THE INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Summary of Discussion at Third Meeting of the European Study Commission with East European Representatives

London, 14th-15th November, 1969

"STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN SECURITY"

Mr. Francois Duchêne, who presided over the meeting for the first time as Director of ISS, welcomed the element of continuity which was becoming apparent in the East European participation in these discussions. He regretted that on each occasion representatives from East Germany had been unable at the last moment to accept the Institute's invitation.

It was agreed to divide discussion under three headings: the relations of the super powers with each other and their purposes in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; the impact on the European context of Soviet-American relations and the vision of their own security problems held by Eastern and Western Europeans; specific suggestions for European security policies or measures which may seem relevant in the light of consideration of the first two aspects.

First Session: The Super Powers

Mr. Ian Smart introduced the opening session with a presentation on the political and technical problems of the impending talks in Helsinki. By definition, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks would be about the strategic relationship between the two most powerful countries in the world. That strategic relationship was, and had been for the past ten years at least, a relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence. Thus SALT as a negotiation was primarily a negotiation about deterrence. 'Deterrence' meant above all an area in which it was essential constantly to weigh stakes against risks, an area which it was not at all easy to define; it was not a monolithic or static concept, there was no particular level of force at which we could say that one country was deterred for all purposes and all times by another. It depended on hostages - a very old historical idea as a substitute for trust between parties and nations. Deterrence was vulnerable, therefore, to two important types of evolutionary development. Deterrence as a system would break down, first, if the synthetic trust, the hostages, were removed from the system before a genuine trust existed to put in their place, and secondly if the reality of this hostage relationship became incredible.

Because deterrence was about threats and about risks and about trust, synthetic or real, it was above all about perceptions; and because these were perceptions of intention rather than of action, it was a very sensitive type of negotiating situation. It was extremely important to recognise how large a part perceptions of each other's capabilities played in this. Because inadequate intelligence was available to the US and Soviet Union about the intentions of the other, as opposed to the weapons which they had in their possession, it became necessary to base these perceptions on two separate pillars - declaratory policy, and capabilities, and the second pillar carried far more weight. Given a mutual assumption that there was a rational reason for the acquisition by either party of particular types of strategic weapons capability, if one side acquired a capability this was taken as important evidence of its intention: just as in the case of a man running towards you brandishing a meat axe while declaring that his intention was to kill a fly on the wall behind you, appearances spoke louder than words.

Clearly, therefore, SALT as a negotiation was not simply about the objective relationship between weapons systems on both sides but rather about the subjective relationship between how each side saw the other's intention and how it did so based on its knowledge of the other's capabilities. The real task of SALT was to bring the perception of intention closer to the reality of intention and to bring the weapons capability of each side closer to both, to create a congruance between the respective perceptions of each side and the reality of their strategic weapons programme.

To achieve this within a framework of nuclear deterrence, there were two primary criteria to be satisfied. First, the deterrent forces on both sides must above all be credible: deterrence must be seen to exist. As part of this it was necessary that these forces should be in an important measure invulnerable. Secondly, these forces must also be unambiguous, and this was becoming the more troublesome of the criteria. Given the importance of the perceptions mentioned above, ambiguous deterrent forces (i.e. forces which while they may have a capability for deterrence by retaliation may also be seen to have a capability which goes beyond this) were likely to be perceived, in a relationship which did not include a maximum of genuine trust, in the most unfavourable light possible. This was the reason why a good deal of the SALT negotiation was likely to centre round two particular types of strategic weapons systems now in course of deployment or development, ABMs and MRVs or MIRVs.

In the case of ABMs, the ambiguity was obvious. If in theory one power were to deploy a highly efficient ABM defence round its centres of population and industry, it would be seen to deprive the other power of the hostage on which deterrence depended. In the case of MRVs/MIRVs, the ambiguity resided not in the systems themselves so much as in the coincidence of the development of multiple re-entry systems in both the US and Soviet Union with other types of technological development which in practice meant an increase in the accuracy of delivery of warheads by a new order of magnitude. High accuracy was of secondary importance from the point of view of ability to deliver effectively a powerful nuclear warhead upon a city or industrial complex, or to deter attack by threatening to rotailate against centres of population and industry; but it was extremely important in relation to ability to deliver a first strike against the other power's <u>forces</u>. Improvements in accuracy had thus raised new fears about the possibility of systems using them being designed for use in a first strike, and this had coincided with the development of new types of multiple warhead systems. Multiple warhead systems were also ambiguous, especially for arms control purposes, because they were invisible. With the development of reconnaissance satellites, and with other means of surveillance, it was possible for each side to have very reliable information indeed about the number of missiles or aircraft or submarines the other side could deploy; but it was impossible to tell whether a missile contained one warhead, or ten. This led to a different kind of ambiguity, one which forced each side to assume that the missiles it observed on the other side did have multiple warheads in some measure.

There was a direct relationship for the purposes of SALT between ABM systems on the one hand and multiple warhead systems on the other. Multiple warhead systems had been developed in the US to be a means of countering ABM systems (by saturating them). It was doubtful whether the US would agree to stop the development of multiple warhead systems in the absence of an agreement to limit deployment of ABM systems, particularly deployment for the defence of population centres and civilian industry. This was an urgent matter because both super powers were in the middle of programmes of testing new multiple warhead systems for very rapid deployment. For the US, testing of the Minuteman 3 and Poseidon systems, each involving extremely effective and advanced

multiple warhead systems, was due for completion in June 1970; deployment of each system could begin in 1971 and be completed in 1975. The Soviet Union had been testing since August 1968 a multiple warhead system to be fired by its largest land-based launcher, the SS-9, designed to deliver three extremely large warheads with high accuracy. This testing programme could be completed in mid-1970 and deployment could follow shortly thereafter; American analysts considered that the Soviet Union could deploy 500 of these systems by 1975. Because these systems were invisible, it would be extremely difficult without intensive on-site inspection to be sure that an agreement to limit their deployment was being respected. Many people felt that the only way was an agreement to ban their further development before completion of the testing programme, so that it would be impossible for each side to deploy them as effective, reliable systems. To make such an agreement possible, it would be necessary to move very fast indeed. Mr. Smart added that even more worrying developments were in prospect - warheads more accurate than anything developed so far; a comprehensive ban on testing might be necessary in order to stop their development. A little more time was available here, but not unlimited.

These two systems, then, reflected an action/reaction cycle in strategic weapons. But this cycle occurred within nations as well as between them. McNamara, as Secretary of Defence, before the US had decided to deploy any ABM system, once said that the main advantage he saw in a development programme was that it was the best possible way to develop penetration aids and warheads for offensive systems. It had also been said by some that the development of multiple warhead systems in the US was a reaction to an American ABM system. Technological innovation by one side in the field of strategic weapons led to an assumption that the adversary would follow suit, and, as part of an insurance policy, immediate preparation of the reaction to the phenomenon. Thus the strategic weapons policy of one country had been conditioned to some extent by reactions to its own policy, as well as to the other's and to interest groups within its own country. There was a strong inter-action of interest among the armed services, for example, in the US and quite possibly in the USSR too which probably played some part in this cycle.

He suspected, therefore, that the acquisition of strategic weapons systems on both sides may have been impelled by three factors besides the perception of each other's capabilities: (1) the reaction to one's own capabilities, which were transferred almost automatically by assumption to the other side: (2) an internal action/reaction phenomenon between individual service or other interest groups; (3) the inexorable progress of technology itself in this field. There was no way of stopping technological innovation in strategic weapons, any more than in any other field: we could not stop men from thinking. We must also recognise that the kind of technological advance we were concerned with here, while often considered of little interest by the specialist concerned, was particularly intoxicating to laymen - which included the vast majority of the political decision-makers responsible for acquiring weapons systems. All these factors meant that SALT would have to be a negotiation not only between the Soviet and American Governments but also within those two governments. The question was whether each country would be able to convey to the other such an assurance of its own intentions and capabilities as to anaesthetise not only the international action/reaction cycle but also its intra-national counterparts. Finally, he suggested that because SALT would be a negotiation about perceptions, it may be of limited use to spend much time on either side discussing or framing specific negotiating packages in advance. In the case of the US, an enormous amount of work had been done in government on types of weapons systems on what could be traded with what, or compared with what. But what counted was the value which the other party would put on packages which could not today be formulated. SALT was a process for pragmatists concerned with perceptions rather than for theorists concerned with objective truth.

Mr. Windsor then introduced his own paper which had been circulated and which he hoped would stimulate discussion. When we talked about detente, we were talking primarily about a system of stabilised deterrence. The kind of synthetic trust which came about in a system of stabilised deterrence was vulnerable not only to the technological and strategic developments which Mr. Smart had analysed but also to a series of political crises or near crises within the systems which had been founded upon a deterrent process in the first place.

He confined the introduction to advancing four propositions. First, that detente meant not an absence of crises but a change in the character of crises. Precisely because the system of deterrence had been stabilised, crises tended to occur within the blocs themselves rather than between them. The partners of the super powers were able to engage in a series of wide-ranging political and economic activities which led to upheavals in the internal relations between them; this had been happening in Eastern and Western Europe. (He did not mean that there was any symmetry between the two, but certain parallel processes of development had been going on) However, these developments, while intra-mural in origin and character, were not so in their effect: indeed, it was precisely for this reason that they became crises in the first place. It was hard to imagine that purely internatil devlopments affecting a country within a bloc could cause military intervention or a very high degree of political pressure were it not also feared that these developments could lead to a different form of relationship between the blocs.

Second, that this process had also changed in character very recently indeed. Whereas before the nexus of internal and international development had been Germany - sometimes even artificially so - now, because of other developments in military and political and technological interests between the Soviet Union and China and the Soviet Union and the US, the importance of the German problem was being downgraded. This process was neither complete nor irreversible. But the nexus which Germany as a whole used to provide between internal and external developments was now changing.

Third, that there was a dichotomy between the super power role and the world power role of the super powers themselves. These two powers, while to some degree helpless before their technological confrontation, were also making serious efforts to control it and had managed to stabilise their relationship quite remarkably in many ways. At the same time they had continued to maintain, and would probably continue to do so, a process of political competition backed up by the possibility of exerting influence elsewhere in the world. The most notable feature was the capacity for naval intervention which now existed on both sides. Their world power role had led them nearly into conflict in the Middle East, for instance, and prevented them from moving towards a settlement in other areas where their interests were in direct competition. At the same time this provided an added incentive to pursue their super power interest of stabilisation. The difficulty was that in some areas at least, perhaps in the Eastern Mediterranean for example, the geographical coincidence of world power competition and intra-bloc dissaray might be enough to destabilise that stability of detente which had been achieved so far. Therefore genuine crisis remained a possibility here.

