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CATHOLICISM AND NATIONALISM IN
LATIN AMERICA

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Historians have long speculated on the relationship between religion and the elusive concept of nationalism, but social scientists have only recently begun to construct more precise measures for their interaction.¹ Evaluating the connection between nationalism and religion has been an intriguing intellectual exercise, and now, as each of these forces significantly affects contemporary processes of social development, their relationship also involves a major area of empirical theory. By studying the links between these forces, we can learn more about their nature and strength, their impact on social development, and the contrasting patterns of effects which varied forms of religion and nationalism can have in different countries and cultures.

In the context of Latin America, the tradition of Catholicism and present manifestations of nationalism suggest a need to study their interrelationships. We have long assumed that the religious and cultural norms of Catholicism undergird Latin America nationalism, but does statistical evidence bear out this assumption? Is nationalism strongest in countries where Catholicism is also strongest? How aware contemporary churchmen of the force of nationalism, and for what ends do they try to exploit it? To reach meaningful answers to these and other questions, it is particularly important to try to measure rather than merely to speculate about the interaction of nationalism and religion.

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¹ The literature on nationalism is well covered in Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, *Nationalism and National Development: An Interdisciplinary Bibliography* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1970). On nationalism and religion in Latin America, see especially Alberto Ezcurra Medrano, *Catholicismo y nacionalismo* (2nd ed., Buenos Aires: Adsum, 1939); John J. Kennedy, *Catholicism, Nationalism, and Democracy in Argentina* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958); Arthur P. Whitaker and David C. Jordan, *Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America* (New York: The Free Press, 1966); Frank Bonilla and José A. Silva Michelena (eds), *A Strategy for Research on Social Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967); and Ivan Vallier, "Religious Elites: Differentiations and Developments in Roman Catholicism," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds), *Elites in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

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I. NATIONALISM AND CATHOLICISM : A POSITIVE CORRELATION

When using the best estimates of Latin American nationalism and Catholicism available at this time, a striking statistical correlation appears between them. A strong, positive relationship exists between K.H. Silvert's typology of nationalism and the strength of Catholic structures as measured by the number of inhabitants per priest in the Latin American countries. The finding that nationalism is consistently strong where Catholicism is strong supports the traditional interpretation of Catholicism as one of the basic elements in Latin American nationalism, and ⁱⁿ doing so it raises a number of other questions. Besides indicating contrasting correlations for different countries, and a resulting need to assess the historical connection between nationalism and Catholicism in this light, quantitative evaluation of the connection points to the possibility of further refining our measures by gathering new types of data.

One of the simplest and most objective measures for nationalism would be a scale developed through several responses in a questionnaire which also probed for other variables with which to compare the nationalism scale.² Such survey research could simultaneously test the relationship of nationalism to class background, occupation, and income as well as to religious values, and comparable surveys in other countries could indicate differences among groups and regions. The high costs of such research now prohibit its coordinated realization in each Latin American country, but this ^{is no} reason that researchers can not begin to devise and apply nationalism questionnaires in particular countries and among selected social groups. The approach of attitude surveys is one which social scientists interested in nationalism should and probably will take in the future.

² Although past surveys on nationalism measure only aspects of it, future studies can expand or adapt material from such work as Christiansen's national patriotism scale and Levinson's internationalism scale. On research in this area, see John P. Robinson, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Kendra B. Head, Measures of Political Attitudes (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Survey Research Center, 1968 pp. 306-308, 321-325, 351-352, and 377-382.

In the absence of comparable survey research on Latin American nationalism, the best estimates of nationalism with which we can work at the present time are those of Professor Silvert. In 1963, on the basis of years of study in Latin America and extensive work on Latin American nationalism and politics, Silvert compiled the typology which appears in the first column of Table 1. The Arabic numerals here represent the rank order of countries in terms of nationalism, with the Roman numerals in parentheses indicating the section of the typology to which a country belongs. Nationalism is thus assumed to be considerably stronger in Uruguay and Argentina than in Haiti or Nicaragua, and the five countries where nationalism is strongest (indicated by Roman numeral I) are Uruguay, Argentina, Cuba, Costa Rica, and Chile. In constructing this typology, Silvert considered what he described as the criteria of "ethnic integration of the population, political history as it may indicate cohesiveness or disorganization, complexity of the city and the occupational range of the economic apparatus, degree of autonomy or dependency of the countryside and political power of the peasantry, if any, mobility factors, and so on" (3)

The most obvious problem with this typology is its essential subjectivity. Silvert admits that his rank-ordering is open to much wrangling and, in order to draw correlations between the rank order and other kinds of quantitative data, we must assume that the rankings of nationalism are on an ordinal rather than an interval scale. This is less satisfying than the kind of scale which could be constructed from survey research findings in the different Latin America countries, where the interval between countries would alternatively appear to be more or less than one unit. On the other hand, Silvert's typology represents the careful estimates of one of the most respected men in the field, and it provides a widely accepted scale for judging the "quantitative" as opposed

- (3) K.H. Silvert, "Political Change in Latin America," in Herbert L. Matthews (ed.), The United States and Latin America (2d ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 67. In an earlier version of the typology, originally presented in 1959, Silvert placed two of the countries in different positions. As an apparent result of the overthrows of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Silvert moved Cuba up six places from its original ninth position below Venezuela, and he moved

Table 1 : Nationalist and Religious Variables

	Nationalism ^a	Number of Priests ^b	Inhabitants ^c per Priest	Population 1967
Uruguay	1 (1)	690	4,033	2,783,000
Argentina	2 (1)	5,499	4,188	23,031,000
(Cuba) ^d	(2a (1))	(220)	(36,514)	(8,033,000)
Costa Rica	3 (1)	373	4,273	1,594,000
Chile	4 (1)	2,470	3,617	8,935,000
Mexico	5 (II)	7,917	5,769	45,671,000
Colombia	6 (II)	4,701	4,082	19,191,000
Brazil	7 (II)	11,750	7,290	85,655,000
Venezuela	8 (II)	1,920	4,871	9,352,000
Dominican Republic	9 (II)	443	8,779	3,889,000
Peru	10 (III)	2,316	5,348	12,385,000
Bolivia	11 (III)	789	4,817	3,801,000
Guatemala	12 (III)	498	9,472	4,717,000
Ecuador	13 (III)	1,572	3,504	5,508,000
El Salvador	14 (III)	372	8,470	3,151,000
Panama	15 (III)	238	5,584	1,329,000
Honduras	16 (IV)	201	12,164	2,445,000
Paraguay	17 (IV)	459	4,708	2,161,000
Nicaragua	18 (IV)	285	6,256	1,783,000
Haiti	19 (IV)	403	11,367	4,581,000

^a Source : K.H.Silvert, "Political Change in Latin America," (2nd ed,1965), p.67.

^b Source : Felician A.Foy, ed., 1969 Catholic Almanac (Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony's Guild, 1969), pp. 435-466.

^c Figured on 1967 population estimates from C.Paul Roberts, ed., Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 1967 (11th ed, Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles, December, 1968), pp. 57, 126.

^d Cuban data are included in this table but not in the scattergrams which follow, because conflict between the Church and the socialist government of Fidel Castro has led to the mass exodus of priests and a highly inflated figure of 36,514 inhabitants per priest. This figure depends upon Castro's expulsion of religious personnel rather than upon any other factor, so that it would be misleading to compare the atypical Cuban data with those from the other Latin American countries.

to the "qualitative" aspects of nationalism⁴. Most importantly for the present discussion, Silvert did not build religious variables into his typology, so that any correlation which exists between the religious factor and his findings remains independent and significant in its own right.

In order to judge whether this correlation exists, we need an effective measure which compares the strength of Catholicism in the different Latin American countries. One readily available measure is the percentage of citizens in each country listed as Catholics in the national census, but this measure is notoriously weak in its failure to reflect anything more than nominal allegiance to the Church. Since most Latin Americans list themselves as Catholic, the measure has the further disadvantage of implying insignificantly small differences among countries.

A second indicator is the percentage of citizens which attend mass at least once a week, but, despite some information on this indicator for particular areas, we lack the full information required to make the data useful for comparisons among all Latin American countries. A third ratio is the number of inhabitants per priest. This measure identifies the strength of Catholic structures in each country, so relating to the pervasiveness of Catholic norms in an indirect manner.

It has the advantage of allowing comparisons between nationalism and the institutional strength of the Church, and the ready availability of information on the past number of priest and the total population in each country permits time series as well as contemporary comparisons.

the Dominican Republic up nine places from its original nineteenth position below Nicaragua. See K.H. Silvert, "Political Change in Latin America," in the United States and Latin America (New York: The American Assembly, 1959) p. 66; and K.H. Silvert, "Nationalism in Latin America," the Annals, 334 (March, 1961), 5.

As indicated in the scattergrams in Figure 1 and 2, a positive correlation exists between the strength of nationalism and the strength of Catholicism. The correlation coefficient (r) between them is .554, while the F test shows statistical significance at the .05 level which approaches but does not reach significance at the .01 level.⁵

Furthermore, comparison of Figures 1 and 2 indicates that nationalism is the dependent variable, that the strength of Catholic structures has a much stronger influence on nationalism than nationalism has upon the strength of Church structures.⁶ With unstandardized observations, the slope of the regression line in Figure 1, where nationalism is the dependent variable, is much greater than the slope of the regression line in Figure 2, where ^{the} number of inhabitants per priest is the dependent variable. The units of measure influence these slopes, but the rough comparability of the units in this case⁷ means that they account only for part of the significant difference between the slope of 1.188 in Figure 1 and the slope of .259 in Figure 2.

The quantitative indicators therefore support, at a high level of statistical significance, the traditional assumption that Catholicism forms one of the important components of Latin American nationalism.

⁴ Nationalism varies "quantitatively" in relation to the proportion of a country's citizens whose actions are affected by its norms, while "quantitatively" in relation to degree of consensus in nationalist attitudes which characteristics of nationalism, see Frederick C. Turner, *The Dynamic of Mexican Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1968) chapl.

⁵ Here $F = 7.542$. With 19 observations, it must reach 4.38 for significance at the .05 level and 8.18 for significance at the .01 level.

⁶ This regression analysis does not, of course, prove causation. It is probable that some of the reason for the high correlation between these two variable results from their common dependence upon other environmental factors.

⁷ In order to provide this comparability, the strength of Catholic structures is measured in units of one thousand inhabitants per priest.

FIGURE 1: NATIONALISM AND STRENGTH OF CATHOLIC STRUCTURES
(NATIONALISM AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE)





FIGURE 2: NATIONALISM AND STRENGTH OF CATHOLIC STRUCTURES
(NATIONALISM AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE)



Given the ordinal scale used to estimate nationalism and its lack of subjective relation to Catholicism, the high correlation between the two indicators and its significance at the .05 level provide major corroboration of the interlocking of nationalism and Catholicism. Where nationalism is strong, the Catholic Church is strong. Since $r^2 = .307$, and since nationalism is best interpreted as the dependent variable the strength of Catholicism appears to account for about 30 per cent of the variation in nationalism. Since many factors influence nationalism and have varied relationships to the forces which impede its growth⁸, one would not, intuitively, expect the religious factor to account for any more than 30 per cent of the variance in nationalism. In combination with the high statistical significance, this appropriate degree of explained variation makes Silvert's estimates of nationalism appear to be most apt, and emphasizes once again the need for complementary measures of nationalism through survey research.

II. Catholic Responses to Nationalism

Catholic clergymen have reacted to the force of Latin American nationalism in at least three ways : through the acceptance of opposing political strategies by different Church factions, through a growing rejection of all political strategies and a concentration upon religious activities by other churchmen, and through contrasting assignment patterns of foreign religious personnel. While all political movements can find at least a few clerical supporters, many Latin American clerics have become so wary of political activities as to reject the political alliances which can bring defeat and ostracism as well as victory. Comparison of the proportions of native priests in each Latin American country with the nationalism rank order and the ratio of inhabitants per priest reveals that the assignment of priests among countries may depend more on the visibility and apparent importance of a country than upon its nationalist receptivity or its relative need for personnel.

⁸ On the forces which have impeded the rise of cohesive and pacific nationalism in Latin America, see the succinct summary in Renato Poblete and J.L Segundo, "La variable politica," in *Tipologia socioeconomica de los paises latinoamericanos*, a special number of the *Revista Interamericana de Ciencias Sociales*, 2, (1963), 254-258.

Those responses to nationalism over which the Church hierarchy has some direct control, therefore, like those over which it does not, form a highly adaptable pattern which assures the Church at least some support in very different situations.

Before seeing in more detail how churchmen have reacted to nationalism, however, it is useful to ask first how they have conceptualized it. The literature on Latin American Catholicism contains disagreements, which interviews and survey research can help to resolve, concerning the ways in which Catholic leaders perceive the contemporary force of nationalism.

Primarily on the basis of experience in Brazil, Thomas G. Sanders has suggested ^{that} clerical perceptions remain narrowly limited in this regard. In his view, many bishops fail to appreciate the role of cohesive nationalism in justifying the self-sacrifice required for development, just as they fail ^{to} appreciate the need for harsh government initiative to increase investment or the need in some cases for violence and group conflict to alter social structures. They allegedly interpret nationalism as being particularistic, just as they interpret government pressure as coercive and violence as disruptive.⁹

On the other hand, popular media often assume that the Catholic clergy now acts increasingly from nationalist motivations.¹⁰ Catholic sociologists claim that Latin Americans look to national traditions rather than to the worldwide Church for a definition of Catholicism, so that priests become representatives of both religion and the national culture.¹¹

⁹ "CELAM", a letter by Thomas G. Sanders to Richard H. Nolte, in the series issued by the Institute of Current World Affairs, July 17, 1967, p. 12.

¹⁰ Even U.S. News World Report, after expressing its perennial concern for United States business interest in Latin America, has warned that "some of the strongest expressions of nationalism in Colombia, and in other Latin-American nations, come from angry young priests and bishops of the Roman Catholic Church." In Latin America: Growing Threats to U.S. Companies, "U.S. News World Report (July 14, 1969), 68.

¹¹ Emile Pin, Elementos para una sociologia del catolicismo latinoamericano (Bogota : FERES, 1963), p. 33.

Such interpretations gain support from field research findings that, when in some Latin American countries a man does not at least profess Catholicism, his fellow citizens consider him "marginal" in terms of the national community as well as in terms of religion.¹²

In response to unstructured questions on nationalism, most priests interviewed during 1968 replied that they felt nationalist sympathies although their loyalty to the Church came first.¹³ Father Manuel Aguirre Elorriaga, the Basque Jesuit who founded the Catholic youth movement out of which the Christian Democratic party arose in Venezuela, even suggested that priests are sometimes more patriotic than other citizens because they have no families which could compete with the nation-state for their loyalties.¹⁴ When asked what made up such patriotism,¹⁵ the influential Cardinal-Archbishop of Santiago, Chile,¹⁶ typically replied that priests are "patriots in the sense that they love their country and feel deeply for the problems which face it." This patriotism detracts in no way from their sentiments of Latin American cultural unity or their frequent desire to see economic integration in the area.¹⁷ The interviews also showed that Latin American prelates are generally unfamiliar with the social science literature on nationalism.

¹² Benjamin Edward Haddox, *Sociedad y religion en Colombia* (estudio de las instituciones religiosas colombianas), Jorge Zalamea, trans. (Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1965), pp. 132-133. This volume is the translation of a Ph.D. dissertation in sociology at the University of Florida, for which Haddox did much of the research in Colombia.

¹³ Based on interviews with 83 Latin American priests carried out between June and September, 1968. Although these preliminary interviews were largely unstructured, questions dealing with nationalism arose in nearly all of them. The majority of the interviews took place in Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Colombia, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic.

¹⁴ Interviews with Manuel Aguirre, who long continued to have major influence on Rafael Caldera and other Christian Democratic leaders, himself became a Venezuelan citizen some twenty-five years before Caldera's presidential victory in 1968.

¹⁵ Several priests reacted negatively to the *nacionalismo*, and preferred to substitute the word *patriotismo* for it. "Nationalism" here conjured up images of chauvinism and aggressive foreign policies, especially among Argentine priests, while "patriotism" connoted a sense of national fraternity which all citizens should feel.

Despite this unfamiliarity, however, the pragmatic manner in which the prelates have used the force of nationalism indicates that, even without conceptualizing it in detail, they react to its contemporary force. From the Christian Democratic President of Chile¹⁸ to the Auxiliary Bishop of Havana whom Fidel Castro exiled from Cuba,¹⁹ the books, pamphlets, and pastoral messages of Catholic spokesmen use the touchstone of nationalism. Long lists of such usages would serve little purpose, since there is no sufficiently extensive compilation of them to permit meaningful content analysis. But a few examples can illustrate their diversity. Groups of Peruvian, Venezuelan, and Chilean bishops have used overtly nationalistic appeals to support expanded technical education,²⁰ civil peace,²¹ and popularly responsive governmental structures.²²

./ Msgr. Carlos Parteli, the Apostolic Administrator of Montevideo, made the clearest distinction between the two sentiments. For him, "nationalism" was what characterized militantly aggressive parties in Argentina, whereas he and his fellow Uruguayans felt a "patriotism" which encompassed loyalty to Uruguay, affection for heroes like Artigas, but also an inseparable commitment to integration and development for Latin America as a whole. Interview with Msgr. Carlos Parteli, in Montevideo, Uruguay, July 9, 1968.

¹⁶ For an excellent discussion of Cardinal Silva Henriquez' position in the Chilean hierarchy and the way in which other Chilean bishops view him, see "The Chilean Episcopate," a letter by Thomas G. Sanders to Richard H. Nolte, in the series issued by the Institute of Current World Affairs, July 6, 1968.

¹⁷ Interview with Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez, in Santiago, Chile, August 6, 1968.

¹⁸ Eduardo Frei has long tied his program directly to Chilean nationalism. A decade before becoming President of Chile, he typically wrote that the perfecting of democracy in social and political terms was the only way to respond positively to Chile's "most authentic sense of her existence as a nationality." Eduardo Frei Montalva, La verdad tiene su hora (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, 1955) p. 82.

¹⁹ In revolucion cristiana en Latinoamérica (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico 1963), p. 33. Eduardo Boza Masvidal, the Auxiliary Bishop of Havana, wrote that "every Christian, because of being a Christian, has the sacred duty to love his fatherland, to work for its welfare and to defend it, if necessary at the cost of his life."

²⁰ "Peruvian Bishops' Pastoral letter on Politics and Social Reform," in Recent Church Documents from Latin America, CIE Monographs, no. 2 (Cuernavaca, Mor.: Tipografica Indigena, 1963, p. 45.)

²¹ Carta pastoral colectiva del episcopado venezolano. Estadísticas de educación gratuita (n.p.: Publicaciones del Secretariado Permanente del Episcopado Venezolano, n.d.), p. 9.

Catholic writers urge mutual reinforcement among the altruistic tendencies of Catholicism, nationalism, and internationalism,²³ while bishops use patriotic analogies to oppose abortion.²⁴ Although some churchmen worry innovations like the vernacular mass will make the Church accommodate itself too much to the force of secular nationalism,²⁵ others issue whole booklets emphasizing the conjunction of nationalism and religion.²⁶

One of the most frequent uses for these appeals of clerical nationalism is in support of particular political norms. A diversity of political leanings within the Church coincides with similar diversity among other citizens,²⁷ so that, when secular movements classify themselves as "nationalist" so as to gain patriotic support, they can each find allies in the clergy who declare that the mantle of nationalism legitimately falls upon them.

²² Raul Silva Henriquez, and others, Los obispos de Chile hablan: El deber social y politico en la hora presente (Santiago : Editorial Universidad Catolica, 1962), p. 20

²³ Pedro Velazquez H., Dimension social de la caridad (Mexico: Secretariado Social Mexicano, 1962), pp. 171-175.

²⁴ In III carta pastoral sobre la inmoralidad del aborto, April 2, 1961 p. 3, Manuel Talamas Camandari, the Bishop of Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, claimed that, just as a soldier should not betray his fatherland to save his own life, so a pregnant woman should accept her own death rather than submit to an abortion.

²⁵ Alfonso Zaplana Bellizza, Exhortacion pastoral con motivo de las nuevas normas conciliares de la Iglesia, November 20, 1967. Msgr Zaplana Bellizza is the Bishop of Tacna, Peru.

²⁶ Comité Permanente de los Obispos de Chile, Chile, voluntad de ser: la comunidad nacional y la Iglesia Catolica en Chile (Santiago: Ediciones Paulinas 1968). Declaring that " Chileans" difficult and pressing duty today is to form a truly united national community," this booklet specified such contrasting goals for the community as the redistribution of power, rejection of violence in both domestic and foreign affairs, an end to emigration by professionals, and the reversal of historic tendencies toward "legalistic immobility" and asphyxiating formalism." See especially sections 10, 32, 36, 41 and 44

²⁷ That similar diversity exists in both groups does not, of course, imply that particular political movements draw support from the clergy in proportions which are comparable to their support from the general population. Despite such studies as Joseph H. Fichter's Cambio social en Chile : Un estudio de actitudes (Santiago: Editorial Universidad Catolica, 1962), we still lack the survey research on which more precise judgements on such issues can be based.

On the right, the Archbishop of Guatemala thus denounced Communists "in the name of Guatemala,"²⁸ while Brazilian prelates have alleged that, if their country entered a war with Russia, Brazilian Communists would side with the Russian enemy against their fatherland.²⁹ On the left, Father Camilo Torres, the Colombian priest whom a military patrol killed in 1966 after he had joined a band of guerrillas, similarly appealed to nationalist impulses in his calls for revolution.³⁰

Nearer the center of the political spectrum, Christian Democrats have practical reasons for showing their parties to be "national" rather than "international" in orientation. Although the formal ideology of Christian Democracy calls for solidarity among the Latin American republics at the expense of divisive nationalism, Christian Democratic parties in Argentina, Panama, and the Dominican Republic have followed intensely nationalistic policies.³¹ Besides the need to win votes by eschewing the appearance of an international movement or of clerical direction, Christian Democrats must avoid the prohibitions against "international parties" which, especially in El Salvador, have been applied to them as well as to Communist parties.³²

²⁸ Mariano Rossell Arellano, Carta pastoral sobre la paz, fruto de la justicia y del amor, July 2, 1954 (Guatemala: Tip. Sanchez & de Guise, 1954) p.4.

²⁹ Geraldo de Proença Sigaud, Carta Pastoral sobre a Seita Comunista, seus Erros, su Acao Revolucionaria e os Deveres dos Catolicos na Hora Presente (Sao Paulo: Editora Vera Cruz, 1962), p.22 Msgr Proença is the Archbishop of Diamantina.

³⁰ In a message which appeared first in the September 9, 1965, issue of Frente Unido, and is republished in Por el Padre Camilo Torres Restrepo (1956-1966) (Cuernavaca, Mor: Centro Intercultural de Documentacion, 1967), Camilo Torres wrote, for example, that "the Colombian Fatherland consists mainly of its men and the majority of them suffer and enjoy no power," and that the Colombian military must "not believe that the Fatherland was formed for the sake of the 24 families whom they now protect, for whom they give their blood and from whom they receive such poor remuneration."

³¹ Edward J. Williams, Latin American Christian Democratic Parties (Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press, 1967), p.262.

³² Interview with a Christian Democratic leader in 1968. At the request of the respondent, the details of the interview are withheld.

As their political rivals attempt to make them seem nonnational or to apply the restrictions against "international parties" to them, the Christian Democrats have good reason to make nationalist pronouncements in order to oppose such attacks.

The Church gains an even wider basis of appeal through religious personnel who, unlike those who relate nationalism to the support of diverse political movements, use it to reject all political factions in favor of strictly spiritual activities. When asked about the proper role of the Church in Latin America, many bishops emphasize that it should concern itself primarily with spiritual matters rather than mix in problems of politics and social change.³³ Supporting specific policies of reform is dangerous for churchmen, because, to the degree that the churchmen become specific, they alienate those whom such proposals hurt. As a result, some Church spokesman voice proposals for reform in such broadly "nationalistic" terms that everyone would seem to benefit and no one would seem to be hurt, while other clergymen support those patriotic norms of Latin American liberalism which restrict clerical activity to a narrowly religious sphere. The apolitical emphasis allows considerable flexibility in the institutional response of the Church, and it helps to remove the Church from political conflicts in which it might unfortunately back the losing side.

Another way to gauge the institutional response of the Church to the force nationalism is to look at the assignment patterns of foreign religious personnel. Table 2 indicates the percentages of diocesan priests in different Latin American countries who were originally natives of each country, and compares these percentages with the nationalism rank order and the ratio of inhabitants per priest. In a classic study of Church-State relations, J. Lloyd Mecham points to the fact that, as interviews with religious personnel often confirm, the heavy reliance on foreign priests in some Latin American countries arouses nationalistic suspicions and resentments.³⁴

³³ Bishop Santos Ascarza of Valdivia, Chile, even suggested that the restriction of Church personnel to strictly spiritual functions means that priest-sociologists should leave to laymen the formal study of issues which underlie programs in social development. Interview with José Manuel Santos Ascarza, in Valdivia, August 2, 1968

TABLE 2 : The Native Clergy

	% of native Diocesan Priests ^a	Inhabitants per Priest ^b	Nationalism ^c Rank Order
Colombia	94.7	4,082	6
El Salvador	90.9	8,470	14
Peru	90.6	5,348	10
Ecuador	85.5	3,504	13
Paraguay	84.7	4,708	17
Brazil	83.2	7,290	7
Costa Rica	79.3	4,273	3
Uruguay	76.8	4,033	1
Bolivia	76.3	4,817	11
Nicaragua	73.7	6,256	18
Chile	71.5	3,617	4
Argentina	70.7	4,188	2
Honduras	69.1	12,164	16
Dominican Republic	65.7	8,779	9
Guatemala	63.5	9,472	12
Venezuela	53.5	4,871	8
Panama	47.6	5,584	15
Haïti	30.2	11,367	19

^a Source: Yvan Labelle and Adriana Estrada, comps., Latin America in Maps, Charts, Tables. No.2 :Socio-Religious Data (Catholicism) (Cuernavaca,Mor.:Center of Intercultural Formation,1964),p. 126.Neither Mexican nor Cuban data on the percentages of native priests in these countries appear above, because the political sensitivity of this data makes it generally unavailable.

^b Source: Table 1, above.

But, as Table 2 indicates, these resentments are not strong enough to create any regular relationship between the nationalism rank order and the percentages of native priests. The Church assigns a high proportion of foreign priests both to countries where nationalist loyalties appear to be pervasive and to countries where they appear to be less so.

Futhermore, there is no regular relationship between the percentages of native priests and the ratios of inhabitants per priest. Table 2 shows that Church leaders do not simply try to equalize the ratio of inhabitants per priest throughout Latin America as a whole. Countries with comparatively favorable inhabitant-per-priest ratios, like Chile and Venezuela, also have a far higher proportion of foreign priests than many countries where priests are even more scarce. In El Salvador, on the other hand, where priests appear to be especially scarce, less than one diocesan priest in ten is a foreigner.

As the data in Table 2 seem to confirm, the assignment of foreign religious personnel depends upon a variety of factors. Nationalist tendencies in the recipient country and its present complement of priests are only two of those factors. Others include the contacts established between individual religious leaders in the sending and receiving countries, and the willingness of political leaders in the receiving country to allow a large influx of foreign personnel. In a nation with as many citizens as Brazil, only a massive number of foreign priests or native vocations could substantially affect the ratio of inhabitants per priest. Given these variables, the positions of Chile and Venezuela in Table 2 suggest that another factor may, hypothetically, be of considerable importance. The special visibility which Chile and Venezuela have long had in Catholic circles because of their Christian Democratic movements, as well as because of Venezuela's wealth and the Chilean clergy's reputation for outstanding progressiveness, has caused particular concern for strengthening their religious structures. Especially in relation to such smaller states as El Salvador or Paraguay, where lower populations mean that smaller influxes of foreign priests would have sharply decreased both the percentages of native clergy and the number of inhabitants per priest, the visibility and apparent importance of countries like Chile and Venezuela may have been a decisive factor in clerical assignments.

34 J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America : A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations (rev. ed., Chapel Hill, N.C. : University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 424.

As clerical assignment patterns have related to several factors in the different Latin American countries, so the manifestations of Catholic nationalism have also varied according to local conditions. Catholic nationalism has opposed the mysticism and traditionalism of Latin American Indians, as in the case of a Panamanian group whose spokesman declares that Panamanian Indians simultaneously want to practice Christian morality and "want no longer to be cannon fodder in popular elections, fervently desire to convert themselves into Panamanian farmers who live in their ancestral lands, who work the land and who produce the aggrandizement and prosperity of the Republic."³⁵ Geographic isolation may affect the conjunction of religion and nationalism just as does the social isolation of Indian communities. Economic hardships in frontier areas, like southern Chile, militate toward a kind of social cohesion which both emphasizes patriotism and lessens conflict among religious groups. When asked about the relationship of nationalism and religion in his diocese, for example, the Bishop of Punto Arenas suggested that Chileans were more uniformly patriotic there than in Santiago, and he pointed out that the physical interdependence of families in this isolated region had produced uninterrupted harmony among the Catholic settlers, British Anglicans, and German Lutherans³⁶.

In a more broadly adaptive process, the Church has already become what Robert H. Dix calls "a legitimizer of defensive modernization," an advocate of at least that degree and type of social change which will preserve the established order and the Church's position within it.³⁷

35. From an untitled document by Marcos Quintero Bejerano, the President of the Organización Indígena Chiricana, sent to the author by Msgr. Daniel E. Nuñez, the Bishop of David, Panama.

36. Interview with Msgr. Vladimiro Boric, Bishop of Punto Arenas, in Punto Arenas, Chile, July 27, 1968

37. Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 318

The Church has always faced the need to reconcile demands for order and change, but the context of Latin American nationalism in which it now faces these demands has significantly altered its environment. If Arnold Toynbee is correct in saying that nationalism has become a more potent religion than Christianity,³⁸ then, in addition to seeing how Latin American nationalism has adapted to the Catholic culture of the region, we may expect Catholicism to adapt to the force nationalism. At present, nationalism seems to encourage Gallicanism and decentralization in the worldwide Church, just as early French nationalism stimulated the original Gallican movement. In conjunction with the secular culture of industrial societies and the much discussed crisis of religious vocations, nationalism may force the Church into institutional adaptations which reshape its traditional structure.

x

x

x

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38. Quoted in E. Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil : A Historical Survey (New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 133

A/III - Les églises comme institutions
politiques

- Churches as political institutions

Catholicism and Nationalism in Latin America.

Frederick C. TURNER
The University of Connecticut.

A/III/2

Conclusions

The contemporary force of nationalism puts a premium, therefore, upon the adaptability of religious norms and institutions. Statistical comparisons substantiate the view that Catholicism is an important ingredient in Latin American nationalism. Both for social scientists and for some of the participants involved in this situation, the implications of the situation appear to be clear. Social scientists need primarily to devise more objective measures for nationalism, particularly through survey research vehicles which can simultaneously relate it to other variables as well. Researchers can compare the resultant findings on nationalism with material from the work of Silvert or Deutsch, as well as with additional indicators on religious movements such as the percentage of foreign clergy in a country, the national level of vocations, and the proportion of different categories of religious personnel in the national population. Regional comparisons of these measures within and among countries could also prove most revealing.

Given these variables, the future relationships of religion and social development in Latin America may depend, more directly than upon any other single force, upon the ways in which the Catholic Church comes to relate to the aspirations of Latin American citizens. The political diversity, patriotic invocations, and spiritual emphasis of Catholicism demonstrate considerable ability to respond to secular nationalism and to changing social conditions. Adjustments may in time become so pervasive as to make the old Catholic norms of meek resignation and hierarchical stratification virtually unrecognizable. For Latin America, the adaptation of Catholicism is also a feasible way, if certainly not the only way, to apply humanist concerns to the process of development.

A III - Les églises comme institutions
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Conclusions.

la force actuelle du nationalisme met l'accent sur la capacité d'adaptation des normes religieuses et des institutions. Des comparaisons statistiques confirment l'idée que le catholicisme est un facteur important dans le nationalisme de l'Amérique latine. Tant pour les sociologues que pour certains membres impliqués dans cette situation, les implications de cette situation apparaissent clairement. Il serait nécessaire avant tout, que les sociologues trouvent d'autres causes objectives au nationalisme, surtout par le canal de sondages spécialisés et qui permettraient en outre de relier ces causes à d'autres variables. Les résultats de ces sondages pourraient être comparés aux indications supplémentaires des recherches de Silver et Deutsch ainsi qu'à celles des mouvements religieux tels que, par exemple, le pourcentage de missionnaires étrangers au pays, le nombre de vocations indigènes et la proportion de catégories différentes de personnel religieux dans la population du pays. Des comparaisons de ces mesures dans et entre pays pourraient se révéler intéressantes.

Etant donné ces variables, les liens de l'évolution religieuse et sociale en Amérique Latine peuvent, dans l'avenir, dépendre plus directement que de toute autre force, de la manière dont l'Eglise Catholique répondra aux aspirations des citoyens Sud-Américains. La diversité politique, les incitations patriotiques, l'emprise spirituelle du catholicisme, témoignent d'une flexibilité considérable d'ajustement aux exigences d'un nationalisme séculaire et de conditions sociales changeantes. Les ajustements peuvent, dans l'avenir, s'avérer si profonds, qu'ils rendront les normes catholiques traditionnelles d'humble résignation et de stratifications hiérarchiques absolument indiscernables. Pour l'Amérique Latine, la voie d'adoption du catholicisme est une manière, mais non certes pas la seule, d'appliquer les concepts humanitaires au processus de développement.

I.P.S.A.
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LES FONCTIONS POLITIQUES DE L'EGLISE EN ESPAGNE

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Problématique

Les institutions ecclésiastiques et les organisations religieuses peuvent être étudiées comme des institutions politiques, en ce sens qu'elles constituent des systèmes de gouvernement, préfigurant parfois ceux aujourd'hui en vigueur dans les sociétés civiles. Mais l'approche de la science politique ne vaut pas seulement pour ce qui a trait à la structure interne des Eglises et de leurs annexes. Elle est également pertinente pour la compréhension de leurs fonctions externes au sein des régimes et des systèmes politiques globaux.

Historiquement, ces fonctions ont revêtu de multiples formes, allant de l'exercice direct du pouvoir, ou de la participation institutionnelle à celui-ci, à l'influence officieuse exercée par les "groupes de pression religieux", ou encore à l'action plus diffuse mais souvent décisive de citoyens déterminés par leur appartenance religieuse. Nombreux sont les travaux déjà consacrés à ces situations et à ces phénomènes, surtout en Europe occidentale.

Cependant, il est un cas où les fonctions politiques externes des institutions ecclésiastiques et des organisations religieuses restent peu étudiées. C'est celui des régimes autoritaires centralisateurs, dans lesquels les institutions religieuses sont, lorsqu'elles jouissent d'une force et d'une liberté suffisantes, conduites à jouer un rôle de substitut des groupements politiques d'opposition interdits en raison du monopole réservé à un parti unique. Il en est ainsi au Brésil et, de façon plus discrète au Portugal, où certaines personnalités et organisations religieuses constituent une véritable opposition aux régimes autoritaires en place. Et il advient aussi que des Eglises locales mettent, au moins implicitement, en question non seulement l'orientation de tel ou tel régime, mais également les fondements mêmes des systèmes nationaux auxquels elles se trouvent confrontées, en particulier dans les états pluri-ethniques de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara, au Cameroun, en Rhodésie, au Nigéria, en Afrique du Sud. Il arrive, enfin, que les Eglises et les organisations qui dépendent d'elles dans un pays donné remplissent une fonction politique de fait à chacun de ces deux niveaux.

L'exemple de l'Espagne, qui est étudié dans cette note, est particulièrement illustratif à cet égard. La fonction politique des institutions ecclésiastiques et des organisations religieuses y transparaît, en effet, à des niveaux très divers, et même contradictoires. Selon les époques, l'Eglise d'Espagne joua successivement un rôle de catalyseur de l'unité nationale, puis de soutien de l'ordre conservateur établi, avant de devenir aujourd'hui, au moins dans certains de ses éléments, un agent essentiel de l'opposition au régime franquiste, et du renouveau autonomiste au Pays Basque et en Catalogne. De son côté, l'analyse de la

seule réalité présente fait apparaître que les fonctions politiques et parapolitiques exercées synchroniquement par l'Eglise sont non moins caractéristiques et variées.

Ces fonctions peuvent se situer schématiquement à trois niveaux. Au premier de ceux-ci, l'Eglise continue à jouer, avec quelques réticences, un rôle politique proprement institutionnel, dans le sens juridique de ce terme. Elle demeure largement l'Eglise de la "Croisade contre les Rouges", alliée et bénéficiaire du franquisme, participant de diverses manières à l'exercice du pouvoir (1) et chargée par lui de tâches spécifiques de légitimation, d'éducation et de propagande.

Mais, grâce aux privilèges et à la liberté d'expression que leur valent leurs liens avec l'Etat, l'Eglise et les organisations religieuses agissent en même temps, de façon contradictoire avec la précédente, comme des substituts des groupements d'opposition défaillants ; et cela aussi bien au niveau de la contestation des seules formes de gouvernement, qu'à celui de la non-acceptation du système politique centralisé dans son ensemble, c'est-à-dire du rejet de l'insertion forcée des Basques et des Catalans dans un Etat "castillan" unique. Au monopole politique formel accordé au Mouvement phalangiste tend ainsi à se substituer le quasi-monopole de fait d'une double opposition au régime et au système national centralisé, animée pour l'essentiel par des chrétiens venus des organisations catholiques, dont on peut se demander s'ils sont susceptibles de devenir les cadres d'un futur courant démocrate-chrétien.

L'Eglise "pilier" du régime franquiste : fonction institutionnelle et de légitimation

Il n'est pas utile de rappeler dans le détail le soutien déterminant apporté aux dirigeants du soulèvement militaire de 1936 par la plupart des évêques espagnols, par la masse du clergé et par presque tous les catholiques (2). Le nouveau régime, dont le général Franco allait prendre rapidement la tête, avait besoin d'une assise populaire qu'il ne pouvait trouver que chez ces derniers. Il lui fallait pour cela la caution de l'Eglise, qu'il obtint de façon solennelle et officielle avec la lettre collective de l'épiscopat espagnol du 1er juillet 1937. Tous les évêques, à deux exceptions près, se rallièrent alors au régime.

De plus, le pouvoir civil et militaire ne pouvait assumer à lui seul l'immense tâche de propagande contre-révolutionnaire et de "récupération" des populations "perverties" par les idées démocratiques, socialistes et anarchistes. Il obtint également, dans ce domaine, la collaboration de l'Eglise, qui accepta d'exercer une sorte de magistère idéologique en matière d'éducation des jeunes et

(1) Nous ne nous référons pas ici à la participation individuelle de ministres membres de l'Opus Dei dans le présent gouvernement, mais à l'insertion de l'Eglise, en tant que telle dans les institutions politiques.

(2) Voir, à propos des positions assumées par l'Eglise avant, pendant et après la guerre civile : SANCHEZ (J.M.), The politico-religious background of the Spanish Civil War, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1962 ; EBENSTEIN (W.G.), Church and State in Franco Spain, Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1960.

de formation des adultes, concurremment avec la Phalange. Dans des cas limites, des organisations catholiques participèrent même à la répression, de manière détournée, comme à Grenade où les dirigeants locaux de l'Action catholique créèrent une milice auxiliaire chargée de l'arrestation et de l'exécution des éléments réputés "dangereux" (3).

L'Eglise fut récompensée de cet appui, sans lequel la victoire et la survie du régime franquiste eussent probablement été impossibles, par l'octroi d'une aide budgétaire et d'un statut d'exception, ainsi que par la proclamation du caractère catholique de l'Etat et l'intégration des représentants les plus éminents de la hiérarchie ecclésiastique dans les organes du pouvoir. La fonction de légitimation du régime, exercée explicitement par l'Eglise, s'accompagnait dès lors d'une fonction proprement institutionnelle.

C'est ainsi que l'Article VI de la Charte des Espagnols du 17 juillet 1945 proclame que "la profession et la pratique de la religion catholique, qui est celle de l'Etat espagnol, jouiront de la protection officielle" (4). Tout au plus est-il mentionné, depuis la revision de ce texte consécutive à la mise en vigueur de la loi organique du 10 janvier 1967, que "l'Etat assumera la protection de la liberté religieuse, garantie par une tutelle juridique efficace qui, en même temps, sauvegardera la morale et l'ordre public". Auparavant, la Charte garantissait seulement que "personne ne sera molesté pour ses croyances religieuses, ni dans l'exercice privé de son culte", étant entendu que "les cérémonies religieuses autres que celles de la Religion catholique ne seront pas permises". De son côté, la Loi sur la succession du chef de l'Etat du 27 juillet 1947 affirme que "l'Espagne en tant qu'unité politique, est un Etat catholique..." et prévoit que le futur roi ou régent devra "professer la religion catholique...". Il en est de même de la Loi sur les Principes du Mouvement national du 17 mai 1958, dont l'article III stipule que "la nation espagnole considère comme un titre d'honneur la soumission à la loi de Dieu, conformément à la doctrine de la Sainte Eglise Catholique Apostolique et Romaine, seule vraie croyance inséparable de la conscience nationale, qui inspirera sa législation".

L'attribution aux évêques les plus élevés dans la hiérarchie de sièges dans les assemblées politiques est prévue par la Loi constitutive des Cortès du 17 juillet 1942, ainsi que par la Loi sur la succession du Chef de l'Etat, en ce qui concerne le Conseil de Régence et le Conseil du Royaume. Cette dernière fait même du "Prélat conseiller du Royaume le plus haut placé dans la hiérarchie ecclésiastique" une sorte de troisième personnage de l'Etat, dans l'ordre de préséance, après le général Franco et le président des Cortès, mais avant le capitaine général le plus ancien.

(3) PAYNE (S.G.), Los militares y la politica en la Espana contemporanea, [Paris] Ruedo ibérico, (1968), p. 365

(4) Les citations des lois fondamentales espagnoles sont tirées de la traduction française publiée dans : Lois fondamentales de l'Etat, Madrid, Service espagnol d'information, 1968, p. 226.

Il est vrai que les rédacteurs des lois fondamentales n'ont pas formellement sollicité l'approbation de l'Eglise ; celle-ci peut ne pas se considérer comme engagée, ou "compromise" par elles. Il en va différemment, en revanche, pour le Concordat de 1953, qui est un contrat d'obligations réciproques reconnu comme tel par les deux signataires, le Saint-Siège et l'Etat espagnol. Or, ce texte confirme largement les principes de confessionnalité de l'Etat énoncés dans les lois fondamentales, et les assortit d'engagements concrets qui en assurent l'application.

L'article 1 du Concordat, selon lequel "la Religion catholique continue à être la seule de la nation espagnole, et jouira des droits et prérogatives qui lui reviennent en conformité avec la Loi Divine et le Droit Canonique" (5), confirme les principes. Par ailleurs, un nombre important de dispositions garantit à l'Eglise et aux organisations religieuses des avantages financiers et un statut administratif, juridique et politique privilégié, substituant dans divers domaines l'autorité de l'Eglise à celle de l'Etat.

En vertu de l'article XIX, les pouvoirs publics s'engagent à verser une dotation budgétaire annuelle pour l'entretien du clergé, des séminaires et autres institutions ecclésiastiques.

L'article II dispense les publications religieuses de tout contrôle de l'Etat, tandis que l'article XXIX oblige, en revanche, celui-ci à veiller à ce que "les institutions et services de l'opinion publique..." donnent "la place convenable à l'exposé et à la défense de la vérité religieuse". L'Eglise se voit même attribuer un quasi-monopole de certaines fonctions administratives et judiciaires, en vertu des articles XXII et XXIV du Concordat, par lesquels "l'Etat espagnol reconnaît les pleins effets civils du mariage célébré selon les normes du Droit Canonique", ainsi que "la compétence exclusive des Tribunaux et Dicastères ecclésiastiques dans les causes touchant au mariage canonique et à la séparation des conjoints" ; sont également garantis les effets civils des décisions et décrets "émanant des Autorités ecclésiastiques dans n'importe quelle matière de leur compétence". D'autres articles concèdent à l'Eglise un droit de contrôle et de censure en matière d'éducation, de programmes et de publications scolaires et universitaires, reconnaissent l'inviolabilité des bâtiments ecclésiastiques, exemptent les prêtres et religieux du service militaire et leur octroient un traitement de faveur dans le domaine judiciaire et pénitenciaire.

La contrepartie des prérogatives politiques ou para-politiques dévolues à l'Eglise se trouve dans la participation déterminante de l'Etat au processus de nomination des évêques. Le Concordat entérine sur ce point l'accord du 7 juin 1941, qui réserve au chef de l'Etat espagnol le privilège de la désignation finale des nouveaux évêques. La procédure requise est la suivante. Lorsqu'une vacance se produit ou que le Saint Siège juge bon de désigner un coadjuteur dans un diocèse donné, le gouvernement présente dans un premier temps une liste d'au moins six candidats, parmi lesquels le Pape retient trois noms soumis au choix ultime du chef de

(5) Les citations du Concordat de 1953 sont tirées de : Texto del Concordato entre la Santa Sede y España de 27 de agosto de 1953 y documentos anejos, Madrid, (Universidad de Madrid), 1961, p. 74

l'Etat, à qui il revient de désigner officiellement l'un d'eux comme évêque, dans un délai de trente jours.

Le cercle est ainsi bouclé. De même que l'Eglise exerce des fonctions politiques, l'Etat espagnol remplit de façon non équivoque une fonction proprement ecclésiastique, grâce à laquelle il tente d'entretenir un épiscopat dévoué à sa cause.

L'Eglise s'est longtemps satisfaite de cette "interdépendance" avec le pouvoir civil. Jusqu'au début des années soixante, ses revendications ont porté surtout sur le renforcement de sa position de partenaire privilégié du régime, plutôt que sur un relâchement de ses liens avec celui-ci. C'est dans cet esprit que Mgr. Herrera Oria critiqua, en 1955 et 1956, la censure de l'information, entendant par là qu'il souhaitait une liberté plus grande pour la presse catholique à grand tirage, non protégée par les dispositions du Concordat. De même, le cardinal primat s'opposa fermement au projet de constitution d'origine phalangiste de 1957, à partir du moment où celui-ci parut susceptible d'abaisser la position de l'Eglise, et d'ouvrir la voie à une laïcisation de l'Etat.

De plus, l'évolution qui se dessine depuis 1966 dans l'attitude du Vatican et des évêques espagnols reste ambiguë. Il est vrai que, tenant compte des orientations conciliaires, Paul VI demanda une révision du Concordat, afin de mettre un terme au privilège de nomination des évêques par le chef de l'Etat. De leur côté, sous la pression du jeune clergé, un nombre croissant d'évêques prend des positions de plus en plus distinctes de celles du régime, en matière politique et sociale. Mais le Pape n'affirma pas sa volonté de renoncer au statut matériellement avantageux de l'Eglise d'Espagne lorsque le général Franco lui suggéra de le faire, en contrepartie de son propre renoncement à la nomination des évêques ; il vient même, depuis 1968, de remettre la procédure concordataire de nomination en marche, après être resté trois ans sans proposer de candidats au chef de l'Etat. De même, l'on ne peut considérer que les protestations de certains évêques contre la répression policière dont des prêtres sont victimes soient toujours adroites lorsqu'elles arguent, de façon discutable, des dispositions concordataires sur l'inviolabilité des édifices religieux et les privilèges judiciaires du clergé.

L'Eglise protestataire des jeunes prêtres et des mouvements d'action catholique : la fonction politique de substitution des organisations religieuses

L'Eglise espagnole continue ainsi à remplir, en partie contre son gré, une fonction institutionnelle au sein du régime franquiste. Mgr. Morcillo, archevêque de Madrid, a, certes, démissionné de toutes ses charges politiques au début de 1969. Mais l'archevêque de Saragosse, Mgr. Cantero, continue à siéger aux Cortès ; et il a fallu une injonction du Saint-Siège pour que l'Assemblée des évêques revienne sur les termes de sa déclaration plutôt favorable à la proclamation de l'état d'exception, contre laquelle six prélats seulement sur près de quatre-vingt, se sont élevés de manière explicite.

Cependant, il est incontestable que ce type de fonction tend aujourd'hui à passer au second plan, pour être supplanté par une fonction plus critique exercée prudemment par quelques évêques, et beaucoup plus explicitement et massivement par le jeune clergé et les organisations d'action catholique.

Au lendemain de la guerre, après l'interdiction de tous les groupements et partis politiques, la Phalange et les organisations catholiques devinrent les seuls cadres susceptibles d'abriter des débats idéologiques et de permettre la formation de militants. De plus, la transformation de la Phalange en une bureaucratie para-étatique, à laquelle l'on adhère par commodité ou par obligation plutôt que par conviction, accrut a contrario l'attrait des organisations catholiques, dotées d'une structure plus propice aux débats idéologiques, et non marquées par une "tare" fasciste originelle.

Ceci explique pourquoi les associations dépendant de l'Eglise rassemblent aujourd'hui encore un nombre d'adhérents plus grand que celui du Mouvement phalangiste et de tous les partis, groupements et syndicats clandestins réunis. Les associations d'apostolat laïc comptent près de 1.900.000 membres (6), alors que la Phalange et ses annexes féminines ne réunissent, au mieux, que 1.200.000 membres dits "actifs" (7), et que les groupements illégaux comptent au maximum quelques dizaines de milliers de membres ou sympathisants tant soit peu organisés.

Le fait que la plupart des associations de laïcs conservent des activités essentiellement religieuses n'amointrit la valeur de ces comparaisons d'effectifs. La proportion des phalangistes véritablement militants est faible, en dépit de l'importance des effectifs globaux, gonflés par les adhésions obligatoires qui vont de pair avec certaines fonctions ; il semble que les 7.000 fonctionnaires de la Phalange et les 120.000 membres de la "Vieille garde" et de la "Garde de Franco" puissent à peu près seuls être considérés comme véritablement "politisés". Les carlistes actifs sont beaucoup moins nombreux. Quant aux partis communistes, qui regroupent la plus grande partie de l'opposition clandestine organisée, leur effectif total ne dépasse pas un chiffre de 5.000 à 30.000 adhérents, selon les estimations. Or, les différents groupes d'apostolat auprès des ouvriers et des employés, qui sont les plus marqués par des préoccupations politiques et syndicales, totalisent à eux seuls plus de 235.000 membres.

Les associations ouvrières constituent, en effet, le fer de lance et l'élément précurseur de l'opposition catholique au régime ; ce sont elles qui jouent depuis plus de dix ans un rôle de substitut des partis et des syndicats de classe interdits. Leur création ou leur réactivation fut postérieure à la seconde guerre mondiale ; jusqu'alors, l'Action catholique ne se développait guère que dans les milieux bourgeois, assez favorables aux principes de la démocratie chrétienne, mais encore plus favorables, dans l'immédiat, au maintien du pouvoir du général Franco. Ses audaces les plus extrêmes consistaient en un rappel de la doctrine sociale de Léon XIII, à laquelle le régime se référait également, au moins verbalement. Elle soutint donc les autorités en place jusqu'en 1960, environ, deux de ses personnalités les plus éminentes, A. Martin Artajo et J. Ruiz Giménez, acceptant même des postes ministériels importants, en 1945 et 1953.

(6) "Les mouvements catholiques laïcs en Espagne", IDOC international 3, 1er juin 1969 p. 19.

(7) Cf. BARDAVIO (J.), La estructura del poder en España, Madrid, Ibérico Europea de Publicaciones, (1969) p. 117.

En revanche, les associations ouvrières créées entre 1946 et 1956 (8), marquèrent d'entrée de jeu leurs distances vis-à-vis du gouvernement franquiste. Cette attitude leur permit d'exercer une sorte de monopole de la formation des militants syndicalistes, concurremment avec les communistes. Elles créèrent également la seule presse ouvrière ayant existé légalement en Espagne depuis 1939, grâce à la publication d'hebdomadaires ou de mensuels tels que Tu, Signo, Voz del Trabajo et le Boletín H.O.A.C., dont certains sont aujourd'hui interdits. Elles contribuèrent, enfin, à la radicalisation politique des jeunes prêtres, irrités par les compromissions de l'Eglise "établie".

Ces derniers trouvent dans l'apostolat en milieu ouvrier un terrain d'action qui leur permet de se situer en marge d'institutions ecclésiastiques dominées par un clergé et des évêques âgés et plus traditionnalistes que dans les pays voisins, sauf au Portugal. La coupure de la guerre civile est à l'origine de ce phénomène, très peu de prêtres ayant été formés entre 1936 et 1946. De ce fait, l'Eglise espagnole dispose d'un clergé très polarisé sur les âges extrêmes : sur 22.000 prêtres exerçant en 1967, 9.000 ont moins de quarante ans, et plus de 12.000 cinquante ans et plus ; 2.900 seulement ont de trente à trente-neuf ans (9). Cette situation entraîne une espèce de dualisme de l'Eglise avec, d'un côté, les masses constituées par l'Eglise traditionnelle et, de l'autre, l'Eglise contestatrice des jeunes prêtres et des mouvements d'action catholique en milieu populaire.

Si ce dualisme semble devoir s'atténuer à long terme, avec la disparition de la génération des prêtres de la guerre civile, il n'en est pas de même à court terme. La question qui se pose à cet égard touche à la réalité même et à la poursuite de la fonction politique de substitution assumée par les mouvements catholiques ouvriers et les jeunes prêtres qui les animent, de façon plus ou moins directe. Les uns et les autres ont maintenant presque achevé la tâche qu'ils pouvaient remplir sur le plan politique et syndical, après avoir largement contribué à la naissance des commissions ouvrières et des nouveaux syndicats clandestins. Ils ne peuvent guère aller plus dans un cadre religieux, et doivent choisir entre un retour vers des préoccupations plus "spirituelles", pour lequel ils ressentent peu d'attrait, ou une coupure complète avec le cadre ecclésial, qui est en fait l'option qu'ils retiennent le plus souvent.

L'épiscopat tend incontestablement à forcer les choix dans ce domaine, depuis l'adoption d'un statut plus autoritaire des organisations d'action catholique. Le nouveau statut, entré en vigueur au printemps 1968, a entraîné la démission de 112 responsables nationaux dans les premiers mois de son application. L'Eglise entend-elle, par là, reprendre plus directement sous son contrôle la fonction de critique du régime assumée jusqu'à présent pour l'essentiel par des organisations religieuses relativement indépendantes ? Ou faut-il ne voir dans cette politique qu'un retour en arrière, provoqué par la majorité des évêques

(8) La Fraternité ouvrière d'Action catholique (H.O.A.C.) date de 1946 ; la "Vanguardia obrera" fut créée en 1954 ; la jeunesse ouvrière catholique s'est unifiée en 1956.

(9) "Une "radiographie" de l'épiscopat espagnol", Informations catholiques internationales 303, 1er janvier 1968, p. 20.

encore attachés au maintien de liens avec le régime, ou bien encore une réorientation tenant compte des directions prises par les technocrates de l'Opus Dei, promoteurs d'une modernisation politique de type "bourgeois" ?

Les trois hypothèses sont probablement valables, si l'on en croit à la fois les résistances au changement enregistrées dans le clergé intégriste, le rôle politique déterminant de certains membres de l'Opus Dei, et la fonction parapolitique directement remplie aujourd'hui par une fraction de l'Eglise au Pays Basque et en Catalogne.

L'Eglise dans la renaissance du sentiment national en Catalogne et au Pays Basque

Le déclin des fonctions d'ordre politique remplies par les organisations d'action catholique pour la formation des nouveaux cadres politiques et syndicaux, qui prennent maintenant leur autonomie vis-à-vis des institutions qui les ont formés, est, en effet, en quelque sorte compensé par le développement du rôle du clergé et des ordres religieux dans la renaissance de la revendication nationaliste en Catalogne et au Pays basque.

Les rapports existant entre le catholicisme basque et le nationalisme local sont anciens, et bien connus. L'on trouve, à cet égard, une filiation assez nette entre le carlisme, intégriste sur le plan religieux et autonomiste sur le plan politique, et le courant proprement nationaliste de tendance démocrate-chrétien qui se développe depuis la fin du XIXe siècle. La déclaration de principe du Parti nationaliste basque, créé le 25 juillet 1894, proclame que "la Biscaye sera catholique, apostolique, romaine, dans toutes les manifestations de sa vie interne et dans ses relations avec les autres peuples", et postule la "complète et inconditionnelle subordination du politique ou religieux, de l'Etat à l'Eglise" (10).

L'on sait, également, que l'attitude des prêtres et des catholiques basques fut, pendant la guerre civile, très différente de celle de la masse du clergé et des fidèles dans le reste de l'Espagne. La presque totalité de la communauté catholique locale accorda son appui au gouvernement autonomiste, d'autant plus que celui-ci était, en dépit de sa fidélité réticente à la République du Front Populaire, dominé par des ministres chrétiens-sociaux, sinon même franchement conservateurs. L'évêque de Vitoria, Mgr. Mateo Múgica, qui s'était, dès 1932, déclaré favorable à un statut d'autonomie, fut l'un des deux seuls évêques qui refusèrent de s'associer à la lettre collective de l'épiscopat espagnol du 1er juillet 1937, par laquelle l'Eglise apportait son soutien à la "Croisade" menée par le général Franco. De leur côté, dix-sept prêtres basques payèrent de leur vie leur non conformité avec celle-ci.

Cependant, l'existence de formations politiques autonomistes légales, fortement implantées dans la région, faisait alors que le clergé et les institutions ecclésiastiques n'avaient pas à remplir la fonction qu'ils assument souvent aujourd'hui, en raison même de l'interdiction de ces formations.

(10) GARCIA VENERO (M.), Historia del nacionalismo vasco, (Madrid), Editora Nacional, 1945, pp. 244-245.

A l'inverse de ce qui se produit en ce qui concerne la contestation globale de la dictature franquiste, dans laquelle l'Eglise est surtout impliquée de manière indirecte, par le truchement d'organisations annexes, le clergé et les institutions ecclésiastiques sont de plus en plus directement mêlés à l'action nationaliste au Pays basque. Cette intervention revêt trois formes principales.

La première est celle de l'action culturelle, traditionnellement assumée par le clergé auprès des minorités, mais dont les conséquences politiques sont importantes dans les régions où la revendication nationaliste part de critères linguistiques. L'Eglise joue à cet égard un rôle de protection et de promotion de la langue basque, qui n'est pas ou très peu enseigné dans les écoles publiques, et que les "bonnes volontés" privées ne peuvent diffuser à elles seules, pour des raisons à la fois juridiques et matérielles.

Le basque est de plus en plus utilisé dans la liturgie, surtout depuis la mise en oeuvre des réformes conciliaires ; son étude est même imposée aux futurs prêtres du séminaire de Saint-Sébastien, et elle est facultative, mais recommandée dans ceux de Pamplune, Bilbao et Vitoria. Mais l'Eglise ne se limite pas au seul aspect culturel. Par l'intermédiaire de deux ordres d'enseignants, elle réintroduit l'usage de la langue basque dans certaines écoles professionnelles et secondaires confessionnelles. Grâce à d'autres ordres religieux, elle se fait également le promoteur d'une nouvelle presse basque. Les capucins, en particulier, publient deux périodiques à grand tirage, destinés l'un aux adultes, et l'autre aux enfants, dont très peu ont la faculté de suivre un enseignement de leur langue maternelle. De leur côté, les jésuites animent une importante maison d'édition, tandis que les franciscains introduisent le basque à la radio, grâce à la messe qu'ils diffusent chaque semaine dans cette langue.

S'inspirant de l'encyclique Pacem in terris, selon laquelle "toute politique tendant à contrarier la vitalité et l'expansion des minorités constitue une faute grave contre la justice" (11), l'Eglise exerce aussi un rôle implicite de légitimation de la cause basque. C'est ainsi que des messes publiques furent dites à la mémoire du militant de l'E.T.A. Xavier Echevarrieta, abattu en 1967 par la police après qu'il eût lui-même tué un garde civil, et que Paul VI prit sur lui de demander la grâce du compagnon de celui-ci. C'est ainsi, également, que l'évêque de Saint-Sébastien et le vicaire apostolique de Bilbao prirent à plusieurs reprises la défense de prêtres arrêtés pour menées séparatistes. Là encore, cependant, les ordres religieux tiennent le devant de la scène ; les couvents des franciscains d'Arantzazu, des bénédictins de Lazcano et des jésuites de Saint-Sébastien constituent d'une certaine manière des "sanctuaires" autonomistes, sur lesquels le drapeau basque a même flotté en une occasion.

En outre, la fonction de certains de ces "sanctuaires" ne serait pas seulement symbolique, si l'on en croit la police espagnole qui reproche à certains

(11) JEAN XXIII, Pacem in terris, [Paris] - Editions du Centurion, [1963], p. 77

prêtres et religieux de profiter des facilités offertes par les bâtiments ou l'habit ecclésiastiques pour apporter un soutien logistique direct aux mouvements extrémistes, tels que l'E.T.A. Nombre d'entre eux ont été arrêtés depuis mars 1968 sous ce chef d'accusation, au point que les prêtres basques forment aujourd'hui l'essentiel de l'effectif des ecclésiastiques emprisonnés, dont le nombre se serait élevé à soixante à la fin 1969 ; la seule prison de Zamora comptait, en juin 1970, vingt-deux basques sur un total de trente prêtres incarcérés (12).

Le rôle culturel et de légitimation de l'autonomisme rempli en Catalogne par le clergé et les institutions ecclésiastiques s'apparente largement à celui joué par l'Eglise basque. Il n'est que de rappeler à cet égard la place tenue par les moines de Montserrat et par leur revue Serra d'Or, ou encore les incidents de grande ampleur créés en 1966 et 1967 par la nomination d'un archevêque non-catalan à Barcelone, qui témoignent de façon manifeste de la signification politique prise par des événements d'ordre ecclésial.

Le caractère plus pacifique de l'action nationaliste catalane fait, en revanche, que les membres du clergé ont moins qu'au Pays basque l'occasion d'être impliqués directement dans celle-ci. Les prêtres catalans arrêtés le sont plus en raison de leurs attitudes sur le plan social et syndical qu'à cause de menées "séparatistes", supposées ou réelles. Mais l'apparence prosaïque de la fonction para-politique de l'Eglise catalane ne diminue pas son importance.

L'intervention de l'Eglise en tant qu'agent de la résurgence du nationalisme est même, à certains égards, plus significative encore que dans les provinces basques. En effet, à l'inverse de ce qui se produit dans ces dernières - où nationalisme et catholicisme ont toujours été liés - cette intervention apparaît en Catalogne comme un phénomène assez nouveau dans un courant autonomiste jusqu'alors fortement sécularisé, sinon même anticlérical.

Les chances de la démocratie chrétienne en Espagne

Cependant, en dépit de tout ce qui vient d'être dit, la fonction politique exercée en Espagne par l'Eglise et les organisations religieuses n'est peut-être qu'une apparence provisoire et fallacieuse. La cléricatisation imposée par les circonstances ne recouvre-t-elle pas un phénomène plus profond de sécularisation (13) des attitudes des citoyens et du jeu du pouvoir ?

(12) "Trente prêtres sont actuellement détenus à la prison de Zamora", Le Monde, 4 juin 1970, p. 5.

(13) Les Américains définissent la sécularisation comme un "processus par lequel les hommes deviennent de plus en plus rationnels, analytiques et empiriques dans leur action politique" (ALMOND (G.A.), POWELL (G.B.), Comparative politics, Boston, Toronto, Little, Brown and Co, (1966), p. 24). Pour eux, la sécularisation est le contraire de l'"idéologisme". Le terme de sécularisation est compris ici dans une acception différente, qui l'oppose plutôt aux idées de "cléricatisation" ou d'emprise religieuse. L'adhésion à des idéologies "profanes" constitue ainsi, dans ce sens, une forme de sécularisation.

La participation institutionnelle de l'Eglise au système de gouvernement est définitivement mise en question, y compris par les évêques, prêtres et laïcs conservateurs, qui prennent conscience de l'anachronisme de la situation créée par les lois fondamentales et le Concordat. De leur côté, les catholiques contestataires se défendent, en général, d'intervenir dans le domaine politique au nom de l'Eglise, l'une de leurs revendications principales portant justement sur la coupure des liens existant entre l'Etat et la hiérarchie religieuse. Beaucoup, surtout parmi les anciens aumôniers et militants des mouvements ouvriers d'action catholique, se détachent des structures ecclésiastiques ; certains abandonnent même toute référence privilégiée à la doctrine politique et sociale de l'Eglise, quand ils ne la rejettent pas totalement.

L'on peut même considérer que les "technocrates" de l'Opus Dei participent au processus de sécularisation de manière encore plus conforme au sens que les politologues américains donnent à ce terme, en se faisant les hérauts de la croissance et de la rentabilité économiques, et en réhabilitant la notion de profit jusqu'alors frappée d'une sorte d'interdit culturel dans une Espagne peu touchée par l'"esprit du protestantisme". Il apparaît ainsi, en définitive, que quelques cercles de démocrates-chrétiens de droite, une fraction des autonomistes catholiques basques et catalans, et les divers groupes de l'extrême-gauche "para-millénariste" d'inspiration chrétienne sont les seuls, hors des générations traditionnalistes en voie de disparition, à rester marqués par une certaine confusion du politique et du religieux.

Quelles sont, dès lors, les chances d'un courant politique d'inspiration catholique, réplique de la démocratie-chrétienne italienne, dans l'éventualité d'un changement de régime en Espagne ? Il est vrai que la sécularisation des attitudes politiques des militants chrétiens ne s'oppose pas absolument à la constitution d'une telle force, qui pourrait être un grand parti centriste, tourné vers l'électorat catholique, mais dépourvu d'attaches ecclésiastiques et relativement "empirique" dans son action. Et il est non moins vrai qu'un parti, ou des partis ou associations politiques de cette nature devraient rallier les suffrages d'un nombre important d'électeurs, compte tenu du discrédit qui affecte les anciens partis de gauche et du centre, ainsi que de la confiance accordée à priori par les catholiques ... non militants aux entreprises se réclamant de la modération chrétienne.

Mais encore faudrait-il trouver les cadres susceptibles de créer, d'animer et d'unifier une telle formation. En effet, ses leaders potentiels sont en désaccord sur l'opportunité et la légitimité même de la création d'un groupement explicitement ou implicitement confessionnel. Et ils divergent non moins nettement dans leurs orientations idéologiques, de grandes différences existant à cet égard entre les militants catholiques non-ouvriers et ceux des mouvements d'action catholique ouvrière. De plus, l'on peut supposer qu'au sein même de ces derniers, nombre de militants d'orientation purement marxiste ou anarchiste ne s'affilient à des organisations religieuses qu'en raison des facilités d'expression qu'elles offrent. De ce fait, une légalisation des partis ou associations politiques risquerait fort d'entraîner une certaine perte de substance des courants qui se réclament aujourd'hui de principes chrétiens (14).

(14) Cette perte de substance est d'ailleurs déjà en grande partie effective, en raison des départs consécutifs à l'entrée en vigueur des nouveaux statuts de l'action catholique.

En outre, même en concevant qu'un parti démocrate-chrétien puisse abriter des tendances multiples, sinon antinomiques, plus encore qu'en Italie, il conviendrait que ce parti revête une ampleur nationale, seule capable de lui assurer une force suffisante. Or, l'unification des courants démo-chrétiens dans une même organisation, implantée dans l'ensemble du pays, est incertaine. Le dissensus portant sur la nature centralisée du système politique espagnol peut à cet égard provoquer une répétition de l'expérience antérieure à la guerre civile, au moins dans le cas où des partis ou associations autonomistes seraient tolérés. La République fut marquée par l'échec de la tentative démocrate-chrétienne consécutive à la dispersion de ce courant entre un parti à dominante conservatrice d'ambition nationale, la C.E.D.A., et un parti régional plus "social", le Parti Nationaliste Basque. Le retour à un pluripartisme "non dirigé" pourrait fort bien aboutir à une division encore plus grande, avec la création d'organisations chrétiennes-démocrates non seulement au Pays basque, mais en Catalogne, et peut-être en Galice, qui s'ajouteraient éventuellement aux scissions nationales ou locales propres à l'extrême gauche chrétienne de tendance syndicaliste ou révolutionnaire.

La réalisation de ces hypothèses, certes fort pessimistes, ferait obstacle à la venue au pouvoir d'un parti dominant, formel ou informel, reposant sur la clientèle catholique dont l'importance, très réelle, se trouve encore augmentée par trente années de propagande "dépolitisante" et de tolérance à l'égard du seul non conformisme chrétien. Dans ce cas, la fonction politique de substitution remplie par l'Eglise et ses représentants pendant la longue dictature du général Franco aurait produit des effets essentiellement négatifs, en contribuant à compliquer l'imbroglio politique espagnol, sans parvenir pour autant à coordonner et à exprimer clairement les demandes politiques émanant de la masse croissante constituée par les classes moyennes "catholiques". A moins que l'on ne considère que les hommes issus de l'Opus Dei soient assez précisément ceux qui conviennent pour la mise en œuvre du régime de "pluralisme limité" (15) qui s'étanche depuis quelques années.

PAS DE RESUME

NO SUMMARY

(15) Selon l'expression de Linz (J.J.), "L'opposizione in un regime autoritario : il caso della Spagna", Storia contemporanea (I), mars 1970, p. 63.

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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN POLITICS : THE PERUVIAN CASE

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It is difficult to imagine that anyone participating in this plenary session would take the position that the Catholic Church does not involve itself in politics; however one defines the political realm. If possible, the political involvement of the Catholic Church in the independent nation-states of Latin America seems to be more obvious than elsewhere. When the Vatican confirms the excommunication of Paraguayan officials who ordered and carried out attacks against faculty and students of the Catholic University of Asuncion, as well as against members of the clergy who had participated in processions and other acts which were said to be politically motivated; when Cuban bishops take upon themselves to demand that the trade boycott imposed more than five years ago be lifted; when the National Confederation of Peasants, one of the three sectors of Mexico's ruling party (PRI) engages in a heated exchange with the First Congress of Theology over the political participation of the peasantry in Mexican politics, it becomes apparent that the Catholic Church of the Latin American countries is deeply involved in national, as well as regional and local politics. The large number of papers dealing with various aspects of this subject being presented here provides quantitative confirmation of the recognition that the Catholic Church is involved in that which is Caesar's and that, in turn, Caesar is involved in that which is the Church's (1).

Within the limited time and space allowed, then, this paper hopes to explore some of the avenues and mechanisms employed by the Peruvian Catholic Church to participate in politics, the course and extent of its power, the processes employed to articulate its interests, and the possibility of alteration of its political role. This analysis will focus on one country only, and its findings may or may not have validity beyond the case considered here. It is the author's opinion that much data needs to be uncovered before broader comparisons can be made, although he looks with sympathy to those who are willing to make the attempt.

It would probably be redundant to relate here the historical factors which made Peru a Catholic nation and the Catholic Church an essential element of the struggle for political power.

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- (1) References to these incidents can be found in Jornal do Brasil, October 31, 1969, p. 9; The Evangelist, May I, 1969, p.1-A; Excelsior (Mexico), November 30, 1969; p. 4-A, respectively.

Suffice it to say that the intimate relationship between Church and State transferred to Latin America by the Spanish political system at the time of the discovery and conquest was adjusted, but not essentially altered, by the processes of independence (2). The republic that emerged saw fit to maintain the close relationship inherited from the Spaniards, and the Catholic Church found the maintenance of the status quo equally attractive. Neither will this paper reproduce in detail the author's thesis that the main source of political power of the Peruvian Catholic Church is the role it has played as the provider of a conservative ideology, thus exempting the traditional upper class and other groups who favor the maintenance of the status quo from developing an ideological base which would intellectually justify their preference (3). One of the main characters of a recent Spanish novel provided a blunt but clear description of the relationship between the holders of political and economic power and the national Catholic Church which the author's thesis implies: ". . . I go to Mass to serve as an example, I give alms to the priests, I protect an orphanage. Religion is useful. We help priests to live, and they defend us from the poor with the threat of hell" (4). A Philippine landowner, who has having difficulties with his plantation workers, provided a more pragmatic outlook of the applicability of religion to the protection of the status quo; he was quoted as saying: "My biggest problem right now is the fact that there is only one mass a year held for the workers of my plantation; I am trying to see that they can have mass once a week" (5). A keen observer of the Peruvian political scene provides evidence that Peruvian landowners seemed, at least until recently, to be thinking along the same lines. He writes that in the Peruvian Sierra,

The chapel is the required complement of the landlord's residence; Mass is celebrated there when there is a priest available, and always on the festivity of the Patron Saint who protects the fields, harvests and cattle, prevents droughts, and offers heaven in exchange for obedience and resignation in this world; these are the Christian virtues which the priest emphasizes in his sermons (6)

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(2) According to a member of the Peruvian clergy, the post-independence period, with the possible exception of the first forty years, was better for the Catholic Church of Peru than the years prior to independence; see Luis Lituma P., "La Iglesia Peruana en el Siglo XX" in José Pareja Paz-Soldan (ed.) Vision del Peru en el Siglo XX (Lima: Ediciones Libreria Studium, 1963), vol. 2, p. 478.

(3) These topics have been treated at length in Carlos A. Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics (Ithaca, New-York: Cornell University Press, 1969) particularly chapter 8, and in "La Iglesia Catolica como Factor de Poder Politico: El Caso Peruano" Revista Mexicana de Ciencia Politica, No 58, October-December 1969.

(4) Bonzalo Torrente Ballester, Off-side (Barcelona: Ediciones Destino 1969)p.180

(5) The New York Times, March 8, 1970, p.14

(6) Victor Villanueva, Hugo Blanco y la Rebelion Campesina (Lima: Libreria-Editorial Juan Mejia Baca, 1967) p.29

Three decades ago the then Archbishop of Peru, Pedro Pascual FARFAN, actually spelled out the ideological role being played by the Catholic Church in relation to the lower sectors of Peruvian society and polity: He told them that poverty was the road to eternal happiness and based the solution of socioeconomic problems on the ability of the state (and apparently the Church) to make the poor recognize the virtue of their economic plight (7).

It would be unfair and erroneous to say that Catholicism's main objective, as a world religion, is either the maintenance or the alteration of the political, social, and economic status quo. Catholicism, as practically all religions, is made up of a collection of texts, often obscure and contradictory, which lend themselves to varying interpretations. At least their basic documents can and are interpreted in so many different ways that they appear to support different, and occasionally contradictory, interests. But it must be remembered that these sophisticated interpretations are available only to a small educated minority, with enough intelligence, time, and means to keep up with Catholic Church reinterpretations of the dogma. For most believers, however, and certainly for Peru's urban and rural lower class, as well as for most of the lower middle class, this is not the case. Particularly in the case of illiterates, but even with the overwhelming majority of those who have received some elementary schooling, Catholic dogma is what the local priest says it is. The available evidence indicates that throughout this century, local priests in Peru have tended to come out on the side of the status quo and against those who favor effective reform. When APRA developed as a reformist party, in the 1920s and 1930s, with a political ideology which at the time ran counter to that of the Catholic Church, each sermon became a forum for the denunciation of APRA, whose leaders and followers were accused of planning to murder priests and laymen, to burn churches, and to rape nuns. When elections were on the horizon, the clergy, often speaking from the pulpit, threatened with damnation those who did not obey their political directives and instead chose to support APRA. One witness reports,

I heard a priest's sermon in one of the churches of Huancaayo in 1932; he was addressing the faithful on political subjects. He showed that APRA was the work of the devil, and that it should be feared and hated since its own leader, because of his nose profile, looked exactly like Satan (8).

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- (7) Carta Pastoral de Pedro Pascual Farfan con Motivo de la Proxima Festividad de Santa Rosa de Lima (Lima : n.p., 1937)
- (8) F.M. Arriola Grande, Discurso a la Nacion Peruana (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pueblo Continente, 1959) p.237. Events of this type are also described by Luis Alberto Sanchez, Aprismo y Religion (Lima: Editorial Cooperativa Aprista Atahualpa, 1933), passim, and Harry Kantor, El Movimiento Aprista Peruano (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Pleamar, 1964), pp. 168 - 73.

Timely-issued pastoral letters reminded Peruvians of the errors contained in APRA's ideology and platform, as well as of the consequences, both in this life and after death, of going along with those errors. Since the end of the Second World War, and as APRA shifted its stand and became a defender of the status quo, the Catholic Church of Peru directed its attention to more immediate ideological threats; political organizations such as APRA Rebelde, MIR, FIR, and some peasant groups became the new rivals. It has been reported that, in the early 1960s,

The Catholic Church, at least at the parish level . . . joined in this campaign against the peasant movement. The priests of the region refused to baptize the sons of those peasants who belonged to the unions directed by Hugo Blanco . . . If the cultural level of the Cuzco peasantry is taken into account, and if the religious beliefs of the Peruvian people in general are remembered, the fear felt by these peasants because of the priests refusal to baptize their children will be easily understood (9).

THE PRESSURES FOR CHANGE

The traditional position of the Catholic Church of Peru as the ideological supplier of the traditional upper class has been subject to increasing pressures since the late 1950s. Domestically, the "revolution of rising expectations" reached some of the lower levels of Peruvian society and, in so doing, contradicted that interpretation of the dogma which counseled patience and resignation, on the grounds that little could really be done to upgrade the status of those who were not getting what they thought was their share of socioeconomic rewards. When the peasantry was told by educated outsiders that they, the peasants, were in fact entitled to own the land they were working and to receive a larger share of the profits for their work, they found nothing wrong with the idea. When the ideological struggle developed between these "outside agitators" and the local clergy, the peasants were in fact forced into the position of having to choose between what they thought was just, fair, and, more importantly, in their interest, and the mandate of the Catholic Church. One should not be surprised that a significant number chose that ideology which offered them, at least on paper, an immediate solution to their economic plight, even if it was at the expense of achieving salvation after death. A similar choice has probably been made by their urban counterparts. While there is no hard data available on this subject (apparently the Peruvian Catholic Church has conducted surveys, but they have not been made public), there are indications that the traditional position of the Church, in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America, has caused it to lose followers. A representative of the conservative sector of the Peruvian Church has indicated that,

It cannot be negated that the percentage of adults who attended mass weekly is low, and the percentage of those who follow the precepts of yearly confession and communion is even lower . . .

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(9) Villanueva, op. cit., p.149; a similar report is made by Hugo Neira, Cuzco: Tierra y Muerte (Lima : Problemas de Hoy, 1964), p. 89

The Protestant propaganda, particularly that of the Adventists, Baptists, Jehova's Witnesses, Mormons, but above all Marxist and atheist propaganda have grown greatly. This propaganda has had contributing parties, unbelieving intellectuals, and press organs. It increased . . . after the triumph of Castrism in Cuba . . . Although in the 1940 census those who stated that they did not have any religion were very few, I fear that their number has grown a great deal in the last twenty-two years (10).

What is perhaps more important, a study conducted by social scientists of the Catholic University of Peru in the department of Puno found that only 27 percent of a representative sample were aware of the religious organizations available in their communities, 8 percent showed appreciation for them, and 6 percent actually belonged to at least one religious organization (one third of those who belonged indicated that they were somehow coerced into membership). The researchers concluded that,

The religious organizations seem to have significantly less importance than we thought before beginning to conduct this research. Only one-third of the sample is aware of their existence, and less than one-third of these appreciate and belong to them (11).

Inasmuch as the political efforts of the Catholic Church were directed during the late 1950s and most of the 1960s against its ideological competitors, the parties of the left, it should be noticed that the above testimony and data are confirmed by the electoral returns in some of the latest elections that were held before the military takeover of October, 1968. While the left-wing parties, because of their own inability and political incompetence, compounded by police hostility, had not been able to show any electoral strength until the mid-1960s, in the 1966 municipal elections their candidates obtained 20.7 percent of the vote in Arequipa, 12.8 percent of the vote in Cuzco, and an impressive 33.9 percent in Puno, where religious organizations were found to be extremely weak, as indicated above. These electoral returns acquire even more significance when it is remembered that illiterates are not allowed to vote and that more than 80 percent of the population of Puno was classified as illiterate.

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(10) Lituma, op. cit., pp. 476 and 485 - 86 (emphasis added). This view is shared by reformist priests, in Peru and other countries.

Segundo Galilea, a Chilean clergyman, warns that political ideologies often replace religion in Latin America, Oiga (Lima), September 12, 1969, p. 33; and Jorge Alvarez Calderon, a Peruvian member of ONIS, has wondered whether the percentage of believers was actually decreasing in his country, Caretas (Lima), October 15-24, 1969, p. 20.

(11) Christian J.L. Bertholet and other, Puno Rural (Lima : CISEPA, 1969) p.129

Only 7,8 percent of the total population and 15,2 percent of the votingage population exercised the franchise in Puno; since 15,8 percent of the votingage population was legally permitted to register, the percentage of those entitled to vote who failed to do so was minimal (12). Those deprived of the franchise belong to the lower layers of society, which is where the ideological conflict between Catholic dogma as interpreted by the local clergy and anti-status quo political philosophies collide; therefore, it is fair to assume that, in the last few years left-wing candidates would have done better had more people been enfranchised and had other elections been held. Incidentally, this projection may explain why the present Peruvian military regime has refused to test its popularity even with local elections and why it has done nothing to extend the franchise to illiterates.

Ideological Changes Within the Peruvian Catholic Church.

The deterioration of the position of the Church, particularly among the lower and lower middle classes of Peru, did not go unnoticed by the clergy. As elsewhere, the parish priests and other religious personnel, such as nuns working in free schools and hospitals, tended to be first to perceive that, in the ideological struggle, Catholicism was losing out to the anti-status ideologies. Relatively little was done within the Church until the late 1960s, although reference should be made here to two clergymen who could be considered pioneers in this matter. Salomon Bolo Hidalgo, considered by many as somewhat of a "character" in Peruvian politics, organizer and leading figure of the country's National Liberation Front, apparently started his opposition to the traditional role of the Catholic Church in politics in the 1950s. Although Bolo Hidalgo has not been taken seriously by most of his fellow countrymen, he bluntly developed the line of reasoning which, in the last two years, has been adopted by what could be identified as the reformist group within the Peruvian clergy (needless to say, this group is far from being political homogeneous). At one time, he wrote,

I consider that it is absolutely necessary for the clergy to place themselves decisively on the side of the peasants, on the side of the unprotected and the forgotten, instead of prostituting themselves before grants spotted with blood. It is very sad for me to see that, when there appears a priest who, conscious of his duty follows Christ in his condemnation of imperialism and the oligarchy, those at the top of the Church hierarchy are the ones who condemn an attitude which they should back . . . I feel that, if Christ were to come to this earth today, he would take the side of the Peasant Leagues, he would take the side of those who earn their food with their sweat, of those who earn salaries of hunger and misery (13).

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(12) The following year the extreme left received 15 percent of the vote in the Lima municipal elections. The electoral data can be found in Astiz, Pressure Groups, chapters 4 and 6.

(13) Salomon Bolo Hidalgo, Cartas de mi Refugio (Lima : Imprenta Grafica T. Scheuch, 1963) p. 114.

Bolo Hidalgo has repeatedly disclaimed that he is a Communist or even a fellow-traveler, an accusation hurled at him by some conservative Peruvian newspapers. In doing so, he uses an argument which constitutes one of the potentially most powerful weapons of the Catholic Left : That they cannot possibly have anything to do with Communism because they are devout Catholics(14) He has consistently emphasized, and still emphasizes, that Communism has nothing to do with the political insecurity which exists in Peru; he blames it on the extremely uneven distribution of wealth and other socioeconomic rewards; and he has not hesitated to attack the cardinal, the nuncio, and the clergy as a whole for their position on these matters

Those bishops who issues pastoral letters to take votes away but do not issue them to require the wealthy to give something to the poor, to pay just salaries, to stop the exploitation of miners, peasants and workers; those bishops who photograph themselves with the "jet set" but who forget the undernourished children and do not issue pastoral letters against those responsible for the massive illiteracy and tuberculosis; those bishops who gain plenty of weight but only remember in their pastoral letters to favor the powerful of this country; those bishops, I repeat, are only merchants of religion (15).

The other priest who should be mentioned here is the Jesuit Romeo Luna Victoria; he is more of an intellectual reformer and less of a "doer" than Bolo Hidalgo. At one time Luna Victoria taught political science at a normal school and has published an interesting manual dealing with the theory and practice of revolution, addressed to political leaders. He provides both a theoretical justification and specific techniques to carry out a revolution. Although he does not single out any one country, outlining only a series of conditions for violent revolution, other writings make clear that Peru was foremost in his mind (16).

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- (14) Although Bolo Hidalgo has employed this argument for a long time (see ibid., pp. 136-37), since the 1968 military takeover he seems to be emphasizing the point that, although a radical reformist, he is as far away from Communism as he is from the traditional upper class; see some of his numerous letters to the editor, published in Oiga, August 15, 1969, p. 3; June 27, 1969, p. 3; September 3, 1969, p. 4; and April 17, 1970, pp. 3 and 42. It would seem that, by so doing and by supporting specific measures of the military government, he is making himself and the National Liberation Front acceptable to the military.
- (15) Bolo Hidalgo, op. cit., pp. 139-40.
- (16) The book being discussed here is Romeo Luna Victoria, Ciencia y Practica de la Revolucion (Lima : Editorial Stadium, 1966). The author's views cannot be completely understood without reading his previous work El Problema Indigena y la Tenencia de Tierras en el Peru (Trujillo, Peru : Cosmos, 1964), and his numerous articles in the nationalist reformist magazine Oiga.

Luna Victoria rejects the idea that Catholic doctrine forbids participation in strikes or in a bloody revolution; his opinion is that the contrary is true and that the advice to "offer the other check" does not apply to socio-political matters. He concluded that,

There may arise the unfortunate and sad situation in which, to carry out that which is experimentally correct, unquestionably just, and extremely urgent, which we are sponsoring throughout this study, there may not be, in some areas of the world, another alternative but to resort to armed revolution (17).

Luna Victoria has recommended the redistribution of certain types of property: those items given by nature and not produced by an individual's work (which he calls "elastic property"), are subject to confiscation, or at least the rent they produce is so subject (18). Finally, he has shown the same frustration expressed by Bolo Hidalgo toward the Peruvian Catholic Church; he has pointed out that, when this institution receives money or other economic advantages from the state, the result often is "a 'satisfied' and 'silent' Church".

I do not wish to cite contemporary names because I prefer to avoid damaging discords and arguments. The spectacle of a religious hierarchy that does not speak up when it should, that remains silent when it must denounce the obvious violation of sacred human rights, is extremely depressive (19).

The political position of these two pioneers, and their disagreement with the Peruvian Catholic Church, was further emphasized in 1965, when guerrilla groups began to operate in the Peruvian Andes. Both Bolo Hidalgo and Luna Victoria supported, or at least defended, the guerrillas, a position which contradicted that of the hierarchy; an organization led by Luna Victoria even rejected the government's branding of guerrillas and supporters of Communism as traitors (20).

(17) Luna Victoria, Ciencia y Practica, p. 280.

(18) Ibid., pp. 190-203. The definition of "elastic property" is not quite clear, but Luna Victoria accepts confiscation of certain types of property.

(19) Ibid., p. 26.

(20) The statements are reprinted in Rogger Mercado, Las Guerrillas del Peru - El MIR : De la Predica Ideologica a la Accion Armada (Lima : Fondo de Cultura Popular, 1967), pp. 140-45 and 183) respectively.

During the 1960s most of the few laymen and members of the clergy, who favored drastic reforms in Peru tried to channel their political activities through the Christian Democratic Party, an alternative that gained popularity after the 1964 presidential victory of its Chilean counterpart. However, it soon became clear that the Christian Democratic party of Peru was going to be unable to develop the popular following or the political influence these Catholic reformers had been hoping for; furthermore, the party was partially coopted by Belaunde Terry's Accion Popular and consequently was blamed for the errors of his administration. More recent divisions of the Christian Democratic Party have further diminished its political potentialities; furthermore, the present military regime placed a cloud over the future of all existing political parties.

Consequently, the ranks of the Catholic reformers seem to have grown substantially in the late 1960s; they have organized themselves and entered their country's political arena as a group. Their activities have been particularly noticeable since the military regime which took power in October, 1968, sowed that it was prepared to carry out certain reforms. In a sense, the influence of the pioneers has been reduced, or perhaps it should be said superseded, by a more highly organized group which, although still a minority of the clergy, no longer relies on a few individuals. The organization that appears to have evolved as the articulator of these reformers' views as to what the political ideology of the Peruvian Catholic Church ought to be is the National Office of Social Information, or ONIS, after its Spanish initials. It is difficult to obtain a complete list of its members, but it would seem that one hundred would not be an unrealistic figure, apparently all of whom are members of the clergy. Their message on agrarian reform, issued on June 20, 1969, shortly before the Peruvian military regime announced its Agrarian Reform Act, has 82 signatures. It was possible to obtain some information on 72 members of ONIS, which is summarized in table I.

Table I.

Comparison of ONIS Membership and General Peruvian Clergy

	ONIS members	All priests
Percentage native Peruvian	57,5	56,8
Percentage located in Lima	62,5	32,5
Age breakdown-percentage distribution		
to 40 years of age	56,9	43,7
41 - 50	33,3	22,7
51 - 60	6,9	17,1
61 on	2,8	16,5
Average age	40,3 years	45,9 years

Source : Prepared by the author from data made available by the Peruvian Catholic Church.

Some characteristics of this group are readily apparent: Its members are clearly young priests, a significant majority located in the Lima metropolitan area; the proportion of those with very advanced training in the social sciences and the humanities is high, and it may even be higher than shown in the available data. Of those not located in Lima, the overwhelming majority were either in the dioceses of Arequipa or Trujillo. In fact, some of the signers participated in an incident, which took place in the city of Trujillo during March and April of 1969; on that occasion they supported blue collar workers on strike and ran into a conflict with an upper class club. The priests involved were attacked by the Papal Nuncio, who denounced them to the hierarchy and to the military government. The episode ended when the government and the hierarchy refused to intervene, thus forcing the Vatican representative to leave his post (21).

These reformist elements have publicized widely their perception of what the position of the Church was and should have been. One of the leading spokesmen of this group has outlined in no uncertain terms the traditional role of the Peruvian Church as follows:

The Church has been an easy, and often complacent, prey of those who in the name of a "western and Christian" world have used it to protect their interests and to defend an order created for their own benefit.

It could be admitted, at the most, that the Church presents certain ethical requirements in the building of the eternal city; and this only when these requirements do not openly contradict the interests of those who have the reins of the economic and political domination of the people (22).

On the other hand, he sees the new role of the Peruvian Catholic Church as that of provider of "a theology of man's liberation",

For those who are trying to conform their lives to the evangelical requirements, it becomes constantly more difficult to accept vague and theoretical calls to fraternity and union of all Christians, without taking into account the deep causes of the present state of things and the concrete conditions of the building of a just society.

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(21) Apparently some of the same priests had also signed a letter to the Pope in November, 1968, in which they opposed the Encyclical Letter Humanae Vitae. Some details were published in Caretas, May 8-22, 1969 p. 16

(22) Gustavo Gutierrez, in his introduction to Signos de Renovacion (Lima : Comision Episcopal de Accion Social, 1969), pp. 7 and 12. Father Gutierrez, a member of the Faculty of the Catholic University of Peru, was involved in the exchange with the Papal Nuncio and is a member of ONIS.

It forgets that the universality of the Church is not something definitely acquired and which continues to exist at any price, but something that needs to be bravely, costly, and willingly conquered. These invocations seem to be intended, consciously or not, to smooth real and necessary tensions and, in the last resort, to maintain the status quo . . . The most dynamic sectors of the People of God in Latin America . . . are seeking two things : A theological base which encompasses all their actions in a continent in the process of liberation; and new ecclesiastic structures which allow a life of total Faith, in accordance with the perception the Latin American man has of his own historic future.

To preach the evangelical message is not to preach an evasion of this world. On the contrary, the Word of the Lord tends to make deeper, to radicalize, our commitment in history. And this, concretely, means for us to solidarize with the oppressed of this continent, to participate in their efforts to become free, with the understanding that the history of salvation is a liberation in process (23).

The Catholic Church and Current Peruvian Politics; A Possible Course of Action.

A careful exploration of events within the Catholic clergy of Peru shows that these views constitute the vanguard of the reformist group. It cannot be ignored, however, that the Peruvian reformists and their more conservative colleagues are currently faced with a very special situation. It is not too difficult for the Catholic Church to place itself to the left of those in control of the government in countries such as Brazil and Paraguay; they can do so without radically shifting their political ideology and without necessarily alienating the bulk of their upper and upper middle class supporters. The abuses of power committed by those in control provide attractive short-term issues, without forcing the Church into a consideration of the more crucial redistribution of socioeconomic rewards (24). But in Peru, since October, 1968, the Catholic reformers, and the rest of the clergy, have been operating under an authoritarian military regime which has presented itself as its country's developmental elite.

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(23) Ibid., pp. 11 and 13

(24) This is not to say that some reformist priests, in countries such as Brazil, have not addressed themselves to the more essential political issues of their country: they have. The numerous statements by Helder Camara and Valdir Calheiros, to mention just two bishops, are there to prove it. But it should be emphasized that they did not have to involve themselves in the larger socioeconomic question to oppose the government.

Furthermore, the Peruvian military officers now in control of the government have taken action in certain fields, such as agrarian reform, tighter control of economic penetrators, and greater supervision of foreign exchange operations, which lend some credence to their avowed intentions (25).

The only situation which could be related to the one being faced by the Peruvian Catholic Church is the Castro takeover in Cuba, and his later embrace, at least orally, of Communism. But this situation is not really comparable. Both the supranational authorities of the Catholic Church and their national counterparts have clearly indicated their opposition to Communism, although the Church has tried to continue its activities in countries controlled by those who subscribe to that competing ideology. The Peruvian military leaders, however, have clearly indicated that, while they are not too responsive to the wishes of one superpower, they have not moved very much closer to the other; and it must be remembered that some of the officers now occupying responsible positions were active in the elimination of the left-wing guerrilla bands in 1965. Therefore, the Catholic Church of Peru and particularly its reformist wing are faced with a regime that is taking the lime-light away from them. The alternative of siding with the traditional upper class is really hardly an alternative at all, particularly for the reformist wing, but also for the other members of the clergy. If the Church was not being very successful in its ideological competition with the left-wing ideologies when it could count on the resources of the state for help, and when it could accuse its ideological rivals of being Communists, which is to say evil, how could the Church expect to be successful against a military government which was able to convey a reformist image? To oppose reform would be to alienate an even greater percentage of the lower and lower middle class, and probably of the few technocrats who still subscribed to the Catholic faith.

The choice was not too difficult for the reformist wing. Since its members noticed that there were policy cleavages within the armed forces, not all of them solved by sudden retirements or by diplomatic sinecures, and that these cleavages were reflected in contradictory and extremely careful actions, the reformists placed themselves clearly to the left of the military regime. They supported those measures that they considered sufficiently reformist, and selectively criticized those which did not meet their criteria, or did not go far enough. Furthermore, they took the military regime to task when no action was forthcoming on items that, in the Catholic reformists' opinion, were in need of change. Consequently, ONIS's declaration on agrarian reform appeared a few days before the military government issued its Agrarian Reform Act, but when it was vox populi in Lima and the rest of the country that a decision on this matter was forthcoming.

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(25) The writer is not prepared to provide a final assessment of the degree of reformism which exists in the present Peruvian military regime. Some changes have obviously taken place; whether these changes amount to a revolution is something that informed observers are unable to say. For recent assessments consult Victor Villanueva, Nueva Mentalidad Militar en el Peru? (Lima : Libreria-Editorial Juan Mejia Baca, 1969); and Astiz, "The Peruvian Armed Forces as a Political Elite: Can They Develop a New Developmental Model?" paper delivered at the special round table of IPSA, Rio de Janeiro, October 27 - 31, 1969.

The declaration states : "It is our duty, as servants of the Lord's Word, to announce to all these who in one way or another return dignity, bread and justice to the peasant, that in doing so they are doing it to Christ himself (26). The implication that ONIS is ahead and more reformist than the military is emphasized by Gutierrez, who indicated in October, 1969 that the steps so far taken by the government were "interesting, important, but insufficient. An authentic transformation suggests, for instance, greater popular participation; such a transformation cannot be made only from the top down". Another member of the organization stated that, "since before this revolution, we were trying to develop a revolutionary consciousness (27)". Another public declaration of ONIS, dated October 4, 1969, continued along the same lines :

Social transformation is not merely a revolution for the people the people themselves - particularly the peasants and the blue collar sectors, exploited and unjustly margined - should be agents of their own liberation . . . The steps recently taken in Peru (IFS's nationalization and agrarian reform suffer obstacles and limitations in their application, owing to the pressures and the involvement of those sectors affected (by these measures) and to the negligence of some public officials . . . We call the public's attention to the distrust and even the repression shown against just demands of unionized labor . . . (28).

More recently, as the government was involved in negotiations with American corporations in regard to the extraction of copper from the Cuajone area, ONIS warned the military that further concessions should not be granted. Members of ONIS have assisted workers who were striking for higher salaries or who had been laid off, while the organization questioned the military government's policy of ignoring the high unemployment rate and maintaining the freeze originally decreed on wages (29). Thus, the priests who are members of ONIS seem to have been successful in maintaining the initiative in terms of reformism and in remaining disassociated from the present regime. A similar attitude has been followed by Luna Victoria, recently living in London but writing often in the magazine Oiga. This political position has had its consequences; Father Harold Griffiths Escardo, sympathetic to the reformists, indicated that,

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(26) The declaration was reproduced in Oiga (Lima), June 27, 1969, pp. 20-24; the quote is from p. 22.

(27) Caretas, October 15-24, 1969, pp. 19-20.

(28) Oiga, October 10, 1969, pp. 22-23.

(29) Oiga, November 21, 1969, p. 11 ; January 9, 1970, pp. 42-43; and January 30, 1970, pp. 35-36. The military had no compunction about granting themselves a 30 percent pay raise; see Caretas, May 23 - June 12, 1969, p. 15. The magazine was immediately closed down.

The powerful economic groups, for instance, have rejected this new attitude (of the Church) and have refused, in retaliation, their economic assistance to the works of the Church. This attitude, however, has only served to assess the depth of the belief of many of those Christians and to painfully ascertain the limitations of the serious training provided in Catholic schools and pulpits. . . . Unfortunately, the January calls of Dedellin and of the national hierarchy have not been sufficiently heard or sufficiently implemented (30).

What may have been more surprising for both interested and neutral observers is that the main bulk of the Peruvian Catholic Church, as represented by the hierarchy, has maneuvered into a position that parallels that of its reformist wing, only that it is a few degrees to the right. This equivocal attitude of the Peruvian hierarchy had been in existence since the 1960's and was reflected in the public positions taken in the Second Vatican Council, as indicated in table II. Thus, while the hierarchy did not punish the early reformist priests, such as Luna Victoria, and did not support the Papal Nuncio's attack in the Ttrujillo episode, it did nothing to prevent the use of the Faith in combating left-wing organization particularly in the Sierra region.

Table II

Public Positions of Peruvian Representatives in Vatican Council II

	Conservative		Liberal	
	Absolute	Percentage	Absolute	Percentage
Cardinal	4	66,6	2	33,3
Bishops	3	50,0	3	50,0
All	7	58,3	5	41,7

Source: Prepared by the author from information published in Xavier Rynne, Letters from Vatican City (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1963-66) four volumes.

The relationship of the hierarchy and the military government has been, at best, an uneasy one. Cardinal Landazurri Ricketts, the head of the Peruvian Catholic Church, supported those measures which had obvious popular appeal, such as the takeover of the International Petroleum Company assets and the conflict with the United States over the purchase of military equipment; his support of government actions on the IPC question, however, was coupled with a call for prompt elections and a return to civilian government (31).

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(30) Oiga, Juli 11, 1969, p. 34

(31) La Prensa (Lima), October 11, 1968, p. 2 and Caretas, May 23 - June 12, 1969, p.15

The bishops of Chimbote and Cajamarca took the side of workers and peasants and severely criticized the authorities; the latter also stated that the Agrarian Reform Law passed by the military regime had serious deficiencies and called for its improvement. The position of the bishop of Chimbote in favor of blue collar workers was so forceful that he was reported to have been detained by Peru's secret police (32). Bishop Bambaren, who was appointed bishop of the shanty towns not too long ago, heads an organization which advises shantytown dwellers on possible improvements. When General Artola, one of the members of the Cabinet, tried to develop popular support by distributing presents among these people, he was rebuffed by Bambaren, who pointed out that, "instead of calming the poor with cake and used clothing, it is necessary to reform society" (33) General Artola ceased in his attempts.

Perhaps the most serious conflict between the hierarchy and the military regime came about as a consequence of university reforms enacted by the government. Students of the Catholic University demonstrated in opposition to the new law and the police entered the buildings and beat up faculty, students, and even the university president; Cardinal Landazurri Ricketts chastised the government, even after apologies were made. The conservative newspaper La Prensa, which articulates the views of the coastal sector of the traditional upper class, praised the Cardinal's position :

These exhortations should be taken very much into account, because they show the preoccupation of the primate of the Peruvian Church for the commission of acts which injure the rights which constitute the spiritual and human patrimony of Peru's Catholics, as citizens.

But the newspaper felt that it should distinguish between the Cardinal and the reformist wing. In a different article, printed in the same editorial page, La Prensa attacked change in the Church by saying,

In wanting to renew the Church in order to bring it up to date, those who wish an "incarnation" of the Church as close to the present world as possible, as modern as possible, should remember what happened in the Middle Ages: A tie between the Christians and what then was "the present" world. And it cannot escape our attention that, in those procedures, there was a large share of legitimate drowning of the Christian in the profane; and this is what is dangerous in a too definitive "incarnation", of too steep a renewal toward that which is temporal (34).

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(32) Oiga, March 7, 1969, p.10; and November 14, 1969, pp. 12 and 33.

(33) Caretas, May 23 - June 12, 1969, p. 15; and July 10 - 23, 1969, p. 32

(34) Both articles in La Prensa, June 17, 1969, p. 8

When it came to deeds that affected their immediate interest, the hierarchy was extremely cautious, and the reformist wing lost its precision and sense of urgency. ONIS agreed in October, 1969, "to make a very real effort to eliminate in our communities the system of payments for the administration of sacraments" (35). A meeting of Peruvian bishops, held in July 1969, agreed to review relations with the state and indicated that a committee was studying the matter of Church property in relation to urban reform; at the same time, the bishops demanded social security and other social benefits for the clergy. Cardinal Landazurri Ricketts decided to move from his official residence into a less pretentious house; he also donated suburban land near Lima to build 600 houses for people of limited means, although it was not made clear to whom the donation had been made or who was going to build the house (36). Actions of this type prompt accusations of deception by anti-Catholic writers:

The Church pretends, through spectacular postures such as the already-mentioned encyclical [Populorum Progressio], to place itself in a more or less "advanced" strategic position. In such a way, it plans to imitate what happens in road bicycle races, when a team captain sends one of his assistants to lead the group, in order to slow it down with the appearance of giving it more impetus (37).

This line of thinking, however, is erroneous. If the core of the Catholic Church's political power in countries such as Peru has been derived from its being the provider of a political ideology ratified by the world of God, which justified the status quo; and if the "revolution of rising expectations" has reduced the effectiveness of that ideology and turned people away from the Catholic Faith, as this paper maintains, it would seem that the only realistic alternative, if those souls are to be regained, is to shift the ideological content of Catholicism and turn it into a political ideology of change. This shift in content can be achieved at the national and local level, by adequate interpretation of existing documents, such as Rerum Novarum, Quadragesimo Anno, and Populorum Progressio. This interpretation is, in most cases and particularly in reference to the lower class, the responsibility of the parish priests and of all other religious personnel working directly with the poor.

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(35) Oiga, October 10, 1969, p. 23

(36) Oiga, July 18, 1969, p. 41; and La Prensa, June 11, 1969, p. 7.

In a follow up note it was indicated that some of the holdings of the Church, apparently including the property involved here, were a losing proposition and that the houses to be built were going to be rented with options to buy. Cardinal Landazurri Ricketts also appointed an advisory committee to gather facts and propose solutions and promised the future creation of a Permanent Bureau of Technical Advice, for further consultation. See Siete Dias de Peru y del Mundo (supplement of La Prensa), June 15, 1969, p. 7

(37) Elias Condal "El Vaticano y el Tercer Mundo", in Bernardo Castro Villagrana and others, La Iglesia, el Subdesarrollo y la Revolucion (Mexico: Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1968) p.196

It is they who have to be convinced of the necessity to shift, before the Catholic Church, as an institution, can provide ideological support to social and political reform in Peru. The data currently available tends to indicate that the great majority of the Peruvian clergy do not yet favor such a change, but it is possible to think that the presence in power of a group of military officers prepared to carry out some reforms, and the neutrality of the hierarchy, together with pressures at the supranational level, will give ONIS the opportunity to develop the widespread support among their colleagues required to effect the desired ideological shift.

lvdb/gv.

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A /III - Churches as political institutions.

- Les églises comme institutions politiques.

The Catholic Church in politics : The Peruvian Case

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A/III/13.

SUMMARY.

This paper attempts to discuss the role played by the Catholic Church in Peruvian politics, and the cleavages that have developed within that institution, as a consequence of its role.

The author maintains that originally the Peruvian Catholic Church provided the ideological justification utilized by the traditional upper class to maintain the status quo. Although Catholicism in the abstract does not necessarily play such a role, the specific application of Catholic dogma to Peruvian political realities by the clergy led to the above-mentioned situations. In playing that role, the Catholic Church found itself in conflict with the anti-status quo ideologies that have appeared in Peru since the 1920s.

While relatively successful against APRA, the political ideology of the Catholic Church does not seem to have done equally well when confronted with the extreme left; this is particularly true after the so-called "revolution of rising expectations" came into being. The data available indicates that the lower and lower middle classes have been moving away from Catholicism in the last two decades. This deteriorating situation encouraged younger priests and laymen to shift the political interpretation of the Catholic dogma toward "a theology of revolution". The priests, still a minority but a growing one within the Peruvian clergy, have become organized around ONIS, now in the forefront of reform within the Peruvian Church.

The presence of a military regime that has shown willingness to carry out some reforms, combined with "the revolution of rising expectations", have left ONIS no alternative but to place itself to the left of the present government. The hierarchy and a majority of the clergy have adopted an ambivalent position, supporting some changes but disassociating themselves from the policymakers. In the present political climate the members of ONIS seem to have an opportunity to make public their position without fear of sanctions either from within the institution or from the government. Under these conditions, it is possible that they will succeed in shifting the role played by the Peruvian Catholic Church from ideological supporter of the status quo to justifier of radical change.

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A III - Les églises comme institutions
politiques
- Churches as political institutions

RESUME du rapport "L'EGLISE CATHOLIQUE EN POLITIQUE :
LE CAS PERUVIEN" par Carlos Alberto ASTIZ,
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A. III / 13

Ce rapport tente de définir le rôle joué par l'Eglise catholique dans la politique péruvienne, et les clivages qui se sont produits dans cette institution suite à son rôle.

L'auteur affirme que l'Eglise catholique péruvienne procura, à l'origine, la justification idéologique utilisée par la classe supérieure traditionnelle afin de maintenir le statu quo. Bien qu'en théorie le catholicisme ne joue pas nécessairement un tel rôle, l'application spécifique du dogme catholique aux réalités politiques péruviennes par le clergé, conduisit aux situations mentionnées plus haut. Pour avoir tenu ce rôle, l'Eglise catholique se trouva en conflit avec les idéologies opposées au statu quo telles qu'elles apparaissent au Pérou depuis les années 1920.

Alors qu'elle s'avère relativement heureuse contre l'APRA, l'idéologie politique de l'Eglise catholique ne semble pas se défendre aussi bien lorsqu'elle est confrontée avec l'extrême gauche ; ceci est particulièrement vrai depuis la "révolution des grandes espérances". Les données disponibles indiquent que les classes inférieure et moyenne se sont éloignées du Catholicisme au cours des deux dernières décennies. Cette situation qui va se détériorant, encouragea les plus jeunes prêtres et les laïcs à faire glisser l'interprétation politique du dogme catholique vers "une théologie de la révolution". Les prêtres, qui restent une minorité - mais une minorité grandissante - dans le clergé péruvien, se sont organisés autour de l'ONIS, à présent à l'avant-garde de la réforme au sein de l'Eglise péruvienne.

La présence d'un régime militaire qui montra la volonté d'opérer certaines réformes, combinée à la "révolution des grandes espérances" n'ont laissé à l'ONIS d'autre choix que de se placer à la droite du présent gouvernement. La hiérarchie et une majorité du clergé ont adopté une position ambivalente, soutenant certains changements mais se dissociant des hommes politiques. Dans le climat politique actuel, les membres de l'ONIS semblent avoir l'occasion de rendre leur position publique, sans crainte de sanctions ni au sein de l'institution ni venant du gouvernement. Dans ces conditions il est possible qu'ils réussissent à modifier l'orientation de l'Eglise catholique péruvienne, passant du rôle de soutien idéologique du statu quo à celui de justificateur d'un changement radical.

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GOLD COAST BEFORE INDEPENDENCE

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MUSLIM POLITICAL ACTIVITY

IN THE GOLD COAST BEFORE

INDEPENDENCE

by J. H. PRICE

I. GENERAL

a. Geographical : The Gold Coast, lying between 1° 12'E and 3° 15' W Longitude and 4° 45' N and 11° 11' N latitude (1) is roughly rectangular in shape, and has a total area of approximately 91,842 sq.m⁽²⁾., made up as follows :

Colony :	23,937 sq.m.
Ashanti :	24,379 sq.m.
Northern Territories :	30,486 sq.m.
Togoland under U.K. Trusteeship	13,040 sq.m.
	<hr/> 91,842 sq.m. (3)

b. Population :

At the 1948 Census, the total population was 4,118,450 (4), made up as follows :

Colony :	2,254,413
Ashanti :	818,944
N.T.s :	1,045,093
Togoland under U.K. Trusteeship	(383,614)
	<hr/> 4,118,450

In 1948 the non-African population numbered 6.770, of whom 4.211 were British, and 1.213 Lebanese (5).

Owing to the rapid expansion in the Gold Coast's economy and the initiation of the development programme since 1948 census, all of which required a rapid influx of skilled technicians, together with the growing tendency amongst Europeans to maintain their wives and families in the country, the total European population of the Gold Coast in mid-1956 may have been over 10,000 the majority being holders of governmental technical appointments and commercial posts, and their dependants.

Of the Africans themselves, in 1948 2,078,715 were males and 2,032,965 were females, giving a male excess of roughly 2 1/2 % (6).

The mid-1954 population of the Gold Coast, the latest relevant figure was estimated as follows :

Colony :	2,496,000
Ashanti:	930,000
N.T. s	1,122,000
Togoland under U.K. Trusteeship	(412,000)
	<hr/> 4,548,000 (7)

This total must be treated with caution, as must all the 1948 census figures quoted above, with the exception of the figures relating to the non-African population, which are checked against immigration statistics. Population figures in most tropical dependencies tend to be underestimates. This was particularly true in the Gold Coast, for the following reasons inter alia :

- I. There is a traditional reluctance to allow oneself or one's dependants to be registered by the Government, as it is feared that one may thereby make oneself liable to direct taxation (the direct tax on heads of families, formerly known as the native authority levy, and now known as the local authority basic rate, is a form of poll-tax, and evasion is widespread, as its incidence is very unpopular for reasons which it would be unprofitable to explore here);

2. As the time of the 1948 census, the Palestine troubles

were still at their height, and a rumour spread round the Gold Coast that the purpose of the census was to prepare a list of all men military age in order that they might be conscribed for service in the Middle East;

3. Laziness on the part of census enumerators led to the omission from the census return of many small villages which could only be reached on foot. (I have myself visited several bush villages, the headmen of which have assured me that they were never visited by census enumerators in 1948, and the populations of which have therefore presumably never been included in the census returns);

4. Headmen of bush villages were expected to declare to the census enumerator the total populations of their villages. Often the total would be deliberately minimised in order to cover up the headman's failure to collect the full amount of the native authority levy;

5. Amongst the non-Muslims there is an apparently unconscious tendency not to count infants as "persons". This attitude is given administrative recognition in the fact that the levy, or latterly the basic rate, is not payable on account of infants. (Women in most areas pay half the basic rate). Amongst the Muslims this occasionally extends to adult females also. Thus if a census enumerator were to enquire of the householder of a hut in which there lived himself, his wife, and four infants how many persons lived in the hut, he might be told 'two'. In the North he might even be told 'one'. Add to these the inefficiency and in-experience of lowly paid and ill-trained census enumerators, and the cumulative margin of error can be quite large. (Wide infra : note on the population of Accra).

The 1954 estimate, which is extrapolated from the 1948 census returns by adding a percentage to cover natural increase, and by taking into consideration estimated net immigration and the increase in the number of persons paying the basic rate, must be even more unreliable.

(I have dealt with this at some length in order to illustrate the pitfalls confronting anyone who relies solely upon statistical evidence when attempting to carry out research into West African affairs.)

c. Historical and administrative :-

The Gold Coast was divided, like Caesar's Gaul, into three parts, which were administratively and ethnically distinct. The southernmost strip, known as the Colony, had had continuous contact with European influences and trade since the first Portuguese landing on the coast in 1482 (8). To judge by its origins, the international status of the Colony should really have been that of a Protectorate, but in 1874, by an Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, a Colony of the Gold Coast and Lagos was created, limited as far as the Gold Coast was concerned to the actual forts and settlements (9), and since 1895, when the term 'protectorate' was abandoned, all territory in the Gold Coast at that time under the jurisdiction of Queen Victoria was deemed to be a colony by settlement, as it was declared in the Order in Council of 1901 (10).

The Kingdom of Ashanti, to the north of the Colony, was a thorn in the flesh of the British administrators throughout the nineteenth century, and after a series of seven Ashanti wars ending in 1900, was declared a colony by conquest under the 1901 Order in Council (11). Paradoxically, although a colony by conquest, Ashanti has been ruled in a manner outwardly at least closer to that of the "typical" protectorates of the "indirect rule" pattern than the administration of any other part of the Gold Coast. The Asantehene, who was exiled with his principal followers to the Seychelles in 1896, was allowed to return to his home in 1924, and was enstooled as Kumasihehene in 1926; while his successor, Nana Sir Osei Agyeman Prempeh II, was recognised as Asantehene in 1935 (12).

Treaties of trade and protection were concluded in 1896 with the Northern chiefs by the British, who were actuated partly by a desire to bar the hinterland of the Gold Coast to the Germans and French whose territories were expanding rapidly in that area at the time, and

partly by anxiety to call a halt to the slave-raiding exploits of the Mandingo emperor, Samori Touré; and the boundaries of what became known as the Protectorate of the Northern Territories were internationally agreed in 1898-9 (13).

In addition to these three territories, the Gold Coast government had administered since the Great War the western strip of the former German colony of Togo, at first as a League of Nations mandate, and latterly as a United Nations trusteeship territory. (14).

Although all four territories were administered as one unitary state, there had until recently been differences in their constitutional development. Until 1946, when the "Burns" Constitution was promulgated. (15), the Governor was himself the sole legislative authority for Ashanti, the Northern Territories and Togoland. In 1946 Ashanti became subject to the legislative authority of the Legislative Council, (16) as did Southern Togoland shortly afterwards. (17) (Northern Togoland became for all practical administrative purpose part of the N.T.s). From 1951 the newly created Legislative Assembly assumed legislative power over N.T.s, including Northern Togoland, (18) a power which since 1954 was for all practical purposes, that of complete internal self-government (19).

Administratively, the Colony, excluding that part of it lying to the east of the River Volta, was divided into three Regions, Western and Eastern Regions, each under a Regional Officer, and Accra Region under a Senior Government Agent. Trans-Volta and Southern Togoland, unified for both ethnic and administrative reasons, formed a separate Region under a Regional Officer. (The importance of this office can be judged from the fact that the first Regional Officer of T.V.T., Mr. G.E. Sinclair, C.M.G. (now Sir George Sinclair M.P.), after holding the office for less than three years, was appointed Deputy Governor of Cyprus).

A plebiscite was held under United Nations auspices in May 1956, to determine the future status of British Togoland, which was as a result incorporated in Ghana on independence in 1957.

Ashanti and the N.T.s (including Northern Togoland) each had a Chief Regional Officer. These officers, with their subordinate regional

organisations, were mainly concerned with the oversight of the local authorities, and were responsible to the Minister of Local Government and Housing, but had inherited from their predecessors, the Chief Commissioners, a residual function as general representatives of the central government on the spot.

Little can be said of the early history of the various tribes of the Gold Coast. Our knowledge of it is based mainly upon oral traditions which are only now being analysed, and which consist largely of ill-remembered traditions of movement and place-associations (one difficulty lies in the identification of place-names used by the various tribes). As none of the Gold Coast tribes had evolved a system of writing, there are no written records available.

It seems safe, however, to assume that the Akan peoples, who occupied Ashanti, most of the Colony and part of Togoland, came from the North in three successive waves, the first arriving probably as early as 1200 AD (20), and the last, the ancestors of the present day Twi and Ashantis, possibly a couple of hundred years later.

The south-eastern tribes, the Ewes in T.V.T., the Gas and Adangmes on the Accra plain, and the Krobo, centred on Odumase, all have oral traditions of having come from the east, possibly from what is now Nigeria. Indeed, some Ewes have claimed to me that the Yorubas are their 'brothers', and that their languages are related though this is manifestly untrue. Attempts to identify place names used in the oral traditions of these tribes have been unsuccessful, though some educated Ewes have hazarded guesses to me which seem to rest on little foundation.

The origins of the tribes of the Northern Territories seem even more obscure. Physically, many of them appear to be of different stock from the Southerners; They tend to be taller and slimmer, and their facial characteristics are often more aquiline. They were probably subject in the mediaeval period to one or other of the great empires of the Western Sudan, the Melle or the Songhai (21), undergoing a certain amount of racial

admixture with Arabs, part-Arabs and Berbers.

These contacts, and the continuance of Arab influence from North Africa until recent times by way of the great caravan routes of the Sahara, led to large-scale conversions of the Northern peoples to Islam.

2. The incidence of Islam :- The vast majority of Gold Coast Muslims, whether indigenous or immigrant, are Sunnis, following Maliki law. (22). An accurate estimate of the numbers involved had hitherto proved impossible, although the Government Statistician, Accra gave consideration to my proposal to include a religious investigation in the next census. The Chief Iman of Accra (the Iman Abas), who in the past had been looked upon as the religious leader of all orthodox Muslims in the Gold Coast (x), claimed to have some 500.000 followers. This may actually be an under-estimate (an unusual circumstance where religious sects are concerned), as Dr. F. Hilliard, in paper on Muslim education in the Gold Coast (23) estimated the Muslim population as between 10 % and 15 % of the total population, and increasing. On a basis of the latest population estimates, that would suggest a possible Muslim population in 1956 of upwards of 700.000. It is interesting to compare this with Trimingham 's estimate of 150.000 or 3.6 %. (J.S. Trimingham: " The Christian Church and Islam in West Africa," S.C.M. Press Ltd., London 1955).

This illustrates the difficulty of discussing religious matters with missionaries. For their own statistics, a Christian is a man who says that he is a Christian , and attends Church at least occasionally; while a Muslim is a man who says his prayers five times a day, keeps his ~~fasts~~ rigorously , never disobeys in the slightest the religious laws of Islam, and is uncontaminated by any non-Islamic influences.(A missionary once said to me of one of my students : ' You can't call X a Muslim - I have seen him drinking beer in the J.C.R.') I prefer, for the purpose of political analysis, to count that man a Muslim who when asked says that he is a Muslim, who wears Muslim dress when not in Western clothes, and who has at least one Muslim name. Identifying himself thus with the Muslim community, he will tend to react as a Muslim to political stimuli.

The literacy rate amongst Gold Coast Muslims is much lower than the average for the rest of the population. This can be ascribed in part to the poverty of the majority of the Muslim community, which has in the past necessitated the putting to work of children of school age, in part to the fact that the greatest concentrations of Muslims are in areas (the Northern Territories and Northern Togoland) where poor educational opportunities have existed until recently, but mainly to the reluctance of Muslim parents to send their children to secular or mission Christian mission schools.

Parents feel that in sending their children to non-Islamic schools, they are failing in the duty enjoined upon them in the Quran of training their offspring strictly in the Faith. At the mission schools, particularly, there is the risk of conversion to Christianity. (I interviewed in March 1956 a six-year-old Hausa girl, who had just completed her first term at a well-known Roman Catholic convent boarding school. During the first week at the school, she told me, all the non-Christian girls, including herself, were baptised, and were then informed by the Mother Superior that they were now Christians. When her mother protested about this, she was blandly informed that she could, if she wished, remove her daughter from the school. As it is very difficult to secure a place for a girl at a good primary boarding school, the mother had to acquiesce for the sake of her child's education). Perhaps the strongest objection that uneducated Muslims of the older generation have to sending their children to school is that they lose their traditional respect for their elders, grow up to despise farming and any other form of manual labour, though not necessarily suited to any other form of employment, and after leaving school drift off to the big cities, where they become the Gold Coast equivalent of "teddy-boys".

Most Muslim parents thus discharge their koranic obligations merely by sending their children on a part-time basis to the local "mallam" for religious instruction. This consists mainly of learning the Quran by heart, and learning to read and write what passes for classical Arabic. (A Sudanese friend, whose mother tongue is Arabic, assures me that he finds the Arabic taught by Gold Coast mallams so distorted after generations of being passed

on from one non-Arab to another as to be virtually incomprehensible).

Besides this lack of education in either the Western or the Islamic sense, Gold Coast Muslims are so cut off for geographical reasons from the main stream of Islam that their religious beliefs and daily habits of life would cause the hands of pious Muslims in other parts of the world to be raised in horror. By this I am not trying to imply that they are deliberately impious; the imperfection of their observances is partly due to the survival from pre-Islamic times of pagan customs amongst some tribes, just as Easter eggs, mistletoe, and Yule logs have been absorbed into respectable English Christian tradition, and partly to the lack of good Islamic educational facilities, with the consequent non-comprehension of some of the basic tenets of their creed by the uneducated masses. I have for instance watched an extremely religious Muslim woman devotedly say her last prayers of the day and then sit down to drink a glass of brandy. When I questioned her about this, she told me that Muslims are only forbidden to drink schnapps (which is very popular amongst illiterate Gold Coast villages) .. " akpeteshi " (locally distilled illicit gin); that all other forms of alcohol are permissible when the daily prayer-cycle has been completed. She seemed blissfully unaware of the fact that in most Muslim countries at the present day, even where women are allowed to appear unveiled in public, it is customary for a woman to retire to a private place when saying her prayers.

3. The Ahmadiyya movement (24) Besides the Orthodox Muslims, there is an active ahmadiyya mission in the Gold Coast. The first missionaries from India landed at Saltpond, a coastal town of little importance some twelve miles east of Cape Coast, in the nineteen-twenties, and decided to start proselytisation at the point where they landed. As a result, the Gold Coast headquarters of the mission, which is led by an Amir, is still in Saltpond, although branches have now been opened in other big towns, such as Accra and Kumasi, and at Wa in the N.T.s. The movement is rapidly growing, gaining its converts both from Christianity and from paganism; the rate of growth being demonstrated by the fact that in 1931 there were 3,110 adherents (25), while by 1948 there were 22,572 (26).

Allowing for the snowball effect of a visibly successful mission which offers good educational facilities to its followers, I am inclined to believe that the strength of the movement may have been approaching 50.000 in 1956. The estimate of 150.000 given to me by the Secretary of the mission is obviously an overestimate if the census figures are at all reliable.

The Gold Coast hierarchy, under the Amir, is autonomous, and is not constitutionally connected with the parallel missions in Nigeria and Sierra Leone, although they circulate in a small way in the Gold Coast a weekly religious newspaper called "The truth", which is published by the Lagos Ahmadiyya Movement. They are financially self-supporting, and for a comparatively small community it must have been with considerable difficulty that the building of impressive mosques at Saltpond and Wa and the new secondary school buildings in Kumasi were undertaken. It is true, however, that they received from their headquarters in Lahore a small donation of, I believe, £ 400 towards the construction of the Saltpond mosque, while the Syrian community in Accra (the Muslims of which are non-Ahmadi) presented the carpet inside the mosque.

The Ahmadiyya mosques in Saltpond and Wa are the only modern properly designed mosques in the country. The poverty, both in finance and in ideas and energy, of the Orthodox community, can be judged from the fact that not a single mosque exists in the Colony and Ashanti which was built as such. Most of the mosques are little better than lean-to garages, while the Central Mosque in Accra, a building of no beauty which is passed by thousands of people every day who never notice that it is there, was formerly the warehouse of a trading company, and was originally built as the church of one of the early missions.

It is interesting to note that some years ago the Accra Muslim community leased a plot of land in a dominant position overlooking Accra (at the junction of Barnes Road and Castle Road) on which it was proposed to build a mosque. The start of the building was indefinitely delayed through lack of funds (very little support was forthcoming from the wealthy Syrian community, on whom reliance had been placed), and now the

new Roman Catholic cathedral has been built on the site.

Besides their mosque-building programme the Ahmadis have been very active in the educational sphere. Unlike the Orthodox Muslims, who instead of making an effort to help themselves demand that the Government should provide everything for them, the Ahmadis got their schools going, and then strove to bring them up to the educational standard required in order to attract direct Education Department grants. In all their schools, which are perforce, in order to qualify for the grant, open to all children irrespective of religious denomination, the normal prescribed curriculum, on a Western pattern, laid down by the Education Department is followed; in addition to which Ahmadi children and such of the Orthodox Muslim children as have parental consent stay in school each day for an extra hour after the other children have gone home, and are given Arabic lessons and Koranic instruction by the missionaries.

The Ahmadiyya mission succeeded in obtaining direct grants for the running of all their primary and middle schools, several of which were considered by the Education Department to be outstandingly good by comparison with many of the Christian mission or local authority schools, but in 1956 the question of a grant to the Ahmadiyya Secondary School in Kumasi was still under discussion. This school, besides having to provide out of Mission resources accommodation and equipment of a higher standard than is required in the primary and middle schools of a higher standard in West Africa, namely the inability to recruit local Muslim staff with the requisite qualifications, and the lack of adequate funds to recruit expatriate staff from better educated Muslim areas, such as the Sudan (+) and the Middle East.

As a result, all the teaching staff at the Kumasi secondary school with the exception of the Principal and the Vice-Principal, who were both Pakistanis, were indigenous mission-trained Christians.

The political philosophy of the Ahmadiyya movement seems to be that of Hum's precept "Obey the powers that be ...". Politically the Gold Coast hierarchy claimed to be loyal to whatever government is in power, while

maintaining that the political beliefs of its adherents are a matter of personal conscience. This attitude, besides being in line with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's teaching, is very understandable on the part of a newly established alien mission, which is not in the last resort backed, as were the early Christian missionaries, by British armed might. It would certainly be wrong to read any special significance into the fact that Kwame Nkrumah was invited to open the Saltpond mosque; he was acting, and invited, purely in his capacity as head of government.

At the same time, members of the hierarchy freely admitted that the vast majority of their congregation were C.P.P. supporters, pointing out at the same time that in this respect they were indistinguishable from non-Ahmadis residing in the same areas. Two Ahmadis were members of the 1954-56 (x) Assembly, while in the previous Assembly there was a former Ahmadi who had been converted to Christianity.

Apart from their activities in the Colony and Ashanti, the Ahmadiyya movement was strong in the chieftdom of Wa, in the N.T.s.. Their pillar of strength there was the former Wa Na ; the fact that his successor is an Orthodox Muslim may prove a hindrance to their expansion there.

By recognising the Ahmadiyya missionary as his personal Iman, the former Wa Na gave the Ahmadiyya movement almost the status of the Established Church in his dominions. He was 'enskinned' on his succession by this Iman, and the skin and other state regalia were laid up in the Ahmadiyya mosque. This Iman was displaced by the present Wa Na on his accession and an Orthodox Iman was appointed. The Ahmadiyya Iman alleged that his supersession was unconstitutional, as the appointment of Chief's Iman had always previously been for life, and refused to surrender the state regalia for the Wa Na's enskiment, claiming that only he had the right to instal a new chief. The Orthodox Muslims outnumber the Ahmadis in Wa, but although tempers rose between the factions, leading to occasional petty outbreaks of communal riotting, no attempt was made to remove the regalia by force from the Ahmadiyya

mosque, where they were publicly displayed. Apparently the Orthodox Muslims felt that even the Ahmadiyya mosque is a mosque, and must not be desecrated. Meanwhile the Wa Na continued to exercise his functions, although unenskinned.

Apart from this, it can be seen that in the Gold Coast, as in other parts of west Africa, the Ahmadiyya movement conformal to its traditional pattern-educational and social activity, combined with official support of the powers that be, and the toleration, or rather the encouragement, of the freedom of the political conscience of individual Ahmadis-and there seems no reason to expect this position to change. All further reference to Islamic attitudes in this paper will therefore be concerned exclusively with Orthodox Muslims.

4. Islam and the Traditional Authorities :- Many accounts of the position of the Chiefs in the Gold Coast have been written, (27) and it would be inappropriate to devote any space here to a summary of them. Suffice it then to say that the only States in the Gold Coast which are predominantly Muslim in composition are found in parts of the North, where, particularly in the North West, Islam has been firmly entrenched for centuries, and where the social capillarity which is noticeable also in Northern Nigeria encourages proselytisation, at any rate on the surface, at the present day. It is felt that success in life and acceptance by one's superiors are dependant upon one's devotion to Islam.

An amusing example of this is found in "Salifu the Detective" by J.C. Neville (MacMillan, revised edition 1953), an English reader much used in the N.T.s schools, where (pp 222) the hero, on becoming a recruit in the Escort Police (who were mainly recruited in the N.T.s), is warned by his friends "not to fall into the bad habits of the Coast and start drinking bush gin and smoking cigarettes; all the Sergeants advised him become a strict Mohammadan and obey the Prophet's commands, at any rate until he was a full-blown constable".

The tribal organisation of all States in the N.T.s., however whether one is concerned with the political structure itself, or with such basic social concepts as land tenure, inheritance, or marriage customs, is basically pagan, with at most a thin veneer of Islam superimposed. For example, no Muslim Northerner would be married to more than four wives simultaneously, although his relationship to those wives, his limitations on the choice of wives, and in some cases the age at which he may be betrothed or married, are regulated by the pre-Muslim tradition of his tribe. I was for instance, interested to notice at the enskinment in Yendi of the present Ya Na (xx), who is himself a Muslim and the ruler of a predominantly (nominally) Muslim tribe, that apart from a few readings from the Quran and a perfunctory blessing by the Imam, the whole ritual was pre-Muslim , being based upon the land-cult which is still a dominant influence in the minds of his otherwise nominally Muslim subjects. The system by which the Ya Na is chosen (from amongst the divisional chiefs of the so-called " Gateways to Yendi ") is itself pre-Muslim and bears no relation to Islamic political ideas.

In the Southern towns, it is customary for the immigrants from the N.T.s, Haute Volta, Northern Dahomey, and Northern Nigeria, the vast majority of whom are at least nominal Muslims, to live squalidly together in ghetto-like " Zongos ". (x) As under the original agreements by which these immigrants were able to settle and to occupy land, they had to integrate themselves into the existing traditional structure, one finds at the present day in each town a Zongo Chief (" Serikin Zongo "), who is himself subordinate to the Paramount Chief or Divisional Chief of the area. Each tribe represented in the Zongo chooses its own Chief (e.g. in Accra one finds, inter alia, the Chief of the Dagomba, the Chief of the Hausa, the Chief of the Moshi, the Chief of the Zambrama, etc.). These chiefs form an informal council for the Zongo, their influence in the council being determined largely by the number of their followers, and are responsible for choosing the Serikin Zongo, who is usually the Chief of the largest community inside the Zongo. They then act as the Serikin Zongo's Council. Particularly in the larger Zongos, such as Kumasi and

Accra, where the Serikin Zongo is a man of considerable substance and power and where the system has been established for a century or more, the posts of Serikin Zongo and of his sub-chiefs have tended to become hereditary, following Maliki inheritance law.

Outside the Zongo, the position of the Serikin Zongo vis-à-vis the traditional authorities has become almost completely assimilated into the traditional pattern, with the Serikin Zongo, who owes allegiance to the Paramount Chief, playing much the same part as one of the subordinate chiefs. The former Gbla Fia, an Ewe chief in Hohoe, Southern Togoland, explained a typical relationship to me.

The Serikin Zongo of Hohoe owes allegiance to the Gbla stool, is expected to look after the administration of the Zongo, and would be held responsible by the Gbla Fia for any anti-social action committed by an inhabitant of the Zongo. In time of war, he would be expected to call out his followers to support the Gbla Fia if he were attacked; but the Gbla Fia was not clear, since no precedent existed, whether he would be entitled as of right to call upon the support of the Serikin Zongo if he proposed to launch a war of aggression. This, he thought, would depend on the circumstances of the case, and his own aggressive intentions might be modified in the light of the Serikin Zongo's attitude.

The attitude of the Zongo was always important in the days of tribal war. With their racial and religious ties throughout the country they constituted a potential intelligence service; and the tribes found in the Zongos enjoyed a high reputation as warriors. (They were still in the 1950s the mainstay of the Gold Coast Military Forces and of the Escort Police).

In return for this support in peace and war, the Serikin Zongo is allowed the undisputed enjoyment, with his followers, of the tribal land which has been granted or leased to him.

5. The Rise of the Muslim Association :- To a large extent the Muslims were the hewers of wood and the carriers of water the police

and the soldiery of the Gold Coast, and as such felt themselves to be in an privileged position compared with other sections of the community. They claimed that as they paid their taxes to the same extent as other citizens (*) they should get the same educational and social benefits, which they felt that they didnot.

Although existing education and other services are just as freely available to Muslims as to non-Muslims, they feel that for true equality of provision, the State should run Koranic schools as well as " Christian " i.e., western-pattern , schools, and should enforce Muslim law (as far as the Muslim community is concerned) to the same extent as " Christian " (i.e., English) law is enforced in the courts.

These alleged disabilities they blamed partly upon the attitude of non-Muslim Gold Coasters towards them, which I shall discuss later, and partly upon the fact that they have few if any supporters sufficiently well educate to state their case effectively either to the general public or to the central government. As a result, the majority of Gold Coast Muslims embraced with almost Mahdist fervour the Gold Coast Muslim Association, which at its inception marked a new departure in Gold Coast politics, being the first party organised on sectarian basis.

Because its activities only recently came before the public eye, it was widely believed in non-Muslim quarters (28) that the G.C.M.A. had been only recently created. It was however found as an educational and social organisation as early as 1932, being at first, as described below, little more than a loose federation of local unions. It did not turn its attention towards politics until 1939, when a serious earthquake demolished a great deal of residential property in Accra. Apart from the central government's rebuilding programme, which produced the straggling and hideous housing estates at Christinasborg and Labadi, the Accra Town Council, as it then was, had a scheme for the distribution of building materials, such as corrugated iron and cement, to those who had been rendered homeless. The Muslim community, which was unrepresented on the Town Council, felt that it had suffered from an unfair distribution of building materials, and as a result the G.C.M.A. took its first political step by supporting Mambii (+) Party candidates in the wartime municipal elections (1940).

However, it felt itself let down by the Mambi Party councillors who after securing election, paid no further attention to Muslim interests. The alliance broke down, and from 1948 the G.C.M.A. leaders lent their support to the United Gold Coast Convention, which was led by Dr. J.B. Danquah, and as Secretary-General of which Kwame Nkrumah was invited to return to the Gold Coast. Bankole Awoonor Renner, the leader of the G.C.M.A., who took the name "Mustafa" on his conversion to Islam, was in addition, at that time one of the most prominent personalities in the U.G.C.C. (++) and played a leading part in the troubles of 1948. When the split, which produced the C.P.P. under Nkrumah's leadership disrupted the U.G.C.C., the G.C.M.A. followed the C.P.P. and gave them their whole-hearted support at the 1951 General Election.

During the latter days of the 1951 election campaign in Accra I saw on numerous occasions public address cars painted in the C.P.P. colours with G.C.M.A. spokesmen at the microphone, urging Muslim passers-by to vote for Kwame Nkrumah and Thomas Hutton-Mills.

The two C.P.P. candidates for the Accra constituency. Such speeches were almost always made in the pidgin Hausa which is the lingua franca of Gold Coast Muslims, and which is not readily intelligible to non-Muslim Southerners.

Muslim support for the C.P.P. at this election was, in part at least, ascribable to the promise contained in paragraph 27 of the C.P.P. election manifesto; 1950; that :

"under self-government, taxes will still be levied on all who should pay taxes, but the C.P.P. will see that taxation brings with it social, educational, medical, cultural and economic rewards for the whole community". (+++)

This was held by the Muslims to contain an implicit promise that Muslim schools ~~would~~ be provided by State, where Arabic and the scriptures would be taught in addition to the normal Westernised curriculum (29). The Muslim interpretation of the passage quoted was confirmed in somewhat wooly language in a private interchange of correspondence between Bankole Renner and Kojo Botsio (+) shortly before the election.

After C.P.P. came into power, nothing was done to implement the promise, partly because the government's educational policy placed such a burden upon educational administration that no new ~~experiments~~ could be undertaken, partly because of the generally xenophobic attitude of the Gold Coast public and politicians towards the Muslim immigrants in the South, and partly because the Education Department was still to a large extent under the influence of the Christian missions, resulting in an attitude of mind on the part of the expatriate educational administrators which will find insuperable difficulties in the ^{way} of setting up Islamic schools (15). This led the G.C.M.A. to feel that they had once again been let down by a political alliance, and in the early part of 1953 a flirtation took place between the leaders of the G.C.M.A. and of the Ghana Congress Party, which was formed largely at the initiative of Professor K.A. Busia from the remnants of the disrupted U.G.C.C. Nothing came of this at the time, partly because, as Renner himself put it, "once bitten twice shy", and partly because the G.C.M.A.'s opinion of the G.C.P.'s stability, strength, and organising ability was very unflattering. (30).

It was therefore decided that for the purpose of securing Muslim representation on the Accra Municipal Council, the first election for which was held on 15th September 1953, and for future activity, the G.C.M.A. should reorganise itself on party lines, indicating its new role by changing its title to "Muslim Association Party", and should embark upon political campaigning in its own right, and without any form of alliance, other than tactical (++), with other political parties.

Accordingly, the G.C.M.A. assumed its new identity as the M.A.P. approximately six weeks before the municipal election in Accra.

The organisation of the M.A.P. at that time was actually very efficient, despite limited financial resources, and could stand comparison on a smaller scale with that of the giant C.P.P. machine. In this they were helped considerably by the common feeling of "Muslim-ness" of all their supporters, a feeling which is akin to the "Jewishness", of being a separate people, experienced by English Jews. It has also been alleged by opponents that Bankole Renner himself, an Accra lawyer who, they say, is the son of a former Gold Coast Governor's A.D.C., and who is married to a Nigerian, herself a lawyer and politician, was a member of the Communist Party (x) while he was in England reading for the bar, and learnt there the art of political organisation.

Whether this is true or not, it was noteworthy that the M.A.P., although only embarking upon independent political activity such a short time before the municipal election, was successful in it, I suspect, beyond its own wildest hopes. The following table gives results of three municipal elections held as consequence of the reorganisation of the municipalities in 1953. In each case, the election was the first to be held under the new system, and the electoral qualification was the same as for the assembly elections, except that resident aliens were eligible for registration as local government electors only. The of course was advantageous to the M.A.P. in the municipal elections, as many of the Muslim immigrants in the South were from French territory, and had French citizenship.

TABLE I

ELECTION	Date	Total Seats	Total contes- ted	C.P.P. counci- llors	M.A.P. candi- dates	M.A.P. counci- llors	Total Votes	M.A.P. votes
Accra M.C.	15.9.53	27	24	24	7+1	3	16,016	2,234
Kumasi M.C.	2.2.54	24	23	20	7	4	19,287	3,400
Sek/Tak M.C.	2.3.54	21	4	21	3	0	2,437	453

A detailed breakdown of the Accra results will be found in the tables, from which it can be seen that the Muslim vote was split in one ward where the M.A.P. was successful.

It is virtually impossible to compute the strength of M.A.P. membership at any time since its foundation. Before 1953 there were no individual members, but instead those of the local 'unions' of Nigerians, etc., which were Muslim-dominated, were affiliated to it (e.g. (++) the Katsina Union, the Sokoto Union, and so on).

These 'unions' have come into existence more or less spontaneously to look after the interests, both economic and social, of the members of a particular tribe or the inhabitants of a particular town or locality who are away from their homes and thus from the start affiliated themselves, if Muslim-dominated, to the G.C.M.A. for cultural reasons.

They provide a meeting place, usually having obligatory weekly 'lodge' meetings, where exiles can gather to talk their own language, enjoy their own food, music and dancing, and discuss their own problems and the problems of the tribe or area from which they come.

They look after their members in sickness or in unemployment, and repatriate destitute members. They also encourage and cater for personal saving, and often send remittances back for the improvement of their own towns e.g. for the building of schools or dispensaries.

Two large non-Muslim Nigerian 'unions' in Accra, the Ibo Union and Ijaw Union, a large proportion of the members of which are domestic servants, usurped the rôle and the influence of the properly-constituted and officially recognised Domestic Servants' Union, which was a trade union in the normally accepted sense. They protected the interests of their members, paid all legal costs, whatever the merits of the case, if one of their members was involved in a lawsuit (usually against their employers for salary in lieu of notice) or faced with a criminal charge (almost always for alleged stealing from their employers), and acted as a very efficient employment exchange, with their own black-list of employers.

The Muslim-dominated unions are also tending to follow this pattern, but have a long way to go to rival the remarkable organising ability of the Ibos, which demonstrated itself so clearly during the Kano riots of 1953.

These 'union' affiliations with the M.A.P. continued to exist, and members of the 'unions' were automatically deemed to be members of the M.A.P. whether or not they were themselves Muslim or in sympathy with the aims of the M.A.P., but since mid-1953 individual membership existed, members paying 2/- on entrance, and 1/- per mensem subscription (6d. in the case of women). Membership cards printed in Arabic and English were issued, on which the payment of monthly subscriptions could be recorded. I have inspected many of these cards, and found the subscriptions in every case to be in arrears most members in fact having paid their dues only when an election has been in the offing. Membership figures are thus misleading, as it cannot be assumed that subscriptions were regularly received from all members whose names were on the register (§), or that all members of the 'affiliated' unions' (some of whom are non-Muslims) were active supporters of the M.A.P.

Obvious weaknesses of the M.A.P. before the 1954 General Election were :

1. Its supporters, though at that time numerous, were scattered thinly throughout the constituencies, and although the total M.A.P. vote might be large, the party might for that reason not win a single seat (32) (in this its position was analogous to that of the Liberal party in the U.K. general elections since 1945); and
2. Muslim political activity had aroused a great deal of resentment among non-Muslims throughout the country, and as a result a certain amount of hooliganism (which however paled into significance when the National Liberation Movement came into existence shortly after the General Election - 1954).

One might carry the above analogy with the Liberal Party further, to argue that if a high but unproductive total M.A.P. vote were built up,

other parties, if evenly balanced, might be driven to 'wooing' the Muslim vote in the way that the Liberal vote is cosseted in the U.K. at the present day, thus giving the M.A.P. a political influence out of all proportion to its numerical strenght. This has never happened, as a political balance was never attained; but is may well come about in the future if such conditions materialise.

6. The M.A.P. and the Ahmadiyya movement : Although the M.A.P. claimed to represent all Muslims, included an Ahmadi in its National Executive, and adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Ahmadiyya movement, it was obvious that support for the party in the South was drawn almost entirely from Orthodox elements, immigrants for the most part. Non-West African Muslims, e.g. the Syrian' community, did not support it, although there may have been good business reasons for that. (+).

Both the M.A.P. leadership and, surprisingly, the Chief Imam of Accra spoke very sweetly in those days of the Ahmadis. Their followers however did not. The teological implications of Ahmadiyyat are beyond ther for the most part : what they regard as significant is the outward observance, that in the second position when saying their prayers, the Ahmadiis fold their arms accros their chest (as do most non-West African Muslims) while the Malikis of West Africa allow their arms to hang loosely at their sides. This, it is held by the illiterate faithful, is sheer irreligion.

7. Non-Muslim attitudes towards the Muslim community :

The attitude of non-Muslims in the Gold Coast towards the Muslim community was interesting.

As far as the Ahmadis were concerned, the non-Muslims had in a sense no attitude at all. They were a comparatively recently established alien mission, and as such were looked upon with much the same all-embracing tolerance as were the Seventh Day Adventists or the Assemblies of God. It was seen that as a body they did not dabble in Gold Coast politics, and if they appeared to have any bias at all, it was , in the South, in the direction

of the most popular of the political parties. Again, their adherents were for the most part indigenes of the area in which they dwelt-Fantis, Ashantis, etc.- who spoke the local language as their normal lives as part of the community into which they were born.

As far as the Orthodox Muslims were concerned, however, the non-Muslim attitude was markedly different. As a generalisation, it may be said that the illiterate masses tolerated them. They were used to the idea of slightly 'foreign' groups - foreign both in origin and in culture half in and half out of local communities, concentrated in the Zongos, with their own chief who owed a modified allegiance to the local chief. Some villagers who were 'civilified' (+) recognised that there was some basis of political conflict at the time, and this occasionally gave rise to minor outbreaks of hooliganism; but on the whole the villagers tend to look upon the pretensions of the Muslims with the same attitude of courteous toleration which was shown on all sides in the Gold Coast towards any person or group with customs or interests differing from their own - an admirable spirit of 'live and let live'.

One found a very different attitude on the part of the literate politically conscious and self-conscious and self-conscious members of the community. The Muslims, it had been alleged since the rise to prominence of the M.A.P. in 1953, were trying to mix religion and politics (This was true enough, but only to be expected, since Islam is a way of life, which pervades all aspects of human existence). The Muslims were clamouring for special schools, while non-Muslims were satisfied with the type of school which they had. The Muslims were trying to dominate the country, and if they did not succeed at the polls, would seek to achieve their ends by violence. The Muslims were foreigners, and as such should be allowed no voice in Gold Coast politics. This last allegation, even if it were entirely true, which it was not, sounded strange when uttered by people who would in the next breath urge West African Federation (x), and the brotherhood of the negro races; but it was the most telling charge, and must be examined.

The electoral law of the Gold Coast took no cognisance of 'foreign-ness'. If an individual was a British subject Protected Person,

provided that the other qualifications were fulfilled, he or she was entitled to vote in Assembly elections, whether or not he or she was a member of a Gold Coast tribe. A large proportion of the Muslims in the South were Hausa Fulani, Kanuri (Beri-Beri), Yoruba, and members of other non-indigenous British tribes who had immigrated into the country, some to work for a longer or shorter time, others to settle permanently. Although no statistics were then available, it was known that many had been settled in the Gold Coast for two or three generations, owned property there, and had all their interests there. They might well have been assimilated into their environment had it not been for the rigour of their religion and culture, and their awareness of their 'Muslim-ness'. They themselves felt that as British subjects or British Protected Persons, permanently domiciled in the Gold Coast, it would be intolerable for them to be disenfranchised and debarred from looking after their own political, economic, and social interests.

At the same time, the fact of being born in the Gold Coast did not diminish the 'foreign-ness' of a person in the mind of an indigenous Gold Coaster. The tribe or race to which one belonged was the sole criterion; and the locality of birth or domicile was held to be irrelevant. (This made the mysteries of the British Nationality Act completely incomprehensible to most Gold Coasters).

It was also held against the Muslims that they were not genuinely zealous for self-government, and were thus out of sympathy with the alleged aspirations of the great majority of the Gold Coast people. This may well have been true: most Muslims whom I questioned on the subject felt that the attainment of complete self-government before adequate safeguards had been evolved for the Muslim minority **would have** proved dangerous for them. They cited the much publicised threat, later officially denied, which was allegedly made by the Prime Minister at a political rally in 1954, that he would deport all Nigerians who took any part in Gold Coast politics, and were also perturbed by the apparently xenophobic attitude of those who were at that time in power.

Repeated reference has been made to xenophobic attitudes in the

Gold Coast, and it is necessary to amplify this somewhat. Xenophobia manifested itself in three contexts: 1, the Gold Coast versus the rest; 2, North versus South; and 3, one's own tribe versus the rest of the Gold Coast. The first was of course a concomitant of the growth amongst the politically active classes of an artificial Gold Coast nationalism, though it did not touch to any marked extent the untutored peasant; it gained some of its force, however, from the 'home homini lupus' tradition of tribal hostility and warfare, when no man was safe except in the bosom of his own tribe - the origin of the presently surviving tribal xenophobia. That this fear was still not dead is exemplified by the attitude of a very senior Cambridge-educated Ga civil servant, with whom I have on many occasions shared bush resthouses in non-Ga territory. He confessed to me that since the local villagers might not realise that he was a senior civil servant, there was the risk that, as a stranger he might vanish without trace if he went out alone at night. In my absence the presence of my then wife (a very frail blonde five-footer) would guarantee his security. His fears were probably exaggerated; the fact, however, remains that he had them.

The second type of xenophobia was, from the Southern point of view, caused by a recognition of the complete alienness, linguistic, cultural, and environmental, of the Northerners, coupled with a snobbish and patronising attitude towards their poverty and their backwardness in education and economic development; while the Northerners feared the political, economic, and cultural 'imperialism' of the more advanced South, feeling that unless they resisted it strongly they would fall completely under Southern domination.

It is only fair to add that, paradoxically, the Gold Coast was perhaps the most hospitable country in the world. So long as a stranger did not, uninvited, interfere in the affairs of the Gold Coast, and was careful not to take sides in internal disputes, he would rely on a friendly and almost overwhelming welcome wherever he went. Hence, possibly, the recent cult of the (invited) 'visiting expert'.

A further point is that it was feared by many educated non-Muslims that the activities of the M.A.P. might result in the 'Pakistanisation' of the Gold Coast. In practice this fear was groundless, partly because, unlike Nigeria

the country was too small to be effective 'Pakistanised', and partly because unlike British India, the Muslims were not for the most part concentrated into clearly defined zones.

Finally, one must mention the underlying snobbery of highly educated Gold Coasters, especially those who received an English university education before the war, when government scholarships were few and far between. This was often directed at their own people, their own families, their 'sleeping scholarships' (+) and their 'upstart' politicians; particularly it focused upon the Muslim community, which appeared uncouth , unobservant of the outward forms of Christianity and Westernism, and uneducated in either the Western or the Tribal sense (++).

8. The Muslim Council :

The activity and success at such short notice of the M.A.P. in the Accra municipal elections of 1953 came as a surprise and a shock to the C.P.P. leaders, as it was the first political setback which they had experienced and the first questioning of their heretofore virtually undoubted political hegemony. They reacted swiftly to the challenge, and without undue publicity which might have rendered the project less effective, brought into existence the Muslim Council.

The Muslim Council, which claimed to speak for the Muslim community in the Gold Coast, and which was the only Muslim body officially recognised by the C.P.P. government, (=) was composed of (mainly young) imams and rank and file Muslims who supported the C.P.P. either for its own sake or as an act of revolt against their elders. Its main strength in Accra was derived from its support, almost to a man, by the Zambrana community, a wealthy and rapidly growing trading community from French West Africa. Unfortunately for the Muslim Council, the Zambranas were all French citizens and were thus , except for a few who had served in the British forces or the police, or who were born in British territory, debarred from voting in the Assembly elections (though of course they could vote in the Accra municipal elections if otherwise qualified). Paradoxically, the proportionately even

stronger Zambrama community in Kumasi supported the M.A.P. This was in all probability due to the fact that Baba, the wealthy and powerful Serikin Zongo of Kumasi, openly backed the M.A.P. from the start. (+)

Although the Accra Zambramas were for the most part disenfranchised, they could exert a considerable social influence locally. The Muslim community in Accra for the first time felt that it was split, a split which found open expression in 1954, when at the festival of Id -ul-Fitr, the M.A.P. Muslims, the C.P.P. Muslims, and the Ahmadis all attended public prayers with different Imams at different praying grounds, a sad deviation from the unity and brotherhood of Islam which is so carefully cherished, particularly at the times of the great public prayers, when unity and numerical strength can be visibly demonstrated to non-Muslims (xx).

In order to undermine the religious and secular influence at the time of the Imam Abas, an aged, weak, and feeble man who from the start fell under the influence of Bankole Renner, who made no secret, even in the mosque, of his political sympathies, and who allowed himself to be used as a pawn in the political game by the M.A.P. leaders, the Muslim Council set up and recognised an " anti-Imam", who was, however, debarred by the Imam Abas from leading prayers in the Central Mosque. This Imam, backed by the C.P.P. (++), was referred to by all Accra Muslims, including supporters of the Muslim Council, as the " C.P.P. Imam ".

One of the charges brought by Nkrumah against the M.A.P. was that they had dragged religion into politics; they could with some justification retort that the C.P.P. had dragged politics into religion .

9. The General Election of 1954 :

From the foregoing, three significant points emerge with a bearing upon the effectiveness of Muslim intervention in a Gold Coast general election :-

I. The Muslim population of the Gold Coast was already about one-seventh of the total population, and was increasing rapidly by conversion and immigration

2. Although the Muslim community was divided religiously (Sunnis and Ahmadis) and politically (M.A.P. and Muslim Council), these divisions were in practice insignificant, as the overwhelming majority of Orthodox Muslims would act alike within their own localised environment; and

3. Muslim voting strength was spread so thinly through the constituencies, except in certain areas of the North, that, although large in aggregate, it was likely to suffer a similar fate to that of the English Liberal Party since the last war, and fail to secure a single seat.

It was to test the validity of these points that I made special study of the effect of Muslim intervention in the General Election of 1954, and found the strikingly confirmed (*).

When the date of the General Election was announced, the M.A.P. flung itself into the fray with all the zest, after its experience in the municipal elections of the previous six months, of a young fledgling newly feeling its wings. Ward organisers in all the big towns started a drive to collect overdue subscriptions from backsliding members (+) and to recruit fresh support. M.A.P. flags, horizontally barred with green, white and green, and with Koranic texts embroidered on many of them, suddenly appeared on green and white flagpoles in front of branch offices in the Zongos of nearly every town and village on the trade-routes of the country; and three green and white public-address cars, painted all over with Koranic texts, were acquired and for a time toured the country, including the N.T.s.

Some very interesting and obvious morals can be drawn from the history of these three cars. They were Citroën cars, the cost of which, with that of the amplifying equipment (a 'must' for any Gold Coast party) and special painting, must have amounted to about £ 200 each. As the M.A.P. was notoriously short of funds, these cars were obtained on hire-purchase from a prominent European firm, and were brought into use. Unfortunately for the M.A.P., the C.P.P. announced its intention of buying 104 public-address cars (one for each constituency), all of which were to be Citroëns and Peugeots. To the constant pressure for favours which as the government party the C.P.P. could exert upon the European trading companies was added the prospect of a very lucrative order for at least a part of this large fleet. As a result the European firm concerned, about ten days before the General Election, found some trivial flaw in the M.A.P.'s observance of the hire-purchase agreement which under normal trading circumstances would have been ignored, and seized the cars, which later, under the same licence numbers, became C.P.P. cars. This had a depressing effect upon M.A.P. morale in the last stages of the election campaign. (Lest I be accused of bias in favour of

the M.A.P. in this account, I think it fair to add that that shortly after the election I sold my own car, which having been used for three years on College business, was otherwise unsaleable, to the M.A.P. for £ 100 on hire-purchase, to be completed in ten monthly instalments of £ 10. Nearly sixteen years later, I have still not received the full amount).

In the M.A.P. there was a dearth of men, literate and fluent in English, suitable for nomination as candidates for election to the Assembly, so the number of M.A.P. candidates was perforce limited. Where no M.A.P. candidate was nominated, supporters were advised to give their votes to the anti-C.P.P. candidate, who was usually a member of the Ghana Congress Party, though in Accra Central constituency, for instance, the solitary Ghana National Party candidate, Obetsebi Lamptey, stood with both G.C.P. and official M.A.P. backing. (This was of course before an anti-C.P.P. combination had crystallised under the aegis of the National Liberation Movement). In the event, the M.A.P. had to scrape the barrel to put into the field fifteen suitable candidates, of whom one, Cobina Kessie in Kumasi North, was himself a non-Muslim.+++

One might have expected the area of strongest support for the M.A.P. to be in the Northern Territories, with its high percentage of Muslims. However, the M.A.P. National Executive were over-confident in their attitude towards the N.T.s., regarding it as already won, not merely because of the high proportion of Muslims there but also because of the well-known hostility of a large proportion of the Northerners to the C.P.P.

Under the influence of their National Secretary, Tamakloe, an Ewe convert to Islam, they concentrated their efforts in the earlier stages of the campaign on the Colony and Ashanti, where they felt lay the greatest potential gains, but where in fact they had little chance of influencing the results. When the N.P.P. was formed, Tamakloe visited the N.T.s to try to pull the M.A.P.'s irons from the fire. This visit proved to be little more than a slap in the face for Northern opinion; Northerners resented a Southerner, and a convert at that, rather than a man who was born in Islam, coming to patronise them. Renner made two visits to the North; these too had no good effect, as he was visibly an alien, could not even speak Hausa, and owing to typical Southern ignorance of the power nexus of the North, failed to call upon any of the influential people who could help him in his campaign.

It is not without significance that the only M.A.P. candidate to be elected in the N.T.s, Alhaji Osumanu, was not merely a very devout Muslim but also a major land-owner in Tamale, the constituency for which he sat.

Owing therefore to this series of blunders on the part of the M.A.P., leaders, and a certain amount of personal friction, their potentially strong position was destroyed.

Altogether in the N.T.s the M.A.P. as such only received 11,040 votes (for 5 candidates) out of a total vote of 192,673 in the 26 constituencies.+

The greatest successes in the North were scored by the Northern People's Party, which had only been launched upon the public at Easter 1954. This party, which had the powerful backing of Abdulai, the Na Yiri ++ (Chief of Mamprusi), and many of the other Northern chiefs, was strongly Muslim in composition, but claimed to represent the interests of the Northerners as a whole, irrespective of religion, and many of their successful candidates appeared to be non-Muslims.

While I was visiting the Na Yiri at Easter 1954, the old man coyly pulled a typewritten sheet from a fold of his robe, which he handed to me without a word. It proved to be the manifesto of a political party. When I questioned him about it, he said proudly, 'It is my new party, which I am going to launch next Tuesday'. I told him that he was mad to start a party at half-cock, without any build-up or organisation, less than three months before the election, as it would fail and make him a laughing-stock. He made a deprecatory gesture with his hand, pointed out that he and his friends controlled twelve constituencies, and that his own people (the Mamprusi) would vote to a man as he instructed them. In the event (see table 2) his prophecy was exactly right.

Further investigation showed that the new party was to a large extent the brain-child of Mamuni Bawumia, the youngish Western-educated Secretary and éminence grise of the Mamprusi State Council, on whom the aged Na Yiri leaned heavily for advice. It was backed by many of the powerful Northern chiefs, including the young Duri Na, who became the party leader in the Assembly and the officially-recognised Leader of the Opposition. (The recognition of his position as salaried Leader of the Opposition was hotly opposed by the C.P.P. when the 1954 Assembly met, on the ground that the N.P.P. was merely a regional faction and not a genuine national opposition party, and therefore incapable of forming an alternative national government in the event of the C.P.P.'s defeat.

They were probably in addition actuated by hostility towards any group which had successfully challenged the myth of the country's unanimous support of the C.P.P. The Speaker, Sir Emmanuel Quist, ruled however that the Duri Na should be recognised, as he was the leader of the second largest party in the Assembly, and as it would be absurd to recognise as Leader of the Opposition Professor Busia, the solitary G.C.P. Assemblyman).

The N.P.P. had as its avowed aim the protection and advancement of Northern interests under Gold Coast self-government, though it was well-known that amongst party leaders and supporters (see Apter, op.ci., p.228) there was little sympathy at the time with the goal of self-government. It would however have been political suicide to admit this openly. Since the formation of the N.L.M., under the influence of N.L.M. ideas the N.P.P. agitated in favour of regional autonomy for the N.T.s, and backed the N.L.M.'s struggle in the South.

Other Muslims stood for election in N.T.s constituencies either as independents or in the C.P.P. interest.

TABLE 2

ALL CONSTITUENCIES

	M.A.P.	Other parties with M.A.P. support	N.P.P.	Other Muslim candi- dates	All Muslim candi- dates	All Parties
Total votes	21.172	39.010	53.705	55.637	96.023+	716.509
Candidates	15	24	15	27	48+	323
Elected:	1	1	12	5	10	104

NORTHERN TERRITORIES CONSTITUENCIES ONLY

Total votes	11.040	-	53.705	51.220	80.202	192.673
Candidates	5	-	15	25	35	80
Elected	1	-	12	5	10	26

NOTE: + = includes 1 non-Muslim M.A.P. candidate.

It is impossible to estimate how many of the 39,010 votes cast for other candidates with M.A.P. support were actually Muslim votes. It may be that the Muslim votes cast for such candidates would roughly cancel out non-Muslim votes cast for Muslim candidates of other parties (e.g. the C.P.P. in the North). In that case, if the total Muslim vote could have been effectively organised, the organiser would have been able to swing just short of one-seventh of the total voting strength of the country +++, thus finding himself in a powerful bargaining position vis-à-vis the other parties if a normal two-party system had developed at that time.

As it was, however, since the General Election of 1954 the potential strength of the Muslim position was largely discounted by public opinion, which did not look beyond the fact that only one M.A.P. candidate was returned, and that too in a straight fight (and so presumably with N.P.P. support) against a C.P.P. candidate.

10. The Muslim vote in the Accra constituencies, 1953 and 1954:

So much for the general picture of the 1954 election. For obvious physical and financial reasons it was impossible for me to make a detailed survey on the spot of all 104 constituencies, so I decided to concentrate on the three municipal constituencies of Accra.

I often surprised people who spent less time than I did in wandering about the markets and back streets of Accra when I told them that Accra was by far the biggest Muslim town in the Gold Coast. After the General Election of 1954, when I received the kind permission of the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court to inspect the marked electoral registers before they were destroyed, I realised that I had the opportunity not only of proving this point, but also of collecting a lot more miscellaneous electoral information .x

Table 3 indicates the 27 wards involved, and, in conjunction with the map of ward boundaries at the end of the paper, their grouping into Assembly constituencies. The wards themselves were each represented by one councillor in the Accra Municipal Council, and were used as areas to be served by one polling station (except in the case of ward 26, where the size of the ward made it necessary to have two polling stations, one in the University College precincts and the other some miles away in Lagostown) at a General Election. The same registers were used for both central and local elections. xx

TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIONS OF WARDS
ACCRA CONSTITUENCIES.

Ward	District	Constituency
1	Maraprobi	W
2	Korle Gonno	W
3	Lartebiokoshie	W
4	Abossey Okai	W
5	Kaneshie	W
6	Nleshie	C
7	Akoto Lamptey	C
8	Kinka	C
9	Amamomo	C
10	Korle Wokon	C
11	Atukpai	C
12	Arbogbloshie	C
13	Tudu	C
14	Kokomlemie	W
15	Adabraka	E
16	Osu Manhian	E
17	Osu	E
18	Kuku	E
19	Osu Doku	E
20	Tenashie	E
21	La	E
22	Nungua	E
23	Teshie	E
24	Wuo Gon	E
25	Niima	W
26	Achimota	W
27	Kwashieman/Greffi	W

Note: W = West

C = Central

E = East

TABLE 4
ACCRA MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
ELECTION RESULTS, 15TH
SEPTEMBER 1953.

Ward	M.A.P. CANDIDATES	OTHER Muslim Candidates	OTHER Candidates	RESULT
1	-	-	648	CPP
2	-	-	1,095	CPP
3	317	-	430	CPP
4	543	-	591	MAP
5	NC	NC	NC	CPP
6	-	-	764	CPP
7	-	-	797	CPP
8	NC	NC	NC	CPP
9	-	-	1,316	CPP
10	195	-	472	CPP
11	504	345	65	MAP
12	-	-	693	CPP
13	78	-	261	CPP
14	-	-	444	CPP
15	-	-	711	CPP
16	337	-	127	MAP
17	-	-	1,485	CPP
18	-	-	320	CPP
19	-	-	353	CPP
20	-	-	370	CPP
21	-	237	633	CPP
22	-	-	590	CPP
23	NC	NC	NC	CPP
24	-	85	28	CPP
25	146	-	541	CPP
26	144	-	1,381	CPP
27	NC	NC	NC	CPP
<hr/>				
TOTAL	2,234	667	13,115	

NOTES. (1) "NC" = "no contest"

(2) This election was fought on the old register. Many Muslims were debarred from voting through nonpayment of tax.

TABLE 5

Table shewing the order in which wards fell at the 1954 General Election in order of:-

Total Registration	% Vote	Muslim Registrations	% of Muslims
8 C	18) E	25 W	3 W)
21 E	19) E	3 W	25 W) Over
17 E	5 W	4 ⁺ W	11 ⁺ C) 50%
4 ⁺ W	9 C	11 ⁺ C	16 ⁺ E)
9 C	14 W	15 E	4 ⁺ W
25 W	2 W	10 C	13 C
7 C	27 W	13 C	15 E
15 E	17 E	26 W W = 4	27 W
11 ⁺ C	20 E	16 ⁺ E C = 4	10 C W = 5
26 W	11 ⁺ C	12 C E = 2	26 W C = 4
2 W	10 C	8 C	12 C E = 2
10 C	7 C	27 W	24 E
3 W W = 5	15 E	14 W	14 W
12 C C = 7	13 C	21 E	1 W
6 C E = 3	1 W	1 W	8 C
1 W	8 C W = 5	9 C	19 E
13 C	12 C C = 8	24 E	21 E
23 E	6 C E = 5	2 W	5 W
14 W	21 E	7 C	9 C
22 E	23 E	17 E	2 W
16 ⁺ E	3 W	19 E	20) E
27 W	4 ⁺ W	23 E	7) C
19 E	16 E	6 C	18) E
20 E	24 E	5 W	23) E
18 E W = 4	25 W W = 4	20 E W = 5	6 C W = 4
5 W C = 1	22 E C = 0	18 E C = 4	17 E C = 4
24 E E = 7	26 W E = 5	22 E E = 8	22 E E = 8

Notes:- (1) + indicates wards in which M. A. P. were successful in Municipal Council Election, 15th September, 1953.

(2) Horizontal lines separate above average from below average constituencies in each category.

(3) W = West; C = Central; E = East.

A comparison of table 4 and 5 will indicate the interesting fact that the M.A.P. victories at the municipal elections in 1953 were scored in the wards which are 3rd, 4th, and 5th in order of the percentage of Muslim registration, and in one ward, ward 4, less than 50% of the registered electors were Muslims. The two wards with the highest percentages of Muslim registration, wards 3 and 25, elected C.P.P. councillors. This is somewhat surprising, but is partly explained by the fact that the M.A.P. only embarked upon independent political activity a few weeks before the municipal election of 15th September 1953. It did not have much time in which to build up an organisation, though it did surprisingly well in the short time available, or to select an adequate number of suitable candidates.

In the absence of a detailed survey of Muslim strength in the wards such as the one I carried out, it had to concentrate its main effort where it knew its friends, and where it had other advantages-e.g. where the Muslim population was dense and congested, and actuated in its political and other actions by a sense of grievance and a feeling of social cohesion. Ward 11 (Atukpai) included some dense and squalid Muslim slum areas, and the M.A.P. National Headquarters were inside its boundaries. In ward 4 (Abossey Okai) was situated the exclusively Muslim village of Fadama, which was in an odd way completely cut off from the rest of the town, like a little rural island, in which the Chief Iman of the Gold Coast had his residence. Ward 16 (Osu Manhian) contained part of the dense Muslim population of the Tudu and Boundary Road areas. All these wards were close to the centre of the town, and the strongest electoral activity of the M.A.P. was directed to them.

The two wards with the highest percentage of Muslim voters were ward 3 and ward 25. Ward 3 included Sabon Zongo, which should have been a natural target for the M.A.P., while ward 25 covered the predominantly Muslim areas of Nima Village and part of what used to be called 'Lagostown', but suffered, from the electioneering point of view, from having a scattered electorate and from being an outlying district.

The Muslim organisers, however, learnt by experience, and, assuming the then existing ward boundaries and level of party organisation, felt reasonably certain of securing the election of four, and possibly five, Muslim councillors at the next municipal election. With improved organisation (the most important feature being the maintenance of an up-to-date list of sympathisers, as opposed to party members, which can

only be done by regular house-to-house canvassing with a copy of the electoral register- this in itself wins over a lot of waverers- combined with gentle bullying of those sympathisers to get them all to the polls on the day) they stood a chance of six, and possibly even more, councillors elected, especially if, as at that time seemed probable, they were in an electoral alliance with the other anti-C.P.P. parties.

To do this they would have to concentrate their efforts on the marginal wards, not neglecting the safe wards, of course, during the municipal election campaign, and since there would be no major advantage to them in maximising the overall vote in a municipal election they should quietly drop the extra-marginal ward for municipal purposes. On a proportionate basis, the Muslim population would be fairly represented by the presence of six Muslim councillors on the municipal council, which it would be possible for them, by concentrating their efforts, to achieve, and it seems proper that they should rest content with that.

The objective in a General Election is in some ways quite different from what is involved at municipal election time. True, on both occasions the primary objective is to win maximum number of seats, but it is much more important at the general than at the municipal election to secure that the maximum number of votes are recorded for your party. This indicates your standing in the country; and your bargaining power vis-à-vis the government, SS and other parties is determined by that. It is obvious that with their electoral boundaries ++ and political attitudes there was no likelihood of the M.A.P. securing even one seat in Accra at a General Election; it was only very faintly becoming conceivable that if a swing away from the C.P.P. had taken place amongst the electorate as a whole, and if the opposition parties had united behind the M.A.P. candidate, then with a great deal of hard work by all concerned the M.A.P. candidate might just have scraped home in the Accra West constituency, where on a basis of the existing registration the Muslim population was 36% of the whole.

TABLE 6 (Continued) p.33

NOTES:

1. All figures in brackets are from Government sources. See Appendix "A".
2. Ward 26 (Achimota) registers were in a chaotic states, and were completely unreliable. "Total vote (Gvt)" (2.052) was arrived at by subtracting total vote in all other wards from government total vote for constituency as a whole. This gives a percentages vote more in keeping with the other wards, but is of course meaningless. The dramatic fall in voting at the by-election is probably due to the fact that the by-election took place during the Long Vacation.

Table 6 (& Notes)
General Election 1954

ACCRA WEST

Ward	Total Popula- tion	Total Registered	% Regis- tered	Total Vote	Total Vote (Govt)	% Vote	Muslims Regis- tered	Muslim % of Total Regn.	Muslim Vote	% Vote	Muslim % of Total Vote	Muslim Votes for Muslim candi- dates	Total Vote	Total Vote (Govt)	% Vote	Muslim Vote	% Vote	Muslim % of Total Vote	Muslim Votes for Muslim Candi- date.
1	(3010)	3010		1603		53.3	323	10.7	163	50.5	10.1	1003			33.3	130	40.2	19.0	
2	(3743)	3744		2202		58.8	204	5.4	90	44.1	4.1	973			26.0	32	15.7	3.3	
3	(3377)	3371		1676		49.7	2413	71.6	1261	52.3	75.2	865			25.1	705	29.2	81.5	
4	(4748)	4739		2315		48.8	2303	48.8	1017	44.2	43.9	1037			22.9	496	21.5	45.3	
5	(994)	995		622		62.5	64	6.4	30	46.9	4.8	319			32.1	14	21.9	4.4	
14	(2112)	2110		1274		60.4	351	16.6	215	61.3	16.9	610			28.9	142	40.5	23.3	
25	(4112)	4275		1535		35.9	2739	64.4	1035	37.8	67.3	626			14.6	445	16.2	71.1	
26	(3276)	3669		1006	(2052)	26.0	999	25.8	230	23.0	22.9	209			5.4	29	2.9	13.9	
27	(1469)	1476		844		57.2	526	35.6	278	52.8	32.9	410			27.8	141	26.8	34.4	
Total	(26341)	27569		13077	(14123)	47.4	9322	36.0	4319	43.3	33.0	(3039)	6102	(6833)	22.1	2134	27.5	35.0	(1,791)

ACCRA CENTRAL

6	(3132)	3142		1625		51.7	65	2.7	50	58.8	4.0								
7	(4019)	4048		2179		53.8	163	4.0	52	31.9	2.4								
8	(6587)	6666		3507		52.6	588	8.8	255	43.4	7.3								
9	(4543)	4645		2812		60.5	260	5.6	106	40.8	3.8								
10	(3664)	3656		1982		54.2	1249	34.2	564	45.2	28.5								
11	(3998)	3891		2115		54.4	2174	55.9	1171	53.9	55.4								
12	(3188)	3173		1663		52.4	799	25.2	225	28.2	13.3								
13	(2825)	2807		1502		53.5	1159	41.3	455	39.3	30.3								
Total	(27567)	27420		17385	(17,517)	54.3	6471	20.2	2878	44.4	16.6	(1,579)							

ACCRA EAST

15	(3948)	4013		2151		53.6	1432	35.7	540	37.7	25.1								
16	(1624)	1721		811		47.1	912	53.0	383	42.0	47.2								
17	(4796)	4784		2725		56.9	125	2.6	40	32.0	1.5								
18	(1074)	1072		697		65.0	39	3.6	15	38.5	2.2								
19	(1331)	1381		897		65.0	110	8.1	57	51.8	6.4								
20	(1340)	1337		737		55.1	54	4.0	21	38.9	2.8								
21	(4984)	4999		2537		50.8	338	6.8	165	48.8	6.5								
22	(1884)	1884		639		33.9	29	1.5	28	96.6	4.4								
23	(2688)	2687		1360		50.6	97	3.6	45	46.4	3.4								
24	(995)	992		360		36.3	231	23.3	72	31.2	20.0								
Total	(24714)	24870		12914	(13,216)	51.1	3367	13.5	1368	40.6	10.5	(471)							

ACCRA MUNICIPALITY

Grand Total	(200,000)	(83711)	84487	(41.2)	43376	(44856)	51.3	19766	23.4	8563	43.3	19.7	(7,089)						
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3. "Votes for Muslim candidate" shows vote for M.A.P. candidate in Accra West, G.N.P. (non-Muslim but M.A.P.-supported) candidate in Accra Central, and G.C.P. (non-Muslim but M.A.P.-supported) candidate in Accra East. Total anti-C.P.P. vote (for these candidates) in Accra East was 1,556.
4. An estimate of 200,000 as the population of Accra Municipality in 1954 is based upon water consumption, and is probably completely unreliable. It is however, probably less meaningless than the official figures from the 1948 census. The guesses at the populations of the wards and constituencies which have been hazarded by various officials are so utterly meaningless that I have not bothered to include them. In other words, your guess is as good as mine.
5. If these figures are reliable, and if it can be assumed that Muslim and non-Muslims registered in the same proportions, it would indicate that the total Muslim population of Accra in early 1954 was roughly 46,800; but see Appendix "B".

The present electoral boundaries shew a probably accidental bias against Muslim representation in both the municipal and the Assembly elections. X If, however, they were to be gerrymandered in favour of the Muslims, as a glance at the map will shew is possible, this would be equally unfair, and ethically and politically unjustifiable.

The habit of the Muslim population, which is mainly immigrant and poor, of settling in large closely-knit groups in densely populated wards, is bound to be a permanent disadvantage from the electoral point of view, comparable with bias against the Labour Party which used to exist in the British electoral system.

It is perfectly obvious from table 6 that the Muslim vote was by no means solidly in favour of the M.A.P. or M.A.P.-supported candidates, since the total votes recorded for those candidates must have included votes from other anti-C.P.P. party supporters. If the Muslim community in Accra really wanted to be represented by Muslims in the Assembly and on the Municipal Council, it would have had to sink its internal differences, which at the time extended even to matter of religious authority, + and a great deal of hard work would have had to be put in by the M.A.P.

11. M.A.P. relations with other political parties after the 1954 election:

The morale of party supporters, and the tempo of party activity, normally declined in the Gold Coast after any General Election. This was particularly noticeable with the M.A.P. in 1954. The one could be largely ascribed to the party's failure to secure more than one seat, combined with an impression of the invincibility of the C.P.P. Goliath; the other was attributable to shortage of money, and the long interval expedited before the next General Election. A modus vivendi was achieved with the N.P.P., and the solitary M.A.P. Assemblyman, Alhaji Osumanu, took his seat on the official Opposition benches under the Duri Na +, voting normally with the Opposition.

The Autumn of 1954 saw the sudden and unforeseen rise of the National Liberation Movement in Ashanti, which under the leadership of the Asantehene's linguist, Eafour Akoto, received the active support of the Asantehene and the Asanteman Council.

This movement, which originally came into existence shortly after the General Election as a protest by the Ashanti farmers at the pegging of the cocoa price 33, soon developed into an expression of Ashanti nationalism in protest against political and economic domination by the Colony, and proposed the federalisation of the unitary constitution of the Gold Coast, in order that regional autonomy (and particularly a regional Cocoa Marketing Board) might be obtained for Ashanti. The similarity of the goals of the N.L.M. and the N.P.P. soon led to an alliance between the two parties, the G.C.P. was absorbed into the N.L.M. xx, and finally the M.A.P., actuated more by its hostility to the C.P.P. than by its pursuit of Muslim interests, made common cause with the other opposition parties thereafter the united opposition parties, including the Togoland Congress and the Anglo Organisation, + presented a solid anti-C.P.P. façade under the leadership of the N.L.M. for electoral purposes. The fact however not be lost sight of that, apart from the common desire to "dish the Whigs", each of the opposition parties except the G.C.P. had its own aims and interests, which would have become paramount if success had been achieved in ousting the C.P.P. from office.

12. Conclusion:

From the foregoing it is possible to draw certain inferences of relevance to present day Ghana. Firstly, the Ahmadu Bello movement in Ghana, though growing rapidly, can in the foreseeable future be ignored as a political force.

Secondly, the orthodox Muslims, numbering approximately one seventh of the total population of Ghana, and nearly one quarter of the population of its capital city X, who at the moment, oblivious of the wide issues of Islamic politics, limit their political aims to the obtaining of Islamic educational facilities and good communal services (drains, piped, water, etc..) in the squalid Zongo areas, are liable, given better leadership than they have so far enjoyed, XX to become a thorn in the flesh of Chandian politicians of all parties unless an understanding of their position is shewn right at the outset, and some attempt is made to satisfy their basic needs. They cannot be dismissed, as now happens, as " foreigners" as an unimportant and insignificant minority, or as just another political party. Considerable statesmanship will have to be shewn by the present government, which as already caused presentment by its expulsion of Nigerian & other settlers, many of them Muslims, if dangerous consequences are to be avoided. If non-Muslim Ghanaians, who at the moment shew an amazing apathy towards, and a lack of comprehension of, Islam, will make a sincere attempt to understand the Muslim point of view, a great deal of future trouble may be averted.

The manuscript contained:

- 2 appendix
 - A. " a note on the Accra Electoral Registers (10 pages)
 - B. " A note on the Muslim population fo Accra (5 pages)
- A map of Accra

These documents were not reproduced because we simply didn't have the time; the report reached us too late, in fact the 30th of July.

Pages 1-2- 3:

1. Gold Coast Annual Report, 1954. London H.M.S.O., 1956.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
- * Hereinafter referred to as the N.T.s.
4. Ibid.
- XX Including those parts of Togoland which were administered as parts of the Colony.
- x Including those parts of Togoland which were administend as part of the N.T.s.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.

Page. 4:

8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.

Page : 5:

13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1946.
16. Ibid.
17. Gold Coast Annual Report, 1954.
18. Gold Coast (Constitution) Order in Council, 1950.
19. Gold Coast (Constitution) Order in Council 1954.
- Ø . Which included both the Accra Minicipality and the Ga-Adangme rural area.

Page. 6 :

- X Professor J.D. Fage and Dr. D.Tait, both of the University College of the Gold Coast, were working upon the oral traditions of the N.T.s at the time of Dr. Tait's death; Mr. J.R. Lander, also of the University College of the Gold Coast, was examining the oral traditions of Ashanti.
20. Gold Coast Annual Report, 1954.
 21. Ibid.

Page 7:

22. See introduction.

X though see below.

23. "Universitas", December 1953. (Published by the University College of the Gold Coast, Achimota).

Page 9:

24. See Introduction.

25. Gold Coast Census, 1931.

26. Gold Coast Census, 1948.

Page 11:

+ The Sudan provided numbers of graduate and non-graduate expatriate teaching staff for secondary schools in Northern Nigeria, and particularly for the School of Arabic Studies in Kano, the Principal of which, Sheikh Awad, was himself a Sudanese.

Page 12:

X Both these members sat for Northern Territories constituencies.

Page 13:

27. e.g. Professor K.A. Busia: "The position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti", London 1951; Rattray's works, etc.

Page 14:

xx The Paramount Chief of the Dagomba.

X Hausa, = "resting-place", or "camping-ground";
almost = "caravanserai".

Page 16:

+ It has been admitted by many Urban and Local Councils that the collection of the basic rate in the Zongos has been, per head of population, more fruitful than in other parts of their areas. This may be sacrificable partly to the anxiety of Zongo chiefs that their communities should not give any cause for offence or criticism to the settled population, and partly to an awareness by M.A.P. organisers that persons not paying their rates are disenfranchised.

28. cf. D.E. Apter: "The Gold Coast in transition" Princetown University Press 1955 note on p.20, in which he states that "a new Muslim party founded since this research was done in the field was appeared as an opposition body".

* Ga; = "The People". This formerly popular party, which only concerned itself with local government issues, is now defunct. Many prominent non-Muslim politicians, e.g., Obetsebi Lamptey, who had led the Mambil Party, gave their support to the U.G.C.C. on its formation.

Page 17:

++ United Gold Coast Convention.

+++ This is indeed a brave attempt to grasp the nettle of direct taxation, rather than to gloss over it, as did other parties. Direct taxation is regarded with odium by all sections of the community, partly because of the feeling that in the past the proceeds of the old native authority levy were spent by the chiefs on acquiring additional wives and glossy American motor cars. Rioting directed against the C.P.P. government broke out at Anloga, in T.V.T., at the end of 1953, and at Elmina, in the Colony, during 1954 in protest against the incidence of the basic rate. The vote-losing propensities of even continuing the very low existing rates of direct taxation in the context of the 1951 election must therefore not be minimised, especially as C.P.P. propagandists in the bush had won support and membership for their party by equating in the minds of their unsophisticated audiences self government and the abolition of taxation. Meanwhile, the great majority of the general public seen unaware of the incidence of indirect taxation, which is easy and cheap to administer, as nearly all imported goods must pass through the main harbours,.

An interesting sidelight on direct taxation was shewn when I visited as Returning Officer a small fishing village near Accra during the 1951 election period. A voting qualification was the possession of a receipt for the payments of a native authority levy for the current year. Nearly every would-be voter in this village produced to me a C.P.P. membership card, saying that this year he had paid his levy to Kwame Nkrumah. They were baffled when I had to disqualify them all. This was one occasion when the zeal of the local C.P.P. secretary had over-reached itself.

Page 18:

29. For a description of the type of syllabus envisaged, see Dr. F. Hilliard's article on Muslim Education in the Gold Coast (Universitas, December 1953).

+ Kojo Botsio was at that time National Treasurer of the C.P.P., and, having obtained a Dip. Ed. at Oxford, was looked upon as the party's educational expert. He subsequently became Minister of Education in the 1951 government.

* It was not until 1955 that under the influence of the new Minister of Education, Mr. J.H. Allassani, himself a Northerner, the first steps were taken to implement the recommendations of a report on Islamic education policy in the Gold Coast which I am informed (though I have been unable to trace the document) was prepared at the request of the Secretary of State during the 1880's. I acted as advisor to the officials concerned, and was surprised to find that they were unaware of the School of Arabic Studies in Kano, which had a teacher training department and was willing to accept Gold Coast students, and were proposing to hand over the administration of the scheme to the Muslim Council (see below), which would of course have doomed it. It was agreed by the Education Department that of two suitable Gold Coast Muslim boys could be found during the summer of 1956 with educational qualifications of at least middle school leaving standard, they would be given as an experiment government scholarships for a two-year teacher training course at the School of Arabic Studies, and would after their return form the nucleus of the staff of a projected Islamic primary school to be set up in Accra.

30 See Apter, op. cit., pg.226, for a description of the internal struggles which were at that time disrupting the G.C.P.

The A.M.C. was not constituted until 1953, when it took over functions which had hitherto been exercised by the Accra Town Council.

++ e.g. the campaigning in support of Mr. Obetsebi Lamptey, the solitary Ghana Nationalist Party candidate, in Accra during the 1954 General Election. (Apter, op.cit., pg.226, describes the setting up of this one-man party).

Page 19:

x I need hardly remind the reader that Marxism and Islam mix as readily as oil and water; c.f. Hazrat Mirza Bashir Admad, "Islam versus Communism", Rabwah, no date.

* including one C.P.P. Muslim.

Page 20:

++ Professor James Coleman, of the University of California, has carried out a considerable amount of research into the political and other influence of these 'unions' in Nigeria. Little work has been done, however, in the Gold Coast, but it can be taken for present purposes that the organisation of local 'unions' in the Gold Coast is broadly with, and modelled on, those which have been described in Nigeria.

Page 21:

§ The reluctance of Gold Coast political parties to strike the names of defaulting members from their registers is demonstrated by the fact that when last I examined the C.P.F. National Register, in March 1956, Bankole Renner still appeared in it as a member.

32. On this point see my paper 'The Role of Islam in Gold Coast Politics' (West African Institute of Social & Economic Research, 1954), which was read three months before the General Election of 1954 took place.

Page 22:

+ The 'Syrian' community is actually at the present day predominantly Lebanese by nationality, but has continued to be referred to locally as 'Syrian' since the partition of Syria. The 'Syrians' are very active in trade (principally cotton piece-goods, but noting that will produce a profit is despised), and amass through hard work, shrewdness, and diligence, a great deal of wealth, which engenders envy and resentment on the part of Africans. Many are Muslims, including a number of Shi'is: the remainder are Maronites and Roman Catholics (the leading Roman Catholic layman of the Gold Coast was a Lebanese), but for the most part the community is far from diligent in its religious observances, and does not allow religion to interfere with trade or the solidarity of the community. Gold Coast Muslims have a poor opinion of Syrian Muslims resident in the Gold Coast, on account of their visible slackness in the outward observance of their faith, their failure to attend the local mosques on Fridays, or at the praying grounds on the big religious festivals, and their aloofness from local Muslim affairs. The Syrian attitude was ascribable partly to snobbishness and partly, being very vulnerable to xenophobic criticism, to an understandable anxiety not be identified with a group which was politically active against the C.P.F., and which was itself the victim of indigenous xenophobia.

Page 23:

+ One of many local coinages which are being established in Gold Coast English. (= "C.P.P.-ified").

* A great deal of lip-service was still paid by politically-minded literates to the fifty years-old concept of West African Federation, though there were many valid reasons why it could not come about in the foreseeable future, and why literate Gold Coast people would have, been the first to complain if it had. Relevant to our discussion is the fact that a federation, whether of British West Africa, or of the whole of West Africa, would inevitably, if democratically controlled, be dominated by a Muslim majority.

Page 26:

+ 'Sleeping scholarships' were a typically Gold Coast institution. Many illiterate women amassed considerable wealth from property or trade. An elderly wealthy illiterate would contract a mutually advantageous marriage with a young man just leaving school. She sent him off to England for further education, either at a university or at some such institution as a secretarial or business college. He acquired a good education which he could not otherwise have obtained; she acquired a young man to warm her old age, who when he returned from England would be in a position to give her economic security and a good social position. Alas, when the young man returned from England, the former wife often found herself abandoned. He might have brought back a European wife with him, or, overcome with revulsion at the idea of living with an ageing illiterate, might prefer an 'educated' flibbertigibbet who thinks of nothing but 'hot combs', face-powder, and expensive new dresses.

++ An interesting example of this arose when I was interviewing for an appointment which did not require any knowledge of Gold Coast languages a well-born settled Fulani woman who had lived for some years in Accra. I was in favour of appointing her, but this was strongly resisted by another member of the board, an elderly Oxford-educated Ga, who gave as his sole objection to her the fact that she spoke execrable Ga, 'little better than pidgin'.

* As mentioned above, the then Minister of Education, Mr. J. H. Allassani, instructed the Education Department, when it was proposed to investigate the possibility of setting up Islamic primary schools, to act in consultation and collaboration with the Muslim Council. It was apparent to me, in conversation with expatriate members of the Department, that they were unaware of any differentiation between the Muslim Council and the Muslim Association. If government Islamic schools were started

on the wrong foot, they would never be accepted by the majority of Muslim parents.

