitimate in certain circumstances. The traditional international law, as mentioned above, allowed intervention at the request of an incumbent government, to protect nationals abroad, to provide humanitarian aid and in self-defence. There is reason to believe that all these justifications have a declining power to command assent among nations, and one may agree with Urs Schwarz's view that it is difficult to legitimise intervention at present unless it is shown to have the collective backing of a group of states and is not merely unilateral.(7)

(7) See Urs Schwarz: Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World, 1970.

Mention must be made, however, of the view of many Third World states and of communist states that intervention to bring about "self-determination" is legitimate, the view of the Soviet Union that within the Socialist Commonwealth intervention is legitimate to protect "socialist gains", and the view of Professor Richard A. Falk and others that intervention should be legitimate only when it is carried out on behalf of the U.N. or a regional organisation.(8) Without having space to argue the point, I can only assert here that none of these proposed justifications of intervention is backed by the consensus of international society at large.

A world as diverse and divided as ours is more likely to be able to agree on the prohibition of intervention than on formulae for making it legitimate. At all events this is so if one is considering the global rules of international society at large, rather than the special rules appropriate to particular regions or blocs, in which a higher degree of consensus may exist (it is interesting that some Soviet international lawyers have asserted that there are three laws of intervention: 1) between socialist states, where non-intervention is subordinated to the higher law of "socialist internationalism"; 2) between capitalist states, where imperialism and interventionism prevail; and 3) between socialist states and capitalist states, which should be governed by the principle of non-intervention as laid down in Article 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter).

On a more constructive and less pessimistic view of world order than that expressed in these pages non-intervention must appear as a negative and constricting principle. "The problem", Francois Duchene has written, "is not to 'stop' intervention but to turn it from a military or quasi-military process to a civilian process and from a civilian process in which there is a strong sense of exploitation to one of joint decision-making which implies joint responsibility by consent".(9) Intervention, however, may need to be stopped first, or brought under control, and we are still a long way from that.

(c) Combatting the International Violence of Civil Factions

The society of states has traditionally treated pirates as hostes humani generis, deprived of the protection of their own state and liable to summary arrest and punishment by any state into whose hands they fall. The various civil factions at present resorting to the international use of violence - by committing acts of violence against the territory of enemy states, or in the territory, against the officials or against the private citizens of third states - can in no case be considered strictly as pirates. But the problem of suppressing them and of restoring the state's monopoly of legitimate international violence is one of mobilising against these civil factions the same sort of solidarity that the society of states (in one of the few manifestations of solidarity of which it has been capable) has in the past displayed towards pirates. The difficulties that arise in dealing with the intrusion of guerrilla bands, with political hijackings of aircraft or kidnappings of diplomats, are the difficulties of bringing this solidarity about.

(8) See Richard A. Falk: Legal Order in a Violent World, 1968.

We are concerned here with international aircraft hijackings and with the kidnapping of foreign officials and private citizens only in so far as these acts are performed for a political purpose. Piracy may include the seizure of aircraft and has often involved the taking of prisoners for ransom, but on the orthodox view it is a crime committed by a private vessel for a private end, viz. plunder. Attempts have been made in the past to extend the concept of piracy to cover the case of attacks on shipping at sea that have been made for political purposes, and/or by vessels that are public rather than private at least in the sense that they are agents of some kind of political group, if not in the sense that they are agents of a sovereign state. Oppenheim, for example, who takes this view, refers to the case of the ironclad Huascar, which in 1877 was seized by Peruvian insurgents, who then put to sea and stopped two British ships, from which they seized coal and abducted Peruvian officials. The Huascar was treated as a pirate vessel and attacked by the British Pacific squadron.(10)

Reference can also be made to the Barbary corsairs, whose vessels were certainly public in that they sailed under the authority of the Barbary Regencies, and whose objective, the extortion of money from European states as ransom for prisoners and in return for undertakings not to attack them further, was in a sense political. One of the treaties signed at the Washington Naval Conference in 1922 provided for treatment of attacks on unarmed merchant ships on the high seas, by regular naval vessels of foreign powers as "piratical". The precedent was followed by the signatories of the Nyon Agreement in 1937, providing for action against "piratical submarines" (of Germany and Italy) off the Spanish coast, by President Roosevelt in ordering action against German "piratical attacks" on U.S. shipping in 1941, and by the Soviet Union in its charges against Chinese Nationalist submarines in 1957.

It is notable that in these cases in which what is being called piracy is the action of a public vessel undertaken for a political purpose international society has not been able to muster the solidarity it has displayed in relation to the private vessel, flying only the Jolly Roger, and stalking the high seas with no other intent than plunder. The Barbary states are a classic example. Because these states had standing in international politics and were able to negotiate with European states and America and exploit their rivalries, they were able to remain in business, despite pitiful relative naval weakness, until as late as the French conquests of 1830. The various attempts I have mentioned, from 1922 on, to treat naval submarine attacks as "piratical", all in fact illustrate bitter conflict between one state or group of states and another, not any common ground as how the concept of piracy might be applied to violence of a public and political nature. This is the measure of the problem faced

(9) from previous page.
Francois Duchene: "The Political Aspects of Intervention in Present Day International Politics". Internationale Spectator, January 1971.