Fourth, that because of the character of these developments, because it was difficult for European powers to perceive the effect of their actions on the reactions of the super powers, the question arose of how relevant straightforward inter-bloc initiatives were to the task of making room for flexibility in the development of Europe. It may now be necessary to devise some form of liaison

between inter-bloc discussion and super-power discussion and negotiation, bearing in mind that the relationship between the super powers as such was not adequate for the two powers where their interests conflicted. They were fundamental powers to any world system, but not necessarily decisive powers: if they were, countries like Israel and North Vietnam would not be as powerful as they were now. The two-power stabilisation had created a certain degree of paralysis on the part of the two powers which made the world safe for minor conflicts - except when these conflicts coincided with European interests, bloc interests and world power interests of these two powers. And in this context the nexus had begun to shift from the central position of Germany to the more outlying posts within the European system.

The first point of discussion related to the significance of the cost element in the motivation for SALT. Mr. Smart said it was not considered of primary importance, at least by the US, at this stage: in both the US and USSR, although the proportions of their defensive budgets differed, the cost of strategic weapons was a comparatively insignificant element. For example the American programme for Poseidon as a replacement for Polaris would cost some seven and a half billion dollars (the equivalent of about four months' expenditure in Vietnam) spread over 5 years; this was not very large money in defence budget terms. Real savings were to be made by cutting down on men rather than strategic weapons. Even an ABM system as sophisticated as the Safeguard still envisaged a type of expenditure which fell below spending on conventional forces: a 10,300 million dollar programme for Safeguard would be spread over ten years and was unlikely to go beyond two billion dollars in any one year - a very small proportion of a defence budget running at eighty billion dollars a year. He agreed that another element was the spiralling effects of moving onto a new plateau, with the possibility of having to spend very significant sums of money if the arms race continued unchecked into the next generation of weapons; this was linked with the realisation that a new plateau would not increase security at the same rate as the cost would rise. He still maintained, however, that this was not a motive important enough to move the US very far in the direction of agreement. Also, there was no direct correlation of savings on defence budgets and greater spending on social programmes.

While agreeing that the cost issue now loomed less large in the convential wisdom, another West European speaker maintained that even in the medium range the likely sums involved were not so negligible as some Americans now argued. The 10 billion dollar Safeguard programme mentioned by Mr. Smart was for 12 complexes only: if the Russians did MIRV their SS-9, and if this system were as accurate as defence experts feared it might be, then the Minuteman 3 would be a wasting asset (and this was already being argued in some quarters) and an entirely new medium would have to be envisaged, i.e. the sea. A programme for undersea missile launchers (which would not apparently be incompatible with the sea-bed treaty) was likely to cost in the order of magnitude of 50 billion dollars. And if the US also felt obliged to move into an ABM programme for full-scale population protection, orders of magnitude of 100 billion dollars might be in view over the next ten years. Admittedly this would still be cheaper than 10 years of war in Vietnam. But apart from the monetary cost, the cost in human resources had also to be counted, and this might be felt more acutely.

It was further suggested that while there may as yet be no correlation between defence and welfare expenditure, this may not hold true in the longer term since public opinion was likely to exert much greater pressure on all our governments in the future. If the arms race did continue, popular pressures against the diversion of resources away from social problems could be expected to increase.

Supporting the view that the cost element was likely to become a more important issue in the next decades, another speaker related this aspect to the role of the super powers as world powers. If present trends continued unchecked, the

strategic proportion of their defence budgets, even if stable, might increase to a level at which their ability to maintain world-wide conventional forces would be impaired. /Mr. Smart accepted the validity of these points but reaffirmed his argument./

The speaker argued that while it was important to look at the super powers as a couple in relation to SALT, it was also important to put some emphasis on the asymmetry in their position. The influence of China made the Soviet Union more interested than the US in ABM systems because China would probably be able to deliver some form of nuclear threat to the USSR well before she could do so vis-à-vis the US. This, combined with the Russian temperamental predilection for defensive systems, might at the start rule out any question of abandoning development in ABM systems, say, or even significantly limiting them. This in turn would make it much more difficult to discuss a package on multiple re-entry vehicles. In regard to costs, while the American conception would be to cut the budget, the main difficulty for the USSR would be the strain on technological resources, not popular pressure against increased defence expenditure. These and many other asymmetries would make SALT very protracted and difficult.

It was suggested that there was asymmetry too in the pressures inbuilt in the system. In the US pressure from the military-industrial complex was strong and would make it difficult for a US Administration to give up buying weapons that were attractive. In the USSR the pressures were for building defensive systems, but the interest groups were not so clearly identified as in the US. SALT would start to expose Russian thinking in a way it was not exposed at present.

With regard to the Sino-Soviet relationship as a factor for SALT, the question was posed of the effect of a Soviet-American agreement to check their progress in the strategic weapons field on their position relative to the mini nuclear powers. Might not these mini powers, and China in particular, be spurred to move up to something of the same level? And what would this imply in terms of mutual perception?

It was suggested that in practice both super powers conceived of themselves as so far ahead of any other nuclear power that this was not an urgent consideration. Even in theory, there was an increasing inclination in both the US and USSR to question the relevance of numerical superiority for this purpose. The speaker was optimistic that even if the smaller powers should approach their strength, the two super powers would take a more relaxed view in the light of their own approach to each other. He supported the view that as the Chinese nuclear capability developed, her attitude was likely to become more and more one of comparative responsibility rather than of potential irresponsibility. Another speaker added his impression that the idea of being drawn into a cataclysmic war started by a mini nuclear power no longer had currency in the US or USSR. It was further argued that since the qualitative arms race was bound to continue regardless of the outcome of SALT, the technological superiority of the two super powers would remain a reality. The relevance of China was purely <u>political</u>. Because of the triangular relationship between the US, the USSR and China it was difficult for the USSR to negotiate with the US without exposing itself to vilification from China in certain circles in which it was very interested, yet at the same time it had a greater urge to do so. The significant thing was that the USSR had decided that it was worthwhile to talk with the US without worrying about the reaction from China.

The first speaker from Eastern Europe agreed that the purely economic factors in defence costs should not be viewed in isolation from the social and political context, internal and external, and the technological implications. The super powers had come to realise that their defence expenditure was so high that they could not meet some of their urgent internal exigencies.

The first question was whether we saw SALT as leading directly to a comprehensive agreement between the two powers, i.e. as the continuation of a process, or as something new, the beginning of quite a long process of dialogue. He understood it to be the prelude to a dialogue, in which the importance of other factors beside that of genuine or synthetic trust would have to be calculated. In the case of certain previous Soviet-American discussions in which strategic considerations had been a primary motivation for agreement at a given stage, such as the outer space treaty, the NPT, the sea-bed, a step by step approach had proved successful. To what extent, he wondered, could this approach be applied to the SALT negotiation? Secondly, to what extent could we rely on the existing systems of verification by national means without reaching the stage of elaborate supranational institutional control provisions which he personally did not consider realistic, at least at this stage? The relationship between the method of approach and verification measures would also have a bearing on the question of mutual trust and the assessment of capabilities.

Pursuing the question why SALT was, as he believed, the beginning of a new development, a West European speaker suggested that the obvious, but not the most important, reason was that both super powers felt bound to take some initiative in the disarmament field to take account of the criticism caused in particular by the NPT. The primary motivation was their awareness of the fact that the strategic equation was becoming destabilised as the result of technological advance and might break down. The two Governments could not deal with that situation without consultation, and the various means of consultation available till now, such as the hot line, or diplomatic channels, or Pugwash, were no longer suitable or adequate. Indeed the consultation itself, which he expected to develop into a lengthy, institutionalised process, would be the main product of the talks: any step by step agreements which may be reached would be byproducts.

A second speaker suggested that the process of consultation was no less an important part of the talks for the Europeans, since it would put some limit to the confrontation between the super powers, and a degree of detente on the super power level was a pre-condition for progress towards closer cooperation between both parts of Europe. This advantage from the talks outweighed the risk, often mentioned, of super power consultation going too far. It was in the interest of all Europeans that the consultation should last for as long as possible.

This led to the consideration of how far the development of genuine trust could go in the absence of a specific agreement. It was very difficult to see an alternative to synthetic trust based on capabilities except through some specific hard agreement, such as a freeze at certain levels or a ceiling on the development of certain weapons at a certain future date. But because of the qualitative difficulty involved, how could agreements be made to stick without force controls that went far beyond mutually agreed unilateral decisions? The process of basing deterrence on synthetic trust may therefore prove very difficult to overcome.

A participant from Northern Europe suggested that capabilities were likely to become harder to assess, first because the whole strategic equation was becoming more complex and secondly because of the development of MIRVs, with the element of invisibility and the whole problem of monitoring what the other side was doing. This did put a premium on speed to reach a ban on further development. He feared, however, that it was already too late to hope for an agreement before July 1970. This in turn put a premium on intelligence and on-site inspection. On-site inspection was unlikely to be acceptable to the Soviet Union; and intelligence alone could not give us full assurance. In this situation, may not declaratory policy, although always susceptible to doubt,

become a little more important than hitherto? Declaratory policy now played a specific function as a guideline to the working of very complex social systems: McNamara's statements, for instance, were signals of the weapons acquisition policy of the US, as well as signals to the USSR. Both at the public and the diplomatic level, we could perhaps set moving a process for increasing the degree of genuine trust as the synthetic trust became less reliable.

A speaker from South-Eastern Europe commented first that economic considerations had never yet hindered governments from proceeding with an arms race, and were unlikely to do in the future. Countries would always put security first, no matter how great the cost; the fact that the cost was in terms of talent and resources rather than of money did not affect this argument. Secondly, he questioned the usefulness of discussing the prospects for the Helsinki talks and their possible outcome purely in terms of the super powers themselves. Even from a purely technical point of view, this was too fragmented an approach.

He agreed that the issue of control did seem particularly acute now in connection with MIRVs. In the light of the negotiations on the test ban treaty, however, he estimated that the variety and the reliability of technical means of control available to governments were such that we would very soon be able to find out what was inside a multiple warhead system even if we did not know today. The control aspect, like the economic, was not relevant to the prospect of reaching an agreement. These thingswere interesting and important, but where a country's security was concerned, it was a question of where there is a will there is a way.