A difficulty, in the setting up of Islamic schools which was not superficially apparent was that the elderly "mallams", who tour the country peddling charms and educating illiterate children in the Quran, and who were M.A.P. supporters to a man, have a vested interest in the maintenance of the educational status quo. They realise that if government schools are set up they will not be employed there owing to their lack of education and teacher training qualifications, and so their present lucrative monopoly of religious instruction will be destroyed. If they are openly slighted, they can wreck any scheme, as they exercise tremendous power over the superstition-ridden Muslim illiterates.

The Muslim Council would have welcomed the setting up of Islamic schools, both in furtherance of C.P.P. policy and as a means of breaking the power of the M.A.P. mallams: if however, the Education Department had dealt solely with the Muslim Council, the mallams would have ward parents not to send their children to school, as they would thus be submitting them to godless C.P.P. influences.

Page. 27.:

- + Some indication of Baba's wealth, power, and prestige was given in 1955 when a dynamic marriage was contracted in Accra between his daughter and the son of the Serikin Zongo of Accra. He brought down with him by lorry over 3,000 of his followers, who after the feasting and celebration roamed round Accra in bands, drumming and behaving generally like occupation forces. The scene when Babamet the Serikin Zongo Ankara was comparable with the meeting of two Heads of State.
- xx I have on several occasions been privileged to attend the mass prayers on the Maidan in Calcutta at Id-ul-Fitr and Id-ul-Adha, where one has seen the impressive spectacle of over a quarter of a million Muslims, Sunni, Shi'i, and Ahmadi, Muslim League and Congress Party, royalty and peasantry, military and civilian, going through the motions of their prayers with the precision of the Viceroy's Bodyguard, and all dressed in spotless new white garments which reveal in no way the social standing of the wearer.
- ++ It must have been a source of embarrassment to the then Prime Minister when he had to attend, as head of the Government, such military ceremonies as Remembrance Day and Mychaung Day. Muslim prayers were always read by the regimental Imam and the Imam Abas, who alone was recognised by the Army as the Chief Imam of the Gold Coast.

Page. 28:

- * The psephological tables and much of the argument used in this section appeared in my paper, " The Muslim Vote in the Accra Constituencies, 1954", which was read at the W.A.I.S.E.R. Conference, Achimota, 1955.
- + It seems to be true in the Gold Coast that a subscription to a political party elicits the subscriber's support, rather than the other way round. A fully paid-up member does not wish to see his money wasted through his party's defeat, but a supporter will not pay his subscription unless more or less bullied into it. It is thus very important for psychological as well as financial reasons, to be active in the collection of subscriptions.

Page. 29:

- +++ See Table 2. I do not think it a breach of confidence to reveal that I was myself sounded unofficially to see whether I was willing to stand as a candidate. The fact that I am a European is sufficient indication of the lack of talent from which the M.A.P. was conscious of suffering.

Page 30:

- + See Table 2.
- ++ The Na Yiri was possibly institutionally the most powerful individual in the Gold Coast, as he had much greater personal authority over the Mamprusi and their tributaries (numbering probably over 300,000) than had even the Assantehene over the Ashantis. Most Southerners had never even heard of him.

Page 31:

- oo See table 2, which clarifies the position.

Page. 32:

- +++ The figures accord very closely with the population estimate quoted earlier; see Appendix "B" (Note on the Muslim population of Accra) for arguments leading to the conclusion that Muslim participation in the election was proportionately less than that of the non-Muslim population.

Page 32:

x For notes on methodology, the administration of the election, and the Muslim population of Accra, see Appendix "A", "A note on the Accra electoral registers", and Appendix "B", "A note on the Muslim population of Accra".

xx See Appendix "A".

Page 36:

xxx See above.

★★ See map.

z (Hansa) = "new resting-place". It is interesting to notice the number of Hausa place-names in Accra. Besides Sabon Zongo we have amongst others, Fadama(= 'water-meadow'), Tudu(= 'highest part of town'), Adabraka (corruption of the Hausa word "Albarakat"= "blessing"), Zongo Lane, etc. This is not merely an indication of the large number of Hausa-speakers living in the municipality, and their cultural influence, but is also a remembrance of the fact that the earliest contact of the Gas (the Accra tribe) with Muslims was with Northern cattlemen. They drove their cattle down from the North for five hundred miles or more, and required to pasture them for several weeks after the drive to fatten them up and get them back into condition before slaughter and sale in Accra market. (Even today the main food-market is called Salaga Market). The Ga Mantse (paramount chief of the Gas) and his subordinate chiefs made extensive grants of suitable pasture land to the cattlemen, in areas which were at that time (late 19th century) derelict, but which are now central areas of Accra (e.g. Tubu, Adabraka, Fadama, etc). These areas naturally received Hausa names. As Accra expanded, the cattleman and their successors were induced to part in dribs and drabs, and for small sums, with building plots which are now extremely valuable, and new land was obtained by them for pasture on what were then the outskirts of Accra. Now the Muslim community has profited by experience, and is reluctant to part with any of its present holdings into which Accra is now expanding, except at a very high price.

Many Southerners (few of whom speak any Hausa) are reluctant to admit that these place-names have a Hausa origin, though they can offer no Ga derivation for them. Ga tribalism is manifested in the (1953) choice of names for the Accra wards listed in table 2. Approximately half of these names are not in common use at all, but are traditional Ga names which were preferred by the Municipal Council to the (often foreign) names which are in daily use. They may be compared with such English constituency names as, for instance, Bassetlaw or Haltemprice.

* Named thus because it was settled by 'Lagosians' (Gold Coast English for Nigerians). The A.M.C. renamed it "Accra Newtown", but the general public still calls it Lagostown.

Page 37:

§ As shewn by the C.P.P. at the 1951 election.

++ See Appendix "A" and map.

Page 39:

x See Appendix "A".

+ See above.

Page 40:

* N.P.P. parliamentary leader and Leader of the Opposition; see above.

33 For an account of the origins of the N.L.M., see "Africa X-ray Report", (Investors' Intelligence (Pty)Ltd., Johannesburg), April 1955. See also "Africa-X-ray Report", November 1955, December 1955.

★★ The N.L.M. and the G.C.P. were from the first hard to distinguish, led as they were by similar (and often the same) intellectuals and traditionalists, and sharing a common bond of great strength in Gold Coast politics, joint opposition, though apparently at first on different grounds, to the C.P.P.

★★★ The Togoland Congress, under the leadership of S.G. Antor, was quite strong in the Ewe areas of Trans-Volta/Togoland, and was at the time (June 1956) numerically the third strongest party in the Assembly. It is unnecessary to discuss its detailed aims here; suffice it to mention that it was hostile to the C.P.P. because of the C.P.P.'s desire to integrate Togoland under U.K. Trusteeship completely into the Gold Coast. It was therefore sympathetic towards bids for regional autonomy by the N.L.M. and the N.P.P.

- + The Anlo Youth Organisation, whose leader, Modesto Apallo, was also its only sitting Assemblyman, first effectively entered politics at the General Election of 1954. Its complex background, involving a detailed exposition of personal and tribal relationships in Anlo State and the state capital, Anloga, and an understanding of the underlying causes of the Anloga riots in 1953, does not concern us, except that the A.Y.O. was a manifestation of local hostility to the established government, and therefore to the C.P.P..

Page 41:

x See Appendix "B"

- xx Bankole Renner was basically a nice man. As he strolled through Accra in his floppy Panama hat and his baggy suit, with his malacca walking stick in his hand, he was the picture of a retired English gentleman. It was, however, just these attributes, coupled with an inner lack of fire, which made him an incompletely successful Muslim leader. He enjoyed much respect amongst the Muslim community in the South as the only educated person who had ever offered to lead them, and had an enviable reputation for his free handling of court cases for poor persons. He was, however, unable wholly to capture the almost Mahdist fervour which was lying dormant in the hearts of Gold Coast Muslims, and which could only be tapped by Max Weber's "charismatic leader" (see Weber, "The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation", (tr), William Hodge & Co. Ltd., London 1947). However, his lawyer's respect for parliamentary institutions, and his support of the Commonwealth ideal, contributed considerably to keeping the minds of his followers away from events in North Africa and the Middle East, and to steering the political thought of the M.A.P. from conscious Pan-Islamic concepts.

A-III / - Les Eglises comme institutions
politiques
- Churches as political Institutions

Muslim Political Activity in the Gold Coast before Independence

J. H. PRICE
(University of Manchester)

A-III / 26

NOTE

This paper is based on research carried out in the then Gold Coast between 1953 and 1956, which was intended to form part of a survey of the influence of Islam on the politics of the four British West African territories.

This survey had to be abandoned owing to the pressure of administrative work upon the writer ; and with the passage of time and the imposition of one-party rule in independent Ghana, the information which had been collated became of purely historical interest.

The re-introduction, after eight years, of party political activity in Ghana, makes this survey, in the opinion of the writer, once more relevant to the situation. Although Muslim political activity has been for so long suppressed (or canalised through the Muslim Council into C. P. P. activity), the underlying political, religious and social problems of the Muslim community remain unchanged, and under a more liberal regime will manifest themselves in much the same way as they did in the days of British rule. Party politicians will do well, therefore, to consider the possible effects of their policies upon the Muslim electorate in both national and municipal elections.

Apart from changes of tense, no attempt has been made to bring this paper up to date. No reference is made, for example, to the 1960 Census (probably the most reliable to have been carried out in tropical Africa up to that time) ; instead, reliance is placed merely on such information as was available at the time. In this way, it is believed, a more authentic impression of pre-independence Gold Coast Muslim politics will be given.

- A-III / - Les églises comme institutions politiques
- Churches as political institutions

Muslim Political Activity in the Gold Coast before Independence

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A-III / 26.

Résumé :

La présente note est basée sur des recherches menées en Côte d'Or entre 1953 et 1956 qui avaient pour but d'étudier l'influence de l'Islam sur la politique des quatre territoires britanniques Ouest-Africains.

Cette étude a dû être abandonnée en raison des pressions exercées sur l'Auteur par l'Administration ; l'écoulement du temps, la prise de pouvoir par un parti unique dans le Ghana devenu indépendant ont donné aux informations qui avaient été rassemblées un intérêt purement historique.

La réintroduction, après huit années, d'une activité politique de partis au Ghana redonne de l'intérêt à la présente étude (c'est du moins l'avis de l'Auteur).

Bien que l'activité politique islamique ait été pendant longtemps supprimée (ou canalisée, par le Conseil islamique, dans les activités du C.P.P.), les problèmes politiques, religieux et sociaux sous-jacents à la vie de la Communauté musulmane n'ont pas changé, et ne manqueront pas de se manifester sous le régime plus libéral que connaît actuellement le Ghana, comme ils l'avaient fait sous la tutelle britannique.

Les hommes politiques feront donc bien de tenir compte des effets possibles de leur politique sur l'électorat musulman aussi bien dans les élections nationales que dans les élections municipales.

Le temps mis à part, on n'a pas essayé de mettre la présente étude à jour. Il n'est fait aucune allusion, par exemple, au Recensement de 1960 (probablement le plus valable de tous ceux qui ont été faits en Afrique jusqu'à ce jour). Bien au contraire, on s'en est tenu aux informations qu'il était possible de réunir à l'époque. L'Auteur croit qu'il est possible, de cette façon, de donner une image plus authentique de la politique musulmane dans la Côte d'Or d'avant l'indépendance.

I.P.S.A.

A.I.S.P.

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DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
IN SECULAR TURKEY

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Organized religion and social change

The Church as a social organization is permanently undergoing a great variety of modifications, due to the fact, that she is a part of society.⁶ Thus at every time the Church has a special relationship to the "world" as such. The tenacious struggle which goes on within the major religions about forms and constitutions of the church, indicates that the institutional characteristics are indices of something more important as the formal lay-out decided upon.

The Church in her capacity of an institution possesses three social sphere of influence :

There is at first the level of direct and more or less spontaneous contact between individuals and smaller groups (informal structure). The second level is characterized by institutionalized behavioural ways, which are externalized through distinct, social roles (formal structure). Next to these internal structural characteristics, comes as third sphere of influence the external aspect of the organization. This part reflects the whole societal system of values. Its repercussions translates itself in behavioural patterns, which are inspired by uncontestable rites, the integrative strength of symbols, etc.

The social force of an institution, especially in the religious realm, is not equally strong and comprehensive on all levels.

Here again one may distinguish between three major types :

1.- A church form, where primary contacts are the most relevant. It distinguishes itself by the autonomy of the different congregations.

2.- A church form, which possesses beyond the social realm of its own congregation a basic organisational structure. Specified ways of conduct such as cult, an elaborate institutionalisation of the preaching are guaranteeing a time and space embracing unification. The most important feature of this form is the hierarchical and authoritarian character of social ties.

3.- The third form represents a church, which is oriented toward society as a whole. In this case a well established organisation collaborates with governmental institutions, thus leading to the establishment of a state church. (1)

Within this last form the religious influence upon social and political decision making covers not only the ethical aspects of every day life, but furthermore touches upon the general problems concerning social, economic and political issues.

Organized religion in Christianity and Islam

In Christianity the Church after eliminating increasingly smaller congregations, tended to become more and more centralized and authoritarian. With time the Church became an integrating instrument of society, even a substitute for the state. Within Islam this development needed not to take place since the dual characteristic of church/state became evident from the very beginning on. As Niyazi Berkes rightly point out, more than any other medieval Islamic polity, the Turkish one, headed by the Ottoman dynasty characterized that combination of temporal and religious attributes implied in the fusion of the words Sultanate and Caliphate. In Turkish history, the concept of unity of state and religion (Din-ü-devlet) was applied through an imperial system, which gave unity and order to a great multiplicity of religious sects, professions and social classes. However this system reflected a different understanding of the unity between religion and government than that implied in the classical Islamic theory of Imamah, which simply meant, leadership of the community of believers. (2)

Within the Christian Churches, the Reformation brought an institutional innovation, which produced intensive reflections on the individual level of behaviour and a strong personalification of belief. The transition from feudalism not only caused the decay of a God-like state such as the Holy Roman Empire, but brought with the founding of national states also the possibility of highly differentiated church forms. Thus the emergence of capitalism led to the emancipation of traditionally bound groups and their social mobilisation. This tendency which stemming from a loss of tradition led to group pluralism was the major cause that the Church lost its central and social privileged position. Since state and society was no more identical, church and society also had to part from each other. With the disappearance of state churches such as for inst, in Germany with the adoption of the Weimar Constitution in 1919, the Church retained rather an intermediary role. This evolution has produced, what F. Fürstenberg calls within the Christian Church, especially in regard of the Anglosaxon countries, the appearance of the "associational Church" (Verbandskirche). (3)

In Islamic countries developments took a quite different way. This latecomer among the major five universal religions, established itself unlike Christianity not with symbols of suffering, but with military conquest thus becoming a religion of triumph.

Islam wherever it took root, usually followed a two-sided process. On the one hand it has consisted of an effort to adapt a universal, in theory standardized and essentially unchangable, unusually well integrated system of ritual and belief to the realities of local, even individual, moral and metaphysical perception. On the other hand, it has consisted of a struggle to maintain in the face of this adaptive flexibility, the identity of Islam as the particular directives communicated by God to mankind by his prophet Muhammad. (4)

Due to its structural characteristics, Islam was first deeply linked with the Arab empire. Following its decline, one important innovation attempted to modify the strictly legalized code of behaviour. This was sufism. Sufism, which shortly meant to bring orthodox Islam into effective relationship with the world. In the Middle East this seems mainly to have meant reconciling Arabian pantheism with Koranic legalism ; in Indonesia restating Indian illuminationism in Arabic phrases ; in West Africa, defining sacrifice, possession, exorcism and curing as Muslim rituals. (5)

But this attempt remained a mediaval experiment without consequences. The reinforcement of the dual character of the Ottoman empire retarded any kind of innovating process. Some sharp challenge from outside had to come in order to start any reconsideration of such a necessity.

According to W.C. Smith, the Turks, once European armies began to defeat theirs on the battlefield, did a quite remarkable thing. (6) They set about, within a spirit of stern realism to ask about the reasons of the weaknesses apparent. This marks the beginning of Turkish secularism. The endeavour if this paper is to throw some light upon the recent development of this important current, especially the impact of constitutionally guaranteed liberties leading toward the edification of a pluralistic society and its implication within an underdeveloped society.

Secularism in Turkey during the XIX and XX century

Although recognizing the necessity of changing the Islamic mode of thinking can be traced as far as to 1718 in a document representing a record between a Muslim and an unnamed Christian officer, (7) the first real break through came first with the intensive efforts of Mahmud II especially orientated toward the secularisation of higher military education institutions. It was followed by a series of reforms, labelled under the Tanzimat movement. The charter of Gülhane, which was proclaimed in 1839 and guaranteed equal right to all Ottoman subjects, irrespective of their religious belongingness, gave shape to a policy of secularism in the sense of bringing forth a differentiation between the "temporal" and the "religious" in the Turkish-Islamic context. This might be considered as the starting point of the dichotomy between "orthodox" (official, elite) and "folk" Islam. (8)

But neither the quest for modernization through westernization, nor secularizing reforms through Turkist influence following the revolution of 1908 such as the elaboration of a new family code, the removing of the religious authority from legislation, etc. represented a real and complete separation of religion and state, such as it would have been anticipated within the framework of absolute secularism. All these attempts remained a series of compromises.

The unrelentless efforts of various intellectuals groups and the main currents of ideas prior to the Turkish revolution, such as Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Turanism, Pan-Islamism, are all carrying one common trait : they are nothing more than compromises to retain the traditional form of monarchy and caliphate, yet striving to achieve some degree of westernization.

It remained as a fundamental task for Atatürk to solve the role of religion in such a way as to eliminate theocracy definitely. By approaching religion through a rationalist point of view, Atatürk was able to eliminate Islam as a state religion from the Constitution in 1928 by amending art. 2. After having experimented with certain attempts to transform Islam in a more viable form during the years 1923-33, the secularist efforts of the Turkish republic - realizing the futile results of such undertakings - concentrated their efforts on formalizing and legalizing all secularist moves. It was agreed upon that the religious question would become a matter of free discussion. It should be relinquished in the realm of the individual's conscience. The state itself would provide the most intensive efforts of scholarisation in order to equip the new generation with sounder and more rational ideas. Such was the situation in the 1930's when a wellknown sociologist was writing "the most important factor in the secularisation of the state is the evolution of science, morals and law autonomously from the religious dogmas... The modern state should punish those who would exploit religious sentiments for mundane purpose democratic Turkey necessarily means a secular Turkey.... (9)

Together with these basic ideas, Kemalist secularism placed three important legal limitations upon religion. The first is expressed in Art. 9 of the Law of Associations of 1938 and concerns the foundations of associations on the basis of sect and order (mezhep ve tarikat). This meant the prohibition to form a society of Sunnis or Alevis or Tıkanis or Bektasî, but it did not limit the right to form religious societies of a non-sectarian and non-exclusive nature such as collecting funds for mosque building, religious literature and clerical education. (10) The much more comprehensive catalogue of fundamental rights of the new constitution of 1961 (11) enlarged these possibilities ; thus a mushrooming of all kinds of associations occurred among which the religious one achieved within a short period the most significant position.

The second restriction was the prohibition of political association or parties seeking particularist religious support. Thus a Muslim Party or Pan-Islamic association was impermissible. This prohibition was also valid in regard of the regularly constituted political parties. Although the new constitution of 1961 as well as the very detailed law for political parties reinforces these prohibitions, legally admitted deviations are encouraging today more than ever religious undertones in political action. While from 1932 until 1946 the single party of the Kemalist regime shunned from playing on religious sentiments and rather preferred to reformulate social and educational problems in a rather unifying way, especially after 1965 and more explicitly prior to the general elections of 1969 religious themes were rather strongly exploited, especially by the Union Party the Justice Party.

The third restriction concerned provisions of the Penal Code ; Art. 169 of this Code, states that acts "contrary of the principle of secularism enunciated in the Constitution and aiming to adapt as the basic social or economic orders of the State, religious fundamentals and beliefs "provides punishment.

Thus it clearly appears that until the advent of multi-party democracy, the major ambition of Turkish secularism after the proclamation of the Republic-much in contradiction to the compromising westernisation efforts of the late Ottoman empire-, was understood as the disassociation of the fundamental institutions of the state from religious principles. Religion was guaranteed freedom and protection so long as and in so far it was not utilized to promote any social or political ideology having institutional implications. Since however Turkish secularism lacks even today a doctrinal basis, the Kemalist approach was both attacked by chauvinist nationalists as well as pro-Islamists. From 1945 on the religious, national and civilizational principles of the secular regime were overwhelmed by a wave of reaction. The governments of 1950-60 as well as their successors, the Justice Party (A.P.) from 1965 on, gave free reign to all sorts of obscurantism. (12)

The new Constitution of 1961 contains a very extensive catalogue of fundamental rights. One of its major goal was to set up the legal frame work for a pluralistic society. (13) With it came an astonishing proliferation of associations, a majority of them serving the extreme right parties and their ideology by supporting a vigilant anticommunism and undisguised preference for a return to the caliphate and teocracy.

These associations are - as it will be further on indicated - most active in the field of building mosques and setting up Koran courses, which are competing with regular primary schools. All these efforts can also be interpreted as the reinforcement of the Islamic self-sustaining community, the "cemaat".

The first systematic analysis of this religious renaissance, reveals astonishing trends. It becomes evident when locating the position of religious associations among all other associations of Turkey.

Table I : Distribution of various associations in Turkey*

Kind of association	1948	1958	1968
Employer	-	16	190
Labour	40	360	995
Small businessmen	146	2487	3670
Social welfare, charity	141	510	1520
Cultural including local city and town associations	287	2742	11654
Ideological	-	-	141
Liberal professions	40	176	259
Government officials	100	503	2355
Religious	58	3639	10730

* All the figures of this and the following tables have been collected by Mr. Ahmet YUCEKOK as a part of his dissertation under preparation.

The increase in absolute figures of religious associations in comparison to all other associational activities permits no comparison. Although the liberation and permissiveness by encouraging individual, local and regional initiative reveals itself significant in regard of cultural and sport associations, they still are far from having grown as fast as religious associations.

The term here covers both all associations dealing with mosque building as well as religious teaching. It is not e-xagerated to state that the building of mosques by community initiative is by far surpassing the school building activity in the villages. Serious scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Kazamias are qualifying this development as "dramatic". (14) They also agree that the persistence of traditional Islamic attitudes and values slow the pace of modernity. Since Islam from its structural set-up does not require the creation of a specially trained clerical staff, the spreading and reinforcement of religious associations are actually taking the place of decentralized Church in the Western meaning. This revival of course serves much less in regard of critical approach to social questions. Its major purpose becomes the obtainment of a beyond-orientated, submissive, fervant mass of believers.

In order to receive a better insight of this development the sequence followed in the course of the years should be carefully noticed.

Table II : Increase of religious associations in Turkey from 1946 - 1968.

Year	Associations for the building of mosques	Associations dealing with various religious activities mostly Koran teaching
1946	8	3
1947	23	4
1948	53	5
1949	88	7
1950	142	12
1951	226	25
1952	361	45
1953	538	60
1954	740	69
1955	1003	85
1956	2199	98
1957	2803	122
1958	3483	156
1959	4098	236
1960	4821	283
1961	4993	305
1962	5220	384
1963	5677	533
1964	6133	668
1965	6370	863
1966	7259	1328
1967	7856	1889
1968	8419	2311
		Total : 10.730

P.S. Alone in 1968 the government opened 994 official Koran courses in addition to the informal one.

Scrutinizing the table above, it becomes evident that inspite the unrelentless efforts to maintain secularism as an undestroyable founding principle of the Turkish Republic, the transition toward a multiparty system and the extension of franchise and mobilisation of masses opens the door to new ventures in the field of exploiting religious feelings and beliefs. This becomes even more serious in the case of Islam which represents not only a moral code and a rigid set of beliefs but also a way of life, which especially in the case of villagers is practically fused with their traditional mores.

Glancing over the years specific dates, so to speak "historical thresholds" are revealing themselves extremely interesting. The modest starting figures of 1946 are indices of the situation prior to the "return to religion". (15) At the end of this very year the CHP government decided to reintroduce Islamic instruction in the public schools, in 1948 secondary schools for the training of religious leaders (Imam hatib okullari) were re-established with a six years course following the elementary schools. In 1949 a Faculty of Divinity was opened at the University of Ankara. Starting from 1947 on Turks were given permission and currency to make a pilgrimage to Mekka, religious programmes on the state radio were instituted, the visitation of tombs of sultans and saints were permitted again. All these modifications, carried out by the same party, which under Ataturk's leadership most vigorously defended secularism in its widest sense, are reflected in the figures of the following years. They also serve as proofs how religions is used as soon as the decision to realize the transition to multiparty life is taken. But the real breakthrough comes with the landslide victory of the Democratic Party in 1950. The Moslem call to prayer was again read in Arabic, there was even relaxation in the wearing of religious garbs. Accordingly both mosque building and organized religious activities suddenly double their coverage. (1949 : 88 ; 1951 : 226 ; 1949 : 7 - 1951 : 25).

With the return to mystical and popular orders (tarikats) also appears the reemergence of folk Islam, designed by S.A. Mardin as a "soft" ideology. Although some political scientists are welcoming the modification of strict secularism by interpreting this shift as a move from urban interest to rural interests (16), in reality the policy of using religion as a political vehicle for the attainment of vote, blocks the spreading of scientific and rational thought. More important is the fact, that it is also the major vehicle to prevent the development of a class consciousness.

It helps to merge the identity of its promotive vehicle, the government party with the notion of the state. All these developments can be traced down with the figures prior to the military revolution on 1960.

Where as religious activities came to a relative still-stand during the interim period, after the return of the Democratic Party under the label of Justice Party in 1965 the increase both of mosque building and setting up of Koran courses becomes stupifying. The proportion within the total sum of religious associations of those devoted to mosque building has reached in the year 1968, 71 %. Further more in addition to government sponsored religious education, there has been a continuing flow of private initiative for the founding of associations with the purpose of setting up Koran courses. These centers very often serve as citadels against the fight for compulsory education.

Table III : Official and private sponsored religious educational institutions.

Year	Secondary schools for religious leaders (Inam Hatip okulu)	Voluntary associations initiating Koran courses
1950	-	-
1951	7	237
1952	7	358
1953	15	492
1954	16	543
1955	16	649
1956	17	724
1957	18	805
1958	19	893
1959	19	997
1960	19	1117
1961	19	1196
1962	26	1330
1963	26	1548
1964	26	1748
1965	26	1869
1966	26	2327
1967	40	2462
1968	58	2510

Similarly to the second table, the figures are revealing a rather reluctant and cautious start, way back in the 1950's, which increased its volume toward the end of the Menderes area. It then remain stagnating during the first two years following the Revolution of 1960, but gains on weight with the emergence of the first coalition government. After the important electoral gains of the Justice Party in 1965, the amount of schools for religious leaders indicates an incredible high increase, inspite of the opposite recommendations of the second Five Year Plan. There is only one plausible explanation for this process : to obtain through the liberalisation of religion successful political slogans for vote getting.

Another important recent development in this regard is the equation of graduates of this type of schools, where the curricula is heavily imbued with non-scientific, rigidly formulated theological material, with all other lycée graduates, thus opening the door to the university entrance examinations. The political impact of this evolution can be traced down to the introduction of heavily dogmatically indoctrinated anti-secular youth, who have been to some extent specially trained in semi-military camps by extreme rightist political parties. These groups are sharpening the tension within the university and are leading to fanatically behaving commando group formations.

Already during the Democratic Party government there were many ugly elements in the political exploitation of religious conservatism. This increased much more with the evolution of Turkey's democratic life. As Kemal H. Karpat states it quite correctly, secularism in Turkey, despite its limited success in the cultural field, had partly achieved, by the end of the second World War one of its major political objectives. People in general realized and accepted the fact that lay matters could be conducted better and more profitably by the government. With the entering into a competitive party system, the situation turned just the opposite way round : political parties continued to seek votes by promising additional religious freedom ; governments incline to sacrifice secularism to maintain popularity ; and politicians are ready to go to the extreme. (17) Thus one witnesses that conservative and religious groups are overdoing each other in order to undermine the modernist reforms and the regime itself.

This shows itself today more imperative than ever, since economic development is unable to provide sufficiently jobs and the only way to calm the aroused masses is to use religion to stamp out worldly materialistic demands. In this regard one can say, that the increasing amount of organized religious groups are performing the function of demobilizing potential opposition centers.

Despite of some optimistic expectation on behalf of the reformist capacity of Turkish Islam (18), the increasing participation of the masses in what is called "political mobilization" meaning high political participation at election even illiterates, turned to reinforce rural factors, parochial orientation and peasant conservatism. Governmental Islam in Turkey as a result of democratic pluralism, seems to have succumbed to the inherent compromises of political exploiters and religious reactionaries. (19)

The fallacy about the advantages of democratic pluralism as it reveals itself in developing countries, is closely connected with the question of regional cultures. It even endangers to some extent the concept of a monolithic national culture. (20) This aspect becomes most evident with the spreading of the sect of the Illuminated (Nurcu), which not only advocates the reinstatement of the Caliphate and teocracy, but at the same time follows a pro-Kurdish policy. The only possible reconciliation between Islam and nationalism in Turkey depends on Islam's becoming Turkish and reformed. This however in front of very intensive efforts of religious pluralism seems an extremely difficult task, especially if this result should be obtained solely by an evolutionary way. The argument of the moderate left, that religion would lose its impact on the masses if necessary reforms would be realized, tends to minimize the role and effectiveness of political culture, of which religion seems to be in Turkey one of its major element.

Table IV : Percentage of religious associations in Turkey in comparison to other associations during 1968 according provinces.

a) Group I :
Between 0 - 50 %

b) Group II :
Between 50 - 70 %

c) Group III :
70 % and more

Istanbul	5.5	Malatya, Sakarya	53	Kars	70
Hatay	13	Artvin	54	Konya	70.5
Mardin	16	Bolu	57	Sinop	74
Aydin	17	Manisa	57.5	Afyon	76.5
Antalya	17.5	Nigde	59	Nevsehir	81
Ankara	19	Sivas	60	Yozgat	84
Diyarbakir	19.5	Bitlis	61	Cankiri	85
Urfa	25	Trabzon, Maras	62	Gümüşhane	87
Usak	26	Agri	63	Rize	91.5
Adana, Hakkari	27	Erzurum, Ordu	64		
Bursa	28	Samsun	64.5		
Adiyaman	30	Kayseri	66.5		
Edirne, Tokat	31	Kastamonu, Corum	67		
Giresun	33				
Burdur	33.5				
Bilecik,					
Van Tunceli	34				
Icel, Balikesir					
Zonguldak,					
Kütahya	37				
Elazig, Maras,					
Gaziantep	39				
Canakkale	40				
Siirt,					
Tikirdag	41				
Mugla	42				
Kocaeli	43				
Kirklareli	44				
Isparta	45				
Denizli	47				
Eskisehir	48				
Kirsehir	49				
Bingöl, Erzincan	50				

When we look at Table IV, both group II and group III, representing provinces where out of every hundred associations in b) between 50 - 70 and in c° 70 or more are espousing a religious character, almost all these regions - except Bolu, Sakarya and Manisa - are belonging to Eastern Anatolia, the most underdeveloped region of Turkey. The phenomena seems to be closely connected with the degree of urbanization and employment in industrial environment. Taking Rize, a province near to Russian boarder, where religious associations are reaching 91.5 %, it is not so much the per capita income or economic development which seems to induce people to seek refuge in religious association but rather the fact, that this region belongs to the minority group of provinces with no centralized village life. Farms are scattered around and only one out of seven is living in an urban surrounding.

Employment in industry seems also to be important. In Yozgat one person out of 47, in Karsu one out of 43 is working in industry, where as in Istanbul, the largest city of the country with the lowest degree of religious association (5.5 %), one out of three persons is engaged in industrial labour.

These few examples all are indicating that formal democracy, together with all its constitutional safeguards, fundamental rights and guarantees, unless built upon a rationalized, industrialized, urbanized modern infrastructure, inevitably or rather because of it, ends in the vicissitudes of a politically exploited folk religion. The resulting exploitation of religious feelings is nourished by the reinforcement of feudal elements such as the political over representation of local notables and influentials (aga, sheikh). The strong linkage between national and international bourgeoisie and the heavy use of anti-communism as a weapon for solidarity actually all rests upon the intensity of religious associational activities.

Kemalism managed to solve the legal aspect of state religion by abolishing teocracy and taking religion under control. As a "Weltanschauung" it did not espouse an open anti-islamic approach. It endeavoured to modify religion in such a way as to enable Islam to answer contemporary problems in a rational way. When it became evident, that this attempt was doomed to failure Kemalism preferred to ignore the religious issues and push it in the sphere of the individual conscience.

Since however Turkey's social structure did not undergo a speedy industrialization, both folk religion and some of the legally abolished orders retained all their vitality. They were held under tutelage during the one party period, but regained their strength after the transition to multiparty politics. This is the main reason why criticism on both side again and for secularism - continues to dominate public discussion to such a point that one of the wellknown Turkish scholars of constitutional law, İlhan Arsel specifies "as long as Turks are preferring the "Arabic" ümmet concept instead of their own identity, this society is doomed to collapse'" (21).

Islamic revival in Turkey nowadays is not solely confined to blocked and predetermined voting patterns. It seeks its political solution beyond local options too. Dissidents within and outside of the government party, critical toward international collaboration, foreign investment, etc. are producing political leaders seeking for the elimination of secularism from the constitution. (22) A wellknown Turkish professor of economics, Sabahattî Zaim, stated at a lecture in İzmir, where the speaker was received with religious chants by heavily veiled women, as follows: "The entrance of Turkey in the Common Market is contradictory to the structure of Turkish-Islamic society, to Turkish nationalism and economic development". (23)

Conclusion

As. S.P. Huntington rightly points out political modernization involves 1) rationalization of authority, 2) the differentiation of structure and 3) the expansion of political participation. In many developing countries intensified electoral competition brings with it the tendency of devolution of power. Local forces become strong, parochial orientated tends to be decisive. Thus pluralism operates in a rather peculiar way, instead of building up a tense web of interrelated, counterbalancing organized social forces, it pushes traditional forces in new frame of references.

This tendency is reinforced by an inherent element of Islam in society. Just to the contrary of the West, where legitimate corporate entities with autonomous political power were able to create a feeling of belongingness, this was not possible within the highly centralized Ottoman empire. Thus the community feeling among Moslems served functionally speaking as an intermediary instrument for social intercourse.

As long as national goals took an important place in politics, this distinctive feature lost its importance. It regained it, however immediately when political participation grew, grass-root politics spread and political priorities were rather granted on the bases of parochial interests.

Democratic ways are reinforcing Islamic religion as an all embracing state religion with a complete set of values, rigid and conservative thoughts. The urge for a belongingness to a community pushes local politicians to replace under circumstances national loyalty with religious attachments.

One of the most important aspects of religious revival in Islam, is its inherent tendency to strengthen all forms of feudalism. Where as during the Middle Ages in Europa, the Church managed to retain its authority against the particularistic tendencies of the feudal lords, the eastern Islamic feudalism shows quite different traits. Religious functions are connected here both with blood relationship and land ownership. Tribal heads (siyyid) are handing over their religious privileges to their descendants, similarly to big landowners (aga), who also maintain an influential position in regard of religious practice. Thus democratic pluralism with it legally admitted, intense activity of multifaceted organizations, represents new and even more vigorous forms than ever for the refuge of feudal elements. The voting results during the general election of 1969 have shown that more votes than casted for the third largest political party, were given to 15 independents, all resulting from Eastern provinces. This political choice can only be interpreted in strong personal influence of almost charismatic character, in which ties such as tribal and religious allegiance are playing the decisive role.

The peril of "folk religion" ending in obscurantist practices permitting an easy manipulation of the power holding group by foreign interests, was the major concern of Atatürk during the early years of the first Republic. The edification of a classical liberal regime in the 1950's gave enough evidence to show the tendencies developing from a propice ground. With the full guaranties of freedom and liberties brought by the 1961 Constitution, rational and logical thinking due to the exposure of uncensored critical thinking permitted Turkey's political life to gain new dynamic dimensions.

However democratic pluralism after experimenting a short time with associations and group formations similar to highly industrialized societies, such as trade unions, associations of liberal professions, bureaucracy, opposition groups, etc., gave soon the dominating position to a proliferation of new pressure groups, all over-anxious to solve the urgent demand for the revolution of rising expectation by pacifying the masses with religious submission, fatalism and renunciation of worldly goods in favour of celestial benefits. The harvest of this policy will shortly become more evident, when political issues together with economic, social and educational one, will not be able to resist vigorous public criticism.

(WITHOUT SUMMARY) (SANS RESUME)

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- (12) According W.F. WEIKER, the newly formed Unity Party (Birlik Partisi) is largely Alevi (Turkish branch of Shiites) based and showed enough concentrated strenght in north Central Anatolia to elect eight deputies so that the problems of the Alevis and Eastern Turkey in general will receive more vocal attention. W.F. WEIKER, Turkey's Elections May Bode Ills, Mid East, December 1969, P. 34.

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- (21) İlhan ARSEL, Ortacag'a dönüş, Cumhuriyet, 16.7.1970.
- (22) At the anti-communist meeting in Ankara, organized by the Tradesmen and Artisans Guild in July 1970, transparencies and posters were calling for "Moslem Turkey", "God is with us", "The cause of all evils is the Constitution", Cumhuriyet, 12.7.1970.
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DATA ARCHIVES FOR COMPARATIVE STUDIES
OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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During the past few years social scientists have directed increasing attention to comparative investigation of processes of political development. These efforts have been productive of significant substantive findings and have resulted in the elaboration of at least suggestive theoretical formulations. At the same time, considerable energy has also been devoted to development of the organizational and other resources necessary to support comparative investigations. Various consortia and ongoing collaborative research groups have been formed; automated archives for the data of political development have been projected and, in some instances, actually created; and new and promising channels of cross-national and cross-disciplinary communication have been opened (1). With a number of note-worthy exceptions, however, these activities have been primarily concerned with essentially contemporary phenomena. Rather surprisingly, historical phenomena have tended to be neglected.

Even the distant past has, of course, been intensively studied by historians and, to a lesser degree, other social scientists. The value of this work is obvious, but it is also clear that these investigations often have serious limitations as contributions to scientific knowledge of developmental processes or of political life more generally. In the view of many social scientists, the methods and evidence which historians have usually relied upon most heavily place implicit but nonetheless narrow emphasis upon elite phenomena and appear unduly impressionistic and not subject to the procedures of verification and replication demanded by contemporary social science. Perhaps particularly in the United States, historical studies have tended to be primarily descriptive and episodic and have emphasized supposedly unique events and personalities. Many historians have argued, in fact, that the development and use of generalizations and theories is neither possible nor desirable in the study of human affairs.

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- (1) Recent brief descriptions of some of these activities and bibliographic references are provided in the introduction to Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1969); and Stein Rokkan, "Centre Formation, Nation-Building and Cultural Diversity: Report on a Symposium Organized by UNESCO, "Social Science Information, VIII (February 1969), pp.85-99.

As a consequence, their studies have tended to lack theoretical orientation and significance and do not fully compensate for the failure of other social scientists to concern themselves with historical phenomena (2).

The growth of interest in recent years among political scientists and other students of politics in systematic comparative investigation of historical phenomena communicates well-justified dissatisfaction with this state of affairs. The need for historical studies in the investigation of developmental processes seems so obvious as to require no comment. Because such processes occur over long periods of time their study dictates a well-developed historical dimension. Developmental processes can be studied, in effect, by examining nations and cultures passing through different stages of a long-term process at the same chronological point. But despite its utility, this general approach has several important limitations. In the first place, it emphasizes the experiences of contemporary developing or transitional nations and societies. On the other hand, the process of political development as it occurred in nations that are somewhat presumptuously described as developed or modernized is neglected. Such an approach, moreover, does not facilitate effective examination of the varied alternative forms and patterns of political development and may not allow assessment of the role and significance of contextual factors which shape and influence developmental processes.

Consideration of the contemporary era as compared with earlier time periods illustrates the latter point. While the years since 1945 may appear to have been marked by large-scale and even chaotic change to those fated to live through them, a little thought serves to demonstrate that these years have also been marked by major elements of continuity and homogeneity. The international environment during these years has been more or less consistently marked by bi-polar tensions and is in this respect unlike the multi-power system of, for example, the nineteenth or eighteenth centuries. Similarly, a relatively high level of affluence, advanced technology, and well-developed communications facilities have also been relatively consistent characteristics of these years. To be sure, change in these aspects of life has occurred, and not all nations, cultural areas and social groups share equally in these attributes of contemporary life. Even so, modern day affluence, technology, and communications could hardly have been dreamed of in even advanced nations a short century ago. While affluence, advanced technology, and communications are not evenly distributed in the contemporary world, it is clear that even impoverished social groups and relatively underdeveloped nations feel the impact of these characteristics of modern life if only in terms of goals to be achieved and as sources of a sense of deprivation. Thus in these and other respects the conditions of life, and with them the conditions and determinants of politics and political development, inevitably differed in more remote time periods from those of contemporary years.

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- (2) For essays relevant to these issues see Louis Gottschalk (ed.), Generalizations in the Writing of History: A Report of the Committee on Historical Analysis of the Social Science Research Council (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1963), and especially David M. Potter, "Explicit Data and Implicit Assumptions in Historical Study." See also Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., A Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

Findings based upon investigation of the evidence provided by a limited chronological period, however intensive the investigation, may well be time-bound and limited in generality and relevance to the particular era considered. Continuities and discontinuities within such a period may be observed and precisely measured, but it is impossible to know whether these mark significant changes or merely limited fluctuations in a longer trend or pattern. Generalizations based upon observation and measurement of such fluctuations may provide little guidance in understanding earlier phenomena and, more importantly, provide only inadequate guidance for the future. The search for causal relations may be frustrated if investigations are limited to a single period in time. The number of particular cases of general phenomena may be a few within a single chronological period, and the range and variety of political phenomena available for investigation within any given period are similarly limited. Because contextual conditions are often relatively constant within a particular historical era, the effort to identify and isolate the impact and causal significance of these conditions is much more difficult if only a single era is considered.

To put the matter in more general terms, the necessity of studying political phenomena in a variety of situational contexts has long been recognized, and attention has been devoted to comparative studies across nations, cultures, regions and subnational groupings. The logic underlying such studies suggests the value of historical investigations. When confronted with conclusions based upon a limited period of time, it is justifiable to ask whether these conclusions have relevance beyond that time period, just as it is justifiable to ask whether findings based upon a single era or nation have general relevance. The tendency to neglect history has the effect of unnecessarily reducing the range and variety of political phenomena available for study and of restricting the number of cases or examples of particular phenomena to be investigated. Historical evidence affords the opportunity to examine a wider variety of political phenomena in more varied contexts than would be possible if investigations were limited to the investigator's immediate present. Historical investigations, in short, can facilitate findings of greater generality and increase the researcher's confidence in the validity and relevance of his work.

In these terms, indeed, historical investigations sometimes have advantages over those concerned with the more contemporary world. By examining specific instances of a class of phenomena in a variety of historical contexts it may be possible to better identify the significance of particular contextual characteristics present only in some of the instances studied. Through the use of historical evidence, otherwise uncontrollable elements of political situations can, in effect, be controlled and varied to better estimate their causal significance. Within the limits of available evidence, moreover, historical events and individuals are open for study to a degree that more contemporary events and individuals often are not. Problems of confidentiality and sensitivity to possibly damaging revelations are less serious where historical investigations are concerned. Historical events and processes are closed and their outcomes are known. The past is insensitive to the process of inquiry, and the investigator can have no impact upon the attitudes and behavior of historical individuals as can be the case in investigations of contemporary phenomena. In historical investigations, in other words, some of the elements of an experimental situation can be approximated sometimes more effectively than in the investigation of more contemporary events.

It is perhaps unnecessary to devote further discussion of the advantages to be gained from investigation of political processes in historical depth or to exploration of the substantive and theoretical benefits which such studies might be expected to yield. Whatever their advantages, however, studies that involve a significant historical dimension present a variety of frustrating difficulties which are in some respects more serious and more complicated than those presented by studies more narrowly concerned with contemporary phenomena. To a considerable degree these difficulties are related to the nature of the data resources available for historically oriented investigations. In the following pages some of the characteristics and limitations of these data resources are discussed with particular emphasis upon concrete and practical problems presented by source materials relevant to the political events and processes of the past.

DATA RESOURCES

A vast and varied store of information bearing upon even relatively remote time periods is potentially available to investigators. Through the years information recording human activities and characteristics and detailing the functioning of political, social and economic institutions has been regularly produced by countless individuals and public and private agencies in the course of day-to-day activities, and major arrays of such materials have been preserved in substantial historical depth. These materials describe the aggregate characteristics of nations, and of a variety of localities and subordinate units within nations, as well as the attributes and activities of individuals, organizations and groups. While no brief discussion can suffice to describe the range and variety of these source materials, some of the major and obvious categories of data relevant to the study of past political phenomena can be indicated drawing primarily upon the example of the United States. This provincialism is, of course, primarily, a matter of convenience. Most of the major categories of source material mentioned are also available often in greater historical depth and in more usable form, for many other nations (3).

Voting records, including the returns for elections of officials, votes on popular referenda, and the records of legislative and other collegial bodies both public and private, are among the most obvious and the most valuable sources for the study of historical political phenomena. For the United States, returns for a very large number of national, state and local offices can be found for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and, in less abundance, for earlier years as well.

(3) See Stein Rokkan and Jean Meyriat (eds.), International Guide to Electoral Statistics, Vol. I, National Elections in Western Europe (The Hague and Paris : Mouton, 1969). For general essays exploring the quantitative historical data resources available for the nations and regions of the world see Jacob M. Price and Val R. Lorwin (eds.), Quantification and History (New Haven : Yale University Press), forthcoming.

In the experience of the United States, moreover, popular voting has not been limited to the election of candidates to public offices. A very large number of policy questions have also been decided by popular vote on referenda, initiatives and amendments to state constitutions. While suffrage requirements have varied from nation to nation and from one time period and office to the next, these materials provide a continuing record of the candidate and partisan preferences of the electorate and a useful means to assess popular reactions to the issues of the day, to investigate public interest and involvement in political life, to trace trends in public opinion across time, and to identify regional patterns of political interest and involvement.

Legislative voting records, and the proceedings of legislative bodies more generally, constitute a particularly abundant and useful form of political data. Comprehensive roll call records for the United States Congress are available for the years since 1789, and similar series of legislative data stretching back into the nineteenth century can be found for most states. Indeed, for several of the original states these materials have been preserved for even the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For many cities and municipalities these sources are available for city councils, county boards of supervisors, and other local government agencies and provide a record of countless collective decisions on matters of public policy and of the positions taken on these matters by large numbers of individuals. As such they provide a vital source not only for the investigation of the functions and nature of these agencies themselves, but also for investigation of changing policy interests and governmental activities, of shifting political attitudes and ideologies, and of the response of governmental figures to societal problems and external pressures. Nor are voting records of this sort limited to formal governmental legislative agencies. Judicial agencies frequently deliver decisions on the basis of a kind of voting procedure, and these records thus constitute a fruitful source of information for the investigation of judicial and governmental processes. A host of private organizations ranging from private clubs to labor unions and political parties employ voting procedures either in general assembly or in their governing councils to transact business of organizational and sometimes public concern.

A variety of governmental and private agencies have also collected and preserved large arrays of information describing the characteristics and activities of individuals, groups, organizations and of the populations of geographic areas. Beginning in 1790, systematic national censuses have been taken by the United States. During early years these censuses were little more than enumerations of the population of the nation by political and geographical areas for purposes of apportioning representation in Congress. But even in the earliest national censuses, population was enumerated by sex, age and as slave or free. Beginning in the middle years of the nineteenth century the periodic national census has steadily expanded both in quality and in scope to collect data bearing upon income, the ethnic composition of the population, internal and external migration, religious affiliation, trade and economic production, education and communication, as well as information relevant to various categories of political, economic and social organizations.

Thus the federal census reports provide a rich source of systematic statistical information describing the characteristics of the population and of geographic areas for more than 170 years of the history of the United States. Particularly during the nineteenth century, moreover, a number of individual states regularly conducted systematic censuses which provide a useful supplement to the records of the federal enumerations. In the case of some of the original states, indeed, local censuses of this sort were carried out prior to the formation of the nation (4). Many other nations, of course, have also regularly conducted national and local censuses and enumerations beginning, in some instances, in earlier years.

Many of the data resources described above are most readily available in aggregated form. With very few exceptions, election returns are preserved only in aggregated form organized at the level of counties or other subordinate political or geographical units, and the bulk of the available census materials for the United States are aggregated data describing population groups or geographical areas. Historical source materials also include abundant individual level data. The biographical directories of various organizations and obituaries and death notices are examples of rich sources of such information. The Biographical Directory of the American Congress provides biographical information of varying detail for all members of Congress from the Continental Congress of 1774 through 1961, and this information can be supplemented by the directories published by each of the Congresses of the latter nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Through the years directories for many of the state legislatures have also been compiled and provide basic biographical information for the members of these bodies. Obviously, these sources provide a means to gain systematic information bearing upon the composition and characteristics of the governmental elite and to investigate such problems as the penetration of new social groupings into elite formations.

Sources such as these, of course, tend to be restricted in their relevance to the members of elite groups; in the past as in the present, biographical sketches of more ordinary men and women rarely found their way into directories, and their deaths were seldom the occasion for lengthy and information-laden obituaries. On the other hand, city directories often contain limited but significant information for a much broader segment of the population of the past.

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- (4) Catalogs of the publications and compilations of state and national censuses of the United States are Henry J. Dubester (ed.), State Censuses : An Annotated Bibliography of Censuses of Population Taken After 1970 by States and Territories of the United States (Washington, D.C. : United States Government Printing Office, 1948); and by the same author, Catalog of United States Census Publications, 1790-1945 (Washington, D.C. : United States Government Printing Office, 1950). See also Conrad Taeuber "Population: Trends and Characteristics" in Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore (eds), Indicators of Social Change : Concepts and Measurement (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), pp.47-48 and passim.

For the United States, moreover, the original enumeration schedules for the federal censuses of 1790 through 1880 are now available; and the individual enumerations from subsequent censuses will become available in later years. These original enumerations provide, in effect, a limited but useful survey of the entire population of the nation at the individual level (5). Thus, national censuses can provide not only a rich source of aggregated descriptive data but of data bearing directly upon individuals as well.

These basic categories of source material do not, of course, constitute the only sources of information for the study of past political phenomena. Most governmental agencies, both local and national, collect and systematically preserve substantial arrays of numeric information in the course of carrying out governmental and administrative activities. The budgetary accounts, tax receipts, and appropriation and expenditure records of national, state and local governments constitute a systematic record of governmental activities and demands and of the allocation of societal resources through government over prolonged time periods. Customs reports, trade statistics and postal records, although the availability of the latter for earlier periods is limited, provide information bearing upon the flow of commerce and communication both within the nation and across national boundaries. Various other categories of basic statistical data are also compiled as a part of ongoing societal life. Among these are vital statistics recording births, deaths, marriages and other information bearing upon the life histories of individuals. The crime statistics compiled by most local governmental agencies--often, unfortunately, quite indifferently--provide information relevant to the quality and nature of life in countless individual communities as do such sources as wills, tax records and building permits. The scattered but abundant data compiled by educational institutions and associations provide information relevant to the performance of the political system and to the opportunities and characteristics of individuals and population groups. Nor is the collection and preservation of basic statistical materials limited to governmental and public agencies. A variety of private organizations have also produced voluminous records of use to students of historical political life. For many nations, including the United States, churches have systematically accumulated records bearing upon the lives of parishioners, and businesses, hospitals, fraternal organizations, and trade union records are often similarly a source of useful information.

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- (5) For a pioneering example of the use of these data see Stephan Thernstrom Poverty and Progress : Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964)

Quantitative and readily quantifiable source materials of the sort briefly discussed above constitute only a part of the total body of extant evidence relevant to the political life of the past. A wide variety of documentary source material is available to the researcher often in published form. Governmental and other official documents, including formal constitutions and charters, statutes and legal codes, treaties and diplomatic correspondence, the official papers of governmental officers, and the reports and proceedings of numerous governmental agencies, have been preserved in great abundance and have long served historians and other social scientists as basic sources of information for the study of both past and contemporary political phenomena. The diaries, letters, memoirs, autobiographies and other writings of a very large number of prominent figures of the past have been diligently collected and preserved and often provide a source of private, more-or-less candid, and "inside" information bearing upon the events of the past. The mass media in its various forms constitutes a further obvious and useful historical source. And to these categories of historical source materials can be added the records and reports of businesses and other non-governmental organizations as well as a variety of other textual sources. The national platforms of the political parties, for example, provide useful indications of the changing goals and strategies of organized politics while the platforms of state and local party organizations, which in the United States of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were often more detailed and extensive than the national documents, provide a means to identify and investigate regional and local variations in political interests and activities.

It is obvious, of course, that as in the case of several of the categories of biographical data touched upon above, textual sources of this sort tend to reflect official views and the experiences, observations and attitudes of elite groups. By and large, only the few of wealth, position and education had the opportunity and motivation to record their views and experience for posterity. It is probably fair to say, moreover, that conventional scholarly use of such materials has often been impressionistic and unsystematic and that these sources have often been uncritically employed to infer mass attitudes and behavior patterns. On the other hand, critical and systematic use of textual sources is possible, and, indeed, large bodies of such materials can be coded and analyzed employing the resources of modern data processing technology.

It is clear, then, that the relative failure of historians and other social scientists to explore systematically political phenomena in historical depth and in ways more nearly in keeping with the canons of scientific investigation is not a necessary consequence of scarcity of source materials. Despite their abundance, however, source materials of the sort considered here are marked by significant limitations which are perhaps particularly serious in the case of comparative investigations. With few exceptions, these materials were not originally collected with the goals and needs of social science research in mind, but were produced instead by ongoing processes of society including government, administration, commerce and simple communication between individuals. Even data produced by systematic enumerations and censuses conducted in recent years are frequently marked by serious inconsistencies and often do not include variables of critical importance to investigators.

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Where materials relevant to the past are concerned these problems are compounded by the passage of time and, indeed, by historical processes themselves. Historical records have been subjected to what amount to arbitrary selection processes. Societies, groups and individuals have usually shown interest in the preservation of the records of their own past. On the other hand, not all records have been systematically preserved; some have been destroyed through accident, and still others destroyed by deliberate act to avoid damaging revelations or to reduce the encumbrances presented by growing masses of records. Careful efforts have been made to select records for preservation in terms of historical value, but interests and assessments of value change over time and the criteria of the past are not always the same as those of later social scientists. In short, both the original collection and the preservation of historical evidence has been affected by changes of interest, by varying historical circumstances and by processes of social, technological and political development in general.

These and related considerations have a number of important consequences. For one thing, available historical evidence is rarely precisely that which the investigator would choose had he control over original processes of data collection, organization and preservation; instead he must frequently make do with data only indirectly and inferentially relevant to problems at hand. Historical materials, moreover, tend to be fragmentary and discontinuous as a result both of the manner in which these data were originally created and of the winnowing processes of time which have worked to preserve some materials and to destroy others. Thus investigations of past phenomena are frequently plagued by problems of missing data. In the investigation of patterns of electoral phenomena of the past, for example, it is often found that returns for crucial elections in particular areas were either never collected or were lost in the course of time. As the investigation leads from major to lesser offices and to smaller geographical units, relevant voting data frequently becomes more fragmentary and difficult to locate.

In the case of the United States, the use of election data is complicated and their quality and availability lessened by the historical absence of a centralized agency for collecting and preserving these materials. But problems of discontinuity are also encountered in the use of data that were originally systematically collected and centrally compiled and preserved. In many nations periodic censuses have been conducted with impressive frequency and regularity and have produced large arrays of basic information of value to the study of political development. In early years, however, national censuses were limited both in terms of the methods employed and the quantity of information collected, and have expanded steadily in size and quality with the passage of time. The United States census, as censuses of other nations, has also been effected by changes of interest and by varying budgetary circumstances. Collection procedures have been modified, definitions and tabulation categories changed, and particular categories of information omitted and new ones added. These data are also characterized by variation in the units for which data are recorded with the result that the critical task of linking together data from disparate sources is seriously complicated.

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As investigations are extended to include lengthy temporal ranges these inconsistencies are often further complicated by changes, frequently undocumented, in the boundaries of geographical units. Thus even though these materials offer the potentiality for extended time series, considerable manipulation, adjustment and interpretation is frequently necessary to achieve maximum comparability. Such problems are serious enough in the investigation of a single nation; where comparisons across nations are concerned, they are seriously compounded.

Probably the most frequently noted shortcoming of historical data concerns problems of accuracy and reliability. Even in contemporary elections, the vote count sometimes proves to be inaccurate, and it is obvious that in earlier years before the invention of such aids to accuracy as voting and adding machines the count was probably even less accurate. Fraud and corruption are further sources of inaccuracy, although their incidence may well have been exaggerated. Systematic enumerations and compilations are also subject to error and bias. The accuracy of census enumerations in outlying and frontier areas in early may well be questioned, just as the count of lower income groups in major urban areas was perhaps often incomplete as was the case in the 1960 census of the United States (6). Statistics relevant to crime, delinquency and other social disorders are of great potential value as indications of the performance and quality of the political system. But as has often been pointed out, the lack of a centralized recording agency, differences in law enforcement procedures, and the absence of uniform definitions, both from one locale and from one time period to the next, may severely limit the utility of this important category of historical information.

Many of the categories of source material discussed above also present a variety of more mundane but nonetheless serious problems. Not the least of these has to do with the great bulk and the scattered, disparate and heterogeneous nature of these materials. Indeed, even the task of surveying historical sources to identify and locate potentially useful data can be a major undertaking. Considerable effort has been devoted to the collection, organization and preservation of documentary sources, and, although these materials are by no means centralized, textual sources are characterized by at least a semblance of organization and accessibility. Statistical materials for the study of political phenomena present significantly different problems. Obvious collections of such materials, such as census tabulations and legislative voting records, are usually available in relatively accessible published sources, but other equally valuable arrays of data are to be found only in fragmentary form in scattered sources ranging from local repositories to obscure publications. To recover these materials large-scale effort is required. The recent work of the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research in collecting basic election data in historical depth for the United States was accomplished, for example, only through the voluntary work of numerous archivist, historians and political scientists throughout the nation who visited state and local archives, university libraries and other repositories to locate and assemble these materials.

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(6) See Taeuber, "Population : Trends and Characteristics".

The use of electronic computers, moreover, is virtually necessary for effective analysis of meaningful bodies of quantitative historical data. But before data can be subjected to machine analysis, time consuming and costly work is required to convert data to suitable form. Appropriate formats, coding conventions, and processing procedures must be devised; the work of organization and codification must be carried out; the data must be converted to machine-readable form; and adequate documentation and supporting information must be prepared. Management and analysis of data of the sort described above also requires specialized computational facilities. For the most part, the general purpose data management and analysis programs now available to social scientists were originally designed with the characteristics of other forms of data in mind or, indeed, to suit the needs of other disciplinary areas entirely. More sophisticated and more advanced computational software is necessary to meet the requirements imposed by the massive, heterogeneous and complex character of data of the sort considered here. Thus innovative work is required to develop computer systems more nearly adequate to cope with these characteristics and to serve the needs of social scientists who employ these data in their work.

The magnitude and varied nature of these tasks, the technical expertise and financial support which they require, and the complexities of relevant source materials all suggest that fully effective exploitation of these resources in social science research can be accomplished only through large-scale cooperative effort. The cost and effort required to collect and automate major collections of election returns, census data and the like in historical depth and to develop computer facilities adequate for the management and analysis of such materials are well beyond the resources of most individual scholars. Where comparative investigations are concerned, the need for cooperation is particularly pressing. The difficulties involved in collecting, processing and documenting data at sites distant from the areas and nations to which the data are relevant are obvious. On the other hand, effective exchange of automated data resources could facilitate comparative investigation almost regardless of the national location of the investigator. Achievement of such cooperation, however, would require a measure of agreement upon such matters as standards of data preparation and documentation as well as development of more uniform computational facilities for management and analysis of these materials.

AUTOMATED DATA ARCHIVES.

Automated social science data archives appear to be one of the most promising mechanisms for the achievement of effective cooperation in the development and exchange of the data and other resources necessary for research involving historical phenomena. In most cases, social science data archives were initially formed to collect and disseminate the raw data of public opinion surveys carried out by individual and group research projects (7).

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- (7) For discussions of social science data archives see Stein Rokkan (ed.), Data Archives for the Social Sciences (The Hague : Mouton, 1964); Ralph L. Bisco, "Social Science Data Archives: Progress and Prospects," Social Science Information, 4 (February, 1967), pp.39-74; and Warren E Miller, "The Development of Archives for Social Science Data", in Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1969).

These data are collected and converted to more or less standard format and made available for secondary analysis. The extension of the data archive concept and, indeed, the broadening of the activities of various existing archives to include other categories of research material, including historical data, is a logical and obvious step. Data files originally organized for specific investigations of political processes in historical depth often have the same potential for secondary analysis as do sample survey collections.

But it is also clear that historical data in particular present a variety of different and, in some respects, more complex archival problems than do survey data and other forms of social science research material collected to serve specific research interests through methods involving direct observation. For one thing the selection of specific bodies of historical data for archival processing, storage and dissemination is more complicated than in the case of survey materials. On the whole, the selection of survey data files for inclusion in archives is relatively straight forward. The prestige of the survey researcher or investigating group, the nature and goals of the survey, and reports of findings stimulate interest in the raw data within the relevant scholarly community. This interest, in turn, dictates integration of the data into archives for general dissemination (8).

This process will also function and, indeed, has functioned where automated files of election returns, census data, legislative voting records, and so on are concerned and will result in the acquisition of substantial bodies of such data by archives. In the case of these materials, however, this "natural selection" process has several limitations. As suggested elsewhere, materials of this sort, and particularly those relevant to the past, tend to be fragmentary and discontinuous and are, in general, marked by a variety of characteristics which frustrate and complicate analysis and manipulation. The investigator who employs such data must often use estimating procedures to compensate for boundary changes; data must be adjusted and interpreted; and disparate and heterogeneous variables must be combined to compensate for missing data, to achieve maximum comparability from one time period or area to the next, and to construct measures more nearly appropriate to the requirements of the particular research task. The individual investigator who collects and processes his own data can find solutions to such problems which, although limited, are adequate for the purposes of his own research. All too frequently, however, these adjustments and transformations are not fully documented, and in many cases the characteristics of the resultant data file tend to be highly idiosyncratic to the particular research project. Thus the potentiality of the data file for secondary analysis is seriously limited.

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(8) Problems involved in the selection of data files for archival acquisition, processing and dissemination are discussed in Miller, "The Development of Archives for Social Science Data".

It is doubtful, moreover, that this general selection process could result in anything approaching comprehensive or fully effective automation and dissemination to the research community of such major collections of source materials as national census or voting records. The size and complexity of such bodies of evidence would seem to preclude development through individual effort alone. The example of the data collections assembled by the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research may illustrate the point. The Consortium collection of county-level election data includes returns for over 20,000 individual elections to the offices of president, governor and United States senator and representative from 1824 to the present and records the names of almost 100,000 individual candidates. In machine-readable form the collection amounts to the equivalent of over one million IBM card images and required several years to collect and process. A complementary collection of county-level ecological data from the United States census reports, 1790 through 1965, comprises the equivalent of well over two million card images, and it should be added, includes only a relatively limited selection of the data available from this source. A third major collection - comprehensive roll-call records for the United States Congress from the founding of the nation - amounts to over three quarters of a million card images. Nor does the mere size of these several collections adequately convey the magnitude of the tasks of collection and processing which they presented. As noted elsewhere, the work of collecting election materials required the assistance of a large number of scholars representing several disciplinary areas to search local repositories and obscure publications and compilations and to bring specialized expertise to the task of evaluating source materials in order to select the most complete and most reliable data. In the processing of Congressional roll call data, large-scale effort was required to collate and compare alternative sources and to identify and reconcile discrepancies between them.

It is unlikely that individual effort alone could result in the automation of more than segments of such bodies of information or would produce fully compatible data files of maximum value to the scholarly community. Collection and processing of data resources such as these can probably be carried out most effectively and efficiently through large-scale centralized effort rather than by individuals or even groups of scholars in connection with particular research projects. Centralized data collection and processing operations allow realization of economies of scale, facilitate the development of advanced and specialized technical expertise and, in general, appear most promising as means to overcome problems of technical incompatibility and to yield genuinely multi-purpose data files of the most general scholarly utility.

It is justifiable, of course, to look with considerable suspicion upon data collection and processing activities which are carried out more or less independently of research projects. These suspicions are particularly justifiable in view of the absence of well-developed theory to guide the process of selecting particular bodies of data for collection and automation from among the many competing categories of historical and other source materials. Obviously the monetary resources available to support social science research are far too limited to be wasted on the expensive work of collecting and processing historical or other data for which no research need exists.

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These dangers seem relatively limited, however, in the case of major national data sources such as the reports of censuses and other systematic enumerations, election returns and legislative voting records, and large-scale collections of biographical data for national elites. The importance of such materials to a wide range of research interests, and their obvious value for comparative investigations, may seem to justify centralized collection and processing even in advance of the formulation of specific research projects. Indeed, it is likely that the existence of readily usable automated collections of such materials in historical depth would serve as a potent stimulant to comparative research. On the other hand, collection and processing of data of this sort for archival storage and dissemination to the scholarly community involves a variety of difficulties and imposes significant responsibilities. Some of these difficulties and responsibilities are discussed below with special emphasis upon the archival problems presented by historical source materials. (9).

Data Preparation.

It may be appropriate to touch first upon an elementary and perhaps obvious issue. As noted elsewhere, data produced by social bookkeeping systems and other "natural" data producing processes tend to be fragmentary and inconsistent from one area and time period to the other, and, because of the manner of their original collection and preservation, such data frequently bear only indirectly upon research problems. As a consequence, the use of these data often requires adjustment and combination of variables to create measures and indicators that more nearly meet the requirements of particular research problems. These considerations, in turn, suggest that data processed for archival storage and dissemination should, at least within realistic limits, be recorded and preserved as raw values. Similarly, and again within realistic limits, these considerations place a premium upon preserving the detail and definition characteristic of original sources.

Economy and convenience may seem to dictate recording and preserving percentages, ratios and other derived measures rather than the raw variables from which they were derived and might also suggest that data for general categories, rather than component subcategories, should be converted to machine-readable form for archival storage. Obviously, such a tactic would work to reduce initial processing costs and, by reducing the size of the resultant data files, contribute to economy and convenience in data management, retrieval and dissemination. On the other hand, this procedure involves loss of information and limits subsequent opportunity to create composite indicators and derived measures to suit particular research problems or to adjust and manipulate data to compensate for their idiosyncracies and inconsistencies. Whatever the economies involved, this tactic if applied generally works to limit the value of archival data to the broader research community.

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(9) Some of the issues examined below are also considered in Jerome M. Clubb, "Ecological Data in Comparative Research: A Report on a Special Data Confrontation Seminar" UNESCO, Reports and Papers in the Social Sciences forthcoming.

Considerable stress has been placed upon the need for uniform data processing procedures and for the use of standardized coding conventions, formats and the like in the preparation of social science data for archival storage and dissemination. Significant progress in this area has been made during recent years. The use of such frustrating practices as multiple punching is no longer common, and, on the whole, data processing standards in the social sciences have greatly improved. Moreover, the power of third generation computational equipment when supported by even modest program capabilities has significantly reduced these problems. Given adequate identification variables and documentation, and the absence of such characteristics as multiple punches, even very complex and large-scale recoding and reformatting can be carried out. While much additional work must be devoted to developing standard formats and coding conventions, purely technical problems in this area need not constitute a serious obstacle to large-scale exchange of automated data resources. Particularly in the case of the categories considered here, questions related to standards of accuracy in data processing and to documentation and supporting information seem to present more serious and more complex problems.

Accuracy and Reliability.

The inaccurate and unreliability of data are among the major and most often noted problems confronted in the investigation of political processes in historical depth and these problems tend to be most serious where materials relevant to the more distant past are concerned (10). It is possible, however, to over-estimate the gravity of these difficulties. Requirements as to accuracy and reliability depend upon the goals of the investigator and the demands of particular research projects. Investigators are sometimes willing to employ data that are known to be inaccurate in the belief that although the recorded values diverge from true values the distribution of the characteristic in question is nonetheless accurately reflected. By the same token, the level of error that can be tolerated frequently depends upon the use to which data are to be put. When comparing nations or other entities that are sharply different in terms of a particular characteristic, the accuracy of data measuring that characteristic is less significant. Obviously when the entities being compared are highly similar, higher levels of accuracy are required. Similarly, the combination of variables to form indices and derived measures can work to reduce the significance particularly of random error characteristic of the individual component variables. Thus even inaccurate and unreliable data can be of value in social science research depending upon the goals and requirements of the particular investigation.

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- (10) Raoul Naroll, Data Quality Control : A New Research Technique (New York: The Free Press, 1970); provides a discussion of problems of error and reliability which is relevant in many respects to the categories of data considered here.

In these terms, then, in projects that look toward the development of data resources for general scholarly use, considerations of accuracy and reliability alone are probably not sufficient criteria to determine the inclusion or exclusion of particular bodies of data. On the other hand, the student of historical phenomena, as the more contemporaneously oriented investigator, requires information as to the accuracy and reliability of data in order to avoid inappropriate applications, and it is probably unnecessary to suggest that accurate and reliable materials are always preferable to those that are inaccurate and unreliable. Clearly, assessment of accuracy and reliability remains a critical element in the preparation of historical as well as other categories of data for social science research.

Identification of error and assessment of levels of accuracy and reliability is more complicated and on the whole more tentative and imperfect where historical data are concerned than in the case of other categories of social science data. Several rather specific examples will illustrate these differences. A variety of consistency checks can be carried out to assess the accuracy and quality of the aggregate data of national censuses and other official enumerations whether historical or contemporary. Once data are converted to machine-readable form, subcategories, such as the number employed in specific occupations, can be summed to a total category, as the total labor force, which can then be compared with the total recorded in the original sources. Similarly, data recorded for subordinate units can be summed to superordinate units and the results compared with original sources. In many cases, however, variables necessary to carry out such tests are not available. Frequently, data for general categories and for superordinate units were not collected through enumeration or other procedures separate from those employed to collect information for specific categories or subordinate units. Rather, the recorded information for the general categories or larger units was originally obtained by merely summing the more specific data. Clearly, in such cases consistency checks serve as tests of the accuracy of summing procedures and are of vital importance for the detection of keypunch and other errors introduced in the process of converting documentary information to machine-readable form. On the other hand, these procedures are often of only limited value in assessing the reliability and accuracy of original sources and data collection procedures.

Various other mechanically supported procedures which would aid in the identification of error will readily come to mind. It is obvious, however, that assessment of accuracy, particularly where data for the past are concerned, frequently requires reliance upon relatively impressionistic procedures which often yield only imperfect and partial results. As an example, while comparison of alternative sources is an obvious device for the evaluation of such information, it is rare that completely parallel data sources are available. On the other hand, data sources that are incomplete, in that they include only a part of the nation or area, or only a few of the variables included in the more complete source, can be used to check the correspondence between specific values and variables. In this way information as to the accuracy of these values and variables can be gained, and an imperfect but useful assessment of the accuracy and reliability of the entire collection of data can be made.

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Still other procedures for data evaluation will suggest themselves. Comparisons of one variable with another within a particular body of data, and comparisons of the characteristics of populations from one time period to the next, can also give an indication of the credibility of data. In the case of the United States, data that indicated neighborhoods marked simultaneously by high population density, by large numbers of blacks, and by high income levels might be regarded as dubious in the light of general information about the social system of the nation. A comparison of election returns in a given area across a number of years which revealed a sharp increase in turnout in a particular year might suggest an interesting phenomena for further investigation, but it might also give an indication of the credibility of data. For many nations at least, data that reveal a large divergence from an approximately equal ratio of males to females might be justifiably regarded with some suspicion. Similarly, sharp changes in the distribution of such a characteristic might suggest the need for further attention to possible inaccuracies.

Assessment of the nature and quality of original data collection procedures also provides a means to evaluate such data. In the case of election data for the United States, for example, it is sometimes known or assumed that recording procedures, especially in certain states, regions or individual cities, were particularly prone to error, faulty record keeping or were characterized by deliberately fraudulent practices. Similarly, some of the national censuses conducted in the United States, especially during earlier years, are known to have been faulty in design or execution. The United States census of 1870, for example, is known to have exaggerated the extent of destruction and population loss in southern states resulting from the Civil War (11). Data bearing upon religious affiliation for the United States are a further case in point. Most of the information as to the membership of the various religious denominations published in the latter nineteenth and twentieth century by the United States census and other organizations was based upon reports provided by individual clergymen or denominational organizations. With this information as to data gathering procedures in mind, researchers can recognize that these data are marred by variations in definitions, by incomplete or exaggerated reports, and by other inaccuracies. Similarly, collections of biographical data are in many cases compilations of sketches prepared by the individuals themselves. It seems clear that such compilations are likely to be marked by inaccuracies and biases different from those characteristic of compilations prepared by more objective but perhaps less well informed independent observers. All too frequently, however, information as to the procedures employed in collecting and compiling such materials were either never recorded or are no longer available.

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(11) Taeuber, "Population : Trends and Characteristics"; and United States Census Office, Census Reports, Vol. I, Population, Part I (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1901), pp. xx.

As noted elsewhere, boundary changes often present a severe problem in the use of election returns, ecological data, and other categories of aggregated data for geographical units. The occurrence of such changes is sometimes revealed by otherwise inexplicable statistical fluctuations such as unusual changes in voter turnout or sharp shifts in population levels. Unfortunately, fluctuations of this sort can also be the product of migration, or the reflection of a new political issue or unusually appealing candidate and thus constitute valid representations of historical reality. The identification of such changes often requires an intensive search of legal documents, official maps and other historical sources. All too often these searches result in little more than confirmation of the occurrence of boundary change and do not provide information adequate to carry out procedures aimed at standardizing the geographical units in question.

In general evaluation of the accuracy and quality of historical materials not only requires the mechanically aided and systematic techniques appropriate to other categories of data, but also demands the techniques of source criticism and evaluation employed in conventional historical research. These techniques involve comparison of alternate sources, meticulous examination of individual sources to detect discrepancies and internal contradictions, and investigation of the manner in which materials were originally collected and compiled. Obviously these techniques require access to a wide range of documentary source materials as well as intimate knowledge of the history and the political and social characteristics of the nations and areas to which data are relevant. Without such information anomalies in data, and distributions or other relations which are not fully credible in terms of the general social or political characteristics of the nation involved, cannot be identified and investigated as possible indications of inaccuracy or unreliability. Moreover, while internal and external comparisons may reveal discrepancies and anomalies which suggest possible inaccuracy, it is often impossible to reconcile discrepancies and to explain or correct anomalies. In short, procedures such as these often provide a basis for no more than a tentative assessment of the accuracy and reliability of data resources. They frequently do not reveal superior data or provide a basis for correction procedures to improve accuracy. Nonetheless, these assessments are often of critical importance to the scholar who employs such data in his research.

Documentation and Supporting Information.

These considerations make clear the need for extensive documentation and elaborate supporting information if automated collections of voting returns, census materials and other "natural process" data are to be generally and maximally useful to the research community. These needs are, of course, particularly pressing in the case of comparative studies. If the comparative researcher is to make use of data for other nations which were originally collected and converted to machine-readable form by scholars, research groups, or data archives in those nations, extensive supporting information is required.

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Indeed, the use of such data in comparative research probably requires much more in the way of documentation and supporting information than is the case of sample survey data or other forms of data collected with the specific goals of social science research in mind through methods involving direct observation. In the case of sample survey data, the prestige and reputation of the individual or groups who conducted the original survey provide an indication of the quality of data collection work, and frequently a major publication produced by the original collectors provides an indication of the nature and characteristics of the data in question. Moreover, data collected through direct observation and interrogation procedures for specific research projects are usually marked by fewer anomalies and complications than are collections of election returns or ecological data whether contemporary or historical.

Many of the elements of documentation required for effective exchange and use of machine-readable files of "natural process" data are obvious and require little comment. No extensive explanation of the need for detailed information as to the documentary and other sources from which data were originally taken is necessary. Obviously, source citations in themselves often provide some indication of the authenticity and reliability of data and can also allow the user to return to the original sources in order to judge the accuracy and quality of data, to gain information as to the characteristics of the data in question, and to obtain better definitions of particular variables. It is clear, however, that where comparative investigations are concerned, even the most detailed source references sometimes serve only limited values in these respects. The textual sources of data relevant to a particular nation are often not available in other nations or are, at best, available in only a few central repositories. Where data compiled from scattered or unpublished sources are at issue, and where the materials in question concern the remote past or nations that are distant, relatively less advanced, or which have not been the subject of intensive research interest, the availability of documentary source material is particularly limited.

These realities suggest other elements of documentation and supporting information required to facilitate exchange of automated data files for comparative research. Clearly documentation should include detailed information as to the kinds of error checks and data quality control procedures carried out in the course of data preparation as well as information as to the results and implications of these procedures. Above all, perhaps, documentation should also communicate assessments of the quality and reliability of the original data based upon the less systematic procedures described in preceding paragraphs. Individuals who carry out the tasks of data collection and preparation and who make initial research applications are usually able to make somewhat impressionistic but virtually indispensable judgments as to the quality and other characteristics of data. Insofar as possible, documentation should capture and convey these evaluative judgments for the benefits of users at distant locations.

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At least in the best of worlds, the idiosyncracies of collections of machine-readable data should also be documented. Ecological data, for example, whether relevant to the past or to the contemporary era, are frequently marked by extreme values which, although valid, can appear as errors or result in the distortion of statistical analyses. Data for particular elections or areas are sometimes missing from collections of such materials and can be productive of erroneous results in analyses conducted by unsuspecting investigators. Clearly then, missing data should be documented, and their occurrence explained. Documentation should also include information as to changes in the boundaries of the units, whether geographical entities or social or economic classifications, for which data are recorded in order to avoid comparison of dissimilar units and categories. Precise identification of geographical and political units and detailed documentation of location and boundaries are particularly necessary to facilitate creation of integrated data bases that link together, for example, election returns, census materials and biographical data for combined analysis (12).

These elements of documentation do not, however, delimit the range of supporting information required to facilitate effective exchange and use of automated data resources in comparative research. As noted elsewhere, the data collected and preserved vary significantly from one time period or nation to the next. Similar discrepancies and discontinuities are characteristic both of the nature, function and size of the political and geographical units for which data are recorded and of the definitions employed in data collection and tabulation. Many of the variables included in original compilations of statistical data are not merely the factual records of concrete and specific phenomena but are instead constructs or indices based upon particular definitions and theories which are marked by considerable variation. The definitions and component elements employed in compiling income statistics, for example, vary significantly from nation to nation and, indeed, from one time period to the next within the same nation (13). Thus the researcher who employs such data in comparative investigations requires extensive information in order to take these discrepancies and discontinuities into account and to devise compensating procedures. Similarly, detailed guidance in the interpretation of data categories and specific variables is required in order to allow identification of variables for a particular nation or time period that may serve for comparative purposes as indicators of attributes for which more directly relevant data are unavailable.

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- (12) Some of the difficulties encountered in constructing complex data bases that involve linking together different categories of data for different units of analysis are discussed in Charles Tilly, "Methods for the Study of Collective Violence" in Ralph Conant and Molly Apple Levin (eds), Problems in Research on Community Violence (New York : Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969), pp. 15-35.
- (13) This point is forcefully made with respect to economic data more generally in Goran Ohlin, "Aggregate Comparisons: Problems and Prospects of Quantitative Analysis Based on National Accounts," and Phyllis Deane, "Aggregate Comparisons: The Validity and Reliability of Economic Data" in Stein Rokkan (ed.), Comparative Research Across Cultures and Nations (Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 163-175

Along these same lines information as to legal and administrative provisions and procedures is necessary in order to correctly interpret data and to avoid invalid applications and comparisons. In many instances, for example, it is not meaningful to compare revenue and public expenditure levels for particular types of localities or geographical units without taking into consideration variations in exchange payments between administrative and governmental jurisdictions. Comparative investigation also requires descriptive information as to the units for which data are recorded. Ideally, information should be available describing territorial units along several dimensions including population and geographic size, administrative and governmental functions, and the degree to which the units in question are recognized and command the loyalties of inhabitants. Detailed information of this sort, however vital for the purposes of comparative research, only rarely finds its way into the scholarly literature and is, indeed, often possessed only by scholars deeply immersed in the study of a particular nation or area.

In more general terms, substantial contextual information is particularly necessary to allow accurate interpretation and fully meaningful use of automated data files relevant to earlier time periods. In the investigation of the phenomena of the past it is often implicitly assumed that basic attributes of the contemporary period were also characteristic of other historical eras. Unfortunately, assumptions of this sort are frequently unjustified and misleading. The fact that the occupational categories employed in contemporary years were also employed in enumerations bearing upon earlier time periods does not indicate in itself that these categories have the same meaning in the two instances. The status rankings of occupations, for example, may change over time with the consequence that direct comparisons in such a case are not meaningful.

The point can also be illustrated by a more concrete example. Investigators have noted the high level of voter participation and the stability of popular voting patterns of the latter nineteenth century United States as compared with the middle decades of the twentieth century. Various explanations for these changes have been suggested including changes in communications facilities and the development of dissatisfaction with the political system on the part of the potential voting population. The same researchers have also suggested, however, that these changes may have resulted from less spectacular and easily neglected developments such as modifications of voter registration requirements, which made it more difficult to vote, and changes in ballot form, which made it easier to shift from one party to the other in elections and which worked to reduce the consistency of the party vote. By overlooking such mundane structural discontinuities, inappropriate comparisons could have been made and erroneous conclusions drawn (14).

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- (14) Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe", The American Political Science Review, 59 (March, 1965), pp. 7-28; Philip E. Converse, "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes" in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, Elections and the Political Order (New York : John Wiley, 1966); and Jerrold Rusk, The Effect of the Australian Ballot on Split Ticket Voting, 1876-1908 (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1967).

Even this limited example suggests, then, the need for awareness of contextual characteristics in the use of materials relevant to other time periods.

The range of documentation and supporting information suggested here obviously goes far beyond that which researchers and even data archives involved in the work of converting historical and other social science data to automated form could be reasonably expected to provide. Even so, these general categories of information seem necessary if researchers concerned with comparative studies involving a number of nations are to be able to employ with relative ease, effectiveness and safety largescale data files that were originally collected, evaluated, organized and automated by others at distant locations. These considerations thus suggest the need for the preparation of extensive and detailed documentation in the process of collecting and automating research materials, and they call attention to the need for supporting information bearing upon contextual factors which effect the interpretation and use of data relevant to diverse nations and historical periods. In these latter terms, it is possible to envision national and regional handbooks which describe, in historical depth, the characteristics and quality of major national data sources, such as censuses and other enumerations, and in general provide the supporting information that cannot practically be prepared as part of the documentation of specific data collections (15).

IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE

As suggested elsewhere the several types of research material considered here present significantly different problems in terms of computer management and analysis than do at least many other forms of social science data. In general, the management and analysis of these various categories of "natural" data, whether historical or contemporary, requires a wider array of more complex and, indeed, more advanced computational capabilities than do data collected through sample surveys, depth interviews, and other forms of direct observation.

Without attempting technical commentary, several of these differences and requirements can be briefly noted. In the first place, and most obviously, collections of election returns, census materials, and other aggregated data organized at small unit levels are larger and more massive than typical collections of other forms of social science data.

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(15) In the preceding pages attention has been focused primarily upon problems involved in the collection and preparation of quantitative and more or less readily quantifiable data for archival storage and dissemination. The abundant textual sources available for investigation of political phenomena in historical depth have been neglected. It is possible, of course, to conceive of large-scale archival collections of machine-readable textual materials organized for use through content analysis and other forms of text manipulation. Effective realization of these prospects may depend, however, upon technological development particularly in the area of optical scanning devices which may be economically necessary to allow conversion of sufficiently large bodies of these data to machine-readable form.

Such materials encourage, in fact require, the use of methods of analysis that involve higher levels of measurement than do sample survey data and, in general, invite the use of more advanced and more powerful analytic tools. The very large size of files of aggregated data particularly, makes access to large, powerful and costly computers particularly important. At the same time, because of the size and complexity of collections of such data, management and analysis work usually involve extensive and time consuming processing and manipulation with the consequence of high cost for machine use. These considerations place a premium upon the development of highly efficient computer programs and suggest the high level of financial support required to facilitate effective use of these data resources.

While many of these categories of data allow the use of advanced analysis devices, their use also requires a variety of more elementary devices. Efficient and easily used display devices are required to allow examination of data in order to identify idiosyncracies and anomalies. Along these same lines, capabilities that allow rapid and efficient arithmetic computations, combination of variables and recoding are also among the computer capabilities required to facilitate effective investigations employing such data. The discrepancies in the variables available from one nation and time period to the next, and the fact that variables rarely reflect the precise attributes or concepts of interest to the researcher, makes index construction and computation of derived measures a vital element in investigations employing such data. As these comments suggest, in the use of the several categories of data discussed here the line often drawn between data management, on the one hand, and data analysis on the other, is frequently blurred. The elementary capabilities discussed above are required for the preparation and archival management of such data, but they also play a vital and intrinsic role in the conduct of analyses.

It is perhaps unnecessary to call attention to the need for cooperation in the development and exchange of general purpose computer software appropriate for the preparation, management and analysis of the general categories of data considered here. The alternative to cooperation is continued duplication of effort at installation after installation, excessive costs, and unnecessary and damaging limitation of the computational facilities available to investigators. Effective exchange of automated data resources within the scholarly community not only requires some degree of standardization in the preparation and documentation of data but also a measure of uniformity in the computational facilities available from one installation to the next. Conversely, the rugged individualism that so often leads computer centers and technicians to idiosyncratic software development can only work to obstruct exchange of data resources.

The problems of computer software illustrate once again the peculiar difficulties and requirements involved in the use of election returns, census materials, governmental statistics and other categories of "natural" data both contemporary and historical, in comparative research. Identification of solutions to these problems and development of resources necessary for their implementation obviously require large-scale and careful cooperation between widely separated and diverse individuals, research groups and data archives. The dimensions of knowledge and understanding which these data can bring to the study of processes of political development and to the investigation of political phenomena more generally clearly justifies such efforts.

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MODELS AND METHODS IN THE COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF NATIONS-BUILDING
MODELES ET METHODES DANS L'ETUDE
COMPARATIVE DE LA CONSTRUCTION DES ETATS

Rapport / Paper :

A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF THE
NATION-BUILDING PROCESS

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A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATION-BUILDING PROCESS

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Introduction

The literature relating to nation-building has tended to draw its main strength from the historical examination of the development of modern states, and in particular modern Western European states. Recent efforts towards systematization have been based on the analysis of historical cases and they have endeavoured mainly to determine the basic social factors which, singly or in conjunction, have contributed and hypothetically will contribute in the future to the development of nations. These analyses had great value, as it was essential to document adequately the relative part in the total process played by such elements as culture, administration, communications, etc. But these elements are basically non-political. Previous studies investigating these elements attempted to examine the relationship between various aspects of the societal environment and the emergence and growth of the state : they did not purport to specify the general conditions under which, through a dynamic process, political systems of all kinds are likely to emerge. They did not determine the processes through which these societal influences affect the political system. They were therefore, at least in part, purely descriptive, and they could not enable us to know whether, under other circumstances, other societal influences might not play a larger part. It is here asserted that only if we start from the analysis of the dynamics of the political process can we eventually hope to build a truly general answer to the problems of nation-building.

The aim of this paper, therefore, is to undertake a preliminary investigation in the analysis of these political dynamics. Nation-building is, by definition, a dynamic process : it must be defined in terms of an increase in national allegiance (we shall attempt a precise definition of the key term later in this paper) from one moment in time to another, subsequent, moment in time. What we are concerned with here is the consideration of the condition under which such an increase in national allegiance can take place, where this allegiance might come from, whether it is likely to be drawn at the expense of the allegiance which might have existed with respect to other political systems or sub-systems, or whether allegiance is somehow, in certain circumstances, generated anew in response to altered circumstances.

Since, at the outset, the question of nation-building raises the question of where allegiance to a particular nation comes from, it follows that we shall have to refer to political systems other than the state and to the process by which allegiance may be transferred from one unit to another. We start from the assumption that, for the purposes of this paper, nations consist, or previously consisted, of usually smaller and always less dominant and sometimes competing allegiance-gathering social entities called "political communities". And nation-building and the building of other types of political communities must be studied jointly. Moreover, the nation is a very complex (and somewhat ill-defined) form of political system. It is very likely to be a special case of political system and a number of consequences will follow naturally from the fact that it is a special case. But it is only a special case : if nation-building occurs under given circumstances, these circumstances must be a sub-set of all the circumstances under which community-building takes place. Thus a theory of the political dynamics of nation-building must be subsumed under a general theory of the political dynamics of community-building. Of course, it does not follow in all cases from the fact that one theory is more general than another that the more general should be attempted before the more particular : but, in the case of nation-building and community-building, such a process is advisable because the nation is probably the most complex of communities. If we want to understand the dynamics of this building process, it is therefore preferable to begin the analysis at the level of the simplest community, and to introduce gradually elements which will add to the complexity of the model.

This paper is therefore divided into two parts. In the first, we consider the general conditions of community-building, first at the level of the simplest (and admittedly somewhat hypothetical) community, later at the level of more complex organizations. We attempt to specify how the building of a community can take place and generally how the "capital of allegiance" which a community enjoys can increase or decrease. In the second part we apply these general conditions to nations and attempt to show under what circumstances the nation-building process is likely to take place and whether the rate of increase is likely to be slow or rapid. Clearly, the present analysis is very tentative ; it has more of the characteristics of a preliminary model than of a theory ; and the lack of data makes it impossible to test the hypotheses, except in an intuitive and impressionistic fashion. But it is hoped that this analysis will show at least one direction which the political discussion of nation-building can take and, in our view, should take in subsequent investigations.

A. THE GENERAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF COMMUNITY-BUILDING

In this section we propose to consider three points in succession. First, we shall examine the simplest type of community conceivable (given our orientation) and the extent to which such a community can be built. Second, we shall introduce the concept of "complex communities" and the evolution of such communities. Third, we shall look at the interplay between political communities and consider in particular whether community-building has to take place at the expense of other, already existing communities, and we shall consider specifically the role which leaders may play, and therefore what might be termed "conscious" or deliberate community-building, alongside what might be termed a natural or purely "unconscious" process.

1. Simple Communities and the Building of Simple Communities

For the purpose of the present analysis of simple communities, we shall assume that there are no relationships between such communities, leaving for the third part of this section any interplay between these communities: moreover, as shall be seen in the coming paragraph, the examination of the behaviour of simple communities is a formal analysis.

We do not suggest that the real world contains many (or indeed any) such communities. But it will become apparent in the coming paragraphs that certain advantages can be gained by considering first the simplest type, however uncommon it may be.

a) Definitions

Definition 1. A community is a decision-making mechanism with respect to an interest or set of interests.

Definition 2. A community is simple if it is a decision-making mechanism relating to one interest and only one.

Definition 3. A community is complex if it is a decision-making mechanism relating to two or more interests. (In this section we deal with simple communities only.)

Proposition 1. An interest exists if and only if two or more persons perceive a self-defined, personal need, and perceive that this need cannot be solved by each of them in isolation.

Definition 4. A person who perceives a need in conditions stipulated in Proposition 1 is a political actor.

Proposition 2. For a community to exist between political actors, these actors must perceive that there are greater gains than losses in the existence of the community.

These definitions and propositions require some explanations. Though the definition of communities is stipulated, it does not appear unrealistic. It is certainly not unrealistic to postulate that communities cannot exist unless interests are perceived by the members of the community. But (a) it must be remembered that the "members" to whom we are referring are in some way active : they are unlikely to constitute all the persons who are legally associated with the community : they include only those persons who perceive an interest ; (b) perception is not taken to mean "conscious perception" : the feeling that the community "obviously" caters for some interests or solves some problems is sufficient. This raises difficult problems which cannot be discussed here. For the purpose of this paper, however, it suffices to state that there is a continuum of perception which can be identified empirically and that the model could be refined to accomodate this situation, but at the expense of simplicity.

Corollary 1. Where an interest ceases to be perceived by a political actor, this actor withdraws from the community which caters for that interest.

The point is a difficult one. As we shall see, withdrawal is in fact very unlikely because the process has to be limited to an instantaneous operation : we introduce this corollary here merely to examine how operations over time will modify the general conditions.

b) The Calculation of Gains and Losses in Political Communities

With respect to a particular interest, a calculation by actors of gains and losses occurs necessarily, even if the process is not a conscious one. This calculation has two characteristics : (1) It is incremental, as policies are more or less satisfactory ; (2) a time element intervenes. Activities of the community at time T lead to gains and losses being calculated afterwards, even if only fractionally afterwards.

Let us consider more closely the origins of this perception of gains and losses. It arises from a conclusion drawn from the relation between (a) the actor's view or feeling of how interests should be met; and (b) the way in which the community meets the interest. It follows that, if we were to compare gains and losses for the same actor over the same need at two moments in time (and assuming he still perceives this interest as defined above), the net change could arise from one or both of two possible movements involving views of the actor and/or the policies of the community.

Proposition 3. Changes in the evaluation of gains and losses by political actors arise and arise only from (a) a change in views about the solution to be given to the interest, (b) a change in policy by the community, or (c) both (in simple communities).

This relation can be represented graphically. The actor's view on a given interest can be represented by a vector, the size of the vector measuring the intensity of feeling and the direction measuring the type of policy which the actor favours (see Diagram 1). Let us draw a perpendicular at the origin of this vector: the half-plane which includes the vector includes all the policies which are relatively acceptable to the actor, the other half-plane the solutions which are not acceptable (points on the line are policies on which the actor is neutral). However, as we assumed earlier that the intensity of feeling would be the same in this analysis, we can therefore assume that all the vectors would have the same dimension: their end would therefore define a circle centred at the origin of the vector. Each actor will therefore consider as acceptable those positions which are located on the half-circle which includes his own vector and is bounded by the perpendicular diameter to this vector.

Proposition 4. In simple communities, assuming the intensity of feeling to be the same among political actors, the gain or loss for each actor may be measured by the projection of the vector of the policy of the community on the vector of the actor, over the value of the vector of the actor. The gain or loss experienced by the actor is thus measured by the cosine of the angle between the vector of the actor and the vector of the policy of the community (such an angle could be measured by asking the actor to rank a number of policies).

Let us now consider gains and losses over time. If the actor's viewpoint or the community's policy changes, the angle between the two vectors varies: as it decreases, the cosine will increase, and conversely, if it increases (Diagram 2). Over a period, one can therefore draw a "gain and loss" curve (G-L curve) for each particular actor: this measures absolute variations over time of gains and losses. If we become interested not in absolute amounts of change but in the slope of the curve or rates of increase or decrease in gains and losses both over time and at a particular moment, we need to calculate the derivative to the G-L curve. This will give the "marginal satisfaction or dissatisfaction" of each particular actor (MSD curve). Finally, we may wish to consider the total gains and losses experienced by a particular actor over a given period, say, between T and T_1 . This is clearly the sum of the gains and losses experienced in each instant of time and it can be measured as the definite integral of the G-L curve for the particular actor. (Diagram 3)

We can now return to corollary 1. We stated that, in the instant, if the loss was greater than the gain, the political actor would be expected to withdraw from the community. But if we consider the point T_1 , the actor would in fact have experienced a whole "amount" of gains between T and T_1 , even though we can see that the MSD curve is declining steeply at point T_1 . Indeed, even at point T_2 (where losses are experienced) we can still note that the definite integral is still positive. Only when we reach T_3 does the integral become negative. Thus it is unlikely that there will be withdrawal before T_3 . But the MSD curve will be important to enable us to predict if, and if so when, the individual is likely to withdraw.

We still have to explain the position at T_1 . We can see from Diagram 3 that, at this point (which is the point when the actor joins the community) he is said to experience gains from the community. In this lies the answer to the fact that the actor does not withdraw in the instant: if corollary 1 was indeed applicable, no actor would ever join any community as, before any activity of the community has taken place, the actor cannot have experienced any gains. Therefore, when the actor joins, he must also be prepared to concede some time to the community before he will judge whether gains accrue for him. Thus joining a community takes place and takes place only if there is an anticipation of gain. The calculation of this anticipation could be based on the extent to which actors believe that the community will provide gains weighted by the time which they would be prepared to wait to see gains happenings; but such a calculation is difficult to operationalise. Yet it is essential since, as we shall see, the overall capital of allegiance of communities (and leaders) should be calculated on a similar basis.

Proposition 5. An actor joins a community only if he anticipates a gain from joining the community. This anticipation represents a type of credit or loan to the community. This credit can be used by the community to offset losses experienced by the actor at subsequent periods.

Corollary 2. We can now replace corollary 1 and state that an actor will withdraw from a (simple) community when the sum of his gains and losses, plus the original credit given to the community, is equal to zero.

Definition 5. The sum of the gains experienced by an actor over a period constitutes his "allegiance" to the community in question: conversely, the sum of the losses experienced by an actor over a period constitutes his "alienation".

Proposition 6. In a simple community, the actor withdraws when alienation equals allegiance (irrespective of the position on the marginal satisfaction curve at the time of withdrawal).




Diagram 1
Policy vector of an actor.




Diagram 2
Variations in policy vectors of the
community and actor's increased gain (or loss)




Diagram 3

Gains and losses over time for
an individual actor.

c) The Process of Community-Building in Simple Communities

We considered hitherto the development of simple communities from the standpoint of one actor. By a process of summation we can extend this calculation to all the members of the community. Over-all gains and losses can be calculated at each instant : if intensity of feeling is assumed to be the same for all actors, such a calculation is indeed very simple (variations in intensity would introduce problems of weighting, which would complicate the model but would not change its general economy).

Proposition 7. A community is held to provide gains to its members at a given moment if the sum of the individual gains is greater than the sum of the individual losses.

Proposition 8. The allegiance (or alienation) to a particular community between two moments of time is the sum of the gains and losses of members between these two moments : this is measured as the definite integral of the community gain-loss curve between these two moments.

Proposition 9. The marginal satisfaction curve for the members of a community is the rate of increase (or decrease) of the gain and loss curve for the community measured in the instant : this is therefore the derivative of the gain-loss curve. It gives the instantaneous increase or decrease in gains and losses and therefore measures the extent of community-building in the instant. (In the case of a nation, this would be the nation-building curve.) Thus community-building is the limit, as time goes to zero, of the gains and losses experienced by all the members of the community.

We can see why community-allegiance, even in simple communities, though ultimately dependent on gain-loss calculations of individual actors, is only dependent to a very limited extent on the instantaneous rate of gains and losses of each individual actor, particularly if the community is large. The accumulated capital of allegiance is stored and helps to maintain the community ; we can see already that, were the community to become complex, this capital of allegiance might also be used to help building other communities, a point to which we shall return as we examine the behaviour of complex communities.

We have analysed certain aspects of how simple communities come into existence, where they draw their allegiance from, and the extent to which this allegiance can vary over time. However, few truly simple communities exist in the real world : they are more frequent in complex than in primitive societies ; moreover, communities do not exist in isolation, and therefore allegiance may decrease in one community to the advantage of another. We need therefore to move from the analysis of simple communities to that of complex communities and to the interplay between communities.

II. Complex Communities and the Building of Complex Communities

The basic principles which are applicable to the analysis of simple communities are also applicable to complex communities, but variations in behaviour stem from the fact that two or more interests are involved. Calculations of gains and losses, of allegiance, and of community-building are the result of an interaction between these various interests. We need therefore to return briefly to each of the steps which we considered in relation to simple communities and to see how changes occur if the community is complex. It goes without saying that the more complex the community, the more the interaction patterns become difficult to measure in practice, but the theory remains the same.

a) General Definitions

We stated in proposition I that an interest existed only if two or more actors perceived a need and if it was also perceived that this need could not be solved by each person in isolation. It followed that, in a simple community, a person was either a political actor or not a political actor (no interaction meaning no politics). In a complex community, a person may be only a partial political actor, however, in that a person may perceive some of the interests catered for by the community but not the other interest(s). Moreover, it cannot be postulated that these interests have all equal weight, as interests are likely to rate differently in importance. Thus, for complex communities, two supplementary qualifications must be introduced.

Proposition 10. With respect to a complex community, political actors may perceive interests only over a limited range of the interests catered for by the community. Such political actors are known as partial actors.

Proposition 11. In a complex community, a weighting is to be given to each interest in proportion to the relative importance of this interest to the total.

There are no simple ways of calculating this weighting, though one method would consist in taking into account the percentage of the political actors who perceive the interest among all the partial and full actors of the community.

b) Calculation of Gains and Losses

Whereas the calculation of gains and losses is fairly straightforward in a simple community, it has to take into account, in a complex community, the gains and losses relating to each of the interests which the political actor,

partial or full, perceives. This increases the independence of the community vis-à-vis each political actor and introduces some viscosity in the process by which allegiance is built or alienation develops. This has the effect of making withdrawal on the basis of instantaneous losses even less likely than in simple communities. In other words, the slope of the community-building curve is likely to be smoother than in simple communities.

Proposition 12. For the same time-periods, gains and losses, and rates of increase or decrease in gains and losses (community-building) are slower in a complex community than in a simple community: other things being equal, the curve becomes smoother as the community increases in complexity.

Corollary 3. For the same complex community, a full political actor perceives slower changes in gains and losses than a partial political actor. The slope of the marginal satisfaction curve is smoother for a full political actor than for a partial actor.

Corollary 4. A short-term actor is more likely to withdraw from a complex community than a long-term actor (as a short-term actor can be expected to be a partial actor).

Whereas the position of political actors can be represented by vectors in simple communities, the positions of actors in a complex community has to be represented by a matrix, with zeros representing the interests for which the given political actor feels no need, the figures having been weighted by the degree of over-all relative importance of the need, as defined for each individual actor.

c) The Process of Community-Building in Complex Communities

Since the distance between actor and community is greater as the community becomes more complex, it follows that the policies of complex communities are more independent from the policy matrices of individual actors. Admittedly, the basis for the calculation of over-all gains and losses, rates of change in gains and losses, and total allegiance remains the same, but the development of policies and the appearance of new interests has some special characteristics.

In simple communities, the policy adopted is a vector which can be deemed to have the direction which is most acceptable to the greatest number of actors. In complex communities, each policy vector is not related to each individual actor's vector: the relationship is between the matrices. It follows that (a) fluctuations with respect to a particular policy do not necessarily reflect fluctuations in views of political actors with respect to

this interest, and (b) conversely, fluctuations in views may not be reflected by fluctuations in policy. We should note, therefore, that we cannot deduce policies on specific needs from policy vectors and that we have to introduce some further element in order to account for policies of political communities.

Proposition 13. In a complex community, the vector of policy with respect to a particular interest cannot be automatically deduced from the vectors of views of the political actors perceiving this interest.

Corollary 5. As a community increases in complexity, the dissociation between individual policy vectors and community policy vectors is likely to increase.

In simple communities, the problem of new interests does not arise, as the community would cease to be simple if another interest was catered for. In practice, communities do cater for new interests : indeed, if they never did, there would only be simple communities. Moreover, communities have allegiance surpluses, as we noted : there will be a propensity to cater for those interests which members of the community come to be involved in.

Proposition 14. Communities have a propensity to cater for new interests.

Proposition 15. As, in view of proposition 13, complex communities tend to be relatively free in relation to political actors, the acquisition of new interests is also relatively free in relation to political actors perceiving pre-existing needs.

Let us leave for the next sub-section the question of interaction between communities and concentrate on new interests and on the way they affect communities.

Proposition 16. When the scope of a complex community is extended to new interests, the proportion of partial political actors increase in the community.

But we noted that the more partial an actor is in a community, the more his propensity to withdraw is high. It therefore follows that an equilibrium will be reached.

Proposition 17. As a complex community caters for new interests, variations in gains and losses, in marginal satisfaction, and in community-building will become greater. If the rate at which new interests are catered for increases, the stability of the community becomes threatened by withdrawals.

Such withdrawals will tend to slow down the rate at which new interests are catered for in the subsequent period, and an equilibrium position will be found.

We have now reached the point when it becomes possible to assume interaction between communities and to examine how new interests come to be catered for independently from political actors through the part played by leaders.

III. The Interaction Between Communities and the Process of Community-Building.

As we moved from simple to complex communities, two major characteristics of community-building emerged. First, we tried to show that communities accumulate a capital of allegiance which is somewhat, and in some cases largely, independent from an individual's policy vectors, and which can be spent to foster interests which were not necessarily catered for by the community earlier. This can also be spent to offset alienation. Second, this independence from individual policy vectors suggested that there was considerable leeway for action, but that no solution could be found on the basis of the equality of the actors which we postulated up to now. We need, therefore, to relax this constraint if we are to account for the type of policies pursued by communities.

a) Variations in Intensity among Political Actors : Leaders and Led

By postulating equality of intensity among political actors in simple communities, we gave to each actor equal influence in the determination of the policy vector of the community. Even if we introduced the same constraint in complex communities, we noted that such an equality of influence did not necessarily follow. If we relax this constraint, policy vectors can no longer be directly deduced from a simple summing of the vectors of the political actors. As it is clear that such a constraint is unrealistic, we have to state that, in all communities, policy vectors are the result of a complex weighting which takes into account differences in standing in the community among political actors.

Proposition 18. Variations in intensity among political actors in relation to interests lead to variations in the relationships between actors with respect to these interests. Those with lower intensity refer or defer (or may refer or defer) to those with higher intensity for the determination of their own individual vectors and for the implementation of policies.

Thus political actors with high intensity acquire a personal influence. This is acquired through (a) the difference in intensity between high intensity and low intensity political actors ; (b) the original distance between the individual vector of the high intensity political actor and the individual vector of the low intensity political actor ; and (c) the distance between these two vectors and the policy vector of the community. As with communities, a credit or loan (or anticipation) has to be added (this may come from personal influence or emerge from community institutions, as we shall see). The gain-loss curve, the allegiance and the marginal satisfaction rate are measured in relation to leaders in the same manner as they are measured for communities. In order to simplify the analysis, here, however, we shall postulate that actors can be divided merely into two groups, as if there were two levels of intensity only (but the analysis could be equally applicable to a continuous set of intensity levels).

Definition 6. In any community political actors with high intensity are known as leaders.

Proposition 19. In any community, the led are related both to the community and to the leaders by allegiance.

Proposition 20. There is interaction between the processes of community-building and leadership-building.

Definition 7. The interaction process between leadership-building and community-building is said to be "personalized" if the accumulated capital of the leader serves to build the capital of the community ; it is said to be "institutionalized" in the reverse case.

b) Transfer of Allegiance Between Communities and Between Communities and Leaders

In the first sub-section we stated that a community exists if an interest is perceived, if it is perceived that this interest cannot be met in isolation and if actors' gains are greater than actors' losses. This definition still holds, but, since we postulate that there are complex communities, it must also be noted that the interest can be met by an already existing community expanding its activities. Yet expansion is merely a special case of a more general problem, namely, that of the way in which interests come to be catered for by communities.

Definition 8. A transfer of community allegiance is the process by which (a) part of, or indeed the whole of, the allegiance to one community is given to another (external transfer) and (b) part of, or indeed the whole of, the allegiance relating to an interest is given to another interest (internal transfer).

Definition 9. A transfer of allegiance between leader and community is the process by which part of, or indeed the whole of, the allegiance to a leader is given to a community or vice-versa.

Transfers of allegiance are very common, though the most common forms are probably the leader-community transfers. It is indeed through these transfers that the anticipation of gain which can be given to a community (or leader) can often arise: the actor gives this credit because it is, so to speak, "guaranteed" by a community or leader whose activities have been known to the actor and whom he trusts. In complex communities, these transfers are the means by which the autonomy of policy-making can be exercised, in particular by leaders (whether personalized or institutionalized leaders). Thus community-building is largely based on transfers of allegiance within complex communities and between communities, and the expansion of activities of communities (or the creation of new ones) is controlled in large part by the transfer capability of existing communities. But, as the transfer capability, although it may be large, is not infinite, it is impossible for leaders to expand communities indefinitely; in particular, national leaders are constrained in the same fashion.

c) Interaction Between Communities in the Absence of New Needs

In the previous sub-section we examined complex communities in isolation and concluded that, under such constraints, they could expand only within given limits. Let us now consider the interaction process between communities, concentrating first on the extent of interaction which can take place if there are no new interests. In the real world, admittedly, the distinction is not dichotomous, but continuous. The absence of new interests can therefore be deemed to be the extreme position of a set of communities in which actors' attitudes are particularly static.

Let us consider first the most extreme positions, where neither interests nor the direction of policy vectors change. The only variable is represented by the leaders. But the policies of the leaders do not change either: moreover, they are highly institutionalized leaders, as their influence comes from the positions which they hold in the communities.

Proposition 21. Where neither interests nor policies change (or when changes are very minor), communities are highly institutionalized and stable: interaction between communities is low and depends on the extent of personal allegiance to leaders (which is also low).

If we now move along the continuum and first postulate that policy vectors change somewhat, interaction increases and leader personalization will also increase. But such changes must be provoked by an outside factor, as the previous situation did not have a potential for change.

Proposition 22. Where relations between a group of communities are static, forces external to the group are required to bring about changes in policy vectors. Such forces can be constituted by immigration, colonization, conquest, etc.

During these processes, a number of developments occur. Political actors tend to become cross-pressured: they become partial actors in one complex community and cease to be full actors in another. Perception of failures in policy achievements will occur, though these will be slow. Personalization of high intensity leaders will increase and in turn reinforce the potential for change in policy vectors. Unless all these requirements combine in the same direction -- an occurrence which is improbable -- the change in the community arrangements will be slow (a point which we shall consider again specifically in the context of nation-building without new interests).

d) Interaction between Communities when New Needs Emerge

The emergence of newly felt and defined interests will accelerate the potential for change in the set-up of a group of communities. They will tend to absorb some of the capital of allegiance which communities had acquired (even if this means reacting negatively against the new interests, as is the case for many older communities). As a result, some communities will become relatively weaker (actors may withdraw, or some full actors may become partial actors). Newer communities may become therefore equal in strength (i.e., in allegiance capital) than older ones. In this context, older complex communities are likely to be shakier than relatively less complex communities, as the former are more likely to have an increasingly large proportion of partial actors while, by definition, simple communities can only have full actors. Leaders become increasingly important. If they succeed in convincing political actors that they can cater for new interests, they will acquire a capital of personal allegiance which they may transfer to some newly created communities. In turn, leaders may further succeed in convincing political actors to acquire new interests (or turn hitherto passive populations into actors). This is why, in such situations, ideas or ideologies become important and contribute to the community-building process.

There are limits to these possibilities, however. Leaders may find that political actors are in the position of partial political actors (they may also follow some other leaders). By extending the interests or the size of the group of political actors, leaders become vulnerable and begin to disinvest. This is clearly a function of the rate at which developments occur: thus leaders in situations of new interests can to some extent control the

development of the communities which they create, but only to some extent. The situation is fluid in both directions, and this accounts for the rapid rate at which the capital of such leaders can be spent. But we can also understand why this is most likely to occur when the capital of leaders was built very rapidly, over the sudden appearance of an important interest (such as independence from a colonial power) and is spent, also with considerable speed, without regard for the ways in which the capital can be replaced.

We have come now to the point where the analysis of community-building can be applied to nation-building. Clearly, the situations under which nations are likely to be built are varied, but the dynamics of nation-building will follow processes which are common to all communities. Overall, the cost-benefit analysis of nation-building will move from one extreme, where communities are very stable and community-building (as the derivative) almost impossible, to the other extreme, where the situation is fluid and where, with the emergence of newly perceived interests, it is possible to build communities very rapidly. But such communities may be very shaky, as the capital of allegiance is too small to allow for survival when circumstances cease to be favourable.

B. THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF NATION-BUILDING

It was necessary to analyze the process of community-building in general before considering nation-building because, as we noted in the introduction, nations are communities, even though they may be communities of a particular type. But we also encountered two further reasons which make the general analysis of the community-building process a prerequisite of the study of nation-building. We postulated that communities interact in order to obtain the allegiance of actors, both in relation to new and old interests: and the effect of this interaction varies, depending on whether a given community has surpluses of allegiance or not, i.e., has "overreached itself in the past" or not. As a result, a study of nation-building implies a study of the processes of "unbuilding" which characterize the other communities to which the political actors belong. Interests are the ultimate "reason" why this shock between communities occurs; but the viscosity over time which created allegiance to other communities has the effect of increasing, or slowing down, the process of nation-building. Moreover, as we saw, the relationship between actors, leaders, and communities is complex: the allegiance to a leader may be acquired through another community and passed on to the nation after a period of a leader's personalization. We shall therefore look at the process of nation-building in relation to these three sets of "variables" which we identified: interests, other communities, and leaders -- remembering that they also interplay in a complex fashion.

We shall first consider interests independently, introduce the interplay between interests and communities as we consider problems of competition between communities and nation and of transfer between communities and nation, and finally look at the interplay between all three types of variables as we examine the role of leaders in the nation-building process.

Given the approach of this paper, we shall not attempt to define nations precisely. All that is required is to postulate that a nation is a highly complex community, in that it has a variety, indeed an almost infinite variety of interests for which it caters : but it follows from the general arguments of the first part of this paper that there are no differences in kind, and indeed that there might be only slight differences in degree, between a nation and other communities. Specifically, there is no difference between "nationalism" and "provincial separatism", except that if a larger unit exists the clash between communities may become more complex : thus the building of a larger unit (as in Germany or Italy in the nineteenth century) may lead to different community building problems from those resulting from the unbuilding of an existing larger unit, as in separatism.

I. Nation-Building and Interests

If we consider variations in allegiance to a nation which stem from variations in interests among members of the nation without taking into account the viscosity of community allegiance and the allegiance to leaders, these variations can occur only through the following types of movements :

1. The number of actors in the nation increases relatively to the number of actors in other communities ;
2. With respect to each interest catered for :
 - a) policies followed by the nation become felt to be more appropriate than those of other communities, and/or
 - b) the implementation of policies by the nation is felt to be more appropriate than the implementation of policies by other communities ;
3. With respect to both old and new interests,
 - a) the interests catered for by other communities cease to be deemed to be as important as previously, and/or
 - b) the interests catered for by the nation appear more important than they were previously ; and in particular new interests emerge which are catered for by the nation.

a) Nation-Building and Variations in the Number of Actors

These variations correspond to a situation in which segments of the population remain passive in relation to all the existing communities and constitute a "pool" of potential actors. Therefore, nation-building will occur only, with respect to this factor, provided such a pool exists (in practice provided a substantial fraction of the population within the area of the nation is passive and has not been concerned with other communities). But this condition is not sufficient : there must also be what might be termed a "mobilization" potential (irrespective from community allegiance transfer and leaders' drawing power, since we shall consider these two situations later).

Actors will remain relatively few, in a given geographical area corresponding to a nation, only if the other communities are relatively oligarchical in character. This condition is necessary, though not sufficient. It may be that natural forms of allegiance lead populations to see their interests as "best" taken care of by relatively few leaders : but conversely, where the communities are relatively democratic, the pool of "non-actors" among the population is bound to be small.

Proposition 23. In a national area, where existing communities are relatively democratic, the pool of uncommitted populations will be small and the nation cannot be built by drawing from such a pool ; the nation can be built only by either attracting new populations (or benefitting from the influx of new populations -- immigration) or by diverting actors from other communities to national allegiance.

Corollary 6. Other things being equal, immigration of uncommitted populations helps nation-building.

Corollary 7. Other things being equal, migration within a national area helps nation-building. (This is because such migrations will reduce the extent to which, on average, the population will be constituted of actors in existing communities.)

Though the existence of uncommitted populations is required for nation-building to benefit from such a pool, national allegiance will benefit only if conditions exist which will make these populations "mobilizable" for the nation. Psychological changes must take place within the minds of these uncommitted populations (though we shall consider in the third section the extent to which this can be engineered). Such psychological changes will arise essentially through education, as seen in the broad sense (including various "adult" forms of education, some of which may be provided by the mass media). It is precisely because education can change uncommitted populations in this way that leaders have attempted to use processes of education to help increase the rate of nation-building.

Thus, from the point of view of variations in the number of actors, we can expect rates of nation-building to be low where other communities are and have been relatively democratic, where the population structure remains relatively stable, and if other communities are oligarchical, where education is not spreading rapidly throughout the population.

b) Nation-Building and the Satisfaction of Pre-existing Interests

With respect to old needs, nation-building can occur only if either the policies themselves followed by the nation or the implementation of these policies are perceived to be better than those followed by existing communities. But we noted already in the first part of this paper that this was unlikely to occur, or will occur only very slowly. If there are no new needs (which is the hypothesis on which we are at present working) the situation of all the communities is likely to remain relatively stable : the capital of allegiance of the other communities is likely to be high : partial actors are likely to be relatively few ; etc. This is why there are so few cases of nation-building in history which occurred "naturally", even though they took place slowly. The processes by which modern European states emerged out of feudalism is typical of what is likely to happen in these circumstances (even though, in fact, some new needs occurred, for example, at the time of the Renaissance, through commercialism). The "better" administration of kings such as the King of France or the King of England did not succeed alone in building the nation : other communities (provinces, tribal, and other personal loyalties) had to be crushed in various ways : the process of nation-building is so slow that the national bodies usually cannot wait for results to occur naturally : the process may take generations or even centuries.

Proposition 24. In the absence of new interests, nation-building takes place at a very slow pace : and the pace is so slow that if national leaders wish to build a nation, they must by force attempt to destroy the allegiance to other communities.

An alternative to destruction by force is "confederation" or "coalition" between existing communities : we shall have to consider the likelihood of each of these situations in the next section on community interaction.

c) Nation-Building and the Satisfaction of new Interests

We are therefore left with the case of the development of nations in situations where there is a relative change of importance of interests, a special and extreme-sub-set of which is the appearance of new interests.

Even assuming that the pool of uncommitted of populations remains constant, we noted already that in this circumstances rates of community-building, and of nation-building, can be high. But nation-building will occur only if the nation is felt to be the community which is most likely to handle these new interests, or the interests which have become more important. Thus we can distinguish two types of changes in the relative importance of interests : those which can be said to be naturally beneficial to nation-building and those which might be beneficial to nation-building if the nation appears to champion these interests.

New interests (or changes in the relative importance of interests) which can be said to contribute naturally to nation-building are those which contribute to a standardization of attitudes across the nation, either directly or through the operation of cross-pressures (by cutting across other interests on a random or near-random fashion). It is in this context that most work of a sociological character in relation to nation-building has been undertaken. For instance, industrialization is usually held to be a powerful boost to nation-building (whether accompanied by urbanization or not) : urbanization itself is also held to contribute to nation-building, because it contributes to the development of cross-pressures among the population : ethnic groups become more mixed, as well as religious groups. This variable appears to account for the rapid development of nation-building in some Western European states in the second half of the nineteenth century and, at a slower pace, for the development of national allegiance in parts of the developing world. Moreover, as urbanization implies movements of population, this factor is combined usually with an increase in the percentage of "actors" among the whole population, and we noted that such an increase is likely to contribute to nation-building. Conversely, the relatively slower industrialization and even urbanisation in parts of central and Southern Europe, as well as in most parts of the developing world, appears to account for comparatively slower rates of nation-building in those areas. Partly for these reasons, German national unity was deeper than Italian national unity at the end of the nineteenth century.

A proviso must be added, however, as neither urbanisation nor even industrialisation as such contributes to nation-building. Both contribute to the development of new interests, to be sure, but these interests will contribute to nation-building only if they reduce the allegiance of actors to other communities. Thus nation-building increases with new interests to the extent that these contribute specifically to a decrease in sectionalism in a given national unit.

Definition 10. A population is homogeneous in relation to given social variables if there is no correlation between the distribution of the population in relation to these variables. Conversely, sectionalism occurs in relation to given social variables, if the distribution of the population with respect to these variables is correlated ; the higher the correlation, the greater the extent of sectionalism.

Proposition 25. When a given social factor emerges as a new interest or when its importance as an interest increases, the more the distribution of policy vectors in relation to this interest is random with respect to those interests which are catered for by communities other than the nation, and thus the more this factor contributes to nation-building.

Proposition 26. If two social factors contribute to nation-building under the conditions specified in proposition 25, then the more they are positively correlated, the more they will reinforce nation-building.

This indicates that nation-building is in fact a form of sectionalism ("national sectionalism"). What new interests might do is precisely to create a new mapping of relationships between interests and communities : a reinforcement occurs if there are indeed positive relationships between these various new interests. This is precisely what happens with the interests which arise from industrialization and urbanization : but it can happen in connection with other variables.

In comparison with interests which appear to be directly and naturally beneficial to nation-building, other new interests or other changes in the relative importance of interests have often been discarded as trivial in the literature on national development, at least until recently, when the growth of "separatisms" of various kinds has contributed to a re-assessment of the general conditions of the nation-building process. It has become quite clear that ethnic, regional, or linguistic-type interests have grown or have indeed almost been wholly revived in some parts of the world : such ethnic interests may not always contribute to a decrease in the sense of national identity -- as can be shown, though this might not appear to be the case on the surface, by the instance of the United States. But they might, and indeed often do, as numerous examples indicate, both in the developed (Canada, Belgium) and developing worlds (Nigeria, Malaysia). More generally, an examination of the processes of disintegration of empires such as the Roman, French, or Austro-Hungarian empires, would suggest that increases in the importance of ethnic feelings, or indeed in some cases, the creation of new feelings in relation to race, have contributed to break-ups. We choose generally to call the growth of regional identity in Nigeria or Canada as separatism, and the disintegration of Austro-Hungary or of the French colonial empire as nationalism, but the process is effectively the same.

While it is usually recognised that ethnic interests can work against nations as well as in favour of them, it should equally be recognised that other new interests, and even industrialisation or urbanisation can have the same effect. If a part of a nation, and that part alone, becomes industrialised, nation-building will occur at a rapid rate in that part of the nation, but not in other parts. Admittedly, if industrialisation occurs in one part of a country, population is likely to be drawn from other regions and the urbanisation of the industrialised parts will contribute to a mixing of populations from the whole nation (as can be shown to have been the case in France or Italy). But this may or may not contribute to nation-building across the whole nation : although Algerians were attracted to France in large numbers (roughly 5% of the whole population and probably 15% or more of the whole work force), feelings of nationalism in Algeria did not decrease. It is not at all clear that Southern Italians are becoming increasingly 'Italian' as a result of the industrialisation of the North alone (indeed, if this was the case, there would be little concern about the 'two' nations).

Thus it follows that nation-building depends on the extent to which industrialisation, urbanisation, and also ethnic feelings or religious feelings, as well as other interests, are spread uniformly across the nation and cut across each other in a way approaching randomness. This is what explains the usual paradox of industrialisation, a paradox which is often noted but the consequences of which for the nation-building process are not systematically drawn. On balance, industrialisation and urbanization are more likely than other new or changed interests to create a homogeneous culture. But this is true only after a massive dose of industrialisation and urbanization has taken place. To put it differently : only if industrialisation takes place at a really rapid rate (Germany in the second half of the 19th century) or after a long period of industrialisation will the break-up of sectionalism typically occur. As long as little industrialisation has taken place, there will be a divorce between 'two' nations or more ; there will be pockets of industrialisation and urbanisation in an alien environment. This can contribute to national break-up, in the same way as, and indeed sometimes in conjunction with (Nigeria), feelings of ethnic identity.

Nation-building occurs therefore essentially where there is a pool of 'mobilisable' uncommitted populations and/or where new interests of a non-sectional character develop in a given national area. As was suggested earlier, these two conditions are often combined because a 'mobilisable' population is typically one which is physically on the move through urbanisation and industrialisation. These are the circumstances in which nation-building is likely to occur naturally or smoothly, in the sense that the social and economic prerequisites for nation-building happen to be present. But it follows that, conversely, nation-building is not likely to occur where there

is no pool of uncommitted populations and where new interests are few or (even worse) are sectional; because, as we saw, existing interests are not likely to lead rapidly to the development of a national identity. It is not easy to develop an efficient bureaucracy and to make populations believe in this efficiency (few nations attempted it and fewer succeeded: even in France, it is not bureaucratic efficiency alone which led to nation-building). It therefore follows that the examination of variations in interests alone will not suffice to develop a comprehensive theory of nation-building. Moreover, attempts at nation-building have been made, and are currently being made, irrespective of the absence of the required socio-economic conditions or at least despite the fact that industrialisation and urbanisation, for instance, remain very low. The pool of uncommitted actors may be present in some cases, but the mobilisation of these actors cannot be done, or can be done on a limited basis only, through economic mobility or education. Thus we must consider the extent to which nation-building can, so to speak, be engineered from other communities or by leaders, though these may in turn also contribute to the development of new interests.

In other words, if interests alone were at the root of the nation-building process, nations would be few; they would only occur at rare intervals when social change in these nations is buttressed by profound economic change affecting almost the whole population. Clearly, nation-building has occurred more frequently, even if rates have sometimes been slow and failures have been mixed with successes. The study of community-based and leader-based nations can account for this difference.

II. Nation-building and the interaction between communities.

The brief and preliminary analysis of the impact of new interests on nation-building shows the limitations of an explanatory model based essentially on social variables. We have therefore to introduce the dynamics of structures and of leadership in order to account for rates of nation-building in many concrete situations. But the examination of interests and in particular new interests, also showed that such socio-economic variables as new interests have a 'neutral' effect on nation-building: various types of geographical concentration of ethnic, religious, or even industrial groups may promote the development of a nation or hinder it. Thus we have to examine both rates of a nation-building and rates of nation-'unbuilding': indeed, in the contemporary world, Western societies seem to be characterised by a relative decrease of national identity, either from below, so to speak, (in the form of separatism) or from above (in the form of supra-nationalism). Leaving aside, for the moment, the role of leaders, we should therefore attempt to assess under what conditions rates of nation-building are likely to be low or high, positive or negative.

a) Rates of nation-building when other communities tend to be simple.

A truly general analysis of the interaction processes between a nation and other communities would require an examination of interaction along two dimensions, that of the number of communities and that of their degree of complexity. In order to simplify the analysis, however, and given the imprecision of our current tools of analysis, it will be assumed here that these two dimensions are broadly related.

Proposition 26. In a given national area, the greater the number of communities to which actors belong on average, the simpler each of these communities tend to be. Conversely, the smaller the number of communities to which actors belong on average, the more complex each of these communities.

There is general circumstantial evidence for this proposition : where communities are all-purpose, or at least multipurpose, few communities call on each member of the population ; this can be seen to be the case in relatively underdeveloped polities, where the tribe, family, or perhaps the church are the only communities to which people belong. Conversely, where communities are numerous, they tend to have a relatively limited purpose, at least on average. Admittedly, many multi-purpose communities still remain, such as churches, families, local authorities, trade unions ; but their activities are less extensive than those of the multi-purpose communities of developing areas. It seems therefore permissible to assume a fairly high degree of association between the two dimensions and to consider the impact on nation-building of numerous and simple communities, on the one hand, and of few and complex communities on the other.

If most communities, apart from the nation itself, tend to be simple, the interaction between nation and communities will have a limited impact on the extent of national allegiance. The situation is analogous to one in which one large firm is in competition with a large number of small ones, each of which has a monopoly over a small number of products. Each of these simple communities may have small surpluses of allegiance, but they are all unlikely to be able either to impede, or to help, the development of national allegiance. Conversely, the national unit is unlikely to be able to increase more than fractionally the allegiance of members of the nation as each of them is at the same time committed to a number of relatively simple communities for an important part of this allegiance. The overall network of allegiance is a complex maze of criss-crossing lines of relationships. Moreover, even new interests are relatively unlikely to lead to increased national allegiance, as new simple communities or existing neighbouring communities will cater for such interests relatively shortly after these interests begin to emerge.

Proposition 27. Where communities tend to be relatively simple and numerous, rates of nation-building are very low ; at the limit, they tend to zero and the extent of national allegiance does not vary over time.

It should be noticed that these numerous simple communities may be 'below' the national level or above that level. In both cases their impact on national allegiance levels remains very small. The nation can no more be built than it is in danger of being unbuilt either through separatism or supra-nationalism. This situation is that of the societies in which associations are many, as in Western countries.

Proposition 28. For national allegiance to decline, either through separatism or supra-nationalism, communities above or below the level of the nation must be neither very numerous nor very simple.

b) Rates of Nation-building when other communities tend to be complex.

Rates of nation-building (and rates of decrease in national allegiance) are much higher when the national community is confronted with a relatively small number of complex communities. As stated earlier, we shall not consider in this section the role of leaders in fostering the development of nation-building. We know, on the other hand, that if there are new interests, community-building will take place more easily for those communities which happen to cater for these interests ; we also know that, if there is a pool of people who can be mobilised, the specific community (national or other) which can draw from this pool will have higher rates of community-building. We also know that, conversely, the community (national or other) which represents or embodies traditional interests is hampered and loses part of its allegiance ; given that it may have acquired surpluses of allegiance in the past, the rate of decrease may be lower than would be the case on the basis of the increase in new interests alone. Thus we need to consider nation-building and complex communities both when there are no changes in interests, and when new interests have come to be perceived.

Nation-building where few complex communities prevail and in the absence of new needs.

This situation can be deemed to be that of the 'technical' development of nations. Typically the complex communities which draw the allegiance of men tend to be provinces or feudal groups ; but they may also be groups which do not have a precise geographical base, such as churches. The dynamics of the situation can be labelled technical in that the relationship has many characteristics of a game, where the only aim is to win 'power' or influence over a population, and not to change in any significant fashion the mode of life of the members of the population. The characteristics of the development of modern states in Europe before the industrial

revolution and of many parts of the developing world after the 19th century constitute instances of such a 'technical' type of nation-building.

Clearly, the measurement of the rates of nation-building will depend on the relative position of the various units (nation and other communities) ; if allegiance is to be gained, it will not more than marginally be gained from policy standpoints (we noted that such changes would be slow). We shall consider in the next section the extent to which it might arise from leadership strength : if this potential source of greater allegiance is discounted, changes in allegiance have to arise through transfer of allegiance from one community to the nation (or vice-versa). It therefore follows that, unless that nation is superimposed by some outside force, the problem which has to be considered is that of the conditions under which one or more of the existing complex communities wishes to establish a nation and to buttress it when it is established.

Answers to this problem will depend on the configuration of communities which exist in the area which is becoming a nation, such configuration including the number, relative size, degree of complexity as well as allegiance surplus of the various communities. Types of combinations, coalitions and oppositions are therefore numerous and we can consider here only some of the characteristics. At one extreme, there are types of 'dominance' situations. One large community holds the allegiance of a large proportion of the population in a given area. It will attempt to turn itself into a nation by endeavouring to dominate the rest of the area or of the population. This kind of development occurred in Europe through various means of aggrandisement of relatively small domains, and the history of France throughout the middle ages is of this type ; the aggrandisement was slow, because it was essentially "technical", whereas the aggrandisement of Prussia in the 19th century was quicker because the technical advantage of Prussia became combined with the development of new interests arising out of industrialisation. Such aggrandisements can occur on the basis of linguistic associations or religious organisations, the original dominance being less markedly territorial at the origin.

At the other extreme, the nation-building process can be based on forms of "co-operation" between various complex communities, but such a co-operation will occur on a sufficiently large scale (allegiance will be transferred to a sufficient extent) only if a new interest (such as the need to defend a particular area on a combined basis) begins to arise. This is why it is in practice impossible to build nations (i.e., larger territorial entities) unless some external threat materialises if the number of communities which need to coalesce in the operation is relatively large, as can be seen both positively in the cases of Switzerland or the United States and negatively in the case of Western Europe.

Proposition 29. The 'technical' development of nations will arise only if either a dominance situation happens to exist in the configuration of complex communities or if the number of complex communities is very small. A combination of technical development and new interests is required if the number of complex communities which have to coalesce becomes relatively large.

Once a nation has been created on the basis of a transfer of allegiance from one or a few complex communities having 'technically' built a nation, nation-building will depend on the continued transfer of such allegiance from the dominant community or communities which helped the nation to be built in the first instance. Only after a period will the new national unit begin to acquire an allegiance of its own, particularly because it will have to put down by force (and therefore at the same time use some of its capital of strength) incipient oppositions from the areas or groups which did not belong to the original dominant group. The early period of national development will therefore be one of 'disinvestment' on the part of the complex community or communities which helped to build the nation while little surplus will be produced by the nation in terms of extra allegiance for itself : as supporters of the nation coming from other communities do not have new needs (ex hypothesi), their change in attitude is necessarily slow (still assuming that leaders do not play a part in this process).

Proposition 30. Where a nation is created on a technical basis, rates of nation-building will remain low for a period, as supporters of other complex communities have to be 'repressed' until they shift their allegiance to the new community on the basis of an old interest only.

Given the hazardous development of 'technical' nations when they are based on the transfer of allegiance from one dominant group, the highly unstable character of artificial nations can easily be deduced. We excluded earlier the case of 'superimposed' nations : these can be defined as those national units which are created as a result of the pressure of an authority which is outside the area of the nation. This situation arises typically under foreign occupation or colonisation. If such nations are based also on the transfer of support of one or a few dominant groups, the problem becomes similar to that which was examined in the preceding paragraphs and it does not need to be considered further. But, if the superimposed nation depends either on the coalition of a fairly large number of complex groups (a fairly large number of small ethnic units, for instance) the maintenance of the nation clearly depends either on the maintenance of the outside force for a long period (it will play the part of the dominant group in a strict technical situation, though it will have to remain longer, not being indigenous and

thus not being able to transfer support) or on the presence of new interests or new leaders. It therefore follows that nations which are created artificially in this way depend almost exclusively on the existence of such new interests ; their leaders are constrained to look for new interests if the nation is to survive, a situation which is characteristic of many African countries, for example.

Proposition 31. Superimposed nations are unlikely to be built through the maintained presence of the outside force which created the nation. They are characterised by a negative rate of nation-building unless leaders or new interests arise.

Nation-building where few complex communities prevail and where new interests arise.

Technical developments alone are therefore unlikely to provide a sustained increase in national allegiance at a relatively rapid rate. Indeed, as we saw, technical development will require the use of force to maintain the national creation and this in turn is likely to create demands of allegiance surpluses which will strain the resources of the complex communities which help to maintain the nation. Thus a combination of technical developments and new interests is more likely to lead to a rapid growth in national allegiance and to the creation of a permanent surplus of allegiance for the national entity.

This situation arises only if new interests come to be perceived by actors in the community : this circumstance is fortuitous, or, at any rate, outside the control of the national community unless national leaders succeed in creating these interests. We can already see why such a temptation will be frequent. But if we still hypothesize the absence of leaders' engineering, it follows that only to the extent that interests do happen to emerge will nation-building occur. Moreover, we noted in the previous section that these new interests will only help nation-building if they are distributed in a way which does not foster sectional groups within the nation (and, it should be added, supra-national groupings). Thus, where a national unit has been created on the basis of a transfer of allegiance from one or a few complex communities, the appearance of new interests will tend to foster the process of nation-building.

Proposition 32. If, over a period, interests change and become more sectional, decreases in national allegiance will result in a threat to national unity unless a prior capital of allegiance to the nation, or to the communities supporting the nation, reduces or stops the effects of the new forms of sectionalism (still assuming no influence on the part of national leaders).

If the nation has existed for a relatively long period, and even though the rate of nation-building may have become small (as in Western European countries) the capital or surplus of allegiance acquired over a number of generations helps to reduce the effect of new sectionalisms ; but disparities in development combined with ethnic or linguistic problems (as in Spain) may constitute drains on the capital of allegiance acquired by the nation and on the allegiance of the communities which support the national unit. Where the national unit has existed for a short period (and even more where the national unit was more superimposed than technical, as in Nigeria) such distortions do in fact easily lead to a break-up in the national unity. The problem is the converse of that where new interests broadly benefit the national unit against hitherto influential sectional units and where these units fight rearguard actions and threaten to secede out of a desire to keep their traditional way of life (as with the South of the United States during the Civil War). One can therefore link the technical creation of nations with the creation of nations under new interests by considering the extent to which the balance of interests favours the nation or some of the sectional units. When the balance is favourable to the nation, rates of nation-building are high or very high ; as the balance becomes less favourable, nation-building depends increasingly on the allegiance surpluses given by the complex communities which buttress the nation and on the allegiance surpluses previously acquired by the nation. When the balance favours the sectional units, the strain on the nation becomes large. Clearly, there is a limit below which one cannot expect any nation to have acquired enough surpluses to survive ; moreover, as new interests develop, and if these interests are unfavourable to the nation, it follows that they will also tend to decrease the allegiance of groups to the complex communities which buttress the nation. Thus surpluses decline and the allegiance base of the nation also declines. In many cases, as in Austro-Hungary after World War I, some further accident will help to produce the final break, but it can be hypothesised that the break would have naturally taken place.

The interaction between communities and nation is therefore very important in the development of the national allegiance and in the determination of rates of nation-building. National allegiance appears to be fairly high (though nation-building rates are low) when the national unit is faced with a large number of small communities ; but because rates of nation-building are low in such circumstances, nations cannot be created on this basis. Moreover, if new interests were to develop which would favour the development of complex communities either within the national unit (provincial, ethnic or religious groups) or above the national unit, these national units would begin to use the capital of allegiance which they had constituted without being able to reconstitute it easily. Ex hypothesi, such national units have a large capital of allegiance, since they cannot have acquired their allegiance recently from complex communities as these do not exist.

Thus nations are not created in situations in which a large number of simple communities exist ; in the absence of new interests such nations are not seriously threatened, but, with new interests emerging, they may not be able to sustain the challenge, if the challenge becomes prolonged and increases in strength. But these nations are stable, despite their low or even nil rates of nation-building, because they have successfully gone through the process of technical nation-building, or technical-cum-new interest nation-building. Those nations which are still in the technical phase of nation-building will eventually succeed in acquiring a substantial surplus of allegiance if they are not subjected to new sectional interests or if, and indeed more so, new interests become allied to the technical development of nation-building. For these nations new interests are therefore critical ; and as we noted in several instances that such new interests may develop fortuitously and indeed against national allegiance, it is important to see how far these interests can be fostered, re-directed, and manipulated by the leaders of the national unit. This becomes a prerequisite in the case of superimposed nations, since little technical base will maintain these units and new interests may not arise quickly enough or in the form which will favour national unity. In the same way as interests become subsumed and modified through the permanence of structures, structures may be modified and maintained through the personal allegiance of the actors to the leaders of the various communities. A comprehensive analysis of nation-building thus implies a detailed examination of the role which leaders may be expected to play in various types of national developments.

III. Nation-building and the role of leaders.

In the long run, national allegiance depends on the extent to which interests are perceived by actors to be satisfied by the national community. But leaders may help or quicken the pace of nation-building by providing other means by which such a capital of allegiance can be created. We must note, though we shall not examine the problem, that the converse may also happen : leaders may have a negative impact, by being so unsatisfactory that they actually drive actors away from the nation ; they may also be leaders of units other than the nation (below or above the national level) and therefore build a capital of allegiance to units other than the nation and thus indirectly reduce national allegiance. The argument is the same as the one which we shall consider here.

a) Origins of leader's following or allegiance.

Leaders can transfer allegiance only if they themselves have a following ; they redistribute the allegiance given to other bodies, they do not create it. Clearly, their following can come only from one of two sources :

- 1) they may be institutionalised leaders of pre-existing communities (mostly highly complex communities) ;
- 2) they may be personalised leaders of pre-existing communities (such communities need not be as complex).

Given that leaders are leaders, they are necessarily in charge of, or at least participate in the decision-making process in some communities. But they may have emerged through the traditional ladder of a pre-existing community or they may have helped to build (or develop) a new community. In the latter case, the community will only have sprung up and mushroomed if it corresponded to an interest which was deeply felt ; and it will only have mushroomed during the life time, indeed during a small part of the life time of the leader, if it corresponded to an interest which was both deeply felt and relatively new. In the first type of case, the leaders will have started as institutionalised leaders ; in the latter case, they will have started as personalised leaders.

However, we know that, if a leader is merely a institutionalised leader, his capability to exercise autonomous influence is small ; at the limit, he has no such capability, if he draws his influence wholly from the institution (complex community) which he leads. Therefore, though there are two broad origins from which leaders may stem, only one group of leaders will be able to contribute to the development of nation-building and national allegiance : they are those who have a personalised following.

Proposition 33. Leaders contribute to the development of national allegiance only to the extent that their own following has become personalised, although the origins of their influence may have been institutional.

In real-world situations, however, leaders tend to combine some institutional strength with a personal appeal in a variety of proportions. This personal appeal has ultimately to be based on the existence of new interests (though still spread on a limited basis) or on policy achievements with respect to pre-existing interests (though this leads to a slow-build-up) or on the mobilisation of new populations or, more probably, on all three. Such leaders become therefore gradually more than mere institutional leaders : their institutional base in one of the major (dominant) complex communities of the nation has helped them to come to power and this maintains their strength in some parts of the country, while their personal appeal is what helps the national to gain gradually a surplus of allegiance, assuming that there is in turn transfer from the leader to the national community.

b) Transfer of allegiance from leader to nation.

While the personal appeal of leaders may help to reduce the allegiance of actors with respect to other complex communities (or help to attract new actors) a second operation must take place : the personal allegiance to the leader must be turned into an allegiance to the nation. Highly personalised leaders may well experience difficulties in operating this second transfer. As we saw, highly personalised leaders emerge in relation to a new interest, this new interest being itself a fairly sudden development. A community is thus created and develops rapidly around this new interest : such communities are relatively simple and unquestionably less complex than some of the pre-existing communities, since they cater essentially for one (new) interest. The problem raised by the second transfer (from personal allegiance to nation) has therefore to be viewed as one by which a relatively simple community has to help to develop allegiance to a nation, which is necessarily a complex community.

The typical example of this process is that of nation-building through decolonisation. Decolonisation occurs (or did occur) as a result of a new interest (independence) being felt by large segments of populations, often by populations who were not actors in the previous period. Some leaders succeeded in acquiring a highly degree of personal appeal as a result of the decolonisation process, their effort being directed afterwards to transferring this personal appeal to the nation. But whereas the need for independence was felt strongly and whereas the policy vectors in relation to this interest were almost identical, interests in relation to other national policies are felt much less strongly (there are fewer actors) and the policy vectors of these actors are markedly different. Thus the personal leader who gained his strength from the independence need has considerable difficulty in transferring to the nation the allegiance which he acquired in relation to independence from the broad mass of actors in the national population.

One can see that, conversely, a leader whose base was in large part institutional may well have less difficulty in transferring to the nation the relatively smaller capital of personal allegiance which he might have acquired. We noted that such leaders acquire personal allegiance in the form of a large number of relatively small 'bits' of allegiance, with respect to policies, some new interests, the introduction of some new actors. Thus the basis of this personal allegiance is more diversified ; the complexity of the national allegiance thus follows naturally from the complexity of the allegiance to the leader. Overall, if the personal appeal of leaders is very strong, the probability of transfer to the nation, on a long-term basis, is relatively low, though, if a transfer does take place, it will help to build the nation very quickly. Conversely, if the institutional appeal is higher, the probability of transfer is also higher, but less is being transferred : the

nation-building process will be slower ; sectional influences may last longer unless the leader's influence takes place precisely in an area in which there was previously a sense of national identity.

Proposition 34. The probability of transfer of personal allegiance of leaders is positively correlated with the degree of complexity of the interest catered for by these leaders (and negatively correlated with the degree of simplicity of such interests).

Corollary 8. Leaders who combine an institutional appeal with a new interest have a high probability of transferring their personal appeal to the nation and thus of building a permanent national allegiance among the population.

If leaders experience difficulty transfer their own personal appeal which stems from a new interest to a broader form of national allegiance, they will be tempted to 'educate' the population. The problem is the following : let us assume that there is one new interest only at a given moment in time, but that this new interest is widely felt (and that policy vectors are similar) --as in the case of independence movements. Let us further assume that for the rest of their interests, the population perceives itself as being well catered for by the existing complex communities (tribe, etc.). Given the difficulty of a direct transfer, one indirect means of building national allegiance could be to try to generate other new interests among the population, and to see to it that these new interests are closely associated with the nation. We discussed hitherto interests either as emerging naturally or in the context of communities ; but leaders may consciously wish to develop new interests : this can occur either by creating a socio-economic infrastructure which will generate new interests, by transforming the psychological attitudes of the population, for instance through the use of a personal appeal to 'mobilise' the people in favour of these needs.

We cannot of course examine in detail the types of policies which might stem from such standpoints. Clearly, an ideology of 'development' combined with efforts to implant into the nation some of the basic economic infrastructure required for development will have the effect of helping both to provide a change in the social conditions and in the psychological attitudes prevalent in the community. The element of 'accident' which, as we saw, in numerous instances characterises new ideas is to some extent circumvented (to some extent only, as resources have to be taken into account) ; and the ideology of development has to political merit of suggesting allegiance in the present in return for benefits to be gained in the future : the building of national allegiance is thus based on trust in the future socio-economic development of the nation and indeed on the belief that only if such a trust exists will economic development occur.

Clearly, such payoffs cannot be obtained without costs, even assuming that conditions are ideal -- namely that the mobilisation of attitudes is sufficiently rapid to allow national allegiance to take roots. (If the extent of mobilisation remains small, national allegiance does not increase and the whole process becomes divorced from reality, as seems to have been the case for example, in Ghana.) The costs are related to the difference between the decrease in the personal allegiance of the leader and the increase in national allegiance. By attempting to mobilise a population, the leader consumes part of the allegiance which he had previously obtained, for instance through the fight for independence. He can only spend a proportion of his personal allegiance at any given moment, as he needs some for the future ; but unless he spends fairly large quantities at the beginning of the operation, he may not mobilise the population at all ; if he does spend too much of his original capital, he may find that the trust will have vanished before the population acquires the new interests and perceives the nation as being the vehicle for them. In practical terms, the use of favours and patronage at the level of the political elite cannot be so lavish at the beginning that nothing remains to be given at later periods ; promises of a good society must not be so repeated and so extravagant that they will boomerang. But if efforts are to be required from the population, promises must be relatively extravagant : efforts would not be forthcoming otherwise.

Proposition 34. For certain given levels of personalisation and prior national allegiance (the former being assumed to be high and the latter being assumed to be low) there exists a course of action which will maximise the mobilisation of the population in relation to the nation ; below certain levels of personalisation and national allegiance, however, the maximum mobilisation capability will not be sufficient to ensure that the nation acquires surpluses of allegiance.

If these indirect transfers are insufficient to build national allegiance (and indeed if they were sufficient but were not perceived as such by the leader or leaders) the only alternative is to perpetuate the mobilisation acquired originally through the new interest of independence and to attempt to build national allegiance on the basis of a perpetuation of this interest. An effort is therefore made to build the national identity either against the original enemy or against new enemies. Indeed, such attempts are likely to be combined with efforts at mobilisation and socio-economic development and their success can be measured in ways similar to those suggested in Proposition 32 (except that payoffs arising from the maintenance of the interest from which the leader obtained his allegiance have to be introduced and balanced against the costs in resources which such a maintenance will entail).

c) Nation-building and the dynamics of leaders' actions.

Clearly leaders cannot 'engineer' nations altogether; there must be the perception of interests among actors, and there must be communities which correspond to these interests; moreover, communities have to be viewed as the means by which actors are being satisfied. But leaders can help to build communities: clearly, the simpler the interest, the easier it is for a leader to build a community. As the nation is a highly complex community, it is not likely that many leaders will succeed in building a nation altogether, but they will contribute to the nation-building process by helping to reverse what would appear to be the 'normal' temporal sequence between interests and communities, though to an extent and for a period only, because such a reversal is viewed as an anticipation, and the personal appeal of leaders is precisely the ability to make other political actors believe in the eventual realisation of this anticipation.

The 'normal' or 'natural' process of community-building is one by which interests arise among a number of actors; communities are the by-products of this belief. When the community has existed for some time, it acquires a propensity to aggregate new interests or to modify them, as a result of the fact that allegiance to the community becomes one of the factors which enters (albeit unconsciously) in the calculations of actors. The weight of past activities of the community is what accounts for the development of communities in new fields. Leaders can reverse this process to an extent because the communities which they help to build acquire a 'loan' which is based on the capital which they are expected to acquire: the policies which they will follow are what buttresses their existence in the present.

Proposition 35. Where there is leader personalisation, the allegiance to the nation of the actors who are in allegiance to the leader is equal to the expected policy returns of the national community in the future, minus the sum of the actions undertaken by actors against interests which they have at the time.

In any given situation of personalisation, the leader will attempt to develop some interests. Each of these attempts constitutes a 'disinvestment' for the leader, as political actors do not yet 'understand' or 'feel' the interest. This disinvestment can be equated to the repayment of the loan. At the beginning of the process, as a result of his 'loan' of personal appeal to the nation, the leader succeeds in building an appearance of high national allegiance. Gradually, the 'loan' is being repayed, which means that the sum total of the situations in which each actor had to act in favour of, or along the lines of policies which did not correspond to his interests, has to be deducted from the allegiance to the nation.

At the end of a given period, national allegiance will have decreased, though the marginal rate of decrease may have slowed down (if it has not, the nation will break up) ; once the 'anticipation' period is over and actors begin to favour these new interests and feel that they are satisfied by the nation, the marginal rate of nation-building becomes positive. At this point, the personalisation of the leader is no longer required, though it may still help to increasing the rate of nation-building or to cushion the nation in case of severe difficulties.

Nation-building does not cease at the end of the anticipation period, but the role of leaders necessarily decreases either because the original leader has by then lost much of his personalisation capital, or because he is replaced by a new leader who is the product of the new national allegiance and is therefore institutionalised. This new leader may in turn want to build a different national community (by operations of supra-nationalism or dominance, for instance) and the same process of 'anticipation' might then apply to him. But if the nation remains geographically the same, the nation-building process continues : further surpluses of allegiance are added through the natural development of interests and through the transfer of allegiance from complex communities : assuming that new interests do indeed develop in ways which are favourable to the national unit, these tend to diminish the allegiance of actors to some of the more complex communities. The role of personalised national leaders tends also to decrease. Finally, the rate of nation-building tends itself to decrease.

We noted earlier that the rate of nation-building tended towards zero as we moved towards a situation in which the national unit was confronted with a large number of simple communities. The role of leaders tends to cease earlier, at or about the moment that the institutionalisation of leadership in the national unit necessarily reduces the extent to which leaders may have for a following of their own. This is why such leaders are likely to be tempted to move towards nation-building at a higher level, either through the development of new nations on a technical basis (by way of dominance) or through the attempt at engineering new interests on a broader geographical basis. This is not the place to examine whether nations which have built a large capital of allegiance still produce leaders of a personalised type to the same extent as nations in which allegiance has still to be built. It may be that, when the nation-building process is completed (at least in the sense that nil or near nil rates of nation-building occur) such leaders no longer emerge and leadership becomes institutionalised and has a brokerage character. But, if such leaders were to emerge, their ability to develop a sense of national identity will occur on a different plane ; it may be that the current Western European wave of provincial separatism stems from the limited room for manoeuvre which leaders

have at the national, and even international plane, in terms of "nation-building". As long as political actors can be mobilised to anticipate new interests, leaders will emerge who will attempt to build nations (or other highly complex communities) on the basis of such anticipations, though they will succeed only, as we saw, if their personalisation and the community-base are sufficient to repay the 'loan' which such an anticipation implies.

Conclusions.

All through this paper, we attempted to examine the nation-building process (our dependent variable) on the basis of the analysis of the interplay between three sets of (independent) variables, interests, communities, and leaders. We did not try to specify what interests were, or could be: we postulated interests as givens and, consequently, variations in interests (and the appearance of new interests) as givens, at least to the extent that they were not the products of the activities of leaders. Still assuming interests as givens we should now attempt to summarise the processes which we examined in detail and to make explicit the general relationship which exist between the three broad sets of variables.

1) The first fundamental assumption which must be made in order to explain allegiance and nation-building is that communities and leaders have an initial credit or capital. This credit of goodwill has to be postulated if communities are to be created at all, as we noted in relation to simple communities; for complex communities and for leaders, transfers of allegiance have to be added to the goodwill relating to a particular interest. As we noted, the measurement of this goodwill raises very serious difficulties, even for simple communities, but until this measurement is done, it will not be possible to predict accurately the potential for nation-building of various countries (or provinces which aspire to be countries) at any particular moment of time.

2) As we indicated, the measurement of the national strength has to be done on the basis of both the calculation of the total allegiance and the marginal nation-building rate. Allegiance is equal to the total amount of gains, less the losses, experienced by the members of the community over time, plus the goodwill which the community had at the origin. For countries which have existed for a long time, this original goodwill becomes a minute part of the total amount of allegiance, and it is not practically important to calculate it. For the same reason, the goodwill which might be transferred to these nations by other communities or by leaders who have a personal appeal is also likely to be very small in relation to the accumulated total of gains over losses over a very long period. This is why such countries do not enable us to make significant advances in the development of the theory and methodology of nation-building.

These countries should be included, however, both because they can be in fact affected by rates of nation-building (when separatism occurs) and because, if the theory of nation-building is to be general, it should apply to them as well as to newer nations which have a much smaller capital of national allegiance.

3) Where a country appears to have a small capital of national allegiance (in practice essentially in new countries) the question of the measurement of the rate of nation-building becomes critical, since it is on the basis of this rate that predictions can be made about the future maintenance of the country (the argument equally applies to provinces which are affected by separatism). But it should be apparent that this problem is in reality the reverse side of the previous problem, namely that the development of national allegiance implies a decrease in allegiance of other, pre-existing, communities to which allegiance was presumably large and stable. Thus, while the analysis of older, stable nations may be difficult to undertake because their accumulated capital of allegiance is very large, the measurement of the accumulated capital of allegiance of other communities, however large, should be undertaken if we are to be able to predict whether the rate of nation-building in a new country will be sufficient to enable the country to have a stable development.

4) We shall therefore assume that a minimum rate of nation-building is required, over a given period of time, to enable the nation to accumulate enough capital of allegiance to sustain itself. We can now endeavour to summarise the ways in which this capital can be obtained and consider alternative rates of nation-building :

At a given point in time T_1 , the slope of the nation-building curve will be determined by :

- a) direct perceptions of interests by the actors ;
- b) the extra capital (if any) obtained from pre-existing communities who lent their capital at T_1 ;
- c) the extra capital (if any) obtained from leaders who lent their capital at T_1 .

It follows that, if nation-building rates are to increase from T_1 to T_2 , this can only come from :

- a) greater perceptions of gains by pre-existing actors, or more actors perceiving interests (or fewer actors perceiving opposite interests) ;
- b) some pre-existing communities lending more capital, or other pre-existing communities lending capital ;
- c) some leaders lending more capital or new leaders lending capital.

5) In relation to (a), we noted in many instances that the only source of substantial increases in rates of nation-building was the perception of new interests and the introduction of new actors ; but we also noted that such substantial sources of new gains for the nation were rare, fortuitous and could therefore not by themselves lead to the conscious development of a nation. We are therefore referred back to (b) (communities) and (c) (leaders). But, if we consider specifically the question of a greater rate of nation-building at T_2 than at T_1 , we have to concentrate on those communities and leaders who did not lend capital at T_1 , but are prepared to do so at T_2 (as well as the possible increase in capital lent by communities and leaders who had done so previously) ; if we assume the latter to be relatively small or rare, we have therefore to concentrate on the amount of capital which can be transferred from other communities or other leaders ; this is to say that we have to concentrate on the capital accumulated by these communities or leaders in the past. It therefore follows that variations in the nation-building process at a given moment in time depend on the total amounts of allegiance which other communities or leaders have acquired in the past. This can be stated conversely : unless there are leaders or communities which are in a position to transfer allegiance to a national unit at a moment in time, the rate of nation-building of that nation will depend entirely on the fluctuations of interests ; in practice, the rate of nation-building will remain the same or indeed decrease, unless a new interest emerges or new actors are introduced in the community.

6) We stated earlier that the lending of new capital by pre-existing communities or by leaders would tend to occur 'in one piece' : if this is the case for a particular nation, the consequences can easily be seen : that nation is very likely to have a stable nation-building rate ; the nation-building rate may even decrease. This in itself is not dangerous for the nation if the accumulated capital of allegiance is already large (we argued earlier that this was the situation for older nations) ; but if the accumulated capital of allegiance is not large, the maintenance of the nation does therefore depend on the presence or absence of large antagonistic communities which call on the allegiance of actors. If they are present, the danger is very serious indeed.

7) It therefore follows that, where such antagonistic communities exist, and still assuming a small overall capital of allegiance, a high probability of maintenance of the nation depends on one of or the combination of two factors, namely, the sustained ability of leaders (and/or other communities) to transfer allegiance and the introduction of new actors perceiving new interests. Let us assume that there are no new leaders who are able to provide fresh capital : the maintenance of the nation does then depend on two possible courses of policy (which turn out to be, at least normally, alternative courses of policy).

One is to attract new actors (and indeed probably spend even more of the capital of allegiance of the leaders to this effect) by educating and mobilising the population towards new interests and making them perceive these interests. Such a policy of mobilisation will be costly in allegiance and is indeed predicated on the leaders having a large capital of initial allegiance. The other (which might be termed reconciliation) is to attract more of the pre-existing communities to the nation (and in so doing to decrease the strength of the antagonistic communities). As this is far less costly in terms of personal allegiance of leaders, this course of action is more likely to be followed where the personal allegiance of leaders is low. As, finally, the leaders' capital can be used in large amounts only if these leaders have a personal allegiance and as they have such a personal allegiance only if they acquired it by embodying interests which became quickly sufficiently large (it will be recalled that independence was mentioned in this context), it follows that the mobilisation course is likely to be rarely successful. Nation-building rates will be low, where a new interest embodied by a new leader did not emerge at a given point in time, unless the pre-existing communities are associated to the nation-building process.

8) This conclusion may appear paradoxical in view of the development of nations in the 1960s. But these nations developed precisely as a result of the demand for independence from a colonial power and the initial slope of the nation-building curve was therefore steep. Such a situation was highly exceptional ; nation-building rates will therefore decrease markedly in the coming period, unless there is a shift by which some communities, hitherto often opposed to the national unit, become associated to it ; the other source of increase in nation-building, the appearance of new interests, is likely to be rare, or very gradual, and will therefore not be sufficient to produce marked variations in the nation-building rates. New nations have probably 'spent' too much of the initial capital of goodwill which their original leaders had, though this could scarcely be avoided, at least in many cases. But because so much initial capital has been spent, the only options are greater reconciliation, and greater dependence on fairly large pre-existing communities (tribal, religious, for instance) or low nation-building rates, and therefore repeated dangers of civil wars, etc, which in turn tend to use the existing capital of allegiance. These constraints are not new ; they affected the older European nations in the past ; they affected the older new nations, namely, the Latin American countries, for a long period and indeed to the present. Nation-building is a slow process ; only by the influx of allegiance transferred from other bodies, or through new interests, can an acceleration occur. But, in most situations, not surprisingly, the latter are not available and the former is not forthcoming or welcome.

Sans résumé.

Without Summary.

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Political Integration, Cultural Integration,
and Economic Development: Their Relationship
in the Nation-Building Experience of Republican Austria

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Introduction

"Nation" and "nation-state" are now a little less than two hundred years old. After a long period of dynastic consolidation beginning in the Middle Ages had fashioned in various parts of Western Europe the territorial and administrative prototype of the modern state, ideological and technical change produced in eighteenth-century England the beginnings of its industrial economic form. And from the French Revolution emerged, in self-conscious expression, the "nation" as the psychological substance of the new polity. All political history since then can be read as the history of "nation-building" or "political development,"-- the revolutionizing of traditional politics throughout the world by the national and industrial ideal.

The purpose of our panel is to consider models and methods for the comparative study of nation-building so that the vast array of "development" phenomena with which we are confronted, both historical and contemporary, can be measured more precisely and reduced to more theoretical order than we are now able to give it. But as we engage in the theoretical enterprise we are aware of the pitfalls that beset those who would move immediately from the data to universal theory. As we seek out sweeping generalizations that will explain the process of "development" or "nation-building" as such, "we normally feel a bit uneasy. We continually remind ourselves that, given the diversity and complexity of the problems, 'there are many exceptions.'" But though the complexity of the theoretical task bewilders us, we must also avoid the "strong temptation to retreat from soaring abstraction into minute particularism." We find it advisable to pursue a middle way, and seek to construct theories of the "middle range," a half-way house "between the levels of universal theory and of case study." And in particular we seek to explore the utility of "linking together particular cases and theoretical generalization."

In the "nation-building" and "political development" literature and in the literature on political unification, which is also relevant for our concerns, there is today considerable disagreement about the causal interrelationships of three important factors: political integration, cultural integration, and economic integration and development. With reference to the first two, some scholars make cultural integration the independent variable, and political integration the dependent. Thus Leo Kuper in a recent study of African politics writes that "Integration rests on common values. . . . It presupposes cultural homogeneity. . . . Cultural diversity or pluralism automatically imposes the strictest necessity for domination by one of the cultural sections. It excludes the possibility of consensus, or of institutional integration, or of structural balance

between the different sections, and necessitates non-democratic regulation of group relationships."³ Similarly Karl Deutsch and his co-authors generalizing from European data in their study of the North Atlantic area specify the mutual compatibility of main values and a distinctive way of life as essential conditions for the growth of political community.⁴ In another study of political unions Deutsch has shown that in practically every case he examined shared cultural symbols, ethnic origin, language, religion, and sense of identity preceded the union's formation.

Amitai Etzioni, by contrast, taking specific issue with Deutsch argues that we have evidence that "cultural homogeneity is neither a prerequisite to unification nor a sufficient condition. . . . We find that quite a few successful unifications have been initiated, and political communities established, without cultural homogeneity."⁶ As examples of successful union he specifies Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, Nigeria and India. He also points to the multilingual nation union of Benelux. (Since the publication of his book in 1965, however, French separatism has threatened to cause political instability in Canada, and tribal animosities in Nigeria have caused at least a brief-lived and very destructive period of separatism.)

Here, then, is an important area in the study of nation-building and political unification where it has been difficult to make adequate generalizations. Etzioni suggests, however, that the contradiction between his and Deutsch's position may be more apparent than real. It may be the case that most cultural values are politically irrelevant. They may in some instances coexist with political unification but not in others. There is nevertheless a "limited set of values and symbols directly related to unification including legitimation of the new power center, a sense of identity, shared political rituals, and the like," which are plainly requisite to political integration. These might be brought under the heading of "cultural homogeneity." And, in fact, it may be that both Deutsch and Kuper, by including the expressions "common values" and "main values" in their definition of "cultural homogeneity", mean to include elements of political *Weltanschauung* in it. But if this is the case, the concept "homogeneity of culture" cannot be of explanatory value. For "it is the emergence of these shared political values that the study of unification has to explain; their existence is part of our definition of integration. If we view the same factors as our dependent variable (integration) and as our independent one (culture) we are spinning tautologies."

Etzioni thus suggests that in explaining integration we should separate out background culture from political culture, as two different phenomena. Presumably we should deem the latter a measure of integration rather than as a causal explanation of it. He adds that whether such an interpretation resolves the contradiction "has to be empirically determined."⁹ This paper, which deals with the nation-building experience of Austria, presents data which may be helpful in making such an empirical determination.

There is another way of resolving the contradiction, according to Etzioni. It may be that "unions whose members do not share a culture may be initiated but they will not develop successfully, at least not until their culture becomes shared."¹⁰ If this were the case, shared culture would not be a "prerequisite for unification but a requirement that has to be fulfilled before the process can be advanced."¹¹ My paper also has something to say about this hypothesis.

Another area of disagreement in the literature concerns the relationship between economic factors and political integration. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in a study of East African integration writes critically of the "functional" or "European theory" of integration. As he capsulizes the theory, "gradually, loyalties follow economic interests and become focussed on the new center, and a new political union comes into existence." Ideology (e.g., "Europeanism") is unimportant, quite peripheral to the integration process. "The politics of . . . integration are the politics of interest, of 'upgrading the common interest.'¹² As Nye sees it, the primacy of economic motives as integration factors can be over-rated, at least under certain conditions. "To study integration in areas like East Africa" he says, "less attention should be paid to [economic interest] groups . . . more attention should be given to ideology" defined as "an interdependent set of . . . value-or-action-oriented ideas." He has in mind even "diffuse ideologies, or 'world views'" which he thinks "can have as important an impact on the integration of states as specific ones." The example which he presents is that "during the period of discussion of East African unification in the early sixties, a widely accepted diffuse ideology expressed the interests of the political elites in the three countries. . . . Pan-Africanism provided the framework of ideas within which East African unification was approached and discussed."¹³ And so we have posed the question of the precise relationship of material need and economic interest as integrating factors to the rational world of meaning and purpose which is the world of ideology.

Karl Deutsch and the other authors of Political Community in the North Atlantic Area include among the nine essential conditions for the growth of political community two economic factors: the expectation of stronger economic ties or gains and superior economic growth for some units participating in the integrated system.¹⁴ But they do not specify the causal relationship of these things to other integrating conditions in their list: "main values" (political? cultural?) and "a distinctive way of life."¹⁵

Ernst B. Haas claims that "generally shared expectations of economic gains are constituents of the process of integration found to recur with monotonous regularity."¹⁶ But Claude Welch, in a study of African unification movements argues in qualification of this thesis that "the successful operation of economic factors . . . requires a relatively stable, long-established political system, in which economic interest groups play a recognized role in political life. Where political systems are in flux and the growth of nationalism signals the start of ideology . . . it may be misleading to base arguments for unification solely on

economic grounds." ¹⁷ In this statement Welch raises the question as to whether economic well-being is a cause or an effect of political integration, and suggests that the latter is the case. In this area too our discussion of nation-building in Austria will offer empirical evidence about the relationship of the two factors. This will be in the context of discussing the connection between economic development and political integration in the Austrian experience.

Republican Austria and the Post-war Emerging Nations of the
Non-Western World: Similarities of Circumstance

The theoretical ambiguities discussed in the first part of this paper illustrate the difficulties involved in the construction of adequate models of the processes of nation-building and of political unification. They derive in part from the problem of relating the nation-building experience of Western Europe to that of the non-western world, where large cultural differences pose a difficulty for theoretical generalization. One argument of the present paper is that the special circumstances of nation-building in republican Austria, the newest of Europe's nation-states, especially in its early phases, are sufficiently like those of the emerging nations of Asia and Africa to derive from a study of the one some theoretical suggestions which may help us to understand problems of development in the other. As we have indicated, the paper will focus on the relationship between cultural and political integration on the one hand, and between economic development and political integration on the other.

"There are . . . instances" writes Myron Weiner "where the 'nation' . . . precedes the 'state.' . . . But more typically the 'state' precedes the 'nation.' 'Nation-building', to use the increasingly popular phrase, thus presumes the prior existence of a state in control of a specified territory." "Political development," Lucian Pye tells us, "becomes the process by which communities that are nation-states in form and by international courtesy become nation-states in reality." The process, as he sees it, is a dual one, consisting of citizenship development on the one hand, and institution-building on the other. "Development" he writes "entails the translation of diffuse and unorganized sentiments of nationalism into a spirit of citizenship and, equally, the creation of state institutions which can translate into policy and programs the aspirations of nationalism and citizenship. In brief, political development is nation-building."¹⁸

Austria emerging from the ruins of dynastic empire in 1918 and the typical post-World War II "developing state", emerging from the ruins of colonial empire, both stand at the beginning of the nation-building process. ¹⁹ Both have the exterior form, but neither has the psychological substance of the nation-state (i.e., a spirit of citizenship) nor political and economic institutions "which can translate into policy and programs the aspirations of nationalism and citizenship." Even the exterior form is an arbitrary foreign creation rather than an indigenous growth. The boundaries of Republican Austria were determined not by Austrians but by the triumphant democracies of World War I. In similar fashion, the boundaries

of new states like the Congo and Nigeria were drawn by the power and convenience of colonial regimes, not by the inhabitants. Nor were the governmental systems adopted at the outset domesticated. "In many underdeveloped countries" writes Joseph Nye, "governmental systems are foreign imports little related to their societies. . . . The African elite inherited an authoritarian structure which was democratized only partially and at a late date."²⁰ In a similar way Austrian parliamentary democracy, within a republican frame of reference, though inaugurated by domestic forces, was patronized and sanctioned by foreign powers--the triumphant western democracies. In the background was an indigenous authoritarian structure which had been "democratized only partially and at a late date."

An important difference between the two experiences would appear to lie in rather different attitudes toward independence. Austrians generally did not wish independent status in 1918, while indigenous demands for independence have been a primary cause of the creation of many new states in the non-western world since 1945. But this observation obscures the more important fact that in both experiences there is a similar lack of fit between group identity on the one hand and state boundaries on the other, which in each case has made for political instability. The usual explanation of the vote in the Austrian Provisional National Assembly on November 12, 1918, declaring an anschluss with Germany, is that the inhabitants of the rump republic wanted to be absorbed by the northern Reich because they were a German subculture.²¹ It is hard to see how the demand for anschluss with Germany on ethnic and linguistic grounds differs in any fundamental way from that by which tribal animosities threatened to detach Biafra from the rest of Nigeria in the middle 1960s. The centripetal-centrifugal difference between the Austrian and African experience here is of secondary importance. Also, the discovery by Austrian Catholic Conservatives in 1934, after the Nazi seizure of power in Germany, that they were Austrians first and Germans second, and their subsequent struggle with the Austrian Nazis and Pan-Germans on the question of independence or anschluss diminishes the importance between Austrian and non-western attitudes toward independence at the outset. James S. Coleman says of the non-western emerging states that they must create "new political and cultural nationalities out of the heterogeneous peoples living within the artificial boundaries imposed by the European master."²² Austria faced a very similar problem in 1918.

Austria in 1918 also resembles the post-World War II emerging nation in its condition of economic dislocation, underdevelopment and lopsidedness. Heavy industry was virtually nonexistent. The chief centers of the Empire had been in Bohemia and Moravia, which now were foreign territory. Only in Styria were there the beginnings of a heavy industrial plant. The Vienna Basin was specialized to light and finishing industries. The Empire had not formed or accumulated capital to anything like the degree typical of Western European industrial states during the second part of the nineteenth century, so that the capital legacy to the successor states amounted to very little. Predominantly rural, the tiny state contained one vast urban area, sprawling Vienna, now cut off from her traditional economic hinterland to the east by new political boundaries and trade barriers. How like this last characteristic is Philip Hansen's description of the single

sprawling metropolis, swollen with a population unjustified by the level of economic development of the region, as a chief mark of the underdeveloped non-western state of today.²³ One Austrian writer recognizes the aptness of such comparisons by stating that "The First Republic was born . . . amidst economic strains and stresses characteristic of a developing area (in der wirtschaftlichen Spannung eines Entwicklungslandes)."²⁴

Paired with cultural disintegration (i.e., the absence of a shared specifically Austrian cultural ideal) and with economic disintegration as common characteristics of Austria in 1918 and some developing areas of today is deep-seated political conflict, erupting into civil war and controlled only by partisan authoritarian measures,--political disintegration. Austria's rival political parties became armed totalitarian camps in the years after 1918, camps representing closed segments with radically different traditions, symbols, and values. Though primarily ideological, the basic cleavages followed regional lines of division, as in the typical unstable emerging nation. "Red" Vienna was pitted against the "Black" provinces. Divisions were even conceived to an extent in ethnic terms, as symbols of general cultural differences. Instead of Ibo versus Yoruba it was "Slavic" or "Bohemian" Vienna versus "Bayuvaric" Tyrol and "Alemannic" Vorarlberg.

It should be stressed that Austrians themselves see the aptness of comparing their nation-building experience with that of the non-western developing nations. We have already cited one writer, who participates in a continuing polemic within Austria about the existence and character of "the Austrian nation." Another publicist who takes part in the debate was quoted in an interview of 1965 as saying: "Large segments of the population have already declared their allegiance to Austria as a nation. There are still, however, political and pseudo-scholarly elements who want to prevent us from taking the last step to true nationhood. They want to keep Austria in the condition of a developing country that can't get beyond the 'Lumumba' phase."²⁶

It should, of course, also be emphasized that in comparing Austrian circumstances with those of the non-western emerging nation I am not suggesting an identity between the two. That there are differences, and significant ones, is obvious. Joseph Nye, for example, limits theories of integration he has developed from a study of East African experience to "situations where economies are underdeveloped; in which the society has few powerful pressure groups (and these often staffed by people of another race); where leaders of newly independent states are still ambiguous about national interests; where the mass²⁷ of the populace is illiterate, and communications are not fully developed." He also suggests that theories based on European experience are inapplicable to areas of which these are the salient characteristics.²⁸

The Austrian situation has the first, the third, and, to a degree, the fifth of the features listed by Nye, but not the second or the fourth. In addition, it is clear that the external situation of Austria both in 1918 and in 1945, plus the intervening experience of *anschluss*, especially as all these relate to the balance of power in Europe, are rather special features which are not obviously

replicated in the case of many developing non-western states. And one could point to still other special aspects, such as the peculiar history of German nationalism. Differences of these kinds will of course mean that the pattern of nation-building which we elicit from the study of Austria will not be applicable without qualification as a description (or prediction) of non-western nation-building. But this was of course not my intention. It is obvious that no nation's history is precisely the same as any other. The only question is whether there are some important common features which allow for some generalization.

Also, it should be clear that theoretical understanding can be enhanced as much by a recognition of differences as by a comparison of similarities. Such recognition defines the conditions under which generalizations obtain and do not obtain and makes possible the classification of sub-types. It should be noted as well that not all differences are "given", fixed by natural necessity, but can sometimes be modified by rational policy.

The Austrian Experience of Nation-Building:
The Empire and the First Republic

That the national idea could ever have been developed into a principle of unity for the sprawling, polyglot Habsburg Empire is unlikely. It is remarkable, indeed, that an effort to create a Great-Austrian nation out of the myriad ethnic and language groups of the Empire should ever have been made. Yet there are on record numerous attempts by the Crown, ^{by the} Imperial intelligentsia and by the bureaucracy to fashion a Great-Austrian ideal to supplement the weakening principle of dynasticism before it was completely undermined by the particularist nationalisms of Czechs, Poles, Slovenes, Croats, and Hungarians. In a decree of 1775, which brought into being the institution of the public high school, Maria Theresa used the expression "national education." And even earlier her father, Charles VI had said that his policy was directed "to the end one gens emerge."²⁹

It was during the Napoleonic Wars that the first extensive and systematic efforts were made to rebuild the conception of the Austrian political community on the basis of the national idea by generating a concept of an "Austrian nation." "Oesterreich ueber Alles," the title of Heinrich Collin's military anthem of 1809 reminds us of the later German nationalist watchword. And from the pens of the intelligentsia of the time flowed a stream of other patriotic songs, poems, and manifestoes to inspire the soldiery of the liberation wars with patriotic fervor.³⁰ Historians attempted to create national feeling by the glorification of the Empire's heroes and triumphs, and in a work of 1814 Josef Freiherr von Hormayr actually calls the Empire a "nation," speaking of the "sins against the Austrian nation." As conditions for the reception of the national idea, it was thought that administrative centralization and uniformity together with state control of education would be sufficient. And as early as 1809 Count Stadion thought the work of ideological and administrative renovation substantially complete, declaring: "We have made ourselves into a nation."³¹ It appears that in most of these cases

the idea "nation" was conceived in the Western-European sense of "political nation", rather than in the sense of "cultural nation", which is the more usual Central European concept. The Central European concept had not as yet fully developed.

These efforts were to prove abortive, however. The Emperor Francis seems to have sensed a threat to Imperial authority in the attempt to propagate a new concept of political community, for he struck from the military levee of 1813 the word "Fatherland" and replaced it with the word "Emperor."³² Later in the century, despite the efforts of people like J. A. von Helfert, Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Education to cultivate the idea of an Austrian nation, the burden of events moved in an opposite direction. During the neo-absolutist period of the 1860s, the suppression of constitution, parliament, and freedom of the press, prizes of the Revolution of 1848, turned the liberal middle-class of the German-speaking Crown lands, the very stratum to whom the national idea has the greatest natural appeal, against the monarchy and its works. The military defeats of 1859 and 1865 at the hands of the Prussians did nothing to enhance their patriotism. Middle class nationalism in German Austria was soon to develop around the Hohenzollern-sponsored concept of "Deutschtum", a cultural concept, rather than around Habsburg political institutions. Elsewhere it grew up around a variety of other cultural foci--Czech, Polish, Hungarian etc. When the Empire was divided into two parts a year after the defeat at Koeniggratz,³³ the Cisleithanian part (all that was not Hungary) had not even a proper name.

In some parts of the Imperial structure there did develop a genuine attachment to the state as such during the nineteenth century, despite the failure of efforts to have that state conceived as a nation. The army and the bureaucracy were Great Austrian elements, as was the clergy of the Catholic Church, especially after the conclusion of the Concordat of 1855. And with the beginnings of political democracy the Christian Social Party emerged as a carrier of the Great Austrian mentality. Ignaz Seipel, one of their leading intellectuals, who was to play a central role in the First Republic, attempted to propagate a Great-Austrian patriotism like that of Stadion, Hormayr, and Helfert by constructing an ideological justification of the Empire. But it was a much-diluted version. For due to the growth of the Pan-German idea, Seipel thought of himself as a German in national (i.e., cultural) terms, and was unable to apply the increasingly authoritative word "nation" to Austria. It did not occur to him that he might enhance the charisma of the state by dubbing it a "nation" in the Western European sense of political nation--which appears to have been what the early 19th century Austrian nationalists like Stadion had in mind. Seipel could conceive of "nation" only in the Central European cultural (i.e., ³⁴ethnic and linguistic) sense. And so defined he saw nothing but a German nation.

The Pan-German idea appealed to Socialists as well as to the Liberal middle classes. Victor Adler, the Party's founder, who entered politics as a supporter of the German nationalist demagogue Georg von Schoenerer, remained an enthusiastic Pan-German after his conversion to socialism, though he did not openly reject the multinational Habsburg state. Others like Otto Bauer, leader of the revolutionary

wing of the party, and Karl Renner, the outstanding representative of right-wing, revisionist Socialism could only think of pragmatist and utilitarian arguments for Great Austria and made no effort to adapt the concept "nation" to the Imperial situation.³⁵

With the dynasty, the one constant focus of Imperial allegiance, swept away along with the empire in 1918, the only thing which might give unity and meaning to the left-over Crown lands was not Austrian but German cultural and political nationalism. This, together with a general despair of the economic viability of the rump republic, motivated the Provisional National Assembly on November 12, 1918 to declare that "German Austria is a part of the German Reich." The Allies would not, for reasons of the balance of power, have it that way, however, and the Austrians were compelled to try to make a go of "the state that nobody wanted."³⁶

The situation of national vacuum boded ill for the workability of the new institutions of parliamentary democracy which replaced the exiled House of Austria. There were parameters neither of political or cultural community coincident with the territory of the state nor an established political tradition to keep within bounds the conflicts which were soon to erupt among the three principal political groupings--Catholic Conservative, Liberal, and Socialist. Each was to become a closed politico-cultural segment during the chaotic years ahead, a total community all its own, fatally separated from the other Lager.³⁷ By 1934 each would be an armed camp. The irrational economic situation would aggravate things and deepen already dangerous cleavages. Fifteen years after its inception the republic would be faced with a structural unemployment problem of half a million persons--a labor force of two million, and only 1.4 million jobs. These would be congregated in the eastern three states, with the largest number in Vienna, the seat of government, and in a mood to use their power in anarchic ways. An impoverished middle class and an elite cadre idled by the disappearance of the civil and military bureaucracy of the Empire would be found willing and eager to engage them in civil conflict.³⁸ The marching and countermarching of party paramilitary forces indicated the dissolution of the order of parliamentary democracy which was suspended in a void, sans psychological, social and economic foundation.

Between 1934 and 1938 an effort was made to rebuild an Austrian political community by negative authoritarian measures to suppress dissent and by positive efforts to inculcate an Austrian national ideal through methods of total mobilization and indoctrination. This was the experiment of the Authoritarian Christian Corporative State, inaugurated by the Christian Social leader Engelbert Dollfuss and liquidated by the Nazis.

On March 5, 1933, in the national election in Germany, the Hitler-Hugenberg group polled 52% of the electorate. Nazi successes in the Catholic areas of Germany must have been particularly shocking to the Austrian Christian Socials, who could see therein the handwriting on their own wall. The local elections of 1932 had already indicated that Austrian sentiment as well as German was moving in a "Brown" direction. In Vienna the National Socialists had polled over 200,000 votes (a sharp contrast with the mere 27,000 they had received in 1930) and

therewith captured fifteen seats in the Landtag, fourteen of them formerly held by Christian Socials.⁷ ^{In addition,} Christian Social majorities in Lower Austria and Salzburg had been destroyed by the Nazis.

The final identification of German nationalism with Nazi ideology, together with the soaring popularity of the combination in the face of political and economic decay galvanized the Christian Socials into action to preserve what was left of their power position. Taking advantage of a parliamentary crisis which had arisen accidentally on March 4th, which left the National Assembly without a presiding officer, Dollfuss determined on the dissolution of the parliament sine die. A decision was reached at a meeting of the leaders of the Christian Social Party that "now for some time the government must be carried on in an authoritarian fashion until, through negotiation with the opposition, an alteration of the constitution as well as of the rules of procedure of the Parliament are secured so that the functioning of the administrative and the legislative organs of state appears assured."³⁹

No agreement was reached with "the opposition" on an alteration of the constitution. Immediately following the coup against the parliament by the executive (Dollfuss had been elected Chancellor by regular parliamentary process in 1932) the Christian Socials dealt with the organized opposition forces. Following a series of Nazi terrorist acts in June, the government prohibited all activity on behalf of the National Socialist Party and dissolved its paramilitary organizations. In February 1934 the Social Democratic Party was disbanded and the power of its paramilitary force, the Schutzbund, which had been outlawed as early as April 1933, was broken in four days of civil war. May 1, 1934 brought the official promulgation of a new constitution creating a "Christian, German, Federal State on a corporative basis," which was to be the instrument of government until the anschluss with Germany of March 1938.⁴⁰

One ideological effort of the Corporatists in the new political game was to compete with the Nazis as the defenders of the "true Germany," and "true Germanism." This was a strategy which had been tried before, during the last fifty years of the Empire, when the Habsburgs, as inheritors of the ancient tradition of the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation", were fighting for their life against the upstart Hohenzollerns and their modern version of German Empire and German Nation. It was, of course, an utter failure. But we find Dollfuss employing it anyway in his own losing battle. Witness the following from his speeches:

We want a German Austria and a free Austria. . . . At a time when the world shrinks from a certain German spirit we want to show the world that we possess a Christian German civilization.

In our Austrian way we feel ourselves to be a true component of the German way and of German life, and to preserve this Austrian individuality, to bring it to fruition in all-German and in European life, is our national duty as well as our duty to humanity.⁴¹

But there is ambivalence. Dollfuss also realized that somehow a distinctively Austrian national program, not subsumed under the category "German", might be needed to stem the Nazi tide and save his position. Despite the fact that he was long accustomed to identify himself as a member of the German nation and as a participant in German culture he vaguely saw that the Christian Social (and traditional Austrian) conception of "German" had nothing in common with that which had become authoritative in the north, and that all of the values that he held dear were threatened by the Nazi success in filling the idea of "German" with their own special ideological content and excluding all others. Though anschluss had earlier been appealing to many Christian Socials, an anschluss under Nazi auspices was a revolting concept. It implied their absolute doom. Witness the result of this realization in the rather different verbiage of other of Dollfuss' popular appeals. In one he speaks of the German intention to "denationalize" the Austrian people:

That this region, once governed for centuries by the Imperial Crown, should become a province of Berlin, that our indigenous people should be de-nationalized and put under foreign rule [my emphasis-W.T.B.]--that is what we have sought to prevent.

The foundation of our entire policy is the defense of our people's heritage [Volksschatz], of our independence, the indivisibility of this land which has come down to us from our fathers, and the cultivation and development of the creative, cultural, political and economic powers of the Austrian people, in other words, the carrying out of the historical mission of Austria in the German and Central European lands.⁴²

Despite a continued ambiguity of language, Dollfuss' strategy was to build a uniquely Austrian ideology by reviving the distinctive values, concepts, and symbols of the Imperial past and by adapting them to the new situation: Christian commitment, mediating mission, corporative order, and authoritarian leadership.⁴³ The traditional character of the reform is revealed in small things as well as large--in the restoration, for example, of the two-headed eagle of the empire as the official seal of state, albeit that the eagle's talons were empty. (The republic had shorn the eagle of one head and replaced the traditional sword and orb with a hammer and sickle clutched in the eagle's talons.)

As the primary instrument for the inculcation of his traditionalist ideology Dollfuss created a "Fatherland Front" as a church militant of the new Austrian creed. In a letter to Mussolini dated July 22, 1933, he described the aims of the organization:

We are giving special attention to intensive propaganda as a means of arousing a kind of Austrian patriotism such as has not existed in the postwar period, and was scarcely possible a few months ago. I may here point to the activity of the Fatherland Front. . . . The Fatherland Front aims at non-partisan union of all patriotic Austrians

to serve the peaceful, cultural and economic development of a free, independent Austrian state.

The Fatherland Front was given the sole right to form public opinion in Austria. It was to be, in the words of Dollfuss' successor, Kurt Schuschnigg:

the sole association of those who participate in the creation of the political will. Outside the Dollfuss Front, the Fatherland Front, there can be no other fronts, and within the Fatherland Front, there can be no particular Fronts.

The episode of the Corporative State reminds us of the phenomenon of the monopoly party in non-western emerging states which are today fighting their nation-building battles. Claude Welch describes the problem of inculcating a national ideal as it appears to African leaders in terms resembling those that Dollfuss had in mind when he seized dictatorial power and created his "Fatherland Front." "The necessary transformation of loyalties is a long-range task," writes Welch, "one that seems, to African leaders to require the formation of single-party dominant regimes. The creation of a 'nation' within the state boundaries inherited from colonialism is the fundamental task."⁴⁶ Or as Arnold Rivkin, citing Sekou Toure and others puts it, "For many of the African leaders one-party authoritarian systems are the answer--the way to forge national unity, to build a nation-state, to create a nationality."⁴⁶ Traditional nationalism as the content of authoritarian indoctrination, however, was hardly the sort which could provide a viable principle of cohesion for micro-Austria. It had nothing to say to the anti-clerical sections of the middle classes or to the working class; it represented no compromise with their Weltanschauungen, but rather totally excluded them.

Major economic policies of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime also proved utopian and unworkable. Corporatism was a disaster. Josef Dobretsberger, one of Schuschnigg's Ministers of Social Administration and during the Second Republic Professor of Economics at the University of Graz, has described it as the cause of the fragmentation of wage and price policy which led to over-all incoherence and inconsistency in economic policy.

When every occupational estate independently regulates wages, sets prices, carries on foreign trade, and conducts work-creation programs, the special interests have free play. Monopolies appear, clothed with the public power,⁴⁷ which proceed to exploit the community in their own interest.

Dobretsberger also attributes to corporative autonomy the failure of the government's make-work program, which may have driven many job-hungry people into Nazi arms.

Nation-building in the First Republic thus proved abortive. No "Austrian nation" ever achieved consensual definition either in political or cultural terms. The experience might appear to bear out the prediction of students of development like Kuper who assert a necessary connection between cultural and political integration. Austrian leaders were unable to conceive Austria as a unique cultural entity, and continued to talk about themselves as a variety of German. Nor were they able to separate the ideas of "political nation" and "cultural nation" from one another. The ideology of the Corporative State as a unique "Austrian Idea" was a mixture of political and general cultural symbols, on which the leaders who created it could not bring themselves to bestow the legitimating concept "national." (Schuschnigg coined the unexciting expression, "Second German State.") The emotions connected with nationalism could be mobilized only for anschluss with Germany, not to support an independent Austria. Even if specialized political concepts had been detached from general cultural ones, it is unlikely that they could have been successfully propagated as the ideology of a "Staatsnation," short of using elaborate brain-washing techniques. For the ideas of the Corporative State were developed out of the world view of a particular segment and were unintelligible to other major social groups with widely different Weltanschauungen.

