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UNDERDEVELOPED SOCIETIES

AND

POLITICAL MODELS FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Rapport / Paper

by Helio Jaguaribe

(IUPERJ)

UNDERDEVELOPED SOCIETIES
AND
POLITICAL MODELS FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Helio Jaguaribe
(IUPERJ)

Development and Underdevelopment

The present paper tries to identify and to analyze, in a succint way, the more relevant structural relationships between underdeveloped societies and the political models more suitable for the promotion of their national development, with an emphasis on the currently more employable one, National Capitalism, State Capitalism and Developental Socialism.

This question involves, as it will be immediately realized, many complex sets on interrelated problems, such as what should be understood by development and underdevelopment, by models and political models, and by the (deliberate) promotion of the national development of a society. Its appropriate treatment would require a broad and systematic appro·achin which these problems could be duly studied so that, when one would deal with the specific question of the present paper, its main factual and conceptual assumptions would have been already presented and discussed. This has been attempted by this writer in another context (x) but would not be compatible with the limits of this paper. The only thing that can be done here is to indicate, very briefly, one of the more fundamental presuppositions of the present study : the understanding given to the usual cause of the underdevelopment of a society, comparatively to the developed contemporary societies of the same civilization.

(x) = The present paper is the adapted version of a chapter of a forthcoming book on Political Development.

Let it be initially made clear that the concepts of development and underdevelopment applied to societies will be understood in a functionalistic way. The general development of a self-adjustable system, as the social system, is always an increase of its adaptability to its environment, i.e., in the case, human beings, nature and other societies. Such increasing adaptability implies a higher capacity of extraction and utilization of resources, of adjusting the environment for the purposes of the society and adjusting the society for the contingencies of the environment.

Comparing the relative grades of development of different societies is an operation that must take into account their historical and cultural situations. The diachronic analysis of societies belonging to distinct historical times, such as the Western Middle Age and 20th century, is distinct from a comparison of contemporary societies at any of those historical levels. It is also different to compare contemporary societies of the same civilization, as Tudor England and 16th century France, and societies of different civilizations, like the former ones and the Incas of the same period.

Besides the consequences resulting from distinct historical and civilizational settings, the comparative grade of development of various societies can also reflect substantial differences in their environmental conditions. This is the case of societies living in such peculiar sites as su-Artic zones or arid deserts, vis-a-vis those of temperate and fertile lands. This is also, in a different way, the case of societies in particularly unfavorable geopolitical situations, such as Poland between Germany and Russia, and those in favored conditions, such as it was for long the case of insular Britain.

Although the particular conditions above referred do not exclude, as well diachronically as synchronically, the possibility of meaningful development comparisons among those societies, given the appropriate qualifications, the present paper is not concerned with such hypotheses.

Its purpose is to consider societies of today, belonging to what could be generically discribed as the universalized Westerncivilization. And it is the basic presupposition of this paper, which here can only be mentioned but not justified, that notwitstanding several other relevant interfering factors (from cultural and geopolitical ones to those of a pure accidental character), a substantial difference of level of development among contemporary societies of the same civilizational groupisan indication that in the underdeveloped societies the elite-mass relationship has been dysfunctional or insufficiently functional.

The underlying theoretical assumption, in what concerns the elite-mass relationships, in that such relationships is the basic factor of a society's dynamics and consist, ultimately, in a exchange of services at a certain cost and with a certain possibility of benefit. Elites extract from the masses resources and compliances to decisions and give them directional services and patterns of excellence performance. That relationship involves a certain <u>exaction enjoyment-directional performance</u> ratio. When the former outweights the latter, which means that, in social terms, the cost-benefit ration is negative, the capacity of adaptability of the concerned society tends to decline. Opposedly, when the cost-benefit ratio is positive, the concerned society accumulates more resources, uses them better and its general capacity of adaptability increases. The former process brings about the underdevelopement of a society whereas societies whose elite present a favorable exaction enjoyment-directional performance ration maintain their continuous development.

A Typology of Underdevelopment

We can presume, from the above assumptions that, in the wide range of societies which, comparatively to their more successful contemporary, should be considered as underdeveloped ones, those presenting a relative level of development, will have an elite with some functionality.