A second South East European participant agreed that SALT could be viewed as a forum for continuing consultation, and in this respect it would certainly be useful, although it was a formalisation of bilateral contacts that had been in existence between the super powers for some time. Arising from the dynamic development in the arms policies and capabilities of the super powers, certain classic ways of viewing the relations of rival powers had to give way to forms unknown in the past. The 'open skies' proposal which the Soviet Union had originally rejected was now a reality: both sides now had more or less precise maps of each other's military establishments to the extent to which this could be seen by secret devices, and as a corollary they could be expected to have discussions. If this process of continuing contacts were the only thing to come out of SALT it would still be useful; but it would not in any serious way influence the undesirable elements which exist on the world scene, any more than mutual inspection by satellite could. He was rather sceptical about the degree of genuine trust that could be built up from this kind of negotiation in the absence of specific agreements.

We were at a very critical point in the nuclear arms race. Until recently, defence had lain in the new family of offensive weapons; but for the first time nuclear defence was being seriously considered. What could now develop was a race, not just between the super powers but between offence and defence, and in the past such a race had produced unforeseeable consequences. The amount of synthetic trust that was possible had already been achieved, and could only be for the present. Even if SALT went as far as a process of frequent consultation between experts on the level where each side would understand the other, there would still remain irremovable cause for mistrust and suspicion that the other side may be on the verge of a new breakthrough which could neither be foreseen nor prevented by any known means.

He believed that the two powers would really be moved by the idea of saving on input, and that this could lead to a specific agreement in this realm of advanced weaponry, not only because of the cost benefit aspect but because an uninhibited offence/defence race would have such a serious effect politically on the societies on each side. Such an agreement might be expressed in rather philosophical terms, in the sense of developments which each might encourage or discourage over the years.

A Northern European participant warned against a tendency to over-emphasise the influence exerted by the prospect of the two powers talking at Helsinki and to under-estimate the forces operating within the powers themselves. We knew something about the forces within the US, which seemed indeed to be moving away from commitment to an arms race: it was becoming very difficult for the Administration to get money from Congress for military expenditure: the ABM decision was carried by two votes only in the Senate. We could only guess at the pressures in the Soviet Union. Following on from Mr. Smart's point that internal pressures had played a large part in creating the situation we were in now and would continue to do so, the question was how would the views expressed at Helsinki influence the forces within each country? The asymmetry was very important in this context. The Soviet motives for entering the negotiation were different from the American, and their aims could well be different too. In the past, the Soviet Union had pursued disarmament negotiations in two ways: by means of psychological warfare, and by attempts to reach specific agreements in specific areas on specific issues where agreement would serve the Soviet interest. Whether they would approach SALT in a different spirit remained to be seen; but we should be cautious in making assumptions about the effect on the Russians of whatever may be said to them at Helsinki.

It was suggested that what was new was not that the Americans and Russians were talking, but that they were talking strictly bilaterally and at a high official level. What they expected from the talks, they themselves did not know. There were two schools of thought in Washington. One, the old McNamara school, wanted to philosophise with the Russians in the hope of reaching some joint insights about the fundamentals of the world situation; those people were harking back to the 1962-63 period when they discussed fundamentals in the context of the test ban treaty and for them Helsinki was an excuse for talks. The other school was thinking in terms of hardware agreements; they wanted something on paper to be signed and ratified by both sides. At the moment, Washington had not made up its mind.

The Speaker felt that if the process of philosophising led anywhere, it must lead to some agreement; whether explicit or tacit did not matter, but there must be some outcome of doing something, or not doing something, together. This had nothing to do with disarmament, however. A first step might be to put a ceiling on numbers - of warheads, or megatonnage, or missile bases or whatever. On the other hand if a ceiling were put on offensive missiles, that might mean incitement to a new arms race because one party or both would be given the opportunity to build up to the ceiling. The next step, and a better one, would be to impose a freeze at existing levels; the two powers may not be ready for this, however, because of the difficulty in balancing one element against another. Only a very distant phase would be one of reduction. There was also the question of how far limited or partial agreements could go without running up against the problem of verification.

He did not believe that this consultation would change the political context: progress on the unresolved problems in Europe would become possible only when the political context was changed by an act of political will. SALT would not lead to disarmament, or even arms control, but at best to a control of the arms race and even that would probably take some years to evolve.

The question was put whether any precise agreements seemed likely in particular in the field of weapons which would primarily affect the security of Europe. It was stated in reply that it was too soon to predict the packages. One speaker believed that the Americans would try to avoid discussing those weapons, but that if they had to they would try to balance reductions in missile deployment so as to cover in some way the MRBMs stationed in the USSR. Whether this would be convincing to the Europeans was another question.

Another Western participant said that both powers faced a real dilemma. Both appreciated the importance of dialogue, not only for understanding each other's perceptions and fears but also for improving their own process of intergovernmental communication. The difficulty was that if SALT took the form merely of a dialogue, a great many actions which both governments may feel the need to take over the next few years would be perceived by the rest of the world as the outcome of a Soviet-American deal. The Chinese would be very insistent on this. There was the danger of the Europeans viewing American policy towards Europe as the outcome of some private bargain. Each super power being the centre of a large international and alliance system, and this was important to them, they could not confine themselves to dialogue over the years. There would be pressure on them to reach specific and public agreements. However, as both governments had gone into the case material of SALT they saw how extremely intractable it was and that the scope for specific agreements was rather thin.

He did not think the US had yet decided whether they wished SALT to take the form of negotiations about problems or philosophising. The McNamara thesis had been shot down a year or so ago, first because it was felt that the rapidity of technological innovation made agreements on problems and on technology essential, and second because it was felt that given the difference in their basic conceptions of stability a philosophical dialogue might not get them very far. On the other hand if only very minor agreements could be reached it may prove necessary to turn back to the philosophical approach, particularly from the point of view of reaching an understanding about what to encourage or discourage over the years. This was the reason why the important question of linkage came to be raised, the question of how far SALT would be a process in parallel with the progress of detente. Thus it would be affected by the kind of modus vivendi the two powers could reach in the Middle East, Vietnam and Berlin, which were seen by the US as the main political spheres. If parallel progress could not be made in those three fields, the question of how deep trust could go became very much an issue.

Replying to several of the points raised, Mr. Smart said first that he did not expect to see a step by step process of agreement in the sense to which we were accustomed. It was impossible in this particular field to divorce one type of weapons system from another: ABM from MIRV, MIRV from the field of offensive missiles as a whole including submarine - and land-based, bombers from nuclear warheads and air defence systems. The only prospect would be of progress by levels, as towards GCD. This was notionally possible, but very far down the road because it would mean agreement on the whole perspective of strategic systems.

He agreed very strongly about the dangers of an offence/defence race. In trying to deal with the strategic arms race over the last decade, the dominant feature of which had been uncertainty, the great difficulty had been in arriving at informed and intelligent assessments by one side of the other. These assessments were put within brackets of probability which were extremely large: and political decision-makers always tended to be guided by the upper end of the bracket. The application of this philosophy in the field of offensive weapons alone was worrying enough: it had already had a significant effect on the arithmetical problem. But if the present uncertainty about defensive systems were injected as well, the problem would become geometrical. One area in which we should perhaps look for results from SALT was in the possibility of reducing the worst case calculations. If one product of the SALT process were to take even the top ten or twenty percent off these very broad brackets being offered to the decision-makers, this would be a very significant result.

The real question was whether it would be possible for SALT to produce specific agreements of any kind, or whether the value would lie solely in the value of a continuing dialogue. On this point he would say only that specific

agreements did not only not have to be treaties, they did not have to be mutual acts. One of the most important and practical forms of agreement would be the reciprocation of unilateral decisions, or non-decisions. If at certain stages it were indicated that one party found it less necessary to move on a particular basis, to build a particular sort of system, etc., this may reflect the most practical type of agreement we could hope for.

Finally, with regard to the question of declaratory policy, the field in which this might become more important would in comparative terms be vis-à-vis third parties, in so far as the external confidence on which the relations of the super powers with their allies would depend could be threatened by declaratory policy which seemed to emerge from SALT and seemed to run counter to the interests of third parties.

Second Session: The impact on the European context of Soviet-American relations, and the European view of their individual and collective security problems in the 1970s

The opening speaker, from Western Europe, summarising his personal impression of the morning's discussion, suggested that with SALT we were in a new phase of a relatively familiar problem, trying to find out whether the new element represented by rapidly advancing technology which was bringing about a qualitative change in the strategic armament of the two great nuclear powers offered a real prospect of dealing with the problem we had faced for more than twenty years of introducing greater rationality and stability into the policies of both powers. Opinion had been divided about the prospects of translating the two-powers consultation into specific agreements; some participants seemed to feel that to attempt to do so would only make the existing situation more complicated. This led to consideration of what the intentions might be of the two powers themselves. It was felt that we knew something at least about the two main schools of thought in the US and had some appreciation of the issues posed for them in the talks and of the interaction of various internal interest groups and pressures. On the other hand we knew very little indeed about the Soviet intentions and about the operation and relative weight of the pressures within that system. Clearly one of the principal effects of SALT would be a more accurate assessment by both parties not so much of each other's intentions as of their respective positions and the various forces at work, and this could lead to a better understanding of the action/reaction cycle within and between each other. This was very important.

But having said this, it must be recognized that from the Soviet Union's point of view trying to raise the threshold of rationality may not be the most favourable development at this juncture. The interest they may have in a dialogue with the US was complicated by a serious of difficult problems affecting Soviet policies in other fields - certain events we had witnessed in Central Europe, for instance, the present state of Sino-Soviet relations, what we knew of the play of internal forces in the USSR. All this made him put a large question-mark against so important a process beginning under such difficult and complex conditions. To this should be added the important conflict of views between the super powers themselves in Asia and the Middle East. In relation to the United States, we had to take account of the shift of public opinion and the new trends which were emerging. Therefore while we were agreed that technology had introduced a new element and a new opportunity, this did present itself in extremely difficult conditions.

He wanted to raise two specific considerations with regard to the impact of super power relations on the European context. The first related to Germany, arising out of Mr. Windsor's point that the nexus which Germany as a whole used

to provide between internal and external developments in Europe was now changing, so that the importance of the German problem was being downgraded. This was true in relation to Germany as a probable cause of tension; but Germany still remained very important in relation to the general evolution of the European system. We had to decide what policies we wanted to pursue. But in as far as any European system would turn to a certain extent on the relationship of Germany as a whole to this system, which in turn depended on the inter-German relationship, a significant change in relations between the two Germanies and between them and other countries must produce all sorts of changes in the general system in Europe and must react on the super power dialogue. This would be a very complex development which could very rapidly give rise if not to tension then at least to great difficulty.