(10) L. Oppenheim: International Law 8th Edition, Vol. I, 1955. p. 611.

by international society now, in finding unity of approach towards the use of violence by civil factions.

The effective control of aircraft hijacking requires, among other things, the general agreement of states to the principle that hijackers must be prosecuted in the country to which they direct the aircraft or extradited for prosecution in the country of origin. A draft treaty providing for this and enjoying the sponsorship of both the United States and the Soviet Union, is now open for signature. The difficulty standing in the way of this system is that states are unwilling to regard as hostes humani generis hijackers for whom they feel political sympathy, or who represent political forces which, whether the states concerned are sympathetic to them or not, they cannot afford to antagonise. It is all too likely that a number of states will remain aloof from the system, and that others, while joining it, will insist that their obligation to prosecute or extradite the hijackers must be qualified by this right to grant particular hijackers political asylum.

The development of the Western powers' attitudes to the matter illustrates the difficulty. Before 1961 most hijacking was of planes diverted from communist countries to the West. The Western powers granted political asylum to the hijackers and did not regard the problem as a serious one. The beginning of hijacking of United States aircraft from 1961 on, and especially its sharp increase from 1968 on, caused the West to change its attitude and eventually to endorse the principle that hijackers should always be prosecuted or extradited, but how far they will be prepared to abandon the right of political asylum is not yet clear.

Operation of the system presupposes a general conviction that there is a class of crime which, even though committed for political ends, is so heinous that persons who are accused of it shall be denied political asylum and extradited. In the last century a number of attempts were made to identify such a class of crime. After the attempt of a French citizen in Belgium on the life of Napoleon in 1854, and French demands for his extradition, Belgium in 1856 amended its Extradition Law, which previously had exempted all those granted political asylum, to provide that exceptions be made in the case of political refugees who had made an attempt on the life of a head of state or a member of his family. After the murder of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 Russia sought (unsuccessfully) to promote a treaty that would provide for compulsory extradition of political criminals who had committed murder. In 1937 twenty-three states undertook in a treaty concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations the obligation of compulsory prosecution or extradition of political fugitives accused of "acts of political terrorism". Can aircraft hijacking be viewed in this way?

The same problem of promoting the solidarity of governments in condemnation of a particular kind of crime, irrespective of its political purpose or complexion, arises in connection with the kidnapping of diplomats or other foreign citizens. With two

qualifications, the correct strategy for a government to follow in dealing with kidnappers is to refuse entirely to meet their demands. The first qualification is that this holds true only if the principal objective is the long-term one of eradicating kidnapping as a technique, rather than the short-term one of securing the release of the hostages. If the latter is taken to be the objective, the results so far are that when a strategy of no concessions has been followed, the diplomat has been killed on four occasions and released on five. When a policy of concessions has been followed, the diplomat has been released on all eleven occasions. (11) The second qualification is that the moral problem of deciding which of these objectives should take priority - the long term one or the short term one - will be different according to the numbers involved. When, as at Dawson's Field in September 1970, hundreds of hostages have been taken the moral problem for the government will be different for that which faces it in risking the life of one or two diplomats. To take the extreme case, the millions of hostages held by the nuclear super powers for one another's "good" behaviour, the short term objective of avoiding execution of the threat is bound to be prior to the long term one of curing the habit.

In these kidnappings the hand of the kidnappers in bargaining with the government is strengthened when pressure is put on the latter by the foreign state whose representative or citizen is in danger. A classic case was the kidnapping in Tangier in 1904 of an American business man and his stepson by the brigand Raisuli, who sought to bring pressure to bear on the Sultan of Morocco by causing outside powers to bring pressure to bear on him. This they did: President Roosevelt sent to Tangier a fleet of seven warships, and the price exacted by Raisuli for release of his captives included £11,000 ransom, dismissal of the Governor of Tangier, the release of Raisuli's fellow tribesmen from prison, imprisonment of pro-government sheikhs, disbandment of the Sultan's Northern Army and the grant of four provinces to Raisuli. (12)

In combatting the Latin American and other diplomatic kidnappings it would seem essential that the foreign governments involved should desist from bringing pressure to bear on the local governments to resist the demands of the kidnappers, subordinating whatever feelings they might have about the lives of their officials or citizens,

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(11) These figures are an updating of the count provided in Raimo Vayrynen: "Some aspects of Theory and Strategy of Kidnapping", Instant Research on Peace and Violence, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Vol. I, No 1, 1971.

(12) The details of the Raisuli affair may be read in The Times, May - June 1904. I am grateful to Roberta Wohlstetter for drawing my attention to this precedent.

or about the justice or otherwise of the urban guerrilla's struggle, to the overriding long-term consideration of preservation of diplomatic immunity and protection of the innocent.