We may still ask why the separation of "cultural" from "political nation" was never made during the First Republic except by isolated writers like Winter.^(See footnote 43.) And we may further ask why political ideological conflict ended in an effort to impose one view rather than in a compromise or in the "end of ideology." Would things have been different if pressure for anschluss from Germany, which was enormous, had been headed off by Western democracies mindful of threats to the balance of power? And what role did economics play in all this? If we adopt the "functionalist" theory that political loyalties follow economic interest, we might argue that continued economic disorder, especially the disintegration produced by corporatism, was a major factor underlying the failure of nation-building in the First Republic. Nevertheless we cannot overlook the fact that there were clear evidences of economic growth present as well. Witness the impressive picture of development painted by Gordon Shepherd:

By the middle 1930s the foundations of a stable economy were beginning to appear. . . . The Austria which Hitler seized in 1938 was not yet a flourishing state; but it at least had the marks of a going concern. The trade deficit, which was over 1000 million schillings in 1929, had been almost wiped out. An important heavy industry was developing out of the iron and steel plants of Styria, and Austrian semi-finished and luxury goods had already become internationally competitive. The first oil had been extracted from Zistersdorf, from whose wells a succession of foreign masters were soon to squeeze 3 million tons a year. Hydro-electric power had expanded to cover all domestic needs, and to allow for an export surplus of 341 million kilowatt hours in 1936 compared with only 20 million in 1929. Over the same period Austrian lumber exports had been raised from 8 million to over 12 million round metres a year. And . . . the Germans were glad to get their hands

on the 91000 kilogrammes of gold and 36 million dollars' worth of foreign currency which had accumulated in the safes of the Austrian National Bank. . . . Within twenty years, the starving Republic of 1918 had turned itself into a country 75% self-supporting in its food requirements.

Thus, despite the traumas of political and economic reorganization, civil conflict, and authoritarian repression and in a context of cultural disintegration (in the absence of a consensual Austrian national identity) substantial economic development was going forward. But it was not capable of producing a level of consumer well-being which might reverse the trend to political disintegration, a trend being spurred by insistent external pressure. We have here then no real test of the importance of economic integration and development for political integration.

The experience of the Second Republic, by contrast, shows that, given certain important differences in background circumstance, political integration and national identity as unique political identity (a "political nation") could be achieved in Austria in the face of continued cultural disintegration (i.e., continued disagreement on the idea of Austria as a "cultural nation" and ambiguity of the concept). It also shows that at a certain stage economic development can be an important integrating factor in such a situation. The data show that the achievement of political integration and economic success taken together may have some effect on increasing the area of general cultural homogeneity (i.e., more widespread acceptance of the idea of Austria as a "cultural nation.") Thus, in certain situations, the causal relationships between political and cultural integration posited by scholars like Deutsch and Kuper may be reversed.

Nation-Building in the Second Republic: Integrating Elements in the Post-War Situation

After seven years of anschluss with the Third Reich Austria was returned in 1945 to the status of an independent republic. But the circumstances of that year--military defeat, political collapse, and territorial reorganization--were only superficially like those of 1918. When these events were associated with the breakup of the Habsburg Empire their effect on the rump republic was, as we have seen, entirely dissolvent. Connected with the downfall of the Third Reich, however, they proved to be altogether centripetal for the revived micro-state.

The experience of anschluss had brought widespread disillusionment to Austrians, for its realities did not correspond to expectations. The Pan-Germans of Seyss-Inquart's last Austrian government thought Austria would remain an identifiable unit enjoying autonomy within some sort of federal arrangement, as did large numbers of average men who greeted the anschluss. They hoped that

Austria might become a "second and more privileged Bavaria within the Reich."⁵⁰ But a year after the anschluss the historic provinces (Laender) were converted into Reich gaue, governed directly from Berlin. And the ultimate fruits of the association were not security, material well-being, and world prestige, but radical insecurity, economic loss, and foreign conquest.⁵¹ In 1945 Austrians daily walked through the desolation which Hitler's war had brought them. A leader of the Second Republic has well summed up the sentiments of those days:

Let us think back to the spring of 1945. After seven years of war and suffering Austria stood before the burned-out legacy of an unhappy time. Ruins and rubble, demolished houses and factories, but also the ruins of souls, ravaged human lives, blood and tears: that was the sad balance of the "1000-year Empire."⁵²

Leaders of the two major parties who had been persecuted by the Nazis had become thoroughly disenchanted with the idea of anschluss. The ruling opinion among Socialists throughout the war had indeed been for the continued integration of Austria in a liberated Germany which the Socialist Party could dominate. Nevertheless Adolf Schaerf, later to be President of the Second Republic, as early as the spring of 1943 had pronounced the anschluss dead in response to soundings by German resistance leaders who were eager to retain the connection.

Ever since I had first learnt to know and love the intellectual treasures of the German people, I had always imagined that my spiritual home was not Austria but Weimar. During this talk [with Wilhelm Leuschner, a German Social Democrat who in the spring of 1943 sought a commitment of German-Austrian unity for the post-war period] however, it came on me like a revelation. It was precisely Leuschner's description of the situation which made me suddenly realize what had changed. I brusquely interrupted my visitor and said: "The anschluss is dead. The Austrians have had their love for the German Reich driven out of them!"⁵³

Among Christian Socials, Lois Weinberger, one of the moving spirits in the resurrection of Christian Socialism as the "Austrian People's Party" in 1945 told Carl Goerdeler, the German resistance leader in October 1942 that he would support⁵⁴ a putsch against Hitler but would work for Austrian independence thereafter.

Since the Allies had made it clear in 1943 that they intended to treat Austria as a liberated rather than as a conquered country, if she worked for her own liberation, it was in the evident self-interest of Austrians to distance themselves as much as possible from Third-Reich Germany and all her works and to take up a position for independence. Karl Renner, the Socialist father of both republics, in 1918 had called^{for} anschluss with Germany with the watchword "We are one tribe and one community of destiny" and in 1938 greeted its realization as "satisfaction for the humiliation of Saint Germain and Versailles." In April 1945 he declared for Austrian independence in order to

find a way out of the catastrophe."⁵⁵ Great-Germany had once appeared as a haven in a storm. It was now a penal colony to escape from.

Another centripetal, or integrating factor was the foreign occupation and the way it was conducted. Russians were encamped in Lower Austria, part of Upper Austria and the Burgenland, British in Styria, Carinthia, and the East Tyrol, Americans in Salzburg and Upper Austria, and French in the Tyrol and Vorarlberg. Vienna was carved into four zones and the old city within the Ring at the center placed under four-power administration. The borders between the various zones were closely watched, and especially in the first months of the occupation movement across them was very difficult and sometimes impossible for Austrians. The circumstances of occupation meant separation, and east-west polarization implied a continued threat of ultimate dismemberment. Negotiations for a state treaty repeatedly came to nought. Yet there remained always the hope of a united Austria because of the remarkable fact that the Allies had actually recognized a central government for all the Laender, while refusing to do so for Germany. President Schaerf, in an address to a joint session of the two Houses of the Austrian Parliament celebrating the fifth anniversary of the finally-achieved State Treaty in 1960, spoke of the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Austria after the war as "a near miracle." He noted that of all the countries occupied after World War II by both Eastern and Western powers, only Austria succeeded in achieving unification. Neither Germany nor Korea was as fortunate.⁵⁶ Former Chancellor Josef Klaus, a leading Conservative, told me in an interview in 1965 that the Allied decision of 1945 to treat Austria as a single political unit was an important phase in the development of Austrian national consciousness. "It was a marvel that we escaped division like Germany, despite the variety of occupation zones" he said. And Dr. Alfred Maleta, another Conservative leader, listed the felt need to make common cause against four-power⁵⁷ occupation as one of three chief integrating factors in the years after 1945.

All of the factors which we have mentioned so far, especially the events of the anschluss period, plus sheer happenstance importantly influenced the mentality of the leaders who would come to the fore to pilot the new ship of state: they were all moderates. Kurt Schuschnigg, the last Christian Social Chancellor of the authoritarian Corporative state emigrated to the United States after his liberation from German imprisonment. The Austro-Fascist Hemiwehr leader Richard Steidle died in a Nazi prison, and Prince Starhemberg, another of the leading authoritarians, did not return to political life. Those leaders from the Christian Social right wing who remained, men like Felix Hurdes, Leopold Figl and Julius Raab, who were to become the chief architects of the Second Republic, had been converted by their "state of nature" experiences to the democratic process. None had been in the first echelon of the leadership of the corporative state. And the failure of that experiment had been an absolute one. Under the Nazis these men had learned what it was to be on the "receiving end."

Those from the left wing of the earlier Christian Social Party, men like Lois Weinberger and Leopold Kunschak, had always been democrats and during the '30s had constantly campaigned for an opening to the left, for cooperation with the

Socialists. All those, both from right or left, who had spent time in a concentration camp had come closer together as persons and had also learned sympathy for the Socialists who had been their prison mates. The KZ had awakened a human understanding of men who formerly had been only ideological stereotypes.

On the Socialist side it was the aging officials of the right wing around Karl Renner who carried through the revival of the Socialist Party in the spring of 1945--men like Adolf Schaerf, Theodor Koerner, Oskar Helmer, Johann Boehm. During the period of the corporate state the left-wing "Revolutionary Socialists" had been able to maintain an extensive and active underground organization. But the Nazis hauled large numbers of them off to concentration camps. The right wingers, who had repudiated the "Revolutionary Socialists" withdrew to private life and were little molested. When the liberation came they were on the spot to take over the reins of power. Otto Bauer, the leading firebrand of the First Republic, died in exile, and such of the other leading leftists who had not been murdered in the concentration camps had fled abroad to England and Sweden. When the survivors returned from exile the democratic and pragmatic tone of the new Socialist Party of Austria had already been set. And many of the former radicals--Karl Czernetz, Oskar Pollak, Bruno Kreisky--had learned a new appreciation of democracy and pragmatism from their experience in England and in Scandinavia. As Kurt Shell sums it up, "With the destruction of the R.S. cadres by the Gestapo and the retreat from political life of the uncompromising revolutionaries who had come to lead them, the commitment to dictatorship of the proletariat was replaced by a remarkably unanimous and unequivocal enthusiasm for parliamentary democracy."⁵⁸ The new party programs of both major parties expressly embraced democratic decision-making and the norms of individual right. 58a

A last and most vital integrating factor in the situation of Austria after World War II was the state of economic development and the correlative demographic situation. Despite the confusions of corporative economics there had been considerable economic development in the First Republic, as we have seen. Following the anschluss, the ^{German} intent on securing the economic foundation of their war machine, continued the expansion of Austrian heavy industry. Especially important were the Hermann Goering works, the new iron and steel mills established in the area of Linz, in 1938 an almost exclusively agricultural region. Also, as Allied bombing was stepped up during the war an increasing number of German factories sought refuge behind the Alps of the western Austrian areas. Styria benefited through the modernization and mechanization of the iron mines of the Erzberg under Nazi auspices. Though Russian occupation later brought a setback through widespread dismantlings, Hitler's plan was to make the German-speaking areas of Europe the heavy industry centers of the Third Reich and the subject lands the producers of consumer goods. The projected ⁵⁹ dimensions of the industrial centers were great enough to have supplied all Europe.

The immediate postwar years reinforced the pattern of over-all growth cum decentralization which the Nazis had set. While down to 1955 Vienna and eastern Austria generally stagnated under Russian occupation, which saw the removal eastward of vast quantities of machinery and material which had been dubbed

German property, the west continued to grow in economic strength by leaps and bounds. Marshall Plan aid took over where Nazi capital investment had left off, and produced the foundations of an economic expansion which from the late 1950s to the present has borne fruit in the greatest and most widespread period of prosperity Austrians have ever known--a truly affluent society (Wohlstandstaat). During the period 1948-1952 one-third of the net investment was financed by ERP counterpart funds.

A key index of democratic modernity is the balance between city and country, between urban and rural factors in a society. If we measure this balance in Austria by comparing the number of persons employed in agriculture with the number employed in industry and trade, we find that in the turbulent First Republic Austria was the epitome of the transitional state, with the number in agriculture maintaining a narrow and declining lead over those in industry and crafts. The census of 1951, however--the first taken after World War II--showed that the balance had been reversed. For the first time there were more people in industry than were employed in agriculture, as the following table shows:

Year	Structure of the Economy ⁶⁰	
	Agriculture and Forestry	Industry and Crafts
1910	39.5	35.2
1934	37.1	36.5
1951	32.6	41.3

Sometime during the wrenching years of anschluss, war, and the early occupation Austria had crossed a great divide between traditional agricultural society and modern industrial society. The economic history of the Second Republic would therefore consist in completing the structure of industrialization rather than in laying the groundwork for it, a phase of development more compatible with political integration than the foundation phase.

Regional balance, especially as it related to the urban-rural distribution, is also important for democratic modernization. We have already noted, in describing Austria in 1918, the beginning of her nation-building experience, the vast difference between sprawling Vienna, the sole large urban center at that time, and all the rest of the country, a hinterland of farms and small towns. Between 1923 and 1934, the year of the establishment of Dollfuss' dictatorship, the population balance had begun to change, but not to a marked degree. Vienna had declined by only .1% while the greatest population increase was in the Vorarlberg which grew by 17.9%. Tyrol and Salzburg grew by 16% each, Carinthia by 12.2% and Styria by 8.5%. Burgenland and Lower Austria had increased by smaller percentages.

By 1951 the demographic picture was quite different. Vienna had declined dramatically by 16.5%, while the increases in the western provinces were similarly dramatic, ranging from 22.8 to 24.6 percent, as the following table shows:

	Population 1934 and 1951 by Land ⁶²			
	1934	1951	Variation	in%
Vienna	1,935,610	1,616,125	-319,485	- 16,5
Lower Austria	1,446,949	1,400,471	- 46,478	- 3,2
Burgenland	299,447	276,136	- 23,311	- 7,8
Upper Austria	902,965	1,108,720	+205,755	+ 22,8
Styria	245,801	327,232	+ 81,431	+ 33,1
Tyrol	349,098	427,465	+ 78,367	+ 22,4
Vorarlberg	155,402	193,657	+ 38,255	+ 24,6
Styria	1,015,106	1,109,335	+ 94,229	+ 9,3
Corinthia	405,129	474,764	+ 69,635	+ 17,2
Austria	6,760,233 ^{x)}	6,933,905	+173,672	+ 2,6

x) incl. 4.726 persons. without fixed dwelling

Once again, the years of anschluss, war, and early occupation witnessed the crossing of an important watershed. The east-west population balance had been dramatically reversed, as the table below indicates.

	Share in the Total Population by Regions ⁶³			
	1934	1951	1961	1967
Vienna & the East	54.5	47.5	46.3	44.7
West & South	45.5	52.5	53.7	55.3

While the regional balance of population would continue to shift westward during the Second Republic, the total change in either direction between 1951 and 1967 would be less than 2%. The major change had already been accomplished before the Second Republic came into existence, or as it was coming into existence.

The great population increases in the western and southern Laender between 1934 and 1951 were all within developing urban industrial centers--the Feldkirch-Dornbirn-Bregenz complex in Vorarlberg, the Salzburg-Hallein area of Salzburg Land, the area around Innsbruck in Tyrol, the Linz-Wels-Steyr triangle of Upper Austria, Klagenfurt and Villach in Carinthia, the area of Graz in Styria. Within each of the Laender the rural areas had lost heavily to these urban centers. The new picture was one of urban concentration of population in seven widely-distributed centers, a sharp contrast with the metropolis-hinterland distribution of the First Republic. Vienna remained, indeed, the largest city, with a population of 1,616,125. But Graz, Linz, Salzburg and Innsbruck had all grown to be large cities with populations ranging between 100,000 and 226,000. Klagenfurt and Villach (adjacent cities) taken together represented a population of about 100,000 and the complex Bregenz, Feldkirch, and Dornbirn, more than

150,000. Moreover, vitality and growth was to be found in the new centers rather than in Vienna.⁶⁴

The rate as well as the direction of social change is important for political integration, as both Lerner and Lipset have shown.⁶⁵ It is significant that the most wrenching period of change, Austria's "great leap forward" demographically, occurred during the chaotic period of dictatorship, war, and foreign occupation, from 1934 to 1951. From 1951 onward, change has been more measured.

The establishment of a new role for the Catholic Church in Austrian life after the inception of the Second Republic is another important background factor which distinguishes the beginnings of the present polity from the one of 1918. Austria is nominally a Catholic country. Almost ninety percent of the Austrian people claim membership in the Catholic confession. But what appears superficially to be a bond of unity--religious homogeneity--has in reality been the opposite. It can be shown in fact that the Catholic Church has been a principal divisive factor in Austrian politics since the Protestant Reformation, when all of the estates of the Austrian Crown Lands went over to the new faith. Only by political coercion did the House of Habsburg win them back to Catholicism. It is not remarkable therefore that places which held out most stubbornly against the Counter-Reformation, and where a crypto-Protestantism flourished down to the time of Joseph II--Carinthia, parts of Styria, the Waldviertel of Lower Austria--were centuries later peculiarly susceptible to the appeals of National Socialism.⁶⁶

The particularly low rate of church attendance for Vienna mirrors the fact that Vienna is a Socialist city and traditionally Socialism has identified the Catholic Church as an ideological support of the hated institutions of Crown and aristocracy. It did not improve matters that Ignaz Seipel, a leading Conservative politician and Chancellor of the First Republic, was at once a Catholic priest, a Capitalist, and a man who was ever ready to use repressive measures against Socialist dissent. Things went from bad to worse during the Christian Corporative State. On the one hand, through a Concordat with the Vatican, Dollfuss restored the Catholic Church in Austria to a place of special prominence and power and on the other hand he outlawed the Socialist Party.

In 1952 the Bishops of Austria came together at the pilgrimage Abbey of Mariazell to reflect on the mistakes of the past and to contemplate the needs of the new situation. At the close of their deliberations they adopted the watchword, "A free Church in a free society."

A free Church means that the Church must rely on itself, and only on itself. . . . Today the Church has no Emperor and no government, no party, no class, no cannon, and no capital behind Her. . . . And thus the Church goes out⁶⁷ from a dying age to meet a new epoch of social development.

Political withdrawal by the church had begun earlier. The bishops decided after the war not to revive many of the old Catholic organizations which had been very numerous and in many cases tied in with partisan political organizations. Instead

a united Catholic Action organization was created and subordinated to the direct control of the hierarchy. In political campaigns the Church gave up the practice of endorsing candidates. Nothing was said from the pulpit, for example, about the candidacy for the presidency of Adolf Schaerf, a Socialist and a non-Catholic, and it is noteworthy that Cardinal Koenig, the Archbishop of Vienna and Primate of Austria, sent Mr. Schaerf congratulations on his victory. The other side of the coin is an ecclesiastical prohibition on office-holding by Catholic priests.

Contractarian Compromise

We have defined the condition of integration, following Deutsch, as "the attainment, within a territory of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough . . . to assure . . . dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population." (See footnote 2.) All the special circumstances of the immediate postwar period we have just described contributed in a major way to the achievement of political integration in the Second Austrian Republic. But they did not produce this result immediately, nor in a direct fashion, but rather provided a favorable context or matrix from which direct integrating causes could arise and operate without hindrance.

One measure of a 'sense of community' is ideological consensus, or, if this is sometimes difficult to assess, at least the "end of ideology." This condition did not yet exist in 1945. The leaders of the time, though moderates, had very different Weltanschauungen. The Socialists were Marxists, and the Conservatives proponents of Catholic social doctrine. In their 1947 program, for example, the first redrafting of Socialist principles since 1934, Socialists identify as a class party and as "battlers for a Socialist social order." There are the usual declarations of war against capitalism, though these statements are few and general. Lacking are words about the systematic cultivation of inherited Christian values, the guarantee of religious education for children, and the conclusion of a concordat with the Vatican which figure prominently in the People's Party program. A special testimony to the fundamentally ideological mentality of the OeVP (Conservative) leaders is found in their felt need to generate a doctrine of "Solidarism," elevating cooperation with the Socialists from the level of expediency to that of principle.

Ideological differences between "Black" and "Red" in 1945 also implied very different conceptions of the meaning and values of Austria as a community, very different conceptions of Austrian identity. The Austrianism of Weinberger, Hurdes, and Figl rooted in a deeply emotional attachment to the values of the old empire. The new Austria for them would be an organic continuation of and development out of the old. They also thought of Austria in a total cultural sense, not only as a political community. Most of the Socialists, by contrast, had been cultural as well as political Pan-Germans. Their attachment to an independent Austria flowed from negative things--from the experiences of German domination during the anschluss, from the sufferings of war and concentration camp. With the exception of a few like Renner and Koerner, they had only bitter memories of the empire and

had no desire to carry on elements of its tradition. For the former Revolutionary Socialists the value of Austria was equivalent to the possibility of realizing Socialist goals within a republican frame of reference.

These differences are clearly displayed in the two parties' first programs. That of the People's Party begins with affirmative reference to the past:

The Austrian People's Party accepts the heritage of those political groups which always stood on the ground of the Austrian tradition and who defended Austria's independence.

A paragraph relating to cultural policy calls for the

systematic cultivation of the Austrian spirit with sharpest emphasis on the autonomous Austrian cultural system, rooted in the Christian-occidental ideals which we have received from our forefathers.

Immediately following is a reference to the churches and religious communities as "carriers of culture in a special way" and a demand for the protection of their cultural institutions and monuments. Another clause calls for the

continuing saturation of the education program at all levels and in all types of schools, including trade schools, with the traditions of Austrian thought (Gedankengut) and the education of the youth as unconditional Austrians.

Towards the close of the paragraph a clause demands "most intensive work in building up the Austrian nation and the formation of a strong and proud Austrian political and cultural consciousness."⁶⁸ Conservatives had finally decided to use the expression "Austrian nation" and to give it a cultural meaning.

The Socialist program makes no reference to an Austrian nation or to the cultivation of a uniquely Austrian culture, but speaks only of striving to obtain for Austria "full political sovereignty after liberation from fascist tyranny. She must be free of the occupation. She must also be free of those clauses of the Potsdam agreements which confine Austrian freedom of action." In the last paragraph a clause demands an "international guaranty of Austria's neutrality as a security for her existing borders, freedom, and independence."⁶⁹

Fundamentally different conceptions of internal political structure--Conservative federalism and Socialist centralism--are also spelled out as ideological differences in the first party programs. The Conservatives call for

an Austrian state with unified leadership based on full regard for the historical development and individuality of the states, the securing to them of the autonomy which is their due and extensive self-administration not only for the states but also for the towns and occupational corporations.

In the Socialist program, by contrast, there is a clause which calls for "strengthening of the unitary republic on a foundation of democratic self-administration in state, county, and town."⁷⁰

Former Nazis, large and small, of whom there were almost half a million in a population of seven million were disfranchised and barred from holding public office in 1945. They remained so until 1949. It is not to be supposed that though the enterprise with which they had been associated was in ruins, many of these people had been able, even if they wished, to change their fundamental orientation to the political world. And certainly their disfranchisement was not calculated to fit them into a new consensual order. Even after 1949 when their political rights were restored and they were allowed to organize as a political party (Union of Independents--today the Austrian Freedom Party) it is not to be expected that all their basic attitudes would have altered. Perhaps significant of this is that the new party's newspaper was dubbed The New Front.

In 1945 there were therefore still three distinct "camps" or Lager. There was, indeed, a general acceptance of liberal democratic procedural norms. But there had been a similar formal acceptance of these in 1918. What is important is that they were not a tradition, not built into a habitual way of acting. (Even as late as 1968 older politicians occasionally remarked to me during interview sessions: "We are not yet real democrats,"--"Wir sind noch nicht Demokraten," though I think that by then this was no longer the case.) There was therefore not yet the substance of a "political nation."

Nor was there in 1945 an established Austrian cultural community, despite the negative reaction to Germans experienced in many areas during the anschluss. Among elites it was only in certain parts of the Conservative leadership that the idea of Austria as a non-German cultural nation had been accepted. Felix Hurdes, the first Minister of Education, was a particularly zealous proponent of this view. But others, like Chancellor Julius Raab, whose administration was to achieve Austrian independence in 1955 opted for formulas such as; "German is my mother tongue, but Austria my Fatherland," which implies the "political nation"--"cultural nation" dichotomy. Socialists had not yet in the early years developed a clear idea of Austrian identity, either political or cultural, or come to terms with the concept "nation." And the former Nazis remained staunchly attached to the idea of an exclusively German nationality, though they were willing to accept the Austrian "state."

Though the integrative context of 1945 did not produce integration, either political or cultural, forthwith, it did produce something that would serve as an important shaping cause of integration in the years subsequent--a persistent will among Conservative and Socialist elites to cooperate politically. This was something which never occurred during the First Republic. Perhaps a fitting label for it is a "contractarian" spirit in the sense of the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes.⁷¹ Their mutual experience of the "state of nature", I argue, culminated in rational contractarianism, a readiness to suspend the ideological and cultural differences which all recognized to exist to escape from a state which was recognized as intolerable by all. Beginning with 1945 Austrian leaders displayed a willingness to conclude agreements in a pragmatic manner, to reach compromises for the solution of pressing common problems, while remaining conscious of deep differences in principle, different visions of the good society (Leitbilder). While unable to forget past battles and wounds inflicted and received, unable to trust the other party fully to abide by the new rules, each nevertheless felt compelled to stay within those rules in its own behavior.

Rupert Emerson has written in an essay on political development that "society derives . . . not from a contract but from natural and organic growth."⁷² But it is precisely the concept of rational contract which was the foundation of the Second Austrian Republic. The agents of the new "social contract" were primarily the two major political parties of the First Republic which had maintained a shadow life in illegality during the seven years of anschluss. The overarching legal order, the Constitution of the Second Republic, was in the first instance a contract among the parties. The signatories of the Declaration of Independence of April 27, 1945 were the members of the executive committees of the parties who also constituted the personnel of the provisional regime which reactivated the Federal Constitutional Law of the First Republic as it stood on March 5, 1933, just prior to the Dollfuss coup.

The first elections to the National Assembly of the Second Republic, held in November of 1945, produced an absolute majority for the People's Party. But Chancellor Leopold Figl chose not to govern alone and invited the Socialists to join a coalition government. It would have been unsafe for the Conservatives in an ideologically divided society to have viewed their majority as concurrent, as a cross section of the whole. Parliamentary elections could not serve as consensus-building or consensus-declaring processes. They tallied instead the strength of opposing armies. If the opposition of these armies was not to eventuate in catastrophic conflict, if they had to be brought to agreement, this could only be by a procedure resembling a continuous treaty or contract negotiation, by a constant conclave of their chiefs, resolving issues by compromise and by unanimous decision--by a "Great Coalition" which was to last for twenty years. As one writer puts it:

Leopold Figl's decision to abjure one-party rule . . . gave people the clearest demonstration that through common effort, without divisive party barriers lay the only chance to make Austria capable of sustaining life again. He prevented thereby that dangerous gulf between the two large parties which had so often convulsed the First Republic.⁷³

For the whole period from 1945 to 1966 the two great parties renewed their agreement to cooperate following each parliamentary election by signing a pact of coalition (Koalitionspakt) by which they divided between them the offices of state at the ministerial level and by which they established a rule for conducting policy-making for the ensuing legislative period. Included in this was a unanimity rule. A system of proportionalism (Proporz) was adopted for staffing government corporations and for the administration of nationalized industries. Each party's share was made proportionate to its electoral strength. The party in control of a particular ministry was given the major voice in appointments in his department, but shared authority with the other party at the top. With a "Black" minister was paired a "Red" state secretary, and vice versa. Another "Proporz"-like feature developed in the pairing of a "Black" Chancellor with a "Red" President during the entire life of the Coalition. While the electorate consistently returned a larger number of Conservatives than Socialists to the National Assembly, they just as consistently chose a Socialist as Chief of State at every Presidential election.

Fruits of Contractarian Problem-solving

The economic policies produced by the elaborate contractual system which was the Great Coalition demonstrated within ten years that micro-Austria was, after all, economically viable. As a semi-official publication states it:

The task which Austria has accomplished in the ten years between 1945 and 1955 on the way from chaos to order, from the misery of war to the construction of peace, can be described in a single brief sentence: the tiny land has demonstrated its viability (Lebensfaehigkeit).

Within the next ten years Austria had become an affluent society, a Wohlstandstaat.

The last years of the war and the first of the occupation had played havoc with the economy. By 1947 industrial production stood at 61.7% of that for 1937, the last pre-anschluss year. Agricultural production was at about the same level. Gross national product was just under 71% of that of 1937. In three short years, however, industrial production was up to 147% of the 1937 level and agriculture, recovering more slowly, to 94.1%. Gross national produce was 120.6%. From then on it has been a steady climb upward, with the 50's and early 60's in particular showing a fantastic expansion. By 1963 industrial production was at 342% of the 1937 level, agriculture at 128.5% and gross national product at 232.1%. Since 1963 the expansion has been more measured, but still noteworthy. Pragmatic politics within a contractarian context of suspended ideological warfare--the context of the Great Coalition--had thus within a twenty year period produced the full flowering of the modern industrial state in Austria.

Accompanying the completion of industrialization was measured demographic change. From 1951 to 1961, Vienna's population stabilized and actually increased by .7%. Lower Austria and the Burgenland declined by less than 2%. And the greatest population spurt in the growing areas was 16.9% in the Vorarlberg. Elsewhere increases were only between slightly more than 2 and slightly more than 8%. The same measured pace has been maintained since 1961 according to available statistics. From 1961 to 1967, the year after the end of Coalition government, Vienna increased by .6%. Lower Austria and the Burgenland were virtually static. Vorarlberg showed once more the greatest growth rate--15%. Increases elsewhere ranged from 3.5 to 10.2%.

The widely-scattered new urban centers which compete with Vienna for population and economic power contribute to a balance in Austrian life in more ways than by merely furnishing that competition. Their equal distribution and the network of communications which link them up with one another have put the remaining rural areas under urban influence. No part of the country is now more than two hours distant by car from an urban center. The goods and services of the city flow out through the countryside to the smallest village. The villager meets the city dweller constantly on holiday, listens to and watches the radio and television programs which emanate from the city, buys the newspapers published in the city. The old parochial ways have begun to break down even in the most out of the way rural places.

Another bridge between urban and rural consists in the commuting workers. In 1961 one-fifth of the Austrian work force were employed in an area distant from their place of residence. These are for the most part persons who are unable to make a living tilling their unproductive small farms and so contract to be brought by the busload daily to a neighboring urban center where they pursue all day an industrial occupation and in the evening are returned to their village.

Little empirical work has been done on social change in Austria. Such evidence as we have, however, indicates emerging social patterns which are the logical correlates of the processes of political and economic modernization which we have been describing. Austrian society is becoming more and more middle class in fact and in mentality. Status rests on education and income as standards of achievement rather than on an ascriptive basis, and intergenerational vertical mobility is on the increase.

A detailed study of social stratification subjectively perceived was done in Vienna in 1967 by the Institute for Empirical Social Research (IFES).⁸⁰ The method used was a random sample survey of 1250 persons selected from street address lists. 1022 usable interviews were produced. No weighting was required in the evaluation of the results since it turned out that the distribution of respondents according to such characteristics as age, sex, occupation, education, and income agreed very closely with the distribution reported in the last census.

When asked to rank themselves socially on a scale of six social strata the majority of the sample placed themselves either in the middle stratum or in the lower middle stratum. The polar extremes of upper stratum and lower stratum were equally thinly populated. Subjective rankings were not fully identical with objective rankings according to occupation, education and income, though a distinct correlation was found. Subjective ranking by income produced a noticeably lower stratification and ranking by social performance (*Leistung*) a significantly higher stratification than the one based on general considerations. Education and occupation played a primary role in determining social performance, and the possession of prestige goods such as autos a secondary one.

It is interesting to note that when the respondents were asked to rank themselves in terms of a class model of society the old ways of thought were found still to prevail. Forty-five percent of the sample identified as members of the working class, an identification which in comparable American studies met with total rejection. (The choices in the class model were "great bourgeoisie"

(Grossbuergertum), "intelligentsia," "small Bourgeoisie" (Kleinbuergertum), and "working class"). This is no doubt a result of the continued strong Socialist allegiance of the Viennese worker and of his continued indoctrination with traditional concepts by the organs of the highly organized Socialist Party in which he spends so much of his time. That the working class identity is becoming a vestigial remain, however, as an indicator of social division and political polarization, is attested by the clustering at the center of the "stratum" model. The new reality of growing social and political homogeneity is expressed when a new vocabulary is used. Consonant with this conclusion were the survey's findings on feelings of discontent with the status quo. While the lowest strata of the sample expressed a broad sense of injustice, this was vague, poorly articulated and poorly focussed, without specific and clear goals. Acute and focussed material dissatisfaction was expressed by the upper half of the middle stratum, especially by academicians and persons with what corresponds to a junior college degree in the United States (Maturanten). "The stable element of our society," concludes the IFES study at this point, "is the broad middle stratum with its tendency to entertain an unduly grand image of itself and to display a somewhat philistine self satisfaction."⁸¹

The survey found considerable evidence of upward mobility, which fits well with other evidence of the emergence of an open modern democratic society in Austria. Old established Viennese families were found to have no clear social advantage. New arrivals in Vienna tend to enter at the lower levels but rise relatively quickly thereafter to higher positions. It is interesting to note that persons from Western Austria constitute an especially large element among the Viennese elite. It was after the Second World War, the survey found, that the old class barriers began significantly to loosen up. Before that they had been quite rigid. Women from working class families, it was found, tend to rise more easily than men. Persisting immobility was found to derive chiefly from educational deficiencies and from lack of desire for educational opportunity.

We have no comparable data for other Austrian cities. But it seems fairly certain that if Vienna, the chief center of social discord and of ideological politics in the past, is moving toward a more open and equal society that the same trend will be found in the newer and more vigorous cities of Western Austria.

We shall try to show in the subsequent section that the economic development accomplished during the years of contractarian government and the demographic and social changes ^{accompanying it} were responsible in a major way for the healthy political integration which has been evident in the experience of the last few years. These effects were, however, gradual, and have appeared slowly and by parts. Another accomplishment of the Coalition years in the area of economic order, which bore almost immediate fruits for political integration, was the extensive program of nationalization carried out during 1946 and 1947.

The action has been described by one scholar as an historical accident, since it could not have been deduced from the principles of the Conservatives. Nor were the industries affected chosen according to a rational scheme of priorities within the Grand Plan of the Socialists.⁸² The object of the nationalization laws of 1946 and 1947 was to prevent the occupying powers from confiscating the vast economic plant which the Germans had created or acquired in Austria during the anschluss years. According to the Potsdam Accords all of this property was subject to seizure as reparation for war losses of the Allies.

Seventy-one enterprises were nationalized. These included iron and coal mines, the iron and steel industry, aluminum, oil, electric power, transport, machine tools, shipbuilding, electronics, nonferrous metals and organic chemicals. Also nationalized were the country's leading banks.

A large portion of the new public economic empire came under Socialist control after the parliamentary election of 1949 when the People's Party lost its absolute majority, which was due in part to the restoration of the franchise to the former Nazis. This vote went heavily to the newly-founded Party of Independents (Wahlpartei der Unabhaengigen--W.d.U) (489,273 ballots) and netted sixteen seats in Parliament for the new party. The OeVP representation was reduced to seventy-seven and the SPOe to sixty-seven. Though fewer in numbers the SPOe was in a relatively stronger position than earlier vis a vis the OeVP and was able to demand control of the nationalized industries. Except for the banks, which were made the province of the "Black" controlled Finance Ministry, these were at first placed under⁸³ the supervision of the Socialist Minister of Transport, Karl Waldbrunner.

The complex of large concerns, employing nearly 300,000 persons, was soon dubbed the "Waldbrunner Kingdom." The Socialist Party had become a vested interest in the state. "In place of the dialectician of the inter-war period, such as Otto Bauer had been, "writes one scholar of the Socialist metamorphosis, "the political manager, the party official and the technocrat stepped into the foreground."⁸⁴ The present Socialist Leader, Bruno Kreisky, is quoted as having⁸⁵ said of Waldbrunner that "in his view the human species begins with the engineer.

From 1945 the top positions in the bureaucracy were staffed by the system of proportionality (Proporz) we have already described. In 1956 the Proporz was adopted also for the control of the nationalized industries. This sort of arrangement at the top naturally led to the development of an extensive patronage system down through the lower levels of organization, and the party rank and file on both sides were well taken care of.

The system of Proporz unquestionably had negative effects--by creating widespread dependence on one's party for one's job it appeared a factor making for the perpetuation of the Lager aspect of Austrian society. It led also to all kinds of inefficiency and corruption. The Editor of the German magazine Spiegel, in an article attacking the coalition system in Austria on the eve of its adoption in Bonn, characterized "Proporzocracy" as follows:

In Austria today . . . everyone knows what color his neighbor is. The engineer in a nationalized steel factory is generally a Red, the member of the Army General Staff a Black. The traffic cop is switched to red, the country school teacher sees black. If an Austrian lives in public housing built by the city of Vienna he almost certainly has a Red party book. If he lives in a dwelling⁸⁶ subsidized by the Ministry of Trade he pays dues to the Blacks.

The number of party members on each side of the Great Coalition became extremely large. In 1965 there were 716,000 card-carrying Socialists and 600,000 Conservatives, figures which contrast sharply with the 690,000 Socialists and 385,000

Christian Democrats of ⁸⁷the German Federal Republic, which has a population eight times that of Austria.

On the other hand, the system of Proporz combined with the extensive nationalizations had important positive results for political community in Austria. By giving the Socialist working class a large stake in the politico-social order it won them over to Austria. Evidence of the change is found in the appearance during the 1950s of a Socialist literature of commitment to Austria, a literature which continues to grow during the '60s. Survey research shows in fact that Socialists of the Second Republic are the most Austrian-minded of all segments of the population. A study of Austrian national consciousness was carried out in November 1964 and during the summer of 1965 by the Social Science Studies Society⁸⁸, a small Viennese research organization affiliated with the Socialist Party. Respondents were asked to select from the following four statements the one with which they most agreed:

1. Austrians are a nation.
2. Austrians are not a nation.
3. Austrians are beginning slowly to feel that they are a nation.
4. Don't know

79.52% of the Socialist respondents selected either alternative one or alternative three, a total of five percentage points higher than the proportion of Conservatives who opted for these alternatives. A study done for me by the Austrian Gallup Institute in March and April 1966 yielded very similar results.

Political leaders are also aware of the new Austrianism of the workers and connect its development with the work of the coalition. Bruno Kreisky, the present leader of the Socialist Party, in talking to me about the causes of working class patriotism mentioned the Coalition second ("The Coalition has strengthened identification with the state.")⁸⁹ Oskar Pollak, a former Bauer Socialist and Editor of the Arbeiter Zeitung for many years in the Second Republic, writes of "the incorporation of the working class into the state" and of "their integration in the nation." He uses the expression "the nationalization or socialization (Nationalisierung oder die Verstaatlichung) of the labor movement." Hermann Withalm, Conservative Vice Chancellor of Austria and Secretary General of the OeVP told me in very emphatic tones that "the greatest service of the Coalition was that 95% of the Austrian people, and especially the working class, are today enthusiastic Austrians." "The great service of the Coalition was the integration of the workers in the Fatherland. The workers are now for Austria."⁹¹

Even a critical appraisal of Proporz by Guenther Nenning, one of Austria's leading contemporary intellectuals, contains indirect (and I think unintentional) mention of the positive results of the system. Nenning writes:

With contemptible seriousness many young people, when they are selecting a career, ponder the question of which organization within the almighty, all-nourishing black-red state party they ought promptly to join.⁹²

The interesting thing is that he speaks in this passage of the two erstwhile ideological opponents as one "black-red state party." There is also the question of how truly divisive a system can be which reduces party allegiance to terms of pure material advantage.

Socialist identification with the Second Republic is by no means wholly an unconscious and unintended byproduct of status, power, and well-being achieved. The word "national" is sometimes very self-consciously manipulated by Socialist leaders to defend specific values. Former Vice Chancellor Bruno Pittermann, for example, in recent years has taken to speaking of the nationalized industries as Nationalindustrien rather than as Verstaatlichte Industrien, the original and more usual expression, and the expression employed in the nationalization laws of 1946 and 1947. In a discussion at the People's College in the working class Viennese district of Brigittenau early in 1965 Dr. Pittermann was asked why lately he had switched to the new formula. He answered that the industries in question belonged to the Austrian nation and then turned the matter back⁹³ on the interrogator by asking whether he had something against the Austrian nation. A young Conservative who has a strong emotional attachment to the idea of an Austrian nation interpreted Pittermann's language as a ploy to protect the industries in question from a possible privatization sometime in the future. As my respondent saw it, "Verstaatlichte Industrie" has the connotation of an industry which underwent change to public ownership at a particular time. The implication is that it could legitimately be privatized again. "Nationalindustrie" implies permanence, for it would be illegitimate to privatize a possession of the nation. There might also have been a purely emotional-patriotic motive in Pittermann's usage. "Nationalindustrie" means⁹⁴ definitely not-German industry, and there is much German capital in Austria). It is interesting that the discussion in Brigittenau occurred a little more than a year before the election which produced a Conservative majority and the end of the Coalition.

Nationalization, then, in the context of Coalition and "Proporzocracy" seems to have been one of the important contributions of the twenty-year Coalition to the development of political community among Austrians.

Integration Through Political Socialization

It may be doubted that nations any more than individuals can live by bread alone. The processes of contractarian problem-solving, working within a context of fortunate historical "givens" which produced economic well-being through the development of a mature industrial state did little to supply meaning and purpose as well. Another achievement of the Coalition which deserves more extensive treatment than is possible here, and which served both interest and the need for meaning was the enactment of neutrality legislation at the time sovereignty was achieved by the State Treaty of 1955. Contrary to Austria's ambiguous position from 1918 to 1938 her present neutral role, which presupposes her continued political and territorial stability, seems to be in the interests of everyone. For the United States and her allies it provides a useful buffer and a listening post at an important confluence of communications networks between the free west and the countries of the Iron Curtain, and to the Russians and their allies it has a similar utility. As a consequence of this mutuality of interest between the great power blocs, Austria herself has an important stake in her continued

neutrality and independence. Austria's neutrality, therefore, gives a national purpose and allows her to play once more the role of mediator and bridge which was for so long an aspect of the ideology which legitimated the old empire.

The most important contributions to meaning and purpose, however, have been the work of a variety of institutions, working to begin with within the contractarian framework but aiming at supplanting it with a consensual order. These include the citizenship education program of the Ministry of Education, its projects for the rewriting of Austrian history in generally-agreed categories, citizenship programs for the Laender, the psychological defense program for both military and civilians sponsored by the Army, and political socialization work, both direct and indirect of the Federal Youth Council and its member organizations.

Also of some significance in this work are quasi-public institutions like the Austria Institute (Oesterreich Institut), which is in part privately funded and in part subsidized by the government. The Institute's program is four-fold: 1) to intensify state consciousness by supplying an intellectual foundation for the Austrian state, 2) to cultivate the growth of democratic ideals in Austria, 3) to develop creativeness among Austrians, and 4) to establish contacts among persons sympathetic to Austrian culture abroad and to arrange cultural exchanges. The Institute participates in cultural congresses and sponsors scholarly research and a variety of scholarly publications. Its Director, Hofrat Dr. Richard Dolberg, has a research interest in the structures and functions of small and medium-sized states and in the problems of neutrality. Another such organization is the Institute for Austrian Information (Oesterreichkunde) which sponsors scholarly work in history, literature, and geography. Its purpose is to "fashion a solid foundation for¹⁹⁵ an image of Austria as a possession for the Austrian youth of the decades ahead." Both these institutions carry forward work begun in the nineteenth century by Josef von Hormayr and J. A. von Helfert, which we mentioned earlier in this paper.

Space does not permit a detailed description in this paper of the work of these agencies of self-conscious political socialization. In the long run their efforts will probably prove to have considerable importance, but the development is a subtle one and difficult to measure by comparison with the impact on⁹⁶ integration of economic growth and the social changes associated with it.

The function of this complex of institutions is analogous to that of the Fatherland Front--the direct inculcation of national ideals and a spirit of patriotism. But they operate in the free context of a liberal democracy instead of as the propaganda arm of an authoritarian government. Both the Conservative and Socialist Parties have participated in and supported the work of all the organizations we have mentioned. The citizenship programs of the Education Ministry and of the Army, however, have been shaped largely by Conservatives over a twenty-five year period. The two quasi-public agencies have also been dominated by Conservatives.

Only occasionally have there been Conservative-Socialist differences in the area of socialization policy. The establishment of an Austrian National Foundation (Nationalstiftung) which was pushed by a faction within the Conservative Party for several years in the early sixties and for which legislation had been prepared was turned down by the Socialists after the Conservatives came to power as a one-party government following the electoral revolution of 1965. I was

told by Socialist leaders in 1968 that they feared it might become a "Black" propaganda weapon. Before that, however, there had been considerable controversy about the projected Foundation within the Conservative Party itself, between a highly ideological group which is attached to the idea of Austria as a cultural nation and pragmatist leaders who feared the Foundation might alienate Pan-German voters whose support has been assiduously cultivated by both parties down through the years. Similarly, some of the socialization work of the Education Ministry has been more of a bone of contention among Conservatives than between the major parties. For example, when shortly after the war Minister Hurdes issued a directive that school teachers use the expression "language of instruction" rather than the word "German" in the classroom he was lampooned by pragmatists as an advocate of teaching a new language--"Hurdestani."

The small Freedom Party (5 parliamentary delegates) which is the rallying point of the most extreme German national groups and die-hard former Nazis, since it did not participate in the Great Coalition has had little to say about political socialization programs carried out by official institutions. And youth organizations under its aegis and those with an ideological affinity to it do not participate in the Federal Youth Council. During the debate on legislation which established Austria's first national holiday in 1965, an important symbolic event, the Freedom Party delegates employed diversionary and disruptive parliamentary tactics, but ended up voting for the government's draft. They objected in particular to the expression "National" rather than "State" holiday. (The day chosen was October 26th, when the last occupation troops were withdrawn and Austria's neutrality proclaimed. The choice was a compromise between the Conservatives' preference of May 15th, the signing of the State Treaty and the Socialists' preferred date of November 12th, the founding of the First Republic. October 26th had for years, however, been a holiday for school children called "The Day of the Flag", which was inaugurated by the "Black" Education Ministry.)

Beyond the area of cooperative political socialization, and in a fashion defining the limits of general agreement, a variety of private individuals carry on a running public debate about Austrian meaning and purpose, which focusses on the expression "The Austrian Nation." The volume of this literature has been particularly heavy since 1955, when external pressures were relaxed with the establishment of sovereignty. Much of it appears in the pages of the scholarly journals published by the quasi-public information agencies described above, and in a privately owned literary journal Forum, whose editor, Guenther Nenning, invites contributions from representatives of all ideological persuasions. He sees his personal role and that of the journal as a synthesizing one.

Most of the participants in the literary debate about the "Austrian nation" are either political outsiders or men who stand on the fringes of one or another of the political parties. Some are academicians, others freelancers, others well-known figures in the literary world. Only in a few instances has an official party spokesman taken part in the discussion. The leaders of the two parties who run the system usually manifest little interest in the debate, and, indeed, try to ignore it when they can. They treat the intellectuals of their party affiliation as poor relations, sometimes as nuisances. A few of the younger participants in the dialogue are integrated in the political system and enjoy places of responsibility in the party bureaucracies. FPOE leaders actively

participate in the polemic. Some of the intellectuals are associated in opinion pressure groups, such as the Austrian National Institute (not to be confused with the Austria Institute) or the Austrian Society. The leading newspapers both in Vienna and in the provinces frequently lend their letters-to-the-editor columns to the purposes of the debate and editorialize themselves on the question of the "Austrian nation." A few well-known intellectuals, like Nenning, have tried to play the role of arbiter and work out a synthesis of the main positions, but the debate goes on, apparently without end. The crux of it is the question--is Austria simply a political nation or a cultural nation as well?

Political Integration as End Product

We have described the background circumstances of the Second Republic and the active processes--political, economic, social, ideological--which for twenty-five years have been operating to convert the initial contractarian situation into a consensual one. We are now ready to measure the degree of political integration which has been achieved and to estimate the major causes which have produced it.

The State Treaty was the high water mark of effective policy by the Coalition. After the achievement of this paramount success in 1955 the Coalition began to decay as a workable form of government. It became ever more difficult for the partners to reach a meeting of minds. Compromises were no longer forthcoming, and unresolved problems began to pile up. Paradoxically, its greatest achievement was to be the source of the Coalition's doom. For the pressures of foreign occupation, which had made the system work by coercing ill-matched partners into cooperative effort, were at an end. A legacy, however, remained. Personal friendships had developed across party lines which could turn ideological specters into mere men. Each party had also learned from the give and take of daily common effort to trust the other to abide by the ground rules of the democratic game. And by 1966 a new kind of elite and a new kind of voter had emerged to work a peaceful revolution in Austrian politics by carrying the system out of the stagnating coalition into the normal form of parliamentary government, with a single ruling party balanced by a loyal opposition. The contract of government as daily policy-making would cease to have the form of treaty negotiations and would become instead the electoral mandate of a consensual society to a single party, a mandate based on the assessment of programs of competing party elites. Alfred Maleta, a Conservative leader, shrewdly observed in 1965 that the Coalition had "created out of a sheer will to cooperate a habit of democratic politics, a democratic tradition."

When the Volkspartei took power in 1966 as a one-party government the head of their strategy-planning bureau was sent to London to confer with the English Conservatives. He carried with him to the mecca of parliamentary democracy a large notebook filled with questions about how one-party government is run. This is a testimony to the rational and moderate spirit with which the Austrian Conservatives embarked on their new role. Instead of concentrating on collecting the spoils of victory the triumphant party was most interested to play the new game precisely according to the book. Learning and abiding by the rules of democratic politics was their first concern. There was to be no repetition of the debacle of 1934.

Great caution was exhibited by the Conservatives in the staffing of the ministries. The sensitive Ministry of Justice was given to a politically neutral Professor of Law instead of to a powerful party chief with an organized interest behind him. Chosen to head the Foreign Ministry was another person known more for his expertise than as a feudal lord of the Conservative baronage. A woman who had been deputy chairman of the third largest union in Austria, and therefore a person with a point of view close to that of the Socialists, was given the Ministry of Social Affairs, another former Socialist province. The government's statement of policy contained in addition a prominent commitment to constitutional government and the efficient administration of justice.

On the other side, the Socialists also exercised prudence in the new situation. Die Presse, a leading Vienna daily, reported: "SPOe operates cautiously in its opposition role," in a headline of its report of the National Assembly debate on the program of the new government.⁹⁸ The Socialists announced that they would exercise a strict oversight of the government's activities, but that they were prepared to negotiate all technical and pragmatic questions. Bruno Kreisky, who became leader in January 1967, made it clear at the beginning of his leadership that he intended to conduct a constructive rather than an obstructive opposition, and preached to his party friends that they ought not to demand from the Conservative government things which⁹⁹ were they to hold the reins of power, could not be accomplished by Socialists.

During the four legislative years from 1966 to 1970 the SPOe played its opposition role precisely as Kreisky prescribed. The Government's program was vigorously criticized in parliamentary debates and in the public media. The question period was extensively used, and Socialist alternatives to proposed Government legislation were placed before the National Assembly. At the same time the Socialists avoided obstructive tactics both in and out of Parliament, and at the close of debate they frequently voted for Government measures in important policy areas.

Majority and minority worked together well in the parliamentary committees. Especially from 1967 on, opposition speakers hardly ever complained that the Conservatives were inconsiderately railroading their proposals through the committee stage. And Conservative committee members seemed to have lost their anxiety about accepting minor changes offered by Socialists in Government drafts. Outstanding differences between Government and Opposition were treated more and more by the Socialists as simply differences of opinion about the most effective way to resolve commonly-acknowledged problems and Socialists ceased to pillory¹⁰⁰ the Conservatives at every turn of the road as ill-willed lackeys of big business.

The men who operated the new system of Government and Opposition were not the same as those who constructed and presided over the earlier "Great Coalition" for the first fifteen years of its life. They differed markedly from them in background, temperament, outlook, and political style. The difference was especially marked on the Conservative side, less noticeable among the Socialists, in whom it appeared later.

Among the Conservatives a new leadership group replaced the founding "Core Group" (Kernkreis) between 1960 and 1963. They had already achieved an identity as "Reformers", whom one of their number defined as persons who do "not like to do politics with a wineglass, but rather with a slide-rule in the hand."¹⁰¹ They have no use for ideology--either the Natural Law doctrines or the "Solidarist"

dogmas of their predecessors--and their style is that of the rational manager. Their chief norm is efficiency, not compromise--in vote getting, coalition building, problem-solving. This has led them to extend the open hand of reconciliation to the former Nazis in order to swell their electoral ranks to the proportions of a winning coalition.

The emotional bond made up of penance and common suffering which the founding "Core Group" felt for the Socialists is entirely lacking in the Reformers. Nearly all are a generation younger than the members of the founding group and were not confined in concentration camps. They are critical of Julius Raab for yielding too frequently to Socialist demands in his last years. The conversion of the OeVP into a Liberally oriented pragmatic coalition has eliminated much of the language of Christian Social idealism from party program announcements, but without excluding that idealism from an influence on party policy. The old traditions are maintained in modernized form by a cluster of bright young intellectuals who are found for the most part in the ranks of the labor component of the party. And in the apparatus of the General Secretariat one also finds a number of bright young men whose daily work is to maintain an efficient party organization which can win elections, but whose goals and aspirations for Austria are stated in terms of Christian Social idealism. These men represent a rather remarkable synthesis of the basically ideological mentality of the "Core Group" and the pragmatic "Reformer." Unlike both of these, they are consensualist democrats by nature rather than men who have learned the politics of democratic compromise the hard way.

The same kind of change has occurred on the Socialist side. The revivers of the Socialist Party though moderates and gradualists were committed Marxist "true believers." But in 1957 another kind of leader, the pure pragmatist began to appear on the scene. One writer describes Bruno Pittermann, the man chosen to replace Adolph Schärf as Vice Chancellor in the Coalition regime as "in the first line a tactician of power, for whom ideological battles mean little."¹⁰² Bruno Kreisky, the present leader, also rose to the first echelon of power in 1957. Though a Revolutionary Socialist in the mid-30s, he came home after the war committed to a non-Marxist, purely pragmatic Swedish version of Socialism. And like Pittermann he has worked very hard to establish good relations between his party and the Catholic Church.

Men of this intellectual cut were fittingly backed up by managerial and technocratic types in other branches of the Socialist leadership. The establishment of Socialist power positions in the extensive nationalized industries had long before brought men of this kind forward. But unlike the "Reformers" of the People's Party, the non-Marxist pragmatists were not able undisputably to obtain the upper hand in the years after 1959. Classical Marxism remained prominently represented among top leaders. And down through the ranks of the party apparatus orthodox Marxism continued to be the "true church." Seeing only one another in their daily party work, and socializing exclusively in party circles, the party functionary lived in a closed ideological world which in every way reinforced his ideological outlook and in no way leavened it with outside influences.¹⁰³

It seems clear that the reason the Conservatives rather than the Socialists won a majority in 1966 when a "switcher" element, capable of upsetting the Coalition system, had appeared for the first time in the electorate was because they had to a

greater extent than the Socialists abandoned ideology in favor of a pure pragmatism. Organizational reforms had also deprived the Viennese Party of its former virtual monopoly of leadership power and distributed it more equally to the Conservative elite of the Laender. The Socialists continued, however, to maintain a highly centralized structure based in Vienna, with ineffective communications with the leaders and grass roots of the Laender in the south and west. The Conservatives won the election because their image was more modern and forward-looking than the Socialists. Changing Austria wanted change in the coalition system which had earned a reputation after 1956 for stalemate, inefficiency and corruption and appeared to be a hopelessly outdated instrument of further progress. And it was the Conservatives who saw this and adapted to it. During the campaign, without calling for one-party government they had promised a search for "new forms of cooperation" which would give a majority party, which they sought to become, more freedom to act than the old system based on a "coalition pact" by which the partners renounced all freedom of action. The Socialists had continued to sanction the coalition system. A Socialist analyst, reflecting on the disaster of the election, wrote that the "most unsettling and most decisive aspect of the defeat for the future of the Socialist movement "was" the fact that the People's Party succeeded to a greater degree than our party in winning the support of the young voters, whom in the past our party always led." They had acquired the image of being "a party more suited to youth and more modern than ours" (The 400,000 new voters had gone overwhelmingly into the Conservative column.)¹⁰³ Another remarked that "the young voters cannot be reached with the traditions, resentments, and arguments out of the history of the First Republic." He warned that the party could no longer count on strong, serried ranks of disciplined voters who could not be moved by the arguments of the opposition. "The so-called class character of the parties" he claimed "had become at least partially an illusion." "Socialism" wrote another "will come to power in this country only if it can learn to open up ideologically (geistig)".¹⁰⁴

This is just what Socialism proceeded to do in the years after the shattering defeat of 1966. Changes were made in the party statutes to increase the representation of the provincial party organizations in both the Presidium and Executive Committee of the Party. This meant an automatic pragmatization, since Socialists in the Laender had never been dogmatic Marxists. Another reform was the establishment of an essentially apolitical technical braintrust to advise the leadership on economic policy, something the Conservatives had created before 1966. The upshot of the work of the experts was an economic program "For a Modern Austria" with which the SPOe went to the electorate in 1970. Its provisions represented a clear and absolute break with the dogmas of Austro-Marxism. A socialism concerned primarily with distribution was repudiated in favor of one which gave first place to economic growth, and whose chief aim was to make Austria a modern industrial state after the "Swedish Way." A carefully worked out program of investments was drawn up, which included efforts to attract foreign capital. Even the legitimacy and importance of capitalist profit was recognized, and a commitment was undertaken to increase the taxes of the little man if necessary to protect economic growth by avoiding a too sharply progressive tax. In addition, the dialogue with the Catholic Church was expanded. And Kreisky has gone on record as saying that he sees the Catholic Church as the only institution capable of mobilizing the moral forces remaining in Austria, and therefore of central importance for the maintenance of a healthy and stable society.

On March 1, 1970, with almost 90% of the eligible electorate voting the Socialists won 48.4% of the total vote. Conservatives 44.7% and the Freedom Party 5.4%. It is significant that the greatest Socialist increases were in the western Laender. The distribution of the vote for the first time in the history of the Second Republic gave the Socialists a plurality of seats--81--with the Conservatives taking second place (also for the first time) with 79. It seemed clear that large numbers of the 96,000 new voters, enfranchised by a law dropping the eligibility age to 18, had voted Socialist. Post-election analysis also showed that one-fifth of the Socialist gain could be attributed to upper middle class defections from the OeVP.¹⁰⁵

Otto Schulmeister, the Editor of Conservative-leaning Die Presse wrote on March 3rd: "This newspaper wanted an absolute majority for Klaus, and if not Klaus, Kreisky. The electoral law wanted it otherwise. Now we must make the best of the situation."¹⁰⁶ The situation produced after six weeks of negotiations a new one-party government. The Great Coalition could not be revived and Mr. Kreisky decided to try his luck as the head of a minority government. One of his first acts as Chancellor was to pay a call on Cardinal Koenig, the Austrian Primate and to instruct his Finance Minister to study ways of making church contributions exempt under promised tax reforms. The Industrialists' Association, a chief financial support of the Conservative Party, gave out the word that Kreisky's minority government should be given a chance to govern. Austria had entered upon a new phase of consensus politics.¹⁰⁷

The restructuring of the polity from contractarian coalition to consensual one-party government is probably the clearest evidence we have of achieved political integration. Relevant also as a measure of integration is the extent to which leaders and followers have developed a sense of Austria as a distinctive political community. Elite interviews carried out in 1966 and 1968 and mass opinion surveys carried out in the 50s and 60s provide evidence on this question and also indicate what Austrians see as the causes of their final success in the politics of integration.

During the period from September 1965 to August 1966 and during the month of June 1968 I talked with approximately one hundred Austrian leaders, using a semi-structured, open-ended approach. My respondents were for the most part from the upper and middle ranges of the political elite--top leaders and key functionaries of the two major parties and civil servants at the Federal and State level. The rest were idea-makers and communicators--academicians, writers, journalists, persons in radio and television.¹⁰⁸

At the tops of the hierarchies of the two major parties I found very similar views of the "Austrian nation." Leaders on both sides emphasized the political aspects of nationality and they saw popular acceptance of Austria as a political nation as complete. As chief causes of this evolution they cited the happy postwar escape from partition into East and West, the unhappy experience of the anschluss, and in particular the success of the postwar coalition in refuting the myth of economic non-viability by creating an affluent society. Former Chancellor Josef Klaus, a Conservative, spoke of a "feeling of having found our own way. . . independent and self-reliant, though small." Self-conscious public discussion of the "nation" concept and the direct propagation of the idea of

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Austria as a nation, especially as a "cultural nation" they see at best/irrelevant and uninteresting and at worst as divisive. National consciousness, said former Chancellor Klaus, would not come from "flowery speeches about the Austrian nation." "It is better to act than to talk" said Conservative Secretary General Withalm. The public discussion of the "Austrian nation" among the intellectuals, said Socialist Leader and now Chancellor Kreisky "is entirely peripheral."

The idea of uniqueness is surely an essential part of the concept of nationality. Yet none of four respondents, two from the summit of each of the major parties, had much to say about the specific content of Austrianism, the things which make Austrians different, unique. Reflections of this kind intellectualize the concept "nation" too much for the pragmatist. National feeling for him is the unthinking acceptance of the political community and the regime which derives from satisfactions produced by the efficient processing of bread and butter issues. As one of them put it, "most people don't think about what a nation is."

Opinion is somewhat differently structured at the middle-range level of elite opinion, by which I mean here principal functionaries of the central apparatus of the major parties. Another scholar who has directed an extensive survey of Austrian elites asserts that a leading characteristic of the middle range political elite as a whole, to which central party functionaries belong, is a highly ideological attitude which contrasts sharply with the pragmatism of their masters.¹⁰⁹ These people, he asserts, are carriers of the Lager mentality which historically has been a major factor in keeping Austria a divided society.

My own research indicates that this generalization does not obtain for the sub-group of central functionaries without important qualifications. For one thing, it is important to distinguish between idealism and ideologism. Interest in normative abstractions is perfectly consistent with community and consensus. Only when those abstractions are battle cries which distinguish "us" from "them", the faithful from the infidel (or heretic) do they produce ideologism. While my interviews indicated a higher interest in abstract value ideas among central functionaries than among the top leaders, many of the functionaries appeared as consensual idealists, not ideologists. The consensual idealists (mostly men in their early '30s) all embraced the idea of Austria as a cultural nation. My ideologists (generally men in their forties and fifties) did not have a common attitude toward the Austrian nation, except that they tended to view the concept more as a political weapon, rather than as the symbol of a reality which demands recognition because it is real. Their image of it as a weapon, however, did not extend beyond an instrument of electoral manipulation in the give and take of democratic politics.

In the various Laender or states which make up the federal republic of Austria I also had the opportunity to interview both top and middle-range political elites. I spoke with Governors, Lieutenant Governors, cultural officers, press officers, members of the national parliament, state legislators, and secretaries of the state party organizations. My conversations revealed some marked differences between these people on the "Austrian nation" and the ideas of national leaders and central party officials with whom I spoke in Vienna.

Few of my provincial respondents were ready to apply the "nation" concept to Austria in any of its meanings. They obviously had not assimilated the delimited Western European idea of the "political nation," as many of the pragmatist national leaders have. Nor did they seem familiar with the "political nation" - "cultural nation" distinction. Like my Viennese respondents, however, nearly all of them were emphatic that Austrians do not want another anschluss. But while in Vienna most respondents in following up the "of course no anschluss" comment remarked that "Austrian state consciousness" is now strong, the provincials generally emphasized that it was well grounded "among the youth." A Conservative leader in Salzburg said that state consciousness was a problem among the older people. I noticed that when a provincial respondent wished approvingly to stress the development of Austrian state consciousness since 1945 he usually related it to economic viability in the manner of the pragmatic national elites and, like them, was content to accept this as an adequate foundation for stable political community.

In Vienna most of my respondents who rejected the "cultural nation" did not at the same time emphasize their Germanness. Some of them insisted that Austrian culture is universal and cannot be given a national label. By contrast, the provincials readily said that they were German in a cultural sense and they showed no inclination to be apologetic or to scout the subject. One Vorarlberger reminded me that Hitler was an Austrian, not a German. Especially in Salzburg, Styria, and in the Vorarlberg some of my respondents told me, in response to questions about the Austrian nation, that of course I must know "that this is a center of Pan-German (Deutsch national, Liberal) sentiment."

Many of the provincials with whom I spoke backed up their statements about the German character of Austrian culture with an ethnic reference, something I heard only rarely in Vienna. As the Socialist Lieutenant Governor of Tyrol said to me, "We belong to the Bayuvar tribe (Bayuvarischer Stamm) just like the Bavarians and we do have a common language with the Germans." (Though this man added, "But Americans are never thought of as English, are they? Just so in Austria, we are not Germans.") Or more typically, a respondent would generalize: "All Austrians as far west as the Arlberg are Bayuvaren. The Vorarlbergers are Alemannen," the name of another of the ancient German tribes.

Geography was frequently invoked by my provincial respondents in explaining their hesitations about an "Austrian nation," sometimes in connection with trade relationships (Salzburg), sometimes with reference to cultural pressures along the border (Styria, Carinthia, Tyrol). "We lie so close to the border" said the Governor of Salzburg, a Conservative. Salzburg lies only seventy-five miles by fast autobahn across a very open border from Munich, a major center of a western European trade on which Salzburg depends for its livelihood. Vienna, the historical center and modern capital of Austria is more than three times that distance to the east and her roads east cross a strictly controlled Iron Curtain into Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It is no wonder that shared language combined with a bustling trade, open communications across the border, and the East-West polarization lead Salzburgers to orient more readily to Munich than to Vienna. In Styria, Carinthia, and Tyrol Austrians emphasize their Germanness in response to long-standing cultural pressures from the Slavic and Italian south.

Strong regional attachments as well as German feeling militate against the acceptance of the "Austrian nation" by provincial political elites. The typical hierarchy of allegiances was succinctly expressed by the Conservative Lieutenant Governor of Tyrol who told me that "alongside our regional consciousness (Landesbewusstsein) we have an Austrian consciousness which is based on the concept of federalism. We are partners in a federal state." A Vorarlberger told me that the Vorarlberger is first and foremost a Vorarlberger. His heart has three loyalties--"Heimat Vorarlberg, Staat Oesterreich, Deutsche Kultur."

In contrast to their unwillingness to accept labels like the "Austrian nation" for the reasons we have described, I found from my provincial interviews that long-standing traditional antagonisms to Vienna are markedly decreasing. The Conservative Lieutenant Governor of Tyrol told me that animosity to Vienna was decreasing "as our relations are established on a sound federal basis," a reference to the multi-level federalization of power and influence we have discussed above. As cultural officer he also heartily approved the youth exchanges between the capital and the Laender. The Governors of Tyrol and Styria told me that while there was a great deal of provincial grumbling about Vienna it was no danger to Austrian unity. Their elaboration of the idea indicated that grumbling about Vienna had become pure tradition; all the new functional relationships had removed the substantial grievances from which it arose. The Socialist Lieutenant Governor of Salzburg spoke to me enthusiastically about the federalization of the SPOe after the disastrous 1966 election.

Along this same line, the Governor of Salzburg told me he was trying to rid the concept of "federalism" of its old emotional overtones, to find a pragmatic, common-sense rule for the division of functions and authority between Vienna and the Land. A young official of the Land Conservative Party organization said: "You have to distinguish between what people want and what is politically practical. Salzburgers are not easily fired up by the mere idea of federalism. You can't just yell 'federalism' if a particular matter is better managed in Vienna. On the other hand there are things that best can be done at the Land level and still others by the Gemeinde. We should think in terms of the /old Christian Social/ principle of subsidiarity, but make decisions from case to case, not on the basis of slogans." In this interview in particular I heard echoes of the consensualist Austrianism which mixes idealism with pragmatism that I discovered among the younger party functionaries in Vienna. Like most of those people this man was in his early 30s. But he did not embrace the concept of the "Austrian nation" as they did.

What does the man in the street think today about the "Austrian nation?" The earliest study was done by Dr. Walter Fessel's Institute for Market and Opinion Research (Vienna) during April 1956, the year after the State Treaty. A representative cross-section of the entire country were asked: "Are you personally of the opinion that we are a group within the German people, or do we constitute an independent people?" The result showed a five percent plurality for the Austrian alternative (49% Austrian, 46% German, 5% no opinion.)¹¹⁰ The word "people" (Volk) not "nation" (Nation) was used in the survey, and "Volk" used to mean the same as "Staatsvolk", which is close to the concept "political nation." The 1894 Brockhaus gives as the meaning for Volk: "the totality of citizens" and contrasts it with "Nation" which is defined as the "hereditary tribal, speech, customs, and cultural community."¹¹¹ The 1957 Brockhaus, however, equates Volk with Nation and describes it as "constituted by a common spiritual and cultural development...and, usually, by a common speech; increasingly connected with these things is the striving for political unity (state)."¹¹² We cannot be sure

therefore in what sense the respondents understood the word. The results show that not quite half of the rank and file of Austrians were ready to accept an Austrian identity. But if the respondents thought they were being asked to choose in a total sense between being Austrian and being German, while actually feeling to be both, each in a different way, the results are not revealing of the true state of the Austrian mind.

That this is likely -- that Austrians at the time wished to have a double identity -- appears from the results of a youth survey done by Dr. Fessel in 1959. A comprehensive examination of their entire outlook on life was administered to a sample of 150 youth, distributed throughout the country, though not a fully representative group. To statements placed before them they were asked to react on a scale of 1 to 5, with the scalar points defined as follows:

- 1 - positively true
- 2 - probably true
- 3 - I don't know. No opinion
- 4 - probably false
- 5 - certainly false.

One statement read "Austrians are not Germans, but a people (Volk) on their own." The one immediately following stated: "Austrians are Germans." To the first the mean response was 1.70 and to the second 1.74. To the subsequent statement, which read "Austria and Germany ought to be reunited" the mean reply was 4.07. The sample of Austrian youth polled apparently were beginning to develop some kind of a special Austrian identity, and seeing the word "Volk" in the first question, they probably thought they were being asked if they were a unique "political nation." But in the second question seeing the word "Germans" used without qualification, they were equally sure that in a general cultural sense they were nevertheless Germans. The Austrian identity was, however, strongly enough formed to produce a rather firm "No" to the anschluss question.¹¹²

These two surveys then and especially the second, seem to indicate the beginnings of a specialized Austrian identity in the general public during the late fifties. And both seem to establish a continued German cultural feeling. In 1963 a poll was conducted by Dr. Manfred Koch, a German psychologist who also used the facilities of the Fessel Institute. Koch asked respondents to indicate nuances of difference/similarity between Austrians and Germans on a scale of 100 in which the polar positions were represented by these statements: at the 100 point--"Austrians are precisely as German as the other German tribes (Staemme), for example, Bavarians, Swabians, etc." and at the 0 point: "The Austrians are in no sense Germans, but a nation by themselves (eigene Nation)."¹¹³ The poll was obviously designed to measure cultural identity in the traditional sense. The mutually exclusive polar points showed 28% of the sample for the German and 17% for the Austrian position. If all the responses down to the 50 point were put together as a largely German position, and all from 50 to 0 as a largely Austrian position, the ratio would be heavily in favor of the German position--51% to 41%.

The latest surveys on the subject were carried out during 1964 by the Social Science Study Society, a Socialist-sponsored survey research organization in Vienna, and by the Gallup Institute in Vienna on my behalf during 1966.¹¹⁴ The surveyors indicate in the report that they intended a political rather than a cultural of the 1964 survey

definition of "nation" and presumably this was conveyed to the sample interviewed. They did not say how they defined "political nation", however.

47.37% of the sample said that Austrians constitute a nation--approximately the same number who responded this way in the 1956 survey. But only 15.34% said that Austrians were not a nation, less than half the number who in 1956 said that they belonged to "the German Volk." 14.25 percent said that they "did not know." And 23.04 percent said that Austrians were gradually beginning to feel that they are a nation. It is possible that if there had been a transitional category in the 1956 survey some of the German identifiers would have chosen this alternative.

The first two surveys of 1956 and 1959, showed the emergence of some kind of Austrian identity, but its nature is not clear. The third showed that whatever the character of that identity, a majority in 1963 still thought of themselves as Germans in a traditional cultural and ethnic sense. The fourth survey of 1964-65 seems to show that when "nation" is used with specific reference to political community, a large majority (70%) express an existing or developing Austrianism.

In 1966 the Gallup Institute of Vienna executed a survey on my behalf in which an effort was made to pose the questions so that both cultural and political identity were revealed at the same time. The questions asked were as follows:

"Many people say that Austrians constitute a nation by themselves. Others maintain that Austrians are a part of the German nation. Between the two opinions there are also many shades of opinion. What do you think?"

1. Austria is a completely autonomous nation and not a part of the German nation.
2. Although Austria belongs to the realm of German speech and culture, Austria is still a nation in itself.
3. Although Austria belongs to the realm of German speech and culture, Austrians are now beginning slowly to develop the feeling that they are a separate nation.
4. Although Austrians constitute a political nation (Staatsnation) and support the independence of the state, they still belong to the German nation.
5. Although Austria is an independent state, Austrians belong to the German nation.
6. Other.

The first alternative was designed for those who subscribe to the maximal or "cultural nation" position, a la Hurd, the person who has a deep attachment to Austrian cultural separateness and who is usually anti-German. The second and third alternatives were designed for those who retain a traditional cultural identity as Germans, but who also have a warm attachment to the Austrian political community. The expression "Staatsnation" was not used here, because this could be read to mean only a very restricted rational and pragmatic acceptance of the Austrian state. The experience of the elite interviews indicated that there is an unfocussed, emotional Austrianism which arises out of the special experience

of the Second Republic as a successful political enterprise but spills over from specific political reference into a sort of general cultural feeling. For example, a Croatian interviewee in the Burgenland spoke of the warm emotions he has on seeing an Austrian license plate when travelling abroad. Many people told me of the patriotic excitement engendered by Austrian victories in international soccer, skiing, or ice-skating competitions. It seemed clear that this sort of feeling could coexist with attachment to German culture defined in the more traditional, linguistic and "high culture" sense. It would be primarily a political identity, but with cultural or quasi-cultural overtones. Hence the word "nation" was used here in an unqualified sense, and paired with the idea of German cultural identity. The fourth alternative was for people with a very restricted Austrian political identity, and the last for those with a purely German identity.

The results of the survey showed 35% of the sample for the maximal Austrian, non-German position, which is double the number found in favor of that position in the 1963 thermometer poll. (This may have been because the word "nation" was used here without ethnic reference.) 37% more opted for the extended "political nation" identity. Only 9% opted for the restricted "political nation" position, and only 11% for the pure German one. 8% gave a response differing from the four alternatives offered. This meant that 72% expressed a political Austrianism with a cultural extension running from partial to total.

One discrepancy is to be noted between the findings of the last survey and the elite interviews. Altogether 81% of the respondents ^{in the surveys} were prepared to apply the word "nation" in some sense to Austria, while almost universally among the provincial elites, including those with evident Austrian feeling, the word was rejected as an inappropriate label. This is not inconsistent with the findings of other scholars, such as Stiefbold and Powell, to the effect that because of their inbreeding Austrian political elites at the middle ranges tend to be more ideological in the traditional sense than either top leaders or the man in the street. Mass opinion seems to have changed faster than elite opinion in the matter of the "Austrian nation." That the general usage is changing in the definition of "nation" is indicated by an article which appeared in August 1965 in the German-national newspaper, The New Front, the journal of the Freedom Party. Entitled "The Changing Meaning of 'National'", the burden of the essay was that in Austrian usage the word "national" is coming more and more to refer to the political nation. The members of the Freedom Party, the author argues, will have to get another word than "national" for the cultural values they cherish and defend. Perhaps "folk conscious" (volksbewusst) he suggests, ^{114a} would serve. For the Freedom Party is a guardian of an "hereditary folkdom."

Conclusion

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Returning to the hypotheses with which we began this paper, we find that the experience of republican Austria bears out Etzioni rather than Deutsch. Political integration has been achieved without an underpinning of cultural homogeneity (i.e., without general assent to the idea of an Austrian "cultural nation" in the traditional and extended sense of "culture"). We find that Etzioni is also right in suggesting that political culture should be separated out from culture in general in talking about the psychological or moral concomitants of successful political integration. In Austria there is plainly,

agreement on a

"limited set of values and symbols directly related to unification including legitimization of the new power center, a sense of identity, shared political rituals, and the like,"¹¹⁵ what we have called/consensual democracy and an identity as a political nation in the extended sense. Actually the cultural aura surrounding Austrian political identity, as we have seen, is somewhat broader than a purely political culture. But it does not embrace culture in general, and is plainly set over/against a continued widespread feeling of "Germanness."

The experience of Austria also seems to bear out the thesis of the "Functionalists" that political loyalties follow economic interests. The demonstration of Austrian economic viability and the development of a mature industrial economy which could produce affluence, perhaps more than any other factor, accounts for the present strong Austrian attachment to the state. Contrary to the arguments of scholars like Welch that "the successful operation of economic factors . . . requires a relatively stable, long-established political system,"¹¹⁶ the Austrian economic miracle/was produced by a brand new political arrangement/contractarian coalition of 1945, not by a long-established political system. In addition, we have shown that the structural evolution of the polity from contract to consensus was intimately related, as a dependent variable, to social and demographic changes which were the concomitants of the completion of industrialization.

What I have described as the contractarian mentality of the leaders of 1945, the great catalyst of economic development and itself a direct contributor to the new consensual system of one-party government through its engendering of habits of political trust, has been theoretically categorized by Arend Lijphart as an aspect of "consociational democracy" and identified as such in Austrian experience by Rodney Stiebold.¹¹⁷ I have attempted an explanation of its origins out of a "state of nature" situation.

A few words are in order on Etzioni's suggestion that perhaps "unions whose members do not share a culture may be initiated but they will not develop successfully, at least not until their culture becomes shared."¹¹⁸ My findings demonstrate that the union of the Second Austrian Republic has not only been initiated but has also developed successfully. It appears today to be very stable, and it is twenty-five years old. But we do, indeed, have no way of predicting with certainty it will be stable tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. The Austrian cultural nationalists prophesy that it will not be stable in the face of a severe economic setback, since it was economic well-being which primarily begot the present situation. The nation has no reserves built up, writes Dr. Walter Jambor, Director of the Austrian National Institute, "either of gold or of the better currency of spiritual values" to sustain the national life in the face of economic crisis. And he sees it as the proper work of his institute to "develop a new Austrian image which in the hour of crisis would be a genuine security for our spiritual values." The role of the Institute is to fashion "a society secure against crisis."¹¹⁹

On the other hand there are others who argue that to foster the ideal of a specific Austrian culture would create an old-fashioned nationalism which would be retrogressive in the face of events which point towards the integration of small political units in ever larger ones. Otto Schulmeister, Editor of Die Presse, speaks of Austria as a "Piedmont of hope for Europe."

(Piemont der Hoffnung auf Europa.) A leading Conservative has been quoted as saying, "What do we need with a nation foundation (Nationalstiftung)? We are about to enter Europe." In other words, it is argued that in a day moving towards regional integration, it is not necessary to complete integration in particular small areas by creating a background of cultural homogeneity. Complete cultural integration might hold back necessary regional union. I believe this position has some merit.

Some of the older people (over 40) who seek to promote the idea of an Austrian "cultural nation" say of those that talk about the uniting of Europe in this fashion that they use the idea of Europe as a cover-up for a crypto Pan-German expansionism, since a united Western Europe would be dominated by Germany. Many of them deeply hate the Germans because of the anschluss experience. Some Socialists feel that Austrian participation in an extensive Western economic integration would endanger the position of the nationalized industries. And they worry about the effect of such a development on Austrian relations across the Iron Curtain, and on Austria's status as a neutral. They, and some Conservatives who entertain the same worry, combine their Austrian cultural nationalism with a broader Europeanism which embraces Eastern Europe as well. **Nostalgic** recollections of the Empire probably account for an interest in closer relations with the east on the part of some of the older Conservative cultural nationalists. Another factor in Viennese cultural nationalists' attitudes toward Austrian participation in a purely Western European economic union is an adverse estimate of the relative position of Vienna and eastern Austria in such a unit. It is undeniable that western Austria is already closely tied into the German market and has shown greater economic vitality than the eastern Laender during the Second Republic. And as we have seen, the balance of political power, population, and wealth is shifting increasingly westward, away from Vienna. The concentration of Austrian cultural nationalist elite opinions in Vienna is no doubt connected with this general situation.

From my own conversations I have not had the impression that all those who talk glowingly about Austrian integration in Western Europe and who restrict the idea of Austria to the "political nation" are either Neo-Nazis or crypto-German nationalists. Though some of them certainly are. Austria has been for many years trying to negotiate a special arrangement with the European Economic Community because on the face of it her EFTA membership alone does not guarantee long-run economic security. Eventually she needs to be more integrated than at present in some larger economic unit in a fashion that would not be incompatible with political autonomy and neutrality.

The success of the Austrians in creating at least a present state of political integration on the basis of economic achievement seems to call in question the current non-western and especially African emphasis on the creation of a cultural nation as the basis of political stability. We have seen that of all the states of Europe, Austria, in the beginnings of her nation-building experience, has much in common with the emerging states of the non-western world. Coleman and Rosberg are no doubt correct that "the problem of 'territorial' integration stems from the persistence--indeed, the paramountcy--of 'promordial' attachments or ties; that is, individuals identify themselves much more strongly with historical groups defined in terms of kinship, religion, language, or culture than with the civil

order of the new states. . . . The essence of the problem is . . . the welding together of a melange of peoples of widely varying primordial attachments into a new and larger 'territorial community.' We may doubt, however, on the basis of the Austrian experience, that such welding requires, as many African leaders believe, 'the formation of single-party dominant regimes' which self-consciously try to fashion a national political culture.¹²⁰ The Austrian attempt to do precisely this via the Fatherland Front failed miserably.

The obvious rejoinder to this is that the Austrian contractarians did not operate in an international vacuum to produce political integration via the economics of affluence, but in a rather special and perhaps unique context. It consisted of the fact and memory of a seven-year ~~anschluss~~ ^{strong international} followed by Marshall Plan aid which was in turn followed by support for a separate Austrian state. I do not conclude, however, that the Austrian experience must remain unique. To produce similar results for the underdeveloped nations of the non-western world requires responsible use by the great powers of their capital resources and capacity to cooperate effectively to stabilize the politics of areas of the world which are being wracked by growing pains. This may be unlikely, but it is not impossible.

Title: Political Integration, Cultural
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of Republican Austria

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¹Charles W. Anderson, et al., Issues of Political Development, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1967, pp. 2, 3.

²1) For "political integration" I am using the definition of "Integration" given by Karl Deutsch et al., in Political Community and the North Atlantic Area Princeton, N. J., 1957, p. 5: "the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population." Implicit in my definition is also the assumption that the institutions and practices of peaceful change are those of a functioning liberal democracy. "Integration" may also refer to the processes whereby "integration" as the end state thus defined is achieved. It refers to those processes "whereby political actors . . . are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre." Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, California, 1958, p. 16.

2) By "cultural integration" I shall mean a population's sense of unique and distinctive cultural identity, based on such things as ethnic affinity, common language, common customs or way of life, common religion, distinctive literary tradition. Amitai Etzioni in Political Unification, N. Y., 1965, p. 22, speaks of "homogeneity of background in ethnic origin, cultural tradition, language and religion" as "once deemed essential for stable political unity." Also see James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosburg, Jr., Eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964, pp. 687-88.

3) "Economic integration and development" will mean the construction in an area of a unified, expanding modern industrial economy. See Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area p. 159 on the concept of "superior economic growth."

³Leo Kuper, Introduction to Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, Eds., Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, p. 14.

⁴Karl W. Deutsch et al., op. cit., p. 58.

⁵Karl W. Deutsch, Backgrounds for Community, cited in Amitai Etzioni, op. cit., p. 23.

⁶Op. cit., p. 23.

⁷Op. cit., p. 35.

⁸Ibid., pp. 35-36.

⁹Ibid., p. 35.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 36.

¹¹ Idem.

¹² Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Pan-Africanism and East African Integration Cambridge, Mass., 1965, p. 18.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 25, 30, 54-55.

¹⁴ Op. cit., p. 58.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ernst B. Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism," International Organization, XII (1958) cited in Claude E. Welsh, Jr., Dream of Unity (Ithaca, New York, 1966) p. 343.

¹⁷ Idem.

¹⁸ Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," in L. Finkle and Richard W. Cable; Eds., Political Development and Social Change, Lucian W. Pye, New York 1966, p. 556. "The Concept of Political Development," in ibid., pp. 85, 86.

¹⁹ Ernst F. Winter, an Austrian intellectual who is deeply committed to the propagation of an Austrian national ideal, as was his father before him, compares the present period in Austrian history with one undergone by other European states two hundred years ago: "Austria finds itself still in a phase of political and national development like that experienced earlier by the Western European nation states as they emerged from absolute monarchy and centralized political organization, when their peoples began to be reeducated as political communities." See Ernst F. Winter, "Der Staat ohne Eigenschaften, oder, Die Suche nach der nationalen Identitaet," Norddeutscher Rundfunk, 3. Programm, Hamburg, 24. Oktober 1965. Hans Weigl, a Viennese litterateur and commentator on Austrian national character entitles a recent book The Thousand-year-old Child (Das Tausendjaehrige Kind, Wien, 1965.

²⁰ Op. cit., p. 21.

²¹ See, e.g., Barbara Ward, "Ignaz Seipel and the Anschluss," Dublin Review, July, 1938, p. 38. The reality indeed is more complicated than this, because at one point in the confused development immediately following the dissolution of the empire eighty percent of the residents of the Vorarlberg, the westernmost province of the "German remainder" voted in a plebiscite for absorption by Switzerland (which refused their overtures) and at another the citizens of the Tyrol were thinking of going it alone as a "Tyrolean nation," before it was clear that the southern portion of the Tyrol was irrevocably lost to Italy. Walter Goldinger, "Der Geschichtliche Ablauf der Ereignisse in Oesterreich von 1918 bis 1945" in Heinrich Benedikt, et al., Eds., Geschichte der Republik Oesterreich, Wien, 1954, pp. 70, 73, 67.

²²See James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," in John Kautsky, Ed., Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries, New York, 1962, p. 186.

²³See Philip M. Hansen, "Some Cultural and Personal Characteristics of the Less Developed Areas," in Finkle and Gable, op. cit., p. 54.

²⁴See Winter, op. cit.

²⁵See Adam Wandruszka, "Oesterreichs Politische Struktur," in Benedikt, op. cit., pp. 334-338, 408-411, 441-452; Eugene Golob, The "Isms", N. Y., 1954, p. 572, note 12.

²⁶Walter Jambor, interviewed in Express am Wochenende, May 15, 1965.

²⁷Op. cit., p. 250.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 17-20.

²⁹Erika Weinzierl, "Das oesterreichische Staatsbewusstsein," in Erika Weinzierl, Ed., Der Oesterreicher und sein Staat, Wien, 1965, p. 17; Professor Peter Berger, "Die Idee einer oesterreichischen Staatsnation bis 1938." Lecture at the Austrian National Library, May 1966.

³⁰Weinzierl, op. cit., p. 19; Rudolph Till, Pax Austriaca, Wien, 1948, pp. 32-35.

³¹Till, op. cit.

³²Ibid.

³³Weinzierl, op. cit., pp. 21, 23.

³⁴See Ignaz Seipel, Nation und Staat, Wien, 1916.

³⁵See Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitaetenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, Wien, 1907. Karl Renner, Oesterreichs Erneuerung, Wien, 1916.

³⁶This is the title of a recent study of the First Republic. See Hellmut Andics, Der Staat den Keiner Wollte, Oesterreich 1918-1938 (Wien, 1962).

³⁷See Benedikt, op. cit.

³⁸See Alexander Vodopivec, Die Balkanisierung Oesterreichs, Wien, 1966, pp. 22, 23.

³⁹Charles A. Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, II, Berkeley, 1948, pp. 972, 1024; Leopold Kunschak, Oesterreich 1918-1934, Wien, 1935, quoted in Ibid., p. 1023.

⁴⁰ Preamble to the Constitution of May, 1934.

⁴¹ Speech at Dornbirn, June 30, 1933, quoted in Johannes Messner, Dollfuss, An Austrian Patriot trsl. from the German (London, 1935) p. 89; Dollfuss article in Reichspost, Dec. 24, 1933 in Engelbert Dollfuss, Dollfuss an Oesterreich, Ed. Hofral Edmund Weber, Vienna, 1935, pp. 55-56.

⁴² Speech at Retz, November 15, 1933, quoted in Messner, op. cit., p. 82; Radio address December 31, 1933 in Weber, op. cit., p. 207.

⁴³ One polemicist during the 1930s did develop a clear conception of an Austrian nation. This was Ernst Karl Winter, a writer and journalist on the extreme left wing of the Christian Social camp, who served briefly as Third Vice Mayor of Vienna during 1934. See Ernst Karl Winter, Monarchie und Arbeiterschaft, Vienna, 1936, p. 4 in which he adopts the Western European concept of the political nation and applies it to Austria. Dollfuss and Schuschnigg remained captive of the Central European "cultural nation" concept.

⁴⁴ Dollfuss to Mussolini in Paul R. Sweet, "Mussolini and Dollfuss," Appendix in Julius Braunthal, The Tragedy of Austria, London, 1948, p.190; Schuschnigg speech in Innsbruck, September 2, 1934, in Kurt Schuschnigg, Schuschnigg Spricht, Graz, 1935, p.106.

⁴⁵ Claude E. Welch, Jr., Dream of Unity, Ithaca, N.Y., 1966, p.345.

⁴⁶ Arnold Rivkin, "The Politics of Nation-building: Problems and Preconditions," Journal of International Affairs, XVI, No.2 (1962) pp.131-43, in Harvey G. Kebschull, Ed., Politics in Transitional Societies, N. Y., 1968. p.276.

⁴⁷ Josef Dobretsberger, Katholische Sozialpolitik am Scheideweg, Graz, 1949, p.79. Transl. by W.T.B.

⁴⁸ Josef Dobretsberger, "Ein missgluecktes Experiment," Civitas, 4. Jg., (1949), p.88. Schuschnigg's biographer, E.K.Sheridon, also attributes the failure of economic policy to the corporative institutions. See Kurt von Schuschnigg, a Tribute, London, 1942.

⁴⁹ Gordon Shepherd, The Austrian Odyssey, London, 1957, p.193.

⁵⁰ Gordon Shepherd, Anschluss, London, 1963, p.180. See also Walter Goldinger, "Der geschichtliche Ablauf der Ereignisse in Oesterreich von 1918 bis 1945" in Heinrich Benedikt, Ed., Geschichte der Republik Oesterreich, Vienna, 1954, p.273.

⁵¹ The intermediate blessings and curses of Nazi rule were, however, differentially distributed among the various Laender. Polyglot Vienna, hated by Hitler because of its ethnically and culturally mixed character, suffered economic deprivation and police tyranny throughout the seven years of anschluss. The more purely German areas of Upper Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol, actually

prospered, for Hitler selected them as sites for an entire complex of new heavy industries, secure supply bases for the paraphernalia of his war machine. The results for the distribution of Austrian and German sentiment at the cultural level today are clear.

⁵² Johann Wagner, "Allzeit im Dienste der Wirtschaft," in Oesterreichische Monatshefte, April 1965, Heft 4, p.63. Transl. by W.T.B.

⁵³ Adolf Schaerf, Oesterreichs Erneuerung, Wien, 1955, p.20, quoted in Shepherd, The Austrian Odyssey, pp.152-53.

⁵⁴ Ludwig Jedlicka, Der 20. Juli 1944 in Oesterreich, Wien, 1965, p.32.

⁵⁵ Hellmut Andics, Der Staat den Keiner Wollte, p.35; Shepherd, Anschluss, p.203; Karl Renner, Denkschrift ueber die Geschichte der Unabhaengigkeitserklaerung Oesterreichs, Zuerich, 1946, pp.15,16.

⁵⁶ Protokoll der Festsitzung des Nationalrates u. Bundesrates, 14. Mai 1960, Excerpts in Bundesmin. fuer Unterricht, "Freiheit, Einheit, Unabhaengigkeit," 1960, p.29.

⁵⁷ Alfred Maleta, "Konzentration des Willens," in Ludwig Reichhold, Ed., Zwanzig Jahre Zweite Republik, Wien, 1965, p.135.

⁵⁸ Kurt Shell, The Transformation of Austrian Socialism, State University of New York, 1962, p.41.

^{58a} See Klaus Berchtold, Ed., Oesterreichische Partei-programme 1868-1966, Muenchen, 1967, pp.268-277, 376-379.

⁵⁹ See Friedrich Thalmann, "Die Wirtschaft in Oesterreich," in Heinrich Benedikt, Ed., Geschichte der Republik Oesterreich, pp.501,502; Alexander Vodopivec, Die Balkanisierung Oesterreichs, Wien, 1966, pp.23-24; Alfred Migsch, Ein Volk Kaempft um sein Leben, Wien, 1949, p.6.

⁶⁰ Source: "Wirtschaftliche Aspekte der oesterreichischen Bevoelkerungsentwicklung," Monatsberichte des Oesterreichischen Institutes fuer Wirtschaftsforschung, Beilage Nr.23, November 1953, p.7.

⁶¹ Source: The World Almanac and Book of Facts, Editions for 1935 and 1936.

⁶² Source: Karl Selber, Die Regionale Bevoelkerungsumschichtung innerhalb Oesterreichs in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten und ihre poelitische Auswirkungen, Wien, 1968, p.3.(Unpublished mimeographed essay.)

⁶³ Source: Ibid., p.11.

⁶⁴Source: Oest. Stat. Zentralamt, Volkszaehlung vom 1. Juni 1951, Tabellenband I, Wien, 1953, pp.2,4.

⁶⁵Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, N.Y., 1958; Seymour Lipset, Political Man, Garden City, N.Y., 1960.

⁶⁶Erika Weinzierl, op.cit., pp.15-16.

⁶⁷Quoted in Richard Barta, "Freie Kirche in freier Gesellschaft," in Ludwig Reichhold, Ed., op.cit., p.3.

⁶⁸Berchtold, Ed., op.cit., pp.376,377,378.

⁶⁹Ibid., pp.268,271,277.

⁷⁰Ibid., pp.376,271.

⁷¹See William T. Bluhm, "Nation-building: the Case of Austria," Polity, December 1968, pp.153,156.

⁷²Rupert Emerson, "Nationalism and Political Development," in Finkle and Gable, Eds., Political Development and Social Change, p.161.

⁷³Susanna Seltenreich, "Leopold Figl," in Reichhold, Ed., op.cit., p.111.

⁷⁴See Frederick C. Engelmann, "Austria: Pooling the Opposition," Ch.8 in Robert A. Dahl, Ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven, 1966.

⁷⁵The phenomenon which I have labeled "contractarianism" is described by Rodney Stiefbold, in a paper delivered at the 1968 convention of the American Political Science Association as an instance of what Arend Lijphart has termed "consociational democracy." "The central characteristic of this type," writes Stiefbold, "lies not in any specific institutional arrangements, but rather in elite attitudes and behavior when confronted with the condition of a fragmented political culture; its defining feature is 'overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate aim of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system.'... Despite fragmentation it is both stable and decisionally effective." The national parliamentary elections of 1966 and 1970 and party organizational reforms within that period indicate that Austria has substantially evolved out of the consociational form into a basically consensual or centripetal democracy, as Stiefbold recognizes. See Rodney P. Stiefbold, "Elite-Mass opinion Structure and Communication Flow in a Consociational Democracy (Austria)", paper read at the 1968 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., and Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies 1:1 (April 1968), pp.3-44.

⁷⁶ Oesterreich Institut, Oesterreich Lebt, Wien, 1955.

⁷⁷ Taking 1963 as the new base year, industrial production by 1967 was up 17% and agriculture 4%. Total product in 1966 was 13% higher than that for 1963 and per capita product rose to 12% over that year. In dollars the gross national product increased from \$7,799,000,000. to \$10,635,000,000. between 1963 and 1967. (Figures published by the Austrian Institute for Economic Research and by the United Nations Statistical Office.) Recent figures show that the same growth pattern continues. The monthly report of the Austrian Institute for Economic Research for September 1969 showed an unusually high rate of growth in industrial production, with the most marked expansion in capital goods, for the first half of 1969. Industrial production per working day had increased at the summer's end by 13% over the 1968 figure, and industrial production overall had grown by 5.5%. (Summarized in Austrian Information Service, "Austrian Information," New York, September 1969.)

⁷⁸ Karl Selber, op.cit., p.7.

⁷⁹ H. Seidel, F. Butschek, Die Regionale Dynamik der oesterreichischen Wirtschaft, Wien, 1966, p.27.

⁸⁰ Institut fuer Empirische Sozialforschung, Sozialschichtung im Vorstellungsbild der Wiener Bevoelkerung, Wien, 1967.

⁸¹ Ibid., p.58.

⁸² Dennison I. Russinow, "Notes toward a Political Definition of Austria," American Universities Field Staff Reports, S.E.Europe, Vol.XIII, No.8,Part IV, (1966), p.3.

⁸³ Idem.

⁸⁴ Alexander Vodopivec, Wer Regiert in Oesterreich?, 2d Ed., Wien, 1962,p.112.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p.113.

⁸⁶ "Oesterreich: Grosse Koalition," Der Spiegel, Hamburg, 1 Sept.1965, p.72.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.74.

⁸⁸ Sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengesellschaft, "Das Nationalbewusstsein der Oesterreicher," Die Meinung, Wien, Hefte 1,2/3, Fruehjahr und Herbst,1965.

⁸⁹ Kreisky mentioned first in the order of causes that the workers "remember the days of unemployment and loss of democracy. During the '30s they developed a sense of what the state meant to them." This is really an indirect way of saying that full employment and freedom in the '50s and '60s made Socialist patriots, and these were the work of the Coalition.

- ⁹⁰Oskar Pollak in Jacques Hannak, Ed., Bestandaufnahme Oesterreich, Wien, 1963 pp. 58, 59, 60.
- ⁹¹Interviews with Dr. Hermann Withalm, Vienna, June 1, 1966 and June 12, 1968.
- ⁹²Quoted in "Oesterreich: Grosse Koalition," op. cit., p. 72.
- ⁹³Reported in Wirtschaftshorizont, Nr. 167, 1 Feb., 1965, p. 12.
- ⁹⁴Interview in Vienna, April 7, 1965.
- ⁹⁵"Wer spinnt den Faden Rot-Weiss-Rot?", Oesterreichische Hochschulzeitung 15 April, 1968 p. 3.
- ⁹⁶For a detailed discussion see William T. Bluhm, Nation-Building: the Case of Austria, Ch. VI, "Molding an Austrian Identity: Integration Through Political Socialization," a forthcoming book.
- ⁹⁷Alfred Maletá in Reichhold, Ed., Zwanzig Jahre Zweite Republik, p. 134.
- ⁹⁸Die Presse, April 21, 1966.
- ⁹⁹Die Presse, February 23 May 2, 1967.
- ¹⁰⁰Datleff Harbich, Die Presse, March 22, 1967.
- ¹⁰¹Gottfried Heindl, Oesterreichisches Monatsheft, March 1963.
- ¹⁰²Alexander Vodopivec Wer Regiert in Oesterreich? p. 117.
- ¹⁰³Vodopivcec, Wer Regiert, p. 119. See also Rodney Stiefbold, "Elite-Mass Opinion Structure and Communication Flow in a Consociational Democracy (Austria)," op.cit.
- ^{103A}Norbert Leser in Arbeiter Zeitung, March 16, 1966.
- ¹⁰⁴Rupert Gmoser and Guenther Nenning in Presse, March 12/13, 1966, p. 5.
- ¹⁰⁵Computer analysis by Institute for Empirical Research, cited in Express, March 3, 1970.
- ¹⁰⁶Die Presse, March 3, 1970.
- ¹⁰⁷New York Times, June 8, 1970, p. 17.
- ¹⁰⁸Eight key interviews are reviewed in detail in Bluhm, "Nation-Building: the Case of Austria, Polity, Dec. 1968.
- ¹⁰⁹See Rodney Stiefbold. "Elite-Mass Opinion Structure and Communication Flow in a Consociational Democracy: Austria", op. cit., pp. 20, 21, 23.

¹¹⁰Survey by Dr. Walter Fessel, Institut fuer Marktforschung (Wien), reported in Querschnitte der oeffentlichen Meinung in R. Steifbold, et al., Eds. Wahlen u. Parteien in Oesterreich, Bd. II Wien, 1966, p. 584. Representative national sample; N. unknown.

¹¹¹This is in the 1894 edition of the Brockhaus as cited by Kurt Shalnik, Republikanische Mitte, Vienna, 1966, p. 140. ^{111a}Der Grosse Brockhaus,

Wiesbaden, 1957, Bd. 12, p. 228.
¹¹²Fessel Institut, Jugend Studie, 1959/60, courtesy of OeVP.

¹¹³Manfred Koch, "Des Deutschenbild der Oesterreicher," Bericht ueber den 24. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Psychologie, Goettingen, 1965, pp. 334 ff. Random survey with structured interview; N. 2000.

¹¹⁴Sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengesellschaft, "Das Nationalbewusstsein der Oesterreicher," in Die Meinung, Fruehjahr 1965, pp. 10-11. Representative national sample, N. 1467. Oesterreiches Gallup-Institut, special survey for W. T. Bluhm as part of omnibus survey, April, 1966, National random sample; N. 2500.

¹¹⁵See footnote 7.

¹¹⁶See footnote 17.

¹¹⁷See footnote 75.

¹¹⁸See footnote 10.

¹¹⁹Die Republik, Wien, 1/65, p. 2.

¹²⁰James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., Eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964, pp. 687-88 in Welch, op. cit., pp. 344-45 and comment by Welch, p. 345.

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MODELES ET METHODES DANS L'ETUDE
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DES ETATS
MODELS AND METHODS IN THE COMPARATIVE
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Nation-Building, Democratization and Mass Mobilization:
First Results of a Statistical Analysis of Norwegian Data

by

Frank Aarebrot and Stein Rokkan

This paper presents the first findings of an analysis of ecological time-series data for the rural parishes of Norway for the period 1868-1903. In an effort to build up a data basis for a "statistical history" of the development of the Norwegian political system, an extensive file of aggregate information has been assembled on the smallest units of local accounting from a wide range of sources: the suffrage enumerations of 1868 and 1876, the census of 1875, 1890 and 1900, the national elections from 1869 through 1903. This historical-ecological data file allows detailed analysis of processes of change during a crucial "take-off" phase in the development of the political system: the initial years of politicization and mobilization, the decisive years of party formation and suffrage extension. Earlier analyses have suggested a variety of hypotheses about the territorial, the socio-economic and the cultural components of their process of mass mobilization: hypotheses about lags in the rural peripheries, in the least monetized sectors of the economy, within the strata of the population least exposed to such agencies of cultural mobilization as the fundamentalist sects, the teetotalist associations, the language movement or the Folk High Schools.(1) The historical-ecological data files established during the last two years(2), will allow detailed tests parish by parish of linkages and lags in such processes of economic, cultural and political mobilization.

(1) Hypotheses along these lines were first spelled out and documented at regional or provincial levels of aggregation: see Stein ROKKAN, "Geography, Religion and Social Class," pp. 367-444 in S.M. LIPSET and S. ROKKAN, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967), and Chapters 6 and 7 of his Citizens, Elections, Parties (New York: D.McKay, 1970).

(2) For details see S. ROKKAN and F.AAREBROT, "The Norwegian Archive of Historical Ecological Data," Soc.Sci.Info. 8(1) 1969: 77-84.

In a first attempt at an analysis of the time-series data for each of the 393 rural parishes (as defined by their boundaries at the time of the first suffrage enumeration in 1868), a set of aggregate growth curves were established for registration and turnout data from the early "pre-political" elections to the second election under manhood suffrage in 1903. For this purpose the parishes were grouped by quartile on a series of indicators of centrality-peripherality, occupational structure, level of monetization, proportions at different levels of monetary income, etc. A typical product of this initial, purely descriptive, analysis of the parish data, can be set out as follows :

Election

		1876	1882	1885	1888	1894	1900
<u>Central Provinces</u>							
Highly Industrialized Rural Parishes (20% + workers, craftsmen: 15 units)	Total Qualified = 100 %	4124	4760	7911	8761	11847	20070
	Registered	56.6	73.3	66.6	66.0	77.9	-
	Voting	22.9	63.3	60.0	52.0	72.4	64.8
<u>South/Western Provinces</u>							
Most Peripheral Parishes Highest Percent Fishermen (6% + Fishermen, 36 units)	Total Qualified = 100 %	13167	13561	15760	16043	17433	33007
	Registered	60.2	62.3	65.1	64.5	79.5	-
	Voting	22.1	37.9	44.5	39.9	69.7	48.10
<u>Northern Provinces</u>							
Highly Industrialized Parishes (6% + workers, craftsmen: 14 units)	Total Qualified = 100 %	3736	3847	5704	5657	6222	13809
	Registered	61.2	65.9	53.7	58.6	65.9	-
	Voting	26.7	40.1	29.2	27.5	50.3	34.6
Most Peripheral Parishes Highest Percent Fishermen (40% + Fishermen: 14 units)	Total Qualified = 100 %	3070	3173	3817	3875	4035	7054
	Registered	55.5	55.4	51.8	55.2	61.8	-
	Voting	10.6	16.6	16.6	22.5	47.9	56.5

NOTE: Registration was automatic from 1900: therefore no separate percentage for registered citizens for that election.

Such marked contrasts in the curves of mobilization at different distances from the political centre set a number of intriguing questions for further analysis :

- what combinations of conditions made for very easy "quantum jumps" in mobilization (e.g., the 1879-1882 move from 36 percent to 63.3 percent in the central, industrialized parishes), what conditions kept the process back until a much later stage of politicization (e.g., the move from 30.7 percent in 1891 to 47.9 percent in 1897 in the Northern periphery)?

- how were the successes or failures of mobilization affected by variations in the proportions of immigrants to the growing urban and industrial centres (setting the total number qualifying for suffrage in 1868 = 100, the 1900 electorate had risen to 562 in the cities to 532 in the rural parishes of the industrialized centre but to only 277 in the Northern periphery: this was clearly as much an effect of migration and urbanization as of the extensions in the suffrage)?

- how severe were the lags in mobilization produced by the entrance of new sectors and strata of the populations through the suffrage extensions of 1884-85 and 1898-1000?

A major effort of multivariate analysis will be focussed on the effects of the two extensions and the difference in mobilization rates for the already established electorates and the first-time entrants into the political arena. The two extensions brought in economically and socially very different sectors and strata of the subject citizenry. The 1884-85 essentially served to reduce the disequilibrium between economic and political mobilization: the old franchise criteria of 1814 gave priority to ascriptive qualities such as Royal office, burgher privileges, and ownership of real estate or land holdings and, consequently, kept out large sectors of the monetized population, employees and workers who earned enough to pay regular income taxes. The addition of a monetary income criterion added more than onethird to the electorate of 1882: if we set the total qualifying in a typical "prepolitical" year such as 1868 at 100, the increase was from 114 in 1882 to 143 in 1885. But the impact was much more marked in the cities and in the industrialized/monetized centres than in the periphery:

	1879	1882	1885	Increase 1882-85
Cities	131	139	193	30 %
All rural parishes	105	110	136	24 %
- central, industrialized	93	115	191	66 %
- South/Western periphery	108	110	128	15 %
- Northern periphery	121	117	140	20 %

The next extension affected the periphery as markedly as the growth centres of the national territory. All men over 30 were given the vote without any economic or social qualifications (apart from a stipulation of temporary suspension during bankruptcy or when receiving public assistance). This brought in the propertyless rural proletariat as well as the lower-income working class in the cities :

	1868	1897	1900	Increase 1897-1900
Cities	100	316	562	78 %
All rural parishes	100	165	309	87 %
- central, industrialized	100	303	485	60 %
- South/Western periphery	100	147	269	80 %
- Northern periphery	100	155	259	67 %

Both extensions led to a flattening or even a decline in the curves for the total mobilization ratios :

	Diff. 1879-82	Diff. 1882-85	Diff. 1891-97	Diff. 1897-1900
Cities	+ 21.2	-1.5	+ 14.0	-15.1
All rural parishes	+ 18.0	+ 1.2	+ 18.9	-16.5
- central, industrialized	+ 27.3	-3.3	+ 9.4	- 3.2
- South/Western periphery	+ 15.7	+ 6.6	+ 25.2	-15.6
- Northern periphery	+ 4.9	0.0	+ 27.3	- 1.5

These ~~lags~~ obviously reflect differences between the citizens already enfranchised and the first-time entrants: both in 1885 and in 1900 the men given the vote under the new criteria must on the average have been much less motivated to take part in the election than those already accepted on the rolls, possibly even less than those already qualified but still not registered. The statistics unfortunately do not give separate figures for turnout for the established, pre-extension electorates, and the new electorates. There must clearly have been important variations among localities in the gap between the old and the new electorates, but all we have to go on are net aggregates for the total electorates after the

extension. A series of attempts have been made to establish plausible models for the generation of the observed aggregates from assumptions about the mobilization rates of the pre-extension electorates, but none of the models so far tested against the data give consistent and interpretable results for all units. Further work is under way and will be reported on during 1971. In this paper we shall restrict ourselves to a summary account of the results for one crude model of differentiation :

	Estimated Turnout			
	1885		1900	
	Established Electorate	Newly Enfranchized	Established Electorate	Newly Enfranchized
Cities	72.9	35.3	77.4	42.8
All rural parishes	51.0	31.2	67.3	31.8
- central, industrialized	74.4	44.5	68.0	59.6
- South/Western periphery	44.9	41.1	63.7	29.3
- Northern periphery	16.3	25.4	58.0	54.1

For the 1882-85 transition this model assumes that those qualified and registered under the pre-extension criteria voted at the same rate as in 1882. This assumption invariably leaves an increment in the absolute numbers of votes beyond the 1882 level: the model proceeds to assume that these votes were generated at the same rate of turnout from the two further sources, a) those qualifying under the new criteria, and registering at the first election open to them. These are obviously arbitrary assumptions but the results for the different areas seem to make sense within a wider context of theorizing about the ongoing processes of change. If the model is correct as a first approximation, the calculations suggest marked differences between central and peripheral areas in the impact of this first extension of political rights within the system. In the cities and the central industrializing areas the addition of the income criterion brought in much larger numbers of qualifying citizens than in the much less monetized peripheries, but this new stratum of the electorate proves much more difficult to mobilize than the old, at least at the first election after the extension: in the cities and in the central rural areas, these new entrants tended to be salaried

employees and workers, often recent arrivals to these growing communities, and the party machineries were not yet ready to cope with this large influx of potential supporters. In the rural peripheries there were much fewer citizens entering the electorate under the new income criterion and these tended to be as motivated for political participation as those enfranchized under the old ascriptive criteria: this comes out for the South/West (41.1% vs. 44.9%) but even more markedly for the North (25.4% vs. 16.3%). These were areas dominated by smallholders and fishermen who might legally have qualified for the vote but who were still to a very large extent (much more markedly so in the North) beyond the reach of the mobilization efforts spreading from the centre. In these areas the few professionals, shopkeepers, craftsmen and workers enfranchized under the income criterion would be as likely to let themselves mobilize as the much more parochial smallholders and fishermen.

The estimates for 1900 again bring out marked differences between areas, but this time the estimates suggest a widening gap between the two peripheries: (3) in the South/West the latest entrants into the electorate produce a dramatic drop in turnout, in the North we observe a groundswell of mobilization within the finally enfranchized coastal proletariat, a wave of mobilization closely linked with the upsurge of the socialists and their first victories in 1903.

The estimates for 1900 are generated from a simpler set of assumptions than the ones for 1885: the provision for voluntary registration disappeared with the introduction of manhood suffrage and this reduced the number of variables to be taken into account in establishing the estimates for the two electorates. The model simply assumes that the established electorate had reached a peak level of mobilization in 1897: this allows quick calculation of the mobilization level for the new entrants from the aggregate increment in the votes cast. This is probably a justifiable assumption for all the central units and for the intermediate areas which reached high levels of mobilization by 1894, it is much more questionable for the peripheral parishes still caught in a process of rapid mobilization after 1894. Most of the parishes of the Northern periphery were still in this phase of surging mobilization when the suffrage was extended.

(3) For further description of these differences between the South/West and the North, see S.ROKKAN and H.VALEN, "Regional Contrasts in Norwegian Politics," pp. 190-217 in E.ALLARDT and S.ROKKAN, eds., Mass Politics (New York: Free Press, 1970).

This accounts for the very high mobilization estimate for the new entrants in 1900 : 54.1% as against 58.0% for the old electorate. This figure is no doubt too high by several percentage points, but better estimates can only be generated through the testing of a series of alternative models for the behaviour of the old electorate from 1885 to 1900. It seems very unlikely, however, that any such further tests will shake the principal finding: the new entrants proved vastly less mobilizable in the South/Western periphery than in the Northern. This, no doubt, reflects differences in the character of the economy and the social structure of the two peripheries: in the South/West the rural proletariat enfranchised in 1900 were much more tied to their parochial communities and depended much less on the whims of the money economy, in the North the commercialization and the industrialization of the fisheries had created much greater dependence on external decision-makers and generated widespread pressures for joint cross-local action just at the time of the first elections under manhood suffrage. This contrast in the time-phasing of monetization and political mobilization goes far to account for the well-established differences between the two regional party systems: the emphasis on "counter-cultural" defense and the de-emphasis on economic conflict in the South-West, the class polarization of the North. Historical-ecological research at this level of detail can help to develop and test much more powerful models for the explanation of divergencies and convergencies of political style within the national territory. In the Norwegian case the analysis currently carried out for the early phases of mobilization and politicization will be followed up phase by phase up to the period of system stabilization after World War II. One of the immediate tasks ahead is the merging of our time-series analysis for 1868-1903 with a corresponding set of analyses by William LAFFERTY(4) for the period 1906-1927: this should not only allow better testing of our hypotheses about lags in mobilization, but also open up opportunities for a step-by-step explanation of the processes through which the regional divergencies in party alignments were deepened during the next spurts of mobilization after the women were given the vote.

(4) W. LAFFERTY, Economic Development and the Response of Labor in Scandinavia. Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1970.

Historical time-series analyses of mobilization data of this type are technically possible in a number of countries of the West: (5) W.D. BURNHAM and Donald STOKES has shown the way for the United States, (6) David BUTLER and Donald STOKES, (7) as well as James CORNFORD, Kevin COX and Tom NOSSITER, (8) have demonstrated the possibilities in the United Kingdom, Emmanuel Leroy LADURIE has taken important steps in this direction in France, (9)

(5) For A quick listing of similar studies through 1965 see S. ROKKAN, "Electoral Mobilization, Party Competition and National Integration", originally published in J. LAPALOMBARA and M. WEINER, eds., Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton : Princeton Univ. Press, 1966) repr. in S. ROKKAN, Citizens Elections Parties (New York: D. McKay, 1970), pp. 226-247; see especially pp. 243-244. For further information on possibilities of historical-ecological research in W. Europe, see S. ROKKAN and J. MEYRIAT, eds., International Guide to Electoral Statistics, Vol. I (Paris: Mouton, 1969), cf. also M. DOGAN and S. ROKKAN, eds., Quantitative Ecological Analysis. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969).

(6) See especially W.D. BURNHAM, "Critical Elections and the Dynamics of American Electoral Politics", Paper, APSA meetings, New York, Sept. 1969, and Donald STOKES, "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces," in W.N. CHAMBERS and W.D. BURNHAM, eds., The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

(7) David BUTLER and Donald STOKES, Political Change in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1969).

(8) James CORNFORD, "Aggregate Election Data and British Party Alignments, 1885-1910"; Kevin R. COX, "Geography, Social Contexts, and Voting Behavior in Wales, 1861-1951"; T.J. NOSSITER, "Aspects of Electoral Behavior in English Constituencies, 1832-1868"; all in Erik ALLARDT and Stein ROKKAN, eds., Mass Politics (New York: Free Press, 1970). For a broader comparative perspective see Kevin R. COX, "The Spatial Evolution of National Voting Response Surfaces", Paper, APSA meetings, New York, Sept. 1969.

(9) See Emmanuel LEROY LADURIE and Cécil DAUPHIN, "Archives militaires pour l'histoire sociale", Soc.Sci.Info. 7(1) 1968:83-87.

Carl-Göran ANDRAE, Gunnar WALLIN, Leif LEWIN, Onni RANTALA, Erik HOGH, Vagn DYBDAHL, and the late Jan STEHOUWER, have in their various ways shown what can be done with the great abundance of historical-ecological statistics in the Scandinavian countries.(10) There is a crying need for closer communication among all those currently engaged in such work: not only at the level of computer technology and statistical methodology, but even more at the level of theory confrontation, in the discussion of alternative models of divergencies and convergencies in the time-phasing of the processes of economic, cultural and political mobilization, activation and integration. This need for a linking of empirical and theoretical confrontations is even greater as we move from comparisons within the developed West to comparisons with the many new sovereign states emerging from colonial dependence. There are important differences in the scope and the reliability of the data accessible for research and there are also crucial differences in the time-phasing between the administrative, economic, cultural and political processes of unification, but many of the fundamental dimensions of systembuildings are the same and deserve painstaking comparative analysis in a world perspective.

(10) For Sweden see Carl-Göran ANDRAE, "The Popular Movements and the Process of Mobilization in Sweden", Soc.Sci.Info. 8(1) 1969: 65-75, Gunnar WALLIN, Valrörelser och valresultat. Andrakammarvalen i Sverige 1866-1884. (Stockholm: Ronzo Boktr., 1961) and the forthcoming reports on a time-series analysis of data for the elections from 1866 onwards, by Leif LEWIN. For Finland, see O. RANTALA, "The Political Regions of Finland", Scand.Pol.Studies, 2, 1967: 117-140. For Denmark detailed descriptive analyses for the early period have been presented in Vagn DYBDAHL, "Partier og erhverv.Studier i partiorganisation og byerhvervenes politiske aktivitet 1880-1913." (Aarhus: Universitetsforlaget 1969) while detailed multivariate analyses have been carried by Erik HØGH for presentation in his forthcoming dissertation Vaelgeradfærd i et samfund under forandring (Copenhagen: Institute of Sociology, University of Copenhagen, manuscript, 1966); for the later period of mass politics see J. STEHOUWER, "Long-term ecological analysis of electoral statistics in Denmark," Scand.Pol. Studies, 2, 1967: 94-116.

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SOCIAL CLEAVAGE AND NATION-BUILDING IN EAST AFRICA

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Nation-building involves in effect five major processes. These are, firstly, some degree of cultural and normative fusion ; secondly, the promotion of economic interpenetration between different strata and sectors of society ; thirdly, the process of social integration ; fourthly, the process of building institutions for effective conflict resolution ; and fifthly, the psychological accumulation of shared national experience.

The process of cultural and normative fusion is ultimately the acquisition of shared values, modes of expression, life-style and view of one's place in the universe. Of special importance for this process is cultural interaction among the different sub-groups of society. And the paramount medium for cultural interaction is, quite simply, language. We shall therefore pay special attention in this paper to the growing restlessness in East Africa over the issue of a national language.

The promotion of economic interpenetration and exchange relationships between sub-group is in part a commitment to the idea of economic interdependence. In other words, the economic dimension of nation-building is the process by which the different sub-groups within a country develop a conscious vested interest in the national economy.

The third dimension of nation-building is social integration. In this paper we use the term "social integration" to mean that process by which the gaps between the elite and the

masses, the town and the country-side, the privileged and the underprivileged, are gradually narrowed.

The fourth dimension in nation-building is, in effect, the routinization of conflict resolution. This involves building institutions and consolidating procedures at different levels of society to enable clashes of interest, divergences of values and opinion, and disputes over rights and duties to be resolved with minimal social disruption.

And fifthly, nation-building is a process of acquiring shared national memories, a consciousness of having undergone some important experiences in the past together. When this fifth dimension interacts with the first process of cultural and normative fusion in African conditions, what we have is the gradual merger of tribal sub-identities into a new national identity.

Let us now relate these five dimensions of nation-building more specifically to East Africa's experience.

Language and Cultural Fusion

Perhaps the most fundamental political problems confronting East African countries are reducible to two crises -- the crisis of national integration and the crisis of political authority or political legitimacy. For our purposes the crisis of national integration may be seen as a problem of horizontal relationships. It arises because different clusters of citizens do not as yet accept each other as compatriots. The sense of a shared nationality has yet to be forged.

The crisis of political legitimacy, on the other hand, is a problem of vertical relationships. It arises not because one citizen does not recognise another as a compatriot but because significant numbers of citizens are not convinced that their governments have the right to rule them. Integration is basically a problem of neighbour against neighbour; legitimacy is a problem

of the ruled against their rulers.

It can therefore be seen that a process of cultural fusion, leading either to a shared life-style at large, is a contribution towards the integration process. Swahili in Tanzania is a shared language and in some respects a shared culture. The government's policies on language include a commitment towards developing Swahili to cope with more and more areas of common endeavour. Committees for the compilation of a fuller legal vocabulary in Swahili, the promotion of literary competitions in Swahili, the encouragement of the writing in Swahili of textbooks, and President Nyerere's own work in translating Shakespeare into Swahili, are a determined attempt to make the language cope with more of national life and make national life more systematically interpenetrated by that shared language.

Kenya as an instance of British cultural policy during the colonial period betrays different after-effects. On attainment of independence there was a large number of languages recognised both in the educational policies and in the policies of the Department of Information and Broadcasting. But independence itself meant a reduction of this plurality. The number of languages used on the radio was drastically reduced to English and Swahili and a few hours of special services. And the debate in the country has gone increasingly in the direction of promoting Swahili. The ruling party, the Kenya African National Union, has already declared itself in favour of the systematic promotion of Swahili as a national language in the country. President Kenyatta has also come out as a strong champion of Swahili for that purpose. Only a small minority of Kenyans speak Swahili as their first language, but a large number have increasingly acquired it as a medium of communication between tribes who would be otherwise mutually incommunicado. The English language is still important in Kenya. It is important as a medium of instruction in the higher levels of school education; and it is also important as the lingua franca of the elite. But the ultimate base for Swahili lies in its role as a lingua franca for the masses. And here the promotion of a shared language, with the ultimate ambition of cultural homogenization, becomes once again part of the process of national integration.

Uganda once nearly became another domain of Swahili. The British Colonial Authorities in the late 1920's were putting

forward a strong case for the adoption of Swahili as a medium of education and administration in Uganda. The arguments put forward have since found an echo in some of the current debates in the country about the utility of Swahili. The British administration in Uganda at that time did believe that there was a case for maintaining close cultural ties between the new areas of knowledge that the British were bringing and the traditional background of the people themselves. There was also the view that if Uganda developed an African language other than Swahili for its lingua franca, it would simply be isolating itself. The most sensible thing for Uganda to do, so the British colonial authorities argued in 1927, was to engage in a vigorous pursuit to policies calculated to spread Swahili widely in the life of the nation and deepen its roots within it.

But resistance to Swahili came from the Baganda, the biggest tribal community of Uganda. The Baganda had a complex system of government with a highly developed cultural heritage. They were also in a strong position to spread their own language and culture to other groups in the country, and thus strengthen their own credentials for leadership in Uganda. The introduction of Swahili into Uganda as a lingua franca would be a threat to the cultural credentials of the Baganda for national leadership. There was therefore Ganda resistance to this linguistic intrusion inside their country. The British authorities, after attempting to promote Swahili in the educational system, gave up the endeavour and acquiesced in the Ganda bid to foster their own cultural hegemony in the country.

But in 1966 there was a confrontation between the independent Central Government of Uganda and the regional Government of Buganda. The Central Government won, and the King of Buganda fled to England where he lived in exile until his death in November 1969.

The political decline of the Baganda has improved the prospects of Swahili in the country. The armed forces had been using Swahili as the language of command since the colonial days, and were by then strongly partial to Swahili as one of the languages of Uganda. And in April 1970 the Language Association of Uganda passed a resolution urging the Government to take steps

to promote Swahili as a potential national language. The resolution was hotly debated in the Press, but the very idea of passing such a resolution in support of Swahili would have been almost inconceivable a few years earlier.

In short, all three countries of East Africa are seeking ways of increasing cultural intercourse among the different linguistic groups of the country. The quest for a national language, capable of spreading at the grass roots among the masses, and capable of being identified as native to Africa, becomes part of the restless search for greater cultural fusion.

The Economics of Nationhood

The second dimension of nation-building is, as we suggested, the process of economic interpenetration between sectors and groups. The different tribal communities in an African country could conceivably live in a state of bare co-existence. In other words, the boundaries of the country might have put them together on the map, but there could still be little contact between some tribes and others.

A more advanced stage of integration is when the tribes are in a state of contact, but minimally. The process of economic interaction and exchange is what could increase these contacts and maximise situations of bargaining and compromise.

Tanzania among the three East African countries has idealised the concept of self-reliance. National self-reliance perhaps deserves to be so idealised provided it does not let itself drift into a form of autarky and isolation. But from the

point of view of the integrative process, there is little worse than tribal self-reliance. When each tribe is called upon to depend only on itself for its needs, the society is not allowing itself the opportunity of fostering tribal inter-reliance. Tribal inter-reliance is achieved when groups from one community find that they have to exchange with groups from another. The market becomes a mechanism for ethnic interpenetration. Goods flow from the boundaries of one community across the boundaries of another in exchange for other goods or for services. The nation moves from a collection of groups in a relationship of co-existence to a collection of groups in a state of interaction.

But economic interaction has its dangers to the nation. Karl Marx was right in his assumption that the production and exchange of goods has all the potentiality for generating conflict. Karl Marx was wrong in assuming that this conflict will necessarily be class conflict. In African conditions ethnic divisions are often deeper and more fundamental than class divisions. And even where economic interaction takes place the tensions which are created are only partly economic, and quite often secondarily economic.

Exchange and economic interaction as a pathway towards nation-building did have a serious setback in Nigeria's experience. The Ibo as a community were impressive entrepreneurs, and their activities in this sphere did enable them to penetrate other regions and communities as tradesmen. To the extent that the Ibo were so economically mobile and capable of establishing their enterprises outside their regions, or establishing business contacts, or facilitating movements of goods from one region to another, or money, either as capital or as subsidies to their relatives - all these were activities conducive to a freater degree of interpenetration within Nigeria? They were, in other words, a contribution to national integration.

And yet tragic massacres in the north of Nigeria in May and September 1966 were in part attributable precisely to these entrepreneurial endeavours of the Ibo and their economic mobility. They had entered the north to fill important sectors of regional life, both public and private. They had provided significant services and helped to enrich and diversify the

regional economic system. But partly because of these activities, coupled with their distinctiveness as an ethnic group external to the region, the Ibo generated the kind of tensions which later erupted on such a tragic scale. Of course the nature of their first coup of January 1966, with special reference to Ibo predominance in its execution, was a major ignitive factor behind the riots and massacres which later took place as the Hausa rose to avenge themselves on the Ibo. Nevertheless, part of the price of economic interaction and exchange as fostered by the Ibo in Nigeria had been the intensification of certain areas of inter-ethnic conflict.

This is what brings us to the third major process indispensable for adequate nation-building - the process of routinising conflict resolutions. We shall discuss this further later on, but we need to relate it here to economic tensions. We have argued elsewhere that the cumulative experience of conflict resolution is indispensable to national integration. Conflict itself may have a propensity to force a dissolution of social relationships, but the resolution of conflict is an essential mechanism of integration. The whole experience of jointly looking for a way out of a crisis, of seeing your own mutual hostility subside to a level of mutual tolerance, of being intensely conscious of each others positions and yet sensing the need to bridge the gulf - these are, as I have argued elsewhere, experiences which, over a period of time should help two groups of people move forward into a relationship of greater integration. It cannot be repeated too often that conflict resolution, even if it is not a sufficient condition for national integration, is certainly a necessary condition.

As for what makes conflict resolution possible, it is sometimes the cumulative power of precedent - of having overcome other crises before. Experience of previous clashes sharpens the capacity to discover areas of mutual compatibility on subsequent occasions of tension. Another factor which makes conflict resolution possible is awareness of reciprocal dependence. We are back here to the function of economic interaction in promoting ethnic inter-reliance.

A question which inevitably rears its head in such a situation is whether a market economy with free enterprise is

a better mechanism for fostering ethnic inter-reliance than a centralised economy would be. The situation in East Africa at the moment is that Tanzania and Uganda have opted for a substantial measure of state-ownership and state-direction of the economy. Tanzania did it in 1967 with the Arusha Declaration and with, initially, the nationalisation of banks and other key enterprises, and a greater governmental control of the rest of the economy. Then on May 1st, 1970, President Obote of Uganda also announced far-reaching socialistic measures designed in part to give the state a 60 % share of all the major industries of the country.

Kenya now is the odd one in this scheme of things. The word "socialism" used to be as recurrently utilised in the rhetoric of Kenya as in that of, say, Uganda - perhaps more so at one time. But the word socialism in Kenya is getting rusty. The country under Kenyatta's government is embarked on the path of promoting private enterprise.

There is a clear commitment to create an indigenous entrepreneurial culture in the country. Much of the exchange trade on attainment of independence was in the hands of the Indians and the Europeans. Government plans have aggressively initiated measures designed to decrease the share of Indians and Europeans in the nation, and raise the level of participation of indigenous Africans in commercial activity. Institutions have been set up to help African businessmen establish themselves. Legislation has been passed to reserve certain areas for African businessmen, and exclude from those areas the competition of the immigrant communities, especially those who did not take out Kenya citizenship. The Immigration Regulations both in Kenya and Uganda are designed to indigenise much of the exchange sector of the economy, as well as indigenising other categories of personnel in national life.

The Trade Licensing Acts both in Kenya and Uganda have been designed to increase private initiative by the African and protect them from excessive challenge by longer established immigrant business enterprises. But in the case of Uganda the Trade Licensing Act of early 1969, which became operational at the beginning of 1970, has in part been over-taken by socialistic measures announced by President Obote on May Day 1970.

From the point of view of national integration a question still remains whether state ownership is a less effective way of promoting ethnic inter-reliance than a free-market economy would be.

On balance this would seem to be the case. State ownership may reduce the challenge of creating new classes in East Africa. But it may also reduce the degree to which different tribes learn the arts of bargaining with each other and the skills of economic exchange. The market as an institution in East Africa, is, in any case, much less developed than it is in West Africa. And the tradition of economic initiative among East African tribes is, on the whole, of briefer historical duration than is found among, say, the Yoruba in West Africa. Premature State-control in East Africa, before an adequately vigorous economic culture has been created and before the tradition of rational economic initiative has fully matured, might slow down that of nation-building which relies on maximising an ethnic inter-reliance and economic interaction.

It is arguable that State-ownership would strengthen governments. If State-ownership does have such an effect, it would be contributing towards the consolidation of political legitimacy, even if it does slow down the process of political integration.

But even such an assumption might be a little hasty. Does State ownership in situations of fragile central institutions enhance or stain political legitimacy? We are not yet in a position to be sure. But it is at least as arguable that the assumption of major responsibilities by the State might prematurely promote a tendency to hold the State responsible when things go wrong. When the State takes over more and more of the economy it is indeed assuming responsibility for these ventures. But responsibility in this sense implies accountability. And accountability implies the acceptance of blame when things go wrong. As the pace of development in such countries is bound to be slow, and as setbacks are bound to be recurrent, occasions for articulated recrimination or silent grievance are bound to arise from year to year. Setbacks which might otherwise have been blamed on businessmen or blind market forces or immigrant communities are increasingly attributable to failings in State policies. The real danger posed by state socialism in a society with fragile institutions is not the danger of making government too strong, but the risk of making governments more conspicuously ineffectual.

And yet even the effort itself to make the economy work could, if it includes a significant amount of genuine participation by indigenous workers and peasants, foster the kind of economic interaction necessary for nation-building.

Pluralism and Social Integration

We have defined social integration as the process by which the gaps between the elite and the masses, the rural and the urban classes, the privileged and the underprivileged, are gradually reduced or levelled out.

But here it is worth distinguishing more explicitly social integration from national integration. For our purposes the term "national integration" has a special sense and a general sense. In its special sense national integration is the merger of sub-nationalities into a wider national entity. It is the combination of the first dimension of cultural and normative fusion and the fifth dimension of cumulative collective experiences on the broad national scale. The merger of tribe with tribe on the slow road to modern nationhood is the meaning of "national integration" in this narrow specialised sense.

But national integration as a broader and more general concept encompasses all the five dimensions of nation-building. When a collection of social sub-groups are undergoing cultural and normative fusion, economic interpenetration, social integration, the institutionalization of their methods of resolving conflicts, and the accumulation of country-wide collective experiences, that collection of sub-groups is getting nationally integrated in the more general sense.

In this regard too the issue of language policy in East Africa might be illuminating. The critical goals of language

policy in relation to social engineering in East Africa are the goals of, firstly, national integration in the special sense and secondly, social integration. As elsewhere in Africa the creation of a supra-tribal or supra-ethnic loyalty to a national homeland is the goal of the integrative process in this national sense.

We have defined social integration, on the other hand, partly in relation to social stratification. Yet social integration is not necessarily a process by which the difference in income between the richest man and poorest man in the country is minimized. That absolute difference might remain the same, or even be increased, without implying that there has been no integration. But if the distance between the top and the bottom of the curve of income differences remains the same, the slope of the curve should be gradual and not steep. In a country where there are only very rich people and very poor people and nothing in between, social integration has a long way to go. But if between the pauper and the millionaire there are a lot of people with intermediate rates of income in a gradual gradation, the social integrative process has indeed made progress. We can indeed have a well-integrated traditional society in this social sense of "integration", as we can have a well-integrated modern society -- but the prerequisites are different in each case. A well-integrated traditional society has to be largely egalitarian, with no major difference in income between the richest and the poorest. A Well-integrated modern society need not be egalitarian, but the process of differentiation of structures and specialization of functions must be sufficiently advanced to have created an even or gradual slope of incomes from the top to the bottom.

Can a society move from traditional social integration to modern social integration without passing through the agonies of major gaps of income and life-style between the new elite and the masses, the town and the countryside? Can it move from social equality (the basis of traditional integration) to social differentiation (the basis of modern integration) without passing through a stage of convulsive disparities? This is one of the most agonising dilemmas of contemporary Africa.

Language policy in East Africa is linked to the problems of both national integration in the special sense and social integration. And the place of the English language is critical in both. A case can be made for the proposition that in relation to national integration in Uganda or Kenya the English language

is functional; whereas in relation to social integration the English language is dysfunctional.

The English language, by providing of means of trans-tribal communication between educated elites drawn from different ethnic groups, does serve the cause of normative interaction and shared acculturation.

But the English language, by opening up certain privileges to those who command it in such countries as Kenya and Uganda, is one causal factor behind a widening gulf between the masses and the elites.

What should be remembered is that both social integration and national integration in the narrow sense are, in essence, processes of depluralizing society. Pluralism itself never completely disappears. But a society ceases to be a plural society when the stage of full national integration is reached. To put it in another way, there is pluralism in every society, but not every society in a plural society. It depends upon the nature and depth of the pluralism. After all, it might be true to say that there is some nationhood in every independent African country, but not every independent African country is already a nation. Again it depends upon the nature and depth of that sense of nationhood.

When Harold Laski rebelled against the notion of "Man versus the State" what he substituted in its place was a view of society which thought of political life in terms of relations between the government and the individual. The theory that Laski was putting forward was a theory of pluralism.

But if a "plural society" is not simply a society with pluralism what distinguishes plural societies from others? The extreme case of a plural society is a society of total identities -- of self-contained cultural systems or exclusive racial groups. This is perhaps the kind of "plural society" which, as J.C. Mitchell suggests, comes nearest to being "a contradiction in terms". Relationships between the groups are either at the level of bare co-existence or minimal contact. This is perhaps the "pure type" of plural society (1).

(1) "... if such societies are 'plural', can they be societies?" See Mitchell, Tribalism and the Plural Society, as Inaugural Lecture, (London : Oxford University Press, 1960) p. 25.

But as the integrative process gets underway, the total identities are increasingly partialized. By the time coalescence is reached, the society has been substantially de-pluralized in this special sense. As in England, the society might still have a highly structured class-pluralism. Yet England has ceased to be a plural society. England is almost a "pure type" of an integrated nation. Complete coalescence with the Scots and the Welsh has not been fully achieved, though it is well advanced. The relationship of the English with the Northern Irish is perhaps still basically a compromise relationship, but with substantial areas of coalescence. But the preponderant English themselves have achieved cohesion. The process of national integration among the English has virtually come to an end.

Yet, for as long as certain forms of pluralism persist, there is still room for further de-pluralization. England has virtually completed national integration in the narrow sense, but there is considerable room yet for social integration. There is room especially for increased erosion of class distinctions.

Yet, while national integration in this narrow sense is finite, social integration is not. The ultimate error of Marxism is perhaps to assume that there is an end to social integration when all classes would be abolished. Having made that assumption, Marxism was logical in further assuming that there was an end to the need for the state as well - that it would "wither away" on attainment of classlessness. Perfect social integration would indeed make the state redundant. Yet because social integration is an infinite process, the state continues to be necessary for the purpose of giving it direction.

Nevertheless, in its formulation of the role of conflict in social change, and in its conception of perfect coalescence, however unrealisable, Marxism still affords useful insights into the nature of the integrative process. As an ideology Marxism does itself often create conflict. But as a methodology it helps us to understand it. After all, the integrative process is, in the ultimate analysis, the story of conflict and its role in socializing man (2).

(2) These points are discussed more fully in Mazrui, "Pluralism and National Integration" published in Pluralism in Africa edited by Leo Kuper and M.C. Smith (University of California Press, 1969). Available also as a chapter in Mazrui, Violence and Thought (London : Longmans, 1969).

The most fundamental of human institutions have often grown in response to the need to contain conflict of interest; divergence of values, and disputes over rights and duties. It is to this process of conflict-resolution in relation to nation-building that we must now turn.

Conflict and Institution-Building

The routinisation of conflict resolution needs not only stable institutions at the centre for such purposes, it also needs a diversity of secondary institutions at all the lower levels of national life as well. The routinisation of conflict resolution is, in fact, a process of institution building and the consolidation of procedures. But conflicts and disputes should not all involve the State. Mechanisms for resolving private disputes, or assuring an acceptable outcome of a private bargain, need to grow on all the different levels.

Meanwhile, authority at the centre of national life, can begin to take root. The problem of political legitimacy, is, in a sense, the old problem of political obligation in social philosophy. It is a problem of why and when one obeys, or ought to obey, the Government. Where legitimacy is fully secure, the citizens do not question the government's rights to govern, though they may question the wisdom of this or that governmental differentiation between dissent, insubordination, rebellion and outright treason.

The problem in Africa in the first few years of independence was of trying to ensure that every Opposition remained a loyal Opposition. It was a quest for a situation in which one could challenge decisions of the government and not the government's right to execute them.

In the final analysis this was the ultimate problem of consensus. As we have argued, there is a distinction between

primary consensus and secondary consensus. Primary consensus is what makes us accept a certain degree of force from the government or even complain about that force without feeling that the government lacks the right to govern at all. Agreement behind institutions is the essence of primary consensus.

Secondary consensus, on the other hand, is consensus on this or that policy, or agreement behind a leader. In this case what is accepted is the substance of a particular policy (for example, a new tax on cigarettes, or greater emphasis on secondary education) or the leadership of a particular individual. The institution which that individual occupies, or through which those policies are arrived at, might remain very fragile, subject to sudden change or collapse, and bereft of the sanctity of widespread and deep acceptance.

In short, then, consensus on policies and behind leaders is secondary consensus, while consensus of methods, procedures and the sanctity of institutions is primary consensus.

None of the three East African countries have as yet arrived at a situation of secure primary consensus. Tanzania has a highly developed level of secondary consensus behind President Nyerere himself and, for the time being, behind his policies of socialism and self-reliance. Tanzania, in other words, has secondary consensus at the level both of policy and of leadership.

Kenya has substantial secondary consensus at the level of leadership : insofar as there is still acceptance of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta as the guardian of the nation, and there is acceptance of his lieutenants to the extent that they are his lieutenants. But secondary consensus behind policies in Kenya is more fragile. This is partly because of the greater haziness about concrete national directions in Kenya than is found in Tanzania, and partly because of Kenya's less organised mechanisms of socialisation and propaganda in support of policies. In addition, there are factors of tribal nepotism in the course of the implementation of policies which help to aggravate secondary dissensus over the very policies themselves.

In regard to this problem of consensus, Uganda's situation is a little worse than even Kenya, let alone Tanzania. In Uganda there is not quite as much agreement behind either the

leadership or the policies as there is in other two countries. Yet Uganda has declared its commitment to having a one-party State. It is clear that the reasons for Uganda's choice of the one-party State are radically different from the reasons which led Tanzania to adopt the same system.

In mainland Tanzania the case for a one-party system was based on the observation that the country was solidly united. The Tanganyika African Union argued that the laws of the country should reflect the realities of the country - and one reality was that Tanganyikans or mainland Tanzanians has massively voted for single-party dominance. In announcing the intention to form a one-party system de jure, President Julius Nyerere defended the decision in 1963 partly on the grounds that without a one-party system Tanganyika would not enjoy real political contests at election time. TANU was so overwhelmingly supported that opposition candidates stood no chance. Only a one-party system, under whose umbrella candidates belonging to the same party could compete for election, would restore the principle of choice to the Tanganyika electorate - so it was argued.

But Uganda's path towards the one-party system has sprung from exactly different considerations. It seems to have sprung from the conviction that the previous multi-party systems had been basically divisive and prone to violent eruptions. The country needed a one-party system not because, as in the case of Tanzania, the country was solidly united; but because the country was dangerously divided.

When we further compare the two countries not only with each other but with a more developed and more stable entity, further points of theoretical interest might emerge. In mainland Tanzania people are united in their support for the particular political party and particular political leadership. In Great-Britain, on the other hand, people are united in their support for a particular set of institutions and system of rule. Tanzania has more secondary consensus than in normally possible in Britain. No head of government in Britain could hope to have the overwhelming support that Nyerere enjoys in mainland Tanzania, and no sets of policies in the United Kingdom are likely to enjoy as much popular backing as seems to lie behind

some of Nyerere's policies on socialism and self-reliance. There is not doubt that in terms of mobilising support for a particular personality in politics or a particular set of policies, Tanzania is more mobilizable in peace-time than the United Kingdom. But clearly, also, the United Kingdom enjoys far greater primary, consensus than has as yet been achieved by Tanzania. The system of government under which the United Kingdom is ruled does not pose the question of whether it will survive the present head of government. But institutions in Tanzania, devised substantially under Nyerere's inspiration, may conceivably outlive him as a major feature of the country, but that is by no means certain. For the time being the institutions derive their authority from the standing of Nyerere rather than Nyerere deriving his authority from the sanctity of the institutions.

In Britain, Prime Ministers come and go, but the system of government - though always changing in a number of stable ways - has nevertheless demonstrated the stable resilience of a substantial period of history.

In some respects, Tanzania is better off than the United Kingdom. Where institutions have already acquired primary consensus to back them they are difficult to change. This is all right for as long as the institutions are desirable in themselves and serve the nation well. But many of the British institutions were born in a period of time when men were not engaged in rational and purposeful nation-building. The institutions were not products of reflection, calculation, and rational choice. They were the outcome of the convergence of historical accidents.

The distinctive thing about the last few decades of world history is the greater self-confidence shown by societies in their readiness to experiment with new social institutions. Even among the Tories in the United Kingdom there is now greater preparedness than ever to try things out and to attempt to control factors of production and social change at large.

A country like Tanzania, with wide secondary consensus but as yet uncertain of primary consensus, is, in a sense, cast in a situation of real social choice. The secondary agreement

behind the leadership and the policies can be used as a basis for experimenting with carefully selected institutions, and gradually creating primary agreements behind those institutions. The people started off united behind TANU and Nyerere, but relatively indifferent towards the actual system of government and social organization devised by TANU and Nyerere. TANU and Nyerere had in other words between them a wide area of latitude as to the direction in which they wished to take the nation.

Because Tanzanians were united on Independence day behind TANU and Nyerere it made sense for TANU to set up a Commission to explore how a one-party unity could be reconciled with democratic values. It was a purposeful engagement in social engineering. But it was social engineering of the most central kind - the decision to erect a structure of government and administration as an act of conscious political choice. Having set up a one-party state de jure, the nation could then get about slowly acquiring primary consensus behind the new system should this be feasible.

But Uganda is in a different situation. It did not emerge into Independence either with the sanctity of primary consensus, as in the United Kingdom, or with the blessing of secondary consensus, as in Tanzania.

Uganda gradually drifted into a system of greater coercion. There are occasions when coercion is thought of as a functional alternative to consensus. The Congo is less united than Uganda; therefore the Congo needs more coercion in its system than does Uganda. Tanzania is more united than Uganda; therefore Tanzania should need less coercion for minimal system maintenance than Uganda.

In this sense coercion and unity or consensus are functional alternatives as bases for governmental action.

Coercion in Uganda is both a response to instability in social values and, to some extent, a cause of further violent plotting and intrigue. On 19th December 1969, there was an attempt

on President Oboto's life as he was leaving the gates of the highly successful annual delegates' conference of his party, the Uganda Peoples' Congress. Who had attempted to kill the President ?

There were three conceivable categories of opponents to the President. There was first the category of ethnic opponents of the President; secondly, ideological opponents of the President; and thirdly, the President's power rivals or those with personal political grievances.

The ethnic opponents of the President were conceivably either those who had strong feelings about the President's own tribe, or those who felt that the President had humiliated too deeply their own tribe. Theories about Ganda complicity in the attempted assassination were attributing the criminal event to issues of ethnic opposition.

The second category of opponents were the ideological opponents of the President - perhaps those who were disturbed by his declared intention to turn the country in a Leftward direction.

The third category was that of rivals for power, or people with personal grievances against Dr. Obote. This third possibility could amount to a cleavage or tense relationship between powerful political peers at the very commanding heights of the polity.

If the attempted assassination was by an ethnic opponent of the President, then the act itself symbolised the simple fact that the task of national survival was far from complete. In this case the attempted assassination was symptomatic of inadequate national integration. And as consequence it was also symptomatic of inadequate political legitimacy.

If, on the other hand, the attempted assassination was by an ideological opponent of the President's, it could mean that Ugandans were beginning to feel passionately about political issues other than tribal loyalties and the legitimacy of the regime. Political violence was moving from issues of national

survival to issues of ideological preferences. This could have great political meaning as difference in the motivation of violence.

We have already discussed the distinction between primary and secondary consensus. There is, in addition, a distinction between primary and secondary violence.

To kill because one hates socialism is less fundamental than to kill because one hates the tribe of one's opponent. Tribalistic violence is the violence of identity; ideological violence is the violence of policy. Violence on policy issues is secondary violence; violence on identity and national survival is primary violence.

The most primary form of violence is that which concerns the territorial survival of the nation. When one group in a nation is so violently opposed to another that it resents having to share the same frontiers of nationhood, cleavage is at its most fundamental. It affects not only integrative questions, but brings in also the question of whether a ruler chosen from one particular tribe has a right to exercise authority over another. National integration and political legitimacy become intertwined in the consequences, although the initial cause of the cleavage is a fracture in the integrative section.

If, on the other hand, the attempt on President Obote's life was a case of ideological violence, resisting the trend towards nationalisation and socialistic preferences, then it could conceivably mean that Uganda was moving a little further forward in the process of national integration. Secondary violence, inspired by ideological preference could indicate - though it was still too early to be sure - that the passions of pure tribalism had started on their slow historical road to extinction.

Tribalism in Africa is unlikely to disappear within a single lifetime. But, pessimistic as it may seem, the first signs of its disappearance might have to be sought in the changing

motives of political violence - from primary to secondary. Much of the violence in developed societies is secondary violence, less concerned with national survival than with the issues of policy preferences. But much of the political violence in Africa remains deeply concerned with identity and is therefore primary. The range is from the ghastly experience of the Nigerian Civil War to inter-ethnic resentments between the Bataro and the Bakenjo in one part of Uganda.

But should the difficulties in Uganda have also been concerned with tensions of power rivalry at the top, this too would be secondary violence. It would indicate that President Obote's rivals were sufficiently interested in the central machinery of the nation to control it themselves. A power struggle for the control of the centre is a confirmation that all the rivals are interested in the survival of the system. They simply disagree on who should control it. Violence between political peers for the control of the centre, or violence by subordinates who have political grievances, is therefore normally secondary violence though it may have points of linkage with the crisis of political legitimacy (3).

Towards a National Memory

But in the long and slow process of national integration, it is not enough that people should interact economically; it is not enough that they should begin to share cultural traits, it is not enough that they should socially evolve a multiplicity of institutions for resolving conflict, there is a fifth dimension

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- (3) These issues are discussed also in Mazrui, "Leadership in Africa: Obote of Uganda", International Journal, Summer, 1970.

required to pull these other four together and focus them towards the centre. This fifth dimension might be called the collective cumulation of shared national experience. Economic exchange, though going on all over the country, usually involves relationships between sub-units of the nation - a shopkeeper and his customers, a firm with another firm, a parastatal body with its clientele. The spread of the Swahili language, though it does introduce significant cultural interaction in the country, does not ensure that one part of the country knows much about another; or that there is a conscious identification between those who speak Swahili in the northern tip of Tanzania and those who speak it in the southern tip. The routinisation of conflict resolution can also be resolution between sub-units of the nation, or between the central government and one particular sub-unit at a given moment in time. None of these experiences really need involve, in any fundamental sense, the population as a whole. They may have repercussions all over the country, but in general the processes of economic interaction, social integration, routinisation of conflict resolution, and cultural fusion may be basically processes of integrating sub-units into each other but not necessarily of nationalising them all in a shared moment of particular experience.

In order to give these four other processes a central focus and promote in the population mutual identification as nationals of the same country, some additional area of experience is needed, and this additional centralising process is what might be called a collective cumulation of shared moments of national experience.

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In Representative Government, John Stuart Mill defined a nationality in the following terms :

" A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others - which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that they should be governed by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes... but the strongest of all

is identity of political antecedents; the possession of national history and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past ". (4)

Mill is here emphasising the importance for nationhood of the kind of shared experiences which lead to shared prejudices and shared emotional dispositions. When a group of people begin to feel proud about the same things or humiliated by the same things, pleased or saddened collectively by the same incidents, that group of people is acquiring the capacity for collective self-hood. The process of nation-building at the psychological level therefore entails the cumulative acquisition of common emotional dispositions and common potential responses to the same stimuli. To be capable of being angry about the same incident is to share an area of fellow-feeling. The shared resentment of colonialism in African countries often constituted the beginnings of national consciousness. And where elections are permitted to take place in independent Africa, the general participation in campaigning and the widespread disputes over policies and personalities are a form of political interaction on a national scale. To that extent every general election, no matter how painful and even violent, is part of the cumulative acquisition of collective memories by an African people.

Social engineering in the new African states has sometimes taken the form of purposeful collectivisation of emotions in a bid to make the populace share a moment of empathy. The collectivisation of anger, for example, sometimes results in the nationalization of protest. A capacity for what Mill calls "collective pride and humiliation" is a particularly important feature of a sense of shared nationhood. It is precisely because of this that anger as an emotion is so central to the growth of nationhood. After all, offended pride gives rise to anger. Collective humiliation is a deeper stage of offended pride. This in turn generates anger, either overtly or in a subdued silent form. Shared moments of collective anger by a group, by being connected with the cumulative acquisition of a capacity for collective pride

(4) Representative Government, (1861) Chapter XVI.

and collective humiliation, become part of the process of national integration.

Among political leaders in Africa Milton Obote of Uganda has been particularly aware of the importance of promoting shared emotional dispositions and potential responses to the same stimuli. Obote, faced with a country deeply divided ethnically has at times turned precisely to the devices of collectivising moments of anger and nationalising protest.

On Saturday February 13th, 1965, some Congolese planes bombed the villages of Goli and Paidha in the West Nile District of Uganda. Obote himself was angry that this should have happened. But, more importantly, he saw the moment as one which afforded the opportunity for collective patriotic anger among Ugandans. Anger against the Congolese for violating Uganda's borders in such a violent way did itself afford some possibilities for patriotic indignation on the part of Ugandans. Yet Obote perceived that being angry with the Congolese was not adequate. The planes which had crossed the border were American-made, sold or given to Tshombe's regime in the Congo by the United States as a conscious high policy. The possibility of collectivising Ugandan anger and directing it at the United States, in addition to directing it at Tshombe's regime, was grasped by Obote. The situation did indeed afford possibilities of a sense of wounded pride. In addition, a diplomatic confrontation between Uganda and the United States had all the air of a David and Goliath confrontation. The weak, aroused in proud anger, were confronting the mighty in a posture of defiant protest. Obote said to his countrymen :

" We blame the government of the United States... We have been attacked without provocation on our part.

I cannot say whether we are going to retaliate...

We must all be prepared to throw sand, and sacks

..... of sands, in the eyes of the mighty " : (5)

(5) Uganda Argus (Kampala), February 15, 1965.

Even then the question arose as to why Dr. Obote was dramatizing the bombing incident instead of minimizing it. One reason might have been the obvious one - the desire to take a justifiably indignant stand at having had one's frontiers violently violated. But it also seemed likely that Obote perceived the political functions of wounded pride when it is collectivised. An important problem confronting every African government is, after all, how to transform that old race-conscious nationalism of the anti-colonial struggle into a new state-conscious patriotism of post-independence days. How could those anti-imperialist protests of transformation of yester-year now be converted into cumulative dispositions of shared national identity ?

In the case of the particular incident in Uganda in 1965, there was something very 'sovereign' about having to defend one's borders against hostile planes. That must have been one reason why Dr. Obote felt impelled to remind his countrymen of a small point when he spoke on television on that night following the bombing of the village. Obote reminded Ugandans that on October 9, 1962, the country had become independent. There was something rather 'sovereign' about having one's air space protected. To be attacked by enemy planes from across the border could almost be a status symbol in the case of new states. The diplomatic protests which followed had inevitably the ring of newly acquired sovereignty.

If, then, an African leader like Obote was dedicated to creating a state-conscious patriotism in his people, he had to utilize the sovereign symbolism of a variety of different factors - from flags to air space. This is what made the 'destruction' of a village in the West Nile District of Uganda something which could be used in the construction of a moment of national cohesion; for Ugandans in a moment of joint outrage were Ugandans united.

The government therefore arranged popular participation in national anger. A national demonstration was arranged for Tuesday afternoon, February 16, 1965. There were ministerial appeals to employers to release their workers for the great march to the American Embassy and for the rally to follow. At least metaphorically, Ugandans were up in arms - or so the great

march was supposed to demonstrate. And even the wounded soldier in a West Nile village was elevated to a symbolic state here. As Dr. Obote put it :

" Our one Officer has already spilled blood for all of us. It will be our duty to redeem that blood ". (6)

The Uganda Government could have protested directly to the Congolese Government or to the Government of the United States. But this would have been a government-to-government from a protest. Instead, what Obote was out to do was precisely to collectivise anger, and popularise protest as a way of nationalising it. In the arrangements which were made there were a number of miscalculations, and not everything went according to plan in that joint endeavour to unite Ugandans in shared indignation. But a demonstration did take place. The American Embassy was momentarily besieged and the American flag was burnt. Diplomatic protest at the level of government to government was one thing, but Obote was out to give protest some grassroots, and, in so doing, add one more thin layer of experience to that slow cumulative acquisition of a sense of "shared pride and shared humiliation" among Ugandans. The history of Uganda under Obote includes other moments of attempted nationalisation of political indignation. The growth of national identity is inseparable from the process by which prejudices become to some extent homogenised in the population, and emotional dispositions become collectivised. Sometimes fear as a source of protest is also relevant to this process. The fear of an enemy, the anger arising out of wounded pride, and the ambition to create the foundations of nationhood have often interacted on those occasions of shared responses in new states. (7)

(6) Ibid.

(7) For a further elaboration of Uganda's experience in this regard consult Mazrui "Leadership in Africa : Obote of Uganda", op.cit. We are particularly indebted to Victor Uchendu for his comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

A-IV MODELS AND METHODS IN THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
 NATIONS BUILDING

MODELES ET METHODES DANS L'ETUDE COMPARATIVE DE
LA CONSTRUCTION DES ETATS

SOCIAL CLEAVAGE AND NATION-BUILDING IN EAST AFRICA

Ali A. Mazrui

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C O N C L U S I O N

These, then, are the five dimension of nation-building as illustrated by East Africa's experience. The quest for a national language is, in part, a quest for a shared cultural heritage. A collection of individuals or sub-groups become a people partly when they succeed in forging a common universe of perspectives and a capacity for mutual communication. Cultural and normative fusion does not presuppose an identity of values or uniformity or thought and cultural behaviour. It simply presupposes a high degree of mutual influence between groups and individuals in cultural perspectives, tending towards a shared language of cultural discourse.

Economic interpenetration between groups and sectors of society promotes a shared interest in the economic fortunes of the country. In East Africa the issue is also connected with the policies of indigenizing the three economies against a background of expatriate dominance. Put at its most extreme, the approaches have amounted to a choice between Black Capitalism and African Socialism -- between state-ownership and state control of the economy on the one hand, and the promotion of an indigenous entrepreneurial class on the other. Tanzania is leaning towards a socialistic approach to indigenous economic engagement; Kenya is leaning towards an indigenous private enterprise system; and Uganda seems to be experimenting with both approaches.

Economic interaction is a process which influence other aspects of social change. The issue of class-formation looms into relevance. Tanzania seeks to achieve social integration through social equality (as was the case in integrated traditional societies). Kenya, on the other hand, has been pursuing social integration through social differentiation and functional diversification among the African populace. Uganda is again caught in-between the two approaches. Meanwhile, the policies of progressive depluralization continue, and both language policies and economic policies are central to the whole process.

Class-formation, whether encouraged or frustrated, generates areas of conflict. There are other forms of conflict as well in every East African country, ranging from ethnic tensions to ideological disputes. Nation-building must therefore include the construction of institutions for the resolution of these multiple levels of conflict. The institutions are intruded to them. But the experience of institutional experimentation, as well as the constant search for ways of containing conflict at large, are perhaps the most explicit political of all the dimensions of nation-building. The crisis of political authority and legitimacy is a crisis of institutional fluidity. It is a crisis of incapacity to solve some of the critical disputes of politics. In this respect nation-building becomes a research for a viable system of tension-management.

Finally, we have discussed in this essay the unifying impact of collective experiences on a people. Colonialism itself was for many African countries such an experience, and the struggle against colonialism was another. The very fact of having been ruled

by the same colonial power for half a century or more was an important factor behind the relative unity and similarity between Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania, as contrasted with the Congo, which was ruled by a different imperial country. After independence, it has been such phenomena as party politics, electioneering, national service, induced collective indignation, and special central crisis which have focussed attention on the country as a whole as a unit of selfhood.

These are the experiences which cumulatively involve into a shared national memory. And a national memory is the historical dimension of nationhood, giving this particular form of collective identity its roots in time.

C.C.

A-IV / 6 SOCIAL CLEVAGE AND NATION-BUILDING IN EAST AFRICA

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CONCLUSION

Selon l'expérience de l'Afrique orientale, telles sont les cinq dimensions de l'élaboration d'une nation. L'aspiration à une langue nationale participe de l'aspiration à un héritage culturel commun. Un ensemble d'individus, ou sous-groupes, s'érige partiellement en peuple lorsqu'il parvient à se forger un ensemble de perspectives communes et une possibilité de communication réciproque. La fusion culturelle et normative ne présuppose ni une identité de valeurs, ni l'uniformité de pensées et de comportement culturel. Elle présuppose simplement qu'entre groupes et individus qui participent d'une même perspective culturelle s'établit une forte influence réciproque dans la recherche d'un langage propre à l'échange culturel.

L'interpénétration économique de groupes et secteurs de sociétés favorise l'intérêt commun pour le destin économique du pays. En Afrique orientale cette question est également liée à la politique autochtone de l'économie des trois pays, en opposition à la domination étrangère. On pourrait dire que leurs approches ont consisté à choisir entre le contrôle de l'économie ou la promotion d'une classe entreprenante autochtone. La Tanzanie incline pour une approche socialiste de l'économie indigène, le Kenya s'oriente vers l'entreprise privée et l'Ouganda expérimente les deux approches.

L'interaction économique est un processus qui influence d'autres aspects de l'évolution sociale. La formation de classes en occupe le premier plan. La Tanzanie cherche à réaliser son intégration sociale par le biais de l'égalité (c'était le cas des sociétés traditionnelles intégrées). Le Kenya de son côté poursuit son intégration sociale par la différenciation sociale et la diversification fonctionnelle parmi le peuple africain. Une fois encore l'Ouganda s'est trouvé pris entre ces deux influences. Encore que la politique de dépluralisation progressive se poursuit, les objectifs quant à la langue et à l'économie demeurent au centre de tout le processus.

Encouragée ou frustrée, la formation de classes est sujette à conflits. Et ce ne sont pas les seuls conflits dans chacun des pays de l'Afrique orientale.

Leurs conflits s'étendent des tensions ethniques aux conflits idéologiques. L'élaboration des Nations doit donc prévoir également l'élaboration d'institutions propres à résoudre ces conflits à leurs multiples niveaux. Ces institutions sont confiées à leur totale liberté. L'expérience qu'ils font de ces expérimentations institutionnelles aussi bien que la recherche constante des moyens de limiter les conflits constitue sans doute l'élément le plus explicitement politique des dimensions de cette élaboration des Nations. La crise d'autorité politique et de légitimité est une crise de la souplesse constitutionnelle. C'est une crise due à l'incapacité de résoudre certains des conflits politiques. Sous cet angle l'élaboration de Nations constitue une recherche de système valable pour le maniement des tensions.

Finalement, dans cet essai nous avons soulevé la question de l'effet d'unification sur un peuple des expériences collectives. La colonisation elle-même a constitué pour plusieurs pays africains une telle expérience et la lutte anti-colonialiste en a constitué une autre. Le fait d'avoir été colonisé par une même puissance pendant un demi siècle et plus a été pour l'Ouganda, le Kenya et la Tanzanie un facteur important d'unité et d'identité relatives en comparaison du Congo qui fut colonisé par différentes puissances. Ce sont les phénomènes tels que les constitutions de partis politiques, les élections, le service militaire, la provocation à l'indignation collective et les crises centrales qui ont attiré l'attention du pays sur son entité en tant qu'unité personnalisée.

Telles sont les expériences qui par un processus consultatif évoluent vers l'établissement de souvenirs communs. La mémoire nationale, en donnant à la collectivité la forme particulière de son identité dans le temps, constitue une dimension historique de la constitution d'une nation.

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CONTINUING POLITICAL CHANGE:THE NEW ZEALAND CASE

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Most of the concern of the theoretical literature of political development has been with the new states created since the Second World War or with older states in some earlier historical period of "nation-building". It is the purpose of this paper to explore the applicability of some of the concepts of development theorists to political change in an economically developed democratic political system. In doing so it is hoped to throw light on possible ways in which the comparative politics of democratic political systems can be studied with an explicit framework which takes into account political change in those systems.

New Zealand in the nineteen sixties has much to offer as an initial case study. It is not only one of the most stable democracies in the world but in this period seemed more stable than usual. The same party was in power at the end of the decade as had been in power for most of the previous twenty years (with the exception of 1957-60), with the same Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister as at the end of 1960. An exploration of the change that occurred in this period might throw some light on the nature of change in other stable democracies as well as on the extent to which change should be given some priority in research.

New Zealand, too, is very dependent on the actions of larger nations. In this it is typical of the great proportion of member states of the United Nations. The case provides an opportunity to consider the relationship of internal political processes with the larger international system, a field sometimes referred to as "linkage politics".

Moreover, it seemed possible that the country was small enough (2.8 million at the end of 1969) for an individual who had been both an observer of New Zealand politics and a participant for most of the decade to produce interpretations of some validity which could be produced in a larger country only with very great effort and expense. The validity of interpretations in this paper, of course, could be challenged by other observers who saw something different, or by the

author himself at a later date looking back with the advantage of more research and more hindsight.

In this paper a conceptual framework will be used comprising a specified time period and a set of headings of significant areas of change. The time period adopted was the decade from 1st January 1960 to 31st December 1969. The object of selecting a determinate period is to provide for the possibility of systematic comparison of change not only between different time periods in the one territory but also in the same time period in different territories. A decade appears to be the most appropriate time period for this purpose.

The set of headings adopted for considering change was derived from the model proposed by some members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, who "have suggested that it may be useful to conceptualize the processes of political development as involving essentially six crises that may be met in different sequences but all of which must be successfully dealt with for a society to become a modern nation-state."² The word "crises" seems inappropriate for the description of the context of change in many of the economically developed nations, since change has often appeared to proceed in an incremental manner. For the purposes of this paper the word "problem" will be substituted and reference will be made to the problems of identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, integration, and distribution. An extract from Lucian W. Pye's outline of the different crises of development will precede discussion of each of these categories.

Whether the changes outlined in this paper actually constitute "political development" is a question that must remain beyond the scope of this present exercise. Although a set of headings is used which has been developed by its originators on the basis of a variety of assumptions and evidence about what is important in studying political change, it is not the intention in this paper to state that changes in these various categories constitute "political development" or that they are desirable or undesirable. The situation into which economically developed democratic political systems are now moving is too ill-defined at present to offer reliable criteria for assessing achievement on a comparative basis. Partly for this reason also, the term "nation-building" has been avoided in this paper. In particular it seems to be an inappropriate concept to apply to a context in which many states are engaged in the creation of new political systems at the international level.

The model has been adjusted to take into account the international or external context of political change in a given territory. This permits the model to be used for territories that are states, parts of states, e.g. Texas, Newfoundland, Scotland, or combinations of states. Accordingly the paper includes the international dimensions of political change in New Zealand.

IDENTITY

The first and most fundamental crisis is that of achieving a common sense of identity. The people in a new state must come to recognize their national territory as being their true homeland, and they must feel as individuals that their own personal identities are in part defined by their identification with their territorially delimited country. In most of the new states traditional forms of identity ranging from tribe or caste to ethnic and linguistic groups compete with the sense of larger national identity.

The identity crisis also involves the resolution of the problem of traditional heritage and modern practices, the dilemma of parochial sentiments, and cosmopolitan practices... 3

For over a century New Zealanders have had a sense of dual identity. On the one hand there has been a growing sense of identity as members of a community with its own history, geography, and way of life, a process influenced by the accumulating experience of operating as a self-governing community since 1856 and by the constant increase in the proportion of the adult population of those whose families have lived for three or more generations in New Zealand. Also relevant in this process have been the isolation of the country, which made a clear-cut distinction possible between New Zealand and "overseas"; the relative homogeneity of the migrants to New Zealand, mostly coming from the British Isles and from Protestant confessions; and the severity of problems of distribution in New Zealand history, which produced national cleavages on economic issues and a vigorous national political life.

On the other hand New Zealanders have continued to have a sense of identity as members of a larger entity than New Zealand. There has been a constant awareness of New Zealand as a fragment which has shaped New Zealand foreign policy. Until the middle of the nineteen fifties this was a sense of identity as part of the British Empire and later of the British Commonwealth. The relationship with Britain for a century was probably as close as has ever existed between two separate communities. It rested not only on sentiment (including nostalgia on the part of many immigrants and their families) but on a mutually beneficial economic and defence relationship. New Zealand specialised in providing abundant cheap food for the British market and also provided a market for British investment.

and manufactured goods. In the military sphere Britain provided an assurance of security for New Zealand and New Zealand provided manpower for British military concerns in the Boer War, two World Wars, and later in Malaysia.

In the nineteen sixties both parts of New Zealanders' sense of dual identity underwent considerable change. There has been a steady growth of national consciousness through the decade, and a widespread and conscious desire to have decisions affecting New Zealand made in New Zealand. One can find a more frequent use of words like "national interests" and nationhood at the end of the decade than at the beginning. Moreover a number of government measures reflected a realisation that New Zealand national interests did not necessarily coincide with those of other countries. Thus measures taken to prevent overseas ownership of the daily press, to limit the takeover of New Zealand firms by overseas concerns, and to restrict overseas purchase of New Zealand land, reflected governmental belief in the need for action in New Zealand's national interest. The decision to commit troops to Vietnam and the decision as to the scope and limits of that commitment, involved a similar belief, while much of the public debate on the Vietnam commitment has been in terms of competing conceptions of the national interest.

At the same time there has been a growing consciousness of the multi-racial composition of New Zealand. The awareness of New Zealand's minority Maori race (approximately 7 per cent of the population) became more pronounced during the decade on the part of both Maoris and non-Maoris. There developed a widespread acceptance of the need to integrate the two races, though there was disagreement over the most appropriate means of achieving this objective. School texts for children beginning to read have been liberally sprinkled with multiracial illustrations and stories, while there has been a strong official emphasis by government departments on the significance of the Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840 by Governor Hobson on behalf of the British Government and by a number of northern Maori chiefs. Although this once symbolised the proclamation of British sovereignty over the territory of New Zealand, the symbol's meaning has been undergoing a rapid transformation in the last decade and a half. It has been authoritatively stated in the Education Department's Education Gazette, received by all teachers, that Waitangi Day (which is now New Zealand's official national day)"commemorates the signing of a treaty

which has come to symbolise for New Zealanders the bonds which united them as one people, equal before the law, in common loyalty to the Crown." Or as the Prime Minister put it in his 1966 Waitangi Day message to schools: "By the simple act of signing a paper, two races, European and Maori, merged their destinies to become one nation." Multi-racialism has strong support among the public as well. Public protests early in the nineteen sixties at the non-inclusion of Maoris in the rugby football team to tour South Africa developed into a powerful consensus by the middle of the decade that no team should go to South Africa if Maoris competent to participate were prohibited from playing South African teams. This was eventually accepted by the South African Government and the team touring South Africa in 1970, which left in a political storm over the merits of any sporting association at all with that country, contains three members with Maori blood as well as one part-Samoan member.

In the international scene New Zealand's identity as part of a larger whole has changed in form though the habit has remained. The evolution during the last two decades and especially during the nineteen sixties has been away from a preoccupation with British models and concerns to a sense of multiple participation in a variety of larger entities. It has been argued during the sixties, sometimes by the same people, that New Zealand is an Australasian country, it is part of the "free world", it is one of the "English-speaking peoples", it is a European country like Britain with a concern in ensuring continued access to British markets when Britain joins the EEC, it is part of Asia, it is a Pacific country with responsibilities to the island peoples of the Pacific, and it is a small country concerned with the preservation of other small countries. These issues of identity faced New Zealand at the end of the decade, and at the beginning of the seventies there is some evidence that New Zealanders may prefer to keep this multiple choice of identity open to them for a long time in the future.

LEGITIMACY

Closely related to the identity crisis is the problem of achieving agreement about the legitimate nature of authority and the proper responsibilities of government. In many new states the crisis of legitimacy is a straightforward constitutional problem: What should be the relationship between central and local authorities? What are the proper limits of the bureaucracy, or of the army in the nation's political life? Or possibly the conflict is over how much of the colonial structure of government should be preserved in an independent state.

In other new states the question of legitimacy is more diffuse, and it involves sentiments about what should be the underlying spirit of government and the primary goals of national effort.⁵

Like the identity problem, legitimacy must be looked at in both internal and external dimensions. Concerning the internal dimensions, the general pattern of legitimacy of New Zealand governmental institutions was established long before European settlement began in New Zealand. The institutions established in the new British colony followed the British constitutional model, and subsequent modifications tended to follow British precedent in so far as relationships between Parliament and the Executive were concerned. The favorable orientations to these institutions of immigrants from Britain were reinforced by the capacity of the new institutions to respond rapidly to the many situations requiring government action.

By 1960 there appeared to be a high level of legitimacy of governmental institutions in general. However, in the decade since there appear to have been several changes of probable significance in the long process of constitutional change.

For example, two constitutional experiments of the previous decade acquired greater legitimacy in the nineteen sixties. The first of these was the abolition of the second chamber in 1950. The unicameral legislature had acquired such legitimacy by the middle of the nineteen sixties that efforts by a small group concerned with re-establishing the second chamber met with little and declining public support. The second was the entrenchment of a number of major electoral rules in the Electoral Act 1956 behind a special procedure of amendment, i.e. a 75 per cent majority of members of the House of Representatives or a majority of the electorate at a referendum. The entrenchment was considered to derive its

strength from the fact that it was passed unanimously by Parliament, but ultimately its sanctity would depend upon the development of a constitutional custom of observance. In the nineteen sixties that custom seems to have become well-established. Four attempts were made to change one or other of the entrenched provisions and in each case the special procedure was followed.

The establishment of indicative economic planning with its elaborate structure of advisory committees should also be included as an important constitutional move in the sixties. By the end of the decade sufficient experience with indicative planning had been accumulated within the governing National Party (which had formerly criticised Labour's inclinations to planning) and among economic interests that the general system had very widespread support when it was created in the last months of 1969. Legitimacy was thus tentatively established by the end of the decade though permanent legitimacy will probably need to wait for signs of economic success associated with the working of the new planning institutions.

Perhaps not unrelated to the evolution of the indicative planning, the bureaucracy has apparently acquired greater legitimacy during the decade. There are today few complaints of inefficiency or abuse of power of the kind very familiar in the nineteen forties and fifties. Possible contributions to this trend have been the establishment of an Ombudsman in 1962, the increasing tendency on the part of government departments to engage in public relations activities, and the growing closeness of relations between pressure group leaders and civil servants.

While individual institutions appear to have acquired greater legitimacy in the course of the decade, it is possible that the existence of a separate sovereign state was more in question at the end of the sixties than at the beginning. Comments by a number of business leaders in the course of the economic recession in 1967 indicated some support for joining the Australian federation, which New Zealand had declined to do at the beginning of the century. While discussion of this possibility has subsided with the rapid economic recovery of 1968 and 1969, there could be a recurrence of the federation discussion at any stage when New Zealand's continued economic viability becomes in doubt.

Legitimacy as a concept appears to be useful to apply to certain aspects of New Zealand's external relationships. New Zealand like many other small countries has relied upon a variety of patterned international relationships for its security and economic survival. Some of these relationships have been formalised, like the ANZUS Pact with Australia and the United States, while others exist mainly in patterns of established expectations and mutual responsiveness like the special relationship of Britain and New Zealand. In the nineteen sixties there was a rise and fall in the legitimacy of the various patterned international relationships. There was a slow decline in the legitimacy of the relationship with Britain, attributable largely to Britain's concern to enter the European Economic Community and to the probability of major British withdrawal of military forces from Southeast Asia. In the defence field the ANZUS Treaty with Australia and the United States became more important during the decade as the basis of New Zealand's security arrangements with the growing imminence of British military withdrawal from Southeast Asia. The great dependence of both Australia and New Zealand on the security provided by the United States protection has meant that the two countries have tended to be more concerned with their individual relations with the United States than with each other. However, co-operation between Australia and New Zealand in the defence field steadily developed in the nineteen sixties and was reflected in the integration of the two countries' forces in Vietnam, attempts to ensure compatibility of military equipment and rationalisation of defence production and supply, development of closer consultation and co-operation between the armed services of the two countries, and development of closer relationships at diplomatic, ministerial, and Prime Ministerial level.

Probably the single most important international arrangement entered into by New Zealand in the 1960s was the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which came into force in January 1966. Rapid expansion of trade has been taking place through the progressive reduction and elimination of import duties over a period of years on a progressively expanding list of products, as well as through rationalisation agreements between firms in the two countries. There has been a marked increase in the legitimacy in New Zealand of the Agreement since it came into force, and it appears likely to form the basis of further developments in integrating the economies of Australia and New Zealand in the present decade.

PENETRATION

The critical problems of administration in the new states give rise to the penetration crisis, which involves the problems of government in reaching down into the society and effecting basic policies To carry out significant developmental policies a government must be able to reach down to the village level and touch the daily lives of people.

. . . . The penetration problem is that of building up the effectiveness of the formal institutions by government and of establishing confidence and rapport between rulers and subjects. Initially governments often find it difficult to motivate the population or to change its values and habits in order to bring support to programs of national development.

By 1960 New Zealand had already developed governmental institutions that would have ranked highly on an international comparison of effectiveness. However, several changes took place during the decade both in the formal machinery of decision-making and in the behaviour of politicians and public, which have further increased government effectiveness. These arose partly from experience in operating the political system and partly from the necessity for co-ordinated action to cope with the problem of economic survival for a small country dependent upon the markets of large countries with powerful protectionist agricultural lobbies.

Within the formal structure of the executive agencies of government a number of significant reforms have taken place during the nineteen sixties. Already at the beginning of the decade there was an effective system of interdepartmental committees servicing Cabinet committees in various areas of policy. To this pattern was added the development of the influence of the control agencies, the State Services Commission and the Treasury, and the development of indicative economic planning.

The State Services Commission arose out of recommendations made by a royal commission in 1962 for the improvement of the efficiency of the State Services. It replaced the former Public Service Commission and had more functions and powers than its predecessor. It had an impact during the second half of the sixties in such areas as personnel policy, staff training, the adoption of efficient management techniques, and most importantly through its function of reviewing the machinery

of government; in this latter area it has contributed to a gradual process of amalgamation of government departments which is likely to continue during the seventies.

The Treasury's influence as a co-ordinator has been in two main areas. First, its role in the area of financial control of government activities has become more active since the beginning of 1967 because of the Government's decision to severely limit growth in public expenditure in order to counter the crisis in the balance of payments. Backed by a determined Minister of Finance with Prime Ministerial support, Treasury influence on departmental spending has since then been very strong. Moreover, in its experimentation and growing acquaintance with new techniques of controlling long-term government expenditure and of evaluating major projects, the Treasury has been evolving methods of controlling government expenditure which are likely to be very important in the nineteen seventies. Second, as the co-ordinating agency in the evolving process of indicative economic planning, the Treasury appears to have been gaining more influence over the policy areas covered by this process.

Indicative economic planning, involving the setting of targets in consultation with the groups affected, has been developing in New Zealand for nearly two decades. Precedents often quoted in this connection (which themselves can be argued to have precedents in earlier decades) include the Housing Conference of 1953, the Industrial Development Conference of 1960, the Export Development Conference of 1963, and the Agricultural Development Conference of 1963-64. The most influential of these on political opinion was the Agricultural Development Conference, together with its continuing machinery, the Agricultural Development Council.

The National Government adopted the idea of indicative planning in 1962, influenced both by its previous experience with the Housing Conference and by Western European examples of indicative planning. It decided that agriculture should be the subject of its first exercise in this field, and the success of the Agricultural Development Conference in mobilising the agricultural sector encouraged further exercises. A separate Treasury Planning Unit, later Division, was set up and a number of separate consultative exercises began in different areas,

including forestry, tourism, and education. In 1968 the decision was taken to combine all these into a large National Development Conference. This lasted over a year and comprised two plenary sessions and a number of committees investigating the major sectors of the economy. Taking part were some five hundred people drawn from the civil service, from the various economic interests, from all the major regions of New Zealand, and from the universities.

The Conference recommended and the Government accepted a target rate of real growth for the economy of $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per annum for two target periods ending in 1972/73 and 1978/79. Targets were also set for exports in different sectors and a large number (632) of recommendations were forwarded to the Government for consideration. During the Conference a consensus was reached on the need for continuing machinery to supervise the implementation of the targets and recommendations. This was established in the later months of 1969 and early 1970, and consists of a number of advisory councils in the various sectors of national life with a National Development Council as a "co-ordinating nucleus".

Indicative planning in the New Zealand setting has provided an effective way of mobilising sectors of economic life in particular directions. It still remains to be seen how successful it will be in mobilising a whole economy.

Another important development in the late sixties was the National Government's acceptance of fiscal policy as part of its repertoire of economic management. The Labour Party when in office in the nineteen thirties and forties and briefly again between 1957 and 1960 had accepted the desirability of using fiscal measures to control the economy, but the National Party was averse to these till the mid-sixties. It preferred to employ monetary and credit restraints. Taxation was something it felt should be continually reduced in incidence, while government expenditure should not be curtailed severely otherwise major development projects could not take place. However, balance of payments difficulties appearing in the mid-sixties and developing into a severe crisis in 1967, compelled a revision of earlier attitudes. In 1966 government expenditure was consciously restrained in order to slow down economic activity and in the course of 1967 a very wide range of fiscal measures were taken to meet the crisis in the balance of payments. These included increases in indirect taxes, removal of most

consumer subsidies, increases in charges for government-supplied services, and a severe reduction in the rate of increase of public expenditure. The British devaluation of the pound in November 1967 enabled New Zealand to devalue by 19.45 per cent as part of a policy of restructuring the economy to favour the exporter.

Two events appear to have been vital in establishing fiscal policy very firmly as part of the armoury of future New Zealand governments. One was the strong recovery of the New Zealand economy in 1968 and 1969, due in part at least to the remedial actions that had been taken. The other was the election victory of the National Government in November 1969 in spite of the unpopularity of the measures it had adopted only two years previously. A new political myth seems likely to emerge from this as a supporting argument for those politicians who prefer strong action but previously have felt that the public would not tolerate it.

It is not irrelevant to note that these developments in governmental effectiveness have been taking place against a background of great stability in the public sector's share of national activity. Over the decade there has been a slight reduction in the central government's share of the GNP from 29.9 in 1959-60 to 29.0 in 1968-69. In terms of proportion of employees, those paid by central government increased slowly, from 19.8 per cent of the total labour force in 1963-64 (from 18.8 in 1948-49) to 19.9 per cent in 1967-68.

The measures outlined above have raised problems in connection with the relationship between Parliament and Government. A growing imbalance in their relationship over the past two decades has probably not been countered significantly by reforms in the institution of Parliament. These include the establishment of the office of Ombudsman in 1962, the setting up of an effective Public Expenditure Committee of the House of Representatives in 1962 to examine departmental use of funds allocated by Parliament, and the streamlining of parliamentary procedure including the adoption of a more efficient Question Time procedure and the expansion of parliamentary committee work. The advent of indicative planning in New Zealand raises important questions about the training of Members of Parliament, the information available to them about the

issues involved in planning, and their opportunity to play an influential and constructive part in the planning process.

Finally, in considering the problem of penetration we should not overlook the external dimensions of the operations of New Zealand government institutions. The most important change in the decade has been the establishment of the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement. It has begun to create a new set of international arrangements for promoting and supervising the growth of economic integration between the two economies. The institutions are still extremely rudimentary, including a Consultative Committee meeting at ministerial and official level and a Joint Consultative Council on Forest Industries. The New Zealand Attorney-General has also begun to take part in meetings of Australian Commonwealth and States Attorney-General, which have been concerned in recent years with the harmonisation of commercial law in the Australian federation.

PARTICIPATION

The participation crisis occurs when there is uncertainty over the appropriate rate of expansion [of popular participation] and when the influx of new participants creates serious strains on the existing institutions. As new segments of the population are brought into the political process, new interests and new issues begin to arise so that the continuity of the old polity is broken and there is the need to reestablish the entire structure of political relations.

In a sense the participation crisis arises out of the emergence of interest groups and the formation of a party system. The question in many new states is whether the expansion in participation is likely to be effectively organized into specific interest groups or whether the pressures will lead only to mass demands and widespread feelings of anomie.⁷

In 1960 the major patterns of political participation had long been established. With responsible government established in 1856, manhood suffrage in 1879, female suffrage in 1893, development of the first national

parties and pressure groups in the last decade of the nineteenth century and first decade of the twentieth century, and consolidation of the present two party system in the middle of the nineteen thirties, the 1960s appear at first sight to be a period of remarkable stability as far as participation is concerned. Below the surface, however, considerable change has taken place.

Throughout the decade New Zealand maintained its finely balanced two party system. Although the National Party gained a majority of seats in the 1960, 1963, 1966 and 1969 elections, it was at no stage in a dominating position where it could safely disregard any major currents of public opinion. Not only did it have less than an absolute majority of the total votes behind it but also the electoral difference between the two main parties was very slight.

The electoral results illustrate the closeness of the party competition. In 1960 the proportions of the total votes recorded were: National 47.33, Labour 43.18, Social Credit 8.57; in 1963 National 46.78, Labour 43.48, Social Credit 7.90; in 1966 National 43.40, Labour 41.21, Social Credit 14.40; and in 1969 National 44.87, Labour 43.93, Social Credit 9.00. Seats in the House were divided: 1960, National 46, Labour 34; 1963, National 45, Labour 35; 1966, National 44, Labour 35, Social Credit 1; and in 1969, National 45, Labour 39.

The closeness of the voting appears to be both a determinant and a consequence of the sensitivity of New Zealand politicians to public opinion. But certain features of the 1963 and 1966 elections suggested that the two main parties were failing to inspire confidence in significant portions of the electorate. In 1963 there was a tendency for more voters than usual to vote for the sitting Member irrespective of his party while in 1966 dissatisfaction with both major parties appears to have a reason for a substantial nation-wide protest vote for the small Social Credit Political League. At this stage the remarks of Lipset and Rokkan seemed to apply to New Zealand.

Decades of structural change and economic growth have made the old, established alternatives increasingly irrelevant, but the high level of organizational mobilization of most sectors of the community has left very little leeway for a decisive

breakthrough of new party alternatives. It is not an accident that situations of this type generate a great deal of frustration, alienation, and protestation within the organizationally least committed sections of the community, the young and, quite particularly, the students. 8

However, this judgment turned out to be premature. The parties responded to the 1966 election results, Labour in increasingly vigorous parliamentary activity and the selection of younger candidates, including a number of professional men, for the 1969 election, as well as a conscious public relations effort during the months before the election; the National Party in gripping the economic nettle firmly and endeavouring to explain its policies to the public, and setting up the National Development Conference to devise new solutions and new directions for the economy. The two-party confrontation was reinvigorated in 1969 and led to a major decline in Social Credit support.

Perhaps most important, the major parties have been paying attention to younger members, who have begun to play an active part within the two organisations.

While there seems to have been a recovery by the major parties of some of the electorate's lost confidence, there seems little doubt that the party system as such is undergoing a transformation. Ideological discussion has virtually disappeared from party competition, election programmes contain much common material, and the parties are less important as initiators of policy than they were even a decade ago and much less important than they were two decades ago. At the same time differences between individuals often seem to be more significant than differences between parties.

Such differences as there are between the parties appear to be mainly differences of emphasis rather than differences in coherent policies. These would include attitudes to private enterprise, to protection of industry, to unemployment, to taxation, to price controls, and to borrowing. The National Party is more oriented to economic growth while the Labour Party is more oriented to equality of distribution and to social welfare. Differences have been more spectacular in the field of foreign policy, mainly over the National Government's decision in 1965 to send troops to Vietnam, but in general one could talk of a bipartisan foreign policy.

A major reason for the increasing similarity of the parties is the growing complexity and diversity of New Zealand society. The major occupational interests that used to be in conflict through the party system are not only facing competition from new interests but are also divided into many interests themselves. To gain or secure a majority of seats a party has to adopt the electoral strategy of forming a broad coalition of interests. The National Party has had the most success in this in the last two decades, not only winning seven out of eight elections in this period but also making up for the relative numerical decline of the rural areas, where it has strong support, with a compensating increase in its urban support. Its success in this strategy is partly due to the fact that it sees itself as essentially a coalition of interests, in principle covering the whole community. Labour on the other hand has sought to maximise its support from salary and wage earners, probably at the cost of antagonising employers and self-employed. Since wage and salary earners make up nearly seven eighths of the labour force this could be a successful electoral strategy if this category could be persuaded it had a common interest.

Another reason for increasing party similarity is possibly that many of the younger members and supporters of the two main parties engage in their partisan activity for reasons related more to their political socialisation into the existing party frameworks than to major cleavages in society.

While the party system appears to have been declining in the areas of policy formation and policy conflict, the pressure group system has been growing more important in these areas. As in earlier decades pressure groups continued to grow in the nineteen sixties both in numbers and in organisational strength. The proliferation of pressure groups is a consequence partly of the growing number of interests in New Zealand's increasingly complex society, partly of the capacity of central government to provide some satisfaction of group demands, and partly of the willingness of New Zealand politicians to listen to these demands. Organisational strength has been developing through continued political experience of group leaders, the growth of paid staff, the development of better internal communications in groups, the formation of group alliances,

and the evolution of regular relationships with central government. The National Development Council and its associated sector committees are the most recent institutionalised form of close relationship between group leaders and government officials.

A trend in a different direction has been the rise of protest groups in the mid-sixties. The commitment of troops to Vietnam provided the first major occasion for the formation of a number of protest groups, and the pattern of activity has remained as one alternative method of expressing grievances. In general, protest politics does not appear to have attracted the energies of more than a very small proportion of the politically active population. Most activists in the nineteen sixties appeared to prefer working within established organisational patterns.

A feature of protest groups and of much of the activity within parties in the late sixties was the youthfulness of many of the activists. Politicians were sensitive to the issue of "the generation gap" and many sought to bridge the gap. The beginning of the wave of young voters from the high birthrate postwar years was apparent to party strategists in the late sixties but there was no consensus on approaches. A cautious extension of the vote to 20 year-olds was passed by Parliament, a measure which had no visible impact on the 1969 results. The nineteen seventies will see a rapid expansion in the numbers and proportion of young voters in the electorate.

Not least of the developments in the decade in its importance for political participation was the expansion of television coverage of New Zealand and the evolution of serious and widely watched public affairs television programmes. Regular programmes began as late as June 1960 but by 1968 three quarters of New Zealand households had television sets. Radio (with small exceptions) and television have been operated by the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation, modelled on the British Broadcasting Corporation. In the late sixties the NZBC was sufficiently experienced and enjoying public support that it began to offer more politically controversial material on television, and by the end of the decade television appeared to be more important as a medium of public debate than the institution of Parliament.

