


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1. "Conflict in the Middle East"/ Leo Mates
2. "IAI's working paper"
3. "Schema di documento dell'IAI"



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Leo Matcs

CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Yugoslav-Italian Colloquy
Belgrade
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Leo Mates

CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Definition of the problem

The area of the Mediterranean Sea is the theatre of many international problems of which the Arab-Israeli confrontation in the region close to the eastern shores is the most intensive and has the broadest ramifications. In this exercise it is the central topic and reference to other problems and situations is made only in connection with it. In this regard particularly references are made to the attitude of the other Arab states not directly involved and situated in other parts of the Mediterranean littoral.

The Arab - Israeli conflict is regarded as a confrontation of Egypt, Jordan and Syria with Israel and also as the struggle of the Palestinian Liberation Movement in and around Israel. The conflict began with the proclamation of the state of Israel in 1948 and followed up to the present day. The examination follows events up to the end of May.

The examination is kept rather general with emphasis on the points considered to be particularly relevant for the discussion of current trends and possible future developments. It is assumed that the participants in the discussion have their own sources of information and possess a rather thorough knowledge of the history of the case. The historical part is, therefore, considered only as a reminder of some salient facts and features.

The purpose of the discussion is to examine current trends and possible developments so as to assess their effect upon the two countries from which the participants come /Italy and Yugoslavia/. It is also expected that the reactions of the one and the other country to developments of the case would be discussed.

HISTORY

The United Nations passed on November 30, 1947 in the General Assembly the resolution on the partition of the British Protectorate Palestine, after the withdrawal of the British authorities. Under the resolution it was decided to set up two independent states, one Jewish and the other Arab /see Map 1/.

The resolution was adopted by 33 votes for, 13 against and 10 abstentions /one absent/. The Arab states which were then members of the United Nations, i.e. Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, left the assembly hall after the vote was taken and declared that their countries are not bound by this illegal decision.

On midnight May 14/15, 1948, Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon and Syria launched an attack on Palestine. Few hours earlier the state of Israel was proclaimed in the afternoon of May 14. The new state was within three days officially recognized by the Soviet Union, Poland, Yugoslavia and Czecho-Slovakia. Followed the recognition by the United States and other countries, Britain hesitating. In the debates in the United Nations full backing to Israel was given by the Soviet Union and the United States, opposing on several occasions the British moves supporting the position of the Arabs.

The conflict ended with armistice agreements signed with Egypt /24 February/, Lebanon /23 March/, Transjordan /3 April/ and Syria /20 July/ in 1949. And the demarcation line then established remained for many years the actual boundary of Israel /see Map 1/. Israel was admitted to the United Nations and no Arab state was established in Palestine. The remaining territories of Palestine which remained outside Israel were included into the neighboring Arab states. The pretence was that the war is still on and that the state of Israel does not legally exist. Thus the Arab states behaved on the assumption that the state of Israel was only the provisional occupation of Arab territory and continued to stand behind the proposal to establish a unitary Arab-Palestine state on the whole territory, as proposed in the United Nations and defeated on November 24, 1947 in the Palestine Committee. Jordan, the new name since June 2, 1949 for the former Kingdom of Transjordan, annexed the territories under its control on the western bank of the Jordan river on June 24, 1950. Thus the largest portion of Palestine territory assigned to the Arab state and which remained under Arab control, became part of the Kingdom of Jordan. Egypt did not annex the strip

of territory around Gaza and considered the line dividing its troops from the troops of Israel merely as a demarcation line, as it was formally stipulated by the armistice agreement.

The second military conflict involved only the forces of Israel and Egypt of the Middle Eastern states. Besides, British and French troops were involved. The conflict started by military operations launched by Israeli forces against Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula on October 29, 1956. This attack was followed by an ultimatum and the opening of air attacks by British and French air forces on October 31 and the landing of their troops in Port Said on November 5. The Egyptian forces were heavily defeated in Sinai in the days from 29 October to 2 November and the territory east of the Suez /Sinai/ was occupied by Israel, while the Canal Zone was occupied by the British and French forces. All occupying forces withdrew completely on 22 December 1956, and UNEF units undertook to supervise the demarcation line between Egypt and Israel on Egyptian territory, as Israel did not accept UN troops on its side of the border.

The Third military clash in the Middle East occurred in the days 5-10 June 1967. The conflict was opened by a surprise attack of the Israeli airforce in the early morning of June 5 destroying virtually the whole Egyptian airforce. Israel defeated in the field the armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria. The armistice line was carried further into Arab territory /see Map 2/. Efforts to cause the withdrawal of the Israeli forces made by the United Nations and outside the United Nations failed.

Breaches of the armistice led into a protracted position war particularly along the Suez Canal. Unable to obtain a favourable decision by diplomatic action or through offensive military operations, Egypt resorted to a protracted war of attrition.

In the sphere of diplomatic activities, the year 1970 was significant because of the declared readiness of Egypt, announced by Nasser in May, to recognize Israel, conclude a peace treaty, concede free navigation for Israeli shipping and curb guerrilla activities in exchange for a complete withdrawal of the Israelis from territories occupied in 1967 and a just settlement of the question of Palestinian Arabs. This offer was reaffirmed after Nasser's death and after the failure to reach agreement during the active period of the Rogers plan.

The proposals of Israel to withdraw to a line not far from the Canal so as to permit the resumption of navigation was rejected by Egypt, because it did not contain the promise to withdraw from all territories occupied in 1967 and because it contained the prohibition for Egyptian troops to cross the Canal after the withdrawal of the Israelis. Israel never accepted the Egyptian comprehensive proposals and the negotiations bogged down.

In the summer 1970 the United States /Secretary Rogers/ undertook the initiative to bring about the opening of negotiations intended to lead eventually to a durable peace, calling for ceasefire. This was accepted by both sides and the ceasefire was formally valid until the beginning of February 1971, but was observed even after this date. During this period serious fighting broke out in Jordan between the Palestinian Liberation Front and government troops. In the midst of it, on September 28 President Nasser died of a heart attack. The revided activities of the United Nations mediator ambassador Jarring of Sweden brought no results and was discontinued in April 1971.

In May President El Saadat, who succeeded Nasser in Egypt suppressed an opposition movement led by Ali Sabri and other high officials in the Arab Socialist Union and in the government of Egypt. This group stood for a stronger line in the war and against the union with Syria and Lybia, which has been announced by Saadat and the presidents of the two neighboring states on January 22, 1971. Prior to the disruption of the opposition, it criticized the policy of El Saadat who was accused of having illusions concerning the possibility of a more favourable attitude to the United States. At that time Cairo had intensive contacts with American Government officials. The Soviet Union accused the United States of trying to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the Arabs by intrigues in the Middle East.

The Soviet presence in Egypt proved to be of increased importance during 1970 in view of the successful Israeli air raids hitting the depth of the hinterland in Egypt. The Soviet Union introduced pilots and crews for SA missiles. In the combats of the years there were **acknowledged losses of Soviet military personnel**. This gave a new dimension to the Arab-Soviet relationship.

El Saadat, after disposing of the opposition, received very cordially the President of the Soviet Union in Cairo and concluded with him a treaty of friendship prohibiting either side to enter into agreements with third parties directed at the other side.

CURRENT POSITIONS OF THE INTERESTED PARTIES

In the Middle Eastern conflict five interested parties can be identified: /1/ the Arab states /Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria and also Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and finally all other Arab states/, /2/ Israel, /3/ The Soviet Union, /4/ the United States, /5/ the Palestinian Liberation Movement.

The Arab states

Egypt is the most powerful and politically significant Arab state with considerable, though varying influence on the Arab League and the Palestinian Liberation Front. The position of Egypt is: Withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967 and a just settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem. In exchange Egypt offers free navigation, recognition and the conclusion and strict enforcement of a peace treaty. The problem of the Palestinian Arabs was stated in the past as the problem of the refugees and is so stated in recent statements, but it was spelled out as the "full respect for the rights of the Palestinians" in the resolution of the General Assembly of November 4, 1970. The precise meaning of this clause was never given and it could mean anything from return to their places of residence within Israel to resettlement in other places and/or the demand to set up an Arab state in the territory of former Palestine. It even could imply the return to the position of 1947, i.e. the demand for a unitary Arab state of Palestine.

The latest statements, however, clearly indicate that the territorial clause was the first precondition and the most important demand of Egypt.

Jordan insists as strongly as Egypt on the territorial clause, covering the cis-Jordan portion of Palestine, in view of its importance to Jordan. Jordan has still less clearly defined views on the Palestinian problem, except the fact that cis-Jordanian Palestine outside Israel was incorporated into the state of Jordan. It is unlikely that the position of Jordan could be more clearly defined until the relations with the PLF are unsettled and hostilities periodically flare up.

Jordan supports the general line of conduct initiated by Egypt, but might be more conciliatory disposed to questions not directly affecting the state.

Syria is the most irreconcilliable Arab state directly involved. The precise position varies with the changes in government. The main preoccupation is the withdrawal from the Syrian territory occupied in 1967 and the maximum demands for the Palestinians. Syria has no part of the Palestinian Arab territory within its borders, or under occupation.

The other Arab states are officially bound by all-Arab declarations, but there is a visible closeness of Lybia and Sudan to the position of Egypt, an extremely radical position of Algeria and a moderate position of Morocco and Tunisia. Yemen did not play an important role in the Arab councils on the war in the middle East, and is not likely to exercise an important influence on the course of events.

Israel

Israel has never, and quite deliberately so, defined its position on the territorial issue. Informally, in Israel the impression is given that all the occupied territories belong historically to Israel. Recently a flexibility has been observed in this respect and offers of withdrawal into the Sinai desert away from the Canal may indicate the readiness to give up part of these territories. There is one certain position on the other side of the question: Jerusalem is firmly claimed and declared not negotiable. There is no readiness to accept Arab refugees in any substantial number into the state of Israel.

The diplomatic activities of Israel are concentrated on the positive demands: recognition and peace treaty including the full freedom of navigation. Besides, demilitarized zones are requested in sensitive areas /border with Arab states/ and strategic positions on the Arab shore of the Gulf of Aqba and on the Gollan Heights in Syria.

The Soviet Union

On the direct conflict in the Middle East, the Soviet Union supports the Arab states and in particular Egypt. This is linked with the desire to maintain the gained position in Egypt and in other Arab states on the Mediterranean Sea /Algeria in particular/. Thus the war in the Middle East is in Soviet views closely connected with the strengthening of her position in that area and in the whole Mediterranean basin. This includes the balancing with American naval forces in the area. The area is of interest because of its military and economic importance,

as well as for its geographical position leading to the Indian Ocean and to the heart of Africa.