One final aspect of the problem of international private violence is the responsibility of states for the acts of civil factions operating internationally from bases on their soil. Groups like the Arab guerrillas operating from Jordan and Lebanon or African guerrillas operating in Rhodesia and the Portuguese African territories from bases in Zambia and elsewhere are unlike privateers in that they do not carry letters of marque providing them with governmental authority for the violence they carry out, and operate against states with which the state of which they are citizens is at peace. On the other hand the Arab and African governments concerned provide them with facilities and are sympathetic to their objectives, while denying responsibility for specific violent acts that they carry out.

The existence of a class of international actor, able to resort to violence on what is sometimes a large scale, but also to escape responsibility for their actions, creates an intolerable strain on the international order, illustrated by the torment of Israel in 1968. At the time of the attack by Lebanon-based Arab guerrillas on El Al aircraft in Athens, for which Lebanon denied responsibility, Israel had to choose between foregoing any reprisal and carrying out a reprisal against the state of Lebanon; when she did the latter by destroying 13 Arab aircraft in Beirut, she was condemned by the Security Council for aggression.

The traditional international law required governments to seek to prevent its subjects or other residents in its territory from committing acts injurious to other states, and to punish them for doing so. This principle has fallen into decay and the restoration of it, as in other aspects of this problem, presupposes a return to the solidarity of states vis à vis civil factions challenging their monopoly of legitimate violence.

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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

13th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

CIVIL VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

PLENARY SESSION

Thursday, 9th September — Evening

Diversities of Violence and the Current World System

PROFESSOR WALTER LAQUEUR

War throughout the ages - up to the invention of the nuclear bomb that is - had both advocates and opponents; civil war, internal violence have been until recently less popular. Writing almost two thousand years ago Lucan in his Pharsalia included the following prayer:

> "Make us enemies of every people on earth, but save us from civil war."

Many centuries later in an evocative passage commenting on the year 1793, Victor Hugo wrote:

> "A foreign war is a scratch on the arm, a civil war is an ulcer which devours the vitals of the nation."

The last few years have witnessed a sharp upsurge all over the globe of collective violence, urban and rural guerrilla warfare, political assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings and various other acts of terror. It would be much easier to list the countries which have been spared such turbulence than those who were afflicted by it: Luxemburg has been relatively quiet, so have Scandinavia, Australia and New Zealand. I cannot think of many other countries outside the Communist world - and those living under Communism have undergone other forms of political violence.

From the suppression of the riots in East Berlin and Czechoslovakia in 1953 to the invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and most recently the uprising in Poland, the Soviet leadership has faced repeated violent challenges to its power. It has not hesitated to deal ruthlessly with these challenges, and today the Communist regimes present a front of strength. Yet no one can be certain about the depth of dissatisfaction, the lack of loyalty, and the resentment hidden

behind this facade. It is one of the characteristics of a dictatorship that it always seems more purposeful and effective, in other words stronger, than a democratic regime - until the very moment of its downfall. Moreover, nationalist dissension has had a strong impact on the Communist world as well as on the West. The monolithic bloc which existed in Stalin's days has gone forever.

It is surely no coincidence that the present conference is devoted to a study of political violence - five years ago, or ten, this would not have been the case. How to explain this sudden sprouting of internal war and other forms of political violence? Is it a novel phenomenon, unique and inexplicable, or simply a repeat performance with some new ingredients? Is there a common denominator to the various manifestations of political violence? And what effect is it likely to have? I am a historian and I believe that to most members of my profession this wave of violence has not come as a total surprise. When Harry Eckstein wrote his study on internal war some ten years ago he complained that social scientists have neglected the study of violence. This was no doubt connected with two facts - that violence is not the most attractive of subjects, and that it is not ideally suited for the application of quantitative techniques and other social science methods. I don't think historians can be accused of similar sins of omission; for while we may not have the answers, we know that at the very latest since Adam left Paradise, the history of mankind has been to a large extent one of political violence. The anthropologists have reported about the Arapesh in New Guinea, the Lepochas in Sikkim and other tribes which know no aggression. Happy are these people, but they have remained outside history. As for the rest of mankind, historians and philosophers alike have taken a dim (or should I say - fairly realistic) point of view for a long time. When Kant wrote that

> "War requires no particular motive - it appears ingrafted on human nature"

no one had as yet heard about modern psychology and the frustration-aggression syndrome. The progress of civilization has been agonizingly slow; there have been ups and downs, and violence and terror have never been far from the surface. It has been only of late that some students of human behaviour have come to regard peace, goodwill, civilized and humane behaviour as the norm and collective violence as a temporary deviation; as a result they have been both perturbed and puzzled by recent events.