No mention has so far been made in this section of the external dimension of participation. There was little noticeable change in external participation over the decade. The only possibly significant new developments were the annual consultations begun in the mid-sixties between the New Zealand and Australian manufacturers' federations over problems of Australian and New Zealand trade, and the regular participation by leading New Zealand businessmen in the Pacific Basin Economic Co-operation Committee along with counterparts from the United States, Australia, Japan and Canada.

INTEGRATION

This crisis covers the problems of relating popular politics to governmental performance, and thus it represents the effective and compatible solution of both the penetration and the participation crises. The problem of integration therefore deals with the extent to which the entire polity is organized as a system of interacting relationships, first among the offices and agencies of government, and then among the various groups and interests seeking to make demands upon the system, and finally in the relationships between officials and articulating citizens.⁹

In considering the last decade in New Zealand it is possible to see a number of conflicting trends in the system of interacting relationships. There is evidence of increasing integration in some areas of national life but also of disintegration in others. Some of the trends we have discussed earlier under the headings of penetration and participation, and only brief reference need be made here.

We have noted the increasing co-ordination of government departments under Treasury and State Services Commission influence, and the evolution of indicative economic planning which has been bringing about a close relationship between government departments and outside individuals and interests. There is an ideology of integration underlying the new system of relationships. It is worth examining the official justification in the report of the Steering Committee of the National Development Conference.

Its guide lines and targets are not imposed on the economy; rather they are arrived at by consultation and consensus between Government and the private sector, and so serve as "indications" of what appears to each to be feasible and desirable.

. . . One of the virtues of extending the scope of indicative planning is that the sector targets will not be set in isolation, but within the framework of comprehensive integrated projections. This process of setting targets for the economy as a whole focuses attention on key issues; it identifies obstacles to be overcome; it clarifies possible alternative policies; and the very existence of targets stimulates speculation about what is needed to achieve them, and so sets in motion many of the forces of attainment. At the same time target setting tends to bring thought and action into the cold light of appraisal, subsequent review, and criticism. This leads to more informed discussion which we believe must improve the quality of decisions reached and of policies agreed upon. ¹⁰

At the same time as the growth of new integrative relationships between government departments and the private sector, one can notice elements of disintegration in the relationship between members of Parliament and the same departments. The provision of information to Members of Parliament other than Cabinet Ministers is inadequate as a basis for intelligent parliamentary discussion of many of the subjects now discussed frankly by government officials with the various citizens on numerous advisory committees and subcommittees that now exist. The trend in the late nineteen sixties appeared to be in the direction of two separate systems of policy-discussion, linked together at the top by the presence of Cabinet Ministers.

We have noted earlier also the aggregationist tendency of the major political parties (Social Credit behaves in a similar manner also) and of the tendency of pressure groups to form coalitions. To this should be added the growing national integration within parties and pressure groups as a result of improved technology of communications. Rapid air transport and improved telecommunications have altered the internal decision-making patterns of many organisations, leading to more frequent interaction among representatives of geographically distant areas.

One of the most important contributors to integration in the nineteen sixties has been electoral change. This has taken a variety of forms in response to different trends in New Zealand society. First, urbanisation continued

through the decade. The proportion of the population living in urban areas of 1,000 or over rose from 73.9 per cent in 1961 to 77.3 per cent in 1966, while the proportion living in towns of 25,000 or over rose from 32.5 per cent to 40.9 per cent. Second, there was a more rapid growth of some cities and areas than of others. There was a continuation of the drift from the South to the North Island and a shift to towns in the northern half of the North Island, especially to Auckland. Two boundary revisions took place during the decade at their statutory time after each five yearly census. The virtual arithmetical equality of population in each district, required by the Electoral Act, ensured that these population shifts were reflected quickly in representation in the House of Representatives. The South Island, however, showed signs of regional consciousness early in the nineteen sixties, one manifestation of which was a desire for stability of electoral representation. Accordingly, the 1965 Electoral Amendment Act stabilised South Island seats at 25 and permitted North Island seats to increase proportionately to the North Island's share of the population.

A third trend or set of trends in New Zealand society to which electoral change has responded in the sixties was the increasing absolute and relative size of the Maori population as a consequence of a very high birthrate, together with the increasing urbanisation of the Maori population. These trends have heightened an already growing sensitivity among politicians and public to problems of race relations. This has led, among other things, to a consideration of the future of separate Maori representation, in particular whether the four Maori seats should be abolished or expanded in number. Most Maoris have so far been opposed to removal of separate representation until they can be certain of equivalent Maori representation under the normal electoral procedure. An important change was made in 1967 to enable Maoris to stand for European seats and Europeans to stand for Maori seats.

DISTRIBUTION

The final crisis in the development process involves questions about how governmental powers are to be used to influence the distribution of goods, services, and values throughout the society. Who is to benefit from government, and what should the government be doing to bring greater benefits to different segments of the society?

New Zealand politics in the nineteen sixties, as throughout the preceding century, was predominantly about economic issues. The two main patterns of economic issues about which conflict has taken place during New Zealand's short history of European settlement continued into the sixties, namely development issues and economic security issues.

Development issues derived from the requirements of catering for the physical needs of a rapidly expanding population and of improving its levels of material prosperity. As the only organisation large enough to undertake transport development and other works involved in expanding settlement the central government was called on by the settlers to undertake tasks which in some other countries would have been left to private enterprise. The task of creating the basic conditions of life for a rapidly expanding population has remained with successive governments and is likely to be a serious problem for many years in the future. New Zealand politics in the last two decades has been dominated by the economic problems produced by the high postwar birthrate. The need to develop the physical and other amenities, including opportunities for employment, for the extra million added to the population since the Second World War (population at the end of 1969: 2,808,590) has produced severe difficulties in terms of scarce manpower and finance. These have occupied a large share of the attention of politicians and of the many interests competing for scarce resources.

Economic security issues are not always separable from development issues. Development may be a means of increasing the economic security of a section of the population; for example agricultural development will help farmers, industrial development will help manufacturers and workers. But the basic element of

economic security issues is that they are concerned with the relative shares of the national income to be granted each section of the community and with the conditions of working and living of each section's members. Economic security issues have contributed to the cleavages underlying the two-party system and have also been at the core of much of New Zealand's pressure group politics. The high incidence of political conflict over economic security issues is related to the tensions produced by fluctuations in the New Zealand economy resulting from fluctuations in prices for New Zealand's predominantly pastoral exports.

These two patterns of conflict over distribution issues were interwoven throughout the nineteen sixties. There was a shift in the course of the decade in the emphases given to particular objectives.

One important trend was an increasing emphasis on economic growth and a decreasing emphasis upon redistribution of income. In terms of public expenditure a choice was seen between spending on transfer payments, and spending on development projects combined with tax incentives for increased production. Consumer subsidies (a product of the war years) were abolished on most items, indirect taxes were increased and direct taxes reduced, and the existing pattern of transfer payments was maintained subject to cost of living increases. The public sector's share of GNP remained stable. Within the public sector the greatest change took place in education where expenditure almost doubled its proportion of GNP in the course of the decade, a reflection mainly of increased numbers in the education system and of increased retention at successively more expensive stages of the educational process.

A major shift also took place in economic development policies. At the beginning of the decade New Zealand was pursuing an industrial development policy behind a strong barrier of protection provided by import licensing. An assumption was that New Zealand could reduce its dependence on fluctuations in world markets by import substitution. Also industrialisation was desirable for its own sake as providing employment for the growing labour force, a high priority in the minds of politicians in the forties and fifties still remembering the bitter experiences of New Zealand unemployment in the nineteen thirties.

Overfull employment, a situation in which vacancies exceeded the number looking for work, was the normal state of affairs until 1967 when unemployment rose briefly to about one half of one per cent.

In the course of the decade the Government moved away from these assumptions. One impelling argument against industrialisation through import substitution was that industrialisation created a demand for more imports of capital equipment and of raw materials, thus creating a need for even greater export receipts from the pastoral industries. The Government responded at first by providing major incentives for increases in agricultural production, with considerable success. At the same time there was a move, slowly at first, and then accelerating, to move manufacturing ^{and} services into the export field. The New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement signed in 1965 was designed to provide the framework of expansion of industrial and other exports, especially forest products, to the growing Australian market. A reduction in internal demand in 1967 resulting partly from government fiscal measures and partly from reduced rural incomes, combined with devaluation of the New Zealand dollar to provide further encouragement to exporters. Tax incentives for exporting were a feature of budgets in the second half of the decade. Finally, the National Development Conference in 1969 produced an apparent consensus among the major groups in the community on the need to emphasise exports in development policy rather than import substitution.

By the end of the decade exports and exporters were the primary concern of government policy, both internally in the measures adopted to encourage farmers and manufacturers to produce more, and externally in the diplomatic field in trying to open up new markets and retain old ones.

One smaller issue in the distribution field should not be overlooked, if only because of the possible long-term significance of the trend. This is the issue of foreign aid. New Zealand's aid programme was criticised by many groups at the end of the decade as being inadequate, and the aim of 1 per cent of GNP was argued as a desirable target. This has been accepted by the Government as a goal of aid policy. The issue of the nature and objectives of New Zealand's aid are likely to become more important as a distribution problem in the nineteen seventies.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

The conceptual framework used in this analysis has been valuable, at least to the author, in focussing attention on elements of political change in a decade when on the surface, and according to most available statistics, little appeared to have altered in this stable democracy. In the author's view the totality of change taking place is of considerable significance, and in the light of New Zealand history cannot be regarded as a slowing down of the long-term rate of political change. This situation may be typical of many other countries regarded as stable. Obviously a great many more things remained stable in the decade than changed, but the evidence of change seems sufficient to justify recasting a textbook for students currently under preparation to take more account of the dynamic elements of the political system.

It is possible that the use of some other development models might have had a similar effect. The model used here, however, has the flexibility and comprehensive coverage necessary in a survey of a political system as a whole. Moreover, as a well-established framework for considering political change in economically less developed countries there are major advantages for the study of comparative politics if the model can be shown to be useful for considering change in other settings.

Precise application of the model was shown to be extremely difficult. Many changes could have been considered under other headings by another observer. There was also the problem of verification of change. Statistical confirmation of interpretations was usually impossible because of the complex nature of the changes yet much of the analysis was fundamentally a measurement exercise. Furthermore, significance of particular changes depended on an assessment of the situation in the previous decade, which has been inadequately explored, and of the situation at the end of the decade, which has to be looked at in terms of likely future developments which may or may not finally take place. What appears to be a trend may well be an aberration.

A further difficulty is that concentration on the changes that actually occurred may result in insufficient consideration being given to the changes that did not occur for a variety of minor reasons. A more complete analysis

than this would need to explore the alternatives available at particular stages.

The use of a determinate time period of a decade appears to have some merit both for comparison with other time periods within New Zealand political history and for comparison of New Zealand change with change in other political systems. Within New Zealand history the decade approach provides for a more conscious examination of the state of the political system at regular intervals, and encourages a more conscious pursuit of the life history of particular changes. For cross-national comparison, the decade approach enables scholars working within each system to standardise their data collection at regular intervals. Concerning its application to the last decade, a comparative study of political change in the nineteen sixties would throw light on the questions political scientists should be studying in the nineteen seventies.

The analysis has demonstrated, it is hoped, the value of incorporating the external dimensions of political change into the conceptual framework. There is little hardship to the investigator in this activity, and much is to be gained from looking at the totality of political change in a given territory. Certainly for small countries dependent on the activities of larger powers and for countries engaged in integration processes with each other, political change has to be looked at in both internal and external dimensions.

Finally, the model employed in this exercise does not provide explanations of the origin of political change. It is, however, compatible with a variety of explanatory models and indeed aids the process of explanation by bringing the questions better into focus.

SANS RESUME
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WITHOUT SUMMARY
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NOTES

1. For a discussion of these issues see R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), and James N. Rosenau (ed.) Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: The Free Press, 1969)
2. Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), p.63. The author is indebted to Stein Rokkan's discussion of this and other conceptual frameworks in "Models and Methods in the Comparative Study of Nation-Building", Acta Sociologica, Vol. 12, No.2.
3. Pye, op. cit., p.63
4. Feb. 1, 1966
5. Pye, op. cit., pp.63-64
6. Ibid., pp. 64-65
7. Ibid., p.65
8. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (ed.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 54.
9. Pye, op. cit., p. 65
10. Report of the Steering Committee to the National Development Conference, May 1969, Document NDC 1, pp. 7-8
11. Pye, op. cit., p. 66

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NATION BUILDING IN SOUTHERN LATIN AMERICA

ITS DETERMINATIONS FROM THE SOCIAL REFLEXION PROCESS

Candido Mendes.

AREA BOUNDARIES

This paper deals with what may be called Southern Latin America, including Brazil, the Southern Cone countries (Uruguay, Argentina and Chile), Paraguay and the Central Andean area (Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia).

Thus Southern Latin America comprises a population of around 150 million people and is divided into two different historical background areas :

- I - Portuguese Latin America - represented basically by Brazil ; with 90 million inhabitants and a former colonial empire that did not get split up in its cycle of political independence early in the 19th century, (in a certain sense the 22 States which compose the Brazilian Federation can be contemplated as counterparts of the same number of Spanish Latin American countries) ;
- II - Spanish Latin America - represented by Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay ; these became the successor States of the old metropolitan empire that submerged in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars with its four main vice-royalties : Mexico, Nova Granada, Peru and La Plata. (The two first ones are covered at this Symposium by the paper on Northern Latin America).

An introductory view of the various units of the different area studies is possible under the following criteria :

- (a) Of cultural inputs, comprising : countries with a strong indigenous population (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay and to a certain extent Chile) ; countries with a strong African input (Brazil) ; and countries with a strong and late European immigration flux settled in a previous cultural vacuum (Uruguay, Argentina and to a certain extent Chile) ;
- (b) Of levels of an overall process of change or of development experience, comprising : countries which have achieved social change through a full pattern of import substitutions, though not yet in terms of a self-sustained process of growth

(Brazil) ; countries which have achieved social change through a very high degree of import substitutions, but at present either at a decreasing rhythm (Uruguay, Argentina and Chile) or at a still increasing rhythm (Peru) ; and countries still at the threshold of development with a yet dominant colonial pattern of economic activities (Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay) ;

(c) Of size, comprising : continental countries with unlimited possibilities of an expanding domestic market (Brazil) ; countries with a viable domestic market (Argentina and Peru) ; countries with a domestic market, though having a common market as preferential condition of growth (Chile) ; countries with unviable domestic markets structurally depending upon new integrated economies (Bolivia, Paraguay and Ecuador) ; and buffer-States (Uruguay) ;

(d) Of the colonial social structure ; comprising : countries with a dominant agricultural system leading, at the threshold of development, to a role-duality of their national bourgeoisie (Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay) ; countries with a dominant mining complex leading to strong lines of cleavage in their social role-playings (Chile and Bolivia) ; countries with a split pattern (Peru) ; and countries with an agricultural system under dominant alien control (Ecuador and Paraguay).

BASIC CONCEPTS IN THE SUGGESTED APPROACH TO SOUTHERN LATIN AMERICA NATION BUILDING

The concept of a "prospective nation"

The approach suggested for the present analysis is all based on seeing the effect of a belated appearance of the concept of a people - and its interfering function - in the circuits of social reflexion, characteristic of the former colonial, or peripheral nations, in the Latin American fringe of the metropolitan world of the last four centuries.

The social reflexions process is here understood as the integrated pattern of communications flow between "memory", "social consciousness" and "will". It is from the work of Karl Deutsch (1), who made exactly the most accurate criticism of the old subjective school of the nation-building processes, that we may borrow some of the new tools provided by this re-enthonization of that dimension in the context of a precise approach and all the rich use of analysis the political science can benefit from that author's exploration of cybernetics.

(1) Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, The M.I.T. Press, 1966, Boston,) pp. 25 and 170-178.

We just want to stress our purpose of tackling the regional problems of nation-building in the light of those advance-ents in the "general state of the system" of ideas and concepts in model-building, which stem from that approach and its constant recent improvement. Let us say that, for the sake of an extremely flexible approach of that matter, we would accept them only at a heuristic stage. Deutsch, for instance, reached a high degree of precision and systematic integration in the inter-relationships between the concepts of "collective memory" and "consciousness" in a pattern of communication flow. He also gave extensive attention to the use of the feedback concept, making explicit the full set of mechanisms to operate between the storage and consciousness (and its seven-stage process) through the elaboration of secondary messages ; and between consciousness and will, through the application or blocking of data - the closure of decision systems - in the "grid" or net of those representations.

It is also necessary to bring about as a main feature of distinction of the social process of the Latin American countries an inverse cor-relationship of the traditional interplay between State and nation, as shown in the historical series of the European countries. The basic approach of a Western nation-building tends to see in the State the later projection or super-structure of a homogenizing cultural deposit ; of a social memory in the sense already previously established here. Some recent theories, like Peter Nettl's, might question the fundamental need of placing all the functions of the nation-State in one sole actor, that behaviour reflecting merely a peculiar historical context and not even a necessary and overall process or trend. However, in denouncing the "historical slot", in which he sees that - thought as necessary - linkage between the unifying and monopoly-like oriented functions embodied in the metropolitan concept of the nation-State, Nettl leaves untouched the premise of the historical precedents between the cultural and the political elements that gave birth to that key-concept in the Western polities (2). He can then argue that the nation-State appropriation of statehood would just represent one historical case in the exercise of the functions embodied in that concept and, too, that other historical experiences could show increasing cases of stateness, as long as we might identify several cases of desintegrated role-playing, (i.e. through many and different actors) of those functions : the process of administration, sovereignty, sectoral autonomy, law enforcement, social goal attainment and representation.

(2) J. Peter Nettl, The State as a Conceptual Variable (World Politics, Vol. XX, 4, July 1968), pp. 559-592, spec. 560-568.

"The State precedes the nation"

This paper has adopted, in this particular and as confronted with Hettle's assumption, an eventual theoretical development of the intuition underlying Leopold Senghor's sentence that in the underdeveloped countries "the State precedes the nation" (3). It is not only the case of admitting that the moving of the pre-requisites of the objective social system, responsible for the emergence of the mechanism of "reciprocity of perspectives" and, hence, of the formation of a people, is dependent upon the phenomenons of social mobility, all contemporary to the upsurge of development. From this point of view, attention has to be given to the characteristics that phenomenon shows as the emergence of a fully new social structure, leading in the former colonial nations to a radical change in the formation of their economic and social life ; and this as the result of some overall mutation of the classical pattern of the colonial transactions in terms of the peculiar features of their imports and exports and the resulting characteristics of their behaviour in a system of international labour division conditioned by the classical capitalistic model. As long as the development structure represents the exact contradiction of that former economic and social organisation, one may refer as its postulate to the significance of industrialization as the very condition for the effective appearance of a functional society in those previously colonial contexts. In other words one might say a society capable of providing the classical interplays and transactions between all the social sub-systems and thus substituting the old regime and its balance of scarcities, based on many and subtle mechanism that would prevent, in the colonial structures, any changes to evolve according to the "crisis patterns" which are characteristic of the metropolitan societies.

Within that perspective, the strategic significance of industrialization derives from its specific conditioning of the urbanization process. It appears in the new kind of interplays those contexts afford between the subsistence economy and the market economy ; and especially in the impact upon the overall phenomenon of stratification and social mobility of the structural surplus presented by their manpower supply and the constitution of important labour reserves.

(3) "Senghor on Dialogo" (Publication Senghor Speeches in Brazil) IBEEA, Rio, 1966 ; & Friedland and Rosberg, African Socialism, (Stanford University Press, California, 1967, pp. 265 e ss.).

Within that picture, to speak of mobilization - in Deutsch's sense (4) - attention must be given to the peculiar perspective of de- and restructuration that bear the impact of said idiosyncratic characteristics of the global social structures in which they are processed.

Social congruity as a project

Development can be identified in the historical series of the peripheral collectivities with the very appearance of pre-requisites that would lead - through a given synchrony between industrialization, urbanization and mobilization - to the appearance, at the same time sudden and belatedly, of the concept of a people in the process of social reflexion of those collectivities, and this inserted in the preceding and rather weak chain of social representations that could account for what was previously experienced as national consciousness. However, especially and to the same extent as the appearance of that new social structure marks the breakup of that prior series, the search for its new congruity in terms of social representation can only be met as a project ; as a teleologic articulation of ends and means, the becoming of which is the real condition for the replacement of the old regime by a genuine, functional society. This latter is not the result of the evolution of the former nor of any kind of inertia of its course, but strictly the outcome of a certain politic and of ensuring the appearance of some new social behaviours, the correlation of which is originally entirely dependent upon their rational calculation and projection. (5) As long as its high degree of interference upon reality is perceived in the project dimension, starting from a teleological connexion stated as an a priori, its necessary embodiment has to be assumed in one sole and exclusive actor, who retains the whole protagonism of development.

(4) Karl W. Deutsch, Social Mobilization and Political Development (Finkle and Gable, Political Development and Social Change, Wiley, N.Y., 1968).

(5) Candido Mendes, Nacionalismo e Desenvolvimento, (IBDAA, Rio, 1963, pp. 124 a 150) ; Robert Daland, Brasilian Planning (Chapel Hill, North Caroline, 1967) ; E.E. Papanicolaou, Théorie et Pratique du Développement Economie (LGDJ, Paris, 1958, pp. 61 ss.).

The State as the protagonist of development

Giving cause to the real emergence of a people concept, development must presuppose, as its key instrument, the appearance of a strong and integrated State, historically, de facto, in opposite position to the emptiness envisaged in Nettl's argumentation. It is that State, as the projection of that required strong and sudden action to break the colonial structure and the innuendo of its vicious circles, that would ensure the final replacement of the inertia of the old structure by a new social order. This marked historical transition forcefully produces an unavoidable effect in the reflexion process. Because of the new and radical change caused in its social foundations, there would be a necessary breakup in the memory and in the social consciousness and, thus, of the symbolic products and of the continuous and aggregated recalls in which it would ultimately have sedimented. They are broken by the necessary interference of this first appearance of the mechanism of reciprocity of perspectives, to which the colonial structure would be inately impervious.

The people as a slot in a social continuum

One must insist upon that distinction. The mature nation-building of the European countries, because of the advance reached by the level of aggregation of its secondary messages, might present - on account of the distance shown between those aggregates and their initial take-up - a phenomenological connotation in terms of their perception as a people, sometimes highly deactivated and even left at the bottom of its own latency ; it would be as if its living content would have fully filtered through the trade and exchange in the building of stereotypes, in which they finally became structured in national consciousness. The residue would almost disappear to the degree of winding up, in which the many reforwardings between the various phases of the reflexion process would leave them almost without trace in the circuits and screens in which the national consciousness were finally to settle conventionally. In the case of the developing countries and especially of Latin America, the aspect, at the same time quite innovating and tardy, of the interference of the concrete social whole in the chain of representations bears a seismic character. It is not only the case of revitalizing those circuits, but, in fact, of contradicting the previous and original historical series by way of following, in the reflexion process, the same breakthroughs which bear the depth of the antagonism between the colonial and the development structures.

Civic pantheons and people's social geology

Forcibly within the assumption of the continuity of the reflexion process, we must investigate what the mechanism is that might express those phenomenons. It is from that standpoint that the problem appears of the very feasibility of expressing that breakthrough within a social context that abhors discontinuity as the reflexion process thus incapable of expressing it through its conventional procedures. That is why techniques, such as the "civic pantheon" analysis, acquire their specific relevance in the nation-building processes. They are devised as a tool for measuring the degrees of congruity, expressed by different generation actors in their own and specific representation of the historical past of a given collectivity. The different degrees of their reappraisal expressed according to the different lags in time of said actors might become crucial for the definition of the very age of the concept of a people in the underdeveloped countries. In an analysis of this kind, already pursued in some recent experiments in Latin-America (6) by the different evaluations and rejections of the exemplary values of a given collectivity seen in a retrospection of its past, one might effectively assess the reflexion processes of those countries and the degree of their penetration by a congruent experience of their reality as a whole.

Nationalism and Development

On the other hand, it is easily understood how to see, in those cases, a change of roles between the State and the nation, in the Latin American countries, is, at the same time, to admit development as the landmark of their genuine historical experience only existing as a collective project, i.e. its feasibility would be all dependent upon overall conditions of change, in their turn dependent upon a certain number of economic measures and programmes that constitute then the very content of that said historical project of development. It is that kind of original motion, breaking up the former historical series of a given collectivity that makes development policies a contradiction in themselves to all previous inertia-oriented behaviours belonging to the past of countries, such as the Latin American ones.

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- (6) Candido Mendes, Miriam Cardoso - A Survey on Systematic Bica in Brazilian History Manuals - a sampling on hero worship in the high schools of Greater Rio (IUPERJ, Rio, 1968, mimeographed). Guy de Holanda - Stereotypes in Brazilian History (Revista do INEP, 1963, N° 3, Rio).

It is in that specific light that it might be understood then how the State, in those collectivities, as an actor of that original and basic decision, precedes the nation-building itself. That also explains the specific contents of their nationalism, contemporary to the emergence of development. It is the result of that new collective will in action that behaves as a wistful intentionality, on the basis of a strong State as the founder of a nation and not resulting from it as a super-structure. This is not the proper place to proceed with a more detailed investigation of the contents of the nationalism of the peripheral countries and especially those of Latin America. But it has to be stressed that its understanding in this process is to constitute the "political consciousness of development" (7). It is in that connotation that it remains, as long as the process of change can really maintain the basic conditions of success and self-inducement. An understanding of the characterization of nationalism in dramatic or xenophobic terms may, on the other hand, be related to the eventual collapse of that process or to the final survival of a colonial situation either in terms of a structural stagnation or of the subordination of the country to new conditions of dependence instead of development.

It is also from that standpoint that, much as we might speak in the underdeveloped countries and especially in Latin America about prospective nations, we have to take into consideration the particular feature of their process of social reflexion and that of extreme closeness in which there is interaction in their circuits, both of the action of the State and the live and recently emerged concept of a people. That appears almost like an eruption still untamed by a symbolic function wanned in its fatigue, almost prone to resume, by the dynamism of its new presence, the whole process of social reflexion of those collectivities.

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- (7) Whitaker & Jordan, Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America (Free Press, N.Y., 1966) pp. 76/93 ; Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil (Praeger, N.Y., 1968) pp. 10/11 ; Hélió Jaguaribe, Economic & Political Development, (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1968), pp. 13/30.

THE NATIONAL ENGRAM

Latin America's categorial homogeneity

A second aspect, on the other hand, is important in the investigation of the categories and for the analysis of the peripheral nation-building, in which the specificity of that situation has an impact upon the very "state of the system of that theory". This is what we have to stress when we characterize the contemporaneity of the nation-building process in those nations as resulting from the already mentioned parametric conversion that took place in its historical series from the moment of development onward. It is in that said moment that former colonial countries might, in fact, present their nation-building process as capable of being fully determined by the Rokkan and Parsons diagram.

In this case the territorial axis is balanced against the functional axis, this latter devoid of its prior hegemonic role in defining and absorbing the determination of the colony and its strict economic functions. We must insist upon the reasons of the former reference, in this case, to the general state of the system of the nation-building analysis. The parametric conversion mentioned, to which the understanding of the analysis of the emerging countries is now conditioned, is in itself the result of the phenomenon of entropy in (8) the overall evaluation of the system of ideas already constituted and for the comparative nation-building study. It reflects the circumstance that the already reached levels of progress in those analyses might require, on account of the degree attained by its organisation and consistence, a necessary and subsequent homogenization of its categorial determinants.

The development juncture, in effect, established a necessary identity between the peripheral social systems and the territory in which that phenomenon of change takes place. In other words, the peripheral countries, in sharp opposition to the former colonial countries, cannot in their social and global articulation go beyond their territorial nucleation; and this as long as the process of change or modernization can be identified as a breakthrough or the collapse of the colonial structure. And increasing the sense of self-determination, the latter, in its turn, is forcibly only a result of the emergence of a centre in that area identified for the first time and exhaustively configured by the geographic boundaries of its territory.

(8) Kenneth Boulding, The Meaning of the 20th Century,
The Entropy Trap, (Harper Colophon Books, N.Y., 1965),
pp. 137/155.

Reference is made, in that case, to the phenomenon of entropy having in mind the fact that those new configurations of the peripheral nation-buildings are the exact reflex of the desintegration of the former and primordial super-system - the one of the complex metropolis colony, which constitutes a peculiar dimensional feature of the systematic organisation of the peripheral countries.

Related bidimensionality in the nation-building processes

This increasing consistency and organisation in the categorical system for the analysis of nation-building from a certain degree onward could not maintain a heteronomous pattern for the study for the study of said processes. This need of homogenization or uniformity in those analyses is strongly helped by the circumstance that, for the first time the peripheral countries in their own historical series after entering the development era can be, de facto, compared with the nations belonging to the main stream of the nation-building tradition. Indeed, it is from that moment onward that the territory can appear as an invariant or an autonomous parametre in its systemic social behaviour. At the same time, however, attention must be paid to preterite conditionings of the emergency of that new bidimensionality, in which we can nowadays appreciate the nation-building process of the former colonial countries of both Latin America or the Afro-Asian fringe. The incongruities or heteronomies which might have been embodied in the old categorical nebula have now disappeared, being forced to assume the uniformity of the same invariants in that theoretical system of analysis. We may now speak of a general coherence in the rules of that system of appraisal, effectively homogenized in the interplay between reality and its conceptual model. And, if that said conversion parametre permits from now on an identical approach in measuring the peripheral and the central nations' recent historical series, forcibly can the former, at the same time, stress the need to pay attention in them to that point of rupture or discontinuity which this new identity starts from. And it is exactly because of that the emergent nation-building in the peripheral countries is, in its rhythm and impulse, strongly conditioned by the ex-ante situation.

Time-series severance and reproduction

The new territorial nucleation implies, at the same time, a phenomenon of cissiparity of the old complex and thus of a necessary reproduction of its behaviour. One must always take into consideration this phenomenon of deflection of the present time-series of the peripheral nation-building as it is reshaped by the new bidimensionality it gains from development on.

The colonial complex rupture does not permit, in its incipient modernization, an undetermined or elastic jump in the scale of institutional refinement or of the systemic development of its process ; and this by means of making the distance between those emerging processes and the forerunning cases of State evolution a strict regressive diachrony instance. The biological analogy fits into the case in order to show the necessary prédeterminations which govern the severance by cissiparity of the new territorial centre-formation of the old colonies and the effective significance recently assumed by their boundary system. (9) They cannot, in that, bypass the engranatic postulate which necessarily conditions the trend to repeat the political models of which they separated and became disassociated. It is from that starting point onward that the peripheral nation-building contemporary to development is, at the same time, prospective in the determination of its residua as a collective identity (i.e. of its emergence as a people) and archaic in the necessary model it chooses to give shape to the will that provides the foundation for its collective project. One has then to see in that special standpoint the ex-colonial countries caught in a genetic historical chain and forced by that to remake the nation-State as the essential landmark to express its belated territorial nucleation and the subsequent collectivity identity which would characterize it in the dimensions of the reflexion process.

Modernization and the necessary Nation-State

This approach contrasts with the regressive diachrony thesis as advanced, for instance, by Eisenstad when he argues that the peripheral nation-building experience might now benefit from an indeterminate capacity to improve and innovate its polities. (10) According to that author, those countries in their present emergence could evolve within the possibilities of an indefinite appropriation of many political forms to give shape to their new independence and this at the margin of any nation-State conditioning. In other words, the modernization phenomenon would not be limited or dimmed by any idea of a prior historical matrix or of cycle degrees or lags.

(9) Kenneth Berrien - General and Social Systems - spec. "social systems : components, structure and Boundary" pp. 88/116 and "Social Systems : Feed Back and Growth" pp. 116/136 (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1968.

(10) Social Science Information, VIII-I, February, 1969, pag. 97.

A fundamental and speedy synchrony would be the necessary end-product of the multiple choices those countries would have in their road to the nation-State. Its only distinctive criteria of validity would be their instrumentality in this overall process of change that characterizes development. "Military bureaucracy", "city-State federations" or even "peasant republics" (11) appear as alternative for the nation-State in the panoply of formulas which today would be at the disposal of the ex-colonial countries. When one speaks, in that case, of engramatic determination, it seems that a strategic connotation is introduced for the understanding of the effective depth of that alleged broad spectrum of institutional patterns for the developing countries. One has to contend also about the necessary implications of that broadening pattern of choice argued by the modernization approach. It is underlined by the perspective of seeing the new oncoming model as the consequence of a strict rational projection as a result of planning. The same elasticity in economic model-building would then be extended to the political model-building and through that the validity problem of the formulas would entirely pass to the flaws or the assets of its project formulation.

The subjectively impossible unviable nation

In that context, however, attention ought to be paid to a crucial empirical fact in the recent nation-building attempts of the peripheral nations. This is the continuous collapse of the confederation projects and of the rational-minded projects of economic integration that would get apart from the irrational persistence of the pertinacious deeply rooted nation-State syndrome in the emerging countries ; and this as a very clear obstacle to giving excessive rights to a logical and sound order that would be the direct result of that elasticity-minded approach of the nation-building process as implied in Eisenstadt's modernization thesis. In fact, it has to yield to the political and historical premises that pre-condition immediately that "will" to develop to be embodied in the new State formation. Generally those new rich forms of trying to divert these processes from the pitfalls of nation-building stem from the idea of the historical unviability of that formula in the emerging nations due to their many handicaps in territorial dimensions or economic resources or demographic expansion.

What has to be stressed, in this context, as a direct contribution of the social reflexion process is the impossibility of formulating the theme of the unviable nation from that

(11) Idem : SN Eisenstadt, Estado, Sociedade e Formacao de Centros (Dados, IUPERJ, Rio, 1963, n° 4):

standpoint, this being a crucial juncture to lead to those rational-minded broad and richer formulas of their developing social processes. That would ignore the unavoidable irrational always occurring in that mentioned parametric conversion and that would be the belief in the permanent conversion capability of the former colonial regimes to become development regimes. What remains as the crux of that irrationality as untouched premise are the components of their political and social corpus and these are expressed by their territorial configuration and by all the magnitudes dependent upon it, and exactly as shaped during the colonial phase and as appearing in the former historical series of its collective representation.

The metropolitan mimesis

To that permanence and to that "indefinite conversion" presupposition responds necessarily the need of the emerging countries to reproduce the model they were dependent upon in the old colony metropolis overall relationship complex. It is as if in building its own system the ex-colonial country would act just retorting the same pattern of polarities it was previously subordinated to. It is not necessary then that, in assuming the nation-State profile for the shaping of its new territorial centre-formation, the emergent countries have forcefully to adapt themselves to the full historical curve that led the old metropolis to wind up in that model its full power and world influence. It is, however, as a result of its system-conditioning impact (as the necessary breakup climax of that centre-periphery historical relationship) that it would become the necessary landmark for the start of the historical series now gaining momentum in the cycle of national independences in the African and Latin American fringe. As previously mentioned, in the former case this takes place as a synchronic economic and political take-off and in the latter with a century-gap between the two movements.

Time-series reproduction : the code and the content

The category of engram is implied in that context to identify the necessary event of a case of a historical pseudomorphosis, such engram coming directly from its biological meaning to stress a historical sequence which forcibly reproduces the form and the code of its previous chain, but not necessarily the contents of its "Gestalt".

Indeed, the new emerging peripheral nation-State is not going to find all the necessary ingredients or conditionings of its European counterpart. At the same time, however, that designation would be more than a mere label. It is going to be a parading to condition and even to pre-codify the prospective feasibility of the development experience, and this by means of becoming an a priori instance for all the equations and projections of its emergent national planning. In that context, that broad pattern of alternatives or choices, as suggested by Eisenstad, tends to be de facto irrelevant. In spite of the many different forms the peripheral countries' State-building would assume in the reflexion process and because of that engranatic postulate, they would always portray themselves as nation-States ; and the tenor of that representation would be made up of an a-prioristic statement of the necessary success of its present experience of self-determination, in the light of the strict recollection of past examples brought in by the main stream of the European nation-building models.

In the reflexion chain of the developing countries, these are the forced historical references that would condition, in the very dynamics of cissiparity, the ex-ante and ex-post stages, the breakthrough of the colonial regime. That is what might explain, notwithstanding, the radical change of the social structure brought about by development, the increasing fidelity to the nation-State pattern in the whole historical series covered by the last century, from the Latin American offsprings to the emergent African countries of the mid-twenties, and this with an even stronger emphasis in the cases of more questionable viability of that said conversion between the peripheral condition and a proposed self-subsistent system as shown by some of the most recent and small African countries.

The dynamics of cissiparity : the isomorphic replica

The rupture point which also marks the inauguration of the colony as a genuine new territorial centre is also one of the beginning of a contraposition between its time series. But exactly because of that it is an isomorphic replica : that said contraposition is necessarily made of a retorsion of the same formations and institutions that would condition the social process deriving from the previous metropolitan matrix. In other words then and within the necessary pseudo-morphosis that will characterize the development experience in terms of a nation-State, it is not necessary to see it as a determinant of the historical emergence of that institution, the previous existence of a basic congruity between cultural backgrounds and its induced political super-structure, as shown by the historical experience of that said nation-State.

Its present appearance in the peripheral countries must be looked upon within the context of the parametric conversion shown by the present socio-political juncture of the peripheral countries and within the determinations and analogies offered, in that case, by that mentioned engramatic postulate. One does then understand the necessary archaic dimension in which that model becomes an a priori for the very definition of the conditions of development ; and, more than that, how it inverts the problem of viability in those emergent nation-building processes. That is exactly why the aspiration to develop can never be curtailed by any kind of a perception of the structural limitations of the collective actor intended for that overall commitment. By definition, the attitude of the emerging nations to perform the role of their previous conditioning centre, in itself, becomes the very a priori of the original experience of self-determination. Its representation, i.e. its dimensions in the social reflexion process would never be subordinated to a critical appraisal. In that dimension and exactly because of that mentioned engramatic postulate, the point of rupture which characterizes the new emergent national consciousness would have a definite connotation ; it would strictly represent the projection, now in the new social order, of the previous chain of collectivity representation in two dimensions (both in the functional and in the territorial axes) ; in other words, of a content the viability and success of which as a forced and necessary recall of the metropolitan paradigm becomes a prius.

THE POSTULATES OF THE ENGRAMATIC DETERMINATION IN THE NATION-BUILDING PROCESS

Gaps and retrospective references in the social memory

The critical rupture point

It can be seen that the said necessary repetition of the nation-State form to shape the development experience in the peripheral countries is all related to a historical starting point in the dynamics of its social change. It is one which corresponds to the final predominance of a whole new set of congruities between emerging economic, political, social and cultural factors, which became incompatible with the subsistence of the old colonial structure and of the many mechanisms which made it a historical configuration.

Those basic compatibilities might attain the necessary dynamism to reach the stage of cumulative effects and even of sudden or intense qualitative changes, susceptible of fitting the analogies of the take-off momentum suggested by some schools of thought within the economic theory of development (12). They might inclusively - as their institutional counterparts - be incorporated into a policy and especially into a planning that could intensify the rationality of those behaviours and thus provide the strategies for the ultimate implementation of the new structure upon the inertia of the previous status quo. The increasing coherence and performance, however, that might be shown by the aspirations or political behaviours configured since the beginning of development are strongly reinforced as of the full admission of the fundamental contradiction between the two social structures and then of the projection of that tension in time. In other words, it depends greatly upon finding the focal point in which the discontinuity of the social memory of the old complex fully appears, thus leading to a new historical series divergent from the one based on the inertia and on the simple continuity of the old order. It is thus now, as a specific characteristic of the nation-building process of the developing countries, that gap appears in the representation chain of realities.

That experience of a new identity is not only prospective, but also re-interprets and re-builds its own past.

Different past feedbacks

Attention must be paid, however, to the fact that it is not only the common case in the ordinary nation-building process of just the continuous reappraisal of its traditional background according to or in the light of the present historical project of the collectivity. In this case, the new retrospective reference is based just on operations of selection or privileged choice among the many roots of its national identity, one facet or another successively exposed to the historical spotlight according to the needs of the present.

In the case of the underdeveloped countries, this dive into a past, shaped into a parametric framework radically distinct from its present juncture, could only appear as a "symbolic reading".

(12) W.W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, (MIT, 1958) ;
Berthold Roselitz, Theories of Economic Growth, (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960).

It corresponds to a premonitory search of some factual elements which would be susceptible, only from development onward, to become effective variables in determining the national identity and the residua of a people that would come out strictly of the success of said development. Hence the final significance of the iconographic representation of values brought in by those previous series in building the civic pantheon of the developing countries. They are structurally different from their previous behaviours in those time series. Their effective relevance in making up the cultural background for the present peripheral nation-building has little in common with the past cyclical reappraisals of the mature countries. That said pantheon might provide radical and qualitative evaluations of that past, the absolute idiomatism of which - in terms of the new values and its examples found in the previous historical series - reflects the uniqueness of the generation contemporary to the rupture point of the advent of development and the necessary off-series character of its gestures and deeds in that same chain of representation.

The impact of parametric heteronomy : functional
hypopolarities vis-à-vis the belated territorial axis

National and territorial congruity

We must not lose sight of the impact, as the very shape-taking of the peripheral nation-building, of the territorial nucleation, gaining its own dynamism against the primeval functional axis responsible for reducing the historical connotation of the colony to just a contrast between centre and periphery of the old metropolitan regime.

Forcibly the gain of this new bidimensionality would be characterized by a transitional period and the new re-ordination of that said territorial axis would still bear conditionings and influences resulting from the old functional dependence, and this one incapable of being reduced to the new territorial dimensionality of the national system that got installed in the former colony.

It thus becomes imperative to take into consideration those subsequent efforts for the reconditioning of the economic parametre in the A G I L diagram, that would necessarily result from the firm imposition of the new 2-axis framework of the peripheral nation-building process.

That would, in turn, lead first to the investigation of how, in that said transitional period, there would be a necessary split between behaviours still related to the old economic parametre and those that would belong to the new and recent functional axis working already in system with the new territorial nucleation.

What is most significant is to remark the lasting effect of that splitting of the functional axis in the general framework of the many behaviours encompassed by the geographical dimensions of the country. At that special moment of the take-off, in the same territory there would coexist procedures related to radically distinct parametres as they are referred to either the still remaining colonial structure or already to development. In other words, that latter complex might be characterized in that special period by a situation of hypopolarity vis-à-vis the total span of the space or territory it was theoretically supposed to occupy or "saturate". Hence and necessarily the effective area of congruity of the national system, identified by the necessary integration between the various behaviours conditioned simultaneously by the new territorial centre and the new induced functional centre is, at that stage, smaller than the real extension of the national domain as conventionally defined by its sovereignty and the delimitation of its boundaries.

Nationalism and patriotism

It is that phenomenon which explains the specific counterpoint between patriotism and nationalism in the peripheral countries. The distinction, in this case, is no longer one of intensity variation, but truly of a qualitative nature. And, in this instance, nationalism is related to the subjective identification of the social actors of the self-determined system within the nation, which here has just a limited bearing on the totality of the economic dynamism that might be at work in the conventional national space. It is this kind of distinction that lacks an uncritical patriotism unmindful of the characteristics of the mentioned hypopolarities of the nation system not yet fully integrated by its territorial centre. Nationalism reflects the necessary perspective of tension implied by the functional development of this system. Its eventual radicality is the reflex of the interplay of the correlations and the final weight in which the development focus might offset the inertia of the colonial structure and its possible re-establishment in terms of dependence with the former metropolitan centres.

The whole gamut of intensity in which nationalism gets away from the normative pattern of patriotism is quite different from that presented by the great Western societies. That is the projection of a social process strictly inner- or self-oriented, its radicalism being the expression of the natural compensation effects resulting from the level of its challenges. Its excess bears the structural determinations of the social tensions involved in that take-off. In fact, one can see the correlations between the ebbing of the nationalistic wave and the increased achievements of that change in its new xenophobic or hard impetus with the new mounting impassés shown by the effort of self-determination. In short, the heat of its contents indicates by itself the intensity of the stress between the two conflicting social structures and the chances of its final outcome.

Summing up, it is only as a subspecies of nationalism that patriotism makes itself present in the circuits of social consciousness of the peripheral countries, both in Africa and in Latin America. They could not be defined as just an increased or decreased variance of the same scale of failures and successes where one can display the collective attachment of the social group. As the reflex of the gaps and discontinuities necessarily shown in the feedback between the social reflexion process and social change, it can only appear as consciousness-taking. This is a fundamental characteristic of the present nation-building system of the developing countries. No other is then the mechanism within the various techniques of animation that led to the movements of popular culture in several of these nations and especially, among them, to the Brazilian experience between 1961 and 1964. (13)

THE PEOPLE CONCEPT IN THE SOCIAL REFLEXION PROCESS :

SYMBOLIC FATIGUE AND ERUPTIVE PROFILES

Its recent emergence in Latin America

The Latin America countries are just at the threshold of extracting all deep implications of their recent exposure to intense phenomenous of mobilization and social marginality contemporary to development, i.e. to an overall condition which strongly affects said correlation.

(13) Candido Mendes, Memento dos Vivos, Emergencia da Cultura Popular (Tempo Brasileiro, Rio, 1966), pp. 173/216.

What is relevant for the present study now is to investigate how those objective variations actually affect, at that threshold, their respective social reflexion processes, i.e. to investigate how those changes and specially their possible synchrony have an impact upon the mentioned "interferent" take-up represented by the people input in those circuits. It is then important to measure how vitalizing an impact the belated appearance of that formation receives from those representations, specially in the light of the degree of "symbolic fatigue" which they might show in said process, indicating levels of conflict at the very plane of representation or of symbol-making, or of the structuring function of social consciousness without precedent in the tradition of the nation-building process of European countries. In other words, as paradigmatic peripheral nations, the Latin American countries provide outstanding opportunities for circuit fertilization in the reflexion process. The concept of a people is then freshly built in those chains of representation as the immediate result of the drastic changes in their conditions of social stratification and mobility. Its "volcanic profile" helps to bring light to the study of the older sediments in that process and thus also helps to afford eventually a keener insight of the very nature of that process itself, both in its cumulative and interferent feedbacks. One has to insist upon the special characteristics of the introduction of the idea of a people as a concrete social totality in the chain of circuits it involves in the reflexion process. It is a full feedback mechanism, but one of an induced nature : a counterflux. The whole appears in the reflexion circuits as the immediate consequence of the continuous tendency of all representations to return upon their own contents. It is the result of a representation deflection in the critical step at which the secondary messages emerge from the primary ones (the latter consisting in direct interactions with reality). In fact, the reflexion process affords, parallel to its production of symbols (which characterizes the straight passage from the primary to the secondary messages), a quasi reducing function featured by the mere superpositions of those representations. It results from the full perception of the reflex operations involved in the moment of that take-up, i.e. its abbreviating role which gives birth to the main set of secondary messages and the formation of its subsequent aggregates and the consciousness of the simultaneity of the contents presented as primary messages. This latter is characterized by the mere intercrossing of the perspectives of the many actors involved in the social process with respect to the reciprocal representation of their interests and levels of social expectations.

In other words, the concept of a people, which emerges in the shadow of the main chain of the reflexion process and as a result of that second operation just described, has to be taken into consideration in any analysis of a nation-building and an overall process of social change. It is both the result of a complementary circuit in those chains of representation and also one of an induced character. That latter effect is due to an interaction different from the one of the cumulative series, In this case, there is, in fact, instead of a relationship between phasic units of overall circuits, one between given components of one phase and their end-product, the latter belonging already to a further step in the major flux of social consciousness. It is what can be described in the following diagram :

Symbolic and residual production of the social whole.

The counter-circuit, in that case, is the result of a direct feedback between the representation as a component of a given take-up and the resulting "global representation". As said before, it consists at a given level of superposed representations of a strict phenomenological and descriptive kind, as a result of a more concretion or residue and not of a symbolic abbreviation ; and it is this kind of superposition which brings about the effective characteristics of a "cultural background" or of a national experience in the process of social reflexion. It can all be measured by the methodology of the reciprocity of perspectives and this one, in its turn, depends upon the objective conditions of the phenomenon of stratification and social mobility of those systems. It can be identified with what was called by Tumin and Feldmann as a stratification consciousness in terms of "abundant qualities" to the explicit (x), as done by Touraine, in the several levels in which that said reciprocity of perspectives would be broadened into larger dimensions of identification and common reivindication, all of them, in turn, tributaries, by definition, of a given concrete situation. They would spread by a strict superposition of "social declinations" and not by a process of symbolic reference each time more complex and abstract. This is how a "people" differs from a reference to an abstract social whole. That is why we might realize the significance which the development juncture presents for that counter-circuit in the reflexion process and this to the extent it activates the mechanism of the reciprocity of perspectives by direct impact upon social mobility.

(x) Tumin, K.H. and Feldman, Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico (Princeton University, Press, 1961).

OBJECTIVE
REALITY

SOCIAL REFLEXION
PROCESS

SECONDARY MESSAGES

OBJECTIVE
REALITY

REPRESENTATION

PRIMARY
MESSAGES

ACTORS
SET OF
INTERETS

A

B

N

A'

B'

N'

PRIMARY
MESSAGES
DECANTING

NATIONAL
RESIDUE


A POEPL
AS THE
WHOLE RESIDUE

RECIPROCALITY OF
PERSPECTIVES

1ST FEED BACK

SUCCESSIVE FEED BACKS

SYMBOLIC FATIGUE
STEREOTYPES



SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATIONS

This latter operation thus presents a definite correlationship with the levels of change of the social expectations of the many social actors ; this is chiefly the result of the emergence of the middle classes as the fundamental "relays" for the enrichment of that overall mechanism of the reciprocity of perspectives. Hence it results from the levels of conflicts which in turn reflect directly the representation of those expectations and, subsequently, of the synthesis between these two "openings" or references to direct realities that would lead to a certain number of social coalitions.

It is not without reason then that this would correspond to the general structure of the Cornblitt/Di Tella and Bonilla/michelena models, perhaps those of greater theoretical significance coined in Southern Latin America for the studies of the overall process of change.

APPROXIMATIONS TO A CLASSIFICATORY PATTERN FOR A SOUTHERN LATIN AMERICA NATION-BUILDING COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The strategic approach

The general purpose then of this paper is to establish some overall and determined correlations between the objective change of the global social structure and the respective characteristics shown by the various circuits of the representation process within the necessary interaction among memory, consciousness and national collective will. This must be done having in mind the necessary interferences and "side feedbacks" between primary and secondary messages to which the present study gives special emphasis in relating them to the proper insertions into those circuits of the concrete totalities identified by the concept of a people or of the effective national residues in the process of social reflexion.

That overall process must then be referred to three focal strategic approaches :

- a) the moment still of the full enforcement of the colonial regime ;
- b) the one contemporary to the effective breakthroughs of development and its chances of self-inducing an overall social change ; and
- c) the possible traumatic shaping of the social reflexion process as an immediate result of the stagnation or even of the abortion of that historical grand intent.

We are, in this context, both concerned with finding a correlational pattern within the macro-dimensions of a social change understood as a process in the specific connotations already advanced in the present study and with a further caveat about the strategy of mentioning concrete cases in the present analysis.

DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL RESIDUE FORMATION :
TOWARD AN INCREASING FUNCTIONALIZATION OF
THE SOCIAL MEMORY

People and systemic social conversion :

In contrast with the limitations of the colonial period, one has to pay attention to some deeper implications of the full impact of the special social timing of the upsurge of development with respect to the social reflexion process of the Latin American countries. It is characterized, in this particular, by an inevitable delay in which that said process, as one of the social sub-systems, finally comes into being in the new global structure. This is a direct result of those mentioned conditions of congenital ambiguity or heteronomy between the objective social alignment of the main social actors and the representation of their interests and social vindications at the threshold of that transition. It was to be expected then that the said reflexion process would emerge as a consciousness-taking, i.e. as both a belated and sudden seizing of the deep nexus between certain scattered social behaviours and certain given signs already at the crest of some happenings or events, but not yet subordinated to a real congruent and totalizing representation. It is from this standpoint that the correlation has to be stated between the gradual emergence of a "people" concept in that period and the successive levels at which the actual reflexion process of the Latin American countries progresses, according to that radical and new systematic conversion required by the emergence of the new social structure. As we characterize the belatedness of that said reflexion process, we might, at the same time, establish the different extent in respect of which one can still speak about a limited synchrony between the objective and the subjective counterparts of that overall process of social change, i.e. it has to be established whether both ends can still be integrated within a minimum of phase compatibility among :

- (i) the objective social changes ;

(ii) the compensation of the belated emergence of the reflexion process by a consciousness-taking that would reduce the colonial equivocality through successive and increasingly dramatic diastesis (14) of the representation chain of that social process ;

(iii) the eventual appearance of the symbolic process of representation of that emerging concrete totality of that social change caught within an effective and operational syndrome.

It is through the articulation of those three momentums that we can speak fully about the decanting of a national residue as parallel to the development process and as the key-element for its contemporary nation-building process. In that context, another dimension would still have to be considered as relevant to that end-product. This would be, on the whole Southern Latin American scale of comparative analyses, the different character all those countries present vis-à-vis the feature of their pre-colonial background. One has to pay attention also to the different kind of latent support this emergent new process of social reflexion would have, since it is rooted either in historical vacuums or in rich pre-Colombian or idiomatic cultures.

Decanting a national residue : paradigms of synchrony

Bearing in mind all these elements one might then try to classify the whole screen of the Southern Latin American contemporary nation-building process according to the correlation between the objective social changes and their respective process of social reflexion in terms of different paradigms of synchrony. It would then be possible to bring in exemplary cases according to three basic situations in those nation-building processes :

(a) a relative anticipation of consciousness is expressed with respect to its corresponding objective change. A manifest blocking of the reciprocity of perspectives would then happen, responsible for the effective interference of the totality in the circuits of social reflexion, thus crippling the chances of a full interplay of all its mechanisms. One cannot expect then the appearance, in that case, of those said operational syndromes that would give birth to and feed the appearance of that totality and subsequently of a true and rich concept of a people.

(14) Diastesis in the meaning used for instance by Edgar Morin - De la Culturanalyse à la politique culturelle (Communications, 14, 1969).

When that phenomenon occurs in a country with a rich pre-colonial background, there would be no effective re-protagonization or dynamization of its potentialities. Though emphasized, it is left at the dimensions of its fossil-like and archaizing content ;

(b) a coincidence between the appearance of the objective conditions of development and autonomization, and the emergence of the reflexion process. In that case, there would be an acceleration of the diastesis of that mentioned equivocality through many rich symbolic gestures, according to the specific pattern of charismatic behaviours in that social transition. That is the ideal condition under which the consciousness-taking might even transcend the personal contents of those figurings in the form of an already highly advanced abstract tenor. That is the fundamental significance of the so-called exemplary polemics that had such a deep bearing on the most advanced cases of that new nation-building process in the fifties. As in this case, there is a real dynamization of the reciprocity of perspectives mechanism : the concrete national whole is clearly in the making. That is the proper ground for the appearance of the representation syndromes which would assume an essential perspective determination as exactly required by the inner characteristics of development as an historical project. The symbolic paradigm in that case tends to be referred to the exercise of self-determination expressed in the following models : (15)

(i) the adoption - as a grand option - of a radically new legislation to define the statutory relationship of some crucial economic activities in the development transition ;

(ii) the attempt to anticipate, in terms of those representation syndromes, the very totality in-formation in terms of a historical maquette or a reduced model, through a feat that would be present and resulting from a contraction in time.

When this ideal case of a synchrony between the objective social change and its respective social process takes place against a strong pre-colonial cultural background, one can then speak of an effective re-protagonization of those contents, in terms of an adequate contemporary finding of its equivalences and then of an authentic re-enacting of its iconography ;

(15) Hélio Jaguaribe - O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira - cp. cit., pp. 142 ss. ; Michel Debrun - Nationalisme et Politique du Développement du Brésil (Sociologie du Travail 1964, vol. VI n° 4, pp. 235/59, vol. VII, n° 2, pp. 351/80).

(c) a belated appearance of the reflexion process within development, almost at the end of the phase where it is still possible to speak of a spontaneous and congruent process of overcoming the colonial structure. In this case, there would be an extremely sudden institutionalization of the consciousness-taking. Just born, it becomes an instrument of strong mobilization and a direct component of the very remaining changes of a thorough policy of change (16). It is in that context that it fully takes up the characteristics of the already mentioned techniques of animation. It would then put into motion the belated effects of the mechanism of reciprocity of perspectives. The total representations, in this case, would then present a traumatic character. This is especially evident, if that belatedness in the objective conditions of social change coincides with a new impetus of the survival of the old regime or of the increasing replacement of development by the newly born profiles of economic dependence. In that case, the optimal or almost canonlike conditions for an abstract or almost ludic expression of self-determination would disappear, as, for instance, provided by the exemplary polemics or the feats typical of the former case. The symbolic determinations of national identity in that case are then taunted by that emerging feeling of an increasingly cornered social destiny. It is in that kind of ground that the grand collective images of the critical expropriations and nationalizations take root and through them the chances of unleashing a high gear of national mobilization as a deterrent against the impending and increasing external conditions of domination.

National consciousness and anticipated to
objective social change : the Peruvian case

The significance of "Aprismo"

In the "Aprismo", as it appeared in the twenties, one might perhaps find the best case of a deep movement of social reflexion in Latin America, clearly anticipated to the objective conditions of change made possible by development. Created by Haya, one could see in that case and in that movement an extreme degree of responsiveness to the effective systemic tension to which the old regime was then exposed. (17)

(16) Candido Mendes - O processo de reflexao na crise do desenvolvimento - op. cit., pp. 104 ss.

(17) Victor Raul Haya de la Torre - El Ant-Imperialismo y el el. Apra (México 1928); Construyendo el Aprismo (Berlín, 1930); Trienta Años de Aprismo (F.C.E., México, 1956)

"Aprismo", from that standpoint, places itself as stern anti-imperialistic doctrine, extremely careful to be sure of a complete dialectic insertion, benefiting, at the same time, from a flexible or culturalistic appropriation of Marxism. However, when stating the necessary national polarity as opposed to the dominance of the old regime, that movement does it still within an extremely stiff focal determination.

In fact, the concept of a people, in this case, because exactly of the very limitations and the still strong weight of the regime, will actually not be the result of the dialectic interplay of the reciprocity of perspectives. It would, then, not go beyond the simple invocation of a nominal residue or the cultural background labeled as "Indo-America".

A systemic surplus

It is significant that, due precisely to the lack of any challenge from the objective development possibilities and the concrete phenomenology it might induce, "Aprismo" could, in this particular, overdevelop its formal and systemic categories ; and this to the level inclusively of a full theory and of a general philosophy of history, giving birth to concepts like historical space-time or cultural personality or a universal Indo-American philosophy. That doctrine, which nevertheless succeeded inclusively in formulating a full theory of consciousness-taking, became relevant in fact, not because of that conceptual production, but especially because of the end results of the practice to which it was led by its accurate methodological approach. It was this aspect which clearly marked the specific importance of its contents as an ideological input in the reflexion process at the threshold of development. "Aprismo" does not lead, in fact, to an effective representation of the latent totality of the process that would subsequently embody a national project then impelled by the development take-off. Its historical validity, nevertheless, remains owing to the acuity of its global references and to its deep consciousness, both of the polarity that would shape the overall process of change and of the necessary radicality those policies would demand.

A case of over-mobilization

It is not without reason thus that "Aprismo" became a movement of a necessarily and even compulsory mobilizing nature ; and that, escaping from the traditional crippling perspective of the behaviour of the Latin American intelligentsia (18).

(18) Torcuato S. di Tella - A responsabilidade politica da intelligentsia latino-americana (Dados, n° 1, 166), pp. 42 ss.

prone to an extremely élite-ish social change approach - developing a direct impact on collectivity as a whole and especially on his rural milieu, deeply imbued in the very core of the old regime. It is from that standpoint inclusively that all subsequent significant events of the Peruvian social change became structured as disputed by other challenges - and especially by the Army - to the extreme capacity of an open and direct mass mobilization (19). "Aprismo" succeeded, through this anticipation, to establish itself as the backbone of the Peruvian power and national control struggle. No other is the condition still prevailing nowadays as we shall see later ; that mobilization is still the fundamental instrument of Government legitimacy. Of no other origin are likewise the symbolic roots which, now fully encompassed by the maturing of that development, shape up more and more as consciousness-aking through charismatic gestures, as so well and strongly evidenced by the recent General Velasco take-over. It is then by means of a direct appeal to the high degree of symbolic mobilization that this recently emerged military regime, inclusively by an open confrontation with APRA, resorted to the confiscation of some key-oil industries as the necessary and basic condition for the generalized and instant consensu which finally ratified its access to power.

Consciousness-taking concomitant with the objective
social change : the Brazilian case in the fifties

The framework of full and accelerated change

It would be extremely difficult to find in the whole Latin American context a case of accelerated change like the one shown by Brazil in the decade immediately after World War II (20).

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- (19) Julio Cotler - Military Populism as a National Development Model : The Peruvian Case (Rio de Janeiro Pol. SC. Round Table, October, 1969, mimeographed) ; Carlos Astiz - The Peruvian Armed Forces as a Political Elite : can they develop a new developmental model ? (idem)
- (20) Celso Furtado - A Economia Brasileira - op. cit. ; Dialética do Desenvolvimento (FCE, Rio, 1967) ; L.C. Pereira - Desenvolvimento e Crise no Brasil - 1960-1967, op. cit. ; Alexandre Kafka. Estrutura da Economia Brasileira ; Ewaldo Correia Lima - Politica do Desenvolvimento ; Rômulo de Almeida - Industrializacao e Base Agraria in Introducao aos Problemas do Brasil (ISEB, Rio, 1956) ; Ignacio Tangel - A Inflacao Brasileira (Tempo Brasileiro, Rio, 1963) ; Werner Baer - Industrialization and Economic Development in Brazil (Yale, N.H. 1965).

In the fifteen years that followed, the country was deeply thrown - to literal exhaustion - into the structural changes derived from a process of substitution of imports. Industrialization then reached all the stages required for self-sufficiency in terms of the production needed by its own domestic market. Consequently the labour structure of the active population underwent a complete change too, due to the strong and absorbant new requirements of the secondary sector.

The appearance then of the regional imbalances reflected, on the other hand, the high level of integration already attained by the country as an economic system and the new role played by urbanization. At the same time, Brazil benefited to a large degree from a simultaneously horizontal and vertical mobility. This was matched in terms of its systemic counterpart at the political level by the strengthening of a democratic model in terms of respectively ;

- a) power diffusions ;
- b) institutionalization and objectivation of its dynamism ;
- c) an increased differentiation and plurality of the decision-taking powers in their various social functions.

All that set of cumulative, objective changes would necessarily bear a strong impact on the cultural sub-system and there on the ideologies that might reflect the increasing expression and compatibilization of the national product of change, then in full swing. In the reflexion process one could then see the unleashing of the mechanism of reciprocity of perspectives simultaneously with :

- a) the full impact of the expansion of the middle-classes ;
- b) urbanization ;
- c) the internal migration made possible by the spreading out of the economic space of the country ;
- d) the increasing status differentiation provided by the general increase of the productivity of the system ;
- e) the erosion of the rudimentary old regime and its stiff pattern of bipolarities through the new dynamic conditions of professional labour by means of the rapid and general dissemination of know-how.

Ideology and objective change : a canonical interplay

It is in that period corresponding almost exactly to the fifties, that development became, with a high degree of logic formulation, an ostensible and long-term-minded programme of Government in Brazil. Accordingly nationalism then became the political consciousness required for the implementation of that ambitious and overall process of social change (21). It is from that standpoint that it was then conceived as an ideology endowed with a high compatibilization-like function, this in order to favour the increase integration and the subsequent mobilization of the various social groups who would tend to assume, while the systemic character of the new structure appears, an actual profile of genuine classes in the overall process of change. In that context, developmental nationalism had the special effect of permitting a basic identity of interests and social representations of respectively ;

- a) the then emerging national bourgeoisie ;
- b) the middle-classes who would provide the services and skills required by industrialization ; and
- c) an increasingly differentiated urban working class who would meet the qualified manpower requirements of the new and dynamic social system.

There would then only remain outside development and its large spectrum of social expectations the cluster of interests structurally linked to the old regime as the export latifundi, the mercantile groups who lived on the trade system that served the plantation needs and the clientele who within the statutory-like dynamism of the colonial structure stood for what might have been the embryo of the middle-classes (22).

(21) Alvaro Vieira Pinto - Consciencia e Realidade Nacional (ISEB, Rio, 1961) Roland, Corbisier - Formacao e Problema da Cultura Brasileira (ISEB, Rio, 1960).

(22) Rélio Jaguaribe - Desenvolvimento Político - Desenvolvimento Economico (F.C.E., Rio, 1962) ; The Dynamics of Brazilian Nationalism (in Claudio Veliz "Obstacles to change in Latin America ; Oxford U. Press, 1965) pp. 162/187. ; Candido Mendes - Nacionalismo e Desenvolvimento, op. cit.

The role of developmental nationalism

It must also be stressed that, exactly because of the already mentioned ambiguity, the colonial transition can be characterized by the appearance of a role duality in one same social actor. That leads to the very special effect that, alongside with the increased dynamism of development, it appears that a more than proportional emptying of the forces contrary to the new system, role shifting or rotation among the same actors, would then shortcircuit roles and actors' translations.

This is what is really shown in the increasing profile as industrialists assumed by the coffee-planters, to the same extent in which the advantages offered by the building of the new industrial plants of the country would clearly offset the confiscation they were, at the same time, submitted to in their roles as latifundary exporters. One has then to speak about a structural imbalance in the projection of those structural objectives conditioned in the realms of the reflexion process that takes finally the shape of a unifying tendency to present their interests and reivindications on a prospective basis. That was still strongly enhanced by the determinants assumed by the iconography of the national project and by the contents of developmental nationalism.

In fact, when referred to their past, those said actors - as the key elements of an oligarchy who assumes an innovating role in the transition process - would be strongly hit by the equivocal representation of their interests and social needs, such deep being the interlocking of their roles in the old and in the new regime in said transition. (23)

An essentially prospective representation

From the angle, however, of a would-be development and of the ideal projection of the many behaviours it would depend upon, those groups could easily range themselves in a clear historical alignment, but this exactly as long as that social change could be visualized in terms of a series of defined targets and the future becoming a declination of a dramatic sequence of stages, in themselves interlocked in a carefully enchained series within their strict agenda.

(23) Fernando Henrique Cardoso - Mudancas Sociais na América Latina (Difusao Européia do Livro, Sao Paulo, 1969) Spee pp. 51/83 ; 186 ss ; 199/221 ; Simon Schwotzman - Development and Political Openess (The Rio de Janeiro Pol. SC. Round Table, IPSA, Oct. 1969, mimeographed).

It is then necessary to define the precise characteristics of the phenomenological and totalizing experience of development as the object of a full effort of social mobilization. It would then appear as both a progressive loss of grip of the old order and simultaneously as the implementation of the new order, as the direct and immediately perceived result of the exercise of free social options. These are in themselves dependent upon a given degree of social sacrifices and efforts, the relations of which are clearly established with the rational targets chosen by a given collectivity as the eminent protagonist of that radical process of social change.

That whole feeling would then be summed up as the experience of self-determination and would constitute the very contents of the intentionality of developmental nationalism from the standpoint of the reflexion process. This would be its specific dimension in terms of the final and remaining significance of the residue then in full decanting, as the effect of the mechanism of reciprocity of perspectives. The latter would then benefit strongly from the degree attained by social mobility and the changes occurring in the many social subsystems which objectively development was made of Quasi ideological and fully symbolic expressions of national consensus.

One must then follow, in this particular context, the social reflexion process in its subsequent stages. In fact, its symbolic processing (i.e. the transformation of its primary phenomenological data into secondary messages) would obey a general pattern of reductions or of syntheses that would afford, at the same time, the chances to express, in terms of an appropriation and an option, the congruity between the national project and all the sectors of the social system. (24)

That would have critical significance as far as its final outcome is concerned. One could then clearly perceive, in the Brazilian case and in that period, that symbolic overwhelming symbolic dimension assumed, from this particular standpoint, by the policies of the oil legislation; this in terms of the adoption of a statute of total State monopoly. Adopted exactly at the most dynamic phase of the Brazilian social change in the fifties, that in itself became the fundamental content of its developmental nationalism. Then one can explain the many components that gave to that historical choice such a deep character of a paradigmatic symbol of self-determination.

(24) Frank Bonilla - "Brazil - : A National Ideology for Development in Kalman Silvert "Expectant Peoples : Nationalism and Development.

Paradigmatic gestures of self-determination

It succeeded in fulfilling completely the needs of expressing the national residua compatible with that period of Brazilian social change. One can see then simultaneously at work in producing that overwhelming symbol the following elements :

a) The eminently prospective character assumed by that decision, since the country has had no previous experience of the advantages of liabilities of a different system of exploitation, like, for instance, its exploitation by private entrepreneurs. They had then to be entirely based on pure extra-polations from other historical analogies. In the Brazilian case, no pre-determination can then be seen in Petrobrás' final statutes by prior timeseries, like, for instance, those which have conditioned, in terms of a radical confiscatory solution, the Mexican oil experience or that of the tin mines in the case of the Bolivian revolution of 1952 ;

b) The character of a pure exercise of a social option stemming from a strictly exhaustive analysis - at the level of an exemplary polemic - of the advantages and flows of the many models and regimes then envisages for that crucial exploitation. (25) In that, from that special viewpoint, the pro and counter reasons of each pattern would be finally assessed as a full neutralization in terms of a final and rational algebraic sum within just a strictly technocratic approach.

Oil statutes as org symbols

Since that exemplary polemic would then have literally absorbed and caught the collective mind, it permits the protagonization of self-determination at a very high degree of abstraction. All conditions were thus established to provide the final choice with all the components of an org symbol. Thus the choice of the monopoly in its own gratuity and radicality became a pure and abstract paradigmatic exercise of national self-determination. It is then useless to try to reduce or to analyse the content of the decision in the light of an average policy of development and its strict rational demands ; or to try to induce the logics of the Petrobrás statutes by means of any other nationalization-minded or confiscation - entrepreneurial oriented - policy that would take place in different sectors of the national economic model of development.

(25) On the concept of "exemplary polemics" see Candido Mendes - Memento of the Miving. The Catholic Left in Brazil, op. cit. pp. 30/33.

In fact, the Petrobrás polemic - and this is what explains its subsequent practically magic untouchability - was entirely transferred to the symbolic level of the national reflexion process. This resulted from a direct and strict transposition of its own contents in themselves, with the addition then of that new connotation of the oil monopoly as the very component of the exercise of self-determination. It is in this context that we can scientifically quote what used to be said as a joke by the oil-monopoly opponents : that Brazilian nationalism was strictly a "Petrobrás" hydrocarburate.

In fact and within this understanding, the over-symbolic importance assumed in the fifties by the Petrobrás polemic was only the reflex of how one might see, in that case, the example of a full absorption within those circuits of representation, of the then emerging national residue as an effect of the mechanism of reciprocity of perspectives then fully activated by development. The Brazilian example, in this context, would then serve to call due attention to how some critical economic gestures of an economic sub-system at the threshold of development might, in fact, have an "historical plus" - especially when taking place at a canonic phase of the process (26) - and might finally appear with a complete off-series significance of the one that would be expected in terms of its strict belonging to a given and limited sub-system in the wholeness of change. Their significance is then what they take from that social reflexion process and through it from the inner social continuum that forms its nation-building.

Role equivocity and its diastesis

It is also necessary now to pay full attention to the effects of the already mentioned rule that, in the cases of a concomitant or a simultaneous objective social change consciousness-taking, the social actors involved in the process tend to have an equivocal reference to their past and a convergent representation of their role within the emerging national project.

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- (26) Candido Mendes - The Development Generation in "The Emergence of The Brazilian Intelligentsia", 77 pp. mimeographed paper presented at the University of California - Los Angeles / Rivea side Symposium on Brazil-Portuguese Africa, February, 1968.

It is from that first standpoint that one can see how those periods would condition the consciousness-taking as diasteses, i.e. as a retrospective enlightening of the congruities and oppositions in which the social actors can perceive their immediate social environment ; and this generally by means of a sudden light thrown on those clusters by the already mentioned charismatic actions of testimony and sacrifice, i.e. of those symbolic negative figurings already mentioned in the present paper.

It is in this sense that there has been a precise social timing for the relevance, for instance, of Vargas' suicide, its extraordinary impact upon national consciousness - taking by giving a full meaning and perception to the polarity nation/anti-nation resulting from its coincidence with the final organisation of the then incoming infra-structure of a national State, capable of offsetting the inertia of the old regime. It would lead - with the subsequent Government of President Kubitschek - to a condition of a creative interplay between a given programme of objective social change and the social consciousness and subsequent social mobilization that became its counterpart. It is exactly that basic synchrony that would permit the totality representations in said process to benefit from a real paradigmatic syndrome, i.e. its iconography would reach the extremes of paraphrase or of transparency with the very nature of the prospective social time in which development was supposed to take place.

From paradigm to paraphrase

It was for no other reason that the general symbolic target of the Kubitschek administration - able to produce the greatest ever experienced national consensus for the tasks of change - was based on the construction of the new federal capital, conceived as a feat in terms of its full completion within one and the same limited presidential period. Said symbolism, in that case, assumes the character of a paraphrase at reduced scale model of that overall development task itself. In this case, the abbreviating function that constitutes a secondary message in the reflexion process and favours and exchanges a special behaviour or task of that whole to become its exemplary feat or achievement.

The creation of Brasilia implied too in itself, with the whole attained dramaticity of a prodigy, the very building up as a microcosm of the emerging Brazilian people.

One has to pay attention immediately to the side-effects or the by-products of that kind of target chosen as exhaustive paradigm. The construction of the new capital, at the same time as it paraphrases development in terms of the implacability of its agenda, also fully expressed the ultimate sense of self-determination taking roots in the very hinterland of a continental nation, to the same extent as, at that stage, development got accelerated. That was exactly the canonical period of the spontaneous change of the colonial structure in Brazil : the social reflexion process was strongly enriched within a pattern of interplays between the objective changes and their respective representations.

In that broader and dynamic context then, an emerging nation-building process at full fledge could be perceived, reflecting at both ends of its social continuum the original success of the Brazilian experience of development in the fifties.

Post-change consciousness-taking : the
Brazilian case in the sixties

Freezing of the social reflexion process

It is also within the same general framework that we may use the Brazilian case to illustrate the interplay between objective and subjective ends of social changes at the very brink of the rupture of their synchrony. These correspondences, in this case, take place at the moment when there is a clear decline in the rhythm of the process of change and in which consciousness-taking - still within a limited phase compatibility - assumes increasingly the character of a compensatory intervention different from that pattern of harmonious interplays, as stated by the same Brazilian previous experience.

In this case, consciousness-taking is no longer just a momentum or a deepening stage of the reflexion process nor the effect of a degree of belated subjective maturity as counterpart of a given set of objective changes, although potentially their final eruption would then be just the last layer of a fully structured and rooted memory-deposit.

In this new context one cannot speak of consciousness-taking as merely a case of a belated awakening of interplay. One faces, in fact, the full use of consciousness-taking not as a result of that said interaction, but as the attempt to utilize it as a point of departure, as a fully structured perspective of intervention in said reality.

Consciousness-taking, in this case, became a fully objectivated instrument of a policy of social change and this in the well-known forms of animation or mobilization. (27)

Consciousness-taking and mass pedagogy

It is as if, in those cases and in order to compensate for the contradictions and obstacles encountered by the objective changes, there would be an intense reiteration of the feasibility of that project in terms of the social reflexion process, thus giving new impetus to certain crucial strategic behaviours acting as an incentive for their impending achievement in time in order to ensure the final maintenance of the basic agenda of structural changes in the development process. By guaranteeing the last-moment effort surplus, in a pattern of increasingly reduced dynamism this might be the difference between success or failure in the take-off or in a self-induced possibility of change. Constituted as a component of the development planning itself and becoming the crucial factor for its own feasibility, consciousness-taking necessarily stiffens. Instead of just enriching the inner circuits of the social reflexion process, it tends to become an instant instrument of mass pedagogy. It becomes just the overconcentrated effort to activate - through what was called animation - the many crucial actors, whose performance would make up the difference between the final edges of development.

In that very special context, it would then be exposed to an ample institutionalization as an instrument to break the increased inertia of a given initial situation of change which progressively loses its original impetus. It is within this context, for instance, that consciousness-taking assumes an increasing relevance simultaneously with the loss of the development change rhythm at the beginning of the sixties.

Popular culture and national catarsis

It would then be successively identified with the movement of basic education or, in a more refined and at a higher theoretical level, with the experience of popular culture. (28)

(27) J.O. Beozzo - Les Mouvements des Universitaires Catholiques au Bresil : Apercus Historique et Essai d'Interpretation (Louvain, 1968).

(28) André Cruziat - Chants, Danses, Fêtes et "Conscientisation" au Bresil (in Terre Entiere, Oct. 1969), pp. 54/78.

In that process it is easy to perceive the increased changing of emphasis placed on education as a critical tool for change. Instead of the old phylogenetic perspective of gradual and long-range effects in the overall process of development, it became more and more a systematic practice of what was called de-alienization. It tried then to extract, in its full and deeper impact, many techniques of social improvement previously within the idea of social development as merely a corrective factor of economic development.

The consciousness-taking, however, would necessarily have to pay a price for its use as a historical shock therapy. It would have to be the closing for the many virtualities of its specific role within the social reflexion circuits. It would then fail to provide those representations with the necessary symbolic and iconographic productions that would have to feed the subjective process of change after the original catarsis ; that would, in short, ensure the new enlightenment and increased impetus toward change gained by those social actors at the threshold of development as well as the subsequent nexus or references to ensure its continuity in the following phases and challenges of the overall process of growth.

The loss of a basic post-development synchrony
and pseudo-morphosis of the national residue :
the cases of Uruguay and Argentina

Non-dissonant middle-classes

Latin America today, as an example underlining the limits of that synchrony and its relevance for the different cases of its paradigmatic nation-building, offers examples of a pseudo-morphic invocation of that residue and this exactly in the situations which correspond, in their objective counterpart, to perspectives of a beginning desintegration of the historical development project. (29) We would be, in that context, precisely in the situation of a marked diachrony, where the increased limitations in the setting of the social reflexion process would indicate an increasing loss of an effective systematic configuration of the objective changes originally nurtured by development.

(29) Dario Canton - The Argentine Revolution of 1966 and the National Project (The Rio de Janeiro Round Table of Pol. Science, IUPERJ, Oct., 1969, mimeographed).

It is symptomatic that these phenomena are exactly taking place in the most mature and complex social processes of Latin America, as it is the case in respect of Argentina and Uruguay.

In the same manner, those are exactly the contexts of pre-Colombian background as historical vacuums. Those are also the countries which, in the phase of a greater dynamism of their modernization process, have reached the point where they reject all idiomatic validity of their immediate historical context, fully assuming the rationale of aculturation and their full portraying as Western nations (30) : they would subjectively feel as fully assimilated to that historical trunk and to the full dynamism of what was expected to be the normal behaviour of the various sub-systems of the "great society".

It is then extremely meaningful that, in those nations, the emergence of that idiomatic variable is actually taking place within the effort to seek a national residue, which really did not benefit from a process of reciprocity of perspectives and of the genuine articulation of concrete totalities, which was supposed to follow the moments of most dynamism in their process of social change. From the objective counterpart, i.e. from the characteristics of their social change, one must analyze that peculiarity of the structural conditions which, in the case of Argentina and Uruguay, did not the behaviour of the middle-classes - in clear contradiction with the Brazilian, Mexican or Peruvian cases - be transformed into the really supporting and dynamic conditions for a congruent determination of their historical residua. And this, as already stated, would be the result of a continuous modulation of the reciprocal remissions of images and levels of experiences and interests of social compositions : there, in fact, the key element, leading to a flexible pattern of coalitions and to the responsiveness of the structures of power, would permit the middle-classes to enjoy both a relative dissonance with the dominant perspective and its secant-like function for the compatibilization and consensus formation that would finally create a national residua.

State patronage and structural Bonapartism

From that standpoint, the José Nun model contribution is extremely significant (31), when it evidences that both in

(30) Leopoldo Zea- The Latin American Mind, op. cit. 216 ss.

(31) José Nun - Latin America : The Hegemonic Crisis and the Military Coup - op. cit.

the Argentine and Uruguayan cases the middle-classes were, at the very beginning of development, immediately inserted into the power structures, their social perspective being entirely assimilated to that of the oligarchy, i.e. that of the over-dominant actor, not only in the old structure, but also in the transition between the two systems through the previously explained strategic role duplicity it might develop.

In the Uruguayan case that is clearly seen in the functions immediately taken up by the State, in the degrees of its intervention at all levels of the socio-economic behaviours of the country, thus giving an increasingly statutory character to the class relationship development might have brought in. (32)

An analogy can be drawn in respect of the Argentine case, but without the same degree of final institutionalization. It would remain at the level of strict personal mediation through the continual processes of incoming changes that would compensate the real direction of the overall process of change : that would be recognized in the Bonapartist-like key-role played by their Governments, which took place after the collapse of the old regime and in which the Peronist regime appears as anthological (33).

What is significant from this point of view is to see how the emergence of an increasing idiomatic reivindication for a national residue is a relatively very recent claim in both those cases : they appear exactly in the phase where there is, due to the failure of the spontaneous development hopes of the last two decades, a situation of manifest stagnation in the Argentine example and of a clear retrocession as show today by the Uruguayan case.

(32) Aldo E. Solari - Estudios sobre la Sociedad Uruguaya (Montevideo, 1964) ; Carlos Rama - La Crisis Política (Ciencias Políticas e Sociales, vol. XVI) pp. 233/412.

(33) Peter Smith - Social Mobilization, Political Participation and the Rise of Juan Peron (Political Science Quarterly, vol. XXXIV, n° 1, March 1969) ; Tulio Holperin Doughi - Argentina en el Collojon (Montevideo, 1964) ; Dardo Cuneo - El Desencuentro Argentino, 1930/1955 (Buenos Aires, 1965) ; Aldo Ferrer - La Economía Argentina : Las etapas de su desarrollo y problemas Actuales (Mexico, 1963).

Inconvertible national residua

No wonder that, in both cases, the claim for that national residue would be increasingly identified with movements of a pronounced subversive character, that would be only convertible into protest-like and violent gestures vis-à-vis the dominant dynamism of the present social conditions of said countries. A definite correlationship can then be established between the manifest artificial character of the residua to which those movements refer (having in mind the vacuum-like character of their cultural back-grounds) and their solidarity with the previous, although abortive, representations of a national whole that might have been generated by that said mechanism of reciprocity of perspectives, killed in the egg by the extreme complacency of the middle-classes toward the oligarchy at the threshold of development. (34) This is as if, exactly as a projection of the most advanced cases of the trauma of stagnation or of social retrocession, those strongly subversive movements would now devote themselves to a strictly symbolic and post-mortem-like exercise of self-determination; it would then be just the compensation "in effigie" of the chances of a national destiny represented as increasingly obliterated by what seemed to be, to those generations, the final and melancholic end-product of the overall process of social change.

"Tacuaras" and "Tupamaros"

One can then establish - and thus giving a special significance to those who use utter nationalism as the main contents of subversive protests in those countries - an interplay between the increasingly artificial character of the intended remission to an idiomatic cultural background claimed by those movements and the progressive anomic characteristics of their behaviour within their social environment.

In the Argentine case, for instance, those gestures can be identified, in the "Tacuara" movement, with the closest manifestation, in already fully Malthusian-like and violent terms, of a bourgeoisie and middle-class frustrated in their expectations of the process of social change, deeply hit by the relative failure of the general policies of starting and re-starting, over and again, their original cycle of prosperity of the last years.

(34) José Nun - Latin America : The Hegemonic Crisis and the Military Coup, op. cit.; The Argentina Variant, pp. 37/42.

The components of radicalism and xenophobia that movement presents are clearly indicative of a downward curve in the process of social change. They could then be held, in the manifest claims they might increasingly assume, as exemplary cases of an utopic connotation turned into a strict ideological one ; and this as a complete change of roles in the reflexion process with respect to their final effect in terms of mobilization and the impact through the objective conditions of change.

It is, however, in the Uruguayan case of today that one can perceive the full closing of the cycle of correspondences between the objectively induced change and their respective process of social reflexion. Indeed, it is in the most firmly and traditionally rooted process of modernization on the continent and thus of the full metropolis-like perspective assumed by its population where there is taking place today the best example of the claims of a national idiomatic residue - like the "Tupamaros" - identifying a movement which makes sheer terrorist action the strict content of its politically significant deed. In these cases and for the protagonists of those movements, the perception of the loss of the chances of a national project is, in this case, simultaneous with an irrational remittance to a theoretical residue, fully obliterated during the long and stable modernization phase by those already explained mechanisms. It can thus be understood how any attempt to refer to the present and surrounding objective social system could only be made in terms of a radical and endless confrontation by means of systematic practice of violence. And exactly as the final counterproof of the pattern of general correlations for the comparative analysis scale which the present paper tries to illustrate, it is of no surprise that Uruguay constitutes, in fact, the extreme case in Latin America of a country that might now even show signs of falling from a perspective of retrocession into one of institutional desintegration.

Extremes which confirm the rule : the lack
of a national residue in the Chilean case

Strong lines of social cleavage

In the endeavour to integrate Southern Latin America into the present suggested cycle for a comparative analysis, it is significant to contemplate the case of Chile. Attention must be paid to the difficulty of fitting that country into any segment of the historical curve which constitutes the main support of that said classification in terms of expressing the paradigmatic cases of a simultaneous or diachronic claim for a national residuum within the development process. (35)

(35) K.H. Silvert, "Some Propositions on Chile", in Robert D. Tomasok, ed. Latin American Politics : Studies of the Contemporary Scene (Garden City, N.Y. : 1966), pp. 383/98.

It is, however, exactly due to this that the Chilean experience is the outstanding case of the exception confirming the rule. Chile is, in fact, in Southern Latin America, the only country that does not show a strong nationalistic component as the dominant element of its contemporary process of social reflexion and this to the same extent in which it also lacked a quasi ideological function in its recent social change. In other words, in Chile -- unlike in the other key countries of Southern Latin America -- a deep rooting of the social actors who monopolized the protagonization of the status quo within the classical oligarchic role-playing was not manifest. Chile did not experience that kind of ideological seizing of the middle-classes by that hegemonic formation of the upper strata that was responsible, in the majority of the Southern Latin American cases, for placing the mentioned phenomenon of ambiguity in the core of their social reflexion processes. No wonder, therefore, Chile was in a position to do without any claim for a national residue as device to arrive at a degree of collective consciousness at the threshold of development. No strong interplay was required, in its representation chain, of the mechanisms of reciprocity of perspectives to the same extent as the social process would produce strong lines of cleavage between the interests and the social supports of its main actors.

In fact, in Chile the traditional oligarchy, due to the peculiarities of that colonial structure, has presented the lowest degree of social penetration, responsible for the structural ambiguity of the economic role-playings in the classical pattern of the Latin American process of change, based on import substitutions. This is what explains how these very specific features of that social reflexion process have led to a spontaneous organisation and sharpening of the consciousness-taking, bringing Chile closer to the European pattern of ideological behaviour than any other country in Latin America.

In its objective process, this is matched by the characteristics of an extremely high internal polarization of the old regime. This had also been the ultimate result of the fact that the colonial regime there consisted of a highly concentrated mining complex with a direct and ostensible degree of dependence between the local subsidiary and the mother company. (36).

(36) Anibal Pinto - Chile, una Economia Dificil (Mexico, 1964).

Contrary to the majority of the Latin American cases, the general pattern of the basic relationships of dependence and control the general structure was made of in this case was extraordinarily apparent.

The absence of a mediating bourgeoisie

In short, that sharp cleavage eliminated all chances of the emergence of a mediating national bourgeoisie and its role-duplicity at the doorstep of change that made ideological ambiguity a structural characteristic of the plantation system within the colonial structure. To that same extent, there would be no room for the emergence of the mechanisms of reciprocity of perspectives that would lead to a broad role-playing in that context of a national residue and of the definition of nationalism as an ideology in the process of change. It is, therefore, no surprise that Chile was the regime which, due to the high level of internal integration of the national pole of its social system - in strong contrast with the duality of the plantation-minded systems of other Southern Latin America countries - gave birth to a genuine ideological alignment of its political and social forces. (37) This became evident either in the general tricotomic pattern presented by the actually national parties of Chile, (with the Conservatist, Christian Democratic and Leftish Parties placed in a continuous and coherent line of increased radicality) or in the full penetration of Christian Democracy into the social layers theoretically more susceptible to suffer the effect of the double phenomenon of the social interplay between marginality and mobilization. (38)

More evidence can be brought to that case - as exception confirming the rule - if one pays attention to the specific features of the stability of the Chilean political process as a result of the high degree of integration with the present social system of its middle-classes.

(37) Maurice Zeitlin - The Social Determinants of Political Democracy in Chile (Petras and Zeitlin Latin America Reform or Revolution? A Reader, Gettleman, Fawcett, New York, 1968), pp. 220/234.

(38) James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, Miners and Agrarian Radicalism (Petras and Zeitlin Latin America Reform or Revolution? - A Reader op. cit.) pp. 235/248.

This latter phenomenon is by itself a result of the extrinsic conditioning of the old oligarchy to the main stream of that process, thus leading to a spontaneous and congruent alignment of the national actors against the colonial regime.

A premature integration of the middle-classes

This degree of strong coherence at the ideological level led Chile also to present necessarily the most evidenced degree of statutory allocation patterns, correcting the spontaneous class tensions and class appropriations of expanding income resulting from development. (39)

In fact, one might speak of a slippage between those two levels of interest composition in said social process. The immediate appearance of that statutory treatment precludes the needs for class aspirations to reach a drastic settlement at the global level of social expectations or a full representation of their interests.

It must, in this context, be stressed that Chile was the country on the continent, as underlined by Mun and Hirschman, that established minimum wages for public service personnel (40) even before any concession of that kind to the secondary sector or to industrial manpower. One can, therefore, speak of a full institutionalization of the intermediary sectors at the very seeds of the development process ; they had their full absorption ensured in the process of change by immediately profiting from a statutory-like access to all benefits that would come out of the overall national development performance. It can also easily be seen how, in that kind of pattern, a latent trend toward stagnation appeared in the long-run, due to the kind of premature distributivism it gave birth to. But the increased loss of dynamism of the regime would not have happened after Chile had arrived at a high degree of social integration, thus avoiding, either the ordinary needs of the quasi ideological behaviour in the critical phase of development or, in any of its dimensions, a significant role-playing of the national residues in its process of social reflexion.

(39) Oswaldo Sunkel - Change and Frustration in Chile, in Claudio Veliz - Obstacles to change, op. cit. pp. 116/44.

(40) Albert O. Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress : Studies of Economic Policy-making in Latin America (New York : 1963), p. 264.

Pre-development stage and its counterpart
in the social reflexion process : the cases
of Paraguay, Bolivia and Ecuador

Rich primitive backgrounds, low national viability

Within the social continuum now outlined, it has been tried to establish a pattern to encompass the various countries of Southern Latin America. At the opposite end of the Chilean case - which presents the closest link with the European cases - it is now important to complete the picture with those countries which are still in a pre-development stage, i.e. which have not yet passed the whole phase of full conversion to another regime but the colonial structure. These are the countries where the very viability of that change in national terms still remains untested. At the same time, these are also the countries which show a high ethnical and idiomatic content in their present cultural background.

This would be the case of Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay. In these cases, one can even speak of one of the very seldom hypotheses of a traumatic historical consciousness.

It is impossible to find, in the whole of Latin America, any other social historical situation in which the eventual continuity of collective representation has been so much linked to a series of social catastrophes. No other country like Paraguay does, in fact, present such a series of disruptive challenges as its exposure to a thorough eradication of the Jesuitic missions and then to the two wars, of 1857 and 1933, which led Paraguay to sacrifice successively the very core of its male population in two almost contiguous generations.

It is relevant to analyze, in this context, the new cultural representations of the present Paraguayan intelligentsia in terms of what they call the culture of the meseta : it is the perfect rationale for a diaspora-like historical perspective in terms of a loose figuring of a nowadays national project for the development of that country. (41)

(41) Enrique Ibarra - La cultura de la meseta y los pueblos menestroles de America Latina (IFIDIAPAL, Seminar, Assuncion, June, 1968, Unpublished).

Instant social mobilization

Ecuador and Bolivia were no cases of an almost historical violation by the succession of those dramatic events, but cases of the already mentioned structural limitations, where the colonial complex might lead its collectivities to at the brink of social historical anomy. (42)

One might perhaps, from that standpoint, try to meet both ends of a peculiar social situation, where these countries show objectively a strong idiomatic background without leading, at the same time, to any consciousness of that said specificity. It would be impossible to speak, in this case, of the presence or of the special functions of the national residue in the social reflexion process in the sense already indicated in this paper. This happens to the same extent in which those are the countries with the least capacity for an autonomous induction of their own development, i.e. the capacity to envisage or to enter the threshold of social change through the process of import substitutions which identifies Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile.

In other words, it can be said that, in these cases, the chances of overcoming the status quo and its deeply rooted inertia were all left within the strict limits of a social mobilization. These efforts, as shown dramatically in the 1952 revolution of Paz Estensoro, in Bolivia, might assume a high degree of challenge against the colonial regime and its "establishment". But these movements immediately tend to assume the character of a confiscatory revolution. These uprisings might even succeed, to a high degree, in popular regimentation, assuming, however, the character of mass union-affiliation or even of a rural militia. This happens to the same extent in which that said idiomaticism resulting from a high social homogeneity of those populations is not effectively transferred to the level of consciousness. There does not appear a claim for a national residue as in countries capable of a self-induced process of change, like those of the rest of Southern Latin America.

(42) For a portrait of the Bolivian impasse prior to the Estensoro revolution of 1952 see Augusto Céspedes - El Dictador Suicida : 40 anos de Historia de Bolivia - Colecion America Nuestra Editorial Universitaria S/A, Santiago, 1956.

It is in this sense that, again at the other end of the whole cycle, the cases of Paraguay, Bolivia and Ecuador confirm the general rule, whereas the Chilean case underlines it at the other extreme of the suggested classificatory outline.

One can speak then about a firm correlation between the appearance of a people defined by the characteristics of the national residue and the process of reciprocity of perspectives here indicated, inasmuch as :

- a) Development began as a process of import substitutions leading the Latin American peripheral countries to an increased affirmation of their new dynamism in terms of a self-determined national project ; (43)
- b) Within this transition there appears a structural ambiguity of the dominant actors in that process of change as a result of their role-duplicities in the two social global structures ;
- c) The polities of this transition would then be represented in the social reflexion process only by quasi ideological terms fundamentally expressed by developmental nationalism ; (44)
- d) Said structural ambiguity and the particular set of social conditions (45) it brings into that transition - very different from the classical crisis junctures of the Western nation-buildings - depends directly upon the nature or patterns of exploitation of the colonial regime where the peculiarities in terms of being oriented as a plantation system or a mining enclave have a marked impact.

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- (43) Maria da Conceicao Iavares - Substituicao de Importacoes e Desenvolvimento Economico na America Latina (Dados 1, 1966), pp. 115/141. Fernando Henrique Cardoso e José Ruy Reyna - Industrializacao, Estrutura Ocupacional e Estratificacao Social na America Latina (Rio 1967) pp. 4/32.
 - (44) Claudio A. Dillon Soares - A Nova Industrializacao e o Sistema Politico Brasileiro (Dados 2/3, Rio) pp. 32/51 ; Frederico Machao de Amorim - Emprego e Desenvolvimento : notas para um debate (Dados, idem) pp. 51/62.
 - (45) Russell Fitzgibbon, Kenneth Johnson - Measurement of Latin American Political Change, in the Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics, ed. HJohn Martz (Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Chipps, N.J. 1965) pp. 113/129.


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WORKING GROUP

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.

FOR THE CREATION OF A EUROPEAN PUBLIC

OPINION RESEARCH CENTER

by J. R. RABIER
and David H. HANDLEY.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1930s, which saw the beginnings of the practical application of modern sample surveys, the application of survey research to social problems has undergone an extraordinary development. Survey research has become one of the most useful tools of the sociologist, psychologist, and political scientist, as well as for the businessman and politician. In other words the utility of the sample survey has been established for all those interested in obtaining precise and exact information - within the limits of confidence attributed to this procedure - on the attitudes, behaviour, and what is commonly called opinions of people in a given social environment.

In Europe, the uses of survey research have grown considerably since the Second World War : first in Great Britain and France, then in Germany, followed by the rest of Western Europe and finally Eastern Europe, which has been making more and more use of this research tool.

The Following figures illustrate the present role of sample surveys in Europe :

- ESOMAR (European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research) in 1968 had 1107 members representing 292 affiliated institutes or organismes in 23 European countries (1)

(1) "ESOMAR YEARBOOK, 1968 - p. 193 - Brussels, 1969."

.../...

- Martin BROUWER, for the Continent, and Philip ABRAMS, for Great Britain, estimated that 161 and 120 institutes respectively were actively engaged in survey field research. Furthermore they estimated that from 4 to 5000 surveys were undertaken on the Continent and about 3000 were done in Great Britain in 1963. In the same year the USA were estimated to have carried out approximately 3300 surveys. BROUWER estimated that between four and five million interviews were undertaken in Europe during the period 1945-1964, and this virtually unexploited wealth of data is growing by about a million interviews per year (1).

This large number of operating institutes and the very large amount of work done in the field in Europe during the past 25 years should not give rise to false illusions of the availability of survey data on European social phenomena for the following reasons :

- 1) Survey research done in Europe has neither been published in a large number of cases nor is the fruit of this research always available to the scholar, or for that matter can even be rediscovered. This is so even in spite of a few fairly recently founded data banks.
- 2) Socio-political and socio-cultural problems are the least studied because they are much less interesting for the sponsors of the surveys than economic and commercial problems such as marketing and advertising.
- 3) Most of the research undertaken in Europe has been done at the national level, which partially explains the relatively large number of surveys compared to the USA. Survey research at only the national level can only be considered, in most cases, as being partial and insufficient, limiting by its very structure, the elaboration and testing of hypotheses. This problem presents itself in two different ways :
 - a) How, for example, can attitudes of European integration or any other contemporary cross-national phenomenon be studied in a simultaneous, analogous and coordinated manner, without doing it in all the countries whose people are directly concerned ?
 - b) How can even some aspect or sector of a national society such as attitudes on democracy, or communism, or trade unions, or the family, or divorce, or education, or linguistic problems, or youth, etc. be studied without asking comparable questions or comparing the results from several countries ?

(1) See Stein ROKKAN (ed.) : Data Archives for the Social Sciences. Publications of the International Social Sciences Council. Mouton, Paris-The Hague, 1966.

These are problems which are specially pertinent Within the European context with its large number of small national units, but are not limited solely to Europe. These problems result also from recent developments within the social sciences in the last few years, consisting in a growing awareness of a need for corss-cultural or cross-national research in order for meaningful progress to be made in the study of man insociety.

II. ACTIVITIES FOR A EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH CENTER

At the present time in Europe and in nearly every country, there are specialized institutes or organisms for the study of social problems through survey research. There are both, commercial and more scholarly, university organisations engaged in field work. However, this distinction is not always clear between the two.

Moreover, there are those which work strictly within national limit while others are members of international chains (GALLUP, INRA.ect.), Mostly, all of them obtain a more or less large part of their financing through contracts with sponsors such as business, universities, newspapers, radio and television political parties, public administrations, etc.

There is little doubt as to the quality of work of these institutes, etc., in the field and in no case, is it proposed here that the European center should interfere with their activities. On the contrary, a European center would :

- increase the volume of research, especially in the fields of socio-cultural and socio-political research, thus increasing business for the commercially engaged institutes or organisms ;
- cover areas previously neglected thus broadening the knowledge base for all operators which would have pay-offs in the form of increased validity and accuracy of results ;
- allow an easier and less costly participation of scholars in the elaboration of research projects, control of field work and int. the exploitation of results.

In a preliminary manner, it seems to us that the principal activities of the proposed center would be the following :

- 1) encouraging and facilitating secondary analyses of data from previous surveys and acting as a data bank or a liaison with already existing data banks ;

- 2) encouraging and coordinating original research, whether it be fundamental or applied ;
- 3) acting as an information center for scholars interested in "European problems", i.e. in the study of European integration or in comparative studies of some aspect of the European countries.

A - Secondary Analysis and Data Bank

Most surveys carried out by an institute or specialized organisme at the request of a sponsor are normally subjected to only primary analysis where the sponsor receives a report containing the response to the questions he wished asked and perhaps some elementary breakdown according to a few sociological variables. At best, the institute or organism which carried out the survey undertook a few analyses, the nature of which was governed by preliminary inspection of the raw results ; this, of course, depended on budgetary limitations. Actually most survey research data are in no way analysed to their fullest potential. This is due to several reasons among which can be named lack of financial means, lack of information, and most certainly because of the lack of a suitable organization for collecting and communicating information as well as for mobilizing and using financial sources.

The value of secondary analysis will not be longly discussed here, but its importance is evident whether it consists of a scholar advancing his research through the introduction of new hypotheses, testing of hypotheses which were developed from a primary analysis, or in extending research to include other time periods or populations (1).

(1) See Michael PHILLIPSON : "Making Fuller Use Of Survey Data (A PEP Report)" - London - PEP - 1968 - and

Davis B. BOBROW and Judah L. SCHWARTZ (eds.) : "Computers and the Policy-Making Community : Applications to International Relations".
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. - Prentice-Hall - Inc. 1968.

In order to carry out secondary analysis, necessary tools must exist. Among the most important of these is the data themselves. They must be stored in archives, their whereabouts known to the scholar, and they must be available. This is the role of a data bank. There are approximately 15 data banks in the USA, and to our knowledge four or five in Europe (dealing with survey data) :

- 1) Cologne, Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung ;
- 2) Amsterdam, The Steinmetz Institute ;
- 3) Bergen, Norway, the Christian Michelson Institute ; and
- 4) Essex, UK, the SSRC data Bank, University of Essex.

It should be noted that the bank with the largest holdings of European survey data is located in the USA : the Roper Institute (Williamstown, Mass.) which was created in 1957 through an agreement between an operating institute, Elmo Roper Inc. and a university, Williams College. Data from some two thousand European surveys are stored there.

The role of a European center would be that of a catalyst in two different ways :

First, the center would insure better communication between researchers and between researchers and the data banks. Through the use of appropriate information system it could make known to the researcher where and in what form data from the different surveys are located as well as indicating the conditions under which these data could be further exploited. The center could also act as bank for data in certain fields, such as European integration, with holdings in these fields as complete as possible, without necessarily repeating the work already accomplished by existing data banks.

Second, the center could sponsor secondary analyses by encouraging the use of existing data which it considered insufficiently exploited.

To further underline the importance of this role attention needs to be called to the fact that a large proportion of the 4 or 5 million interviews in Europe referred to above have been lost forever for further research. This is due to the policy of several operating institutes and organismes to destroy files after a certain period of time. This means that the fruits of research carried out previously will never be available for research.

We can only express our regret that part of the store of knowledge of social behaviour of man has been lost. The role of the catalyst which this proposed center would play in this field could positively contribute to preventing further losses of knowledge in this important field by adding to the facilities available for stocking this knowledge and encouraging its further exploitation.

The encouragement of research directed to the re-exploitation of existing data for purposes of secondary analysis could foreseeably consist of :

- 1) technical aid for researchers, including if necessary, the organization of seminars for technical training ;
- 2) financial aid for visits and trips, and perhaps for research itself or as the agent for putting the scholar in contact with sources of possible financing ;
- 3) the setting up of communications channels between researchers, operating institutes or organismes, data banks, perspective sponsors, etc.,
- 4) the carrying out of a policy of recuperation of survey data which has not been placed in existing data archives and which would be other-wise lost (this could take the form of acting as a data bank or encouraging organization to undertake this task or both).

B - Coordination of Research Efforts

The idea of coordination of field activities and analysis of data must be understood in the light of the basic conceptions of the authors of this paper. Actually, we are in the presence of a "free market" mechanism where the offer of services (operating institute or organism) is faced with a demand (sponsor or client), and each is free to conclude, or not, an agreement for a given research at a given price.

By coordination we primarily mean the encouraging of research in areas which the "free market" generally neglects. This is the case, for example, in certain fields of social and political behaviour or in the repetition of studies through time, following the evolution of a given population thus introducing a dynamic element. It is also possible to conceive

of research aimed at better defining the populations under studying sample surveys which neither the operating institutes nor their clients can always undertake or do correctly. The study and operationalization of ecological variables also falls under this type of activity which can only result in increased accuracy and validity of field work and subsequent analyses. A third direction which coordination can take is the encouraging of research on the development of the techniques of survey research tending to improve the general proficiency of this whole service and research sector.

Briefly, our conception of coordination is that it is a means of rapidly fulfilling lacunae and of avoiding unnecessary waste in the functioning of the "free market" of social research in Europe. In the long run, this would tend to develop the volume of sociological research. Wherever private initiative gives good results, such as in the field of advertising research, it must be left to freely develop. Wherever a sector recognized as being socially important appears to be neglected or insufficiently explored, an effort of coordination and stimulation of research activity is needed and should be undertaken.

C - Information Diffusion

Communications and information problems have already been dwelt upon in the previous sections of this paper. However, it can also be considered a separate and distinct problem area and is perhaps the most urgent one. The rapid increase in the number of institutes, universities and firms engaged in survey research is probably a fairly good index of the degree of progress in the social sciences, but it also is a barrier for the isolated scholar, as well as for research teams located in geographically or culturally distant areas, far from the primary research centers.

The collection and diffusion of information has become a singular and important activity in several sectors. The "Centre d'Information et de Documentation d'EURATOM" fulfills this role for nuclear research. There are also several private organizations which cover other scientific, technical and industrial activities. We can give as an example Harry WASSALL and Associated (New York and Geneva) for the petroleum industry and Business International (Geneva) and the Economist Intelligence Unit (London) for other business sectors, etc. Nothing of this sort exists in the field of social sciences, at least at the European level.

The utility of this type of service is very important indeed. The creation of an information service, indicating what is going on, who is active, what methods are being used, where work is being done, availability of data, etc. is advantageous for all persons and groups concerned. The firm operating in the field increases its knowledge of the activities of other researchers on a given subject, has a better knowledge of results on similar subjects, thereby opening a comparative dimension in its services offered to a client, has quicker access to what may be qualified as fundamental research for the setting up of better samples, inclusion of ecological variables for better contextual analysis, developments in latest techniques, etc. The prospective sponsor or client is more familiar with the limitations and potentials of the method, has a better idea of whom to approach and who is operating, studying which subject, and more people become aware that survey research is a useful tool for their enterprise or governmental agency or political party, etc. The researcher has a possibility of communicating research results quicker and easier, of having closer contact with the practitioners in the field, of knowing what others are doing in related fields, of setting up closer ties for possible collaboration and extending the results of his research to a larger population or comparing results over time, etc.

Such activities are relatively inexpensive when compared to the pay-offs which could be obtained for the researcher, sponsor and operator. As an example WASSALL's Foreign Scouting operates with six or seven editors, three or four secretaries, and three or four persons handling off-set printing and mailing. With this small group of persons plus a limited number of contacts within the different oil companies and in the countries covered by their reports, they are able to report on world-wide oil exploration and production activities. This they are able to do, realizing a profit, in one of world's largest and perhaps most secretive industries with the encouragement of the operating companies, governments, and other persons interested in this field of activity.

Information diffusion activities of a proposed European center, could consist of the editing and distributing of a report series on public opinion research with a group as limited in number as that of WASSALL. It could easily cover between twenty and thirty European countries, publishing quarterly or even monthly reports, on such things as field activities, research completed, availability and location of data sets, developments in analytic techniques, requests for work to be undertaken, funds and scholarships available for research, etc. Moreover, the fact that the center is in the process of

continually gathering this type of information means that it would become a sort of clearing house for the different persons' interest in setting up contract, obtaining data sets, discussing new analytic ideas, finding out where equipment exists for specialized analytic jobs, etc.

III. ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING

A. Organization

The problem of organization of a European center is one of two dimensions : organizational structure and development through time.

1. The forms of organizational structure which the proposed European center could take on are many and varied. It is felt, however, that the one chosen must be very flexible and light because, in the minds of the authors of this project, such a center should not actually undertake extensive field work.

Activities such as coordination of primary research, in the sense described above, and the encouragement of secondary analyses do not require an elaborate, complicated structure. It is even conceivable that a decentralized organization be created with a permanent secretariat existing in a given place.

Other activities such as archiving data or the publication of studies or providing of information services would require, of course, a higher degree of centralization and more personnel and equipment.

2. In conceiving the structural form of the proposed center it must be born in mind that the type of activities engaged in will be the principal determinate. It is quite possible to conceive of the formulation of a program of development through time whereby different types of activities would be undertaken in accordance with the financial means available and the degree of necessity and urgency of certain tasks.

For example, the center could start out by developing the information diffusion activity with a limited permanent secretariat and organizing a limited number of colloquiums and/or seminars. In a following stage, it could conceivably undertake the sponsoring of a certain number of research projects, and the publication of studies. At this same time, the basis for a data bank could be set up with a minimum of acquisitions without necessarily going into the expensive operations of cleaning, spraying and standardizing of the data sets. In the following phase, and with the acquisition of the proper equipment, more important data bank activities could be carried out, an information retrieval system could be set up for bibliographical reference and general survey research information and more coordinated research programmes touching on population studies, ecological variables, etc. could be elaborated.

Whatever the final program elaborated (and there are many other possibilities than those indicated above) the project must be studied and discussed, with the group of initiators of this project, by researchers in the fields of social psychology, political sociology, etc. and by representatives of the principal operating institutes and organisms in Europe specialized in survey research.

It must be stressed that such a project, however ambitious it must seem, must not be interpreted, in any way whatsoever, as constituting, in the long term, competition with existing organizations. If these existing organizations, university or commercial, took up the ideas put forth in this project and undertook steps to put them into action, the authors of this note would be the first ones to congratulate and celebrate. However, at the present time this does not seem likely to happen because of the solid and high obstacles encountered by long term multidisciplinary and multinational activities in Europe.

B. Financing

As concerns the way of financing the organization proposed in this note, the authors are fully cognizant of the very serious problems this sort of endeavour presents. Financing presents one of the major constraints in the elaboration of developmental scheme and must be kept in mind during the elaboration of any definitive project. Without doing so there is a very real risk of losing touch with reality and of seeing a project, no matter how carefully planned, condemned to failure before implementation.

There are several possible solutions to this problem which can and must be studied simultaneously or successively :

- 1) For what may be qualified as external financing, it is always possible to obtain for a well defined and interesting project, funds from different foundations occupied in the advancement of the social sciences. There are European foundations such as Nuffield (UK), Volkswagen (GFR), Agnelli or Olivetti (Italy), etc. and the American organizations such as Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie, etc.
- 2) Another form of external financing can be found in the obtention of support from the institutes, centers, universities, making use of facilities which a European center could provide. This is the method used by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research and the Roper Public Opinion Library Association. The inconvenience of this type of Financing is that the rates charged by these organizations are often prohibitive for a large number of European organizations.
- 3) The proposed center could also undertake autonomous financing through the publication and sale of the information report series described above. In any case this report series could cover its own costs, and has the potential of providing funds for the financing of other activities.
- 4) Finally, the center could undertake, with a reasonable and controlled profit margin, certain jobs such as information processing, data gathering, codifying, consulting on given projects, etc. In other words a whole range of services which are not presently available because of the non-European orientation or scale of existing service organizations.

Following the idea of a program for development discussed above, the project setting up a European center should take into consideration all four types of financing. In a first phase, reliance would be principally on external means (forms 1 and 2). It is through this means that the facilities could be set up so that what can be classified as the money-making activities can be gotten underway. A detailed project must be elaborated showing careful consideration of the limits and potentials of the proposed center as well as initial financial needs and submitted to the responsible persons of the Different European, American, etc. foundations. Progressively, with the development of the center's activities, the role of internal financing could take on more and more of the financial burden. An equilibrium could then be established between institutional memberships (with fees furnishing an element of subsidy), and earnings from services furnished which would be billed at market price.

B-I - EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE

FOR THE CREATION OF A EUROPEAN PUBLIC
OPINION RESEARCH CENTER

by J.R. RABIER
and David H. HANDLEY

B-I/I/2 E

Concluding remarks

The authors of this note would like to underline the fact that we have undertaken the formulation of this proposition on a personal basis, that they consider it as having provisory nature, and are ready to discuss its contents with any interested party.

In the way of a final comment, we would like to indicate what seems to us a logical approach for getting the elaboration of a definite concrete project off the ground. Firstly this note should be circulated to all interested parties, who would be invited to note down and communicate observations and suggestions to the authors. These could in turn be compiled and edited into the basic working document(s) for a meeting with researchers and representatives of institutes and others engaged in university, commercial, governmental, etc. survey research. The results of this meeting or these meeting would be a series of feasibility studies of the defined problem areas and the drawing up of a detailed project

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cum developmental program. The would in turn be submitted to the different foundations, etc. for consideration, with a view to obtain financial support. Once the necessary support has been obtained, the concrete work of turning the project into a functioning organization could be undertaken.

Realizing that, even though the necessary steps appear simple on paper, the amount of work and voluntary effort on the part of the persons involved will be vary great, it is felt that the need for this type of center operating at the European level is sufficiently important for the development of the social sciences that it should be undertaken. This is a need for coordination and cooperation between disciplines and transcending national boudaries ; this has been expressed many times in the literature and in previous efforts undertaken in other and in related disciplines.

The realization of this type of endeavour in the field of opinion research, as well as in other disciplines, means that very positive and innovating steps will have been taken towards the creation of a European reserach community in the social sciences.

B-I - INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

POUR LA CREATION D'UN CENTRE EUROPEEN
DE RECHERCHE SUR L'OPINION PUBLIQUE

par J.-R. RABIER

et David H. HANDLEY

B-I/I/2 F

Observations finales

Les auteurs voudraient souligner, en terminant cette note, qu'ils l'ont rédigée à titre personnel, qu'ils la considèrent comme provisoire et qu'ils sont prêts à en discuter avec tous les intéressés.

Comme dernier commentaire, ils voudraient indiquer ce qui leur semble un cheminement logique pour entreprendre l'élaboration d'un projet concret et précis. Tout d'abord, cette communication devrait circuler parmi toutes les parties intéressées, qui seraient invitées à noter et à communiquer leurs

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observations et suggestions aux auteurs. Celles-ci pourraient être rassemblées et publiées dans des documents de travail de base pour une ou plusieurs réunions avec des chercheurs et des représentants d'instituts et centres engagés dans la recherche par sondages pour les domaines universitaire, commercial ou gouvernemental. Les résultats de cette ou de ces réunions aboutiraient à une série d'études semblables suivant les catégories de problèmes et à l'élaboration d'un projet détaillé pour un programme de développement. Ces résultats seraient ensuite transmis aux différentes fondations et organisations analogues pour examen, en vue d'obtenir un financement. Dès que l'appui nécessaire serait obtenu, la tâche concrète consistant à transformer le projet en une organisation active pourrait être entreprise.

En tenant compte du fait que, même si les phases nécessaires paraissent relativement simple sur papier, la quantité de travail et les efforts de volonté de la part des personnes concernées seront très importants, les auteurs ont le sentiment que ce projet de Centre européen est justifié et doit être réalisé parce qu'il répond à un besoin suffisamment important pour le développement des sciences sociales. Il s'agit d'un besoin de coordination et de coopération par-dessus les frontières, aujourd'hui périmées, qui subsistent entre les disciplines et les pays ; ce besoin a été plusieurs fois exprimé dans la littérature scientifique et a déjà suscité certains efforts de décloisonnement dans d'autres disciplines.

La réalisation de ce genre d'efforts, tant dans le domaine de la recherche d'opinion que dans les autres disciplines, signifiera que des étapes nouvelles et très importantes auront été franchies dans la voie de la formation d'une communauté européenne de recherche dans les sciences sociales.

I.P.S.A.

A.I.S.P.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

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EUROPEANS ABOUT EUROPE

Young intellectuals of six countries express their
attitudes about the unification of Europe.

A study in social psychology (1).

P.A. Cornelis
University of Nijmegen

(1) Swets and Zeitlinger. Amsterdam 1970.

1. THEOREM AND RESULTS

As a result of enquiries held about the integration of Europe there appeared to be a need for more accurate research with more reliable measuring instruments. In order to trace the relation between a pro-Europe attitude and the variables connected with it, and to avoid disturbing incidental effects, it proved advisable to involve homogeneous groups in the enquiry; groups comparable in intelligence and education level with a critical mind, capable of formulating an opinion, being well up in the matter and interested in the subject.

For this reason the enquiry was concentrated on students at universities in the E.E.C. countries and England. It was a written test by means of a precoded questionnaire which had been carefully drawn up and translated in the various vernacular languages. The purpose was to obtain answers to the following questions:

1. What is the attitude of the students in respect of a United Europe and is this attitude based on facts?
2. What image has one portrayed for oneself and what is the picture of a United Europe?
3. What is the distinction between Pro's and Non-Pro's and can a difference in personality be shown?
4. What factors prove in general to play a part in an attitude of being pro or not pro unification?

In order to determine a Europe attitude a measuring scale was constructed, which proved to be strongly unidimensional and was reliable and possessed a due amount of validity. For the items of the attitude scale and the factor loading see Enclosure I.

In the Knowledge Test designed, a high degree of reliability and validity could be supposed to be present on the ground of the nature of the test and the careful pre-selection of the items. There appeared to be a high amount of (mutual) correlation among the three parts of the test, to wit: knowledge of European organisations, the tenor of the mutual agreements, and the results obtained in the European frame-work.

In order to get to know something of the personality of the test persons we made use of the "Social Attitude Inventory" of Melvin.

Factor analysis brought to dimension and the tough-minded tender-minded dimension, which corresponded very well with the findings of Eysenck and Melvin in England.

The efforts to measure with a "Motivational Distortion Scale" the degree of being motivated in the enquiry, and to derive from this a yard-stick for the degree of truth of the answers given did not prove successful. There is little reason for us to suppose that distortion of facts on a large scale has taken place. This may be asserted on the ground of the unidimensionality of the Europe Scale found, the answers to the Knowledge Test and the logical conformity in the results of the various measuring instruments, (Europe Scale, Knowledge Test, social attitude and image questions). Nor are there arguments to be brought forward for an unconscious, incorrect representation of reality. Although a certain degree of "social desirability" (conforming oneself to a certain opinion of a group) was shown, it appeared that this factor had only a weak influence. Also the conformity of the results found by us with those of other enquirers confirms that there is no reason for suspicion of dodging the truth, wittingly or unwittingly, on a large scale.

On the other hand it may be assumed that the very large number of accurately completed questionnaires, the quality of the answers and the knowledge of Europe have strengthened our presumption that the student test group mainly consisted of strongly motivated test persons, with a critical mind, with interest in the subject, capable of distinguishing the relative importance of scientific research and willing to cooperate. It may further be supposed that this willingness was all the more manifest because of the strict anonymity of the enquiry. Altogether we may speak of an attitude that indicates sincerity in answering the questions rather than trying to distort reality.

On account of the scores on the Europe scale it may be assumed that the student group as a whole votes with conviction for the Unification of Europe. Although an attitude scale does not actually allow of a discrimination between advocates and opponents it is reasonable to suppose that about 15% of the test persons must be reckoned to belong to the Non-Pro's. Fifty percent of these at most may be considered to be opponents. An analysis of the statements with direct reference to an attitude pro or contra a United Europe,

shows that the Pro's feel personally involved in the integration, that they have confidence in its set-up and that they want to continue the integration in a political respect.

With a classification of the student group by age, sex, nationality etc., it appeared that certain variables played a part, and others little or not at all, in a Europe attitude. Considerable differences in Europe score occur among test persons of a different political conviction or nationality, in degree of political interest and between test persons having travelled abroad or not, as well as between the students who have a great or small amount of knowledge of languages. By environment, age or sex, faculty or duration of academic education there appeared to be no distinction of significance in Europe score.

The student group proved to be well informed on Europe affairs. Of 75% of the test persons it may be assumed that they are factually knowledgeable. Twenty-five percent of them may be categorised as having a good knowledge of Europe matters. Although there proves to be some difference on the ground of sex and duration of academic study, the differences by political party, political interest and nationality are most remarkable, as well as the difference between the well and little travelled test persons, and students with a larger or smaller amount of knowledge of languages. The test persons have proved to be interested in political matters. Over 40% state to be highly interested; 45% state that they have a moderate amount of interest, and 15% have little or no interest in political affairs.

The picture they have portrayed for themselves of a United Europe appears to show a great similarity. The majority of all test persons is in favour of a United Europe of all Western European countries, except Spain and Portugal. Half of all the students are also in favour of including these two countries together with Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Turkey. A minority is in favour of admission of the other Eastern European countries, with the exception of Albania and Russia. Only a very small minority (22%) votes for these two countries to be included in a United Europe.

The majority of all students, i.e. between 60 and 80%, are for a democratic Europe on a federal basis, independent of other world powers, economically but also politically integrated. In this Europe one is for combined scientific research and joint economic projects. One is for development aid and does not want to do away with the army. If a common language should be adopted, one is for the English language, although the need of a uniform language is not great. Nor is a need felt for changes in the boundaries of member states. Hopes are focused on the future and one is convinced that a United Europe will materialize though not within 15 years.

The rate of integration should be speeded up and one is for a European Parliament. That Europe, as it is now, has nothing to fear is endorsed by only a few of the test persons (17%). There is no fear for domestic political difficulties, problems with other world powers or economic crises, but one is afraid of dominance by one of the member states and mutual tensions, as a result of difference in size, of leadership, economy or mentality. The Unification of Europe is regarded as an important matter but not considered to be of a primordial nature. Freedom from hunger campaigns and stopping the Vietnam war are seen as the most important problems that demand a solution.

The Attitude Inventory of Melvin is meant to measure a particular "social" attitude and in connection with it certain personality factors. The answers on this scale demonstrate that the attitude structure of the student group shows great similarity with the distribution of attitudes found by Eysenck, Melvin and others in a representative sample of the populations of England and several Western European countries. The students in our enquiry as a group appear to be somewhat more radical than the average citizen, but for the rest they deviate little or not at all in social attitude. There is thus no reason to suppose that the positive attitude of the students for a United Europe would be due to a deviation in social attitude or personality from the test group.

There proves to be a distinct relationship between a Europe attitude and other "social" attitudes. A pro-Europe attitude appears to be closely related to attitudes expressing equality of and consideration for one's fellow-men and a tendency against aggression and violence. An attitude non-pro Europe appears to be related to attitudes expressing a "hard line", as well as strong nationalism and a certain amount of conservatism as regards the church and sexuality. Being for or not for Europe refers to a distinction between radicalism and tender-mindedness on the one hand and conservatism and tough-mindedness on the other. The answers on the Social Inventory show some difference between villagers and the inhabitants of towns, though also here the most important differences are shown on the ground of political party, nationality, political interest (and knowledge) and to a lesser extent on the ground of being travelled or knowledge of languages. Also among religious and non-religious people differences occur, contrary to other categories such as environment, age, duration of academic study etc.

Among the student group as a whole there proves to be a tendency towards defending oneself against (in their eyes) exaggerated nationalism, militarism, paternalism, as well as a desire for more freedom in the domains of religion and sexuality. However, it is only a small percentage of the students that take an extreme position.

In order to gain an impression of the difference between Non-Pro's and Real Pro's of Europe, 100 test persons on the one end of the scale were compared with 100 students on the other end. The 100 test persons who obtained a score of half or less than half of the maximum number of points on the Europe Scale were called Non-Pro's; the 100 test persons with the highest scores were called Real Pro's. The average of the total test group on a scale from 11 to 56 points appeared to be 43.7, of the Non Pro's 28.6 and the Real Pro's 53. Non-Pro's feel hardly or not to be engaged in a United Europe, have little or no confidence in the set-up, are not in favour of political integration and are thus not prepared to take an active part to this purpose. For the number of Real Pro's and Non-Pro's by political conviction and nationality see Enclosure II.

Taking into account the degree of difficulty in the knowledge test Non-Pro's generally appear to be duly informed of European matters. About 20% of them belong to the category with a very limited amount of knowledge. The Non-Pro's are by a majority also politically interested, 25% of them having a good deal of interest, 20% little and 6% no interest. Real Pro's of the integration appear to have a good amount of knowledge and by a majority to show a great amount of political interest. People with a very limited amount of knowledge or having no political interest are not found in this group.

There is little difference between the two groups in their opinions as to what countries should be included, or not, in a United Europe. Real Advocates prove to be less in favour of autocratic governments and the outspokenly Communist countries; there is less general unanimity among Non-Pro's with regard to the admission of Great Britain and other Western European countries. Both Pro's and Non-Pro's have broadly the same future Europe in mind as the test group as a whole, although among the Non-Pro's there are more people who are in favour of a large Europe than among the other groups.

Differences between Pro's and Non-Pro's can thus be hardly attributed to contrasts between "knowers" and "not knowers", between people with political interest and without political interest or to a difference in the opinions of a large or small Europe. On the other hand there appear to be differences in the opinions about form of government, objectives and degree of integration. Real Pro's feel strongly engaged in the integration and are willing to cooperate in an active manner. They are unambiguously in favour of a democratic Europe, as a close federation, economically as well as politically integrated. They want a strong and independent Europe, without direct ties with other world powers. They are for aid to developing countries and poor areas in Europe. European integration is felt to be an important issue of world interest, almost as important as stopping the war in Vietnam. They are convinced that a United Europe will materialize, perhaps within 15 years, and would like to accelerate the integration. There is a conviction that a United Europe will bring real drawbacks with it, but one is prepared to make sacrifices.

Non-Pro's expect little advantage of a United Europe and do not see integration as a realistic proposition, nor as an important problem. They do expect that in the long run a European Union will be brought about. They prefer a democratic (or people's democratic) Europe, but as a less closely-knit federation or as a convention of countries with long-term agreements, not politically integrated, but with ties with other world powers. Interest is focused most on economic integration, in which personal welfare does play a considerable part. Aid to developing countries is not regarded to be essential.

Remarkable differences between the two groups are shown in social attitude. Non-Pro's generally prove to be conservative and tough and to distinguish themselves from the other group by less objections to certain forms of aggression and violence and less consideration for one's fellow-man. They are rather for "my country right or wrong" and against intervention of governments.

Real Advocates appear to be radical and tender or (moderately) tough. There are also a number of Pro's with a conservative tender-minded attitude. However, conservative tough-minded people do not occur in the latter group or hardly at all. A relatively large number of Non-Advocates of integration is found among the conservative and right political groupings, among the small group of students having no political interest and among English students. Real Advocates are of frequent occurrence among all nationalities except Italy and England. They are also often found among students with an excellent knowledge of Europe, among Socialists and Liberals, and among students with a great amount of political interest.

Europe attitude, Europe knowledge and social attitude appear to show a mutual relationship, a certain correlation. A further analysis of the data collected shows that the degree of knowledge of European matters does correlate pretty well with the degree to which one is pro or strongly pro integration, but has relatively little to do with an attitude pro or not pro Europe. On the other hand Non-Pro's appear to distinguish themselves in social attitude from the Real Pro's by a conservative tough-minded attitude. It

shows that the abovementioned three scales or tests correlate mutually and that it is always the same sub-groups that show the largest differences per category both in Europe attitude, in knowledge of Europe and social attitude. On the ground of this we have supposed that Europe knowledge and social attitude form an essential part of an attitude with respect to the unification and are as such more fundamental than the other differences found in the sub-groups.

That a good knowledge of European matters goes along with a positive European attitude may be accounted for because a greater amount of knowledge will just be a consequence of greater interest in the subject. With respect to a Europe attitude political interest appears to play a part which is comparable with the knowledge factor. However, it is less plausible that political interest should play a more important role in such an attitude than Europe knowledge, c.q. Europe interest. Political conviction or party proves to show a clear relationship with social attitude as was also shown by Eysenck. In every political party we found a clear difference between Pro's and Non-Pro's in the respect expected. Also on this ground we supposed that differences in social attitude or personality play a more fundamental part in a Europe attitude than a difference on the ground of political colour although in certain cases the stamp of the party may turn the scale (Communists).

On the ground of nationality there appears to be little difference in Europe attitude among students of the E.E.C. countries, but there is a considerable difference in knowledge, as was also shown by Gallup (1962). This might indicate that difference in Europe attitude on the ground of nationality may be largely accounted for by a difference in knowledge of Europe. That a certain nationalistic attitude can play a distinct part also appeared from the English student group. It seems that the relation between being travelled as well as having a knowledge of languages and a Europe attitude can be accounted for by a difference in personality, a difference between radicals and conservatives (travelling), and by a difference between people with a tender-minded or tough-minded-attitude (languages). Also knowledge of and interest in Europe prove to exercise a certain influence in this respect. That visiting foreign

countries as well as reading foreign languages as such does cause the mind to ripen towards the unification of the European peoples may for the rest be deemed quite likely.

If the fundamental difference between Pro's and Non-Pro's is rooted in a difference in personality, the insight into the relationship between Europe attitude and a number of other variables will certainly increase: e.g. the fact that Non-Pro's with their conservative-tough-minded attitude are mainly found among conservative and (tough) right groupings; but also that they have a smaller amount of political interest and at the same time that they are less inclined to become acquainted with foreign countries and languages. That knowledge of European matters, though related to the radical-conservative dimension, plays its own considerable part, particularly in an attitude for or strongly for unification (also as a feature of positive interest in the matter), gives little grounds for doubt. The differences in knowledge of the subject may very likely be one of the reasons for differences in Europe attitude among the inhabitants of the countries of the present European Community, rather than the differences in personality. More research will be required to confirm or to deny the justness of the above assumptions.

A very recent research at the instigation of the European Communities in Brussels into the attitude of young people toward the integration of Europe seems to confirm our supposition. In a provisional report on this research it appears that education or training, political interest and social attitude are the cause of the most important differences in the scores on a Europe measuring scale. Young people with a conservative tough-minded opinion on "le bon citoyen" get the lowest of all scores measured. Better schooling together with a greater amount of political interest appear to be attended with a "stronger" pro-Europe attitude.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The determination of an attitude by means of a measuring scale is to be preferred to registration of opinions, in spite of the fact that converting an attitude scale into a foreign language brings drawbacks with it. A literal translation is almost impossible and certain words may sometimes have different meanings. The technique of Osgood, the semantic differential, meant to accurately define the real meaning of a word (1964), seems promising in this respect, although this method also has its drawbacks. For the study of the relation between variables it is desirable not to work with too small groups of test persons. This is necessary to preclude secondary effects. (In this way it is conceivable that the notions a certain professor had about Europe exercised a direct influence on his students). For the determination of the Europe attitude of e.g. Communists the number of test persons in our enquiry was decidedly small.

We deem it doubtful whether in general international research e.g. among students should be done with separately calibrated scales per country. The correlation matrices of the 11 items of the Europe scale for the different countries are practically the same. There is only one exception: In the matrix of the German students the statement "To believe in the Unification of Europe is a matter of realism" shows no correlation with the other 10 items. Doise (1969) also underlines the great amount of homogeneity in attitude and thought among students of the E.E.C. countries. Even of a contrast between French and German students in mutual appreciation, as is supposed, little or nothing is to be discerned. Yet he found some differences in the capacity of empathising with the mentality of other peoples. The Dutch students obtained the highest score in this respect, followed by the Belgians, Germans, French and Italians, which appears to be practically in conformity with our own findings on the Social Attitude Inventory.

A measuring scale registers an attitude, but does not supply certainty about the behaviour or activities that are attendant on it. As to this matter, research and particularly observation are requirements of prime order. By this is meant observation of behaviour and

attitude with respect to a United Europe, as may appear from the reading of articles on the subject, in discussions from groups' activities, from the formulation of thought etc. More research is also desired as to what is meant by unification, integration and cooperation. In this respect the result of the previously mentioned enquiry by Gallup INRA will be quite interesting.

What is the significance of nationalistic thinking in a Europe attitude? As has appeared from our enquiry a conservative mind need not prevent one from having a positive Europe attitude. It is the combination of a conservative attitude and tough-mindedness that does not seem to go together with a positive attitude. Yet in our enquiry, not all conservative tough-minded students take a negative position with regard to unification. It would be interesting to continue the research in this group. A radical attitude proves to contribute towards a positive Europe attitude, although extreme radicalism does not seem to contribute particularly. Is the desire for change as such most important and e.g. the aim of the Unification of Europe a by-product of it for them? That the new epoch will bring about changes for young people is certain. Possibilities of looking across the borders have greatly improved. T.V. and travelling, books and films, music and fashion will no doubt contribute or are an expression of a more international orientation. Also in a political respect changes are being brought about, which points to changed views and other social attitudes. An empirical description of what is changing in this respect is very desirable. In our enquiry the comparison of the political convictions of a father with the political aspirations of his son is interesting. The table below will give some indication on this point.

Table 37

Comparison of political conviction between father and son.

Political conviction	father	son
Right	4	2
Conservative	22	12
Christian Democrat	27	23
Liberal	26	30
Socialist	19	29
Communist	2	4

From this table a distinct shift to the left clearly comes to the fore. That this is a temporary shift and that most of the sons will in course of time revert to the old state may be possible but is in our opinion not very sure. Since radicalism in general goes together with a desire for Unification of Europe, the time seems to be ripe to proceed to action, at least for young people.

The proportion in party-political respect are quite interesting. The survey in Enclosure III gives an impression of this. In the enclosure we have also shown the "second" preference by political orientation, which gives an indication as to how these shifts have been brought about. However, as party political shifts are beyond the scope of this enquiry we shall not go further into this matter.

We ourselves found evidence for the supposition that a European attitude shows a direct relationship with social attitude or personality together with knowledge of facts. A representative investigation among the various population groups would in this connection be clarifying.

3. ON TO A UNITED EUROPE

Social psychological research ought to measure and to register, and as such be free from personal likes and dislikes. However, in this last paragraph we shall intentionally deviate from this rule and add to the conclusions of this enquiry some thoughts in the frame-work of the strivings for a United Europe.

In the enquiry some striking points came to light. It appeared that among the students there is a great amount of goodwill in respect of the unification of Europe, based on a knowledge of facts. A greater or lesser amount of knowledge appeared to be a yard-stick for an attitude for or strongly for a United Europe. From this it may be concluded that information plays a very important part in rousing more enthusiasm for the European cause. On the ground of a wish for a "greater Europe", which came to the fore in our enquiry and others, a greater supply of information on the Western European countries inside and outside the E.E.C. is desired.

In our opinion more thought should also be given to the supply of information on the Eastern European countries, preferably on a basis of reciprocity. We found that there is difference in the amount of knowledge among Pro's and Non-Pro's. It is quite likely that information as such has little influence on Non-Pro's, i.e. more information does not seem to be the appropriate means to turn a negative or neutral attitude into a positive one.

Pro's and Non-Pro's distinguish themselves particularly in social attitude. The latter group appeared to be conservative and tough, in contrast with the former. In 1960 Salvador de Madariaga concluded that in a given situation and at a certain moment there are two ways to create Europeans: by educating the new generation and re-educating the old one. As education presupposes social cultivation, rather than the bringing of knowledge, we would gladly confirm this statement. In this light education must be regarded as the difficult task of cultivating more frankness and an understanding of another person's situation, in order to open the window to the outside world and allow others to enter one's own environments. In brief: an orientation or re-orientation in social attitude.

Actions that appeal to the public may also contribute to broader views and minds in this respect. This will be all the more the case as the results are felt. (Success does make an appeal). For the near future we think of a smooth start in the negotiations with England about joining the European Community, of breaking down the reviled barriers, of direct elections for the European Parliament.

Besides the goodwill among the students we found a clear willingness to make one's own contribution for the purpose of unification. The small amount of action in this respect may well be due to the lack of opportunities to undertake something. This is all the more surprising since the tools are available at every university. Practically every faculty is in a position to make its own contribution. For the faculties of social sciences an immense field lies fallow in the framework of project research, as was shown in the previous section. The majority of the research can be done on a national level. The European Communities at Brussels have at their disposal the facilities for the coordination of and the assistance to the various countries. European research among various classes of the population (e.g. by means of project research at the universities) might provide for some form of "say" in the national policy in respect of integration.

Although various institutions of higher education have their "Europe centre" it seems that the time is ripe for a Europe College at university level, a truly European University for research and brain work from the aggregate with a specialisation in studies orientated on the individual countries, managed by the European Commission, financed by the governments and populated by young people eligible from the participating countries. Such an institution could supply selected Europe specialists and considerably speed up the integration of scientific education in Western Europe. More fundamental thought and attention could then be given to the standardization of qualifications and diplomas. There would also be an opportunity for a permanent braintrust to do research and to solve specific problems.

First priority should be given to a direct influence e.g. in direct elections of national delegates in the European Parliament. Such a step would considerably promote the interest of the Euro-citizen, urge political parties to a clear statement of their points of view and stimulate news media to particular activities.

The differences in the native languages of the European peoples deserve particular attention. Teaching in one or two foreign languages in all sections of education may in the long run be a means of filling the language gap. Understanding a foreign language will in this respect be more important than speaking it. It is interesting to witness a discussion between French and English students, when each group speaks its own language which is mutually understood, so that neither of the two is obliged to speak the foreign language. Is it perhaps possible that the difference in language is the reason of the persistent conviction that the Western European peoples show such large differences in many respects?

One may wonder if we have not stuck too long to a perhaps imaginary contrast between the French and the Germans, the Dutch and the Belgians etc. We have found that the national differences in the European attitude of the students (which may be accounted for by differences in knowledge and personality) show little distinction in Europe-consciousness and image. Also Paul Valery (1924) and Madariaga (1960), Lutte (1968), Doise (1970) and other enquirers underline the uniformity of thought in Western Europe. In this respect it is interesting to know the opinions of non-Europeans, the opinions of people from the "rich" as well as the "developing" countries. The uniformity in opinion which can be noted in discussions with them is remarkable. Europe, and still more Western Europe is regarded as one aggregate and is a population clearly distinguished from other population groups in the world. Sometimes there is irritation about the "blindness" of the Europeans themselves, a blindness which would prevent them from undertaking jointly and unswervingly a special task in the world, a task of a cultural and spiritual nature rather than of an ideological or economic character. A task not based on an ideology or prosperity (as an export item), but emanating from the capacity to identify oneself with the other party, from a willingness to partake in consultation or mutual assimilation. In this sense an independent Europe

should be regarded as a necessity for a resting point (and a centre of gravity?) in the play of world powers.

It will depend on the Europeans themselves, but especially on the visions of the leaders of the governments and the national parliamentarians if this challenge is to be accepted. The next decennium seems to hold certain promises. The tiresome building on in the sixties could be closed with the conference in The Hague on December 1 and 2 1969. Leaders of States and Governments of the E.E.C. countries decided to jointly enter the final stage of the Common Market, from which there is no point of return. It was stated that the realisation of an economic and monetary union would be achieved soon. General agreement was reached at the start of negotiations between the Community and candidates wishing to joint, although no exact date was fixed. No progress was made as to strengthening the powers of the European institutions; nor was any encouragement given for the promotion of effective efforts for the realisation of a political union. Yet there are hopes that the next ten years will usher in a new European era perhaps with an elan that may be compared with that of the fifties. According to Jean Rey (1969), the president of the European Commission, there is no doubt that the Community will enter upon a new stage of construction and development and that it is regaining the creative powers which have in the past years been lacking. At the Conference the leaders of the governments betrayed a broader view on the European issue and it was particularly the strong and convincing standpoint of the Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany that drew general attention. However, hopes are set on the increase of a real sense of Europe among the new generation which is reaching maturity.

It looks as though in the coming years advantages may be expected of this vital force and that this collective process deserves as much attention as the formulation and ratification of agreements. The search for new ways is required to enable youth to make an effective contribution in the process of integration.

A purposeful effort of the post-war generation in the construction of the common home seems a paramount condition to ensure the birth of The United States of Europe.

Pas de résumé

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Without summary

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I.P.S.A.

A.I.S.P.

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NOTE RELATIVE A UNE RECHERCHE
EN COURS SUR LES ATTITUDES DE
LA JEUNESSE SCOLAIRE BELGE EN
MATIERE EUROPEENNE

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Note relative à une recherche en cours sur les attitudes de la jeunesse
scolaire belge en matière européenne.

par Nicole LOEB, chercheur au Centre national d'étude
des problèmes de sociologie et d'économie européennes,
collaborateur scientifique à l'Institut de Sociologie de
l'Université Libre de Bruxelles.

I. Enquête effectuée.

Une enquête par questionnaires a été menée en avril 1969 auprès des élèves des deux dernières classes de l'enseignement secondaire en Belgique. Cette enquête se situant dans le cadre d'une "action" de l'Association Internationale des Amis de Robert Schuman, il n'a pas été procédé à la détermination préalable d'un échantillon : tous les élèves ont été interrogés ; sur les 62.000 questionnaires renvoyés, un échantillon représentatif de 20.000 unités a été prélevé en vue du dépouillement.

II. Elaboration du questionnaire.

Le questionnaire a été mis au point avec la participation d'un groupe de travail. Il a été tenu compte

1. des objectifs définis ci-après ;
2. du double but poursuivi par l'Association ayant pris l'initiative de l'enquête ; obtenir des informations et susciter des discussions au sein de la population interrogée ;
3. du souci du ministère de l'Education nationale de connaître les attitudes des élèves à l'égard de l'école et leur opinion sur l'apport de l'enseignement et son degré d'adaptation à la société actuelle ;
4. d'assurer une certaine comparabilité avec d'autres enquêtes et notamment avec l'enquête internationale actuellement en cours, organisée à l'initiative de la Direction générale Presse et Information des Communautés européennes, sans toutefois faire double emploi avec celle-ci.

III. Objectifs de l'enquête.

A. Information "photographique".

1. sur ce que les jeunes pensent de l'école, de la société dans laquelle ils vivent et de leur avenir dans cette société ; sur leur degré de participation sociale et politique ;

2. sur leur degré de connaissance du Marché commun ; leurs opinions sur le Marché commun et sur l'Europe ; la conception qu'ils se font de l'Europe ; les arguments invoqués pour ou contre la construction européenne ;
3. sur les canaux d'information privilégiés.

Cet aspect d'information a fait l'objet d'un rapport présentant, sur base de comptages ventilés, les premiers résultats groupés autour des principaux thèmes : les parents, l'école, la société, l'avenir, la politique, le Marché commun, l'Europe. (1)

Pour chaque question, les comptages ont permis de dégager la tendance dominante et de constater le degré d'homogénéité de la population du point de vue linguistique et selon la fréquentation d'un réseau scolaire (officiel ou libre) et d'un type d'enseignement (moyen, normal ou technique).

On voit se dessiner des différences parfois importantes entre francophones et néerlandophones, les premiers se montrant notamment plus critiques à l'égard du système scolaire et des institutions, moins dynamiques et moins disposés à l'engagement politique, plus enclins aux solutions technocratiques, mieux informés des problèmes relatifs au Marché commun, moins intéressés par les problèmes belges et plus "européens" ; une comparaison sommaire entre élèves des écoles officielles et libres fait apparaître chez ces derniers moins d'expressions de mécontentement scolaire, plus d'optimisme et de générosité, plus d'attachement aux valeurs nationales et des attitudes plus "européennes".

L'analyse multivariée devra révéler si les différences évoquées sont réelles ou attribuables à l'intervention d'autres facteurs.

B. Analyse.

Recherche des corrélations existant entre certaines dimensions de la personnalité, certaines caractéristiques du milieu, les attitudes à l'égard de l'environnement familial, scolaire et global, le degré de participation sociale et politique, les attitudes en matière européenne.

Cette analyse est en cours.

(1) En annexe à cette note, un aperçu de certains résultats.

Les tableaux croisés combinant les différentes questions avec les données d'identification (âge, sexe, degré d'urbanisation, enseignement suivi, profession du père, etc.) sont à l'étude ; leur examen permettra de déterminer un certain nombre de contrôles à effectuer lors de l'analyse multivariée.

Des groupes de questions étaient destinées à fournir des échelles d'attitudes ; celles-ci ont dû être remaniées au vu des corrélations obtenues. Sous réserve de modifications éventuelles, les échelles provisoirement envisagées sont les suivantes : optimisme social, égoïsme matérialiste, conservatisme social, tendance à l'engagement ; contentement familial, contentement scolaire, confiance dans le pouvoir, sentiment d'insécurité mondiale ; nationalisme, ethnocentrisme conservateur ; intérêt pour la politique, européisme, opinion sur le Marché commun ; connaissance du Marché commun.

IV. Thème de la recherche.

1. La nature réelle et les fondements des attitudes des jeunes à l'égard de la construction européenne seront étudiés sous deux angles :

- celui du nationalisme : les attitudes favorables à l'Europe procèdent-elles d'un conformisme de même type que l'attachement à l'Etat national, ou d'un état d'esprit nouveau ?
- celui de la conception globale de la société : étude des convergences et des divergences entre les aspirations des jeunes d'une part, les réalisations et orientations de l'unification européenne d'autre part.

2. D'autres études (et un examen sommaire des premiers tableaux résultant de l'enquête) établissent une forte corrélation entre l'intérêt porté à la politique et les attitudes extrêmes en matière européenne. La présente recherche s'efforcera d'éclairer :

- a) le problème de la formation des attitudes politiques chez les jeunes ;
- b) les conditions liant l'intérêt porté à la politique et les attitudes en matière européenne.

V. Moyens d'investigation.

1. Analyse de l'enquête.

L'échantillon dépouillé a une dimension considérable, tout en se rapportant à une population homogène au point de vue de l'âge (16 à 19 ans), de l'occupation (scolaire) et de la nationalité (belge). Ces caractéristiques de l'échantillon permettent une analyse fine et l'étude de groupes minoritaires.

Des dépouillements manuels complémentaires pourront éventuellement être effectués sur des questionnaires prélevés parmi les 40.000 documents non dépouillés.

2. Des données complémentaires pourront être fournies par des interviews de groupes et des analyses de textes. Le milieu scolaire s'y prête relativement aisément.

3. Consultation d'ouvrages de sociologie, de science politique et de psychologie sociale.

Pas de résumé.

Without Summary.

cb.

Annexe : Aperçu de certains résultats relatifs à la politique, au sentiment national et aux problèmes européens. (1)

Intérêt porté à la politique.

76% des élèves ne sont pas d'accord avec l'item "il est inutile de s'intéresser à la politique, c'est l'affaire des politiciens" ; 59% déclarent s'intéresser à la politique ; 53% souhaitent pouvoir voter à 18 ans. 64% affirment lire fréquemment des journaux, 71% suivre régulièrement les émissions d'information.

L'intérêt manifesté pour la politique est moindre chez les filles, où il a tendance à décroître avec l'âge. On observe d'ailleurs chez les filles un nombre plus considérable de "sans avis" en réponse aux questions portant sur les affaires publiques.

Les partis et le pouvoir.

Les partis politiques sont jugés "incapables de défendre nos véritables intérêts" par 67% des jeunes exprimant un avis ; les avis exprimés sont en majorité (58%) critiques à l'égard de "notre régime de démocratie parlementaire" ; ils sont partagés également entre ceux qui approuvent la gestion économique du pays (majorité parmi les néerlandophones) et ceux qui la jugent négativement (majorité parmi les francophones).

Il semble que la critique des partis politiques soit plus fréquente parmi ceux qui ne s'intéressent pas à la politique, n'écoutent pas les informations et ne lisent pas les journaux ; l'inverse se produirait en ce qui concerne les jugements portés sur le régime démocratique et la gestion économique. Les deux groupes linguistiques ayant répondu de façon très différente à ces questions, des contrôles seront nécessaires.

Les élèves se sont prononcés massivement (69% de réponses positives, 11% de réponses négatives) en faveur de l'item "les problèmes sont devenus si compliqués que le soin de gouverner les Etats devrait être confié plus à des spécialistes des divers problèmes qu'à des hommes politiques." Cette tendance semble se raffermir avec l'âge.

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- (1) Dans la mesure où il est fait état de relations entre les réponses à différentes questions, ces observations résultent d'un premier examen des tableaux et devront faire l'objet de contrôles ultérieurs. Ils sont donnés à titre provisoire et indicatif.

La nécessité de confier le pouvoir de décision dans un Etat moderne à une autorité très forte suscite des avis plus partagés : 48% pour, 37% contre.

Il semblerait que la tendance "technocratique" serait plus répandue parmi les mécontents, la tendance "autoritaire" parmi ceux qui ne critiquent pas le pouvoir.

Les valeurs nationales.

Une majorité des élèves manifeste de l'attachement au pays : 53% des avis exprimés rejettent l'item "peu m'importe d'être né en Belgique, tous les pays se valent", 54% estiment qu'"il serait dommage que la Belgique perde, en s'intégrant dans un grand ensemble, les valeurs qu'elle a acquises par son histoire et son travail".

18% seulement aimeraient être citoyens d'un grand pays. Mais la majorité serait fière que son pays joue un rôle important (60% lorsqu'il s'agit du rôle des hommes politiques belges au plan international, 66% lorsqu'il est question de la participation aux grandes expériences spatiales).

Les filles se montrent plus attachées aux valeurs nationales que les garçons ; d'autre part, cette attitude paraît moins répandue dans les grandes agglomérations et aurait tendance à décroître lorsque l'intérêt porté à la politique augmente.

L'étranger.

La presque unanimité des élèves aimeraient voyager à l'étranger. Presque aussi nombreux, ceux qui s'intéressent aux modes de vie et aux problèmes des autres peuples du monde. 74% accepteraient de s'installer à l'étranger s'ils y trouvent une meilleure situation et de meilleures conditions de travail.

64% répondent affirmativement à l'item "j'aime qu'il y ait des élèves étrangers dans ma classe". Les réticences sont plus fréquentes parmi les garçons.

C'est aussi parmi les garçons que le plus d'approbation est donnée à l'item "l'aide au Tiers Monde est illusoire : il ne sortira jamais du sous-développement auquel le condamnent la mentalité des habitants et le climat". Au total, un élève sur quatre approuve cette affirmation ; le pourcentage d'acquiescement augmente avec l'âge.

Interrogés sur les événements suivis avec le plus d'intérêt, 58% des élèves disent accorder la première place à l'actualité mondiale ; 31% la donnent à l'actualité belge. Pour la majorité (52%), l'actualité européenne occupe la deuxième place. Les filles se montrent un peu plus préoccupées par l'actualité nationale, au détriment des événements mondiaux et européens.

Le Marché commun.

77% des élèves ont entendu parler du Marché commun "très souvent" ou "assez souvent". 51% déclarent s'y intéresser. Cependant si 69% des réponses indiquent correctement les six pays membres, les questions de connaissance relatives au Marché commun suscitent un pourcentage de "non-réponse" et de "sans avis" allant de 25 à 49% et un nombre important de réponses incorrectes.

49% (70% des avis exprimés) pensent que "la suppression du Marché commun serait une catastrophe pour la Belgique"; les réponses négatives sont un peu plus nombreuses chez les garçons. 10% de l'ensemble estiment que "le Marché commun ne sert qu'à occuper des fonctionnaires inutiles".

L'Europe.

57% des jeunes déclarent ne pas trouver les problèmes européens ennuyeux. Cet intérêt paraît fortement corrélé avec l'intérêt porté à la politique et l'écoute des informations. Cependant il est un peu plus fréquemment exprimé par les francophones et par les filles, qui se montrent par ailleurs moins intéressés par la politique.

Les items correspondant à des attitudes favorables à l'unification suscitent entre 54 et 68% de réponses positives, entre 15 et 18% de réponses négatives, avec un degré d'acquiescement plus élevé chez les filles. Cependant les filles sont plus nombreuses que les garçons parmi la majorité relative qui estime qu'"un gouvernement européen est irréalisable parce que les intérêts des différents pays seront toujours divergents".

Les élèves étaient invités à indiquer, parmi 14 "avantages" et 12 "désavantages" de l'unification européenne, respectivement les trois principaux.

L'argument le plus souvent invoqué est la paix mondiale : elle est désignée par 56% des jeunes parmi les "avantages"; l'augmentation des risques de guerre par la création d'une nouvelle puissance vient au premier rang des "désavantages" (38%), les entraves au rapprochement avec les pays communistes au 4ème rang (23%) et la crainte de voir l'Europe se détacher des Etats-Unis au 5ème rang (21%).

Viennent ensuite les arguments d'efficacité et de puissance :

- parmi les avantages :
 - favoriser les recherches scientifiques et techniques en Europe 35% (2ème rang)
 - créer une grande puissance mondiale à côté des Etats-Unis et de l'U.R.S.S. 32% (3ème rang)
 - permettre le développement d'une économie puissante 32% (4ème rang)
 - nous libérer de l'influence prépondérante des grandes puissances 29% (5ème rang)
- parmi les désavantages:
 - mettre les petits pays européens sous la domination des plus grands 38% (2ème rang)

La position de l'Europe à l'égard des pays en voie de développement occupe une place assez importante :

- parmi les avantages :
 - rendre plus efficace l'aide aux pays en voie de développement 24% (6ème rang)
- parmi les désavantages:
 - accentuer les déséquilibres entre pays riches et pays pauvres 36% (3ème rang)

Les arguments de type "nationaliste" recueillent relativement peu d'adhésions. Cependant la disparition de l'esprit patriotique vient au 6ème rang des "désavantages" de l'unification (19% des élèves).

Les réponses à la question relative à l'organisation politique d'une Europe unie sont en majorité favorables à une structure de type fédéral : se sont prononcés pour

- pas de gouvernement européen, mais les gouvernements de chaque pays se rencontrent régulièrement pour essayer d'adopter une politique commune : 13%
- un gouvernement européen qui s'occupe des questions les plus importantes, mais chaque pays garde un gouvernement national qui s'occupe de ses problèmes particuliers : 67%
- un gouvernement européen qui s'occupe de toutes les questions et les pays membres n'ont plus de gouvernement national : 5%

Les avis au sujet des domaines auxquels devraient s'étendre les compétences respectives des diverses autorités confirment l'importance que prend, dans l'esprit des jeunes, le rôle de la construction européenne dans le domaine de la recherche scientifique :

	Autorité européenne	Autorité belge	Autorité régionale
Recherche scientifique	70	10	8
Politique étrangère	65	17	5
Politique économique	58	18	11
Système fiscal	44	30	10
Programmes scolaires	43	32	15
Vacances scolaires	40	32	16
Durée du service militaire	37	41	10
Politique linguistique	23	39	26
Politique sociale	30	33	21
Orientation professionnelle	24	30	31

48% des élèves estiment qu'"une organisation politique de l'Europe ne se conçoit qu'avec un Parlement élu au suffrage universel direct" ; 40% sont sans avis à ce sujet. Appelés à élire un représentant au Parlement européen, 77% voteraient pour un candidat dont ils partagent les idées, quelle que soit sa nationalité ; 5% choisiraient un Belge.

Interrogés sur leurs préférences entre une Europe la plus étendue possible et une Europe géographiquement limitée mais complètement unie, les élèves ont donné des avis extrêmement dispersés. Une faible majorité (42% de l'ensemble, soit 51% des avis exprimés) se prononce en faveur d'une Europe étendue au plus grand nombre de pays possible.

Lorsqu'on invite les jeunes à se prononcer sur la composition idéale de l'Europe, sans poser l'alternative extension - cohésion, on constate qu'une forte majorité se prononce pour l'inclusion des pays occidentaux à régime démocratique ; 80% des avis exprimés sont en faveur de l'inclusion inconditionnelle de la Suisse, 72% en faveur de celle de la Grande-Bretagne. L'Espagne et la Grèce seraient admises respectivement par 48% et 38% sans conditions, par 43% et 48% "si certaines conditions étaient remplies". Les pays à régimes communistes seraient admis conditionnellement par le plus grand nombre. Seule l'U. R. S. S. serait exclue par une majorité relative des avis exprimés.

I.P.S.A.

A.I.S.P.

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National Distinctiveness and Transnationality in West European
Public Opinion, 1954 - 1962 *

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In recent years two primary focuses have emerged in the study of Western European integration. First, many, perhaps most, analysts have turned their attentions to the functioning of Europe's supranational institutions, and, in a broader way, to political processes in the region's "would-be" polity.¹ On the other hand, some authors have allotted less analytical attention to international decision-making between and among West European governments but relatively more to community formation between and among West European peoples.² The project reported in this paper is essentially a community formation study. In it, I set myself the task of assessing the degree to which three nationalities -- Frenchmen, West Germans, and Italians -- assimilated attitudinally to form a "European" population between 1954 and 1962. Findings reported here may be somewhat disappointing to those who picture European integration as movement toward transnationality. Little evidence to show any integration of populations was uncovered. Still, what was uncovered concerning the persistence of distinctiveness in national opinion positions is noteworthy in its substantive and theoretical import for understanding Western European integration.

National Distinctiveness and Transnationality :
Models and Methods

The primary object of analysis in this study is to test the hypothesis that nationality declined in salience as a differentiator of political opinion in Western Europe during the 1950s and early 1960s. The corollary to this hypothesis, which is also tested here, is that as nationality became less important as a determinant of opinion in Western Europe, such other factors as political-ideological predispositions, and elite or mass status, became more important. Essentially, what I was looking for over time was an emerging West European regional population, less rent internationally along lines that separated Frenchmen, from West Germans from Italians, but more distinctly rent transnationally along lines that separated elites from masses, the politically Right from the Center from the Left, etc., in

* This paper was prepared for presentation at the Eighth Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, August 31 - September 5, 1970.

similar ways in all countries. Implicitly, of course, I was looking to see whether the regional population of Western Europe was integrating into a new "national" population similar to that of France, the United States or any modern nation-state, where ethnic identification and regional differentiation may persist to become politically salient intermittently, but where the most important attitudinal cleavages cut along other than ethnic or geographic lines.³

Technically, findings reported in this paper follow from attempts to fit rather bodies of French, West German and Italian opinion data to statistical models which operationally define and distinguish "nationally distinctive" and "transnational" opinion positions. Investigating national distinctiveness and transnationality statistically poses a fairly straightforward problem in the Analysis of Variance. That is, to ask statistically whether national populations hold separate and different opinions about political issues is to ask whether the variance in opinion positions between countries is of great enough magnitude to be statistically significant. On the other hand, to ask statistically whether transnational attributes are more important determinants of opinion than international ones, is to ask whether the variance in opinion among similar subpopulations within countries is significant and of greater magnitude than the variance in opinion between countries. The comparison of variance between with variance within is the basis of well-known statistical procedures for the Analysis of Variance.⁴ Hence, if the variance in opinion between countries turns out, upon analysis, to be significantly greater than the variance in opinion within them, "national distinctiveness" will be in evidence. But, if, on the other hand, the variance in opinion within countries generated by political-ideological differences, status differences, etc. turns out, upon analysis, to be significantly greater than the variance between them, "transnationality" will be in evidence.

Actual analysis for this study consisted in executing one-hundred ninety-four separate tests of variance "within" and "between" three national sample populations -- the French, West German and Italian -- on international issues affecting them in 1954, 1957, and 1961-62.⁵ The public opinion questions analyzed were selected from four international polls in Dr. Leo Crespi's USIA XX-Series : xx-2, October, 1954 ; XX-9, April, 1957 ; XX-13, July, 1961 and XX-14, June, 1962.⁶ Criteria for selecting these particular polls were more or less imposed by the availability of data. The polls include the earliest and the latest of the XX-Series for which full results were available to me at the time of this writing.⁷ On the other hand, criteria for selecting particular questions to be analyzed are more reasoned. First, questions were selected to reflect, as broadly as possible, the ranges of international political issues facing West Europeans at successive intervals during the 1950s and early 1960s. An effort was made to tap perennial issues having to do with the Cold War, relations with East and West, European security, armament and disarmament, and Germany. But the selection of issues also deliberately included "headline" topics current in 1954, 1957,

and 1961-62, such as the London Conference, the EDC, the Geneva Conference, Suez, Nuclear Testing, Kennedy's meetings with DeGaulle and Khrushchev and the Berlin Wall. These latter were included primarily to test for similarities and differences in national reactions to international crises and other fast-breaking events. Finally, special efforts were made to include batteries of questions having to do specifically with West European unity, supranationality and integration. In all, thirty-three questions were selected as test issues for 1954, thirty-two for 1957 and thirty-two for 1961-62.

For the analyses of variance, each national sample was broken down into subnational groups, first according to respondents' levels of educational attainment, and then according to their political-ideological predispositions.⁸ "Education" and "ideology" were selected as test variables mainly because these consistently accounted for the greatest attitudinal variation within national populations. (In this sense, the study was actually biased against finding national distinctiveness.) Moreover, and more important theoretically, both education and ideology are clearly interpretable as transnational attributes, i. e., they are attributes shared by individuals and groups within different national populations. Elites and masses educationally defined certainly existed in all three countries tested, as did Right, Center and Left ideological adherents. Furthermore, differences in opinion among different educational attainment groups and different ideological groups were generally in similar directions in the different countries, so that in cases where within-country variance overshadowed between-country variance it truly became meaningful to speak of "transnational" opinion positions. Once the national populations were subdivided, variance in opinion within and between them was computed. F Ratios, or ratios of Between-to-Within Variance were calculated. Then, Intra-Class Correlation Coefficients (R_i) were derived to measure degrees of differentiation or homogeneity among national populations. As will be shown, this coefficient varies along a scale that ranges from + 1.0 (denoting extreme national differentiation due to high variance in opinion between populations as well as low variance within them) to - 1.0 (indicating complete homogeneity or transnationality).⁹

Transnationality and National Distinctiveness : Some General Trends in Overview

The primary and most striking finding that emerges for this probe into transnationality and national distinctiveness among West Europeans is that national distinctiveness in international political opinion was more marked in 1961-62 than in 1954. The poles of French, West German and Italian opinion diverged over time, and nationality remained a much more salient determinant of opinion than any of the transnational attributes tested. What is noteworthy in this is that national distinctiveness in political attitude not only persisted, but actually increased, during the decade of giant institutional leaps toward Western European integration, a consideration to be dealt with at some length later in this report.


Turning to the data, Figure I shows the path of median F Ratios (Between-Country Variance/Within-Country Variance) and Intra-Class Correlations for the thirty-three, thirty-three and thirty-two issues respectively tested in the three time periods. In addition, the table included at the bottom of Figure I shows the median values for Within-Country and Between-Country Variance during each time period and a tally of the number and proportion of national opinion differences found to be statistically significant.

The lines and numbers in Figure I speak for themselves. Where national populations were broken down into ideological preference groups and the variance of opinion within countries was compared to variance between them over time, some slight movement toward transnational opinion positions on international issues occurred between 1954 and 1957. This movement shows in the falling values of median F Ratios and Intra-Class Correlations between 1954 and 1957. But the trend was sharply reversed between 1957 and 1961-62 as both the median F Ratio and the Intra-Class coefficient climbed to ultimately reach magnitudes well above those recorded in 1954. Hence, with regard to opinion differences among internal political-ideological groups, the French, West German and Italian populations were each more cohesive in 1961-62 than in 1954. Moreover, while this internal cohesiveness (i.e., decreasing variance in opinion within countries) strengthened, external distinctiveness (i.e., increasing variance in opinion between countries) became more clearly marked. Thus, instead of an emerging Left, Right and Center in a regional polity where transnational ideological differences blurred national ones, analysis reveals narrowing opinion differences between Left, Right and Center within countries, and widening attitudinal distances between these countries.

Similar, but even clearer, trends emerge when the national populations are broken down into educational attainment groups. As is apparent from the "education" lines in Figure I, the paths of median F Ratios and Intra-Class correlations move continuously upward from 1954 to 1957 to 1961-62. Therefore, "Education", like "ideology", became an increasingly less salient differentiator among political opinions within West European countries, while nationality became increasingly more salient. Thus, instead of an emerging intelligentsia in a regional society where elite-mass differences blurred national ones, analysis, here as before, reveals narrowing differences between elites and masses within countries, but widening differences between the countries. Whatever integration in Western Europe meant institutionally, economically and otherwise between 1954 and 1962, it apparently did not mean the submergence of nationalities in a transnational population, at least as far as these nationalities' attitudes about world political issues were concerned.

Figure I

Trends in Opinion Variance within and between three West European Populations,
1954, 1957, 1961-62



Year	Median F Ratio		Median Intra-Class Correlation		Median Within Variance		Median Between Variance		Number & Proportion Stat. Sig. Differences	
	Educ.	Ideol.	Educ.	Ideol.	Educ.	Ideol.	Educ.	Ideol.	Educ.	Ideol.
1954	3.0	2.7	.40	.23	97.0	248.9	297.3	746.2	12(.36)	14(.44)
1957	3.8	1.6	.48	.10	94.0	189.8	250.3	435.4	15(.47)	11(.34)
1961-62	18.3	5.1	.83	.41	30.9	163.3	484.1	877.0	20(.63)	21(.66)

The Substantive Bases of National Distinctiveness in West European Opinion

Looking at trends in statistical indices provides only a general outline of the evolution of international opinion in Western Europe during the 1950s and early 1960s. Richness is added by asking and answering how and why French, West German and Italian attitudes became more nationally distinctive over time. Furthermore, which attitudes in particular became more nationally distinctive ? And significantly, which ones did not ? Tables I-III were developed in an attempt to answer some of these questions.

The tables are essentially a list of the international opinion positions on different issues tested for within-country and between-country variance. Separately, they describe ranges of transnationality and national distinctiveness in West European opinions at different periods in time. Collectively, they provide a fairly detailed summary of trends in transnationality and national distinctiveness over time. Opinion positions in the tables are categorized as either "transnational" or "nationally distinctive" according to definitions for these concepts offered earlier. That is, an opinion position such as "Germany Should Participate in Western Defense" would be classified as "Transnational" if differences in support for the position among subnational groups within countries were both transnationally similar and of sufficient magnitude to render differences between nationalities insignificant. The position would, on the other hand, be classified as "Nationally Distinctive" if differences in opinion between nationalities proved significantly more important than differences within countries. In addition, for a somewhat finer distinction among the response patterns shown in the tables, "transnational" positions are divided into those that reflected "Regional Consensus" (i. e., very little difference of opinion either within or between countries) and those that reflected "Regional Dialogue" (i. e., differences of opinion along lines of cleavage defined by transnational attributes). In all, the tables paint a rather revealing picture of the evolution of West European public opinion during the 1950s and early 1960s.

TABLE I

Transnationality and national distinctiveness in West European public opinion on international affairs issues in 1954^a

I. Transnationality : Regional Consensus

1. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are to blame for World Tension
2. The West Should Not Initiate the Use of Atomic Weapons in a Military Conflict.
3. There is a Low Likelihood of Accomplishing Anything at a Conference with the Russians.
5. The East is Unlikely to Win Ultimately in its Contest with the West.

II. Transnationality : Regional Dialogue

A. Transnational Cleavage Along Political-Ideological Lines

6. Take the Western Side in a Hot War
7. The United States is Doing All it Should to Prevent a New War
8. Favor an International Conference with the Russians
9. Germany Should Participate in Western Defense
10. The United States Should Oppose and Attack on Formosa
11. The United States Should Not Oppose and Attack on Formosa
12. Communist China Should be Seated in the United Nations
13. Bad Feelings About the Soviet Union

B. Transnational Cleavage Along Elite-Mass Lines

14. Take the Western Side in the Cold War
15. Favor West European Unity in General
16. Favor West European Political Federation
17. Bad Feelings About Molotov
18. The London Conference was a Step Toward European Integration
19. Result of London Conference Satisfactory

C. Transnational Cleavages Along Both Political-Ideological and Elite-Mass Lines

20. West Germany Should Remain Unarmed
21. The United States Should Increase its Defense Efforts in the Far East

(continued)

(Table I, continued)

III. National Distinctiveness

22. Good Feelings About England
23. Good Feelings About Eden
24. Approve of the United States Attitude Toward France
25. The United States Has Increased Efforts Toward European Defense
26. Good Feelings About Dulles
27. Favor Increased West German Sovereignty
28. The United States is Treating Germany Too Favorably
29. Good Feelings About Mendes-France
30. The Soviet Union is Not Working to Prevent a New War
31. The West Will Ultimately Win in Contest with the East
32. Good Feelings About the United States
33. Germany Should be Reunited

^a Technically and statistically, the allocation of opinion positions into the different categories was rather complicated. Positions were assigned to categories on the basis of their quartile scores for both Within and Between Variance. That is, all positions were rank ordered first according to the Within Variance they generated and then according to the Between Variance they generated. Then, quartile scores were allotted, with the 25% of positions generating the least Within Variance allotted to the first quartile for Within Variance, the next 25% allotted to the second quartile, etc., and then similarly with regard to Between Variance. Finally, categorization was made on the basis of the quartile scores : Regional Consensus operationally came to mean First Quartile for Within Variance and First Quartile for Between Variance ; Regional Dialogue operationally came to mean Second, Third and Fourth Quartile for Within Variance and First Quartile for Between Variance ; and, finally, National Distinctiveness operationally came to mean Second, Third and Fourth Quartile for Between Variance whatever the Within Variance, but with the stipulation that Between-Country differences had to be statistically significant at the .05 level. This procedure was first performed for the political-ideological break down and then repeated for the education break down.

TABLE II

Transnationality and national distinctiveness in West European
public opinion on international affairs issues in 1957

- I. Transnationality : Regional Consensus
 1. Good Feeling About Macmillan
 2. Support for United States and Soviet Military Disengagement in Europe
- II. Transnationality : Regional Dialogue
 - A. Transnational Cleavage Along Political-Ideological Lines
 3. Disapproval of Eisenhower Doctrine for Middle East
 4. The United States is Making Efforts to Ban Atomic Tests
 5. Maintaining Present Arrangements is Best Way to Guarantee European Security
 6. The United States is Making Efforts for Disarmament
 - B. Transnational Cleavage Along Elite-Mass Lines
 7. Approval of British Defense Plan Placing Greater Emphasis on Nuclear Weapons
 8. Atomic Energy is a Boon to Mankind
 9. For European Unity in General
 10. The Common Market and EURATOM are Steps Toward Political Union
 11. The Common Market and EURATOM will Reduce United States Influence in Europe
 12. Neither the United States Nor the Soviet Union is Working to Ban Atomic Tests
 - C. Transnational Cleavages Along Both Political-Ideological and Elite-Mass Lines
 13. Support for West European Federation
 14. Approval of Common Market
 15. Bad Feelings About Bulganin
- III. National Distinctiveness
 16. West European Security Can be Guaranteed Without Alliances
 17. West European Security Can be Guaranteed in a General System Including Both Superpowers
 18. NATO is in Healthy Condition
 19. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union are Working for Disarmament
 20. Approval of Eisenhower Doctrine for Middle East

(continued)

(Table II, continued)

21. Approval of EURATOM
 22. Support for Israel in Suez Situation
 23. Support for Arabs in Suez Situation
 24. Support for Neither Israel nor Arabs in Suez Situation
 25. Bad Feelings About the Soviet Union
 26. The Common Market Will Raise Standards of Living
 27. Confidence in NATO
 28. The United States is Doing What it Should to Prevent War
 29. The USSR is Not Doing What it Should to Prevent War
 30. Good Feelings About Eisenhower
 31. Good Feelings About the United States
 32. Bad Feelings About Gomulka
-

TABLE III

Transnationality and National Distinctiveness in West European
Public Opinion on International Affairs Issues in 1961-62

I. Transnationality : Regional Consensus

1. Favor for General and Complete Disarmament
2. West Should Not Initiate the Use of Nuclear Weapons
3. Good Feeling About Great Britain

II. Transnationality : Regional Dialogue

A. Transnational Cleavage Along Political-Ideological Lines

4. The West is Ahead in Military Strength At Present
5. Favor European Federation
6. The Common Market is a Big Step Toward Political Union

B. Transnational Cleavage Along Elite-Mass Lines

7. Favor for Limited, Partial Disarmament
8. Hardly Anything Came from Kennedy-Krushchev Meeting
9. Force Should Be Used in Response to Threat in Berlin Even if this Means War with USSR

C. Transnational Cleavages Along Both Political-Ideological and Elite-Mass Lines

10. Favor Inspection for Disarmament
11. Favor European Unity
12. Common Market Will Raise Standards of Living
13. Approve of Common Market
14. Leave Berlin Rather Than Use Force

III. National Distinctiveness

15. Take Western Side in Cold War
16. Bad Feelings About the Soviet Union
17. The Soviet Union is Not Working to Prevent War
18. NATO is in Healthy Condition
19. Country's Basic Interests are Similar to United States Interests

(continued)

(Table III, continued)

20. The United States is Justified in Resuming Nuclear Tests
 21. The United States is Working to Prevent War
 22. The United States is Making Efforts Toward Disarmament
 23. Country's Basic Interests are Different from Soviet Interests
 24. The West Will Come Out Stronger After 20 Years' Competition
 25. Use Force Rather than Leave Berlin
 26. Good Feelings About the United States
 27. NATO is Effective in Guaranteeing European Security
 28. The Developed Countries are Doing What they Should to Aid the Less Developed Ones
 29. The West Will Be Ahead in Military Strength in 10 Years
 30. Favor Atomic Weapons as a Last Resort
 31. The Common Market will Increase United States Influence in Europe
 32. The Kennedy-DeGaulle Conference Strengthened the Western Alliance
-

First, Tables I-III contain in verbal form most of the information contained statistically in Figure I and its accompanying table. The trend toward national distinctiveness in opinion is exhibited in the increasing numbers of entries in the "national distinctiveness" category and the decreasing numbers in the "transnationality" categories as Table I is compared with Table II and this with Table III. In 1954, for example, "transnational" positions outnumbered "nationally distinctive" ones by a margin of, two to one. But by 1961-62 the majority of positions had become "nationally distinctive".

Even more than this, however, Tables I-III indicate exactly what kinds of issues were dividing West Europeans, and along which lines of cleavage, international or transnational, they were dividing them. In general, the most internationally divisive issues (those that separated Frenchmen, from Italians, from West Germans) were of four kinds : (1) "Soviet" issues that concerned the USSR and its foreign policies, (2) "American" issues that concerned the United States and its foreign policies, (3) "security" questions concerned with the value and efficacy of the NATO system, and (4) "crisis" issues that concerned fast-breaking events which heightened international tensions. Significantly, though not surprisingly, on the other hand, the only opinion positions which fell mainly and consistently into "transnational" categories were those on "integration" issues concerned with European unity and supra-nationality, the Common Market and political federation.

Evolving National Differences on Soviet Issues -- One of the sources of growing divergence in opinion among West European nationalities was a differentially changing image of the Soviet Union. The political-military threat posed by Stalin's Soviet Union fostered harmony in opinions among West Europeans in the early 1950s. But the more ambiguous postures of Khrushchev's Soviet Union began to divide these peoples along national lines later in the decade. By 1962, questions of relations with the Soviet Union, and with the East more generally, had become some of the most internationally divisive issues in Western Europe. In effect, the USSR and its policies ceased over time to function in West European opinion as unifying "threat factors" as they had in the first years of the cold war.

Table I shows that the greatest number of "Soviet" issues fell into "transnational" categories in 1954. Since apprehensions about the Soviet Union were shared at that time by similarly large majorities in France, West Germany and Italy, between-country variance in opinion was minimal. Most of the variance on "Soviet" questions was therefore within-country variance accounted for by pro-Soviet deviances on the ideological far Left, mainly in Italy and France. These intra-national differences persisted, though diluted, into 1961-62. But by this time they were sharply outweighed by divergences in national positions. Table III shows at a glance that by 1961-62 practically

all "Soviet" issues generated "nationally distinctive" opinion positions. At this later date the French (Right, Center and Left) were significantly less anti-Russian than the Italians (Right, Center and Left), and the Italians, for their part, were significantly less anti-Russian than the West Germans. Between 1954 and 1962, then, the Soviet Union changed, the world changed, and West European attitudes toward the Soviet Union in the world also changed. But different national attitudes changed in different ways, all to the great detriment of the transnational harmony on "Soviet" issues that united West Europeans in the early 1950s.

"American" Issues as Constant Sources of Divisiveness -- Much of what has just been said with regard to the Soviet Union, its policies and their impacts upon West European opinion may also be said about French, West German and Italian reactions to the United States. The difference, however, between the respective impacts of "Soviet" and "American" issues is that the former became internationally divisive over time, while the latter were internationally divisive from the outset. National differences in French, West German and Italian attitudes about the United States were already marked in 1954 : the French, on the average, were either suspicious or hostile toward the United States and cool to American policies (years before De Gaulle !), but both the Italians and the West Germans showed amity for the United States and exhibited support for most U.S. policies. Since within-country agreement on these respective positions was high in all three countries, most of the variance in West European attitudes about the United States was in fact between-country variance generated by the differences between the French on the one hand and the Italians and the West Germans on the other. As time passed, Italians became moderately disenchanted with United States policies, so that, as a consequence their opinion positions on "American" issues fell increasingly between French coolness and West German enthusiasm. Between-country variance on "American" issues was thus further increased. By 1962, the symbol, "U.S.", had become one of the most internationally divisive symbols in West European politics.

Disagreements over the Structure of European Society -- If the "U.S." was one of the most divisive symbols in West European politics in early 1960s, "NATO" was the most internationally divisive of all. On the question of "NATO's Effectiveness" asked in 1961, the F Ratios for the "education" break and the "ideology" break respectively were 26.4 and 21.1, so that, on the average, between-country variance on this position was about twenty-four times greater than within-country variance ! But international division over NATO was not new in 1961 ; NATO questions were already falling into the "national distinctiveness" category in 1957. Moreover, national divergences over specific NATO issues reflected wider and deeper French, West German and Italian differences over the structure and functioning of the Western security system. Notably, these differences became less transnational and more markedly international over time.

Some "reading between the lines" is necessary here since "security" issues were not as well covered on the XX-Series polls as they perhaps should have been, but it would appear that questions of defense struck "transnational" cleavages more readily than international ones in the early 1950s. This transnationality was shortlived, however. Looking at the data for 1954, it is interesting to note that the question of German rearmament cut transnationally between political-ideological groups, Right, Center and Left, more distinctly than it cut internationally between France, Italy and Germany. In a similar way, though along different lines of transnational cleavage, questions about the London Conference and reactions to its results (German rearmament and integration into NATO) separated elites (approval) from masses (rejection) more distinctly than it separated nationalities. But despite evidence of early transnationality, by 1957 "security" issues were falling most frequently into the "national distinctiveness" category. Preferences for a "general security system" that included both of the superpowers became a distinctively French position (though not a majority position). Wariness of all alliances came to characterize Italians more than other West Europeans (though again not a majority). Then finally, NATO per se notably separated the French on the one hand from the West Germans and Italians on the other in 1957. This international division became even more marked by 1961-62, and thus contributed in considerable measure to the general trend toward national distinctiveness in West European opinion.

International Crises and Division in Europe -- To complete this inventory of the roots of international divisiveness in Western Europe, note should be taken of the fact that international crises, both within Europe and especially without, were damaging to transnationality through much of the period under investigation. Table II, for example, shows that almost all of the issues surrounding the Suez crisis -- i. e., support for the different Middle East contenders, support for none of them, approval of the Eisenhower doctrine, etc. -- generated "nationally distinctive" opinion positions. In fact, the values of Intra-Class coefficients derived from the tests for variance in these opinion positions, indicate that the "Suez" issues were among the most internationally divisive questions in 1957.¹⁰ Similarly, though less spectacularly, crisis again separated European nationalities in 1961 when Berlin raised international tensions. As Table III indicates the basic issue of whether or not to use force to meet Russian moves in Berlin generated "nationally distinctive" opinion positions (the Germans most in favor of a military response; the French significantly less so; and the Italians even less than the French). Thus, it would appear that the typical attitudinal impact of international crises in the 1950s and early 1960s was to drive West Europeans together nationally while driving them apart internationally. This is understandable since different countries are generally differently affected by crises, and "all in the same boat" feelings are much more likely to be nationally shared than regionally shared. Still, two points are of interest here. First, it would appear that

transnationality in opinion grows and thrives in relatively tranquil international environments, but it deteriorates rather rapidly under high tension. Second, what is most fascinating is that there is very little evidence of any "European" response to any fast-breaking international events. When the Europeans reacted to these situations, they reacted as Frenchmen, Germans and Italians.

European Integration Issues and the Limited Scope of Transnationality

After all that has been said about national distinctiveness and international divisiveness it has to be somewhat anticlimactic to point out that in marked contrast to the general trends, most questions of Western European unity, supranationality and federation did not divide nationalities one from another. There were differences of opinion about "integration" questions, but these remained transnational rather than international throughout the period under study. For the most part, there was a constantly wider range of differences in opinion about European integration within countries than between them. Interestingly, but expectedly in the light of the history of European unity, elite-mass differences on integration issues tended repeatedly to overshadow any national differences. The data analyzed here suggest that European integration was "pulled along" between 1954 and 1962 by a transnational elite, supported for the most part by the more enlightened strata of national populations. These data also show, however, that ideological cleavages affected positions on those unity issues more directly concerned with the Common Market and economic integration. This was especially the case in 1957. But again, the opinion differences cut across rather than between countries. While far Left and far Right looked with suspicion upon the Common Market idea and withheld support, the venture in economic unity found solid support among a broad transnational coalition of the Center. Thus, where the Common Market was concerned, variance in opinion generated by differences between political-ideological Centers and more doctrinaire peripheries within countries significantly outweighed any variance generated from international differences.

This transnationality in positions on "integration" issues is both understandable and enigmatic. It is understandable in the sense that it was expected. Anyone recalling the EDC debates, and the EEC negotiations, as well as anyone familiar with the politics of the Common Market, will note at once how skillful "European" leaders continually build and rebuild regional coalitions of supporters from likeminded and similarly sympathetic "European" enthusiasts in different EEC countries. By the same token, even a purely impressionistic analysis, without the data or the statistics, would suggest

immediately that opponents of West European integration in all EEC countries tend to wear the same kinds of ideological badges. They too represent transnational forces. Hence, the transnational bases of "Europeanism" and even "anti-Europeanism" are understandable almost by definition.

What is puzzling is the fact that transnationalism in the issue-area of West European integration came to stand virtually alone and isolated in a surrounding attitudinal environment of national distinctiveness. By 1961-62, transnationality about "integration" was almost the beginning and the end of West European transnationality. What lessons this limited transnationality holds for the theory of international integration, what it explains about the course of European unity, and what it predicts about the future, are all among considerations treated in the next and closing sections of this report where attempts are made to evaluate some of this study's findings.

Some Causes and Implications of Observed Trends in West European Opinion

A first reaction to finding that Frenchmen, West Germans and Italians became more nationally distinctive and less cosmopolitan in political opinion between 1954 and 1962 is to "blame it on De Gaulle" with the explanation that the General led Frenchmen to adopt nationally peculiar and regionally deviant positions on foreign affairs issues. There is, to be sure, evidence here of General De Gaulle's influence upon French opinion. Average French attitudes toward the Soviet Union, NATO, neutrality, and even European unity to some extent, diverged from West German and Italian positions much more markedly, in 1961-62 than in the pre-De Gaulle years. Moreover, these divergences -- a warming toward the USSR, criticism of NATO, a slight cooling toward supranationalism, etc. -- were in directions that suggested popular rallying to Gaullist positions. Therefore, more independent French positions, probably following from De Gaulle's impact on the French system, did account for some of the increased between-country variance in West European opinion after 1957.

Still, De Gaulle's influence and French deviance from regional means are but part of the explanation for increasing national distinctiveness among West Europeans. First, all three national populations taken separately grew more internally cohesive in their foreign affairs opinions over time, with the result that transnational attributes such as ideological predisposition and education became less important differentiators of attitude. As these lines of political cleavage cutting across countries became less salient, differences between countries became more apparent. Furthermore, perusal of the ranges of national positions on the various issues tested shows that both the West Germans and Italians opted for nationally peculiar and regionally deviant

stances almost as frequently as did Frenchmen. Therefore, rather than to give De Gaulle all the credit, or the "blame" for injecting national distinctiveness into West European political opinion, let us more realistically conclude that the period extending from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s was a time of emerging national independence in foreign policy for many Western European countries -- a period which some have described as a time of "new national self-assertiveness". During this period national interests concerning relations with the United States and the communist East, security, armament, disarmament, regional unity and international organization were nationally debated in France and West Germany, certainly, and in Italy too. The result was a new set of definitions of national interest which turned out to be more nationally distinctive in 1962 than they were in 1954 because of differentially altered environments surrounding the different countries. The world did not change in the same way for Frenchmen, West Germans and Italians between 1954 and 1962. An analyst could say with justification that West Europeans, threatened from the East, dependent militarily and economically on the United States and relatively inactive in world politics, were nearly "all in the same boat" in the early 1950s. But this description became less and less accurate as the 1950s wore on toward the 1960s and as foreign policy problems for West Europeans became less regionally general and more nationally peculiar. The altering nature of "Soviet" questions illustrated earlier is but one example of the world changing in different ways for different West Europeans. Hence, it would seem that the best explanation for the trend toward national distinctiveness in West European opinion is that increasingly divergent French, West German and Italian attitudes toward foreign affairs reflected new and essentially distinctive definitions of national interest arrived at during the latter 1950s.

Continuing National Distinctiveness and European Integration

Implicit in these findings concerning national distinctiveness in French, West German and Italian opinions on foreign affairs issues are several conclusions about European integration.

The first has already been stated rather boldly : "Whatever integration in Western Europe meant institutionally, economically and otherwise between 1954 and 1962, it apparently did not mean the submergence of nationalities in a transnational population". Following from this it would appear that definitions of international integration that include, call for, or require the assimilation of populations are inappropriate when applied to Western European integration. European integration has included the international merger of governing institutions and policy-making processes. It has involved a good deal of transnational cooperation among governmental and non-governmental leaders,

agencies, organizations, and interest groups. It has produced regional economic policies, externally directed commercial policies and even some coordination of foreign policies. But, to the extent that research results presented here are accurate and reliable, Western European integration has meant neither the disappearance nor the dilution of nationality as the important determinant of political opinion in the different countries. As far as the distribution of political attitude was concerned, the Western European population was not a transnational society before institutional steps toward regional integration were taken. Nor is there evidence to show that this regional population was becoming a transnational society after, or as a result of, institutional merger. The important theoretical point in this is not that the absence of transnational society signals failure for integration, but rather that major steps toward regional political amalgamation may be successfully taken in the absence of an underlying transnational society. Establishing the European Economic Community, for example, was such a step.

After this has been said, however, the findings reached in this study strongly suggest that a transnational elite did emerge in Western Europe during the 1950s and that this group was probably a "pulling" force instrumental in launching the integrative institutional ventures. What is interesting about this elite, as alluded earlier, is the extremely narrow range of its transnationality. The intelligentsia and upper-educated in the different countries apparently shared values in regional unity and expectations of reward from amalgamative ventures. In these attitudes the elites were more similar to one another transnationally than they were to the mass populations in their respective countries. But here their transnationality ended. Over the rest of the range of foreign affairs issues these higher-educated Western Europeans were most often much closer attitudinally to the mass populations in their respective countries than they were to counterparts in other countries. In fact, on some issues national elites were farther apart internationally than mass populations. As a result of these observations, the designation "European" takes on a new and much more limited meaning.

If we are to accept our findings about the limited range of West European transnationality, we must conclude that it does not require very much transnational consensus to launch experiments in international integration. Nor, apparently, does it require very much transnational agreement about political substance to keep supranational institutions operating. What does however appear to be the case is that it is continually necessary that regional leaders be able to rally a transnational coalition in support of regional integration per se. Notably, this requires transnationality in the "integration" issue area, but it requires no transnationality beyond this area. Notably, too,

this exactly describes conditions prevailing in Western Europe at least since the middle-1950s. A transnational coalition of the political-ideological Center (broadly defined) complemented perhaps by a coalition of transnational intelligentsia, all of whom shared a common value in European unity even if they shared no other common attitudes, could always be mustered to carry European integration over hurdles. These latent transnational "European" coalitions undoubtedly continue to exist.