At a lower level, societies manifestly underdeveloped,
but neither submitted to an outstanding grade of coercion
nor presenting characteristics of extreme backwardness, may
be considered to have a non-functional elite bu to enjoy
of some sort of compensating factor. At the lowest level,
societies extremely underdeveloped will either have a mani-
festly dysfunctional elite or will present characteristics
of extreme backwardness, inclusive for their elite.

This preliminary and rough classification allows
another step ahead. If we consider the societies of the
first group and we use our informations concerning the
most typical historical cases of national development we
will see that the condition of relative but insufficient
functionality of the elite is likely to be two distinct
causes. One possible cause consists in the retention by
the concerned society, in all its strata, of a traditional
culture, comparatively to the grade of modernization of
the other contemporary societies. In that case, the in-
sufficient functionality of the elite would be primarily
due to its incapacity of making use of modes and means of
action otherwise available to other societies, as it was
typically the case of Komei's Japan. Another possible
cause, distinctly, consists is the existence of serious
divisions and differences within the elite, which would
have a least tendencially, a functional and a dysfunctional
sector. Not the lack of modernization but the lack of
coherence of the elite, with institutions and policies,
representative of the dysfunctional sector creating obstacles
to the action of the functional one, would be responsible for
the insufficient functionality of the elite as a whole and
resulting deficient development of such society. The case
of France and Germany, in the late 18th and early 19th
century, seems to be a good example of such hypothesis.

The second group of societies are characterized by a
certain disproportion between the hypothesized non-functiona-
lity of their elite and the fact that they are neither extre-
mely backward nor submitted to extremes of coercion. There
is in these societies a compensating factor which improves
their final condition beyond the level of performance of
their elite.

If we look more closely to such societies we will
see that the explanation to this compensating factor
consists in the fact that they have formed a modern and
capable sector in their subelite to whose action is due
the rather less unfavorable consequence of the elite's non
functionality. The case of pre-Nasser Egypt is one of
the best illustrations of this type of society.

The third group, finally, presents a rather distinct
picture according to whether the very low level of deve-
lopment is due to a manifestly dysfunctional elite or to
extreme backwardness. In the latter case underdevelopment
means, above all, the retention of a primitive or archaic
culture, as it occurs today with many African new states.
In the former case, distinctly, accentuated underdevelopment
may be associated with relatively high aspects of moder-
nization. Underdevelopment as the expression of a dysfunc-
tional elite is essentially a deficiency of institutionaliza-
tion and is characterized by the maintenance of a inequali-
tarian regime of participation by the extensive use of
coercion and/or fraud, either for supporting a regime of
values whose legitimacy is repelled by the free thinking
sectors of the society, as in the cases of Russia and China
of the late 19th and early 20th century, or for pretending
that the facade of an acceptably legitimate official regime
does really correspond to the actual social regime and is
effectively enforced, as in the case of Batista's Cuba.

If we add to these observations our current knowledge
of the regime of stratification of contemporary societies we
will be able, for these societies, to insert, in the place
of the abstract functional categories of elite, subelite
and mass, the effective classes, sectors of class and relevant
groups that are actually interacting in such societies.
It is also indispensable, on the other hand, to take into
account the current forms of international domination,
hegemony and preponderance. As it has always ocurred in
history, the relationships of domination, hegemony or pre-
ponderance, between a society and other ones, although af-
fecting the concerned societies as a whole, are actually
based on, and processed through, relationships of dependence
between the elite of the dominated societies and the elite
of the dominant one. The understanding of these relations
of international dominance-dependence between elites is an
essential requirement for the intrasocietal analysis of the
grade of functionality of any elite.

At the present stage of our survey we can now attempt
to formulate a general typoloty and characterization of
underdeveloped societies. Although the main categories
of our analysis, because they are based on permanent functional
traits of the elite-mass dynamics, are applicable to any
society, at any time, we can concentrate on the contemporary
societies, which are the object of our present interest and
by doing so we will be dispensed to enter into details and
qualifications which would not be relevant for the central
purpose of this inquiry.

.As it could be seen in the preceding preliminary survey,
underdeveloped societies can be classified in three major
types, including six varieties, as indicated in the following
table.