A little history should have taught them differently; we were spoiled by two decades of relative calm when the economic damage caused by the second world war was not yet repaired, and when the political and psychological effects of the great blood-letting were still palpably felt. During this period, the preconditions for a fresh upsurge in political violence did not exist. But the post-war era is over: it may be more helpful and illuminating to compare this new age not with the one preceding it but with others more distant in time, such as, for instance, the last centuries of the Roman Empire. I refer to the period of Roma saturata, when the Emperors began to engage in philosophy rather than make war, when a new strange sect appeared on the scene preaching: Make love not war, when banditry spread and when the bandit leaders were venerated as saints. Does it not sound very topical when we read in Tertullian that it has been observed that heretics have connections with very many magicians, itinerant charlatans, astrologers and philosophers, or when another contemporary historian reports that the leaders of what we would now call guerrillas were not slaves or oppressed peasants but men of free birth and wealth. This was the period when oracles triggered off rebellions, when visionaries announced the impending downfall of Roman rule (I am quoting Ramsay MacMullen: Enemies of the Roman Order): The rule of the world would pass to a saviour coming from the East - an angel 96 miles high and 16 miles wide. The leading ideologists of the day predicted that there would be a general breakdown with all-wasting fires, the sun checked in its course, the moon bloody, mountains levelled, rivers filled with blood and eventually the last judgment. It sounds very modern, certainly to the student of present day radical literature. There have been similar such manifestations throughout the ages but their origins have been insufficiently explored.

The subject of my paper is varieties of civil violence. There is an almost unlimited number of varieties. What Tolstoy said about marriages seems to apply a fortiori to this subject: all happy ones are similar, but each unhappy one is unhappy in a different way. Some of these varieties have no apparent motive; there was an anarchist group in Russia before the first world war which called itself The Motiveless Ones. But most pursue certain political aims and they can be subdivided broadly speaking, into two major groups, traditional and modern. The various national liberation struggles against colonial powers, such as the fight of the FLN against the French in Algeria or the campaign against the Portugese in Africa, are no doubt traditional in character even though they include not

infrequently new elements. The same refers to national dissension in South-East Asia, in Nigeria and Cyprus, or to give some other illustrations, to the reawakening of old tensions in Ulster, in Belgium, in Canada, and elsewhere. Communists, Trotskyites, Maoists and the New Left may infiltrate these movements to make political capital, but basically they are nationalist in character. To the same group of traditional conflicts belong certain violent manifestations of the class struggle such as peasants' attacks against landowners, industrial violence and sabotage etc. Such movements have been frequently described and analysed, and if I do not deal with them in what follows, this does not imply that I want to belittle their impact or to underrate their prospects. Unless central state power asserts itself, some of these separatist movements (to give but one example) may cause the disintegration of more than one country, big or small, in Asia and Africa. But essentially these trends do not constitute a new departure in politics and there is little one can say about them except that national separatism is a constantly underrated factor and that minorities, if they feel themselves discriminated against, tend to resist. This has been going on for a long time in many parts of the world and while it no doubt deserves further study, it is the other type of civil violence, guerrilla warfare and organized acts of terror in the revolutionary context, which preoccupies us much more these days.

Individual and collective terror are not exactly new; political murder was common in ancient Greece and Rome as well as in the Islamic world and in Chinese history. If the term guerrilla was coined only some 160 years ago, the thing itself, warfare carried out by irregular forces, is certainly as old as the hills. If the resurgence of political violence has nevertheless caused surprise and shock in recent years, it is no doubt mainly because most of us thought that it had been overcome, at least as far as the modern industrial societies were concerned, because it was both immoral and ineffective - to put it somewhat crudely.

The extreme left dissociated itself long ago from the use of terror. Commenting on the recapture of Vienna in 1848 by counter-revolutionary forces, Karl Marx wrote that there was only one way to shorten the agony of the old order and the bloody birth-pangs of the new - revolutionary terrorism. But he modified his views later on, and when Engels wrote in 1895 a new preface to Marx's '<u>Class struggles in France</u>' he said that the time of surprise coups, of barricades and street fighting to be carried out by small elites leading amorphous masses lacking class conscience, was over once and

for all. The development of modern arms had made street fighting obsolete. The situation in Russia was different. The programme of the Narodnaia Volia (People's Will) in 1879 stated that terrorist activity consisting in destroying the most harmful individuals in the government, in defending the party against espionage, in punishing the perpetrators of notorious cases of violence and repression on the part of the government, was highly desirable. It aimed at undermining the government's power, demonstrating the possibility of fighting the government, arousing in this manner the revolutionary spirit of the people and its confidence in the success of the cause, and finally giving shape and direction to the forces that were to carry on the fight. This programme reminds one almost textually of Guevara's writings but then there is not that much new under the sun. The Anarchist Cookbook recently published in New York, which gives fairly detailed practical advice on how to prepare detonators and bombs in one's kitchen, draws heavily on another such text written 70 years earlier by a German immigrant, Johannes Most, the full title of which was Science of Revolutionary Warfare, a handbook of instruction regarding the use and manufacture of Nitroglycerine, Dynamite, Gun Cotton, Fulminating Mercury, Bombs, Arsons, Poisons etc. The essential novelty is that the new manual includes a long section on electronics, a field unknown in Most's days, and an even longer one on drugs which seventy years earlier were not considered part of the revolutionary heritage. But even the combination of hashish and political murder is not unprecedented; I refer to the medieval Assassins and their exploits. Having quoted the programme of the 19th century Russian terrorists, I ought to add in fairness that they never claimed that their doctrine was universally applicable. On the contrary, when President Garfield was assassinated in 1881, the Central Committee of Narodnaia Volia sharply denounced it: in a land where the citizens are free to express their ideas, political assassination reflected a despotic state of mind and was therefore to be denounced.