The United States

The United States had since the end of the Second World War a dominant military position in the Mediterranean area and also substantial influence in other respects, as well as considerable economic interests. This position became threatened by the growing influence and presence of the Soviet Union in the region and of her navy in the Mediterranean. Soviet influence in Egypt is viewed as the most important element in this context. The main line of conduct could be understood as a defensive action aiming at the conservation of earlier acquired positions of dominance and influence.

The United States policy is also influenced by sympathies in the country, particularly among the Jewish population, for Israel. Furthermore, the United States has accepted a serious commitment giving aid and support to Israel and this is in itself a strong reason not to allow the destruction of that state.

The Palestinian Liberation Movement

The original position, of course, is not to recognize Israel and to claim the whole territory of Palestine. The Movement showed recently implied readiness to accept less than the maximum. It, however, denounced belatedly the Jordanian annexation of the territory on the western bank of the river Jordan.

MILITARY FORCES OF THE DIRECTLY INVOLVED STATES

/All data from the Military Balance 1970-71, Institute for Strategic Studies, London/

ISRAEL

General Population: 2,900,000.⁺ Military service /Jewish population only/: men, 36 months; women, 20 months. Total armed forces: 75,000 regular cadre and conscripts /can be raised to about 300,000 by mobilization of reservists, which is completed within 48-72 hours/.

+ Excluding occupied territories.

Estimated GNP 1969: \$4.5 billion. Defence budget 1970-71: 3,762.5 million Israeli pounds /\$1,075,000,000/. 3.5 Israeli pounds = \$1.

Army Total strength: 11,500 regular, 50,000 conscripts /275,000 when fully mobilized/. Active: Two infantry, two armoured, one mechanized and one paratroop brigade /some only in cadre form/. Reserve: about 26 brigades, for one-third of which armour is available on mobilization. 300 M-48 Patton /with 105mm guns/, 450 Centurion, 100 T-54/55s, 200 Super Sherman /with 105mm guns/ medium tanks. 15 AML-90 and some AML-60 and Staghound armoured cars. Up to 1500 M-2 and M-3 half-tracks. About 300 self-propelled artillery pieces, including mortars and 155mm howitzers on Sherman chassis and 105mm howitzers on AMX chassis.⁺ Anti-tank weapons include: 106mm recoilless rifles mounted on jeeps. 90mm SP guns. SS-10/11 missiles mounted on weapons carriers. Cobra missiles. 20mm, 30mm and 40mm anti aircraft guns. /There are reports that the MD-660 surface-to-surface missile is due to become operational during 1970 or 1971./ There are separate regional defence units which provide a permanent guard in the border regions. Most of these units are on a militia basis.

Navy Total strength: 3,500 regular, and 1,000 conscripts /8,000 when fully mobilized/. 4 submarines. 1 destroyer. 1 anti-aircraft frigate. 1 coastal escort. 12 Saar-type fast missile patrol boats /with Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles/. 9 motor torpedo boats /less than 100 tons/. 4 seaward defence vessels /less than 100 tons/. 7 landing craft /1 less than 100 tons/. 500 naval commandos.

Air Force Total strength: 8,000 regular, 1,000 conscripts /17,000 when fully mobilized/; 330 combat aircraft. 12 Vautour light bombers. 36 F-4E Phantom fighter-bomber/interceptors. 67 A-4E Skyhawk fighter-bombers. 60 Mirage IIIC fighter-bomber/interceptors /some with R-530 missiles/. 30 ~~Mystère IVA~~ **Mystère IVA** fight.-bomb. 30 ~~Ouragan~~ **Ouragan** fight.-bomb. 10 Super ~~Mystère~~ **Mystère** interceptors. 85 Magister jet trainers /can be used in groundattack role/. 2 squadrons with 15 Noratlas, 6 Stratocruiser and 10 C-47 medium transports. Helicopters include 25 AB-205s, 5 Alouettes, 12 Super Prelons, 8 CH-53s and 15 H-34s. 2 battalions of Hawk surface-to-air missiles. /Israel has ordered and paid for fifty Mirage 5s, but their export from France has been blocked./ /Delivery of further American aircraft has been under discussion./

⁺ Further SP artillery is being delivered by the United States.

Para-military forces The militia element of the border region defence units is building up to a strength of 10,000.

EGYPT

General Population: 33,300,000. Military service: 3 years. Total armed forces: 288,000. Estimated GNP 1969: \$6.3 billion. Defence Budget 1970-71: £E553 million /\$1,272 million/. £E1 = \$2,3.

Army Total strength: 250,000. 3 armoured divisions. 4 mechanized infantry divisions. 4 infantry divisions. 18 commando battalions. 2 parachute brigades. 15 artillery brigades. About 30 JS-3 and T-10 heavy tanks. Some 950 T-54/T-55, 250 T-34, 10 Centurion Mark 3 and 15 Sherman medium tanks. 150 PT-76 amphibious and 20 AMX-13 light tanks. 900 BTR-40, BTR-50, OT-64 and BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers. About 150 SU-100 and JSU-152 SP assault and ZSU-57 SP anti-aircraft guns. 1,500 122 mm, 130mm and 152 mm guns and about 40 lorry-mounted rocket-launchers. About 24 FROG-3 and 25 Samlet short-range surface-to-surface missiles.

Navy Total strength: 14,000, including coastguards. 12 submarines /6 ex-Soviet W-class and 6 ex-Soviet R-class/. 5 destroyers /4 ex-Soviet Skory class and 1 ex-British Z-type/. 2 escort vessels. 12 coastal escorts. 6 fleet minesweepers. 2 inshore minesweepers. 12 Osa-class missile patrol boats and 7 Komarclass, both with Styx short-range surface-to-surface missiles. 27 motor torpedo boats /less than 100 tons/. 18 small landing craft.

Air Force Total strength: 20,000; 415 combat aircraft. 15 Tu-16 medium bombers. 28 Il-28 light bombers. 150 MiG-21 interceptors. 105 Su-7 fighter-bombers. 165 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter-bombers. About 40 Il-14 and 20 An-12 medium transports. 70 Mi-1, Mi-4, Mi-6 and Mi-8 helicopters. 150 MiG, Yak and Delfin trainers, some of which can be armed. Air defence is provided by 37 mm, 57 mm, 85mm and 100mm anti-aircraft guns, and by 250 SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missiles deployed in 25 batteries of 6 launchers each, co-ordinated with a radar network and six squadrons of MiG-21C interceptors. There are some 100 Soviet-operated MiG-21J interceptors. It is believed that 22 SA-3 sites have been completed, and that construction of another 23 is in progress. These missiles are manned by Soviet personnel.

Missile Command This is separate from the Army and the Air Force, and consists of about 4,000 men, including civilian technicians. The 100 missiles that have been built include the Al Zafir, stated to be able to carry a 900-lb warhead some 200 miles, the Al Kahir, stated to be able to carry a rather larger warhead up to 350 miles, and the Al Raid, stated to be able to carry a one-ton scientific probe some 440 miles. /All these figures are thought to be over-optimistic./ The first two were designed to be launched from mobile platforms, but none of the missiles is thought to have achieved any operational capability. It is believed that the programme has been abandoned and that the command may be disbanded.

Para-military forces A National Guard of about 90,000.

JORDAN

General Population: 2,225,000. Military service: 2 years. Total armed forces: 60,250. Estimated GNP 1969: \$0.7 billion. Defence budget 1970: 42 million dinars /\$117,600,000/. 1 dinar = \$2.8.

Army Total strength: 58,000. 2 armoured brigades. 1 Royal Guards battalion /armoured/. 9 infantry brigades. 1 anti-aircraft regiment, for which Tigercat surface-to-air missiles are on order. 160 M-47 and M-48 Patton, and 150 Centurion medium tanks. 130 Saladin armoured cars and about 140 Ferret scout cars. 250 M-113 and 100 Saracen APCs. 30 105mm and 155mm howitzers, a few 155mm and 203mm guns, and 3 regiments of 25-pounders.

Navy Total strength: 250. 8 small patrol craft operating from Aqaba.

Air Force Total strength: 2,000; 38 combat aircraft. 1 squadron of 18 F-104A interceptors. /A second squadron is due to form in 1970./ 2 squadrons /about 20 aircraft/ of Hunter FGA6 and 9. 4 C-47, 2 Dove and 2 Devon transport aircraft. Helicopters include 6 Alouette III and 3 Whirlwinds.

Para-military forces Total strength: 37,500 consisting of: 7,500 Gendarmerie. 30,000 National Guard.

SYRIA

General Population: 6,025,000. Military service: 30 months. /Jewish population exempted./ Total armed forces: 86,750. Estimated GNP 1969: \$1.35 billion. Estimated defence expenditure 1970: £840 million Syrian /\$221,000,000/. £3.8 Syrian = \$1.

Army Total strength: 75,000 /including 1,200 in Jordan and 2,000 in Iraq/. 4 armoured brigades. 4 mechanized brigades. 6 infantry brigades. 1 parachute battalion. 3 commando battalions. 7 artillery regiments /including 1 in Jordan/. About 30 JS-3 heavy tanks. 150 T-34 and 700 T-54/55s medium tanks. 100 SU-100 tank destroyers and 600 BTR-152 APCs. Soviet-made artillery includes 122mm, 130mm and 152mm guns. 40 SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missiles.

Navy Total strength: 1,750. 2 minesweepers. 3 coastal patrol vessels. 10 Komar-class missile patrol boats, with Styx short-range surface-to-surface missiles. 15 motor torpedo boats /less than 100 tons/.

Air Force Total strength: 10,000 men; 210 combat aircraft. 80 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter-bombers. 40 Su-7 fighter-bombers. 90 MiG-21 interceptors. 8 Il-14, 6 C-47, 4 D-18 and 3 Li-2 transport aircraft. 4 Mi-1, 8 Mi-4 and some Mi-8 helicopters.

Para-military forces Gendarmerie: 5,000. Internal Security Camel Corps: 1,500. The People's Militia is stated to be building up to 250,000.

IRAQ

General Population: 9,000,000. Military service: 2 years. Total armed forces: 94,500. Estimated GNP 1969: \$2.8 billion. Defence estimates 1970: 151,700,000 dinars /\$424,760,000/. 1 dinar = \$2.8.

Army Total strength: 85,000 /including about 15,000 in Jordan and 6,000 in Syria/. 2 armoured divisions. 5 infantry divisions. 450 T-54/55, 140 T-34 and 55 Centurion Mark 5 medium tanks. 40 M-24 Chaffee light tanks. 55 AML-60 armoured cars and 20 Ferret scout cars. BTR-152 APCs. Artillery includes Soviet 120mm and 130mm guns.

Navy Total strength: 2,000. 3 submarine chasers.
12 motor torpedo boats /less than 100 tons/. 10 patrol boats
/less than 100 tons/.