SANS RESUME

WITHOUT SUMMARY

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FOOTNOTES

1. The "decision-making" focus has been most pronounced and most interestingly developed in the works of the functionalist writers, most prominently, Haas, Lindberg and Scheingold. Cf., Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1953), passim ; Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1963), passim ; Leon N. Lindberg, "The European Community as a Political System : Notes Toward the Construction of a Model", Journal of Common Market Studies 5:4 (June, 1967), pp. 344-387 ; Leon N. Lindberg, "Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System", International Organization 22:2 (Spring, 1966), pp. 233-265 ; Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity : Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1970), passim ; Michael J. Brenner, Technocratic Politics and the Functionalist Theory of European Integration (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Center for International Studies, 1970), passim.
2. The list of works here too is extensive. On community formation in Western Europe and the North Atlantic Area specifically, see, Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1957), passim ; Karl W. Deutsch, et al., France, Germany and the Western Alliance (New York : Charles Scribners, 1967), passim ; Roger W. Cobb and Charles Elder, International Community : A Regional and Global Approach (New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), passim ; Hayward R. Alker and Donald J. Puchala, "Trends in Economic Partnership : The North Atlantic Area, 1928-1963" in J. David Singer (ed.) Quantitative International Politics (New York : The Free Press, 1968), pp. 287-316 ; Bruce M. Russett, Trends in World Politics (New York : Macmillan, 1965), pp. 33-66 ; Ronald Inglehart, "An End to European Integration ?" American Political Science Review 61:1 (March, 1967), pp. 91-105 ; Ronald Inglehart, "The New Europeans : Inward or Outward Looking ?" International Organization 24:1 (Winter, 1970), pp. 129-139 ; Daniel Lerner and Morton Gordon, Euratlantica : Changing Perspectives of the European Elites (Cambridge : M.I.T. Press, 1969), passim.
3. Cf., Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge and New York : M.I.T. Press and John Wiley, 1st edition, 1953), passim.
4. A most comprehensive theoretical and practical discussion of Analysis of Variance techniques is to be found in Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York : McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 242-271.

5. Data for the years 1961 and 1962 are combined in this analysis because neither the 1961 poll used (USIA XX-13) nor the 1962 poll (USIA XX-14) contained questions on a broad enough range of issues to make it comparable with the polls for earlier time periods. The two polls in combination however cover a very broad range of issues current in the early 1960s.
6. The USIA XX-Series and Dr. Crespi's efforts in gathering and analyzing international public opinion are fully described in Richard L. Merritt, "The USIA Surveys : Tools for Policy and Analysis", in Richard L. Merritt and Donald J. Puchala (eds.) Western European Perspectives on International Affairs (New York : Praeger, 1968), pp. 3-30.
7. Polls XX-15, XX-16 and XX-17 conducted in 1963, 1964, 1965 respectively are being analyzed at the present time. The early deadline for submission of working papers for the VIIIth Congress of the International Political Science Association, however, forced completion of this report before work on the more recent data could be finished.
8. The "education" breakdown was threefold : "no education or elementary only" ; "secondary school education" ; and "university education". To determine political-ideological breaks questions that ascertained respondents' political party affiliations or preferences were used. The number of parties reported varied from year to year. In general, however, the French spectrum included between six and eight possible party preferences ranging from the Peasants' Party at the right to the CPF at the Left ; the West German spectrum included four possible party preferences ranging from the CSU at the Right to the SPD at the Left ; and the Italian spectrum included between six and eight possible party preferences ranging from the Monarchists or Neo-Fascists at the Left.
9. Since the Intra-Class Correlation Coefficient (R_i) increases in value both as the Within-Country Variance decreases and as the Between-Country Variance increases, it is a particularly appropriate index for gauging attitudinal distance between populations. In the extreme case where there is no within-country variance at all, so that all opinion difference is accounted for by differences between populations, the value of the Intra-Class coefficient is 1.0. See Blalock, op.cit., pp. 268-69.
10. On the position, "Support Nobody in the Middle East", the Intra-Class correlation coefficient average across the "education" and the "ideology" break was .760. On the position, "Support Israel in the Middle East" the average intra-class correlation was .730. Both of these R_i figures are extremely high by comparison with R_i figures generated on most other issues. In addition, both approach 1.0, the indicator of maximum within-country homogeneity and between-country difference. The average intra-class correlation on the position, "Support the Arabs in the Middle East", was .565, somewhat lower, but still impressively high.

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THE POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF EUROPE:

CONCEPTIONS AND MISCONCEPTIONS ?

Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau.

Few notions in postwar literature and official statements have given rise to more controversy and to a larger variety of interpretations than the term "political" in the context of the European integration process. Political scientists write about the European Community as a political system, political integration as a process, political community as a terminal condition, the political future of the European Community, the political powers and institutions of the communities and so on. Statesmen and politicians have produced an even greater conceptual confusion. They have spoken about a political community as a merger of the EDC and the ECSC; about political unification and political cooperation; about political union both as the next step to be made after EEC and the step to be made to get rid of the supranational communities; and about EEC as a political union itself. And last but not least, it just required the political will - la volonté politique - of governments to move forward in European integration.

Mr. Rabier's request to study and eventually clarify the vocabulary therefore appears appropriate at the time the Hague Summit Conference has revived the issue of political unification in Europe.

A study of this kind and a reader of this paper should, however, bear in mind that the semantic confusion reflects fundamental conceptual unclarity, and disagreements on aims to be achieved. Any clarification of language or precision of the notion therefore is likely to produce a clarification of disagreement rather than provide a starting point for more coherent "political action" as Rabier is hoping to achieve (according to his explanatory note). This is all the more true for the present author, who has recently questioned the very basic assumptions of European integration.¹⁾

Having given this advance warning, my first objective in this paper is to present a number of basic concepts and feed current definitions into them with the hopeful result of identifying some crucial confusions and misconceptions. For the purpose of this paper, the basic concepts may be subdivided into two categories:

(1) analytical concepts: political system, political integration, and political actor;
and (2) policy-making concepts: political unification, political cooperation, political union. This approach appears necessary as most of the confusion stems from the use of particular word-combinations from which different meanings of the term "political" itself result.

BASIC CONCEPTS.

Political System.

The first and analytical concept to be presented here is the use of the term political as part of the word-combination : the political system.

" It is defined by Easton as that system of interactions in any society (including pre-national or multi-national societies) through which bindings or authoritative allocations are made and implemented." 2) The activities connected with allocating values authoritatively distinguish political systems from other kinds of systems. 3)

The extent to which these political activities are carried out separately in several distinct settings, distinguished the political system from another political system, or enables us to distinguish between a political system and its political sub-systems. As indices for the existence of a political system or distinctions between political systems, we may mention:

1. the extent to which members show "readiness or ability to work together to solve their political problems" and are "bound together by a political division of labour".4)
2. the extent to which members have established "some regularized methods for ordering their political relationships" including common values, "regime norms" 5) and common institutions.
3. the extent to which members are prepared to direct their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a common center whose institutions 6) are entrusted with the power to allocate values authoritatively.

Political integration.

As the analytical concept of a political system may serve to identify sets of existing political relations, the concept of political integration may serve to identify the evolution of relations between distinct or separate political systems.

In this sense political integration is a process whereby:

1. members of distinct political systems develop readiness to work together to solve joint political problems and elaborate new divisions of labour thus promoting a "dependent superordinate system" 7), or several new "dependent superordinate systems";
2. members of distinct political systems develop common values, regime norms and common institutions;
3. members shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new center, enabling authorities in their pre-existing institutions to transfer powers to the new institutions.

A process of political integration can be successful only if certain conditions are met. Suffice to say here 8) that we

can list among them :

1. a clearly perceived advantage of developing a new joint political division of labour over maintaining the divisions of labour in pre-existing political systems (is a process-condition as well as a condition at the time of creation);
2. a relatively high degree of homogeneity in values, regime norms and institutions between the separate political systems;
3. a substantial and open-ended transfer of power to new institutions coupled with a high degree of political communication across system boundaries.

Political Actor.

Sofar we have spoken about members of a political system. The term was used not in a formal sense but in an analytical one.

It is in this way that the term political actor is often being used. It does not refer to real persons, institutions or states as such but only insofar to persons -individually or collectively - acting in a political system that is to say performing activities and making decisions directed towards authoritatively allocating values to a society.

It is quite clear that this summary reference to three basic analytical concepts is far removed still from a conceptual clarification of political science theory. It may however serve our purpose of presenting a conceptual framework for evaluating conceptions and misconceptions distinguished as policy-making concepts, thus facilitating this second task.

Political Unification.

Political unification, often used interchangeably with political integration or political unity, distinguished itself as a concept from political integration in two respects. First of all, it does not connote an analytical concept introduced to measure a process of systems change, but a policy-making concept introduced to express an idea or goal held by certain European elites. Secondly, the concept implied a clearly and institutionally defined purpose to be achieved : the emergence of European unity seen as a federal state. I have therefore defined political unification as "a process, whereby existing sovereign states agree to foster the formation of a new and independent international entity, capable of acting on their behalf in the conduct of international relations." 9) Given the circumstance that the process of European unification among the six took off with the creation of three economic communities often termed as pre-federations, the concept was gradually narrowed down to include those spheres of political activity for which the community institutions were not yet acting on behalf of member states. Hence the first confusion if not a manifest misconception introduced in our vocabulary.

Assuming that the formation of economic communities had been a first step towards forming a European federal state, political unification became the label given to attempts to set up institutions acting on behalf of member states in the field of defence and foreign policy - two fields in which the authorities of traditional federal states had always acted on behalf of their members in international relations.

It thus introduced a fundamental confusion between the nature of (political) activities - authoritatively allocating values - and certain issues political actors might deal with in a political system, - conducting foreign relations and dealing with external defence.

Political Cooperation.

The confusion became even more apparent when governments of the six member states began talks on consulting each other more regularly on general problems they were dealing with in conducting foreign relations with third states.

An analysis of these talks does not justify the conclusion that they were part of a process of political integration as defined above. Analytically speaking "political" in the word-combination "political cooperation" points to another conception. In its nature it was a non-political activity in the field of foreign policy. The federalists' urge to start "political cooperation" resulted from the expectation that in this particular field, political integration could be fostered by non-political activities.

Or to put it differently : federalists held the "theory" that it was the field in which interaction took place rather than the nature of interactions by which the concept of "political" was determined. In their federalist conception, foreign policy was not only considered as the logical next field to enter into. They had always been in a great hurry to have member states start cooperation in that field, as they assumed it to be crucial one for any future federation. This conceptual confusion between nature of interactions and field in which they take place might not have been too serious if the model of a traditional federal state had remained valid for the purpose of analyzing the process of political integration in Europe.

Reliance on this model, however, points to an out-moded conception of systems-change in international relations. This appears to be so for two reasons :

(1) the objectives in post-war European relations are not necessarily concurrent or complementary in the three fields distinguished in the federal model-economic, defence and foreign policies, and (2) foreign-policy, notwithstanding the federalists' assumption, is not any more a field at all in modern European relations. In the present stage of European integration, a common foreign policy may evolve later and gradually as part of the so-called spill-over process.

By urging foreign policy cooperation immediately, its advocates deviated from the original concept of integration, thus erro-

neously applying doctrinaire thinking regarding the functions of a traditional federation to the present integration process. 10)

Given also the "community-approach" to political integration, foreign policy at best points to a number of issues as yet remaining outside the scope of the existing communities.

But even attempts made so far to distinguish "remaining issues" from community issues has proven to be a failure. An analysis of discussions on political cooperation soon revealed that such a distinction was not at stake. What was at stake was an attack on the community-approach towards political integration in the disguise of promoting foreign-policy cooperation.

This became apparent already in the compromise communiqué issued by the six foreign ministers on November 24, 1959 in which it was stated that (political) "consultation shall relate to the political aspects of the activities of the European Communities as well as to the remaining international questions." It needed the negotiations on political union to reveal the extent to which semantic confusion reflected fundamental misconceptions and disagreements.

Political Union.

Political Union -according to Susanne Bodenheimer - "refers to one particular kind of institutional arrangement which would, through consultation among the six governments, facilitate the adoption of common positions on foreign and defense policy." 11)

This definition certainly embodies the minimum common denominator of the agreed subject governments have been negotiating on since 1960. It disguises some fundamental disagreements so as to impede any substantial progress in negotiations so far. Political Union in fact meant very different things to different people. For the French government under de Gaulle political union referred to a particular kind of institutional arrangement intended to function as an explosive device for the existing institutional arrangement of the communities. A regular concert of the responsible governments in each field of cooperation was to replace the existing communities in the field they were operating and to prevent similar arrangements in other fields.

For other governments, political union referred to an arrangement for consultation in two fields outside the communities in which they insisted on retaining complete freedom of action within their own political system.

For the European Commission, political union was just another name for the political system of the European Communities in a process of functional expansion.

For the federalists political union meant another kind of pre-federation, this time not a "functional" but an "institutional" pre-federation.

Ever since 1960, the negotiations on political union dragged on without any prospect for substantial agreement or any progress towards clarification of conceptions and objectives 12). Or as Miriam Camps wrote : "Thus far, the political union debate has gone around in circles or, more accurately, in a descending spiral with the expectations of all the participants declining each time talks are resumed" 13).

The 1969 Hague Summit Conference, charging the "Foreign Ministers to examine the best way for achieving progress in the field of political unification, in the perspective of enlargement" - despite its psychedelic terminology - has not been able to reverse this trend, so far. The basic disagreement on objectives to be pursued, on institutions to be set up, and on the participation of candidate-states in the debates, has not been resolved in the Davignon Committee nor by the Foreign Ministers themselves during their meeting in May 1970 14).

B-I - EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
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B-I/II/1 - THE POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF EUROPE:
CONCEPTIONS AND MISCONCEPTIONS ?

Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau.

CONCLUSIONS : Political Unification as a non-concept.

This quick review of basic concepts cannot but lead us to the conclusion, that political unification as a concept is ill-defined analytically and virtually non-existent in policy-making. The best one can try to do is to deduce a variety of meanings possibly attached to it from the use of the word "political" in other word-combinations. In political analysis "political unification" is used either interchangeably with political integration or more specifically to study the pursuance of "political objectives" in the fields of foreign policy and defence.

In policy-making "political unification" and "political union" have been used -unproductively- to bridge a twofold conceptual gap. The first gap is the one between those working for a union of states, as their final objective and those working for a new international (federal type) entity as their final objective, commonly referred to in more romantic language as a political community.

The second gap is the one between those working for changing the political division of labor and the regime norms in fields of common interests among members, and those working for a "European identity" and influence towards the outside world or in "world politics".

The attempts to bridge the first gap - in practice - has produced the tug of war on the particular kind of institutional arrangements to be made for political union. The attempts to bridge the second gap has been responsible for a profound confusion on processes of integration, tasks and objectives.

For my part, I have come to the conclusion that the twofold gap cannot be bridged in the contemporary international system in which the six member states and their economic communities operate 15).

In this situation "political unification" as a concept merely disguises the existence of this twofold gap, as well as some more fundamental problems facing political actors.

Let me therefore make an effort to elaborate somewhat on the aspects of this twofold gap.

The concept of a union of states as forwarded by Debré in 1952-53 and by the French government since 1960 does not refer to a political system of relations in the sense it has been used above.

The nature of activities to be carried out according to the 'union of states' concept could be characterized as diplomatic. Its activities would be part of a diplomatic system to be defined as that system of interactions in inter-state society in which international relations are managed by negotiation and consultation. Behaviour in a diplomatic system involves neither the authoritative allocation of values for the inter-state society nor the attempt to work out some division of labour. The effort to adopt common positions towards the outside world (e.g. in the Middle-East crisis) or to provide for regular consultations points to a better management of international relations and not to a change in the behaviour of the nature of activities. It might create a diplomatic union, but would not show any of the features required to call it a political union.

The concept of political community on the other hand is equally removed from the notion of a political system. The "community" concept belongs to a system of social relations in which solidarity and loyalty to the community rather than division of labour and authoritative allocation of values are involved in the behaviour of members.

A growing sense of community may create an integration-promoting environment. The concept of a political community, however, confuses two kinds of activities : the social one of promoting solidarity and changing loyalties and the political one of identifying common interests and organizing division of labour.

In societies marked by a plurality of systems of relations neither a better management of diplomatic relations nor an important change in social relations necessarily produce a process of political integration.

On the other hand, a process of political integration may well be successful in one field without necessarily spilling over to those other fields in which historic federations were able to create political divisions of labour. The post-war evolution of relations in Western Europe at least suggests that the conditions for political integration in the field of economics obtained at the time of creating the communities. They do so to a far lesser extent today (e.g. common commercial policy with state-trading countries). They are absent or insufficiently distinct for the six member states in the fields of foreign policy and defense.

In the final analysis and replying to the question submitted by M. Rabier, the use of the term political unification involves the absence of a conception, rather than the existence of a conception or a misconception.

For the purpose of an analysis a distinct political system is emerging in the field of economics and encompassing the six member states' territories.

In the field of foreign policy and defense, the six member states carry out activities to be characterized as diplomatic and not distinct from a larger group of states. A clarification of concepts therefore has to be preceded by a clarification of interactions between different kinds of systems of relations, an analysis complicated by the fact that contemporary interdependence indicates that the interacting systems also differ in members and issues.

As far as I am concerned, the post-war European system can be distinguished into the following components (using the federalist issue areas) :

<u>Issues</u>	<u>Area</u> <u>Europe of the</u> <u>six</u>	<u>Western</u> <u>Europe</u>	<u>Atlantic</u> <u>Area</u>	<u>Europe</u> <u>East + West</u>
<u>Economic</u> <u>Policy</u>	Dependent Super- ordinate Political System in a process of political integration	Diplomatic System	Diplomatic System	Emerging Di- plomatic System
<u>Defense</u> <u>Policy</u>	Absence of a identifiable system of relations	Attempts to- wards Diplo- matic Coope- ration	Diplomatic System	
<u>Foreign</u> <u>Policy</u>	Attempts to- wards diplo- matic ccoope- ration	Absence of identifia- ble system of rela- tions	Attemp s towards diplomatic cooperation	

- 1) In a recent book : Beyond the European Community. Leyden, 1969.
- 2) Lindberg, The European Community as a Political System : Notes toward the Construction of a Model. Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. V. No. 4, June 1967, p. 346.
- 3) I shall not elaborate on this distinction in the context of this paper. See further : Lindberg loc. cit. and Easton in various works.
- 4) Easton quoted in Lindberg op. cit. p. 352-353.
- 5) loc. cit. passim.
- 6) paraphrased from : Haas, The Uniting of Europe.
- 7) loc. cit. p. 356
- 8) For a more elaborate discussion of this topic, see the author's Beyond the European Community and various works of Haas, Hoffmann, Lindberg and Nye quoted there.
- 9) Beyond the European Community. p. 164.
- 10) Op. cit. p. 190
- 11) Bodenheimer, Political Union. A microcosm of European Politics 1960-1966. Leyden 1967 p. 18.
- 12) There is little need therefore to add to the analyses made already. See especially, Bodenheimer op. cit.; Silji, and Chapter VII in the author's : Beyond the European Community.
- 13) Camps, European Unification in the Sixties. From the Veto to the crisis, p. 223.
- 14) For a summary of these debates, compare "Europe" May & June 1970.
- 15) Beyond the European Community, especially chapter IX.

B-I/II/1 The Political Unification of Europe : Conceptions and Misconceptions

Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau

Conclusions

Unification politique en tant que non-Concept

Cette brève étude des concepts de base ne peut que nous conduire à la conclusion que l'unification politique en tant que concept est analytiquement mal définie et virtuellement non-existante dans l'élaboration de la politique. Au mieux, on peut essayer de déduire les diverses significations qui sont attachées au mot "politique" que l'on pourrait aussi appeler combinaisons. Aux fins d'analyses politiques "Unification politique" est utilisé pour signifier soit "intégration politique" ou, plus particulièrement l'étude d'objectifs politiques dans les domaines de défense et de politique étrangère.

Dans l'élaboration de la politique "unification politique" et "union politique" ont été employés - sans résultat - pour combler une double lacune conceptuelle. La première lacune règne parmi ceux dont l'objectif final est une Union d'Etats et ceux dont l'objectif final réside dans une nouvelle entité internationale (du type fédéral) mais que l'on nomme dans un vocabulaire plus romantique communauté politique.

La seconde lacune règne parmi ceux qui tendent vers une transformation de la division politique du travail et des normes du régime dans le domaine des intérêts communs propres à ses adhérents et ceux qui tendent à une identification européenne et à son influence sur le monde extérieur ou sur les processus politiques du monde.

Les tentatives pour combler la première lacune ont eu pour résultat une lutte acharnée autour des aménagements institutionnels nécessaires à la réalisation d'une union politique. Celles pour combler la seconde lacune ont conduit à une profonde confusion quant aux processus d'intégration, actions et objectifs.

Pour ma part, je suis arrivé à la conclusion que la double lacune ne peut être comblée dans le système international contemporain dans lequel agissent six états membres et leurs communautés économiques (15). Dans une telle situation une unification politique, en tant que concept dissimule tout simplement cette double lacune ainsi que les problèmes plus fondamentaux auxquels doivent faire face les responsables politiques. Je vais donc m'attacher à approfondir les divers aspects de cette double lacune. La conception d'une union d'états telle qu'elle fut définie par Debré en 1952-53 et par le Gouvernement français depuis 1960, ne se réfère pas à un système de relations dans le sens décrit ci-dessus. D'après les concepts de l'union d'états on pourrait décrire ses activités comme étant de nature diplomatique. En tant que telles, elles participent à ce que l'on pourrait décrire un système d'interactions dans une société inter-étatique dont les relations internationales font l'objet de négociations et de consultations. Dans le système diplomatique le

comportement n'implique ni un caractère d'autorité en matière de répartitions des valeurs dans la société inter-étatique ni une tentative en vue d'élaborer une répartition des tâches. L'effort pour adopter une attitude commune vis-à-vis du monde extérieur (par exemple, dans la crise du Moyen-Orient) ou pour établir des consultations régulières témoignent d'une volonté d'améliorer les relations internationales mais non d'amener un changement dans la nature même des activités propres à ces relations. Une telle conception peut créer une union diplomatique mais elle ne témoigne d'aucun fait caractéristique de l'union politique.

D'autre part le concept de communauté politique est tout aussi éloigné de la notion de système politique. La conception "communauté" participe à un système de relations sociales dans lequel la solidarité et la fidélité à l'égard de la communauté font l'objet de l'attention de ses membres plutôt que la répartition des activités et l'allocation autoritaire de valeurs.

Un sentiment croissant de communauté peut créer un climat d'intégration progressive. Mais le concept d'une communauté politique confond deux sortes d'activités : l'activité sociale qui consiste à promouvoir la solidarité et fidélité réciproques et l'activité politique qui consiste à identifier les intérêts communs et organiser la division du travail.

Dans les sociétés caractérisées par un pluralisme de systèmes de relations, ni l'amélioration des relations diplomatiques ni l'évolution des relations sociales ne produisent nécessairement un processus d'intégration politique.

D'autre part un processus d'intégration politique peut réussir dans un domaine sans pour autant influencer ces autres domaines dans lesquels des fédérations marquantes ont réussi à créer la répartition des compétences. L'évolution des relations en Europe occidentale, après la guerre, fit croire que les conditions d'une intégration politique dans le domaine économique étaient obtenues dès la création des communautés.

Elles sont bien moins étendues aujourd'hui (entre autre la politique commerciale commune avec les pays associés). Elles sont inexistantes ou insuffisamment nettes pour les six Etats membres en politique étrangère et dans la politique de défense. Dans l'analyse finale et pour répondre à la question de Monsieur RABIER, l'emploi du terme unification politique implique une absence de concept plutôt qu'un concept ou un faux concept. Dans un but d'analyse, un système politique distinct apparaît dans le domaine économique et englobe les territoires des six états membres.

En ce qui concerne la politique de défense et la politique étrangère des six états membres, on peut qualifier les échanges de diplomatiques; ils ne diffèrent pas de ceux qui sont entretenus avec un groupe d'états plus étendu.

Dès lors, une clarification dans les conceptions doit être précédée d'une clarification des interactions entre différents genres de systèmes de relations ; ce qui représente une analyse compliquée par le fait que l'interdépendance actuelle montre que l'interaction des systèmes varie chez ses membres et dans ses résultats.

En ce qui me concerne, le système européen d'après guerre peut être reconnu par les composantes suivantes : (d'après les issues fédéralistes) / ndlr. : voir tableau dans le rapport /.

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POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

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The achievement of political integration among the nations of Europe requires the creation of political institutions to develop and implement the public policy of a transnational European society. This requirement carries with it certain inescapable questions for the theory and practice of political representation. What is the mandate of those who initiate, decide, and administer the policies and programs which lie beyond the scope of the member nations, taken separately? How are the transnational decision-makers to be controlled? By what procedures will they be held accountable for the proper discharge of their responsibilities? How can they be kept responsive to the needs, interests, and demands of the peoples whom they serve?

The impact of modern science and technology on human society has created a new dimension for the problem of representative government. Historically, the concept of public policy under popular control arose in connection with the evolution of national states, with governments which would be representative of the peoples concerned and at the same time represent them in their external relations. From its origins in post-medieval Europe, the idea of nationalism gained strength and acceptance until it became the dominant fact and aspiration of the world political system. The nation-state emerged as the decisive power center and as the object of supreme loyalty.

The role of the nation-state today reflects a paradoxical combination of triumph and obsolescence. It remains as the basic unit of world political organization, the repository of preeminent power, and an important focus of loyalty. Yet the dynamics of modern society have undermined the capacity of independent states to perform their primary functions of security and welfare.

Autonomous national jurisdictions are no longer adequate to manage the problems inherent in a world of space exploration, intercontinental ballistic missiles, economic interdependence, instantaneous communication, and supersonic travel. Under these conditions, the persistence of the nation-state has created a discrepancy between political organization and social reality. The jurisdiction of governments has not kept pace with the geographic and functional scope of the activities and conflicts requiring regulation.

In its earlier evolution, nationalism as the dominant principle of political organization demonstrated both its consolidating power over local particularism and its disruptive force for the ambitions and dreams of a united Europe. More recently, in its projection on a worldwide scale, nationalism has provided the ideology for Asian and African self-determination, and each success is achieved in the form of another nation-state to take its place in the world political system. The countries emerging from colonialism have been preoccupied with establishing their own systems of representation independent of external control. Sovereignty and consent become the prerequisites for the legitimate expression of public policy in its external dimensions. At the same time, the concepts of representation applied internally vary with the political cultures of the peoples concerned and with their historical experiences.

The chief ideological rival of nationalism during the past century has been communism, with its identification of social groups on the basis of class as determined by relations to the means of economic production. However, the expectation, logically implied in the original Marxist premise, that proletarians would be loyal to class rather than to nation did not survive the experience of World War I. The dictates of "socialism in one country", the conflicts among Communist regimes organized as nation-states, and even the appeal of "national liberation" movements testify to the persistence of nationalism as a vital force. Communist societies may accommodate to a system of nation-states but their inherent logic cannot easily come to terms with a political order based upon the premises of nationalism. The Brezhnev doctrine asserts the fundamental reality of transnational representation, but this is a form of virtual representation by the self-appointed vanguard of a multinational Socialist camp.

I mention the variants and alternatives of "national" representation because of their theoretical importance and their relevance to the problem of political representation beyond the national level. The remainder of this paper, however, will deal with representative government in the Western tradition, since my immediate concern is with certain aspects of political integration in Western Europe. It is here that the problem of a representative transnational public policy is more pressing, especially for the European Community of the Six with supranational political institutions which have been in actual operation for some years. This allows us to look at an enterprise which has a history and a set of issues with which we can grapple. An analysis of this experience, with its record and prospects, is all the more urgent since an extension of its scope, in both authority and geography, now seems to lie within the realm of the possible.

The political institutions of the European Community make or influence decisions which have an impact on the public policies of the member countries. This fact raises the issue of political representation, involving the structure and process for determination and control of governmental decision-making. Who are the agents of the people in this connection, and how are they selected? What is their authority, and the basis of their legitimacy? What are their responsibilities, and how are they to be held accountable?

One might assume that the issue of political representation in supranational institutions could readily be discussed in terms of existing theory applicable to national political institutions, by extending the appropriate principles to a new dimension. This assumption, however, is not well founded, as I soon learned in attempting to follow this course in my own research several years ago. The unfortunate fact is that we do not have an adequate modern theory of political representation.

Some evidence must be offered in explanation of this assertion, which undoubtedly strikes some of my colleagues as a startling one after many centuries of intellectual effort devoted to this problem. Let me make two points in this connection. First, the traditional theory of political representation (in the Western world) has been stated almost exclusively in terms of elections and legislative bodies.

Confirmation of this fact can be made by a cursory examination of definitions, textbook explanations, and other types of literature in this field of study. At the same time, it is generally recognized that executives, courts, the bureaucracy, diplomats and ombudsmen are in some important ways representative in terms of public policy. One sometimes even finds the same writers defining representation in terms of electoral accountability and also asserting that the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, is representative precisely because it is not accountable to an electorate. The fundamental difficulty is that there is a serious confusion between the concept of "representative government", based on the principle of democracy, and the concept of "political representation" as a necessary function in any system of government. An adequate modern theory of representation must account for all devices, institutions, and processes relevant to this function. Elections and legislative bodies are extremely important, but they do not tell the whole story of the means by which group interests and demands are translated into public policy by the agents and trustees of the people. The act of representation should be regarded as a functional division of social labor in a political society ; it encompasses considerably more than elections and legislative decision-making, without disregarding the importance of these components of the total process.

I, therefore, cannot accept Alfred de Grazia's statement (essay on "Representation" International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 13, p. 463) that, "There is no need ... to separate the study of representative government from the study of representation". The focus he suggests is a group of institutional devices intended to produce a high level of representation, defined subjectively. The focus, in my opinion should be on the institutional devices which, in any system of government, provide for the conversion of interests and demands into public policy.

The second point is that the theory of political representation has been widely neglected by 20th century political scientists. My search of the literature leads one to agree with de Grazia, in his article on "Representation" mentioned above, that "... it is odd and regrettable that so little work has borne directly upon the foremost structural problem of democracy".

I would offer two considerations as a tentative explanation of this neglect. First, there was the influence, especially in the United States, of the behavioral approach (even if that term may now be regarded as an epitaph). Traditional normative theories of representation were concerned with ways in which men ought to be governed. Spokesman for aristocracy believed that a chosen elite was needed to prevent the evils of tyranny and mobocracy. Democratic theorists insisted on the value judgment that all legitimate governments are based upon consent, with electoral accountability and the free expression of interests and opinions. Dante and Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, Madison and Mill had in common the assumption that they were showing how man ought to be governed, not merely describing how he is governed. Emphasis on operational research and quantification, with deliberative avoidance of normative ambiguity and subjectivity pointed the direction away from "grand concept" school of theoretical investigation. It would be too much, however, to say that empirical research is necessarily incompatible with attention to problems of political representation. The recruitment, role, and responsibilities of the agents who perform the tasks of government are crucial factors, whether one is analyzing how it works or attempting to show how it should work. Representation has been neglected by empirical research partly because "behavioral" scholars preferred to turn their attention elsewhere and to deal with quantifiable data and with identifiable segments of political behavior, while a concern with "representation" requires us to deal with the broad framework of political institution and processes. Even if normative theory is not involved, macro-analysis is necessary. This is difficult, and may have to be approached by gradual steps as case studies of various aspects are built up. At the same time, fortunately, there is no conceptual barrier to empirical research on problems of representation, and one hopes to see more studies of this type in the future.

A second consideration relevant to the neglect of political representation as a key concept lies in the influence of certain modern approaches to political science which have attracted widespread attention. As evidence of this fact, the example of system analysis as developed by David Easton may be cited. This is one of the most ambitious attempts to lay a basis for a general theory by formulating a conceptual framework within which all possible propositions about the political process might find a coherent place.

The concept of political representation, however, receives little explicit treatment in Easton's writings and he does not include it as an essential element of his conceptual framework.

Perhaps one reason for the seeming neglect of representation by systems analysis is the fact that the textbook version of "representative government" cannot be logically utilized as a category applicable to all political systems. This difficulty, however, can be eliminated by viewing representation as a function in all political systems. Immediately the conceptual framework of systems analysis becomes useful for research on political representation. The model of input--conversion process--output can readily be stated in terms of interests and demands as input, the channels and dynamics of representation as conversion process, and the resultant public policy is output. Stated in another way, representation is the process by which inputs are fed into the system, an "authoritative allocation of values" is made, and feedback occurs in the ongoing dynamics of political reality. Representation, thus conceived, is geared to an analysis of any political system, in that it refers to the fundamental division of labor in political society by which some legitimately act for all. Systems analysis can accommodate representation theory at the very heart of its conceptual framework, without prejudice to other approaches which some scholars might prefer.

Recent years have seen a growing trend toward recognition of the crucial importance of representation theory. Research on interest groups, political parties, executives, bureaucracies, regulating bodies, courts, and ombudsmen have revealed conclusions and implications for their role in the representative process of translating interests and demands into public policy. At the same time, the awareness is growing that analysis of each component of the governing process can be adequately understood only as it stands in relation to the determination of public policy in the context of a political system. The next step would be to undertake a tentative statement of inclusive theory, drawing the various components together from the viewpoint of their common and interrelated bearing on the function of political representation. Let me add one further note on the interaction of elective and non-elective representation, and therefore on the relevance of the latter. In the United States the "one-man one-vote" issue for electoral districting seems to emphasize once again the traditional emphasis on elections and legislatures, but that issues has assumed its

current importance precisely because of the role of the Supreme Court, a non-elected and independent body, in making policy decisions through constitutional interpretation.

Interest in representation theory, I am glad to say, is reviving after a period of neglect. Realistic analysis of the political process virtually dictates this result, as we cannot ignore a central reality of the phenomena which we are examining. Scholars are led to the crucial issue of representation as they analyze the components of political institutions and political processes. There has been a growing tendency in recent years to make explicit assertion of this reality, as shown in the publications of Eulau, Pitkin, Reimer, and Hogan in 1967, Nomos X in 1968, and others which might be mentioned, as well as in the work encouraged by the International Political Science Association itself. (1)

The transnational component of modern government, and especially the institutions and processes of regional integration, must be included in a modern theory of political representation. Let us now turn to a brief examination of the European Community from this point of view.

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- (1) Henry Eulau, "Changing Views of Representation", in Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.), Contemporary Political Science; Toward Empirical Theory, McGraw-Hill, 1967.

Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, University of California Press, 1967.

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J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.), "Representation", Nomos X, Atherton Press, 1968.

International Political Science Association, "Problems of Representation", Round Table Meetings, 1966.

Political Representation and the European Community

The principal institutions of the European Community, as everyone knows, are the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice, and the European Parliament. All these institutions are representative in terms of task performance and policy formation. They are agents entrusted with the duty of carrying out the responsibilities assigned to them, and they participate in the decision-making process by which policy is determined. On this assumption, it follows that their functions and powers have implications for the theory and practice of transnational representation. Actions which directly affect interests within the member states raise problems of influence and control, and of compatibility with the familiar practices of national politics.

The Commission has executive and administrative functions arising from its responsibility for ensuring that the treaty provisions and the decisions taken by the Community institutions are correctly applied. It also has the important role of initiating new policy proposals, enabling it to set the pace for economic integration to the extent that the prevailing political forces will permit. The Council of Ministers, of course, represents the governments of the member states through its authority to approve or reject proposals for new policies and regulations. The Court, as an independent judicial organ, has the specific function of interpreting treaty obligations and maintaining the rule of law in the programs and activities of the Community.

The development of transnational parliamentary institutions is significant for a modern theory of representation, and also for the determination of public policy through devices of regional integration. Let us look at the European Parliament, which is of particular interest in this connection. First, the composition of that body raises the ever intriguing question : What do the representatives represent ? The basic unit for the assignment of representation and the selection of delegates is the member state. By treaty provision, each country is entitled to a specified number of seats and votes, and appointment to these positions is vested in the national parliaments.

This arrangement might be interpreted to imply a juxtaposition of national delegations, with each group considering itself primarily as representative of a national point of view. The responsibility of the delegates, however, is a double one, since the representation "of the peoples of the States united within the Community" gives a mandate for insuring the common interest as well as the national interest of each member state considered separately. At the same time, the delegates occupy a position of independent judgment; they are not instructed by their national parliaments or governments, and they are not accountable to any external authority for their speeches and votes.

The actual composition of the European Parliament has developed along lines of party affiliation. Each major party group has a permanent secretariat and attempts to work out a common policy which transcends the national boundaries. The debates and the voting record reflect the same basic approach. Delegates have advocated their ideas as Christian Democrats, Socialists, Liberals, and Gaullists, rather than as spokesman for Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, and Luxembourg. At the same time, national interests sometimes become apparent within the party groupings, especially for questions relating to agricultural policy. The members do not represent any one point of view to the exclusion of others. They must be aware of influences emanating from national and interestgroup considerations, political party programs, the common interest postulated in the Community, and their own ideas of constructive and feasible measures. As is the case of all representatives with multiple constituencies, their essential task is to reconcile particular and general interests in the formation of public policy.

The representative character of the European Parliament does not lie solely in the fact that it is composed of parliamentarians, but also in its role in the context of Community institutions taken as a whole. For any political system, the problem of the distribution of power must be solved in two dimensions. First, the relations between the inclusive government and the constituent units must be determined. Second, arrangements among the institutions within each level of government must be specified. In solving this problem, there are available two alternative approaches which, for convenience, we may designate as the single-focus versus the multiple-focus method. The former, if applied to the territorial distribution of power, results in a unitary state, in which the supreme authority in the

central government ; if applied to the functional distribution of power, it results in a parliamentary system with a concentration of responsibility for legislation, oversight of administration, and budgetary control. The multiple-focus approach, on the other hand, results in a federal state and in the separation of powers among coordinate branches of government, as practiced in the United States. Both systems can be "democratic", but one tries to achieve this result by centralizing a power whose exercise is dependent upon continuing popular support, while the other provides a system of checks and balances to insure that no agency or official of government can wield excessive authority.

The European Community clearly reflects, in its structure, the multiple-focus type of institutional arrangement for the distribution of power. This structure was created by an adaptation of devices which were familiar to the national governments concerned, or used in traditional international organizations, to the particular needs and objectives of transnational integration. Executive commissions, ministerial councils, parliamentary assemblies, and courts are not recent inventions. It was the functions and powers assigned to them, and the relationships established among them, that created a novel and unique structure. The Community is obviously not a unitary superstate with full governing powers over the member nations. It is not a federation with a division of governing powers between its institutions and the nations. The Community powers are too limited, confined to one sector of public policy, and dependent upon the member states for implementation, for it to be accurately called a federal system. It is, however, a supranational entity, and to the extent that an independent authority for decision-making is vested in the Community, it must have powers distinguished from those of the individual member states. Thus the principle of "one focus" is inherently incompatible with the nature of the European Community.

The limited but real powers vested in the Community are distributed among separate but interdependent institutions which balance and supplement each other. Results are achieved from their interaction, not from decisions made at one predominant focus of authority. The European Parliament is one side of the policy-making triangle, but it is not the apex with an ultimate decision-making competence.

In theory, the Parliament might control the Commission by the use of censure as provided by treaty, but actually the Parliament finds its chief role in influencing the dialogue between Commission initiative and Council approval. The Council of Ministers, for its part, could not be brought under the control of the European Parliament without a power to remove it from office, or to dismiss its members. This would mean, however, a competence to remove ministers who are responsible to their own national parliaments, and it is clear that a minister can be responsible to only one parliament.

Community policy in economic and political integration has such an intimate relationship with national policies of the member states that control of the former necessarily involves power over the latter. Therefore the Council of Ministers, as representative of the national governments, cannot be responsible to the European Parliament without giving an autonomous governing power to the European Community. Upon the assumption that this is an unlikely prospect in the foreseeable future, one must come to the conclusion that the separation-of-powers principle is implicit, and parliamentary supremacy logically precluded, in the operation of these supranational institutions. As long as the crucial fact is the exercise of national power, the control of policy depends upon the locus of that power and ultimate responsibility remains with the jurisdiction of the member states. A supranational parliament cannot be "supreme" (but only a "partner institution") if the disposition of issues within its purview depends, in the final analysis, upon the national governments. In this respect, the European Community differs from a federal union not only in degree, with its limited powers and specialized functions, but also in its essential nature as a political institution sui generis.

One often finds in the literature of European integration an underlying assumption that parliamentary supremacy is a prerequisite of representative government based on the principle of democracy. This assumption, however, is a fallacious one. The fact that some political systems based on democratic principles give the key role to parliamentary institutions does not preclude the expression of "democracy" through other devices. It is true that the achievement of parliamentary supremacy was historically associated with the rise of the democratic tradition in western Europe.

However, the projection of national experience to the international stage has not been sufficiently appreciative of the differences between a national government and supranational institutions with limited functions and powers.

In national experience, the control of legislation, executives, and budgets by parliament was the device which tamed the arbitrary power of monarchs and ensured a public policy responsive to the opinions, interest, and aspirations of the people. A complex technological society in the twentieth century challenged the capacity of an elected representative body to govern effectively, and brought experts and bureaucrats to the front at the expense of parliamentarians. For the latter the European integration movement posed both a threat and a promise. The threat was a further deterioration of the parliamentary role in the face of independent supranational authorities ; the promise was that an effective supranational parliament might enhance the prestige and influence of elected representatives in general. The resulting transnational projection of parliamentary assertiveness was too often argued on the false premise of an identification with "democratic control", rather than on the sound basis of benefits to be gained from participation by the European Parliament in Community policy formation.

The real problem for the European Community is to develop an effective expression of a common interest, rather than to provide a structure for curbing excessive power. Since the Commission initiates policy proposals and administers policies and regulations already decided, it has no way of becoming a tyrant, imposing its will on the member countries according to its own arbitrary decisions. It does not have the power which would enable it to endanger the liberties of the people. And power which does not exist does not need an external control in order to be consistent with "democracy". The Community executive is not a Louis XIV or a Charles I.

Likewise, the Council of Ministers has only the authority to approve policies and regulations which have been initiated by the Commission. There is no way that the Council can take matters into its own hands and set itself up as an authoritarian ruler of the Community. The modest powers given to it are not comparable to the extensive powers vested in national governments. Therefore, the argument for "democratic control" in this context is based, not on reality, but upon the uncritical projection of an assumption from national government into supranational institutions.

The same considerations apply to the requirements of a responsive public policy. The Commission is to implement and develop a policy which has been determined by a democratic process within the member countries, and which has the majority support of the peoples concerned. The use of independent authorities to perform a specialized task is in no way inconsistent with democracy. Such bodies are representative in terms of their functions and can be regarded otherwise only on the mistaken belief that non-elected agents do not have representative validity. The Council of Ministers, for its part, represents the common interest of the European Community as seen by the national governments, and helps to carry out a policy which has the support of the member countries.

In short, an effective parliament is one way to ensure "democratic control" in a political system. But it is not the only way. There is no inherent reason to rule out the separation-of-powers principle as a possible alternative basis for representative institutions. This principle, as a matter of fact, is operative in the structure of the Community, since the European Parliament is one of the integral bodies to supplement and "balance" the Commission and the Council. It should be judged by its usefulness in this connection and attempts to expand its role should accept the premise of this type of partnership in the common effort. The assumption of parliamentary supremacy as a necessary ingredient is theoretically unfounded, inherently inconsistent with the European Community as established, and unrealistic as an objective.

The Question of Direct Elections

The debates over the question of direct elections to the European Parliament are significant for the assumptions which they reveal about the nature of political representation, as applied in the context of transnational institutions. Scholars in the field of European integration undoubtedly are familiar with Article 138 of the EEC Treaty and with the various proposals which have been made since 1960, and in any case limits of space preclude a detailed analysis in this paper. It will suffice for our purpose to mention some of the difficulties in adopting a plan by direct elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage.

They include the problems of uniform electoral systems in the member countries ; the relation of an extension of the Parliament's powers to the inauguration of direct elections ; the size of constituency which might leave each member with a tenuous connection with his electorate ; the prospects for mobilizing mass support and the negative reaction for European integration if this were not forthcoming ; the opportunity for disruptive elements to express themselves ; the implications for expanding membership to Great Britain and other countries ; and so on.

Let us make the optimistic assumption that these difficulties could be overcome, or that the new arrangement on balance would be more desirable than the present one. There still remains the basic problem of an appropriate theory of political representation. Much of the debate over the proposal for direct elections to the European Parliament have been colored by a doctrinaire assumption that such elections provide an inherently superior representative device. Some advocates have argued that direct elections constitute the essential element in every democratic parliament, and that they are necessary for three basic reasons : legitimacy, justice, and efficacy. Legitimacy, it is said, requires this device in order to give a true representative character to the elected body. Justice demands it so that the European Parliament will not continue to affect the destinies of the people without their direct participation in the designation of their representatives. And the objective of greater efficacy would be served as direct elections result in a greater importance and influence.

The question of efficacy depends upon a judgment as to the probable consequences of a future contingency. I am willing, for the sake of argument, to accept the optimistic assumption. The contention, however, that legitimacy and justice require direct elections is of a different order. Its fallacy is easily revealed by stating the obverse proposition that all indirect methods of representation are illegitimate and unjust. Such an assumption has no basis in fact or theory. In national governments which by any test can be classified as representative and "democratic" indirect devices are frequently used. This is true not only for independent institutions, such as courts, but also in the workings of the national parliaments themselves. Prime ministers and cabinet members are chosen by the parliaments, and no one claims that "legitimacy and justice" require their selection by direct popular vote.

If national parliaments can be entrusted with this responsibility, it is arbitrary to rule out the possibility of an appropriate role for them in choosing persons to fill other types of representative positions.

An indirect connection between electorates and their representatives also exists in countries with a list system of proportional representation. Votes may be cast directly for a political party, but it is the party which determines the listing of successful candidates. If this system were used for direct elections to the European Parliament, the element of indirection would still exist. Furthermore, the electorate would not have control over the members during terms of office, if the representatives are to vote individually and personally without receiving instructions or an imperative mandate.

There is no reason to assume that indirect selection necessarily results in an elite which will not be responsive to the opinions and interests of the people. Members of the European Parliament now are susceptible to the same influences which affect them as members of their national parliaments. Those ties may be just as effective in the expression of political sentiments at the Community level as an electoral system which recruits the representatives by popular vote, but which gives no control over them except a possible refusal to re-elect after a five-year term. Modern government requires a balanced mixture of direct and indirect representation, of accountability and independence. If one seriously believes that only direct elections are legitimate and just, the uncomfortable conclusion must be drawn that a proper mandate does not now exist. It seems both wise and correct to debate the issue of strengthening the European Community on the prospective merits of various proposals, rather than on an assumption which precludes consideration of indirect elections as an appropriate device of representation for some purposes.

DG.

- B.-I/II. - European integration
- Local Politics
- L'intégration européenne
- Etude comparative des
politiques locales

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

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B.-I/II/2.

Conclusion

Representative government has a double responsibility-- to act upon the basis of popular consent and to act effectively in the common interest. Emphasis upon the former to the neglect of the latter leads to a distorted perspective. Under modern conditions, the task of developing adequate representative devices for the transnational component of society ranks as a fundamental imperative. This fact gives a priority to the creation of integrative political institutions rather than to any particular set of arrangements for "democratic control". There have been some historical occasions when the primary concern was properly with the limitation of executive authority. In other situations, the extension of executive competence has been the factor needed to advance the cause of representative government.

Political institutions of one era cannot genuinely responsible and representative if people lose faith in their capacity to adapt themselves to emerging needs and to solve the urgent problems arising from a new mode of social life. The inability of separate nation-states to provide security and welfare in an age of space travel and possible instant annihilation is a far greater threat to the basic values of the Western tradition than reliance on executive authority as the chief instrument of transnational integration.

Representation occurs, existentially, in the process of government. Responsibility is a question of the connection between the agents or trustees and their constituents. Here it is useful to make a distinction between the wielders of decisive power and the subsidiary instruments of policy formation and implementation.

Responsible government requires that the former be held accountable to the citizens or to an elected assembly. It is in imposing limits on the decisive power centers, and in assuring that the main tenor of public policy rests on popular consent, that elections and parliaments still have a role of crucial importance. Once this fundamental requirement is met, political institutions with a protected position of independence, or subject to methods of indirect control, are entirely consistent with representative government based on the principle of democracy.

In the European Community, the national governments, the Council of Ministers, the independent Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court are all "representative", each in its own way, and policy emerges from a process of interaction. The Community institutions, and other instruments of transnational integration, have the primary responsibility of providing a new dimension of public policy to serve the needs of an interdependent technological society. The development of political forces in this direction is an essential task for the future of representative government.

- B.-I/II. - L'intégration européenne
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Conclusion.

Le Gouvernement représentatif a une double responsabilité : agir sur la base d'un consentement populaire et agir effectivement dans l'intérêt général. Mettre l'accent sur le premier et négliger le dernier conduit à une perspective dénaturée.

Sous les conditions modernes, la tâche d'inventer des mécanismes représentatifs adéquats pour le contenu transnational de la société se range parmi les impératifs fondamentaux. Cela donne priorité à la création d'institutions politiques intégratives plutôt que n'importe quel ensemble d'arrangements pour un "contrôle démocratique". Il y eut quelques occasions historiques lorsque fut posée l'affaire primordiale de la limitation de l'autorité exécutive. Dans d'autres circonstances, l'extension des compétences exécutives a été le facteur indispensable à la défense de la cause du gouvernement représentatif.

Des institutions politiques d'une époque ne peuvent pas rester naturellement responsables et représentatives si les gens ne croient plus qu'elles sont en mesure de s'adapter elles-mêmes aux besoins naissants et de résoudre les problèmes urgents provenant d'un nouveau mode de vie sociale. L'impuissance d'états-nations séparés de procurer sécurité et bien-être à l'âge des vols spatiaux et de la destruction instantanée potentielle est de loin une menace plus grande pour les valeurs de base de la tradition occidentale que la confiance en l'autorité exécutive comme instrument suprême de l'intégration transnationale.

La représentation se présente, en réalité, dans le processus de gouvernement. La responsabilité est affaire de liens entre les mandataires et leurs mandants. En ce qui concerne cette question il est d'usage de distinguer les détenteurs du pouvoir de décision des instruments subsidiaires de préparation de la politique et de gestion. Un gouvernement responsable requiert que les détenteurs du pouvoir soient tenus de rendre compte aux citoyens ou à une assemblée élue.

C'est en imposant des limites aux centres du pouvoir de décision et en s'assurant que le principal ténor de la politique officielle s'appuie sur le consentement populaire que élections et parlements ont encore un rôle important à jouer.

Dès que cette exigence fondamentale est satisfaite, des institutions politiques ayant une position d'indépendance garantie ou soumise à des méthodes de contrôle indirect, sont tout à fait compatibles avec un gouvernement représentatif basé sur le principe de la démocratie.

Dans la communauté européenne, les gouvernements nationaux, le Conseil des Ministres, la Commission, le Parlement européen et la Cour de Justice, sont représentatifs, chacun dans son domaine d'attributions, et la politique émerge d'un processus d'interactions.

Les institutions communautaires, et d'autres instruments d'intégration transnationale, ont la responsabilité primordiale de fournir une dimension nouvelle de politique générale pour satisfaire les besoins d'une société technologique interdépendante.

Le développement de forces politiques dans cette direction est une tâche essentielle du Gouvernement représentatif dans le futur.

I.P.S.A.

A.I.S.P.

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RECHERCHES SUR LE VOCABULAIRE
EUROPEEN

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RECHERCHES SUR LE VOCABULAIRE EUROPEEN.

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Le langage est le véhicule de la pensée, l'expression d'images, d'attitudes, d'opinions, d'actions; il représente donc une forme du comportement humain.

Certes, la linguistique, la sémiologie en particulier, nous ont appris que tout langage, sauf le langage mathématique, développe un sens second, correspondant à un ordre symbolique ou mythique. Il faut reconnaître que la science politique n'atteint qu'imparfaitement ce niveau-là, qu'on le regrette ou non. Il n'en reste pas moins que la communication verbale demeure, dans son domaine, qu'elle soit écrite ou orale, un des outils privilégiés de la recherche.

Etudier l'intégration européenne à travers le vocabulaire qui l'exprime, constitue une des approches possibles d'un sujet qui peut être abordé par de multiples voies, selon les objectifs fixés et les méthodes retenues. Il s'agit de cerner au plus près le phénomène européen par la représentation que l'on peut s'en faire à travers son expression linguistique.

PREMIERE PARTIE - DELIMITATION DE LA RECHERCHE.

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I. Qu'entendre par vocabulaire européen ?

- Au seuil d'une telle étude sémantique, du moins apparentée à la sémantique en ce sens que l'on va étudier les communications verbales du point de vue de leur signification politique dans l'intégration européenne, il convient en premier lieu de préciser la notion de vocabulaire telle que nous l'entendons. Ce terme recouvre en effet, en première acception, l'ensemble des mots dont dispose une personne. Ce n'est pas là le sens que nous retenons mais plutôt, comme le définit le dictionnaire Littré "l'ensemble des mots qui appartiennent à une science, à un art". Il s'agira donc, en quelque sorte, des termes "techniques" du langage européen, caractérisant ce dernier; ceci nous permettra d'éliminer d'emblée les vocables non spécifiques, mais appartenant au langage courant, à l'exception de quelques-uns dont

l'emploi, par sa fréquence même, peut devenir significatif.

- Notre recherche n'est donc en aucune manière une étude linguistique, car elle n'a pas pour objet "la langue envisagée en elle-même, et pour elle-même" selon la définition de Saussure. Nous recherchons des significations politiques, des attitudes, des comportements devant l'intégration européenne en non pas la structure d'une langue. Comme, de toutes façons, nous avons travaillé exclusivement sur des communications en langue française, qu'il s'agisse de la langue initiale ou des traductions des langues du Marché Commun, il était absurde d'envisager seulement une amorce de recherche linguistique.

II. L'échantillon

- le corpus que nous proposons d'étudier devait répondre à trois critères principaux :
 - présenter une certaine homogénéité et une certaine continuité,
 - constituer une revue aussi exhaustive que possible des questions européennes, aussi bien politiques qu'économiques,
 - émaner du plus grand nombre possible d'acteurs de l'Europe : hommes politiques représentant les gouvernements et les peuples, fonctionnaires et technocrates européens.

- C'est pourquoi nous avons finalement retenu les comptes rendus des échanges de vues qui se déroulèrent chaque année depuis 1959 dans l'enceinte du Parlement européen et qui rassemblent les membres des Commissions des Communautés, des Conseils de ministres et les parlementaires européens. Ce choix n'est pas exempt de critiques, mais correspond à peu près aux exigences que nous avons posées. Il présente l'inconvénient de concerner un langage presque "diplomatique", assez feutré, "neutralisé", mais peut-être, est-ce finalement-là une caractéristique du vocabulaire des Européens ?

III. Sémantique quantitative et qualitative

La définition du vocabulaire européen que nous avons retenue fut déterminante dans le choix de notre méthode d'analyse.

Nous avons rejeté la description purement statistique de tous les mots prononcés et de leur fréquence d'emploi pour retenir, lors d'une première lecture, les seuls mots ou groupes de mots qui par leur caractère "technique" nous semblaient devoir faire partie du vocabulaire des Européens. Notre analyse de contenu fut dominée par le souci constant d'éliminer le plus possible les risques de choix arbitraire en recensant, de façon systématique et sans exception, les mots ou groupes de mots exprimant toutes les questions traitées par les Européens au cours des colloques.

IV. Les objectifs

- Notre objectif est de déterminer quelles réalités politiques, sociologiques, économiques ou psychologiques exprime le vocabulaire des Européens et dans quelle mesure l'évolution de la construction communautaire s'est traduite et peut être discernée à travers une évolution parallèle du langage. Ce n'est pas seulement la description de ce dernier qui nous intéresse, mais à travers lui l'appréhension du phénomène de l'intégration européenne.

- Le vocabulaire des participants aux colloques reste-t-il essentiellement nationaliste ou est-il communautaire ? Cela varie-t-il sous l'influence de l'époque, de la conjoncture, de la nationalité, de l'institution, de l'appartenance politique, de la matière dans laquelle il intervient - Quelles préoccupations exprime-t-il le plus volontiers ? Et comment ? De quoi parlent les Européens ? Leur vocabulaire traduit-il pessimisme ou optimisme, une attitude de stagnation ou de construction, face aux réalisations européennes ? Autant de questions auxquelles notre étude va chercher des réponses ?

DEUXIEME PARTIE - UNE ESQUISSE DE RECHERCHE =====

Avant d'entreprendre définitivement notre travail, nous avons préféré tester la validité de notre méthode en procédant à l'analyse d'un seul colloque; ce sont les résultats de cette première recherche que nous exposerons dans ce rapport.

Notre choix s'est porté sur l'échange de vues qui eut lieu le 20 janvier 1966, sur le thème général de "la situation actuelle de la Communauté", et qui fut entièrement consacré aux implications de la crise du 30 juin 1965. C'est précisément parce qu'il se situait dans une période particulièrement dramatique, où les positions étaient affirmées, les conflits accusés, que nous l'avons retenu, encore qu'au 20 janvier, la solution du conflit semblât se dessiner, à l'issue de la première conférence de Luxembourg des 17 et 18.

I. METHODOLOGIE

1.- Le choix des items

Ce sont les mots-clés, constitutifs du vocabulaire européen, qui forment les unités d'enregistrement de l'analyse de contenu. Ils furent sélectionnés selon les critères précédemment exposés, classés par ordre alphabétique et numérotés. L'unité de numération se réduit au nombre de fois où chaque mot-clé est employé.

2.- Le choix des catégories

L'objectif précisé et le vocabulaire constitué, il s'agissait de déterminer des catégories significatives, au sein desquelles chaque usage de chaque mot-clé devait être classé et quantifié en fonction de l'identité de l'émetteur, de la matière dans laquelle il était prononcé et l'attitude qu'il traduisait.

Nous avons obtenu les catégories suivantes :

- Pays membre de la Communauté auquel appartient l'orateur :
Allemagne, Belgique, France, Hollande, Italie, Luxembourg.
- Institution à laquelle il est attaché :
Commission, Conseil de ministres, Parlement.
- Groupe auquel l'émetteur est inscrit (catégorie valable seulement pour les parlementaires) :
Démocrato-chrétien, socialiste, libéral, union démocratique européenne, non-inscrit.

- Matière à laquelle se rattache le mot-clé

fonctionnement interne du Conseil
fonctionnement interne de la Commission
fonctionnement interne du Parlement
fonctionnement interne, autres problèmes
commerce extra-communautaire
commerce intra-communautaire
relations organiques avec les pays tiers
politique industrielle
politique fiscale
politique agricole

Euratom

Appréciations d'ordre général sur les perspectives
d'avenir de la Communauté Politique sociale.

- Attitude face à l'intégration européenne

Constatation de la stagnation de l'Europe et pessimisme.
Compromis entraînant stagnation.
Souhait de stagnation.
Action entraînant la stagnation de l'Europe.
Constatation d'une construction de l'Europe et optimisme.
Compromis entraînant construction.
Souhait de construction de l'Europe.
Action pour la construction de l'Europe.
Autres attitudes de construction.
Accord sur un problème entraînant construction de l'Europe.
Attitude neutre.

Cette dernière rubrique dépasse quelque peu l'étude stricte du vocabulaire des Européens au sens où nous l'entendons, car chaque mot-clé n'est pas forcément significatif en lui-même de la position de l'émetteur face à l'intégration européenne, mais revêt une certaine coloration en fonction du contexte - Elle nous a paru cependant suffisamment intéressante pour que nous la conservions.

T A B L E A U N° II.

Fréquence d'emploi des mots-clefs du vocabulaire par pays membre de la Communauté, par institution
et par groupe parlementaire.

(pourcentage calculé par rapport à l'ensemble des usages des pays membres et par rapport au total des usages de chaque institution ou de chaque groupe parlementaire.)

PAYS MEMBRES	L'ENSEMBLE DES PAYS MEMBRES.		COMMISSION		CONSEIL		PARLEMENT											
							Total Par- lement %		Démocrates chrétiens		Socialis- tes %		Libéraux %		U.D.E. %		Non-inscrits %	
Allerag.	391	25,96	38	47,50	12	9,84	301	33,51	165	50,30	136	52,91	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgique	258	17,13	0	0	182	34,46	76	8,46	0	0	0	0	58	38,41	0	0	18	100
France	216	14,34	0	0	0	0	216	24,05	0	0	72	28,01	0	0	144	100	0	0
Hollande	275	18,26	42	52,50	0	0	125	13,91	76	23,17	49	19,08	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italie	197	13,08	0	0	17	3,21	180	20,04	87	26,52	0	0	93	61,59	0	0	0	0
Luxemb.	169	11,22	0	0	169	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	1506	(1)	80	100	528	100	898	100	328	100	257	100	151	100	144	100	18	100

(1) Nous nous sommes arrêtés à la seconde décimale en calculant les pourcentages : cela explique la différence entre le total réel et les 100 % que nous aurions dû obtenir. Il en est ainsi pour tous les tableaux.

3.- La technique de dépouillement

Une fiche perforée fut attribuée à chaque mot-clé et fut cochée en fonction du nombre attribué au mot-clé et de sa position dans le code établi. L'ensemble des fiches fut ensuite trié selon les résultats que nous cherchions à atteindre, pour obtenir totalisations ou corrélations intéressantes.

II. DESCRIPTION GENERALE DU VOCABULAIRE

Nous avons relevé, pour l'ensemble du colloque, 274 mots-clés (1), faisant l'objet de 1.506 usages (2).

1.- Fréquence des usages au sein des institutions et des pays membre de la Communauté.

Fréquence d'emploi	1.506	%
Commission	80	5,31
Conseil	528	34,92
<u>Parlement</u>		
Total	898	59,69
Démocrates chrétiens	328	36,52
Socialistes	257	28,62
Libéraux	151	16,82
U.D.E.	144	16,03
Non inscrits	18	2,01

(1) Les listes des mots-clés et le nombre d'usages de chacun sont situés en annexe I pages 25 à 32.

(2) Par "usage" nous entendons la fréquence d'emploi de chaque mot-clé.

Tableau n° 1

(Pourcentages calculés par rapport au total des usages et pour les groupes parlementaires, par rapport au total des usages chez les parlementaires).

On peut remarquer combien la Commission, qui n'avait pas été invitée à participer à la Conférence de Luxembourg et qui adoptant depuis l'éclatement de la crise une attitude de prudente discrétion, s'est tenue également à l'écart des débats au Parlement européen (5,31 %). De plus le président de la Commission de l'Euratom, un Hollandais, s'est plus manifesté (52,50 %) que le président de la Commission de la C.E.E. (47,50 %) : cf. tableau n° II ci-contre.

Sur l'ensemble des pays membres, les Allemands sont intervenus le plus longuement (25,96 %), suivis par les Hollandais (18,26 %) et les Belges (17,13 %).

Au Conseil des ministres, ce furent surtout les délégués des gouvernements belge, luxembourgeois (président en exercice des Conseils de ministres), et hollandais qui exposèrent leurs points de vue respectifs.

Parmi les parlementaires enfin, l'Allemagne se place en tête, suivie cette fois de la France et de l'Italie - les groupes démocrate-chrétien et socialiste y sont les mieux représentés.

T A B L E A U N° IV.

Usages des mots-clés au sein des matières et des institutions.

(Pourcentages calculés par rapport au total des usages et par rapport au total d'usages des institutions et des groupes parlementaires.)

MATIERES	TOTAL DES USAGES.		COMMISS- SION		CONSEIL		PARLEMENT.											
							Total %		Démocrat. Chrét. %		Socialist %		Libéraux %		U.D.E. %		Non- inscr. %	
Fonctionnement du Cons.	320	20,58	4	5	137	26,04	169	18,81	59	17,98	24	9,33	48	31,78	38	25,50	0	0
Fonctionnement de la Commission.	301	19,98	17	21,25	105	19,96	179	19,93	73	22,25	33	12,84	41	27,15	32	21,47	0	0
Fonctionnement du Parlem	29	1,92	0	0	1	3,23	12	1,33	2	0,61	9	3,50	1	0,66	0	0	0	0
Fonctionnement autres problèmes	96	6,37	1	1,25	26	4,94	69	7,68	20	6,09	41	15,95	0	0	3	2,09	0	0
Comm. extra-communautaire	75	4,98	0	0	26	4,94	49	5,45	22	6,70	6	2,33	6	3,97	15	10,06	0	0
Comm. intra-communautaire	28	1,85	0	0	10	1,90	18	2	7	2,13	0	0	11	7,28	0	0	0	0
Rel. Org. av. pays tiers	65	4,31	0	0	5	0,95	60	6,68	46	14,02	14	5,44	0	0	0	0	0	0
Polit. industrielle	4	0,26	0	0	3	0,57	1	0,11	1	0,30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Politique fiscale	4	0,26	0	0	4	0,76	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Politique agricole	61	4,05	0	0	38	7,22	23	2,56	12	3,65	4	1,55	1	0,66	6	4,02	0	0
Euratom	70	4,64	33	41,25	9	1,71	28	3,11	2	0,61	26	10,11	0	0	0	0	0	0
Evolut. du Marché Comm.	419	27,82	25	31,25	147	27,94	247	27,50	84	25,60	84	32,68	16	10,59	50	33,55	18	100
Politique sociale	44	2,92	0	0	1	0,19	43	4,70	0	0	16	6,22	27	17,88	0	0	0	0
Total	1506	100	80	100	528	100	898	100	328	100	257	100	151	100	144	100	18	100

Le tableau n° III ci-dessous précise :

la fréquence d'emploi des mots-clés du vocabulaire par institution
au sein de chaque pays membre

Institution	Allem %	Belg %	France %	Holl %	Italie %	Luxemb %
Commission	9,71	0	0	15,27	0	0
Conseil	13,29	70,54	0	39,27	8,62	100
Parlement	76,99	29,46	100	45,46	91,38	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Tableau n° III

(Pourcentages calculés par rapport au total des usages de chaque pays membre))

A l'exception du Luxembourg et de la Belgique, les interventions les plus fréquentes, au sein de chaque pays membre, furent le fait des parlementaires.

Rappelons que la France, qui pratiquait depuis le 30 juin 1965 la politique de la "chaise vide" n'avait pas envoyé au colloque de représentant de son gouvernement. Seuls les parlementaires français sont intervenus : 66,66 % d' U.D.E. contre 33,33 % de socialistes.

Parmi les parlementaires allemands, les démocrates-chrétiens (54,81 %) l'emportent sur les socialistes (45,18 %). Chez les Belges, c'est le groupe libéral qui vient en tête (76,31 %), et chez les Hollandais, le groupe démocrate-chrétien (60,80 %) contre 39,20 % chez les socialistes. Chez les Italiens enfin, c'est le groupe libéral : 51,67 % contre 48,33 % au groupe démocrate-chrétien.

2.- Fréquence des usages et matières.

a) au sein des différentes institutions

(cf: tableau n° IV ci-contre)

L'échange de vues se déroula sur le thème général de la situation actuelle des Communautés et concerne surtout la question de l'évolution du Marché Commun (21,82 %), liée aux deux problèmes-clés soulevés par les Français, à l'issue de la crise du 30 juin et après que le memorandum de la Commission du 22 juillet ait aplani certaines difficultés techniques, soit le principe du recours au vote majoritaire au sein du Conseil (catégorie fonctionnement du Conseil) : 20,58 % et le rôle et l'autorité de la Commission : 19,98 % (catégorie fonctionnement de la Commission).

La Commission, fidèle à son parti-pris de discrétion, prit sa propre défense (21,25 %) mais évita soigneusement d'aborder longuement la question du vote majoritaire (5 %). Au contraire le Conseil des ministres s'y arrêtait longuement, et particulièrement au sein de celui-ci, les ministres hollandais (38,88 %) et belge (35,71 %), contre 28,84 % au ministre allemand et 8,87 % au ministre luxembourgeois.

On peut noter, chez les parlementaires, l'intérêt soulevé par la catégorie "fonctionnement autres problèmes" relative essentiellement au budget de la Communauté, notamment chez les socialistes (15,95 %) qui parlèrent aussi de la C.E.E.A. (10,11 %).

Remarquons enfin qu'ils évoquèrent plus fréquemment parmi les trois institutions la question des relations organiques avec les pays tiers (6,68 %), et moins souvent celle de la politique agricole. L'attitude du représentant français du groupe U.D.E. se différencie sur certains points de celle de l'ensemble de ses collègues; il ignore en effet complètement les problèmes de l'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne (catégorie relations organiques avec les pays tiers) pour être le plus prolixe sur la politique agricole commune.

b) au sein des pays membres

Tableau n° V

Matières abordées par les pays membres.

	Allem	Belg	France	Holl	Italie	Luxemb
Fonctionnement du Conseil	<u>16,87</u>	<u>32,94</u>	<u>17,59</u>	<u>21,09</u>	<u>24,36</u>	<u>8,87</u>
Fonctionnement de la Commission	<u>19,69</u>	<u>29,06</u>	<u>12,50</u>	<u>18,90</u>	<u>27,91</u>	<u>8,87</u>
Fonctionnement du Parlement	2,30	1,94	0	3,27	1,52	1,77
Fonctionnement autres probl.	2,30	1,16	12,96	12	4,06	8,87
Commerce extra communautaire	6,64	1,94	6,94	0	6,59	9,46
Commerce intra communautaire	1,79	3,88	0	0	2,03	4,14
Relations organiques avec pays tiers	<u>12,53</u>	0	2,77	1,81	0	2,95
Politique industrielle	0	1,16	0	0	0,51	0
Politique fiscale	0,05	0,07	0	0	0	0
Politique agricole	5,11	2,32	2,77	0,73	1,52	14,20
Euratom	0	1,94	12,03	12	1,01	2,36
Evolution du Marché Commun	<u>32,22</u>	<u>22,86</u>	<u>25,00</u>	<u>30,18</u>	<u>16,75</u>	<u>37,87</u>
Politique sociale	0	0	7,40	0	13,70	0,59
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Tous ces chiffres sont exprimés en % (pour cent).

(pourcentages calculés par rapport au total des usages dans chaque pays membre).

L'Italie émet moins d'appréciations d'ordre général sur l'évolution du Marché Commun (solution de la crise, calendrier français,...) : 16,75 % qu'elle ne s'intéresse au rôle de la Commission (27,91 %) et au principe majoritaire (catégorie fonctionnement du Conseil) : 24,36 %.

C'est la Belgique qui intervient le plus sur ces deux derniers problèmes : 29,06 % et 32,94 %.

Notons l'attention portée par l'Allemagne à la question des relations organiques avec les pays tiers (12,53 %). Précisons qu'elle provient surtout des membres allemands du groupe démocrate-chrétien : 24,45 % contre 7 % chez les socialistes.

Remarquons enfin que le Luxembourg, sauf sur le sujet de l'évolution du Marché Commun, répartit assez régulièrement ses interventions entre les autres matières. Il faut rappeler à cet égard, qu'il fut présenté seulement par le président en exercice des Conseils de Ministres, qui présenta un panorama général de la situation de la Communauté en évitant des prises de position trop affirmées sur les sujets les plus brûlants.

Nous avons utilisé la même corrélation : usages du vocabulaire par matières et pays membres, en calculant cette fois les pourcentages par rapport au total des usages dans chaque matière. Les résultats sont peu significatifs dans les sujets les moins abordés (1), mais intéressants ailleurs. On s'aperçoit ainsi que les Français ont proportionnellement moins abordé que leurs partenaires (à l'exception des Luxembourgeois) les deux problèmes clés qu'ils avaient soulevés (cf. tableau n° VI ci-après).

Les Hollandais et les Allemands s'intéressent au fonctionnement du Parlement, soit la question de l'extension de ses pouvoirs en matière budgétaire -- On peut noter aussi que ce sont les Allemands qui parlèrent le plus du commerce extra-communautaire, en l'occurrence, le problème du Kennedy-Round (34,66 %), des relations organiques avec les pays tiers, c'est-à-dire le problème de l'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne (75,38 %), et de la politique agricole commune (32,78 %).

(1) L'importance des matières en chiffres absolus est donnée dans le tableau n° IV - verso page 8.

	Allen %	Belg %	France %	Holl %	Italie %	Luxem %	Total %
Fonctionnement du Conseil	21,29	27,41	12,26	18,71	15,48	4,84	100
Fonctionnement de la Commission	25,58	24,91	8,97	17,27	18,27	4,98	100
Fonctionnement du Parlement	<u>31,03</u>	17,24	-	<u>31,03</u>	10,34	10,34	100
Fonctionnement autres probl.	9,37	3,12	29,16	34,37	8,33	15,62	100
Commerce extra communautaire	<u>34,66</u>	36,66	20,00	0	17,33	21,33	100
Commerce intra communautaire	25,00	35,71	0	0	14,29	25,00	100
Relations orga- niques avec pays tiers	75,38	0	9,23	7,69	0	7,69	100
Politique industrielle	0	75,00	0	0	25,00	0	100
Politique fiscale	50,00	50,00	0	0	0	0	100
Politique agricole	32,78	9,83	9,83	3,27	4,91	39,34	100
Euratom	0	7,14	37,14	47,14	2,86	5,71	100
Evolution du Marché Commun	30,07	14,08	12,88	19,00	7,87	15,27	100
Politique sociale	0	0	36,36	0	61,36	2,27	100

Tableau n° VI (pourcentages calculés par rapport au total des usages du vocabulaire dans chaque matière).

T A B L E A U N° VII.

	TOTAL DES USAGES %		COMMISS- SION %		CONSEIL %		PARLEMENT											
							Total %		Démocrat. Chrét. %		Socialis- tes. %		Libéraux %		U.D.E. %		Non - inscr %	
Total des attitudes de stagnation.	469	31,14	20	27,50	101	19,12	346	38,53	108	32,92	146	56,80	56	37,08	33	22,91	3	16,66
Constatation	292	19,38	20	25,00	62	11,74	210	23,42	67	20,42	81	31,51	33	21,85	26	18,05	3	16,66
Compromis	11	0,73	0	0	0	0	11	1,22	2	0,60	6	2,33	3	1,98	0	0	0	0
Souhait	1	0,06	0	0	0	0	1	0,11	0	0	1	0,38	0	0	0	0	0	0
Action	146	9,69	2	2,50	28	5,30	116	12,91	36	10,97	55	21,40	19	12,58	6	4,16	0	0
Autres	19	1,26	0	0	11	2,08	8	0,89	3	0,91	3	1,16	1	0,66	1	0,69	0	0
Total des attitudes de construction	569	37,78	20	25,00	273	51,70	276	30,73	110	33,53	43	16,73	56	37,08	58	40,27	9	50
Constatation	93	6,17	5	6,25	35	6,62	53	5,90	9	2,74	6	2,33	24	15,89	12	8,33	2	11,11
Compromis	149	9,89	4	5,00	97	18,37	48	5,34	12	3,65	6	2,33	12	7,94	16	11,11	2	11,11
Souhait	119	7,90	3	3,75	40	7,57	76	8,46	43	13,10	2	5,05	3	1,98	14	9,72	3	16,66
Action	167	11,08	8	10,00	85	16,09	74	8,22	36	10,97	5	5,44	8	5,29	14	9,72	2	11,11
Autres	33	2,19	0	0	13	2,46	20	2,22	9	2,74	4	1,55	7	4,23	0	0	0	0
Accord	8	0,53	0	0	3	0,56	5	0,55	1	0,30	0	0	2	1,32	2	1,38	0	0
Attitudes neutres	463	31,07	38	47,50	154	29,16	276	30,73	110	33,53	68	26,45	39	25,82	53	36,80	6	33,33
Total	1506	100	80	100	528	100	898	100	328	100	257	100	151	100	144	100	18	100

(Pourcentages calculés par rapport au total des usages et par rapport aux usages dans chaque institution et chaque groupe parlementaire.)

3.- Les usages du vocabulaire et les attitudes en face de l'intégration européenne.

Comme nous l'indiquions dans notre exposé méthodologique, il nous a paru intéressant de rechercher comment les membres de la Communauté appréciaient les incidences des questions abordées sur l'intégration européenne. Les résultats globaux par rapport à l'ensemble des usages ne sont pas totalement significatifs; ils expriment en effet, aussi bien la position de chaque membre devant la construction communautaire, que le jugement porté par chacun sur la position adoptée par ses partenaires. C'est d'ailleurs là un défaut de nos catégories de dépouillement, auquel il faudra remédier. Néanmoins, cette imprécision s'atténue fortement lorsque nous aborderons l'étude détaillée du vocabulaire.

Les attitudes constructives l'emportent légèrement : 37,78 % sur les attitudes de stagnation : 31,14 % et les attitudes neutres : 31,07 % (cf. tableau n° VII ci-contre).

La constatation de la stagnation, soit un certain pessimisme, se manifeste plus souvent : 19,38 %, que la satisfaction devant la construction européenne : 6,17 %. 11,08 % des usages du vocabulaire expriment la volonté d'agir dans l'intérêt de l'Europe et 9,89 % qu'un compromis ira dans le même sens. L'accusation d'agir à l'encontre des intérêts européens rassemble 9,69 % des usages; nous verrons plus loin qu'elle concerne surtout la France (cf. tableau n° XII verso page 20)

a) au sein des institutions

(cf. tableau n° VII).

La Commission gardant la même ligne de conduite a une position essentiellement neutre : 47,50 %. Toutefois son pessimisme apparaît lorsqu'elle constate la stagnation de la Communauté : 25 %.

Le Conseil est au contraire fortement optimiste, insistant surtout sur le compromis et l'action en faveur de la construction européenne. C'est au Parlement que les attitudes de stagnation sont les plus fréquentes, et notamment, les critiques

relatives aux prises de position défavorables à l'Europe :
12,91 % (21,40 % dans le groupe socialiste).

Notons que les parlementaires U.D.E. (français) sont les plus optimistes après les non-inscrits. Ils ne portent pas de jugement critique sur leur propre attitude, bien édidement, et évitent de heurter leurs cinq partenaires; ce souci constant ressort aussi des résultats antérieurs. La conciliation est proche à Luxembourg; les Français ne rejettent plus le compromis. Nous verrons qu'il n'en va pas de même de l'ensemble des interventions françaises, car Monsieur VALS, parlant au nom de la Commission des budgets, fit, comme on peut s'en douter, un exposé essentiellement pessimiste. (cf. tableau n° VIII ci-après).

b) au sein des pays membres

Le Luxembourg, qui intervient seulément par la voix de son Premier Ministre, est le plus optimiste des pays membres; viennent ensuite la Belgique, les Pays-Bas et l'Allemagne. En revanche, la France et l'Italie sont plus pessimistes.

Les pays les plus conciliateurs et les plus actifs dans un sens constructif sont le Luxembourg, la Hollande et la Belgique. L'Allemagne est la moins disposée à la conciliation : 5,88 %, elle est la plus accusatrice : 14,32 %, mais veut agir pour la construction de l'Europe : 12,02 %.

Tableau n° VIII

	Allom	Belg	France	Holl	Italie	Luxemb
Total stagnation	30,94	21,70	37,03	31,27	46,70	20,11
Constatation	14,57	14,34	30,09	16,00	31,47	15,97
Compromis	1,02	0	0	1,45	1,52	0
Souhait	0	0	0	0,36	0	0
Action	14,32	6,58	6,48	12,00	12,18	1,18
Autres	1,02	0,77	0,46	1,45	1,52	2,95
Total construction	34,27	42,24	30,55	37,81	29,94	57,39
Constatation	3,06	11,24	6,94	4,00	6,59	7,69
Compromis	5,88	11,62	7,40	13,09	6,59	18,34
Souhait	10,48	3,87	8,33	8,72	5,07	9,46
Action	12,02	14,34	6,94	11,63	5,58	14,79
Autres	2,81	1,16	0	0,36	4,56	5,32
Accord	0	0	0,92	0	1,52	1,77
Neutre	34,78	36,04	32,40	30,90	23,35	22,48
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Tous les chiffres expriment des pourcentages.

(Pourcentages calculés par rapport au total des usages de chaque nombre).

III. VOCABULAIRE NATIONALISTE OU COMMUNAUTAIRE

Le vocabulaire des Européens est-il communautaire ou rest-il essentiellement nationaliste ?

Pour répondre à cette question, nous nous sommes attachés à relever en particulier tous les mots et expressions désignant, d'une part chacun des pays membres du Marché Commun, d'autre part la Communauté européenne elle-même.

Nous avons simultanément adjoint à ce diptyque un troisième volet rassemblant les vocables désignant tous pays extérieurs à la Communauté.

Cela représente 120 mots-clés (sur le total de 274) employés 646 fois, soit 42,82 % de l'ensemble des usages du vocabulaire européen (1).

Il en ressort que le vocabulaire du colloque du 20 janvier est plus nationaliste : 50,30 %, que communautaire : 40,40 %, et ne consacre que 9,28 % d'usages aux pays tiers. Le Vocabulaire nationaliste se distribue comme suit :

- vocabulaire relatif à l'Allemagne	3,71 %
- vocabulaire relatif à la Belgique	1,54 %
- vocabulaire relatif à la France	21,51 %
- vocabulaire relatif à la Hollande	5,41 %
- vocabulaire relatif à l'Italie	0,77 %
- vocabulaire relatif au Luxembourg	0,46 %
- vocabulaire relatif au Bénélux	0,30 %
- vocabulaire relatif au Nationalisme en général	16,56 %

1.- au sein des institutions

Les résultats consignés dans le tableau n° IX ci-après, sont nettement significatifs : le vocabulaire de la Commission est particulièrement communautaire : 78,57 % ; celui du Conseil

(1) Voir le détail des mots-clés et des usages en annexe II pages 50 - 51 - 52 - 53 - 54 - 55 et 56.

représentant les gouvernements, surtout nationaliste : 71,05 %; celui du Parlement se partage à peu près également entre les deux tendances; d'autre part, seul, il est sensiblement consacré aux pays tiers : 12,38 %.

Tableau n° IX

Vocabulaires relatifs à	Commission %	Conseil %	Parlement %
Allemagne	0	5,78	3,03
Belgique	0	4,21	0,46
France	17,71	20,00	22,89
Hollande	0	11,05	3,27
Italie	0	1,05	0,70
Luxembourg	0	1,57	0
Bénélux	0	0	0,46
Nationalisme en général	10,71	27,36	12,14
Total nationalisme	<u>21,42</u>	<u>71,05</u>	<u>42,99</u>
Communauté	<u>78,57</u>	<u>25,26</u>	<u>44,62</u>
Pays tiers	0	3,68	12,38
Total	100	100	100

(pourcentages calculés par rapport au total des usages du vocabulaire nationaliste ou communautaire dans chaque institution).

2 - au sein des pays membres

Tableau n° X

Vocabulaires relatifs à	Allemagne %	Belgique %	France %	Hollande %	Italie %	Luxembourg %
Allemagne	19,27		14,58		2,77	2,94
Belgique	1,20	14,63			5,55	2,94
France	51,80	41,46	58,33	33,73	38,88	26,47
Hollande				39,75	2,77	2,94
Italie	1,20	2,43			5,55	2,94
Luxembourg						8,82
Bénélux					2,77	
Nationalisme en général	26,50	41,46				52,94
Total nationalisme	43,22	49,39	43,24	65,87	59,01	46,57
Communauté	41,14	46,98	45,04	29,36	36,06	46,57
Pays tiers	15,62	3,61	11,71	4,76	4,91	6,84
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

(Pourcentages calculés par rapport au total des usages nationalistes dans chaque pays membre pour le détail du vocabulaire nationaliste, et par rapport au total des usages de vocabulaire nationaliste ou communautaire pour les autres catégories.)

Seule la France a, parmi les pays membres, ce qui peut surprendre, un vocabulaire plus communautaire que nationaliste ; mais si l'on considère la seule intervention du parlementaire français du groupe U.D.E., on constate, chez ce dernier, que son vocabulaire est nationaliste à 53,80 % contre 35,81 % d'usages du vocabulaire communautaire.

Les pays les plus nationalistes sont manifestement la Hollande et l'Italie.

Remarquons que chaque pays membre parle surtout de la France (notamment l'Allemagne) et en second lieu de soi-même - quant à la France, elle ne connaît que deux protagonistes : l'Allemagne et elle-même. Après les Français, ce sont les Hollandais qui font le plus référence à leur propre nation.

Notons enfin que c'est l'Allemagne qui possède le vocabulaire le plus souvent consacré, notamment aux pays non membres de la Communauté.

3 - Vocabulaire nationaliste ou communautaire et les matières dans lesquelles il se manifeste.

Tableau n° XI

	Vocabulaire nationaliste %	Vocabulaire communautaire %	Vocabulaire relatif aux pays tiers %
Fonctionnem. du Cons.	25,53	15,32	0
Fonct. de la Commis.	10,46	11,49	0
Fonct. du Parlement	1,84	0	0
Fonct. autres probl.	10,46	4,21	0
Comm. extra-commun.	4,30	5,36	21,66
Comm. intra-commun.	3,07	1,14	0
Relat. organiques avec les pays tiers	1,23	6,13	48,33
Politique industr.	0	0,38	1,66
Politique fiscale	0,30	0	0
Politique agricole	4,00	0,76	1,66
Euratom	1,53	11,11	6,66
Evolution Marché Com.	<u>36,92</u>	<u>41,76</u>	<u>20,00</u>
Politique sociale	0,30	2,29	0
Total	100	100	100

(Pourcentages calculés par rapport aux usages de chaque type de vocabulaire.)

Le vocabulaire nationaliste est particulièrement fréquent lorsqu'on parle du principe du vote majoritaire (catégorie fonctionnement du Conseil : 25,53 %) ou de l'évolution générale du Marché Commun, mais dans une proportion moindre, toutefois, pour ce dernier sujet, que le vocabulaire communautaire.

Si l'on calcule les pourcentages du vocabulaire nationaliste par rapport au total de chaque catégorie matière, on obtient les résultats suivants :

	Vocabulaire nationaliste %	Vocabulaire communautaire %	Vocabulaire relatif aux pays tiers %
Fonctionnement du Conseil	67,47	32,52	0
Fonctionnement de la Commission	53,12	46,78	0
Evolution générale du Marché Commun	49,78	45,22	4,97

4. - Vocabulaire nationaliste ou communautaire et les attitudes face à l'intégration européenne.

Nous avons approfondi les résultats du tableau n° XII, ci-contre, en les différenciant par pays membre de la Communauté. Nous en exposerons les éléments les plus intéressants.

a) le Vocabulaire nationaliste.

Les attitudes exprimées par le vocabulaire nationaliste sont plutôt optimistes puisque 37,53 % des usages sont en faveur de la construction européenne contre 24,61 % pour la stagnation. Les attitudes de construction se partagent entre le compromis (16 %) et l'action (11 %) : 34,84 % des usages n'impliquent pas d'opinion.

T A B L E A U N° XII.

	Allema- gne %	Belgi- que %	France %	Hollan- de %	Ita- lie %	Luxem- bourg %	Bene- lux %	Nation. engén. %	Total national- isme %	Intégr. %	Pays tiers %
Total des attitudes de stagnation.	20,83	0	35,97	20	20	0	0	15,88	24,61	32,56	30,00
Constatation	12,50	0	7,19	14,28	0	0	0	6,54	7,69	27,96	18,33
Compromis	0	0	1,43	0	0	0	0	0	0,01	0,38	0,46
Souhait	0	0	0,71	0	0	0	0	0	0,31	0	0
Action	8,33	0	25,17	2,85	20	0	0	7,47	14,46	2,29	9,13
Autres	0	0	0,71	2,85	0	0	0	1,86	1,23	1,91	1,54
Total des attitudes de construction	54,16	50	30,21	51,42	40	33,33	50	37,38	37,53	35,63	35,13
Constatation	0	10	2,87	2,85	0	0	50	3,73	3,38	6,13	4,48
Compromis	8,33	20	12,23	11,42	20	0	0	24,29	16,00	6,13	10,52
Souhait	12,50	0	7,19	8,57	0	0	0	3,73	6,15	11,49	9,13
Action	33,33	20	7,19	28,57	20	33,33	0	3,73	11,07	10,34	9,90
Autres	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,93	0,30	1,53	0,77
Accord	0	0	0,71	0	0	0	0	0,93	0,61	0	0,30
Attitudes neutres	25,00	50	33,81	28,57	40	66,66	50	46,72	37,84	31,80	36,53
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

(Pourcentages calculés par rapport aux usages de chaque vocabulaire nationaliste,
communautaire, ou relatif aux pays tiers.)

- Ce pessimisme concerne surtout la France (35,97 %) ; 25,17 % des usages contiennent notamment à son encontre l'accusation d'agir contre l'Europe. Il faut cependant noter que 30,21 % des usages relatifs aux Français contiennent une opinion favorable notamment par le biais du compromis (12,23 %).

Viennent ensuite les vocabulaires relatifs à l'Allemagne (20,83 %), à la Hollande (20 %) et à l'Italie (20 %).

- Pour les usages concernant ces derniers pays, ainsi que la Belgique, les opinions émises expriment surtout une attitude de construction à l'égard de l'Europe (voir tableau n° XII, ci-contre).

- Si l'on étudie les relations entre le vocabulaire nationaliste et les attitudes devant l'intégration européenne, par pays membre, on constate que ceux-ci sont tous plus optimistes que pessimistes, sauf l'Allemagne.

Ce dernier pays exprime son pessimisme à travers 36,14 % d'usages, dont 58,13 % pour la France ; en revanche, sur 30,12 % d'usages relatifs à la construction européenne, 62,50 % se rapportent à lui-même.

A l'égard de la France, les pays les plus critiques sont les Italiens (50 % d'attitudes de stagnation contre 21,42 % d'attitudes de construction) et la Hollande (39,28 % d'attitudes de stagnation contre 31,14 % d'attitudes de construction).

Inversément, la France elle-même considère qu'elle a une attitude surtout constructive (53,57 % contre 10,71 %), alors qu'elle critique violemment l'Allemagne (57,14 % d'usages expriment la stagnation contre 28,57 %).

b) Le vocabulaire communautaire.

Il exprime surtout une attitude de construction devant l'intégration européenne : 35,63 % ; tout-fois le pessimisme s'avère plus fréquent que dans le vocabulaire nationaliste : 32,56 %.

Trois pays membres suivent cette tendance : le Luxembourg : 55,88 % d'attitudes de construction, la Belgique : 33,33 % et l'Allemagne : 32,91 %.

En revanche, ce sont les attitudes de stagnation qui se manifestent le plus souvent chez les Italiens (40,90 %), les Français (40 %), et les Hollandais (32,43 %).

c) Le vocabulaire relatif aux pays tiers.

La recherche d'une corrélation de ce vocabulaire avec les attitudes devant l'intégration européenne n'offre pas grande signification. En effet, nous ne l'avons pas étudié en détail et il concerne aussi bien les pays africains et malgache que la Grande-Bretagne ou le partnership avec les U.S.A.

Il faut reconnaître cependant que les Européens ne semblent pas globalement, trop mécontents de la situation, puisque ce sont les attitudes de construction qui l'emportent.

IV. LE VOCABULAIRE RELATIF A LA COMMISSION.

Il nous a paru intéressant de procéder à l'étude spécifique de l'ensemble des termes relatifs à la Commission de la Communauté économique européenne. En effet, la question des pouvoirs et du rôle de cet organisme, soulevée par la France après la crise du 30 juin, compte au nombre des principaux problèmes abordés.

T A B L E A U N° XIII.

VOCABULAIRE RELATIF A :	TOTAL DES USA		COMIS- SION %		CON- SEIL %		PARLEMENT											
							Total %		Démocr. Chrét. %		Social. %		Libéraux %		U.D.E. %		Non- inscr. %	
Pouvoirs de la Commission	31	16,31	0	0	5	8,77	26	22,03	19	37,25	2	8,33	3	13,04	2	12,50	0	0
Limitation des pouvoirs de la commission	3	1,57	0	0	1	1,75	2	1,69	0	0	1	4,16	1	4,34	0	0	0	0
"Style" de la commission	39	20,52	0	0	10	17,54	29	24,57	10	19,60	4	16,56	9	39,13	3	18,75	3	75
Modification du style de la Com.	6	3,15	0	0	0	0	6	5,08	4	7,84	0	0	2	8,69	0	0	0	0
Relations commission-conseil	38	20,00	7	46,66	19	33,33	12	10,16	2	3,92	3	12,50	0	0	6	37,50	1	25
Absence commission à Luxembourg	8	4,21	7	46,66	1	1,75	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aide-mémoire français	30	15,78	0	0	7	12,28	23	19,49	12	23,52	7	29,16	2	8,69	2	12,50	0	0
Inforuàtion	8	4,21	1	6,66	5	8,77	2	1,69	0	0	2	8,33	0	0	0	0	0	0
Relations commission-Parlement	2	1,05	0	0	0	0	2	1,69	0	0	2	8,33	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commission unique	14	7,36	0	0	7	12,28	7	5,93	2	3,92	2	8,33	0	0	3	18,75	0	0
Renouvellement de la Commission	3	1,57	0	0	1	1,75	2	1,69	1	1,96	0	0	1	4,34	0	0	0	0
Responsabilité politique de la commission	8	4,21	0	0	1	1,75	7	5,93	1	1,96	1	4,16	5	21,73	0	0	0	0
Total	190	100	15	100	57	100	118	100	53	100	24	100	23	100	16	100	4	100

(Pourcentages calculés par rapport au total des usages du vocabulaire relatif à la Commission dans l'ensemble de l'échantillon dans chaque institution et dans chaque groupe parlementaire.)

C'est ainsi qu'on relève, au sein de ce vocabulaire particulier (1) 34 mots-clés, employés 190 fois, soit 12,61 % de l'ensemble des usages du vocabulaire européen.

Le tableau n° XIII, ci-contre, nous indique comment ces usages se répartissent entre les termes que nous avons dû regrouper par catégorie, pour faciliter ultérieurement la recherche des corrélations.

On a surtout parlé des pouvoirs de la Commission (16,31 %) de son style (20,52 %) de ses relations avec le Conseil de Ministres (20 %), et du mémorandum français (15,78 %) - Ce dernier document, souvent dénommé "décalogue" contenait les propositions du gouvernement français visant à restreindre les responsabilités de la Commission et à la subordonner plus étroitement au Conseil.

On aborda aussi la question de la composition de la Commission unique qui devait être mise en place lorsque le traité relatif à la fusion des exécutifs des Communautés serait ratifié.

a) L'emploi du vocabulaire relatif à la Commission au sein des institutions communautaires.

Sur l'ensemble des usages du vocabulaire relatif à la Commission, 7,89 % proviennent de la Commission, 30 % du Conseil et 62,10 % du Parlement.

Le calcul des pourcentages par rapport au nombre total d'usages du vocabulaire européen de chaque institution donne les résultats suivants :

Commission	: 18,75 %
Conseil de Ministre	: 10,79 %
Parlement européen	: 13,14 %

(1) Voir le détail en annexe III pages 57 - 58 - 59 et 60.

Remarquons que la question des relations entre la Commission et le Conseil intéresse tout particulièrement ces deux organismes, alors que le parlement s'attache surtout au problème des pouvoirs et du style de la Commission, et débat assez longuement de l'aide-mémoire français, notamment par l'intermédiaire des représentants des groupes démocrate-chrétien et socialiste.

Notons enfin que le parlementaire français U.D.E. aborde en particulier la question des relations entre le Conseil et la Commission, qui sous-entend celle de la subordination de celle-ci à celui-là.

b) au sein des pays membres.

Chaque pays membre accorde au vocabulaire relatif à la Commission sur l'ensemble des usages qu'il fait du vocabulaire européen, l'importance suivante :

Italie	: 16,75 %
Belgique	: 16,66 %
Allemagne	: 13,81 %
Hollande	: 11,64 %
France	: 7,40 %
Luxembourg	: 7,10 %

On s'aperçoit que la France qui a pourtant amorcé le débat sur le problème de la Commission se tient en retrait lors du colloque et évite de s'étendre trop longuement sur le sujet. On ressent là encore que le compromis est proche et que les antagonismes vont s'adoucir.

Le tableau n° XIV ci-après présente le détail des différents points relatifs à la Commission qui retiennent l'attention de chaque pays membre.

Vocabulaire relatif à	Allema- gne %	Belgi- que %	France %	Hollan- de %	Italie %	Luxem- bourg%
Pouvoirs de la Commission	20,37	9,30	12,50	18,75	21,21	8,33
Limitation des pou- voirs de la Comm.	1,85	2,32	0	0	0	8,33
Style de la Comm.	16,66	27,90	18,75	15,62	27,27	8,33
Modification du style de la Comm.	3,70	0	0	3,12	9,09	0
Relations Commis- sion-Conseil	16,66	23,25	37,50	21,87	3,03	41,66
Absence Commission à Luxembourg	12,96	2,32	0	0	0	0
Aide-mémoire français	12,96	6,97	12,50	28,12	21,21	16,66
Information	5,55	11,62	0	0	0	0
Relations Commis- sion - Parlement	3,70	0	0	0	0	0
Commission unique	3,71	11,62	18,75	9,37	0	8,33
Renouvellement de la Commission	0	0	0	3,12	3,03	8,33
Responsabilité politique de la Commission	1,85	4,65	0	0	15,15	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

(Pourcentages calculés par rapport aux usages du vocabu-
laire relatif à la Commission dans chaque pays membre.)

Il fait apparaître notamment que la question des relations entre le Conseil et la Commission intéresse tout particulièrement la France et le Luxembourg (représenté seulement au Colloque par le président en exercice du Conseil de Ministres, rappelons-le). Le "style" de la Commission est évoqué surtout par la Belgique et l'Italie. Ce dernier pays et la Hollande parlent aussi de l'aide-mémoire français. Notons enfin l'attention portée par la France à la future Commission unique prévue dans le cadre du traité sur la fusion des exécutifs des Communautés.

c) Le vocabulaire relatif à la Commission et les attitudes face à l'intégration européenne.

Vocabulaire relatif à	Attitudes de stagnation %	Attitudes de construction %	Attitudes neutres %	Total %
Pouvoirs de la Commiss.	19,35	48,38	32,25	100
Limitation des pouvoirs de la Commission	100	0	0	100
Style de la Commission	10,25	51,28	38,46	100
Modification du style de la Commission	100	0	0	100
Relations Commission - Conseil	2,63	47,36	50,00	100
Absence de la Commission à Luxembourg	25	25	50,00	100
Aide-mémoire français	53,33	36,66	10,00	100
Information	12,50	37,50	50,00	100
Relation Commission Parlement	0	0	100	100
Commission unique	0	14,28	85,71	100
Renouvellement de la Commission	33,33	33,33	33,33	100
Responsabilité politique de la Commission	12,50	50,00	37,50	100
Total vocabulaire relatif à la Commission	21,57	40,00	38,42	100

Tableau n° XV.

(Pourcentages calculés par rapport aux usages de chaque catégorie du vocabulaire relatif à la Commission).

Lors de la crise du 30 juin, les Hollandais et les Italiens, puis les Allemands s'étaient alignés sur les propositions de la Commission, visant à la mise à la disposition de la Communauté de ressources propres et à un accroissement des pouvoirs du Parlement européen. On peut se demander s'il s'agissait d'une position de principe ou de la manifestation d'un certain sentiment anti-français, exaspéré par les méthodes "diplomatiques" du Général de Gaulle. C'est pourquoi il est intéressant d'étudier les jugements portés par les pays membres sur le rôle joué par la Commission dans l'intégration européenne, à une époque où les passions s'étaient déjà apaisées (cf. tableau n° XV ci-dessus.)

On s'aperçoit immédiatement que les jugements favorables l'emportent nettement lorsqu'il s'agit des pouvoirs de la Commission de son style ou des relations qu'elle entretient avec le Conseil. On ne veut pas introduire à cet égard de modifications (limitation des pouvoirs de la Commission et modification de son style = 100 % de stagnation), et l'aide-mémoire français est assez sévèrement jugé (53,33 % pour la stagnation). Remarquons que sur ce dernier point, les attitudes neutres sont peu nombreuses.

En approfondissant nos recherches au sein de chaque pays membre, nous avons obtenu quelques éléments intéressants ; on ne peut prétendre cependant qu'ils soient significatifs car les chiffres absolus sont très faibles.

Notons par exemple que les critiques à l'égard du "décalogue" français émanent surtout de l'Allemagne (85,71 %) et de la Hollande (55,55 %), puis de l'Italie (42,85 %) et de la Belgique (33,33 %). La France, au contraire, estime à 100 % que son memorandum est constructif ; de plus, elle ne se prononce ni sur la limitation des pouvoirs de la Commission, ni sur la modification de son style. Sur ces deux derniers points, tous les autres pays-membres sont unanimes à considérer que ce serait aller à l'encontre de l'intégration européenne.

En ce qui concerne les pouvoirs de la Commission et son style, les jugements portés se partagent entre la construction, surtout de la part de l'Allemagne, du Luxembourg et de la Belgique, et la neutralité (France, Hollande, Italie). Enfin c'est sur la question des relations entre le Conseil et la Commission que la France est la plus critique (16,66 %), alors que les autres pays n'émettent aucune opinion défavorable.

Il faut remarquer, là encore, que la France s'aligne à peu près sur ses cinq partenaires puisqu'elle ne parle de la Commission en termes de stagnation qu'à 16,25 %, contre 50 % en termes de construction.

V - LE VOCABULAIRE RELATIF AU VOTE A LA MAJORITE AU SEIN DU CONSEIL.

Le traité de Rome prévoyait qu'au 1er janvier 1966 un certain nombre de questions seraient réglées par un vote majoritaire, et échapperaient donc à la règle de l'unanimité, de mise jusqu'alors. Le gouvernement français profita de la crise du 30 Juin pour centrer une partie de ses attaques sur cet élément susceptible, aux yeux du Général de Gaulle, de battre gravement en brèche la souveraineté des Etats. Le problème fut débattu lors du colloque du 20 Janvier 1966.

C'est ainsi que nous avons regroupé 10 mots-clés (1) relatifs au problème du vote majoritaire, employés 131 fois, soit 8,69 % de l'ensemble des usages du vocabulaire européen.

La fréquence d'emploi se répartit entre les différents termes de la façon suivante :

	Chiffres absolus	Pourcentages
- vote majoritaire :	71	54,19 %
- Règle de l'unanimité :	28	21,37 %
- Droit de veto :	13	9,92 %
- Majorité à la troisième lecture :	6	4,58 %
- Mise en minorité :	5	3,81 %
- Abandon du principe majoritaire :	3	2,29 %
- Proposition belge (les décisions prises à l'unanimité ne pourront être ultérieurement modifiées à la majorité) :	3	2,29 %
- Autres (mots Nos 9 - 37 - 51) :	2	1,52 %

(1) Voir leur liste en annexe IV - page 61.

T A B L E A U N° XVI.

VOCABULAIRE RELATIF A	COMMISS- SION %		CONSEIL %		PARLEMENT.										Non - inscr. %	
					Total %	Démocrates Chrétiens %		Socialis- tes %		Libéraux %		U.D.E. %				
Abandon du prin- cipe majoritaire	0	0	0	0	3	4,16	2	5,88	1	11,11	0	0	0	0	0	0
Droit de veto	0	0	3	5,55	10	13,88	2	5,88	5	55,55	2	9,52	1	12,50	0	0
Majorité à la 3ème lecture	0	0	1	1,85	5	6,94	2	5,88	0	0	3	4,28	0	0	0	0
Proposition belge	0	0	1	1,85	2	2,77	1	2,94	0	0	1	4,76	0	0	0	0
Unanimité	3	60	12	22,22	13	18,05	6	17,64	1	11,11	4	19,04	2	25,00	0	0
Principe majori- taire	2	40	31	57,40	38	52,76	21	61,76	2	22,22	10	47,61	5	62,50	0	0
Mise en minorité	0	0	4	7,40	1	1,38	0	0	0	0	1	4,76	0	0	0	0
Autres	0	0	2	3,70	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	5	100	54	100	72	100	34	100	9	100	21	100	8	100	0	0

(Pourcentages calculés par rapport au total des usages du vocabulaire relatif au Conseil,
dans chaque institution et dans chaque groupe parlementaire.)

a) L'emploi du vocabulaire relatif au vote majoritaire au sein
des institutions communautaires.

C'est la Commission qui intervient le moins, sur ce sujet également, avec 3,81 % des usages ; viennent ensuite le Conseil : 41,22 %, et le Parlement : 54,96 %.

Si l'on calcule les pourcentages par rapport à la fréquence totale d'emploi du vocabulaire européen au sein de chaque institution, on obtient les résultats suivants :

Commission :	6,25 %
Conseil :	10,22 %
Parlement :	8,01 %

On remarque ainsi que le Conseil parle à peu près autant de cette question que de la position de la Commission (cf. page 23) ; alors que le Parlement et la Commission sont nettement moins intéressée.

Le tableau n° XVI, ci-contre, peu significatif quant à la Commission car les chiffres absolus sont vraiment très faibles, nous montre que le Conseil évoque plus longuement que le Parlement la question de l'unanimité et celle du vote majoritaire. Il se préoccupe aussi davantage du risque, pour un pays membre, d'être mis en minorité. En revanche, il parle moins souvent de la proposition belge et du droit de veto, alors que le Parlement fait assez fréquemment ressortir ce danger (notamment le groupe socialiste : 55,55 %).

Remarquons aussi que c'est le parlementaire U.D.E. qui aborda le plus la question de l'unanimité.

b) Au sein des pays membres.

Sur l'ensemble des usages du vocabulaire relatif au vote majoritaire, les pays membres de la Communauté interviennent avec les fréquences suivantes.:

Belgique	:	26,71 %
Allemagne	:	23,66 %
Hollande	:	19,84 %
Italie	:	17,55 %
France	:	6,10 %
Luxembourg	:	6,10 %

Nous pouvons faire, à l'égard de la France, la même remarque que dans le cas du vocabulaire relatif à la Commission : elle n'intervient que peu dans le débat.

Précisons que c'est la Hollande qui parle le plus d'un droit de veto éventuel : 19,23 % (Italie : 13,04 % - Allemagne : 12,90 % - Italie 13,04 %).

Seules l'Italie (8,69 %), la Belgique (8,57 %) et l'Allemagne (3,29 %) évoquent la proposition du vote majoritaire après trois lectures.

c) Le vocabulaire relatif au principe majoritaire et les attitudes face à l'intégration européenne.

Tableau n° XVII.

Vocabulaire relatif à	Stagnation %	Construc- tion %	Neutre %	Total %
Abandon du principe majoritaire	100	0	0	100
Droit de veto	92,30	7,69	0	100
Majorité à la troisième lecture	33,33	50,00	16,66	100
Proposition belge	0	66,66	33,33	100
Unanimité	17,85	50,00	32,14	100
Principe majoritaire	8,45	43,66	47,88	100
Mise en minorité	20,00	20,00	60,00	100
Autres	50,00	50,00	0	100
Total vocabulaire relatif au principe majoritaire	22,90	40,45	36,64	100

(Pourcentages calculés par rapport au total des usages dans chaque catégorie du vocabulaire relatif au vote majoritaire.)

Il est très intéressant de noter que l'on stigmatise volontiers l'abandon pur et simple du principe majoritaire (stagnation 100 %) et le droit de veto (stagnation : 92,30 %). En revanche, les positions sont bien moins tranchées sur la question du vote majoritaire ou de l'unanimité. Le principe de la majorité n'entraîne pas l'adhésion unanime de tous les pays membres (43,66 % de construction seulement), et ceci est confirmé par les jugements portés sur la règle de l'unanimité, qui sont loin d'être défavorables (Construction : 50 %).

La proposition de la majorité après trois lectures soulève d'assez nombreuses critiques (33,33 %), alors que la proposition belge est jugée assez fortement constructive (66,66 %).

Il se dégage de ces résultats la nette impression que si l'on proclamait le désir de s'en tenir strictement aux traités en préservant le principe de la majorité dans les délibérations du Conseil, les pays membres étaient cependant décidés à accepter bien des accommodements et à conserver en partie la règle de l'unanimité. Ceci correspond d'ailleurs à l'issue des négociations de Luxembourg et à la pratique communautaire ultérieure.

VI - LES AUTRES MOTS-CLÉS DU VOCABULAIRE EUROPÉEN.

Comme nous l'indiquions au début de notre deuxième partie, ce travail doit être considéré au même titre qu'une "pré-enquête" ; c'est pourquoi nous n'avons pas approfondi au-delà l'étude du vocabulaire du colloque du 20 Janvier 1966.

Il reste 110 mots-clés (1) non analysé en détail. Ce n'est pas en raison du manque d'intérêt que cela pouvait présenter, mais parce que les résultats déjà obtenus nous semblaient répondre d'une manière satisfaisante à notre souci de vérifier la validité de notre méthode.

(1) Voir leur liste en annexe V pages 62 - 63 - 64 - 65 - 66 - 67 - 68 - 69 et 70.

Il ne sera pas question, bien entendu, dans l'étude définitive du vocabulaire européen de les laisser de côté.

Ces mots-clés évoquent les questions les plus diverses.

Vingt d'entre eux, Nos 46 - 60 - 95 - 100 - 118 - 148 - 149 - 150 - 202 - 212 - 230 - 231 - 232 - 233 - 239 - 240 - 241 - 242 - 261 - 264, employés 76 fois, concernent notamment le thème du respect des traités, argument de défense de la Commission et du principe majoritaire.

Le mot "calendrier" (N° 32) relatif au document présenté par la France est prononcé 22 fois. Par qui et dans quels termes ? Question qu'il sera intéressant de creuser.

Le mot "crise" (N° 57) revient 51 fois.

Un certain nombre de mots-clés (Nos 49 - 74 - 94 - 124 - 165 - 207 - 185) évoquent la construction d'une Europe politique.

Une autre recherche intéressante pourrait concerner les termes : "Les Cinq" (N° 35) et les "Six" (N° 247) employés respectivement 29 et 23 fois.

Il en va de même pour la fusion des exécutifs (N° 106) : 19 usages - la politique agricole (Nos 7 - 16 - 33 - 99 - 104 - 139 - 142 - 143 - 167 - 187 - 204 - 220 - 221) : 53 usages - La conférence de Luxembourg (N° 237) : 62 usages...

Toutes ces études complémentaires devront être menées ultérieurement.

B-I/II/3 RECHERCHES SUR LE VOCABULAIRE EUROPEEN

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CONCLUSIONS

Les résultats exposés dans ce rapport ne constituent ni une explication, ni une description assez exhaustive pour être susceptibles de généralisation. En effet, le vocabulaire que nous avons retenu est trop limité au fond et dans le temps pour que nous puissions prétendre qu'il représente valablement le vocabulaire européen. Ce n'était d'ailleurs pas là notre objectif immédiat et nous en étions bien conscients.

En revanche, ces premiers travaux nous semblent mériter un approfondissement. La technique que nous avons appliquée à l'échantillon retenu nous a permis d'attendre des observations précises, nous donnant une image objective, bien que limitée, de la crise qui secoua le Marché Commun en 1965, et de l'état de l'intégration européenne à cette époque. Son degré de validité est suffisant pour que nous l'appliquions à un corpus plus étendu.

La poursuite de nos recherches va s'effectuer dans deux directions :

- sur le plan chronologique : nous ne nous limiterons plus à un seul colloque, mais procéderons à la même analyse systématique des échanges de vue depuis 1959 jusqu'à nos jours. Nous pensons ainsi mettre en évidence une évolution du vocabulaire, traduisant les divers développements de la construction européenne.

Notre étude s'avèrera plus directement quantitative puisqu'elle portera sur une plus longue série de situations.

- Sur le plan sémantique : il s'ensuivra un net élargissement ; les mots-clés choisis suivant les critères précédemment exposés concerneront en effet un champ de questions bien plus vaste. Le vocabulaire européen ainsi déterminé, plus représentatif, constituera une description qui, pensons-nous, sera plus significative.

B I/II/3 RECHERCHES SUR LE VOCABULAIRE EUROPEEN

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CONCLUSIONS

The results shown in this report constitute neither an explanation nor a description, sufficiently exhaustive to be liable of generalization. As a matter of fact the vocabulary we have suggested is too limited as to its substances and as to the course of time so as to represent, with some validity, the European vocabulary. Besides it was not our immediate aim and this we were conscious of.

In return, we believe that these works deserve a thorough study. The technique we used towards the model which we worked upon, entitle us to await accurate observations, showing an unbiassed, although limited image of the 1965 Common Market crises as well as the position of integration in Europe at that time. It's validity is strong enough to allow application to a larger corpus.

For the furtherance of our investigations we will choose two directions :

- on a chronological level : we shall no longer limit ourselves to a single colloquy but proceed to the same systematical analysis of views-interchanged from 1959 to this day. By doing so we believe evidence shall be put on the evolution of the vocabulary, thus translating the different developments which occur in the European up-building.
- on semantic level : a definite enlargement will take place; the chosen key-words previously tested will indeed affect a much wider field of questions. The European vocabulary thus more representative, will settle a description which, to our belief, will be more significative.

D O C U M E N T S

A N N E X E S.

A N N E X E N° I

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70	Développement Communauté
71	Développement des échanges
72	Développement économique
73	Développement Marché Commun
74	Développement politique
75	Différends économiques
76	Diminution rôle Commission

77	Discrimination raciale
78	Douzièmes provisoires
79	Droit de veto
80	Droit d'initiative Commission
81	Du côté français
82	Echange de jeunes travailleurs
83	Echéancier des engagements et paiements
84	Enquête sur les structures des salaires
85	Engagements communautaires
86	Espagne
87	Espagnols
88	Esprit communautaire
89	Etat français
90	Europe
91	Européens
92	Europe économique
93	Europe politique
94	Evolution politique
95	Exécution des traités
96	F.E.D.
97	Fédération européenne
98	Financement (d'Euratom)
99	Financement politique agricole commune
100	Fidélité aux traités
101	Fonctions président Commission

124	Institution politique
125	Intégration européenne
126	Intérêt de la Communauté
127	Intérêt de l'Europe
128	Intérêts particuliers
129	Intérêts nationaux
130	Interruption des négociations
131	Italie
132	Libéralisation Espagne
133	Liberté
134	Libre circulation des marchandises
135	Limitation des pouvoirs de la Commission
136	Limites géographiques de la Communauté
137	Majorité troisième lecture
138	Marché Commun
139	Marché Commun agricole
140	Marché industriel
141	Mauvais Européens
142	Matières grasses
143	Mémoire de la Commission
144	Mesures d'ordre budgétaire
145	Ministre français des affaires étrangères
146	Mise en minorité
147	Modification rôle Commission
148	Modification du traité

- 149 Modifier les traités
- 150 ne pas Modifier les traités
- 151 Moyens d'action de la Communauté
- 152 Négociations diplomatiques
- 153 Négociations du C.A.T.T.
- 154 Négociations internationales
- 155 Néerlandais
- 156 Nigéria
- 157 Nous (Communauté)
- 158 Nous (Allemagne)
- 159 Nous (France)
- 160 Nous (Pays-Bas)
- 161 Notre (Communauté)
- 162 Notre - ou le nôtre - (Français)
- 163 Oeuvre communautaire
- 164 Oeuvre économique
- 165 Oeuvre politique
- 166 Opinion publique
- 167 Organisation des marchés
- 168 Organisation des services de l'information
- 169 O.T.A.N.
- 170 Paix

171	Parlement belge
172	Parlement français
173	Parlement néerlandais
174	Parlements nationaux
175	Partenaires
176	Partenaire allemand
177	Partenaire français
178	Partenaires mondiaux
179	Participation de la Commission à Luxembourg
180	Partnership atlantique
181	Pays africain et malgache
182	Pays-Bas
183	Pays du bloc de l'Est
184	Pays tiers
185	Plan Fouchet
186	Plan Spaak
187	Politique agricole commune
188	Politique atlantique
189	Politique commerciale
190	Politique européenne
191	Politique du "fauteuil vide"
192	Politique fiscale
193	Politique industrielle
194	Point de vue allemand
195	Point de vue belge
196	Position de la Commission
197	Pouvoirs de la Commission

198	Pouvoir de décision de la Commission
199	Pouvoir d'exécution de la Commission
200	Pouvoir de gestion de la Commission
201	Pouvoirs du Parlement européen
202	Préserver le traité
203	Presse
204	Prix des produits agricoles
205	Problèmes extra-européens
206	Problèmes intérieurs de la Communauté
207	Problèmes politiques
208	Processus communautaire
209	Producteurs européens
210	Programme quinquennal
211	Progrès interne de la Communauté
212	Question de vie ou de mort pour les traités
213	Questions monétaires
214	Réacteur Essor
215	Recettes
216	Recherche (Euratom)
217	Recours à la procédure écrite
218	Réductions des droits de douane
219	Régime provisoire

220	Règlement financier
221	Règlements sur le sucre
222	Relations avec la Grande-Bretagne
223	Relations Commission-Conseil
224	Relations Commission-Parlement
225	Relations extérieures Communauté
226	Renforcement pouvoirs Parlement européen
227	Renouvellement Commission
228	Réorganisation Commission
229	Reprise du travail à six
230	Respect des traités
231	non Respect des traités
232	Respecter les traités
233	ne pas Respecter les traités
234	Responsabilité de la Communauté
235	Responsabilité politique de la Commission
236	Ressources propres
237	Réunion de Luxembourg
238	Revendications sociales
239	Révision des traités
240	non Révision des traités
241	Révision indirecte du traité
242	Révision unilatérale des traités
243	Rôle de la Commission
244	Roulement de la Commission

245	Situation difficile
246	Situation des licenciés mines de soufre en Italie
247	Six
248	Sortir de la Difficulté
249	Souveraineté des Parlements nationaux
250	Supranationalité
251	Supranational
252	Tarif extérieur commun
253	Tutelle de la Commission
254	Ultinatum
255	Unanimité
256	Unification européenne
257	Union douanière
258	Union économique
259	Unité européenne
260	U.S.A.
261	Validité du traité
262	Veto adhésion Grande-Bretagne

263 Vie européenne
264 Violation du traité
265 Volonté européenne
266 Volonté politique commune
267 Voté majoritaire
268 Voyage de Gaulle à Moscou

269 Etats membres
270 Euratom
271 Suppression du contrôle politique
du Parlement
272 Institution technique
273 Français
274 Situation sociale de la Communauté

A N N E X E N° I I.

LES MOTS-CLES DES VOCABULAIRES NATIONALISTE, COMMUNAU-
TAIRE ET RELATIFS AUX PAYS TIERS.

Le vocabulaire nationaliste.

N° d'ordre	Mot-clé	Fréq. d'emp tot.	(1) Fréquence d'emploi par pays					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
18	Allemand	2	2					
19	Allemagne	5	3				1	1
63	Délégation allemande	2	1		1			
108	Gouvernement allem.	3			3			
158	Nous	7	7					
176	Partenaire allemand	3			3			
194	Point de vue allem.	3	3					
27	Belgique	3		2			1	
64	Délégation belge	1					1	
109	Gouvernement belge	4		3				1
171	Parlement belge	1		1				
195	Point de vue belge	1	1					
22	Attitude française	2				1	1	

N° d'ordre	Mot-clé.	Fréq. d'emp. tot.	(1) Fréquence d'emploi par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
34	Chef de l'Etat français	4	2			2		
45	Conférence de Pres. du Gén. de Gaulle	1				1		
65	Délégation franç.	7			4	1		2
81	Du côté français	2	1			1		
89	Etat français	1	1					
103	France	59	24	12	2	12	6	3
111	Gouvernement fran.	32	8	1	6	7	6	4
145	Ministre français	1				1		
159	Nous	10			10			
162	Notre ou le Nôtre	3			3			
172	Parlement français	1			1			
177	Partenaire franç.	5	3		2			
268	Voyage du général de Gaulle à Moscou	1				1		
273	Français	10	4	4		1	1	
114	Gouvernement néer- landais	16				15		1
155	Néerlandais	1				1		
160	Nous	3				3		
173	Parlement néerl.	8				8		
182	Pays-Bas	7				6	1	

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq. d'emp. tot.	(1) Fréquence d'emploi par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
66	Délégation italien.	1					1	
112	Gouvernement ital.	1						1
131	Italie	3	1	1			1	
113	Gouvernement du Luxembourg	3						3
2	Abdication de souveraineté	1				1		
54	Coopération inter-gouvernementale	1				1		
62	Délégations	1				1		
107	Gouvernements	39	7	8	9	3	8	4
110	Gouvernement démoc.	1					1	
129	Intérêts nation.	18	4	4	2	5	2	1
174	Parlement nation.	2						2
175	Partenaires	11	3	4		4		
249	Souveraineté des Parlem. nationaux	1			1			
269	Etats membres	33	8	1	1	8	4	11
28	Bénélux	1					1	

(1) Les initiales employées à titre d'abréviation désignent respectivement l'Allemagne, la Belgique, la France, la Hollande, l'Italie et le Luxembourg.

Le vocabulaire communautaire.

N° d'ordre	Mot-clé	Fréq. d'emp. tot.	(1) Fréquence d'emploi par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
5	Actions communaut.	1					1	
8	Activités commun	2						2
13	Affaires européennes	1		1				
40	Communautaire	2	1				1	
41	Communauté	138	51	19	19	14	14	21
42	Comm. démocratique	2				2		
48	Construc. européenne	1		1				
55	Coopér. aupra-nat.	1				1		
70	Dévelop. de la Com.	3	1					2
73	Dévelop. du Marché Commun	1					1	
85	Engagements comm.	1						1
88	Esprit communaut.	4			2	1		1
90	Europe	20	7	7	3		3	
91	Européens	3			2	1		
92	Europe économique	3			3			
93	Europe politique	7		2	5			
97	Fédération europ.	1				1		
120	Indépendance de la Communauté	1			1			

N° d'ordre	Mot-clé	Fréq. d'emp. tot.	(1) Fréq. d'emploi par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
121	Indépendance de l'Euratom	1			1			
125	Intégration europ.	4		2		1		
126	Intérêt de la Com.	8	4			2		2
127	Intérêt de l'Europe	1		1				
136	Limites géographiques de la Communauté	1	1					
138	Marché Commun	6	2	1	1	1		1
141	Mauvais Européens	1			1			
151	Moyens d'action de la Communauté	1	1					
157	Nous	3	2					1
161	Notre ou le Nôtre	1	1					
163	Oeuvre communaut.	2	1					1
190	Politique européen.	3	2			1		
206	Problèmes intérieurs de la Communauté	1			1			
208	Processus commun.	2		1	1			
209	Producteurs europ.	1		1				
211	Progrès interne de la Communauté	1	1					
234	Responsabilité de la Communauté							

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	F req. d'emp. tot.	(1) Fréq. d'emploi par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
250	Supranationalité	1				1		
251	Supranational	1	1					
256	Unification europ.	3	2	1				
259	Unité européenne	2	1		1			
263	Vie européenne	1		1				
265	Volonté européenne	2			2			
266	Volonté politique commune	1		1				
270	Euratom	21			7	11	2	1
<u>Le vocabulaire relatif aux pays tiers</u>								
10	Adhésion aux Comm.	1	1					
11	Adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne	2		2				
12	A.E.L.E.	2	2					
14	Afrique	5			4			
15	Africains	2	2					
21	Association de l'Espagne	1	1					
25	Autriche	3	2					1
86	Espagne	6	6					
87	Espagnols	1	1					

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq. d'empl. total	(1) Fréq. d'emploi par pays-memb.					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
115	Grande-Bretagne	4	3			1		
130	Interruption des négociations avec la Grande-Bretagne	1				1		
156	Nigéria	1						1
169	O.T.A.N.	6	1		2	3		
178	Partenaires mondiaux	1			1			
180	Partnership atlantique	2	1			1		
181	Pays africains et malgaches	4	3		1			
183	Pays du bloc de l'Est	1	1					
184	Pays tiers	7	1		1		3	2
188	Politique atlant.	2	2					
205	Prob. extra-europ.	1			1			
222	Relations avec la Grande-Bretagne	1	1					
260	U.S.A.	4	1		3			
132	Libération de l'Espagne	1	1					
174	Le monde	1		1				

ANNEXE N° III

LES MOTS-CLES DU VOCABULAIRE RELATIF A LA COMMISSION

N° d'ordre	Mot-clé	Fréq. d'emp tot.	(1) fréquence d'emploi par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
23	Autonomie de la Commission		5			1		
24	Autorité de la Commission			1				
43	Compétence pour arrêter les directives		1					
80	Droit d'initia- tive de la Commission		1			1	1	
101	Fonctions du Président de la Commission						1	
119	Indépendance de la Commission	1				2		
197	Pouvoirs de la Commission		2	3	2		4	1
198	Pouvoirs de décision de la Commission					2		

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq. d'empl. total	(1) Fréq. d'empl. par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
199	Pouvoirs d'extension de la Commis.		1					
200	Pouvoirs de gestion de la Commission						1	
135	Limitation des pouvoirs de la Comm.		1					
253	Mise sous tutelle			1				1
6	Action de la Comm.		1	3				1
196	Position de la Commission		2	1		2		
243	Rôle de la Comm.		6	8	3	3	9	
44	Condamnation de la Commission						1	
76	Diminution du rôle de la Commission		1					
147	Modification du rôle de la Commission		1				1	
228	Réorganisation de la Commission					1	1	
36	Collaboration commission - Conseil		4	3		3		

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq. d'empl total	(1) Fréq. d'empl. par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
53	Coopération Commission - Conseil		1		4	1	1	2
223	Relations Commission - Conseil		4	7	2	3		3
3	Absence Commission à Luxembourg		3	1				
4	Abstention de la Commission		2					
179	Participation Commission à Luxemb.		2					
17	Aide-mémoire franç.		3	1	2	6	1	2
58	Décatalogue		4	2		3	6	
122	Information		3	4				
168	Organisation de l'Information			1				
224	Relations Commission - Parlement		2					
39	Commission unique		2	5	3	3		1
227	Renouvellement de la Commission						1	

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq. d'emp. total	(1) Fréquence d'emploi par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
244	Roulement au sein de la Commission					1		1
235	Responsabilité politique de la Commission		1	2			5	

A N N E X E N° IV.

LES MOTS-CLÉS DU VOCABULAIRE AU VOTE MAJORITAIRE.

N° d'ordre	Mot-clé	Fréq. d'empl. total	(1) Fréq. d'empl. par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
1	Abandon du principe majoritaire	3	2			1		
79	Droit de veto	13	4		1	5	3	
137	Majorité à la troisième lecture	6	1	3			2	
186	Proposition de M. Spaak	3	1				1	1
255	Règle de l'unanimité	28	8	12	2	4	2	
267	Vote majoritaire	71	14	17	5	15	14	6
146	Mise en minorité	5	1	2		1	1	
9	Activité des Conseils	1						1
51	Contrôle du Conseil sur l'information	1		1				

A N N E X E N° V.

AUTRES MOTS-CLES DU VOCABULAIRE EUROPEEN.

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq. d'empl totale	Fréq. d'emploi par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
46	Non conforme aux traités	2	1			1		
60	Défense du traité	1	1					
95	Exécution des traités	2						2
100	Fidélité aux traités	3				1	1	1
118	Incompatible avec les traités	1				1		
148	Modification des traités	8	5			1	2	
149	Modifier les traités	2			1		1	
150	Ne pas modifier les traités	1						1
202	Préserver le traité	1	1					
212	Question de vie ou de mort pour les traités	1				1		
230	Respect des traités	27	4	4	2	5	8	4
231	Non respect des traités	8	4	1			3	

N. d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq. d'empl. totale	Fréq. d'empl. par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
232	Respecter les traités	4		1		2	1	
233	Ne pas respecter les traités	3	2			1		
239	Révision des traités	6	1	4			1	
240	Non révision des traités	1					1	
241	Révision indirecte des traités	1		1				
242	Révision unilatérale des traités	1		1				
261	Validité des traités	1	1					
264	Violation du traité	2	2					
32	Calendrier	22	4	3	6	4	2	3
56	Crises antérieures	1			1			
57	Crise du 30 juin	51	10	11	7	5	16	2
61	Délai pour reprendre sa place	1	1					
152	Négociations diplomatiques	1		1				
191	Politique de la chaise vide	2	1		1			
219	Régime provisoire	3	3					
229	Reprise du travail à six	2		2				

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq. d'empl totale	Fréq. d'empl. par 'pays membre'					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
237	Réunion de Luxembourg	62	9	10	8	15	12	8
245	Situation difficile	2		2				
248	Sortir de la difficulté	1		1				
254	Ultimatum	2	1	1				
49	Construction politique	3		1	2			
74	Développement politique	2		2				
94	Evolution politique	2			2			
124	Institution politique	3					3	
165	Oeuvre politique	1			1			
207	Problèmes politiques	1			1			
185	Plan Fouchet	2		2				
47	Construction économique	1			1			
72	Développement économique	4		4				
75	Différents économiques	1			1			

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq.	Fréq. d'emploi par pays membre					
		d'emp. totale	A	B	F	H	I	L
105	Fusion des économies nationales	2	1					
123	Institution économique	1						1
164	Oeuvre économique	1			1			
258	Union économique	2	2					
272	Institution technique	2					2	
35	Les cinq	29	9	3	6	8	2	1
247	Les six	23	2	2	4	10	2	3
26	Avis du Parlement	2					2	
37	Collaboration : Conseil-Parlement	1					1	
201	Pouvoirs du Parlement européen	13	3	3		3	2	2
226	Renforcement des pouvoirs du Parlement européen	5	1			3		1
271	Suppression du contrôle politique du Parlement	1					1	
29	Budgets	16	1		8	1	3	3
30	Budgets de fonctionnement	1			1			

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq. d'empl totale	Fréq. d'emploi par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
50	Contrôle budgétaire	4	1	2		1		
68	Dépenses	1						1
144	Mesures d'ordre budgétaire	1		1				
215	Recettes	1						1
217	Recours à la procédure écrite	1						1
336	Ressources propres	1						1
106	Fusion des exécutifs	19	2	2	3	10		2
20	Association	2	2					
52	Convention de Yaoundé	1			1			
96	F.E.D.	1			1			
153	Négociation du G.A.T.T.	21	10	1		2	2	6
154	Négociations internationales	1						1
252	Tarif extérieur commun	7	1	2			2	2
225	Relations extérieures de la Communauté	3		3				
262	Veto à l'adhésion de la Grande-Bretagne	1	1					

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq. d'emp. totale	Fréq. d'emploi par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
71	Développement des échanges	1		1				
134	Libre circulation des marchandises	1						1
189	Politique commerciale	3	1	1			1	
209	Producteurs européens	1	1					
218	Réduction des droit de douane	6	2	1			2	1
257	Union douanière	4	1	3				
31	Budget recherche et investissement Euratom	11		1	4	3	1	2
38	Comité consultatif recherche nucléaire	1				1		
69	Dépenses d'investissement	1			1			
78	Douzièmes provisoires	1				1		
83	Echéancier des engagements et paiements	4				4		
98	Financement d'Euratom	1						1
210	Programme quinquennal	1			1			

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq. d'empl. totale	Fréq. d'emploi par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
214	Facteur essor	1			1			
216	Recherche (Euratom)	1					1	
140	Marché industriel	1	1					
93	Politique industrielle	2		1			1	
7	Achèvement politique agricole commune	2						2
16	Agriculture	6	1	2			2	1
33	Calendrier agricole	4		3				1
99	Financement politique agricole commune	13	6			2		5
104	Fruits et légumes	2		1				1
139	Marché Commun agricole	3	1		2			
142	Matières grasses	1						1
143	Mémorandum de la Communauté	5						5
167	Organisation des marchés	1						1
187	Politique agricole commune	11	1	4		3		3

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq. d'empl totale	Fréq. d'emploi par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
204	Prix des produits agricoles	1						1
220	Règlement financier	3			2			1
221	Règlements sur le sucre	1		1				
117	Harmonisation des politiques fiscales	1	1					
192	Politique fiscale	1		1				
213	Questions monétaires	1		1				
82	Echange de jeunes travailleurs	1			1			
84	Enquête sur la structure des salaires	1			1			
102	Formation professionnelle	4			4			
238	Revendications sociales	1						1
246	Situation des licenciés des mines de soufre en Italie	1			1			
274	Situation sociale de la Communauté	2			2			

N° d'ordre	Mot-Clé	Fréq. d'empl totale	Fréq. d'emploi par pays membre					
			A	B	F	H	I	L
59	Déclaration Schuman	1						1
67	Démocratie	3	3					
77	Discrimination raciale	1	1					
116	Groupes de pression	1				1		
128	Intérêts particuliers	1				1		
133	Liberté	2	2					
166	Opinion publique	1					1	
170	Paix	2	2					
203	Presse	8	2	4			2	
234	Responsabilité de la Communauté.							

I.P.S.A.

A.I.S.P.

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IN THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT
DISCUSSION ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

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A Reconsideration of Federalism in the Scope of the
Present Discussion on European Integration *

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Introduction.

Europe's experience in integration continues to split the theoretical debate on international organization. The rise of supra-national functionalism to which Europe owes its existence as a Community still provides the most controversial interpretations, and Europe's political classification remains a critical issue. Ernst Haas defines Europe's present structure in terms of a new form of "regional government" under modern conditions of technocracy and pluralism.¹ Stanley Hoffmann prefers to call it a "halfway house" which must either snowball towards full political union or roll back to the nation-state level.² David Mitrany considers the Community as a strictly functional body which would be misused when molded into a more ambitious political framework.³ Finally, Carl J. Friedrich views it as the carrier of an emergent European nation with compelling potentials for a federal state.⁴ While Europe's would-be polity obviously still is waiting for its definition, its discussion could be at least prepared by directing the attention to existing traditional concepts which may block or confuse the unbiased search for a meaningful political framework of European integration.

As a reasonably clear and readily communicable political goal, federalism has attracted broad support from the very beginnings of European cooperation. The idea of a United States of Europe could effectively serve as a European symbol of emancipation, peace, liberty, etc. European federalists have indeed mobilized the major forces on which the "New Europe" is based. But did federalism succeed to transcend the dimension of hope, ideology and symbolism towards an explanatory theory of European integration? Can it provide Europe with a realistic political pattern reconciling her own interests with those of the world-political environment? The object of this paper is to reconsider the general relevance of the federalist approach to integration by tracing some of its most significant ideological, theoretical and practical aspects in the present debate on European integration.

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Ideological Roots of European Federalism

Federalism has served as a symbol and ideal of a peaceful international order at least since Kant proclaimed the "inevitable" interdependence of "eternal peace" and a "federation of free states". Placed into the broader framework of a philosophy of history Kant developed the forceful idea that man's own moral failure, his persistent antagonism, would force him to join into a "perfect civic association" of cosmopolitan scope.⁵ Exhausted from excessive, never-ending wars, mankind, so argued Kant, will come to the point where it has no other choice than "to leave the lawless state of savages and to enter into a union of nations wherein each, even the smallest state, could expect to receive its security and rights - not from its own power or its own legal judgment - but only from this great union of nations (Foedus Amphictyonum) and from united power and decisions according to the united will of them all. However fanciful this idea may seem..., it is, nevertheless, the inevitable escape from the destitution into which human beings plunge each other."⁶ Though Kant was not entirely clear about the federal structure of his "union of nations" about which he says at one place that it "would not necessarily have to be a state of Nations (Voelkerstaat)⁷, he leaves no doubt about the necessity of introducing a "united power", despite all remaining national diversity. Unlike his spiritual forerunner, the Abbé St. Pierre, who in his famous "Projet pour rendre la Paix perpétuelle en Europe" (1713-1717) still thought in more traditional terms of a league of European monarchs, Kant already stressed the need for an institutionalized central authority, a central federal government as a guarantor of eternal peace.

It is certainly no surprise that after the catastrophes of two world wars this Kantian idea of an "inevitable escape" from war through a merging of nations into a "federalism of free states" was enthusiastically revived. In 1948 a leading federalist scholar celebrated Kant as the spiritual father of the United Nations: "What is more, looking back from San Francisco in 1945 we can test his (Kant's) ideas by the intervening century and a half and we can say 'He was right'".⁸ And Kant again is living in his critique of the loose-type organizational pattern of the U.N.: "the 'moral' propensities of man require an institutional framework for the realization of a 'more perfect league'. Only a true international government can free the common man in all mankind to help maintain peace."⁹

The same neo-Kantian federalist ideology naturally had and still has a strong impact on the European movement after World War II. When in 1944 the European Resistance Movement declared: "Federal Union alone can insure the preservation of liberty and civilization on the continent in Europe and enable the German people to play a peaceful role in European affairs"; or when Churchill two years later in his famous Zurich speech proclaimed: "We must build a kind of United States of Europe", a Europe

"as free and happy as Switzerland", a Kantian "inevitability" was looming behind these postulates: Did not Europe's total exhaustion and the challenge of growing non-European world powers make the federation of Europe an "inevitable escape" ?

Stimulated by the increasing tension of the "cold war" and the enormous task of economic reconstruction the federalist conception of a United Europe certainly became the most popular vision of a future Europe. It attracted both politicians who believed in the necessity to make Europe a bulwark against Soviet expansionism, and economists who saw the expansive chances for a larger European market.

European federalists were most actively involved in the creation of first institutionalized forms of European cooperation. The council of Europe emerged in 1949 in a compromised form of the original proposal of the French Foreign Minister, George Bidault, to create a European federal parliament. And federal hopes, too, were looming behind the crucial project to pool French and German steel under common institutions open to the other countries of Europe, a plan which was to give birth to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The original practical focus of the ECSC project was to gain control of the rapidly recovering heavy industry of Germany at the Ruhr and to settle the Saar problem. But when the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, made his famous ECSC-declaration on May 9, 1950, it clearly reflected a merging of federalist ideology and pragmatic functionalist strategy.

Functional integration in the field of coal and steel was conceived as a first step towards a European federation. "The European federation", declared R. Schuman, "is indispensable to the maintenance of peace... but Europe will not be made all at once, as a single whole : it will be built by concrete achievements which first create de facto solidarity The pooling of coal and steel production will immediately provide for the establishment of a common basis for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe."¹⁰

The events following the foundation of the ECSC, in 1952, have indeed proved the basic soundness of the Schuman-Plan within its self-imposed functional limitations ; the Plan has solved a specific problem of European economic development and has promoted peaceful cooperation in general. But did the pooling of coal and steel achieve the promised "first step in the federation of Europe" ?

The defeat of the EDC and EPC proposals in 1954 demonstrated the discrepancy separating Europe's federal ideal from her political reality. Military integration and the creation of a full-scale federal institution like the planned European Executive Council could gain significant support under

the pressure of the Berlin Blockade and Korean War. But, to the extent that the image of the U.S.S.R. as the potential aggressor against whom the EDC had been designed in the first place weakened, Europe's federal potential seemed to fade away. And yet, European federalists like W. Hallstein interpreted the political experience of 1954 as a "school of victory" ¹¹ as it necessitated the return to the less ambitious and more pragmatic strategy on which the Schuman Plan was based. The federalist ideology survived its political defeat under the shelter of a functionalist strategy. It reappeared after the EDC crisis as the secret superstructure of Europe's economic relance (EEC) and since then has remained a faithful companion of Europe's experiments in supra-national functionalism. The Community, though in itself a functionally limited type of supra-national organization, became a carrier of federalist hopes, expectations, and predictions from the very beginning of its existence.

The functional approach to federal integration

The theoretical analysis of European integration has been significantly influenced by the "compelling logic" and success of a theory of action as it was developed by Europe's leading activist Jean Monnet. His action scheme for a United States of Europe stimulated a characteristic merging of functionalism and federalism which has changed the traditional face of federalist theory. Monnet's influence was crucial for the formative period of the Community, from the supra-national experiment of the Coal and Steel Community to the pragmatic "relance Européenne" after the EDC defeat. He was the real architect of the Schuman Plan which he formulated with a devoted band of assistants from the key position as head of the French Planning Commission. His Action Committee for the United States of Europe, founded in 1954 after his resignation from the presidency of the High Authority, was most actively involved in the mobilization of support for the Common Market and Euratom treaties. ¹²

Monnet's political conception of Europe is a definite "third force" doctrine, and federalism appears as its necessary complement. Europe's weakness, he argued, is a steady source of conflict inviting Russian invasion and begetting permanent American countermoves. A peaceful international system requires an independent and strong Europe which can maintain itself against both Moscow and Washington, thus diminishing cold war tensions by reducing world bi-polarity of power. To create "this new giant big enough to hold its own in a world of giant powers" ¹³ intergovernmental cooperation is condemned as futile. Only federation, not a union of states, is considered as an adequate political basis of Europe's political emancipation as a "third force".

To achieve this federation of Europe under conditions which did not favor an aroused public support, Monnet and his team developed and practiced the strategy of functional integration. The premise of this functional approach to integration is that the complex interrelation of politics and economics under modern conditions creates a margin of non-controversial common interests, which makes it possible to cooperate in specific functionally limited fields without touching high politics. Relying on a continuum between economics and politics, the functionalist strategy stresses the indirect penetration of the political by way of the economic. Political integration is viewed as the final stage of a cumulative process of economic integration. Hence Monnet considered it tactically useful to merge "federally" different important economic sectors, like coal, steel, and atomic energy on the one hand, and to create a competitive free market on the other hand. In both cases the dynamics of economic integration, if properly managed by a non-national, detached, technocratic body of "Europeans", was expected to lead to "full federation" by confronting governments with inescapable economic faits accomplis.

We find the theoretical confirmation of Monnet's doctrine in E. Haas' early studies on the European Community. In his "The Uniting of Europe" (1958), E. Haas seemed to identify the cumulative logic of economic integration as set at work in the Community with a federalizing logic when he remarked, in regard to the existing European supra-nationality: though "not federal in nature, its consequences are plainly federating in quality merely because it activates socio-economic processes in the pluralistic-industrial democratic milieu in which it functions".¹⁴ Almost all the criteria (of supra-nationality) point positively to federation.¹⁵ This same idea of a continuum in the relationship between economic and politico-federal integration is repeated and radicalized in the paper "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration" (1964). Here E. Haas and Ph. Schmitter calculate the "spillover" from economic to political union (one form of which is federal union) in terms of "automaticity" given the existence of favorable "background conditions" (size of units, rate of transaction before union, pluralism, elite complementarity), adequate "conditions at the time of economic union" (governmental purposes, powers of union) and a "high" score in "process conditions" (decision-making style, rate of transaction after union and adaptability of governments). In Western Europe -- the "model pattern of successful politization of economic unions", according to Haas and Schmitter -- "the element of automaticity . . . is provided by the internal logic of industrialism, pluralism and democracy".¹⁶

Preceding Haas' and Schmitter's attempt to develop a fixed pattern of variables from which to derive the political potential of a process of economic integration, W. Hallstein already expressed the similar idea of a "compelling and inexorable logic of economic integration" which under conditions of modern industrialism is expected to flow over into a political process.

"Economic integration", according to Hallstein, "is a response to a political challenge, a political response that is also a political process";¹⁷ "the logic of economic integration leads on toward political unity by way of the fusion of interest".¹⁸ In short, the formation of a European federation is conceived in terms of a cumulative movement, a "continual revolution" triggered by the functional expansion of the originally "economic" Community.

Both Hallstein and Haas evidently draw from the same old theoretical tradition which can be traced back at least to Friedrich List's famous Zollvereintheorie in Germany,¹⁹ a tradition which was continued by Friedrich Naumann when he proposed in 1915 a customs union between Germany and Austria which would involve an "economic government", the indirect sphere of activity of which he believed to include commercial legislation, social welfare and many other things which could not clearly be separated from a purely politically oriented integration.²⁰ In 1939 W. O. Henderson, a British expert on the Zollverein, likewise pointed out the dynamic structure of customs unions, when he concluded that they "can seldom be regarded as a permanent arrangement. Its members must sooner or later decide if they are to go backwards or forwards If they go forwards they unify their economic organizations as far as possible".²¹ And, in the words of a League of Nations study on customs unions to which Hallstein refers in particular, "to assure uniformity of policy some political mechanism is required. The greater the interference of the state in economic life, the greater must be the political integration within a customs union."²²

The Zollverein theory and its modernized functionalist version developed in the European context raises some serious questions concerning the nature of "federalizing processes" in general. Not only the presupposed priority of economics as the way to federal integration, but also the image of the process, the gradual, cumulative approach to federal union, deviates from "classical" theory of federalism which regards integration first of all in juridical and institutional terms. Haas and Schmitter admit the difficulty of finding sufficient historical data to back their economic version of federal integration. With the exception of the German Zollverein, they believe that "recent history alone affords the instances in which voluntary economic integration preceded formal or informal steps towards political unity."²³ But if the victory of economics over politics" is an event limited to the age of industrialism (or post-industrialism), there still remains the question why this "victory" should be conducive to a federal type of political union as Haas assumed for many years of his preoccupation with the process of European integration.

The functional approach to federalism evidently presupposes that there is a parallel in rationality between economic processes and those conducive to the emergence of federal systems so that we are encouraged to think, with regard to Europe, of a continuous "federalizing process" in which

economic integration is a first step. To examine the soundness of this assumption we have to enter into a critical analysis of recent attempts to explain the emergence of federal systems.

Federalism as a process

Recent literature on federalism has paid increasing attention to the question of formation and change of federal systems. The sterile juristic dispute about a static design of federalism has turned into the attempt to develop a more flexible model of federalism which is capable of taking into account the dynamic of social and economic processes conducive to federal integration. In various discussions on federalism and European integration (since 1954), C.J. Friedrich has emphasized the need to replace the narrow established meaning of federation as a particular type of political union with the idea of a "dynamic process". A summary of his position is :

"that federalism should not be considered as a static pattern, as a fixed and precise term of division of powers between central and component authorities. Instead, federalism should be seen as the process of federalizing a political community, as the process by which a number of separate political organizations, be they states or any other kind of associations, enter into arrangements for making joint decisions on joint problems, or, reversely, the process through which a hitherto unitary political organization becomes decentralized to the point where separate and distinct political communities arise and become politically organized and capable of making separate decisions on distinct problems."²⁴

It is not difficult to recognize behind the flexible definition of federalism the "federal spirit" of Althusius (*Politica Methodice Digesta*, 1603) and his doctrine of "sympiotic association" in which Otto von Gierke (1880) identified the "federal" structures of the feudal medieval society.²⁵ Inspired by the example of the German City Leagues and the defensive federations of Switzerland and Holland Althusius designed the picture of a cooperative community of men (whom he calls "sympiotes") living together and united in contractual unions at successive levels of their political community. The family, the village, the town, the province, and finally the state are different articulations of "sympiotic associations" ; on all levels this type of a social union is composed of the units of the preceding lower level. There is a continuity of co-operation beginning at the level of the family as consociatio sympiotica conjugum and culminating in the "state" as consociatio sympiotica universalis.

Significantly Althusius himself does not use the term "federalism" before he turns to the problem of territorial growth and defense in chapter XVII of his *Politics*. "The augmentation and extension of the good of the associated body", he writes, "is accomplished through confederation or

association with others By their admission, the body of the universal association is extended and made stronger and more secure."²⁶ And he only briefly mentions two types of federal orders : a confederation which is either full (confederatio plena) or not full (confederatio nonplena) depending on whether the confederates retain their sovereign rights, their jura majestatis or not. This "fluid" transition from consociatio to confederatio has encouraged Friedrich to "synthesize" what Althusius still found worth being distinguished : the general associational symbiotic conception of political life, an essential idea of the medieval society and the principle of federation as a particular defensive articulation of this general type of co-operative association, an idea which Althusius characteristically dedicated "ad illustres Frisae inter Flevum et Lavicum ordines". While both conceptions, consociatio and confederatio, are certainly based on the principle of co-operation their co-existence in Althusius' theory indicates at least that such an extension of communal "sovereignty" was only "natural" or "fluid" under specific defensive conditions. And only by abstracting Althusius' social and political theory from its original historical background can it be expanded into the myth of a "federalizing process" which finally covers any co-operative relationship between "autonomous" units under the label of federalism. The present European Community, the North Atlantic Community, the British Commonwealth or even the United Nations -- to take some of Friedrich's examples -- automatically receive a federal decoration which can hardly serve to understand their present and prospective functions.²⁷

More strain is imposed on Friedrich's federalism when we consider the theological implications of his process-scheme. The federalizing process which originally was designed as a "permanent give and take" between cooperating communities secretly gains a cumulative pattern, becomes an "integrative federalizing process" with an "initial phase" (the international league), and a culminative conclusion, the "federal state".²⁸ Federalism finally is both a dynamic process and a static structural pattern which serves as normative goal of this process pointing in the direction of American federalism. In 1968 Friedrich optimistically wrote :

"not only ... Switzerland, Germany, Canada, Australia, the Union of South Africa, Brazil, Austria, India, Nigeria, Malaysia and many other countries have evolved a governmental structure of this (U.S.) federal type. The organization of the world at large into the United Nations points in the same direction, and so does the united Europe, though both are at present loose leagues or federations of states."²⁹

What are the patterns and conditions of "genuine" or "integrative" federalizing processes, i.e., processes which lead from a loose-type of federal cooperation ("federal order") to a centralized American-type of federalism ("federal regime"). Friedrich derives his cumulative scheme from historical illustrations such as provided by Swiss, Dutch, German or U.S. federal

experiences, and economic, social and cultural conditions are conceived as the "essential" factors of progressing federalization.³⁰ In a radicalized form this approach to federal integration has found its expression in K.W. Deutsch's (et al.) "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area". Summarizing their findings Deutsch and his collaborators have computed a list of nine "essential conditions" for what they call an "amalgamated security community" (a subgroup of which is federalism) which seems to be representative of the prevailing understanding of federalism as a response to certain socio-economic and cultural conditions :

(1) mutual compatibility of main values ; (2) a distinctive way of life ; (3) expectations of stronger economic ties or gains ; (4) a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units ; (6) unbroken links of social communication, both geographically between territories and sociologically between different social strata ; (7) a broadening of the political elite ; (8) mobility of persons, at least among the politically relevant strata ; and (9) a multiplicity of ranges of communication and transaction.³¹

J.S. Nye has pointed at the limited explanatory value of checklists like those composed by Deutsch or Haas-Schmitter as long as they do not specify the relationships between their variables.³² Riker refers to different defects of the Deutsch-list that cannot explain, for example, why the Central American Federation broke up, or why a pan-Arabic movement does not reunite the Arabic parts of the former Turkish empire though in both cases all "essential conditions" have been fulfilled.³³ More ambiguity is introduced by the fact that Deutsch's "essential conditions" may at the same time be conducive to a "pluralistic security-community". But if they can cover such a wide range of political "reactions" to what extent then are they still to be considered as essential or even explanatory for the specific formation of a federation ? Even "classical" federations like Switzerland and Germany don't fit into the Deutsch-scheme. The discrepancy between catholic, conservative and protestant liberal cantons as well as the cultural differences between Prussia and Bavaria still prevailing at the time of unification violate conditions (1) and (2). Conditions (3), (4), (5) and (9) were only satisfied in the case of the federation of Malaysia.³⁴

In face of these shortcomings the presupposed "continuum" between socio-economic processes and political (federal) union can hardly be justified. Deutsch characteristically uses the image of an "assembly-line process",³⁵ or the concept of "take-off",³⁶ in order to describe the "fluid" transition from "Background" to "process" on the way to federal integration : through an assembling of "essential background conditions" potential forces are accumulated which finally "spill over" into a process of political (federal) integration like an airplane that speeds along the runway and loses touch

with the ground once it has reached its optimal speed. Whether we describe the movement into federal integration as "spillover", "take-off" or "assembly-line-process" all these examples presuppose a rationality which can be calculated in quantitative terms natural to the world of mechanics and economics. But can we expect the same "fluid" rationality in the sphere of politics as long as human rationality is involved ?

In his recent study on the European Community Friedrich illustrates his process-scheme of federal integration with new "organic" concepts which despite their "humanistic" undertone point in the same direction of a socio-economic determinism. "Political, like other organic systems", he writes, "are primarily and basically characterized by creativity and growth, including reproduction."³⁷ The basis of growth is the economic and social sphere ; the institutional structure of a political system "reflects the social structure of the community". Ongoing community formation finds its political expression in specific federal structure of governance. The "federal state" itself organically emerges from the social sphere as a "recurrent form of effective organized co-operation between groups". The dilemma of this organic approach to federalism becomes evident as soon as we turn to Friedrich's empirical analysis of community formation in the European context. "Growth appears as a mystical entity qualifying any movement as federal in potential. No indication is given how to distinguish relevant from irrelevant factors of community formation. No criteria are developed to qualify societal processes as conducive to a federal type of integration (in Friedrich's terminology a "federal regime"). Nor do we know under which conditions social processes "overflow" into political structures. In short, there exists no explanatory theory of a federalizing process except the firm belief that a growing community will, sooner or later, end up in a "federal regime". Federalist theory absorbs the functionalist confidence in cumulative effects of linkage mechanisms and the spill-over dynamic of economic integration. Friedrich's extensive presentation of data concerning the achievements and growth of the European Community in the different fields of business, labor, agriculture as well as elite (universities) and mass communication is certainly helpful for understanding the facts of change in Europe but not the pattern of a "federalizing process". We know at the end that the Community is "very much alive and kicking". "The trends are forward, the prospects are that these trends are also slow, and the prospects are that there will be a great deal of up and down".³⁸ And in case our federalist confidence in these trends is not strong enough we still have Oliver Wendell Holmes to help out "The mode whereby the inevitable comes to pass its effort".³⁹

Thus, vaguely equated with co-operation, community formation and "useful instrumentality for good government" federalism loses its identity as a particular solution to particular problems of regional integration ; instead it becomes an "organic" complement of any "togetherness of persons"

and is potentially present as soon as people are forming some kind of a common interest or consensus which Friedrich somewhat mystically describes as the "federal spirit". This "federal spirit" overflowing in its maturity into "federal loyalty" and "federal comity" (federal behavior) represents the "microcosmic aspect of the macrocosm that is a federal regime".⁴⁰ The step from the behavioral into the "political" reality of federalism obviously follows the Hegelian in-itself-for-itself-pattern, a movement leading from potentiality to actuality except that the dimension of conflict and self-conscious particularity, the mediator of progress in Hegel's dialectic, is skipped. The political dimension of federalism is lost in its crypto-Hegelian interpretation as a process.

The political dimension of federalism

The shortcomings of the socio-economic interpretation of federalism are not only expressed in incomplete federalizing checklists and unsatisfactory explanatory theories, they become strikingly evident as soon as we turn our attention to the concrete historical situation in which "federal spirit" is transformed into political action, when we consider the specific act of making a federal constitution or concluding a federal pact. There is no way to understand events like the first federal pact between Swiss cantons in 1291, the signing of the Pacification of Ghent by Dutch states-general in 1576, the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 or the founding of the German Federation in 1871 - only to take some of the classical examples - in terms of organic growth or "spillover" or "take-off" process-schemes.

Each and every federal act certainly "emerges" from a specific socio-economic and cultural milieu with potentials for unification so that politicians develop a predisposition to unite, but at the same time this act transcends its milieu by "projecting" it into an external political environment of world politics. It is this coincidence of external catalytic conditions and conscious political action which is necessarily neglected as long as federalism is reduced to a socio-economic phenomenon. A few examples may help us to illustrate the bearing of this point.

The Swiss experiment in federal integration, stretching over more than five centuries, has little in common with Friedrich's organic model nor with any other cumulative process-scheme, except if we try to adopt a post-historical "grey in grey" perspective. W.E. Rappard in his study on "Collective Security in Swiss Experience" again and again stresses that the Swiss cantons "have always differed greatly from each other in size, in population, in wealth, and in social, economic and cultural structure".⁴¹

Their way into a federal union (1848) cannot be conceived without taking into account their permanent and pressing need for collective security in face of a neighbourhood of expansive imperial powers :

"It was because the thirteen sovereign cantons, in spite of their great military traditions ... failed to find security in the loose alliances they had concluded for their mutual protection, that they were most reluctantly driven to form a closer union among themselves. It might delight the patriot to believe but it would discredit the historian to assert, that the present Swiss federal state was born of the love of the Swiss cantons for each other ... it was in spite of their mutual dislikes, jealousies, antagonisms and quarrels, of which their annals are full to overflowing, that the cantons were led to sacrifice their age-old idols of local sovereignty.⁴²

The federal pact, in August 1291, between Uri, Schwytz and Unterwalden must be seen in the light of the death of Rudolf of Habsburg on July, 15, 1291, which put into question the charters of liberty obtained by the Swiss communities in 1231 and 1240 and increased the general sense of insecurity. The step into a centralized federal state in 1848 on the other hand is only intelligible when we consider the Swiss experience of French occupation during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period as well as the danger of a renewed French occupation in 1838, when the canton of Thurgau offered asylum to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte ; and finally we have to take into account the internal situation of the Swiss community threatened with a break-up under the separatist pressures of the conservative Catholic cantons. The draft of the constitution of 1848 was significantly preceded by revolution and civil war (Sonderbund War of 1847). And it is hard to see how this violent "take off" could be explained in terms of economic "spill-over" (triggered by an increased cheese production ?) or organic growth (maturity of the "federal spirit" ?).

The history of Dutch federalism offers similar obstacles to the prevailing socio-economic interpretation of schemes. The external environment again is that of imperial expansionism without which the "overflow" from community-formation into federal, political structures remains unexplained. Dutch federalism found its catalyst in the encroachment of the Spanish crown ; an event like the Pacification of Ghent (November 8, 1576) which stands at the beginning of its formation was preceded by the sacking of Antwerpen by Spanish troops (November 4, 1576). The first 30 years of the Dutch Republic were entirely determined by the events of war against Phillip II and later constitutional developments towards a centralized system were dictated by specific military conditions too.⁴³

The rise of American federalism cannot be placed into the same purely defensive context which determined the structures of Swiss and Dutch federalism and no attempt can be made to discuss the ongoing controversy between, for example, Beard's economic⁴⁴ and Riker's military interpretation of the Philadelphia convention.⁴⁵ Certainly both, military and economic interests were inextricably interwoven on the path to the federal constitution of 1787. But the prevailing tendency in our time to assume that any event can be reduced to economic and social factors makes Riker's emphasis on the specific external conditions the States were facing at the time of their federation particularly important. Such facts as the vulnerability of the American continent late in the 18th century, its confrontation with British colonial armies in the Northwest Territory, and Spanish troops in the Southwest (where New Orleans served as a base for potential expansion into the Ohio and Tennessee valleys), not to mention the Shays rebellion and the Indian wars, cast new light on the presupposed "rationality" of federal integration. Only in the conflict-full atmosphere of colonial expansionism and national emancipation could the dynamic of community formation and economic interests gain the political connotation of a "federalizing process". The act of "creating" the American federation finally appears as the conscious attempt to mediate the external challenge of colonialism and the internal dynamic of specific social conditions and economic interests.

In the case of Germany's path into a federal union in 1871 this catalytic function of the external environment and the conscious contribution of a catalytic agent finds its strongest illustration. A unification movement was alive throughout the 19th century ; it found its early emotional expression in the Wartburg Festival of 1817 ; the Frankfurt Parliament and Friedrich List's Zollverein (since 1833) were pointing into the same direction of a potential for unification ("federal spirit"). But by no stretch of imagination is it possible to understand Germany's path into a federal union in terms of a "gradual emergence of a German state out of the Zollverein"⁴⁶ Certainly the Zollverein had a useful function for preparing a favorable atmosphere in which the idea of a closer union could develop. But when we turn to the actual situation in which a Bavarian king, for example, decided to join with Prussia -- a power he still was at war with a few years before (1866) -- into a federal union, the Zollverein argument cannot convince anymore, and Bismarck's Emser Telegram and the French declaration of war brings to mind the political dimension of federalism : the external challenge of the European nation-state system and the conscious political action of a Bismarckian "federalizer".

Our preceding illustration of some of the shortcomings surrounding the socio-economic or organic interpretation of federalism finds theoretical support in Riker's attempt to set forth a new approach to federalism which is entirely confined to the political level. The result of his political reinter-

pretation of federalism is summarized in his definition of federalism as a "bargain between prospective national leaders and officials of constituent governments for the purpose of aggregating territory, the better to lay taxes and raise armies."⁴⁷ The "essential conditions" which Riker sees present in all federal bargains are reduced to two predispositions :

- └ (1) the expansion condition : "the politicians who offer the bargain desire to expand their territorial control, usually either to meet an external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for military or diplomatic aggression," but prefer to expand without the use of force ;
- (2) the military condition : "the politicians who accept the bargain, giving up some independence for the sake of union, are willing to do so because . . . they desire protection from an external threat or they desire to participate in the potential aggression of the federation."

The constitutional result of such a bargain, according to Riker, is reflected in a (1) two-level-structure of government, (2) each of which has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous and (3) each of which has "some" guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution) of its autonomy within its sphere.⁷⁴⁸

Riker's change of perspective placing federalism into the sober atmosphere of a political bargain first of all breaks the moral myth surrounding federalism as long as it is equated with virtues like community-formation and cooperation in general. His political definition of federalism points at the concrete environment of international politics in which the formation of federal systems becomes intelligible and relevant. The bargain itself as conscious mediator between socio-economic basis and external political demands disrupts the streamlined image of a "fluid" transition from "federal behavior" to "federal regime" and brings us back into the living world. A main problem which Riker's theory creates is implied in its too rigid formalization of federalism. Reducing federalism to strictly two conditions (military and expansion) makes it impossible, for example, to explain why England and France during World War II, when Churchill offered a merging of both nations, did not federate ; and Europe, in 1954, still fulfilled all conditions for a successful federal bargain, and yet it did not "take-off". Riker's "proof" that no federal bargain has been successfully concluded without "recognized need" for military unity is open to objections, too, since in many cases it may be hard to distinguish a fictitious "recognized need" for military unity -- like the famous "Communist invasion" of our days -- from an essential one. A more "comprehensive" and less formalistic approach to the phenomenon of federal integration, which would have to take into account both socio-economic conditions (Federalism cannot be abstracted from the rise of industrialism and the emergence of a new commercial middle class), as well as the political factors, could avoid such problems.

There is general agreement that military considerations have been involved in the forming of federal unions ; even federalist theorists like Friedrich and Wheare support this view :

" there appears usually to have been involved (in the forming of a federation) the common objective of resisting some outside pressure or threat of a military nature, a possible conquest even, to which all the potential member communities are exposed."⁴⁹

Placed into a broader historical perspective this military aspect of federalism can be easily explained when we bear in mind that the rise of federalism coincided with the collapse of the system of European empires and its violent replacement by the modern nation-state. In its original medieval forms, federalism was exclusively designed as a defensive order of smaller independent political entities (German and Italian city leagues, Switzerland, Holland) engaged in the desperate struggle for survival against their imperial neighbors ; and theories of federalism from Althusius to Rousseau and Kant reflect this defensive (Swiss-Dutch) conception of federalism. It was mainly the impact of the successful American rebellion and its constitutional aftermath that achieved the transformation of the federal principle from an exclusively defensive device into an effective unity capable of not only fighting but also replacing imperial dominance. This centralized federalism or the "federal state" with its characteristic predominance of the central government in matters of diplomacy and defense, supported by an exclusive demand of federal loyalty, became the modern "alternative to empire as a technique of aggregating large areas under one government".⁵⁰

Much of the glory surrounding federalism is due to its liaison with the world-wide rebellion against imperial dominance and the struggle for national emancipation. But it could be questioned whether this superiority of federalism over imperial forms of control is not itself exposed to limitations depending on whether the international system still requires the "militant" and exclusive qualities of nationally emancipated and federally integrated self-sufficient actors.

European federalism in global perspective

Our preceding analysis has revealed the limitations of reducing the phenomenon of federal integration to the sphere of socio-economic or organic necessities. Neither the logic of functional integration nor any other process-scheme, whether based on the dynamic of social, economic or even cultural and moral conditions can explain the qualitative leap from "federal behavior" to "federal regime". In the same way it is misleading to construct an "organic" link between cooperative patterns of interaction, as they exist, for example, in present Europe, and federal integration. "Cooperative" communities have been existing under most diverse political structure; the decentralized feudal political system of Althusius' Politics is only one example

and there is no evidence that present Scandinavian or British societies are less cooperative (or even less free) than other societies existing under full-scale federal constitutions. The forming of a "federal union", i.e., the deliberate merging of independent political entities under one central authority "for the purpose of aggregating territory, the better to lay taxes and raise armies," transcends the realm of adequate "background" and "process-conditions" and points in the direction of a specific international milieu and its demands. Without placing the emerging European community into a global political perspective, there is no way to judge the relevance and prospects of European federalism.

As we mentioned at the beginning of this paper, European federalism received its strongest impulse from the world-war experience and its military-diplomatic sequel and Jean Monnet's "third force" doctrine can be considered as a representative version of the global conception on which European federalists usually have based their plea for unity. With the fading of the cold war and the failing of the frontal approach to federal integration, in 1954, neo-functionalists, under the impression of the remarkable rise of supra-national functionalism, have been inclined to relate this federal ideal to the internal "necessity" of the cumulative logic of economic integration. In recent times, inspired by stagnating tendencies of the European Community and the growing Americanization of the European market, J. J. Servan-Schreiber has placed the problem of European federalism back into the classical context of an external challenge;⁵¹ while C. J. Friedrich's interpretation of the international scene points into the direction of a world-wide movement of emerging large-scale federations in the context of which the problem of European federalism seems to return into the natural circle of a Kantian "inevitability".⁵² In conclusion, let us review both these positions: Servan-Schreiber's challenge conception and Friedrich's neo-Kantian world federalism.

In the light of Servan-Schreiber's "Défi Américain" Europe's federal integration under a central authority based on majority rule appears as a necessary response to the challenge of American large-scale corporations: the basic objective of such a federation is: "devenir compétitifs avec les Etats-Unis"; "échapper à la 'colonisation' américaine"; "faire de l'Europe le foyer d'une civilisation autonome". The superiority of American corporations increasingly penetrating and dominating the European market is attributed to their impressive size, administrative capacity and close collaboration with universities and federal authorities. It is this "type moderne d'association 'Industrie-Université-Etat'" which, in Servan-Schreiber's view, contains the secret of America's economico-technological advance and which he consequently advocates as necessary goal of Europe's "contre-offensive" towards autonomy. A "strong central authority" is needed to promote the necessary merging of corporations, the creation of a "big science" and its educational basis.

Servan-Schreiber's analysis of the "European situation" is based on several critical simplifications which deserve our attention. First of all his information is one-sidedly directed towards the performance of American corporations ; he presents no data concerning the growth and achievements of the European Community and little as regards European corporations. His general conclusion : "l'Europe économique, au lieu de se faire, se défait",⁵³ though written in face of the EEC crisis in 1965/66, shows a significant impatience with the slowly moving complicated Community-system. A comparative performance analysis of U.S. and European corporations, for example, could demonstrate that from 1957 to 1967 "the U.S. corporations did not grow faster than their European... rivals".⁵⁴

The role of American investments in Europe is not carefully defined either. Is "challenge" the only aspect of a flow of capital into Europe ? Could it not be effective in inducing just the kind of changes for which Servan-Schreiber tries to mobilize a huge concentration of political power ? Recent tendencies towards transnational mergers within Europe seem to encourage this view.⁵⁵

A major problem results from Servan-Schreiber's narrow identification of national interest with the interest of certain dominant firms ; this pushes him into a new form of protectionism. His entire political conception centers around the idea of creating conditions which are helpful for European corporations to expand and penetrate foreign markets. While American universities are struggling for a margin of independence and autonomy against governmental and business interests, Servan-Schreiber demands the merging of university and industry into a "client-fournisseur" relationship.⁵⁶ Could we assume that European giant-corporations protected by governmental agencies would at the end be less "oppressive" than American corporations ? Is not the Japanese triumph of economic superiority and growth paid with more than doubtful sacrifices ? Europe's "autonomy", so urgently demanded under the guise of the "American challenge" seems to be less attractive when considered in this light of contemporary Japanese experience.⁵⁷

More doubts come up, when we turn to the actual political consequences of Servan-Schreiber's proposed "minimum fédéral". On the one hand he poses the sweeping goal of making Europe a "troisième civilisation de grande taille" competitive with both the U.S. and Russia and proposes therefore a giant merger of corporations, a new "association" of industry and university under a "strong" central authority ; on the other hand he tries to belittle the impact of such a "federal" restructuring of Europe by describing it in terms of a "limited" enterprise :

"...de quoi s'agit-il ? Exclusivement, et simplement de transférer, de l'échelle nationale à l'échelle européenne, un très petit nombre de problèmes qui ne peuvent pas être résolus avec efficacité au niveau des nations. Et tout d'abord : une politique industrielle et une politique scientifique face à l'Amérique".⁵⁸

Matching American power and influence without facing its political reality that is the seductive perspective of the "Défi Américain". What is the nature of a federation which has achieved "le type moderne d'association 'Industrie-Université-Etat'" ?

The problem of centralization and concentration of power needed to promote a "big science" and a "big industry" is never realistically discussed by Servan-Schreiber. Since the American rise to world-power the degree of centralization in all substantive functions of government is increasing rapidly ;⁵⁹ even the liberal state has turned into a mighty Leviathan under the burden of welfare, defense and finance responsibility. The present inability of the U.S. Congress to influence effectively the President's Vietnam policy may serve as illustration ridiculing the old myth on which Servan-Schreiber still draws when he writes that "les fédérations sont, par définition, des pouvoirs toujours limités, mesurés, forcément respectueux des diversités régionales".⁶⁰ As David Mitrany points out :

"For any new federal experiment, if meant to be free to develop the modern attributes of a welfare society, the working prototype is likely to be not the U.S. Constitution of 1787 but something nearer to the federal system of the U.S.S.R." ⁶¹

Servan-Schreiber characteristically never touches military matters when he designs the European "contre-offensive". His fascination with American bigness and power prevents him from any critical analysis of its sources. A few figures may illustrate the fallacy of his approach : ⁶²

In 1964/65, even before the Vietnam war, the U.S. government budget amounted to \$ 121,400 billion (France \$ 18,002 billion, West Germany \$ 15,075 billion), of which \$ 51,476 billion or more than 40% (France \$ 3,657, West Germany \$ 4,762 billion) were spent in military expenditures. Military organizations employed 3.5% of the economically active U.S. population (2.685 of 75.712 million) and 90% of the U.S. Government employment was related to the defense establishment. Defense procurement amounted at the same time to \$ 14,719 billion, which is 9.2% of the U.S. gross-domestic product originating in manufacturing, while \$ 7.950 billion were spent in defense related research and development (more than 50% of West Germany's total budget).

The interrelation of military establishment and governmental influence on industry and research is striking ; and yet Servan-Schreiber praises the U.S. expenditures for research and development⁶³ without ever mentioning that 47% of its \$ 17 billions (\$ 7, 950 billion) are part of the defense budget and applied to military related projects ; the same holds for his lavish praise of the close collaboration between U.S. federal government and big firms. The problem of a military-industrial complex does not exist for Servan-Schreiber ; the fact that corporations like Avco, Collins Radio, General Dynamics, L-T-V, Lockheed, Martin-Marietta, Douglas-McDonnell, Newport News Shipbuilding, Northrop and Raytheon have become defense contractors with government orders exceeding one half of their sales volume⁶⁴ is no matter of concern for the author of the "American Challenge".

It seems unlikely that Europe could go the competitive path of a "contre-offensive" without adopting the tools of American superiority. Demanding a big science, a big industry, big corporations without demanding a big army is illusive ; the "Imitation Américaine" cannot survive without accepting its own logic.

Discovering the American Challenge seems to imply more than copying it ; by placing Europe into the global context of growing multinational corporations Servan-Schreiber opens perspectives which necessarily point beyond myth and reality of a federalist solution à la U.S. American corporations are not the Red Army (nor the German Wehrmacht) ; they cannot replace the traditional catalyst of military challenge which would make a European federation a realistic goal. As long as a challenge still results in prosperity other methods than Europe's complete Americanization may be more appropriate to cope with problems of a technological gap. And Europe's cultural survival could be even more threatened when fully exposed to its own gigantism ; the separation of national (European) pride and corporate success could create a larger margin of critical thinking in regard to sense, method and consequences of economic and technological development, a margin which, for example, was lost when nationalism and capitalism co-operated in 19th and early 20th century Europe.

The actual challenge which Europe is facing - and which Servan-Schreiber only indirectly describes - is less American than international in scope. What the "Défi" has brought into public view is simply the fact that the international system has gained a "new" type of actor, the multinational large-scale corporation, the function and influence of which within the global context still has found little attention.⁶⁵ In size and scope of its organization as large, as powerful and as multifunctional as the nation-state, in geographical extent and operational structure transnational, the modern corporation escapes the traditional framework of international interaction creating new challenges which are only incompletely explained in Servan-Schreiber's term "colonialism". From a functional point of view the modern corporation has

lost its traditional "exploitative" face by shifting its activity from trade to foreign investments linked with a general exchange of ideas, technical skills and organizational know-how ; as such it has become an important platform for large-scale research and planning, imparting, through its size, stability and predictability to the world economy.

The problem of "colonialism", to which Servan-Schreiber directs our particular attention, consequently, is not a necessary implication of having to face large-scale corporations ; but it becomes relevant as soon as corporations, through structure and function essentially global actors with global responsibility, are tied to national prestige and interests. As G. Modelski has pointed out :

"... to function effectively as a constituent structure of the world society the corporation would have to satisfy two conditions :
(1) it would have to become international in substance and not in name only ; (2) the global dimension of its power would have to be brought into a relationship of responsibility and responsiveness to the world interest".⁶⁶

In the light of these preconditions for a positive functioning of multinational corporations a European strategy in the face of the "American challenge" is placed into a perspective different from that of Servan-Schreiber.

Priority of action shifts from reinforcing the national or regional basis of corporations, which are destined to assume a global responsibility, to its denationalization. The still essentially national character of modern corporations in fact creates a danger, but the point is not to duplicate but to cope with the "American challenge". If there is any power - beside the U.S. itself - with potential for assuming such a responsibility, the European Community would be qualified in the first place.

European business is stronger than Servan-Schreiber wants to see it. Qualitative change of European corporations towards multinational operations cannot depend on the existence of a European super-state, nor is gigantic size of corporations the absolute key to their success. Data presented by Hymer/Rowthorn do not support the view that size of corporations competing in Europe has been an advantageous, much less a crucial, factor in growth during the first decade following the establishment of the common market.⁶⁷ The problem of "colonialism" consequently is less the problem of Europe than that of the Third World, where both state enterprise and private capital are very weak and are in no way a match for the powerful business organization of the advanced world. By turning her attention to the international aspect of the "American challenge" Europe's own interests could become that of the Third World.

Taking the "American challenge" seriously i.e., relating Europe to a world environment in which global operations and interdependence are becoming the dominant challenge a federalist utopia of Europe seems to lose its attractiveness. The retreat into the ethnocentric milieu of a "self-sufficient" federal European state and its protectionist practice would unleash the very forces the "Défi Américain" is designed to master. There is no evidence that a European "colonialism" (if it does not yet exist) should be less challenging than an American. Accepting the functional limitations of a supranational European Community - a shelter still powerful enough to keep Europe competitive but eventually preventing it from becoming another American superstate - may keep Europe open to link its own interests free from "national" exclusiveness to that of a global interest.

In his "Europe : An Emergent Nation ?" C.J. Friedrich has tried to reinforce the position of European federalism with a new cultural dimension which seems to overcome Servan-Schreiber's vulnerable dependence on self-defeating economic arguments.

Europe is viewed as part of an emergent world of great cultures which are in the process of organizing themselves into politically viable entities :

"Whether one considers Asia, Latin America, Africa or the Arab world 'movements' for cultural integration, so-called pan-movements, have made their appearance and have spread. They all employ the idea of federalism as offering a potential solution to the problem of how to achieve a measure of unity while retaining a great deal of diversity."68

Regional large-scale federations, running from 100 to 700 million each, are expected to form around the integrating cultural heritage of the four world religions : Christianity, Mohammedanism, Confucianism, Buddhism. But linked to this basically peaceful trend towards cultural integration Friedrich introduces the element of conflict and challenge by referring to the existence of powerful "creedally based political communities" such as the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. While cultural units, according to Friedrich, are first of all "turned inwards", being "primarily occupied with themselves", these convictional units have a "markedly outward-bound propensity towards missionary activity and expansiveness."69

Placed into this context the idea of a European federation necessarily gains a twofold inevitability : in order to "survive" the challenge of Russian-American expansionism as well as in order to fulfill its cultural destiny Europe must unite :

"Europe is bound, in this world of emerging cultural and convictional federal unions of continental dimensions, to go forward in the direction of unification. For such unification is the ineluctable condition of its survival as a major factor and force in the world that is emerging."70

It is hard to see on what kind of empirical date Friedrich can base his global conception of federalism. It is true that pan-movements have gained some popularity in recent years but there is the same evidence that ideological conflicts are paralysing these very movements by splitting them into conservative and revolutionary camps. On the other hand it seems unlikely that our shrinking planet could leave much space for an "inward-turned" process of culturally based integration. Phenomenal progress in communications and transportation, new forms of transnational co-operation have created an interdependence of human activity that is rapidly diminishing geographical and linguistic barriers and dissolving regional integrity, the very preconditions of cultural block-building. Simultaneously, local national movements like those in Quebec, Ireland, Wales, Scotland, Brittany, Nagaland, West Irian, Biafra, etc. portend a trend towards international diversity instead of continentally sized uniformity. Recent experiments in regional integration in Central America, Africa as well as in Europe since 1954 have effectively contradicted all federalists' descriptions, explanations and predictions.71

But in the face of intractable facts there still remains a dimension of hope. The myth of the "federalizing process" which has intruded into the discussion on European as well as world integration can only survive on the basis of firm belief in a Kantian "Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent" to which we directed attention when discussing the ideological roots of European federalism. Interpreting the present international system in terms of emerging large-scale federations and concluding "that federalism also holds out the prospect of organizing the world at large"72 cannot mean more than confirming the Kantian hope that "the history of mankind could be viewed in the whole as the realization of a hidden plan of nature in order to bring about an internally - and for this purpose also externally - perfect constitution".73

Kant's bold historical speculation, developed in face of the French Revolution, was based on the assumption, we said, that though not men's moral perfection, at least his moral insufficiency would force him to introduce a "united power", to federate in order to survive ; or in the words of Friedrich's interpretation of Kant : "War is part of a hidden plan of nature to drive men onward to the establishment of a universal rule of freedom under law, that is to say, a universal, all-inclusive government".74

War appears as the secret "harmonizer" and "federalizer" of the Kantian society on its way to "eternal peace". The specific military conditions which have accompanied the rise of federalism from its very beginnings certainly confirm the Kantian "realism". Under Hobbesian international conditions of permanent war where, as Abbé de Mably wrote, "neighbouring nations are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a Confederate Republic",⁷⁵ the shelter of federalism, indeed, could become an "inevitable escape", and the logic of war could turn into a federalizing logic. But it is this very logic of war, on which Kant relied when he projected his "eternal peace", which has fatally defeated itself under modern conditions and created a new situation escaping any Kantian "inevitability". Kant did not and could not have foreseen the development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental rockets which have transformed the meaning and character of war and with it our international environment. Though war has evidently not ceased harassing the present international system its significance for accomplishing international purposes has greatly declined. In face of the constant threat to trigger total destruction war has lost its classical function of being the continuation of politics by other means and this in particular in highly industrialized zones like Europe. Under the perverse "shelter" of nuclear weapons the traditional escape into federal unions has lost its compelling logic. As no state can lose its freedom against the opposition of one great power new margins for independence, decentralization and diversity are established which do not fit into a Kantian federalizing scheme. As Stanley Hoffmann remarks : "Today's international system is a perverse seducer to diversity. It inflates each national situation, while it removes some of sovereignty's sting ... The mighty cannot use all the muscles they flex ; the weakly can safely boast of more muscles they have."⁷⁶ But perversions once in a while may turn into virtues.

With a diminishing priority of traditional diplomatic-strategic patterns of international interaction and advancing technology new diversifying forms of global communication are developing ; their impact is pointing in the direction of an emergent global network of political, economic and cultural relationships which in its complexity and diversity may disappoint the federalist champions of world government and cultural block- and nation-building.

But by avoiding a new large-scale tribalism, such a decentralized issue-oriented global system could remove the tension from the territorially based nation-state system without utopian demands for its destruction and thus safeguard mankind from a Kantian "federalizer".

By accepting the historical limitations of the Kantian vision of "eternal peace" we implicitly concede the historical limitations of federalism in general. Just as the rise of industrialism has undermined the viability of imperial forms of governance the advance of modern technology may diminish the inevitability of forming new and larger federal regimes and increase the importance of international organizations or supra-national bureaucracies as they are developing around the European community. The new world of global awareness needs new patterns of political organization.

Pas de Résumé.

Without Summary.

cb.

FOOTNOTES

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LES TERMES UTILISES POUR EXPRIMER LA NOTION DE FORMATION D'UN SYSTEME
POLITIQUE EUROPEEN

par

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1.- Le cadre de la recherche

1.1. Les sources: La présente communication s'inscrit dans le cadre d'une recherche plus générale concernant la terminologie européenne, recherche dont nous avons consigné les résultats dans une thèse doctorale soutenue en 1969 à l'Université de Liège (1).

Parmi l'abondante documentation traitée, nous avons retenu ici plus particulièrement les textes "politiques" qui représentent des moments significatifs dans le devenir européen de ces quelques vingt dernières années, car ils ont, par leur caractère officiel ou semi-officiel, inspiré le langage des innombrables commentaires consacrés au thème de l'unification politique.

1.2. Choix des termes: La notion proposée est celle de "formation d'un système politique européen". Dès l'abord, il nous faut donc distinguer:

- a) l'aspect dynamique, c-à-d. le processus qui conduit au système,
- b) l'aspect résultatif, c-à-d. le but final de ce processus.

Quant au processus lui-même, il recouvre toute une gamme de notions:

- idée de participation à une oeuvre commune: collaboration/
coopération
- idée d'établissement d'un lien permanent : association
union
- idée de création de l'unité: unification
intégration
fusion

Le processus étant non pas imposé de l'extérieur ni d'un sommet encore à créer, mais spontané, tous ces termes doivent être conçus comme nominalisations de verbes soit intransitifs, soit réfléchis (et non transitifs): collaborer, coopérer; s'associer, s'unir; s'unifier, s'intégrer, fusionner.

A cette liste de termes possibles, nous appliquerons le critère linguistique suivant: ces termes s'emploient-ils avec les adjectifs épithètes politique et européen et, notamment, de façon elliptique, c-à-d. sans spécification du sujet des verbes ci-dessus sous forme d'un complément du nom (p.ex. " union des peuples européens")?

En principe, tous les termes cités peuvent être accompagnés de ces adjectifs, mais le dépouillement des textes nous amène à constater que l'on ne parle pour ainsi dire jamais de

" collaboration politique et/ ou européenne"
 " association politique et/ ou européenne"
 " fusion politique et/ ou européenne"

Dans le premier cas, le groupe est rendu inutile par la présence d'un synonyme de niveau stylistique plus élevé et plus courant dans le langage diplomatique: coopération. Remarquons que l'équivalent allemand est par contre Zusammenarbeit et non Kooperation, beaucoup plus rare.

Pour le deuxième terme: association (all. Assoziierung, Assoziation), il ya en terminologie européenne spécialisation de sens (p.ex. l'association d'un pays au Marché commun), de sorte qu'il devient moins disponible.

Quant à "fusion" (all. die Verschmelzung, die Fusion, die Fusionierung), même les intégrationnistes les plus convaincus évitent un concept qui implique la disparition de la personnalité des éléments constitutants, en l'occurrence les Etats, (2) et l'emploi du terme reste limité à des contextes moins politiques comme " fusion des marchés" (3) et "Fusion progressive des économies nationales" (4).

Restent donc: coopération - union - unification - intégration que l'on trouve régulièrement avec les adjectifs: politique et européen dans des expressions elliptiques, employées de façon autonome, telles que: l'unification politique, l'unification européenne, etc....

- 1.2.2. Une seconde série de termes désignant le but poursuivi, c-à-d. le système politique européen, fruit de l'unification en cours. N'entrent évidemment plus en ligne de compte les termes purement dynamiques, mais nous retrouvons union (all. Union!) en concurrence avec fédération, confédération, et communauté.

Tous ces termes sont utilisés avec "européen", éventuellement avec "politique", à cette restriction près que "fédération" et "confédération" impliquent normalement un élément politique de sorte qu'ils sont plus rarement combinés avec cet adjectif.

Nous retiendrons donc: Union européennes

Communauté européenne

Union politique

Communauté politique

Fédération européenne

Confédération européenne

Un critère orthographique intéressant est la majuscule, souvent octroyée au premier terme (en fait souvent aussi au second, contrairement aux normes françaises généralement admises). Ce critère, qui correspond en allemand à la majuscule de l'adjectif (p.ex. die Politische Union) marque le passage de l'appellatif au nom propre, en l'occurrence le nom du système politique proposé.

Nous écarterons de cette brève étude:

- les périphrases, telles que " le rassemblement des nations européennes" (3)
- les métaphores, telles que " la construction européenne" (4)
- les slogans proprement dits, tels que "Europe unie" ou " Etats-Unis d'Europe".

1.3. Remarques de caractère sémantique; Le sens virtuel de beaucoup de mots et notamment de la plupart des vocables utilisés en politique- couvre une aire sémantique très large. Dès que l'on dispose d'un contexte, un des sens possibles s'actualise. Le contexte linguistique auquel nous venons de faire allusion, pourrait être appelé le " microcontexte". Mais il existe une autre forme de contexte, plus large, plus situationnel, qui naît de la moyenne des emplois dans un milieu donné. Ce "macrocontexte" est constitué ici par l'ensemble de ce que l'on appelle la "terminologie européenne". L'équivalent allemand " europäischer Sprachgebrauch" exprime mieux qu'il s'agit d'un usage- qui intéresse aussi bien l'emploi préférentiel de certains termes que le sens spécial de certains vocables ou encore la phraséologie. Sans remonter aux origines de certaines formulations, on peut estimer que cette "terminologie" s'est fixée surtout à l'occasion de la création des premières institutions européennes, dans le cadre de ce que certains auteurs appellent l'"eurosphère".(5)

Nous allons donc tenter, en analysant et en comparant les termes retenus, de préciser, par référence à ce contexte général, leur sens et les relations qui s'établissent entre eux.

2- Les termes désignant le processus.

2.1. Coopération (E. co-operation, A. Zusammenarbeit)

Le concept de coopération occupe une position à part, nettement en retrait par rapport au groupe union-unification-intégration. Il implique en effet la présence de partenaires distincts qui "coopèrent", c-à-d. qui participent à une oeuvre commune. Ces partenaires sont ici les Etats, représentés par leurs gouvernements. Nous sommes au niveau interétatique, intergouvernemental, sans création d'un ensemble plurinational ni même d'un lien organique.

"Pour les Etats, la coopération se traduit par la recherche, à travers des confrontations et des discussions permanentes, d'accords librement consentis".(6)

Aussi n'est-ce pas par hasard que nous trouvons les expressions "coopération politique" et "coopération européenne" notamment dans la première phase du projet d'Union politique (1961). Le communiqué du 11 février 1961, publié à Paris, dit p.ex:

" La conférence avait pour objet de rechercher les moyens propres à organiser une coopération politique plus étroite. ... Cette commission étudiera aussi les autres problèmes concernant la coopération européenne,..." (7)

Le rapport de cette commission nous montre quel est l'objet de la coopération politique:

" La coopération politique entre les Six est d'autant plus souhaitable que les traités de Paris et de Rome ont déjà établi entre eux une étroite communauté d'intérêts. Pour permettre à cette communauté de s'épanouir pleinement, il convient qu'ils confrontent leurs politiques étrangères et cherchent à les harmoniser dans toute la mesure du possible". (8)

Par coopération politique (E. political co-operation, D. politische Zusammenarbeit), on entend donc essentiellement l'harmonisation des politiques étrangères des Etats membres, à laquelle on ajoute parfois l'harmonisation de la politique de défense et de la politique culturelle. L'expression s'est fixée dans ce sens comme le montrent différents extraits des discours prononcés à la récente Conférence de La Haye, notamment par M.P. Werner:

" le moment est-il venu aussi de reprendre le dossier de la coopération politique proprement dite? Le Gouvernement luxembourgeois n'y est pas opposé, alors qu'à la longue on ne saurait concevoir le plein épanouissement de l'union économique sans un minimum de coordination des politiques étrangères, des politiques culturelles et de la défense." (9)

2.2. union (E. union, unity, D. Einigung, Zusammenschluß)

Le mot union couvre une aire sémantique très large, mais qui reste cependant motivée par l'idée d'unité incluse dans la racine du mot. D'une façon générale, on peut distinguer:

- le fait d'unir
- le fait de s'unir
- le fait d'être unis
- le sentiment de former une unité
- l'ensemble de ceux qui sont unis.

On voit que "union" a d'une part un caractère dynamique (création de l'unité) et d'autre part un caractère statique (existence de l'unité); nous laissons provisoirement de côté le sens résultatif " ensemble de ceux qui sont unis".

Le terme est fréquent dans les documents européens de base. Citons:

Le Statut du Conseil de l'Europe: " Le but du Conseil de l'Europe est de réaliser une union plus étroite entre ses Membres.." (to achieve a greater unity) (10).

Le projet de traité portant statut de la Communauté européenne:
"La Communauté est fondée sur l'union des peuples et des Etats,..." (upon a union of peoples and States) (11);

le préambule du Traité de Rome; " Déterminés à établir les fondements d'une union sans cesse plus étroite entre les peuples européens..." (einen immer engeren Zusammenschluß).

et enfin le communiqué de Bonn du 18 juillet 1961:

" s... soucieux d'avancer vers l'union de l'Europe... résolus à développer leur coopération politique en vue de l'union de l'Europe... ont décidé de donner forme à la volonté d'union politique, déjà implicite dans les traités qui ont institué les Communautés européennes... de donner aussitôt que possible un caractère statutaire à l'union de leurs peuples"
(D. Einigung Europas, politischer Einigung, Einigung ihrer Völker) (12)

Le rapprochement de ces textes et de leurs traductions nous amène à constater que "union" est employé pour désigner soit:

- 1- l'existence de liens entre les peuples européens, présentés comme fondement ou comme but,
- 2- soit l'établissement de liens (éventuellement politiques) plus étroits et surtout plus institutionnalisés.