Russian terrorism was effectively suppressed by the Tsarist regime. On the ideological level it was decisively refuted by Plekhanov in a famous tract. Lenin, Plekhavov's pupil, took a more ambiguous view of revolutionary terrorism: he justified it in certain circumstances - for instance in Latvia in 1905 - and emphasized that the rejection of partisan warfare by the socialist movement was a matter of expediency, not of principle. If it appeared that terror achieved results, one should not reject it out of hand. These views were uttered at the time of revolutionary up-

surge; in later years Lenin agreed with Trotsky, who wrote in 1911 that a pinch of powder and a slug of lead were not sufficient to change the social order. A terrorist attempt could at best cause temporary confusion in the ruling circles; But the capitalist state does not rest upon ministers and cannot be destroyed together with them . . . the mechanism remains intact and continues to function. Communist strategy ever since, with some notable exceptions, has been not only against individual terror but has taken a dim view of putschism and guerrilla warfare, urban and rural alike.

Orthodox Communists continue to stick to this line but others no longer believe that terror does not pay. It cannot be denied that personalities are sometimes of decisive importance: had Hitler been shot in front of the Feldherrenhalle in November 1923, or if Lenin upon his arrival at the Finland Station had met with an accident, twentieth century history would almost certainly have taken a different course. It can be argued that these were exceptional cases and that by and large individual terror does not work - certainly not in the developed nations. If a new, more successful Guy Fawkes appears on the scene and managed to blow up the appropriate buildings in London or Washington he would cause a week's confusion but not the overthrow of the system. But some of the advocates of the new terrorism such as Fanon or Guevara have developed their strategy outside Europe and North America, in underdeveloped countries that were or are ruled by small oligarchies and in which, therefore, the chances for a quick, violent coup or protracted guerrilla warfare are much better. Some of these advocates of revolutionary violence argue moreover that the application of terror morally cleanses and purifies the people or peoples concerned; such suggestions are not particularly novel, they appeared first around the turn of the century and were taken up by fascism. Those who preach terror in the industrially developed countries have done so out of despair; they have given up hope of attaining their aim by political means. Unlike the Communists they do not believe any longer in the revolutionary potential of the working class, and the peasants have become a counter-revolutionary force <u>par excellence.</u> Like Bakunin, they believe that the working class has been corrupted, and that it is only from the flotsam and jetsam of society, the <u>Lumpenproletariat</u> the outcasts of all classes, that they can hope for any mass support.

But do they need any mass support? They have come to believe, not altogether wrongly, that the more sophisticated society becomes, the more vulnerable, the more exposed, it is to the actions of a few

dedicated determined revolutionaries. There are differences between the various theoreticians of guerrilla warfare: Mao and Vo Nguyen Giap are still closer to Lenin, they do not regard partisan warfare (which should always be directed by the party) as the only possible road to victory. In their view it is essential to mobilize the masses in this way for the lutte finale. The Latin American guerrilla leaders, on the other hand, are openly contemptuous of the party but put all their hopes on the foci - revolutionary armed bands. They dissociate themselves from Marxism in as much as they pay no attention to objective conditions: an insurrection is always possible, provided those involved are brave and well organized. These revolutionaries are more in the tradition of the Latin American pronunciamentos than of Marxism. There are further differences between the various exponents of guerrilla warfare: Debray paid hardly any attention to urban guerrilla warfare, Guevara considered it a possibility but did not give it high priority, whereas the Brazilian Marighella regarded the cities as the most promising battleground by far. The defeat of Debray and Guevara on one hand, the spectacular exploits of the Tupamaros, and to a much lesser extent the ALNX in Brazil, has caused a swing during the last 3-4 years of guerrilla warfare from the countryside to the towns. The cities offer so much better protection to the insurgents than the pampas or mountains where the arms and techniques of counter-insurgency can be applied by the government with far greater ease.

The proponents of guerrilla warfare believe, like Mao, that the road to victory in the developed country is through the Third World. Such belief is based on the mistaken assumption that the industrial West will be lost without the markets and raw materials of the Third World. But the industrially developed nations do not depend on the Third World; it has been said that if India and Brazil were no longer part of the world economic system, this would cause a temporary shortage of tea and coffee, but little other inconvenience for the rest of the world.