His second point concerned the impact of the super power dialogue on relations between Eastern and Western Europe. The natural effect of introducing greater stability into the super power relationship would surely be to give greater impetus to rapprochement between the two halves of Europe and with it the desire not to act as a third force but to remain responsible for political evolution along lines of Europe's own choosing. But this process of rapproachement would run up against the basic problem of European security, the potential predominance of the USSR. While the US may be accepted as a participant in a European Security Conference it was not a European power, whereas the Soviet Union was and would always regard the security of a future Europe as a matter directly touching its own security interest. Therefore there was the risk of this intra-European process being hampered by concern about not upsetting the balance at any stage to the detriment of either part of Europe and beyond this the question of the balance between a future European system and the USSR. If this rapprochement did go ahead too fast, we risked upsetting the whole structure so laboriously built up in the West.

The first speaker from Eastern Europe suggested some consideration also of the other side of the medal, the impact of the European situation upon the general political context, looking beyond the talks in Helsinki to the perspective of a continuing dialogue between the super powers. The impact on Soviet perceptions was of particular interest to Europe. Europe would always be a factor. Irrespective of what happened in the Middle East or Vietnam or other crisis areas, the European relationship in all its implications, between the two blocs and between individual countries, might also serve to facilitate or to hamper the super-power dialogue, depending on the course of events. He felt we should take into account the potential as well as the demonstrated dangerous or positive trends in Europe: it was the borderline between the very sophisticated weaponry deployed on either side and it had so many unsolved political and security problems of its own, besides the German problem. Without stability and security in Europe there could be no guarantee of stability in the longer-term outcome of the super power negotiations.

For a Western participant this illustrated the differing concepts of European security in East and West. It was no coincidence that the Finnish Government was both host to SALT and trying to organise a European Security Conference. From the point of view of Soviet policy, the two were linked: besides the aspects considered in the morning's discussion, a Soviet motive for entering a dialogue was to win some degree of recognition by the US of the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe, of more stability in the relationship in Europe and perhaps more rigidity vis-à-vis the dividing line. For the Soviet Union and for some East European countries detente stood for stabilisation of the present situation, whereas for many West European countries it stood for a dynamic relationship containing the opportunity for peaceful change to overcome the division of Europe based on spheres of influence.

Supporting this argument, another Western speaker commented on the apparent vagueness on the part of the Soviet Union about subjects that might be discussed at an ESC. Until the recent proposal from the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers for discussion of a multilateral declaration on the renunciation of the use or threat force in European questions and the widening of economic and technological co-operation no specific points had been put forward. And the more precise specification of the agenda proposed in Pravda of 13th November - trans-continental oil and gas pipelines, a common electric grid, joint efforts against water population and cancer, and joint nuclear research with other European countries for peaceful purposes - had nothing to do with security. This bore out the point that for the Eastern countries stabilisation of the present situation would be considered satisfactory from the point of view of European security.

It was suggested that it was up to the Europeans themselves to show a little more interest in trying to define what they meant by European security. Since the idea of an ESC was first put forward by the Warsaw Pact countries the main effort made by at least some Western countries had been in trying to explain why a conference was untimely or unnecessary. None of the Warsaw Pact countries held the copyright for any agenda: any constructive suggestion would be considered if it would help to bring about talks on European security and to clarify what both sides meant by security. Some ideas might perhaps be forthcoming from this present discussion. There was need for clarification too of what was meant by the dynamic approach to detente, taking into consideration that peace in Europe had been maintained so far on the basis of the existing situation. [It was agreed that concrete proposals should be discussed in the third session.]

A West European participant saw two European interests in relation to SALT: (1) that whatever the outcome, it should not affect the central balance under the umbrella of which we lived and must continue to live; (2) that it should not evolve into a double hegemony. Personally he felt that European interests on both scores were sufficiently safeguarded by the range of opinion represented within the US Administration. (Some disagreement with this observation was voiced by other Western participants).

With regard to an ESC, he considered it a psychological necessity for the Europeans to have a parallel exercise to SALT, a dancefloor of their own, although some Americans were unsympathetic towards this idea. On the other hand he found it hard to judge how serious the East really was: until the recent Foreign Ministers' meeting, all proposals relating to an ESC had been party documents, not official documents. Moreover it had always been a question so far of all or nothing. Any attempt to sound out Soviet aims had been met by reference to the Karlovy Vary and Bucharest declarations, both of which mentioned the withdrawal of foreign troops from Europe, dissolution of the two military alliances, international recognition of the Oder-Neisser line by West Germany, abrogation of the Munich Agreement, and sometimes the recognition of Berlin as a separate entity. The aim would seem therefore to be a total acceptance of all the political demands that the East had ever served on the West. Yet no indication had been forthcoming from the Soviet side of what the West could expect in return. No doubt concrete proposals would be formulated by the West. Could we be sure, however, that if the West did engage more seriously in this idea the East would not back down again?

He was not sure in which sense the Foreign Ministers' document ought to be interpreted. The only proposal contained in it that touched on security concerned the conclusion of a multilateral agreement on the renunciation of the use of threat of force. The question was whether this might be an instrument by which the Russians hoped to prevent their allies from entering into bilateral dealings with the West and to keep East-West contacts under control. The attitude adopted recently by the GDR towards the new West German approach, Winzer's statement that the idea for a no-use of force agreement between East Berlin and West Germany was an attempt to

deflect attention from the broader issue of a multilateral no-use of force agreement, seemed to bear out this suspicion. If this were the case, an ESC would have little to offer the West in terms of prospects for evolution in Europe. 'Evolution' did not mean the de-communisation or even the de-Russification of Eastern Europe: Eastern Europe would remain in the Soviet sphere of influence, and would remain communist if it so desired. But it did mean that there should be room for minor adjustments along national lines and in keeping with national traditions, that the Russians should not make a certain pattern of development obligatory for the whole of Eastern Europe.

If an ESC were to lead anywhere, two things should be clear; these were not conditions, but facts of life. First, the Conference must be preceded by a lessening of tension between the two Germanies, otherwise the whole proceedings would be weighed down by the German quarrel. Second, before a new European security system could come into being the Brezhnev doctrine must either be abrogated or at least permitted to lapse. Before entering into a treaty which would/probably boil down to renouncing the use or threat of force and intervention in each other's internal affairs the West Europeans would make themselves ridiculous if they did not insist beforehand on a clarification of what 'non-intervention' meant. Unless it did not mean a possibility of the repetition of the events of August 1968 he would hold out little hope of an ESC having any success.

A Northern European speaker disagreed with this argument only to the extent that it would be asking too much of the Soviet Union to abrogate the Brezhnev doctrine. Some indication of its being allowed to lapse would however be distinctly desirable. With regard to the prior lessening of tension between the two Germanies, we could not expect a demonstrative act on the part of the East Germans; we might however look for some symbolic gesture.

/The previous speaker added that he did not envisage any prior solution of the German problem, merely a readiness on the part of both Germanies to engage in discussions without either of them making this conditional upon prior acceptance of their maximalist demands/.

Another Western speaker felt that if the outcome of an ESC were no more than a common renunciation of the use of force, this would hardly justify such a big enterprise. He could not see it making significant progress in the field of military problems, and even on political problems an ESC would surely be the culmination of a long process of diplomatic negotiation rather than the instrument of such a thing. There did seem to be a shift of interest from the Eastern side towards a European co-operation conference, for which a good case could be made; but we should not pretend that this had anything to do with security.

The question of bilateralism was quite fundamental. It raised broader considerations that bargaining positions at an ESC. If the trend on the Eastern side were now towards a purely multilateral approach to problems of European co-operation, this reversal of position would affect the whole range of Western policies.

Coming back to the relationship between European security and SALT, a speaker from South-Eastern Europe warned against any idea that by a conjuring trick all the atmosphere of tension which still existed in Europe, although less than in the past, could be made to evaporate and a system created whereby all the countries of Europe would guarantee each other's security. Any suggestion that if one country were in conflict with another member country of the same bloc an alignment would be possible which could disregard the existing

alignment in Europe would be incredible. The division in Europe could not be wiped out. To be realistic, therefore, we could only discuss accommodation between the two sides without trying to assign to this process more than it could produce. It could lower tension and lead to certain forms of co-operation, but not much more. He was not so sure about the question of change. To expect a fundamental change in the European atmosphere as the entry ticket to any conference would be naive. He would prefer a movement over the longer term with a similar perspective of improved perception of each other's intentions as we believed to see in SALT.

To understand the relationship between two parallel efforts we must identify the partners and the kind of parallelism we could hope to see. There were four elements involved: the two super powers, and Eastern and Western Europe. Undoubtedly the relationship between the USSR and the Warsaw Pact powers was not comparable to the US relationship with Western Europe. There were many differences apart from geography - population, size and wealth for instance. There was less disparity between Western Europe and the US than there was between Eastern Europe and the USSR. If a purely European balance were drawn excluding the super powers, the Western side was preponderant in military and economic potential. If it came to the ultimate strategic confrontation both parts of Europe would rely on the nuclear arsenal of the respective super power; but in any non-war situation Western Europe would be the superior force. This asymmetry on the European level was very significant, and it accounted for another asymmetry in the European relationships with their respective super powers. Western Europe, enjoying this preponderence in Europe, could have much more latitude vis-à-vis the US than the Warsaw Pact countries, because of their inherent weakness, could vis-à-vis the USSR, irrespective of the attitude of the Soviet Government referred to as the Brezhnev doctrine.

The speaker endorsed much of Mr. Windsor's paper, in particular his point about the possibility of intra-European and super power relations taking a separate course in the future. On the other hand there was a certain margin beyond which these two pairs of relations could not be in disagreement. The important thing was to decide what would bring a certain elasticity into these relations and what would limit the disparity. The elasticity would depend on the West European relationship with the Soviet Union: the Soviet Union and East European countries would essentially act as one unit in their relations with Western Europe and with the US, so that there would be two partners in the West and one in the East. This could not be a triangle like the US/Soviet/China relationship was, because the ultimate balance could only be between the West and the East in the two alliance systems; but the possibility for looseness in the West was the rational explaination why such a difference in relations between the super powers and between Eastern and Western Europe was possible. The degree of latitude available to Western Europe would however necessarily depend on the remoteness of the threat of a confrontation involving nuclear forces. In this respect SALT would to a great extent have a favourable effect on the prospects for intra-European relations. On the other hand the Europeans had very limited ability to influence Soviet-American relations: a positive relationship between Eastern and Western Europe would have no effect on SALT, and East-West tension only a moderate effect. SALT could still be prevented, but only by factors above and beyond the scope of Europe.