2.3. unification (E. unification, D. Einigung, Vereinigung, Versinheitlichung, Einswerden)

La structure sémantique de "unification" est un peu plus simple que celle d'"union", car elle se situe tout entière du côté du processus. Il faut y distinguer l'aspect transitif, c-à-d. le fait d'unifier

{ soit des éléments = les rendre un ou semblables.
{ soit un ensemble = le rendre cohérent,

et l'aspect intransitif, c-à-d. le fait de s'unifier

{ soit pour des éléments = se joindre pour former un tout
{ soit pour un ensemble = devenir cohérent.

Dans le contexte européen, c'est ce dernier aspect que nous allons RETROUVER
le fait (pour les Etats concernés/pour l'Europe) de s'associer(volontairement)
en une entité (politique) non encore définie mais plus cohérente.

Dans les textes officiels qui nous servent de référence, le terme est surtout utilisé pour le domaine économique. Ainsi R.Schuman:

"l'établissement de cette unité puissante de production.. jettera les fondements réels de leur unification économique" (3).

On constate assez souvent un emploi parallèle de "union politique" et de "unification économique" (D. politische Einigung/wirtschaftliche Vereinigung): le terme "unification" impliquant plus nettement qu'"union" la création de l'unité, on peut voir dans cette distinction le choix volontaire ou diplomatique d'un terme qui engage moins.

Cependant d'autres documents proposent de "réaliser l'unification économique et politique de l'Europe" (13), d'apporter "une contribution décisive au processus d'unification politique de l'Europe" (14). Enfin, le communiqué final de la récente Conférence de La Haye charge les Ministres des Affaires étrangères "d'étudier la meilleure manière de réaliser des progrès dans le domaine de l'unification politique, dans la perspective de l'élargissement" (15) alors que l'Aide-Mémoire de la Commission de M.Jean Rey dans sa déclaration devant le Parlement européen parlent à ce propos de "l'union politique".(16)

Ces rapprochements de textes nous amènent à penser qu'il ne faut pas- du point de vue de l'usage- voir de différence essentielle entre "union politique" et "unification politique"; nous n'en voulons pour preuve que l'usage allemand, qui, dans tous les textes cités, à l'exception de celui de Schuman, donne comme équivalent "Einigung" et non "Vereinigung", c-à-d. traduit de la même manière "union" et "unification" dès qu'ils sont joints à "politique" (17).

2.4. intégration (E. integration, D.Integration, Integrierung, Zusammenwachsen, Zusammenfügung).

Ce qui frappe tout d'abord ici, c'est le contraste entre la fréquence de ce mot-clef de la terminologie européenne- de loin la plus élevée dans notre fichier- et le fait qu'il ne figure pas dans les traités européens, mis à part celui de la C.E.D. Ce succès est dû notamment à ses multiples possibilités d'emploi que nous pouvons schématiser comme suit:

A- intégration comme processus

- 1- dans son aspect transitif = le fait d'intégrer (das Integrieren)
 - a) un ensemble (p.ex. l'Europe)
 - b) des éléments (p.ex. les marchés)
 - c) un élément dans un ensemble
- 2- dans son aspect intransitif = le fait de s'intégrer (das Sichintegrieren) avec les mêmes nuances.

B- intégration comme état = le fait d'être intégré (das Integriertsein)

Mais qu'est-ce qu'intégrer? Selon une tradition qui remonte en fait à H.Spencer et passe par Max Huber et Rudolf Smend, intégrer, ce n'est pas fondre en un tout indistinct (fusion), ce n'est pas simplement unir par un lien (union), ni unifier des éléments sur un même plan (unification), c'est créer, grâce à des centres de connexion, une unité nouvelle sur un plan supérieur, unité organique, caractérisée à la fois par une interdépendance des éléments et une différenciation de leur fonction dans l'ensemble. (18)

Quand les fondateurs de l'Europe et leurs disciples parlent d'"intégration", cette notion est toujours liée à celle des centres de connexion (Spencer), des facteurs d'intégration (Smend) que sont à leurs yeux les institutions supranationales.

"Lorsqu'on parle d'intégration des pays européens cela signifie, selon M.Schuman, fusionner des institutions qui jusqu'ici étaient purement nationales, les faire fonctionner en commun sous une autorité commune et en faire une organisation permanente".(19)

Citons encore le premier emploi officiel en liaison avec les traités, en l'occurrence le discours de M.W.Hallstein, chef de la délégation allemande aux négociations de Paris, le 3 juillet 1950:

"Die beabsichtigte Institution kann die ihr zugewiesene politische Funktion, nämlich ein Symbol der europäischen Gemeinschaft, ein integrationsfaktor für Europa zu sein, nicht erfüllen, wenn sie nicht funktioniert".(20)

De même, lorsque l'on parle d'"intégration politique", c-à-d. du fait (pour l'Europe, pour les pays européens) de s'intégrer politiquement, on entend par là: créer des institutions politiques communes qui, à leur tour, "intégreront" davantage les pays membres, c-à-d. renforceront leur interdépendance au sein d'un ensemble cohérent, mais différencié.

Remarque: il n'est pas surprenant que les adversaires de la supranationalité aient attaqué aussi le concept d'intégration et que, par un procédé caractéristique du langage de la propagande politique en aient volontairement déformé le sens par de fausses synonymies. Les exemples les plus célèbres sont fournis par les déclarations du Général de Gaulle, p.ex.:

"Mais elle entend que cette union s'établisse sur la base des réalités et non pas sur je ne sais quelle intégration d'Etats, où les pays seraient dissous..." (21)

"le réseau des conventions antérieures qui nous assignait un rôle de nation dite "intégrée", autrement dit effacée".(22)

Ce dénigrement par association est avec l'ironie, les guillemets, les soi-disant, etc... une façon de mettre en question la terminologie idéologique adverse, comme l'a montré avec pertinence W.Dieckmann dans "Information oder Überredung". (23)

Si nous faisons abstraction de cette définition idéologique (intégration = fusion), nous pouvons résumer le sens habituel des quatre expressions retenues par un critère distinctif, nécessaire et suffisant, mais non exhaustif quant à leur définition: (24)

- la coopération politique: l'harmonisation des politiques étrangères;
- l'union politique: l'établissement de liens politiques plus étroits;
- l'unification politique: la constitution d'une entité politique;
- l'intégration politique: la création d'une autorité politique commune.

Il y a entre ces notions une gradation évidente dans le sens de la cohésion. Coopération reste en deça de l'idée d'établissement d'un lien organique, union et unification exprimant cette idée à des degrés divers, mais le système politique qui en résulterait n'étant pas défini, les deux mots sont souvent employés indistinctement, enfin intégration implique un tel degré de cohésion qu'il est le seul de ces termes à avoir été mis en question dans la lutte idéologique autour de l'Europe.

3.- Les termes désignant le but:

Nous avons retenu une série d'expressions qui désignent le système politique européen auquel doit aboutir le processus étudié: Union européenne, Fédération européenne, Confédération européenne, Communauté européenne. Lorsque l'on veut en scruter le sens, il apparaît bien vite que l'on ne peut procéder de façon purement sémantique, mais que l'on doit absolument situer ces expressions dans le contexte politique où elles ont été employées. En effet la plupart des dénominations politiques ne prennent un sens plus ou moins précis que par rapport à une situation politique donnée. On s'aperçoit aussi qu'elles obéissent souvent au principe de bipolarité, c-à-d. que des dénominations qui, dans leur sens lexical, ne sont pas nécessairement des antonymes et qui ne sont parfois séparées que par une nuance, sont employées par des groupes idéologiques adverses de sorte qu'elles s'opposent l'une à l'autre. Comme le dit Jean Dubois, " la structuration paradigmatique est faite d'oppositions et d'identités pertinentes à l'intérieur d'un groupe socialement et historiquement défini". (25)

Dans le langage " européen" de telles oppositions pertinentes nous paraissent être constituées par:

<u>Union européenne</u>	et	<u>Fédération européenne</u>
<u>Fédération européenne</u>	et	<u>Confédération européenne</u>
<u>Union politique</u>	et	<u>Communauté politique</u>

3.1.	<u>Union européenne</u>	et	<u>Fédération européenne</u>
	E. European union		European federation
	D. Europäische Union		Europäische Föderation
	Europa-Union		Europa-Föderation
			Europäischer Bund

Au sens résultatif de "union": ensemble de ceux qui sont unis, qu'il s'agisse d'individus ou de groupes - se rattache l'emploi traditionnel dans la langue diplomatique pour désigner des unions d'Etats. Le terme n'est pas très précis puisqu'il entre aussi bien dans dénomination de fédérations très structurées comme l'Union soviétique et d'alliances comme l'Union de l'Europe occidentale que de simples régimes contractuels comme l'Union Européenne des Paiements. Le Dictionnaire de la terminologie du Droit international (1960) en donne une bonne définition sous B:

" Terme employé parfois dans un sens général pour désigner ou qualifier un groupement politique d'Etats ou de territoires avec l'intention d'insister sur ce qui les rapproche sans méconnaître ce qui les distingue ".

Dans les premières années de l'après-guerre, "Union européenne" est le mot d'ordre de la plupart des mouvements qui veulent l'unité de l'Europe. Signalons comme témoins parmi beaucoup d'autres les ouvrages de Paul Bastid: " L'Union européenne" (1948) et d'Olivier Philip " Le problème de l'union européenne" (1950). A cet égard, " Union européenne" peut être considéré comme un slogan général et apparaît même dans un manifeste nettement fédéraliste comme celui de Hertenstein (1946):

" Art.4: Les membres de l'Union européenne transmettent une partie de leurs droits de souveraineté économiques, politiques et militaires à la fédération créée par eux". (26)

La résolution politique du Congrès européen de La Haye (10 mai 1948) exigea la "création d'une Europe unie sous forme d'une Union ou Fédération de tous les peuples européens" (26). Ce texte de compromis est le témoignage historique de la polémique qui s'était fait jour entre " unionistes" et "fédéralistes" et qui allait se poursuivre dans le cadre du Conseil de l'Europe. "union" prend ici un sens restrictif, qui exclut le transfert de droits de souveraineté à des autorités supranationales et se réfère à un système d'accords multilatéraux.

Ce sens restrictif de "union" ne s'explique en fait que par l'opposition entre les deux mots d'ordre: union et fédération. Le fédéralisme implique toujours une répartition des pouvoirs entre la Fédération (ou l'Etat fédéral) et les membres de la fédération. Selon la situation de départ, le "fédéralisme" désignera une tendance au renforcement des pouvoirs régionaux ou au contraire une tendance à l'établissement d'un pouvoir central, c-à-d. une tendance centrifuge ou une tendance centripète. Dans le contexte européen, vu l'absence de pouvoir central, la "fédéralisme" ne pouvait prendre que ce dernier sens: tendance à l'organisation de l'Europe en fédération. La conséquence en est la fixation de l'expression "unionisme" et du mot d'ordre "Union européenne" dans le sens restrictif décrit ci-dessus. Nous retrouvons d'ailleurs cette expression dans un texte certes peu "engagé", le dernier texte de la Commission Fouchet du 28 février 1962:

" Art.1. Il est institué par le présent traité une union d'Etats (et de peuples européens) ci-après désignée par le terme "l'Union européenne".(27)

Quant à "Fédération européenne", l'expression est avant tout restée le mot d'ordre des mouvements fédéralistes européens comme l'Union européenne des Fédéralistes, fondée en 1945 par M.H.Brugmans, qui insistait particulièrement sur la nécessité de créer des pouvoirs fédéraux européens dans les domaines législatif, exécutif et judiciaire. Elle est aussi passée, dans quelques cas, dans les documents officiels, l'exemple le plus célèbre étant le passage de la déclaration Schuman du 9 mai 1950:

"... cette proposition réalisera les premières assises concrètes d'une Fédération européenne indispensable à la préservation de la paix".(3)

Dans les documents des Communautés elles-mêmes, nous trouvons relativement peu d'allusions aussi nettes au but ultime. Citons ce passage de "Initiative 1964" qui reflète les idées de M.Hallstein:

"Nul ne peut mettre en doute le fait que le chemin vers la fédération européenne passe par les Communautés existantes. D'une part, un échec des Communautés signifierait pour notre génération qu'elle ne verrait pas de communauté politique accomplie; d'autre part, tant que vivront les Communautés et qu'elles conserveront leur dynamisme, il restera une chance réelle que se fasse une véritable fédération".(28)

En résumé nous constatons:

- 1) que "Fédération européenne" est plutôt un mot d'ordre des mouvements européens et n'est employé qu'avec réserve dans les textes officiels pour désigner le but ultime des efforts d'unification européenne:

2) que par suite de la polémique entre "unionistes" et "fédéralistes", "Fédération européenne" s'oppose en tant qu'expression de latendance maximaliste à "Union européenne" comme expression de la tendance minimaliste ;

3) que "Union européenne" est employé dans un sens très vague, impliquant au moins un système d'accords multilatéraux alors que "Fédération européenne" se réfère à une nouvelle organisation de l'Europe, dans laquelle une autorité centrale détiendrait les pouvoirs généralement attribués à l'Etat fédéral (on parle d'ailleurs parfois d'"Etat fédéral européen"/"Europäischer Bundesstaat"), les Etats membres conservant tous les pouvoirs qui ne seraient pas expressément confiés à cette autorité centrale.

3.2. Fédération européenne et Confédération européenne

(E. European confederation
D. Europäische Konföderation
Europäischer Staatenbund).

Si "Fédération européenne" s'oppose à "Union européenne", il s'oppose aussi à "Confédération européenne" dans un contexte politique que nous allons analyser.

La notion de confédération (d'Etats)" ne correspond pas à une catégorie rigoureusement définie du droit international" reconnaît le Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international, qui donne cependant une définition assez exhaustive. En général, on admet qu'une confédération est une "union de plusieurs Etats qui s'associent tout en conservant leur souveraineté", et qu'une fédération est "une union de plusieurs Etats en un seul Etat fédéral" (29), ou encore qu'une fédération est fondée sur une constitution et une confédération sur un traité (30).

L'alternative apparaît au moins une fois officiellement dans les textes des Traités européens, à l'article 38 du traité instituant la C.E.D. (27 mai 1952):

" l'organisation de caractère définitif qui se substituera à la présente organisation provisoire devra être conçue de manière à pouvoir constituer un des éléments d'une structure fédérale ou confédérale ultérieure..." (31)

Mais l'expression "confédération européenne" s'est cristallisée dans le langage des gaullistes comme opposition à "fédération européenne" et ce processus peut être suivi en détail dans le remarquable ouvrage de Edmond Joue "Le Général de Gaulle et la construction de l'Europe". L'auteur lui-même fait remarquer que de Gaulle a employé quelquefois - entre 1944 et 1951- l'expression "fédération européenne", soit "par inadvertance", soit par calcul (32), mais qu'il a toujours eu en vue une confédération européenne. A partir de novembre 1951, nous trouvons ce terme dans de nombreuses déclarations relatives à l'Europe, dont nous citerons les deux plus typiques:

"Depuis des années, je pense - avec beaucoup d'autres d'ailleurs- que la communauté européenne doit être une confédération. Oui, une confédération d'Etats constituant entre eux un pouvoir confédéral commun, auquel chacun délègue une part de sa souveraineté" (33)

"On sait aussi que la France oppose à ce projet (d'une fédération européenne, dans laquelle... les pays perdraient leur personnalité nationale...).. le plan d'une coopération organisée des Etats évoluant, sans doute, vers une confédération".(34)

On trouve la même conception chez G.Palswski, auteur d'une proposition de résolution sur l'organisation d'une confédération européenne (29.12.1951), M.Billotte, Peyrefitte (" la confédération qui unit les Etats par le sommet tout en respectant l'autonomie de leurs bases") (35), M.Debré, L.Terrenoire, Couve de Murville. Que les gaullistes soient restés fidèles à cette conception et à cette terminologie, on le constate à la lecture de la dernière conférence de presse du Président Pompidou. (36)

L'expression "confédération européenne" participe de la nature du slogan par la distorsion du rapport de deux termes en soi assez proches et l'insistance sur ce qui les sépare. Dans cette opposition, c'est surtout "fédération" qui est volontairement faussé par le procédé du dénigrement par association, en l'occurrence avec la notion de fusion ("Pour l'Europe, une confédération, oui, mais pas une fusion") (37).

Cependant, il y a plus qu'un slogan. Si l'on s'en tient aux déclarations gaullistes, il est fait mention plus d'une fois de "délégation de pouvoirs", ce qui semble un élément commun à une fédération et à une confédération. Sans entrer dans une analyse politique des différents projets gaullistes, il faut constater que cette délégation se ferait à un organe composé des chefs de gouvernements, notamment dans le projet Debré du 6 janvier 1953 (38) et dans les propositions Peyrefitte de 1960 (39). On peut donc estimer que le terme confédération- qui implique généralement le fait pour les Etats de garder leur souveraineté et de s'unir par un traité- est choisi pour souligner le rôle éminent des gouvernements nationaux dans cette construction.

3.3. Union politiqueet Communauté politique

E. Political union
D. Politische Union

Political Community
Politische Gemeinschaft

" Les trois communautés économiques européennes sont déjà des communautés politiques. Cependant dans le vocabulaire 'européen' l'usage a prévalu de désigner des termes 'Communauté politique' ou 'Union politique' les institutions à créer dans le but d'unifier ou de coordonner, non pas seulement, la politique économique des Etats adhérents, mais leur politique extérieure et de défense" (40).

- la Communauté politique (européenne): dès le moment où le terme 'Communauté' fut choisi pour désigner la première structure européenne de caractère supranational, la C.E.C.A., l'expression "communauté politique" apparut, non pas seulement dans le sens général que ces mots impliquent, mais dans le sens institutionnel d'une organisation qui encadrerait les Communautés spécialisées. C'est ainsi que la Déclaration commune, lue par R. Schuman le 18 avril 1951 à l'occasion de la signature du traité instituant la C.E.C.A., s'exprime comme suit:

" Ces initiatives, dont chacune est limitée dans son objet, devront rapidement s'inscrire dans le cadre d'une communauté politique dont l'idée s'élabore au Conseil de l'Europe. Il devra en résulter une coordination et une simplification de l'ensemble des institutions européennes" (41)

On sait que, sur la base de l'article 38 du Traité de la C.E.D., le Conseil des Ministres invita le 11 septembre 1952 l'Assemblée commune à élaborer un projet de traité instituant une Communauté Politique Européenne (42). L'Assemblée ad hoc constituée le 15 septembre 1952 rédigea pour le 15 mars 1953 le "Projet de traité portant statut de la Communauté européenne" (43).

Un des rapporteurs, Mr. F. Dehousse, commente le choix du terme:

" Disons le mot: la Commission constitutionnelle et l'Assemblée ad hoc ont fait... une "découverte" scientifique. Elles ont donné le jour à un type nouveau d'association d'Etats qui ne rentre dans aucune des catégories connues, quoiqu'il emprunte des éléments tantôt à la Confédération d'Etats, tantôt à l'Etat fédéral, tantôt même à l'Etat unitaire. C'est pourquoi le mot Communauté devient particulièrement précieux pour désigner l'œuvre accomplie". (44)

Il est évident que le terme "Communauté" avait été choisi par fidélité au nouveau concept introduit dans le droit international par la création de la C.E.C.A. et le traité en instance de ratification de la C.E.D. Ce concept, comme nous le verrons plus loin, implique la mise en commun de certains droits de souveraineté. L'article 1 du projet de Communauté politique déclare explicitement: "il est institué par le présent traité une Communauté Européenne de caractère supranational". (43)

Même lorsque l'expression est détachée de ce projet avorté et employé pour désigner le système politique européen à créer - ce qui se marque généralement par la minuscule - elle implique une certaine perspective: la "communauté politique" s'inscrit dans la ligne des Communautés existantes, qu'elle complète; elle est, par son caractère institutionnel, proche du type fédéral, comme le montre l'extrait déjà cité de "Initiative 1964". (p.11)

L'Union politique: cette expression s'est fixée également dans un contexte politique déterminé, celui des efforts entrepris à l'initiative de la France - du 5 septembre 1960 au 17 avril 1962 - et concrétisés par les projets Fouchet (n°1 du 3 novembre 1961, n°2 du 18 janvier 1962 et tableau comparatif du 28 février 1962). Les projets eux-mêmes n'emploient pas l'appellation "Union politique", mais "Union d'Etats", "Union des peuples européens", "Union d'Etats et de peuples européens", "Union européenne". (45), mais l'usage s'est établi de parler à ce propos de l'Union politique, comme l'indique d'ailleurs le titre du dossier Battista: Le dossier de l'Union politique, qui réunit tous ces textes. En les comparant et en contrôlant leur traduction allemande - qui est différente selon qu'il s'agit du processus (politische Einigung, politischer Zusammenschluss) ou de l'institution (Politische Union) -, on peut y saisir sur le vif ce phénomène de fixation.

C'est ainsi que la résolution de l'A.P.E. du 28 juin 1961 "demande aux gouvernements de déterminer les étapes de la réalisation progressive d'une union politique étroite" (Zusammenschluss) (46) et que le discours de M. Heath à l'U.E.O. le 10 avril 1962, demandant la participation de la Grande-Bretagne aux pourparlers, cite "l'Union politique" comme une institution:

"Vous avez décidé vous-mêmes que ceux qui désirent se joindre aux Communautés économiques comme membres à part entière doivent aussi se joindre à l'Union politique" (Politische Union) (47)

"Communauté politique" et "Union politique" forment dans une certaine mesure un couple d'opposition. M.F. Dehousse, p.ex., voit dans le passage de la "Communauté politique" de 1953 à l'"Union politique" de 1962 un recul de l'idée de supranationalité:

" Dans le domaine du droit public, j'accorde beaucoup d'importance aux dénominations. Les projets Fouchet n'emploient pas le mot " communauté", mais le mot " union" et l'union politique est moins qu'une communauté politique... La preuve en est que le rôle du Conseil des Ministres dans l'Union projetée par Fouchet est encore plus important que celui du Conseil des Ministres des Traités de Rome". (48)

Rappelons aussi que le Président Hallstein a souvent critiqué l'appellation " Union politique" parce qu'elle engendre selon lui une confusion:

" Avant de vous répondre, il faut exposer brièvement mes vues générales sur l'union politique; expression, qui, je le répète, risque de créer un malentendu, car il ne s'agit pas de commencer l'unification politique de l'Europe : elle a déjà commencé. Nous sommes dans une période expérimentale qui précède l'éventuelle communauté politique". (49)

De même que "Communauté politique", "Union politique" s'est détaché du contexte de fixation. C'est ainsi qu'on le retrouve (avec la traduction: politische Union) dans l'Aide-mémoire de la commission et le discours de M.Rey à propos de la Conférence de La Haye de décembre 1969. (16) Le commentaire de M.Rey:

" La Commission avait jugé souhaitables des progrès sur la voie de l'union politique. Elle avait déjà, auparavant, exprimé le désir qu'à défaut de créer ses institutions ou d'élaborer des textes ayant un caractère constitutionnel, on se mette au moins d'accord sur un programme d'action qui devrait être celui de l'Europe politique". (50)

nous fournit une analyse du contenu de l'union politique. Le terme peut se référer a) à un simple programme politique commun

b) à une constitution politique commune

c) à des institutions politiques communes, mais il semble bien que l'on ne puisse employer l'expression "communauté politique" que dans le sens institutionnel.

3.4. Communauté européenne (E.European Community, D. Europäische Gemeinschaft)

Dans sa déclaration du 9 mai 1950, R.Schuman avait proposé, au nom de la France, la création d'une Haute Autorité commune sans dénommer spécialement l'ensemble de "l'organisation projetée" (3).

Il s'ensuit dans les premières réactions un certain flottement quant à la terminologie : on parle du "combinat" (51), du "consortium" (52) et surtout du "pool" (53). Ces termes économiques manquaient assurément de panache.

Dans le premier rapport sur les négociations de Paris, l'organisation est désignée sous le nom de "complexe (économique)", mais le terme "Communauté" fait son apparition pour désigner l'ensemble des six pays :

" Afin de fournir à la Communauté le charbon et l'acier aux prix les plus bas, on a à nouveau confirmé le principe que le complexe ne pratiquera pas une politique protectionniste". (54)

Dans le Mémoire du 28 septembre 1950, on parle même des "frontières de la Communauté" et des "relations entre la Communauté et les autres producteurs", par contre, du point de vue institutionnel, des "pays membres de la Haute Autorité". (55)

D'autre part, alors que primitivement on envisageait un organe unique, le document Monnet du 28 juin 1950 prévoit une Assemblée et une Cour d'arbitrage, auxquelles on ajoute bientôt le Conseil spécial des Ministres. Il convenait que la personnalité juridique soit attribuée à une organisation globale, qu'il fallait dénommer "Communauté", sans anticiper sur la forme future d'un système politique, exprimait très heureusement l'idée que R. Schuman avait pérorasée par "fusion des intérêts", solidarité de fait" et surtout "mise en commun". Le terme "Gemeinschaft" plaisait particulièrement aux Allemands, chez qui il évoque l'idée d'un groupement organique. (56)

" Communauté" employé pour désigner une union partielle entre certains Etats avec des objectifs et des institutions communes, représente une nouveauté dans le langage international :

" De la sorte le terme "Communauté" appliqué au pool charbon acier, au Marché Commun et à l'Euratom va prendre un sens nouveau et inédit dans l'histoire des relations internationales. On a voulu distinguer ces institutions des autres organismes régionaux ou mondiaux existants" (57).

On pourrait définir la Communauté comme un sujet de droit international qui naît de la mise en commun de certains droits souverains des Etats membres dans un domaine déterminé par un traité.

Il est frappant de constater d'une part qu'aucun des nombreux projets fédéralistes antérieurs n'avaient employé ce terme pour désigner leur objectif et d'autre part que les Six lui sont restés fidèles à travers tous les projets et créations effectives qui ont suivi : C.E.D., C.P.E., C.E.E., C.E.E.A.

Actuellement, le pluriel: les Communautés européennes désigne les structures existantes: C.E.C.A., C.E.E. et Euratom, le singulier "la Communauté européenne" - au sens propre: l'entité juridique formée par la mise en commun des droits souverains dans les trois traités, appelés d'ailleurs à être fusionnés.

- au sens large, l'ensemble des six pays, l'Europe des Six.

Cette spécialisation de sens est attestée notamment par l'emploi d'adjectifs comme "communautaire", "intracommunautaires" et même "extracommunautaire" et, en allemand, par des dizaines de composés nouveaux.

La question se pose de savoir si cette dénomination est encore disponible pour désigner éventuellement le système politique européen à créer? Il semble que oui. Un précédent existe: au moment où l'on a voulu créer une Communauté politique, le projet fut finalement appelé: statut de la Communauté européenne, ce qui souligne son caractère global. D'autre part, si nous comparons l'expression aux termes concurrents: Union européenne - Fédération européenne - Confédération européenne, qui tous ont servi de mot d'ordre à des tendances diverse parmi les "Européens", on doit admettre que "Communauté européenne" est politiquement moins marqué. Ces quelques considérations nous incitent à penser que par delà l'approfondissement et l'élargissement des Communautés, nous pourrions un jour voir naître un ensemble politiquement uni qui s'appellerait "la Communauté européenne".

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WITHOUT SUMMARY.

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L'INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE

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The Common Market crisis of 1965 : ORIGINS AND RESULTS: 1962-1969

by

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- A. The problem: to understand the relationships between economics and politics in the Common Market area.
- B. Existing theories and relevant literature: Haas, Haas-Schmitter, Lindberg (see World Politics- January 1969), Deutsch, Etzioni, Hoffmann, Newhouse, Coombs.
- C. The research method: an empirical analysis of the organisations of the European economic integration and their behavior- inside and towards the national governments- concerning a central economic and a political problem: Agriculture.
 - I. General: Sociology and political thinking of the founders generation- Schuman, Monnet, Adenauer, De Gasperi, Spaak, Mansholt.
 - II. European vision and its elements in 1958- the economic motor to federalism. Birth of the " spill over " and " the point of no return " theories.
 - III. The organisational way to achieve the aims of the treaty - the Commission as the realisation of the treaty's frame.
 - IV. The main figures of the Commission during the period of the research: Hallstein (Narjes, Meyer), Noël, Gaudet, von der Groeben (Albrecht), Marjolin (Barre), Mansholt, Rey.
 - V. The strategy and tactics of the Commission concerning the common agriculture policy.
 - a. The decision-making process in the Commission.
 - 1. The initiative
 - 2. Role of General Direction VI and background of its main figures: Rabot, Heringa, von Verschuier, Krohn.
 - 3. The commissars and the president- the crossing point between national administrative traditions which made the " package " possible.

- b. The development of France's aims and tactics. The Commission's response;
- c. The role of Germany.
- d. The role of Italy.

VI. The unique features of the crisis: can it happen this way again?

VII. France's return and the Luxembourg compromise: An institutional and constitutional disequilibrium.

VIII. The Rey era:

- a. The policy of the Commission: " L'immobilisme en marche".
- b. The ascendancy of Pompidou, and the monetary difficulties in France and Germany in 1969.
- c. The " Plan Barre".
- d. The Hague conference and its results.

IX. European integration at the end of the Rey era:

- 1. The EEC was saved, and new areas of cooperation, especially in the finance area, were found thanks to the customs union and the common agriculture policy. A new drive towards the enlargement is opened.
- 2. The institutional and constitutional disequilibrium in the EEC organisation remained.
- 3. The gap between organised political society in the nation states and the superstructure of the EEC was widened- without any direct connection to the process of integration, or as an anti-reaction to it.
- 4. The attitude of the youth, especially of potential academic candidates to serve with the Community became hostile, more so in France and Germany.

Conclusions:

1. European integration cannot be modelised, measured or observed upon without a basic perception: the ever existing tension between society and political structures in the continental European nation states themselves. If taken into consideration, this makes the most sophisticated "spill over" theories and existing systemic models of European integration insufficient. They lack a dimension, which I would like to call "the autonomy of politics" in Europe, even if there is a very complicated and delicate connection between politics, economic and administration in the continent.

2. European integration as an ideology seems to be a product-mostly- of the non-leftist middle class thinking following the second world war and during the cold war. Yet, this thinking is a mixture of very individualistic, different, typical to its origin-frame of mind, which may be nationalistic and cosmopolitan, egoistic and very humanistic in the same time, and which bear responsibility as a political group to national interests and economics in the same time.

It was put into an organised test of birth by typical representatives of the national administrative traditions united under the European vision in an extremely interesting- and typical- way to a new, supranational bureaucracy. Hence their successes and failures: the very "organised" and "bureaucratic" character of the Commission- the heart of the integration process according to any existing model, the rare mixture of politics and technical details, which are a product of continental European administrative traditions, which still can achieve only a limited influence upon national politics. These remain, and continue to behave "autonomously", i.e.- in connection with the degree of tension between society and political structure in every nation state. This tension, grew severely between 1962-1969 in the ranks of the youth, without any direct connection to the integration process, and the leftist groups-not only the extreme left, tend to blame European "capitalistic" integration as one of the reason for the unhappy state of affairs in Europe.

The "European" youth and middle generation seem not to be able to follow always the above-mentioned mixture of politics and technical details, which is the key to the successes of the EEC central organisations. At the same time, they participate in the "autonomous" process of politics in their own countries, which is not always relevant to European integration. It may even contradict it sharply as in the case of the socialist parties attitude towards workers participation in the factory's management, which is, by the way, different in France and in Germany.

The candidates for the enlargement-Great Britain and the others- don't seem to understand the mixture either-yet.

3. Englands entry- and the new Commission which hopefully will regain more influence in the negotiations with London- gives us a chance to continue the above-mentioned empirical research in the first two years of the Malfatti era, which will be decisive to the future of the british question.

It is therefore suggested, to continue the research-on the agriculture problem and its implications (see Appendix A) as a part of the problem of the British entry, in order to reach later better conclusions about the relationships between economics and politics in Europe.

SANS RESUME

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ESQUISSE D'UN MODELE DE
L'INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE

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La présente communication reproduit, avec quelques modifications, le texte de la dernière section d'une communication plus importante qui a été rédigée à l'intention du Groupe de Spécialistes du VIIIe Congrès Mondial de l'IPSA ayant l'Intégration européenne pour thème d'activité.

En raison de sa longueur, cette communication ne sera pas distribuée par le Secrétariat du Congrès; elle sera directement adressée aux membres du Groupe par le Secrétariat de la Direction générale "Presse et Information" des Communautés Européennes.

On est parti de l'idée que la théorie de l'intégration européenne gagnerait à se rattacher explicitement à quatre grandes catégories explicatives;

- la relation situation-attitudes-idéologies-décisions;
- la relation infrastructure-superstructure;
- la relation instruments-objectifs;
- le "problem solving".

Le présent modèle n'est qu'un des multiples schémas théoriques qui peuvent être dérivés de ces quatre explicanda. Il ne tend, en effet, à expliciter ni la théorie de la décision, ni la relation instruments-objectifs, ni le "problem solving", encore qu'il touche implicitement à ces divers aspects de la théorie politique.

Sa raison d'être principale est d'introduire un critère de nécessité historique dans la théorie de l'intégration européenne en associant une composante de nécessité objective axée sur le couple infrastructure-superstructure à une composante d'action politique englobant les attitudes et les conceptions idéologiques des gouvernés et des élites. La soudure des deux composantes se réalise au niveau des situations sociales qui se confondent avec l'infrastructure et avec la superstructure.

Le modèle se présente donc, à la fois, comme une mise en forme des catégories qui ont été introduites ci-dessus et comme une contribution à la théorie de l'intégration européenne.

Cette construction théorique associe cinq niveaux successifs de facteurs, à savoir :

- I. Le niveau de l'infrastructure et des situations sociales;
- II. Le niveau des attitudes et des conceptions idéologiques de la collectivité;
- III. Le niveau des attitudes et des conceptions idéologiques des élites;
- IV. Le niveau des problèmes du système;
- V. Le niveau des superstructures institutionnelles et des décisions politiques.
(Voir schéma in fine).

Ce dernier niveau englobe normalement les centres - de décision politique, ainsi que les centres de décision des entreprises nationales et transnationales qui forment, par leur réunion, la superstructure institutionnelle du sub-système économique, mais il sera fait abstraction de ces derniers centres pour ne pas compliquer le raisonnement.

Chaque niveau du modèle est actuellement ou virtuellement polarisé par l'évolution spontanée ou induite qui l'affecte;

- les flèches qui traversent les divers niveaux indiquent le sens de l'évolution qui transforme progressivement- et par étapes successives les structures nationales en structures transnationales ou internationales;
- les flèches portées aux angles des compartiments intérieurs des niveaux II et III indiquent que les groupes en question ont tendance à décroître ou à s'accroître selon que ces flèches sont dirigées vers l'intérieur ou vers l'extérieur de ces compartiments;
- les pôles nationaux et internationaux de chaque niveau sont respectivement affectés du signe - et du signe +;
- l'ambivalence des attitudes intermédiaires est affecté du signe + et il en va de même en ce qui concerne les problèmes intermédiaires du niveau IV;
- les traits pleins et les traits pointillés qui encadrent les niveaux II et III symbolisent respectivement les attitudes actuelles et les attitudes virtuelles qui sont en conflit à ces deux niveaux.

Un tel modèle peut indifféremment fonctionner à l'échelon national et à l'échelon communautaire; dans le premier cas, il concerne l'impact de l'intégration sur les différents systèmes nationaux; dans le second, il concerne le même phénomène, mais en tant, cette fois, qu'il affecte le supersystème politique constitué par les différents systèmes nationaux.

Les cinq niveaux du modèle sont considérés ci-dessus selon leur ordre d'entrée en scène historique (I, III, II, IV et V) et non selon leur ordre de succession numérique.

A. Le niveau de l'infrastructure - Structure et situations sociales non politiques
(Niveau I)

Ce premier niveau est considéré à un moment du temps où les infrastructures nationales ont déjà commencé à évoluer dans le sens de la transnationalité. La métamorphose de l'infrastructure est en cours. Certes, les aspects nationaux de l'infrastructure sont encore prévalents, mais les conditions objectives d'une transnationalité accrue de l'économie et des modes d'existence sont déjà acquises ou sont en voie de réalisation. Les transformations du contexte international issu de la guerre éliminent toute possibilité d'un nouveau grand conflit européen. Les U.S.A. et l'U.R.S.S. deviennent des pôles de superpuissance mondiaux auxquels l'Europe ne peut espérer se mesurer qu'en s'intégrant. Les conditions technologiques de l'intégration économique et politique ultérieure de l'Europe commencent déjà à manifester leur action. Bref, il y a déjà distorsion, au niveau même de l'infrastructure européenne, entre un pôle d'infrastructure nationale en voie d'affaiblissement potentiel ou actuel et un pôle d'infrastructure transnationale en voie de formation. Tel était en raccourci, l'état de l'Europe à l'issue de la seconde guerre mondiale, et il était aussi remarquable par les évolutions qu'il faisait présager que par les transformations irréversibles qu'il avait déjà subies.

B. Le niveau des élites

A l'origine du phénomène, les élites européennes sont encore engagées dans les nationalismes issus de la guerre, mais ces nationalismes ont été profondément déconcertés, chez les vainqueurs comme chez les vaincus, par les expériences faites au cours du conflit.

Très tôt, une première minorité active se différencie au niveau des élites européennes (III, b). Héritière du mouvement pan-européen d'avant-guerre, cette minorité active prend position en faveur de l'intégration du continent sur la base d'une appréhension idéologique des transformations qui affectent l'infrastructure européenne dans le présent et d'une anticipation idéologique de leurs prolongements et de leurs conséquences politico-économiques probables, puis elle réadapte progressivement ses attitudes à cette idéologie nouvelle. Cette anticipation idéologique est un aspect fondamental du phénomène. Les individus et les groupes de contentent, en général, de réagir idéologiquement à l'évolution de leur situation. Les minorités actives qui déclenchent un grand changement politique vont plus loin en anticipant par la pensée sur des évolutions à venir et en se déterminant intellectuellement à l'égard de ces anticipations comme si elles étaient déjà réalisées. L'idéologie de ces groupes amorce alors, par la seule puissance de l'idée, un changement socio-politique qui ne deviendra un phénomène de masse qu'au fur et à mesure que les évolutions anticipées se réaliseront, entraînant ainsi un nombre croissant d'individus et de groupes dans les mouvements. Cette appréhension idéologique du futur peut, bien entendu, se combiner en toutes proportions avec une appréhension idéologique des transformations acquises. On sait que ce double rôle d'entérinement et d'anticipation idéologique a été assumé d'une façon frappante, en France, par le Groupe Monnet-Schuman, que ses ramifications rattachaient aux groupes homologues qui épaulaient son action dans les pays voisins. L'association des dirigeants politiques du type Schuman à des notables du type Monnet ne permet pas d'opposer ici d'une façon simple, les attitudes des gouvernants à celles des gouvernés. Les attitudes de la grande masse se distinguent, en réalité, de celles d'une classe dirigeante au sein de laquelle se confondent des gouvernants et des notables sans responsabilités politiques, qu'ils soient d'obédience nationaliste ou européenne. L'Europe n'est pas née dans la sphère du pouvoir; elle est née au sein des élites européennes, ce qui implique un élargissement sensible du niveau dirigeant.

A l'autre pôle de l'élite, une seconde minorité active, axée sur la défense de la souveraineté nationale menacée, se forme très tôt, mais avec un peu de retard par rapport à la première, à la faveur, notamment, de la crise de la C.E.D. (III.a). La crise de la C.E.D. n'a certes pas exclusivement opposé des partisans à des adversaires de l'intégration de l'Europe. Nombre d'"européens" convaincus étaient, en effet, opposés à la création de la Communauté Européenne de Défense. D'autres "européens" la considéraient comme une étape périlleuse mais nécessaire de l'intégration de l'Ouest du continent alors que, dans l'autre camp, beaucoup de nationalistes voyaient dans la crise qui s'était ouverte une occasion inespérée de déconcerter l'idée européenne ou de la remettre en question. Si les attitudes des deux camps en présence étaient loin d'être homogènes, il n'en reste pas moins qu'il y avait, dans le camp des partisans de la C.E.D., suffisamment de partisans de l'Europe qui étaient conscients de l'enjeu pour que l'on puisse considérer cette crise comme une péripétie politique caractéristique du mouvement européen. Quoi qu'il en soit, l'antipôle de l'intégration comprenait, dès ce moment, tous les membres des élites nationales qui se regroupent pour organiser la défense militante des valeurs nationales menacées. Il n'y a pas, ici, d'antériorité logique de l'action d'un des déterminants sur l'autre au sein du couple attitudes-conceptions idéologiques. Les attitudes et les idéologies nationales se sont constituées en même temps que les grandes nationalités, à l'aube des temps modernes. La paix revenue, elles réagissent ensemble, à la faveur d'une remise en question historique du fait national par les partisans de la supranationalité. Il n'y a donc pas lieu de rechercher, à ce stade, quel est celui des deux facteurs en cause qui a conditionné la variation de l'autre. L'origine des attitudes et des idéologies nationalistes se perd dans la nuit des temps. Le problème de leur genèse ne se pose donc pas. Elles réagissent simultanément, dans le présent, à une conjoncture politique modifiée.

Ces deux minorités actives encadrent toute la fraction de l'élite européenne que l'on peut encore considérer comme neutre à leur égard et qui forme leur réserve de recrutement (III a/b). Ces neutres sont essentiellement ambivalents. Encore effectivement engagés dans le nationalisme, ils le sont déjà potentiellement dans l'internationalisme, en raison de l'action que l'évolution de leur situation sociale commence à exercer sur leurs attitudes et sur leurs conceptions idéologiques traditionnelles.

L'ambivalence qui affecte les attitudes et les conceptions idéologiques des neutres se manifeste également, quoique d'une manière moins tranchée, dans le chef des deux minorités actives de ce niveau. L'hésitation n'est pas moins réelle, en effet, chez les engagés des deux bords que chez les neutres. La minorité nationaliste ne rejette pas formellement la supranationalité, elle compose avec elle et ne s'oppose absolument aux idées nouvelles qu'à l'occasion de la crise de la C.E.D., résultat d'une erreur de manœuvre manifeste du pôle adverse. Pour le reste, elle laisse faire, tout en surveillant de près les initiatives prises par les tenants de la supranationalité. Le pôle nationaliste est d'autant plus coopératif, à certains égards, que le pôle adverse est, sauf exception, plus prudent dans ses revendications. De leur côté, les partisans actifs de la supranationalité ne cherchent encore à la réaliser que par étapes, avec une grande prudence tactique, en suivant d'aussi près que possible la ligne de moindre résistance de l'adversaire, et en s'en tenant strictement à des innovations dont les aspects positifs n'impliquent pas d'atteintes trop sensibles à des droits acquis (C.E.C.A., C.E.E.). A la moindre imprudence (C.E.D.), les adversaires de la supranationalité se regroupent et livrent bataille.

Les deux noyaux engagés au niveau de l'élite sont à l'origine d'une triple action qui se développe sur le plan de la propagande, du recrutement et de l'initiative politique;

- ils exercent tout d'abord, par leur propagande, une action de recrutement différentielle sur la fraction de l'élite encore neutre (III. a/b); celle-ci est, en effet, d'autant plus sensible à l'attraction du pôle "européen" et d'autant moins sensible à celle du pôle nationaliste que sa propre situation la sensibilise davantage aux arguments et à l'appel qui émanent du premier;
- ils exercent, parallèlement, une action de propagande différentielle sur les attitudes et sur les conceptions idéologiques du reste de la collectivité (niveau II), ce second phénomène s'analyse de la même façon que celui qui peut être observé au niveau de la classe dirigeante, le gros de la collectivité étant, a priori, plus sensible à la propagande de la minorité "européenne" qu'à celle de la minorité nationaliste;
- avec le consentement plus ou moins résigné du pôle adverse, la minorité "européenne" de l'élite s'emploie, enfin, à favoriser la création des premières superstructures supranationales (niveau V). Deux circonstances facilitent cette réadaptation institutionnelle. L'une est que les gouvernants font, par définition, partie des élites, ce qui signifie qu'une partie des dirigeants sont acquis, au départ, à l'entreprise. L'autre est, comme on vient de le laisser entendre, que les adversaires sont à demi consentants. Les distorsions qui affectent l'infrastructure se compliquent, dès lors, de distorsions analogues au niveau de la superstructure, ce qui modifie, par voie de conséquence, l'intensité et la nature des tensions corrélatives qui opposent l'infrastructure et la superstructure.

C. Le niveau des attitudes et des conceptions idéologiques de la collectivité
(Niveau III):

La conversion des attitudes et des conceptions idéologiques du gros de la collectivité constitue le pivot de la composante d'action politique du phénomène.

Cette évolution s'opère simultanément sous la pression des transformations objectives qui affectent l'infrastructure et sous la pression des propagandes contradictoires qui émanent des minorités actives groupées aux deux pôles de la classe dirigeante.

Les attitudes et les conceptions idéologiques de la collectivité ne sont pas uniquement conditionnées, en effet, par l'évolution de l'infrastructure sociale. Le principe d'analyse politique qui veut que l'infrastructure, réduite à elle-même, n'exerce, comme telle, qu'une action virtuelle sur les superstructures sociales du niveau V s'applique également aux attitudes et aux idéologies du niveau II. Les évolutions acquises ou en cours au niveau de la situation ne font, tout d'abord, que prédisposer la collectivité aux attitudes et aux conceptions idéologiques nouvelles qu'elles impliquent. Celle-ci commence donc par superposer, dans son propre chef, un nationalisme actuel avec un un internalisme virtuel que seule la propagande émanant des minorités actives occupant les deux pôles de la classe dirigeante permettra d'actualiser et qu'elle actualisera d'autant mieux que l'émergence d'attitudes supranationales virtuelles au sein de la collectivité la sensibilise davantage à la propagande du noyau de la classe dirigeante qui s'attache à promouvoir la supranationalité sur le plan institutionnel.

Ainsi activée par l'évolution objective de sa situation et par les incitations politiques qui émanent de l'élite, la collectivité se scinde progressivement, à son tour, en deux fractions porteuses d'attitudes opposées :

- l'une qui adhère encore au nationalisme, mais qui décroît numériquement et dont les attitudes fluctuent en intensité et en cohésion au gré de la conjoncture politique (II.a);
- l'autre qui est favorable à l'internationalisme et qui s'accroît progressivement, mais qui ne se caractérise encore, dans la phase initiale du phénomène, que par des attitudes purement permissives. Ce second noyau de la collectivité se contente tout d'abord de laisser faire la fraction pro-européenne de l'élite; il ne s'engagera que plus tard, dans des conditions et dans des proportions qui restent à déterminer (II.b);

- ces deux fractions sont séparées par la partie encore neutre, mais déjà ambivalente de la collectivité, qui est vouée à rejoindre progressivement le pôle "européen", la réaction des neutres obéissant au même mécanisme que celui qui affecte le pôle "européen" de ce niveau, mais avec un retard qui résulte d'une inertie plus marquée de ses attitudes et de ses idéologies (II.a/b).

La conversion partielle des attitudes permissives de la fraction "européenne" de la collectivité en attitudes engagées (b/b') amorce la phase cruciale du phénomène. Cette conversion ne peut être comprise que dans la mesure où l'on fait intervenir explicitement les problèmes politiques du niveau IV, déjà implicitement actifs dans la propagande de la minorité "européenne" de l'élite dont les arguments se fondent tout naturellement sur l'impotence fonctionnelle de plus en plus marquée des institutions nationales.

D. Le niveau des problèmes du système (Niveau IV)

Il s'agit, en l'espèce, non de tous les problèmes politiques du système, mais de la fraction de ces problèmes qui est normalement appelée à tomber dans la sphère de compétence des institutions supranationales, au fur et à mesure que l'évolution de l'infrastructure s'accroît.

Ces problèmes peuvent être classés en trois catégories :

- selon qu'ils peuvent encore être normalement résolus par des décisions des États souverains;
- selon qu'ils ne peuvent plus être résolus que d'une façon précaire par des décisions des États souverains;

- et selon qu'ils ne peuvent plus être résolus du tout par les Etats souverains.

L'évolution se réalise à ce quatrième niveau en faisant progressivement glisser les problèmes de la première catégorie dans la seconde et ceux de la seconde catégorie dans la troisième. Ce glissement mesure, en quelque sorte, la tension croissante qui oppose l'infrastructure transnationale à la superstructure nationale, et par voie de conséquence, l'impotence fonctionnelle de plus en plus marquée de l'institution étatique.

C'est, en définitive, l'accumulation des grands problèmes du système dans la troisième catégorie qui est responsable de la conversion des attitudes supranationales permissives de la collectivité en attitudes engagées.

Cette conversion est essentiellement sélective, seuls les groupes de gouvernés qui sont fortement pénalisés par la stagnation des problèmes qui concernent leur existence quotidienne prenant conscience du phénomène et s'engageant politiquement à la suite du noyau "européen" de l'élite.

Considérations interprétatives

Dans quelle mesure un tel modèle correspond-il à la réalité ?

Un problème de ce genre ne peut se résoudre que par référence au rôle joué par les modèles théoriques dans les sciences sociales.

Tout modèle explicatif suppose une simplification et une accentuation corrélatrice des relations en forme de loi que l'observation des phénomènes concrets permet de formuler.

Les inférences inductives (lois) qui constituent les modèles utilisés dans les sciences sociales sont immédiates ou médiate.

L'induction est immédiate lorsqu'elle porte sur une classe de phénomènes suffisamment semblables à eux-mêmes pour que l'on puisse considérer les relations qui se vérifient dans un cas particulier comme des propriétés de l'ensemble;

- si l'on pouvait observer plusieurs processus d'intégration analogues à celui qui se développe actuellement en Europe, il suffirait d'en connaître un pour les connaître tous, à certaines variantes près.

L'induction est médiate lorsque le phénomène étudié est unique en son genre, mais que ses relations constitutives apparaissent comme des cas particuliers de relations plus générales dont le phénomène étudié n'est qu'une manifestation possible.

- un phénomène d'intégration supposé unique en son genre est, en ce sens, réductible, à des lois dans la mesure où l'on peut démontrer qu'il est régi par des relations générales dont il n'est, en dépit de sa singularité apparente, qu'un cas particulier. Pour prendre un exemple simple, la loi psycho-sociale qui exprime la transformation d'une attitude collective en fonction d'un changement de situation régit indifféremment des phénomènes aussi différents que l'intégration européenne, la sociologie électorale et le regroupement des juifs des ghettos d'Europe orientale en Israël. Par rapport à cette relation, tous ces phénomènes forment une classe de manifestations homogènes, en dépit de leurs différences de qualification.

Le modèle d'intégration qui a été analysé ci-dessus est fondé sur ce second type d'induction; chacune de ses relations constitutives l'apparente, en effet, à d'autres phénomènes psycho-sociaux dont chaque classe de manifestations caractéristiques est régie par une loi, c'est-à-dire par une relation fonctionnelle établie entre deux ou plusieurs variables.

L'intégration européenne n'est, en effet, qu'un cas particulier de changement social; or tout grand changement social se caractérise par la réadaptation progressive des niveaux d'un système qui ne se sont pas encore transformés aux évolutions qui se manifestent à d'autres niveaux.

Si l'un des étages d'un système a déjà varié, et si cette évolution est irréversible, acquise, alors le changement qui affecte le niveau considéré doit se propager aux autres niveaux selon un ordre et selon des modalités dont l'observation, assistée de la théorie, doit pouvoir rendre compte.

Disons, plus concrètement, que si l'échelon de situation du système européen a déjà commencé à varier dans le sens de la transnationalité, il est inévitable :

- que les élites prennent conscience d'une façon ou d'une autre des conséquences politiques qu'implique ce changement;
- que le reste de la collectivité se polarise à leur image;
- que les neutres de ces deux échelons se rallient progressivement aux minorités qui soutiennent activement ou passivement la supranationalité;
- que les grands problèmes du système soient de moins en moins bien résolus par les centres de décision nationaux;
- que les groupes de gouvernés qui subissent le plus fortement les conséquences de cette carence transforment progressivement leurs attitudes "européennes" permissives en attitudes engagées;

- et que les antagonismes politiques en cours de développement au sein de l'élite se dénouent de plus en plus franchement dans le sens de la création d'institutions et de procédures de décisions supranationales.

Le modèle peut tolérer certaines variantes; chacune de ces variantes tolère, à son tour, un grand nombre d' "histoires" possibles, mais le système de relations psycho-sociales qui gouverne tous ces devenir historiques reste stable dans certaines limites.

Le système politique étudié est, à cet égard, comparable à un cône élastique dont la base, analogiquement identifiée au niveau des situations sociales, subit une torsion qui se répercute progressivement d'étage en étage, jusqu'à l'échelon des décisions qui correspond au sommet du cône.

Les forces de rappel engendrées par cette torsion peuvent théoriquement ramener l'échelon de situation à son état primitif, lorsque l'évolution qui l'affecte est réversible, ce qui annule alors l'évolution en cours. Elles peuvent aussi provoquer, de proche en proche, la réadaptation des étages supérieurs du système, lorsque l'évolution qui affecte sa base est irréversible.

Seule une crise économique majeure ou une grande guerre internationale pouvant ramener l'échelon de situation d'un système en voie d'intégration à son état initial non intégré, l'évolution de l'infrastructure doit se répercuter, d'échelon en échelon, jusqu'à celui de la superstructure institutionnelle, dans la mesure où on peut faire abstraction de ces deux accidents.

Lorsque le modèle intègre valablement des observations empiriques réduites, par des opérations de simplification ad hoc, à leurs éléments essentiels, on aboutit à un équivalent analogique du phénomène réel qui substitue une image surdéterminée de la réalité à une réalité floue au sein de laquelle le jeu des conditionnements fondamentaux est partiellement perturbé par un halo d'accidents politiques et psychologiques singuliers.

Les lois qui régissent le modèle s'appliquent alors d'une manière rigide; il n'y a plus, au niveau du modèle, de différence de rendement entre les lois de la nature et les lois de la phénoménalité sociale; aucune place n'est laissée à l'imprévu.

Jusqu'à quel point les lois qui régissent le modèle régissent-elles la réalité ? Là est le vrai problème. Tout dépend de la nature du phénomène social que l'on étudie. Les systèmes réels sont, en effet, plus ou moins fortement déterminés. Lorsque l'évolution d'un système réel est fortement déterminée, la réalité s'écarte peu du modèle. Lorsque le "coefficient d'historicité" du système réel est très grand, le modèle théorique n'est plus qu'une approximation moyenne d'une réalité dont les devenirs concrets dépendent indivisiblement des aspects du phénomène qui ont "passé" dans le modèle et des aspects du phénomène qui en ont été exclus dans un but de simplification.

Dans le cas particulier de l'intégration européenne, la validité de la simplification que l'on réalise au niveau du modèle dépend essentiellement de la puissance de l'évolution qui transforme l'infrastructure. Plus cette évolution est tranchée, mieux le modèle théorique régira la réadaptation des niveaux supérieurs. Moins elle est tranchée, plus les devenirs réels qu'elle implique risqueront de s'écarter des devenirs théoriques qui découlent du modèle.

Si la transformation du système n'est inéluctable qu'en apparence, si l'évolution de l'infrastructure est insuffisante pour provoquer des transformations politiques nécessaires aux autres niveaux, l'intégration n'est plus constituée que par une série d'accidents politiques, il n'y a plus d'irréversibilité dans le système réel et tout ce qui a été édifié à la faveur d'un concours de circonstances politiques favorables pourra être annulé par des concours de circonstances politiques défavorables.

Un modèle d'intégration qui ne se prononce pas explicitement sur cette alternative se cantonne fatalement dans l'ambiguïté, quelque soit la richesse des données empiriques dont il est lesté. Le discours sociologique n'a plus alors que des avantages apparents sur le discours historique traditionnel. On n'a rien gagné en incorporants les concepts de "variable", de "fonction", de "loi" et de "système" au discours ordinaire.

La spécification des variables et des relations entre variables qui caractérisent le présent modèle a été délibérément simplifiée à l'extrême dans le présent modèle. Il n'y aurait aucun sens, en effet, à **formuler** a priori les développements qui s'imposent, de toute évidence, à cet égard. Ceux-ci ne peuvent être décidés que sur le terrain, au fur et à mesure que le modèle s'enrichit de données empiriques et que celles-ci permettent de développer et d'explicitier la théorie.

* * *

Si les modèles théoriques se jugent, en fin d'évolution, sur leur réussite ou sur leur échec, ils se jugent, lorsque l'évolution est en cours et que les dés ne sont pas retombés, sur le rendement des observations empiriques qu'ils incitent à faire et sur le succès des prévisions qu'ils permettent de formuler.

Le modèle qui a été discuté ci-dessus semble impliquer des orientations de recherche caractéristiques qui portent notamment :

- a - en ce qui concerne les analyses discursives basées sur de simples observations historiques

- sur l'analyse des changements de situation, d'attitudes et de conceptions idéologiques qui se sont produits en Europe occidentale depuis la guerre;
- sur l'analyse des corrélations qui lient les transformations observées dans le chef de ces trois variables;
- sur l'analyse des problèmes du système, en tant que leur solution ou que leur non-solution implique des pénalités et des avantages variables pour les groupes sociaux dont ces problèmes affectent la situation;
- sur l'analyse des techniques de décision et de négociation qui concrétisent les aspects politiques du processus d'intégration.

b-en ce qui concerne les observations basées sur les données spécifiques fournies par les sondages

- sur la mise en évidence des attitudes permissives et des attitudes engagées;
- sur l'étude des concomitants idéologiques des changements d'attitude et des ambivalences d'attitude observés.

Cette problématique semble, en tout état de cause, impliquer une redéfinition partielle des objectifs des sondages d'opinion, ainsi qu'une reformulation corrélatrice des questionnaires qui permettent de les atteindre;

- beaucoup de choses restent à faire, en effet, si l'on veut se mettre en mesure de détecter les groupes sociaux que leur

situation prédispose à l'engagement politique et d'analyser leur réactions;

- les enquêteurs continuent trop souvent, d'autre part, à ignorer les ambivalences d'attitudes qui affectent les réactions des échantillons de population étudiés. Les difficultés que les théoriciens de l'intégration éprouvent à interpréter les hauts et les bas des réactions des Britanniques à l'égard du Marché Commun sont visiblement liées à cette carence. Une collectivité ou un groupe social peut à la fois être favorable et défavorable à une éventualité politique. La signification de ses réactions négatives n'est alors interprétable que dans la mesure où l'on est capable d'évaluer l'intensité des réactions positives qui les sous-tendent et de déterminer, par des sondages successifs axés sur des modèles théoriques adéquats, le sens dans lequel l'ambivalence observée tend à se dénouer;
- le peu d'intérêt dont les chercheurs ont fait preuve, jusqu'à présent, à l'égard des conceptions idéologiques des groupes étudiés n'est pas moins préjudiciable à l'étude de leurs réactions que les deux insuffisances précédentes. Il peut être, dans certains cas, plus rentable de sonder des systèmes d'idées en évolution que des systèmes d'attitudes ou de motivations élémentaires, la valeur significative d'un sondage pouvant se déplacer, selon la circonstance, du niveau des attitudes à celui des conceptions idéologiques et réciproquement.

La théorie moderne de l'intégration régionale dispose de beaux outils, mais elle les met, trop souvent, au service de modèles insuffisamment élaborés. Ce déséquilibre entre l'élaboration théorique et les techniques d'investigation ne disparaîtra

que lorsque les catégories explicatives qui ont été mises
au point par les différentes sciences sociales réintégreront les
modèles théoriques dont dépend la rentabilité des techniques
d'investigation qui concernent leurs domaines respectifs.


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


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
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


II

ATTITUDES ET ID COLLECT.



I



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POLITICAL MAN AND THE HERITAGE OF HAIR :

SOME AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES

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In 1953 the King of the Baganda entered into a political confrontation with the British Governor of Uganda, Sir Andrew Cohen. The issues at stake ranged from whether Uganda should be forcibly tied to Kenya and Tanganyika to form an East African federation dominated by white settlers to the more immediate issue concerning the limits of the Governor's authority over the king of the Baganda.

The British finally decided to send the kabaka away into exile in England. There thus started one of the most fascinating wrangles between an African tribal community and the Colonial Office in London. The kabaka's people were plunged into grief, but not into a spirit of resignation. Debates, petitions, and demonstrations in favour of the kabaka's return became part of the strategy of his people to get him back to his throne.

Protests by the Baganda against the exile of their king took a variety of forms. But from the point of view of this paper one manifestation deserves special mention. It is a form of protest which has been observed in other parts of the world, in societies vastly different from that of the Ganda. Yet its very universality as a medium of protest raises questions about man's perception of significance. A number of devoted subjects of the kabaka of Buganda took a vow to let their hair and beards grow without cutting or shaving. Some of these were civil servants, and

~~... was not just the different species which~~

limited themselves to letting the beard grow. His Excellency the Governor of Uganda later declared that it was not seemly for civil servants to have beards. Yet many persevered all the same.¹

By 1955 the Baganda's strategy of protest on all fronts had ultimately succeeded. The British capitulated to the idea of returning the kabaka to his kingdom. The symbolic band of bearded men prepared to end their mourning. A decision was taken that they should all assemble at Entebbe Airport and ceremonially shave their beards collectively as the kabaka's plane landed. The hair had served its purpose as a symbol of protest.

But the protest had been victorious. Should there not be a memorial to some of the forms which it took? It was suggested that the mass of hair and whiskers thus shaved should be collected together and used to stuff a cushion which could then be presented to the king. But would not this violate the kiganda custom which decreed that the king was not to come into contact with the clippings of other men? True to the style of the old political culture of Uganda a debate ensued over this proposition. Away out was finally found in another kiganda dictum - that although every custom was sacrosanct, the kabaka had the right to innovate. He could thus depart from custom if he so wished. The only question which remained was whether he would agree to receiving a cushion stuffed with the hair of those who had endured its discomfort as a measure of their loyalty to him. His Highness accepted the cushion.²

The case of the bearded Baganda was, as I indicated, in a tradition quite widely dispersed in different parts of the world. We shall discuss this tradition more fully in the course of the analysis, but what needs to be noted for the time being is that the Ganda case was an instance of the functions of hair in contexts of political protest.

Another area in which hair plays a part is that of cultural nationalism. In the ultimate analysis, situations of cultural nationalism concern areas of cultural interaction between one society and another.

But hair acquires this significance in intersocietal relations partly because hair is important in intra-societal arrangements. Issues of identity arise not only when one civilisation finds itself resisting the encroachment of another, but also in matters concerning the individual's place within his own civilisation.

This paper proposes to address itself to these three dimensions of the functions of hair in politics - hair as a medium of political protest ; hair as a focus of cultural nationalism ; and hair as an area concerning an individual's membership of his own society. Behind it all is the meaning of hair as a biological residuum and the final purposes that nature might still have intended it to serve on the body of man.

On Natural and Sexual Selection

The place of hair in relation to African nationalism has in part to be related to the history of European racialism. And this history has included an important biological dimension.

In 1859 Charles Darwin's Origin of Species was published. It was soon to have long-term repercussions both for the study of biology and for the study of social science. Racists could now proceed to demonstrate, by the utilisation of the theory of natural selection, that major differences in human capacity and human organization were to be traced to biological distinctions between races. But to some extent this theory was much older than Darwin. What Darwin added to it was the dynamism which converted mere classification of beings into a process. The static version of the theory goes back to the ancient idea that God had so organised the world that the universe and creation were arranged in a "Great Chain of Being" - that all creatures could be classified and fitted into a hierarchy extending "from man down to the smallest reptile, whose existence can be discovered by the microscope".

But it was not just the different species which

were so classified. Even within the highest species (that of human beings) there were in turn sub-divisions. Theories of the Great Chain of Being assumed that the Almighty in His wisdom did not want a big gap between one type of creature and the next. And so there had to be intermediate categories between orang-outangs and white men. As early as 1713 naturalists began looking for the "missing link" between men and apes and apparently speculated on the possibility that Hottentots and orang-outangs might be side in "the scale of life", separated only by the fact that orang-outangs could not speak.

Darwin's concept of natural selection was particularly crucial as a basis of classification in racial theories. It was also the foundation for theories of physical differentiation between races, and the presumed implications of those physical differences. Darwin's argument was that in every generation of animals there is an array of individuals varying in a random fashion from the average type. The differences may be in terms of size, shape or general performance. One individual may be larger, or may possess an organ with a slightly different shape, or may have an aptitude above average. The differences themselves could be small, but those who possess variations in their makeup which are better suited to withstand the environment would tend to live longer, or reproduce more. Over a period of time the favourable characteristics might accumulate, and if the specimens which lacked the strong characteristics gradually diminished in numbers, the stronger type might gain ascendancy. A large accumulation of differences could result in a new species altogether.

It was this gem of an idea which Darwin called "natural selection".

As we know this was a significant departure from the previous theory put forward by the French naturalist Jean Baptiste de Lamarck. Lamarck had published a book in 1809 entitled Zoological Philosophy in which he suggested that it was the environment which caused organisms to acquire certain changes and these changes were then passed on to their descendants. His famous illustration was the giraffe, then a newly discovered sensator. The theory was that the giraffe started as an antelope-like creature

that fed on tree leaves. It then ran out of food and found that it had to stretch a bit to reach the leaves. By the habitual stretching of its neck, tongue and legs the animal gradually lengthened these organs. In minute stages, generation after generation of stretching, the primitive antelope feeding on leaves finally evolved into the elongated giraffe.

Darwin's theory argued that the giraffe got its neck not by stretching but because some giraffes were born with longer necks than their fellows, and the more elongated individuals found that they could reach their food more effectively and stood a better chance of survival. In the end, by this process of natural selection, the long-necked characteristic prevailed. Natural selection also went some way towards explaining the blotched skin of the giraffe - certainly it was more effective as an explanation for that skin than anything that Lamarck could advance. An animal with blotches on its skin again enhanced its survival capability by blending against the sun-spotted vegetation and disguising its presence from lions on the prowl.

In relation to hair as a biological residuum of man, it was not merely Darwin's of natural selection which was relevant, but also his idea of sexual selection. This was worked out in his later book The Descent of Man and Selections in Relation to Sex. Natural selection to Darwin was an idea which was needed to operationalise the theory of evolution as a whole in relation to all species. Sexual selection, on the other hand, was introduced by him to meet the special problem of the evolution of the human being. The greater part of Darwin's Descent of Man does indeed attempt to explain the action of sexual selection in animals. But the aim is to some extent oriented towards the descent of homo sapiens. The theory is to the effect that in all species of sexually differentiated animals, individuals of both sexes vary genetically in their attractiveness to the opposite sex. In animals those who are more attractive or more aggressive are likely to have more opportunities for sexual fulfilment, and leave more progeny. Each sex would then evolve in the direction of maximising characteristics congenial to sexual success. The process itself could either modify, accelerate, or occasionally conflict with the broader process of natural selection.

In his recent book on The Evolution of Man and Society, C.D. Darlington places human hair predominantly within the stream of ideas of sexual selection, but with some residual link to natural selection.

"Today we do not need to share Darwin's misgivings about natural selection in order to see the point of sexual selection. In the evolution of man the development of the beard is no doubt due to sexual rather than natural selection. In the evolution of woman the hairlessness of the body is manifestly due to sexual selection ". 5

Darlington distinguishes between sexual differences which are primary and crucial for fertility and sexual differences which are secondary. With regard to primary differences the two sexes usually evolve independently. When the independence breaks down, when the chromosome mechanism gets mixed up, "which frequently happens in heterogeneous outbred communities intermediate tendencies may be produced in individuals - tendencies which are inter-sexual, homosexual, neuter, or sterile in any one of a hundred different ways.

But regarding what is secondary, Darlington asserts that the two sexes evolve only in part independently.

"Thus the male, in selecting for hairlessness in women, has also been selecting for hairlessness in men. In selecting for good looks in women he has also been selecting in the same direction less effectively in men".6

Here Darlington is not entirely convincing. It is not self-evident why genetically determined secondary differences should not evolve independently.

Darlington is on firmer (and more orthodox) ground when he describes hair as one adaptation in man's sexual evolution which has reached its limit. He first noted that as man became more upright, he found it possible to change his mode of copulation. He was no longer condemned to the single mammalian type of back to front, and could now more characteristically choose a face to face posture. He argues that the selective tensions induced by this versatility are still not fully released, and further anatomical changes favoured by it are incomplete.

"The directly structural effects are seen in the anatomical variation of genitalia between human races and individuals today. Only in one direction has adaptation reached its limits. The development of pubic hair in both sexes, unknown in any of our ancestors, became necessary to avoid damage from friction in coitus. It is now universal ; so also is the useless but developmentally correlated axillary hair".⁷

Applying sexual to racial differences, we note first Darwin's own mundane admission that in the mind of man there was no "universal standard of beauty with respect to the human body". He thought rather that each society tended to admire those characteristics which were distinctive of their own race, and which therefore marked them off from others. The result was that sexual selection exaggerated any racial differences which already existed. Darwin asserted that

"of all the causes which had led to the differences in external appearance between the races of man, and to some extent between man and the lower animals, sexual selection has been the most effective".⁸

In fact, as we shall later indicate in relation to the problem of acculturation in the colonies, Darwin's assumption about human partiality for one's own distinctive characteristics was exaggerated. But for the moment it remains pertinent simply to note that theories of racial gradation following the publication of The Origin of Species

re-examined afresh physical differences between the races, and formulated hypotheses concerning their respective social and cultural performance.

On Hair and Racism

One of the curious factors in the history of racial theories in Europe was the extent to which skin colour was regarded as a more meaningful differentiating characteristic between races than comparative hairiness or differences in the texture of hair. One would have expected hair to feature prominently in, at least, the pseudo-scientific theories for two reasons. One reason concerns the evolutionary kinship with the apes. It might therefore have been a matter of interest to pseudo-scientific theories of race to compare human groups partly by the yardstick of propensity for hairiness.

Another factor which might have aroused greater interest in the phenomenon of hair concerns the concentrations of hair about the skull. Phrenology grew up as a science in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, shifting the criterion of race classifications away from language and skin colour towards head shape. The ultimate hope of phrenology was, in the words of Philip Curtin, the hope of "discerning the inner nature of the human mind by examining its outer covering". It was Georges Combe who first went the whole way in applying phrenology to groups of people and attempting to analyse the entire character of races. He argued that African skulls showed a higher stage of development than those of American Indians or Australian aborigines, but a lower stage than those of Europeans. The evidence provided by African skulls was to him as follows :

"The organs of Philoprogenitiveness and Concentrativeness are largely developed ; the former of which produces love of children, and the latter that concentration of mind which is favourable to settled and sedentary employments. The organs of Veneration and Hope are also considerable in size. The greatest deficiencies lie in Conscientiousness, Cautiousness, Ideality, and Reflec-

tion".9

The evidence deduced from the skulls of black people supported the traditional concept of the Negro as it then prevailed.

S. G. Morton put more emphasis on the size rather than on the shape of the skull. Curtin refers to Morton's attempts in measuring cranial capacity in cubic inches by filling each skull with white pepper seeds and then measuring the volume of the seeds. His findings as published showed a range of mean capacity from 87 cubic inches for 'Caucasians' to 78 cubic inches for 'Negroes'. Curtin comments :

" In fact, his measurements had no statistical validity (even if the capacity of the skull was a genuine measure of intellect) : his sample of Negro Americans and 9 from."10

Considering this importance of the skull in such pseudo-scientific theories of race, it remains surprising that the outer growth on the skull, hair, did not invite more curiosity in relation to racial differentiation.

But perhaps one explanation might lie in the embarrassment which might be caused if hairiness as a quality were to be placed as a relevant factor in the chain of being from apes to the white man. The Indo-Europeans are among the more hairy of the human groups. Does this establish a closer proximity to the hairy species of the animal kingdom? Issac Asimov, in his popularised introduction to the biological sciences, has captured the dilemma of racial theories neatly. He draws attention to the pseudo-scientific theorists and their assertion that the Negro was inferior to the white man "because he obviously represented a lower stage of evolution". The physical characteristics were again invoked. Were not the Negro's dark skin and wide nose, for instance, reminiscent of the ape ? Asimov gives the ultimate answer in these terms :

"Unfortunately for their case, this line of reasoning leads to the opposite conclusion. The Negro is the least hairy

of all the groups of mankind ; in this respect and in the fact that his hair is crisp and woolly, rather than long and straight, the Negro is farther from the ape than white man is".11

It may have been partly these considerations which pushed questions of hairiness, and of the texture of hair, outside the main-stream of racial theories propounded by Caucasians.

But relatively understressed as hair has been in European racialism, it has in fact been quite significant in African nationalism. The distinctive physical characteristics attributed to Africans have been black skin, flat nose, thick lips, and woolly hair. In fact, the flat nose and thick lips are much less universal as characteristics of black Africans than has sometimes been assumed. Nilo-Hamites and some branches of both Bantu and Nilotes have noses and lips which would not obviously be out of place within a Caucasian collection.

The black skin and the woolly hair are more strikingly peculiar to natives of sub-Saharan Africa. Even images of a black Christ in some African religious movements have permitted Jesus a straight nose and thin lips, while attributing to him a black skin and woolly hair. B. G. Sundkler, in his contemplation of the Black Christ movements of South Africa, is suddenly reminded of a verse as old as Xenophanes : -

"The Ethiop's Gods have dusky cheeks,
Thick lips and woolly hair ;
The Grecian Gods are like the Greeks,
As tall, bright-eyed, and fair."12

But the thick lips have again been less of a prerequisite for images of the Black Christ than either the skin colour or the peculiarly African woolly hair.

While African religious nationalism has tended at times to Africanise Jesus Christ, African cultural nationalism has often insisted on the Africanisation of the Pharaohs. It was the Senegalese romantic historian Cheikh Anta Diop who once put it thus :

"It remains... true that the Egyptian experiment was essentially Negro, and that all Africans can draw the same moral advantage from it that westerners draw Graeco-Latin civilisation".¹³

Here again skulls are relevant as evidence. They were once important, as we indicated, in phrenology and the attempt to classify races by either the size or the shape of the skull. In this period of African cultural nationalism the evidence of skulls has assumed a new relevance. But in this case so has the evidence of hair.

Basil Davidson, in his romanticism, sometimes over-argues the vision of a glorious African past. But he is probably well within the evidence available when he tells us the following.

"An analysis of some eight hundred skulls from predynastic Egypt - from the lower valley of the Nile, that is, before 3000 B.C. - shows that at least a third of them were Negroes or ancestors of the Negroes whom we know ; and this may well support the view, to which a study of language also brings us some confirmation, that remote ancestors of the Africans today were an important and perhaps dominant element among populations which fathered the civilisation of ancient Egypt.¹⁴

But the additional evidence comes from some of the contemporary descriptions of ancient Egyptians. Blackness on its own is not peculiar to Africans. There are communities in South India and in Ceylon which are blacker than some tribes in Africa. It is the combination of blackness and the particular texture of hair that carries the stamp of African distinctiveness. African cultural nationalism has sometimes turned to the Greeks for evidence to support

the Africanness of ancient Egypt. The late W. E. B. Du Bois, the distinguished black American and one of the founding fathers of the pan-African movement, used to cite the testimony of Herodotus that ancient Egyptians were, as Herodotus described them, "black and curly haired."¹⁵

European racial theorists had invoked the evidence of skulls to demonstrate intellectual endowments and intellectual deficiencies. African cultural nationalists have more recently utilised the evidence of skulls and the evidence of texture of hair in contemporary records to demonstrate their own role in the oldest of all major ancient civilisation.

Hair and Politics of Beauty

But the African's own tendency to be culturally defensive in this way has of course its roots in the whole history of colonisation and racial humiliation. But history in turn has involved processes of cultural nationalism. We will remember Darwin's argument that each race tended to admire those of its characteristics which were peculiar to itself. and that sexual selection therefore tended not only to perpetuate but also exaggerate the differences which already existed between the races.

But the history of imperialism and its attendant acculturation have cast new on Darwin's assumptions. In the words of J. Maynard Smith :

"Often, conquered or technically backward peoples have abandoned their own standards of taste in favour of those of their conquerors, just as they have abandoned their own gods for those of Christianity or of Islam".¹⁶

Much of Africa, because it was colonised, is feeling the pull of conflicting criteria of sexual attractiveness. In Uganda press discussion has periodically erupted since 1967 on the issue of the Miss World Contest.

The concept of a Miss World as an aesthetic problem was partly initiated in Uganda by statements made by Miss Uganda on completion of the world contest in 1967. There was an increasing sense of awareness that in order to stand a chance in that Caucasian-dominated competition, Africa had to breed special females, seek advice from western beauticians and physical statisticians and strive for comparability with the western female. The Uganda press discussion included a call for a separate Black Beauty contest, which would seek out the most striking black females from Africa, the West Indies, the United States, Brazil and elsewhere in the black diaspora.

It is, of course, conceivable that a black girl might win the Miss World competition before a separate Black Beauty contest comes into being. But a black Miss World could only win if, with the exception of her colour, she is a 'western' beauty by every other criterion. Indeed, choices of beautiful women from Uganda for the 1967 world contest were so influenced by presumed western criteria that both number one and number three in the national competition for Miss Uganda were girls of mixed parentage racially. In 1968, the attempt to shine in London led to an emphasis on intellectual values in Kampala. The girl had not only to try to approximate western criteria of beauty, but had, if possible, to be intellectually westernised enough to feel comfortable in London society. The result was that both number one and number two in the Miss Uganda contest were undergraduate girls from Makerere University College. Indeed, number two, Miss Freda Lule, was the daughter of the Principal of Makerere. Number one was Miss Joy Lehai, a student of English literature at Makerere. She reigned as Miss Uganda and went to London for the world contest. Her experiences, and sense of being cast in the role of an imitator, made her join the voices of those who were already clamouring for a separate Black Beauty contest.

In 1966, Miss World was Miss Reita Faria of India. She did seem to have broken the Caucasian monopoly of the world contest and just as decolonisation in Africa, had been preceded by decolonisation in India, and was in part influenced by it, so the Indian success in the beauty contest and the arrival of Miss Faria in Uganda and elsewhere in Africa, opened up African hopes of standing a

chance. Even Tanzania, in spite of her radicalism and opposition to bourgeois values, competed in 1967. BUT shortly after that attempt Tanzania decided that the entire exercise was extremely decadent, and the Government prohibited such a contest in 1968. In any case, it should have been remembered that Miss Faria's features were strikingly Indo-European - the beauty judges of Europe had not ventured too far out of the comfort of their accustomed criteria.

Yet western criteria of female beauty do continue to exert some influence in the former colonies. AND if sexual selection proceeds under the influence of revised aesthetic criteria, some of the differences between the physical characteristics of the races of the world might begin to narrow. Questions relating to the height and shape of the human body are especially susceptible to both sexual and natural selection. Distribution of flat noses as against straight noses, and of thick lips as against thinner ones, might also be affected in situations where those with features accepted as handsome or beautiful by the new criteria become sexually more successful as " they scatter their Maker's image through the land".

Inevitably the question of hair has also added to the tensions of aesthetic dualism and sexual acculturation. Straightening one's hair as a way of looking more attractive is a borrowed approach to beauty. Evidently this area of sexual acculturation arouses reactions among those who are more concerned with preserving cultural identity. The different imitative fashions which have emerged in Africa in response to western criteria of beauty have not penetrated without some resistance. A passionate speech once given by a parliamentarian in Kenya captured some of the fire which is felt over these issues. That was in 1966 before Kenya merged her two Houses of Parliament. Senator J. Kabaso was speaking in the Upper House when he exploded with the words :

"Some African women take much trouble applying Ambi Spécial so that they can look white in the face while the rest of their bodies are black. If this painting of lips continues, there is no reason why European women should not start painting their faces black".

He also condemned the reduction of African hair to something that " looks like sisal".

The Senator was arguing both for the preservation of African cultural identity and for the maintenance of simple authenticity in feminine beauty. He concluded his speech with a motion calling on the Kenya Government to prevent "this wholesale copying of alien cultures". State action was necessary because, as he put it, "African women have a natural beauty that should not be allowed to disappear".¹⁷ But if the Senator's call for state intervention was phrased in terms of national identity, the Government's refusal to act was rationalised on the basis of individual liberty. Opposing Senator Kabaso's motion, the Attorney General argued that it was the Kenyan Government's view that the question of fashions should be left to the people themselves.¹⁸

But while governments have withdrawn from debates on fashions in East Africa, the poets and political commentators have not. Okot p'Bitek, one of the best known of Uganda's literary figures, has entrusted the cause of preserving Africa's hair to the heroine of his famous poem Song of Lawino. The poem is a long lament, originally written in Acholi and translated into English. Lawino is a traditionalist " bush wife" finding herself estranged from her husband by the intervention of western tastes in his life. The increasing westernisation in her husband has also affected his taste for women.

" My husband
Is in love with Tina
The woman with the large head ;
Ocol dies for Clementine
Ocol never sleeps
For the beautiful one
Who has read !
When the beautiful one
with whom I share my husband
Returns from cooking her hair
She resembles a chicken
A chicken
That has fallen into a pond ;
Her hair looks

Like the python's discarded skin.

They cook their hair
With hot iron
And pull it hard
so that it may grow long.
Then they rope their hair
On wooden pens
Like a billy goat
Brought for the sacrifice
Struggling to free itself.

They fry their hair
In boiling oil
As if it were locusts,
And the hair sizzles
It cries aloud in sharp pain

And the vigorous and healthy hair
(curly, springy and thick)
That glistens in the sunshine
Is left listless and dead
Like the elephant grass
Scorched brown by the fierce
February sun.
It lies lifeless
Like the sad and dying banana leaves
On a hot and windless afternoon". 19

Clearly there is a strong possibility here that Clementine may have more opportunities to beget Ocol's children than Lawino may now have. Would the triumph of western criteria of beauty have consequences for sexual selection even with regard to hair ?

This might have worked if Lamarck's theories had been vindicated in practice. We mentioned earlier Lamarck's example of the giraffe stretching its neck, tongue and legs for so long to reach its food until, over a period of generations the stretching resulted in elongated organs and the change from a primitive antelope to a giraffe.

Lamarck's notion of "the inheritance of acquired characteristics" might conceivably have applied to the genetical consequences of the prestige of western hair in African societies. A sceptical experimenter did in fact embark on an exercise which bears some resemblance to the notion of straightening hair generation after generation in Africa. Following Lamarck's theory, the experimenter cut off the tails of mice for several generations and reported that the length of the tail in the last generation was not one fraction of an inch shorter than the length in the first. He was ascertaining whether consistent mutilation, generation after generation, might convert this acquired change into an evolutionary inheritance. In fact, as one commentator has said with regard to this neo-Lamarckian experimenter, "he might have saved himself the trouble (or cutting off the tails of mice) by considering the case of the circumcision of Jewish males, which after more than a hundred generations had produced no shrivelling of the foreskin".²⁰ Likewise the straightening of Clementine's hair, in spite of all the attractions that it might have for the Ocols of present day Africa, will never become subject to sexual selection in the evolutionary sense and be passed on biologically to succeeding generations of African women.

Where sexual selection might play a part is with regard to the length of natural hair among African women. There are African women. There are African women who are so strikingly hairless that what they acquire on their head is never enough to distinguish them from men with regard to hair style. If African men in those communities begin to prefer women with longer hair, and if this, in turn, results in greater opportunities for reproduction among such women than among those with inhibited hair growth, it is possible for future generations of Africans to have an even greater preponderance of women with a greater capacity for the growth of hair on their heads.

What is uncertain in the present stage of black nationalism is whether the prestige of straight hair is in fact stable. Black nationalists in the United States have already rebelled against the preference for CAucasian texture of hair. The Afro hair style has taken much of black America by storm. And wigs have come into being to facilitate the Afro fashion.

But like ideas of pan-Africanism the Afro hair did not only start in the black diaspora, it then also struggled to find its way back to Africa. And in Africa this style has sometimes been accused of causing new tensions between men and women. In the words of one woman writer in a Uganda newspaper :

" Men are ever poking their noses into women's fashions. They think it is rather ridiculous for our girls to copy the Afro fashion from the Afro-Americans who in turn considered they had copied it from us".²¹

Hair and Modes of Protest

We started with a discussion of the utilisation of beards and hair as a medium of protest. Our illustration at the beginning was the oath taking by subjects of the king of the Baganda not to shave until their king was returned to them by the British.

Vows of this kind in relation to protest are, as we indicated, widespread in vastly divergent societies. The range is indeed from the experience at Entebbe airport on the return of the Kabaka of Buganda to the phenomenon of the hippies in the United States and the defiance of letting hair grow unattended.

If the utilisation of hair as a medium of protest were purely cultural, one would not have expected it to manifest itself so persistently in cultural systems which are otherwise very different. Cultural variations do occur regarding the precise manner in which hair becomes either a symbol of protest or a medium of political articulation. But there is enough similarity between some of the ways in which hair has been so used to raise questions of whether it might not be related to some of the psychological or physiological aspects of human perception.

There is the famous painting by Rembrandt, affirming a commitment to the sword and a boycott of the razor. Both the readiness to use the sword and the calculated refusal to use the razor became martial symbols. As the beard grows unshaved, the blade is ready for the enemy and not for the chin.²²

Then there is the whole story of Guru Nanak and the founding of Sikhism in India. The withdrawal of the brave disaffected into the forest, the subsequent vow not to shave and the ritualistic carrying of a little blade meant more for valour in combat than for vanity in a shaving salon. Sikhism has, of course, to the present day retained an aversion to the shaving of hair. And Sikhism is, in a profound sense, a religion of protest par excellence.

The enormous growth of hair sometimes entailed problems of how to cover it. The turban has become as important a part of the personality of a Sikh as the hair itself. though the turban seems to have originated out of the compelling need to find a way of covering the hair.

Sikhs in England have sought to retain their turban even when employed as bus conductors, for example. The politics of the Sikh turban have also been, in this sense, the politics of hair. Municipal corporations in some British cities have at times been reluctant to permit Sikh employees a dispensation for retaining their turban and not wearing the official conductor's cap. Both the turban and the hair then come to be inseparable from questions of religious toleration. Debates on how much latitude the Sikhs should be given in their headgear have therefore been debates about religious toleration. Given the nature of British society, such debates have normally resulted in the triumph of the Sikh against his municipal employer.²³

But what in the original functions of hair, or in human responses to its perception, could have resulted in this phenomenon of its utilisation for purposes of protest? An answer to such a question, considering the intrusion of a variety of cultural factors, can only be speculative. And yet the widespread nature of the phenomenon justifies an attempt to seek a satisfactory hypothesis as an explanation.

We have already discussed the Darwinian approach to hair in relation to sexual selection. The beard in the male has sometimes been seen in terms similar to the functions of bright colouration among male birds. In the Descent of Man Darwin develops the proposition that the focus of masculine life is the female, and that the dynamics of evolution rest in an important sense on the male's success or failure in enchanting the female.

The bright feathers, crest and fleshy chin of the cockerel, the mane of the lion, and the beard of the male homo sapiens are all to be seen in terms of the dynamics of sexual enchantment.

But an alternative theory has got increasing attention in more recent times. C. B. Moffat, in a paper published in 1903 in the Irish Naturalist, disputed Darwin's idea that the bright colouration of the male bird serves primarily the purpose of enticing the female. Instead he posed the following question :

"Have we not here some ground afforded us for suspecting that the bright plumage may have been originally evoked as war paint ? In other words as a sort of warning colouration to rival males, rather than attractive colouration to dazzled females"²⁴

Robert Ardrey elaborates further with a more telling popular question. What does the male have on his mind? The male or the female ? Ardrey refers to Darwin's answer in terms of heterosexual attraction; but then notes Moffat's negative answer.

"What the male has on his mind is the male. The female will make her choice, well and good. What is eternally bothering the male is not female estimate, but how he is doing in the eyes of this fellows. Many a contemporary school of psychology would regard this as a homosexual tendency. Nature sighs".²⁵

The beard became, in turn, a symbol of masculinity in the male precisely because it was peculiar to the male. But there is a difference between the beard as something seen by the woman, reminiscent of the man's masculinity and the beard as something felt by the woman's face, a possible irritant in the movements of actual copulation. It is here that culture intruded to determine various answers for various communities. Among many Arab tribes the beard is retained as part of the honour of man and as a symbol of manliness. With the Arabs the beard is at least as important as a symbol of dignity among men as it might be as a badge of masculinity in man's confrontation with woman.

Issues of dignity then became related to and associated with the beard. In the nineteen-thirties a number of Arabs acting as grocery vendors in the streets of Mombasa were arrested and taken to prison overnight. The offence was minor, concerning the issues of vending licences at a time when licensing was haphazard and not uniformly applied. While they were awaiting a ruling within the walls of Fort Jesus, then used as a prison, the prison warders shaved off their beards.

The people of the coast of Kenya had interacted with the Arabs for quite a while, and the significance of the beard in certain Arab customs, especially among those people from the Arabian Peninsular proper, was fully understood by many of the local Muslims in Mombasa. My father at the time had founded a rudimentary weekly newspaper, used more for debate and polemics on social issues than for any special news purposes. The shaving of the Arab vendors incensed my father so deeply that he wrote a furious open letter addressed to the Governor of Kenya denouncing this humiliation of people to whom possession of the beard was part of the dignity of man. He wondered whether, had the vendors been Sikhs with all the power of rich Indians in East Africa and the authority of the India Office in London, this humiliation would have been perpetrated.

Because of the initiative taken by my father in publicising this slight, other influential figures along the coast also articulated their own sense of outrage. In the end a public apology came from governmental authorities in

In fact the two theories are not mutually incompatible. It is possible for the beard, for example, to be both a symbol of masculine dignity in relation to other males, and a point of potential attraction to females in the original state of homo sapiens. Most societies regard manliness in terms both of dignified behaviour by males in the face of difficulties and dangers and in terms of effective relationship with females. Parity of esteem with fellows males and power of attraction to females both became embodied in the later evolution of the bio-cultural concept of masculinity.

Some societies then, aware that the beard is the most distinctive thing on the face that differentiates the male from the female, have, therefore, opted to maximise its effect. The whole enterprise may not be unconnected with the biological change in the sexual act itself which has resulted in face to face relationships.

We have referred earlier to the important biological change in man's sexual posture. This was the change from the general mammalian copulation style of back to front to the more characteristically human style of face to face. C. D. Darlington has asserted that the directly psychological and social effects of face to face mating have initiated evolutionary sequences which "will no doubt continue as long as man exists".

"Concentrating attention on the face and breasts of woman, the reversal of position has, to use Haldane's words, tended to change man's idea of beauty from the stertopogous Hottentot to the modern European, from the Venus of Brassempouy to the Venus of Milo. Sexual selection, acting more slowly than Haldane supposed, has favoured the appearance of forms of beauty, first in woman and secondarily in man".²⁶

Facial beauty, as a major aspect of sexual attractiveness, therefore owes its origin to this major transformation of the sexual posture of man.

Nairobi, explaining that the indignity to which the poor Arab vendors had been subjected had been caused by a misunderstanding within the prison walls of Fort Jesus. The apology however was unqualified, and a point had been made in defence of the beard.

The dignitarian implications of the beard are important in some sections of Christianity too, as indeed in Judaism. The beard sometimes becomes not a symbol of manliness as such, but a symbol of fatherhood. The bearded man emerges as a father figure in the very dignity he acquires. The Greek Orthodox Church responded to this situation, and had its priests resplendently bearded. The rabbis in Judaic synagogues have also invoked nature's heritage of the beard to add dignity to their presence as father figures in the community.

In the case of historical figures like Marx, Karl, there might have been a combination of the protest function of beards and the Judaic continuation. Bearded Karl Marx appeared to many as one more Jewish prophet, bringing forth in the nineteenth century a proletarian revolutionary religion. The beard, then, signified his status as a prophet ; but it might also have signified his status as a revolutionary.

Fidel Castro in Cuba again had his beard connected with the stream of history going back to Karl Marx and beyond. The bearded revolutionary, part prophet part rebel, emerges in Castro. But in his case there is the additional factor of having been a revolutionary who was once in the jungle, withdrawn like Guru Nanak.

The beard as protest becomes linked both to the concept of withdrawal and to the concept of mourning. The withdrawal might take the form of a return to the bare necessities of nature by the rejection of artificial adornments, or by the retreat to the original hairy essence of manhood.

The beard as mourning also implies a rejection of artificial trimming and adornment. In the case of men the mourning might take the form of unrestricted hair growth. In the case of women, the mourning sometimes takes the form of shaving the hair on the head. Leaving a man untrimmed and unshaven and rendering a woman totally hairless on the skull both become forms of the rejection of adornment and therefore modes of mourning. A widow in some denominations of Islam is indeed required to shave her head. But the Ganda utilisation of unrestricted male growth following the exile of their king was an instance of the male plunging into mourning by letting the hair grow. The cultural variations which arose as to whether the man's beard was attractive or repellent to the woman hinged on the difference between the beard as seen by the female and the beard when felt by the female. The beard as masculinity was attractive by the judgment of vision and sometimes repellent by the judgment of sensation. Balancing sexual attractiveness to the eyes against sexual irritation to the touch has varied from society to society and from one human couple and another. In the case of Rembrandt's painting when the men let their hair grow it was a way of announcing their sexual abstinence.

A similar phenomenon in the case of the early days of the Mau Mau insurrection. Many of the rebels in the forest at first observed the Kikuyu prohibition that men shall remain celibate during the course of a war. There were women around in the forest, though fewer in numbers than the men. There was first a determination to live up to the traditional abstinence of combat. This abstinence was accompanied by long beards and shaggy hair. There was, in addition, the element of convenience, as living in the jungle entailed difficulties in the refinements of shaving, but in the earlier days the shaggy hair and unattended beard were intermingled with issues of sexual abstinence as decreed by cultural ways.

Later on the men decided, given the prolonged nature of the war, that the demands of the traditional requirements of combat should not apply to the agonising durability of guerilla warfare. The camps met in jungles of Kenya, and finally decided democratically that the taboo on sex was to be ended. There was still a tendency to put women in

separate camps; and each woman was to have only one man and each man only one woman. A form of enforced monogamy was observed among these people who in their own habits were sometimes polygamous. Warfare monogamy was respected wherever possible. The sexual abstinence was ended. But the long beards and shaggy hair continued among at least some of the rebels.

We might therefore say that the protest meaning of hair is derivative/ Hair assumed significance as a medium of protest because it had already assumed significance in terms of withdrawal and mourning. Both angry disengagement and bitter sadness can be modes of articulating protest.

But connected with these two other roles in the case of protesting males is the masculine dignity symbolised by the beard, and the related emotions pertaining to wounded dignity.

Hair and Family Ritual

As for the reasons which have helped to give hair these additional socio-cultural roles, a major one is simply the ease with which hair can be cut. Human communities have often felt a compulsive need to leave ritualistic marks or even inflict ritualistic mutilations on the human body as a point of entry into the membership of society or a badge of continuing affiliation through the different phases of life. The range of bodily mutilations on both the bodies of men and women in different societies in history is quite wide. Very often the marking of the body, or sharpening of the teeth, has been connected with questions of mating and sexual attractiveness. Among the most enduring of all forms of bodily mutilation must be included the custom of circumcision. It persisted among the Jews for thousands of years, and among Muslims for about half as long. It is also observed in a variety of communities in Africa and some Pacific islands. Male circumcision, partly because it can take forms which are less drastic, is on the whole a more enduring custom than female circumcision. There are, of course, communities which practise both. In Africa the Kikuyu have sometimes been a controversial community be-

cause of the nature of their female circumcision, though, of course, they have also practised male circumcision.

The cousins of the Kikuyu, the Kamba, also have forms of tampering with the body inherited from nature. But among their more distinctive customs has been the deliberate sharpening of the teeth partly for ritual and partly for adornment.

But of all the various physical parts of the body of man, the most easily manipulable for ritualistic purpose is hair. It can be clipped, or completely shaved, or cut according to specific designs, or plucked out selectively. It has also a range of distribution which makes it worthier of such ritualistic treatment than fingernails or toenails, the second most manipulable parts. There is hair on some of the most conspicuous areas of the human body, on top of the skull, and, in the case of men, around the chin and below the nose. The entire heritage of face to face relationships focusses attention on certain areas of hair. But in addition there is hair on more intimate parts of the body, connecting it with the range of experience that is deeply personal and yet also reproductive. Pubic hair acquires a wealth of suggestiveness partly because it surrounds intimate areas and also because it is hair which comes almost simultaneously with sexual maturity. A baby acquires hair on top of its head quite early, be it male or female. But hair in those private areas of sexual intimacy takes its time in appearing, almost afraid to adorn those parts before they have become sexually meaningful.

It is because of this manipulability of hair that among African communities we find it serving a variety of roles. Among the Nuer their rites de passage associate with nudity the whole process of discarding old and acquiring new social roles and statuses. In the words of Beidelman :

" The relation of hairlessness to nudity is unclear but obviously important... During his initiation a Nuer boy must be completely nude, shaved, and with no ornaments or garb whatsoever... Hair may perhaps be seen as some kind of concealing aspect of the self which

must be removed to obliterate one's present status. Such a procedure, of course, is common to many societies where removal or neglect of hair are two methods of indicating a radical dissociation from a person's.27

Among the Kikuyu hair is also called to serve a variety of ritualistic roles. A particularly intriguing selective clipping has raised questions about the origins of the symbol of the cross among the Kikuyu. In certain ceremonies involving attempts to chase away evil spirits, mothers shave off the hair of those children who had not been able to join in the ceremonial combat. The shaving is in the form of the cross, designed to protect the children against returning spirits. And yet this sign of the cross on the head of Kikuyu children seems to antedate the coming of Christianity to Kikuyuland in historical times. John S. Mbiti, Professor of Religious Studies at Makerere University, has speculated whether the sign of the cross in the fight against evil forces among the Kikuyu owed its existence to a previous coming of Christianity to this part of equatorial Africa - a previous contact with the religion of Jesus whose only legacy is that sign of the cross. In the absence of any other evidence of a "First-coming", it seems easier to believe that the sign of the cross, shaved on the heads of Kikuyu children as a protection against evil spirits is an independent form of symbolism, born out of a tradition which in its origins had nothing to do with the religion founded by Jesus Christ.28

There are other functions that hair is called upon to serve in yet other communities in different parts of the world - functions which include the full life cycle, birth initiation, marriage, parenthood and death. All these different phases of human experience have been known to manipulate the heritage of hair in symbolic terms for symbolic purposes.

FOOTNOTES

1. Mutesa acknowledges this gesture by some of his subjects in his book Desecration of my Kingdom (London : Constable, 1967), pp. 123-124.
2. See Uganda Argus and East African Standard, October 16-29, 1955. See also Martin Southwold, 'was the kingdom Sacred ?' Mawazo, Vol.1, NOS 2, December 1967, pp. 21-22
3. Charles White. An Account of the Regular Graduations in Man (London :1799), Vol. 1. See also A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Mass : 1936). For an attempt to trace the long-term implications of some of these theories consult Mazrui, 'From Social Darwinism of some to Current Theories of Modernization : A tradition of Analysis', World Politics, Vol. XXI, No.1, October 1968. The article occurs as Chapter 4 in Mazrui, Violence and Thought Essays on Social Tensions in Africa (London : Longmans, 1969), pp. 85-101.
4. Lovejoy, op. cit. pp. 233 ff ; also Lovejoy, 'Some Eighteenth Century Evolutionists', Popular Science Monthly Vol. LXV, p. 327 (1904)
5. Darlington, the Evolution of Man and Society (London : George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1969), p. 56.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 55
8. Darwin, The Descent of Man, op. cit. Consult also J. Maynard Smith, 'Sexual Selection in A Century of Darwin edited by S. A. Barnett (London : Mercury Books, 1962), pp. 231-244.
9. George Combe, A system of Phrenology (New York, 1945). I am indebted to P. D. Curtin's book, The Image of Africa (London, Macmillan, 1965) for bibliographical guidance and stimulation.
10. Isaac Asimov, The intelligent Man's Guide to Science, Vol. 2, The Biological Sciences (NEW YORK : Basic Books 1962 edition), pp. 690-691. Darwin refers to 'savage' communities elsewhere-the Aysara and Quichua Indians.

Darwin says : "The men of these two tribes have very little hair on the various parts of the body where the hair grows abundantly in Europeans, and the women have none on the corresponding parts" (The Descent of Man, op. cit.) In fact among the least hairy of the races of the world are the yellow peoples as well as the black peoples. As compared with East Indians and Caucasians, the Chinese are singularly hairless. Among the Africans there are in fact variations. The Nilotes tend, on the whole, to have even less hair than the Bantu groups.

12. Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa (London : Oxford University Press, 1961 edition), p. 279.
13. For a brief version of his views on this, see Chikh Anta Diop, 'The Cultural Contributions and Prospects of Africa', Proceedings of the First International Conference of Negro Writers and Artists, Presence Africaine Special Issue, June/November 1956, pp. 347-354. The meaning of Egypt for African cultural nationalism is also discussed in my inaugural lecture, Ancient Greece in African Political Thought (Nairobi : East African Publishing House, 1967).
14. Basil Davidson, Old Africa Rediscovered (London : Victor Gollancz, 1961), p. 28.
15. W. E. B. Du Bois, The World and Africa : An Inquiry into the Part which Africa Has Played in World History (1946) (New York : International Publishers, 1965 edition), pp. 120-121.
16. J. Maynard Smith, 'Sexual Selection', op. cit; p. 244.
17. See East African Standard (Nairobi) 29 july 1966.
18. See Mazrui, 'Miniskirts and Political Puritanism', Africa Report, Vol. 13 No. 7, October 1968.
19. Okot p'Bitek, Song of Lewino (Nairobi : East African Publishing HOUSE, 1966), pp 59-60.
20. Isaac Asimov, op. cit. PL 668

21. See Mary Apio, "African Hair Saldon on the Decline ?", The People(Kamala), July 8 , 1970.
22. Rembrandt's vision of 'The Conspiracy of the batavians' postulated vow. Rembrandt was also interested in Samson and his power.
23. Percival Spear has argued that the Sikh attitude to hair is partly an outcome of Islamic influence on the founding fathers of Sikhism. " The wearing of long hair is related to the orthodox Muslim custom of wearing beards". See Spear, India : A Modern History (Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 1961, p.250).
24. Moffat, ' the Spring Rivalry of Birds' Irish Naturalist (1903).
25. Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative : A Personal Inquiry into the Anomal Origins of Property and Nations (London : Fontana Library, Collins, 1969, pp. 68-70
26. C. D. Darlington, op. cit., p.55.
27. T. O Beidelman, 'Some Nuer Notions of Nadedness, Nudity and Sexuality' Africa Vol. XXXVIII, N° 2, April pp. 128-129.
28. Consult Reverend John S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (London : Heinemann, 1969), p.90.

B VII. BIOLOGY AND POLITICS.

BIOLOGIE ET POLITIQUE.

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B VII/16

Conclusion.

We have examined the significance of the heritage of hair in relation to its socio-political roles. Against the background of the biological meaning of hair, we have attempted to unravel the different dimensions of symbolism which this growth on the human body has acquired in history. With the presumed operation of sexual selection, the beard especially became a symbol of ultimate manliness distinguishing man from woman. The emphasis on the face as an area of sexual relevance consolidated itself partly as a result of a transformation in the sexual posture of man, away from mammalian back to front styles of love making to the more characteristic human style of face to face. From symbolising manliness in a sexual sense, the beard came later to symbolise manliness in the sense of readiness to fight, and readiness to endure the discipline of self-neglect. Masculine hair in Sikhism, the beard among rebels, the vow in Rembrandt's painting, and that oath of unrestricted hairiness which some Baganda loyalists took when their king was exiled, are all part of the transition of the beard from symbolising manliness in a sexual sense to symbolising manliness in situations of social combat. It is in part within such situations that hair serves functions of protest.

Protest also arises in contexts of wounded dignity. And hair, as we have indicated, does at times relate to dignity. Certainly the beard, from symbolising sexual manliness of courage, then moves on to symbolising dignified fatherhood. We have indicated that Judaic, rabbis in synagogues, and priests in churches of the Greek Orthodox religion, have all utilised the beard for purposes of augmenting the image of the priestly father-figure.

But hair in relation to dignity in the British tradition retains a residual role in the wig which judges wear as they listen to the solemnity of a court case in session. The even more obvious solemnity of giving judgment is again achieved in visual effect by making the men sitting on the judicial throne wear a wig of dignified presence. Just as protests often relate to wounded dignity, the neglect of hair or the shaving of hair find themselves serving protest functions.

We have also discussed social withdrawal and mourning as moods which agains are sometimes concretised in man's treatment of his own hair. The ritualistic purposes which, hair, neglected or shaved, has been made to serve indifferent societies have almost all the stages of the life cycle, from birth to death. But it is hair in relation to either social withdrawal or personal mourning which has been rallied to the cause of protest movements.

This paper has also discussed hair in the context of group identity and cultural nationalism. We drew attention to its conspicuous absence in racial theories in Europe, in spite of the importance of hairiness among man's cousins, the apes. The scientific racists paid considerable attention to the skull, but seemed indifferent to the hairy covering of the skull in the living species.

But African cultural nationalism has been less indifferent to the social signification of hair. The distinctive aspects of African hair, woolly and relatively tough, have been rallied in historical studies to establish African participation in the genesis of the civilisation of ancient

Egypt. But African hair has also been subject to the forces of acculturation which came with the imperial presence in Africa. The prestige of straightened hair, on the model of the Caucasian texture, has illustrated the impact of the West on Africa's aesthetics and criteria for beauty. But a counter-movement, more self-consciously nationalistic, has erupted first in black America and now increasingly within Africa itself. This is the movement that turns its attention once more to a sense of pride in the physical characteristics distinctive to Africans, including a sense of pride in African hair, unstraightened and "uncooked". The Afro style, and even the Afro wig, become symbolic of a reassertion of black aesthetics. Politics, hair, art and beauty converge in the whole controversy about hair styles for black women.

But behind it all are not only the tensions of racial groups in cultural interaction, but also the persistent theme of man's identification with his own group and with his own society. The ritualistic manipulability of hair among the Nuer, the Kikuyu, the Maya, and the Aztecs defined social roles for different members of society and asserted their identity in group perspective. That dimension has persisted in a variant form to the latest debates on whether the heritage of hair will now become the central visual aspect of unisexuality as a social trend in the West.

Perhaps the real meaning of hair in human affairs is a compromise between its meaning to Charles Darwin and its meaning in the story of Samson Agonistes. For Darwinian theorists, hair emerges or disappears preeminently in response to the process of sexual selection. Some residual purposes are retained biologically after man has become man, but in general hair is a biological residue in man.

But in the story of Samson, the inner meaning of his own hair is power and strength. The sexual dimension remains in that he confides the meaning of this hair to Delilah, with tragic consequences. A period of wounded dignity ensues and a period of withdrawal and mourning. And then comes the final act of protest as Samson pulls down the pillars of the entertainment arena of the Philistines. His hair had come back ; his strength had returned. He found in revenge the ultimate protest.

Somewhere between the science of Darwin and the romance of Samson Agonistes lies the real meaning of hair in human affairs. It is neither a biological anachronism nor a source of great power. It is a bequest from biology to the world of social and religious ritual, cultural innovation and political articulation.

Political Man and the Heritage of Hair : Some African Perspectives

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B-VII / 16.

Conclusions :

La présente étude a examiné la signification de l'héritage de la chevelure dans ses relations avec ses rôles socio-politiques. A l'encontre du fond de signification biologique de la chevelure, nous avons tenté de débrouiller les diverses dimensions symboliques que sa croissance sur le corps humain a acquises au cours de l'histoire. Avec l'opération présumée de sélection sexuelle, la barbe tout spécialement devient le symbole qui distingue l'homme essentiellement viril de la femme. L'accent mis sur la figure comme une aire de signification sexuelle de l'homme, s'écartant de la façon caractéristique des autres mammifères de s'accoupler pour adopter le style caractéristique de l'homme face à face.

De symbole de la virilité prise au sens sexuel, la barbe est devenue le symbole de la virilité prise au sens de vertu prête au combat et d'aptitude à endurer la discipline de se négliger soi-même. La chevelure des Sikhs, la barbe des rebelles, le voeu dans la peinture de Rembrandt, et le serment de ne pas se couper la chevelure, sans aucune limite, que certains loyalites Baganda formulèrent quand leur roi fut exilé, sont tous signes de la transition de la barbe de sa signification symbolique de virilité au sens sexuel à la signification de virilité dans des situations de lutte sociale. C'est dans des situations de ce genre que la chevelure a assumé des fonctions de protestation.

Des protestations se sont également élevées dans le contexte de la dignité blessée. Et la chevelure, on l'a dit, peut être en rapport avec la dignité de l'homme. Il est certain que la barbe, à l'origine symbole de virilité au sens sexuel et symbole de courage, devient symbole de la dignité paternelle. Les prophètes hébreux, les rabbins dans les synagogues, les prêtres dans les Eglises orthodoxes ont utilisé la barbe pour affirmer l'image du prêtre-père.

Dans la tradition britannique toutefois, la chevelure dans sa relation avec la dignité ne joue plus qu'un rôle résiduel sous la forme de la perruque que portent les juges pour donner plus d'apparat aux travaux du tribunal. La solennité du jugement est encore accrue, visuellement en ornant le chef de l'homme qui est assis sur le trône judiciaire d'une perruque. Comme protestations contre les offenses faites à la dignité, on compte la négligence des soins capillaires.

Nous avons aussi traité les cas de réclusion sociale et de deuil qui sont parfois concrétisés par des traitements spéciaux de la chevelure. L'utilisation de la chevelure, soignée ou négligée, à des fins rituelles qui en a été faite dans différentes sociétés, a également été appliquée à tous les âges de la vie, de la naissance à la mort. Mais c'est la chevelure dans ses relations soit avec le deuil, soit avec la ségrégation sociale, qui a été adoptée par les mouvements de protestation.

La présente note a aussi discuté la question de la chevelure dans le contexte de l'identification du groupe et du nationalisme culturel. Elle attire l'attention sur le phénomène remarquable de son absence dans les théories racistes en Europe, malgré l'importance de la pilosité chez les cousins de l'homme, les singes. Les racistes scientifiques accordent une attention considérable au crâne, mais semblent ne pas s'intéresser beaucoup au couvre-chef chevelu du crâne dans les espèces vivantes.

Le nationalisme culturel africain a été moins indifférent à la signification sociale de la chevelure. Les aspects distinctifs de la chevelure africaine, laineuse et relativement dure, ont été utilisés dans des études historiques pour établir la participation des Africains à la genèse de l'ancienne Egypte. Mais la chevelure africaine a subi également l'impact de l'acculturation qu'apportait la présence du Blanc en Afrique. Le prestige des cheveux droits, à la façon de la race caucasienne, illustre les effets de la civilisation occidentale sur l'esthétique de l'Afrique et ses critères de beauté. Toutefois un mouvement de réaction, plus consciemment nationaliste, a fait éruption dans l'Amérique noire tout d'abord, et actuellement, de plus en plus, en Afrique même. C'est un mouvement qui trouve à nouveau des raisons d'orgueil dans les caractéristiques physiques distinctives des Africains, y compris dans la chevelure africaine, non décrépelée et "non préparée" ("uncooked"). La chevelure africaine et même la perruque africaine redeviennent le symbole de la réaffirmation de l'esthétique noire. La politique, la chevelure, l'art et la beauté convergent dans toute la controverse qui se déroule autour des styles que les femmes noires doivent adopter en matière de chevelure.

Mais derrière cela on découvre non seulement les tensions des groupes raciaux dans leurs interactions culturelles, mais encore la persistance des thèmes de l'identification de l'individu avec son groupe et avec la société où il vit. La façon rituelle de traiter les cheveux chez les Nuer, les Kikuyu, les Maya et les Aztèques définit les rôles des différents membres de la société et confirme leur identification avec les vues du groupe. Pareille dimension s'est poursuivie sous une forme quelque peu différente dans les derniers débats qui se sont poursuivis sur le point de savoir si l'héritage de la chevelure allait devenir maintenant l'aspect visuel central de l'unisexualisme comme tendance sociale en Occident.

Il est possible que la véritable signification de la chevelure dans les affaires humaines soit un compromis entre la signification qu'en donne Charles Darwin et la signification qu'elle a dans l'histoire de Samson. Pour les Darwiniens, la pilosité est apparue ou a disparu en réponse principalement à un processus de sélection sexuelle. Quelques objectifs résiduels ont été conservés après que l'homme est devenu un homme, mais en général, la pilosité est un résidu biologique chez l'homme.

Dans l'histoire de Samson, la signification profonde de la chevelure est force et puissance. La dimension sexuelle subsiste dans ce qu'il confie à Dalilah, avec les conséquences tragiques que l'on sait. Une période de dignité blessée s'en suivra et une période de retraite et de deuil. Puis vient l'acte final des protestations quand Samson fait tomber les colonnes du Temple philistin. Ses cheveux avaient repoussé et sa force était revenue. Ce fut sa revanche et son ultime protestation.

C'est entre la science de Darwin et l'histoire de Samson que se situe la véritable signification de la chevelure dans les histoires humaines. Elle n'est ni un anachronisme biologique, ni une source de puissance, mais un legs de la biologie au monde des rites sociaux et religieux, de l'innovation culturelle et de l'articulation politique.

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Parte **V**

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TOWARDS A STUDY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN
A TYPOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL THEORIES

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Towards a study of Social Movements
in a Typology of International Theories

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Since the beginnings of this century the elite oriented international interaction has been slowly transformed into a far more structure oriented interaction (1). While power relations whether articulated in terms of military relations or diplomatic relations have not been modified the centralization of power in governmental institutions no longer legitimizes the limits of international relations.

Earlier, as the nation was successively identified with the monarch and later with the bourgeoisie the dimensions of international relations extended from diplomatic intercourse between royal families to economic and diplomatic relations of essentially bourgeois governments (2). Unfortunately the identification of mass society in the west with the nation state (3) has been a rather presumptuous exercise particularly in view of recent trends. Studies pertaining to industrialization and modernization of world societies in the South and (4) scientific and technological change (5) in world societies in the North imply that international relationships would have to incorporate total societies whatever their structural organization may be. In addition to the modernist-scientific pressures, the trends in both South and North indicate the rapid alienation of a variety of social groups from the mainstream of governmental structures and a simultaneous acceleration of their transnational activities (6).

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- (1) J.P. Nettle and Robertson : Modernization and International Systems p. 139
 - (2) E.H. Carr : Nationalism and After
 - (3) Ibid.
 - (4) Marion Levy, Jr. : Modernization and Structure of Societies : A Setting for International Affairs (Princeton), 1966, and David E. Apter : The Politics of Modernization
 - (5)
 - (6) Robert C. Angell : The Growth of Transnational Participation in Journal of Social Issues XXIII Jan. 1967.

The latter has undoubtedly been facilitated by the communications and technological revolution but the legitimacy of these transnational relations and the impact of alienated groups seeking change on international relations is only beginning to receive attention.

The new perspectives on international relations is no doubt facilitated by the use of systemic approaches involving within the societal dynamics cultural, military, economic and other dimensions of relationship whether shared, interdependent or exploitive.

Contemporary social movements provide in their interaction with national systems, new perspectives in the analysis of international relations; their transnational relations provide a further dimension to foreign policy analysis. But in analyzing through these perspectives the philosophical outlook behind distinct foreign policies is just as significant as the systemic mechanism. Consequently the significance of specific social movements in its impact on foreign policy can be meaningfully comprehended in the context of distinct international theories.

The systemic approaches underline the importance of certain actions within the social system in affecting significant changes in the domestic and international system both directly and indirectly. Whilst theoretical analytical studies of these have increased greatly in recent years the role of some social movements per se as key actors in contemporary social change have not been adequately extended to the international system. And yet some of these actors, through the fundamental change they are currently affecting and posing to national societies are inevitably bound, up to a degree, to affect the international systems. The purpose of this paper has thus been to emphasize these emerging trends in the context of international theories distinguishing the role of these in a comparative study of a popularly conceived activist - ideological classification of types of "movements".

The weakness of the simplistic nature of the classification are acknowledged but in view of the overwhelming evidence of the existence of such classifications in the minds of leaders and participants in the South and North, its relevance and existence cannot be denied. Perhaps one needs to argue as Pye does that they serve as heuristic devices. Further, two specific movements conceived in terms of Hans Toch's characteristics of movements have been examined in terms of their foreign policy implications. They represent two powerful alienated groups, one ideological and another still predominantly ethnic. On the basis of their behaviour and attitudes an emphasis on theories linking social movements and international theories are suggested.

INTERNATIONAL THEORIES

As any systematic search for international theories is bound to uncover a number of rather contradictory looking ideas, efforts to systematize distinct conceptions can only provide a heuristic device.

Traditional 'normative-oriented' theories (7) have largely been conceived in terms of national actors and international governmental systems based on centralized power and monistic conceptions of state sovereignty. Thus the balance of power theory whilst implicitly acknowledging the balance of internal forces, explicitly conceptualizes and emphasizes an inter-governmental theory. Likewise the systems theories of Modelski, (8) and prismatic theory of Riggs, (9) by concentrating on the mechanics of the system, obscure their role in the transformation of foreign policy.

Among other theories, the stratification theory of Galtung (10) AND Etzioni's (11) intrasocietal schema facilitate the explanation of international theories attempted here.

Though prone to the criticism of being overly simplistic international theories of leadership can be classified as being Traditional, Modernist and Revolutionary (12) in Southern Asia (India) and Conservative, Liberal and Radical in Northern America (U.S.A.). The positive correlation becomes complex and categories overlap especially when one examines main value themes. Nevertheless, I would like to describe them in an impressionistic way (13), a systematic analysis would have to await further study based on precise data.

SOCIAL PROTEST MOVEMENTS :

I shall discuss one major social movement in North America which has also been clearly distinguished as an ethnic movement of Protest - the Afro-American or Black movement. Several other ethnic protest movements though going through a revivalist period or becoming increasingly

- (7) Note classical analysis by Schumann, Morgenthau, etc ..
- (8) George Modelski : Agraria and Industria : Two Models of the International System in K. Knorr and S. Verba : The International System.
- (9) Fred Riggs : International Relations as a Prismatic System, World Politics XIV, 1 (October, 1961) pp. 144- 81.
- (10) Johann Galtung : A Structural Theory of Aggression : Journal of Peace Research, 1964 (2), pp. 95-119, also International Relations and International Conflict : A Sociological Approach, Plenary Session, Sixth World Congress of Sociology, 1966
- (11) Amitai Etzioni's : Studies on the Sociology of International Relations.
- (12) For a discussion on typologies see Pye's and other papers.
- (13) Some leading ideas derive from Martin Wright; others from Hedley Bull.

visible because of technological (especially communications) and societal reasons (Charismatic role of Black movement in inspiring similar behaviour patterns) such as Quebecois in Canada, the Aztlan movement among Chicanos (with its base in New Mexico) or Red Power movement in Canada (concentrated in Saskatchewan and Northern Ontario) still require basic data before meaningful research can be undertaken.

In Southern Asia one can likewise identify several ethnic (and linguistic) social protest movements such as that of the Nagas and Mizos in India, East Bengalis and Pushtoons in Pakistan, Shans, Kachims, Karens, Chins, Mons in Burma, Tamils in Ceylon and other less visible movements. Statistical information on these is also rather rudimentary, besides whether they have the comparable significance of the Black movements in the U.S.A. is highly questionable. I have therefore taken one alienated group who constitutes an ideological movement in India which compare with the North American case; this is the Naxalite movement mainly confined to West Bengal and constitutes a significantly developing socio-political protest movement in South Asia.

The differences between the two are underlined by the difference between ethnic movements with their physical attributes and limited (minority) scope and ideological movements with their philosophical attributes and unlimited (from minority to majority) scope. Despite this basic difference and other characteristic features what is striking is their significance in the context of foreign policy systems of the U.S.A. and India.

BLACK PROTEST MOVEMENT :

Many writers on social movements till very recently have tended to concentrate on the problems facing suburban middle class America and in course of this ignored those problems exploding in the U.S. to-day often leading to radical movements which have rapidly developed within the past few years. Yet, recently and even currently the vigorous social criticism though having their origins much earlier revolve around the black revolt, the student revolt and the peace movement closely linking the three and revealing a close linkage with U.S. foreign policy opinions.

The Black movement is, ofcourse, not new since it dates back to civil rights movements even before the Civil War (14). More than a century later these protest movements have gained enormous strength still having failed to achieve the justice and equality on which American democracy has prided itself. The continuity of their struggle reads like a tragic chronology of events - a climate of oppression created

(14) Alexander, W.T. : History of the Coloured Race in America, Negro University Press, 1968.

by lynchings and violence and injustice opposed by a succession of black social and political leaders with varying ideological persuasions such as Marcus Garvey and his Universal Negro Improvement Association, William Dubois founder of the National Association for the advancement of Coloured People, Martin Luthers King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Malcom (x), Robert Williams, SNCC, Carmaichel and Black Power and more recently Cleaver, Newton, Seale and the Black Pauther Party. During this long period the movements have gained throught marches, démonstrations as well as riots. The causes of this acceleration in consciousness are varied though the impact of the international system especially anti-colonialism and the independance of Asian and African states has undoubtedly had a traumatic effect. The black struggle has been oriented to different goals as well (15) to some the goal of a separate black state seems the logical solution (16); to others social and economic equality is a more practical goal. Whatever the goal and ideological persuation the demand for more power has immediate priority; as James Baldwin eloquently points out :

"How can one respect, let alone adopt, the values of a people, who do not, on any level whatever, live the way they say they do, or the way they say they should ? I cannot respect the proposition that the four hundred year travail of the American Negro should result merely in his attainment of the present level of American Civilization. ... The only thing White people have that Black people need or should want, is power - and no one holds power for ever" (17).

The struggle for this power is bitter and is no longer seen solely in terms of the domestic system. The linkage between the Third World in the international system (Emerging States) and third World within the American national system alienated ethnic and socio-economic groups) becomes increasingly clearer leading to identical foreign policy goals such as a check on America's global ambitions. As one scholar points out : -"Underpopulated on a rich continent, geographically insulated from predatory nations, White America rarely felt constrained by forces it could not surmount. It therefore has little experiential basis for understanding the impotence and frustation, manifest in alternating resignation and violence, that Characterize much of the Southern World to-day. Many regroes feel this impotence and frustation. For this reason the analogy between their situation as they perceive it and that of the underdeveloped countries is an improvement over the analogy presently in use : Our thinking of Southern societies as "Nations like us", as confident of progress, as consensual, as experienced in nonviolent

* Robert S. Browne : The case for Black Separatism.

(15) See Broderick K.L. Negro Protest thought in the XXth Cent. 1965

(16) Harold Cruse : The Crisis of the Negro Intellectual (New York 1967).

(17) James Baldwin : The Fire Next Time p. 10

change as we conceive ourselves to be" (18).

Within the American national system the import of the linkage between the Civil Rights movements and the Peace Movement has been well emphasized in a recent study. "Let us look at two movements of social protest in our society as examples of the relevance of social structure and system forces for an understanding of social phenomena - the Civil rights movement and protests against the war in Vietnam. From the conventional approach of individual psychology they seem very similar. They have both been led by much the same type of people, largely those outside the basic power structure of the society : small groups of students activities, part of the academic and intellectual world, some Church groups and some members of the Negro community"

"They have one other major similarity which is more at the system than at the individual level. They have both the advantage that the values which justify their thrust are part of the value system of the larger society : the doctrine of racism furnished little support for the opposition to Civil Rights in a political democracy of a multiethnic character In similar fashion the protestors against the Vietnam War had the legitimizing values of society on their side. Democracy demands the right of self - determination of small as well as large nations. It does not justify the intervention of large powers in small nations merely because of their power" (19)

The major reflection of the black movement therefore can be seen in a radical rather than either a global or a limitationist (liberal) foreign policy (20). The global policy is defined as a policy which is limitless despite the obvious truism that no policy is completely limitless. Nor is such a policy considered overambitious according to domestic conservative opinion and is totally rejected by the black protest movement. The movements, despite their ideological nuances in fact find in the North Vietnamese and others, allies in a common struggle against what it consider "American imperialism" operating in both the domestic and international scene. Thus Eldridge Cleaver of the Black Panthers though in self-exile offered to exchange American prisoners of war in Vietnam for Panther leaders serving long sentences in U.S. jails. Cleaver emphasized that blacks had also been involved in : liberation struggle for their country (like the NLF) hence their demand for freedom had the same international implications.

(18) Kentworthy Eldon : Black-White at home, North-South Abroad, in the Tale Review, Vol. LVII, Dec. 1967, No. 2 p. 162

(19) Katz, Daniel : Group Process and Social Integration : A system analysis of two Movements of Social Protest, Kurt Lewin Memorial Award Address 1966

(20) For a discussion of these theories see Charles Gati's Review article : Another Grand Debate in World Politics.

Like other radical critics of globalism the need and value of the U.S. assuming the role of the sole super sovereign state is questioned by blacks.

In place of such dominance an international system of equal states united not through collective security but ideological and or cultural solidarity is envisaged.

The limitationist thesis which on the other hand is verified by the prospect of an American empire pursuing the goal of Pax Americana is closer to the radical views of the black movement though the fervour may be said to be somewhat stronger (21) whilst limitationists seek to identify American interests through the U.N. and other international bodies and implicitly accept the legalism of these institutions radical black policy is more clearly revolutionary.

The link between issues in the national and international arena have been dramatically asserted by student activists of whom it is said :

"No one could possibly hope to understand the development of student unrest as it now exists nor the future of activism without a careful consideration of both the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War. For many activists these are not perceived as two distinct events but rather as part of a longer picture which puts the people against the injustices of the Establishment" (x)

THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT :

Indian revolutionary tradition dates far back into the 18th and 19th Centuries and became particularly significant in the early 20th Century, prior to World War I. Thereafter and till the last decade it was the CPI which assumed the rôle of the revolutionary national party with notable regional exceptions like the Anushilan Samity and Jugantar Party which flourished in industrially rich and intellectually advanced Bengal (x) (22).

In October 1962 West Bengal like the rest of India was affected by the Wave of anti-Chinese feeling which swept through the length and

(21) See Eugene McCarthy : The limits of power : America's Role in the World (1967) and William Fullbright : The arrogance of Power (1967).

(22) See Gobindo Lall Banerjee : Dynamics of Revolutionary Movement in India (Calcutta, 1965).

(x) Sampson, Edward E : Student Activism and the Decade of Protest Journal of Social Issues, July 1967.

breadth of India in the Wake of the Sino-Indian border conflict. The Communist Party of India then constituting the only Communist Party reacted ambiguously both for domestic reason and the international situation underlined by the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. Some party members condoned the Chinese policy whilst others expressed strong reservations. This ambiguity was soon to be replaced by a clear ideological split. In less than seven years (1969) the scenarios had greatly altered. The old C.P. was now divided into three Communist Parties separated organizationally and distinct ideologically, the CPI, CPI (Marxist) - a break away group of those who disagreed with what was considered a 'Revisionist' pro-soviet line and constituted themselves into a party in 1964 (23) and more recently the newly formed CPI (Marxist-Leninist) party owing allegiance to Mao, inaugurated in April 1969.

The formation of this new C.P. is in many ways the most significant development in Indian politics since Gandhi organized his mass Civil disobedience campaigns in the 1920's. The major cause of this is the very philosophy of the Naxalites as members of the CPI (M-L) have been called after their successful beginning in the village of Naxalbari in Northern Bengal. In the same way that Gandhi's movement of mass Civil disobedience as a political weapon was unique in that context, similarly the movement for a struggle for landless peasants is rather unique in the new context (24). The Naxalite movement though confined to West Bengal and to a lesser extent in Kerala and Andhra has the emerging dimensions that suggest the twilight of parliamentary politics in Bengal and subsequently other parts of India and the inauguration of a new age of extra parliamentary politics. In all this, the role of the Naxalites not only in the style of effecting change - the espousal and use of violence - but also in the impact on foreign relations has had the profoundest impact. The essence of the transformation is that whereas an increasingly large number of the total population either overtly or implicitly supports the Naxalite movement in wishing for a change in the social and economic statuquo which is clearly to their disadvantage, another number - mostly in the urbanized areas are suspicions of the impact of China and curious about China's policy in S.E. Asia. In theoretical terms as a result of the impact of the Naxalite movement, whereas the constituency of supporters of China has been on the increase, another number feeling threatened would demand a closer relationship to the U.S.A., if not outright rejection of China. This domestic input in which the Naxalite movement is the major catalyst, polarizes the views on external policy and

(23) See John Wood : Observations on the Indian Communist Party Split, Pacific Affairs Vol. XXXVIII, No 1 (1965).

(24) Such ideas can be found in the underground Bengali Press and a few English language periodicals. These include commune, Bidroho Dakshin Besh the party monthly.

also jeopardizes the future of a foreign policy of non-alignment which has been the sheetanchor of Indian diplomacy for a quarter century.

The Naxalite movement revolves primarily around the socio-economic conditions in rural Bengal and in the context of similarities with rural conditions in other areas in India and elsewhere in Asia (e.g. China and Vietnam) reveals the importance of linkages between domestic developments and the international system. This linkage between agrarian societies, the international opinions of the rural peasantry especially landless peasants, and middle peasants and the Government's foreign policy has not been adequately analysed. Yet, the sequence of historical events specially in Asia within the last decade centreing around Vietnam and extending to Indo-China and to the entire S.E. Asian Region would suggest that to avoid the current tragedy in Indo-China and to make foreign policy analysis worthy of scholarly effort, this new dimension which is gaining increasing visibility - the linkage between agrarian societies in the Third World, domestic socio-economic developments and foreign policy linkages deserve the greatest attention. In the case of the Naxalite movement the relevance of this is underlined by several recent statements of the C.P.I. (M.L.) party which advances the cause of peasant revolt and political change often along the theories advocated by Mao Tse Tung and the Chinese leadership.

"Today the basic task is to liberate the rural areas through revolutionary armed agrarian revolution and encircle the cities and thus complete the revolution throughout the country" (*)(25).

Continuing on the international implications :

"Thrown into confusion by severe crisis, U.S. Imperialism and Soviet Social Imperialism are trying to get out of them by launching aggression against the great Socialist China. They are out to turn India into their base for this aggression. They will not only impose the crushing burden of their War of Aggression against China on the 500 million Indian people, but will also use the Indian people as their Canon-fodder" (26).

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- (25) Liberation Vol. II No 6 (1969)
(26) March 12, 1970

"Deshabrati" - Bengali Weekly of C.P.I. (M.L) translated and republished in liberation Vol. 3 No 5, March 1970.

Further,

"Today the Indian working class armed with the weapon of Mao Tse Tung thought has become invincible. The liberation of the vast millions of the Indian people is near. The peasant revolutionary struggle is already raging in the countrywide. Led by the C.P.I (M.L) the poor and landless peasants are setting new glorious examples of sacrifice and developing people's war in various States of India. This revolutionary war waged by the poor and landless peasants in striking at the foundation of the system of exploitation, and the entire structure built on this foundation is tottering. Stricken with panic the ruling class is at its wits end and a fierce dogfight is going on among its members in order to save their own skin. The anger of the masses is bursting forth throughout the vast expanse of India, and they have become vocal in their hatred for the ruling class. Such foreign policy attitudes within a typology of traditional, liberal and revolutionary options open to an emerging society unquestionably correspond to the category of revolutionary values and policies. Like the attitudes of radical American Blacks, the revolutionary Indian Naxalites may still give the impression of being extreme minority fringe groups who reject both the conservative and liberal options and have a streak of revolutionary romanticism which does not truly impinge on foreign policy. Such arguments ignore the charismatic effect of extreme movements in creating effecting other movements and thereby both directly and indirectly influencing a states foreign policy alternatives. The significance of this is heightened when one considers societies of rapid change - whether post-industrial societies of immense scientific technological change or pre-industrial agrarian societies no longer isolated in a "global village" of superior communications and faced with revolutions of rising expectations.

The raising of a NLF flag in a Black Meeting in Harlem, New York, and the inscription of Mao's quotations on the walls of Jadavpur University in Calcutta symbolize and dramatize the linkage between social protest movements and foreign policy.

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B/VIII - The theory of international relations

- La théorie des relations internationales

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Conclusion

On the basis of the foregoing ideas some theoretical propositions (x)(27) may be suggested which need careful study and proof.

- (1) That basic social problems lead to social movements which in turn activate issues. The Government responds to these either by seeking to accommodate the goals of the movement and allegiation of the problem. In such a case the relationship between Government and movement results in violence and reflects itself in rigid face saving formulas in foreign policy.
- (2) A country exports in its foreign policy, its negative attitude towards the change manifested in domestic social movements. Foreign countries attempt to capitalize upon the domestic unrest created by social movements in other countries. The negative attitude of the primary country is then turned from the social movement taking place in the foreign country towards the country itself as a whole.
- (3) See chart suggesting possible linkage between specific types of social movements and foreign policies.
- (4) Studies on the linkage between domestic and foreign policy have either emphasized the importance of domestic elites in "making" foreign policy or the "influence" of varying types of "public opinion" - attentive, inattentive (the "silent majority" ?)

(x)(27) Several of my students at Lakehead University helped in the discussions, leading to the formulation of specific ideas.

(5) DOMESTIC LINKAGE

INTERNATIONAL

TYPES	VALUES	AUTHORITY	UNIT	MOVEMENT PARTIES	COMM. SYSTEM	IDEOLOGICAL FRGN POLICY-GLOBAL	IDEOLOGICAL FRGN POLICY-REGIONAL
(1)						(2)	
A TRADITIONAL	Sanskritized	Not centralised mediated through	Village	Jan Sangh, Swatrantra RSS, Shiva Sena	Charisma, village pan-chayat, socio-religio symbols	Nationalist-isolationist Anti-West, anti-Marxist exclusive of 3rd World	Religions anti-Pak anti-China Link with Hindu leadership in other States (Nepal)
X CONSERVATIVE		"establishment"- Corporate industrial elite	Small Town	Denver (Southern) Republican Ku Klux Klan	Charisma educational resources	Globalist anti-Marxist anti-non-aligned	Dominance of states in regional system
B MODERNIST	Secularilized-	centralized power & political loyalty	Urban/ Nation State	Congress CPI	Radio, educational resources	Non-alignment Balance of power	Primus inter pares
Y LIBERAL	Individualist/ achievement	Rule of law	Suburbia	Republican, N. Democrat	T.V., News-papers, films Political	Co-existence balance of power	primus inter pares
C REVOLUTIONARY	Socialist	"idealized"- populism	Society	CPI(M) CPI (M-L) Marxist revolutionary groups	Charisma political associations (Peasant Unions) Radical and underground press	anti-west; anti-Soviet; pro-3rd World revolutionary class solidarity	Pro-revolutionary groups in Pak; pro-revolutionary other states
Z RADICAL ROMANTICISTS	Egalitarian	decentralized-participatory democracy	Urban small in West	Black Panthers S.D.S., SNCC Conf.New.Pol. other New Left groups, Yippies	Charisma, TV small periodical, underground, films foreign films	solidarity with 3rd World States	solidarity with '3rd societies' in states in regional system.

- (1) The 'types' selected by me are as Lucian Pye says "primarily as a means of organizing and categorizing data (used by Plato, Weber, Durkheim) and deal with "ideal" types constructed of variables that preclude comparison at levels about the nominal scale that is, statements that one differs from the other, rather than statements of more or less difference. They are therefore open to the behaviourists' criticism that as ideal types they are more of a heuristic device. Whilst I agree that other typologies may be subject to more precise analysis and "provide a framework for mathematical manipulation of analytical data". I am not convinced that such typologies would contribute to a meaningful classification of foreign policy profiles.
- (2) Whilst ideological policies have been noted, economic foreign policies which often provide a limitation to ideological policies have been omitted as statistics on international economic relations are more easy to obtain than 'measurements' of ideological policies and the use of these statistics would distort the ideas presented.

With the importance of movements often centreing around political parties and other interest groups the linkage between "activist segments" of the national system and the international policies of that system becomes essential. The extremist movements in the U.S. - the Black Movement and the Naxalites in India - (both dialectically heterogeneous) not only put the domestic system in considerable disarray but have also shaped directly or indirectly the foreign policy options. Such influence despite seeming invisibility in the short run could lead to unnatural rigidity and thence to sharp changes in international policies. Social scientists interested in foreign policy studies could also zero in on charismatic movements within these social movements which have the effect of propagandizing or educating the masses. Thus the civil rights movement has a charismatic role among other movements - e.g. youth and peace movements and the Naxalite movement is a catalyst for fundamental social and economic change in India.

The foregoing was not intended to constitute a rigorous set of theories analyzing the linkage between one aspect of domestic policy and of international policies. The purpose is to underline the importance of one area in the domestic system - the extreme protest movements which despite their weakness in numbers has a charismatic effect on other movements and which constitute a fundamentally important variable in foreign policy planning. In contemporary world politics there has been a sudden resurgence of such movements so their nature and foreign policy significance deserves more research attention than it has received so far. If the protest movements are anticipating significant foreign policy options serious research based on special efforts to acquire urgently needed empirical data would undoubtedly minimize the conflict potential of contemporary society.

B VIII - La théorie des relations internationales
- The theory of international relations

Towards a Study of Social Movements in a Typology of
International Theories

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B VIII/ 1.

CONCLUSIONS :

Sur la base des idées qui précèdent, quelques propositions théoriques (27) peuvent être suggérées à condition de pouvoir mener les études avec soin et d'en faire la preuve :

- 1) Que les problèmes sociaux fondamentaux mènent à des mouvements sociaux qui tour à tour accélèrent les "issues". Le gouvernement y répond pour chacun en cherchant d'accommoder les objectifs du mouvement et l'énoncé du problème. En pareil cas la relation entre gouvernement et mouvement aboutit à la violence et se reflète dans des formules rigides d'amour-propre en politique étrangère.
 - 2) Un pays transpose dans sa politique étrangère son attitude négative envers le changement qui se manifeste dans les mouvements sociaux nationaux. Les pays étrangers essaient de spéculer sur le malaise interne créé par des mouvements sociaux dans d'autres pays. Dès lors l'attitude négative du premier pays, d'abord envers le mouvement social se développant dans le pays étranger, s'exerce envers le pays lui-même pris dans son ensemble.
 - 3) Voir le tableau exprimant les liens possibles entre des types spécifiques de mouvements sociaux et de politiques étrangères.
 - 4) Des études sur les relations entre politique interne et politique extérieure ont chaque fois mis l'accent sur l'importance des élites nationales dans la "préparation" de la politique étrangère ou sur "l'influence" des divers types "d'opinion publique" - vigilante, indifférente (la majorité silencieuse).
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- (27) Plusieurs de mes étudiants à Lakehead University m'ont aidé dans les travaux préparatoires, me permettant même de concevoir des idées spécifiques.

Types (1)	RELATIONS INTERNES					INTERNATIONAL	
	Valeurs	Autorité	Unité d'approche	Partis ou mouvements	Système de communication	Polit. étrang. idéologique - globale (2)	Polit. étrang. idéologique - régionale
A Traditionnel	sous l'influence du sanscrit	pas de lien centralisé entre les notables locaux	village	Jan Sangh, Swatantra, RSS, Shiva Sena	charismatique, "Panchayat" de village, symbolo-socio-religieux	nationaliste-isolationniste anti-occidentale, anti-marxiste à l'égard du tiers-monde	religions anti-Pak anti-Chine Gauche avec leader hindou dans d'autres Etats (Nepal)
X Conservateur	--	"Establishment" corporative élite industrielle	petite ville	Denver (Southern) républicain Ku Klux Klan Congrès, CPI	charismatique, éducation l'argent	globaliste anti-marxiste anti-non-aligné	domination d'Etats dans le système régional
B Moderne	sécularisées	pouvoir centralisé et loyauté politique	ville, nation, état	Congrès, CPI	Radio éducation l'argent	non-alignement ; équilibre des forces	primus inter pares
Y Libéral	individualisme, exécution	règle de droit	banlieue	républicain, démocrate	Télévision, imprimés, films, politique	co-existence équilibre des forces	primus inter pares
C Révolutionnaire	socialistes	populisme "idéalisé"	société	CPI (M), CPI (M-L), Marxiste, groupes révolutionnaires	charismatique, associations politiques (Unions de Paysans), presse radicale et clandestine	anti-occidentale; anti-soviétique; pro tiers monde classes révolutionnaires solidarité	groupes pro-révolutionnaires en Pak ; autres états pro-révolutionnaires
Z Radical - romantique	égalitaires	décentralisée, participation démocratie	petites zones rurales dans l'ouest	Panthères noires, S.D.S., SNCC, Cong. N. New Pol. autres groupes de la Nouvelle Gauche, Yippies	charismatique, TV, petits périodiques, films clandestins, films étrangers	solidarité avec les états du tiers-monde de	solidarité avec "les sociétés du tiers-monde" dans les états dans le système régional

* Notes (1) et (2) : voir page 3.

Outre l'importance des mouvements gravitant souvent autour des partis politiques et autres groupes d'intérêt, le lien entre "segments activistes" du système national et les politiques internationales de ce système devient essentiel.

Les mouvements extrémistes aux U.S.A. - le mouvement noir et les "Naxalites" en Inde (les deux étant hétérogènes au plan dialectique) - non seulement perturbent de manière considérable le système interne mais aussi façonnent directement ou indirectement les options de politique étrangère.

Une telle influence en dépit de son caractère confidentiel à court terme pourrait conduire à une rigidité artificielle et par conséquent entraîner des changements en politique internationale.

Les politistes intéressés aux études de politique étrangère pourraient aussi situer des mouvements charismatiques au noeud de ces mouvements sociaux qui ont un effet de propagande ou d'"éducation des masses".

Ainsi le mouvement pour les droits civiques a un rôle charismatique parmi d'autres mouvements - par exemple les mouvements de jeunes et pour la paix - le mouvement "Naxalite" est un catalyseur de changement social et économique en Inde.

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- * (1) Les "types" que j'ai choisis sont d'après Lucian Pye "essentiellement des moyens d'agencer et de catégoriser les données (fournies par Platon, Weber, Durkheim) et procèdent de types "idéaux" construits de variables qui excluent des comparaisons aux niveaux de l'échelle nominale, laquelle représente plus des énoncés dont l'un diffère de l'autre que des énoncés plus ou moins différents. Ils sont susceptibles d'être critiqués par les behavioristes en tant que types idéaux mais ils constituent un moyen heuristique. Bien que j'accepte que d'autres typologies peuvent être facteur d'analyse plus précise et "fournissent un cadre pour le traitement mathématique des données analytiques", je ne suis pas convaincu que de telles typologies contribueraient à une classification significative de profils de politique étrangère.
- (2) Tandis que les politiques idéologiques ont été notées, les politiques économiques extérieures qui fournissent souvent une limite aux politiques idéologiques ont été omises car les statistiques sur les relations économiques internationales sont plus faciles à obtenir que leurs mesures.

Il n'était pas question par ce qui précède d'établir un ensemble rigoureux de théories relatives au lien existant entre un aspect de politique intérieure et un aspect de politiques internationales.

Le but est de souligner l'importance d'une aire dans le système interne - le mouvement extrémiste protestataire qui se lamente sur sa faiblesse numérique a un effet charismatique sur d'autres mouvements et cela constitue une variable fondamentale importante dans les programmes de politique étrangère.

Dans la politique mondiale actuelle existe une résurgence inattendue de mouvements de cette nature et la signification de politique étrangère mérite plus de recherche qu'elle a reçue jusqu'à présent. Si les mouvements protestataires sont influents sur les options significatives de politique étrangère, des recherches sérieuses basées sur des efforts particuliers d'acquiescer sans retard des données empiriques nécessaires minimiseraient incontestablement le conflit potentiel de la société contemporaine.

I.P.S.A.

A.I.S.P.

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Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda

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INTERNATIONAL ROLE DEFINITION OF NEW STATES :
RESEARCH PROBLEMS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO KENYA,
TANZANIA, AND UGANDA

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New nations are ushered into existence under conditions of enormous pressure - both domestic and international. They often find it necessary quickly to sort out the dimensions of the two crises - internal and external which they are inevitably called upon to face. The elder nations developed into maturity in a period of comparative quiet, and, in a very important sense, the growth of international relations as we understand it has paralleled the growth of the elder nation states. Even the Soviet Union which was established in a revolutionary context had to encounter in a self-conscious manner the question of dealing with the external environment. During the last fifty years the world has witnessed a quickening of pace in the development of communications and a deeper interdependence of its different parts. Thus new nations commence their existence as independent states in an atmosphere of heightened international activity. (1)

In a very vital sense, then, a new nation comes into existence in an international environment not of its making - in fact, made at least in part, by the colonial powers from whom it has severed its ties of dependence. It is obliged to make the necessary accommodation to this situation and at the same time contribute to the creation of conditions which will be conducive not only to its internal development but also to securing a favourable position for itself in the comity of nations. A new nation is thus usually characterised by contradictory inclinations.

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- (1) Ward & Rustow in their study of the modernization of Japan and Turkey point out that the time when nations could isolate themselves from the rest of the world (e.g. U.S.A.) during their phase of development is long gone. Ward & Rustow leave out of account revolutionary situations in which isolated development would still seem possible.

On the one hand, it feels compelled to learn the rules of the game as played by established powers (e.g. international law, diplomatic practice, etc.) ; on the other, these are generally rules which are European in origin, and, in any case, created and enforced by former colonial powers without reference to the conditions obtaining in the Afro-Asian world long before the emergence of the state system as it is known today. In revolutionary situations such as those of the Soviet Union, China, and to a certain extent Cuba, such a dilemma is often dealt with by a general tactical disregard of the international environment as well as the established rules of the game during such period as may be required for the accumulation of political, economic and military power and the stabilisation of the polity. Characteristically, such a period is one of self-imposed isolation.

In non-revolutionary situations such as those with which we are concerned, however, the problem becomes more difficult because at least some of the important premises of the policies of the independent states are governed by the assumption that some form of association with the former metropolitan powers would continue - either in the loose forms known in such groupings as the Commonwealth, or in the more close ties which have been retained by some French African countries with France, or in any other variation of these two essential types. At the same time, for various reasons, these new nations (both from the point of view of prestige and from that of more fundamental considerations), feel the need to modify old practices and generate new practices which reflect the changed international situation and emphasise the heterogeneity of the present day world. It should be noted here that a majority of the new states believe that a fruitful association with the former colonial powers in the new context coupled with new relationships cautiously entered into with other states would vastly simplify the major problems of economic development and technical assistance. The essential feature of new nations consists in the fact that they accept a specific connotation of international law resulting from a rather vague kind of state succession. As successor states of the Colonial dependencies, these states automatically assume certain obligations which they have to discharge under normal circumstances. This presupposes a degree of accommodation to the international environment and a capacity to follow established procedures in the conduct of international relations. Two important questions which frequently crop up are : To what extent should new states accommodate themselves to the international environment not of their making ? In what directions and to what degree can they influence changes in the existing environment ?

Related to the question of adaptation of the new organisms to the international environment is another important factor which again emphasises the difference between the atmosphere in which old nations developed and that in which new states have to exist. Until the beginning of this century, the family of independent nation states was comparatively homogeneous in character - consisting mainly of a state system developed as a result of more or less shared experience. During the last sixty years, however, new political models have been tried with success and are available for emulation to emerging nations. To be sure, there are not all that many of such models. But the radical differences between those available poses insuperable problems for those who would like to marry the merits of mutually irreconcilable systems in their own policies. The law of inertia as well as familiarity with the educational system, the corpus of ideas and the political methods of the metropolitan (colonial) country before independence made it convenient for leaders of new nations to adopt it as their political model after independence. Thus Indonesia and Ghana started by copying the political models of Holland and Britain respectively. But very soon they realised that political institutions cannot be mechanically transplanted from one soil to another. Furthermore, the conditions and problems prevailing in new nations are seen to compare more rationally with those in countries which have achieved their economic development through radical political means. The alternative models are, therefore, equally compelling for different reasons and the ultimate cost of adopting one model wholesale in preference to another may be too high to contemplate. The development of One Partyism, although justified on the basis of a purely African rationale, is in fact an attempt at combining different features of institutions created under widely varied conditions.

If the problem of choosing between models is in many cases forbidding, the prospect of using the fact of the existence of such models for increasing one's international prestige is alluring. Because the difference between models radically opposed to each other stems from the contradiction between the ideologies underlying them, the new states see their opportunity in uniting together, albeit in a very loose and tentative manner, to serve as an ideological buffer over which co-existence becomes less perilous than it otherwise might be. In any case the real or imaginary part played by small states in their role as non-aligned promoters of peace and peaceful co-existence, gives them added prestige both in their own countries and in the eyes of others.

The existence of a variety of political models on the world scene is not only concrete in its significance for new nations but also symbolic in its actual impact on them. For we are living in an age in which symbols, both domestic and international - in all their inter-relationships - are seen as important by political leaders in their efforts to achieve concrete goals. In the international sphere with which we are concerned, western nations are associated with certain values, norms and aspirations ; so are the more revolutionary societies which create their own symbols (e.g. China) as they progress. The African leaders, not unnaturally, feel the need to express African aspirations through symbols which are entirely African in character (at this level, notice how African internationalism, however vague, exercises a prevailing influence over parochial self-identifications). The terms, "African personality", "African socialism" "Negritude" etc., are useful when viewed in the context of symbol creation. Irrespective of the consequences which flow from a nation's perception of its domestic identity, the images which it bounces off (in most cases, these images are ambivalent - whether the ambivalence itself is typified by the differences between leaders - e.g. Odinga-Mboya, and lately Odinga-Kenyatta, or, whether it is exhibited in a more complex manner, as in the case of Uganda) on the international plane are of great importance to its International Role definition.

One other observation is germane to the specific context of East African countries which differ in several important respects from the countries which became independent during the first few years after the war (i.e., during the rather intense phase of the Cold War), and therefore, were familiar with only a few mutually contradictory models (chiefly the antagonistic ideologies of USA and USSR). Firstly, the early sixties have witnessed, at least in international terms, a certain decrease of tempo in the Cold War aspects of the strife between the USA and the USSR (certainly with particular reference to Africa). Secondly, during the last eighteen years several intermediate models have been generated (as well as, of course, the revolutionary situation in China which falls outside the continuum with which we are concerned) as a result of the varied experiences of the ex-colonies of Asia and Africa. Thus, the Ghana of today is quite different from the Ghana of 1957 although several of the old institutions have been retained with radically altered functions ; so also, is the Indonesia of today very different from the Indonesia of 1955 ; this is also true of Egypt and several other countries.

(2)

(2) Even though Nkrumah and Soekarno may have become figures of history, some of their efforts at forging a new identity for Ghana and Indonesia are still relevant. It would be wrong to write them off as aberrations of the normal course of history.

The specific changes in structure are determined by a variety of considerations - chief among them being the character of the leadership arising within a system, the development over time of indigenous political styles, and the remoulding in the new context of selected features of the colonial, traditional and modern aspects of the society in the hope of creating a new (unique) national identity. And, these models, hammered out of practical experience by states with a similar historical background and comparable conditions, often tend to carry several strong attractions - chiefly emotional and psychological, but also practical and political, for new entrants of the Third World (no matter what their short range inclinations may be towards one or other of the Great Powers). Thirdly, during the last twenty years the United Nations has assumed, vis a vis the small countries, a certain sanctity not only as a forum for discussion and ventilation of grievances but also because the nationhood of a new nation is itself symbolised by entry into the world body. One of the first actions of the political leaders of a new state upon achievement of independence consists in an announcement of their intention to seek entry into the United Nations (and in the case of former British colonies, the Commonwealth as well - e.g. Singapore). In certain countries such as Zambia one witnesses a desire on the part of the government to seek United Nations assistance to a degree more than usual in a variety of technical and administrative areas as well. The process of international legitimation is no longer confined to internal considerations alone or to a few neighbouring powers, but extended to a much wider sphere.

I have tried to examine in some detail a few of the implications of the international environment for a newly emergent polity in the African context. The task of defining the international role of East African countries is at once seen to be related to other concepts, chiefly, legitimacy and identity/identification. The main aim of leaders and new nations points in the direction of an increase in their autonomy and decrease in the influence of external forces on their foreign and domestic policies. The constraints placed upon such an aim both by the international system taken at its widest and by several sub-systems (Commonwealth, Africa (OAU), non-aligned world, European Economic Community etc.) constitute one very important dimension of the rather nebulous concept with which we are concerned. One main difference between the central concepts of legitimacy, identity and participation, and the one which we are examining here lies perhaps in an answer to the question of whether it is advantageous from the point of view of research to regard the latter as a crisis or whether it would be more fruitful to regard it as a concept of a different order from the others.

I shall proceed on the assumption that the contours of this concept are best seen when it is not seen as a crisis (or even a potential crisis). While in most spheres of political and administrative activity the post-colonial independent position of a new nation is essentially a continuation of its former colonial times, the new situation is radically different from the old in all matters governed by the principle of self-determination. Self-determination is perceived as the most important operative principle in the formulation of policies in the spheres of defence, finance and foreign affairs - three key areas in which the colonial power left no autonomy for the local political leaderships. In addition to the above consideration one must also take into account the fact that the nature of foreign policy has itself altered owing to several factors which affect international role definition. These factors include the influence of the backlog of colonial experience and practices (including such concrete matters as treaties concluded by colonial powers to which independent states succeed) ; the dependence of the state in question on foreign powers for economic, technical and other aid; its position in relation to other countries of similar background ; its relationship with its neighbours ; in the case of East Africa, its particular attitudes to such regional ideas as federation, common market ; and the relationship between internal and external policies. We shall deal with a few of the important dimensions of the problem in some detail :

I. Maximisation of Self-direction in the International Environment.

Maximisation of autonomy in the international environment, as has already been noted, is an increasingly complicated affair. But certain important determinants - political, ideological, diplomatic, and others can be discerned. The impact of each of these on foreign policy may be studied. First, the idea of non-alignment occupies a very prominent place in the foreign policy of a new nation. This idea is nowadays more or less a blanket idea covering many specific aspirations and obscuring several potential areas of conflict between nations otherwise similarly placed. Yet it is a convenient psychological rubric under which to adumbrate the foreign policy of a new state and one which yet, at any rate, it is difficult to ignore completely. Secondly, in Africa Pan-Africanism has a great emotional and symbolic significance. States which are diametrically opposed to each other in their conception of the practical ways of achieving it are nevertheless agreed on its importance to the future of Africa.

No new state can ignore the significance of the OAU for its foreign policy. Furthermore, as long as racial and colonial tensions continue in parts of Africa (e.g. South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, etc.) a powerful all-African answer is seen by the newly independent states to be needed in order to deal with the remaining political problems of the continent. In the particular context of East Africa, however, the intensity of the problem is highlighted by geographical factors (especially in the case of Tanzania which is surrounded by seven countries in different stages of political development). Thus the extent to which Pan-Africanism is useful as a symbol of cooperation and the areas in which it fails to evoke response need to be investigated from the perspectives of the scope and function of the Organisation for African Unity on the one hand, and the individual foreign policies of East African countries on the other. We have seen that new nations are faced with constraints in the international setting with which they cannot always cope. A country with a small population, a large area, poor communications, and a scarcity of already available resources often finds it difficult to make an impact on the international environment. But if many countries similarly placed can join forces and create an ideology emphasising common aims and objectives, they may make an impression on the more powerful nations of the world. The fortunes of Pan-Africanism should be viewed in the light of the desire of a number of small states in an era of rapid communications and inevitable interdependence on an international scale, to assert their combined importance on the world scene.

Thirdly, we have seen the development of the idea of Afro-Asian solidarity during the period between 1955 and today. Since Bandung, a large number of African countries have achieved independence. They have found that their views on certain issues such as colonialism, specific aspects of application of the principles of self-determination etc. have much in common with those of the slightly older Asian nations. During the period 1955-1959, the view was strongly prevalent that an Afro-Asian bloc of nations with a sense of solidarity and common purpose could achieve in world bodies such as the United Nations and in periodic meetings at various levels (chiefly, Foreign Ministerial and Head of State levels) successful solutions to problems affecting them in various spheres. It was felt that they could do this in a manner in which each individual country could not by its own individual effort. In actual fact, however, the history of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement during the last ten years since the Belgrade Conference has been a chequered one leaving many of the individual countries with the major dilemmas of foreign policy which they hoped to solve by concerted effort.

Here again, one is faced with substantially different variations on the theme when one looks at the particular problems posed by the East African countries.

II. Development, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy.

Almost all new nations are consciously committed to a policy of economic, social and political development. Development requires resources and capital. During the initial stages at least such resources and capital as are necessary for planning have to be obtained from external sources (here again, there are the few revolutionary exceptions - perhaps the only exception has been China and that too only after the abrupt termination of Soviet aid programmes). Furthermore, development as a feature of the political life of new nations has attracted the increasing attention of the more powerful nations whose motives are not entirely devoid of self-interest. The rivalry between the Big Powers is thus injected into the national politics of new nations.

The development model which most new nations adopt often exhibits features of both the so-called capitalist and socialist systems - in practice this is reflected in the division of the economic plan sectors into private and public. In the pursuit of their respective foreign policies, new states realise the dangers to which they are exposed by their dependence on foreign powers for financial and technical aid. Even if no strings were attached to the aid given, it is impossible to hermetically seal the receiving country from the various influences to which it is subjected by the very fact of letting in foreign technicians to educate local technicians and adopting technical practices originated in other countries. In actual fact, new nations find that they have to cope with more than merely letting foreign powers come in and set up their factories and schools.

One other aspect of development needs to be examined carefully by students of politics. Very often new nations, realising that sustained development capable of improving the standard of living of the vast majority of the people is a long drawn out process, deviate from the path of long term planning and adopt a policy geared to making an impression on foreign countries and especially the more developed states. Scarce resources of indigenous foreign origin are utilised for the creation of expensive prestige projects of marginal utility.

Whether a particular image which a new nation seeks to create in the world at large by engaging in such activities is capable of giving useful dividends in the sphere of its internal viability (and political stability) and its relationship with its neighbours is something worth exploring.

The rivalries between the Big Powers constitute a chief source of pressure on the new states' policy-making capacity. To start with, the posture of non-alignment is adopted thus obviating the necessity for new states to choose one side of the ideological battle as against the other. It also automatically permits them to accept aid from both protagonists of the Cold War. A new state also reacts to the fundamental necessity of safeguarding its own security and sovereign independence from all external interference. Taken together, the simultaneous balancing of all these three factors in the pursuit of a new nation's foreign policy (in a world unusually sensitive to changes in power politics) becomes extremely difficult to achieve in practice. Recent East African examples illustrate only too vividly the dilemmas of new nations in such cases. The decision of the United States in 1964 to assist the Congolese government in their fight against the rebels who were active near the Uganda-Congo border was viewed by the government of Uganda as a threat to her own security and has resulted during subsequent years in a few shifts in emphasis in foreign policy, the significance of which it would be profitable to assess. Similarly with the Union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika into the new Republic of Tanzania the problem of simultaneous representation of East and West Germany in the new state came to the fore. The West German government which, only a few weeks before the eruption in Tanzania took place had been involved in a misunderstanding over the same matter with the United Arab Republic, threatened to cut off its military aid to Tanganyika (Tanzania) if she extended any kind of diplomatic recognition to East Germany. The Tanzanian government felt that it was forced to choose between its independence in foreign policy-making and the continuance of aid from a foreign power. Now this is not as simple a choice as it may seem to a casual observer. The choice itself was forced not so much by a psychological attitude towards two different foreign states in Europe, but by a whole series of events of profound internal significance to the two parts of the new state. Furthermore, the whole question of development aid is inextricably intertwined with the overall foreign policy of a country in a series of concentric contexts - in this particular case, the national context followed by the East African, followed by the African, and so on.

It is very important that the political scientist should be able to disentangle the various aspects of policy which affect each other, and also to ascertain the limits imposed by the different internal and external constraints on the pursuit of an autonomous foreign policy.

III. Foreign Policy and Style of Leadership.

Reference has been made to the different images evoked by different established polities in the minds of the policy makers of new states. But it is also important to realise the extent to which the developing style of leadership of a new nation affects its perception of foreign policy problems and international affairs and in turn is affected by the external factors present in the world situation at any given time.

One of the important dimensions of this factor lies in the nature of the personality of the national leaders prior to the achievement of independence. In some countries national leaders paid greater attention to matters pertaining to the role of newly independent nations in the international sphere and in such independent world bodies as the United Nations. Especially in the case of African colonies, attention to foreign policy in the pre-independence period was highlighted by the non-aligned foreign policies pursued by the already independent states of Asia. One hypothesis of a very general character may be advanced at this stage is : Where the struggle between the colonialist and the nationalist forces was intense and uncompromisingly bitter, the leadership of the new nation after independence tends to be more radical and experimental in the choice of foreign policy. Where the struggle between the colonialist and nationalist forces took place in a more or less peaceful manner, the leaders of the newly independent nation tend to adopt a moderate line in their foreign policies.

(3)

If what happened before the achievement of independence is significant, what happens after independence is of even greater importance.

(3) The recent developments in Lesotho, for instance, would require that one qualified such a hypothesis with the phrase : "Subject to there being little change in the internal leadership patterns during the period subsequent to independence".

Thus Nkrumah started as a somewhat moderate leader of independent Gold Coast. As the initial years of independence thrust him into the limelight as a leader not only of Ghana but, in a sense, of Africa he became more radically inclined. The influence of the changes in the internal organization of the C.P.P. and the direction in which social change and economic development were planned also made an impact on the general character of Nkrumah's leadership. A radical image of Nkrumah on the international scene had thus gradually developed.

The case of Tanzania is even more interesting. I have elsewhere referred briefly ("Revolutions and Revolutionaries", Transition 21, July 1965) to the circumstances leading to the revolution in Zanzibar. Tanganyika, which started its nationalist career under the leadership of a moderate Nyerere, was faced with the problem of accommodating itself to the new situation in Zanzibar. The revolution itself was followed by a catastrophic attempt on the part of the local armed forces to undermine the political power of the neighbouring East African regimes in a bid to obtain fairer working conditions. This challenge was met by seeking the assistance of the former colonialist power to intervene on behalf of the regularly constituted governments. With the tenuousness of the new governments (despite the distinguished personalities of the leaders) thus exposed, it became necessary for the leaders to take a series of steps in order to retrieve their position. Zanzibar was thus admitted into a new union with Tanganyika, perhaps on the assumption that a revolutionary Zanzibar within a larger state rather than as a sovereign neighbour would be easier to cope with. Once such a step was taken it could not but affect the whole picture of the federation. Also, the admission of Zanzibar into the new Union could not be effectively accomplished without a corresponding willingness on the part of Nyerere to change his previous moderate stance in foreign policy. Thus a new legitimation in the eyes of African nations through the OAU had to be sought in the wake of the mutiny. In order to make this new legitimacy a part and parcel of the international posture of Tanzania, certain shifts became obviously necessary in her foreign policy. These shifts have tended to affect a whole series of policies of a regional character and have introduced new dimensions into the foreign commitments of Tanzania.

In Kenya we encounter a conflict between two essentially different kinds of international image makers. Mboya was identified with the West and Oginga Odinga is seen as the spokesman of the East, even though in the internal setting the former was an urban leader with trade union backing and the latter is pre-eminently a tribal leader with a national stature.

In the early years of independence, the identification of the two leaders with the two sides of the Cold War was a matter of convenience from the national point of view. Mboya seemed more conversant with the western idiom and therefore more acceptable to the West. Odinga saw himself as a leader next only in rank of precedence to Kenyatta himself, and therefore proceeded to build an international image for himself. This not unnaturally consisted in his favouring the Eastern bloc, partly because the latter was still unexploited, and partly for the reason that while he would have to compete for support with the more educated and sophisticated Mboya in the West, the field was clear for his overtures to the East. Although Oginga Odinga has unwittingly projected an international image of himself as a radical leader, what he has in fact done is to fortify his internal position with the resources available from outside by adopting the policy of righting what he considers to be a wrong balance of Kenyan alignment between the forces of the West and the East. The fact that he is now out of office does not alter the fundamental characteristic of the political situation of Kenya. Thus the foreign policy and international commitments of Kenya on the one hand, and the whole question of internal political succession on the other need to be viewed against the background of the dynamic personalities of its controversial leaders.

IV. Internal Policy in relation to external policy.

It is a truism to say that although internal and external policies are analytically separable, in fact they are deeply influenced by each other. We have seen how the personalities of national leaders are important factors in the making of foreign policy. Not only are personalities important for what they do, but also for what they represent to the world outside. Thus Kenyatta legitimates Kenya in the eyes of the world, and Nyerere legitimates Tanzania. Internal policy consists of several important component parts, chief among which are the ideological position of a new state as perceived by itself, the pattern of development it embarks upon, its attitude to such questions as expropriation and compensation, its trade policies, and its attitude to refugees. All these determine to a certain degree the external policies of a state. In the case of the East African countries, however, because of the co-existence of a few federal structures with the three national sovereign governments, almost all important changes of internal policy affect in some way or other the existing federal institutions and their functions.

Here again it would be useful to investigate the impact of particular shifts in internal policy on the different commitments in the external affairs of a country and the regional organizations of which it sees itself as a participant.

Not only do internal factors affect the crisis orientations of such dimensions as participation, penetration and distribution but also external variables. Thus the development of a particular ideological style derived from selective international contacts is likely to affect the penetration crisis in a certain direction. Similarly, a deliberate choice of method of action in the internal political sphere may militate in favour of certain external policy preferences rather than others. (4) Similarly, a choice in favour of one dominant mode of economic development may correspondingly affect the distribution crisis or the participation crisis of the polity. It is in many ways a pity that social theorists, in writing about societies (even sociologists such as Parsons) have omitted the influence of external factors on internal arrangements by transferring wholesale the thermodynamic model of adiabatic systems into the realm of social scientific speculation. The task of defining the international role of a new nation is thus complicated by a complete lack of attention to international aspects in the building of social theory. A few political scientists have succeeded in bootlegging the internal decision-making environment as a salient factor in decision-making on external policy matters but the reverse is equally important, and is still very much an unexplored area of research.

Even so one can detect a few clues to an understanding the relationship between internal and external policies. One factor which must be studied in this connection is the mass - elite continuum in new states. If the elite is fragmented, certain results may be expected which would differ from those stemming from a homogeneous elite situation. If the elite is completely discontinuous with the mass, and the two are not connected by any normal channels of communication there is likely to be a greater divorce between domestic and external policies.

- (4) The Arusha declaration, February 1967, though a document setting forth new directions in the domestic policy of Tanzania is of international significance. This has indeed been demonstrated to an ample degree during the 3 years it has already been in operation.

Where the elite consciously attempts to integrate masses into the decision-making structure, by whatever means; one may encounter a greater correspondence between, and mutual sensitization of internal and external policies. If this picture were to be transferred to the international system itself (rather than national systems), then with respect to the various national and regional sub-systems within the international system one may apply elite-mass criteria such as those mentioned above.

There is one other point which needs to be made here as it pertains to both the spheres of decision-making - internal and external. This relates to the process of learning which any state has to undergo in coping with domestic and international problems. The more developed states of the world have gone through a whole series of internal and international crises over a long period of time, during which they have been able to build a corpus of political, diplomatic and administrative experience upon which they are in a position to draw when new situations arise. The new nations, starting their career in a period of heightened international activity, lack the distinct advantage of stored social knowledge. Domestic and international crises occur in rapid succession, needing immediate practical attention in the hands of comparatively inexperienced politicians. Very often the separation of domestic from international problems becomes difficult, and the ways adopted by political leaders to deal with them do not reflect an appreciation of the different methods needed.

Sometimes the style of politics developed in dealing with the colonialist power may become a liability in the context of independence. Since the eradication of colonial rule was the main preoccupation of the nationalist movement, the leadership usually tended to be uncompromising in its attitude to the ruling power. In other words, the normal political processes of bargaining, compromise, and negotiation are less known to the average nationalist politician than the techniques of resistance. When a new state achieves independence it is more than likely that the leaders are loathe to make compromises on controversial matters whether the rivals are inside the polity or outside it (in the case of East Africa, the intra-African rivalries become very important, in addition to the more general international issues). In general, the style of internal politics affects, to a more or less profound degree, the style of intra-African politics, even as sub-national (tribal) rivalries overlap with the national integrative forces which the political leadership desires to foster.

In the fields of education and culture, we encounter important problems of international participation and role definition. In African countries one of the most influential sections of the population consists of the student community. Students' organisations tend to view problems of international importance in a way which is not necessarily the same as that adopted by people at the helm of affairs who are compelled to make decisions on matters of practical importance as and when they arise. Furthermore, the students especially at higher levels of education, are the potential inheritors of power within the system, and their attitude to politics which is influenced by the various ideologies associated with important foreign countries, are of great significance. The present leaderships of some of the new nations are also more or less interested in shaping the student community in ways which they think may be appropriate to their policies. For instance, in a typically non-aligned situation, it is felt that students should be sent abroad both to Eastern and Western countries for higher training and technical education. But once students go abroad for training they are affected by the whole culture to which they are exposed, and return home with new norms and values which are either favourable or unfavourable to the ideology of the country to which they were sent to receive training. In some cases, foreign help is sought for the creation of educational institutions within the national borders where young people can be trained for political, administrative and technical jobs. But the future of such institutions is frequently subject to the vicissitudes of foreign policy, as the case of the Lumumba Institute illustrates. The educated sections of the population represent an important section of the politically relevant community. Heterogeneity of indoctrination and diversity of ideological loyalties in this section of the population have to be studied with care in an attempt to understand the way in which internal factors impinge upon external policy.

V. International Role Definition among East African Countries.

The regional policy of each of the East African countries is of paramount importance especially because of the importance-initially concrete but subsequently symbolic - attached by each of them to the idea of a federation. The relationship among these countries is something more than an assertion of solidarity because of the existence of certain organizations which are supranational in character (at least administratively speaking) - e.g., EARE, EACSO and the EAPT.

But as the national governments became more and more absorbed in problems of a national character, some of their federal arrangements tended to be jeopardised, although the existing federal arrangements by virtue of their manifest usefulness have tended to stay, and in fact to be strengthened.

In studying the impact of internal developments on the federal intentions and capabilities of the three East African countries, the student of politics ought to bear in mind the great differences between them, ranging from their natural resources to their styles of development and politics. Here the relevance of the conceptual apparatus with which we have so far been concerned becomes apparent. The manner in which the three countries are predisposed to solving their internal penetration, participation, legitimation, integration, and distribution crises will have an important effect on their mutual relationships. Thus important differences in approach to the crisis of penetration and distribution between Tanzania and Kenya on the one hand, and to the crises of legitimation and identity between Uganda and Kenya on the other may have far-reaching repercussions on the whole problem of federation.

A whole genre of problems unanticipated during the period of nationalist agitation can be subsumed under the rubric of iridentism. Independent Uganda has to face border problems in its relations with Ruanda, the Congo and the Sudan (whereas colonial Uganda did not have to face such problems). Independent Kenya has to face border difficulties in her relationships with the Ethiopia and Somalia. These are no doubt created by the system of defining boundaries alien to the indigenous peoples but in the context of political problems arising from boundary definitions these cannot be avoided.

Quite apart from problems arising from iridentism and the federal intentions of the three states, the political scientist is faced with the phenomenon of new alignments of cooperation in specific matters, which may or may not in the long run promote regionalism of a more farreaching character than is at present contemplated. Thus the policy of Tanzania to offer hospitality to political leaders opposed to existing regimes in certain African countries (including Malawi) and her decision to build a railway line with the cooperation of Zambia which would pass through both territories constitute two very different actions which may have important consequences for East Africa, as a whole. They also mean that the political leaders of Uganda and Kenya are compelled to show their interest in regional questions, even though, left to themselves they may not wish actively to embroil themselves in the affairs of other countries.

One of the most important barriers to empirical research in this whole area of International Role Definition stems from the very natural desire of the respective governments to withhold from researchers vital information affecting matters of a policy character. In spite of this difficulty, sufficient scope exists for empirical inquiry in the general areas outlined above. Some of the questions which may be fruitfully pursued by the scholars are outlined below :

1. A whole class of questions relates to self-image. What kind of image do East African countries wish to project abroad ? How do they see themselves ? What are the shades of difference between their self-images in international bodies (a) of world dimensions (b) of African dimensions and (c) of Afro-Asian dimensions, and (d) Commonwealth proportions.
2. A comparative study of the role of the three countries in important international organisations of an African and international character.
3. The influence of development on foreign policy - especially attitude to aid, in the psychological, as well as the substantive senses.
4. Federal policies and institutions (general and theoretical).
5. Relations among East African nations including Zambia, Sudan, the Congo and Somalia : (a) cooperation (b) conflict.
6. The role of ideology in foreign policy making.
7. The impact of internal political rivalries on external policies.
8. The relationship between each individual country and the former colonial power.
9. The impact of the revolution in Zanzibar, and the union of it with Tanganyika on the relations between the three East African countries.
10. A Comparative examination of the process of foreign policy-making in East African countries.
11. The classes of issues - domestic and international - to which foreign policy is most sensitive.

12. The impact of Big Power rivalries on new nations' policies.
13. The changing attitude to internal security (as well as personal security of leaders) generated, at least in part, by crises of external origin.
14. Attitude to defence - changes caused in this by developments of external origin.
15. A whole class of questions which may be designated as federal questions - care should be taken to distinguish between policies geared to federal goals and policies determined solely by national goals. Also, one may come across attitudes to policy hostile in intent to federation in the short run which may not in the long run have such an effect. These should be distinguished from national policies which are calculated to harm federation. One other question which should be considered here relates to already existing federal institutions. To what extent do these structures performing useful functions of federal scope, ensure the persistence of the federal idea over a long enough period of time to permit re-thinking by the leaders of the three countries on controversial issues ?
16. Attitudes of East African countries to international law - not so much to the rules of law as to their interpretation when it comes to be applied to cases in which they are, or, are likely to be involved.
17. The response of the indigenous leadership of each country to what it perceives as crises originated abroad. Comparison of styles of leadership in the three countries.
18. Internal crises created by contradictory preferences of different leaders to external ideologies and influences.
19. The kinds of legitimation consciously sought abroad by the leaders - both a comparative study of this, and also a study of the differences between international legitimation, Africa-wide legitimation etc.
20. The influence of the domestic crises of a developmental nature on international role definition.

DG.

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NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE INTERNATIONAL LINKAGE THEORY

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This paper attempts to relate the concept of 'national interest' developed by the author (1) to the theory of national/international linkages, outlining a framework for the study of the value-content of polity inputs and outputs in relation to this theory. (2)

Rosenau leaves this area to the study of comparative government and politics (and has come to negative conclusions about the utility of the concept of 'national interest') (3). As, however, the national/international linkage approach purports to be integrative, it is preferable that polity behaviour and its value contents are considered also within it.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. Despite the justified contemporary doubts about the wisdom of concentrating International Relations upon the behaviour of states, states remain the main actors and the "main mediating agency between individuals at home and others abroad." (4)
2. In all political systems, whichever way the leaders come to power, they regard themselves as responsible for and to the citizens of their own states and hence, on the whole, they act in ways they consider to be in the interest of their state (exceptions occasionally occur for various domestic reasons). Co-operative international behaviour and the pursuit of 'milieu-goals' are not precluded, but they have to be perceived to be in the national interest, directly or indirectly, immediately or in the long run. The central role of the state is postulated by the very linkage approach which, being an attempt to relate domestic and foreign policies, recognizes the relevance of national boundaries.
3. In this context, 'national interest' will be used exclusively in application to foreign policy although it is often indiscriminately used also in the domestic context. This postulates foreign policy as a fairly distinct 'issue-area', despite its blurred boundaries in reality. It postulates also a distinct value component in foreign policy for a number of reasons: the parameters of actions usually differ from the domestic environment as the international environment is more unpredictable and intractable;

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- (1) Cf. National Interest, Pall Mall/Praeger and Papermacks, 1970; and "National Interest - a Vindication", International Journal, XXIV/4 Autumn 1969.
 - (2) J.N. Rosenau: Linkage Politics, 1969, p. 50, fig. 3.1, cells 1, 2, 5, 6,
 - (3) Cf. his entry on 'National Interest' in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 1968.
 - (4) Cf. D.J. Singer in Linkage Politics, op. cit., pp. 22-3, 26.

survival and defence dominate foreign policy ; the existence, in principle, of a common, all-embracing national good has never been seriously questioned in foreign policy, as it often is within the domestic context ; governments, having the monopoly of both diplomacy and defence, play a much more exclusive role.

4. Although foreign policy rarely shows a clear purpose beyond the limiting case of the state's survival being directly threatened, we can always distinguish in it a value component which governs perceptions as well as the determination of ends and means. This applies not only to active (penetrative) but also to reactive and emulative (or imitative) policies. We should not, therefore, as is often done, limit the value component to end. (5)

5. National interest can be and is rationally determined, but only within the rather narrow limits of the decision-makers' span of attention ; many of the non-salient issues and dimensions escape rational determination simply because they are never fully considered.

MEANINGS AND USES OF 'NATIONAL INTEREST'

The task of clarification of the concept seems to be timely and urgent. For the developed states, particularly those groping for new forms of international integration, the clarification is necessary before they decide upon the most appropriate forms of international co-operation and/or integration and determine more clearly the limits beyond which they will insist on preserving 'national sovereignty'. For new states which generally strive both for national integration and for some form of regional integration, and many of which can scarcely take their statehood for granted, the clarification is of equal importance. In Communist states, legitimacy based upon ideology is becoming insufficient.

Unfortunately the term 'national interest' has been used confusedly and has been much abused in political argument. One important distinction is between the use of the concept in political action and its use as an analytical tool, to explain and evaluate foreign policy. The analysts fall into two broad categories of the objectivists who postulate the existence of an objective 'national interest' and of the subjectivists who deny it. Both schools are highly vulnerable to criticism. (6)

A clear-cut distinction between analysis and political actions is, however, unrealistic. Can one clearly divide the activities of say George Kennan or Henry Kissinger in their official and their academic capacities ? Likewise the objectivist/subjectivist dichotomy is inconclusive - most objectivists agree that in practice the notion of 'national interest' can never be fully apprehended and most

(5) Cf. the otherwise excellent definition coined by the Brookings Foundation as 'the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts'. It is, however, reasonable to hypothesise that the value content is higher in active than in reactive policies and perhaps in outputs than in inputs.

(6) For details see : J.N. Rosenau in the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, op.cit.

subjectivists accept that at least some of its dimensions are capable of objective determination. Probably the most promising way for dealing with the elusive political datum is to give up the search for unattainable precision and to look at political behaviour as a whole, including both the activities of political leaders and the analysis of these activities. The classification that I am proposing into aspirational, operational and explanatory and polemical levels does not aspire to logical precision as the third category overlaps with the previous two. It offers, however, considerable intellectual advantages and is operationally convenient as every single reference to 'national interest' falls predominantly, though seldom exclusively, within one of the proposed categories.

On the aspirational level, national interest refers to the vision of the good life, to some ideal set of goals which the state would like to realize if this were possible. If such national interest is not actively pursued this does not mean that it is politically irrelevant as, given an opportunity through favourable changes in the environment or in the power of the state, it may become operational. Thus while it would be a mistake to attribute an immediate operational significance to the professed Soviet desire to communize the world, it would be likewise a mistake to consider this desire as meaningless and as incapable of becoming operational in some favourable circumstances.

On the operational level, national interest refers to the sum total of interests and policies actually pursued. The main distinctions between the two levels are that aspirational interests are generally long-term, rooted in history and ideology, need not be fully articulated or coordinated, and can be contradictory; they are determined more by political will than by capabilities. Operational interests tend to be the very opposite. The inter-relationship between the two levels is significant in determining political dynamism. Such dynamism is lacking in the extreme situations when aspirations are either clearly beyond any chance of achievement or pitched so low that they approximate to actual policies. Changes, whether in the power of the state or in the international environment, which affect the state's "net achievement capability", can seriously affect the distance between aspirations and policies since any revision of the contents of national interest need not take place simultaneously at both levels.

On the explanatory and polemical level, in political argument, the notion of national interest is used to explain, evaluate, rationalize, or criticize international behaviour. It is used less to describe or prescribe than to prove oneself right and one's opponents wrong. As a dominant proportion of political behaviour is verbal, argument is the most important source of information but its relations to non-verbal behaviour present great difficulties of analysis. The proposed distinctions can help to resolve some of them. When politicians say different things from those they actually do, they are not always guilty of hypocrisy and their statements are not meaningless. On the contrary, these statements always bear some relation both to aspirations and to the policies actually pursued and can be fruitfully analysed to explain the relationship between the two.

THE IMPACT OF SOME MAJOR VARIABLES IN THE CHARACTERISTICS OF STATES

1. POWER STATUS has obviously an important bearing although its exact impact is disputable. On the one hand, the greater the power, the less does the state depend upon the wills of other states in defining and pursuing its national interest. On the other hand, the scope and complexity of 'national interest' grow with power status so that a much less powerful state may be as much or even more autonomous in defining and pursuing its much more limited national interest than its more powerful counterpart with a national interest much wider in scope. The question cannot be decided in a general way but requires a full study of each case, looking both at capabilities and at the definition of the national interest. The concept of 'net achievement capability' is here more helpful than that of capabilities alone.

2. IDEOLOGY determines the degree of attachment to the values pursued. The fairly obvious generalisation that a state strongly pursuing ideological ends is likely to be more insistent on realising its aspirations and more inflexible in pursuing its interests is, however, operationally insufficient. The question must be posed in each case to what extent ideology affects the single dimensions of the national interest; one cannot exclude the possibility that the impact is not at all uniform.

3. POLITICAL REGIME determines the sources of legitimacy and the degree and nature of dependence of the political elites upon the people. The electoral system and the articulation and impact of public opinion determine the autonomy of the political leaders and the domestic parameters of their freedom to define and pursue the national interest.

4. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT is an important characteristic as well as a high value shared by all contemporary states, independently of their state of evolution. The major questions arising here are the primacy of political or economic values, the degree of economic necessity, and the impact of the level of economic capabilities available upon the definition and the choice of means for pursuing the national interest.

THE MAIN DIMENSIONS OF 'NATIONAL INTEREST'


1. The balance between economic, political and strategic priorities is delicate and greatly varies from state to state and from period to period, and within each, from individual to individual. Nevertheless, some generalisations can be made about the priorities chosen by western-liberal, communist or new states and, within these categories, meaningful distinctions can be traced between individual states, which may ultimately allow us to rank them in a significant order.

2. The concept of 'salience' has not so far been sufficiently explored. This rather poorly defined term (sometimes spelt saliency) conveys the joint qualities of importance, prominence, urgency and intensity but does not fully coincide with any of them. The reasons determining salience, its extent and its implications are obviously crucial in political behaviour; non-salient issues often escape rational determination as they do not come directly within the decision-makers' span of attention.

3. All states define some of their interests, especially those regarding national survival, as vital.
4. The scope of the national interest is determined both by environmental influences and by volitional acts.
5. Geography being a fundamental element in the environment, the spatial dimension of the national interest requires attention. A central part is played here by the concepts of the territory and its boundaries, of the 'vital core' and of the measurement of social distance from it. Here an intriguing and unexplored problem is the choice between the state belongs and the decision in which region its primary interests lie (cf. Britain and her three circles - the Atlantic, the Commonwealth and Western Europe).
6. The time-dimension is of lesser but not inconsiderable importance. Here the major question is to what extent the conception of the national interest is past or future oriented.

DICHOTOMIES AND CHOICES

The factors and considerations entering into the determination of the national interest are potentially innumerable and in practice, in every single case, are very numerous. Schematically, their study can be organised according to the phases in the decision-making process :



Major distinctions which, although partly overlapping, are analytically worthwhile, can be made regarding the following choices : -

1. The degree to which the decision-makers are ready to accept environmental influences of insist upon exercising their political wills.
2. The interplay between dynamism and readiness to change and stability of definition and inflexibility.
3. The priority accorded to domestic or to foreign policy.

4. The choice between the modes of conflict and co-operation.(7)
5. The insistence upon autonomy in the determination of the national interest or the acceptance of interdependence with other states.

HYPOTHESES

Most of the distinctions made above can form the basis of general and, in most cases, probably also operational hypotheses.(8) This will be illustrated in relation to point 5, of the preceding section, i.e. the dichotomy between autonomy and interdependence, a problem particularly germane for the international linkage approach which, moreover, can be readily illustrated by case-studies from the well documented evolution of the E.E.C. and of Britain's attitude to it. It should also be useful to those primarily interested in the transformation of the traditional behaviour of States.

The dichotomy can be stated in the form of two contradictory propositions, each ostensibly valid but limited by the other proposition :

- a. States attach great value to their autonomy in determining their national interests and agree to limit this autonomy only under duress or in relatively unimportant areas ;
- b. Owing to a combination of security, economic, technological and psychological changes, states are becoming increasingly 'other-oriented' and tend to accept the principle of broader international forms of organization.

This leads to a third proposition :

- c. The operational result is an oscillation between self-centred and other-oriented behaviour.

On the basis of these propositions the following hypotheses can be advanced :

1. Each state has to define its national interest within a broad spectrum of possible futures of the international system, the one extreme being that states remain much as they are, and the other that they merge under one world government.
2. The process is unlikely to proceed in a uniform fashion and some states can be expected to insist on retaining much more autonomy than others, and also in different fields. Their degree of success will differ, too. (The differences can be related to the major variables in the characteristics of states (power, ideology, etc.)).

(7) This theme is elaborated in the author's International Politics : Conflict and Harmony, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1969.

(8) In 1970/72 the author intends to undertake an empirical study of the perceptions of the national interest in Britain, held by segments of the political elite.

- (ii) Persuasion of BUREAUCRACY (cf. the conversion of the British Civil Service to support the British entry into the EEC).
- (iii) Persuasion of PUBLIC OPINION (pressure groups like the Movement European or the various pro-European bodies in Britain).

8. The major obstacles to internationalisation and insistence upon autonomy in determining the national interest may be expected in :

(i) in THE POLITICAL ELITE owing to

- a. The traditional conception of their role ;
- b. Their reluctance to lose freedom of decision ;
- c. In all, even the most authoritarian regimes, their fear to lose the basis of legitimacy and power ; in systems based upon free elections with the added fear of losing the next election.

(ii) and (iii) in THE BUREAUCRACY AND IN PUBLIC OPINION owing to their inertia which, however, diminishes and even disappears when the traditional state structures fail (cf. Western Europe after World War II).

Several of these hypotheses can be empirically investigated by applying and refining the available methods of analysing political attitudes.

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DOMESTIC POLITICAL POWER BALANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY
IN INDONESIA

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In their enthusiasm for "scientism" in the study of International Relations, a number of scholars have of late deplored the poor state of theory in the explorations of state behaviour and then have tried to do something about it. (1) What has been accomplished, however, is not a workable general theory of foreign policy, but a few partial theories or conceptual frameworks. Some have stressed the impact of external stimuli, some have stressed the domestic sources of foreign policy, and some have offered single-cause deterministic or ideosyncratic explanations. A few of the theoretical writings are so filled with mathematical symbols that they negate the very purpose for which theory is meant, i.e., facilitating enquiry and understanding of empirical reality. At least one of them, namely the Snyder's Decision-making Theory, is too elaborate and complex to be workable. It is, as Stanley Hoffman aptly remarks, "so filled with boxes within boxes that before it can be used, much has to be thrown out." (2) George Modelski offers an "input-output" model of foreign policy in the Parsonian spirit that is notable for its conceptual clarity, but it leaves some essential items out. (3) Recently Michael Brecher has produced a slightly improved "input-output" model of foreign policy analysis. Brecher, as does Modelski, views foreign policy as a system of action wherein the key variables, i.e., environment, actors, structures and processes, are placed within a framework of Demands on Policy (Inputs), Policy Process, and Products of Policy (Outputs). A foreign policy system, in other words, receives inputs, channels them into a policy-machine which produces outputs or decisions (implicit here is the assumption that outputs, or at least some of these, may, induce course function as inputs). The inputs that influence decision-makers are: the perception of operational environment or the international and regional system (including, probably, the geographical location), the nature of bilateral or multilateral relationships with other countries, economic and military capability, political structure, the pressure potential of competing elites or pressure groups, and communications system.