What about the prospects of the urban guerrillas in the United States and the other highly industrialized countries? The chances of achieving results in terms of political and social change are virtually nil. There were some 4,330 bombings in the United States between January 1970 and April 1971, but Mr Nixon is still President and Mr Agnew his deputy. The result would not have been different even if there had been ten times as many attacks. But if victory is as remote as ever, the chances for at least temporarily paralys-

ing life in the country are much greater, creating a climate of insecurity which will result in economic recession: permanent chaos rather than permanent revolution. The leaders of the urban guerrillas assume that as a result of continuous attacks the old order will either collapse or, more likely, try to defend itself by extreme means, to do away with civil liberties, become fascist. This in turn will cause further polarization, the guerrillas will gain the support of many liberals believing that the cure is worse than the disease.

I suspect that these tactics are largely based on miscalculations. The prospects for uban guerrillas in the Western world are not that good: true enough, modern cities offer a great many advantages to the attacker - but not in the long run, for they may well find themselves in total isolation. What has been easily destroyed is often easily and quickly repaired; it may even act as a spur to a sagging economy. Lastly, the urban guerrilla wants to achieve quick success; if he does not see any spectacular progress he loses courage, there will be internal splits, mutual recriminations. The fate of the Weathermen and the Black Panther are an obvious illustration. And since the guerrilla, unlike the orthodox Marxist, negates the political struggle, this may well be the end of his revolutionary career. One should not rule out urban guerrilla victories in certain countries where political circumstances are particularly favourable. But even there, the most the guerrillas can hope for is to act as pace-makers for the traditional parties of the left, especially the Communists, as, for instance, in Uruguay at present. They may take up arms against a national-revolutionary or left-wing government as in Ceylon and perhaps tomorrow in Chile, if their expectations are not fulfilled. But on the whole they are finding it easier to get publicity than to disrupt society, let alone to bring about social and political change.

The media, television in particular, have greatly helped the progress of small, insignificant groups by giving them a wide hearing. The constant need for sensationalism is one of the inbuilt features of modern mass media - the more extreme one's views or actions, the more newsworthy they are. But the media with their bias for the extreme, unlike King Midas, do not turn everything they touch into gold; on the contrary, their kiss is very often the kiss of death. They need seven-day wonders; today's cultural hero is bound to be tomorrow's bore. Television, moreover, is a cruel medium: it has probably damaged more reputations than it has created. If the opinions aired on television strike viewers and

listeners as outrageous, such exposure, far from helping the cause, effectively destroys it.

Nevertheless, there has been a dramatic upsurge in violent politics in recent years, and the question remains: how to explain it? Is there a general unified theory of violence? There is now a great deal of literature on the subject which I have studied, I admit, with much initial scepticism. Historians do not see eye to eye about the origins of the French revolution or the causes of the American civil war, indeed some of us now argue that strictly speaking there never was a French revolution. How much less likely is it for satisfactory answers to be found for more recent, even more complicated, developments. This is not to say that all that has been written by social scientists on the subject of revolution, guerrilla warfare and other forms of civil violence is wrong and can be safely ignored. Eckstein's observation in 1963 was quite orrect: scarcely anything in the French ancient regime has escaped blame by one writer or another for the revolution. But if it is true that many conditions can generate internal war - economic crisis as well as economic prosperity, social mobility as well as its absence, social change as well as stagnation - then less attention should be paid to the so-called objective conditions and more to the people who engage in political violence, the intellectual and voluntaristic factors, the personality of the leaders, the composition of the followers, their political orientation, and so on. These are interesting questions, but since there is no room for the rigorous analysis and controlled experiments that social scientists demand, it is more than doubtful whether we can expect from them more than occasional insights. Perhaps it is the process of modernization which disrupts social balances and undermines traditional society? Several writers have argued that precisely for this reason peasants have usually rebelled. Yet others sharply disagree: peasants do not rise when they are poor or when things get worse, they are always with those who have the power.

One of the first to engage in the comparative study of civil strife was Pitirim Sorokin, who found that in Europe the thirteenth century was the most violent one as far as the average level of disturbance is concerned. I shall not go into the finer points: the differentiation between turmoil, conspiracy, internal war, and so on. Others have followed in his tracks, but this again is a field in which quantification is only of little use - for what good are theories in which, say, the French and the Russian revolutions count as much as some Paraguayan pronunciamento which lasts for a

day, a week, or even a month? Let me give but one example. The History of Violence in America, a report to the National Commission on the causes and prevention of violence, provides on page 652 a table concerning political violence profiles of 84 countries for the period 1948-1966. According to this table, Finland and Luxemburg have the lowest profile, so to speak, they score nil - and Indonesia has the highest score, 190. My doubts arose when I gathered that France scores almost five times higher than Italy, Lebanon ten times higher than Israel and 83 times as high as Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom twice as high as Afghanistan and Ireland. I do not know on what ingenious schemes such tables are prepared, but they are (to put it as mildly as possible) open to doubt.