Table 1

Types and Varieties of Underdeveloped Societies

TYPE   I/ SOCIETIES WITH A SEMI-FUNCTIONAL ELITE

        I-1/   Traditional society

        I-2/   Societies with a split elite

TYPE   II/ SOCIETIES WITH A NON-FONCTIONAL ELITE

        II /   Societies sustained by the modern
              sector of the subelite

TYPE   III/ PRIMITIVE OR ARCHAIC SOCIETIES AND SOCIETIES
            WITH DYSFUNCTIONAL ELITE

        III-1/ Primitive or archaic societies

        III-2/ Coercive inequalitarian societies

              III-2.1/ Societies with a rigidified
                     aristocratic elite

              III-2.2/ Societies with a societas
                     sceleris elite

Let us now proceed, following the above table, to a brief attempt of typological characterization of the concerned societies.

The societies of the Type I have in common the fact that they present a relative grade of development, due to a relative grade of functionality of their elite, but are profoundly distinct according to whether they belong to the first (I-1) or the second (I-2) variety. What is meant by relative grade of development, in both cases, tends also to be rather distinct. The relative <u>development</u>, in the conditions of our time, of a traditional society (I-1) concerns, primarily, her grade of institutionalization. The preservation of the traditional culture brings with it the preservation of the traditional forms of legitimacy, in the context of which the directional performance-exaction enjoyment ratio of the elite tends, more often than not, to present a favorable or at least a socially unobjected balance. Distinctly, the meaning of relative development, for societies with a split elite, (I-2) concerns primarily their grade of modernization, although their legitimacy may be contested. It is necessary to study separately each case. In a similar form the societies of Type III present three distinct varieties. The first (III), refers to primitive societies which have kept a tribal organization and culture, as most of the new African states and to archaic societies, as some Islamic (Saudi Arabia, Iran) and Coptic (Ethiopia) whose grade of comparative backwardness is of such an extent that, whatever the remaining intrasocietal legitimacy, the respective status quo cannot be maintained without increasing dysfunctionality of the elite. (x) The two other varieties belong to the same subtype (III-2) of coercive inequalitarian societies. They have in common the fact that both varieties are characterized by a coercively imposed inequalitarian social regime. In one case, (III-2.1.) societies with a rigidified aristocratic elite, the crisis of legitimacy results from the fact that the regime of values of the elite is rejected by the modern sectors of the subelite and the free thinking individuals, usually forming a revolutionary <u>intelligentsia</u>, with the consequence that only by coercive means the elite can maintain the old social regime.

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(x) = Such unavoidable dysfunctionality, among other reasons, results from the propensity of the elite, unable to resist international pressures in the conditions of the status quo, to preserve their elite status by becoming satellites of a big power.

In the other case, (III-2.1) societies with a <u>societas
sceleris</u> elite, there is a lack of compatibility between
the culture of these societies and their effective social
regime, which actually provides the elite with privileges
in contradiction with the prevailing regime of values.
For that reason the elite pretends to have a social regime
distinct from the real one and maintains both the pretense
and the regime by a combination of coercion and fraud.
We will briefly examine each one of these six varieties.

I - 1/ Traditional society

The best historical example of a traditional society
(cf. table 26, group A.2), comparatively to the contemporary
ones, with a semi-functional elite, was Japan, in the middle
of the 19th century. The traditional culture permeated all
the strata of society and all social roles. The prevailing
regime of participation, in correspondence with the regime
of values was an inequalitarian one, but was legitimized
by the tradition and as such accepted both by the elite
and the mass, preserving among the former a strong sense of
state duty and maintaining in the latter a basic allegiance
to the regime. The present examples of traditional (but not
primitive) societies are much less simple and typical than
19th century Japan due to the increasing world wide penetra-
tion of the Western influence since the 19th century and
the corresponding de-traditionalization of most cultures.
Except in primitive and archaic societies, which in our
typology belong to another group (III-1), in the remaining
traditional societies of our time, mostly represented by
un-modernized Eastern countries, the elite has been affected
in a large extent by the Western culture and does not keep
a traditional outlook comparable to the one of the Japanese
elite in the middle of the last century. Some Southeast
Asian countries, as Laos and Cambodia, are possibly the
closest contemporary examples of a remaining traditional
society, but already in the deliberate drive for their own
modernization, as Meiji Japan. India and Pakistan, with
a still larger amount of Westernization of the elite, are
also examples of traditional societies purposefully striving
to modernize.