Brecher's framework is extremely useful for an explanation of the elements of continuity and change in Indonesian foreign policy. We need, however, to add a few more items in his list of inputs. An analysis of Indonesian foreign policy would be incomplete without an inquiry into ideosyncratic (value-orientations of individual decision-makers such as Sukarno) and societal (value-orientations of the society in general) variables as well as the fluctuations in the domestic political-power balance. Furthermore, the Policy Process need not necessarily always remain a separate category; it can have an input function when the decision-making power

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rests with a dominant individual such as Sukarno (or de Gaulle). It is, in fact, the theme of this paper that the significant elements of Indonesian foreign policy have to a great extent been determined by the dynamics of power-balance within the Indonesian political system. There is an underlying continuity in foreign policy ; but fluctuations in power balance have effected shifts towards right or left.(4)

Foreign policy of the Liberal Democracy Period :

A major, and probably the clearest, statement of the basic tenets of foreign policy was made on September 2, 1948 by the then Indonesian Government, headed by Vice-President Muhammad Hatta :

Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course of action open to them than to choose between being pro-Russian or pro-American ? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of our national ideals ? The Indonesian Government is of the opinion that the position to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a passive party in the area of international politics but that it should be an active agent entitled to decide its own standpoint ... the lines of Indonesia's policy can not be determined by the bent of the policy of some other country which has its own interest to service. (5)

Thus, the policy of non-alignment with power blocs or the "independent and active" foreign policy, as Indonesians prefer to call it, had been adopted long before Indonesia formally obtained her independence. The same policy was reaffirmed by half a dozen successive coalition governments of Indonesia during the period of liberal democracy that lasted till 1957. The inputs that had initially produced this policy were ideosyncratic, systemic (environmental), governmental and societal variables. The desire to achieve equality with older, European, states and to resist new dominations was a value-orientation dear to nearly all nationalist leaders. As Drs. Hatta, the leading architect of Indonesia's initial policy, wrote a few years later : "Nations that have recently become independent are strongly influenced by national sentiment and feel the need to maintain their self-respect. The memory of the colonial status that bound them for centuries makes them resist anything they consider an attempt to colonize them again, whether by economic or ideological domination. This psychological factor profoundly influences Indonesia in her insistence upon an independent policy." (6). The ideological orientations of the decision-making elite and their perceptions of the cold war contestants (i.e., U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.) were additional factors against alignment. Neither the colonialist-capitalist west, nor the communist Soviet Union could exercise magnetic influence on Indonesian nationalists such as Hatta, Sjahrir and Sukarno. Moreover, there was no pressing need for Indonesia to choose between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. as she did not have common borders with either of them. There was also the pragmatic consideration of not alienating any of the bloc leaders since the Republic needed their sympathy and support in its struggle for independence from the Dutch. The Indonesian society has a long philosophical tradition of

toleration and synthesis and, as such, the decision-makers could not look at the cold war blocs in black and white terms. The societal variable, therefore, favoured a policy of non-alignment.

When all is said and done, the fact remains that the most important variable that sustained Indonesia's non-alignment during the period of liberal democracy was the domestic power balance. All the cabinets during this period were coalitions of ideologically heterogeneous political parties and prominent individuals. Of the five major or influential parties, the Masjumi (Modernist-Islamic) and the Nahdatul-Ulema (traditional-Islamic) were anti-communist and pro-western generally. The Indonesian National Party (PNI) was generally suspicious of the Western Powers. The Sjahrir-led Socialists were anti-communists, but not always pro-western. The communist Party (PKI) of course, was hostile to the West. President Sukarno had little sympathy with the West, and Vice-President Hatta had an unfavourable image of the communist powers. It is not surprising, therefore, that non-alignment offered an ideological consensus on foreign policy. So much so that whenever a Prime Minister or Foreign Minister tried to push Indonesian non-alignment eastward or westward, he spelled disaster for himself, his party or faction, and for the cabinet. In 1952, for instance, the Sukiman cabinet was forced out of power for breaking with the ideological consensus on foreign policy. Foreign Minister Subardjo, a new-recruit to Sukiman's Masjumi party and a close personal friend of the Prime Minister, had signed an agreement, without adequate cabinet consultation, with the U.S. Ambassador, Merle Cochran committing Indonesia to accept U.S. aid under the terms of the U.S. Mutual Security Act of 1951 (Section 511 of the M.S.A. obliges a recipient to make a full contribution... to the development and maintenance of its own defenses and to the defensive strength of "the free world", and "to take joint steps to further international understanding, goodwill and security"). Subardjo's secret diplomacy raised a stormy controversy. PNI, one of the two largest parties, and even a faction of the Masjumi, charged that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were guilty of making a formal ideological surrender in that they were cooperating with ambassador Cochran's efforts to align Indonesia with the United States. The critics recalled that the Natsir government had turned down U.S. military aid offered by The Melby mission in 1950. They further argued that Indonesia must keep out of the cold war for the sake of national unity. (7)

A careful study of the facts of the issue suggests that neither Subardjo nor the U.S. had conspired against the "active and independent" policy of Indonesia. (The same agreement, with a modified wording was concluded later). But the elite images of the U.S. and of the Sukiman faction were such that the critics had little difficulty in succeeding in their primary aim, i.e., the overthrow of the Sukiman cabinet, by mobilizing a defence of the symbolism and the mystique of the "independent" foreign policy. As Herbert Feith has aptly remarked, "independent and active" foreign policy became "a sort of ideological prism through which all practical policies had to be refracted." (8) No one, not publically at any rate, could go against non-alignment. In later years the PNI-led government of Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo, who was very much aware of the integrative functions of an ambitious foreign policy in internal politics, made it really "active" by organizing the famous Bandung Conference of the Afro-Asian countries.

Sukarno's Foreign Policy

With the introduction of Guided Democracy in 1959 the governmental, political, ideosyncratic, military, and societal-ideological variables changed and so did the content of the non-alignment to a degree that it virtually ceased to be non-alignment. During the liberal democracy period the structure of government and the equilibrium of rival political forces sustained non-alignment. Under the Guided Democracy (Sukarno-Army authoritarian rule), Sukarno was allowed a monopolistic control over foreign policy. The anti-Sukarno forces that were also generally pro-Western were eliminated. The growing strength of the PKI, with which Sukarno established a mutually-protective relationship against the power of the Army General Staff, pushed Indonesian foreign policy towards the left - a shift that Sukarno could not bring about in the period of liberal democracy because of the limitations on foreign policy of governmental and political variables. And with a quantitative and qualitative change in the military variable - Indonesia became one of highly armed nations of the world with enormous Soviet assistance - Sukarno adopted an assertive and aggressive policies of one "confrontation" after another. The ideosyncratic variable was now allowed an unchallenged role and the elite images of the operational environment became perfectly harmonious with Sukarno's own perception of international reality due to governmental monopoly over the communications media. Since perception of international reality very often becomes the international reality, and since this was especially true of Sukarno's Indonesia, a brief mention of Sukarno's world view is now in order.

Sukarno's world view had been determined largely by his experience of the revolutionary struggle against the Dutch and by his leftist ideology. He rejected the commonly accepted view that the cold war between the U.S. - led countries and the communist states was the main conflict of our time and asserted that the conflict of our time and asserted that the conflict (or "confrontation" as he preferred to call it) between anti-colonialists or the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) and the NECOLIM - imperialism colonialism and neo-colonialism - or the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS) was the dominant conflict in the contemporary international system. As George Modelski has admirably suggested, it was a "conflict theory" of international relations which postulated that the conflict between the "new" and the "old" must end in the destruction of the "old". (9) In Sukarno's view, imperialism-colonialism in its many manifestations, and not the cold war, was at the root of all international tensions. Sukarno, in this way, rejected the three-fold division of international society (the "Free-World", the communist states and the "third world" or the non-aligned states) and suggested a two-fold division - OLDEFOS and NEFOS (eliminating, by implication, the non-aligned).

The Indonesian President did not come to a precise view of the struggle of NEFOS against OLDEFOS on one fine morning ; he gradually developed it in accordance with the exigencies of his domestic and foreign policies. In his address to the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1960 (the speech, "To Build The World Anew", later became a document of state policy) President Sukarno gave the first formulation, albeit casually, of his ideas about "emerging" and the "established" forces. But he neither defined nor specified the emerging

nations and the old established forces. We may easily infer, however, from his speech that the "emerging" nations were also the "younger", the "smaller" and "the burgeoning" nations. By implication at least the Soviet Union, a great and established power, was not one of the "emerging" nations. The communists, therefore, were not the "emerging" nations in 1960. At the Belgrade conference of the non-aligned nations a year later the Indonesian leader elaborated further on his theme of the new emerging forces. He defined them as nations which were, or had been, engaged in the struggle for national independence. It was here at Belgrade that Sukarno spoke of the "conflict" between the new emergent forces for "freedom and justice" and the old forces of "domination" : and asked everyone to believe that : that "conflict", not be cold war, was the source of contemporary tensions : "Prevailing world opinion today would have us believe that the real source of international tension and strife is ideological conflict between the big powers. I think that is not true." (10) Declaring that there could be no co-existence between independence, justice on one side and imperialism-colonialism on the other side, the Indonesian leader called upon the non-aligned countries to ally themselves with the forces that were challenging the imperialist-colonialist order.

It was at the opening of the preparatory conference of Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) - games organized to overcome the humiliation suffered during the Asian Games held at Djakarta in the Fall of 1962 - that Sukarno for the first time included the communist states as well, besides the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in his description of the NEFOS. Denouncing the International Olympic Committee (which had suspended Indonesia for its refusal to allow the teams of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Israel to participate in the Asian Games) as the "tool" of the OLDEFOS, Sukarno ordered the establishment of a permanent organisation called GANEFO to resist the OLDEFOS. Stressing the history and significance of these two fond terms he observed that "the NEFOS were characterized by a desire to be free from colonialism, free from exploitation of man by man, free from poverty and so on. The Old Established Forces on the other hand, fearing for the sake of their interests, opposed the existence of the New Emerging Forces." (11) The list of participants made it abundantly clear as to who the NEFO countries were... 51 countries from Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America present for the GANEFO including all the communist countries, the Arab Palestine, Belgium, France and, above all, with the restoration of diplomatic ties the erstwhile enemy, the Netherlands, but excluding India (it was an Indian national who had annoyed Sukarno by protesting against the exclusion of the Republic of China and Israel); the Republics of Korea and Vietnam, Israel and a few pro-Western Arab states. The composition of the Executive Board of the GANEFO gave a clear cut indication regarding Indonesian aspiration for the leadership of a political grouping of the NEFOS ; while the Peoples China, the Soviet Union and U.A.R. were named Vice-Presidents for Asia, Europe and Africa respectively (Latin American post remained vacant), Indonesia was given the honour of presiding over the Board. The willingness of some West European countries such as the Netherlands and de Gaulle's France (which, of late, had been growing unhappy with the United States) to participate in the GANEFO led to a further expansion in the area of NEFOS. In his Independence Day Address on August 17, 1963, President Sukarno described the New Emerging Forces as comprising of "the oppressed and the progressive nations" - the nations of Asia, Africa, Latin America, "the socialist" countries, and the progressive groups in the

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capitalist countries. (12) By 1963, therefore, it became obvious that the OLDEFOS were the "imperialist-colonialists" of North America, Western Europe and Australasia. Some of these could always be transferred to the NEFOS group if they be on good terms with Djakarta. Similarly, the enemies of Indonesia, even if Asians, automatically be in the OLDEFOS. A year later, with the "Crush Malaysia" campaign in high gear and with corresponding heightening of belligerency in Djakarta, Sukarno gave up all pretence of non-alignment. At the Cairo conference of non-aligned countries in October 1964 he echoed the Peking line in rejecting peaceful co-existence between NEFOS and OLDEFOS and once again tried, rather unsuccessfully, to make the confrontation between the two as the main pre-occupation of the conference. The tireless campaign waged by Sukarno and his foreign minister, Subandrio, to make the non-alignment synonymous with "confrontation" permeated discussion on almost every item on the agenda of the Cairo conference. Sukarno's team, to the bewilderment of many participants, seemed to suggest that peaceful co-existence was of purely Western invention intended to legalize colonialist or neo-colonialist domination. (13)

For Sukarno, therefore, peace between NEFOS and OLDEFOS was unthinkable. As he himself said : "There are persons who say, why bother about the Old Established Order ... live and let live ! Stupid such a person is." Forging the solidarity among NEFOS, and thereby securing Indonesian leadership, and to intensify the struggle against NECOLIM became, thereafter, the primary item on the agenda of Djakarta's foreign policy. Behind all this lay the clever design to secure the support of the NEFOS for Sukarno's international ambitions. Once he disapproved of the projected Federation of Malaysia, he denounced it as a "neo-colonialist" plot of the OLDEFOS and called upon the NEFOS to assist Indonesia's campaign to "crush" it. In this way he sought to mobilize, the way he had gathered international support for his West Irian policy, significant world wide sympathy and support for his aspiration in South-east Asia - the removal of the American and the British influence and the restoration of the same type of Indonesian paramountcy in the region as that of the days of Majapahit and Srivijaya empires. The slogan of the struggle of NEFOS against OLDEFOS, therefore, was primarily meant for raising international stature of the President and for mobilizing international support for his regional aspirations. In addition, it had the merit of rallying round two major, and basically antagonistic, domestic forces - the army and the communist party - behind his foreign policy concerns.

Thus towards the close of the Sukarno era, Indonesian foreign policy goals were to acquire the leadership of a large segment of Afro-Asia, construct a NEFOS grouping, and use this international credit for Indonesia's desire to dominate the structures and processes of international decision-making regarding Southeast Asia. Sukarno was never shy of asserting such a role. As he declared while opposing the formation of Malaysia :

Are there not grounds for us to be vigilant of associations of several countries surrounding us ? ... especially if Indonesia's voice is not heard ... looked upon as if ... hmm, hmm, as if Indonesia does not have a right to appraise an event that is to take place on its very door step ? (14)

In order to achieve Indonesia's hegemony Sukarno set out to remove Western presence from Southeast Asia. In this he received some psychological success. Two documents issued after a conference in Manila (of Indonesian, Malaya and the Philippines to discuss Malaysia dispute) bore the imprint of Sukarno's ideology and underlined his external aspirations. It is worth noting that both documents - the Manila Declaration and the Joint Statement - were signed by Sukarno, Macapagal and the Tunku Abdul Rahman in that order. The three heads of governments agreed, in the "Bandung Spirit", that the foreign bases were "temporary in nature" and "should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries". They also promised to refrain from "the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers." (15) A proud President Sukarno told his people in his Independence Day Address on August 17, 1963 :

Indonesia is no longer treated like the dummy Togog and allowed just to look on alone at alterations to the status quo in the region around it ... Indonesia is recognised as having the right and a primary responsibility to guard security and peace in the region.

Since Indonesia's aim of ejecting Western powers from Southeast Asia coincided with Communist China's interest in the region and since the leadership in both countries had a favourable image of each other, both formed a Peking-Djakarta axis. Pakistan joined the axis in its search for friends against India. Sukarno proceeded further to expand the group and was quick to link his "crush Malaysia" campaign with North Vietnam's and North Korea's efforts to drive the United States out of South Vietnam and South Korea. Sinhanouk of Cambodia had recently broken diplomatic relations with Washington. Sukarno now proclaimed in 1965 the emergence of an "anti-imperialist" axis, the Djakarta-Pnompenh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang-Pindi axis, as the "most natural axis" that had been formed by the course of history. (16) In the same year, Djakarta left the United Nations saying that the world organization had become a tool of OLDEFOS.

Unfortunately for Sukarno, his perception of international reality did not conform to the facts of international life. In so far as he aimed at solidarity of the NEFOS, his pronouncements did touch a sensitive chord in the militant Afro-Asians. But in so far as he aimed at manipulation of the NEFOS for his regional aspirations, he could not possibly succeed. His vanity, his hopeless domestic performance, and selfish national concerns could not but reflect on his principles and his claims for leadership. Although some of the Afro-Asian countries were initially reluctant to criticize his aggressive posture towards Malaysia, in due course most of these countries except Peking, let it be known that he could not secure their approval, let alone support, for his adventures. Even Soviet Union remained surprisingly reserved in this regard. The abortive second Afro-Asian conference left no doubt that Sukarno's view of NEFO Solidarity must remain a dream. The Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-Indian rivalry, not to mention a host of bilateral tensions within the "third world", were far more powerful factors than the slipping anti-colonialism that was the main edifice of Sukarno's ambitions NEFO structure. Ironically enough, he could not sustain even the domestic counter-part of his NEFOS, the precarious amalgam of army, communist and

nationalist forces over which he presided. The September 30th (1965) putsch swept it away, and thrown away in its wake were Sukarno and his policies.

Post-Sukarno Foreign Policy

The ill-fated September 30th putsch brought about a drastic change in the domestic power balance. The victorious anti-communist General Staff led by General Suharto eliminated PKI, forced Sukarno to sign away much of his authority to General Suharto in March 1966, and then finally ousted him from power in March 1967. This change in political, though not in governmental variable brought about a change in ideosyncratic, communications, and even societal-ideological variables and hence a major shift in foreign policy orientations. A programme of de Sukarnoisation was launched without delay. The Djakarta-Peking axis and "confrontation" policies had created a revolutionary fervor in Indonesia that was extremely beneficial to the communist party. The new regime not only suppressed PKI and harassed the local Chinese, it also denounced Peking for conspiring with PKI in connection with the 1965 putsch. Peking in turn spared no superlatives in giving "stern warnings" to "Indonesian rightwing thugs". (17) To no ones surprise, therefore, the two countries withdrew their diplomatic missions from each other.

Thus while relations with communist countries, particularly China, deteriorated, the new regime set out to improve relations with all those countries whom Sukarno had declared enemies of Indonesia. Adam Malik, the new Foreign Minister did not delay in announcing that he would give priority to "confrontation of stomachs" over "confrontation of Malaysia". In line with this policy, he declared in his first major policy statement that Indonesia would return to "active and independent" foreign policy, would restore friendly relations with the United States, would seek economic aid from all quarters and might join the United Nations.

The new Indonesian leadership concluded that in order to put Indonesia's economic house in order they had to reduce their military expenditure (which had gone up to 70 percent of the national budget) and that they had to convince the would-be creditors that the loans could be repaid. Aware of the fact that Indonesia already owed \$ 2.5 billion in debt to various countries, the non-communist lenders had been reluctant to offer any aid so long as the policy of "confrontation" lasted. Even the Soviets had been holding back deliveries of military spare parts until some new agreement was reached on the \$ 1 billion Indonesia owed them. Such compelling factors, together with the futility of "confrontation" (no single gain to show for the expense and the lives lost), led the new leadership to seek ways to a dignified disengagement from the "confrontation" of Malaysia. Conscious of the fact that they could be branded as the tool of neo-colonialists, the new leadership proceeded to end the "confrontation" while talking the language of the Sukarno era. Suharto, for instance, declared early in April 1966 that Indonesia would continue "confrontation" but added that his government "remained open to a peaceful settlement" and that the efforts against Malaysia would have to be based on "needs of the Revolution and the people" (indicating that the latter should have priority over "confrontation"). The true thinking of the new leadership was reflected by an editorial in the army paper Trisakti : "We suggest a peaceful confrontation instead

of physical confrontation or war that was inspired by the Indonesian Communist Party for the interests of China." (18) Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, went to Bangkok to attend a meeting of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand convened to find a peaceful settlement of Malaysia tangle. Given the Indonesian desire to make peace with Malaysia, the foreign minister concluded an agreement very swiftly in May 1966. Malaysia agreed to a face-saving gesture towards Indonesia by declaring that the people of Sarawak and Sabah, the two Borneo territories in the Federation, would always have the right to determine their political status (Sukarno had always insisted on the Manila agreements of mid 1963 providing for ascertainment, to Indonesia's satisfaction, of the wishes of the two states).

Another de-Sukarnoisation step that the new regime took was to rejoin the United Nations and the specialized agencies from which Sukarno had taken Indonesia out. As Sukarno was still technically the chief decision-maker, the new regime arranged a face-saving device to meet the Bung's demand for "retooling" the world organization so as to make it better reflect the desire and policies of the "New Emerging Forces". An exploratory mission to the United Nations reported on its return that many other U.N. members were willing to co-operate with Indonesia in common endeavors to effect a reorganization of the world body. The new regime, using Sukarno's language, declared that it would "retool" the U.N. from within. These policy changes were quickly approved by the People's Consultative Assembly, the highest organ of the state.

Having abandoned Sukarno's costly and adventurous foreign policies, and having cancelled his extravagant prestigious projects such as the skyscraper Nusantara House and the CONEFH Hall, the new regime proceeded to seek postponement or rescheduling of foreign debts and procurement of maximum possible foreign economic aid. A jubilant United States and its western allies were only too willing to oblige. The new regime, however, had no desire to present itself as a pro-western country to an elite that had been fed by Sukarno on anti-Western slogans. The United States appreciated this and did not show unnecessary public enthusiasm. She encouraged Japan to take a lead in arranging economic assistance to Indonesia. Japan offered \$ 30 million in emergency credit and organized a "Tokyo Club" of non-communist donors consisting of herself, the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. A team of experts from the International Monetary Fund helped Indonesian officials to draw an economic stabilization programme. The Tokyo Club met three times in the second-half of 1966 to discuss ways and means of helping Indonesia. In addition to offering a variety of new aids, the Club decided to defer payments on over \$ 350 million due from Indonesia. The Soviet Union, though unhappy with the suppression of the Indonesian Communist Party by the new regime, agreed to reschedule its loan payments in order to salvage its own diplomatic assets in Djakarta. India, eager to re-establish friendly ties with Djakarta, offered \$ 20 millions in credits and some other countries also did their best for Indonesia. Ever since then the Western powers, especially Germany and the U.S., and Japan have concluded a series of agreements to bolster Indonesian economy. The Soviet Union and its allies, on the other hand, have given no aid to the new regime. It is ironic that the distinguished visitors

to Djakarta during the last three years have been the visitors from the U.S., Australia, the U.K., Germany and Japan - "necolim" countries against whom Sukarno had been building a world-wide front. The "new spirit" that the regime intended to bring home to the average Indonesian was very well summarised by General Suharto in his New Year's Eve address : "We must get rid especially of arrogance, stress on Indonesian leadership and "beacon-of-the-World" attitude... to make room for a more proper approach based on equality and mutual respect." (19) Evidently the new regime wanted its people to give up their belief, injected by Sukarno, that they were the leader of the "New Emerging Forces" destined to rid the earth of domination by the forces of "Old Established Order" and "build the world anew".

It would be wrong to conclude from the above account of some of the specific policies that the post-Sukarno Indonesia had opted to fall within the orbit of the Western powers and that it had decided against an ambitious foreign policy. President Suharto, Foreign Minister Malik and other Djakarta spokesmen have in a number of policy statements stressed that Indonesia still adhered to an independent and active role in world affairs. In fact, they have insisted that they were only correcting Sukarno's deviations. The new regime has declined to join the Asia and Pacific Council on the ground that such a move would compromise non-alignment. Similarly President Suharto flatly rejected suggestions from certain quarters that Indonesia should cooperate with Australia and others to evolve a regional defence arrangement in the wake of the British withdrawal from Singapore. (20) Thus, while Djakarta has endeavoured to establish friendly relations with prospective donors, it has broken with the ideological consensus on non-alignment or "active and independent" policy. Similarly, Post-Sukarno Indonesia, has not given up regional aspirations of the Sukarno area. What has changed is not the aim but style and technique. The new regime wishes to be influential through a series of structures for regional cooperation. It is significant that Indonesia was instrumental in the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and has acted as a quiet conciliator between Malaysia and the Philippines in their dispute over Sabah. Malik has often spoken on the desirability of keeping non-regional influences out of Southeast Asia. Within the non-aligned world also the new regime has been endeavouring to regain Indonesia's lost influence. Thus, while post-Sukarno Indonesia initially moved towards the right of the centre of non-alignment spectrum (in direct contrast with Sukarno era), it has been trying to return to the centre.

Notes

- (1) See James N. Rosenau, "~~Pro~~ Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, Evanston (Ill.), 1966, pp. 27-92.
- (2) Stanley Hoffmann, ed., Contemporary Theory in International Relations, Englewood Cliffs (N.J.), 1960, p. 52.
- (3) George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy, New York, 1962.
- (4) Michael Brecher, "Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices : Krishna Menon's View of the World", Pacific Affairs, vol. XL, n°s 1 & 2 (Spring and Summer 1967), pp. 60-61, and Michael Brecher et al., "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. XIII, n° 1 March 1969, pp. 75-101.
- (5) Cited in Muhammad Hatta "Indonesia's Foreign Policy", Indonesian Review, vol. one, n° 6 (1953), p. 26.
- (6) Ibid.
- (7) For a detailed analysis see Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Cornell, 1962, pp. 198-205.
- (8) Ibid.
- (9) George Modelski, ed., New Emerging Forces : Documents on the Ideology of the Indonesian Foreign Policy, Canberra, 1963, pp. ii-iv.
- (10) Ibid., pp. 33-44 ; Indonesian Observer, Djakarta, September 4, 1961.
- (11) Djakarta Daily, April 29, 1963.
- (12) Indonesian Observer, August 18-19, 1963.
- (13) For an extended discussion see L.P. Singh, "Dynamics of Indian-Indonesian Relations", Asian Survey, vol. VII, n° 9 (Sept. 1967), pp. 655-666.
- (14) From the Independence Day Address, Aug. 17, 1963, cited in Modelski, op. cit., p. 126.
- (15) For the text of the document see, Malaysia-Indonesia Relations, Kuala Lumpur, 1963 (Appendix).
- (16) Independence Day Address, "Reach the Stars", Indonesian Herald, Djakarta, Aug. 20, 1965.

- (17) Department of External Affairs, Hubungan Republic Indonesia Dengan Republic Rakjat Tjina, Documents Diplomatica, 1967, n° 4, pp. 182-259.
- (18) New York Times, April 5 and 11, 1966.
- (19) Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. LV, n° 4 (Jan. 26, 1967), p. 129.
- (20) Amera, (Djakarta) June 18, 1968 ; Merdeka (Djakarta), June 13, 1968 ; and Warta Harjan (Djakarta), June 19, 1968.

B/VIII - La théorie des relations internationales

- The theory of international relations

Domestic Political Power Balance and Foreign Policy in Indonesia

L.P. Singh

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B/VIII/5

Conclusions

A survey of the Indonesian foreign policy under the three historical phases leads us to the following conclusions :

1. Non-alignment or "independent and active" foreign policy provides an ideological consensus to politically divergent forces within the Indonesian power elite.
2. As long as the continuity on the fundamentals of "independent" policy is maintained, some changes to bring about a slight shift to the left or to the right of the centre of non-alignment spectrum is permissible. A major shift in either direction would be an untenable deviation.
3. There is a continuity in elite images regarding an active global role and a dominant regional role for Indonesia. There are, however, variations with regards to styles and methods to pursue these goals.
4. Of all the variables, the political variable, i.e., the domestic power balance, is the most decisive variable in determining the significant components of foreign policy.

- B-VIII - La théorie des relations internationales
- The theory of international relations

B-VIII/5 DOMESTIC POLITICAL POWER BALANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY
IN INDONESIA

L. P. SINGH
Sir George Williams University

B-VIII / 5.

Conclusion :

Une étude de la politique extérieure Indonésienne sous les trois phases de son histoire nous amène aux conclusions suivantes :

1. Une politique étrangère de non-alignement ou "indépendante et active" procure un consensus idéologique aux forces politiquement divergentes parmi l'élite du pouvoir en Indonésie.
 2. Aussi longtemps qu'est maintenue la continuité des fondements d'une politique "indépendante" on peut tolérer certains changements dans le sens d'une légère tendance vers la gauche ou vers la droite du centre de l'éventail de la politique de non-alignement.
Un déplacement plus conséquent dans l'un ou l'autre sens constituerait une déviation intenable.
 3. Il existe une continuité dans les images de l'élite en ce qui concerne le rôle actif dans son ensemble et le rôle local dominant en Indonésie. Cependant les styles et méthodes varient dans la recherche de ces objectifs.
 4. De toutes les variables, la variable politique, c'est-à-dire l'équilibre du pouvoir intérieur, est la plus décisive dans la détermination des composantes importantes de la politique extérieure.
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LINKAGE THEORY IN APPLICATION TO MICRO STATES

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This paper applies the linkage approach to the analysis of foreign policy of "microstates", with special reference to their characteristics of limited capabilities and to their objective of economic development.

The rapid increase in the number of states which comprise the international system presents problems for the understanding of their foreign policies to the scholar and the diplomat alike. Even if it were possible to have up-to-date studies of the foreign policy of every state, certain disutilities might accrue to the decision-making process from the information overload which might derive from such a vast range of data. For this reason a classification of states which arranges units in groups which possess a similarity of basic attributes, and whose behaviour patterns exhibit a high degree of similarity to the extent that they derive from these attributes, can contribute to the improvement of the foreign policy process through the facilitation of the understanding of international behaviour. To some extent, such classifications cannot avoid the charge of being arbitrary since they embody the subjective view of the analyst about causation. Some of the traditional schemes of classification have been based on implicit notions on the importance of geography as a factor in international politics and have stressed "regional" groupings of states. Yet it is possible for the student to construct as many regions as his imagination and the flexibility of his selective criteria will allow.

Another distinction which has a longer historical currency as a basis for classifying states is their separation into Great Powers and Small Powers. Such distinctions have tended to be of limited value since ultimately they have used military capability measured in terms of hardware as their rationals. A continuation of this tradition is evident in the categorization of the Soviet Union and the United States as Super Powers in the light of their nuclear capability. The fundamental weakness of this classification, as it was originally intended to be understood, lay in the fact that it told nothing about the interests of states, and hence how they were likely to behave in the international system. Modified forms of this type of classification which takes account of other quantitative factors of state power as well as qualitative dimensions of this variable are now employed to generate more informative hypotheses.

The rapid growth in the number of juridically independent states since the Second World War has resulted from the anti-colonial climate which emanates in particular from the United Nations. As the decolonization activity of this organization has resulted in the political independence of larger units, apart from the hard core colonial areas in southern Africa, attention has been focused on the very small territories most of which are either islands or enclaves formerly part of a colonial empire. The term "microstate" or its variant "ministate", has been applied to those units which have now attained their independence and implied a conventional notion about their international capabilities. While no specific criteria for distinguishing microstates has been articulated, a convenient though arbitrary approach might be to regard all states which possess populations of less than one million as microstates. The theoretical importance of the classification of microstates lies in its utility in the explication of the relationships that exist between the concepts, "statehood", "sovereignty", "autonomy" and "state capabilities" in the contemporary international system. Indeed, the juridical notion of statehood may itself be regarded as a capability in that statehood provides access to channels of international influence, which are not open to manipulation by non-state collectivities. If we include the European principalities such as Monaco, San Marino, Andorra, etc., we arrive at a fairly significant number of microstates, and it might also be possible to extend this number by examining their behaviour and subsequently including all other states which, though having slightly larger populations, exhibit essentially similar patterns of behaviour. While the states of Iceland and Luxembourg are part of the developed world, it will be observed that the vast majority of states with populations of less than one million are developing nations. This factor is of prime importance in the analysis of their linkage phenomena, as has been indicated.

For the purpose of this analysis, it may also be useful to distinguish microstates as either insular, oceanic or continental. While the insular and continental categories are selfexplanatory, the use of the term "oceanic" has been employed to describe those polities which are islands but isolated from other states by relatively great distances. Such polities can be found in the Pacific Ocean, the Republic of Nauru being the most outstanding case. Perhaps a particular type of insular polity could be differentiated as the "archipelagic". Such islands as those found in the Caribbean which form a chain may experience linkage phenomena which emanate from outside the geographical area but which are transmitted through the chain by being received first in that island which is more receptive to the phenomena, and subsequently dispersed among the others through the channels of social communication which are relatively more intense between members of the chain than between members and non-members. In the course of the

subsequent discussion the importance of these geographical features of microstates will be pointed out.

As a point of departure it may be useful to refer to Rosenau's classification of politics around four basic types of linkage patterns.³ He suggests that these could be distinguished by classifying them in terms of the number of linkages to which they contribute outputs, by doing the same in terms of the linkages for which they are the input recipients, by dividing the two scales into high or low, and by then combining them into a fourfold table. Such a scheme establishes four types of politics which are (1) those that are high on both scales; (2) those that have many linkages to which they contribute outputs and few in which they receive inputs; (3) those that have the pattern opposite to (2); and (4) those that are low on both scales. Rosenau suggests that this classification could indicate ways in which groups of politics resemble each other. Thus he argues that it may well be discovered that many outputs are fostered by superpolities and medium sized politics for whose allegiance super-polities compete. Again, it may be found that few outputs are generated by disunited new politics and traditionally neutral ones, while many inputs may be experienced by new politics and by those for which superpolities compete. In addition, it might be discovered that both superpolities and traditionally neutral ones are likely to be the recipients of few inputs. Following this line of reasoning, the hypothesis may be advanced that microstates are likely to generate few outputs while receiving a large number of inputs, though variations may occur depending on location and resources. This assumption is based on the relative absence of capabilities which is inherent in the definition of the group. Indeed, it might be argued that as microstates are unlikely to be able to insulate themselves against the penetration of the national boundary by these outputs, they are challenged by the need to develop a capacity to accommodate them. An analysis of the decision-making process in microstates could thus evaluate the perceptions of and responses to the linkage outputs from the various environments by the leaders of these states.

Of particular importance to the study of the decision-making process in microstates are hypotheses which indicate how these states become linked to their various environments. Thus it would be useful to follow the scheme proposed by Bruce Russett for establishing a minimum classification of the spectrum of linkages between a state and the world society.⁴

3. Rosenau, "Towards the Study of National International Linkages", p. 58.

4. Bruce M. Russett, "Indicators for America's Linkages with the Changing World Environment". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 388, March 1970, pp. 82-96.

Russett suggests that the indicators could include (1) membership of international organizations; (2) trade in goods; (3) distances on major issues in the United Nations as indicated by speeches and voting records; and (4) conflict and co-operation dimensions as indicated by the number of international treaties concluded and diplomatic personnel exchanged. Thus, states could be differentiated in terms of whether their linkages are few or many, as well as whether they are concentrated or diffuse. Applying this scheme to the analysis of microstates it might be discovered that their linkages are relatively high but heavily concentrated. Here again, this assumption is based on the recognition that this group of states are highly dependent on the environment to assist in the meeting of needs which cannot be satisfied by the dependence on domestic resources. The major example of this type of dependence can be seen in the external orientation of economic development strategies which emphasize the role of foreign aid and foreign direct investment, often from a narrow range of countries.

By far the most important problem which confronts theorizing on international politics is that of relevance. While many variables are thought to be relevant to international politics, theorizing is needed to reduce their number to manageable proportions. In short, the theorist must be able to demonstrate that those conditions which he contends are necessary for the concurrence of events are sufficient to bring them about. Some scholars have attempted to narrow the range of variables by stating that their concern is only with political phenomena. Yet, if one thinks in systemic terms, this only complicates the problem of analysis by interposing the necessity to establish the boundaries of the political system. Indeed, the problem of establishing boundaries is crucial for the investigation of politics in the developing world since the desire to seek first the political kingdom, and leaders' beliefs about the primacy of politics may result in the attempt to subordinate all other areas of activity to the demands of political action. As a cautionary note, however, it must be suggested that the study of microstates should not be approached with an essentialist notion of politics. Analytical tools which have been developed in, and tested on data derived from large industrial nations should be applied to nations at the other end of the spectrum with a measure of academic diffidence. Thus, one must be aware of the possibility that in the very small pre-industrial state there may be no clearly distinguishable political system. This point has been elaborated by Singham⁵ who argues that the study of political culture should

5. See A.W. Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 93-98 for an elaboration of this argument.

distinguish carefully between analytic and ideological functions. He suggests that political activity in the very small societies in the Caribbean is the "politics of marginality" in which one of the by-products is "the capacity to accommodate to anyone and everyone with whom the individual comes into contact". The distinction between politics and interaction which Rosenau claims is of importance for the application of the linkage concept may not be able to be maintained in the study of the foreign policies of some of these states.

The student who is aware of the above problem may, thus, be faced with the task of deciding on an objective basis which issues are political or, conversely, searching for indicators of an underlying notion of their political nature by the decision-makers. In short, he is faced with the problem of determination of the salience of issues. A decision-making approach based on the concept of rational international behaviour would suggest the assumption that decision-makers will give primacy to domestic considerations since they are likely to be relatively more capable of exercising control over domestic phenomena than those which unfold in the external environment. International behaviour could then be related to two hypotheses, both of which indicate the relatively great stress which is placed on foreign policy. The first of these is based on a notion of "covariance" and suggests that the more a system is oriented to the attainment of political objectives domestically the more it will also be oriented to attaining them externally. This hypothesis would hold good for cases where it could be demonstrated that the decision-makers perceive that their domestic objectives could not be attained without their being involved in external activity and appears to underly many analyses of the foreign policy of Ghana under Nkrumah. In addition, this hypothesis can be linked to the absence of domestic restraints on the foreign policy elite by a strong and informed public opinion or by opposing elite groups which give primacy to domestic concerns. The alternative hypothesis is based on a "zero-sum" notion and suggests that the inability of leaders to cope with domestic issues will shift their attention to foreign policy. This hypothesis stresses the non-rational aspects of international behaviour since it would seem to follow that where a state is unable to exercise control within its domestic environment its disabilities with respect to the external environment would be even greater. From the point of view of the analysis of microstate behaviour, the possibility of such behaviour should not be ignored, in view of the fact that much of the decision-making of very small developing states is individual-based.

I have indicated that it may be found that microstates are more likely to be receivers of linkage inputs than the producers of outputs. It will also be useful to speculate on the types of processes which are likely to generate

these inputs into the micro-polity. The types of processes which have been identified are the penetrative, the reactive and the emulative.^{xx} Foreign aid, and the encouragement of direct foreign investment, which we have indicated as particular policies of microstates foster the development of penetrative processes. Such policies are the result of a desire for economic development which is itself the outcome of a process of diffusion of foreign ideas and values. The process of diffusion which is an emulative one, can be defined as the acceptance over time of some specific item, such as idea or practice, by individuals, groups, or other adopting units, linked to specific channels of communication, to a social structure, and to a given system of values or culture. It can be argued, also, that the existence of the above features results in an asymmetric relationship between microstates and larger states in their environment which restricts the policy making process to being reactive in nature.

^{xx} Perhaps, it may be useful to distinguish between "emulative" and "imitative" processes. As will be argued later, the linkage concept may be useful in pointing up hypotheses about the international behaviour of particular classes of states. In so far as such distinctions are based on differences in resource capabilities of states, some states may be appropriately regarded as being effected by emulative processes in the sense that they undertake activity with the objective of seeking to equal or excel in the attainment of some end state which is seen to be possessed by actors of similar resource capabilities. Other states may, then, be regarded as being involved in imitative behaviour if they seek to achieve similar conditions as are perceived to be possessed by actors whose resources are significantly greater. Much of the activity of the nations of the third world which attempt to industrialize as a means of attaining levels of self-sustaining economic growth can be regarded as falling within this category. That such nations constantly refer to the widening gap between themselves and the rich nations provides some indication of possible outcomes of imitative behaviour. Rosenau's concept of an emulative process stresses that not only is the behaviour of the actor a response to the output, but it takes essentially the same form, and he cites the phenomena of nationalism, aspirations towards industrialization and political modernization, as the more striking examples of linkages established through emulative processes. It is worth investigating whether these processes as they unfold in the third world, can be described as emulative in their underlying motivation and/or their end result in these states.

Any analysis which attempts to apply the concept of linkage to the examination of the foreign policy process of microstates must evaluate the implications of the structural and textural features of the domestic political system for the ways in which linkage phenomena will impinge on the decision-making process. Thus it is necessary to provide an outline of the features of the political system of microstates which are relevant to this evaluation. In examining the decision-making process one may begin by noting that the political leadership tends to be concentrated in one predominant individual. Indeed, this key foreign policy decision-maker who is usually the Prime Minister tends to hold other important portfolios as well, such as responsibility for financial matters and the promotion of economic development. This can, at times, give rise to role conflict and increases the probability that foreign policy considerations are viewed in the context of more longstanding domestic issues and may thus be subordinated to these issues. The political elite also tends to be restricted in size with an absence of overarching group relationships. Thus there is a high level of repeated interaction within the elite and there is thus a tendency towards the polarization of conflict and co-operation. The bureaucracy is restricted in size and areas of specialization. While its organizational objectives and purposes may be essentially the same as exists in larger countries, a major problem which confronts it is that the solutions which it presents to problems which confront it are more restricted. Indeed, the small society syndrome may mean an accentuation of conflict between the organizational imperative of giving impartial expert advice and the infringement of the official's own political values which are often well known. Finally, an examination of the electorate would need to discover the area of choice which exists between parties and proposals and the degree of commitment which is fostered by electoral policies. It is possible to argue that the area of real choice is fundamentally restricted by the narrow range of alternatives which can be articulated in very small states. Thus, the electorate may come to regard participation as futile and display all the symptoms of political apathy or alienation. On the more positive side of the coin, one may argue that the absence of strong commitment to a particular tradition of foreign policy which is a feature of large, informed and well established electorates in developed countries, place fewer strictures in the way of policy change.

This brief tour de force of the domestic political structure of microstates will assist the formulation of a number of additional hypotheses. We may argue that the impact of low levels of development will intensify the distance between the elite and the masses. This elite will tend to be proportionately smaller than in larger states, especially those which are more economically advanced. Thus it will be

necessary to distinguish between linkage phenomena which impinge upon the elite structure and those which affect the masses. The elite will be more responsive to linkage phenomena and may act as a catalyst transmitting these phenomena to the masses. Many of the developing microstates have emerged from an imperial-colonial relationship which has resulted in the assimilation of the imperial culture and tradition by the elite. Where the masses have remained wedded to a native culture there will be a significant gap between them and the elite. This may result in a situation in which the elite are highly responsive to emulative and penetrative inputs, while the masses may demonstrate a condition of reactive linkage behaviour. The existence and intensity of these features will be affected by whether the polity is insular, continental, or oceanic, and on the relative size and power of the states from the environment from which the inputs are received.

This brings us finally to a comparison between insular, continental and oceanic microstates. It can be argued that the oceanic microstate demonstrates an accentuated condition of insularity which emphasises its isolation and remoteness. The effect of insularity is to establish the significance of the discontinuities in the pattern of relationships with other political entities. Social communication outside the national boundary is relatively sporadic, restricted and much less intense than communication within the national boundary. The insulation inherent in this condition may mean that for even weak insular polities there is a delay in the transmission of linkage phenomena across the national boundary which will provide the decision-makers with a greater degree of time to contrive a response than would be available to leaders in even relatively larger continental politics. While the small population of the polity may result in a quicker rate of diffusion of the phenomena once it has entered the polity, the speed of the diffusion process will be limited by the extent of internal homogeneity as we have noted above.

It is well accepted that satisfactory attempts to explain political behaviour and the foreign policy produces by such behaviour must distinguish between the psychological environment of the actor and his operational environment. While the former will explain his images, attitudes, and motivations, it is the latter which the analyst posits as approximating reality which will explain the particular way in which foreign policy outcomes unfold. This distinction appears to underlie the concepts of compatibility and consensus which have been advocated by Wolfram Hanrieder as a means of correlating the important external dimensions of foreign policy aims, and which allow the analyst to view foreign policy as a continuous

process bridging the analytical barriers between the international and domestic political system.⁶ Hanrieder's concern with the difficulty which he believes many of the national actors in the contemporary international system experience in distinguishing between foreign policy and domestic policy -- a difficulty which, from the foregoing analysis, would appear to be even more pronounced in microstates -- leads him to advocate the first concept as a means of assessing the feasibility of various foreign policy goals, given the structures and opportunities of the international system. He argues that the second enables the assessment of the measure of agreement on the ends and means of foreign policy on the domestic political scene. Hanrieder contends that by compatibility between the conditions of the international political system and foreign policy goals he means that a particular objective has a reasonable chance of realization, if implemented by a policy which an outside observer would deem appropriate, while consensus is, in fact, a standard of feasibility, especially in a democratic political system, since it determines in the long-run what foreign policy goals a government can pursue without losing popular support and office.

This contribution clearly indicates the concern of theorists to encompass not only their own notions of reality, but to account for the domestic calculations which precede foreign policy activity, as well as to relate such activity to change in the domestic political system. It is to be noted that the utility of such concepts for the facilitation of political action will depend on the degree of congruence between their attempts to interpret the complexities of causation and consequence and the evaluations of the relevant phenomena by decision-makers.

There appears to be an implicit assumption which colours the treatment of the linkage concept in the analysis of foreign policy which is rather deterministic. Earlier, attention was drawn to the contention by Rosenau that the study of linkage politics can be equated with the study of political adaptability. When this approach is applied to the study of the foreign policy of microstates, the relative inability to exercise control over its environment which is implicit in the concept tends to lead to the conclusion that the microstate must seek to maximise its adaptability as its only positive response to the impact of linkage phenomena.

6. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "Compatibility and Consensus : A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy", American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 4 (dec. 1967), pp. 971-982.

Such a deterministic conclusion should not be reached on a priori grounds. The capacity of the very small state to manipulate the foreign policy process of larger states should not be dismissed. It is unlikely that larger states will perceive that demands from microstates are likely to threaten their vital interests in the same way that similar demands, when articulated by more powerful states -- particularly those of similar capability -- may be regarded as actually or potentially threatening. Further, to a larger state, the cost of meeting specific demands from microstates are likely to be smaller and more easily met. This is certainly the case in relation to requests for foreign aid by very small states, which, if fulfilled, present greater prospects of raising levels of welfare than would be possible if provided in the same amount to larger developing states. From this point of view, the possibility that the "net achievement capability" (x) of the very small state may be greater than that of larger states, with larger endowments of material capabilities, should not be overlooked..

(x) Concept developed by J. Frankel in National Interest, 1970.

B-VIII - The theory of international relations.

- La théorie des relations internationales.

B-VIII/6 - LINKAGE THEORY IN APPLICATION TO MICRO STATES

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Conclusions :

In concluding this tentative examination of the utility of the linkage framework for the examination of the foreign policies of microstates, it is necessary to reiterate that the framework is still in a frankly experimental state. While a detailed application of the framework may be restricted by the limited information which is currently available on the foreign policy processes in these states, it should be useful for students of these areas to build on each others investigations. The search for explanatory concepts is an ongoing endeavour which should not be discarded merely because specific schemes may, at a particular point in time, generate more questions than they can answer. It may well be that the linkage framework can be developed to suggest answers to such questions as, whether to increase in the number of member states in the international system is a stabilizing or a destabilizing feature, and whether there is a symmetric or an asymmetric relationship between number of member states, relative degrees of power, types, and number of states, and the number of linkages between them. These are empirical problems, and, ultimately, their solution will depend on the way in which we define our concepts and the data which we adduce to demolish or support them.

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B-VIII/6 LINKAGE THEORY IN APPLICATION TO MICRO STATES

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CONCLUSIONS

Pour terminer cet essai sur l'utilité d'un canevas de relations pour l'étude des politiques étrangères des petits états, il est nécessaire de répéter qu'un tel cadre n'existe encore qu'au stade expérimental. Tant que l'application détaillée de ce cadre peut être réduite à cause de l'information limitée disponible en pratique sur les processus de politique étrangère de ces états, il devrait être d'usage que ceux qui étudient ces pays se basent sur leurs recherches mutuelles. La recherche de concepts explicatifs qui demande une grande persévérance, ne devrait pas être abandonnée sous prétexte que certains thèmes peuvent parfois soulever plus de questions qu'ils ne peuvent recevoir de réponses. En se développant, le cadre de liaisons pourrait offrir les réponses à des questions telles que : l'augmentation du nombre d'états membres d'un système international constitue-t-il un facteur de stabilité ou d'instabilité, existe-t-il un rapport symétrique ou asymétrique entre les membres selon le nombre d'Etats-membres, les degrés relatifs du pouvoir, les groupes et nombre d'Etats et les liens existant entre eux ? Tous ces problèmes sont d'ordre empirique et, finalement, la façon de les résoudre dépendra de la manière dont nous formulerons nos concepts et des données que nous apporterons pour les défendre ou les condamner.

I.P.S.A.

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FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS AND POLARISED POLITICAL
COMMUNITIES

C.R. Mitchell

Some implications of a simple model

Once upon a time, during the early 1960s, all undergraduate International Relations courses in the United Kingdom were deemed incomplete if they did not contain a number of lectures on the question of the relationship between a country's foreign policy and the shape, size and other attributes of its national political community. The lectures often evolved into a discussion of the relative advantages of possessing a large population, and whether or not this was an element in a state's power (as in the case of the Soviet Union) or of a state's weakness, and hence of its inherent inability to attain a wide range of desirable foreign policy goals (as in the case of India). The debate was usually fairly inconclusive.

Since this time, discussion of the determinants of foreign policy have moved away from this type of question in a number of directions. Snyder, Rosenau and Frankel (1) have questioned whether the concept of "the policy" as a dependent variable is a useful one, and have suggested alternatives such as "the decision" or "the undertaking". Work has been carried out on related clusters of foreign policy problems, or "issue-areas" (2), and the associated sets of domestic influences which come into play when any of these issue-areas is activated by an external stimulus. Finally, there has been a firm move in the direction of multivariate analysis, and a rejection of the idea that national foreign policy could be influenced in a dominant manner by any single domestic or external determinant. James Rosenau has been most influential in this movement away from mono-causal explanations, and has produced a five-fold classification scheme for analysing potentially determining variables, ranging from the personal (or "idiosyncratic") to the systemic. (3)

This present paper may thus appear rather old-fashioned, not merely in the fact that it is non-statistical and not particularly rigorous, but also because it returns to the suggestion that there are discernible relationships between the structure of the national political community and the type of foreign policy issues likely to face national political authorities.

In making such a suggestion, it may appear that I am placing a great deal of emphasis on a single determinant which falls within Rosenau's category of "societal" variables. However, it does seem to me that the nature of the political community plays a major determining role, at least as far as activating certain classes of foreign policy problems or raising certain classes of issues. I would also argue that the most constructive way of approaching this relationship does necessitate the initial abandonment of any rigid division between "domestic" and "external" political variables, and of the billiard-ball perception of the nature of the international system, and the adoption of analysis which directs attention to systems straddling formal state boundaries and involving units situated within the formal jurisdiction of national political systems. The paper may, therefore, be regarded also as a small contribution to the literature on transnational or "linkage" politics, but only as a very small one. It merely takes a minor step away from the conventional approach of looking at international relations as consisting basically of intergovernmental interaction, and towards a view of the international system as an intricate maze of relationships which ignore national territorial boundaries, but call into being as a reaction, sets of representative national political authorities, who then have to deal with the problems created by this maze of transnational linkages. In this paper, the basic level of analysis is still that of the national political system, and the only innovative move away from the nation-state "billiard ball" has been the attempt to show how certain transnational phenomena at another systems level (namely, ethnic, religious and linguistic communities which "overlap" national political boundaries) cause problems for the decision makers at the familiar, national level. The paper, apart from being non-rigorous and non-statistical, is also, therefore, non-revolutionary.

A. The Political Community: Relevant Structural Dimensions

If it is a plausible starting point to assume that the nature of the political community (4) within any political system will affect both foreign and domestic behaviour, then this process is likely to occur through the community's influence on the kind of allocation problems faced by national political authorities. The size, wealth, level of education, degree of associational group formation, and level of urbanisation (to mention only five attribute dimensions along which political communities may be classified) will affect the nature and range of demands formulated, articulated, and made upon the political authorities.

The demands faced by the KANU-dominated Government of Kenya, which emanate from a tribally based, rapidly urbanising, anti-colonialist, primarily agricultural, political community will differ widely from those fed into the Norwegian system by the Norwegian political community. Similarly, the ethnic composition, rate of population growth, degree of national commitment and the level of religious homogeneity will all affect the level of support given to any set of political authorities, to the structures and processes of the regime, or even to the survival of the national political system itself. Hence, the main structural features of the political community have importance both for domestic and external policy making, but the key question remains of the salient structural attributes that affect relations with other political authorities and their relative potency when compared with other determinants of these relations, such as the structure of the political regime, the ideology of the political incumbents, or the problems set by the structural features of the international system.

This is not an area that has been totally neglected by International Relations scholars. Kingsley Davis has written a stimulating paper on the way in which social change within the political communities affects international relations (5) ; Fred Sondermann has suggested a number of ways in which the rapid growth in size of the national political community will pose a range of related problems for the national political authorities, particularly in developing societies (6) ; and John Burton has pointed to the connexions between a population's level of education, functional flexibility, and geographical mobility and its ability to bring about major internal readjustments in response to changes in the external environment thus possibly avoiding inter-state competition or violent conflict. (7) Furthermore, many conceptual and empirical studies of "public opinions" on external affairs are indirectly concerned with analysing one dimension, the attitudinal, of the structure of the national political community, and its effects of the political system's response to the international environment. One thinks particularly, in this connexion, of the work of Johan Galtung and the Oslo international Peace Research Institute (8), and their model of political communities being classifiable by mode of attitude-holding into a centre, pragmatic and gradualist in its approach to foreign policy problems, but constantly competing for influence and support ; and a periphery, normally passive and without firmly structured foreign policy attitudes, but tending towards extremist solutions when rarely roused. One can infer from this model that the relative sizes of centre and periphery will have an effect upon the style of foreign policies pursued by a political system.

For example, in many newly independent countries, especially in Africa, the active and influential "centre" is relatively tiny and homogenous compared with a "periphery" which is large and particularly passive where external affairs are concerned. Hence, competition and rivalry within the centre tends to be minor, in the sense that it covers only a few issues, but intense in the sense that individuals tend to become split into a few rival groupings instead of being members of many cross-cutting rival groupings, such as occurs within larger and more diverse centres. One likely outcome of this seems to be a parallel extremism in affiliations to external governments as a result of this intense internal rivalry, so that in the contemporary Third World, the domestic rivalry of a Kenyatta and an Odinga is expressed externally in their attitudes towards major participants in the United States/Chinese confrontation. In this fashion, external alignment may become a function of domestic rivalry among elite groups, so that a change of political authorities may lead to a sudden change in external affiliation, as in Ghana following the overthrow of Nkrumah and that ostensibly following the army coup of October 1969 in Somalia.

Even the small amount of work carried out in the area indicates that the number of dimensions along which it is possible to measure national political communities is considerable. Size, rate of increase, level of general education, level of aggregate frustration, proportions engaged in market or subsistence sectors, all these may be used in building up a profile of political community "structure". Confronted with such a range of dimensions it is necessary to be selective, so the aspect I wish to concentrate upon in this paper is the dimension concerned with the level of internal unity within the political community, and the effects of "differences in that level upon foreign policy making. An alternative way of regarding this approach is that it analyses the degree of polarisation of a national political community, and attempts to discern the effects of a highly polarised community on the range of external problems likely to be faced by the political elites of that community which dominates the political authority roles of the system.

The arguments in favour of concentrating on this particular aspect of the structure of the political community appear to be persuasive, in that the number of highly integrated political communities within world society seems to be surprisingly few.

This fact was pointed as long ago as 1963 by Chadwick Alger (9), who emphasized that the conventionally accepted view of the nature of the main actors in the international system was coloured by the fact that those with which Western scholars were most familiar were national political systems whose political communities lacked significant cleavages, and were highly integrated through the existence of cross-cutting group membership and affiliations. Hence there was a tendency to assume that the stable and integrated national actor, was, in some sense, "normal" and to proceed to draw comparisons between"... the most orderly and stable national systems on the one hand, and the most disorderly and unstable international systems on the other..." (10). However, conflict and instability are not a monopoly of international systems and there is a prima facie case for arguing that, in contemporary world society, there are a great number of unstable "national" political systems (perhaps proportionately the greater number) in which the underlying political community is split by fundamental cleavages and lacks the elements of stable interaction, interdependent group membership and criss-crossing affiliations which, in Coser's terms"... serve to sew the social system together by cancelling each other out, thus preventing disintegration along one primary line of cleavage..." (11).

In short, the international system consists of many more Sudans than Swedens, and in this case numbers may be as important as the relative status, wealth, or influence or the units in that system. Even if the dominating units, such as the United States, the Soviet Union or China, remain highly integrated, the fact that they share the system with large numbers of polarised national units will inevitably create problems for their national decision makers, and will necessitate their possessing theories about the probable behaviour of such non-integrated systems. Hence, any analytical concentration upon the actions of integrated systems may be of little help when attempting to theorise about the behaviour of the more numerous polarized systems. Indeed, John Burton has further hypothesized that, with the growth of a new desire to participate more directly in the making of decisions affecting localised community groups, even political systems which are normally classified as being highly integrated, such as the United Kingdom or France, in future may experience newly activated movements for local autonomy, and will find old lines of social cleavage being reopened with the revival of Welsh, Scottish, Basque or Breton nationalism.

B. The Nature of Polarisation

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to introduce some greater precision into the concept of lack of integration or "polarisation". There are a number of ways in which a political community may be divided, and these may be regarded as separate dimensions which indicate degrees of cleavage within that community. There is procedural problem here, in that the degree of internal cleavage within a political community can most clearly be indicated by attitudinal or perceptual factors, so that the self-images held by individuals and groupings within the overall community can best indicate that community's main lines of cleavage and the nature of its basic divisions. In some cases, perceptual lines of demarcation are clearly visible. In the northern areas of Kenya for example, the inhabitants have a self-image of themselves as belonging to a Samburu, a Turkana or a Boran tribal community, and not to any national Kenyan community. In other cases, the lines are not as sharply drawn, the some form of multiple self-image, or self-classification scheme appears to exist. Members of the political community in Belgium may regard themselves as Walloons, and hence as separate and distinct from the Flemings, but they also regard themselves in other circumstances and for other purposes as Belgians.

However, in the absence of comparable attitudinal or perceptual data, any initial exploration of the problem is forced data as an indication of the level of perceptual cleavage within a community. This might not be as misleading as it first appears. A constant theme running through the work of Karl Deutsch is that contact, interaction and exchange bring about, in time, a shared community of interest, common values, attitudes and self-images, and an eventual sense of in-group solidarity. It may, therefore, be argued that an absence of such interaction should indicate with some reliability that such shared attitudes have not had an opportunity to form, so that a sense of separation and distinctiveness accompanies the lack of contact. Polarisation and the existence of fundamental cleavages may therefore be indicated in a number of ways :

(a) Geographical isolation

It seems plausible that if a section of the political community occupies a separate geographical area, then this will tend to encourage a sense of local particularism through a low of interaction with other sections of the community in distant areas. This factor will be particularly powerful where the isolated section occupies an area peripheral to the main territorial centre of the political system.

However, it is important to emphasize that the key factor is low level of interaction brought about by geographical isolation, rather than the geographical isolation itself. It is perfectly possible to have isolation, lack of contact and a low level of interaction in areas which are geographically proximate, and the communities so mixed that no line of physical separation can easily be drawn. Ghettos in urban areas can continue to reflect broader geographical separation in the country at large. Even when the overall political community appears thoroughly mixed, from any macro-geographical standpoint, total lack of interaction may still exist. The two communities in Ulster cannot meaningfully be regarded as occupying widely separate geographical "areas", but the lines of barbed wire down the middle of some streets in Belfast and Londonderry nevertheless indicate where levels of social interaction ceased, and where the symbolic separation existed.

(b) Linguistic division

Lack of contact and a low level of interaction may be a function of physical isolation and distance. Equally, it may depend upon the inability of sectors of the political community to communicate directly with one another. In such bilingual or multi-lingual situations, two or more distinct communications systems may exist, side by side, both at the level of the mass media, and at the face-to-face level of any two-step flow system. The Voice of Kenya, for example, has to broadcast in English, Swahili and Somali, though this practice may change with the declared Kenyan intention of making Swahili the official language by 1974. The problem may be overcome through education and opportunity for contact, but where this is not possible, linguistic cleavages tend to be perpetuated to reinforce ethnic and tribal divisions and to underline the more obvious physical differences between different sectors of the community. The situation is made worse when the information in one of the separate communications networks emanates from a source outside the national political system but one which nonetheless uses the same language as a sector of the community. This can occur when part of a political community relies for its information mainly upon newspapers imported from a neighbouring country or on external radio broadcasts for news, and is particularly dislocating when propaganda broadcasts are directed at one sector of the political community by an outside source, such as the use of Somali language broadcasts by the government of the Somali Republic to encourage separatist tendencies among the Somali-speaking peoples of Ethiopian Ogaden. In both cases, reliance upon a source of information utilizing the same language as a medium of communication will emphasize the cleavage between two linguistic sectors within the one political community.

In different circumstances the language "barrier" may create problems of perceived or actual discrimination in employment, particularly in situations where there is an "official" language, a dependence upon employment in the local or national administration for high rewards and status, and an educated sector of the community speaking a "non-official" language. The violence of the language riots in Ceylon during the late 1950s may be attributable to this very practical factor rather than to any sentimental attachment to their language on the part of the educated Tamils.

(c) Religious division

Banks and Textor in their cross-polity survey estimate that only 57 out of the 106 political systems for which information was available were homogenous in a religious sense, and the importance of lines of social cleavage based upon differences in religion has recently been underlined in both Ulster and Quebec (12). Aside from establishing set in-group / out-group attitudes, the division of a political community into sectors on the basis of distinct religions has the effect of ensuring the rigidity and retention of these divisions. In many cases, inter-marriage is discouraged, social contact is limited (13) and even separate associational groupings are established to perform parallel functions. (14) Most important, religious separation often involves a different pattern of education, so that socialisation of the young is carried out within a separate and distinct set of values, attitudes and self-images, and any attempt by the political authorities to secularize or unify the educational system is regarded as a form of discrimination against that sector supporting educational separation. Thus the religious cleavage perpetuates itself and reinforces other lines of division.

(d) Functional separation

Division of a political community along a functional dimension can have two meanings. In the extreme case, the implication may be that the entire pattern of socio-economic behaviour and the values to which this gives rise may be distinct and perceived as such. One may contrast the differences between the oil workers in Kuwait and the desert tribes in Saudi Arabia as an illustration of such a division, where the entire pattern of behaviour used in acquiring wealth and status is so entirely different as to constitute a major social cleavage in spite of linguistic and religious similarity.

At a different level, functional separation may refer to the occupation of a distinct range of social and economic roles by a sector of the political community which possesses other identifiable attributes setting them off from other sectors. At a simple level the occupancy of jobs in the United Kingdom public transport system by West Indian or Pakistani immigrants, or the Kamba near-monopoly of posts in the pre-independence Kenyan armed forces, serve to illustrate this less fundamental form of functional cleavage. At another extreme, the positions of certain Indian castes, or the Eta minority in Japan, reflect the way in which functional separation can help to isolate (and even eventually to distinguish) a certain sector of the overall community. More familiar examples are the role of the Asian sectors of many African political communities as shopkeepers and small traders, and the range of commercial and industrial functions performed in Nigeria by the Ibos, before the Ibo massacres of September 1966 and the attempted separation of Biafra.

It can be seen even from this brief review that it is possible to speak of a political community "polarised" along a number of dimensions. Furthermore, while the community might be subjected to wide divisions along, for example, a religious dimension, it might, like Ulster, have very little cleavage of an economic-functional nature. However, I would suggest that it is most useful to apply the term in cases where significant cleavages coincide, so that the lines of division along several dimensions involve roughly the same numbers and categories of people, so that one or more category is clearly distinguishable from others in not one but several respects. This implies a lack of cross-cutting interaction and group allegiances stemming from multiple group membership and activities on different issues with different sets of people within the total community (15). Where two sectors of the community live in distinct geographical areas, follow differing patterns of socio-economic behaviour, possess different religious beliefs, and speak a different language, then it is likely also that they will possess an image of themselves as belonging to a distinct and different grouping within the overall political community as a result of the low level of interaction with the remainder of that community. Such a degree of separation exists between the two halves of Pakistan, which are geographically isolated and have different ethnic and linguistic bases, but which possess an underlying religious unity binding together Bengal and the Punjab. Other examples may best be seen in the belt of newly independent political systems stretching across Africa along the line where Islamic and African culture meet.

In countries such as Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Niger, Mauretania and Mali the lines of cleavage are clearly distinguishable, dividing a nomadic-pastoral from a sedentary-cultivating form of economic organisation, as well as separating Muslim from pagan and Christian, Arabic from local African languages, or actual physical locations, often on a simple north v. south basis. The resultant separation of the political community into two or more sectors is often reflected in the internal political conflicts within these countries.**

This suggests that the next step in the analysis is to posit a basic model of a polarised political community split into two sub-categories, with the lines of division clearly marked and coincidental along a number of dimensions. These two communities may be differentiated simply on the basis of relative size into a majority and a minority community. Both of these will naturally possess interests (which may be common or conflicting) and will attempt to further these by formulating demands to be fed into the political system in exchange for support. The model is a slight modification of that originally proposed by Easton and may be represented thus :




Figure 1.

** See table 1 in the appendices.

Using this model, it is helpful to talk of the overall Cypriot political community as being polarised into the Greek community and the Turkish community, or Ulster being divided into the Catholic and Protestant communities, or Belgium being polarised into Flemish and Walloon communities. A community (as opposed to a political community) may thus be defined as : any category of people within any political community bounded from other categories by significant discontinuities of actual (or potential) interaction which lead to shared values and attitudes, and to a shared image of themselves as constituting a separate grouping.

I should emphasize that this definition of polarisation does differ in some respects from other common usages of the term. In the first place, polarisation is regarded as a static attribute rather than as a process which may change fairly rapidly over time, in the sense that one may talk about a political system (or a conflict situation within that system) becoming increasingly or decreasingly polarised. This is partly explained by the fact that I have used only two elements in the definition of the term : lack of interaction and a shared self-image and resultant sense of in-group solidarity. Both of these seem, from empirical observation, to remain at the same level in the short run, though both may change over a long period of time as integration proceeds. The definition does not, however, contain a third element commonly held to be a necessary attribute of polarised situations ; that of a significant level of hostility between the two groups, which can alter in the short run and cause a situation to become rapidly more or less "polarised". I have assumed initially that a high level of hostility is not a necessary attribute of any polarised situation, though inter-community hostility may develop from a number of other conditions which will be mentioned below. However, there are enough historical examples of stable political systems containing two (or more) separate communities to cast some doubt on the simple assumption that low-interacting, self-contained communities within one system always develop a high level of inter-communal hostility. One question is how such a development is avoided and the system remains stable.

C. Processes of "Enemy-searching" and "Ally-seeking"

Given the basic model of a political system split into two communities by significant lines of cleavage as a starting point, what can initially be said about the effects this will have upon the system's external behaviour ?

Most of the work carried out in this area shares two features. The first is that the work begins with the implicit assumption that polarisation necessarily leads to a high level of internal conflict, and the second that it has tended to use aggregate data analysis over short periods of time as a method of analysis. This approach then uses such short term data from a large number of political systems to test out propositions about relationships between internal violence and external conflict, so that it assumes an initial step in the argument, that a low level of unity within the political system is necessarily associated with a high level of discontent, which ultimately leads to internal instability and violence. It is then hypothesized that unstable or disunited political systems will tend to become involved in international war through the operation of two alternative processes.

The first of these involves the political authorities of the unstable system attempting to divert attention from internal frustrations and discontent on to an "outside threat". This strategy is held to have the beneficial effect of creating internal unity at the risk of coming into violent conflict with the chosen "enemy", which may be chosen for a number of historical, geographical or ideological reasons. The rationale behind this strategy is either that the "enemy" provides a convenient scapegoat towards which all frustrations and discontent may be channelled, thus providing a convenient "safety valve" for aggregate national frustration, or that the presence of an external threat brings about a higher level of group cohesion and integration. The latter proposition has been explored at another social level by Lewis Coser, who underlines the often ignored qualification to the proposition, that the increase in group cohesion caused by the existence of the external threat depends both upon the nature of the threat and upon the structure of the threatened group (16). Hence, any indiscriminate transfer of the "increasing group integration" principle to the level of the national political community is potentially misleading, as the recent example of the increasing disunity in the Lebanon in the face of the Israeli threat must remind us.

On a number of grounds, therefore, the argument that political authorities deliberately create or encourage an external threat in order to overcome problems caused through internal disunity needs to be very carefully qualified, even though Coser himself does support the proposition that certain types of group may engage in "enemy searching" behaviour, or at least may tactically exaggerate the danger which an actual or potential enemy represents (17).

However, there are some indications that political authorities confronted with the internal problems posed by a polarised (or even "fractionated") political community do find the presence of a potential external danger of some use, though their reaction is normally confined to displays of independence or opposition and is never permitted to reach the level of open conflict. Robert Good, for example, sees the lack of internal integration as being a dominant determinant in the external policies of many newly independent states, and argues that, in many cases "... foreign policy is domestic policy pursued by other means .. beyond the boundaries of the state..." (18). He further argues that external behaviour is often undertaken primarily for its domestic impact. The aims of the policy makers are either to enhance their own domestic prestige, mainly through a perpetuation of the struggle against colonialism which they themselves initiated in pre-independence days, but especially to underscore the identity and the unity of the new national political system, and to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the political community. For this purpose, "... foreign issues unite a nation and reveal it as a going concern..." (19) without raising too many problems cause internal conflict and instability. In such cases there is a clear connexion between the treatment of foreign issues and the level of polarisation within the political community, in the sense that many more external actions are taken with the main purpose of underlining national integrity than is the case in less polarised political systems.

The second, alternative process by which domestic disunity is said to lead to a country's involvement in external conflict is that of external intervention, whereby a major "power", or alliance leader intervenes militarily into a situation of domestic conflict. The intervention is made either on behalf of the political incumbents or insurgent groups, and often appears to set off a process of counter-intervention by bloc rivals, who adopt the rival party to the domestic conflict as clients in their wider struggle. This possibility is explored by Inis Claude in his work on the concept of "passive provocation" (20), in which he sees weakly integrated, polarised or conflict torn political systems as offering a standing temptation to other states of political authorities to enhance their power and influence by acting as patron to one particular domestic faction, in its internal struggle.

Thus both approaches hypothesize a connexion between a high level of internal instability or actual organised domestic violence and certain types of external problem such as the need (1) to indulge in the process of "enemy-seeking", or (2) to stave off interventionary activity or offers of external assistance, for which some price will inevitably be exacted.

In fact, in the empirical work that has been carried out in investigating this relationship, there seems to be no direct connexion between the two variables. Rummel and Tanter have both used factor analysis to determine whether any obvious relationship exists between internal violence or instability and external conflict for the period from 1955 - 1960 and have come to the conclusion that none exists, even when data are lagged, (the customary way of finding relationship in aggregate data when none becomes immediately visible). Rummel concludes that : "... In spite of the widely held view that nations experiencing domestic instability will have more foreign conflicts than others, the empirical findings imply otherwise. Rather, the situation seems to be that domestic instability has little relation to a nation's foreign conflict behaviour ..." (21). In another study using similar techniques of analysis, though based more upon the thesis that the level of aggregate frustration within a political community (or sectors of it) may be channelled outwards against an external foe, Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend use data taken from the period 1948-62 to produce some ambiguous results with regard to the relationship also investigated by Rummel. In their final analysis, the Feircabends reveal that, according to their data 24 political systems (out of a sample of 77) score low on both a domestic instability and an external conflict dimension, while 25 score high. On the other hand, there are 16 examples of political systems which scored high on domestic instability but low on external conflict, and 14 of which the opposite was true. The information and analysis therefore seem to reveal that no common pattern in that particular relationship, though there does appear to be one between such factors as a high level of economic development, a low rate of change, and both domestic and external conflict (22).

However, even if research carried out to date seems to indicate that there is no direct relationship between the level of domestic discontent or instability within the political community and the level of external conflict behaviour undertaken by the political system, it may still be possible to suggest a process by which polarised political systems (which do experience a high level of internal instability and violence) become involved in international conflicts or alternatively "internationalise" their own domestic conflicts. Both eventualities may occur through a process of ally-seeking (as opposed to national "enemy-searching"), whereby one party to the domestic conflict calls in the aid of an external patron, and the process then widens as further patrons are called in by the opposing faction, so that the domestic conflict becomes affected by wider, international rivalries and confrontations.

However, before discussing such processes it is necessary to consider the relationship between the level of polarisation of a political community, the level of support for the political authorities within the system, and the resultant probability of internal violence or conflict. This will offer some clue as to the connexion between internal instability and the likelihood of domestic conflicts becoming entangled with external actors.

D. Polarisation and the Level of Support for National Political authorities.

My initial assumption here is that there is no necessary connexion between the level of polarisation within a political community, and the degree of discontent felt by one or both of the communities within the system, nor between this and the level of support for the political authorities. Finally, there are a number of intervening variables between this level of discontent and the degree of domestic instability and conflict behaviour within the political system (23). The key element in establishing such relationships appears to be the manner in which the system generates both individual loyalty and community commitment to the system, and to a large degree this is dependent upon the manner in which the rewards available to the overall political community are distributed within that community.

Herbert Kelman has suggested some possible answers to this question of how polarised political systems, containing two or more communities, continue to hold together within that political system. These implications are contained in his investigations into the nature of national loyalty, and the manner in which individual "citizens" become committed to the continuance of their system, their political regime or even a particular set of political incumbents (24). In this work Kelman proposes that there are two ways in which such a sense of commitment may be created, and an individual become affiliated to the national political system. He may become either : (i) sentimentally (or affectively) committed, or (ii) instrumentally committed. In other words, at the level of the individual, a citizen of a national political system has two alternative or complementary sets of reasons for regarding the continuation of the political system or its regime as desirable :

- (a) Because he receives psychological satisfaction from a sense of ethnic/cultural identity, from a commitment to national symbols and from a view of the state as the symbolic representation of the national group. These may be termed affective rewards.

(b) Because he receives a different type of satisfaction from the continuance of the social and political system, through the achievement of his minimum concrete needs and values (such as rewards of security, wealth and status). These may be termed instrumental rewards.

Satisfaction of instrumental needs leads to a commitment to certain social roles and the continuance of the political system in order to preserve a valued pattern of behaviour and interaction. This "Two Path" Model of commitment to the national political system can be represented in the following diagram :




Figure 2.

Instrumental Commitment

At the level of the political system rather than the individual, a combination of both these psychological commitments among social groups and classes leads to the "legitimization" of that system and its continuity and development over time. When both of these mechanisms are working successfully citizens will accept demands made upon them by the political system of the nation state, and will order their behaviour in accordance with such demands when these are made by a recognised source of authority.

However, the absence of a sufficient level of either of these senses of commitment can lead to demands for radical change and reform, or, should the level of aggregate psychological commitment fall extremely low and levels of support for the system go down, separatist or secessionist movements may develop and the political system may break up completely.

Such a situation would conventionally be one to interest the student of revolutionary social situations. One which would more involve the international relations scholar would be a polarised situation in which a single political system contains two communities, one comprised of individuals both instrumentally and affectively committed to the existing political system, and a second whose individual members may be committed instrumentally to the political system within whose jurisdiction they live, but affectively to another, larger group embracing their own community and another community within another separate political system. In systems analytical terms, there would be an "affective system" existing among the members of the second community within State A, and the political community and authorities within State B. The key attributes of such a system would be that its component "units" (the individuals making up the two halves of the community divided between the two political systems) possess a highly potent self-image of belonging to a system which cuts across formal, jurisdictional boundaries, a highly developed sense of group loyalty, and a psychological commitment to the preservation of their community linkages and values which affects their behaviour within their own (national) political system.

This suggestion is merely an adaptation and extension of the Kelman "Two Path" model. It emphasizes that it is possible, given that there are two ways of creating a sense of national loyalty and commitment at the individual level, for any national political system to contain a community or social group whose affective ties, loyalties and sense of group identity lie outside the boundaries of the political system in which they live, even if instrumentally they continue to see benefits of continued integrative action within their own political system. Individual members of such communities may thus experience clashing loyalties :




Figure 3.

This may continue to be a situation of domestic stability as long as the benefits of path A compensate for the affective commitment of path B. In such a situation, a political system containing two (or a number) of distinct communities may survive as a "going concern" for a considerable length of time, and may also avoid a high level of internal conflict between communities. The Jewish, Armenian and Orthodox "millets" (communities) appeared to derive considerable instrumental benefit from membership of the Ottoman Empire in spite of their second class status as non-Moslems, while the instrumental rewards offered to the Kurds in the settlement signed with the Baghdad government in March 1970 may, in time, compensate for their re-incorporation in an Arab political system. However, over time, the non-fulfilment (or even perceived or potential non-fulfilment) of instrumental needs will lead to the salience of path B, and the resultant danger of a break up of the existing political system: (i) in favour of independence and the creation of a separate political system to coincide with the affective system (as in the case of Biafra, the Basques, the Nagas or the Scottish Nationalists), or (ii) in favour of joining with the political system or external community with whom the affective ties exist, and achieving a fresh congruence of instrumental and affective commitments, values and attitudes (as in the case of the Greek Cypriots' demand for Enosis, or the Kenyan Somalis' demand to become part of Greater Somalia").

E. Asymmetric Distribution of Rewards and the Level of Commitment

If we return to our simple illustrative model of a system containing a majority and a minority community \times , and posit a situation where the majority community (a) controls the occupancy of political authority roles (and hence the allocation of rewards), and (b) is affectively committed to the continuance of the national political system through its symbolic representation of their own community, then the retention of a similar level of commitment on the part of the minority community will depend upon the latter's perception of a sufficient level of instrumental rewards accruing to its members through the operations of the political system. On the other hand, empirical observation seems to indicate that a far more likely situation is one in which the minority community will be discriminated against by its controlling majority, either at a popular and unofficial level, through riots, program or minor administrative irritations (such as being confined to a particular urban area by informal pressures) or at a more official level. In this latter case, the stated policies of the political authorities primarily representing the majority communities involve some form of structural discrimination, such as legislation ensuring that social rewards are asymmetrically distributed on a communal basis, $\times\mathbf{x}$ or even of ensuring that key political authority roles are reserved for the members of the majority, as is the case in Malaysia.

It may be hypothesized (solely on the basis of unstructured observation), that the retention of the instrumental commitment of a minority community with no affective commitment to the system is, at best, a delicate matter. $\times\mathbf{x}\mathbf{x}$

- * A minority community may range in size from a very small number to 49.9% of the overall political community; but obviously the majority/minority ratio is important in helping to determine the unity and stability of the system. John Burton has suggested that instability is likely when the minority community numbers between 10% and 40% of the political community, though other variables, such as geographical concentration, obviously have some bearing on levels of conflict. (The respective minority communities in Cyprus, Ceylon, Canada, Belgium and Ulster are (very roughly) : Turks 28%, Tamils 25%, French-Canadians 20%, Walloons 40%, and Catholics 35%.
- $\times\mathbf{x}$ For example, the bias in favour of providing new housing, relief or employment for the Protestant community in Ulster, or of retaining official administrative posts for one particular community by insisting upon a single official language and demanding competence in this.
- $\times\mathbf{x}\mathbf{x}$ The exodus of British settlers in Kenya once the colony had become independent and no longer represented the white settler community in any affective sense illustrates the comparative weakness of a set of (possibly uncertain) instrumental rewards in retaining affiliation to any political system.

In conditions of formal discrimination, or informal but undeterred scapegoating, it seems likely that the instrumental commitment of a minority community to both a political regime and eventually to the political system itself will be rapidly destroyed, even if any existed in the first place. ~~****~~

A circular process of discrimination against a minority community, a diminishing level of support for the political system within that community, and the creation of a situation of domestic instability and ultimate violence may be set in motion by the actions of the incumbent political authorities, even when the minority community is small and initially reasonably content with the level of instrumental rewards it receives from the operations of the national system. The reason for this lies in the fact that, even with the political elite of the majority community firmly in control of the political system and of the allocation and distribution of social rewards, and with that majority community affectively committed to the maintenance of regime and system, there will inevitably be an imbalance in the way in which instrumental rewards are distributed within that majority community itself.

The introduction of the concept of uneven distribution of rewards within a community introduces an element of social and economic "class" into the analysis, for while some elements of the majority community obviously receive a high level of both affective and instrumental rewards from their affiliation to their political system, it is obvious that, save in unusually egalitarian systems, some elements will be low in the level of instrumental rewards they receive. This raises, then, the question of what the political elites within a majority community exchange with their supporters in that community in return for support to maintain themselves in power and the system in being.

~~****~~ One short term method of "buying" support from a disaffected minority community is for the political authorities to attempt to increase the level of instrumental rewards to the minority (for example, the Kenya Government's promises of increased and rapid development of the Somali-inhabited north east), though the increase cannot be too large or too public without the majority community beginning to feel frustrated and threatening to withdraw its support. The alternative is to emphasize affective rewards (Kenyan emphasis on new Kenyan nationalism and independence) while continuing to ensure that the bulk of instrumental rewards go to their majority supporters. This last policy seems unlikely to work for any great length of time before the minority becomes highly dissatisfied.

Logically, one answer to this would be that in polarised political systems, it is particularly easy to compensate for lack of instrumental rewards by engendering an increased level of affective rewards as compensation. Thus, domestic politics in polarised systems may be characterised by an emphasis on communal solidarity, and the affective benefits of belonging to the dominant community. The actual political system is used as a symbol of that solidarity, and continual emphasis is placed

in the uniqueness of its institutions, on the exclusive manner in which it symbolises communal values, and on the way in which its survival represents the survival of the community itself. In Ulster, for example, the system is characterised by expressive expressions of loyalty to the Queen and the "British connexion", and the constant implicit and explicit contrast of the "loyalist" Protestants and the subversive Catholics, who would "sell out to a foreign power" if they only dared. (In reaction, the Catholic minority have retaliated with unprintable suggestions about the activities of the British Royal Family, the domestic display of pictures of the Pope, and the covert use of the Republican tricolour in opposition to the Union Jack). These symbolic patterns of behaviour and attitudes are reinforced by structural factors such as the country-wide system of powerful Protestant "Orange Lodges" throughout Ulster, and the constant parades in celebration of historical or mythical occasions when the Protestant community proved either its loyalty to the British Crown, or its superiority over the Catholics.

The use of such processes often avoids the necessity of winning political support by an increase or an equalisation of economic rewards to the worse-off economic groups within the majority community. Instead, rewards of status (i.e. a heightened sense of belonging to a privileged national "in-group") and identity with the more rewarded "top-dogs" and privileged political elites are substituted. The result is that the operations of a political system containing a polarised political community will tend to be based upon ethnic, linguistic or religious divisions rather than upon economic, or class divisions * :

* Several observers of the Ulster scene, who possess Marxist inclinations, have remarked to the author that once Ulster rids itself of the medieval pre-occupation with religious bickering it may be able to get down to some "real" politics - a remark which might have been received with some surprise behind the barricades in Belfast or Derry.




Figure 4

This may be contrasted with the situation in a system containing a thoroughly integrated political community, where the affective rewards of system membership are shared by all, and are taken for granted by all, so that political conflict is over the distribution of economic rewards, upon which status and security are usually based, and where everyone identifies with and is committed to the continuance of the national political system :




Figure 5.

This use of affective rewards and emphasis upon community solidarity and superiority within polarised systems, can have side effects, in that the process often involves an equal emphasis on (i) the minority community as a separate (and often inferior and untrustworthy) part of the community, which does not share the value consensus of the majority, and (ii) as a continuing potential danger to the continuance of the system as symbol of the values of the majority. This second factor often leads to tacit and often open encouragement of discriminatory practices and both official and unofficial levels, which increases the cleavage between the two communities and, by lowering still further the minority's commitment to the continuance of the national system, may bring about the major "disloyalties" that have been feared by the majority. The situation is made worse if the minority community is part of a transnational affective system and possesses a readily visible external patron as a potential ally. One other result of the use of affective rewards to engender support in the majority community may be a maintenance of that external patron as a potential threat long after the patron has ceased to have any real interest in (or intention of) becoming involved on behalf of its erstwhile clients.

However, it is again necessary to distinguish two classes of situation in which a minority community feels that it receives too few (or no) instrumental rewards to compensate for the lack of affective rewards from membership of an "alien" political system. One case is where the minority community feels discriminated against but is "isolated", in the sense of not forming part of any transnational affective system. When a community, such as the Nagas in India or the Ibo in Nigeria, possesses no external affective linkage to another political community or set of national political authorities, its likely reaction will be to try to work for a separate and independent political system of its own, where instrumental and affective commitments will eventually coincide.

* This is another important distinction. A discontented minority community may merely have external linkages to yet another minority, as in the case of the Iraqi Kurds¹ links with their fellow Kurds in Iran or Syria. However, the situation is quite different if the linkages are to another political community and its political authorities, as in the case of the Ewe minority in Ghana, which has connexions with both people and government of Togo.

In contrast is the situation where the minority community is part of transnational affective system and already possesses strong affective links to an external community or government. In this latter case, there is likely to be a movement to leave the present unsatisfactory political system and become part of the one to which the community is affectively linked, on the grounds that, while the instrumental rewards of membership of the new system may be at the same low level, at least the affective rewards will be higher. A whole range of possible situations involving polarised political communities with the majority in control may be summarised as follows :

Case	Instrumental Commitment	Affective Commitment	Illustration
1. Integrated Community A	Political System A	Political System A	Any non-polarised political community such as Denmark or Portugal
2. Majority Community B ₁ Minority Community B ₂	Political System B Political System B	Political System B Own Community	Ceylon (Tamil minority) or Canada (French Canadian minority)
3. Majority Community C ₁ Minority Community C ₂	Political System C None (rejection of own system)	Political System C	Naga community in India, Biafrans in Nigeria, or South Sudanese in Sudan
4. Majority Community D ₁ Minority Community D ₂	Political System D None (rejection of own system)	Political System D Political System X	Somalis in Kenya, Turkish community in Cyprus

Table 1.

In the latter two examples (Systems C and D)** the political community consists of two communities, one of which is committed affectively elsewhere (either to itself, or to an external group or political system). In both examples, the national political system no longer satisfies the instrumental needs of the minority community, so that the second set of values and commitments become salient. The behavioural reaction may either be : (i) separation : an independence movement to create a new political system, in the case of community C₂, or, alternatively : (ii) secession : a movement to break out of the existing political system and to join another. In the latter case the new political system might be no better (or even worse) at fulfilling instrumental needs, but at least it gives the psychological satisfactions of group identity and personal integration into a larger collectivity which were lacking in the previous situation. However, both cases pose problems of external policy for the units in the international system, the former because of the implications of the violent separatist struggle being waged internally, and the necessity for external parties to react to this conflict, and the latter primarily because of the effects of the existing affective linkages to external parties. These effects will be dealt with in a final section.

This balancing of relative efficiency in fulfilling needs does introduce a further complicating factor into the model. For one thing, there is no a priori reason for assuming that all the members of the minority community will simultaneously agree that the "alien" political system no longer fulfils their minimal instrumental needs, so that the extent to which different social and economic groupings within the minority community will reject the political regime or system will vary (and will alter over time). Some groupings (possibly in categories with higher incomes) will continue to receive a sufficient level of instrumental rewards from the system to retain their commitment long after other groups have decided to cut their losses and emigrate, agitate or separate. (The rich should always be able to find sufficient compensation for discrimination, or even avoid it altogether'). This will lead to opposed views as to necessary and feasible action within the minority community should there be considerable asymmetry in reward distribution within the community, and possibly to fundamental splits, which may be exploited by the majority.

Secondly, the minority community's perceptions of the relative efficiency of the potential patron and the "alien" political system in fulfilling instrumental needs may be decided in favour of the majority controlled "alien" system, especially if the potential patron to whom the minority might defect is economically at a lower level of development.

** Note the similarity in these cases with Rosenau and Scott's conception of a "penetrated" political system.

In this situation, there will be a clash of affective and instrumental commitment (probably exacerbated by differential distribution of instrumental rewards within the minority community), and the outcome will again be uncertain. For example, though the Catholic community in Ulster is affectively highly committed to Eire, and ostensibly wishes to become part of the Irish political system, the instrumental sacrifices in terms of higher prices, fewer employment opportunities and lower social security benefits are considerable. A similar situation faces the Somalis in Kenya who are agitating for union with the Somali Republic, for to do so would involve them in becoming part of one of the poorest countries in Africa, so that there is no chance of receiving a marked increase over even the low level of instrumental rewards available from Kenya. However, many such situations are resolved so as to indicate that, where a clash of instrumental and affective commitments occurs, the attraction of affective rewards is the more powerful. A summary table is included in the appendices to show possible situations.

F. Internal Conflict and the Involvement of External Parties

The case in which the minority community is linked in a transnational system is, of course, the one which poses the greatest number of external problems, both for the political authorities of the system containing that minority community, and for the political authorities of the system linked to the discontented community. The situation must inevitably have its effects upon relations between the two governments involved. Faced with the problem of having to control a community with strong and salient links to a potential external "patron", both the majority community and their representative political authorities are likely to perceive themselves as being under an external threat, even though the behaviour of the government of the patron may be circumspect in the extreme. A major factor in the Ulster situation is a strong Protestant fear that the government of Eire is merely waiting for a sufficiently strong appeal from the Ulster Catholic minority to "march" north and incorporate Ulster as part of the Irish Republic - in which case the Protestants see their role of a dominant and discriminating majority being inverted when they in turn become a Protestant minority in a united Ireland. This self-image of the Protestants as a threatened potential minority group is a curious reflexion of the actual situation of the Ulster Catholics.

Paradoxically, this type of fear brought about by the perception of a threat from an external patron may have the effects of increasing the informal discrimination of the majority against the minority, who will be perceived as a potential "fifth column" within the polarised system, and even of increasing the official discrimination by the political authorities. This process may, in turn, increase the minority's dissatisfaction with the performance of its political system, lower the level of community support, and lead eventually to an escalating process of violence, "lawlessness", counter-violence and eventual full-scale civil strife. In such circumstances, the minority community is more likely to seek for allies and an appeal for direct aid from that community to any potential "patron" becomes highly probable. Through this ally-seeking process, the type of dilemma which faced the Eire government in the summer of 1969 (with the associated problem of increasing pressure from groups within the Republic for government action to aid the Ulster Catholics), may well be one which is a typical by-product of such transnational linkages. In other cases, moreover, such reactions as the Irish governments response of moving medical units to the Ulster/Eire border as a token gesture, and of appealing in the Security Council for a UN force may be deemed inadequate, and further external action forced upon unwilling political authorities by domestic pressure.

Another likely effect of this type of situation, involving strong transnational ties, is that the political authorities representing the majority community may take out some form of "insurance" against internal violence or external pressure by seeking its own patron to provide external support and guarantees. (In many cases, this will involve the polarised system in an existing international confrontation, for the choice of a majority community patron will be limited by the fact that the minority community's own external patron may already be a member of some international alignment system). Even in a situation where the internal minority does not possess an easily identifiable external patron (or even when the patron is most unwilling to assume this role), ally-seeking action on the part of the political authorities of the polarised system may involve further external partners. These will not initially be linked as direct patrons of the minority community, but merely as enemies of the government chosen as "insurance" by the political authorities of the polarised system. Peter Lyon has argued that the involvement of the United States in Thailand as patrons of the Thai regime against internal discontent and instability has, in fact, brought about an increased Chinese involvement in Thailand, not because the political authorities in the CPR see themselves as patrons of the Chinese minority in Thailand, but because they wish to demonstrate that United States's protection leads to instability and unrest.

This type of situation, therefore, contains a large element of self-fulfilling prophecy, with political authorities taking out strategic insurance against internal unrest and external involvement, only to bring about the very situation they sought to avoid through their selection of a particular patron to provide that insurance. For both types of patron, the existence of linked polarised systems poses a serious problem for foreign policy making. Lyon concludes that the existence of overseas Chinese minorities, such as those in Thailand, can "... be regarded as having constituted a problem rather than an asset for Chinese foreign policy, exacerbating among its neighbours.. the fears and resentments which make a good many of them look for the reassurance of a Western countervailing presence..." (25).

The overall result of antagonistic processes of ally-seeking by both minority community and majority political authorities may be the establishment of a pattern of informal interlocking alignments which involve not merely governments but communities within political systems, and which cut across state boundaries to such a degree that they tend to become meaningless. Informal alliances may be established between communities in one political system and authorities representing communities in another. These may be off-set by still further alignments involving other communities and other authorities. For example, the Syrian government at present supports the Muslim dominated Eritrean Liberation Front in north-eastern Ethiopia, and has very poor diplomatic relations with the latter government as a result. Relations between Ethiopia and the new Libyan regime have recently become hostile, as a result of the latter's public fund-raising campaign for the ELF and its more private agreement to supply the Front with £3 million a year for its activities. Sentiments of Islamic or Arab solidarity have always coloured the Sudanese Government's actions with regard to the ELF campaign, and in turn, the Ethiopian Government has tended to remain tolerant of the activities of the southern African separatist movements, such as the Anya Nya, the NPG and the Azania Liberation Front which are fighting to the south of the Sudan against the Muslim dominated regime in Khartoum. *

* Recently, the Khartoum government of General Numeiry has become convinced that the southern rebels have successfully sought a new ally, and that Israeli instructors are working alongside Catholic clergy to bring about the defeat of their forces in the south. In April of this year the Sudanese foreign minister, Mr. Awadallah, referred to "an imperialist Zionist plot to strengthen the rebels in the south.." In response, a spokesman of the NPG has charged that Egyptian planes and pilots are taking part in air raids against targets in southern Sudan and has expressed "grave concern" at the direct involvement of other Arab countries.

In a similar fashion, Sudanese Governments have offered tacit approval to the Muslim rebels in Chad, both FROLINAT and those in the extreme north-west, who are fighting against the African dominated regime in Fort Lamy (with whom Sudan has a long-standing boundary dispute). The Government of Chad, led by President Tombalbaye, has recently been forced to call in the French troops to help it control the activities of FROLINAT, thus activating an agreement for military assistance which had provided strategic insurance for the regime since independence (27). In this manner the interaction of a number of contiguous polarised political systems has involved, through their lack of integration, a Middle Eastern and a European government, and created a number of acute foreign policy problems for both.

In summary, then, it appears that a discontented and disaffiliated minority community within a polarised political system is likely to create problems in the external relations of three classes of national political community :

(1) Those of the political system containing the two separate communities, who will possess two problems : firstly, of raising the level of support and commitment to the system among the minority community (possibly by raising the level of the instrumental rewards its members receive, which may bring about an adverse reaction from the authorities' own supporters within the majority community) ; and, secondly, of dealing with any internal interference or external pressure brought by the "patron" of the minority community, which has become involved through the latter's appeal for protection or direct assistance.

The second problem becomes especially acute when the minority community and its national political authorities are indirect, violent conflict, involving a range of behaviour from isolated terrorist attacks to a sustained campaign against the national security forces. In such cases the likelihood of external involvement becomes intense as does the authorities' problem of preventing this, or allowing for its effects.

One practical problem is that of the availability of a "sanctuary" for leaders or guerrillas of the minority community, and this is an acute problem when the minority community occupy an area contiguous to an international boundary, and spill over that boundary into the territory of a neighbouring political system. (For example, the Ewe in Ghana and Togo, the Nagas in India and Burma, and the Somalis in Kenya and Somalia). The use of such an external sanctuary or base area by minority community guerrillas may lead to strained relations between the two sets of political authorities concerned.

(In 1964 there were actual skirmishes between Sudanese and Congolese troops after the Congolese Government had been accused of sheltering "black southern Sudanese rebels" who had been using Congolese territory to launch raids into the Sudan). Border incidents may occur with increasing frequency, between guerillas and security forces from both governments, while the temptation to extend "search and destroy" type operations into neighbouring territory will constantly afflict those security forces trying to cope with the guerrillas. (These problems will arise whether the neighbouring political authorities are actively sympathetic to the minority, or attempting to maintain a difficult neutrality. Recently the Ugandan Government has complained bitterly about the habits of territorial infringement developed by Sudanese troops in pursuit of Anya Nya guerrillas). The situation will be made worse if the boundary in question is in dispute, or has yet to be demarcated. One constant cause of tension between the Sudanese and Ethiopian governments has been the whereabouts of their common boundary and, both sides' use of this lack of delineation to pursue and destroy their respective rebels, the DLF and Anya Nya.

(2) Those of the minority community's potential "patron", who must decide what action to take in protection of its client community, and which may find itself with its own internal support diminishing if its actions are deemed insufficient or unsatisfactory by its political community.

In many cases, the political authorities of the patron must balance benefits and losses very carefully before deciding the extent to which they will support their client minority, and what degree of direct aid, as opposed to more encouragement, they can afford. The Ankara government's calculations about assistance to the Turkish minority on Cyprus must have involved variables such as Turkish public opinion and the effects of Turkey's actions on the NATO alliance. On occasions, the role of patron, once entered into, can become very costly and, moreover, it appears to be one which is difficult to abandon; President Nasser's espousal of the Palestinian community has not been without cost to the UAR but he can hardly opt out of his role.

Again, one practical problem for the political authorities of the patron is that of the minority community's exiles. The initial problem is whether they should be given asylum, and, if this is decided favourably, what degree of freedom they should be allowed in pursuing their political aims from the safety of the patron's capital.

Too much latitude can lead to deteriorating relations between the government of the host" country and that of the exiled political activists. These may result in general accusations of interference in the internal affairs of another state and to more direct charges of harbouring an actual government in exile such as the government of Chad levelled at the Sudanese in July 1965. One solution is to ban all political exiles from engaging in activities directed against political authorities in other states (the Sudanese government publicly adopted this principle for fellow members of the OAU in 1969) but this may prove unpopular or impossible if there are strong affective links between the minority community and the political community of the "patron", it would be most difficult for a Greek government, for example, to try to stop completely the activities of those who continue to work towards Enosis for Cyprus, no matter how internationally embarrassing these efforts might become. *

(3) Those of the international rivals of the minority community's "patron", who may, for strategic or ideological reasons, find it advantageous to support either the political authorities of the polarised system, or the minority community, (depending upon whom their own international rivals are supporting).

This is the final stage in the process by which a domestic conflict becomes fully "internationalised", and bloc rivals become involved in patterns of conflicting "client-patron" relationships on the basis of that international rivalry. The example of China and the United States in South East Asia has already been mentioned, but there are many other examples of this "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" principle in operation.

* The "exile" problem becomes particularly acute when geographical contiguity allows large numbers of the minority community to cross the border as refugees. Apart from the political implications of this movement, there is the sheer problem of housing and feeding larger numbers of exiles, and the often very tricky problem of arranging for repatriation - if this ever becomes possible or desired by any large number of exiles. Relations between Uganda and the Sudan have been be-devilled by the fact that there are some 45,000 south Sudanese living in northern Uganda.

A slightly different relationship between internal conflict and external patterns of alignment may be mentioned under this heading. This is the process of informal alignment brought about by two sets of political authorities facing analogous problems. For example, internal conditions of polarisation or acute instability tend to condition national foreign policy reactions, so that predetermined stances to certain types of analogous issues exist and are adopted whenever these issues become prominent. Political authorities with their own internal problems of disaffiliated minority communities will tend to adopt similar attitudes and make similar reactions to cases of secessionist attempts by minorities. The attitudes of most OAU members to the question of Biafran separatism and the revision of certain African boundaries to incorporate minority communities are cases in point. No set of African political authorities facing its own potential Ibo separatist movement could do anything but align itself against Biafra, while only Morocco and Somalia could set their faces against the OAU principle of no redrawing of African boundaries. Other, less obvious examples of such informal alignments exist. Public Ethiopian agreement with India on the inappropriateness of a plebiscite for Kashmir may be seen to stem directly from the Ethiopian view of a similar inappropriateness in the case of her own dissident Somali community in southern Ethiopia, or of the Eritrean separatist movement in the north-east. (28)

G. Summary and Conclusion

In the foregoing sections I have examined some implications of a simple model of a polarised political system containing a minority and a majority community, and the effects that such a structure may have upon the type of external problem faced by the political authorities of that system. I have argued that the fact of polarisation does not necessarily imply internal instability or violent domestic conflict, though certain factors may lead to the disaffiliation of the minority community and to conditions in which conflict becomes likely. I have then proposed that the process by which external parties become involved in such internal conflict is one in which both minority community and the national political authorities attempt to find external allies or patrons, a process which is simplified when a transnational affective system already exists to provide linkages to another government or to a political community and to make it probable that any internal conflict within the polarised system will involve them as patrons.

I have concluded by arguing that this process of "ally-seeking" will therefore involve three classes of national political authority in certain types of foreign policy problem; and sketched in some of the types of problem which arise through the existence of conflict within polarised systems and of related informal, transnational alignments.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the model can be modified in a number of ways to offer insights into other types of situation. For example, it may be changed to include situations in which a political system contains a number of separate and self-conscious communal groups (some with potential external patrons), where problems of satisfying multiple demands for both instrumental and affective rewards confront the national political authorities. Such systems may be termed "fractionated" systems to distinguish them from the two community model of a "polarised" system presented in this paper. * Alternatively, the assumption that the majority community will control the political authority roles within the system may be inverted, and a dominant minority community assumed. Examples of minority governments from Rhodesia to Zanzibar emphasize that numbers do not necessarily ensure dominance of the system, and it may be that the process of ally-seeking is even more relevant to such situations of a precarious minority domination. However, this paper is already far too long, so that the implications of such alterations in the model will have to be left aside for the time being.

* It will not have escaped the notice of the reader that many illustrative examples used so far have been drawn from fractionated rather than from genuinely polarised systems, (i.e. two communities only).

Table 1.

Political System	Political Community (millions)	Main Ethnic Divisions	Proportion of Political Community	Language	Religion	Geographic Location	socio-economic Organization
SUDAN	13.0	Arabic/Hamitic	73%	Arabic	Islam	N and C	Diverse
		African	27%	Diverse (Arabic as lingua franca)	Animistic Christian	S	m S.C.
CHAD	3.5	Arabic/Hamitic	-	Arabic Tebu	Islam	N.C. and E.C.	m N.P.
		African		Fusfulde Sava	Animistic	S.SW and W.C.	m S.C.
NIGER	3.25	Arabic/Hamitic	33%	Arabic-Berber	Islam	N.C. and S.C.	m N.P. (some S.C.)
		African Djerma-Songhai 23 Hausa ...40	77%	Songhai Hausa	Animistic Islam	S.W. and C S and S.E.	
MALI	4.5	Arabic/Hamitic	25%	Arabic-Berber	Islam	N.NC.E and C	m N.P. (some S.C.)
		African ...32 Bambara ...32 others ...43	75%	Mande dialects	Animistic	W.S and S.W.	m S.C. (some H.F.)
MAURITANIA	1.05	Arabic/Hamitic	86%	Arabic Fusfulde	Animistic Islam	N.WC and S.E.	m N.P.
		African	14%	Mande dialects	Animistic Islam	S and S.W.	m S.C. (some H.F.)

All figures are very rough "guess-timates". Data for this whole area is either highly unreliable or non-existent. It has also been necessary to over-simplify a complex and tangled ethno-linguistic "mix".

m N.P. = Mainly nomadic pastoralists
m S.C. = Mainly sedentary cultivators
m H.F. = "huntsmen or fishermen.

MINORITY COMMUNITY

Domination of Political System by :	Level of affective rewards from identification with own political system compared with those available in patron	Level of instrumental rewards compared with those perceived as available from patron	Ultimate commitment	Illustration
OTHER	HIGH	HIGH	Own system	No obvious examples
		LOW	Uncertain	No obvious examples
COMMUNITY	LOW	HIGH	Uncertain	Ulster Catholics ; Turkish Cypriots (pre 1963)
		LOW	Patron	Hausa community in Niger
OWN	HIGH	HIGH	Own system	White Rhodesians
		LOW	(probably) Own system	Nearest situation could be Algeria rejecting links with France
COMMUNITY	LOW	HIGH	Uncertain	Greek Cypriots supporting Enosis
		LOW	Patron	No obvious examples

Table 2.

FOOTNOTES

- (1) See Richard Snyder et al. Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York : Free Press 1962) : James N. Rosenau, "Moral Fervour, Systematic Analysis and Scientific Consciousness in Foreign Policy Research", Chapter 9 in Austin Ranney (ed) Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago : Markham, 1968) : and Joseph Frankel, "Towards a Decision-making Model in Foreign Policy", Political Studies VII (1) February 1959.
- (2) James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue-area", Chapter 2 in J.N. Rosenau (ed), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York : Free Press, 1967).
- (3) James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in B. Barry Farrell (ed), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1966)
- (4) It will be apparent that the term "political community" has been pirated from Eastonian analysis, which is based upon the concept of each separate society possessing its own political system, by which is meant the set of processes by which envailed objects and roles of that society are authoritatively allocated among the society's members. The political community may be taken to be all those groups and individuals within the political system's jurisdictional space who are concerned with or affected by the process of taking decisions about the allocation of valued resources and roles for that society. (In non-behavioural terminology, it might be called the "national group" or even "the people"). This concept must be contrasted with the political regime, which refers to the structure of national authority roles, plus the accepted formal and informal rules for filling these roles ; and the political authorities, which refers to the current incumbents of these authority roles.
- (5) Kingsley Davis, "Social Changes Affecting International Relations", Chapter 14 in James N. Rosenau (ed), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York : Free Press, 1961).
- (6) Fred A. Sondermann, "Political Implications of Population Growth in Underdeveloped Counties" in William C. Olsen and Fred A. Sondermann (eds), The Theory and Practice of International Relations (2nd edn) Englewood Cliffs : Prentice Hall, 1966).
- (7) John W. Burton, Peace Theory : Preconditions of Disarmament (New York : Knopf, 1962).

- (8) See particularly, Johan Galtung, "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position" Journal of Peace Research 1964 and Nils H. Halle, "Social Position and Foreign Policy Attitudes" Journal of Peace Research, 1966 (1)
- (9) See his article "A Comparison of Intra-national and International Politics" American Political Science Review LVII (2) June 1963
- (10) Alger, op. cit. p. 408.
- (11) Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), p; 80.
- (12) Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross-polity Survey (Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1963).
- (13) The separate Greek and Turkish cafes in the Cypriot villages are mirrored in the separate Catholic and Protestant pubs in Ulster.
- (14) For example, the establishment of separate Catholic trade unions.
- (15) I.M. Lewis has argued convincingly that, in spite of the high level of inter-group conflict and dan rivalry over very scarce rewards in the Somali Republic, the important factors of overlapping group membership, regional loyalties and clan-family allegiances have enabled the two formerly separate halves of the country to remain united and even to become more closely integrated. In this example of an integrated political community, Lewis argues that there are a number of bases of alignment which tend "... less to split the Republic into rigid divisions than to provide a set of overlapping ties which, if they tend to exert a paralysing influence on bureaucracy, also seem to contribute towards overall stability..." I.M. Lewis, "Nationalism and Particularism in Somalia", p. 193.
- (16) Coser notes that : "The degree of group consensus prior to the outbreak of the conflict seems to be the most important factors affecting cohesion. If a group is lacking in basic consensus, outside threat leads not to increased cohesion, but to general apathy, and the group is consequently threatened with disintegration..." He later qualifies this argument by stating that : "... The relation between outer conflict and inner cohesion does not hold true where internal cohesion before the outbreak of the conflict is so low that the group members have ceased to regard preservation of the group as worth-while, or actually see the outside threat to concern "them" rather than "us".

In such cases, disintegration of the group, rather than increase in cohesion, will be the result of outside conflict...." Coser : op. cit. 92-93.

Coser also quotes Robin Williams' distinction on this subject : "Given a social group which is a 'going concern', a sensed outside threat to the group as a whole will result in heightened internal cohesion... However, (this general principle) holds true only under very specific conditions : (a) a group must be a 'going concern', i.e. there must be a minimal consensus among the constituent individuals that the aggregate is a group, and that its preservation as an entity is worthwhile ; (b) there must be recognition of an outside threat which is thought to menace the group as a whole, and not just some part of it..." Robin M. Williams Jr., The Reduction of Inter-group Tensions SSRC Bulletin No. 57 New York, 1947. p. 58.

The point about polarised political communities is that there is a high probability that one section of the "group" at least will not regard the preservation of the system as desirable, and will also see any external threat as being aimed at the other community and its leaders.

At the national level, two colleagues have suggested examples of situations where the existence of an external threat has helped to preserve and intensify the integration of the political community. Frank Edmeand has noted the advantage to the Israeli Political system of possessing an external threat which helps to postpone conflict over domestic Israeli issues, and he also emphasizes the effects of the Indo-Pakistani confrontation in helping to define a Pakistani national 'group' (especially in the early years following partition, when there was widespread uncertainty about who was an Indian or a Pakistani, and what the labels implied). The conflict has, in Coser's terms, helped to maintain the boundaries of the national group against the surrounding environment.

Analysing the same situation, Kalim Siddiqui has proposed that the existence of the Indian "threat" may have assisted the elite groups in Pakistan to justify and even popularise the concentration of limited resources in certain sectors and on certain groups, and the resultant deprivation of other sectors of the Pakistani political community. Indeed, Siddiqui argues that, by making the Indian threat a very real one, in the sense that it is perceived as threatening highly salient values for all Pakistanis (religious and cultural values), this concentration of resources in defence sectors and in groups connected with the military elites, is actually highly popular and has resulted in an increase of legitimacy for the Pakistani political authorities.

The whole problem seems to hinge on whether, in fact, these policies are ever used consciously or deliberately by political elites with the goal of overcoming fundamental domestic cleavages. If so, this would be a wholly different phenomenon from an unintended process of enemy creation which has the function of creating internal unity, or, in other words, the ultimate effect of so doing.

- (17) Coser, op. cit. p. 104-8.
- (18) Robert C. Good, "State-building as a determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States", Chapter 1 in Laurence W. Martin (ed.), Neutrality and Non-alignment. (New York : Praeger, 1962), p. 12.
- (19) Good, op. cit. p. 8.
- (20) See Inis L. Claude Jr. "Economic Development Aid and International Political Stability", paper presented to the 7th IPSA World Congress, Brussels, September 1967.
- (21) Rudolph J. Rummel, "The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behaviour". Chapter 6 in J. David Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics. (New York : Free Press, 1968), p. 208. See also, Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour within and between nations 1958-60", Journal of Conflict Resolution, X (1).
- (22) Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend and Darlene L. Boraviak, "Empirical Typologies of Political Systems : Aggressive Prototypes" Paper presented to the 7th PSA Conference Brussels, September 1967. See also, Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviours within Politics, 1948-62, : A Cross-national Study", Journal of Conflict Resolution, X (3) p. 249.
- (23) In this connexion, see the model used by Ted Gurr in his investigation of the phenomenon of "civil strife".
- (24) H.C. Kelman, "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System", Chapter 26 in J.N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy. (2nd edn.) (New York : Free Press, 1969). Much of what follows is also based upon ideas contained in David Easton's work on the concept of the level of support.

- (25) Peter Lyon, "The Foreign Policy of China", Chapter 4 in F.S. Northedge (ed.), The Foreign Policies of the Powers (London : Faber and Faber, 1968), pp. 133-34.
- (26) One feature of the colonial withdrawal has been the frequent conclusion of residual military agreements whereby the former metropole promises future aid in the event of an external attack or serious internal unrest. This type of agreement was activated in 1964 when UK troops were called in by the governments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to deal with a wave of mutinies in the three African armies. In such cases, the external patrons for the political authorities are pre-selected.
- (27) The rather curious agreement between Somali and West Germany on the question of self-determination can also be seen as a common response to a form of partition and a common desire for unification.

B.-VIII - The theory of international relations

- La théorie des relations internationales

FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS AND POLARISED POLITICAL
COMMUNITIES

C.R. MITCHELL

B.-VIII/8.

Summary

This paper explores some possible relationships between the level of unity within a national political community and the type of foreign policy problem likely to be faced by national political authorities. It begins with a simple, two community model of a "polarised" political system and attempts to outline the major factors leading to internal instability and violent inter-communal conflict within that system. It proposes that a key factor making for such instability is the asymmetric distribution of rewards as between the two communities, and adopts Kelman's concepts of instrumental and sentimental (affective) rewards to explore ways in which the national political authorities may develop and retain communal loyalty to the national system, and thus avoid high levels of domestic conflict.

Assuming that the national political authorities fail to maintain a high level of loyalty and affiliation in the minority community, a number of possible responses for that minority community are outlined. One response, which leads to the involvement of external governments or communities, is that of seeking allies to assist in the prosecution of any domestic conflict. This "ally-seeking" process creates a number of transnational linkages which, in turn, may raise a variety of complex foreign policy problems for the national political authorities involved. It is emphasised that in many cases, the minority community is already linked to external groups or governments, and that the involvement of an external party as "patron" is more probable when these linkages exist to form an "affective" transnational system, as in the case of the Turkish Cypriots and the political authorities and community in Turkey.

As a result of the two processes of growing internal instability and the involvement of external "patrons" through the ally-seeking behaviour of both minority community and national political authorities, a complex pattern of informal alignments, cutting across formal, national boundaries may be developed. It is argued that this phenomenon may only be satisfactorily studied within a framework that does not rigidly divide political behaviour into that which occurs within national systems and that which occurs between them.

B-VIII/ - The Theory of International
Relations

- La Théorie des Relations
internationales

B-VIII/8 FOREIGN POLICY AND POLARISED POLITICAL COMMUNITIES

C. R. MITCHELL

R E S U M E

L'étude explore quelques unes des relations possibles entre le niveau d'unité au sein d'une communauté politique nationale et le type de politique étrangère qui doit être menée par les autorités politiques nationales. Elle commence par un modèle simple, à deux communautés, de système politique "polarisé" et tente de dégager les principaux facteurs qui conduisent à l'instabilité intérieure et aux conflits inter-communautaires violents au sein du système. Elle suggère qu'un des principaux facteurs de pareille instabilité réside dans la distribution asymétrique de la considération entre les deux communautés, et adopte les concepts de Kelman de considération instrumentale et affective pour analyser les moyens que les autorités politiques nationales peuvent utiliser pour développer et resserrer les fidélités communautaires envers le système national et éviter ainsi des conflits intérieurs violents.

Dans l'hypothèse où les autorités politiques nationales ne réussiraient pas à maintenir un degré suffisamment élevé d'allégeance et d'intégration dans la communauté minoritaire, l'Auteur dégage un certain nombre de réponses possibles pour elle. Une des réponses qui implique l'intervention de gouvernements ou de communautés extérieurs, consiste à chercher des alliés pour lui permettre de poursuivre ses conflits intérieurs. Cette recherche d'un allié crée une série de liens transnationaux, situation qui, en retour, peut susciter une série de problèmes de politique étrangère, à la fois complexes et variés, pour les autorités politiques nationales qui y sont impliquées.

On souligne qu'en bien des cas, la communauté minoritaire est déjà en rapport avec des groupes ou des gouvernements extérieurs et que l'intervention d'une partie extérieure comme "patron" est plus probable lorsque existent des liens susceptibles de former un système transnational "affectif", comme c'est le cas pour les Chypriotes turcs, d'une part, et les autorités politiques et le peuple turc, d'autre part.

Le résultat de ce double processus d'une instabilité intérieure croissante et de l'intervention de "patrons" extérieurs due à la recherche d'alliés poursuivie à la fois par la communauté minoritaire et les autorités politiques nationales, est de développer un modèle complexe d'alignements informels, recoupant les frontières formelles des Nations. L'Auteur avance que ce phénomène ne peut être étudié de façon satisfaisante que dans un cadre conceptuel qui ne divise pas rigidement les attitudes politiques en attitudes adoptées, à l'intérieur des systèmes nationaux et celles qui sont adoptées dans les rapports entre les systèmes nationaux.

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A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY

S. Brucan

In recent years, the academic controversy on the relationship has boiled between domestic and foreign policy/ down to the eternal priority quarrel between the chicken and the egg. Indeed, in the small and inter-e end at world in which we live, the connection between the two polities is so inextricable that every major internal problem has an external dimension and vice versa. There is constant feedback in the process of decision-making, between the two areas of politics.

To some writers such phenomena as the occupation regimes in Germany and Japan in the postwar period, U.S. involvement in Vietnam, U.N. operations in the Congo, foreign aid grants with restrictions on utilization appear as cases where the allocation of values in a national system has been strongly affected by the prevailing patterns of power and purpose in the international system (Philip Mosely, Robert Good, Fred Riggs, etc...). Adding to such cases the operations of regional organizations and the fact that nation-states are becoming increasingly "penetrated" or "permeated", primarily because of developments in modern weapons technology and the application of economic and psychological warfare (John H. Hertz, Kenneth Boulding, etc..), authors like James R. Mayhew reach the conclusion that these examples go beyond the mere fact of increasing interdependence among national actors; rather, they are examples of a process in which the traditional boundaries separating the nation-states from the enviroing international system are becoming increasingly obscured.

Karl Deutsch defines the boundaries between " external" and "internal" as "marked discontinuities in the frequency of transactions and marked discontinuities in the frequency of responses- particularly, therefore, discontinuities in the degree of covariance . (1) Such a definition can easily be applied to many phenomena, both in nature and in society, which are interdependent or linked in one way or another.

To this observer the boundary between external and internal politics is primarily defined by the distinct character of international relations versus internal social relations. Distinct, because they operate in a sphere where there is no supreme authority, no institutions and repressive machinery which would allow the authority to impose its will and law. As a result of that fundamental particularity, relations between societies comprise human rapports which are much looser and relaxed; their character is more unstable and contingent. The degree of social integration within states differs qualitatively from that of international society, which looks fragmented rather than integrated.

What is more, whereas the social internal mechanism functions by itself, and is self-regulating, the international social mechanism does not self-regulate. It is only the decisions made by the states that put the international system into gear. These distinct features of international relations make for the boundaries between internal and external policy .

Those who maintain that the nation-state is "permeated", that the traditional boundaries separating nation-states from the surrounding international system are becoming increasingly obscured, should not forget that the actor of the present international system is the nation-state , and that this is what chiefly makes the law and behavior of the international system. In what sense does the role of the nation-state as actor determine the law and behavior of the international system? In the sense that while nation-states are different in size, geographic location and vulnerability, big and small, developed and underdeveloped, rich and poor, mighty and weak, these glaring inequalities among nations make for the conflicts arising from them to constitute the basic law and behavior of the international system. It is the conflict and cooperation among these basic units that determine the shape of international politics and make the international system behave as it does.

Lvo D. Duchacek comes close to this thesis when he writes: " The assumption of possible interference or uncivilized behavior on the part of other nations induces nation-states and their leaders to engage in activities and policies that aim at safeguarding or maximizing their freedom of action while minimizing and, if possible, eliminating any actual or potential threat to it. The behavior of nations is conditioned by the nature of the present international system which in turn mirrors the suspicions and ambitions of nation-states (2).

Professor Duchacek then qualifies his statement, emphasizing that the anticipation of threat and damage should not be interpreted as meaning that the interests of all nations are necessarily in direct and constant conflict with each other. Some interests, he goes on, do not affect each other in any manner, for instance, because of great distance. This, after all, is not such a formidable handicap for those who indulge in threat or damage in this era of supersonic jets and missiles. The Congo republic was at a relatively great distance from all the powers involved in its internal affairs in 1960. And so is Vietnam, for that matter, and the Middle East. Other national interests, writes Duchacek, are in harmony, or may be brought into harmony by negotiation and comprise within regional (for example, Western hemisphere-), ideological (for example, Communist), racial (Pan-Arab), religious (Islam), continental (European), or functional frameworks, such as common protection against epidemics. (3)

Although harmony might be too idyllic a word for the kind of actual relationship between nation-states within the frameworks described above, it is true that even when the interests of several nations clash with one another it does not mean that these nations are in mutual opposition in all respects, for one thing, because conflict and cooperation are not two mutually exclusive concepts in international politics. They are not of an optional character, for they are both inherent in interstate relations. There is no "pure" conflicts, nor "pure" cooperation between nations. Conflict between two or more powers presupposes the cooperation of the conflicting parties in the game, including acceptance at least partially of the rules of the game. In its turn, cooperation within regional (for example, Western hemisphere) nations does not imply a state of non-conflict between the United States and Latin-American countries. Nor does PanArab cooperation exclude conflicts between the United Arab Republic and Tunisia or Morocco.

Even on a larger scale, basic conflicts between socio-economic subsystems (socialist and capitalist) do not exclude a degree of cooperation among them for limited purposes or scope.

Major antagonists, such as the Soviet Union and the United States, while preserving their atomic arsenals, may have a common interests in preventing further proliferation of atomic weapons in other countries. Another illustration of this dual point of conflict and cooperation is China; despite her irreconcilable attitude toward the capitalist West, she did not exclude some degree of political understanding with France, or a wheat deal with Canada, both allies of the United States. But even with the latter, China is having talks in Warsaw at the ambassadorial level. Obviously the fact itself that nation-states are the basic units or subsystems of a whole or a system requires and imposes upon them a certain cooperation without which the international system could not function, nor, for that matter, even exist.

The correct understanding of the dialectical relationship between conflict and cooperation is essential for the proper definition of the boundaries between "external" and "internal" politics and for the explanation of their mutual impact in the decision-making process.

Let us stay with basic unit, the nation-state, Karl Deutsch proposes to define the concept of a country as a multiple market for goods and resources based on a market for factors of production. He does so because the emergence of national markets was a characteristic of nineteenth - and early twentieth-century economic history. National markets, however essential in the formation of nations, are not enough. Deutsch adds to them a general or national political community, which, however, is too encompassing, for practically all the components of the nation-state are thereby covered. From there, he proceeds to a definition of autonomy. Looking at it from the outside, he says that any system is autonomous if its responses are not predictable; from outside, if it is characterized by a combination of intake and memory, and if this memory is itself dissociative and combinatorial, thus providing opportunities for initiative and novelty. What really fits my demonstration more closely is Deutsch's description of sovereignty as an intensive type of autonomy and the application of his formulae: a state is sovereign, looked from the outside, if its decisions could not be commanded or reversed dependably from its environment; looked from the inside, it is sovereign if it possesses a stable and coherent decision-making machinery within its boundaries (4). To be sure, sovereignty of a nation-state has got two facets: supreme power inside and independence outside, i.e., exclusive right freely to decide, without any outside interference, its domestic and foreign policy. This is why sovereignty is inextricably linked with the notion of equality between states whatever their size and power, and with the notion of non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

In practice, however, big powers tend to encroach upon the sovereignty of smaller (or weaker) nations and to interfere in their internal affairs, imposing their domination or their will over the latter. It is this tendency on the part of the big and mighty nations that makes a national system become increasingly "permeated", and not the development of modern weapons technology, nor the application of economic and psychological pressure (John Hertz, "International Politics in the Atomic Age", chapter 6). Nuclear bombs, missiles and rockets are just modern instruments being used by big powers in order more effectively to carry out their policies. Modern weapons technology is a part of big power status and privilege.

Such thesis as a "allocation of values in a national system which is strongly affected by the prevailing patterns of power and purpose in the international system", (5) or as the "process in which the traditional boundaries separating the nation-state from the enviroing international system of becoming increasingly obscured" (6) actually

deal with effects of a policy of domination and foreign influence. What is really thus obscured is the issue and not the traditional boundaries, which have always been trespassed by the powerful and the mighty.

Surely, modern technology and increasing interdependence among nations have somewhat modified the application of the sovereignty concept. As a result, nation-states now are voluntarily adjusting themselves to the new situation, and are making decisions in the light of new environmental limitations. But what remains in the last analysis vital to the nation is that its decisions be made inside, and not commanded or reversed from outside.

The essence of what is called a "penetrated political system" is revealed by its very definition: a system "in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals" (7) In other words, it is not modern technology that is involved here, but nonmembers of a national society participating in the decision-making process of the nation. And who are these "nonmembers of a national society"? Since the "penetrated political system" is an American product, one could legitimately ask the question: "Is it assumed that Canadians or Vietnamese nationals or Mexicans may participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with Americans, in either the allocation of U.S. values or the mobilization of support on behalf of U.S. goals? Or does the assumption go the other way.

CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS.

The problems of the domestic sources of foreign policy and vice versa, of the external influences on the internal behavior of nations, are major meeting grounds for international and comparative politics.

James N. Rosenau notices that "while it was not long ago that the external behavior of nations was considered to be exclusively a reaction to external stimuli, ever since World War II students of foreign policy have emphasized that the wellsprings of international action are also fed by events and tendencies within societies" (8). This is how the statistical metaphysical cookies crumble, and dialectics become indispensable. Even though the literature on the subject is very rich and multilateral, Professor Rosenau maintains that the processes which culminate in the behavior of societies remain obscure, and concludes that the main reason for this situation is that "foreign policy analysis is devoid of general theory". (9) In other words, the field has an abundance of frameworks and approaches which cut across societies and conceptualize the ends, means, capabilities or sources of foreign policy, but no schemes which link up these components of external behavior in causal sequences.

As to external factors which influence the policy of states, they could be systematically indentified and presented as follows:

- a) From outside: Acting through the three channels of interstate relations i.e. by intimidation or coercion, by cooperation and interchanges, by integration (or disintegration).
- b) From inside: Manipulating groups that are dependent in one way or another from external forces, and that thus, become subsystems subject to foreign influences. Such subsystems may be of different character, and with different motivations; output for foreign markets (coffee growers and exporters of Brazil, oil production of Kuwait or Venezuela, etc...); dissatisfied, alienated social groups (exploited and opressed social classes or groups, segregated or discriminated national or racial minorities, intellectual groups in autocratic regimes, etc...); organized agencies (Fifth column, spy-networks, lobby pressure groups, military bases).
- c) Transnational: Propaganda or artistic messages transmitted by radio, television, satellites or literature smuggled into the country, both penetrating the sovereign territory of another country against the wish of the authorities of the recipient country, anyway without their visa. Informational, sport, cultural, artistic, touristic activities may also be carried with the permission of the recipient country on a reciprocal basis, with the assumption that neither one will profit from the exchanges more than the other. In fact, one of the parties or both, hopefully, expect some profit out of the exchanges.

Measures taken by governments in view of annihilating or minimizing external influences may be:

- a) Negative: destroying the subsystem, by nationalization (Suez, Anglo-French property nationalized by Egypt; Standard Oil property in Perou, ect...); dismantling foreign military bases((Algeria, Lybia, etc...); unmasking foreign agencies; stopping infiltration (immigration policy, Berlin Wall, radio-Jamming, visa-interdiction, etc...).
- b) Positive: Tying the subsystem so tightly to the internal system that input from outside becomes ineffective. Surely, the reduction of social contrasts and inequalities, the elimination of national or racial discrimination constitute the safest thway annihilating or diminishing the capability of outside forces to manipulate subsystems within a nation-state.

As a conclusion, it can be stated that the more popular and stable a political regime, the less it cares about manipulation and influence from outside.

As to internal factors of foreign policy, Professor Rosenau offers a pre-theory of foreign policy, by which he means both an early step toward explaining specific empirical events and a general orientation toward all events, a point of view or philosophy about the way the world is.

He proceeds from the assumption that all pre-theories of foreign policy are either five-dimensional or translatable into five dimensions, namely that all foreign policy analysts either explain the external behavior of societies in terms of five sets of variables or they proceed in such a way that their explanations can be recast in terms of the five sets. Listed in order of increasing temporal and spatial distance from the external behaviors for which they serve as sources, the five sets are what the author calls the idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal and systemic variables. (10).

The first set encompasses the idiosyncracies of the decision-makers who determine and implement the foreign policies of a nation. The second set pertains to the external behavior of official that is generated by the roles they occupy and that would be likely to occur irrespective of the idiosyncracies of the role occupants. Government variables refer to those aspects of a government's structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers. The fourth cluster of variables consists of those non-governmental aspects of a society which influences its external behavior. As for systemic variables, these include any non-human aspects of a society's external environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials.

Yet when trying to attach causal priorities to these various sets of variables, the author finds the exercise extremely difficult.

Considering, for example, the U.S. sponsored invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs in April, 1961, he wonders to what extent was that external behavior a function of the idiosyncratic characteristics of John F. Kennedy, or to what extent did government variables contribute to the external behavior of the U.S.A.? And, posit Cuba at 900 rather than 90 miles off the Florida coast, would the invasion have nevertheless been launched?

Thus, Risenau presents a crude pre-theory of foreign policy in which the relative potencies of the five sets of variables are assessed in terms of distinctions between large and small countries, between developed and underdeveloped economies, and between open and closed political systems.

The author of that pre-theory is well aware of the relative validity of both potencies of the five sets of variables and of the different rankings he suggests in his table. While he expects objections and rejections of foreign policy analysts vis-a-vis his pre-theory, he emphasizes that it is not much more than an orientation and is not at present subject of verification (11).

This writer thinks that Rosenau's quest for theory is sound and extremely useful in opening a new avenue for foreign policy analysts. It is quite clear to me that the field has reached a point where it cannot go further without a theoretical framework. The most important thing in Rosenau's endeavor to provide a pre-theory of foreign policy is the initial assumption that events derive from an underlying order, that the external policy of every society stems from some sources and is, therefore, at least theoretically, explicable. There is in his assumption an implicit rejection of policy-analysts' and historians' schools who view the external behaviors of societies as random and impulsive, as occurring for no reason and as therefore unknowable and inexplicable. This is a significant step forward, indeed a departure from both anti-theory prejudiced sociologists and political scientists and microsociological-research-addicts who view empiricist methods and techniques as the universal panacea to all questions relevant to international affairs.

However, the bold essay of James N. Rosenau falls short of expectations because of two major reasons—one regarding its basis, the other regarding its range. The former is that any theory or pre-theory of foreign policy can be formulated only within the wider context of a theory of international relations and politics, for the very simple reason that foreign policies of states are shaped and conducted within that wider context. The latter is that his pre-theory does not make the distinction between necessity and accident, so essential whenever someone tries to establish causal relationships and sequences. For whereas necessity, as the law, belongs to the sphere of essentials and relates to the attributes and rapports which have an internal ground, reflecting general, lawful, typical aspects of processes, with permanent character; accident relates to the attributes and rapports which have an external ground, thus being non-essential, individual, temporary, incidental, non-typical. Unlike necessity, accident does not have an obligatory inevitable development; it can happen or not, earlier or later, under one form or another. In other words, whereas necessity can be part of a causal process, accident can not.

The idiosyncratic variable, for instance, is an accidental rather than a necessary phenomenon. To include it in a system of causal relationship is a fruitless endeavor, since every idiosyncratic behavior of a leader is different from every other and no theory or pre-theory can possibly be coherent if it proposes to account for the infinite and nonpredictable variation of such behaviors. Rosenau was right in his introduction when he asserted that the preliminary processing of foreign policy materials involves considerably more than methodological tidiness; it involves the need to develop an explicit conception of where causation is located in international affairs .(12).

What is more, the theorist should find out what makes international politics tick, what is the motive force of foreign policy; and what drives the system of causal relationship which culminates in the external policy and behavior of a nation-state?

By now, the reader has probably realized that my criticism to Rosenau's pre-theory is actually the preface to my own pre-theory for foreign policy.

A. Pre-Theory of Foreign Policy

While accepting as a starting point the five sets of variables, I shall alter them according to the conceptual framework for the study of international relations and politics.

The order of precedence itself will be altered, for three sets of variables will be filled by the three layers making up the national sections of the international relations setting, and the remaining two by the national foreign policy making machinery:

1. Natural or material basics (systemic variables): geographic milieu, population and production of goods, with the latter as the determinant one magnified by the scientific-technological revolution to such an extent that it transforms and molds the former two-- geography and population-- and every feature of the environment in which international relations unfold.

2. Social forces (societal variables) particularly classes and nations, with their ideological consciousness and psychological impulses and reactions driving them to act on the international arena.

3. Contingency factors, particularly economic, political, military, which valuate the natural-material basics and condition the intensity of social and national drives and reactions.

4. Decision-making machinery (governmental variables).

5. Leadership (role and idiosyncratic variables).

As a rule, the mobility and potency of variables grow with their ascending: the basics are the stablest and the most potent, leadership covers the loosest and the most ephemeral set of variables. The latter, in our scheme, comprises both role and idiosyncratic variables, though there might be rare cases when a leader or a statesman behaves and acts beyond his role. Yet, however idiosyncratic a leader, he will not act against the role he occupies, but within the autonomy provided for the role by the respective political regime.

Let us now test our set of variables making for foreign policy against the example picked-up by James Rosebau: the U.S. sponsored invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs in April, 1961. The natural-material basics will tell us that we are dealing with a superpower, with the mightiest industrial and financial nation in the world, extending its possessions over five continents.

The societal variables will tell us the story of an expansionist ruling class with a tradition of interventionist policies in the Caribbean, particularly in Cuba. The nation was prepared for "doing something" against Cuba and the opposition to it was negligible, provided that the "doing" succeeded. As far as contingency factors are concerned, the timing of the invasion could be related to the series of nationalizations of American properties undertaken by the Castro regime, to the build-up of political hostility against Cuba and to the urge of the military to crush such a brazen challenge to American supremacy. The decision-making machinery was already set in motion for the invasion; when John F. Kennedy entered The White House the preparation was in progress. The training of Cuban anti-Castro refugees was in an advanced stage. The Pentagon, the C.I.A., and the State Department were ready to get into the act. Under the circumstances, the new President just carried out a policy already established and although there was a dissenting voice-- Senator Fulbright, to be sure-- the possibility of reversing the trend and rescinding the decision made by his predecessor, General Eisenhower, never really occurred to John Kennedy or, for that matter, to any of his major associates in government.

As a matter of fact, even after the flasco of the invasion and Kennedy's "self criticism", he maintained the same policy otowards Cuba and stated in unequivocal terms:" Should it ever appear that inter-American doctrine of non-interference merly conceals or excuses a policy of non-action-- if the nations of this hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration-- then I want it clearly understood that this government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our Nation". Later that day he called in Richard Nixon and by the week-end he had talked to Eisenhower, Nelson Rockefeller and Barry Goldwater. (13)

According to the other four set of variables, there was nothing unusual, unexpected in the leadership variable behavior and decision. Only ten years prior th that decision, another president of the U.S. ordered a similar operation in Guatemala where the leftist government of Arbenz was overthrown by an armed expedition led by Colonel Castillo Armas, subsidized, directed and inspired by the C.I.A., Pentagon and State Department under almost indential terms.

SENS RESUME

WITHOUT SUMMARY.

FOOTNOTES.

12.-

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FOREIGN-LINKED FACTIONALISM AS A HISTORICAL PATTERN

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I

One of the major problems of international relations theory is differentiation between what is unique in the contemporary international system, and what is inherent to any system of relationships among sovereign political units. Theorists have recognized the need to isolate the "implicit logic" of inter-state politics not only because it is essential to basic theory, but also because only in this way could the true importance of such variables as historical change and particular systemic configurations be assessed..(1) By implication this leads to a comparative study of international politics which would include pre-modern and non-Western systems, though these areas have as yet been little researched(2).

In the absence of broadly-conceived research into the international relations of other periods and areas, there is constant risk of generalizing basic theory from the contemporary system, despite frequent emphasis on the very non-representativeness of twentieth-century world politics. Only empirical research into the actual presence or lack of historical continuity in patterns of international interaction can firmly establish the relationship between the timeless and the essentially modern. This argument is the point of departure for the research described below.

The problem of linkages between internal political factors and the international environment, in particular, has usually been treated as an aspect of the contemporary international system. Interest in the issues was partly a result of observations regarding the increasing "interpenetration" among sovereign entities and the contemporary eclipse of sovereignty in its traditional sense (3). Most analyses bearing on the subject emphasize the role of modern communication networks, international ideologies, technological ties, and other factors that are "shrinking" the world and thus strengthening the links between internal politics and the various external environments. Nevertheless, one

encounters comments such as "the notion of linkages is not entirely new.. linkages are a universal phenomenon".(4) This suggests that linkage phenomena, like other problems of international relations theory, might be profitably studied in larger perspectives that will help to identify basic patterns, if any, that exist in the relationship between the internal and external dimensions of politics. This is not to imply that "nothing is new under the sun", but that we can better understand what is new by identifying that which is not.

The power of comparison as an analytic technique is another argument for broad-ranging historical research. The "need for more genuine comparisons in the study of foreign policy" has been noted as a justification for the linkages framework, (5) and is certainly a powerful argument even when limited to the comparison of various modern cases. The argument is that much stronger when the object is to discover the inherent logic, or what might be termed the "strategic imperatives", of inter-state relations; indeed, the obvious research strategy is to compare cases from the most widely variant contexts, when the only explanation for common features is the logic of the inter-state system itself. In such a way one might try to identify, for example, the conditions associated with linkage phenomena at their most basic level.

As an exercise in the feasibility of this approach, this paper identifies and describes one single pattern of linkage between internal politics and international politics that is common to a number of historical systems. No effort is made to measure this pattern against other linkage patterns; it may be regarded simply as a prominent pattern of linkage in the observation of several systems. Nor is the modern international system included in the comparison at this stage. Analysis of the pattern itself, the conditions with which it is associated, and the sub-patterns into which it may be divided, will be followed by discussion of the usefulness of suggested frameworks of linkage study in delineations such as "universal" linkages.

In searching for a test case, the linkage between internal conflict and international conflict was chosen as a focus. This is an arbitrary decision, but intuitively the area seems one of the most promising in the search for basic patterns, as conflict behaviour is by all accounts one of the most universal and "generalizable" subjects of international relations. Phenomena associated with conflicts are also likely to stand out more prominently, and more complete historical information is generally available. (6).

II

Previously gathered data on all international conflicts in four different historical areas and periods, all of which constitute interdependent regions, was used as a point of departure. This material includes all violent and non-violent conflicts, as reported in the standard historical literature, between sovereign states in the Classic World, 280-150 B.C., India, 1347-1526, Europe, 1492-1559, and Latin America, 1810-1914 (7). All of these conflicts are analyzed first on a dyadic level; those dyadic conflicts which were in fact part of a larger conflict receive special attention later. As TABLE I indicates, the total number of dyadic international conflicts in these four historical contexts is 237, distributed fairly evenly among the four regions.

Following Rosenau's definition of linkage, these conflicts were studied for "recurrent sequences of behavior that originate on one side of the boundary between the two types of systems and that become linked to phenomena on the other side in the process of unfolding" (8). One of the most prominent patterns of behavior that appears to meet this definition, and is common to all four historical contexts, is alliance or cooperation between internal factions within a state and that state's external "enemies". This has been termed "foreign-linked factionalism", and might be more fully defined as the presence within a state of a competing faction that seeks or accepts aid from other states in order to seize or wield power by non-legitimized means ...(9). The incidence of such cases in the 237 dyadic conflicts is recorded in TABLE I; the regularity of the pattern in the four contexts is striking.

As defined here the concept of foreign-linked factionalism is one of the "international aspects of civil strife" that have been discussed elsewhere, and can be interpreted in terms of Modelski's active and passive models of outside intervention, as well as Rosenau's schematic representation of sixteen linkages between internal war and the international system (10). The pattern here is broader, however, than intervention in civil wars, in that "intervention" does not cover all forms of linkage and internal factionalism is broader than civil war.

The regularity of the incidence of foreign-linked factionalism (from about 20 to 30 per cent) in these widely varying historical cases is evidence of a strategic constant. Not only are the cultural, economic, social, and political contexts vastly different, but even in terms of the structure of the international system (bipolarity, multipolarity, incidence and permanence of alliances, scope of conflicts, etc) these systems have little or nothing in common (and purposely so). It seems fair to hypothesize, therefore, that foreign-linked factionalism as defined is dependent of cultural influence and of the overarching structure of the international system.

TABLE I. Dyadic Conflicts and Linked Factionalism in Four Contexts

Context	Number of States	Total Dyadic Conflicts	Conflicts with Fac- tionalism	Conflicts without Fac- tionalism	% Conflicts with Factionalism
Classical World (280-150 B.C.)	29	51	10	41	19.6
India (1347-1526)	23	44	9	35	20.5
Europe (1492-1559)	34	73	22	51	30.1
Latin America (1810-1914)	21	69	16	53	23.2
TOTAL	107	237	57	180	24.1

These assertions should be further examined if factionalism is not related to particular cultural differences, it may yet be related to be the very fact of cultural similarity or dissimilarity. In at least three of the four historical cases, a similar percentage of the dyadic conflicts are between states that are heterogeneous in a basic cultural sense-- Hindu vs. Moslem in India, Hellenistic vs. non-Hellenistic in the Classical World, Christian vs. non-Christian in Europe. On the hypothesis that foreign-linked factionalism is associated with homogeneity, then, the regularity of its incidence could be at least partly explained. As TABLE II shows, however, this hypothesis when tested is upheld in only one case of three ("homogeneous" dyads in this case are all those not considered heterogeneous as described above; Latin America is excluded because of the absence of heterogeneity in a comparable sense):

TABLE II. Factionalism and Homogeneity/Heterogeneity in Dyadic Conflicts

Context	Total Dyadic Conflicts	Factionalism		NO Factionalism		Level of 11 Significance
		Homo- geneous	Hetero- geneous	Homo- geneous	Hetero- geneous	
Classical	51	10	0	23	18	0072
India	44	5	4	22	13	n.s.
Europe	73	19	3	39	12	n.s.

The significant absence of factionalism in heterogeneous conflicts in the Classical World indicates that under certain conditions extreme cultural heterogeneity may indeed inhibit the development of foreign-linked factionalism. This appears, however, to be the exceptional case, and again factionalism appears to be generally independent of such influences.

A similar test may be used to check the influence of particular systemic structures and configurations. As mentioned earlier, some of the dyadic conflicts studied are indeed isolated bilateral clashes, while others (in fact the majority in every case) are in fact interwoven into larger, multilateral conflicts. The conflicts can thus be divided into "isolated" and "fused" conflicts, with the minimal condition of fusion defined as coordinated action in wartime or recognized common alignment in peacetime diplomacy between parties to each of two dyadic conflicts. Since fused conflicts are closer to the systemic level of interaction, it is reasonable to hypothesize an association with factionalism in this case as a measure of systemic influence. This is tested in TABLE III.

A second test of systemic influence is based upon a distinction between direct conflicts, where a substantive issue or tension is at the root of the clash, and indirect conflicts resulting from extraneous causes such as membership in opposing coalitions, demonstrations of solidarity, or financial inducements. Since indirect conflicts are usually an expression of the structure of the international system, one can hypothesize an association between factionalism and indirectness as an additional measure of systemic influence. This is tested in TABLE IV.

TABLE III. Factionalism and Fusion in Dyadic Conflicts.

Context	Total Dyadic Conflicts	Factionalism		MO-Factionalism		Level of Significance
		Fused	Isolated	Fused	Isolated	
Classical	51	6	4	22	19	n.s.
India	44	8	1	19	16	n.s.
Europe	73	20	2	44	7	n.s.
L.America	69	13	3	31	22	n.s.

TABLE IV. Factionalism and Directness in Dyadic Conflicts (12)

Context	Total Dyadic Conflicts	Factionalism		Mo-Factionalism		Level Significance
		Direct	Indirect	Direct	Indirect	
Classical	51	9	14	40	11	n.s.
Europe	73	16	5	41	10	n.s.
L.America	69	16	0	48	15	n.s.

In both cases the incidence of foreign-linked factionalism bears no provable relationship to the structure of the international system, if the combining of conflicts and their indirectness are accepted as expressions of "systemic" or "structural" influence. To frame this in other terms, direct isolated bilateral conflicts should show a significantly lower incidence of factionalism if this phenomenon is associated with particular international configurations, but in fact they do not. The sources of factionalism must be sought on a more basic level, and first of all in the nature of the dyadic conflicts themselves.

The connection between factionalism and the severity of conflicts, to take one possibility, can be examined by two criteria: the violence of the outcome, and type of issue at stake. Conflicts that led at one stage or another to the outbreak of war were therefore distinguished from those which did not. Secondly, a distinction was made between direct conflicts definable as tensions-- a general state of enmity not dependent on specific objects of contention-- and those classifiable as disputes resulting from some concrete issue in the absence of which the conflict would seemingly not exist (13). The hypothesis that factionalism will occur more frequently as a conflict is more severe-- as war breaks out or as the conflict transcends specific disputes-- is not supported by the present evidence, as shown in TABLE V and VI:

TABLE V Factionalism and Incidence of War in Dyadic Conflicts

Context	Total Dyadic Conflicts	Factionalism		No Factionalism		Level of Significance
		War	No War	War	No War	
Classical	51	10	0	39	2	n.s. *
India	44	9	0	33	2	n.s. *
Europe	73	22	0	47	4	n.s.
L. America	69	7	9	21	32	n.s.

* Exactly expected frequencies.

TABLE VI. Factionalism and Type of Conflict in Direct Dyadic Conflicts.

Context	Total Dyadic Conflicts	Factionalism		No Factionalism		Level of Significance
		Tension	Dispute	Tension	Dispute	
Classical	49	9	0	36	4	n.s.
India	44	9	0	34	1	n.s.
Europe	57	14	2	34	7	n.s.
L. America	64	11	5	13	35	< .005

The exceptional case of Latin America in TABLE VI seems to be due to as unusually high number of minor border disputes not important enough to serve as a bases for internal polarization. This suggests the existence of a threshold of severity in a conflict, below which linkage to internal factionalism is relatively infrequent, and above which the increasing severity of the conflict seems to be unrelated to the incidence of such linkage.

Another aspect of a conflict that could conceivably be associated with internal factionalism is the contiguity or non contiguity of the two clashing states. The presence of a common border, it can be hypothesized, may facilitate the emergence of linked factions. This is tested in TABLE VIII; again the hypothesized association proves, however, to be insignificant:

TABLE VII. Factionalism and Contiguity in Dyadic Conflicts.

Context	Total Dyadic Conflicts	Factionalism		NO Factionalisms		Level of Significance
		Conti- guous	NonCon- tiguous	Conti- guous	Noncon- tiguous	
Classical	51	3	7	24	17	n.s.
India	44	9	0	28	7	n.s.
Europe	73	13	9	27	24	n.s.
L.America	69	7	9	27	26	n.s.

These figures also tend to indicate that systemic influences are of secondary importance in international conflicts. Assuming that noncontiguous conflicts are more likely to be part of a larger conflict system than conflicts between neighboring states, there is nevertheless no difference between the two cases in the incidence of foreign linked factionalism. Furthermore, it is not clear that even noncontiguous conflicts are in fact greatly influenced by the encompassing international "system"; a majority of these conflicts (53 of 99) can be interpreted in dyadic terms as a Great Power-small power relationship; that is, as a small state's resistance to the expanding influence of a noncontiguous Great Power. In other words, all but 46 of the 237 conflicts were either between neighboring states or between a Great Power and a small state (or both). In both cases the dynamics of the conflict, including factionalism, seem to be rooted in the direct bilateral relationship and not in any larger framework.

If this is the case, it is logical to test for a relationship between factionalism and equality/inequality in the dyad, leaving contiguity aside. For this purpose dyadic conflicts between "unequal" powers were distinguished from those between states of roughly comparable power. "Unequal conflicts" were defined as those in which the smaller state is too inferior militarily to consider the alternative of war, unassisted, against its rival, as a tenable proposition. The distinction is in most cases empirically obvious; in case of doubt, a state was not considered unequal if it fought unassisted against its rival, even unsuccessfully, more than once in the period studied. Such a distinction between "equal" and "unequal" dyads is admittedly crude, but even with this rough measure it is apparent that the association between inequality and factionalism is not due to chance:

TABLE VIII. Factionalism and Inequality in Dyadic Conflicts.

Context	Total Dyadic Conflicts	Factionalism		No. Factionalism		Level of Significance
		Equal	Unequal	Equal	Unequal	
Classical	51	3	7	31	10	< .01
India	44	3	6	29	6	< .01
Europe	73	5	17	45	6	< .0005
L.America	69	4	12	38	14	< .005

That a small state in conflict with a larger power should be split by internal factionalism seems intuitively reasonable, as there is always an incentive in such cases for "coming to terms" with the superior enemy. Furthermore, as Modelski points out, "parties to an internal war in a great power have little to gain by seeking the assistance of a small power; events in a small country would, on the other hand, be decisively influenced by the actions of a great state". (14) Rosenau also suggests that "small politics are more vulnerable to penetrative processes than super ones" (15).

The association of inequality with foreign-linked internal factionalism also helps to explain the regularity of the phenomenon in different historical areas and periods. Inequality of power has remained fairly constant in international politics; the percentage of "unequal dyads" in the conflict areas studied varied from 27% to 38%. If a fairly consistent proportion of conflicts occur between states of substantially unequal power where the temptation and efficacy of exploiting internal splits is heightened, the regularity of foreign-linked factionalism as a "strategic imperative" comes as no surprise. A further contributing cause to this regularity may be the incidence of domestic instability in the smaller state, assuming that such instability occurs in a fairly constant proportion of cases throughout history (an assumption not tested here).

This discussion suggests the need of a closer look at the actual dynamics of foreign-linked factionalism in order to clarify the role of both inequality and domestic instability. As suggested by various frameworks for the study of the linkage problem, the following questions seem most important:

1. the origin and direction of the initial impetus,
2. the point of transition from perception to action in the sequence of activity,
3. Whether the linkage remains one-directional, or is reinforced from both sides (a "fused" linkage).

To this is added a question suggested by observation of the material presented here:

4. .. whether the issue serving as the impetus for the link is the international relationship itself, or whether the link develops out of extraneous issues.

Applying these questions of foreign-linked factionalism in the four regions and periods studied, it appears that inequality characterizes in fact only a particular, though dominant, sub-pattern, and that at least three distinct sub-patterns are subsumed under the general definition (patterns observed in only one region not being included). These patterns are:

Pattern I: Pre-existing Issue Group. Typically this pattern involves states of unequal power. The relationship of one state with another (usually larger) state is a permanent issue, serving as the basis for "prop" and "anti-" parties. The position of the second state is usually reactive, though it may be the first to act, either in response to events within the first state or in a forthright attempt to exploit its internal divisions. The majority of such cases involved "double factionalism": a small state located between two larger powers, and divided into factions linked with each. The pattern was observed in all four regions and accounted for 31 of the 57 dyadic conflicts with foreign-linked factionalism, all but three of them in "unequal" dyads. (16)

Pattern II: Outside Exploitation of Domestic Unrest. This pattern is common to both equal and unequal dyads. The initial issue in this case is not the dyadic relationship itself, but some other source of domestic division: a struggle for power, a civil war over the form of government, regional hostility. Initiative in both perception and action comes from the outside state, seeking to exploit the previously unrelated and unlinked strife. In some cases there is reciprocal linkage, but the essential relationship often remains one-directional. On the whole this pattern is quite similar to Modelski's "passive form" of international intervention. (17). Of the 57 conflicts with linked factionalism, 17 can be assigned to this pattern, 10 within unequal dyads and 7 in equal dyads. These are distributed among all four regions, but are especially evident in Latin America-- perhaps as an index of the greater domestic instability there. (18).

Pattern III: Reciprocal Intervention as Strategy. This pattern might be described as reciprocal meddling in internal quarrels among rival states, as a part of their normal strategy. Such a pattern occurred in two different contexts, in both cases between roughly equal states, contiguous geographically and closely associated in a cultural, ideological, and historical sense. (19).

It might be expected that a variant of Pattern II, with domestic unrest leading to an appeal from the inside to a foreign power, would also be a common pattern. In fact, one-half of Modelski's basic model of intervention--the "active form"-- is based on just this expectation. (20). But in the cases studied here only one clearly fits this pattern, (21) though a few other cases could arguably be so defined. This suggests that unless ties to the foreign state are themselves the crucial dividing issue within the factionalized state, hesitation to link outsiders to essentially domestic quarrels will outweigh consideration of the advantages to be gained.

In sum, the basic patterns of foreign-linked factionalism, as seen in four widely-varying historical contexts, are associated with the repetition of certain strategic situations and seem uninfluenced by systemic structures or cultural differences. This is especially evident in the relationship between inequality and the incidence of such factionalism, and in the repetition under vastly different conditions of strikingly similar situations such as a small factionalized state "sandwiched" between two strong neighbors.

III.

Which analytical frameworks for the study of national-international linkages seem most relevant to the material presented here? Deductive models and classificatory matrices, such as those offered by Rosenau and Modelski, have been useful in defining categories and framing questions, but as the authors of these models themselves state, such frameworks are designed primarily as guides of research and not as substantive theory. For this more analytically-oriented concepts must be sought.

In its very conception this research shares Hanrieder's misgivings on the "sterile parallelism" of approaches that merely posit analogous processes in domestic and international politics -- as "primitive", "developing", or "prismatic" systems.(22) When applied to historical cases, such parallelisms either do not exist or, if they do, they tell us very little about the incidence of foreign-linked factionalism. This parallelism is in essence what Singer calls "relationship as similarity of attributed", as opposed to "relationship as interdependence"; it exhibits what he describes as "the tendency to assume or imply that the more similar a cluster of entities may be on certain relevant attribute dimensions, the more likely they are to exhibit high interdependence, cooperation, responsiveness, and so forth"(23). But the substantive link between a state and its environment, which constitutes a "relationship by interdependence", is clearly a different matter, bearing little necessary relationship to the similarity or dissimilarity of internal and external processes.

Hanrieder has suggested the concepts of compatibility (between foreign policy goals and the international environment) and consensus (in domestic agreement on the ends and means of foreign policy) as analytical tools in the study of linkage as interdependence. The basic patterns of foreign-linked factionalism can indeed be described in these terms. In Pattern I the compatibility of a small state's goals with its environment is obviously limited, even for minimal goals, and this in turn creates difficulty in achieving full consensus on the ends and means of foreign policy. To use Hanrieder's "isomorphic" language, the lack of in fact "isomorphic" (both being standards of "feasibility"), and

if so what value this isomorphism has. The "consensus" described above has different meanings in different contexts; to say that internal dissension in the form of non-legitimized factionalism is always a measure of "feasibility", in the same sense that one measures the feasibility of the state's external goals, is to strain comparability. Compatibility also has vastly different content in different cases: in some cases the clash with a single opposing state is decisive, in some cases the influence of larger outside configurations is dominant, and in most cases there are disparate, accidental, and fleeting factors influencing the chances of success which considerably reduce the validity of generalization.

But even granting that of these "feasibilities" are in some sense comparable, the usefulness of the "isomorphism" is not clear. It runs the risk of substituting a subtler form of parallelism into the study of linkages, comparing internal and external "feasibilities" rather than actually analyzing the substantive causal relationships between them. To use Harrieder's analogy, the reduction of apples and pears to apples alone does not establish the relationships among them, and furthermore it may be possible to study the relationship between apples and pears, if this be the focus of interest, without homogenizing them. What may be needed is not a common language, but statements on the content of linkages that can be used to translate from one language to another.

The twin subjects of external limitations and internal acceptance are undoubtedly important desiderata in any discussion of linkage, but any analysis of their content and consistent relationships between them requires study of other elements in the foreign policy-making process. It is suggested here, in a speculative spirit, that only a general model of foreign policy-making may be inclusive enough to analyze linkages satisfactorily. Harrieder also aspires "to view foreign policy as a continuous process bridging the analytical barriers between the international and the domestic political system", and refers to the general problem as the linkage of "external and internal dimensions of foreign policy" (25). If so, might not the foreign policy-making process be the most suitable analytical focus?

Model of foreign policy-making have been bypassed in the study of linkages for a number of reasons. These objections are indicated in the following requirements for a foreign policy-making model suitable to study linkages (other requirements indicated by the empirical part of this study are also included). Such a model should:

1. provide contact between the internal and external environments other than through the policy-making process, recognizing their recurring fusion in the minds of policy-makers,

2. describe the flow of influence both from the state to the environment and from the environment to the state (negative and positive feedback: militancy to desirability),

3. provide explanation of dynamic and ongoing processes, not being limited to a single point in time,

4. differentiate the operational and psychological environments (the sequence of perception and action),

5. differentiate the elements of the external environment,

6. differentiate major types of issues,

7. have a reasonable number of variables, be operationally definable, and be of general applicability.

The foreign policy-making framework proposed by Brecher and associates is presented here (Figure 1) in both descriptive and schematic form. This model, described as "a research design for the study of foreign policy" whose categories provide a means of classifying "all data regarding foreign policy" is an example of a foreign-policy model that may be useful as a framework for the study of internal-external linkages. (26)

Unlike most foreign policy-making models, the external environment is excellently differentiated here. The remaining criteria also seem to be met, though interaction between different elements of the operational environment-- external and internal-- is not expressly provided for.

Is this design applicable, in fact, to the linkage patterns already described, and is it useful in suggesting further lines of inquiry on the nature of linkages and their relation to other aspects of national and international politics? Again, describing foreign-linked factionalism in language of the design is simple enough. To take a simple case, consider a small state divided internally over whether to resist or "come to terms" with a larger state (Pattern I). Perceptions of the "dominant bilateral" relationship will affect the competition between the foreign policy-making elite and competing elites: the sharper the threat, the greater the uncertainty on policy and the greater the tendency of the competing elite to perceive an alternative to established policy. This will be reinforced if implementation causes negative feedback. If established policy is one of resistance, the competing elite will be drawn to a policy of cooperation, as the only viable alternative. If established policy is cooperation, competing elites will serve as crystallizing points for patriotic resistance. The "translation" of the pattern into language of the model may be continued from the second state's perspective, and extended to other patterns.

FIGURE 1. A Research Design for the Study of Foreign Policy (Bracher et al.)

INPUTSOPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

External: Global (G)
 Subordinate (S)
 Subordinate Other (SO)
 Bilateral (B)
 Dominant bilateral (DB)

Internal: Military Capability (M)
 Economic Capability (E)
 Political Structure (PS)
 Interest Groups (IG)
 Competing Elites (CE)

COMMUNICATION: The transmission of data about the operational environment by mass media and face-to-face contacts

PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT

Attitudinal Prism: Ideology, historical legacy, personality predispositions

Elite Images: of the operational environment, including competing elites' advocacy and pressure potential


PROCESS

FORMULATION of strategic and tactical decisions in four issue areas:

Military-Security (M-S)
 Political-Diplomatic (P-D)
 Economic-Development (E-D)
 Cultural-Status (C-S)

IMPLEMENTATION of decisions by various structures: head of state, head of government, foreign office, etc.

OUTPUTS — the substance of acts or decisions



The framework also suggests ways of generalizing empirical observation and framing additional questions or hypotheses. Under what circumstances, for example, does the presence of a strong competing elite moderate or sharpen conflict with another state? Or with a dominant state? To what extent does a competing or dissenting elite grow out of a foreign policy issue, and to what extent does it exploit a foreign policy issue to further extraneous aims? What is the relationship of political structure, military capability, or economic capability to linkage, or to the perception of a hostile dominant power, or to the repercussions of a policy in the operational environment? Does a dominant bilateral conflict always tend to give rise to factionalism in the smaller state, and if not what are the intervening conditions?

The sufficiency, economy, and relevance of a foreign policy-making design such as Brecher's for the study of linkage cannot be fully established here. But the potential of such approach for integrating a heretofore diffuse discussion, and relating it meaningfully to the general subject-matter of international politics, should be explored.

SANS RESUME

WITHOUT SUMMARY.

FOOTNOTES.

1. See the writings of Raymond Aron, especially Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1966), Stanley Hoffman, ed., Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), Richard Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1962).
2. Notable exceptions are Morton Kaplan and his students (see the relevant chapters in Kaplan, ed., New Approaches to International Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), and Joel Larus, ed., Comparative World Politics: Readings in Western and Premodern Non-Western International Relations (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1964).
3. Much of the vocabulary and focus of the "linkage" problem seems to have come from the classic statement of the modern "interpenetration" thesis in John Merz's International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
4. R.V. Burks, "The Communist Politics of Eastern Europe" in James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp 300-301.
5. Rosenau, "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages", in Rosenau, op.cit., p.56.
6. This focus may seem to overlap the work of R.J. Rummel and Raymond Tanter on the internal and external conflict behaviour of states, but the differences are substantial. This paper concentrates on a specific, direct, substantive link between one kind of conflict within a state and that state's external conflict relations with one or more other states. Using aggregate the degree of statistical association between all forms of internal conflict and all forms of external conflict for the same state. See Rummel, "The Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within and Between Nations", General Systems Yearbook, VIII (1963), 1-50; Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behaviour Within and Between Nations, 1958-60", Journal of Conflict Resolution, X (1966) 41-64.

7. A fuller discussion of the definition of the units and the areas, as well as the general approach and the selection of historical periods rather than "systems" as a point of departure, can be found in a previous "macroanalysis" based on the same four historical cases: Alan Dowty, "Conflict and War-Potential Politics: An Approach to Historical Macroanalysis", Peace Research Society (International), Papers, Volum XIII, 1969, 85-103.

8. Rosenau, op.cit., p.45

9. The conclusion or non-inclusion of such factionalism in historical accounts being in itself an index of importance, all factionalism reported in standard monographical material was included if it appeared to meet the definition. Classification of cases according to this and other definitions was carried out prior to the establishment of hypotheses on their relationships; the definitions themselves were derived from preliminary observation of the conflicts. Classification was carried out by two independent codings, followed by a third in case of disagreement. Disagreement was in all cases less than 10 per cent..

The definition of factionalism as given here does not necessarily link the phenomenon to conflict between the two states. But in fact support of one faction leads to conflict with the other where such conflict does not already exist.

10. George Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War", and Rosenau, "International Aspects of Internal War: A Working Paper", in Rosenau, ed., International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964).

11. This and all following tests are one-tailed. There is disagreement over the appropriate test when expected frequencies are low, but following Sidney Siegel (Nonparametric Statistics, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956) the chi-square test for a 2 x 2 contingency table is used where all categories are positive, since N in every case is greater than 40 (Siegel, pp.107-110). When a zero category is observed, however, (as with the Classical case above in TABLE II), the Fisher exact probability test is used.

12. India is not included as none of the international conflicts in that context were defined as indirect. It should be noted parenthetically that the overall low number of indirect conflicts seems to argue against overemphasis on systemic interpretations of international conflict; in the vast majority of cases, conflicts can be sufficiently explained on the basis of direct, substantive issues dividing the two states.

13. For fuller discussion of definitions see Dowty, op.cit. See also Footnote 9 above. As indirect conflicts are not included in the tension-dispute division, the totals in TABLE VI are somewhat lower.
14. Modelski, op.cit., p.28
15. Rosenau, Linkage Politics..., p.58. Further research in progress on these same historical cases suggests at least two independent dimensions for the dyadic conflicts: one, a dimension of severity, is associated to varying degrees with outcome, type of conflict, fusion with other conflicts, and homogeneity/heterogeneity; the second dimension includes linked factionalism and inequality.
16. The single cases of factionalism were the following (with the linked state in parentheses): in the Classical World: Acheae (Macedon), Acheae (different period) (Rome), Actolia(Macedon), Aetolia(Rome), Pergamum (Rome), Sparta(Acheae), India: Khandesh(Sujerat), Europe: Crimea (Russia), Genoa (Milan), Necherlands(France). Cases of double factionalism: Classical World: Rhodes(Rome, Sleucid Empire) . India: Malwa(Gujerat,Mewar), Warangal (Bahmani, Vijayanagar). Europe: Astrakhan (Crimea, Russia), Florence (France,Habsburgs), Genoa (France, Habsburgs), Kazan (Crimea, Russia), Milan (France, Habsburgs), Papacy (France, Habsburgs), Teutonic Order (Poland, Russia), Latin America: Uruguay (Argentina,Brazil). As Milan did not actually come into conflict with the Habsburgs, the total is 31 instead of 32 as appears here. The operative periods of these linkages may be for only a few years, or for the entire period studied, which explains the apparent duplication in some cases. It is interesting to note that in 9 of the 11 cases of double factionalism, the factionalized state was eventually either annexed or dominated by one or both of its two more powerful neighbors.
17. Modelski, op.cit., pp.20-23.
18. Pattern II cases (the linked state in parenthesis): Classical World: Sparta (Epirus), India: Bahmani (Vijayanagar), Delhi (Jaunpur). Europe: Naples (France), Saxony (Austria), Switzerland (Savoy). Latin America : Argentina (Brazil), Bolivia (Peru), Columbia (United States), Cuba (United States), El Salvador (Nicaragua), Haita (Dominican Republic), Mexico (France, Great Britain, Spain), Mexico (United States), United Provinces of Central America (Great Britain).
19. Ptolotemaic Egypt-Seleucid Empire in the Classical World, and Florence-Papacy in Renaissance Europe.
20. Modelski, loc.cit.

21. The appeal of Nicaraguan rebels to the United States, 1909.

22. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy", American Political Science Review, LXI (December, 1967), 971-982. See especially Chadwick F. Alger, "Comparison of intranational and international Politics", American Political Science Review, LVII (June, 1963), 406-418; and Fred W. Riggs, "International Politics as a Prismatic System", World Politics, XIV (October 1961), 144-181.

23. J. David Singer, "The Global System and its Sub-Systems: A Developmental View", in Rosenau, Linkage Politics, . . . , pp. 36-37.

24. At the time this is being written, only Hanrieder's initial article in the American Political Science Review (op.cit.) is available to the author.

25. Hanrieder, op.cit., 977.

26. Michael Brecher, Eliezer Steinberg, and Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior", Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII (March, 1969), 80.

An explanatory word on the elements of the external environment should be added. The "global" environment refers to relationships with all the actors in an international system. The "subordinate system is an intermediate level of interaction based on geographical contiguity (the first category) or on another basis (geographical but non-contiguous; organizational--all subsumed under "subordinate other").

"Bilateral" relationships include all those between two states, except for dyads involving a superpower, which are included as "dominant bilateral".

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ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS AND DYNAMICS OF VIOLENT POLITICAL
MOVEMENTS LEADING TO FOREIGN INVOLVEMENTS AND DEPENDENCE:
CROSS-CULTURAL OBSERVATIONS.

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The purpose of this paper is to discern and describe the internal problems and dynamics of clandestine violent organizations, which, regardless of the cultural setting and ideological goals, compel these organizations to seek foreign assistance.

The discussion is organized under four subheadings:

- I. Behavior of the "Enemy"
- II. Time at the Disposal of the Violent Organization
- III. Characteristics of Leaders and Members of the Violent Organization
- IV. Physical Needs of the Violent Organization

It is the thesis of the paper that these factors propel clandestine organizations toward foreign involvements. Points are illustrated by examples from various organizations in various cultures.

The author represents an unusual combination of experience pertinent to his subject. He is a scholar with interdisciplinary training in political science and psychology and has also had four years of combat service in an underground movement during World War II.

" Some burning was organized (in Detroit) in fact a lot of it was. They hit sections in teams..... We will have to fight, and we must do it from the position of strength ... All we have to be is strong enough to hold off military attack on our Southern bastions until these foreign alliances can service their influences... For instance, the deterrent effect of Chinese nuclear subs in the Gulf of Mexico".

Statement by Mr. Richard Henry (Imari), an influential leader of a militant minority group in the United States.

Whether Mr. Imari is actually going to have " Chinese nuclear subs" assisting him with making a revolution in the United States. I do not know, but if I shared his convictions and intended to rely on violence, I certainly would like to have submarines to discomfort my enemies and I would try to get them from any foreign power that offered assistance. On the other hand, if I were a Chinese Communist Party member, I would certainly promise submarines to Mr. Imari. I would even promise portable ones, which he could assemble in his bathtub which could also shoot around corners: I would promise him anything! Mr. Imari, I am sure, would accept anything. When you feel that you are facing a hated enemy, as evidently Mr. Imari does, you do not parley. You either run or fight. And if you decide to fight, then you obtain whatever assistance is available. That is the rule of the game for extra-legal organizations bent on violence. Where do you get the assistance? From anyone who is willing to give it for a sensible price. What is a sensible price? That depends... (1).

Shortly after World War II, prior to the emergence of Israel as a state, Ho Chi Minh offered Ben-Gurion Hanio as a place to set up the Israeli government in exile. Ho Chi Minh was not a Zionist, and Ben Gurion was not a Communist, but this illustrates the point that political movements which use violence, because of their internal problems and the dynamics of their situations, may become involved with foreign sources of support. Hence there is the possibility of dependency upon foreign powers.

Since the outbreak of World War II (which is, incidentally, a chronological out-off point for the materials used in this paper), many movements using violence have sought foreign assistance and have affiliated themselves with foreign powers in order to function. Their internal organizational problems and the available solutions compelled them to do so. Moreover, it appears that these internal problems and

dynamics are present regardless of the cultural setting and the ideological goals for which these organizations stand: They generate intrinsically a specific energy which propels them toward foreign involvements. It is, therefore, the purpose of this paper to discern and describe some of these problems and the dynamics which cause these organizations to pivot toward foreign support.

According to my evaluation, more than 400 violent outbreaks of magnitudes involving more than 50 participants have occurred during the past twelve years within or across national boundaries. These have involved ninety-three various extra-legal movements in seventy countries. In at least seventy per cent of these cases the outcomes affected foreign relations. Such phenomena, being so common, merit detailed study by political scientists. Moreover, in the present balance of terror among the nuclear powers, mutual exploration of weak points is carried on by application of subversion, manipulation of social unrest, and organization of underground movements-. The natural outcomes of these activities have been selective terror and mass violence.

While exploring this subject it is my intention to write in terms of my experience as a former member of an underground organization which relied on violence, rather than as a political scientist. Hopefully, this may provide more insight and less jargon.

There seem to be the four paramount problems ever-present within organizations that live by violence. They are listed below in order of their importance and effects upon dynamics of the organization and their role in turning the organizations to foreign powers for assistance. ("Dynamics" is used in this context to refer to the moving forces in internal problemsolving).

- I. Behavior of the "Enemy"
- II. Time at the Disposal of the Violent Organization
- III. Characteristics of Leaders and Members of the Violent Organization
- IV. Physical Needs of the Violent Organization

I. Behavior of the "Enemy"

The "Enemy" proclivity to react and the intensity of reaction play extremely important roles in determining the frequency and intensity of response on the part of the extra-legal violent movement. The enemy's reaction can be divided into five categories.

1. Ignoring the Organization. This is reaction most acceptable to the rank and file but never to the leaders, who will intensify the organization's activities in order to attract attention and so gain prestige.
2. Measure-for-measure retaliation. This is the best policy from the standpoint of the organization, because it can then arrange action when and where convenient and anticipate the counter-measures of the enemy. All these factors, in a sense, enable the organization to regulate the enemy's response.
3. Punishing with vengeance (escalation). The enemy turns against the organization and its most important and vital base- a sympathetic population. Under this category reprisals can escalate to the level of genocide.

From the standpoint of organizational objectives, this is a desirable policy on the part of the enemy because the application of non-selection terror will bring new recruits into the ranks of the organization. Moreover, it makes of the members heroes and martyrs.

4. Amputation approach. The enemy isolates the area and physically and selectively removes from it potential members from the population, or alternatively, the whole population en masse.

To illustrate the point, in 1940 and the first half of 1941 the Soviet Union, which had occupied Eastern Poland, organized four mass deportations of the Polish population, removing more than 1,200,000 Polish citizens from the territory, transferring them forcibly into the Soviet Union. The families transported were given hours to pack, and were ordered to prepare and take with them food for one month and only luggage which they could carry. (2) This was a selective deportation, and, in fact, did not destroy the anti-communist movement in the Polish territories. To the contrary, the impact of this activity of the Soviet government lingers still among the Polish population. However, it is obvious that if a total removal of the population has taken place (as has happened in cases with some other governments) no organization could exist.

5. Planned genocide. In this instance the enemy simply intends to physically destroy the population, including, of course, actual and potential members of the organization. The genocide of Jews during World War II is the horrifying example of this technique. The enemy's choice of behavior may affect the approaches of the organization toward foreign powers in the following ways:

In the event of enemy actions enumerated under 1,2 and 3 above, contacts with foreign governments will not be especially affected. In variant number four, depending upon the magnitude of the enemy action and the speed with which this policy is implemented there may not be time to seek foreign assistance. However, this is one of the surest

means to escalate the activities for the extra-legal organization to the point of a premature uprising and spontaneous mass-explosions of violence for self-defense purposes. Policy number five is put to bring a desperate and indiscriminate search for any source of foreign assistance and for any price, including the organization's loss of self-determination. Inadequately prepared and spontaneous uprisings may take place if the threatened group is culturally conditioned to resort to violence; but some groups may react by falling into a lethargic coma. On the whole it can be postulated that the perception of immediate danger to a violent organization will be much more intense when the enemy uses the pressure of indiscriminate terror upon the population as a whole than when such pressure is applied solely to the specialist in violence (saboteurs, agitators, guerrillas). Such action by the enemy will intensify greatly the search for foreign assistance.

II. Time Available to the Organization.

Depending upon the intensity of response by the enemy, as classified above, an organization relying on violence will have to adjust its time-table for four distinct target audiences.

1. The general population whose support it is seeking
2. Its own membership
3. Foreign donors
4. The Enemy

It is my thesis that the most important refector regulating the time-schedule with regard to the general population is the prestige which an organization can earn. This is in direct opposition to a concept commonly held in American political thinking that legitimacy is the key. Legitimacy can be a formal window-dressing used by various organizations since it appeals to Americans. Yet in a life and death struggle this is really not the immediate issue which will be crucial in gaining support or rejection by the population. The search for prestige with the general population is an extremely effective inducement to seek foreign assistance, particularly from major powers whose military and economic potential may give the impression of inexhaustible resources. The leaders of the extra-legal organization will surely give the feeling to the rank and file and to the population that these resources are at the disposal of their organization.

Next in importance among the target audiences is the rank and file of the organization. One has to realize that such organizations are highly pluralistic, fiercely competitive and quite independent. Their coalescence takes place usually under pressure from above, not from below, since under the guise of secrecy the members may be kept in the dark as to the real identity and purpose of the leaders. Before I joined the underground army (A.K.) it took me eight months to discover that I was a member of a splinter organization which I knowingly would never have joined.

In the cover of secrecy leaders of the organizations bent on violence may also engage in deception as to their own importance. Since they are ultimately engaged in a struggle for political power, not only against the enemy, but also against the competition of other violent groups, the leaders are very much inclined to have, or to give the impression of having, an exclusive claim on assistance from abroad. It is quite possible that plans of the foreign donor rather than the interest of the community which they claim to represent may be a decisive element in arrangement of a timetable by the leaders of a violent organization. The leaders will follow these plans in order to secure the assistance and the attendant prestige. This sort of informal accommodation occurs in practically all organizations although, for understandable reasons, it is very difficult to prove.

Paradoxically enough, unless the enemy's behaviour aims at genocide, he is not so important a factor in the organizational timetable as are the three factors discussed above. However, the enemy's behaviour may dictate the character of the structure of the organization (centralized or decentralized). Also, alternative strategies and their anticipated consequences might affect the time-schedule with regard to the enemy. On the basis of a study of various violent organizations it appears that so long as there is no perception of genocidal intention on the part of the enemy toward the rank and file or the general population, the foreign donors seem to have a greater impact either in imposing restraint or giving impetus to organizational time-tables than does the enemy. It is the foreign powers who very often, in fact, dictate the timetables. They do not give assistance for nothing!

Although in some instances foreign donors may have a decisive influence in arranging a timetable one way or the other this, as a rule, will be hidden from the rank and file and from the general population by the leaders of the organizations.

III. Characteristics of the Leaders and Rank and File of Violent Organizations.

There are two types of leadership in all organizations of this kind-- military and civilian, and each by the virtue of different backgrounds and preparation will perform different functions. It is quite clear that they compete for influence, prestige, and therefore, for foreign assistance. One of the typical characteristics of the leaders of extra-legal movements is the fact that they are practically never elected. Therefore, they are never, in fact, directly responsible to the rank and file during the struggle. Under the guise and shield of security and secrecy many devious manipulations take place within and among organizations. Strangely enough, although these extra-legal organizations often claim to stand for democratic principles their leaders have as little responsibility to their constituencies as those of any political body in existence. The leaders are, in this respect, in a truly privileged position. If they are victorious nobody asks them questions, and they write the history of the struggle. If they lose, who cares. They fade into oblivion, or graves, or both. So, with relative impunity, they are free to wheel and deal with foreign governments in order to procure specialists in violence, supplies, and money in competition for prestige.

The behavior of the rank and file will depend upon quite a spectrum of variables; culturally-conditioned operational values, age-range, sociological composition and stratification (It is not necessarily the deprived who join violent movements), the percentage of women, motivational factors, (3) ethnic composition, and the rate of ebb and flow of the membership. These are a few characteristics of the rank and file which it is helpful to discern. As a rule skillful leaders will either define the formal objectives of the organization in such broad terms that they encompass all the highly diversified aspirations of all the members. If the leadership is more sophisticated, it makes a sort of a content analysis of the members' formal and latent aspirations in order to assess the prevalent mood and values of this highly pluralistic "society within a society". Then it manipulates these values and the members accordingly.

Of all the variables mentioned above, which influence behavior of the rank and file, the one which is most conducive to foreign involvements is that of ethnic composition. If the organization is ethnically heterogeneous there is a phenomenon which might, by analogy, be compared to a centrifugal effect: the greater distress and intensity of action, greater the force pushing the ethnic groups outward from the cohesion of the organization. As a rule they cluster in separate units,

although still following the unified command above them. An example to support this is the fact that Marshal Tito was able to form two Italian divisions, who fought beside his troops. There were also many examples with the Jewish partisans in Europe during the Second World War, and with Poles serving with the French resistance movement. If these ethnic groups are strong enough numerically, or if they are overrepresented professionally, particularly in the area of communication (writers, T.V., producers, press, radio, etc), they will automatically manipulate common sentiments and also often, quite unconsciously, inject their ethnic values and objectives into the life of the organization. Consequently, they not only may distort the coloring and purposes of the organization itself, but they may also find an easy entry into pressure groups abroad which are of the same ethnic origins. In instances where the ethnic groups control the means of communication (radio stations) with the suppliers from abroad, such a situation can be deadly to the overall position and political stand of the organization, yet be a great advantage of an ethnic group in question. There are many examples from the period of the Second World War and post-war period indicating that this is a reality of political dynamics of the group relying on violence.

IV. Physical Needs of the Organization Relying on Violence

To maintain credibility in the eyes of the general population, rank and file, foreign supporters, and the enemy an organization has to act. To do so it has to satisfy certain requirements in order to be functional. These things are needed:

1. Specialists in violence,
2. Money,
3. Supplies.

During the summer of 1970 in one night firemen fought more than one hundred fires in a section of New York City. This was a self-inflicted outlet for hostility, undoubtedly approved by a large percentage of the community. And a very non-professional job it was, so far as the application of violence is concerned. It was non-selective, poorly timed, and it did not hit a sensitive spot. (Predominately, uncollected garbage was burned). The United States has not produced, as yet, ideologically inspired professional specialists in extra-legal violence. Mafia executioners and gangsters obviously do not fit into this category. Other societies have had a tradition of producing such men, for example, the USSR and Poland. However, American society within four to six years will, in my judgment, train and produce such clandestine specialists. They will emerge and systematically apply selective terror for political reason.

Depending on the intensity of conflict, organizations engaged in violent struggle need instructors in disruption and killing, because weapons and techniques have become rather complex. (We have made technological progress, you know).

It may sound ridiculous, but it is a fact that violent organizations have within them division of labor-- specialization has affected even these. The French Resistance had special units for train derailments. They were composed of ten men, six to disarrange the track and four as security guards. The Poles found more than twenty ways to disable a locomotive in a few minutes. They also had special squads to execute those condemned by their underground courts.

All these specialists had to be trained and provided with equipment. (The problem of supply will be discussed below.)

It is the technology above all-- a need for specialists in communications, weaponry, air-delivery, etc.; which compels an organization to seek foreign suppliers who will provide the specialists in violence to train its members. Such training can be done in the safety of foreign bases or by sending instructors or leaders such as, for example, Che Guevarra, to assist the organization in the field.

It is true that there is always a pool among the rank and file of skilled man-power who have had military training or have technological know-how. However, as a rule the former was conventional military training and the technological know-how is usually several years behind the newest developments.

At this point, by the writer's calculations, more than twenty countries are actively engaged in training foreign specialists in undercover violence.

In some countries the word money creates a sense of discomfort when connected with patriotic and idealistically inspired activities or goals. Yet, Napoleon once said that to win a war one needs three things, " money , money... and money". Violent movements are engaged in warfare. They want to win and, therefore, they need money to care for wounded, pay salaries for full-time personnel, buy weapons, help the imprisoned, bribe officials, assist widows, etc. Between January and September 1969 seventy-four Brazilian banks were robbed by clandestine organizations. Columbian terrorists collected " at least six hundred thousand dollars in ransom money of kidnapping in August 1969" (4).

When the organization is well-developed it becomes a bottomless pit for money. Poles, for the military underground alone, between 1939 and 1944 spent twenty-sevent million dollars in paper money, three hundred fifty thousand dollars in gold, and two thousand pounds in gold, four thousand marks in gold, and ninety million in local Polish currency. These sums do not include money sent out of England for the civilian underground apparatus. (5) The French resistance movement spent five billion francs during World War II. (6)

Also self-financing through voluntary contributions is always present. (If asked one had better pay, since the organization cannot afford a refusal, which would establish a bad precedent, and one presumably cannot afford "an accident"). During World War II, three industrialists in Italy raised about one hundred twenty million lire for the "regional command" during one day!

The search for money is another powerful incentive to approach foreign governments. And from the viewpoint of a foreign power, it is the most convenient form of assistance, since it can be provided in the currency of the country within which the organization operates, and its donor cannot be traced or identified. Finally, there is the matter of the last need which propels an extra-legal organization engaged in violence into dependence upon foreign governments and their directions--supplies, ultimate and necessary requirements for violent action.

The availability of supplies may become in itself, the controlling agents not only of the intensity of the struggle, but also of the character and structure of the organization and the power of its leaders. For example, the organization or a segment of it which proves its ability to get immediate delivery of weapons, will gain the most prestige--hence the support of the violently disaffected.

The United States soldier under combat conditions requires thirty-seven pounds of supplies per day including

- " Six pounds of equipment
- Five pounds of fuel and oil
- Twenty pounds of ammunition
- Six pounds of miscellaneous supplies.(7).

Experience shows that a member of the clandestine violent organization can survive and fight on a fraction of such supplies since his organizational requirements and criteria for efficiency are different. At the same time he does need equipment, although some organizations will provide themselves partially with home-made or captured supplies. It is typical and illustrative that on the night of July 7th, 1941, when the first drop of World War II took place in occupied France, it consisted of a radio set, sixteen pounds of explosives, four machine guns, and twelve flashlights. During the struggle the French Resistance alone received more than three hundred thousand rifles and machine pistols from abroad. (8) (Incidentally, an organization may get from abroad free Sousa's marches, Lenin's writings, and Mao's little red books. But for weapons the organization pays in one way or the other, sooner or later). Delivery presents great difficulties and the internal distribution even greater ones. (It reminds me of a messenger girl of my underground platoon who was unkindly nicknamed "Flat-chested Mary". This valiant girl would refuse to deliver a single hand-grenade, but she would volunteer to carry two!) The need for supplies--medical, electronic, weaponry, and other specialized equipment -- is a powerful incentive to seek friends and donors abroad.

FOOTNOTES.

1) Professor J.K. Zawodny teaches International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. He was a Fellow of the Social Science Research Council; Fellow of the VCenter of Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford; Senior Associate Member, St. Anton's College, Oxford University; Research Associate, Harvard University Center for International Affairs. He had four years of combat service with the Polish Underground Movement during World War II.

2) Komisja Historyczna Polskiego Sztabu Głównego w Londynie. Polskie Siły Zbrojne w Drugiej Wojnie Światowej. Tome III - Armia Krajowa (Polish Armed Forces in the Second World War. Vol.III - The Home Army). Londyn : Instytut Historyczny im. Gen. Sikorskiego, 1950, pp.34-35.

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4) Time, September 19, 1969, p.38

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6) Ir. Bloch-Laine, "Le financement de la Résistance", Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, n°1 (November 1950) pp.6-19. passim

7) Col. J.C. Murray, "The Anti-Bandit War", Marine Corps Gazette, April, 1954, Part.4, p.58.

8) Ferdinand Otto Miksch, Secret Forces: The Technique of Underground Movement, London: Faber and Faber, 1950, p.148 note 1.

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ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS AND DYNAMICS OF VIOLENT POLITICAL MOVEMENTS
LEADING TO FOREIGN INVOLVEMENTS AND DEPENDENCE: CROSS-CULTURAL OBSERVATIONS.

By J.K. Zawodny

CONCLUSION.

If you did not do anything courageous before, you can do it now! This was one of the Fidel Castro's slogans which brought him followers. It played on human pride and human guilt, the variables ever-present as motivational factors in all groups engaged in violence. Human feelings are so easily anchored on symbols and slogans! They provide formally stated reasons for latent human motivations and sentiments, and all such symbols and slogans become contagious in a group situation.

It is impossible to predict in behavioural terms, on any level of analysis, the degree, frequency, consistency, and reliability of the conditions under which a group engaged in violence will look for foreign assistance. Yet what has been stated above is one approximate, speculative analysis of causal relationships. There are, however, such unmeasurable variables as the sub-conscious and irrational which are ever-present on the level of personality dynamics of everyone, and which are augmented by the cumulative effect of members' inter-action within such groups as have been discussed. These factors are the main reasons for inability of a social scientist, at least this one, to provide a more precise empirical validation for his interpretation.

One thing seems to be clear. Once a group chooses violence, which involves the risk of its self-destruction, it will seek assistance from outgroups--units of different national or ethnic identification. The degree of perceived danger to their own survival will be related to the price, including dependence, which they are willing to pay for such assistance. This specialized assistance is necessary for such organizations if they want to be engaged in systematic long-range selective performance of violence. This does not mean, however, that they are unable in one hand, well-timed and delivered punch in the solar-plexus to irreparably disrupt stability of their particular society.

But such a "punch" is rather a matter of luck than skill.

On the other hand, such organizations may as well keep in mind the following illustration : .In my underground units the youngest soldiers were eight and eleven years old (boys) and the girls were fourteen and sixteen. The " Impossible they did at once: miracles took them a little longer". Two of them were killed in action. Had we had the foreign assistance we expected to have, they might be alive today.... Moreover, we lost. Not to the enemy. To our allies who had given us one third of our supplies and much more than 10 million dollars in money. Ultimately, neither our enemy nor we made the decisions determining our national fate and frontiers. Our allies made them without consulting us or our representatives. So we lost unknown millions in vain Here is a lesson for Mr. Imari who seemed to be longing for Chinese submarines...

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COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM

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The traditional distinction between domestic and foreign politics, made by both decision-makers and analysts, is increasingly called into question by contemporary historical developments. The cold-war conflict and the attending mobilization of military, socio-economic, and psychological resources by the superpowers and their allies; ventures of regional economic integration; the changing nature of the nation-state; the close connection between the conditions prevailing in the international system and the attempts made by the new states to modernize and to coalesce into viable societies -- these are just a few examples of how foreign and domestic policy projects have become overlapping and perhaps entirely inseparable.

It is for compelling reasons, then, that political analysts have devoted considerable attention to this development in recent years. If the decision-maker finds that historical processes make it difficult for him to separate external and internal aspects of national policy, the analyst similarly is called upon to refashion his analytical tools and adjust his conceptual framework: important changes in concrete historical circumstances sooner or later impel revision (in both senses of the word) of analytical paradigms. Such revisions -- in this case, efforts to attune analytical frameworks to an apparent blending of external and internal political processes -- implicitly or explicitly challenge long-accepted conceptual principles and their underlying assumptions about historical reality. In doing that, they inevitably raise searching questions about traditional divisions of labor in the discipline and about the most effective pedagogical method of portraying the international system. In short, these analytical reappraisals touch upon fundamental questions of methodology and data collection, the relationship between the study of international politics and that of comparative politics, the comparative analysis of foreign policy, and the teaching of international relations.

I

The relationship between domestic and foreign policy -- the "central mystery", as one writer has called it -- has always held a special fascination for the analyst, in part because reflections on this nexus raise some of the largest questions about the nature of political processes. These

questions not only deal with how a political unit seeks survival and accommodation in a frequently predatory environment ; they also touch upon internal dimensions such as sources of aspirations, the perception of restrictions and opportunities in the environment, prevailing value systems and their institutional manifestations, the role of groups and individual decision-makers, and so forth -- in other words, all the converging factors that influence how a political unit conceives, articulates, and advances its demands on the environment. To talk about the connection between internal and external politics means to talk about all the major elements that form the patterns of power and purpose in the domestic as well as the international system.

Organizing questions around the distinction between internal and external aspects of state affairs presupposes a corresponding underlying separability in historical reality. This is true whether the political unit in question is an individual, a family, a tribe, a nation-state, or an international organization. But it is only natural that the socio-political entity we call the nation-scale should have become particularly susceptible to having its political processes dichotomously categorized as foreign and domestic, as external and internal. All the traditional attributes of the nation-state -- territorial exclusiveness, sovereignty and equality under international law, large-scale social mobilization, successful secularization and "nationalization" of value systems, the ability to command the supreme loyalty of its subjects, the capacity to control communications and traffic of persons, goods, and services across borders -- have imposed sharply defined boundaries between the nation-state and the international environment.

Two theoretical consequences of these boundary-maintaining qualities are of particular importance. First, most political analysts have accepted what must have appeared as a "natural", or at least a historically and analytically justifiable, distinction between foreign and domestic affairs. Second, they have used this distinction as the basis for an increasingly elaborate but fundamentally two-fold division of labor : between the study of international and of (comparative) domestic politics, and between two significantly different approaches to the analysis of international relations.

Although their connection rarely has been denied, the distinction between international and domestic politics has become deeply embedded conceptually, pedagogically, and institutionally. Decision-makers and analysts have long suspected that domestic structures and operational "styles" of national governments may significantly affect external relations and that, conversely, the international environment may produce important "situational impacts" on domestic political processes. Nor is there a lack of classical studies that have specifically focused on such relationships -- for example, the writings of Plato and Aristotle, Alexis de Tocqueville,

and James Bryce, as well as the whole Rankean school of historiography that stressed concepts such as the primacy of foreign policy. More recently, the rise of totalitarian systems and, after World War II, the emergence of formerly colonial developing systems have spurred a large number of studies that have attempted to correlate internal "structural-functional" requisites with external conduct. Yet many analysts in recent years have expressed their increasing dissatisfaction with the apparent lack of progress in this field of inquiry. Blame is often placed on the lack of purposeful communication between specialists in international politics and specialists in comparative politics. In truth, many of us have imprisoned ourselves in conceptual jails of our own making where we remain incommunicado and deaf to the voices from next door. But the uneasiness, I think, goes deeper than this aspect of the prisoners' dilemma.