It has been known for a fairly long time that there is a connection between frustration and aggression, and the concept of relative deprivation has been introduced by some students. It has been shown that overcrowding stimulates aggression - among lemmings, rats as well as human beings. But all these theories explain at best part of a complex reality which obstinately defies generalization: the inhabitants of the most densely populated countries - such as Egypt, Holland, Belgium - are not necessarily more aggressive than, say, the Mongolians, and while life in a big city has no doubt many drawbacks it remains to be shown that city dwellers are more aggressive than farmers. Relative deprivation is not of much help either because there are relatively deprived people all over the world at all times, perhaps no less in Sweden and Madagascar, notably peaceful countries in our time, than in the United States or Colombia. More sophisticated is James C. Davies' concept of the J-curve which postulates, very briefly (following Tocqueville) that revolution is most likely to occur when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversal during which the gap between expectation and fulfilment widens and becomes intolerable. The author of this thesis has studied in detail the American civil war, Hitler's rise to power and the present turbulence in the United States. But what if he had studied instead the Russian or the Chinese revolutions? There were no rising expectations in Russia in 1917 or in China before 1949. Many social scientists have detected a causal correlation between social and economic change and political violence: when traditional means of production and time-honoured occupations have been superseded by more modern ones resulting in unemployment, when traditional habits and beliefs have undergone change, this has resulted in confusion, demoralization and very often violence. But

in some places the level of political violence has still been relatively small, in others exceedingly high. The Industrial revolution, the greatest social revolution of recent centuries has hardly anywhere resulted in major political revolutions, whereas lost wars frequestly have. Some have detected a causal connection between violence and modernization as well as social mobility. According to Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend the highest and lowest points of the modernity continuum will tend to produce maximum stability in the political order, whereas a medium position will produce maximum instability. In other words - the most and the least developed societies are the most integrated and therefore relatively immune to manifestations of political violence. It stands to reason - or so it seemed, until recent events in the United States and other highly developed countries made us doubt it. As for Latin America, it is my impression that the most backward, the most developed countries and those in between have been more or less equally hit by insurgency and other turbulence: if there is a general pattern of political violence it cannot be discerned with the naked eye. Professor Lucian Pye of MIT wrote in his book, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya, that it was almost impossible for political controversies within highly complex industrial societies to develop to the point of sustained and organized violence. He should have added: Provided that they also happen to be totalitarian dictatorships - in which case there may not be political controversy in the first place. Pye wrote his book in 1956; we are sadder and wiser now.

There are, in short, many theories about the origins, the character and the function of political violence. Some see it as a rational, others an irrational, phenomenon, some regard it as permanent, others as transitional, some as mainly caused by socio-economic, others by psycho-social, causes. Some interpret it as an instrument to eliminate backwardness, others, on the contrary, as a tool to spread barbarism. Of the various theories of political violence that have been submitted and discussed in recent years, few have been rejected outright, most have been simply discarded and forgotten. Many contained a grain of truth, but tried the impossible: to find a magic formula, a key to a phenomenon for which, alas, there seems to be no simple answer and no common denominator. Perhaps one day we shall have theories on political violence; I am fairly sure there will not be one theory.

I shall conclude with a few observations on the future of political violence and some generalizations of my own about what can

be learned from the experience of many years. For the future, I waver between cautious optimism and pessimism. I do not believe for a moment, as some social scientists do, that it is somehow possible drastically to reduce the amount of political violence. However just the social order, however perfect the rulers there will always be disaffected, alienated, and aggressive people, claiming that the present state of affairs is intolerable, that every change would be for the better, and that only violent change will be effective. Admittedly, the number of such people and the violence of their behaviour varies from country to country. Moreover, as far as one can see into the future, there will be despotism and injustice. Nevertheless, the prospects for guerrilla warfare are not too good. Only two years ago, the Palestinian irregulars seemed an irresistible force - today they are in very poor shape. In 1962, Venezuela was on the brink of disaster - it had the strongest, most experienced guerrilla movement and the weakest political and social order. Castro and his friends thought it would be the next country to fall. Seven years later the movement has virtually ceased to exist. The same happened in Colombia and Peru. The only Latin American country in which the extreme left has come to power is Chile, which is also the only country in which there was no sizeable guerrilla movement. Human beings do learn, however reluctantly, from historical experience: potential guerrilleros will draw conclusions not only, and perhaps not mainly, from their setbacks in recent years but also from the political futility of their actions. Since Cuba, they have as yet to win a decisive victory, and the Cuban example has lost much of its attraction for them. All this is not to say that the guerrilla movement is everywhere doomed, that it may not have spetacular successes in one country or the other. But I have been preoccupied with the rule, not the exception.