Air Force Total strength: 7,500; 229 combat aircraft.
8 Tu-16 medium bombers. 10 Il-28 light bombers. 50 Su-7 all-
-weather fighter-bombers. 36 Hunter Mark 9 ground-attack
aircraft. 20 T-52 Jet Provost light-strike aircraft. 60
MiG-21 interceptors. 45 MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighters. 4 Mi-1,
20 Mi-4 and 11 Wessex helicopters. Transport aircraft include
12 An-2, 6 An-12, 10 An-24, 13 Il-14, 2 Herons and 3 Bristol
Freighters. SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missiles.

Para-military forces Total strength: 20,000
including: A national guard of about 10,000. 1 mechanized
brigade of security troops /about 3,000 men/.

LEBANON

General Population: 2,700,000. Voluntary military
service. Total armed forces: 16,250. Estimated GNP 1969:
\$1.6 billion. Defence estimates 1970: £100 million
/\$30,300,000/. Lebanese £3.3 = \$1.

Army Total strength: 15,000. 2 tank battalions.
1 motorized battalion. 9 infantry battalions. 40 Charioteer
medium tanks. 40 AMX-13 and 20 M-41 Walker Bulldog light
tanks. M-706 and M-6 Staghound and AEC Mark-3 armoured cars.
M-113 and M-59 APCs. Artillery includes 155mm howitzers.

Navy Total strength: 250. 1 patrol vessel.
1 landing craft. 3 small patrol boats /less than 100 tons/.

Air Force Total strength: 1,000; 24 combat aircraft.
1 squadron of Hunter fighter/ground-attack aircraft. 1 squa-
dron of Mirage III C interceptors with R.530 air-to-air missiles.
About 6 transport aircraft. 1 helicopter squadron with 3
Alouette IIs and 6 Alouette IIIs. /A Crotale air-defence
missile system is on order./

Para-military forces There is a Gendarmerie of
2,500. It is planned to form a National Guard with a strength
of up to 5,000.

SAUDI ARABIA

General Population: 7,300,000. Voluntary
 military service. Total armed forces: 36,000. Estimated
 GNP 1969: \$3.9 billion. Defence budget 1969-70: 1,742 million
 riyals /\$387,000,000/. 4.5 riyals = \$1.

Army Total strength: 30,000. 4 infantry brigades.
 55 M-47 Patton medium tanks. 35 M-41 Walker Bulldog and 30 AMX-13
 light tanks. About 200 AML-90 and some M-6 Staghound and M-8
 Greyhound armoured cars; some Ferret scout cars. Vigilant
 anti-tank missiles. 10 batteries of Hawk surface-to-air missiles.

Navy Total strength: 1,000. 1 patrol vessel.
 6 fast patrol boats. /About 20 smaller patrol boats are on
 order./

Air Force Total strength: 5,000; 75 combat aircraft.
 16 F-86 fighter-bombers. 24 BAC-167 Strikemaster ground-attack
 aircraft. 35 Lightning interceptors. 8 C-47, 2 C-118,
 6 C-123 and 9 C-130E transport aircraft. 2 Alouette III, 2
 AB-204, 24 AB-205 and 10 AB-206 helicopters. About 30 Hunter,
 Lightning, and T-41A trainers. 37 Thunderbird surface-to-air
 missiles, some of which are installed around airfields.

Para-military forces. Lightly armed tribal levies
 /the 'White Army' / number about 24,000. They are used chiefly
 for internal security purposes.

The forces of the United States and of the Soviet
 Union in the Mediterranean Sea are not given because they are
 variable and can be increased or reduced rapidly. The above
 figures must be taken with caution and may only serve as an
 approximate indication of strength.

The material strength does, of course, not indicate
 the fighting capability which depends on the leadership,
 generalship, morale of the troops and the level of competence
 and quality of training.

Furthermore, the material strength over the last
 years was increasing on both sides. Roughly one could say that
 the two sides have maintained a similar **ratio** in forces over
 the last three years, i.e. after the Soviet Union supplied the
 equipment needed to replace the losses in the war of June 1967.
 This process of parallel further increase of forces is continu-
 ing.

THREE MODELS OF POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE NEXT FUTURE

1/ Durable peaceful settlement of the conflict

This solution requires a settlement which can be accepted by the parties concerned as satisfactory or at least tollerable. It must be added that a solution is tollerable if the disadvantages are outweighed by advantages, or if the expected price to oppose it is too high absolutely or in relation to possible advantages. Thus, tollerable compromises cannot be judged in absolute terms, but only relatively. The factors influencing the behaviour of either side in a compromise are, therefore necessarily variable. What was accepted at one time, may appear no longer tollerable at another time. In order to include such type of agreement into a durable overall settlement, such guaranties are required which would make a breach of the agreement too risky or subject to so serious disadvantages or losses, that they could serve as adequate deterrents.

This preliminary remark appears essential, because it is most unlikely that a durable settlement could ever be attained if all sides should require a full respect of their aspirations. In order to reduce tensions and undue strain on the agreement, the degree of dissatisfaction must be as equal on both sides as possible. Thus a durable solution must be regarded as a compromise, i.e. solution regarded as much as this is possible equally unsatisfactory to both sides. This is a more realistic expression of the over-optimistic usage to call it a "just" mutually "acceptable" solution.

It is obvious that a durable solution requires a profound change in attitudes and behaviour. This cannot be brought about by imposition from outside the area, nor is it likely to develop within the area as long as there is a precarious balance between war and peace, or a formal state of war. It follows, therefore, that the first step must be the freezing of a temporary situation that is based on a compromise with which both sides, or all sides concerned, can live. This initial period is therefore the object of this model and it is expected, that it could serve as an introduction to a durable or quasi final settlement. Its main purpose would

be to make possible settlement that could last long enough to generate the political and psychological climate conducive to relevant changes in attitudes and behaviour upon which a durable settlement would rest.

+ + +

The territorial settlement

The boundaries of Israel would be determined, recognized, guaranteed and accepted by the contiguous states. They would have to run close to the demarcation line in existence before the war of 1967. Both sides have, although at different times declared this line as acceptable. In order to give durability to the settlement the United Nations and/or the major powers would be asked to guarantee it. Possible changes in the line must not affect vital interests and must be comparatively small.

The most delicate problem will be the line between Israel and Jordan, where the city of Jerusalem may prove to be a problem. Furthermore, the Palestinian part of Jordan /Cis-Jordan/ could become a separate small Arab state, might obtain autonomy within Jordan or be part of a confederation.

The territorial settlement would probably include also demilitarized zones and/or observation and patrolling of the borders by neutral, United Nations, or combined great-power personnel.

Status and ancillary clauses

The settlement must have the form of a ratified and registered peace treaty, including full mutual recognition and stipulating good-neighborly relations. Further, there will have to be the recognition of free navigation in all waters of the sea in harmony with international law.

Some form of mutual guaranty against hostile alliances and other forms of threat or pressure would probably be required on one or the other side. It is possible that one or the other side may ask for neutrality or neutralization of the whole region and/or the exclusion of nuclear arms. The prohibition of granting military or naval facilities or bases to other powers may also be proposed and could create complications.

Palestinian Arabs

Unless some territorial solution is found, the problem of the Arab refugees will have to be settled. It is unlikely that more than a small fraction would be admitted to settle in Israel. This question could raise serious problems with Jordan, because of the close relations of the Palestinian Arabs and those in Transjordan and the weakness of the Monarchy which has been imposed upon Jordan by the British and which relies mostly on Bedouin soldiery. The creation of an Arab Palestinian state or even an autonomous province might arouse the Israelis too.

The only imaginable durable settlement of this problem could be^a/compromise based on a combination of decisive action and firm behaviour of the existing Arab states /including the possibly created Palestinian Arab state/ against unsatisfied Palestinian elements or organizations and, as far as possible fulfilment of the aspirations of the Palestinians. The more the settlement relies on firmness /i.e. less on satisfying Arab Palestinian aspirations/ the more it will be a strain on the Arab side. The more it would satisfy the Palestinian demands, more it will be irksome to the Israelis.

The United States

The United States has not entered the Middle East scene as the protector of Israel, as erroneously often stated in the press, but in order to safeguard its own interests. The United States, in spite of the influence of American Jewry, gave little material help to Israel in the first round of the armed conflict with the Arab states in 1948. Then, the Soviet Union was the main provider of help to Israel.

The main interest of the United States is to maintain as much as possible the position acquired during and after the Second World War in the Mediterranean area, including the potentialities this position offers in connection with adjacent areas further to the East and the South, as well as the strategic position in regard to the European area of confrontation with the Soviet Union.

From this is derived the resentment of and opposition to the presence of the Soviet Union which has developed particularly in the later Sixties after the first results of the new program of naval construction in the Soviet Union.

The main requirements for this model would be a tolerable territorial settlement and a solution of the Palestinian Arab question which would burden as moderately as possible the relations between the opponents in the area. It would have to rest also, on an acceptable compromise between the two super powers about their presence and relationship in the Mediterranean.

2/ Revival of major warfare

A. /a/ The outbreak of another bout in the 23 years old war is likely to occur if the hope for a peaceful settlement on the one and/or other side falls below a certain threshold of credibility, which will be lower or higher depending on the internal political stability and economic viability of the two sides.

/b/ Large scale fighting can break out if the trend of internal stability and viability as well as the correlation of forces, briefly the prospect of an unfavourable outcome of fighting, begins to look in the eyes of the one or the other side as worsening without hope of redress.

/c/ It can be started by any if there is a firm expectation of an easy victory, the fruits of which could be used to impose a durable unilaterally favourable settlement without serious opposition, or risk.

Ad /a/: If the one or the other side, more likely Israel than the Arab, gain the conviction that there can never be a settlement which could be accepted or at least tolerated and that, consequently, there can be no security and stability, unless the other side is brought down to its knees and such conditions are imposed that security would appear to be safeguarded by superiority, rather than legal obligations and mutual self-interest, then this can lead to the decision to use arms in a new bout of major fighting.

It is not relevant to argue that this kind of settlement by imposition is not durable. This method has been so frequently applied in history, including recent history, that it must be taken into consideration as a possibility.

Ad /b/: The prolonged war of attrition and the heavy expense together with the frustration caused by a prolonged state of war without prospect of a final solution, is a heavy burden for every society. The main opponents in the Middle East,

particularly Israel and Egypt, are carrying this burden only thanks to foreign aid /USA and its Jewry to Israel and the Petroleum states among the Arabs to Egypt/ and this can sooner or later lead to serious political trouble which could induce "energetic" action towards the other side as the only way to recover internal or external political stability. This would become even more likely if such development should be aggravated by the impression that the military balance is deteriorating.