In such societies, besides the arrested permanence of tradi-
tion, with the consequent lag in modernization, the other
relevant features, for the purposes of our typology, are the
preservation, together with the legitimacy of the social
regime, of a sense of duty in the elite, according to the
prescriptions of the tradition. It is that sense of duty
which will impel a sector of the elite to adopt a modernizing
posture and which will be able to satch the adherence, even
at the cost of great class and personal sacrifices, of a large
part of the elite for such purpose, driving the elite to
self-renovation in the line of modernization and of overall
national development.

II - 2/ Split elite

The best historical examples of societies with a split
elite (cf. table 26, subgroup 2, item 3.1.1.1.) have been
the French and German cases of national development, under
Napoleon III and Bismarck, respectively. Contemporary, that
category fits many of the Latin American countries. The
typical feature of such societies is the actual or tendencial
division of the elite between a functional and a dysfunctional
sector, usually of traditional origin (patrician landlords,
consular bourgeoisie, upper-class professionals, certain top
military), imposes the preservation of structures and policies
which block the possibility of national development, essential-
ly by maintaining a dualistic society. The hyperconcentration
of wealth, education, prestige and power in the hands of the
elite and the corresponding marginality of the mass prevent
the social integration of the country, limit the potential
of the national market and its capacity of growth and affect
in a similar way the social, cultural and political planes
of that society. The functional sector of the elite (new
industrial bourgeoisie, modern national entrepreneurs, top
technicians and executives and certain military) whose interests
and values would be much more conveniently attended by the ge-
neral expansion of the nation, is not sufficiently aware of
the contradictions opposing them to the dysfunctional elite.
A loose ideological identifications of the functional with
the dysfunctional sector of the elite negatively affects not
only the interests of the former but also the notness, affir-
mativity and consistency of their values and behavior. The
society, as a whole, is submitted to serious distortions, which
substantially reduce the efficiency of the system of rewards and
penalties, with the corresponding restriction of the national
cohesion and productivity.

In such societies the opposition between functional and dysfunctional sectors is also to be found at the subelite and mass levels. The subelite is divided between a traditional sector, including the agrarian administration, the conventional professionals and old fashion intellectuals, the semi-parasitical (cartorial) public functionaries, a large sector of the military, the traditional churchmen, the traditional clerks and the shopkeepers, and a modern sector, including the national managers and technicians of the new industries, the new professionals and modern intellectuals, the social oriented churchmen, the technocrats, the modernizing military and the new national executives of modern businesses. The urban mass is also divided into traditional and modern sectors. The former includes either the older unionized workers, sticking to a rigidified view of the protection of labor, or the non-unionized (mostly the marginal terciary and the lumpen proletariat) recent migrants from rural activities. The latter includes the workers of the new industries of transformation. The rural mass in such societies is still predominantly traditional and parochial.

II/ Societies sustained by the modern sector of the subelite.

The best historical examples of those cases were pre-Kemal Turkey and pre-Nasser Egypt. Bolivia, before the N.N.R. revolution of 1952 and Peru before the overthrow of Belaunde, are also representative samples of that type. Such societies are the control of a non-functional elite, comprehending sectors of varying grades of dysfunctionality, the top stratum of which is a patrician sector of landlords with national and foreign financial and merchant interests and associates, including the top military. The elite is always linked to, and increasingly dependent from, external business circles. Whereas the control of rural and urban property is kept in the hands of the elite, the new modern industrial and larger commercial and financial concerns which gradually make their appearance are owned and controlled by foreign groups, although with a minor or nominal participation of the local elite.

In such societies the subelite presents a clear diffe-
rentiation between a traditional and a modern sector. The
former represents the typical middle sector of colonial and
semicolonial societies. It is composed of the rural adminis-
trators, the shopkeepers, the traditional professionals and
clerks and the bureaucrats of the more conventional depart-
ments of the state, including the military. The modern
sector, quantitavely much smaller than the former one, in-
cludes the national technicians and managers who operate
the few modern departments of the state, usually in the
ministries of finance and economy, the modern sector of the
army and the few executive functions in the modern private
sector not directly operated by foreigners.