In the first place, the historical events that have made it extremely problematic to distinguish between international and domestic politics have overtaken analytical endeavours that are still based on the assumption of their separability : we have not as yet solved analytical problems that are already obsolescent. For example, the conceptual issues that evolve from the overlap of international and domestic politics are not confined to the old question of whether external or internal considerations are predominant in the policy agenda of the nation-state. In fact, the many analytical tasks generated by the concept of the primacy of foreign policy or by the inverse formulation --important as these tasks may be -- take as their starting point the presupposition that these two dimensions are separable and generically distinct. Since this assumption has become difficult to sustain, the analytical challenges based on it are obsolescent even though they have not as yet been successfully met. It is understandable that such a state of affairs should cause uneasiness in a discipline with scientific ambitions : one cannot skip Maxwell on the way from Newton to Einstein.

Another reason for concern is methodologically much more complex. It stems from a fundamental epistemological difficulty in relating the processes of one social system to the processes of another of which it is a part. The problem applies to the relationship between international politics and domestic politics as well as to that between some diverging approaches to the study of international politics. It is a generally accepted assumption of social science theory that the phenomena to be illuminated by theoretical concepts are characterized by both similarities and dissimilarities. Since the essence of theorizing is not only to discover regularities of behavior but also, in Cassirer's phrase, to fashion "an abbreviation of reality", an adequate theory of social processes should be able to account for recurrent patterns of both similar and dissimilar behavior. What is regarded as "similar" or "dissimilar" depends on the frame of reference and on what parameters the analyst "brackets out" by holding them constant.

Generally, there has been a tendency in the study of domestic politics to hold the international environment constant and a corresponding inclination in the study of international politics to hold the domestic environment constant. As a consequence, regularities of behavior that seem to emerge from the comparative study of domestic politics are examined within a framework of reference that is only sporadically connected to the international environment. Conversely, perceived behavior patterns in international politics are often attributed to inherent qualities of the international system (for example, its decentralized structure), with only intermittent discussion of how the members' internal characteristics may affect relational patterns of the system. The matter is further complicated by "Galton's problem" of idiographic versus nomothetic generalization --that is, the problem of analyzing a particular situation on the one hand and discovering general laws on the other hand. (Scientific explanation is concerned with both and most analysts aspire to the both fox and hedgehog : they not only want to know many things but they want to know one big thing as well.) All of these considerations raise troublesome methodological issues when two distinct frames of reference (each holding constant central variables of the other) are applied to subject matters, such as international and domestic politics, that are perceived to be overlapping : it becomes difficult to discover whether idiographic findings within one frame may not be nomothetic within the other, and the other way around.

This problem is well illustrated by two significantly different approaches to the study of international relations. The first of these approaches views international politics primarily from a global vantage point and highlights the power configurations of the international system and the way they affect the behavior of the system's members. This "systemic" level of analysis tends to view nation-states as essentially monolithic units whose value systems and internal processes are of secondary importance for understanding their external conduct. To use the terms that Denis Donoghue has applied to Nabokov, followers of this approach are essentially analysts of "ossature rather than intestine", concerned primarily with "surfaces and structures". This perspective leads to a neglect of subnational groups and to a peculiar version of state reification : "By eschewing any empirical concern with the domestic and internal variations within the separate nations, the system-oriented approach tends to produce a sort of 'black box' or 'billiard ball' concept of the national actors." ¹ This outlook is frequently encountered in the "classical" analyses of balance-of-power relationships as well as in more recent approaches that stress systemic environments factors.

The second approach emphasizes domestic predispositions and the complex internal political and socio-economic processes that go into the making of foreign policy. Understandably, analysts of this persuasion have little trouble in detecting and highlighting dissimilarities among the actors' behavior on the international level even as they strive for generalizations

on the domestic level. In focusing on the personal idiosyncracies of key decision-makers and on the "structural-functional" characteristics that distinguish various national systems, this approach tends to relegate external events to the secondary analytical role of serving as "inputs" from the international system into the domestic system. (Clearly, this approach is close to the traditional subject matter of comparative politics, even though it is primarily concerned with foreign policy processes.)

The choice of one approach rather than the other -- although influenced by the analyst's interest, temperament, and training -- is largely determined by the kind of questions that are being raised. The analyst who is primarily interested in the outcome of foreign policy will necessarily focus on the operational setting of the international system whose patterns of power and purpose make for either success or failure ; the analyst who is pre-occupied with motivational, institutional, and decision-making aspects of foreign policy will necessarily turn his attention to internal political processes. The two approaches are obviously complementary, but as in any intellectual endeavor, the epistemological bias of the question slants the analytical content of the answer and may skew the accumulation of empirical evidence. This poses serious methodological problems when it comes to combining propositions from these two levels of analysis within a unified conceptual framework --the so-called level-of-analysis problem. Propositions that can be culled either from the international-systemic level of analysis or from the national sub-systemic level of analysis are frequently regarded as non-cumulative because they emerge from significantly different analytical contexts. Such propositions, "representing different levels of analysis and couched in different frames of reference ... would defy theoretical integration ; one well be a corollary of the other, but they are not immediately combinable. A prior translation from one level to another must take place".² Attempts to "translate" such propositions are in effect a search for a conceptual synthesis among various levels of analysis ;³ and while this quest for a "new dialectic" has not been accompanied by the fanfare of the "great debates" of realism versus idealism and traditionalism versus scientism, it is related to both and is probably equally important in the long run.

II

The conceptual difficulties which attend the analysis of a single country's foreign policy are even more pronounced in a comparative study of foreign policies. It is true of course (as Max Weber and others have pointed out) that any statement, whether explicitly comparative or not, can be reduced to its inherent comparative premises ; and in that sense the conceptual issue we have been discussing with respect to a single country's foreign policy already contains major implications for comparative perspec-

tives. Even so, it may be useful to point out more specifically how the analytical questions raised by the convergence of external and internal dimensions of foreign policy relate to long-standing issues of the comparative method -- or, to put it another way, how these traditional issues have become especially problematical for those comparative foreign policy approaches that seek to come to terms with the "convergence syndrome" and the level-of-analysis problem. Of the large number of such problems, three appear to be especially pertinent in the present context : the problem of nomothetic versus idiographic characterization, the problem of "theorizing by omission", and the problem of static versus dynamic explanation.

1. The traditional paradigm for analyzing foreign policy processes -- the paradigm which posits a duality between external and internal aspects -- highlights in a striking way the central preoccupation of the comparative method in general, namely the crucial question of what phenomena the analyst should view as recurrent (essential, necessary) and what phenomena he should treat as unique (accidental, contingent). The currently prevailing epistemological position holds that this decision is not ineluctably imposed on the analyst by the subject matter itself, but stems also from the analytical perspective of the inquiry : what the analyst perceives either as regularities or irregularities is as much a function of his analytical viewpoint -- that is, a function of the kind of questions and the way of asking with which he approaches the subject matter -- as it is a function of possibly inherent regularities which the subject matter may reveal itself. What appears as nomothetically recurrent, and hence amenable to theoretical structuring, within one framework of analysis may appear as idiographically unique, and hence resistant to theory-building, within the context of another framework. Concepts and paradigms are not only (as Locke put it) "rooted in the similitudes of things", but are also rooted in the point of view of the beholder. Since the traditional paradigm for the analysis of foreign policy allowed, and even encouraged, the dual conceptual perspective I have already mentioned -- a striving for generalization on the level of either the international or the domestic political system -- it also allowed and encouraged the tendency for one approach to hold constant and "bracket out" central variables of the other approach. In short, the issue of nomothetic versus idiographic characterization, as it pertained to foreign policy studies, was largely settled by paradigmatic fiat and professional convention. As a consequence, the comparative dimensions of either approach not only reached into different directions and encompassed differently constituted elements, but also reinforced the dualistic quality of the paradigm and its inherent guidelines on how to generate generalizations on two distinct levels of analysis.⁴ The approach which searched for its generalizations on the level of the international system (and largely ignored domestic variables) put together its comparative framework with such elements as the number and configuration of independent powers (which might make for unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar systems),

the intensity of conflict or cooperation among the powers, the means available for the advancement of goals, and the relative stability and self-regulatory capacity of international systems. This led to comparative analyses either of historical international systems (such as the "classical" balance of power system, or the post-World War II bipolar system) or of systems which the analyst hypothesized for heuristic purposes. In both cases, comparison proceeded in terms which searched for regularities of behavior on the basis of systemic constellations and which often implicitly relied on a balance-of-power concept. The approach which focused on internal determinants of external behavior also entailed comparisons in time and space, but drew on significantly different elements : the "political culture" or "national character" of a nation-state, its decision-making processes and institutional strengths and weaknesses, and many other factors, were compared either "vertically" in time in terms of their development within one nation-state, or "horizontally" in space in terms of similarities or dissimilarities with other nation-states, or both comparative dimensions were combined within one framework.

One could argue of course that there was no real incompatibility between these two approaches because they were not only complementary in theory but also often combined in analytical practice. But this is not really the issue. It does not matter so much in the present context whether the traditional paradigm was ever "correct" in the sense of being fully adequate for the purpose of structuring historical reality, or whether sets of data may have remained unexamined because the paradigm did not point to them or could not accommodate them, or whether the diverse comparative strata covered by either approach were combinable in a satisfactory conceptual whole. What matters is that the analytical as well as the political discourse about foreign policy was circumscribed by the limits to which the meaning and implications of the predominant metaphor could be stretched ; and further, that these limits have been stretched beyond the breaking point by the whole set of phenomena we have labeled the convergence syndrome. By creating an overlap, or interpenetration, between external and internal dimensions of political processes, the convergence syndrome has altered the texture of the prevailing paradigm and has deprived the analyst of the opportunity to navigate with, or between, two logically plausible and conceptually satisfying analytical viewpoints. By corroding the paradigm, the convergence syndrome has also corroded the basis for comparative statements which took their meaning from the paradigm, and has posed the challenge, as Ionesco put it, to "break up our language so that it can be put together again in order to re-establish contact... with multiple reality".

Conventional meanings cannot be melted down completely, and the search for a new and more appropriate paradigm (the "best available statement" of a situation, as Bentley called it) has resulted in a good deal of conceptual confusion -- confusion in both senses of the word. In the absence

of a compelling order of research priorities and incontrovertible conceptual guidelines, it has been difficult for theoretically-oriented foreign policy analysts to agree on what are the most important and "interesting" questions that should be raised and on what is the most appropriate conceptual language in which they should be phrased. In such a period of paradigmatic flux, there is a good deal to be said, at least from an epistemological point of view, for postponing choices of analytical frameworks as long as possible. This is a position for which Stuart Hampshire has argued in the field of philosophy and aesthetics : "I have looked in philosophy, as also in fiction and poetry, not for a greater clarity in familiar ways of thought, but rather for a particular kind of confusion. The confusion is that which comes from trying conflicting possibilities of description, and from postponing a decision between them. It is the kind of confusion that occurs when one listens to different voices speaking different languages at the same time, and when one will not stop one's ears against all the voices other than the most familiar ones."⁵ The trouble is of course that it is difficult, if not impossible, for an analyst of sociopolitical processes to postpone a decision between modes of description and methodological languages since he necessarily makes such choices as he delves into his subject matter.

2. The convergence of external and internal aspects of foreign policy has also complicated the old historiographic issue of what one might call "theorizing by omission", or the "chiaroscuro" method of historical exposition. Very simply put, "theorizing by omission" means that the analyst, in choosing and correlating the variables with which he advances his argument, necessarily omits some other variables which he regards as less important or entirely irrelevant, or whose consideration by the reader he takes for granted. As Whitehead has said, "each mode of consideration is a sort of searchlight elucidating some of the facts and retreating the remainder into an omitted background" or, to put it another way, that which is omitted in historical analysis can be as important as that which is explicitly stated because it helps the analyst -- by providing contrast through a "chiaroscuro" effect -- in drawing the contours of his verbal expression and analytical exposition.

Precisely because theorizing by omission is unavoidable, it is not normally viewed as an obstacle that should be allowed to stand in the way of analytical progress. There are circumstances, however, when theorizing by omission deserves closer attention. This is the case during time periods when one cannot take for granted what the analyst's unarticulated assumptions may be, or when a previously unquestioned paradigm and its conceptual conventions are undergoing revision, leading to a blurring of the borderline between explicated foreground and omitted background. F.M. Cornford describes an example of uncertainty about underlying assumptions which is

equally applicable to periods of paradigmatic transition. Speaking of his work on Thucydides, Cornford notes the following : "My thesis did not necessarily cast a doubt upon any single statement of objective fact. But it seemed to me that any historian's choice of facts to be recorded, his distribution of emphasis among them, his sense of their significance and relative proportion, must be governed by his philosophy of life. For the history of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides is our only authority of the first rank. How are we to control his presentation of the facts ? In such a case criticism can apply only one method. It consists in disengaging from the narrative that whole framework of preconceptions which the author cannot help bringing with him, because it is the very atmosphere of his mind -- in a word, his philosophy of life."⁶

Aside from such individualistic factors as human temperament and personal experience, the preconceptions and unstated assumptions which govern an analytical point of view are largely shaped by the prevailing paradigm of inquiry. This makes it possible (at least in principle) to discover what these assumptions are, to take their presence for granted even if it is not specifically indicated, and to compensate for them if that appears desirable. (In fact, it is the assumption of such a paradigmatic convention which permits the argument, made above, that analysts of international processes have in the past tended to "bracket out" domestic variables whereas analysts of domestic politics have tended to hold constant the international setting of domestic political processes.) On the other hand, central but tacit preconceptions of this kind remain more obscure when analysts, for commendable reasons, seek to transform the prevailing paradigm -- in our case the outmoded dualism between external and internal political processes -- in order to adjust it to a more complex historical reality. When a discipline is engaged in the difficult and gradual process of revising conceptual conventions, the issue of theorizing by omission becomes more serious because it becomes difficult to discern what new preconceptions are replacing what old one, and because the dividing line between the conceptual "area" encompassed by the paradigm and the "area" it retreats into an omitted background becomes fuzzy if not entirely indistinguishable. A transformation of paradigm entails a transformation of the omitted background.

3. Closely related to the question of theorizing by omission is the issue of static versus dynamic explanation. This distinction simply means that when a sociopolitical process or event is explained in terms of variables that belong to the same time period the analyst employs a static mode of explanation ; when some of the explanatory variables are drawn from an earlier period than the variable to be explained (thus incorporating the direction and rate of change of the explanatory variables) the analyst employs a dynamic mode. A static explanatory model of historical processes is generally considered unsatisfactory because it cannot, strictly speaking,

explain but can only describe, and because it rests on unacceptably restrictive assumptions : static explanation implies a static model of the social system and assumes that all variables relevant to the analytical task at hand adjust to one another without any significant time lag. Since this is an assumption that is very difficult to sustain, static explanatory models are intrinsically defective; especially when they are applied comparatively. As John Harsanyi has pointed out, "The problem is to explain similarities and differences in the development over time of different societies or different parts of the same society, in terms of the initial conditions (i.e., the conditions prevailing at some arbitrary point of time chosen as the starting point of our investigation) and in terms of the subsequent external influences (boundary conditions) affecting their development . . . The fact that the social system is a dynamic system means that all problems of social science have an essentially historical dimension and that in effect the main task of social science is to explain historical development." ⁷

The whole question of how to obtain satisfactory dynamic explanations is closely related to the consequences of paradigmatic change and to the issues raised in our discussion of nomothetic versus idiosyncratic characterization and theorizing by omission. In the first place, what we perceive to be boundary conditions and external influences is itself a function of the paradigm : the paradigm has habitually informed our thinking on what we view as external and internal, what we regard as boundary conditions, and more generally, what we tend to accept as analytically profitable modes of generalization and what considerations we entertain in the manufacture of our fictions. ⁸ Consequently, a change of paradigm involves a change, or at least a suspension, of a customary mode of thinking and of the explicit and implicit definitional elements it consists of. Second, a redefinition of the traditional external-internal paradigm complicates the analytical operations of both the static and dynamic modes of comparison. Static-horizontal comparison becomes more complicated because the units (nation-states) to be compared are less clearly delineated vis-à-vis one another and recede in the panoramic cross-section of time and space in which the static perspective has momentarily frozen them for purposes of description. Vertical-dynamic comparison --which is necessarily concerned with development, flow, interaction, process -- is even more affected by the convergence syndrome and its conceptual consequences because it must account for changes over time (including changes in the character of the unit of analysis, such as nation-states, city-states, empires, international organizations) within a framework of analysis whose governing paradigm is itself subject to change or revision. ⁹ It is like trying to measure a contracting and expanding phenomenon with a measuring device that contracts and expands itself. This is especially problematical since different nation-states may exhibit the convergence phenomenon in different degrees. This would seem to imply that (unless the degree of convergence were itself the variable to be explained) one might profitably approach

different sociopolitical systems with different analytical frameworks. This possibility, to which Amitai Etzioni and others have already pointed in a very tentative way, would involve a drastic revision of the traditional maxim of comparative inquiry which holds that one should not change the yardstick while one is engaged in the process of measuring for comparison.¹⁰

Third, and most fundamentally, the very definition of what is static and what is dynamic is a function of the prevailing paradigm and hence changes with it. At first sight this seems implausible since we have (very simply) defined dynamic explanation as a mode of analysis in which the analyst employs explanatory variables from an earlier period than the variable to be explained. How could a change of paradigm affect the flow of time? This question raises issues which, although they are directly pertinent to it, go far beyond the confines of the convergence syndrome and the paradigmatic transformations it has engendered in the field of foreign policy studies; it is a question which touches upon a view of causality and time-sequences in the analysis of political processes which is itself undergoing revision.

In a remarkable essay, whose insights and ambience cannot be adequately conveyed even in the long quotation which follows, Norman Jacobson argues that the radical dimension of Bentley's thinking on process -- "a vision in favor of release and against all premature fore-closures" -- was subsequently emasculated by political scientists who, although paying lip service to the idea of process, lacked "the tolerance of ambiguity and possibly disorder to allow process the freedom to flow." Jacobson suggests, with Bentley, that causality is still a useful concept for establishing an order for a time sequence and that "Normally an order is constructed such that an event considered as a cause is taken as earlier than the event representing the effect. But order means just that: it is a purely theoretical arrangement, and permits two distinct directions equally admissible. Consequently, no unique direction of time may be assigned once for all by means of causality." Jacobson, who implicitly argues for a radical revision of all prevailing paradigm for the analysis of political processes, continues:

"There are numerous accounts, usually in books on the philosophy of science, in which time is treated as a reflection of universal psychological experience, a preference which we ourselves project from our inner lives onto objects and events in the external world. Only when we are prepared to acknowledge as much, we are told, will we be ripe for alternative ways of conceiving time. There is no question that it is tremendously difficult to relinquish set ways of looking at the world. But that is precisely the point: our psychological experience is scarcely a matter of orderly occurrence through time or neat sequences of events. Acausality vies with

causal modes of thought, atemporality challenges temporality, a vague impression of simultaneity invades even our fully conscious moments. Which might help account for the uncompromising order we insist upon projecting onto the world about us. We dread that dissolution into 'function' about which Bentley dreamed, the terrifying disappearance of the 'firm land of matter or even of sense of self' which he welcomed as an opportunity. Perhaps rather than reflecting our psychological experience, temporality is an effort to escape his intolerable 'floating cosmology'. Bentley would thrust us back upon ourselves, would give neither himself nor us any rest but would have us all gaze with the merciless eye of the detached scientist straight through the barriers which we ourselves have thrown up for our own protection. There has been, to put it mildly, a certain reluctance to cooperate, which is perhaps the sign of a canny wisdom. For given a multiplicity of time-order sequences darting every which way, the problems raised are not of the sort to rest easily with a weak constitution.

"For one thing, it is conceivable that there exists a certain 'autonomy' of action within process, not excluding political process. If descriptions of the neural net give any indication we might expect that following 'stimulation' certain political activities will cease while others will continue. Concretely, there is no reason to believe, on the basis strictly of process thinking, that all or even many aspects in the political life of a new nation will reflect recent industrialization. Activation might well cease abruptly in one segment but 'radiate' almost indefinitely in another. Nor is there any reason to anticipate a uniform rate of change or development. In fact, however intimately related, even causally connected they appear, it may be that within the very same system activities of a critical nature are taking place in utter freedom of one another but not without reference to still a further activity, as yet unspecified. And that is just the beginning."ll

III

It is clear that a change of paradigm must, at least in the long run, lead to a change of method. Equally compelling and important is the consideration that a change of method can lead to a change of paradigm. In that connection, the current debate about method in political science necessarily has some bearing on the methodology of foreign policy studies. Nonetheless, to the extent that this debate has increasingly focused on the issue of "traditionalism" versus "scientism" it appears as somewhat misdirected and not centrally pertinent to the questions that have been raised here. In the first place, many science-oriented "modernists" (as well as many "traditionalists") have in the past accepted the traditional dualistic foreign policy paradigm and have constructed analytical frameworks on the basis of the external-internal guidelines which that paradigm suggested.

In that sense, the debate over method has, if anything, further enshrined the orthodoxies of the predominant metaphor and inhibited efforts to escape from its conceptual grip. Secondly, the argument over the possibility of quantifying central political variables has largely run its course and has ended in an uneasy but probably permanent truce. To be sure, there are and always will be differences of analytical temperament. What characterizes one orientation as "traditional" is less an infatuation with the past than the more or less self-consciously held assumption that not only the conduct but also the analysis of political affairs is an art rather than a science -- an assumption from which follows the attitude that there cannot be any real "progress" in political analysis for, as Ilya Ehrenburg has put it, "In the arts there is never any progress, but only changes in form which give expression to what men are like in any particular epoch". The behavioral approach, on the other hand, assumes that methodological progress is possible at least in principle and that one can arrive at a more convincing and incontrovertible understanding of sociopolitical processes through methods which allow replication and depend less on individuated idioms of analytical expression. It is also true that what we have labeled the issue of theorizing by omission has figured in the general debate over method, with the "modernists" making the point that their own underlying assumptions are more explicitly articulated, while those of the "traditionalists" are alleged to be shrouded in historical narrative. Of this aspect of the debate one could perhaps say, at the risk of offending both parties, that the more traditional approaches tend to have the problem of making the significant more clearly visible (and hence "behaviorally" comprehensible) while the modernists tend to have the problem of making the visible more clearly significant.

By and large, however, the "great debate" over method that took place in the 1960s has proved to be astonishingly conservative. For example, on such fundamental questions as the issue of nomothetic versus idiosyncratic characterization -- an issue which is central for efforts to revise prevailing paradigms -- we do not seem to have advanced substantially beyond Kant's classical formulation of the problem in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant argues in essence that one can distinguish between two important schools of scientific interpretation, one of which stresses the common feature of observable phenomena and follows a principle of homogeneity, the other of which highlights heterogeneity and follows a principle of specificity. These two orientations are complementary and merely reflect the propensity of human reason to seek satisfaction in both modes of inquiry -- the issue is largely one of methodology and purpose of inquiry. Kant says, "When purely regulative principles are taken for constitutive, they may become contradictory, as objective principles. If, however, they are taken for maxims (that is, "paradigms") only, there is no real contradiction, but it is only the different interest of reason which causes different modes of

thought. In reality, reason has one interest only, and the conflict of maxims arises only from a difference and mutual limitation of methods, in which that interest is to be satisfied. But this difference of the two maxims of manifoldness or unity in nature may easily be adjusted, though as long as they are taken for objective knowledge they cause not only disputes, but actually create impediments which hinder the progress of truth, until a means is found of reconciling the contradictory interests, and thus giving satisfaction to reason."

As the dispute in the social sciences and modern philosophy (especially the philosophy of science) has demonstrated, the difference between the two maxims could not in fact be easily adjusted, and the middle ground which Kant sought between Hume's two neat pigeonholes of induction and deduction has not as yet been gained. It may well be, as James Ward Smith has pointed out, that the conflict between Hume and Kant is remarkably "up-to-date", and that "when one examines that conflict in the light of all that is transpiring in recent philosophy, one is tempted to conceive of the entire nineteenth century as an unfortunate and relatively unprofitable digression."¹² At the same time, it is somewhat ironic to note the similarities between the passage from Kant quoted above and the defense of the inductive method which such a prominent modernist as Bruce Russett felt obliged to put forth recently: "We have entered a new phase in the apparently endless debate over method. Argument once centered on the possibility of quantifying important political variables, and of establishing empirically based generalizations about international behavior. With accumulating evidence that measurement and generalization are possible, the grounds have shifted ... (and) a more sweeping criticism is now being encountered; it is phrased in the language of scientific inquiry, and deserves careful examination. Essentially, the new case is one for the merits of deductive analysis in political science, and a virtual rejection of inductive procedures ... My own conclusion is that the controversy is essentially unprofitable, and that the general argument (as opposed to questions of specific application in particular studies) is a silly one. There is room for both induction and deduction, the particular application being determined by such factors as the researcher's skill and temperament, the kind and quality of scientific work that has preceded the application, and the difficulty of data-gathering. I find it impossible to imagine any firm rule that would satisfactorily set out any exclusive province for one or the other, just as I cannot imagine any exclusive province for 'quantitative' versus 'non-quantitative' research."¹³

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. Kant's "conflict of maxims" is apparently still with us, and one can only argue (and hope) with Norman Jacobson that we will find it possible to relinquish our set ways of looking at the world and break through the conceptual barriers which we ourselves have thrown up for our protection. Perhaps we can then open up new questions of looking at old questions.

FOOTNOTES

1. J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations", World Politics, October 1961, p. 81.
2. Ibid., p. 91. See also Siegfried Kracauer, History, The Last Things Before the Last (New York : Oxford University Press, 1969), esp. chapter 5.
3. For examples, see Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1963 : International Pressure and Domestic Response (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1967) ; and "Compatibility and Consensus : A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy", American Political Science Review, December 1967.
4. As Martin Landau points out, "The use of a dominant metaphor always involves us in a basic form of comparative analysis. We compare B to A in order to pursue a more or less systematic analysis of B. A is our representational base, our model. If very little is known about A, the likelihood of any significant yield is minimal ; if we do not understand A's characteristics, the comparison is pointless. It is only when we understand the structural form, the concepts involved, and the properties and features of the model that we can make an 'educated guess' as to the validity of the analogy." Martin Landau, "On the Use of Metaphor in Political Analysis", Social Research, October 1961, pp. 351-52.
5. New York Review of Books, September 26, 1968, p. 52.
6. F.M. Cornford, The Unwritten Philosophy (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 1-2 ; see also Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen : J.C.B. Mohr-Paul Siebeck Verlag, 1960).
7. John C. Harsanyi, "Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social Science", Behavioral Science, April 1960, p. 139. (Emphasis in original).
8. Paradigms also set the limits of the analytical task on hand. Harsanyi says, "If a social scientist suggests an explanation for a social fact in terms of other social facts (i. e., in terms of variables endogenous to the social system), his explanation is incomplete so long as he cannot offer explanation for these latter social facts themselves. But if he puts forward explanation for a social fact in terms of variables genuinely exogenous to the social system his analytical task will be completed, as it will not be his business as a social scientist to find an explanation for these exogenous variables themselves... One of the reasons why explanation of social phenomena in terms of economic forces is often so fruitful lies in the fact

that the economic system is one of the main channels through which the natural (exogenous) environment (in particular, the presence or absence of natural resources and of natural routes of communication) acts upon the social system." Ibid., pp. 140-41.

9. Boundary conditions and delineations of analytical units are generally difficult to define, not only in the social sciences. As Felix Mainx has pointed out, a statement of the biological form "not only relates to the organism but takes in a part of the environment." "Foundations of Biology", in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. I, Part. II (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 593.
10. See Etzioni's introduction to J.P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, International Systems and the Modernization of Societies : The Formation of Goals and Attitudes (London : Faber & Faber, 1968), esp. p.11. See also Henry Teune, "Measurement in Comparative Research", Comparative Political Studies, April 1968, pp. 123-38.
11. Norman Jacobson, "Causality and Time in Political Process : A Speculation", American Political Science Review, March 1964, pp. 20-21. See also Kracauer, op.cit., chapter 6 ; George Kubler, The Shape of Time : Remarks on the History of Things (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1962) ; Margherita von Brentano, "Die unbescheidene Philosophie: Der Streit um die Theorie der Sozialwissenschaften", Das Argument, July 1967, pp. 1-2-116.
12. James Ward Smith, Theme for Reason (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 176.
13. Bruce M. Russett, "The Young Science of International Politics", World Politics, October 1969, pp. 87-88.

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Intervention et contagion, conflits limités et guerres
civiles régionales

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Le titre ci-dessus n'étant pas d'une parfaite clarté, il est utile de préciser de quoi il va être question. Nous allons examiner les rapports qui existent d'une part entre la notion de région internationale et le problème des liens entre politique intra-étatique et politique inter-étatique ("linkage problem") ; d'autre part entre ce "linkage problem" et l'usage de la violence, c'est-à-dire les liens qui existent entre la violence intérieure et la guerre internationale ; enfin les relations entre ces deux points, la violence intérieure et extérieure comme facteur déterminant ou favorisant l'unité ou la désagrégation régionales.

I. - Les formes contagieuses de la violence

Les "liens" qui existent entre violence intérieure et violence internationale peuvent être appréhendés de deux manières : du point de vue de l'explication, c'est-à-dire des relations d'enchaînement qui conduisent de l'un à l'autre phénomène ; du point de vue de la comparaison c'est-à-dire des ressemblances ou similitudes qui peuvent exister entre eux. Ces deux séries de considérations ne sont pas sans rapports entre elles, l'existence de similitudes étant un des éléments qui permettent d'analyser les relations de causalité.

Dans la réflexion politique traditionnelle on rencontre, à propos des relations d'enchaînement entre la guerre internationale et les troubles intérieurs, deux doctrines opposées. Pour la première, il y aurait une antinomie entre ces deux types de phénomènes, la guerre internationale étant un facteur de cohésion interne des sociétés. Pour la seconde, ils se renforceraient au contraire l'un l'autre. Cette opposition ne doit pas être conçue comme constituant les deux aspects d'une question que l'on peut formuler ainsi : dans quelles circonstances et à quelles conditions la guerre est-elle un facteur favorable à la cohésion interne des sociétés, ou au contraire un facteur de leur désagrégation ?

L'étude des ressemblances entre violence intérieure et violence extérieure est étroitement liée à la définition même du "linkage problem". En effet, la possibilité de la guerre est traditionnellement considérée comme un

des critères décisifs qui distinguent la politique intérieure de la politique internationale. A cet égard on doit distinguer entre la violence, entendue au sens le plus général, et la guerre, forme particulière, "légalisée" comme le souligne Quincy Wright¹, de celle-ci.

La violence appartient autant à la politique intérieure qu'à la politique extérieure. C'est le monopole de la violence légitime qui définit, pour les juristes, la souveraineté interne de l'Etat. Et la différence entre les relations politiques intra-étatiques et inter-étatiques, violentes ou non, tient à ce monopole. La politique intérieure est dissymétrique, elle se joue entre acteurs de statuts inégaux, les relations internationales sont, du moins en principe, symétriques.

La guerre civile, où le recours à la violence n'est légitime que d'un seul côté, la guerre internationale où ce recours est légitime pour chacune des parties, il s'agit là de deux pôles conceptuels. Dans les faits, se multiplient les phénomènes qui occupent une position intermédiaire et cumulent des traits de l'un et de l'autre. Un mouvement insurrectionnel revendique toujours une légitimité et parvient souvent à la faire reconnaître assez largement ; il peut créer un "gouvernement provisoire" et parvenir, grâce à une aide extérieure, à briser le monopole de moyens de l'Etat qu'il conteste. A l'inverse, dans une guerre internationale, chacun conteste la légitimité de l'adversaire, et l'apparition de moyens nouveaux très inégalement répartis et d'idéologies universalistes ont permis à certains états de disposer à l'égard des autres du monopole de certains moyens de la violence, ou d'exercer sur eux un contrôle quasi-hiérarchique qui s'apparente à la relation entre gouvernants et gouvernés.

C'est là, nous semble-t-il, un des points qui méritent le plus d'être soulignés à propos du "linkage problem" considéré pour les relations violentes. Non seulement la violence intérieure influe sur la violence extérieure et réciproquement, mais il y a confusion croissante entre les deux phénomènes. Cette confusion est à la fois un des facteurs et une des manifestations de l'interpénétration, sans doute croissante elle aussi, des politiques intérieure et internationale.

Si l'on veut tenter d'ordonner la confusion entre violence civile et violence internationale, il semble que l'on puisse le faire de deux points de vue - de celui des enjeux des conflits - et de celui des méthodes de combat adoptées par les protagonistes.

Pour ce qui est des enjeux, il semble que l'on puisse utiliser avec profit la distinction classique en sociologie entre universalisme et particularisme. Un conflit est universaliste lorsqu'il est livré au nom d'une idée, d'une conception de l'ordre social ou plus généralement du Bien, théoriquement compréhensible et acceptable par chacun des acteurs en présence. Dans un tel conflit,

l'adversaire n'est perçu comme tel que dans la mesure où il s'oppose à cette idée ; il peut être vaincu, mais peut aussi être converti. Les guerres révolutionnaires ou les guerres de religions appartiennent à ce type.

Dans un conflit particulariste au contraire, ce qui est en jeu, c'est la défense des intérêts ou des ambitions d'un groupe dont les limites sont fixées au départ. Les guerres nationales appartiennent à ce second type.

Un conflit est universaliste lorsque les acteurs disposent d'une certaine liberté d'y choisir leur camp, et éventuellement d'en changer. Il est particulariste lorsque leur position est déterminée à l'avance par des données qu'ils ne peuvent contrôler. Au XVI^e siècle en Europe, les guerres religieuses ont été plutôt universalistes dans la mesure où on pouvait choisir d'être catholique ou protestant. En Irlande du Nord aujourd'hui où on naît l'un ou l'autre, un conflit religieux apparemment comparable est devenu, en fait, particulariste, et s'apparente plus à une opposition ethnique.

Il s'agit là bien sûr de pôles théoriques, les conflits réels se situent entre les deux et sont plus ou moins universalistes ou particularistes. Les partisans d'une idée aboutissent toujours à créer une organisation ou un groupe possédant des intérêts propres, dont la défense se même plus ou moins étroitement à la lutte pour l'objectif universaliste. A l'inverse, tout groupe qui défend des intérêts particuliers aura tendance à donner de ceux-ci une formulation généralisante, ne serait-ce que le "droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes", justification universaliste du particularisme.

D'autre part, un conflit n'est pas universaliste ou particulariste en soi mais par référence à tel ou tel acteur. Le même conflit peut être particulariste pour un des partis en cause et universaliste pour l'autre. C'est le cas lorsqu'un pays ou un groupe défend son indépendance face à une idéologie conquérante.

Cette distinction n'est pas sans rapport avec celle qui existe entre guerre civile et guerre internationale, mais ne s'y superpose pas exactement. Pour le cas limite d'un système international parfaitement homogène au sens de Aron², toutes les guerres internationales seraient particularistes, tous les conflits intérieurs seraient universalistes, sans pouvoir d'ailleurs se développer jusqu'à la guerre civile sans menacer l'homogénéité du système. En fait, un système international est toujours plus ou moins hétérogène ; le conflit international connu sous le nom de "guerre froide" apparaît comme très largement universaliste, et la guerre civile du Nigeria a eu une dominante particulariste très nette.

C'est parce qu'elle comportait une dose importante d'universalisme que la deuxième guerre mondiale a parfois été qualifiée de "guerre civile mondiale". "Civil", ce conflit l'était aussi en ce qu'il mettait aux prises des

combattants qui n'étaient pas tous des militaires. C'est là semble-t-il la principale distinction que l'on puisse faire entre les formes d'exercice de la violence quant aux méthodes de combat. D'une part on a la guerre régulière que se livrent deux armées organisées appliquant des méthodes stratégiques conventionnelles. D'autre part, on a la guerre populaire livrée par des combattants civils appliquant des méthodes relevant de la guérilla ou du terrorisme. La première a pour objet l'occupation d'un territoire et s'organise en termes de points et de lignes, lignes de fronts ou lignes de communications. La seconde se préoccupe du contrôle d'un territoire et plus encore d'une population, elle n'est pas une guerre linéaire mais une guerre en surface, elle ne connaît pas de front mais des zones de combat qui ne sont sous le contrôle exclusif d'aucun parti.

De nouveau il s'agit là de modèles théoriques entre lesquels s'organisent dans des positions intermédiaires les cas réels, et qui ne recouvrent qu'approximativement la distinction entre guerre civile et guerre internationale. Il ne manque pas d'exemples d'armées populaires qui se soient donné très vite des structures et une stratégie militaires, d'armées régulières en difficulté qui aient eu recours à la guérilla, de guerres civiles qui se soient traduites par l'affrontement de deux armées régulières, de conflits internationaux qui aient comporté une part de guerre populaire.

On peut cependant considérer qu'il y a une certaine parenté, d'une part entre la guerre intérieure, le conflit universaliste, et la guerre populaire, d'autre part entre la guerre internationale, le conflit particulariste, et la guerre régulière. En combinant ces trois éléments on peut dresser un tableau des types possibles de conflits :

Guerre intérieure	(- universaliste populaire	guerre civile chinoise	1
	(- particulariste populaire	Algérie	2
	(- particulariste régulière	Nigeria	3
	(- universaliste régulière	Espagne	4
Guerre internationale	(- particulariste populaire	Palestine	5
	(- universaliste régulière	Corée	6
	(- universaliste populaire	Vietnam	7
	(- particulariste régulière	guerre indo-pakistanaise	8

En face de chaque type on a fait figurer un exemple qui n'a qu'une valeur d'illustration. Aucun cas réel n'est pur et ne correspond exactement à un type défini abstraitement. Nous ne considérons absolument pas que la guerre civile chinoise n'ait comporté aucun aspect particulariste, ni le conflit indo-pakistanaise aucun aspect universaliste, mais seulement que la première était plutôt universaliste, et le second plutôt particulariste.

Les types numérotés 1 et 8 sont ceux qui apparaissent les plus conformes aux modèles du système international homogène. Cette conformité décroît de 1 à 4, et croît de 5 à 8. Il y a en effet une parenté entre le particularisme et la guerre régulière, qui tient à leur rapport à l'espace. Il est plus facile pour un groupe qui dispose d'un territoire défini de s'organiser sous une forme étatique ou para-étatique qui permette de mener une guerre régulière, ce qu'on a pu observer au Biafra. Réciproquement, lorsqu'un parti défini idéologiquement est amené à contrôler un territoire, il acquiert des caractères particularistes, ainsi le Viet-Minh est-il devenu le Nord-Vietnam. Le même type de relation existe entre l'universalisme et la guerre populaire, celle-ci est la seule forme de guerre que puisse mener un parti qui a une idéologie mais pas de territoire, et la propagande est le moyen de recruter des combattants pour qui ne peut les mobiliser légalement, ainsi les mouvements de Résistance en Europe dont les motivations ont été d'abord nationalistes se sont-ils vus aussi révolutionnaires à la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale.

Les deux exemples les plus surprenants de notre tableau sont d'une part la guerre civile espagnole, livrée sur une base idéologique, et avec les méthodes stratégiques les plus conventionnelles de l'époque, une guerre de positions entre armées régulières ou semi-régulières, d'autre part le conflit international israélo-arabe, livré pour des raisons profondément particularistes, et auquel certains cherchent à donner, du moins sur le front asiatique, et avec un succès qui reste à démontrer, la forme d'une guerre populaire.

Malgré ces exceptions, on peut cependant admettre qu'il existe des relations de renforcement réciproque d'une part entre l'universalisme et la guerre populaire, d'autre part entre le particularisme et la guerre régulière. De ces quatre éléments, deux sont favorables à la contagion, l'universalisme et la guerre régulière.

Le caractère contagieux de l'universalisme est assez évident. Il est clair qu'un conflit interne semblera d'autant plus menaçant pour l'environnement international qu'il sera formulé dans des termes le rendant plus aisément transposable d'un pays dans un autre, et que réciproquement la tendance à l'intervention sera d'autant plus grande au sein d'un système international que les divisions de celui-ci seront plus idéologiques. A l'inverse une guerre internationale, si elle s'accompagne d'un conflit idéologique accusé, prendra à l'intérieur de chacun des protagonistes les caractères d'une guerre civile au moins larvée.

La guerre régulière peut s'étendre à de nouveaux pays du seul fait des intérêts stratégiques d'un des belligérants, c'est un phénomène qu'on a pu observer plusieurs fois en Europe. La guerre populaire peut elle aussi s'étendre pour des raisons essentiellement stratégiques, on l'a vu récemment

au Moyen-Orient et en Asie du Sud-Est, mais pour cela l'une ou l'autre des deux conditions suivantes doit être remplie : ou bien le parti envahisseur dispose, à l'égard du pays envahi d'une supériorité telle, en termes de guerre régulière, que celui-ci n'a pas les moyens de s'y opposer, c'est sans doute le cas au Laos. Ou bien il lui faut obtenir l'acceptation du gouvernement ou le soutien d'une fraction de la population du pays envahi, comme c'est le cas au Liban. Ceci revient à dire que la possibilité de contagion de la guerre populaire est subordonnée à sa capacité d'universalisation.

Enfin, il faut noter que le recours à la violence est en lui-même, sous l'aspect de "l'ascension aux extrêmes" de Clausewitz, un facteur de transformation des conflits, et en cela de contagion. Un conflit particulièrement à l'origine, tendra en se prolongeant à être formulé en termes de plus en plus universels comme en Europe entre 1914 et 1918 ; et réciproquement, le rapport qui existe entre le succès de tel ou tel mouvement communiste et le lien que celui-ci a su établir avec le nationalisme est connu. Une guerre régulière perdue peut se transformer en guerre populaire, et lorsque celle-ci se prolonge, on voit se développer une organisation de plus en plus para-militaire des combattants et para-étatique des "zones libérées". Cette propriété de l'ascension aux extrêmes est sans doute un des éléments qui permettent d'expliquer la possibilité des types intermédiaires du tableau. Elle a pour conséquence que, si dans l'instant les possibilités de contagion d'un conflit dépendent de son caractère universaliste, à terme, tout conflit est plus ou moins universalisable.

II. -- La contagion de la violence dans le cadre régional

Avant d'examiner comment se pose le problème de la contagion de la violence dans le cadre particulier des régions internationales, il est utile que nous adoptions une définition provisoire de la notion de région. "Appartiennent à la même région des pays qui sont géographiquement proches et possèdent un certain nombre de points communs ou de liens particuliers". Les deux éléments de cette définition ne doivent pas, semble-t-il, être considérés comme alternatifs mais comme complémentaires.³ A ne retenir que la proximité géographique on se prive du moyen de reconnaître les limites extérieures d'une région. En se limitant aux ressemblances et aux liens particuliers on vide la notion de région de tout sens spécifique en en faisant une simple classe au sens taxinomique. Etudier le régionalisme c'est rechercher dans quelle mesure la proximité géographique est un facteur favorisant ou non l'existence de ressemblances ou l'établissement de liens particuliers entre Etats.

L'étude de ces ressemblances et de ces liens est étroitement reliée à celle des "linkage". L'existence de relations particulièrement nombreuses et étroites entre des pays différents peut entraîner une convergence des structures politico-sociales internes de ceux-ci. A l'inverse, des ressemblances intérieures nombreuses peuvent favoriser ou provoquer l'établissement de relations internationales privilégiées. De manière assez approximative on pourrait dire qu'une région est composée d'Etats qui sont, les uns envers les autres, "moins étrangers que les autres".

Le deuxième élément de la définition proposée ci-dessus, les données culturelles qui font exister la région, doit être mis en rapport avec la variable universalisme/particularisme que nous avons utilisée pour étudier les types de conflits. Le premier élément, la proximité spatiale, doit être examiné en relation avec les méthodes de combat.

Nous avons essayé de montrer que la capacité de contagion d'un conflit était fonction de son caractère universaliste. La prise en considération du cadre régional devrait nous permettre de nuancer cette affirmation. La notion d'universalisme n'est pas une notion absolue, mais est relative aux limites du groupe humain dans lequel on raisonne. Pour donner un exemple, la loi en Grande-Bretagne s'efforce de traiter les Britanniques de manière plutôt universaliste. Mais cet universalisme connaît une limite, celle de la citoyenneté, puisqu'il ne s'applique pas de la même manière aux étrangers. Universalisme si on raisonne dans le cadre britannique, la législation anglaise devient, si on raisonne au plan mondial, l'expression d'un particularisme.

De même un conflit est universaliste s'il l'est pour les acteurs qui y sont impliqués, et éventuellement pour un certain nombre d'autres, mais sans qu'il soit nécessaire qu'il le soit pour n'importe qui. Nous n'avons donc pas seulement à nous demander dans quelle mesure un conflit donné est universaliste, mais aussi pour qui ou dans quel cadre.

La région internationale, dans la mesure où elle est définie à partir de caractéristiques socio-culturelles communes à tous les pays qui en font partie, peut constituer un tel cadre. La communauté de langue, de religion, de tradition historique et idéologique, de régime politique, permet de comprendre qu'un conflit d'abord limité à un pays puisse être transposé aux autres pays d'une même région et que les habitants de ceux-ci puissent s'identifier aux acteurs du conflit initial.

L'importance du rôle joué par la révolution cubaine dans la politique latino-américaine s'explique semble-t-il ainsi. Le retentissement de cette révolution a été comparable à celui des révolutions française ou russe en Europe, sans que Cuba soit en rien un pays d'une importance comparable

à la France ou à la Russie. Mais l'Amérique latine apparaît comme une région culturellement beaucoup plus homogène que l'Europe. L'unité presque complète de langue et de religion, la communauté d'histoire, la similitude des problèmes politiques affrontés, développement, réforme agraire, relations avec les Etats-Unis, créent une facilité d'identification assez grande d'une situation nationale à une autre. Ceci a eu pour résultat que le modèle cubain est très vite apparu comme mettant en cause les structures de l'ensemble du continent.

Dans le conflit nigerian, le particularisme ibo est apparu comme un problème général à l'intérieur des limites de l'Afrique noire, mais pas en dehors de celle-ci. Pour les gouvernements africains, il ne s'agissait pas d'un problème spécifique nigerian, mais d'une menace générale, le "tribalisme" qui, si elle triomphait au Biafra, comporterait des risques graves de contagion. Hors d'Afrique, ni le conflit Est-Ouest, ni le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes n'ont été considérés comme s'appliquant au cas biafrais qui est resté un conflit particulariste sans signification universelle.

Le conflit du Moyen-Orient est particulièrement intéressant. De tous les grands conflits actuels, c'est sans doute à la fois le plus particulariste dans ses origines, et celui qui soulève le plus de passions dans l'opinion mondiale, ou au moins dans deux secteurs de celle-ci, le monde arabe et les pays occidentaux. Comme à l'intérieur de l'ensemble latino-américain, l'identification est très forte à l'intérieur du monde arabe du fait de l'unité culturelle de la région. Sur le conflit particulariste local entre Israéliens et Palestiniens, s'en est greffé un autre, universaliste celui-là à l'intérieur du monde arabe, entre radicaux et modérés. Ce second conflit qui est inter-arabe, a joué un rôle déterminant dans l'extension de la guerre au Liban. Il serait intéressant à cet égard de pouvoir expliquer pourquoi la solidarité avec les Palestiniens a joué à l'intérieur de l'ensemble arabe plutôt que de l'ensemble musulman ; la proximité géographique est en effet une explication insuffisante, la Turquie ou l'Iran étant plus proches de la Palestine que l'Algérie.

Dans les pays occidentaux, le particularisme juif, dont Israël est l'expression, est, et restera sans doute tant que la Bible occupera une place particulière dans la culture de peuples qui sont ou ont été christianisés, et tant que des minorités juives y joueront un rôle important, un particularisme différent des autres, en bien ou en mal.

Jusqu'en 1967, les thèses arabes ont été acceptées en Occident soit par des minorités antisémites traditionnelles, soit sans grande conviction par les partis communistes qui identifiaient Israël et "l'impérialisme américain". Depuis 1967, le thème de la "Révolution palestinienne" est apparu comme une tentative intéressante pour universaliser un conflit particulier et faire épouser les thèses arabes par certains milieux révolutionnaires occidentaux.

L'espace est toujours une des données par rapport auxquelles s'organise une stratégie, et la proximité géographique sera toujours un des facteurs de la contagion des conflits ; ceci à des degrés divers selon les circonstances. Dans le cas de la guerre régulière, le problème est simple, il suffit, pour qu'un pays soit entraîné dans une guerre malgré lui, qu'un des belligérants estime qu'il peut en tirer un bénéfice, et qu'il ait un avantage de puissance suffisant pour pouvoir lui imposer sa volonté. Cet avantage devra être d'autant plus grand que la distance entre les deux pays considérés sera plus grande. Ce rôle de la distance dans la mesure de la puissance relative décroît selon qu'il s'agit de guerre terrestre, de guerre aérienne ou navale, ou de guerre nucléaire.

Dans le cas de la guerre populaire on a une dissymétrie envers les acteurs. Pour le parti qui conteste l'autorité en place et qui a recours à la guérilla, la proximité géographique entre le pays où il combat et celui ou ceux d'où il peut tirer des ressources pour alimenter ce combat, est d'une très grande importance. La guerre populaire est en effet une guerre artisanale, uniquement terrestre, dont les communications se font à pied, ou utilisent des moyens de transport rudimentaires. On a pu observer au Moyen-Orient ou en Asie du Sud-Est que la guerre populaire se propageait par contiguité. Les situations où la guerre populaire a échoué (Philippines, Malaisie, Bolivie) sont celles où elle est restée isolée.

Au contraire, pour le parti gouvernemental et ceux qui le soutiennent, les grandes distances ne sont pas ou très peu un obstacle. De toutes les difficultés que rencontre l'intervention américaine au Sud-Vietnam, la largeur de l'Océan Pacifique est une des moindres.⁴ Si les Thaïlandais sont plus disposés que d'autres à intervenir au Cambodge du fait de leur proximité, ce n'est pas tant parce que celle-ci rend leur intervention matériellement plus facile que parce qu'elle entraîne pour eux un risque de contagion plus grand. Si la contagion de la guerre populaire est locale ou régionale, l'intervention contre celle-ci peut, sans grande difficulté, être globale.

Pour expliquer la contagion d'un conflit on doit donc tenir compte de deux séries de facteurs, la communauté culturelle entre les pays concernés, et leur position géographique les uns par rapport aux autres. L'extension au Cambodge de la guerre du Vietnam est sans doute due d'abord au deuxième facteur ; c'est l'utilisation du territoire de ce pays comme base et comme voie de passage qui l'a entraîné dans la guerre. Dans le cas du Liban, les facteurs stratégiques ont joué, mais aussi le fait que ce pays était revendiqué comme "arabe" par au moins une partie de sa population, ce qui a imposé des limites à la volonté de son gouvernement de s'opposer aux commandos palestiniens. Si on compare l'engagement dans le conflit du Moyen-Orient de deux pays comme le Liban et l'Algérie, il est évident que celui du premier doit beaucoup à la proximité géographique, et que celui du second doit être expliqué entièrement au niveau culturel et idéologique.

Ces deux facteurs ne sont pas seulement complémentaires, ils peuvent interférer l'un avec l'autre. La proximité géographique peut être créatrice de communauté culturelle, et ceci particulièrement du fait de la guerre. Etre impliqué dans la même guerre, ou être exposé au même risque de guerre, on a pu l'observer en Europe pendant et après la deuxième guerre mondiale, constitue une communauté de situation qui peut entraîner des similitudes ou même une harmonisation politiques entre des peuples ou des Etats différents. La violence peut être à la fois un facteur d'unité ou de désintégration des régions comme elle l'est des sociétés nationales.

Ce serait, à cet égard, une erreur pour l'étude régionale de considérer qu'il y a équivalence entre le fait pour une région d'être une du point de vue de l'analyse, et le fait pour celle-ci d'être politiquement intégrable. Le Moyen-Orient ou l'Asie du Sud-Est sont actuellement des régions où les liens d'interdépendance sont très forts. La politique israélienne est très largement fonction de la politique égyptienne, et réciproquement. Ce qui se passe à Saïgon ou à Phnom-Pen dépend étroitement de ce qui se passe à Hanoï et dans les maquis. Il est impossible d'étudier un parti sans tenir compte de l'autre. Et en même temps ces régions sont plus profondément divisées, que n'importe quelle autre. Leur unité analytique apparaît comme le résultat de leur désintégration dans les faits.

III.- Récapitulation et conclusion

Tendances qui se manifestent dans les transformations des conflits violents

- . Lorsqu'un conflit devient violent, s'il est universaliste, ses aspects particularistes se renforceront, s'il est particulariste, ses aspects universalistes se renforceront.
- . Un conflit particulariste tendra à prendre la forme d'une guerre régulière.
- . Un conflit universaliste tendra à prendre la forme d'une guerre populaire.
- . Lorsqu'un conflit a la forme d'une guerre régulière, il tendra à devenir particulariste.
- . Lorsqu'un conflit a la forme d'une guerre populaire, il tendra à devenir universaliste.
- . Dans la guerre régulière, le parti qui a le dessous peut être amené à entreprendre une guerre populaire.
- . Une guerre populaire qui réussit tendra à prendre les caractères d'une guerre régulière.

- . Un conflit universaliste est contagieux à l'intérieur de l'aire culturelle pour laquelle il est universaliste.
- . Une guerre régulière peut s'étendre, par contiguïté ou non, à des pays qui n'ont pas les moyens d'empêcher cette extension.
- . Une guerre populaire peut s'étendre, par contiguïté, et dans la mesure où elle est universalisable.

La liste des propositions ci-dessus, est générale, en ce sens qu'elle peut être utilisée pour analyser n'importe quel conflit international ou civil ; mais elle n'est pas exhaustive en ce sens qu'il existe d'autres tendances qui régissent les phénomènes violents et que nous n'avons pas examinées. A chaque fois que le cours des événements réels semble contredire ces propositions, cela signifie que d'autres tendances ont joué qui se sont révélées plus fortes et en ont annulé les effets.

En terminant, nous voudrions montrer rapidement le rapport qui existe entre ce qui précède et les schémas d'analyse du "linkage problem" proposés par Rosenau et Hanrieder.

Il est clair que tous les Etats actuels sont des "systèmes pénétrés"⁵. Ils le sont à des degrés divers et sous des formes diverses. Le but de l'analyse des "linkages" est d'étudier ces différences de degré et de formes.

A partir du moment où on renonce au modèle du jeu de billard de l'analyse internationale traditionnelle, et comme il n'est pas praticable de considérer séparément tous les individus humains impliqués par un événement comme des centres de décision autonomes, le premier problème que l'on doit résoudre est celui de la sélection des acteurs à prendre en considération.⁶ Cette sélection comporte toujours une part d'arbitraire et ne peut être faite que par rapport à la question qu'on se propose d'étudier.

On peut sans doute considérer que les Etats occidentaux développés sont plus des systèmes pénétrés dans l'ordre économique que dans l'ordre politique. Si on étudie un problème qui appartient plus au premier domaine qu'au second, les gouvernants nationaux seront moins traités comme des centres de décision autonomes et privilégiés.

En Indochine on a en présence des acteurs de statuts différents : les gouvernements des Etats-Unis, des deux Vietnam, du Cambodge et du Laos, et les "mouvements de libération" du Sud Vietnam, du Cambodge et du Laos. A côté de ces acteurs directement présents sur le terrain, il en existe d'autres dont le rôle est aussi très important : le ou les mouvements

d'opposition à la guerre aux Etats-Unis, l'Union Soviétique, la Chine, la Thaïlande, etc.. Ces acteurs ont entre eux des relations très différenciées. Le F.N.L., Sihanouk et le Pathét Lao ne sont pas exactement dans la même situation par rapport à Hanoi, pas plus que Saïgon, Vientiane et Phnom-Pen ne sont aussi dépendants, ni de la même façon, à l'égard des Etats-Unis. Ceux-ci ne sont pas engagés, ni matériellement, ni symboliquement, de la même manière à l'égard de chacune de ces trois capitales. L'opposition du F.N.L. au gouvernement de Saïgon n'est pas exactement du même type que celle qui existe entre le Pathét Lao et le gouvernement de Vientiane qui, du moins en principe, se reconnaissent réciproquement un rôle à jouer dans la vie politique laotienne.

Si on considère les frontières qui divisent l'Indochine on a aussi une situation très différenciée. La plus importante est sans doute la frontière de fait qui sépare les zones contrôlées par l'un et l'autre parti. Mais les frontières juridiques des Etats n'en ont pas pour autant perdu toute importance. Aucune de ces frontières n'arrête plus les avions américains, mais au-delà de celles du Nord-Vietnam, ceux-ci ne bombardent pas, ou plus. Aucune n'arrête les troupes terrestres Nord Vietnamiennes, mais les troupes régulières américaines ne franchissent ni celles du Nord Vietnam ni celles du Laos. Le début, puis la limitation et l'arrêt des bombardements du Nord, la chute de Sihanouk, l'entrée des Américains au Cambodge puis leur retrait, ont marqué des étapes dans l'évolution de la carte de la région.

Se demander si on a des Etats "vraiment" souverains ou de "vraies" frontières n'aurait guère de sens. Il est plus intéressant de rechercher dans quels domaines et jusqu'où un Etat peut décider librement, et dans quels domaines il est dépendant ; de rechercher ce qu'arrête telle frontière et ce qu'elle laisse passer, et dans quel sens. Tout dépend du problème que l'on étudie et de ce que l'on veut expliquer.

Si on admet, ce qui nous semble difficilement contestable, que tous les Etats actuels sont, à un titre ou à un autre des systèmes pénétrés, la distinction entre consensus et compatibility⁷ ne recouvre plus exactement celle qui existe entre politique intérieure et politique extérieure. Un gouvernement est toujours soumis à un certain nombre de "validators" au sens des jeux de simulation⁹, c'est-à-dire qu'il doit obtenir l'accord d'un certain nombre de gens pour rester en place ou pouvoir faire exécuter ses décisions. A côté de ces "citoyens actifs" existent toujours des "citoyens passifs" dont le gouvernement ne veut pas ou sait ne pas pouvoir obtenir le soutien, mais dont il doit tenir compte comme des données qui conditionnent sa politique.

Un gouvernement peut avoir des validateurs étrangers. C'est le cas pour un pays sous-développé qui doit faire accepter sa politique économique par ceux qui lui fournissent des moyens financiers. La dépendance de la Tchécoslovaquie à l'égard de l'Union soviétique apparaît depuis 1968 comme appartenant de moins en moins au domaine de la compatibility et de plus en plus à celui du consensus.

La dépendance réciproque des politiques israélienne et égyptienne dont nous avons parlé plus haut, appartient tout entière au domaine de la compatibility. Celle de l'Egypte à l'égard de l'Union Soviétique comporte une part importante de consensus dans la mesure où l'Egypte ne peut pas exécuter sa politique sans utiliser les services de techniciens russes. La dépendance d'Israël à l'égard des Etats-Unis est peut-être en fin de compte aussi grande, mais elle apparaît moins immédiatement contraignante, elle comporte moins de consensus et plus de compatibility.

L'écart entre les distinctions consensus/compatibility et politique intérieure/politique extérieure, loin de dévaluer la première, est ce qui lui donne son intérêt. Cet écart est du même type que ceux qui existent entre les distinctions que nous avons utilisées, relations symétriques/relations dissymétriques ou universalisme/particularisme et les oppositions politique extérieure/politique intérieure ou guerre civile/guerre internationale.

L'étude des "linkages" entre politique intérieure et politique extérieure est la recherche des éléments de l'une qui ont des caractéristiques appartenant normalement à l'autre et réciproquement. Pour faire cette recherche des distinctions qui recouvrent mal ces deux domaines sont utiles dans la mesure même où elles les recouvrent mal.

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- B.-VIII - La théorie des relations internationales
- The theory of international relations

Intervention et contagion, conflits limités et guerres civiles
régionales

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B.-VIII / 14.

Résumé :

L'étude des ressemblances et des relations causales qui existent entre violence intérieure et violence internationale, peut être faite en utilisant deux distinctions conceptuelles. La première, entre conflit universaliste et conflit particulariste, concerne l'enjeu ou la formulation idéologique des conflits. La seconde, entre guerre régulière et guerre révolutionnaire, porte sur les méthodes de combats adoptées par les acteurs.

La possibilité de contagion d'un conflit, c'est-à-dire de transformation soit d'un conflit international en conflit intérieur, soit d'un conflit intérieur en conflit international ou en conflit intérieur à un autre pays, est fonction de son degré d'universalisme.

Le cadre des régions internationales est favorable à la contagion de la violence à deux titres. D'une part, dans la mesure où il existe une unité culturelle de la région, cette unité favorise l'universalisation des conflits. D'autre part, la proximité géographique est toujours un facteur favorable à la contagion de la guerre ; elle l'est plus pour la guerre révolutionnaire que pour la guerre régulière.

B-VIII/14 INTERVENTION ET CONTAGION, CONFLITS LIMITES ET GUERRES
CIVILES REGIONALES

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Paris

SUMMARY

Two conceptual distinctions may be used to study the resemblances and the causal relations existing between internal violence and international violence. The first distinction - i. e. between universalist conflict and particularist conflict - regards the back-out or the ideologic formulation of the conflicts, The second one - between regular war and revolutionar war - concerns the methods of struggle adopted by the actors.

The chance for a conflict to propagate, i. e. the transformation of an international conflict into an internal conflict, or of an internal conflict into an international one, or into a conflict internal to another country, depends from its degree of universalism.

The context of the international regions favors the propagation of violence, in two ways. On one hand, if a cultural unity does exist in the region, this unity encourages the universalisation of conflicts. On the other hand, the geographical proximity is always an element favourable to the expansion of war ; it is more favourable for the revolutionar war than for the regular one.

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ETATS, SYSTEMES, SOCIETES:

Les contradictions de l'"état mixte"

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Le problème du lien (linkage) entre politique intérieure et politique extérieure est, par certains aspects, un faux problème; par d'autres, il s'agit du problème le plus fondamental et le plus général de la science politique.

Les esprits ironiques et traditionalistes peuvent, invoquant Molière, sourire de la mode actuelle ("Aimez-vous le linkage? On en a mis partout!") et rappeler que de Platon pour qui l'éducation des citoyens devait les rendre invincibles contre toute attaque de l'extérieur et inaccessibles à toute tentation de conquête, à Marx affirmant qu'avec les antagonismes entre classes on supprimerait les antagonismes entre nations, de Périclès demandant aux Athéniens de considérer l'empire (à l'extérieur) comme une tyrannie (à l'intérieur) dont il fut injuste de s'emparer mais dont il serait x x x néfaste de se débarrasser, à la tradition washingtonienne pour laquelle l'engagement dans les pièges de la politique de puissance risquerait de mettre en cause la pureté du régime intérieur américain ou à la tradition monarcho-gaulliste pour laquelle le régime des partis rendait impossible à la France toute politique extérieure, tous, théoriciens ou politiques, ont, comme M. Jourdain de la prose, fait du linkage sans le savoir.

A quoi les esprits positifs et scientifiques répliqueront qu'il s'agit précisément, désormais, de faire du linkage

en le sachant, c'est-à-dire de se poser systématiquement la question de la méthode et des outils conceptuels à l'aide desquels il est possible de donner un sens cohérent et véritable aux innombrables relations que nous postulons tous les jours entre politique intérieure et extérieure.

Pour commencer, une vue à la fois systématique et empirique devrait permettre de distinguer, à l'intérieur de ces rapports trois questions, souvent confondues:

1) la question théorique de l'homogénéité ou de l'hétérogénéité de la politique intérieure et extérieure, c'est-à-dire de la nature spécifique du comportement diplomatico-stratégique à l'intérieur de comportement politique, et de la structure spécifique du système international par rapport aux sous-systèmes nationaux; 2) la question empirique ou causale des ~~xx~~ interactions entre la politique intérieure et la politique extérieure, question que l'on peut poser au niveau national, où elle devient celle des influences et des contraintes, intérieures et extérieures, qui s'exercent sur les gouvernants, et au niveau global où elle devient celle des rapports entre système inter-étatique et sociététrans-nationale; 3) enfin la question à la fois philosophique, électorale et budgétaire, donc éminemment politique, du primat de la politique intérieure ou extérieure au niveau des fins de la cité ou de ses priorités.

Poser ces questions, n'est-ce pas tracer dès l'abord les limites de tout cadre conceptuel au moment même où on en montre la nécessité? Ces limites, ce sont la permanence des questions philosophiques et la multiplicité des réponses historiques qui les lui imposent: comment étudier les différences de nature et de structure entre politique ~~xxxxxxxx~~ intérieure et extérieure sans se prononcer sur la nature même de la politique, comme ordre ou comme conflit? Comment, sur le plan des causes et sur le plan des fins, étudier les rapports de l'intérieur et de l'extérieur sans s'interroger sur le sens même de ces deux dernières notions, et sur

l'existence même des communautés ou des unités qu'elles doivent séparer? S'agit-il des nations, et celles-ci sont-elles des réalités bien circonscrites, au point de vue de leurs limites et de leurs fonctions, ou l'ont-elles été à une époque qui est déjà derrière nous?

Mais précisément, la justification des recherches actuelles n'est-elle pas, justement, de confronter nos concepts théoriques et politiques à l'évolution historique pour nous demander si celle-ci n'impose pas la révision de celle-là? En ce sens, tout linkage entre politique intérieure et politique extérieure dépend étroitement du linkage entre la philosophie propre du chercheur et les caractères propres de la réalité politique qu'il étudie.

La préoccupation actuelle vient, peut-être, de ce que l'univers historique et l'univers théorique partagent, aujourd'hui, au moins un caractère, celui de se trouver dans une période qui, un peu plus encore que les autres, est une période de transition et de crise de légitimité, où d'anciens clivages s'effacent et d'autres apparaissent sans vraiment encore remplacer les premiers et sans que l'on puisse même savoir si l'ambiguïté et la coexistence d'éléments contradictoires ne sont pas la marque même de l'époque.

Si nous nous intéressons tant aux linkages entre politique intérieure et politique extérieure c'est précisément parce que nous avons des doutes sur le sens et le sort des termes qu'ils sont censés relier.

Le phénomène central est connu de tous; c'est le déclin à certains égards de certains des aspects qui avaient jusqu'ici passé pour les plus caractéristiques de la politique extérieure et de la politique intérieure: guerre inter-étatique, institutions juridiques. Les rapports entre certains Etats ressemblent à des rapports de politique intérieure, la situation intérieure de certains Etats rappelle celle du

système international. Cela tient-il à une crise ou à un déclin de certaines activités, telles que la guerre, de certaines valeurs, de certaines institutions? Ou à une crise ou un déclin de certaines unités ou de certains groupes politiques ou sociaux?

Sans doute les deux réponses ne sont-elles pas exclusives l'une de l'autre; de nouveaux types d'unité et de nouvelles élites dirigeantes peuvent, justement, être favorisés par l'ascension de nouvelles valeurs et de nouveaux types d'activités et les favoriser à leur tour. Mais le problème reste posé et, comme tous les problèmes philosophiques, a des conséquences pratiques immédiates: ainsi, pour certains Européens, le dépassement de l'Etat national permettre le dépassement de la politique de puissance, voire de la politique comme telle, alors que pour d'autres il constitue au contraire la seule chance de sauver celles-ci, qui excèdent désormais les capacités des nations existantes. De même certains jeunes Américains sont opposés à la guerre du Vietnam par pacifisme, mais d'autres contestent non pas la légitimité de la violence mais celle non seulement de la politique américaine, mais des Etats-Unis comme communauté - pour se réclamer d'une communauté rivale sub ou trans-nationale, qu'il s'agisse de la "Woodstock nation" ou de la Révolution mondiale.

Le résultat est l'émergence de formes mixtes et ambiguës, au niveau des activités, - mélanges de guerre et de paix, de conflit et de coopération, - au niveau des unités ou des organisations, - où communautés régionales ou non-territoriales entrent en compétition avec l'Etat national -, au niveau des relations - où, aux mécanismes bloqués de la guerre inter-étatique ou du jeu des institutions légales se substituent de plus en plus des types à plus informels, plus indirects, et par là même moins contrôlables et moins prévisibles d'influence. Parler d'arms control ou de guerre civile, de régions ou d'alliances, c'est, nous semble-t-il,

parler de linkages entre politique intérieure et politique extérieure; c'est chercher à décomposer et à recomposer une réalité dont le seul trait certain est d'être une totalité différenciée en mouvement qu'on ne peut approcher qu'en épousant ses contradictions et ses paradoxes et en évitant le double piège des classifications figées et du globalisme confusionniste. Les véritables linkages se révèlent peut-être, surtout lorsque à propos de questions à la fois philosophiques et concrètes comme le sens de la politique, les effets de la violence ou le destin de l'Etat national, on touche du doigt le caractère insatisfaisant de tout schéma qui ne serait pas contradictoire.

Voilà pourquoi il nous a semblé que, plutôt que de traiter spécifiquement le problème du linkage ou l'un de ses aspects, il pourrait être intéressant de nous demander à propos de problèmes que nous avons été amenés à étudier comment ces études pouvaient être ré-interprétées à la lumière du problème du linkage. Il ne s'agit certes ni de proposer notre démarche comme exemplaire ni de lui prêter une cohérence qu'elle n'a pas. Mais, partant du fait que, au départ nous ne nous intéressions pas au problème du linkage politique intérieur - politique extérieure comme tel, mais que, à un niveau plus global nous nous intéressions au problème des rapports entre les différents types d'activités et d'unités et plus généralement entre le procès et le drame, entre l'évolution sociale et l'interaction stratégique, nous voudrions rechercher les difficultés et les enseignements que nous avons rencontrés et qui peuvent s'interpréter en termes de linkage.

L'intérêt de l'expérience est qu'elle constitue une sorte d'aller et retour entre deux pôles, celui de la philosophie politique et celui de l'étude empirique des relations internationales actuelles en Europe, en passant par la théorie des relations internationales en général, et plus particulièrement par celle de l'usage de la force et par celle des sous-systèmes régionaux, des nations et des alliances.

La philosophie politique et le problème du "linkage"

La pluralité des communautés politiques-avec la dualité, qui en résulte, entre politique intérieure et politique extérieure - est la croix de la philosophie politique. Rarement abordée de front, au 18^e siècle par Montesquieu, Rousseau et Kant, elle constitue l'éternelle pierre d'achoppement qui frappe d'imperfection et de contingence les constructions théoriques ou pratiques de tous ceux qui recherchent la bonne société.

Si Platon et Aristote, Hobbes et Locke, se contentent de l'évoquer en quelques phrases ou en un rare chapitre, leur embarras même indique qu'ils se heurtent à une difficulté cruciale qu'ils sont incapables de résoudre. C'est bien pourquoi, s'ils partent en général d'un point de vue qui, à une date encore récente, aurait été considéré comme extérieur à la science politique positive (celui du primat de la politique intérieure ou extérieure dans une perspective téléologique), ce point de vue leur fait rencontrer de la manière la plus dramatique les questions spécifiques qui caractérisant plus particulièrement les périodes de transition comme la nôtre où le conflit entre les différentes exigences fonctionnelles de l'ordre social fait peser une menace sur l'identité, la dimension et la structure des unités politiques.

Pour Platon et pour Aristote, le problème des priorités est résolu à partir des fins de la vie humaine: la paix est supérieure à la guerre comme le loisir au travail et la pensée à l'action. Dans chacun de ces couples, la fonction du second terme est de rendre possible le premier. Il en va évidemment de même pour les rapports entre politique intérieure et extérieure. Si la fin de la cité n'est pas seulement la survie ou la richesse mais aussi l'éducation des citoyens et l'harmonie entre eux par la justice et la communauté, ce sont ces

considérations qui détermineront la structure et la dimension de la cité.

Mais cela implique que le monde extérieur soit ou bien ignoré ou bien évoqué seulement à titre de repoussoir pour cimenter l'unité des citoyens par leur sentiment de solidarité. Si, soit par la communication pacifique soit par la menace guerrière, soit, dirait - on aujourd'hui, par l'interdépendance coopérative soit par l'interaction conflictuelle, les autres cités font sentir leur présence et leur action, elles ne peuvent qu'introduire des influences et des contraintes ruineuses. Le philosophe peut résoudre le problème de la stabilité et celui de la communauté, mais à condition d'informer sa cité dans ce que Bertrand de Jouvenel a appelé "la prison des corollaires"¹, isolement par rapport au monde extérieur, par rapport au changement technique, par rapport aux compétitions de puissance.

Mais l'histoire est faite précisément de ces réalités. D'où la question actuelle: comment résoudre les problèmes du bien commun dans des sociétés complexes, changeantes et ouvertes les unes aux autres?

Platon et Aristote, comme plus tard Rousseau, choisissent résolument la vertu et l'unité des l'isolement. La bonne cité sera petite, éloignée de la mer, refusera l'innovation, même si les progrès de la technique militaire ou la dimension supérieure des adversaires doivent la condamner: plutôt périr de l'extérieur que de perdre son originalité et sa vertu intérieure. Ainsi Rousseau conseillera-t-il aux Polonais de se laisser envahir en s'efforçant de garder (sans reculer devant le chauvinisme) leur originalité nationale sous la domination étrangère, plutôt que de corrompre leur société pour résister à celle-ci.

On voit le dilemme de la taille, qui n'est qu'un cas particulier du dilemme, si présent aujourd'hui, par exemple, aux Etats-Unis, entre les exigences intérieures de la survie (identité, donc unité et communauté), et ses exigences extérieures (indépendance, donc défense): "Si une république est petite", écrit Montesquieu, "elle est détruite par une force étrangère; si elle est grande, elle se détruit par un vice intérieur"².

Il y a une solution qui, avec les accents et à des degrés divers, a les faveurs à la fois de Montesquieu, de Rousseau et de Kant: c'est celle des fédérations, qui combinent les avantages des petits Etats sur le plan intérieur et des grands sur le plan extérieur. Mais, à supposer qu'elle puisse être réalisée sans violence, il s'agit d'une solution de compromis, sans cesse obligée à l'intérieur d'éviter les deux dangers de la désagrégation et de la centralisation, sans cesse obligée à l'extérieur de se prémunir contre le danger de l'agression et la tentation de l'expansion: même si l'équilibre intérieur et extérieur donne aux fédérations un sursis provisoire, le ver de la pluralité, celle des unités et surtout celle des préoccupations, est dans le fruit de la communauté. On se trouve dans cette "condition mixte", dans cette "association partielle et imparfaite" qui est, pour Rousseau, "la source de tous les maux" et qui l'amène à se demander "s'il ne vaudrait pas mieux qu'il n'y eût point de société civile au monde que d'y en avoir plusieurs"³.

Le problème est le même que pour le "socialisme dans un seul pays" ou pour le "socialisme à visage humain" à l'intérieur d'une communauté socialiste à direction soviétique ou pour les îlots d'autogestion dans une société capitaliste, ou pour les sous-cultures et les contre-cultures entourées par les majorités silencieuses; une communauté peut-elle "vivre sa vie" si elle est entourée par des rivaux, voire comprise dans un système qui obéit à des préoccupations différentes? Y a-t-il une sorte de loi de Gresham politique, la

coexistence des belliqueux et des pacifiques obligeant les seconds à se conformer aux premiers plutôt que l'inverse, voire la coexistence des pacifiques elle-même étant nécessairement empreinte de méfiance et la compétition, la politique étrangère étant par essence le domaine du conflit?

On comprend que philosophes et utopistes aient toujours préféré se donner une suppression de la politique étrangère, au profit de communautés dont les dimensions et les activités seraient dictées par les seules préoccupations intérieures. Pour cela, une seule solution: être seuls au monde, soit en se coupant de celui-ci, soit en l'occupant entièrement - île isolée ou Etat universel-. Longtemps, les "robinsonnades philosophico-politiques", sur le plan théorique, l'éducation de communautés isolées (qui renaît aujourd'hui au milieu des sociétés encore pluralistes) ont prévalu. Lorsque les contraintes et les possibilités de l'interdépendance, par le commerce, la guerre, et plus généralement la technologie, les communications ont semblé irrésistibles, c'est la suppression de la pluralité par l'évolution historique (commerce, révolution, technique, militaire) aboutissant à une société universelle qui nourrit l'espoir d'un dépassement de la politique étrangère auquel correspondait, sur le plan théorique, un dépassement de la philosophie politique par la philosophie de l'histoire et la sociologie.

Mais en attendant ou en supposant que l'on rejetât cet espoir par crainte de la tyrannie universelle, soit par crainte de la guerre indéfinie à la recherche de la paix? Il ne reste qu'à renverser les priorités, en abandonnant le primat de la politique intérieure. On aboutit alors à deux types de primat de la politique extérieure.

Pour les uns, comme Hobbes ou Locke, il s'agit d'objectifs pacifiques liés à la survie (sécurité, prospérité) qui ne sont pas liés par essence à la compétition ou au conflit avec les autres Etats mais imposent la considération prioritaire de ce conflit ou de cette compétition dans la mesure où ce sont ceux-ci qui les menacent d'abord.

Pour les autres comme Machiavel ou comme les historiens allemands du 19e siècle, il y a primat de la politique extérieure parce qu'il y a primat de la guerre, ou du moins de la lutte entre princes et entre Etats, sur la paix, ou du moins sur l'administration intérieure et sur l'éducation des citoyens, qui doivent être dirigés vers la puissance et la gloire de la communauté.

Dans un cas, on essaye, faute de mieux, de préserver dans les rapports avec les autres Etats la sécurité et la prospérité qui seraient mieux assurées si le problème de la pluralité des Etats n'existait pas; dans l'autre on se donne des objectifs par essence conflictuels, et on y subordonne les objectifs propres des individus et des groupes sub-étatiques, dont on exige une unité totale à l'intérieur et une opposition totale par rapport à l'extérieur.

La question du primat amène ainsi nécessairement à celle de la structure isomorphique ou contrastée de la société interne et de la société internationale. La conception de Hobbes et de Locke conduit à la vision libérale d'une homogénéité de la politique intérieure et de la politique extérieure, soit, selon la logique de Hobbes, par un Etat universel, soit, selon la logique de Locke, par une combinaison d'unité et de diversité ou encore par une compétition pacifique réglée par la loi, à l'intérieur des Etats comme entre eux. Inversement, la conception de la politique de puissance qui trouve son expression extrême dans le fascisme, trouve son répondant en théorie des relations internationales

dans la conception dite des "billes de billard" pour laquelle la cohésion nationale et la rivalité internationale sont telles que les rivalités intérieurs et les communautés internationales sont des exceptions superficielles qui peuvent être exclues du schéma.

En fait, il est clair pour nous aujourd'hui, comme ce l'était déjà pour les philosophes que nous évoquons, que ces deux visions extrêmes sont fausses.

D'une part, les tendances de la nature humaine et, plus encore celles de la société moderne rendent impossible et la communauté et l'hostilité totales, elles creusent des clivages à l'intérieur des sociétés et tissent des liens entre elles. Mais d'autre part, la transposition à l'univers international du modèle intérieur de la compétition pacifique réglée par la loi néglige la différence fondamentale qui tient à la structure anarchique du milieu international, à l'absence d'une autorité contraignante qui ferait respecter sinon le droit, du moins les accords, qui s'opposerait à la violence et limiterait l'imprévisibilité - bref à tous les caractères qui correspondent à ce que K. Waltz appelle "la troisième image"⁴ et que, de Hobbes à Hegel, les philosophes ont appelé l'état de nature.

Locke lui-même reconnaît l'opposition; en distinguant, au niveau des gouvernants, le pouvoir exécutif et le pouvoir fédérateur, nécessairement moins soumis à la loi parce que s'appliquant à la politique extérieure, domaine de l'imprévisibilité, voire de l'arbitraire. Que, comme Hobbes, on pense que l'état de nature est plus tolérable pour les sociétés que pour les individus ou au contraire, comme Rousseau, que les individus soumis aux lois et aux hommes tandis que les sociétés gardent entre elles l'indépendance de la nature, restent exposés aux maux des deux états sans en avoir les avantages"⁵, que l'on s'efforce, comme Locke, les juristes internationaux et les hommes d'Etat, d'aménager l'anarchie

par l'équilibre et la coopération ou que l'on établisse, comme Kant, une distinction radicale entre un Etat juridique et un Etat de nature, donc de guerre, la dualité de l'état civil intérieur et de l'état de nature international est reconnue par tous.

Mais à tous elle pose un problème insoluble par rapport à leur conception soit des fins de la politique soit du sens de l'évolution sociale et historique. L'obstacle que constitue la persistance de la troisième image de Waltz par rapport aux deux premières et, plus généralement, à l'évolution de la société globale que Waltz a tendance à négliger, est au coeur des difficultés d'un Hobbes, pour qui le but de l'ordre social est d'éviter la mort violente mais qui doit accepter l'existence de la guerre, d'un Montesquieu, passant de la vertu des petites républiques aux effets pacifiques du commerce, de Rousseau ne rédigeant pas la partie du Contrat Social où ses hésitations entre l'isolement et l'association, et son scepticisme envers sa propre solution, se seraient fait jour, de Kant oscillant entre une conception mécaniste et une conception morale de l'ordre juridico-politique, entre la nécessité conceptuelle de l'unité cosmopolitique et les avantages empiriques de la diversité, entre le progrès indéfini et le saut qualitatif de l'état de nature à l'état de droit⁶. Même chez Hegel, pour qui la guerre a perdu sa fonction historique unificatrice et semble désormais impossible en Europe, elle garde sa valeur pour la santé des populations et sa possibilité structurelle due à la pluralité des Etats, ce qui pose sans le résoudre tout le problème de la fin de l'histoire et des rapports de l'Etat prussien avec l'empire universel⁷. Enfin Marx lui-même oscille entre une vision économique-sociale qui se donne unité planétaire comme déjà réalisée et une vision de la politique internationale de son temps entièrement conçue en termes de spécificité diplomatico-stratégique⁸.

De la philosophie politique à la sociologie historique des relations internationales

La problématique philosophique aboutit à l'opposition des États-particuliers et de la société universelle qu'à thématisée de nos jours, la philosophie politique de M. Eric Weil⁹, avec l'ambiguïté qui se retrouve chez celui-ci: tantôt l'universalité apparaît comme annonciatrice d'une ère nouvelle, les États demeurant des survivances contingentes et violentes, impossible à dépasser en fait mais irrationnelles en droit, tantôt ce sont ces États qui seuls peuvent apporter à l'individu le sentiment de la communauté par l'éducation, et c'est la société universelle et calculatrice qui apparaît comme la donnée de fait qui vient troubler ces communautés porteuses de sens.

Le résultat est la division non seulement entre politique extérieure et politique intérieure, mais à l'intérieur de l'individu moderne, nécessairement insatisfait parce que déchiré entre des éducations et des appartenances divergentes, comme homme, comme être social, et comme citoyen.

Cette double division, de la politique et de l'individu, permet nous semble-t-il, de poser de manière intéressante un problème méthodologique souvent rencontré à l'intérieur de la théorie des relations internationales: celui de l'application des concepts psychologiques et stratégiques aux groupes et aux organisations, en particulier aux États, qui entraîne l'accusation de réification ou de personnification anthropomorphe d'entités abstraites¹⁰.

D'une part, l'idée que les États sont dans l'état de nature, ou l'idée de la lutte des classes, impliquent une conscience ou une volonté collective, classes ou nations aspirant à la sécurité ou à la domination, ayant recours à des stratégies etc. Mais d'autre part, Hobbes et Rousseau, et même Aristote et Hegel, pour qui la cité ou l'État ont, d'une certaine façon, une dignité supérieure à celle de l'individu, savent, autant que tout nominaliste contemporain, que la réalité de ces entités collectives n'est pas de même nature que celle des individus, qu'elles peuvent être créées et se dissoudre ou être recomposées autrement.

Chez Rousseau, en particulier, qui pousse à leur extrémité à la fois l'individualisme et le collectivisme il y a d'abord une logique du comportement des sociétés dans une situation donnée, qui permet de les personnifier, en dépit, et parfois en vertu même de leur caractère artificiel: si la guerre est une relation d'Etat à Etat et non d'homme à homme, si l'état de nature est plus conflictuel entre Etats qu'entre individus, c'est parce que la pitié, qui atténue l'hostilité, leur est inconnue, alors que l'obligation de se comparer pour se connaître, source de tous les maux, leur est plus fondamentale précisément en raison de leur absence d'identité naturelle¹¹. Mais deuxièmement, ce qui est censé, en quelque sorte, les rendre plus naturels que nature, c'est la dénaturation des individus, ce sont les mécanismes bien connus d'identification psychologique non seulement des dirigeants à leur fonction ou à l'organisation qu'ils conduisent, mais des dirigés aux dirigeants et à la communauté: c'est elle qui permet aux Etats d'acquérir une unité et aux individus d'en retrouver une. Mais c'est dire que l'opération ne peut pas ne pas échouer¹² et cela d'autant plus que les sociétés sont plus complexes et changeantes: surtout, si la division entre dirigeants et dirigés, entre groupes, ou à l'intérieur des individus, se réintroduit, l'unité d'action que donne aux dirigeants leur position stratégique et l'unité d'intention du corps social que prétendent traduire ses institutions et son idéologie deviennent des instruments usurpés qui se réclament d'une unité mythique au profit d'une domination réelle. A long terme, la double fonction minima de la politique extérieure, assurer l'unité du corps social et son indépendance, peut difficilement résister au double défi de l'individualité et de l'universalité.

D'où deux conclusions premièrement il faut distinguer entre 1) une personnification allégorique d'un processus impersonnel (Main invisible, ruse de la nature ou de la raison), 2) une personnification pratique et organisationnelle par la représentation et l'autorité, et 3) une personnification psychique et culturelle d'une unité collective, par la création d'une volonté générale, ou du moins d'une communauté d'objectifs et de perceptions entre ceux qui représentent la société et ceux qu'ils représentent.

Lorsque cette unité de communauté ou d'engagement fait défaut, l'unité d'organisation que de commandement risque de devenir inefficace et l'unité de représentation usurpée, quitte à se réclamer d'une identification magique avec une entité abstraite personnifiée (le prolétariat, la nation, la volonté générale, voire un processus du premier type l'Histoire, la Revolution, l'Esprit universel, le Destin etc.)

Cette personnification anthromorphique d'un processus peut elle même être légitime si, d'une part, son caractère heuristique et analogique est bien précisé, si d'autre part, la logique du processus apparaît rétrospectivement comme contraignante par rapport aux buts et aux stratégies des acteurs individuels, S'il était vrai que volentem fata ducunt, nolentem trahunt, il serait légitime de personnifier le destin.

A plus forte raison, l'on peut parler des buts, des actions, voire des sentiments et des frustration d'une communauté politique dans la mesure où l'action entreprise par les dirigeants au nom de la communauté n'est pas, à l'intérieur de celle-ci, la résultante de forces contradictoires inégales, aux résultats imprévisibles. Aristote, Rousseau et Hegel sont d'accord pour refuser le nom de cité à la pure juxtaposition d'individus sur un territoire ou d'intérêts privés. Encore l'unité d'une société peut-elle ne résulter ni de son caractère communautaire ni de son caractère centralisé, mais, comme dans le modèle du marché, de son caractère décentralisé, à condition que ses règles ou ses caractères communs s'imposent comme des données à ses différents le vocabulaire de Morton Kaplan, on dirait: il faut que le système soit "system dominant". Encore son unité, faute de la capacité de rechercher des buts voire de les modifier, se prêterait-elle moins à la métaphore de l'organisme que celle des communautés politiques.

L'opposition system dominant ou sub-system dominant apparaît comme plus importante que l'opposition de la construction analytique et du système concret que l'on présente souvent comme la solution du problème de la personnification: tout ce qui n'est pas individuel est, d'une certaine manière artificiel, mais d'une communauté politique homogène et institutionnalisée à un système international qui est sub-system dominant et qui se réduit à la configuration des relations et des inter-

actions de ses membres, en passant par des groupes inorganisés, comme les classes, mais dont on peut considérer qu'ils se posent en s'opposant et que la conscience et l'action de leurs membres reflète cette position et cette opposition, il y a toute la distance qui rend légitime ou illégitime d'assigner des rôles et des fonctions, d'attribuer des buts et des aspirations¹³.

On retrouve ainsi, à travers l'erreur de ceux qui veulent appliquer au système international un modèle du système emprunté aux communautés politiques organisées, l'opposition de l'état interne et de l'état de nature international. C'est d'elle que partent Raymond Aron ou Stanley Hoffmann lorsque d'une part, sans refuser la notion de système international, ils refusent de lui appliquer les concepts de la méthode structurelle-fonctionnelle mais que, d'autre part, sans hypostasier l'intérêt national et nier la complexité et la diversité interne des unités politiques, ils considèrent que leur comportement extérieur a des caractères suffisamment spécifiques, dictés par la logique de leur pluralité, pour pouvoir leur attribuer des objectifs et des calculs.

Pour surmonter la dualité, pour rendre légitime la personnification du système international ou illégitime celle des unités qui le composent, il faudrait soit que le premier, prenant conscience de lui-même, se transforme par-là même en société ou en communauté, dotée d'un minimum de solidarité ou de buts communs s'exprimant dans un minimum d'institutions et d'actions soit que, à l'intérieur des unités, la crise de l'autorité et de la communauté soit telle que leur propre sub-système dominante ne leur permette plus d'agir en tant que sous-système à l'intérieur du système international, que la logique (ou l'anarchie) de la compétition intérieure prenne le pas sur celle de la compétition extérieure, que les dirigeants n'aient plus assez de liberté d'action ni pour contrôler leur propre société ni pour agir à l'intérieur du système international. Le jour où cela se produirait les fictions utiles de l'Etat national perdraient leur raison d'être: s'il est vrai que dans la société, ce que l'on croit réel le devient parce qu'on le croit tel, l'envers de la médaille est que ce à quoi on ne croit plus cesse également d'exister.

Une fois de plus, tout notre problème est de savoir si ces différents phénomènes ne sont pas en train de se produire, si, pour saisir le nouvel état mixte, qui en résulte, de nouvelles combinaisons conceptuelles sous forme soit de concepts mixtes tels que la "politique intérieure mondiale" de Weizsäcker¹⁴, la "guerre civile froide" d'A. Fontaine,¹⁵ la "politique trans-nationale"¹⁶ de Karl Kaiser, la "quasi-polity" de Lindberg et Scheingold,¹⁷ soit de concepts plus généraux (tels, par exemple, que ceux utilisés par Karl Deutsch¹⁸ de combinaisons variables entre coordination volontaire ou habituelle et coercitive, ou par la menace de sanctions) ne sont pas préférables aux dichotomies classiques.

Ce devrait être la tâche principale de la sociologie historique, telle que le définissent Raymond Aron et Stanley Hoffmann, que de répondre à cette question en comparant les différentes combinaisons auxquelles aboutit dans différents contextes historiques, la dialectique du système international, des systèmes de décision nationaux et de la société trans-nationale, quitte à ce que cette comparaison révèle les limitations historiques des modèles sociologiques adoptés au départ.

A partir de la constitution centrale du paradoxe de l'état de nature interétatique, les théoriciens des relations internationales pouvaient, soit prendre le relais des philosophes et poursuivre, dans la lignée de Thucydide, Machiavel et Clausewitz la logique de l'interaction diplomatique-stratégique entre Etats en tendant à postuler sa permanence, soit étudier la dynamique des processus sociaux en tendant à postuler qu'elle prendrait le pas sur l'interaction diplomatique-stratégique en l'effaçant la rendant marginale, soit enfin étudier l'influence réciproque des deux dimensions à travers, en particulier, l'évolution des attitudes et des actions des groupes placés à la charnière des deux univers.

Or, à ce point de vue, il nous semble (sans pouvoir, ici, le démontrer en détail) qu'il existe dans l'approche de la sociologie historique telle qu'elle est pratiquée par ses deux principaux représentants, Raymond Aron et Stanley Hoffmann, une lacune au niveau de l'élaboration théorique ou du schéma conceptuel. Le point de départ nous paraît le plus propre

à rendre compte de la double dimension des relations internationales. A l'autre extrémité, nous devons à Raymond Aron (dans des livres comme Les guerres en chaîne, Dimensions de la conscience historique, Les désillusions du Progrès) une remarquable description historique de la dialectique du drame et du procès, du jeu diplomatique et du progrès technique du système interétatique et des évolutions et révolutions de la société industrielle; de même Stanley Hoffmann a montré avec virtuosité la dialectique de la logique de l'intégration et de celle de la diversité, du spill-over et du spill-back, en Europe occidentale, ou celle de la guerre et de la révolution, du blocage de la conquête et de l'internationalisation de la politique, dans le système international actuel.¹⁹

Il N'en est que plus paradoxal que, nous semble-t-il, entre l'orientation générale et les descriptions concrètes, il subsiste un fossé conceptuel. Celui-ci est marqué, au point de vue de l'interaction, par la juxtaposition des deux perspectives plus que par leur intégration dans une dialectique; au point de vue du primat philosophique et historique, par une certaine hésitation entre la perspective du progrès d'une humanité pacifiée par l'interdépendance, et celle de la permanence des conflits de puissance; enfin et surtout, au point de vue des types idéaux de la politique intérieure et de la politique extérieure, du système intérieur et du système international, par le maintien d'une hétérogénéité fondamentale, qui traduit une approche, voire une structure de pensée, dichotomique, voire antinomique, qui, en dépit de toutes les nuances descriptives, ne peut manquer d'entraîner une difficulté à envisager les transformations réciproques des termes en présence, et une tendance à privilégier les structures, voire les unités actuelles.

Certes, l'interprète de la paix belliqueuse et des frères ennemis ne nierait pas les cas frontières ou marginaux, celui du système international bloqué et de la société bloquée les analogies; mais ils affirmeraient que plus les réalités concrètes sont ambiguës plus les types idéaux doivent être clairs, et que, du fait de la présence ou de l'absence d'une autorité souveraine les deux critères essentiels - faculté des acteurs de décider de la paix ou de la guerre, caractère

homogène ou hétérogène centralisé ou décentralisé du milieu, continuent à différencier les deux types de système.

A quoi l'on peut répondre en posant le problème non sur le plan de la légitimité mais sur celui de l'utilité; par les quatre questions suivantes: 1) Le cas extrême doit-il forcément être considéré comme le cas décisif, même s'il devient exceptionnel par rapport au cas normal? 2) A supposer que l'on adopte une approche dichotomique les différentes paires de contraires (guerre- paix, conflit-coopération, drame - procès, hétérogénéité - homogénéité, centralisation - décentralisation, conduite diplomatique-stratégique - forces économiques et sociales, "high politics - low politics", etc.) sont-elles forcément agglutinées ou congruentes ou y a-t-il lieu de se donner les moyens d'en examiner différentes combinaisons? 3) Faut-il, à l'instar de Rousseau, considérer qu'il n'y a pas de milieu entre la volonté générale et le hobbisme le plus parfait²⁰, ou, si l'on considère que la guerre de tous contre tous, d'une part, la communauté homogène et unie par la loi de l'autre, sont deux modèles extrêmes et que la réalité est le plus souvent entre les deux, ne vaut-il pas mieux penser en termes d'éventail ou d'échelle plutôt que de dichotomie? Ou, pour appliquer la même idée aux rapports entre politique internationale et intérieure eux-mêmes ne peut-on pas voir dans leur opposition radicale (à l'intérieur, par exemple, d'un équilibre des puissances entre Etats nationaux), et dans leur confusion totale (à l'intérieur, par exemple, de ce qu'Aron appelle l'"âge post-diplomatique"²¹, les deux modèles extrêmes tandis que le système actuel, et des sous-systèmes partiels ou subordonnés tels que les alliances les sphères d'influences, les organisations internationales, offriraient des modèles intermédiaires caractérisés par différents degrés et types d'interprétation? 4) Enfin, ne peut-on pas poser la même question, dans une perspective dynamique et se demander si poser, comme le font par exemple Aron et Hoffmann, à propos de la construction européenne la question de la nouvelle réalité en termes d'alternative, ne revient pas, comme l'aurait dit Bergson, à imposer une représentation spatiale à un processus temporel

d'évolution créatrice? On aurait alors trois modèles, l'un à tendance statique fondé sur l'anatomie du système, le second à tendance dynamique ou vitaliste, fondé sur le modèle dialectique ou conflictuel, fondé sur les heurts entre forces et structures et entre rythmes discordants d'évolution des différents niveaux de la réalité sociale et internationale²².

C'est, en tout cas, ce troisième modèle qui nous paraît s'appliquer plus particulièrement au système international actuel, et, plus spécialement, au sous-système européen que nous ignorons moins que les autres. Nous essayons de donner quelques indications à ce sujet. Mais plus généralement nous voudrions indiquer que la tâche conceptuelle la plus urgente, dans la perspective du linkage entre politique intérieure et extérieure, nous paraît consister dans la distinction, la combinaison et peut-être l'intégration dynamique de l'étude des interactions et de celle des transactions.

Partant de la sociologie historique, comme Linda Miller et George Kelly, dans leur étude sur "Internal War and International System"²³ ou comme Hoffmann lui-même dans l'usage de concepts comme ceux du système révolutionnaire ou de compétition dans la coopération, ou comme Karl Kaiser essayant d'intégrer l'étude de l'intégration régionale et celle du système international,²⁴ de la sociologie tout court, comme Roland Robertson qui, dans un remarquable article essaye d'intégrer Parsons et Schelling²⁵, ou comme Galtung dans son approche structurelle de l'intégration, de l'agression et du système international,²⁶ ou de l'analyse générale des systèmes comme Charles Mc Clelland²⁷ dont les études d'interaction montrent l'utilité méthodologique de la réification prévisoire, par la mise entre parenthèses des processus de décisions à l'intérieur des sous-systèmes suivi de leur réintroduction et de leur mise en relation avec l'évolution sociale, un certain nombre de schémas et d'études empiriques peuvent contribuer à rendre les schémas conceptuels de la sociologie historique des relations internationales plus propres à appréhender le caractère complexe et changeant

de ces dernières dans le monde actuel. Nous nous contenterons quant à nous, à propos de problèmes partiels mais cruciaux pour l'objet du débat, (usage de la force, et sous-systèmes régionaux) d'insister sur la manière originale dont se combinent la structure des organisations et leurs relations extérieures, l'interdépendance et l'interaction et l'importance, dans les conditions originales de notions comme celles de force latente et d'influence indirecte qui peuvent constituer des outils de linkage entre politique intérieure et extérieure.

De l'"état de guerre" à l'"état mixte"

Ce qui fait le plus problème pour la définition des relations internationales par la capacité de choisir entre la paix et la guerre, c'est l'évolution dans le sens de l'ambiguïté, non seulement de la paix et de la guerre, mais de la capacité de choix.

L'idée de l'action diplomatico-stratégique implique celle de la guerre comme ultima ratio regum ou comme "continuation de la politique par d'autres moyens". Si ces deux formules sont fréquemment aujourd'hui battues en breche, c'est certes parce que les armes nucléaires rendent la guerre inter-étatique moins praticable et que la mobilisation sociale favorise au contraire révolutions et guerres civiles, mais c'est aussi parce que les définitions classiques supposent de la part des rois, des stratégies et des diplomates en degré de liberté d'action qui est mis en cause par le rôle croissant (au-dessus et au-dessous, en quelque sorte, des interactions stratégiques et diplomatiques), de niveaux qui obéissent à une structure et à un dynamisme différents: l'équilibre nucléaire, la guérilla ou guerre révolutionnaire, la politique trans-nationale.

Il est classique, aujourd'hui, de distinguer trois types de guerre ou d'équilibre militaire: nucléaire, classique et révolutionnaire (ou sous-conventionnelle). D'autre part, la distinction du système internationale et de la société

transnationale mène directement à la distinction entre la politique interétatique (celle des diplomates et des stratèges) et la politique trans-nationale, celle des forces et des courants qui dépassent les frontières soit par leur nature propre soit par imitation, contagion ou réaction entre phénomènes intérieurs à plusieurs Etats, ou par réaction politique ou militaire d'un Etat à l'évolution intérieure d'une autre société.

La manière dont s'articule, à différents moments et pour différentes régions, la relation horizontale entre les trois niveaux militaires et les deux niveaux politiques et les relations verticales entre les différents niveaux est une des clefs essentielles pour la compréhension du système international.

Le phénomène le plus général et le plus frappant est le suivant: alors que les deux niveaux politique et militaire classiques ont entre eux un rapport relativement clair, exprimé par la formule de Clausewitz, il n'en va pas de même pour les autres. Le niveau nucléaire a beaucoup de mal à trouver sa traduction politique et a tendance à se figer en un équilibre autonome. Au contraire, le niveau de la guerre sub-classique et celui de la politique trans-nationale ont tendance à se confondre en une réalité unique celle de conflits et de transformations dont la forme et le rythme, tantôt violents, tantôt pacifiques, tantôt lents, tantôt explosifs, par leurs côtés collectifs et non structurés ne se prêtent guère aux distinctions tranchées, et encore moins aux règles ou aux mécanismes des institutions juridiques, de la diplomatie ou de la stratégie.

Entre la tendance nucléaire au gel ou à l'immobilité, la tendance diplomatique militaire classique à la flexibilité de l'action modérée par les calculs de la prudence, et la tendance trans-nationale-révolutionnaire aux transformations ponctuées d'explosions, s'inscrivent des rapports dont la nature détermine la situation des différentes régions et le système dans son ensemble.

Ainsi en Europe, où la guerre classique et de guérilla, est peu probable pour l'instant à cause de l'engagement nucléaire direct des grandes puissances et de la nature des sociétés, c'est essentiellement, jusqu'ici, entre les trois niveaux nucléaires diplomatique et socio-idéologique que s'est instauré le dialogue, encore que des tendances et des événements récents montrent qu'il n'en sera pas nécessairement toujours ainsi. Au Moyen-Orient, la diplomatie et surtout la guerre classique ont un rôle beaucoup plus considérable, le niveau nucléaire et, les deux niveaux trans ou sub-étatiques un rôle plus réduit, encore que, là aussi les fedayins aujourd'hui peut-être les armes nucléaires demain, puissent modifier les règles du jeu. En Afrique, au contraire, c'est essentiellement à l'intérieur des Etats que se produisent évolutions, pacifiques ou violentes. En Asie, les cinq niveaux se trouvent en action, avec, cependant, un rôle du niveau nucléaire moins décisif qu'en Europe.²⁸

Contrairement à certaines illusion internationalistes ou pacifistes, cette multiplication des niveaux politico-militaires, et notamment le rôle de la dimension nucléaire et celui de la résistance populaire, ne signifient ni la disparition du rôle de la force ni celle de la pluralité des centres de décision. Bien au contraire, ils signifient la diversification de celle-là et la multiplication de ceux-ci et c'est cette multiplication qui semble, sinon condamner l'Etat national qui par bien des côtés se trouve renforcé, du moins le relativiser comme source unique de la décision de paix ou de guerre, puisque, dans certains cas, elle semble appartenir à tous et dans autres à personne.

Cette relativisation par l'ambiguïté apparaît bien dans le cas des armes nucléaires et de leur effet sur les alliances. Le même auteur qui commence "Paix et Guerre parmi les Nations" en se donnant le fait que chaque Etat se réserve la capacité de choisir entre la paix et la guerre comme caractéristique majeure des relations internationales, achève le Grand Débat en opposant, à l'âge thermonucléaire le souci de la sécurité à la préférence pour le maintien de cette capacité.²⁹

D'où le problème théorique de l'importance du cas extrême: ne peut-on concevoir des cas où soit les Etats seraient interdépendants dans leur vie quotidienne tout en se réservant dans l'abstrait (un peu sur le modèle de l'accord de Nassau) le choix suprême, ou, au contraire, un modèle où les Etats garderaient une existence indépendante qui ne serait pas affectée par le fait qu'ils auraient renoncé au pouvoir suprêmement improbable de déclencher l'apocalypse? Et si cette séparation de la décision suprême improbable de déclencher l'apocalypse? Et si cette séparation de la décision suprême et de la vie quotidienne était la règle de notre époque, ne serait-on pas amené à renoncer à juger l'une en fonction de l'autre, sur le plan de la théorie, à moins d'admettre, comme H. Morgenthau à un stade de sa pensée, qu'il n'existe plus que deux Etats au monde?

Nous espérons avoir montré ailleurs³¹ que dans le débat sur les armes nucléaires et le sort de l'Etat national la vérité n'était ni du côté des mondialistes pour qui l'Etat national est dépassé parce qu'il ne peut plus assurer inconditionnellement sa défense ni du côté des nationalistes pour lesquels ce sont les alliances et les inégalités de puissance qui sont dépassées parce que les Etats nationaux, et eux seuls peuvent assurer leur protection par la dissuasion. En fait, certains facteurs, surtout matériels, dévalorisent, à ce point de vue, l'Etat national, d'autres surtout psychologiques, le favorisent.

La proportion optimale entre la crédibilité de la riposte et son efficacité, entre l'importance de l'unité nationale et de celle de l'unité des alliances, dépendent de la nature des régimes, des menaces auxquelles ils peuvent être soumis, des liens et des engagements dans lesquels ils sont imbriqués; elles ne peuvent être déterminées a priori. Ce que l'on peut dire, cependant, c'est que, à l'âge nucléaire, dans la mesure où la sécurité d'un pays repose sur des garanties ou des alliances celles-ci impliquent la prévisibilité donc un certain degré d'automatisme dans l'engagement qui ne peut pas ne pas entraîner un certain degré d'interpénétration et, en fait, de contrôle de la part du garant. Il y a donc

une certaine autonomie entre d'une part de la sécurité qui implique interdépendance, organisation collective, et stabilité, et d'autre part, la liberté d'action et le changement qui impliquent l'imprévisibilité.

D'autre part, on a souvent remarqué la diminution de la productivité de l'usage offensif direct de la force, soit à cause de la dissuasion nucléaire, soit parce que, ailleurs non seulement la conquête territoriale est rendue plus difficile par la dissuasion que procurent aux petits, les possibilités accrues de résistance locale, mais aussi, en général elle est pour les grands moins attrayante économiquement et, du moins dans le cas des régimes occidentaux, plus dangereuse pour leur propre équilibre social et moral.

De la conjonction de ces facteurs il semblerait résulter une séparation croissante entre la recherche de la sécurité et de la recherche de la puissance. Certes il reste vrai que la conception extensive ou maximaliste que certaines grandes puissances ont de leur sécurité peut les conduire à la domination ou à la violence envers les autres, mais le "dilemme de la sécurité" caractéristique de l'état de nature, conduit aux courses aux armements plutôt qu'à la guerre, il s'oppose au désarmement, non à la dissuasion. En tout cas, à l'intérieur du sous-système des nations développées à direction américaine (Europe occidentale, Canada, et Japon) le problème de la paix et de la guerre semble résolu sous le double signe de la Security community³² à l'intérieur et des collective goods³³ à l'extérieur; on se repose sur le système, c'est-à-dire sur le leader, et on donne la priorité aux préoccupations intérieures ou à la compétition extérieure nonmilitaire.

Cela nous paraît poser des problèmes pour la définition arono-hoffmannienne des relations internationales. Mais la conception opposée nous paraît sur ce point, au moins aussi contestable. Ainsi certains partisans de l'économique par rapport au militaire adoptent purement et simplement, l'opposition entre high politics et low politics lancée, en passant, par Stanley Hoffmann, ils rangent avec lui, la sécurité dans la première catégorie, aux côtés de l'influence ou du prestige, admettent implicitement soit qu'elle constitue un des biens les plus rares³⁴, soit qu'elle constitue un objectif "transcendantal" non mesurable et se contentent d'inverser les signes, en affirmant que la high politics est supplantée par la low politics, les buts transcendants par les buts empiriques, ou du moins qu'aux buts classiques de la sécurité et de la puissance s'ajoutent les buts nouveaux de la richesse et de la prospérité et que par opposition aux premiers fondés sur le conflit, les seconds sont fondés sur la coopération dans le cadre de la recherche de biens collectifs³⁵.

En fait, la sécurité, comme l'avait bien vu Hobbes, est par essence, au moins aussi opposée à la gloire que la richesse. La recherche peut être aussi in définie et pathologique que celle de cette dernière, mais en soi l'argent dépensé pour éviter une agression n'est pas plus "transcendantal" que celui consacré à éviter une dépression économique, de même que l'achat d'une assurance se propose un but indirect mais aussi empirique que celui d'une voiture.

A plus forte raison, aujourd'hui, dans l'alliance occidentale c'est la sécurité qui est le bien conçu le plus nettement à l'intérieur d'un système collectif et ce sont les politiques économiques qui provoquent le plus de tension: c'est en refusant d'augmenter son budget militaire qu'un pays fait preuve d'indépendance.

En revanche, les domaines monétaire, commercial ou technologique supposent, comme la défense, un système commun mais, à l'intérieur de celui-ci, sont actuellement, et de plus en

plus, le théâtre de rivalités et de tensions bien plus grandes que la défense. Il est tout aussi trompeur de dire qu'elles reposent essentiellement sur la coopération que de voir dans la recherche de la sécurité une lutte de tous contre tous: ce qui se fait jour, de plus en plus c'est l'insuffisance de la dichotomie conflit-coopération et l'importance de la catégorie intermédiaire de la compétition. Le dilemme actuel est bien plus tôt celui, rousseauste, de l'isolement ou de la compétition que celui du conflit et de la coopération.

C'est bien pourquoi l'opposition high-politics low politics, dont on ne sait pas très bien si elle porte sur les buts, les moyens ou le milieu, devrait être abandonnée. Les activités économiques comme les activités militaires peuvent donner lieu à conflit ou à coopération, être conduites de manière offensive ou défensive, instrumentale ou symbolique ou expressive.

Quant à l'importance respective des différentes dimensions, il est d'abord indéfendable de voir les buts économiques comme les nouveautés s'ajoutant aux buts classiques, comme si de tout temps les communautés n'avaient recherché la prospérité et la richesse et comme si la nouveauté actuelle n'était pas, bien au contraire, le fait que celles-ci, font moins l'objet direct de la politique extérieure par l'importance diminuée de l'exportation économique et de la conquête, "par la prévalence"³⁶. Or par définition, si l'opposition transcendantal-empirique à un sens, c'est celui des vieilles idées positivistes, saint-simoniennes, ou spenceriennes, de la correspondance entre le passage de l'âge militaire à l'âge industriel et le passage de l'âge métaphysique à l'âge positif³⁷. Mais, s'il est vrai que la modernisation implique le progrès du "procès" donc de la société économique et que les valeurs de "drame" sont pré-modernes dans la mesure où elles sont celles du groupe uni-hiérarchique et guerrier, s'il est vrai que par là attention se porte sur les relations entre Etats, encore faut-il n'oublier ni que le XXe siècle

est celui des récupérations successives du procès par le drame, de la technique moderne au profit de valeurs archaïques, ni surtout qu'à l'intérieur même des sociétés la modernisation entraîne à son tour des réactions métaphysiques ou psychologiques, romantiques ou irrationnelles, violentes ou en tout cas conflictuelles et non instrumentales.

Les théoriciens de la fin de la "high politics" par la modernisation risquent de se trouver dans la même situation que ceux de la fin des idéologies d'il y a quelques années: l'utopie d'une politique désormais consacrée à administrer ou à se disputer avec modération un gâteau commun fait place à une compétition accrue pour le prestige, la dignité, la participation ou simplement l'action status politics et politics of experience.

À l'opposition du transcendantal et de l'empirique se combine avec une importance accrue, l'opposition de l'instrumental et de l'expressif, de l'action destinée à atteindre un but déterminé et de l'action résultant d'une frustration et constituant à elle-même sa propre fin. Si le caractère instrumental de la société s'accroît, il est normal, comme Max Weber l'avait prévu, qu'il suscite des réactions expressives. Il est tentant de transposer aux rapports des XXIX Etats avec le système international cette dialectique des rapports des individus et des groupes avec la société technique et de dire avec Galtung, que l'une des raisons pour le moins bon fonctionnement du système international est précisément sa prédominance instrumentale et l'occasion insuffisante qu'il offre aux conduites expressives de se manifester³⁸. Il nous semble vrai, sur tous les plans, que dans la mesure où, les trois grands objectifs de la sécurité, de la prospérité et du prestige (correspondant aux trois grandes passions de la crainte de l'avidité et de la vanité qui, de Thucydide et Hobbes à Lasswell et Aron ont été constamment distingués dans la pensée politique) les deux premiers sont atteints, le troisième prend de plus en plus d'importance; et qu'en tout cas, à l'intérieur d'un

système ou d'un sous-système rationalisé, rigide ou bloqué, précisément dans la mesure où les objectifs tangibles sont soit inaccessibles soit atteints dans le cadre de structures collectives, la place de l'activité pour l'activité, de la compétition pour la compétition, incapables de se donner des objectifs concrets et s'en inventant de psychologiques, symboliques ou abstraits, doit s'accroître.

Cela nous semble particulièrement vrai en Europe occidentale, pour la politique du général de Gaulle comme pour celle du chancelier Brandt, on peut penser à ce que Marion Levy appelle l'aspect récréationnel de la politique, reprendre ses analyses de la magie, de la mode et du jeu comme réactions expressives à la fois contre l'incertitude et de la société³⁹. Certainement la politique gaulliste, réaction contre les rigidités du système, était, comme pour les contestataires intérieurs à la fois une recherche de la liberté d'action ou de l'activité pour elle-même et la contestation du système global et de tout système rigide, plus que la recherche instrumentale de résultats empiriques obtenus par la méthode "incremental". De même, l'Ostpolitik s'explique moins bien en termes de stratégie instrumentale qu'en termes d'activité expressive, ou, pour puissance, de la sécurité ou de la prospérité (bien que, chacune de ces préoccupations soit présente, mais, précisément de manière indirecte et atténuée) qu'au besoin de faire quelque chose (achievement) et d'être accepté ou adopté (belonging)⁴⁰.

Mais c'est ici qu'il faut à nouveau se garder de la "pathetic fallacy". Quant il s'agit de buts ou d'aspirations plus encore que quand il s'agit de la logique de l'interaction, il faut se garder de trancher par la transposition pure et simple le difficile problème du passage de la psychologie individuelle de celle des petits groupes, voire de la psychologie sociale et de l'anthropologie culturelle aux attitudes et aux comportements des Etats. Ce besoin d'activité, d'acceptation ou d'expression, sont-ils ceux du chef de l'Etat, des groupes dirigeants, de la société

dans son ensemble? D'autre part, s'ils correspondent à des aspirations diffuses dans l'ensemble de la société par quelles médiations en arrive-t-on à chercher à les satisfaire dans le domaine international? Est-ce leur direction spontanée ou est-ce une manière de les détourner ou de les projeter? Le degré précisément, de prospection ou d'identification à l'Etat, à la nation et la nature des activités expressives permises par le système international actuel, sont-ils tels que les aspirations ou les frustrations diffuses de la société se trouvent satisfaites par les activités symboliques de l'Etat ou risquent-elles de n'en être qu'accuses et de se tourner désormais contre l'Etat lui-même et sa politique, ou de se chercher des moyens d'expression à l'intérieur, ou, à l'extérieur, des buts concrets inaccessibles mais que précisément, la frustration ne permettra plus de percevoir comme tels?

Il est impossible de répondre à ces questions, mais c'est précisément cette impossibilité qui constitue le meilleur argument en faveur de notre point essentiel, à savoir que dans la phase actuelle, en tout cas dans les secteurs "bloqués" du système international, l'aspect le plus caractéristique n'est ni la décision d'usage de la force, ni la coopération pour des buts calculables, mais l'influence réciproque des sociétés dans le cadre d'une compétition dont les buts sont de moins en moins tangibles, les moyens de moins en moins directs, les conséquences de moins en moins calculables - précisément dans la mesure où il s'agit moins de stratégies que d'activités et où ces activités sont importantes par leurs effets sur ce que les sociétés sont autant que sur ce qu'elles font.

Plus qu'à travers l'opposition du conflit et de la coopération, c'est à travers la dialectique de la compétition et de l'isolement que le linkage de la politique intérieure et extérieure se manifeste. Il est certain que jamais les problèmes et les préoccupations de sociétés n'ont été aussi convergentes que parmi les pays développés

occidentaux; mais la similitude des problèmes intérieurs, et la coïncidence de leurs priorités, ne les amène pas nécessairement, ni principalement à une coopération accrue. Elle peut d'une part, engendrer une compétition accrue dans le cadre des organisations collectives communes, compétition portant précisément sur qui y contribuera le moins, sur qui réussira le mieux à se placer dans la posture du profiteur des biens collectifs auxquels on ne peut refuser les bénéfices d'une coopération au profit de laquelle il refuse de sacrifier des priorités intérieures; elle peut, d'autre part, aboutir à un isolement, ou à un domesticisme ou à un repli sur soi accru. Mais, - nouveau renversement dialectique - celui-ci, à son tour loin de diminuer l'influence réciproque, peut l'accroître, soit par contagion et réaction, soit par la mise en danger des structures coopératives de base, à partir de quoi les problèmes de la sécurité et de la prospérité, les latents redeviendraient aigus et de neutres deviendraient conflictuels.

L'influence réciproque n'est pas moindre, mais elle est moins calculable et prévisible, avec que plus indirecte et moins contrôlée. On retrouve la formulation de Deutsche de la politique internationale en terme de fossé entre l'interdépendance et le contrôle⁴¹, et les analyses d'E. Morse pour qui l'interdépendance accrue diminue la liberté d'action et la possibilité de contrôle des gouvernements à la fois à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur et augmente la probabilité des ~~xxx~~ crises imprévues⁴².

Plus que le "calculated control" de Rosenau⁴³ ce sont la renonciation calculée au contrôle ou à l'influence et l'influence involontaire ou non calculée qui deviennent caractéristiques. La clef des rapports entre coopération, conflit, isolement et compétition est dans la dialectique la plus caractéristique des sociétés et des relations modernes, celle de la prévisibilité et de l'imprévisibilité.

On pourrait légitimement faire sinon à ces analyses, du moins à ~~xxxx~~ leur portée, l'objection que nous ferions nous-mêmes à bien des analyses de la modernisation et de son impact sur la politique extérieure; c'est d'être fondée, sur, l'expérience des pays développés occidentaux qui d'une part ont des régimes analogues, d'autre part font partie d'un système commun qui a pour essence de n'être pas universel. L'existence d'alliances et de systèmes de coopération internationale n'empêche pas plus les relations internationales d'être fondées sur le conflit, que l'existence de rivalités interieures n'empêche les communautés politiques d'être fondées sur la coopération. Dans le premier cas, il s'agit de coopération dans un cadre de conflit, dans le second de conflit dans un cadre de coopération. De même, l'existence de "security communities" ne repose-t-elle pas, en dernière analyse, sur l'existence d'un système de menaces, ou de rapports de force, par rapport à un adversaire commun?

C'est pourquoi il importe de rappeler que c'est plus particulièrement dans le domaine de l'arms control et des relations entre adversaires que l'idée de la situation mixte de coopération et de conflit, celle d'usage indirect de la force latente du potentielle et celle de la dialectique de la pré visibilité et de l'imprévisibilité ont été ~~xxxx~~ développées, en particulier par Thomas Schelling. Les enseignements que l'on peut en tirer pour le linkage de la politique intérieure et de la politique extérieure nous semblent importants, mais les ~~xx~~ enseignements que l'on peut tirer des erreurs d l'école de l'arms control et de la stratégie aussi bien que de celles de leurs adversaires partisans du désarmement ou de la révolution violente ne le sont pas moins.

Schelling a indiqué qu'on pouvait appeler la théorie, fondée sur les jeux à motifs mixtes, indifféremment la "theorie du partnership imparfait" et celle de "l'antagonisme incomplet". De ce fait, elle transcende l'opposition des

relations entre alliés et entre ennemis. Mais par là même ne transcende-t-elle pas également l'opposition entre relations inter et intra-étatiques ? Ne peut-elle servir à une théorie de "l'état civil imparfait" et de "l'état de guerre incomplet" ? On dira que, justement, la différence est plus fondamentale que celle qui sépare les relations d'alliance et d'antagonisme entre Etats, en vertu de l'absence ou de la présence d'une autorité supérieure.

Mais précisément, plus encore que celui du droit international, le rôle de l'arms control dans la conception schellingienne n'est-il pas de réduire cette différence en aménageant l'anarchie, en organisant entre Etats détenteurs de la force une communication, une coordination, une coopération, voire une institutionnalisation horizontales l'absence de celles, verticales que permettrait un arbitre suprême ? Inversement les exemples de cette communication ne viennent-ils pas le plus souvent de relations intra-étatiques - comme les négociations industrielles, et n'a-t-on pu appliquer aux relations à l'intérieur, par exemple, de la bureaucratie ou entre l'exécutif et le législatif, des schémas - dissuasion, engagements, etc. - empruntés à la stratégie inter-étatique ?

Il nous semble donc que la stratégie et l'arms control avaient vocation pour surmonter les dichotomies figées et pour s'efforcer d'intégrer la compétition et la coordination, le conflit et la coopération entre acteurs à l'intérieur des sociétés et entre elles. A. Rapoport a remarqué que l'idéal serait d'étudier les interactions de tous les individus d'une société avec tous les individus de toutes les autres. Faute de pouvoir le faire, on est bien obligé d'étudier et de s'efforcer d'aménager les interactions entre sous-systèmes sociaux; encore est-il souhaitable, au moins, de le faire dans un cadre multilatéral qui s'efforce de tenir compte, encore que de manière imparfaite, du fait que les relations bilatérales entre deux Etats subissent des influences multiples, ni le decision-maker à l'intérieur de la société ni les deux Etats

à l'intérieur du système international n'étant seuls au monde. Les jeux de simulation s'efforcent de tenir compte de cette multiplicité et, sur le plan conceptuel, c'est le grand mérite de l'article de Robertson, déjà cité que d'aborder directement le problème. Mais il faut reconnaître que les théoriciens de la stratégie et de l'arms control comme Schelling et leurs critiques comme Rapoport se sont également rendus coupables jusqu'ici du double péché contre la complexité, par la transposition automatique des relations inter-individuelles aux relations inter-étatiques par la personification, et par le bilatéralisme international. Que ce soit dans l'étude abstraite de l'escalade ou des courses aux armements ou dans les jeux expérimentaux de "dilemme de prisonnier", que ce soit dans l'interaction des décisions rationnelles ou dans celle des projections psychologiques, on a tendu à postuler des acteurs monolithiques symétriques et dominés par leur interaction.

Aujourd'hui, d'ailleurs, on a tendance aux Etats-Unis, à tomber dans l'excès inverse et, par réaction contre le modèle de la décision rationnelle et le danger de la spirale des interactions avec l'adversaire, à mettre l'accent uniquement sur les combats, jeux et débats à l'intérieur de la société et en particulier de la bureaucratie⁴⁴. Il est probable que, par là, on rend mieux compte de la tendance croissante des sociétés occidentales à réagir avant tout à leurs propres problèmes à se soucier assez peu du comportement d'autrui et à n'en percevoir que les aspects conformes à ce que leur propre évolution leur fait souhaiter percevoir. Mais d'une part on évite une fois de plus une intégration du triple dialogue entre Etats, entre dirigeants d'un même Etat, et entre dirigeants et dirigés, d'autre part, on tombe une fois de plus dans la projection ou le préjugé de symétrie en postulant qu'en U.R.S.S. aussi, par exemple les décisions résultent essentiellement de luttes pour le pouvoir à l'intérieur de la bureaucratie ou de pressions de la société, ce qui est bien possible mais aussi peu prouvé que la représentation inverse qui fait résulter chez autrui d'une stratégie à

long terme des décisions qui, chez soi, résultent de compromis contingents. C'est que les cas d'intégration entre l'analyse comparative des sociétés et celle de leurs interactions sont excessivement rares

Les effets en sont encore bien plus graves lorsque, de la dissuasion et d l'arms control, c'est-à-dire de l'usage négatif et coopératif de la force on passe à son usage positif et coercitif, c'est-à-dire à la compellence et à la violence. Après tout la dissuasion peut rester impersonnelle du côté de son auteur comme de son destinataire dans la mesure où elle peut se présenter comme automatique: au contraire, une menace destinée à provoquer une action plutôt qu'à l'empêcher vise nécessairement un adversaire déterminé et, par son côté plus précis et plus actif oblige son auteur lui-même à se découvrir davantage.

D'où le double caractère du danger que comporte le passage de The Strategy of Conflict à Arms and Influence. Si Schelling continue à insister sur la menace plutôt que sur la force brute, sur l'exploitation de la force latente plutôt que sur son emploi physique, cette première opposition tend à être, sinon effacée, du moins atténuée, par son insistance sur l'exploitation offensive et coercitive de la force dont il reconnaît lui-même, au passage, qu'elle est plus difficile à mettre en oeuvre et nécessite pour être crédible davantage de recours collectif au pouvoir d'infliger destructions et souffrances que l'usage négatif et dissuasif. Le lecteur en retient que, s'il reste vrai, à l'âge nucléaire, que la force brute est improductive, le pouvoir de détruire peut être utilisé non seulement pour dissuader mais aussi pour influencer.

Par là d'une part l'une des idées de Schelling les plus fécondes pour le linkage entre politique intérieure et extérieure - à savoir que le rôle essentiel de la force est de rester latente, que la force employée constitue par elle-même un échec et que le plus grand succès de la

menace est d'être structurée de manière tellement implicite et impersonnelle qu'elle passe inaperçue en tant que menace - se trouve dévalorisé par rapport à une sorte de pragmatization de la violence sous la forme d'un calcul du plaisir et de la douleur à infliger sous forme de récompenses et de punitions; d'autre part, l'idée même de ce calcul fait apparaître avec éclat l'absence de considération réelle de ses effets sur le caractère même des deux parties, et, en fait, l'absence de considération de ces deux parties elles-mêmes, considérées comme deux personnes qui peuvent communiquer par la violence parce que leurs réactions devant celle-ci, devant la douleur ou devant le temps sont suffisamment proches pour leur fournir un code commun.

Naturellement, l'expérience des bombardements sur le Nord Vietnam a montré de manière éclatante combien la question: Qui inflige quoi pour obtenir quelle décision? devenait cruciale, entre deux peuples de culture et d'idéologie différentes - combien ce qui était conçu comme un message pouvait entraîner un processus incalculable dont les effets en chaîne sur les rapports à l'intérieur des deux sociétés pouvaient être encore plus importants que sur les rapports entre elles.

Là encore, cependant, il est facile en tirant la leçon d'une erreur d'y retomber sous une autre forme.

Schelling lui-même indiquait en 1968⁴⁵ comme deux des principales et douloureuses leçons de l'expérience par rapport à son livre l'idée que les gouvernements et les nations n'étaient pas des personnes, qu'on n'influencait pas des processus collectifs de décision comme des individus et d'autre part l'idée de l'effet que l'usage de la force a que celui qui a l'empire. Mais c'était pour en tirer aussitôt la conclusion que l'U.R.S.S. n'interviendrait pas en Tchécoslovaquie et, après l'intervention que celle-ci ne pouvait résulter que d'une décision précipitée et irrationnelle et ne pouvait aboutir à aucun résultat,

puisque l'expérience du Vietnam avait montré l'impossibilité d'obtenir des transformations politiques par la force et les conséquences désastreuses qui en résultaient pour celui qui s'y employait. Rien n'interdit de penser qu'à long terme l'histoire justifiera ce verdict, mais il reste qu'à court et moyen terme il repose sur une équation. U.R.S.S. = Etats-Unis, Tchécoslovaquie = Vietnam qui, une fois de plus, néglige les différences politiques et sociales, voire historiques et géographiques.

Entre un pays développé pluraliste et un pays éloigné, sous-développé et communiste, le rôle de la force, les possibilités de résistance chez le petit, les conséquences sociales chez le grand (l'influence, par exemple, de la télévision etc.) ne sont évidemment pas les mêmes qu'entre deux pays développés communistes, voisins et membres d'un bloc dont l'un est le leader. En particulier le grand courant transnational de mobilisation politico-militaire des pays sous-développés, au moins en ce qui concerne l'attitude de certaines de leurs élites envers la violence inter-étatique, l'importance comparée de ces tendances dans les régimes communistes et dans les régimes occidentaux et le caractère des réponses de ces régimes sont totalement négligés. Que l'évaluation et la prédiction soient positives ou négatives, la violence est toujours considérée en elle-même de manière instrumentale et non replacée dans le cadre historique et des objectifs, des valeurs, des communautés, des processus, des régimes, des systèmes.

La même erreur est commise aujourd'hui par les tenants de la violence expressive ou révolutionnaire, à l'échelle des sociétés nationales ou des continents.

Dans la phase antérieure, plus pacifique, les critiques de la dissuasion et de l'arms control tombaient dans le même travers de bilatéralisme symétrique, que leurs partisans: à l'image de deux adversaires s'opposant deux stratégies rationnelles à base de conflit et de coopération, ils

substituèrent soit celle de deux adversaires névrosés entraînés par leurs frustrations et leurs projections respectives et réciproques dans un aveuglement et une hostilité irrationnels, soit celle de ceux partenaires dont le conflit ne reposait que sur des malentendus et qui, désormais faisaient harmonieusement la synthèse de leurs points de vue respectifs. Aujourd'hui, à l'enquouement récent, théorique et pratique, des Etats-Unis et de leurs stratégies pour l'usage instrumental de la violence dans les guerres limitées et antisubversives, correspond un l'enquouement actuel des minorités révoltées ou révolutionnaires, sub ou trans-nationales, pour la violence, instrumentale ou, au moins aussi souvent expressive.

Cette évolution se retrouve dans le domaine de la "peace research" presque autant que dans la réalité, encore que de manière légèrement différente. On trouve encore des auteurs, comme D. Senghaas, pour se livrer avec éloquence à la critique de la dissuasion comme systèmes de menaces menant nécessairement à l'autisme, à l'hostilité et à la diabolisation de l'ennemi, à l'heure même où à Vienne et à Moscou les poignées de mains se succèdent d'un plateau de la balance à l'autre⁴⁶. Mais la nouvelle vague, en peace research, prend au contraire acte de cette situation, mais y voit une collaboration entre exploités au service du statu quo; elle appelle au dépassement non seulement de la dissuasion mais de la recherche de la paix et de la coopération comme telles, pour leur substituer la mobilisation et la création de conflits, éventuellement violents, contre la violence implicite, latente, institutionnelle ou structurelle, des puissances et des classes dominantes - la paix véritable n ne pouvant être atteinte qu'à travers la suppression des causes de l'oppression et de l'exploitation⁴⁷. Il semble que l'idée de limitation de la violence et de coopération institutionnalisée entre adversaires soit, pour aujourd'hui, rejetée comme démobilisatrice et réactionnaire et que, pour demain, elle soit considérée comme dépassée dans un monde d'où

la violence aura disparu.

De même, dans la nouvelle gauche trouve-t-on souvent la combinaison d'une préférence pour la violence comme telle, verbale ou physique, comme expression d'un antagonisme total contre les pouvoirs établis, comme refus, en dehors de toute considération stratégique, de toutes règles ou objectifs communs, combinées avec une vision idyllique d'une société future ou d'une contre-société actuelle, fondées sur l'amour et combinant l'expression totale de chacun avec l'unanimité de tous.

Ces nouvelles tendances semblent mettre en question ce qui passait pour l'acquis à la fois de la philosophie politique et de l'arms control premièrement, l'idée que toutes les relations humaines et sociales sont une combinaison de conflit et de coopération; que toute société politique repose en dernière analyse sur des rapports de force mais que le but la politique est précisément de modérer la logique de ces rapports en atténuant la brutalité de la force, en faisant intervenir d'autres hiérarchies, en introduisant par la morale, par l'éducation et le droit, par les institutions, par l'équilibre, des instances qui modèrent la force, la rendent inutiles le plus souvent, en limitent l'injustice, l'anarchie et la destruction en introduisant les distinctions légitimité, bref la repoussent de plus en plus en arrière-plan pour maximiser, au contraire, l'autre élément du *lieb social*, celui de la coordination volontaire, troisièmement enfin l'idée qu'à l'intérieur des individus, entre eux, entre groupes et entre Etats, l'éclatement de la violence est toujours le signe d'un échec, qu'en tant que telle elle peut être inévitable, voire salutaire et servir à corriger ou à guérir la violence ou le désordre qui l'ont elle-même provoquée, mais qu'elle ne peut, en soi, constituer une valeur positive, et que la violence expressive si elle nie les communautés

existantes, risque de se trouver en butte à la fois à la logique des rapports de forces et à la dynamique de la contagion et de la réaction, en suscitant ainsi contre elle une violence expressive plus puissante et plus destructive.

Par rapport à la dialectique de la force latente et de la 48
force ouverte ou, si l'on adopte le vocabulaire de J. Galtung de la violence structurelle et de la violence active, on observe quatre déviations, également dangereuses à des titres divers: 1) le pragmatisme de la force militaire, 2) le romantisme de la violence révolutionnaire, 3) le légalisme conservateur, 4) le pacifisme utopiste, les deux premières envisageant d'un coeur léger le recours à la violence, les deux autres l'excluant totalement, pour aujourd'hui ou pour demain, peut-être parce qu'elles considèrent soit la situation actuelle soit la situation future comme exemples de violence structurelle ou institutionnalisée.

L'important pour notre propos est que ces visions, activistes ou quiétistes, de l'état de paix et de l'état de guerre, transcendent l'opposition entre l'état de guerre inter et l'état civil intra-étatique. Cette distinction peut être retrouvée si l'on combine les attitudes 1 et 3, auquel cas on retrouve le modèle de l'Etat uni et belliqueux; mais les attitudes 2 et 4, séparées ou combinées tendent à nier l'opposition parce qu'elles nient toute structure et toute institution et qu'elles refusent d'un même mouvement la violence latente ou structurelle à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur, celle des institutions libérales et celle de la dissuasion.

La vérité, nous semble-t-il, est qu'il faut conserver de la philosophie politique et de la sociologie historique l'idée de l'importance des structures et des institutions, mais

qu'il faut de moins l'identifier à l'opposition des communautés intérieures et de l'état de nature international.

Sur le plan pratique, dans le monde actuel, bien qu'il existe encore des guerres inter-étatiques et des communautés pacifiques, il semble, si l'on regarde, par exemple, certains aspects des relations du gouvernement américain avec l'U.R.S.S. et certains aspects de ses rapports avec les minorités violentes, que ce soit à l'extérieur que le conflit s'inscrive dans un cadre de coopération et à l'intérieur que la coopération s'inscrive dans un cadre de conflit. En tout cas, dans certains secteurs limités, il semble qu'il y aurait désormais intérêt pour les Etats à s'inspirer des techniques juridiques et sociales du domaine intérieur pour institutionnaliser leur coopération et créer une nouvelle légitimité qui impose un tabou contre l'usage de la force et qu'il y aurait également intérêt pour les adversaires dans le cadre des guerres civiles permanentes ou larvées dont les Etats, sont, à l'intérieur, le théâtre, de s'inspirer des techniques de l'arms control pour observer des limites et des seuils, éviter l'escalade et l'affrontement total, même en l'absence d'une autorité supérieure ou d'une légitimité commune. Dans les deux cas, la transposition se heurte ou se heurterait à des obstacles sérieux, le système international n'étant pas en train de devenir un Etat universel, et le niveau de la violence civile ne se prêtant guère, comme celui des armes nucléaires, à la codification ou la dissuasion par l'équilibre: ce dernier risque plutôt de produire l'escalade que l'on veut éviter! Mais il reste que le traité de non-prolifération nucléaire, les négociations SALT, l'action soviéto-américaine au Moyen-Orient tendent à créer une sorte de légitimité oligarchique, et qu'il importe, pour rendre leur contribution à la paix durable et légitime, que les deux grands "transforment la force en droit et

l'obéissance en devoir" en assurant entre eux et les petits Etats satellites, adversaires ou neutres, le même respect réciproque qu'ils se témoignent entre eux et qu'ils prétendent encourager chez les autres. Ce serait là l'équivalent d'un "nouveau contrat social international"⁴⁹, inégalitaire mais assurant des garanties sur le modèle de Locke, l'Unanimité rousseauiste étant utopique et l'unité de commandement hobbesienne étant tyrannique.

De même, à l'intérieur, ce que Lieberman⁵⁰ appelle "challenge" pour l'opposer à "threat" à savoir la menace accompagnée de l'assurance que constituent la limitation des moyens, le respect des autres et la conscience d'avoir certains intérêts minimums en commun, à défaut d'appartenir à une même communauté, semble la seule manière de concilier la fonction expressive et la fonction instrumentale de la violence sans susciter une escalade menant à la destruction de la société. Le mélange de nécessaire complexité et de fragilité des sociétés modernes, peut, à ce point de vue, être comparée à l'effet des armes nucléaires sur le système international et rendre la victoire de l'Ordre ou celle de la Revolution aussi utopiques que celle d'un des adversaires nucléaires. Dès lors, entre adversaires condamnés à vivre ensemble dans un état d'instabilité structurelle, la stratégie comme technique de nonemploi de la force et comme manipulation et limitation concomitante du risque, etc. prend toute sa valeur par opposition à l'irrationalité de l'affrontement brutal. Quand il n'y a plus "débat" autant maximiser la part des "jeux" par rapport aux "combats".

Cela nous amène à la conclusion correspondante, sur le plan théorique. C'est ici qu'il faut, nous semble-t-il, faire sa place à la distinction entre unites concrètes et constructions analytiques, entre membres des premières et propriétés des secondes. Pour le rôle de la force latente, il nous semble utile d'adopter la formulation de Boulding

et de concevoir toute organisation sociale, de la famille au système international, comme comprenant les trois dimensions d'un système de menaces, d'un système d'échanges, et d'un système d'intégration⁵¹. Quand il s'agit de relations conflictuelles on peut également adopter la trinité rapportienne des fighths, games and debates⁵².

L'important, nous semble-t-il, est de voir, premièrement, que si tout le mouvement de la civilisation consiste à passer des menaces à l'échange et de l'échange à l'intégration, ou encore des luttes aux jeux et des jeux aux débats, les niveaux inférieurs ne sont pas pour autant supprimés: ils sont dépassés, au sens hégéliens, c'est-à-dire sublimés, parfois ils sont simplement refoulés, repoussés à l'arrièreplan, rendus implicites ou inconscients. Toujours, les régressions sont possibles, qui dévideraient l'écheveau en sens inverse, qu'il s'agisse du spill-back des communautés européennes, ou d'une famille où des relations fondées sur la confiance et le dialogue peuvent dégénérer en relations fondées sur le calcul et l'échange et de là en relations fondées sur la menace et la force. Les systèmes inférieurs doivent même parfois, resurgir pour mettre les niveaux supérieurs à l'épreuve, démontrer leur nécessité ou corriger leurs défaillances. Tout le problème politique, tout le problème de la paix, consistent à organiser l'intégration de ces différents systèmes entre eux, en un système global qui n'est qu'un système de systèmes. Mais c'est cette intégration qui, aujourd'hui, pose des problèmes particuliers dans la mesure où il n'est pas évident que ce soient les mêmes organisations qui, dans tous les cas, assurent les systèmes de relations d'échange et les systèmes de relations d'intégration ou de menaces pour les mêmes acteurs. Ou plutôt, si on retrouve les différentes dimensions à différents degrés dans toutes les organisations, la proportion est précisément extrêmement variable d'une organisation à l'autre pour les mêmes acteurs: les relations américano-soviétiques

ont des éléments d'échange et d'intégration mais sont d'abord un système de menaces et de coopération née de cette menace et pouvant éventuellement la déborder et la reléguer au second plan, les relations entre pays développés occidentaux sont d'abord un système d'échanges, les relations à l'intérieur des Etats un sont davantage système d'intégration. Aujourd'hui, les relations entre les gouvernements de certains Etats et certaines de leurs minorités constituent d'abord des systèmes de menaces, alors que l'intégration des membres de ces minorités se fait davantage au niveau de leur sub-culture, ou de leur classe d'âge, ou de solidarités trans-nationales. De même y-a-t-il souvent une opposition radicale entre ceux avec qui on discute et ceux contre qui on se bat.

Mais cela montre aussi le deuxième, et le plus grave, aspect de problème. Cette intégration des systèmes de relations que prétendant réaliser au maximum, à différents stades de l'organisation sociale, des communautés à vocation autarcique, est aujourd'hui de plus en plus difficile. Autant que les nouvelles combinaisons de conflit et de coopération, les nouvelles séparations entre systèmes de menace et ^{ti} système de légitimité ou entre échanges et intégration, etc., menacent non seulement les unités existantes mais leur fonction centrale d'intégration, de coordination, et de contrôle des différentes fonctions et des différentes relations. Un peu comme les idées chrétiennes de Chesterton, on a des relations de menaces, d'échanges, de solidarités, d'identifications, "devenues folles et qui courent le monde": des acteurs (comme les firmes multinationales), des courants, comme la contagion des barricades, que personne ne contrôle mais auxquelles les systèmes nationaux ou régionaux existants ou les nouveaux systèmes ad hoc que suscitent les nouveaux courants, réagissent chacun à sa manière par des actions de force qu'aucune légitimité ou aucun dialogue ne vient rendre tolérables, des dialogues qu'aucun calcul des forces réelles ne vient étayer.

La séparation et la disparité des types de relations, aussi bien à l'intérieur des unités qu'entre elles, correspond à la séparation et à la disparité des types de puissance dont elles disposent⁵³, et des types de fonction qu'elles assurent: la "distance structurelle" d'Hanrieder⁵⁴ (écart entre les différents systèmes correspondant aux différentes issue areas) s'étend, souvent aux activités d'un même domaine et contribue à la généralisation de l'écart entre interdépendance incomplète et contrôle insuffisant par lequel Deutsche définit les relations internationales: les deux concepts semblent s'appliquer à l'intérieur des Etats comme entre eux. Réciproquement, dans la mesure où, à défaut d'intégration une certaine coordination ou une certaine compatibilité, doit être maintenue ou restaurée entre systèmes d'activités il se crée des systèmes à degré de formalisation, d'institutionnalisation et de centralisation divers, mais à travers lesquels des barrières, et des noeuds ferroviaires, des centres de triage, arrêtent, ralentissent, accélèrent ou infléchissent le cours anarchique des transactions et des interactions. A cet égard, le rôle des alliances, des sphères d'influences, des groupements régionaux, aussi bien que des régions sub-étatiques ou des groupements non-territoriaux est comparable à celui des Etats nationaux et du système international et, à certains égards, dans la mesure où il résulte d'efforts conscients pour réduire les incompatibilités ou les distances structurelles, leur est supérieur. Cependant, dès qu'il s'agit de structures déterminées le problème de l'ouverture vers l'intérieur et vers l'extérieur

du pluralisme et de la coexistence, des risques de contrôle insuffisant et de perméabilité excessive se retrouvent, et tel groupement qui se veut centralisé et imperméable court des risques de désintégration plus lointaine mais plus violente et plus certaine que tel autre qui en vient à perdre son identité à force d'ouverture et de flexibilité.

Cela est particulièrement net en Europe, où les différents types de relations et de groupements se trouvent combinés et concentrés au maximum par la coexistence des deux alliances les plus organisées et structurées, correspondant aux deux types principaux de régimes politiques, des Etats nationaux qui ont servi de modèle historique à ce type d'unité, enfin d'une société moderne qui est le lien privilégié des tentatives d'intégration supranationale et des Courants de communication transnationale actuels. Si, fidèles à notre problématique de l'état de guerre et de l'état mixte, nous nous posons, après la question des rapports entre alliés ou membres d'un même type de société et entre adversaires, intérieurs ou extérieurs, celles des rapports entre alliances opposées ou entre régimes et sociétés qui se font face ce qui nous frappe avant tout c'est combien les rapports entre alliances dépendant de ce qui se passe en leur sein, et réciproquement, et combien ce qui se passe dans les relations entre Etats membres d'une alliance dépend à son tour de leurs réactions respectives aux courants transnationaux qui affectent leurs sociétés.

Comme les hommes et comme les Etats, les alliances, les empires et les régions se trouvent, à des degrés divers, dans l'état mixte, et, à ce titre, condamnés indéfiniment à rechercher la quadrature du cercle de la continuité dans l'ouverture, de l'identité dans le changement, de l'indépendance dans l'interdépendance.

L'application de cette problématique de l'indépendance et de l'interdépendance à la dynamique des influences réciproques directes et indirectes, entre alliances européennes nous a amenés, ailleurs⁵⁵, à formuler une série de questions que nous voudrions évoquer ici car c'est elles qui nous fourniront les cadres permettant à notre avis, d'orienter l'observation de l'évolution européenne.

En partant de l'influence réciproque du comportement des Etats à l'intérieur des alliances, on peut formuler trois hypothèses sur les effets possibles de l'hérésie ou de la déviance d'un Etat qui s'affirme contre le leader ou les règles de l'alliance. 1) La première est l'hypothèse de la non-influence : la domination du système ou du leader, ou la particularité des intérêts et des situations des différents pays par rapport à eux, sont tels, que l'action du déviant ne modifiera pas celle de ses partenaires. C'était, par exemple le postulat de ceux qui, défendant le gaullisme français, affirmaient que la situation de l'Allemagne était trop différente pour qu'elle pût l'imiter.

2) La deuxième est l'hypothèse de la contagion : si un pays s'insurge contre la philosophie et la politique dominante du bloc auquel il appartient, sa position doit amener les autres à une prise de conscience ou à un réveil analogues, aboutissant à un effet d'entraînement ou d'imitation. C'était, par exemple, le postulat de ceux qui pensaient, pour s'en réjouir, que la politique du général de Gaulle mènerait à la dissolution des blocs ou, pour s'en affliger, qu'elle susciterait des émules en Allemagne.

3) La troisième est l'hypothèse de la réaction : l'action du déviant risque de provoquer une réaction de sens opposé, les autres pays resserrant les rangs autour du leader : c'était ce que prévoyait ceux pour qui, par son opposition brutale à l'Angleterre ou aux Etats-Unis, le Général de Gaulle rejetterait les autres Européens vers ces derniers, ou pour qui, la crainte de la contagion du polycentrisme amènerait l'U.R.S.S. à contrôler ses alliés encore plus étroitement.

On voit le passage à la série suivante, et centrale, d'hypothèses qui porte sur l'effet de la structure et de l'évolution interne d'une alliance ou d'un sous-système régional sur son vis-à-vis.

On retrouve l'hypothèse de non-influence: c'est celle pour laquelle le rideau de fer est tellement impénétrable, l'existence des deux alliances fondées sur des réalités propres (domination du leader, communauté idéologique ou économique, etc.) tellement solides, qu'elles ne peuvent être affectées par ce qui se passe de l'autre côté.

On retrouve également, mais sous une forme plus complexe, les hypothèses de la contagion et de la réaction. Cette dernière se présente, au niveau des sous-systèmes sous la forme du contraste: plus nous sommes forts, stables, unis et fermes, plus nos vis-à-vis tendront à être faibles, instables, désunis et conciliants; notre division favoriserait leur union ou le succès; notre union favorise leurs querelles internes, nées, de l'échec et attire vers nous, par notre rayonnement, leurs éléments les plus proches de nous. C'était le postulat dominant de l'orthodoxie atlantique et européenne; d'est toujours le postulat de l'orthodoxie soviétique.

Quant à l'hypothèse de la contagion, elle devient, entre alliances, celle de la symétrie ou du mirétisme, ou selon une expression empruntée par Marshall Shulman⁵⁶ à la physique, de l'induction: plus nous sommes unis, plus nous cimentons l'unité de l'adversaire; plus nous sommes engagés dans une alliance militaire ou une communauté économique, plus nous l'incitons à s'intégrer lui aussi militairement et relâchement de l'autre, si les Etats-Unis retirent leurs troupes, l'U.R.S.S. en fera autant; la diversité, le polycontrisme, le non-alignement d'un côté doivent susciter leur symétrique de l'autre; les deux blocs se dissoudront ensemble, par entraînement réciproque.

Ces deux séries d'hypothèses devraient être appelées postulats si l'on s'orientait d'après l'usage qui en est fait dans le discours politique, tellement une réponse ou

l'autre est, en général, considérée comme évidente sans démonstration. C'est sans doute parce qu'elles correspondent à trois conceptions généralées de la politique et de sa philosophie, conceptions que l'on retrouve sur le plan théorique et qui, elles, contrairement aux mécanismes que nous venons d'évoquer, ne sont pas susceptibles de démonstration rationnelle ou de vérification empirique.

Selon la première, la politique étant faite essentiellement de rapports de puissance, la division de l'Europe, la bipolarité, le statu quo sont des faits acquis, puisqu'ils sont impliqués par l'équilibre des grande et par leur supériorité par rapport aux autres, inscrits sur la carte par une ligne de démarcation sans équivoque, consacrés par les armes nucléaires dont le propre est de geler les situations acquises.

Les deux autres représentent l'application des deux conceptions fondamentales de la politique et de l'ordre international, que nous avons rencontrées tout au long de cette étude, au problème de la réunification de l'Europe et du dépassement de la guerre froide. Pour l'une et l'autre, la rigidité du système bipolaire peut être dépassée; mais, pour l'une c'est par l'interdépendance croissante des sociétés, pour l'autre par l'indépendance retrouvée des Etats; pour l'une par le rapprochement des peuples et des régimes grâce aux relations fonctionnelles et à l'expansion ordonnée des entreprises (maîtrise des armements, intégration européenne) fondées sur la découverte d'intérêts communs, pour l'autre par les fins et les moyens éternels de la "high politics", l'ambition nationale et l'art des combinaisons diplomatiques⁵⁵.

Toutes les décisions concrètes résultent forcément d'un compromis entre ces conceptions, mais le compromis ne doit pas cacher l'opposition entre les trois visions, celle de deux empires fondés sur les réalités de la

division et du rapport des forces; celle d'une zone ouverte de stabilité et de coopération fondée sur un ensemble de liens infra et supra-nationaux, qui dévaloriseraient peu à peu les frontières tout en limitant la liberté d'action des Etats engagés dans une entreprise commune, zone qui finirait par aboutir à une communauté des pays développés; finalement une stratégie dialectique s'efforçant de débarrasser les deux Europe des "deux hégémonies" avant de les grouper dans un concert restauré fondé sur un nouvel équilibre. L'opposition des méthodes entre les deux projets dynamiques, primat de la construction intérieure ou de la stratégie extérieure - élargissement progressif ou succession en phases contrastées - est conservée dans le résultat: la libération de l'Europe apparaît comme une libération en dépit de et par rapport à, ou au contraire grâce à et en faveur de, la liberté d'action des Etats nationaux.⁵⁷

Ce que nous voudrions indiquer c'est que les trois positions sont fausses en tant que telles, mais qu'elles nous donnent une indication précieuse sur la structure et la dynamique de la réalité européenne et internationale.

La clef des trois positions à propos de nos trois problèmes nous paraît pouvoir être présentée sous la forme de la coexistence et de la dialectique de trois niveaux (ou de trois systèmes de relations et d'interactions) que nous suggérons d'appeler: le système (en entendant par là l'équilibre et la division des deux blocs conduits par les deux leaders, la présence des troupes de ceux-ci entraînant une continuité du nucléaire au policier en passant par le face à face territorial classique), les Etats (en entendant par là l'action et l'interaction polycentrique des Etats exerçant une liberté d'action diplomatique presque intégralement séparée, du fait du système, de l'instrument militaire) et la société (en entendant par là l'évolution des croyances, des aspirations et des

attitudes des différents groupes sociaux, à l'intérieur des Etats et des alliances et à travers leurs frontières) ⁵⁸.

Ceux qui croient au statu quo se fondent avant tout sur la permanence du système (encore que, dans les intervalles sans troubles intérieurs et répression ouverte, ils s'affaiblissent parfois, aussi la stabilisation des sociétés et des régimes); ceux qui croient au changement voient soit l'évolution de la société abaisser les barrières, pour la convergence des deux systèmes ou par la désintégration de l'un et son par l'autre, soit les initiatives et la négociation diplomatique entraîner de proche en proche un mouvement devant aboutir à une redistribution des cartes. Aujourd'hui, d'ailleurs, on semble assister à une nouvelle conception qui combine plusieurs de nos postulats de manière originale encore que, pour l'instant, quelque peu mystérieuse: l'évolution des sociétés et leurs communications doivent renforcer la stabilité de chacun des deux systèmes, l'activité diplomatique doit aboutir à la reconnaissance de la division, réconciliation et séparation des deux Allemagne, des deux Europe, des deux alliances, unité de celles-ci et liberté d'action de leurs membres, doivent aller harmonieusement de pair.

En fait, si l'on peut avoir des doutes sur cette harmonie, on ne peut en avoir sur la combinaison inévitable des trois niveaux. Mais, toujours présents dans les deux Europe et dans leurs rapports, les trois niveaux le sont dans des combinaisons et avec des accents qui diffèrent selon les moments et surtout, selon les systèmes mais qui, toujours sont suffisamment contradictoires pour faire mentir toute conception du continent fondée soit sur le statu quo dans la division, soit sur le progrès harmonieux dans la réconciliation, soit sur la réorganisation par le démantèlement de l'un des deux systèmes ou de tous les deux.

Si la caractéristique essentielle des relations internationales actuelles, en particulier en Europe, est la contradiction entre les cadres institutionnels et les forces de changement, entre l'évolution idéologique et sociale et l'autorité politique et militaire, entre les aspirations intérieures et les contraintes extérieures, il y a toujours assez de fermentation pour empêcher la stabilité par le gel, assez de rigidité pour empêcher la stabilité par l'adaptation, assez de communication et de convergence pour empêcher la stabilité par l'isolement, assez de séparation et de divergence pour empêcher la stabilité par l'intégration. Que ce soit au point de vue de la relation entre niveaux, entre alliances, entre Etats, entre ceux-ci et leurs citoyens, l'Europe obéit parfaitement au modèle rousseauiste de la condition mixte et de ses contradictions. Pour répondre à nos questions, il faut cependant essayer de placer ces contradictions dans la perspective d'une dialectique historique qui ne permet certes pas de les surmonter mais qui permet peut-être être moins surpris que par les tenants de l'immobilisme ou ceux du progrès linéaire, soit par les disparités qui donnent à l'évolution de l'Europe un caractère dissymétrique, soit par les chocs en retour et les réactions qui y ont introduit des aspects cycliques.

Au premier niveau, territorial et militaire, rien n'a changé depuis 1945: le système européen, au point de vue de la sécurité et de l'équilibre, est toujours caractérisé par la présence directe des deux grandes puissances, par leur équilibre militaire et par la division du continent, de l'Allemagne et de Berlin selon une ligne de partage issue de la situation militaire en 1945.

Mais, au fur et à mesure que cet équilibre semblait stabilisé et que la confrontation des deux grands semblait se nuancer d'acceptation réciproque, voire de coopération,

le deuxième niveau se dégagait - celui des intérêts nationaux et de la flexibilité diplomatique, celui du refus par les alliés ou les satellites des deux grands d'accepter un alignement inconditionnel et automatique, celui des manœuvres et des explorations vers de nouvelles combinaisons à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur des anciens blocs: les années 1962-1967 ont vu les grandes puissances sur la défensive, devant le primat franco-roumain de la flexibilité.

Mais pendant ce temps, de manière plus souterraine, à la fois plus constante et discrète mais, en dernière analyse, moins contrôlable et plus explosive, se déroule l'évolution des sociétés, des attitudes et des croyances, qui brusquement révèle un abîme entre institutions et aspirations, entre générations d'un même pays ou entre pays d'un même bloc.

En ce sens les deux printemps de 1968, à Prague et à Paris, représentent un double réveil en montrant d'une part l'importance première, même au point de vue international, des tensions et transformation intérieures, d'autre part la puissance de conservation et de réaction des structures institutionnelles en particulier lorsqu'elles sont appuyées sur la force.

Certes, entre, en France, l'épreuve de volonté gagnée par un homme confirmé par une majorité, en Tchécoslovaquie, l'intervention d'une puissance extérieure utilisant la force militaire, et, plus encore, entre ces deux exemples et les réalités impersonnelles du rapport de forces économiques mettant en échec avec l'aide des étudiants révolutionnaires l'offensive française contre le dollar ou du système international refusant de se laisser dissoudre par la contestation polycentrique, les analogies ne sont que formelles. Mais on aurait tort de négliger le phénomène bien réel qu'elles manifestent - celui de la double faiblesse des institutions et des contestations - chacun ayant juste assez de force pour faire apparaître la faiblesse de l'autre. Dans l'instant, les semaines ou les mois mêmes où il manifeste sa fragilité idéologique du spirituelle, l'ordre établi montre qu'il est capable de revenir en force tant qu'il n'a pas décidé d'abdiquer; le problème est de savoir quels sont les lendemains de ce retour en force, s'il signifie également un retour en grâce et un retour en légitimité, s'il manifeste assez de flexibilité pour intégrer ou "récupérer" des contestations qui l'ont ébranlé, ou assez de puissance pour les extirper ou s'il n'a fait que gagner un sursis.

Tout le problème des niveaux consiste à se demander dans quelle mesure les vagues du troisième peuvent être endiguées

par la muraille du premier ou au contraire mordre sur elles ou encore si les agitations ou les manœuvres du deuxième niveau consolidant ou affaiblissent le statu quo, accélèrent ou détournent l'évolution ou n'ont qu'un effet épisodique - celui de rides à la surface de l'eau - sur le dialogue essentiel de la force militaire et des forces profondes.

A l'"heure de la négociation", il semble que le niveau diplomatique revienne au premier plan, et de manière plus sérieuse qu'en 1962-1967, puisque cette fois ce sont les partenaires essentiels du système européen, - l'U.R.S.S., les Etats-Unis et les deux Allemagnes - qui sont les interlocuteurs. Mais l'objet des négociations est précisément de consacrer le statu quo sous la forme de l'équilibre militaire et de la division territoriale, dans le cadre des engagements institutionnels existants. Les véritables questions qu'elle pose - tant quant à ses sources que quant à ses conséquences - sociale moins sur les déplacements de l'équilibre militaire ou sur ceux des alignements diplomatique que, une fois de plus, sur l'évolution intérieure, économique, sociale et politique: effets psychologiques, respectifs des événements de Tchécoslovaquie et de l'augmentation des besoins intérieurs des sociétés⁵⁹ sur leur vision de la situation internationale, lassitude de la guerre froide et réactions aux tendances centrifuges, effets de la reconnaissance du statu quo sur la stabilité des régimes et de celle-ci sur leur ouverture ou leur rigidité.

A propos de tous les termes employés: statu quo, sécurité, détente, reconnaissance des frontières, non recours à la force, se pose le même problème, qui est précisément celui du linkage entre système et société, à savoir de la tension entre sécurité du système, et de ceux qui s'identifient à lui⁶⁰, et l'évolution de la société. La sécurité doit certainement être entendue comme protection des Etats par rapport à la guerre, intentionnelle ou accidentelle. Doit-elle aussi être entendue comme protection des régimes contre la révolution intérieure ou mondiale? Ou, dans une conception encore plus extensive, comme la protection des gouvernements contre le mécontentement des populations, ou des sociétés

contre le changement, même si ce mécontentement et ce changement prennent des formes pacifiques? L'acceptation du statu quo doit-elle consister seulement dans l'engagement à ne pas le modifier par la force ou aussi dans l'engagement à ne pas désapprouver qu'on empêche par la force sa modification pacifique? D'autre part, ce statu quo est-il défini par les frontières et les Etats existants, par l'équilibre militaire, par les organisations institutionnelles et les alignements idéologiques, extérieurs et intérieurs, alliances ou régimes existants? Vouloir la sécurité de l'Europe, est-ce interdire à tout Etat, de l'Ouest ou de l'Est, de changer de position intérieure ou extérieure, de cesser d'être membre de l'OTAN ou de Pacte de Varsovie, de cesser d'être communiste ou capitaliste ou même d'adopter, par son évolution intérieure ou extérieure, une position spéciale à l'intérieur des cadres existants? Et quant aux frontières de ceux-ci, entre Etats ou entre systèmes, quel doit être non seulement leur tracé mais leur caractère? Quel est le rapport entre la circulation des troupes, des biens, des hommes, des connaissances et des idées? Peuvent-elles être filtrées ou sélectionnées, et dans l'affirmative cela se fera-t-il dans le cadre national ou régional?⁶¹

A vrai dire, le problème essentiel est celui qui a été posé récemment par M. Pecic, vice-ministre yougoslave des Affaires étrangères, pour qui les traits caractéristiques de l'Europe sont la complexité des rapports politiques et l'inégalité de développement, et pour qui, en particulier, la révolution scientifique et l'expansion des forces productives entrent en conflit avec les structures des blocs et des sociétés⁶².

Sur le plan économique et technique, les intérêts et les possibilités ne coïncident pas nécessairement avec ceux des blocs ou des régions: celles-ci sont soumises à la pression de leurs membres à la fois pour plus d'autonomie et plus d'ouverture vers l'extérieur. Sur le plan psychologique, il se produit, au niveau des blocs le même phénomène que J. Galtung⁶³ a analysé au niveau des Etats nationaux: sous l'influence, à la fois des volontés d'indépendance nationale et des courants de communications et d'aspirations de la société trans-nationale, l'horizon de certains groupes

sociétaux importants ne coïncide pas avec celui de l'alliance ou de l'empire: pour certains il est national ou provincial, pour d'autres il devient pan-européen, mondial ou non-territorial. La solidarité par affinité croît aux dépens de la solidarité par contigüité, et celle-ci elle-même, là où elle garde ou accroît sa vitalité, tend à s'arrêter à des limites le plus souvent nationales. Mais l'équilibre militaire, et le pouvoir politique là où il résulte directement de cet équilibre (pour parler clairement, là où il repose d'abord sur la force) est toujours au niveau de l'empire, du bloc ou de l'alliance, ou entre les mains de son leader.

Longtemps, la stabilité relative de l'Europe a été due non seulement à l'équilibre des deux grands et à leur présence directe, mais aussi au fait que l'ordre intérieur et l'orientation idéologique des pays européens de l'Est ou de l'Ouest pouvaient être tenue pour acquis, quelles que fussent les raisons de cette stabilité. Pour l'essentiel, l'idée d'un pays de l'OTAN adoptant le communisme, d'un pays du pacte de Varsovie l'abandonnant, de l'un ou l'autre ou d'un pays neutre sombrant dans l'anarchie ou la guerre civile n'entraient pas en ligne de compte. Mais ces dernières années nous ont montré que ni la stabilité qui semblait reposer à l'Etat sur le triomphe de l'idéologie ni celle qui semblait fondée à l'Ouest sur le déclin de celle-ci n'étaient à toute épreuve. D'où une dialectique de la nouvelle instabilité des sociétés industrielles et de la stabilité persistante du système bipolaire (ou, si l'on préfère, de la rigidité de celui-ci et de l'évolution de celle-là) qui est sans doute la principale source actuelle et potentielle de crises et de conflits en Europe.

L'intéressant est que la stabilité semble venir du "drame", et l'instabilité du "procès". L'état de nature inter-étatique semble avoir, en Europe, abouti à une stabilisation par l'équilibre et la technique militaire. Personne ne croit à l'éventualité d'une attaque d'une des alliances contre l'autre, ni, sauf à la rigueur, entre la Grèce et la Turquie à propos de Chypre, à celle d'une guerre de deux Etats

européens pour le territoire ou d'autres intérêts nationaux. Seul, peut-être, un conflit entre un leader et l'un de ses alliés ou un neutre serait concevable, mais on ne le voit guère surgir que, précisément comme sanction de l'échec de la "pénétration informelle" à contrôler ou à orienter son évolution intérieure. Les sociétés industrielles semblent retrouver les problèmes d'instabilité et d'intervention compétitive familiers au Tiers-Monde⁶⁴. Si l'Europe en vient à se "latino-américaniser", quelles ne seront alors les conséquences pour l'autre aspect, celui de la présence des grands? Chacune dans sa sphère, l'un et l'autre dans les nouvelles "zones grises" des Etats neutres, seront-ils plus interventionnistes ou moins? Dans quelles direction leurs propres conflits intérieurs les pousservont-ils?

On peut, ainsi, spéculer sur les conséquences internationales d'une Yougoslavie soumise aux pressions centrifuges du problème nationale après la disparition du maréchal Tito, d'une Grèce, voire d'une Espagne, en proie à une nouvelle guerre civile, d'une Italie où l'affrontement des gauchistes et des bourgeois succéderait celui des communistes et des colonels réclamant le soutien américain, d'une Europe orientale où la corde raide hongroise de la réforme intérieure, ou la corde raide roumaine de l'indépendance extérieure finiraient par céder, où les réaction soviétiques affecteraient des pays-clefs ou frontières comme l'Allemagne de l'Est ou la Yougoslavie.⁶⁵

Les résultats de ces crises affecteraient-elles plus durablement l'atmosphère de la détente et la réalité de la sécurité, en Europe, que ce ne fut le cas à propos de l'affaire de Prague? Les doutes sont permis car désormais les priorités intérieures font que "l'effet Festinger" de "cognitive dissonance"⁶⁶ joue à l'Ouest du moins et pour l'instant plutôt en faveur de la détente que de la guerre froide et en tout cas contribue au modèle de la noninfluence. Mais l'important est de voir que les tensions sont trop nombreuses et diverses pour qu'elles ne soient pas à la fois inévitables et imprévisibles.

Elles ne correspondent cependant qu'à l'un des modèles d'interaction entre sociétés, Etats et systèmes régionaux. On peut aussi imaginer que les institutions et les autorités de la nation ou de l'empire aient suffisamment de vitalité et de force pour faire taire les voix de la contestation et stopper les courants centrifuges et reconstituer l'unité sinon dans les esprits, du moins dans les actions. Si, comme pour les pensions, on assiste à l'Ouest comme à l'Est, à une crise de légitimité correspondant au déclin (67), à des institutions et des élites et à la disparité des dimensions politiques, cette solution ne peut avoir qu'un temps même si elle réussit à opérer l'ouverture vers l'extérieur de manière sélective et centralisée, et même si par la puissance ou la richesse, la persuasion clandestine ou le sens du danger, elle réussit à remobiliser les énergies sociales. Mais ce temps gagné peut lui permettre de retarder le déclin voire de l'éviter si, entretemps, une relève se produit.

Enfin, entre l'affrontement ouvert de la société et de l'autorité et la réduction au silence de la première par la seconde, se situerait le modèle d'une coexistence relativement pacifique marquée par le lent déclin ou la lente absorption de l'autorité par la société. Ce serait l'érosion des systèmes : l'Etat, par ses institutions, l'alliance, par son dispositif militaire, continuent à exister, mais dans la mesure où ils se cantonnent dans une définition technique et étroite de leur fonction, les préoccupations, les valeurs, l'évolution de la société leur échappent de plus en plus. Les préoccupations de la partie (nations dans les alliances, groupes et individus dans les nations) l'emportent sur celles du tout, dont seuls quelques spécialistes assurent le fonctionnement.

Normalement, ce schéma devrait aboutir à l'effondrement de l'organisation en question, de l'intérieur ou de l'extérieur : c'est tout le problème, qu'avait vu Hegel, de la discordance entre l'une part les nécessités fonctionnelles des Etats et de leur pluralité, et l'autre part les tendances spontanées de la société moderne et de ses valeurs vers

.../...

la privatisation⁶⁸, d'où le risque d'Etats sans citoyens et sans hommes d'Etat et de guerres sans guerriers, Mais dans un système international bloqué et une société technobureaucratisée, on peut concevoir de manière presque permanente, une sorte d'anarchie structurelle intérieure contenue dans certaines limites par des structures continuant leur vie propre.

A la longue, les dangers de perte de légitimité, d'effondrement ou de réaction violente subsistent. Plus encore, ils peuvent venir de l'extérieur, si la contagion des explosions d'un autre sous-système se communique au sous-système en érosion, ou si celui-ci offre des tentations à l'expansion du premier.

Le cas le plus normal et le plus intéressant, cependant, dans le cadre européen est que le système continue à tenir bon, mais que, ce qui se passe à l'intérieur devienne, d'un sous-système à l'autre, l'objet d'une course inversée à l'érosion qui serait l'équivalent moderne de la course à la puissance. Nul ne conquiert personne, nul n'invite personne à sortir de l'alliance opposée; extérieurement, au point de vue de la division territoriale et à celui du danger d'agression, rien ne se passe. Mais en réalité, tout se passe à l'intérieur dans la perception que les populations des deux alliances ont de leur solidité, de leur unité, de leur dynamisme comparés. L'"internalisation"⁶⁹ de la politique, la substitution des "milieu goals" aux "possession goals" s'appliquerait aux rapports entre alliances comme aux rapports entre Etats: on ne cherche pas à détruire l'adversaire, on prend même soin de conserver le système dont il fait partie avec nous, mais on s'efforce de décourager ce qui l'unifie et le renforce, d'encourager chez lui non la révolution mais un relatif mélange de paralysie et d'anarchie. Pourquoi faire, puisqu'on ne cherche pas à la conquérir? Pour rien sans doute, sinon pour soi-même et son propre système, pour la logique rousseauiste de la comparaison: la dialectique de la compétition et de l'isolement prend le pas, ici aussi, sur celle de la guerre et de la paix. Introduire des nuances ou des incertitudes dans l'attitude d'un membre de l'alliance opposée peut-être, à l'âge nucléaire, le substitut de la conquête ou du ren-

versement des alliances, en même temps qu'une assurance prise pour le cas d'un effondrement du système ou de sa transformation radicale. C'est la politique du "ala ob" substituée à celle du "Alsop".

En tout cas, la dialectique de l'explosion, de l'expansion (intérieure et extérieure) et de l'érosion devrait être prise en considération pour l'étude des rapports d'influence directe et indirecte. Entre les deux sous-systèmes d'un système bipolaire comme celui de l'Europe. Il est clair que selon le processus auquel ils seront respectivement en proie leur influence réciproque sera différente.

Or, l'un des caractères frappants des deux Europes, est, tout en appartenant à un même système et étant affectées par les mêmes processus, leur dissymétrie. Celle-ci tient à la structure différente des unités, à commencer par le leader et des organisations elles-mêmes.

La clef de la dissymétrie est le caractère à la fois plus centralisé, plus simple et plus tendu des systèmes, intérieurs et d'alliance, à l'Est, et leur côté plus décentralisé, plus complexe et plus flexible ou feutré à l'Ouest. Ce qui est en commun, c'est que dans les deux cas les systèmes existants sont perçus à la fois comme dépassés et comme inévitables, comme ayant perdu tout prestige sans pouvoir être remplacés par rien. C'est, en particulier, le cas pour la présence des deux grands qui ont échoué à bâtir autour d'eux une communauté mais qui restent les seuls piliers de l'équilibre. C'est deuxièmement, le fait que les deux grands eux-mêmes sont en période de grave crise interne, qui met en question la légitimité de leurs institutions et les priorités, civiles ou militaires, intérieures et extérieures de leur politique et qui introduit de graves incertitudes dans son avenir. Mais la ressemblance s'arrête là.

Pour l'U.R.S.S., même si elle a tendance à se replier vers l'intérieur, l'Europe de l'Est fait partie de cet intérieur. La légitimité de l'élite dirigeante est indissolublement liée à son rôle de gardienne de la communauté socialiste,

et la forme de ses relations avec les sociétés "pénétrées"⁷⁰ l'oblige à un contrôle direct et centralisé. Au contraire, les Etats-Unis peuvent voir avec une certaine philosophie des régions comme l'Europe occidentale se détacher d'eux dans une certaine mesure: légitimité intérieure et autorité extérieure semblent aujourd'hui, vues d'Amérique, être autant en conflit qu'en liaison nécessaire. Surtout, il reste l'assurance de liens et de contrôles autres que politiques et militaire.

C'est que l'opposition entre tendance au détachement et présence, des deux grands prend des allures contrastées à l'Ouest et à l'Est. A l'Ouest, il y a eu à la fois tendance à la création d'un fossé politique et progrès de l'interdépendance ou de la pénétration économique, sociale, culturelle. D'une part, les sociétés convergent ou l'Europe s'américanise, d'autre part la France peut quitter l'OTAN et les Etats-Unis être tentés par le néo-isolationnisme. A l'Est, au contraire, le fossé est plus évident tous les jours entre les mentalités des Européens de l'Est et celles des Soviétiques, la tendance spontanée des économies est la séparation ou la réorientation plutôt que l'intégration, mais l'U.R.S.S. ne manifeste aucune envie ni de se retirer ni de laisser ses alliés se détacher d'elle. A l'Ouest, les évolutions, même contradictoires, sont possibles, parce que le décalage entre elles n'est pas trop grand et parce que chacune d'elles est limitée; il y a à la fois suffisamment de diversité et de liens pour que ni l'américanisation, ni le départ de la France, ni celui des Etats-Unis n'aient beaucoup de chances d'aller jusqu'au bout. A l'Est, on a une lutte brutale entre des tendances contradictoires dont chacune risque de détruire l'autre et entre lesquelles il y a moins dialogue ou compromis que tendances au tout-ou-rien.

La raison en est, sans doute à chercher dans ce que Galtung appelle "rank incongruence". Les Etats-Unis sont militairement les leaders mais ils sont aussi les plus riches, ils ont l'initiative sur le plan des communications de masses, les deux courants universels modernes qui portent les deux

tribus, transnationale, technicienne et contestatrice, trouvent chez eux leur impulsion même si leur modèle est quelque peu terni. Ils peuvent donc régner, parfois inconsciemment, et par personne interposée, et ne pas craindre la communication. Au contraire l'U.R.S.S. est plus puissante mais moins développée et moins proche par tradition, idéologie et culture, des Européens de l'Ouest que des pays comme la Tchécoslovaquie. Dès que le processus de convergence européenne s'engage vraiment, les pays d'Europe centrale se trouvent tout de suite beaucoup trop avancés dans cette direction pour ne pas inquiéter les dirigeants soviétiques et les amener à donner un coup d'arrêt. Pour eux, les évolutions ne sont acceptables que s'ils sont certains d'en garder le contrôle. Aussi courent-elles le risque de ne pas aller assez loin pour la vitalité de leur propre système, par peur d'aller trop loin.

C'est là, nous semble-t-il, ce qui fournit la réponse aux hypothèses sur le mimétisme et le contraste, la contagion et la réaction. Tout dépend de la réaction du système ou plutôt du leader. Ces contagions à l'intérieur de l'alliance et les impulsions de l'Est sont en général suivies, plus ou moins mollement, à l'Ouest. Quand les courants partent de l'ouest, ils tendent à produire un effet d'imitation (Krouchtchev imitant le Marché Commun, la Roumanie imitant la France dans l'organisation militaire) mais celui-ci à son tour provoque une réaction qui, très souvent, aggrave la situation antérieure, quitte à ce que l'impulsion première se retrouve à un autre moment, à un autre endroit, sous une autre forme.

Plus feutrée et aboutissant à des compromis dans un cas, plus brutale et aboutissant à des renversements dans l'autre, les deux évolutions correspondent aux deux types de société plus élastique parce que plus pluraliste dans un cas, plus tendue entre ces extrêmes dans l'autre.(?)

Certes, l'ouverture progressive n'est pas impossible, même aux régimes les plus centralisés, et, d'autre part, la croyance aux vertus du compromis et du pluralisme semble quelque peu anachronique si on considère les déchirements des Etats-

Unis aujourd'hui. Il ne nous semble néanmoins pas improbable que les organisations de l'Occident, sur le plan international comme sur le plan intérieur, puissent plier sans rompre et survivre sans gloire, dans un mélange de réformes partielles et de réaction également partielle, d'instabilité structurelle et d'érosion progressive. Dans le monde soviétique, l'opposition plus radicale entre autorité et diversité paraît de nature à promettre davantage d'ordre et d'expansion, à court terme, davantage de conflit et de danger à long terme.

La réponse aux questions fondamentales sur le sens de la politique internationale - interdépendance des sociétés ou interaction des Etats - nous paraît désormais claire, elle aussi, même si elle est peu bouleversante.

Nous sommes condamnés à l'état mixte, c'est-à-dire à la pluralité des organisations humaines et donc, inévitablement, aux conflits de légitimité et à la compétition. Ni la fusion ni l'isolement ne sont à notre portée. Mais si la pluralité entraîne nécessairement la possibilité du conflit, ce n'est pas celui-ci qui lui donne son sens. Ce sens, les organisations et les communautés ne peuvent le trouver que dans la double ouverture vers la diversité et le pluralisme, intérieur et extérieur, vers leurs membres et vers leurs semblables.

Il n'y a pas de coexistence entre billes de billards, qu'elles soient grosses(?) ou petites, entre blocs, nations, groupes, individus qui se prétendent monolithiques et ne reconnaissent pas en eux-mêmes la marque de l'adversaire. Les maux de l'état mixte pluraliste qu'a dénoncés Rousseau sont bien réels mais on ne peut y répondre que par davantage de pluralisme, un pluralisme qui, sous la forme sinon des fédérations, ou moins d'un peyenet de "federalizing process",⁷¹ admette la multiplicité des types d'unité et de communauté, des cultures et des sous-cultures.

De tous les linkages, le plus nécessaire et le plus authentique est celui qui, à la sécurité et à la coexistence entre grands Etats et entre blocs, rattache l'indépendance des Etats et la liberté des groupes et des individus, cette

cette liberté qui, selon Montesquieu, consiste en l'opinion que chacun a de sa sûreté". Faute de cette sûreté-là, nous sommes condamnés à l'état mixte de Rousseau, qui "participe à la liberté et à la loi sans assurer ni l'une ni l'autre, per quem neutrum licet, nec tanquam in bello paratum esse, nec tanquam in pace securum"⁷². Le défi que nous lance Rousseau, c'est de montrer que dans les conditions modernes, une association "peut être partielle et imparfaite" sans produire la tyrannie et la guerre.

Si, comme l'a dit Marx, un peuple qui en opprime un autre ne veut pas être libre, un système qui réprime la société ne veut, aujourd'hui, être stable. Réciproquement comme l'écrit Jean Calery, "parfois est-il admis que dans l'ordre social les Etats doivent servir la justice, alors que dans l'ordre international ils continueraient à ne servir qu'eux-mêmes?"⁷³

Chercher à concilier les exigences d'identité et d'universalité de communauté et de participation, de changement et de stabilité, empêcher que les inégalités ne deviennent cumulatives et ne se transforment en oppression, que les compétitions n'escaladent et ne se transforment en lutte à mort, ces tâches sont communes à tout ordre politique, national et international. Les nouveaux caractères que le progrès technique a imposé aux sociétés modernes et à leurs rapports augmentent, à cet égard, les dangers de l'échec mais aussi les chances d'une demi-réussite.

L'action politique peut essayer non pas supprimer la tyrannie et la queue-possibilités toujours présentes aux tant qu'il y aura deux hommes - mais les rendre suffisamment marginales et improbables pour que nul ne soit plus tenté d'y vu les traits décisifs de l'état unité, c'est-à-dire de l'état social.

R E S U M E

Ce rapport part de l'idée que le problème du linkage entre politique intérieure et extérieure est lui-même lié à un phénomène historique: celui de la crise ou du déclin ou de la transformation de certaines activités (la guerre), de certaines valeurs et de certaines organisations (l'Etat territorial-national, les alliances). Ce phénomène met en question l'opposition classique de l'état civil à l'intérieur des nations et de l'état de nature, ou de guerre potentielle, entre elles. Le rapport étudie les dans celle de l'approche dite de la sociologie historique. A partir de la distinction et de l'influence réciproque entre système et société, et entre interactions et transactions, ou relations, il s'efforce de poser quelques jalons pour l'étude de l'"état mixte", c'est-à-dire de l'état civil imparfait ou de l'état de guerre incomplet et de la dynamique de contradictions. Il examine pour cela les relations 1) entre pays développés, à l'intérieur du sous-système occidental (en insistant sur l'importance de l'influence indirecte, de la dialectique de la compétition et de l'isolement, et de la distinction entre conduites instrumentales et expressives, 2) entre adversaires inter et intra-étatiques (en insistant sur le rôle de la force latente et en proposant l'application de certains concepts de l'arms-control aux conflits intérieurs et de certains concepts d'ordre juridique ou institutionnel interne à l'équilibre international, et 3) entre alliances (en proposant des hypothèses sur l'influence réciproque de leur évolution respective, par imitation, contagion ou réaction, et des schémas pour l'analyse du sous-système européen: distinction a) de trois niveaux, le système territorial-militaire, l'action diplomatique des Etats et l'évolution de la société, b) de trois types d'évolution, fondé sur le primat de chacun de ces niveaux, c) de trois types d'effets sur les relations entre organisations et sociétés: expansion, explosion et érosion).

Il conclut par des observations sur l'asymétrie entre les deux alliances européennes, sur la probabilité des conflits à l'intérieur de chacune d'eux dû au fossé entre la rigidité des systèmes et l'instabilité de la société, et sur le caractère désirable du pluralisme et de la communication pour prévenir et limiter ces conflits.

Summary

The paper starts from the idea that the problem of the linkage between domestic and international politics is linked itself to a historical phenomenon: the crisis, decline or transformation of certain activities (e.g. war) certain values and certain organizations (e.g. the nation-state, alliance). This trend calls into question the classical opposition between civil society within nations and the state of nature, or of war between them. The paper studies the difficulties of this distinction in the discussion of political philosophy and of the approach, within international relations theory, known under the name of "historical sociology". Starting from the distinction and the mutual influence between system and society, and between interactions and transactions or relations, it tries to bring a few contributions to the study of the "mixed state" of imperfect civil society and incomplete state of war and to the dynamics of its contradictions. It examines the relations

- 1) between developed countries within the western sub-system (emphasizing the importance of indirect influence of the dialectics of competition and isolation, and of the distinction between instrumental and expressive behavior);
- 2) between opponents, within and between states, (emphasizing the role of latent force and suggesting to application of certain notions derived from arms-control to domestic conflict and of certain notions derived from civil society to the international balance), and 3) between alliances (suggesting some hypotheses on the mutual influence of their respective evolution, through imitation, contagion or reaction and some schemes for the analysis of the european sub-system: the distinction a) between three levels, the military-territorial system; the diplomatic action and interaction of states, and the evolution of society; b) between three types of evolution, based on the primacy of each of these three levels, and c) between three types of effects on the relations between organizations and societies: expansion, explosion and erosion).

It concludes with observations on the asymmetry between the two European alliances, on the likelihood of conflicts within each, of them, due to the gap between the rigidity of systems and the instability of societies, and on the desirability of pluralism and communication to prevent and limit these conflicts.

NOTES

1. JOUVENEL (B.de), De la Souveraineté, Paris, 1955, IIe partie, ch. III, pp. 163-183. Il s'agit des corollaires de petitesse, d'homogénéité, de clôture et d'invariance.
2. MONTESQUIEU, De l'Esprit des lois, Livre IX, chapitre I.
3. ROUSSEAU, Emile, Livre 5, Ed. Garnier, p. 596.
4. WALTZ (K.), Man, the State and War, Columbia University Press, 1959, ch. 6 et 7.
5. ROUSSEAU, Loc. cit.
6. Voir: "Les concepts de guerre et de paix chez Kant", in Revue française de science politique, sept. 1961, pp. 642-671.
7. Voir, sur ce point, nos quelques indications dans le chapitre sur Hegel de Strauss and Cropsey (ed.), History of Political Philosophy, Rand McNally, 1963, pp. 648-654.
8. Cf. PAPAIOANNOU (K.), "Marx et la politique internationale", Le Contrat Social, mai-juin 1967 ("Marx et l'unité du monde") et juillet-août 1967 ("Marx et le monde des puissances").
9. WEIL (Eric), Philosophie politique, Paris, Vrin, 1956.
10. C'est ce que Marion Levy appelle "The pathetic fallacy". Cf. son: "Does it matter if h's naked? Bawled the child", in: KNORR (K.) et ROSENAU (J.) ed., Contending approaches to international politics, p. 99.
11. ROUSSEAU, L'Etat de guerre, "L'Etat, au contraire, étant un corps artificiel, n'a nulle mesure déterminée ... ainsi, la grandeur du corps politique étant purement relative, il est forcé de se comparer pour se connaître ..." Vaughan, p. 297.
12. ROUSSEAU, loc.cit., p. 298: "Les citoyens ont beau s'appeler membres de l'Etat, ils ne sauraient s'unir à lui comme les vrais membres le font au corps".

13. Ces distinctions semblent en accord avec SCOTT (A.), The functioning of the international political system, Macmillan, p. 30. Pour toute cette discussion, cf. DEUTSCH (K.), The Nerves of Government, New York, 1966. D'autre part, la discussion méthodologique gagnerait au contact de la philosophie phénoménologique, critique et dialectique. Sur la réalité des objets de la connaissance historique, cf. L'introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire de Raymond Aron, ses Dimensions de la conscience historique et ses livres sur la philosophie critique de l'histoire et sur la sociologie allemande contemporaine. Sur la réification, cf. Histoire et conscience de classe, de Lukacs. Sur la dialectique de la série, du groupe organisé, et du groupe en fusion, et sur la notion de totalisation, cf. Sartre, Critique de la raison dialectique. Pour une conception marxiste de la totalité concrète opposée, à la démarche analytique et aux conceptions structurales-fonctionnelles, cf. les travaux de J. Habermas ainsi que K. Kosik, La dialectique du concret, trad. fr., Paris, Maspero, 1967, en particulier la première partie. On éviterait ainsi les malentendus issus du provincialisme intellectuel dont fait preuve, par exemple, Gran Young: "Aron and the whale: a Jonas in theory: in KNOOR et Roschau, op. cit., pp. 129-144.
14. WEIZSÄCKER (C.F.), "Friede und Wahrheit", Die Zeit, 30 juin 1967.
15. FONTAINE (A.), La guerre civile froide, Paris, Fayard 1969.
16. KAISER (K.), "Transnationale Politik", Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 1969, pp. 80-109.
17. LINDBERG et SCHEINGOLD, Europe's would be polity, Prentice-Hall 1970.
18. DEUTSCH (K.), The analysis of international relations, Prentice Hall, 1968, pp. 17-20 et passim.
19. HOFFMANN (Stanley), Gulliver's troubles, New York, 1962, 1ère partie (en particulier chapitre 3) et 4ème partie (en particulier chapitre 11).

20. ROUSSEAU, Lettre à Mirabeau, Vaughan II p. 161, Voir la remarquable étude d'Hoffmann "Rousseau on War and Peace" in: The State of War, Praeger, 1965, pp. 54-88.
21. ARON (R.), Paix et guerre, Paris, Calman-Lévy, 1962, p. 29
22. Telle est aussi la préoccupation de LINDBERG et SCHEINGOLD, op. cit. p. 105-106.
23. KELLY (G.) et MILLER (L.), Internal War and International Systems: perspectives on method, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers, 21, août 1969.
24. KAISER (K.), "The interaction of Regional sub-systems: some preliminary notes on recurrent patterns and the role of super-powers", World Politics, octobre 1968, pp. 84-108.
25. ROBERTSON (R.), "Strategic relations between national societies: a sociological analysis", Journal of Conflict Resolutions, mars 1968, p. 16.
26. GALTUNG (J.), Journal of Peace Research, passim. Cf. en particulier "A structural theory of aggression", J.P.R. 1964, pp. 95-119, et "On the future of the international system", J.P.R. 1967, pp. 305-334. Vue d'ensemble dans: Conflict as a way of life. New Society, 16 octobre 1969 et Survival, janvier 1970.
27. Mc CLELLAND (Ch.), "The acute international Crisis" in: "The International System", numéro spécial de World Politics édité par Knorr et Verba, Octobre 1961 et (avec G.D. Hoggard) "Conflict Patterns in the interactions among nations" in ROSENAU, International Politics and Foreign Policy, Revised Edition, p. 711.
28. Cf. notre: "L'équilibre des puissances et le système international" in: L'Univers politique, Relations Internationales sous la direction de J. Meyriat, Paris, Ed. Richelieu, 1969, pp. 204-237.
29. Le Grand Débat, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1963, p. 274.
30. Cf. notre: Les Alliances sont elles dépassées? Paris, Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1967, p. 26 (Série C, "Recherches").

31. "The nation-state in the nuclear age", Survey, avril 1968, pp. 3-37.
32. Cf. DEUTSCH, Political Community at the International Level, Doubleday, 1954, p. 41 et passim dans l'oeuvre de Deutsch.
33. OLSON (M.) et ZECKHAUSER (R.), "An economic theory of alliance" in RUSSETT (B.) ed., Economic theories of politics, Marsham, Chicago, 1965, pp. 25-51.
34. HOFFMANN (S.), "Europe's identity crisis between the past and America", Daedalus, 93, 4, 1964, p. 1265.
35. Cf. MORSE (E.), "The transformation of Foreign Policies Modernization interdependance and externalization", World Politics, Avril 1970, pp. 371-393.
36. Cf. HOFFMANN (S.), Gulliver's troubles, pp. 58-59 et KNORR (K.), On the uses of military power in the nuclear age, Princeton University Press, 1966 passim.
37. Cf. ARON, La société industrielle et la guerre, Paris, Plon, 1959.
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