A Western speaker felt that insufficient allowance had been made in this analysis for the fundamental point that potentially the USSR was the dominant power in Europe. Only the US had been able to balance the USSR in a situation of acute confrontation. The balance was still being maintained. But as detente continued, the question must arise of mutual confidence that this balance would

continue. The Soviet Union could not 'go home'. This created a certain nervousness in Western Europe that must not be disregarded; it had very little to do with the old cold-war situation discussed in the past, it related to Mr. Windsor's point about potential crisis in Europe. The great power of the USSR had had an effect of stabilising the situation: the hopes of many countries were more modest now. But if the situation changed - and a different perception both in the European countries and in the USSR vis-à-vis the European situation would be a change from the balance of the cold war period - the Soviet Union might then be a destabilising factor. Some countries had internal difficulties and the USSR could add to these.

The previous speaker argued this was true only in the context of ultimate confrontation. Given that SALT and the parallel European engagement would make progress in terms of improving the climate (without conjuring away any fundamental problems) there would be even more than prevailed at present a remoteness in the perception of the threat of an ultimate confrontation in Europe. In that situation Western Europe without the US would be a match and a partner for the Soviet Union which did have and would maintain a real interest in agreements of all kinds to link up with the technology of Western Europe. /The Western participant maintained that despite evolution in this direction, the inequality would remain and must be reckoned with/

A second point of disagreement was raised about the feasibility of drawing a distinction on the issue of nuclear confrontation. There could be no East-West tensions in Europe worthy of the name that did not ultimately raise the nuclear question. The speaker's impression from a visit to the US was of a linkage in atmospheric terms, the idea that nothing very specific must be allowed to happen in the obvious areas of tension in the world because in an atmosphere of crisis SALT would break down immediately. From that point of view SALT could be seen as a guarantee against any increase in tension in Europe, but perhaps no more than that.

He did agree that the intra-European dialogue, like SALT, should be viewed as a process. But this begged the issue of an ESC. The problem we faced was of a basic divergence of interest between the USSR and Western Europe. The USSR had a vested interest in a one-time show, because it would reap the benefit by the mere fact of the conference opening, i.e. regardless of the course of discussion, of some legitmisation of the GDR. The vested interest of the US and Western Europeans was in the institutionalisation aspect of the conference, that by a process of meeting and facing up to the issues the possibilities for East-West rapprochement may improve. One could immediately see points where the USSR might have some reservations, especially on the point of the Brezhnev doctrine.

Another speaker from the Western side confirmed that the US now approved the idea of a West European dialogue with the East or with the USSR as a natural concomitant to SALT. This change of opinion was perhaps reinforced by the fact that SALT was concerned with strategic nuclear weapons, not the whole power basis of the confrontation.

He felt that more thought ought to be given to the words 'European', 'Security' and 'Conference'. The Soviet Union did now seem to accept the necessity for the US and Canada to participate in an ESC. But did we really want every European state to attend - for instance Cyprus, Malta, Spain, the Vatican? If so, the prospects of progress would be very slight. Secondly, 'Security' meant, surely, security against military aggression or subversion: it had nothing to do with pollution or telecommunications. If it were desirable to have a conference about technological communication in Europe, why not use the ECE as a forum? With regard to 'Conference' in terms of population and GNP there may be an asymmetry between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries. This did not mean

however that the smaller West European powers felt they had greater freedom of action than their counterparts in Eastern Europe. From this point of view, a negotiation between blocs might be more promising than a conference of individual countries. And did the Europeans themselves necessarily want the negotiation to take the form of a conference? The Poles for instance were now talking about a commission with more specific terms of reference rather than a generalised conference.

A second speaker from South-Eastern Europe suggested that SALT must have significant consequences for Europe whether the talks were successful or not, even though the super power and the European processes of detente were no longer directly interdependent, as Mr. Windsor's paper stressed. The very uncertainty about the course and the outcome of the super power negotiation made it essential for the Europeans to engage in a parallel activity. If SALT were to fail, the arms race would make the super powers much more preoccupied with their own strategic interests; the interests of their European allies would be neglected, and this would influence the European situation in a negative sense. If a major ABM system were deployed, credibility gaps would appear within each alliance. If the talks made progress, if no European initiative to promote their own cause were forthcoming we might find a European settlement kept in abeyance for quite some time, or the super powers dissociating themselves from European affairs which would only strengthen hegemonial tendencies in Europe itself.

He agreed that many things needed clarification in relation to an ESC. Not only security was at issue - and this must include the independence and freedom of action of individual countries, not just security between the two blocs and against military aggression - we needed a European settlement rather than a security system. And a pre-condition for a settlement was a change in the political climate within the two alliances and within the countries of Europe generally. Otherwise it was an illusion to suppose that holding a conference would solve anything.

Commenting on some of the points raised, Mr. Windsor turned first to the question of the effect of any movement in Europe on the Soviet Union in particular. A difficulty was that one could only judge the context from the outside. The whole internal situation was so confused that it was hard to identify specific Soviet interests that would be affected by what happened in Europe. The real problem of linkage was one faced by the Russians, that of the linkage within the system - the effect on civil-military relations within the USSR, on relations with Eastern Europe and on relations with China which were all relevent to consideration of what went on in the USSR. Without attempting to draw conclusions, he suggested that because of this internal question of linkage the Russians were likely to be more interested in the philosophical approach to SALT than in the discussion of problems. McNamara was a convert to the Soviet point of view, which was to take more account of the political context surrounding a particular weapons system than of the system's stability as such. In this sense SALT may be more conducive to an improvement of the situation in Europe than to a hard and fast agreement on problems.

With regard to the German problem, he agreed this was fundamental to any pursued set of agreements or even dialogue between the two blocs. However, it was now less clear that a particular kind of political or economic development in Europe was any longer linked with the German problem. The lack of immediacy so far as the Soviet Union was concerned was indicated by the degree of success gained by the Ostpolitik in recent months without leading to any crisis in Europe. This trend was not irreversible. But the question now was the degree to which a country like Poland was able to develop a new form of relationship with the Federal Republic at a time when it was clear that the East Germans were strongly

against it, and even at the expense of Poland's relations with the GDR for the time being. The Karlovy Vary attitude no longer applied, therefore.

This was relevant to some of the doubts expressed on the Western side in relation to an ESC. Certainly the USSR wanted to stabilise its control over Eastern Europe. The control was demonstrated in 1968, at little cost to the USSR internationally. An ESC was not necessary for that purpose. Far from trying to impose greater rigidity, in recent months the USSR had been more disposed to allow greater flexibility in the East European position internationally, perhaps because a certain rigidity now prevailed in the domestic situation. Gomulka's speech proposing to settle a number of outstanding problems with Bonn was made with Soviet permission: it was startling that of all the old conditions the only one left was recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. This indicated the degree to which the USSR was now prepared to allow negotiations to come about. This did however make more acute the dilemma of the Ostpolitik that relations with the other East European states could not be improved without a deterioration in relations with the GDR. The East German position was being weakened. The Winzer statement referred to reflected an East German position adopted precisely because of the greater flexibility and latitude for improving relations elsewhere in East Europe. The situation <u>was</u> changing, therefore, and this had partly to do with an ESC. He had the impression that the Brezhnev doctrin was being allowed to lapse. /Two West European participants interpolated that a full-blown restatement of the doctrine was contained in the Czechoslovak/Soviet joint statement of 28th October./

Mr. Windsor felt that the real question relating to an ESC - which would in the event probably be neither European nor a conference nor about security - was whether, if it took place in conditions of change, by moving into a new framework it would weaken the step by step bilateral approach about which there was encouragement for optimism. In that sense it could do positive harm. But if it were a framework for further step by step relationships it could improve the prosects for Europe considerably, and in that sense it did not matter if the first talks would be about pollution. One fundamemtal difficulty however was the asymmetry referred to by a previous speaker. An ESC which brought the Soviet Union into the East European unit but which left the West Europeans (which were not a unit in fact) in an exposed and flexible position would produce a set of political and security reflexes which would make progress very difficult.

Observing that the characteristic of parallel lines was that they did not meet, a participant from South Eastern Europe suggested that we should aim at a process of dialogue along convergent lines. Seeking to make clear his own country's position towards an ESC, he said that clearly absolute security for all the countries of Europe would come about in conditions of general and comprehensive disarmament; alternatively if we could achieve the peaceful solution of all outstanding problems the existence of armaments would not cause apprehension. But while we must persevere with both these aims, another approach to European security would be of greater practical importance in the shorter term. The German problem had been mentioned specifically. Its solution would be a very lengthy process given the position of the two German states. But in his conception no direct relationship was claimed between the German problem and an ESC, since even if a single German nation came into being there would still be a European security problem. The countries of Europe could, without disarming, live secure from the use or the threat of force against them given the overriding interest of all our countries in peaceful relations rather than relations based on the use of force. His own small country enjoyed excellent relations with other nations having a different philosophy and he saw no reason why every European country could not get to the same position. If our policies could be set on convergent

lines, progress made in one direction would help progress in another since we should be moving closer together. Convergence would be a process, made by a series of steps. Because it would be a very long road, it was all the more necessary to set out on it at once. There was no need to delay an ESC until we thought conditions would be more favourable for settling outstanding problems. We should sit down now and discuss, regardless of our different ideas about disarmament and political and other issues. Obviously no European conference, whether held tomorrow or in five years' time, could hope to resolve by magic all causes of tension in Europe. We should need a series of conferences; but this did not mean we should not make a start, as the two super powers were now doing, at trying to improve the climate and mutual understanding, which would be worthwhile even if nothing very concrete emerged from the talks. But he felt that a European conference could make some positive progress, beginning with measures on which there was no great difference of opinion and which even if they did not make a very strong contribution to the actual security of Europe would nevertheless be important in underlining the desire for general international co-operation and thus create better conditions for progress on more difficult issues later on. In this sense, why not have an agreement on the renunciation of the use or threat of force in European affairs?

Some concern had been expressed that a multilateral approach might prevent bilateral contacts and agreements. So far as his country was concerned, all states were invited to continue to treat questions of European security and co-operation on both an individual and a multilateral basis. It was suggested to conclude a multilateral renunciation of force agreement because a desire for security was something we all shared over and above the interest of individual countries in bilateral agreements in this sense. Bilateral discussions were always likely to lead to divergent views at some point. What was of interest here however was what we had in common, the desire for security and the need for a conference, not as a single event but as the initiation to a series of conferences and the beginning of an institutionalised process, just as in the case of SALT.

A Western European speaker put two points as a footnote to the discussion. First, one very important element in SALT was the recognition of parity between the Americans and the Russians. Second, it was important to take into account the different situation existing at the beginning of the Nixon era from that of the Johnson era, when it was possible to envisage a general arrangement between the US and Soviet Union which might be extended to Vietnam and even to the Middle East. Because of the continuation of the war in Vietnam and the change of Administration, substantial or rapid results were not likely in the effort to improve Soviet-American understandings. SALT was a Johnson initiative and we could not yet judge how it would fare under Nixon. This was relevant to our discussion of the impact on the European context. While the speaker did not see an urgent need for a parallel intra-European dialogue he agreed that this was a European <u>interest</u>. On the other hand, judging by the situation in both the great powers, the general perspectives today led in the direction of immobility rather than revolutionary change. A truly European conference which would lead to greater understanding and co-operation between East and West European countries would be very useful. But the prospects for moving towards a European settlement were less favourable now than they were a year ago.