It is due to the action of that modern sector of the
subelite that the final picture of that kind of society is
proportionally less distressing than otherwise it would be.
In sofar as that sector of the subelite plays efficiently its
role without challenging the position of the elite and the
usual expectations of the latter are satisfied, their dys-
functionality is partially contained and the content of
coercion to preserve the social regime is moderate. The elite,
however, within the limits of its capacity of enforcement,
is prepared to increase its coefficient of exaction enjoyment
and of coercion whenever, for whatever circumstances, their
habitual incomes decrease.

III - 1/ Primitive and archaic societies.

The best historical examples of this group are such
African countries as, respectively, the Congo of Leopoldville
and Ethiopia. Primitive societies, however, present the
widest possible range, from the Australian aborigine and other
higher groups, not capable even of nominal independent state-
hood, to the societies of many of the new African states.
Archaic societies, on the other hand, although much world
and in Asia. The limits separating archaic societies from
traditional ones are not clear, for the bordering cases.
In their typical form, it can be said that a traditional
society is one whose cultural system is not inherently incom-
patible (i.e. not founded on a magic conception of the world)
with modernization and whose social regime can, in principle,
be reformed by the initiative of the modernizing sector of
the elite.

Opposedly, archaic societies are those whose culture is
founded on beliefs not compatible with higher levels of
rationalization and whose social regime is excessively rigid
to be self-reformable. Primitive societies, on the other
hand, can be understood, for the purpose of the present ty-
pology, as including all forms of nominally independent and
sovereign societies which, in spite of some form of central
government, have kept basic tribal features. Such societies
have in common the fact that, in their encounter with the
Western civilization, their respective elites have to react
to Western influence and challenge before having achieved,
themselves, a higher level of non-traditional education.
Brought to the awareness of their bachwardness without time
and conditions for a strategical withdrawal the elites of
those societies are compelled to achieve their own moderniza-
tion by submitting to a foreign-directed and controlled
Westernization.

III – 2-1/ Societies with a rigidified aristocratic elite

This group, in its original form has today mostly an
historical significance, as its typical samples have disap-
peared with the Russian and Chinese revolutions. Such socie-
ties are characterized by what could be called a stratified
traditionaliam. Whereas the traditional societies preserve,
beyond their historical possibilities of functional survival,
a cultural tradition which keeps, however, permeating all their
social strats and sectors, the societies with a rigidified
aristocratic elite preserve such cultural tradition only
as a class or state tradition of the elite. The modern sec-
tor of the middle class is led to an increasing rejection of
such tradition, henceforth breaking the traditional foundation
of legitimacy and imposing to the elite the necessity of a
correspondingly increasing corcion for the maintenance of the
social regime. The coextensiveness of class conflict with
a cultural conflict of values increases the rigidity of the
elite and the rebelliousness of the intelligentsia, establi-
shing a situation on which the public order can only be kept
by the permanent exployment of the most violent forms of re-
pression and in which opposition becomes neccessarily of a
conspiratorial and revolutionary nature.

To an extent, archaic societies, as Ethiopia or Saudi Arabia, are also societies with a rigidified aristocratic elite although, in the conditions of archaic societies, an intelligentsia is less likely to emerge and much less to have a meaningful communication with the mass.

A derivated form of that kind of society, however, is one of the two possible typological consequences of the deterioration of the societies (I-2) with a split elite. In this latter case, when the functional sector of the elite is not capable to reach a minimum of ideological consciousness for identifying its own basic interests and values, or is prevented from taking a course of action consistent with its peculiar views by an excessive fear of the involved risks, or by loosing the power contest for the dysfunctional sector of the elite, the latter tends to drive the society to one of the two varieties of a coercive inequalitarian society. In most cases the result of the supremacy of the dysfunctional sector of the elite is the establishment of (III-2-2) a societas soeleris elite. In some fewer cases, however, the dysfunctional sector of the elite may keep a basic ideological bonafida, understanding its role, in accordance with a dogmatic regime of values, of an archaicizing nature but of modern outlook and formulation (x), as the championship of some supreme cause, as the defense of the "Christian Western Civilization", understood in an archaicized idealization, as the absolute good, against communism, the absolute evil. This has been the case of Western fascism, until its defeat in the second world war and presently it corresponds to the several varieties of Colonial-Fascism occurring in the underdeveloped world.