It is to be expected that this development would be **properly** masked by political oratory and ideological smoke screens as it is usual in similar situations and as it was observed in other cases which can be found in recent history.

Ad /c/: There is nothing so tempting to use arms in a confrontation than the prospect of an easy victory combined with the expectation to enjoy all the fruits of it. It is **hardly** necessary to elaborate on this possibility.

+ + +

B. The behaviour of either side will also depend on the attitude of allies and friends and on the nature of relationships with them.

/a/ The Arab side

The war effort is based on cooperation of the adjacent or nearby Arab states. The state of the **alliance** is therefore the first variable to be considered. The discord among the allies is more likely to add to the readiness to renew fighting than the success of political and military cooperation and coordination. In fact both harmony and discord have been observed in history as incentives of alliances to go to war. The Arabs, have so far never succeeded to preserve a high degree of harmony during intervals of no fighting in the war with Israel. On the other side, war acted as an unfailing catalyst in the process of bringing together the quarelling sides.

The development of internal political conditions and the state of the economies in the different Arab states is not following a uniform pattern. Discrepancies and differences in interests do arise and can play an important role in the behaviour of the whole alliance. The more radical and belligerent attitude proved so far the one that can be most easily

imposed upon the other partners. The common denominator among them is therefore, usually closer to a more extremist position than to moderate attitudes. This radicalism is, though, more likely to be an obstacle on the road towards a settlement, than a cause of renewed warfare. Nevertheless, it could be a possible variable influencing the outbreak of large scale hostilities and must be taken into consideration here.

The Palestinian question, more than anything else, proved to be a serious obstacle in the way of settlement in recent time /since the opening steps of the Rogers Plan/. The Palestinian problem is most likely to function in this respect along lines similar to those described in the Model 1.

The main extra-regional ally is the Soviet Union. In view of the interests and attitudes described earlier, it would follow that the Soviet Union would exercise all possible influence to prevent the outbreak of major hostilities. It may be assumed that this will be valid even if it were justified to expect an Arab victory over Israel. The ensuring strengthening of the international position of the Arabs would make them rather difficult clients for the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union would also be greatly interested in the survival of regimes in Arab states /in particular in Egypt/ which would be friendly. A threat to their survival may profoundly alter Soviet views about war or peace along lines described under A./a/.

The more intricate and delicate variable is the quality and degree of Soviet influence on Arab behaviour and attitudes. It may vary as a function of many parameters, but it would seem that the most important would be Soviet credibility in the eyes of the Arabs and their degree of economic and/or military dependence on aid.

/b/ Israel

The only relevant ally currently is the United States, and the friendly factor the Jewry in the United States and also in other countries. The interest of the United States has been discussed earlier, and the quality and degree of influence would probably vary in the same way as described under B./a/ in the case of the Soviet Union and the Arabs.

C. The global policies of the two super powers and the general situation in the world would appear to be at present conducive to avoiding new outbreak of major violence in the Middle East, as well as elsewhere. This, however, must be taken together with the continuing urge to maintain acquired positions and to gain advantages wherever and when ever possible. These two trends are contradictory, because the desire to avoid war at the same time leads to building up situations wrought with the danger of war.

Fighting in the Middle East can break out in spite of the mentioned trends and attitudes against war, but in the case of a deterioration in the world situation, restraining influences would diminish or altogether disappear, increasing the likelihood of an eruption of fighting.

+ + +

D. General considerations concerning the possibility of a new outbreak of open warfare can be summarized as follows:

/a/ Israel has still military superiority based on the superior quality of forces rather than on numbers and fire power. Israel had so far also superiority in strategic skill and generalship. The durability of this superiority is questionable in view of the overwhelming superiority in numbers and likely superiority in fire power. The main variable is the pace and results of the military training programs in Egypt.

/b/ Israel could hardly survive a defeat, unless there is a vigorous and timely military and/or diplomatic intervention, strong enough to cause changes in the created military situation. The Arabs did and can survive several defeats.

/c/ For the two super powers the Middle East confrontation is only one, although important, regional problem. The attitude to this problem will necessarily depend in the future, as it did in the past, on the general development and global policy of both of them. It can, therefore, be only indicated as a variable of a double function, but cannot be assessed or predicted with any precision. It should be remembered that the one and the other side have at one time very firmly supported Israel.

/d/ The degree of interest and the quality of it /including the choice of the side to be supported/ depends on the general degree of activity in the foreign policy of the great powers as well. This degree of activity depends on a variety of internal developments within the super powers and also on reciprocal interaction between them. It may also depend

on the special degree of importance given to the Middle East in world affairs and can be influenced by the possible fulfilment of separate aims, as for instance the opening of the Suez Canal /a special interest, more of the Soviet Union, than of the United States/.

3. Continuation of the present state of limited violence

A. The discussion of this model includes only a prolongation of the present state of affairs without major fighting or a durable settlement, which were discussed separately. One could distinguish two major categories of situations: intensive war of attrition and less intensive and intermittent border incidents and similar bursts of sub-war-level fighting.

/a/ War of attrition tactics could be resumed on a scale comparable to the conditions preceding the Rogers Plan cease-fire, if efforts to arrive at a durable settlement are given up by at least one side and decisive and major warfare at the same time considered undesirable. The same result would be obtained if any other combination of situations arises mentioned in Model 2 under A, but with the additional element that at the given moment reopening of major fighting is considered unprofitable, or attrition promises a favourable outcome.

In the circumstance this would seem to apply more to the Arab side /which made use of this tactics after 1967/ than to Israel which is more likely to be induced to major scale operations relying on superiority in decisive mobile battles.

/b/ Low-violence confrontation is a rather unstable situation. It means reliance on time, hoping for a change in the correlation of forces. It is also a situation which can develop out of an imposed settlement which is not acceptable or tollerable to the one and/or other side. Thus, it could be interpreted as a degenerated and unsuccessful introductory phase to a durable settlement as discussed in the opening paragraph of Model 1.

The tollerant attitude and acceptance of a prolonged confrontation of this kind can also be imposed by the presence of respectable forces placed at the border between the two sides. They must be respectable by size, or representing forces of powers whose antagonism cannot be risked /E.g. combined forces of the super powers/, or having full backing of such powers /UNEF/.

B. The continuation of a limited violence confrontation would most likely be the product of the limiting effects preventing full scale warfare and/or obstacles preventing the functioning of a durable settlement. Both contingencies have been discussed under the two previous models.

This type of confrontation could be based also on:
/a/ direct or implied agreement of the super powers, or /b/ a complete lack of such agreement.

/a/ Agreement between the super powers in meant as an understanding that each side has **an admitted interest** in the area. As it is unlikely that a stable division of zones or degrees of influence could be reached and maintained, this would lead to a limited violence rivalry in general and in particular in areas as vulnerable as the Palestine region.

/b/ Complete lack of agreement between them must lead to more or less similar conditions, because then the behaviour would be restrained only by the generally admitted need of avoiding major or uncontrolled violence in direct confrontation of the two super powers. As a durable Israeli-Arab settlement in these conditions would become most unlikely, the Palestine region would remain in a state of limited violence.

+ + +


C. It is thinkable, but less likely, that this state of affairs could be prolonged in a situation when all directly involved states and the Palestinian movement have accepted the aim of a durable settlement, but one or a minority of the actors find one or more components utterly unacceptable although they have no power to make their opposition felt in stronger terms than resorting to limited violence with the aim of preventing the application of a settlement. The action of some of the Palestinian organizations who tried to oppose the Rogers Plan by attacking passenger aircraft in the region is an example of such behaviour.

FINAL REMARKS


The models presented above are deliberately uncomplete, because an exhaustive consideration of all possibilities would lead to so extensive examinations of a very large number of variables and functions, that a coherent discussion would become almost impossible. The selections and omission made by the author were guided by the desire to present most likely and not most desirable cases for examination in the discussion.

As it is in all similar cases the choices method and content had to be personal, or still better, based on personal insight and judgement. It is hoped that the presentation is complete enough to serve as a basis for discussion which would be relevant and productive, and it is also expected that the discussion will complete some of the lacunes which may be judged inadmissible.

MAP I —
PARTITION OF PALESTINE 1947



MAP II — ISRAEL BEFORE 1967 AND OCCUPIED TERRITORIES



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IAI's WORKING PAPER

1. Twenty five years after the end of the Second World War, a situation of relative stability has formed in Europe, generally characterised by the consolidation of the socio-political structures existing in the various countries. There is now agreement in taking for granted the respect of the present territorial pattern and of the capitalist and socialist systems which, in their various nuances, have become established in the Continent's Western and Eastern regions. The existence of unsolved problems, left over from the last conflict, should not be underestimated (the status of Berlin, the position of the German Democratic Republic), but these are "knots" that can be untied if we view them in the prospect of a basic trend towards the overcoming of the causes of conflict that still exist. From this viewpoint, we can say that the atmosphere in Europe has been making considerable progress over the last ten - fifteen years, to the point of turning our Continent, relatively speaking, into one of the world's most stable regions.

This pattern is characterised by the existence of the two opposed blocs, Western and Eastern, supported by the great powers, the U.S. and the USSR, to which the Europeans on either side are tied, although in a rather different manner. To expect this division to be overcome in the near future appears unrealistic, as well as offering dubious advantages. However, there emerge periodically certain situations of unrest and stress, different in substance (nationalistic or integrationist) and in methods (revolts or political and diplomatic moves), which tend to break away from the monolithic order of the blocs. The problem lies in finding that degree of autonomy with respect to the superpowers which will substitute

for the excessive dependence and limited sovereignty not an anachronistic return to national autonomies and purely bilateral detente relations, but a different and more flexible relationship with them, in the form of a multilateral cooperation suiting the requirements of individual countries and groups of countries.

2. The most advanced and promising experiment in this direction is the process of economic integration of Western Europe. This process is not taking place without difficulties, as recently evidenced again by the threats to institutional structures and the crisis of the economic and monetary union. Differences in position still exist between member countries, and fluctuations occur in their own political lines: today it is Federal Germany which is taking its own autonomous initiative, at times contradictory. On the other hand, there is a promise of success in expanding the Community to include four more countries, and in the first place Great Britain, with all the potential implications of such a move, not only economic but also political (and perhaps military). Although it is difficult to make now an assessment of such implications, they are likely to be very important.

The consolidation of the Community's structures poses a number of problems for non-member countries in their relations with the Community. One of these countries is Yugoslavia, which is demanding that its economic trade relations be not sacrificed to the latest developments. Belgrade's realistic attitude vis-a-vis the EEC, with which an agreement was concluded last year, guaranteed among other things by the supervision of a Joint Committee, constitutes a satisfactory result.