It was suggested that a possible, indeed a likely, result of SALT may be a false sense of security in certain countries of Europe. Even if there were no tangible result the fact of the two super powers talking together would make the danger of war seem even more remote and intensify political pressure against military efforts. This may accelerate the disintegration of the alliance systems, especially where there was already some freedom of action.

This led to the comment from another Western speaker that the already considerable lessening of threat perception may be a reason why although the proposed conference and all the measures connected with it were labelled 'security' in reality security was not a major preoccupation. The elements of security and co-operation in the proposals from the Eastern side were interconnected, the idea being that greater co-operation would bring greater security and vice-versa. Co-operation in fighting pollution, etc. was seen as a means of undermining the present situation of security based on deterrence, with the aim of reaching among the countries of Europe as a whole so many linkages and involvements that war would be as inconceivable as it was today between, say, France and Germany. The question was whether such a strategy would prove feasible. But he felt that having been offered the opportunity to try to do something about the partition of Europe, even if not to overcome it, the Western countries should respond more favourably to the idea of an ESC.

The real problem was that while co-operation would decrease the military danger it would increase the danger of ideological subversion. This danger affected different countries of Europe in different degrees, but for some it was a very important aspect and might limit the amount of co-operation that they could afford to engage in.

An East European participant made two general observations about SALT. First, the strategic importance of the talks supassed that of all other previous disarmament negotiations; second, the success of these talks was of direct and primary interest to Europe. There were many reasons for this view. SALT may become symptomatic of an important new step in international relations, a realisation that a war involving the two super powers was unthinkable and that therefore a system of durable safeguards against such a war should be devised. This might be achieved through a series of measures, beginning with a ban on the future development of means of mass destruction and leading in the final stage to a reduction of existing stocks of those weapons. Had a reduction of the strategic umbrella to the level sufficient only for minimal deterrence (suggested in the past by Western and Eastern sources) come about already, undoubtedly there would be not only a completely new strategic framework in the world but also a fresh foundation for political developments in Europe. Elimination of the danger of a major global conflict would prompt efforts to work out procedures to avoid local conflicts as well. This would naturally be a long-term objective. In the more immediate future SALT could exert a favourable influence on the more positive military and political trends in the European and the global context.

The European stake in the success of SALT was undeniable. The interest of the two super powers in regulating their strategic potential would have an impact on the shaping of the North Atlantic and Warsaw Treaty Organisation which relied heavily on the strategic forces of the two super powers. The evolution of strategic doctrine, military and economic planning in Europe, even the intellectual approach to many current military and political issues would be influenced by a positive outcome to SALT. The outcome would be of particular importance to Poland, which had been advocating since 1964 a freeze in nuclear and thermonuclear weaponry in Europe in the interest of European detente and security. Today, thanks to the NPT, there did seem to exist a de facto observance of the greater part of the Gomulka Plan. But in order to prevent this de facto situation from worsening we did need a political and legal agreement on this issue which was vital to detente. It would only be logical to expect the two super powers to proceed to an undertaking not to increase their nuclear arsenal in the strategically most sensitive areas such as Central Europe. Such a modest measure of understanding could open up wider avenues for negotiation.

The speaker shared the good opinion of Mr. Windsor's paper, but proposed to comment on just one point, the argument for the need to find a liaison between the European powers and the super powers which would make the prosecution of detente a viable concept. He felt that the Prague Declaration pointed the way to such a link in suggesting two concrete measures - the conclusion of a non-use of force agreement on a regional scale and an agreement to improve trade and technical exchange. This was not a closed list of measures for European security and co-operation, but it was at least a beginning. It was up to the Western powers to submit proposals of their own and show what they were ready to do to provide this liaison.

On the specific point of Polish proposals for talks on an improvement of relations with the Federal Republic referred to earlier in the discussion, he would prefer to follow the example of the Polish Foreign Minister and withhold further comment until Bonn had delivered its promised reply.

The final speaker from the Western side maintained that a non-use of force agreement would be valuable only if it symbolised a significant political understanding. For instance a Polish-West German no-use of force agreement in which West Germany recognised the territorial integreity of the Polish state in so many words would symbolise German recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. A similar agreement between East and West Germany would formalise a West German readiness to consider the other part of Germany as a full partner in negotiation. But what would be the political impact of a general European non-use of force agreement? The facts of the political and military situation in Europe prevented and would continue to prevent the use of force. A declaration that did not signify a change of atmosphere in some direction would be merely a gesture.

He felt that the comment that whatever we did in the field of co-operation decreased the military danger but increased the danger of ideological subversion reached the heart of the matter. Co-operation on a large and effective scale would not be possible without some reforms on the Eastern side which some Eastern friends would consider subversive. The flowering of the important industrial co-operation between West Germany and Yugoslavia dated from the adoption by Yugoslavia of basic economic reforms. The West was not asking for 'revisionism'; but because of the way the Western economy was structured, the Eastern economies had to be restructured to make certain forms of co-operation possible. But having said that, trade and co-operation of all kinds were merely instruments. What an improvement of the general political context began with the abolition of some of the worst aspects of the cold war that still remained.

Third Session: Proposals for European Co-operation in the light of discussion of the general political context.

The Chairman said that his impression was of a certain parallelism in the approaches to SALT and to European co-operation. In both cases there was a strong urge to do something, but a long list of difficulties was seen in the way of multilateral general agreements as opposed to bilateral piecemeal ones. The largest number of objections were raised by West European speakers, but the sentiment was shared by some on the Eastern side. It was strongly felt that security resided in the strategic balance rather than in security declarations. It was suggested that only declarations symbolising specific political understandings, such as declarations affecting the security relations of West Germany on the one hand and Poland and/or East Germany on the other, were worthwhile. The question was also posed of how much further economic co-operation could be carried without a more radical adjustment on the Eastern side to the Western market economy. And there was the underlying consideration of how much multilateralism would add to the ad hoc arrangements already under way. There was the question too whether we thought of an ESC as a negotiation, a conference or a lengthy institutionalised process.

He hoped that from this third session would emerge some specific conclusions confirming or contradicting these general political impressions. First, however, a certain clarification would be desirable of the political and mental associations of ideas that went with a political European security conference. Accordingly he invited two opening speakers, one from Eastern and one from Western Europe, to address themselves particularly to this point.

The Eastern speaker wanted to make some personal comments on specific points arising out of the previous day's discussion. First, the preparatory process: he felt that bilateral or limited regional negotiations would help to clarify the possible outcome on certain issues. Second, the agenda: the prevailing view among public opinion in his own country was that to put forward as the first step an agenda including the major and thus most controversial topics relating to Europe would put a strain on the conference from the outset. Those who expected problems which had been outstanding for decades to be settled in a conference of this kind were not being realistic; it meant that they did not genuinely want a conference at all. This was the justification for deliberately proposing consideration of more modest items on which there seemed reasonable prospect of agreement. It might be argued, perhaps, that the non-use of force may not be the least controversial of issues; it was however broad enough to leave room for some agreement, at least on certain aspects. A rather critical view seemed to have been taken of pollution as a subject for an ESC; it did however have a bearing on the human environment, and the fact that a world conference on this problem was to be organised in Sweden showed how important it was becoming. For the East European countries, particular importance was attached to means of improving trade and economic and technological links on a basis of equality, with the aim of strengthening political co-operation among European states. This was reflected in the wording of the second item proposed in the Prague Declaration. It was true that trade and economic, technological, scientific and cultural co-operation could expand irrespective of any conference. On the other hand a conference would not hamper development in this sense, and was indeed likely to exert a positive influence since it was considered to be a stage of a process of fostering rapprochement and detente in Europe.

The speaker registered his disagreement with the view voiced from the Western side the previous day about readjustment of the economic system in the East being a favourable condition, if not a prerequisite, for the development of co-operation. It would be quite unrealistic to try to make co-operation the instrument of change in Eastern or Western Europe. The principles of mutual respect and sovereign equality were highly important for the peaceful coexistence of European states.

The Western participant preferred to present a typical small-nation approach to the idea of detente, co-operation and security. Two basic elements, described in Mr. Windsor's paper, were part of this approach. First, stability at the super-power level based on mutual deterrence; and second, political developments in both parts of Europe that would tend to de-emphasise the difference and emphasise the growing similarities not of the political structure (at least in the first round) but at least of the political concepts. This would be with the idea, as had been said elsewhere, of without changing the frontiers themselves trying to change what they stood for, trying to move into a more open kind of society between the two halves of Europe. He noted his Eastern colleague's view that it would be unrealistic for the West Europeans to put too great emphasis upon a change in the present economic structure in Eastern Europe.

What mattered from the Western point of view was not that a particular system or structure should change before contacts or negotiations opened, but that the possibilities for peaceful change should grow as the process of contacts and negotiations grew in scope. That possibility for further change in countries in both parts of Europe was what was meant by the dynamic approach. If

recognition of the unchangeable character of the East European systems were insisted upon as a pre-condition for negotiations, the possibilities for progress in the European context would be less than was generally believed. The speaker welcomed the more relaxed and constructive atmosphere at this meeting compared with that at the previous year's East-West meeting which followed hard upon the events in Czechoslovakia. He agreed that those events caused fairly limited damage to the Soviet Union, at least in terms of super-power relations. But we could not pretend that those events did not happen. In his part of the world immense harm had been done to the concept of future political co-operation in Europe - perhaps because too much wishful thinking had been put into some proposals for rapprochement and detente. With regard to the ESC, perhaps a European Co-operation Conference would be a better term. Certainly when talking about a conference we might mean a series of conferences supplementing or complementing a series of bilateral contacts. There was no reason why environmental problems for instance should not be taken up: as well as the world conference in 1972, the ECE was arranging a conference on the same subject in 1971, so that some kind of co-operation was already under way. To Western eyes, a conference was seen as a possible means of improving the state of affairs in Europe, but not as a main objective in itself: it would be wrong to focus exclusively on the idea of a conference, because what was to be achieved was much more important than the formalisation of the contact between the two halves of Europe.