(x) = Distinctly from what occurs in traditional societies, where the legitimacy of the social regime is really founded on the religious values of the culture, fascist and colonial-fascist elites sustain archicized traditional religious values for what they represent as an archaicized idealization and not for their actual religious content, as manifested in their current modern versions. For that reason the commitment for the defense of "Christian culture" is usually associated with the actual prosecution of the modern Christian churches and militants, as it has occurred ih Nazy Germany and is occurring, since the coop of 1964, with the manifestations of Colonial-fascist tendencies in Brazil.

In such case, the sociological equivalent of (III-2.1) a
rigidified aristocratic elite, composed by the coalition
of middle class sectors, with the bourgeoisie and the re-
mainders of the patrician landlords, form the equivalent
of an ancien regime rigid elite. With the relevant diffe-
rence, however, that this new elite, whatever the traditional
implications of its regime of values, is basically a modern
one in operational terms and is therefore much abler in the
imposition of its class interests and values than a tradi-
tional aristocracy.

III - 2.2/ Societies with a societas sceleris elite

The best example of a society with a societas sceleris
elite is Batista's Cuba. Most Central American countries
of today keep that character (cf. Table 26, item 3.1.2.1.).
The distinction between that form of a coercive inequalita-
rian society and the one above discussed is essentially of
a subjective nature, although in terms which may be sometimes
empirically verifiable. Such distinction consist in the inner
bona fide belief of the rigidified elite in its regime of
values, in contrast with the naked and self conscious exploi-
tative opportunism of, the societas sceleris elite. As so
often it occurs with distinctions of such a kind, there are
many intermediary cases in which the differentiation is
difficult or impossible to make, and so becomes ultimately
irrelevant. What is characteristic of the typical societas
sceleris case is the formation, for the consolidation of the
exploitation of the mass, of a coalition, around the elite,
of the more strategic sectors and groups of the subelite.
The elite usually includes, besides a patrician agrarian
sector, a consular bourgeoisie, entirely at the service of
foreign interests, the upper class professionals, equally
dedicated to the interests of foreign groups and their
local allies and the military, who, in such societies, are
incorporated to the higher social strata and constitute,
in varying mixtures of a modern pretorian guard with a
modern feudal nobility, the basic actual support of the
regime. The coopted sectors and groups of the subelite
include the higher public functionaries, the protected
sectors of private employees, the professionals, the merce-
nary intellectuals, the rural administrators, the non-com-
missioned officers, and last but not least the union
leaders.

Whereas the military represent the effective base of support
of the regime, maintaining the quantum of coercion and vio-
lence necessary to prevent the mobilization and organization
of the exploited masses by disaffected members of the subelite,
the union leaders are the indispensable agents of mystifica-
tion of the better organized sectors of the urban mass, con-
tributing to preserve a facade of social welfare and/or of
populist intentions of the regime or the authorities.

Societal Characteristics and Political Models

The proceeding succint classification and characteriza-
tion of the types and varieties of underdeveloped societies,
considered particularly in view of the contemporary picture,
enables us now to analyze the operational political develop-
mental models, which will be called for facility sake, poli-
tical models or simply models. We will concentrate our study
on the three more largely applicable models (National Capita-
lism, State Capitalism and Developmental Socialism) although
these three models do not exhaust the possibilities of their
kind. According to the structural conditions of the concer-
ned societies, their societal environment and the historical
period in course, other models may be indicated. The liberal
model, in spite of its anti-programmation message, is notwith-
standing an implicit operational model, in the sense that is
assumes a process of societal optimization and progress by
the free inter-play of self-oriented actors and its imple-
mentation, in spite of the economics of laissez faire, depends
on the instauration and maintenance, by the state, of appro-
priate political and institutional conditions, as it has been
historically seen in the cases of Great Britain and the
United States. In a more explicit form the same can be said
of the neoliberal model.