3. The defence system of the Western countries is based on the Atlantic Alliance. The last meeting of the NATO council has strengthened the tendency to make it also an instrument of political coordination, but it remains essentially a military instrument, in which the U.S. contribution constitutes the basic element. The current debate on the respective levels of contribution by Europeans and Americans to the defence effort is revealing of the existing difficulties.

The Americans tend to decrease their military presence in Europe to lighten the cost burden. The willingness to negotiate on this point with the Soviets, who have long since been making proposals to this effect, clearly reflects the U.S. intentions. It was decided in Lisbon to sound out the Moscow representatives, and if the result were positive, concrete progress could be made even at a fairly fast pace. This U.S. position seems to have caught the Europeans by surprise and to have strengthened the concern that an excessive reduction in the American troop contingents may reduce the degree of flexibility and articulation of the Western defence system. Washington argues that the cut will be a limited one and the U.S. force will have sufficient means for a limited conventional defence, with tactical nuclear response capabilities; moreover, the U.S. commitment to come to Europe's defence in the event of a Soviet aggression has not been questioned.

In an abstract line, there remains the hypothesis of a total removal of the American military cover from Europe, as a premise to the development of an autonomous European initiative. The possible hazards of a proposal, which in the opinion of some should lead to the active neutralism of a disarmed Europe, and in that of others to the formation of a European nuclear force, are not to be underestimated.

4. Now that the shock of the events in Czechoslovakia has worn out, the ties between European Communist countries tend to become "normalised"; the characteristic feature in the Soviet effort to make the Eastern area continue to behave towards the external world as a united and homogeneous bloc. The XXIV Congress of the CPSU has reconfirmed the concept of "indivisible Socialism". The use of coercitive instruments, when consensus fails, to maintain unity among Socialist countries, was at least formally accepted also by a majority of the Eastern countries. The drive for the consolidation of the Eastern area is developing at different levels. In the first place there is the military sector, where obvious efforts are being made towards a more flexible integration. Then comes the policy of economic integration which, as it is known, is making very slow progress, with elements of agreement (Poland, GDR, Czechoslovakia), reticence (Bulgaria and Hungary) and opposition (Romania). Finally, there is the political level, the most sensitive in mutual relations, but also that where the Soviets have formally achieved the most satisfactory results.

The conclusions of the Congress of the Czechoslovakian CP have confirmed the adoption of a line of stabilization based on positions of explicit pro-Soviet policy; the leadership appears firmly oriented towards solidarity with Moscow. Finally, the Romanian regime too has been obviously toning down its autonomist tendencies.

The process of stabilization and unification within the Eastern area, for the very reason that it is largely haege~~moniz~~ed by the Soviets, is still viewed with disfavour in various sectors of the Eastern societies. The ruling regimes themselves, even when they have not taken frankly autonomist positions, are inclined to take such tendencies into account. There is a risk, however, of a nationalistic backlash.

5. The existence of the two "camps" has not prevented the development, on the tide of detente, both on a bilateral and on a multilateral level, of a system of major inter-European relations, though a process in which are participating also the neutral countries, such as Austria, Yugoslavia, Sweden and Switzerland. In addition to the considerable expansion in economic-commercial, cultural, tourist and other exchanges, there have been recently some encouraging developments of a strictly political nature: the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw reflect the strides made in such a crucial sector as Central Europe. Certainly, much remains to be done in getting those treaties ratified and solving the problem of equal rights between the two German states. Only through reciprocal concessions, among other things on the Berlin issue, will it be possible to finally settle the German dispute, this being the very condition for security in Europe.

It would not seem that the drive towards integration in the West should hinder a more flexible and extensive progress in the EEC-COMECON relations. The West should not propose to the Eastern countries the adhesion to its structures as the only alternative. On the Eastern side, and above all on the part of the Soviet Union, there should be a more realistic assessment of the EEC, giving up vetoes and injunctions (Moscow has recently insisted again in warning various EFTA countries, including Austria, against entering into forms of cooperation with the EEC).

In this framework, the satisfactory state of Italo-Yugoslav relations constitutes an example of cooperation between countries with different social regimes which is unique in its

kind (the only shadow being cast on the general picture by the fact that a final settlement of the issues relating to borders and the respective minorities has not yet been reached). The Italo-Yugoslav relations are influenced by the respective domestic conditions, the complexity and sensitiveness of which is quite plain for all to see. The uncertainty of Italian politics on the one side, and the stresses between separatism and centralism in Yugoslavia on the other, have indeed created some concern and uncertainty.

6. The problem of European security, viewed as a whole, cannot be properly assessed without referring to the role played by the U.S. and the USSR in determining the fate of our Continent. The two superpowers, in the framework of a strategy of global confrontation, are equally interested in Europe, even though the extent and form of their presence take up different aspects. This position, Soviet and American at the same time, of powers bearing worldwide and regional European responsibilities, has ambivalent implications with respect to Europe's security.

There is one level of direct specific Russian-American relations, as evidenced by SALT and possibly by MBFR, which is superimposed on that of relations among European countries. Therefore, towards the establishment of an effective security system in Europe, there is no avoiding a direct commitment of the two super-powers in the joint management of such a system.

It is only within the overall framework of a situation of world peace and stability that we can really talk of security in Europe; it does not seem possible to reduce the problem to a regional agreement that would cover our Continent alone. It will suffice to consider the ties of economic and even political-military interdependence that we have with vast regions of the world.

7. It is evident that all stress points play a major role in adversely affecting security conditions in Europe, this being particularly true of the case of the Arab-Israel conflict, which places added stresses on a region like the Mediterranean, characterised by a condition of potential instability. On the shores of this sea lie several nations, formerly colonies, with their problem of development and conflicts, as well as some of the Western countries (Greece, Spain and Turkey) ruled by authoritarian regimes. With this is combined the problem of the accesses to the Mediterranean Sea itself, which still has a major importance, above all strategic.

The situation, as regards the conflict in the Middle East, is such as to require external intervention to promote a de-escalation of stresses and an agreement between the belligerents, through an action of mediation and arbitration. This role should be played by the United Nations, but in effect it was assumed by the two super-powers, that are performing an international policing function by increasing their presence in the area, which dates back to several years ago (1947 for the U.S. and 1954 for the USSR). The presence of the U.S. and Soviet naval forces in this region is now playing a dual and contradictory role: on the one hand by considerably increasing the war potential in the region, and on the other by covering but also controlling their allies (Israel and Egypt), this being one form of control of the situation.

Among the European countries affected by the developments in the Mediterranean, a special position is occupied by Italy and Yugoslavia: what had been traditionally a position on the Southern flank of NATO, practically out of the main line of fire and thereby marginal, has now become one of the most exposed in the alliance. Also as regards Yugoslavia, the recent developments have appeared disquieting. In effect, the presence of the Soviet naval forces has increased, albeit only potentially, the hazards of an external pressure by the Eastern countries on the perimeter of Yugoslavia's land and sea boundaries.

8. Bearing in mind the whole of the elements present on the European scene, it is certain that the proposal for a security conference, which has played such a major role in diplomatic relations in recent years, is to be viewed favourably. It should be noted, however, that recently the USSR seems to have toned down its erstwhile enthusiasm, while in the U.S. there has been some stiffening, considering the overall negative judgement of the Soviet policy (see President Nixon's message to the world). The European countries, although with different positions, are still generally rather favourable, and in the East quite favourable, to the proposal in question.

As to the objects of the Conference, which will then have to break down into a series of meetings in successive stages and on different issues, the scope for discussions appears very broad, also in the light of the conclusions of the XXIV Congress of the CPSU. In addition to the basic political-military set of issues, the participating countries - the U.S., the USSR and the European countries - will be led to get into the

broad sector of economic and technical-scientific cooperation, of tourism, of cultural exchanges and of joint conservation efforts.

Even if the Conference resulted straight away in a pact for the renunciation of the use of force, or commitments for the recognition of the present territorial order, these would sound but still limited achievements.

The proposal for the establishment of a Commission for European Security (along the ECE line) to play a permanent role of supervision and mediation on European problems, is to be regarded with caution.

A CENTRAL-EUROPEAN SCENARIOASSUMPTION A

As a result of the successful conclusion of negotiations among the four great powers, a final and general settlement of the Berlin problem is reached, as regards both the status and the accesses to the city. This agreement is reached with the consent of the four great powers and the two Germanies, and therefore involves a number of reciprocal concessions.

The agreement, which is the widest possible, is satisfactory to all parties concerned, thus resulting in a de facto if not de jure normalisation of the status of Berlin.

Consequences and Reactions

Consequences and reactions may occur as regards:

The German Federal Republic - A full agreement on Berlin strengthens the Brandt Government and its Ostpolitik, permitting an early ratification of the treaties signed with Moscow and Warsaw. This new climate does not bring about, at least in an initial stage, the de jure recognition of the German Democratic Republic, but does create the conditions for the normalization of reciprocal relations between the two Germanies. Taking for granted that the Bonn Government will benefit substantially from this arrangement, there are two possible and diverging developments of the Ostpolitik:

- 1 - the re-launching of the Ostpolitik takes place in parallel with Bonn's re-launching of the Europapolitik. In this case the will of common political action is strengthened in Western Europe, whose spearhead to the East could be constituted by the German Federal Republic;
- 2 - the conclusion of the agreement strengthens the German Federal Republic's pretention to play a role of world importance, and this ends up by accentuating in general the autonomous tendencies in the Western countries.

The German Democratic Republic - In the GDR, a full agreement on Berlin strengthens the trend towards a line of moderation and reasonableness. This would in an initial stage take place not within East Germany, but in its international relations, above all with West Germany.

One unknown factor lies in the internal repercussions which may be created by a greater opening to the West. The possibility of moving more freely outside the country will create for the regime a problem of stability and consent. A power crisis might be in the cards.

The Western Bloc - There might be a change in relations with in the Alliance, in the sense of the West Europeans having a greater say, especially if they will form a united political entity. This will depend on many factors, but namely on the European inclinations of the Brandt Government and on the strengthening of the Community's organs. Western Europe can take the opportunity offered by the settlement of the German problem to act as the spokesman for an autonomous proposal of a detente policy.

Another possible alternative is a country-by-country definition of relations with the U.S., accentuating the different nationalistic policies in Western Europe, also in military defence. The reduction of the U.S. military presence being likely, a solution may lie in strengthening, also through an European agreement, the French and British nuclear forces.

Eastern Europe - The relationship between the settlement of the Berlin problem and the relations within the bloc is not direct as in the Western case. The "Brezhnev Doctrine" is compatible with a conciliatory attitude of Moscow toward the West (this is fully confirmed by the recent Congresses of the CPSU, SED and of the Bulgarian and Czechoslovakian Communist Parties).