What conclusions, if any, can be drawn from recent history about the deeper reasons for the large scale revival of movements sponsoring political violence? Above all, it reflects the weakness of the established order. For such movements spread only if there is at least some chance of success - if there are no guerrilla movements in the Soviet Union this is not the result of the absence of conflicts, but the presence of a strong government which would suppress without compunction any attempt to challenge its authority. Revolutionary movements succeed not because objective conditions are ripe - to a certain degree these always exist, fully they are never present. They succeed because their enemies are weak. Pol-

itical regimes fall, not because they are wicked, but because they are ineffective. No regime, however abhorrent, has been overthrown as a result of the magnitude of its crimes, but a great many fairly good ones have fallen because its leaders have lost faith and nerve, because they no longer believed in the rightness of their cause, because, to the fanaticism of their enemies, they had nothing to juxtapose but tired scepticism. Weakness, admittedly, can have a great many causes - a lost war - or even a victorious war - if it caused many victims and much disruption, a deep structural economic crisis or even some major natural disaster. But our age, like some previous ones which were characterized by a high level of political violence, is remarkably free of such catastrophes, and therefore the deeper causes of the weakness, the tiredness, the scepticism, are connected with the spiritual crisis of our time: the loss of faith, be it religious or ideological, the depreciation of traditional values which have resulted in pessimism, emptiness, boredom and in various curious manifestations sometimes of a suicidal character. I am of course aware that the situation in the developing countries is different, but in the developed industrial societies this seems to me the core of the problem that will preoccupy us at this meeting: the key is not in the GNP, nor in the level of material expectations, but in the minds of men.

What makes civilizations become unsure of themselves, doubt their raison d'etre? There are, of course, always objective factors - political, social, economic - and we shall ignore them at our peril. But economic reasons do not suffice to explain why democracy in Germany succumbed to its enemies and why an even more severe crisis did not have the same effect in the United States. If the instinct of survival has been weakened, even minor challenges seem overwhelming, insurmountable. What causes a weakening of will? I do not profess to have an answer, but, if one is wanted, this seems to me the most promising direction for further exploration. Afflictions of the instinct for survival, of the will, are not necessarily fatal, they tend to appear like a bolt from the blue, and occasionally they disappear with equal suddenness. In France, around 1890, it was de rigueur to argue that the country was finished: observers referred to demographic stagnation, military weakness, the high consumption of alcohol, the prevalence of decadent trends in literature and in the arts, general demoralization - everything pointed in this direction. Everyone was beyond despair, Finis Galliae was the generally accepted slogan; as one leading economist wrote: France is going under like a lump of sugar in the ocean. Incidentially, this was also the heyday of anarchist attacks, of

Ravachol and Emile Henry, of bombs thrown in coffee houses and the Chamber of Deputies, of the murder of President Carnot. Fifteen years later, without any forewarning, everything changed almost overnight - the preoccupation with eroticism gave way to the newly fashionable outdoor sports, the natural sciences and technology attracted the young generation. The manly virtues were again extolled by writers and artists. France was at last herself again to quote a famous best-seller of those days, she became almost aggressively nationalist. Objectively nothing had changed: the birth-rate had not gone up, the French economy was still falling behind its neighbours, alcoholism had not decreased, and church attendance had not gone up. But whereas in 1890 these had seemed fatal diseases, fifteen years later most people were inclined to dismiss them as of no great consequence. I am not sure whether we are entitled to draw far-reaching conclusions from the French example. Perhaps all it teaches us is this: since the human factor is so important, and since human behaviour is so unpredictable, we should be very cautious in our predictions.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO "CIVIL VIOLENCE IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES"

1. Has the revival of civil violence been general in industrial societies? Is it limited to particular problems and countries whereas in other areas it is rather less than it has been in the not so distant past? If so, what lessons can be drawn?

2. What are the observable limits on civil violence? Why, despite their potential vulnerability, have urban societies been so little threatened by sabotage? Are e.g. the search for political popularity, the revulsion against extremism, etc., constraints on violence?

3. Must malaise and grievance breed violence, or only in certain historical situations? Why should this period be marked by the renewal of violence?

4. What is new in the revival of violence in industrial societies:
   - is it a revival of old demands for equality (the Blacks, Ulster, decolonisation)?
   - is it a new form of protest (e.g. influenced by new styles of international communication) for what are essentially old-style demands?
   - is it radically new, a 'Cultural Revolution' e.g. related to the youth culture and affecting the middle class?

5. Is violence a symptom of a 'pre-revolutionary' situation (Martinet) or of a cultural malaise - due e.g. to the ending of externally imposed constraints such as poverty, ignorance etc. - which cannot be resolved primarily in political terms?

6. Is political participation meaningful in a pluralist society? Is the revival of violence merely one way of playing the pluralist game and as such absorbable in the system? Or does the impatience of constraint behind it threaten the Western political tradition of politics by public debate, and Parliamentary representation? What part can violence play in an authoritarian society?

7. What will the impact of civil violence be on the policies of industrial countries, individually and collectively?
   - on economic prosperity? international economic co-operation? the 'Community of developed nations' (Brzezinski)?
   - on the capacity of governments to pursue foreign policy or defence goals? on the vulnerability of societies to subversion? on their porousness to radical influences coming from poorer societies than themselves?
   - on collective security? on the eruption of crises and crisis management? on radicalism at home and nationalism, even imperialism, abroad?