A second Western speaker commented on the extent to which the concept of security had changed in comparison with the late 1950's when the Rapacki and other plans were in the foreground. Consequently the discussion of security was shifting from military to political matters. He regarded this as progress - and a progress that the Warsaw Pact members had acknowledged by suggesting that an ESC should be mainly concerned with questions of European co-operation. The question of which political measures could enhance what we still called European security depended on our perception of the threat to our security. There was still a dichotomy of interest in the two halves of Europe. In the East the main concern was that the integrity of the bloc should be officially recognised or even guaranteed by the West. For the West, security meant that the atmosphere of tension deriving from the international division of Germany should be replaced by co-operation and a more open society between the two parts of Europe. The most difficult problem in this respect was how to overcome the hostility between the two Germanies in order to improve and make more secure the position of West Berlin among others. To what extent would an ESC help us towards those goals?

On the Eastern side the proposed agenda had been changed several times, possibly relecting changes of emphasis and aim. It was an open question why the agenda had boiled down to the two topics mentioned in the Prague Declaration. First, these topics might represent the highest common factor of agreement among all the Warsaw Pact members. Second the USSR, and perhaps other socialist countries, may have decided that little result was to be expected and that they would gain most from the mere convening of the conference, in as much as the status of the GDR would be upgraded to equal that of all other European countries participating in the conference. Third, the Czechoslovak Government had distributed to a number of Western states copies of two papers prepared for the Prague conference, on a renunciation of force agreement and on European co-operation. The first of these papers proposed a multilateral agreement on the renunciation of force, recognition of the territorial integrity of all European states, and a declaration by all European states that they would not solve their problems by other than peaceful means. In the last paragraph, however, it stated that these principles should not apply to obligations accepted by states on the basis of bilateral or multilateral treaties or

agreements. This seemed to indicate clearly that the application of the Brezhnev doctrine would not be excluded by such an agreement. This would not be acceptable to the West.

He still wondered whether co-operation would be a suitable topic for a conference. The West European experience with Euratom showed how difficult it was to organise technological co-operation multilaterally. This was a field much more suited to bilateral agreements: an ESC might establish a framework, but the co-operation itself should be organised by individual states.

This led him to consideration of what else an ESC might do. Given that the main problem was to overcome the division of Europe to some extent, it might be worth looking back to the beginning of the unification of Western Europe and the creation of the Council of Europe. If an ESC were envisaged as the beginning of a framework for co-operation, it could make a start by setting up some very general rules for enhancing coexistence in Europe - covering such questions as self-determination and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs and refraining from actions which could disturb other nations, which had particular relevance to the situation of Berlin; it could also initiate some measures of practical co-operation, such as an agreement on freedom of travel between states, or joint action against pollution, etc. The Federal Republic would be prepared to contribute towards progress in that direction. Indeed, a start had already been made towards enhancing coexistence in respect of the Munich agreement, and might be carried further in relation to the Oder-Neisse line in negotiations between Bonn and Warsaw.

A Northern European participant questioned the point about upgrading the present status of the GDR. Its partipation in an ESC would rather about amount to formalisation of a basic consensus which did prevail in the West today accepting the GDR as an equal partner in negotiations - but negotiations aiming at an amelioration of relations between East and West Europe, including of course the two German states. The Soviet Union would gain a propaganda advantage from this formalisation.

Striking a different note from previous Western speakers with whom he did not disagree emotionally or intellectually, another participant urged that we should be clear about our priorities. If we agreed that top priority should be given to preserving peace and damping down the arms race, we had to draw the consequences. The reality was that in the political and military field the owrld was still almost completely bipolar. The West must face up to this fact and accept that relations between the smaller nations of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union were their own affair, not ours.

He felt that the sole pre-condition which should be posed in relation to an ESC related to the right of the US and Canada to participate. This might seem to be acquiescing in the status quo. But life was a dynamic process. A step by step approach could create a favourable climate for internal changes in both halves of Europe and in the long run lead to a situation in which political problems could be solved. We could not start this process by putting pre-conditions for a European conference.

Coming back to the definition of security, a South-East European speaker commented that in Europe as a whole there had been no anxiety about security in the sense of fear of a breach of the peace for quite some time. Although some very tense situations had occurred, these had all been overcome without a war, so that we could safely say that Europe enjoyed a high sense of security. He reflected on the paradox that this feeling prevailed despite the failure of

previous inter-governmental initiatives in Europe to reach any significant formalised security agreement and despite the maintenance of a high level of forces and weaponry in the area. However, it was also true that security in the nuclear era had become quite compatible with the persistent state of tension which was neither peace nor war between groups of states and which we called cold war. The alternative today was not between peace and war in Europe, but between cold war (although combined with a considerable degree of security as far as open war was concerned) and whatever we might consider better or more desirable - tranquility, or co-operation. Thus the distinction between a conference on security or on co-operation was a matter of semantics. Whatever we may call it, we wanted to change the present situation; and this could only be done by working positively, not in the sense of achieving security from something but in trying to bring all the nations of Europe together in a positive effort aimed at improving the quality of life in all countries, through all kinds of co-operation.

His own Government had launched an initiative with the support of eight other small nations aimed at instituting a forum in which European parliamentarians would meet and discuss co-operation in all its aspects in the hope of first reaching broad bases of understanding on which positive acts of co-operation could rely and then leading on from this to lay the groundwork for inter-governmental agreements on specific measures. However, after two or three years of preparatory work this initiative collapsed, because the Warsaw Pact countries ceased to co-operate. Instead, we now had the current proposal for an ESC. Certainly it would be very difficult to refuse to participate in such a conference, provided it were sufficiently prepared. This was his own Government's view. This did not mean that he personally had great illusions about what such a conference could achieve. With regard to preparation, one essential element would be to find a formula whereby the question of who should participate and in what capacity should be decided without in the process heightening tension. If it was imagined to solve one element of the German problem in the process of convening the conference, there would be trouble. He did not consider it worthwhile to press for something such as a multilateral no-use of force declaration which in the first place was already giving rise to controversy and in the second place would contribute nothing to the sense of security in Europe. He did agree that environmental problems were extremely important; but the ECE was a far more suitable forum for discussion of such problems and offered better hope of results than a gathering of top-level statesmen not normally preoccupied with questions involving highly technical considerations.

He endorsed a previous speaker's misgivings about any insistence on internal changes in Eastern Europe as a pre-condition for co-operation. It was nonsense to pretend that countries belonging to the Comecon or to the OECD could not co-operate because of the differences in their types and forms of contact with the outside world. It was true, however, that this difference did create certain difficulties and tended to limit the kind and amount of co-operation. This was mainly due to the manner of organisation of co-operation with the outside world, but also to internal factors. If an economy was primarily directed by considerations of internal self-sufficiency and the reduction of dependence on supplies from outside, obviously the degree of foreign trade would be less than if the country concerned believed in interdependence and a freer exchange of goods. But every effort should be made within the existing conditions - and there was much to be done. This aspect should not be mixed with problems of European security, however.

A previous speaker said his reference to the need for changes in the Eastern system was meant only in the sense of adjustment to the facts of life. All the Comecon countries must develop a kind of communism that would be technically able to co-operate with capitalism. This meant introducing certain elements of the market economy, of the profit motive, and especially of planning flexibility.

These were precisely the goals of all the economic reformers in those states: it was a matter of the speed with which such developments would proceed. Essentially the Eastern countries must show a far greater awareness and understanding of the extent to which the market demand ruled purchasing policy in the West, and sufficient flexibility in their planning to be able to respond readily to fluctuations in demand, if trade were to expand beyond a certain level. The Eastern states were in the position of the demandeur in this respect. The West European countries had some partial interest in enlarging any market in the East, but on the whole were quite happy to trade within the capitalist system. And since the credits came from the Western side, the greater adjustment had to be made on the Eastern side. This was not a pre-condition but a matter of making things work.

It was suggested that reliability, as well as flexibility, was important in considering the record of a particular country as a trading partner. The Eastern countries did encounter more economic difficulties in relation to multilateral systems, but bilateral relations presented no problems and their interest would remain strong in encouraging such relations. In their sincere desire to co-operate as fully as possible with the West the line must however be drawn at a demand for changes in the social and economic structure in the East. Indeed, this would be an unfair demand, because the Eastern countries had never asked the West to adapt to a more socialistic economy just because it would be more comfortable for them. Maintenance of the existing systems was also realistic, because this was the pattern of difference in which we had been living for quite some time, as a previous speaker said, in a state of security, although we all shared the desire for something more comfortable.

The point was put by a Western speaker that while co-operation was undoubtedly an instrument of detente, it could also create tensions. Serious co-operation, going beyond commercial exchange to important technological and scientific co-operation and involving the exchange of persons and ideas and an interpenetration of the two parts of Europe, did entail some risks - to both sides. The events in the summer of 1968 surely drove home to both West and East Europeans the need to face up to what the consequences of such a policy might be. This was a matter not of pre-conditions but of looking at reality.

Coming back to the question of a conference, a Western participant said that he had always argued in favour of detente and co-operation. But he was not interested in any conference of which he felt the only possible result could be the recognition of the more ugly features of the status quo without any of the consolation that change might hold out. He would be opposed to the upgrading of the GDR (which he did see as an outcome of the conference) if that upgrading were to be underwritten on the basis of the present policy of the East Berlin regime. He would be quite willing to accord recognition of the equality of the GDR on the basis of their acceptance of (and action upon) the principle of peaceful co-existence rather than that of the international and intra-German class struggle. If the Soviet Union wanted the West merely to subscribe to the Brezhnev doctrine, he would oppose that too. The West could not do anything about the Soviet hegemonial position in Eastern Europe. But it would not be in our interest to put the seal of approval on it. The Czechoslovak affair had not been forgotten in the West; it remained as a psychological obstacle and increased the necessity for hard and fast guarantees.

To have any value at all, an ESC must induce an element of flexibility rather than of rigidity into the European situation. This meant, as had been suggested by previous speakers, changing the quality, rather than the facts, of the status quo; this applied to the relationship between the two Germanies as between the two halves of Europe. He belonged to those Germans who did not consider the partition itself necessarily unnatural. But the present form

of that partition was truly unnatural. The present Bonn Government was ready to give up its previous maximalist positions: in his inauguration speech Brandt said explicitly that the degree of recognition of the GDR with which Bonn was willing to go along would depend solely on the behaviour of the East Berlin Government itself. This was aimed at amelioration of the situation, not at overturning the status quo. Change was needed in our mutual perceptions. A great change had come about in the perception of the East European countries and the Federal Republic in recent years; there would be more change to come if the Eastern countries were at all forthcoming. If they were not forthcoming, a retrenchment could be expected in Bonn, such as happened three years ago, even with the present Government.