The following possibilities, however, can be considered:

- 1 - a policy of greater flexibility by East Germany towards the West, conducted in agreement with Moscow, reduces the conservative-spearhead role of the GDR, thus removing one of the elements of cohesion of the bloc, generally self-enclosed towards the exterior;
- 2 - above all with the ratification of the Bonn-Warsaw

treaty, the "iron triangle" formed by the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland would no longer perform any function;

- 3 - nationalistic and revisionist tendencies may grow stronger in the East European countries, as well as the tendencies towards sub-regional cooperative arrangements (Balkan area, Danubian area, etc.)

Relations between the two Blocs - The end of one of the oldest causes of stress between the two blocs causes a series of positive developments in inter-European relations, encourages first of all the calling of European security conferences, facilitates other disarmament programs, helps the recognition of the political and territorial status quo in Europe (East Germany). SALT and MBFR negotiations too should proceed in a more relaxed climate.

At this point it will have to be seen whether these understandings will be sought on a collegial multi-lateral level or individually through bilateral arrangements.

Non-Aligned or Neutral Countries - Non-aligned countries like Yugoslavia would have everything to gain from an agreement in Central Europe. This will facilitate a whole series of exchanges and relations with the Western countries. The problem is whether the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR can change through this kind of agreement.

(In the specific Yugoslav case, moreover, an agreement on Berlin in some way normalizing the German situation, may facilitate the pulling out of the military forces which the Soviets are maintaining in countries like Bulgaria and Hungary pending the settlement of the German problem. This would result for Yugoslavia in a lightening of the Soviet military pressure in the proximity of her borders).

Mediterranean - The connection between a Central European settlement and the Mediterranean is a very indirect one.

Only if a certain detente process incorporating concrete negotiations (SALT and MBFR) is set in motion, the prospect of the removal or withdrawal of fleets operating at a distance from their bases can assume some weight.

On the other hand, the USSR might be interested in European security so that it can better secure a defensive belt in

the Mediterranean (and in the Indian Ocean).

ASSUMPTION B

The Berlin settlement is achieved only in part, for instance on the access problem and not on that of Berlin's international-law status. This has obviously international consequences which are less important than those of a full settlement.

Consequences and Reactions

German Federal Republic - This is a solution which does not fully conform with the wishes of the GFR. It will create difficulties to the pursuit of the Ostpolitik by increasing the reservations already existing in this respect both in West Germany and in the Western countries. This does not mean that the two treaties cannot be ratified. The Brandt Government might lose some of the self-confidence which it is now showing in its Ostpolitik and become more strongly attached to the Western system, and in particular to European integration.

German Democratic Republic - A partial settlement should not cause substantial changes in the present situation. The present regime would not be weakened. Honecker's contention that a sharp separation should be maintained between the two Germanies, denying the existence of common elements even from a national standpoint, would not be refuted by the new situation.

The Western Bloc - The situation is not such as to disturb the developments within the Western system, in its components both political-economic and military. However, the different West German and U.S. reaction to a partial settlement would confirm the American predominance in NATO, as well as a more limited European decision-making space in the Alliance. Neither would the developments of the Community be substantially affected by such a settlement.

The Eastern Bloc - If there are no changes in the Westpolitik of the East German regime, relations within the Bloc too should register no substantial changes.

Relations between the two Blocs - The conditions for better inter-European relations and for the calling of the European security conference would not be substantially changed to better or worse by a partial settlement, even though a resistance by West Germany would have to be expected. The detente process, however, would cover a narrower range of issues than in the case of a full settlement. A partial settlement probably facilitates the relations between the two super-powers (better progress with SALT and MBFR negotiations).

Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries - The impact of a partial Central European settlement on the relations between non-aligned and West European countries is not substantial. In particular, Yugoslavia could hope to gain something from an improvement in East-West relations.

Mediterranean - The considerations made for Assumption A also apply in this assumption.

ASSUMPTION C

The negotiations show that there is no possibility of even a limited settlement on West Berlin. The solution is put off in definitely.

Consequences and Reactions

German Federal Republic - The failure to reach a settlement on Berlin threatens to weaken to a very serious and hard-to-overcome degree the Ostpolitik and the Brandt Government. The latter will find itself unable to obtain ratification of the treaties signed.

If European integration will not be sufficiently advanced to offset the failure of Brandt's political line, West Germany will be more exposed to U.S. pressure. At the same time we will witness, as a result of a major political frustration, a stiffening not only towards the GDR but also vis-a-vis most East European countries.

German Democratic Republic - Should the negotiations fail, there will be definitely a stiffening on positions not so much extremist as of greater intransigence and detachment towards the West. In this case the position advocated by Ulbricht towards Czechoslovakia in 1968 might turn out the winner. The relations with the other Germany would further deteriorate.

The Western Bloc - To an even greater degree than in the case of a settlement of the Berlin issue, the problem will arise of defining relations between Western Europe and the U.S. The presence of the U.S. in Europe would appear indispensable and a certain pressure on the West European countries might result. Much will then depend on whether the European countries will face the difficult international situation not separately but forming a common political front.

The Eastern Bloc - The hard line taken by the East German regime will be matched by a stiffening of Moscow's Westpolitik, above all towards West Germany.

The latter will in part be seen again as Enemy number one, more so if the Brandt Government will collapse as a result of the failure of the Ostpolitik. The anti-German attitude will in part re-emerge, as a factor of ideological cohesion of the Bloc.

Czechoslovakia too might show greater intransigence about the problem of the Munich Treaty. In general, at least in the short term, The Eastern bloc will become more self-enclosed, also due to the likely postponement of the European security conference.

Relations between the two Blocs - The failure of the Berlin negotiations seriously affects the calling of the European security conference. The impasse which this would cause in the whole set of other security initiatives might help strengthen the direct talks between the two super-powers over the Europeans' heads; it is therefore hard to tell whether SALT and the MBFR negotiations would be affected in some way by the deterioration of inter-European relations.

Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries - A climate of tension in Central Europe, combined with a degree of stiffening of the Eastern bloc, would not be good for countries like Yugoslavia. Pressure from the USSR on this front too might grow stronger. The very attitude of non-alignment might be threatened or reinforced by an increase in the tension between the two blocs.

The Mediterranean - In this assumption too the connection between the Central-European situation and the Mediterranean is not a direct one. It can be said, however, that a period of pause in the relations between the big two may delay also in this case the settlement of conflicts.

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10 luglio 1971

Incontro Iai con l'Istituto per la Politica e l'Economia Internazionale di Belgrado.

SCHEMA DI DOCUMENTO DELL'IAI

A venticinque anni dalla fine della seconda guerra mondiale si è creata in Europa una situazione di relativa stabilità, caratterizzata, in complesso, dal consolidamento delle strutture socio-politiche proprie ai diversi paesi. Ormai si concorda nel dare come acquisito il rispetto dello attuale assetto territoriale e dei sistemi capitalista e socialista venutisi a formare, nelle loro varie sfumature, nelle zone occidentale e orientale del continente. L'esistenza di problemi insoluti, eredità dell'ultimo conflitto, non va sottovalutata (statuto di Berlino, posizione della Rdt), ma si tratta di "nodi" risolvibili se considerati nella prospettiva di una tendenza di fondo al superamento dei motivi di contrasto ancora esistenti. Considerata sotto questa angolazione si può dire che l'atmosfera in Europa ha compiuto notevoli progressi negli ultimi dieci, quindici anni, tanto da farne, relativamente, una delle regioni più stabili e tranquille del mondo. Dal 1962 ad oggi non vi sono stati, nonostante tensioni ricorrenti, motivi reali di crisi tali da rimettere in gioco la stabilità europea. La guerra fredda è esperienza del passato e si entra nel periodo della coesistenza pacifica e competitiva.

Oggi ancora l'assetto politico-militare in Europa, basato sull'equilibrio delle forze, è caratterizzato dalla

esistenza dei due blocchi contrapposti occidentale e orientale, sostenuti dalle due superpotenze Usa e Urss. Si tratta di un sistema che lasciando ben poco margine alle improvvisazioni e alle iniziative azzardate (vedi il caso della offensiva sovietica per Berlino) ha garantito la sicurezza favorendo in ultima analisi un clima di distensione. In questo senso esso ha assolto una funzione stabilizzante e positiva che sarebbe demagogico sottovalutare. D'altra parte, proprio perchè basata su una concezione rigida e dicotomica della realtà internazionale, con tutti gli elementi di pericolo impliciti in tale concezione, è destinata ad essere superata. Tendenze evidenti all'interno dei due blocchi a sviluppare iniziative politico-diplomatiche ed economiche su basi di autonomia nazionale sono rivelatrici di una esigenza reale: quella di rompere con il monolitismo dei blocchi e sostituirvi una concezione più flessibile ed articolata dei rapporti di alleanza e dei condizionamenti delle grandi potenze. I paesi europei tendono ad affrancarsi dalla situazione di dipendenza stabilita a Yalta, in modo che le esigenze di influenza delle superpotenze in Europa, vengano a conciliarsi con le aspirazioni dei paesi piccoli e medi. Non sovranità limitata imposta dall'esterno, è stato detto, ma sovranazionalità risultato di una libera scelta.

Questo non vuol dire che si possa concepire un rapido dissolvimento dei blocchi, nemmeno limitatamente alle loro strutture prettamente militari, perchè ciò oltre ad essere irrealistico non darebbe nelle attuali condizioni garanzia di maggior sicurezza. Ritenerne che il superamento dell'attuale sistema attraverso l'abolizione delle alleanze

militari, il ritiro delle truppe e la conclusione di un trat
tato di sicurezza risolverebbe ogni problema sarebbe una pe-
 ricolosa illusione. Ancora per un periodo significativo (di-
 ciamo dieci, quindici anni) il sistema dei blocchi è desti-
 nato a persistere e quello che si può portare avanti è un
 graduale processo di evoluzione verso forme di organizza-
 zione più articolate ed una concezione attiva delle rela-
 zioni internazionali. Va superata, è stato notato, la con-
 cezione propria della guerra fredda per cui le alleanze han-
 no solo la funzione di bloccare le aggressioni a favore di
 un loro intervento più diretto per la soluzione stessa dei
 motivi di conflitto (Brzezinski, in Foreign Affairs, genna-
 io '68).

L'importante è che, parallelamente, si crei un si-
 stema di sicurezza alternativo, evitando sintomi di fluidi-
 tà e di destabilizzazione nella fase intermedia. In sostan-
 za, occorre che il processo di distensione e cooperazione
 venga portato avanti senza rompere bruscamente gli equilibri
 esistenti, mantenendolo sotto il controllo dei responsabili
 politici europei.