Besides those implicit models there are other explicit
ones (cf. Table 2), as the models of Modernizing Autocracy
(Peter and Great) and Modernizing Elitocracy (Meiji restora-
tion), or the more advanced case of the social welfare models.
Furthermore, the basic political models present a wide possi-
bility of intermediary combinations. Modernizing Autocracy and
Modernizing Elitocracy from two points of a spectrum with seve-
ral intermediate positions. The same must be said of the three
more relevant models. National Capitalism, State Capitalism
and Developmental Socialism.

There are several possible and empirically occurring mixes
between, on the one hand, National Capitalism and State
Capitalism, and on the other hand, between State Capitalism
and Developmental Socialism. It is still to be remarked
that between these latter more "modern" models and the more
"traditional" models of Modernizing Autocracy and Modernizing
Elitocracy there may have some interesting connections.
The Meiji Modernizing Elitocracy used many of the techniques
of State Capitalism to later reach the form of a National
Capitalist Model, now evolving to a Welfare Capitalism.
Opposedly, the Soviet Developmental Socialism showed various
important traits of an Autocratic Modernization during the
period of Stalin. Features of Autocratic Modernization,
moreover, were also to be found in the earlier phase of
Bismarck's Modernizing Elitocracy, which evolved, during the
proper time of Bismarck, to a National Capitalism. The fol-
lowing Table 2 presents the general picture of what hereto
has been said en that matter.

Table 2

<u>Operational Political Models</u>

Traditional Models	Modernizing Autocracy (MA) Modernizing Elitocracy (ME)
Implicit Models	Liberalism (laissez faire) (L) Neoliberalism (NL)
Explicit Developmental Models	National Capitalism (NC) State Capitalism (SC) Developmental Socialism (DS)
Welfare Models	Welfare Capitalism (WC) Welfare Socialism (WS)

<u>Empirically more frequent combinatory forms</u>

MA - NC	(Early Bismarcksism)	
MA - DS	(Stalinism)	
ME - NC	(Meiji - Restoration)	
NC - SC	(For more developed Latin American countries --e.g. Brazil)	
SC - DS	(Later Nasser regime and for less developed Latin American countries --e.g. Ecuador)	

Essentially political models are designs setting goals and strategies setting conditions and means for the deliberate optimization, <u>in given structural conditions</u>, of the potential rationality (including moral rationality) contained in a given society. The question of the given structural conditions is a fundamental one for the understanding of political models. Models are not magical devices and do not create the elementary conditions, the actors and the drives for action or the means for the implementation of action, which may be required. Models are just techniques of potimization of preexisting elements, although in a process of a self-inducing growth. Some societies cannot be developed by any sort of model either because they are not viable, as national societies, or because they actually have not, at a given stage or phase of their history (usually at the cost of their own future survival) any social sector willing to, and capable of, promoting structural social changes. Sometimes the conditions required for a successful innovating leadership are so exacting, in terms of the personal qualities required, the sacrifices imposed, or the initially available means for action, that nobody --- as in Paraguay, since the fourties -- is willing or able to play the role. The problem of the operational conditions for any developmental project is alien to the present study. It is indispensable, however, to keep in mind such prerequisite. They can be listed, including those referring to the proper model, in the six following items : (1) national viability, (2) political mobilizability, (3) capable leadership, (4) appropriate choice of model, (5) appropriate implementation of model and (6) non interference of insurmountable extra-societal obstacle, as natural cataclysms and particularly foreign intervention.

Concerning the effects and implications of political models, as far as their successful implementation is concerned, it is also indispensable to realize that in politica, as in engineering, the easier the goal to reach the simpler is the required model and the easier it is to reach the goal. Differently from engineering, however in which the incomparably higher level of possibility of scientific command of the concerned subject-matter and the still higher level of possibility of accurate technological application of scientific knowledge allews a great degree of goal attainment, in politics we are confronted with a principle of declining probability of goal achieving as we increase the complexity of the models and of the requirements for their successful application.