It was no less important to try to change our present security structure on a mutually acceptable basis. For example plans for balanced force reductions had been worked out in NATO and all kinds of other proposals put forward over the years. These would be small steps, but each could signify a certain improvement in the political atmosphere. Possible measures might begin with a hot line between the two high commands; then an exchange of manoeuvre observers; then agreement to fix ceilings of troop levels and certain kinds of armaments, to be followed by a freeze and eventually by reductions. This would mean grappling with the difficult problem of inspection. But given that the basis from which we must proceed was mutual confidence, inspection and verification might prove a substitute. But none of this could be settled in a three-day conference. The genuine negotiation of specific security measures would probably require a permament body in continuous session. If what we called a conference could develop into a framework for negotiation at a European level we might get somewhere over time. The important thing, however, was to have a formula for change in mind before sitting down at the first meeting, otherwise nothing would come of the whole exercise.

Another Western speaker raised the question of timing, in relation to his impression that the path to a successful ESC led through a long process of harmonisation of views. He had noticed recently some insistence on the Soviet side on the need to fix a date. Supposing a conference were held in 1970: would this mean that something was really taking shape in Europe, or would it be just one theme? One consideration not touched on so far was the possibility of a number of developments on the Western side in the coming year - moves towards a strengthening and deepening of the process of integration within the European Economic Community and towards its enlargement - which would bring the whole problem of the structure of the West European system to the forefront. How far would these two movements, for an ESC and intra-European co-operation on the one side and further development of West European political and economic co-operation on the other, be compatible? This was the old problem that arose in connection with any initiative for reinforcing the Western system of the impact on relations with the East and the extent to which the development of closer co-operation in the West should wait upon reconciliation with the East. This was a very difficult question.

It made him wonder, in the light of the previous speaker's remarks, whether the pursuit of the Federal Republic's contacts with the East on a purely national basis may not revive old fears about German expansionism in the Balkans, etc. Might it not be better to envisage this process taking place in a wider framework, the development of Western institutions and economic integration, so that the growth of East-West relations might go forward on the basis of a partly national but increasingly transnational system which would in a sense act as a filter to avoid the feeling that a special type of economic development may be taking place which was not necessarily favourable to mutual understanding?

The time was not yet ripe for an ESC. We were still in the situation where in order to maintain the idea we should develop as many bilateral contacts as possible. It was not a question of dragging our feet. Clearly the proposals

put forward in the Prague Declaration would not help to solve any of our real problems; and at the same time we must keep in mind that there was a certain positive trend in relations between East and West in Europe which needed to be encouraged. Bilateral contacts would help us to discover what the possibilities for joint action were in relation to, say, economic or environmental problems. These contacts might then open the way to a certain amount of regrouping on a regional basis, ad hoc, to deal with specific issues. The technical organisation of co-operation was likely to prove very complicated, and we should be prepared for this. But the idea of regional regrouping on the basis of common interest might lead us on to some regrouping for the solution of political problems which would be of particular interest to a certain number of states. Intra-German discussions, for instance, might be fitted into such a framework. A pragmatic approach of this kind, leading from bilateral co-operation to something on a regional basis with a general all-European conference at a later stage if it appeared necessary, would not exclude the further developments envisaged to take place within the Western system. It might be possible in this way to avoid a contradiction between these two major movements.

A second South-East European participant emphasised the need for change - within countries, within blocs and in world politics generally - as the means by which we could hope ultimately to bring about a transformation of the international situation which had led to the creation of the spheres of influence between which Europe was divided. It was that fundamental division, not just the confrontation of the two blocs in Europe, which was the substance of the European problem. But along with this there was need for the development of various kinds of co-operation and contacts which did not exist today, so as to establish a network of all-European interests and co-operation and also to create a European public opinion which did not exist today. Initiatives by individual European countries would be important too: despite its failure, the nine-power initiative launched by Yugoslavia was a good one. If we were to get anywhere, we must expect occasional failures. We also needed various forums for discussion - such as a European Security Commission, or a UN body - where specifically European views and initiatives could be presented and discussed and identified as such rather than as initiatives from the East or the West. The possibilities did exist: none of our countries had done all they might.

In this spirit, although he shared the doubts voiced by a number of other speakers in regard to the likelihood of promising results from an ESC, he felt it would be harmful for the political atmosphere in Europe to oppose the idea. Any objective which was basically or in principle positive should be accepted. It was up to the Europeans themselves to make the most of their opportunities.

An East European speaker wanted to deal with some misunderstandings, and some unjustifiable suspicions, on the Western side in relation to the proposed ESC. First of all, with regard to the distinction drawn between the doctrines of the dynamic approach and the permament status quo approach, for the Eastern countries the recognition of certain countries' social and political set-up did not in any way mean a demand for recognition of the status quo as permament. Life did not stand still. It was the internal affair of each country as to the direction in which it developed its own policy and structure. Neither the idea nor the agenda of the conference should be associated with any so-called abandoning of the existing situation in Eastern or Western Europe but as one of the means - not the only means - to create a favourable climate in Europe for making further progress. This was why the proposed agenda had been drawn up in the way it had.

It was not a case of the socialist countries having changed their minds. All previous suggestions were suggestions - and consultations had been going on through different channels. The Prague Declaration contained the first formulation of an agenda. The subjects proposed were regarded as the minimum common denominator likely to be acceptable to both sides as the basis for discussion. If other proposals were thought to prove more acceptable, then other countries should put them forward: this was intended to be a process of dialogue.

He did not accept the argument that the status of the GDR would be upgraded due to its participation in the conference: it was well known that the participation of a given country in an international conference did not in itself confer any kind of recognition. There was a misunderstanding too in the reference to the observance of bilateral or multilateral treaty obligations. This proviso was added to make it clear that this conference was not envisaged as changing the whole structure and institutionalisation of Europe as such or the bilateral and multilateral treaty commitments. It was a frequent Western criticism of moves made by the East that these could undermine NATO or take advantage of internal difficulties in Western countries etc. Treaties, too, often contained a final clause to the effect that the agreement reached did not nullify a previous commitment. It meant that the conference was viewed as a modest stage in the process.

With regard to the motives for the conference, a second speaker added his disappointment at the reaction of Western colleagues. He agreed with much of the analysis of a previous speaker about the different aspects of security. It was only natural to want to depart from the sterility of the balance of mutual deterrence and try to start a period in which the people of Europe could enjoy much more the advantage of security based on mutual detente and co-operation. This was no less true of the Soviet Government: there was no reason to suppose that they wanted to perpetuate the present position in regard to security either. The motivation for an ESC was quite normal, therefore.

The question then arose of how to get to the conference and what to expect from it. He believed that the proposal to hold the conference in the first part of 1970 was designed to speed up the preparatory process somewhat, simply because the major Western countries had spoken of the need for careful preparation but had done nothing about this. It was necessary to see whether there was a real readiness to get together. The need to put cards on the table was underlined by the hoped-for progress in SALT: we had discussed the previous day some of the issues arising for Europe and agreed on the genuine need for a parallel process to some extent in trying to organise Europe better than it was now. Undoubtedly, then, an ESC would be the start of a developing process. Following up his colleague's remarks regarding the agenda, he felt that it would not help Europe as a whole if we put pre-conditions (whether we called them so or not) before our readiness to discuss proposals for the agenda to which, he repeated, no socialist country felt it held the copyright. Recalling the pre-condition mentioned of an amelioration in relations between the two Germanies, he suggested that if we tried to make the beginning of European effort dependent on the amelioration of bilateral problems of which there were many between various countries (not that the German question was only a bilateral problem, or a minor one) we should never get there. /It was insisted from the Western side that in relation to an ESC a definite change was required from the GDR specifically of its attitude towards discussing with the Federal Republic./

A participant from South-Eastern Europe regretted that some speakers seemed in so little hurry to get to a conference. He regretted also the emphasis on the two halves of Europe: as well as being inaccurate, it was undesirable to emphasise the conception of Europe as divided into two blocs. He felt that every European state should have the right to participate in the Conference. The Soviet Union was incontestably a European state with European interests. There would be no obstacle however to the participation of the US and Canada given the importance attached to this by certain countries from the point of view of their own security. Recalling his remarks the previous day about a process of convergence, obviously one single ESC could not solve anything. We should need a series of conferences, bilateral and multilateral, in which the US and Canada might also participate if so desired. Alternatively we might envisage the conference developing into an institutionalised process. Other forms could also be considered. What was important was the readiness to embark on ways and means of advancing security and co-operation in Europe.

Coming back to the doubts expressed on the Western side about the agenda, there was certainly no intention of trying to undermine a multilateral non-use of force declaration. We wanted to move away from the concept of security based on armed strength. But at this early stage we did not want to make the task more difficult by asking the countries in either alliance to renounce their links. He saw the point of the argument that environmental problems, say, might be more effectively dealt with in the ECE. On the other hand there was room for considerable improvement in the kind and degree of economic co-operation achieved so far and discussion of the possibilities could hardly be disadvantageous. This led back to the request to Western colleagues to contribute proposals of their own. And by improving the atmosphere, common discussion would do some good towards making the outstanding major political problems easier to deal with. It was a case of every little helps.

In his summing up, the Chairman suggested that the nub of the discussion was the extent to which a European Security Conference could advance the process of co-operation on which everyone obviously agreed in principle and even in practice. While different points of view had emerged on both the Eastern and the Western side, on the whole and in the majority the speakers from Western Europe had the feeling that ESC in its present form might make the process of co-operation more difficult and not easier.

The explanation for this difference related to what one participant said about the paradox of the failure of security conferences in Europe and the high level of weaponry and force coinciding nevertheless with a high level of security. While it may be highly desirable to lower the tension in political terms, if this came about it might create problems for the de facto situation on which the de jure sense of security had been based. The effect of the idea that we were moving towards an alternative European security system would have an impact on the social and political process in Western countries which could lead to a considerable lowering of weaponry and armaments for a period. At the same time taking account of the situation in the East, including the geographical relationship of the one super power as well as the structural factors in the political situation, it was very difficult to imagine that we could have fundamental reforms which would be regarded as having a permanent effect. This created a direct security problem for the West Europeans in particular. It also created an indirect political problem, that in such a situation when we were consciously in a situation of peace but unconsciously felt a certain anxiety about the European situation, one country might fear that it would have to make allowance for what the Soviet Union wanted before considering its own policies. This was called 'Finlandisation' and should be taken into account. The fear may be irrelevant: but it could not be dismissed out of hand and it did have a peculiar influence. It had been brought to the surface by the very fear of an ESC which raised this aspect to the top of the European political discussion. This was also a reason why he was encouraged by the tendency to see an ESC as one form of co-operation which could include multilateral or bilateral forms. However, he felt we were only at the beginning of exploration of all the issues involved.

EUROPEAN STUDY COMMISSION

THIRD EAST - WEST MEETING

November 14/15, 1969

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