Al centro della scena europea, e quindi del problema
 della sicurezza figurano i due blocchi (oltre al gruppo dei
 paesi neutrali e non allineati). Valgano in proposito alcu-
 ne considerazioni.

Blocco occidentale.

Il dato caratteristico è costituito dal processo sem-
 pre più avanzato di cooperazione e integrazione fra i diver-
 si paesi componenti, sotto la spinta di motivazioni econo-

niche e tecnologiche. Ciò è particolarmente evidente per la Comunità europea, la quale è divenuta il polo di riferimento, anche per una serie di nazioni europee al di fuori della sua organizzazione. Questo non avviene senza difficoltà. Nel momento in cui la Cee entra in una fase di iniziative per l'unificazione monetaria ed economica e l'allargamento alla partecipazione di altri paesi, in primo luogo la Gran Bretagna, si manifestano ostacoli e tensioni. La recente crisi monetaria e le difficoltà nel settore agricolo sono sintomatiche di una situazione complessa, come pure il fatto che ad un lungo periodo di stabilità ed espansione durante gli anni '60, sia sottentrata una fase più incerta (vedi rapporto Barre del marzo scorso). Differenze di posizioni persistono fra i paesi membri, e questi stessi oscillano nella loro linea politica. Oggi è soprattutto la Germania federale ad esprimere una propria iniziativa autonoma, alle volte contraddittoria. Fautrice tradizionalmente di un indirizzo sovranazionale in polemica con l'atteggiamento nazionale della Francia, la Germania aveva all'inizio dell'anno favorito una prima esperienza unitaria in campo monetario. E' bastato che la situazione si facesse difficile perchè Bonn, abbandonata l'unione monetaria, rovesciasse tre mesi dopo la sua posizione e decidesse di lasciar fluttuare il marco. Questo non è che un episodio, naturalmente, ma c'è da ritenere che contrasti di interessi fra i vari paesi (soprattutto ora che si profilano nuove adesioni) e all'interno delle singole economie nazionali, non mancheranno nella vita della Comunità. Anche tenendo conto di tali fattori, tuttavia, gli osservatori sono ottimisti circa la vitalità del processo unitario, considerato nelle sue linee di

fondo.

Il consolidamento delle strutture comunitarie pone una serie di problemi ai paesi terzi in rapporto con la comunità stessa. Fra di essi è la Jugoslavia, la quale preme affinché le proprie relazioni economiche commerciali non vengano sacrificate ai più recenti sviluppi. Il realistico atteggiamento di Belgrado nei confronti della Cee, con la quale è stato concluso un accordo lo scorso anno, garantito fra l'altro dalla supervisione di un Comitato congiunto, rappresenta un buon risultato. I problemi nascono dal fatto che permangono limiti istituzionali in sede comunitaria, ad uno sviluppo dei rapporti dal livello commerciale a quello più attuale della cooperazione tecnico-produttiva. Su un piano generale negli ambienti comunitari e italiani si manifesta soddisfazione per l'evoluzione della politica economica jugoslava (riforma del '65, legge sugli investimenti del '67, svalutazione del dinaro) in quanto porta quel paese ad avvicinarsi ulteriormente all'area occidentale. Parallelamente non mancano preoccupazioni per gli effetti destabilizzanti che tali provvedimenti possono avere, e non solo a livello economico, sulla società e lo stato jugoslavo.

Se la Cee è ormai una forza operativa in sede economica, più sfumato deve essere il discorso su quello che essa rappresenta a livello politico. Indubbiamente fin dalla sua fondazione essa si è definita anche come fattore politico e le iniziative per rafforzare tale connotazione, al di là del dibattito fra federalismo, confederalisti e favorevoli al coordinamento, continuano. Tuttavia è da sottolineare quanto gli strumenti politici della Cee restino in-

completi e quanto sporadica ed insufficiente, sotto questo profilo, sia la sua iniziativa internazionale.

Un capitolo a parte riguarda il sistema di difesa dei paesi occidentali, nel quadro dell'Alleanza Atlantica. Benchè si sia rafforzata la tendenza a fare dell'alleanza anche uno strumento di coordinamento politico è chiaro che essa rimane essenzialmente uno strumento militare, del quale l'apporto statunitense costituisce un elemento fondamentale. Il dibattito in corso sui rispettivi livelli di contribuzione allo sforzo difensivo da parte di europei e americani è rivelatore delle difficoltà esistenti.

Da parte americana vi è la tendenza a ridurre la propria presenza militare sul continente per diminuire il carico delle spese relative. La disponibilità a trattare su questo punto con i sovietici i quali da tempo si sono fatti patrocinatori di una tale proposta e rivelatori delle intenzioni statunitensi. Al recente consiglio della Nato si è deciso di sondare i rappresentanti di Mosca per stabilire il valore effettivo delle intenzioni sovietiche; se il risultato dovesse essere positivo si potrebbe procedere sul piano concreto anche abbastanza rapidamente. Questa disponibilità statunitense non ha mancato di creare preoccupazioni in occidente, dove si teme che un'eccessiva riduzione delle truppe americane possa ridurre il grado di flessibilità e articolazione del sistema di difesa occidentale. Secondo Washington, tali preoccupazioni non devono sussistere: primo, perchè la riduzione sarà limitata e quindi il contingente americano avrà mezzi sufficienti ad una difesa convenzionale limitata, con possibilità di risposta nucleare tattica; se-

condo, perchè l'impegno statunitense ad intervenire in difesa dell'Europa in caso di aggressione sovietica non è messo in questione da nessuno (vedi risoluzione Mansfield).

In linea astratta resta aperta l'ipotesi di un totale sganciamento dall'Europa della copertura militare americana come premessa allo svolgimento di un'autonoma iniziativa europea. I rischi possibili di una proposta, che nell'opinione di alcuni dovrebbe sfociare nel neutralismo attivo di un'Europa disarmata e, di altri, nella costituzione di una forza europea atomica non sono da sottovalutare.

Blocco orientale.

Superato il trauma degli avvenimenti cecoslovacchi i legami fra i paesi europei comunisti tendono a normalizzarsi; l'elemento caratteristico è rappresentato dallo sforzo di parte sovietica affinché l'area orientale si confermi nei confronti del mondo esterno, come un blocco unitario ed omogeneo. Al 24esimo congresso del Pcus è stata ribadita la concezione del "socialismo indivisibile" e quindi della legittimità di interventi per impedire l'evoluzione di forme di regime non omogenee a quello sovietico. Il ricorso agli strumenti coercitivi, quando non bastino quelli consensuali, per mantenere l'unità fra i paesi socialisti viene pienamente riconosciuto. Su questo punto i dirigenti sovietici, e formalmente anche la maggioranza dei paesi orientali, sono stati concordi. La spinta al consolidamento dell'area orientale si sviluppa a diversi livelli. Per cominciare vi è il settore militare dove sono evidenti gli sforzi per una

Il fatto che il processo di stabilizzazione e unificazione all'interno del campo orientale proceda senza apparenti tensioni e opposizioni non significa che manchino le difficoltà. Proprio perchè, largamente egemonizzata dai sovietici, esso rimane avversato da una tendenza largamente maggioritaria dei diversi settori delle società orientali. Gli stessi regimi al potere, quando pure non abbiano assunto posizioni francamente autonomistiche, come quello romeno, sono portati a tenere conto di tali tendenze. Il rischio in questa situazione è quello di un riflusso nazionalistico con tutte le conseguenze negative e destabilizzanti che ne seguirebbero.

Rapporti intereuropei.

L'esistenza dei due campi non ha impedito che sull'onda della distensione si sia sviluppato tanto a livello bilaterale che multilaterale un complesso di importanti rapporti intereuropei (al processo partecipano a pieno titolo il gruppo dei paesi neutrali come Austria, Jugoslavia, Svezia e Svizzera). Oltre al notevole incremento degli scambi economico-commerciali, culturali, turistici, ecc. si sono avuti di recente sviluppi incoraggianti di natura propriamente politica. L'avvio alla normalizzazione nelle relazioni fra Germania federale e paesi socialisti, sancito dal trattato di Mosca e poi di Varsavia, sono rivelatori dei passi in avanti compiuti in un settore cruciale come quello del centro Europa. Certo resta ancora molto da fare perchè si arrivi ad una ratifica dei trattati stessi e alla

soluzione del problema di eguali diritti fra i due stati tedeschi. Solo attraverso concessioni reciproche, fra l'altro sulla questione di Berlino, è possibile arrivare ad una conclusione definitiva della controversia tedesca, con condizione stessa della sicurezza in Europa.

Su alcuni aspetti particolari del processo si possono fare le seguenti considerazioni.

- Relazioni Cee-Comecon. Non sembra che la spinta all'integrazione in occidente debba ostacolare un più articolato progresso nei rapporti. A condizione che da parte occidentale, sfruttando il vantaggio di un più organico processo unitario, non si proponga come unica alternativa ai paesi orientali l'adesione alle proprie strutture. E' d'altra parte da lamentare che non si sia ancora arrivati ad una definizione delle relazioni fra la Cee e i paesi orientali in termini chiari ed effettivi. Il fatto che si sia rimandato di tre anni il problema dell'imposizione di rapporti diretti non deve impedire che siano compiuti i primi passi in vista di una cooperazione reciproca. Condizione essenziale di tale sviluppo è che da parte orientale, e soprattutto dell'Unione Sovietica, si opti per un apprezzamento più realistico della Cee rinunciando a veti e chiusure (da parte di Mosca, si è insistito ancora di recente nel diffidare vari paesi dell'Efta, fra cui l'Austria, a stabilire forme di cooperazione con la Cee).

- Rapporti italo-jugoslavi. In questo quadro il positivo andamento di tali rapporti rappresenta un esempio di cooperazione fra paesi a diverso regime sociale unico nel suo genere (solo il fatto che non si sia ancora arrivati ad

una conclusione definitiva delle questioni relative alle frontiere e alle rispettive minoranze getta un'ombra sulla situazione generale. Tuttavia è da ritenere che la graduale presa di coscienza di un problema residuo della seconda guerra mondiale faciliti l'adozione di una soluzione di reciproca soddisfazione). Sui rapporti italo-jugoslavi influisce l'evoluzione delle rispettive situazioni interne, la cui complessità e delicatezza non sfugge a nessuno. Le incertezze della politica italiana da una parte, e le tensioni fra autonomismo e centralismo in Jugoslavia dall'altra, non hanno mancato di creare qualche apprensione e incertezza. Belgrado e Roma, pur nel realistico apprezzamento delle inevitabili spinte e tensioni politico-sociali ed economiche, interne ai due sistemi, dimostrano interesse a che tale processo abbia luogo senza toccare la stabilità dei rispettivi regimi e società.

Rapporti con le superpotenze.

Il problema della sicurezza europea, valutato nel suo complesso, non può essere inteso senza che ci ricolleggi al ruolo che Usa e Urss esercitano nel definire i destini del nostro continente. Le due superpotenze, nel quadro di una strategia di confronto globale, sono ugualmente interessate all'Europa anche se il rilievo e le forme della loro presenza si manifestano in modo diverso. Questa posizione, sovietica e americana allo stesso tempo, di potenze con responsabilità mondiale e regionale europea ha implicazioni ambivalenti sulla sicurezza dell'Europa. L'andamento dei

rapporti in settori di interesse extraeuropeo (Medio oriente e Vietnam) o di pertinenza esclusiva dei supergrandi (armamenti atomici) può, a seconda di uno svolgimento positivo o negativo, influire in un senso o nell'altro sulla situazione europea. Esiste un livello di relazioni dirette specifiche russo-amicane, come dimostrano i colloqui per il Salt e per l'eventuale riduzione bilanciata di truppe, che si sovrappone a quello dei rapporti fra paesi europei. Il che aggiunge complessità alla trattativa generale per la sicurezza in Europa.

In conclusione appare evidente che non si può prescindere, per la instaurazione di un valido sistema di sicurezza in Europa, da un impegno diretto alla gestione del sistema stesso da parte delle due superpotenze. Paradossalmente, è stato notato, la soluzione migliore dovrebbe basarsi su una politica fondata sulla riduzione della presenza armata americana e sovietica sul continente ed allo stesso tempo il mantenimento del loro ruolo di garanti del sistema di sicurezza. In modo che la loro funzione sia di copertura a quella, più direttamente impegnata ed accresciuta nel suo ruolo autonomo, delle potenze europee.

Sicurezza e situazione extraeuropea.

Solo nel quadro complessivo di una situazione di pace e stabilità nel mondo si può parlare effettivamente di sicurezza dell'Europa; non appare possibile ridurre il problema ad un accordo regionale che copra unicamente il nostro continente. Basta pensare ai legami d'interdipendenza

economica e anche politico-militare che ci legano a vaste regioni del mondo.

E' evidente quanto i focolai di tensione (guerra nel Vietnam e nel Medio oriente) pesino nel condizionare negativamente le condizioni della sicurezza in Europa, in parte perchè inaspriscono i contrasti Usa-Urss, in parte perchè rischiano di coinvolgere direttamente i paesi europei. Questo vale soprattutto per il caso del conflitto arabo-israeliano che accentua il livello di tensione in una regione come quella del Mediterraneo, caratterizzata da una potenziale instabilità. Qui infatti si affacciano una serie di nazioni, già colonie, con i problemi relativi allo sviluppo e ai conflitti reciproci oltre ad alcuni dei regimi occidentali (Grecia, Spagna e Turchia) più orientati in senso autoritario. A questo si aggiunga il problema costituito dagli accessi al Mediterraneo stesso la cui importanza soprattutto strategica rimane molto forte.

La situazione, per quanto riguarda il conflitto medio orientale, è tale da richiedere un intervento esterno al fine di favorire una "deescalation" della tensione e un accordo fra le parti belligeranti sotto la spinta di un mediatore e di un arbitro. Questo compito dovrebbe spettare alle Nazioni Unite, le quali, tuttavia, non hanno né la volontà politica, né le forze per sviluppare tale compito. In effetti esso è stato assunto dalle due superpotenze, le quali svolgono una funzione di polizia internazionale, rafforzando un ruolo di presenza nella regione iniziato già da diversi anni (Usa dal 1947 e Urss dal 1954). La presenza di forze navali statunitensi e sovietiche nella regio-

ne ha oggi una funzione contraddittoria: per un verso, aumentando notevolmente il livello del potenziale bellico nella zona e l'impegno delle due superpotenze ha implicazioni obiettivamente pericolose, per un altro operando di copertura ma anche di controllo dei rispettivi alleati (Israele ed Egitto) è garanzia di controllo della situazione. Dopo gli avvenimenti del '67 a fasi di calma sono sottentrati in successione alterna momenti di tensione rendendo la situazione notevolmente instabile. Avvenimenti come l'avvento di Sadat in Egitto e la guerra civile in Giordania dovrebbero rafforzare le possibilità di pace. Sul fronte internazionale, intanto, si ha l'impressione che i sovietici non abbiano intenzione di forzare la situazione coscienti della inevitabile reazione americana. Oggi, sembra si possa dire, le due superpotenze operano nel complesso in funzione mediatrice.

Fra i paesi europei interessati agli sviluppi mediterranei, una posizione particolare viene ad essere occupata da Italia e Jugoslavia situati in una zona che fa direttamente da cerniera fra Mediterraneo occidentale ed orientale. Per l'Italia, in particolare, l'evoluzione degli ultimi anni è stata alquanto significativa. Quella che era stata tradizionalmente una posizione sul fianco meridionale della Nato praticamente defilata e, per questo marginale, è divenuta una delle più esposte dell'alleanza. Il focolaio di tensione arabo-israeliano e la presenza politico-militare sovietica hanno fatto proprio del fianco sud della Nato uno dei più cruciali e delicati dell'alleanza. Anche per quanto riguarda la Jugoslavia l'evoluzione degli

ultimi tempi è apparsa preoccupante. La presenza delle forze navali sovietiche ha infatti accentuato, se pure solo potenzialmente, i rischi di una pressione esterna da parte dei paesi orientali sul perimetro delle sue frontiere terrestri e marittime.

Riguardo all'atteggiamento italiano e jugoslavo sul merito del conflitto che oppone Israele ai paesi arabi, vanno fatte alcune considerazioni. Gli jugoslavi, anche come conseguenza dei rapporti personali intrattenuti fra Tito e Nasser, appoggiano una serie di rivendicazioni arabe; gli italiani, al contrario, data la tradizionale posizione filo-israeliana del governo e di un settore importante della opinione pubblica favoriscono le tesi contrarie. Sembra, però, manifestarsi da qualche tempo un processo di rimeditazione delle rispettive posizioni che, fondandosi sul presupposto che bisogna garantire sicurezza e stabilità per tutti gli stati del Medio oriente, riduce il margine delle differenze stesse. Infine resta aperto, oltre il merito del conflitto stesso, la questione della presenza di forze navali delle superpotenze nel bacino mediterraneo. Su questo punto occorre tenere aperta la discussione, anche con gli altri paesi rivieraschi, per puntare, sia pure in prospettiva, ad un accordo che riduca ed eventualmente abolisca la presenza sovietica e statunitense nel bacino stesso.

Conferenza europea.

Avendo presente l'insieme degli elementi presenti sulla scena europea è certo che la proposta per una conferenza sulla sicurezza, che tanta parte ha avuto nelle relazioni diplomatiche degli ultimi anni, deve essere considerata positivamente, e ciò indipendentemente dalla molteplicità dei problemi relativi ai tempi, ai contenuti e alle prospettive medie e lunghe. Vanno rifiutati gli atteggiamenti negativi che vedono nelle proposte di incontro solo delle mosse tattiche o tendono, ponendo una serie di pregiudiziali, alla convocazione stessa, a dilazionarla. Anche il consiglio della Nato, nella sua ultima riunione, ha ribadito la disponibilità degli occidentali all'incontro, ponendo come unica condizione il raggiungimento di una soluzione soddisfacente per Berlino occidentale.

Va però notato come, negli ultimi tempi, si sia venuta a determinare una situazione non particolarmente favorevole alla realizzazione della conferenza. L'Urss dà l'impressione di avere attenuato l'entusiasmo di un tempo, anche perchè non sembra volersi spingere oltre limiti piuttosto ristretti, nel creare premesse ritenute in alcuni settori occidentali come indispensabili. Di contro, negli Stati Uniti, vi è stato un certo irrigidimento considerata la valutazione complessivamente negativa data dalla politica sovietica (vedi messaggio al mondo di Nixon). I paesi europei pur con diversità di posizioni restano nel complesso piuttosto favorevoli, e in alcuni casi decisamente favorevoli, all'iniziativa stessa.

Circa i contenuti della conferenza stessa, che dovrà

poi risolversi in una serie di incontri per fasi successive e temi disparati, il discorso pare molto ampio anche alla luce delle conclusioni del 24° congresso del Pcus. Oltrechè della fondamentale tematica politico-militare i partecipanti, che sono poi Usa, Urss e paesi europei, saranno portati a toccare l'ampio settore della cooperazione economica e tecnico-scientifica, del turismo, degli scambi culturali e dei progetti comuni per la difesa dell'ambiente. Interessante la proposta per la creazione di una Commissione per la sicurezza in Europa (secondo la linea dell'Ece) che svolga una funzione permanente di supervisione e mediazione sui problemi europei.

Quanto al significato effettivo di una conferenza sulla sicurezza europea occorre fare qualche osservazione cautelativa. Per cominciare, va ribadito che con la convocazione della riunione stessa ha inizio solo la prima fase di un processo di ricerca della sicurezza, i cui risultati potranno essere valutati dagli accordi specifici presi in seguito. In secondo luogo, c'è da notare, che anche ove si arrivasse subito ad un patto per la rinuncia all'uso della forza o a impegni per il riconoscimento dell'attuale assetto territoriale si tratterebbe di risultati validi, ma di rilievo pur sempre contenuto. Il peso reale di documenti declinatori per se stessi che non si collocano in un sistema di garanzie e di controlli effettivi è molto limitato, come dimostrano i precedenti storici. Essi hanno valore soprattutto in quanto, creando un'atmosfera più distesa, favoriscono una definizione realistica dei problemi ed eventualmente l'avvio di trattative e di accordi fra le

parti interessate.

Belgrado e Roma, pur nel realistico apprezzamento delle difficoltà esistenti, sono favorevoli alla rapida con vocazione di una conferenza, come premessa e condizione alla creazione di un sistema di sicurezza in Europa. Da par te italiana, anche se sono mancate le iniziative clamorose, si è cercata una collaborazione nell'ala marciante dello schieramento occidentale per quanto riguarda le prospetti- ve di un incontro est-ovest.

Quanto agli jugoslavi è stata notata l'insistenza, in occasione delle visite a Roma e Parigi di Tito e Ribicic, a richiedere un superamento degli indugi e l'avvio alla pre parazione della conferenza. Il fatto che la questione tede sca sia oggetto di negoziati e di accordi viene giudicato di buon auspicio dai due governi in vista di una sistema- zione nel centro Europa, e quindi di un più largo accordo paneuropeo. Tuttavia non si nascondono gli ostacoli esisten ti al conseguimento di un accordo definitivo tedesco e eu- ropeo e la necessità di guardare in prospettiva a soluzio- ni d'insieme che stabiliscano su nuove basi la sicurezza in Europa.

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