The application of a political model implies several stages which here can only be indicated : (1) choice, formulation and politicalization of suitable model, (2) model building, (3) state building, (4) nation building, (5) consensus building. The probability for the suitable model for a given society, in given conditions, to be led from stage one to stage two, and successively, until stage five, tends to be larger for more developed societies and smaller for less developed ones because, as we decrease the starting level of development, we have accordingly to increase the complexity of the model, followed by the complexity of its requirements for success and, therefore, we increase the number of arrangements and combinations that have necessarily to match, increasing correspondingly the chances of failure. Politics is at the same time a science and an art. As a rule, the more complex are the arrangements and combinations the matching of which is required by a model, the more dependant the successful implementation of the model will be on the artfulness of the principal actors, the more the number of "soloists" will have to increase and the more will be the chances of occurrence of human errors and of distorting interferences of unforeseen events. This is the reason why so few of the countries that have remained underdeveloped after the 19th century have until now succeeded in over coming their comparative backward ness. And this is also the reason why countries that have succeeded or are now succeeding in overcoming their underdevelopment by a tremendous political effort, as Russia and China, are still so far from achieving a minimum of social consensus (stage 5 of implementation of political model) comparable to the one obtained by the countries whose development has been achieved earlier and more effortless.

In order to proceed to the analysis of the way how our three basic models can be applied in the convenient socio-political cases, according to the societal typology precedently indicated, let me now summarize, in a schematic form, the essential characteristic, the main promoting actors and the basic modus operandi of each of the three basic models.

Characteristics of the Basic Models

A. NATIONAL CAPITALISM (NC)

  (1) Essential Character

      Model for surmounting the obstacles to development
      brought about by the dysfunctional sector of the
      elite through the creation of conditions leading
      to the predominance and leadership of the functional
      sector of that elite and to the nation-wide mobiliza-
      tion of the modernizing sectors of all social classes
      for actively supporting and contributing with the
      efforts and sacrifices necessary for the deliberate
      promotion of national development, according to a
      central plan formulated by the state and executed
      under its guidance and with its major intervention.
      Emphasis on the nation, its autonomy and endogeny,
      based on and leading to a functional nationalist ethos.

  (2) Main Social actors

      Modernizing sectors of the national bourgeoisie and
      the middle class in alliance with the proletariat and
      with the support of the mobilized peasants versus
      traditional and consular sectors of bourgeoisie and
      middle class, their foreign bosses, partners and
      allies and anti-modernizing rural sectors.

  (3) Modus Operandi

      Combination of state and private entrepreneurial
      action, under state guidance and with its major
      intervention, but with a much decentralization and
      delegation of responsibility to national private
      sector as compatible with the efficient politic-econo-
      mic execution of plan. Central national planning and
      control, state regulation of investment-consumption
      ratio, massive reproductive investments and severe
      but socially fair contention of consumption. State
      organized or supported corporations for infra-structu-
      ral and basic industries. Highest priority to general
      and high education and to research and development.

Neo-bismarckian leadership by chief of state with
social arbitration of benefit reallocation among
social sectors, according to a realistic and so-
cietally functional equalitarian readjustment of
regime of participation : the New Social Pact.
Organization of National Development Party for
articulating and aggregating interests in accor-
dance with New Social Pact and in a way conducive
to national development. Exercise of power pre-
dominantly throught demo-electoral procedures with
minimum strategically required authoritarian re-
course.
Developmental and autonomizing orientation of
nationalism.

(4) Typical Example and Cases of Applicability

Historically, Bismarckian Germany. Currently appli-
cable in Latin America, with ingredients of State
Capitalism, to Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil,
Uruguay, Argentina and Chile.

B. STATE CAPITALISM (SC)

(1) Essential Character

Model for surmounting the obstacles to development
brought about by non-functional elite through
the creation of conditions leading to the seizure
of politico-economic control and leadership by
the modernizing sector of the subelite and the
subsequent utilization, in depth, of the state,
to promote societal change and national development,
with active mobilization of the support of the urban
and rural masses for enduring the sacrifices and
making the contribution necessary for the accelerated
promotion of national development by the state.
Emphasis on social reforms and national autonomous
development, based on and leading to a functional
social and national reformistic ethos.

(2) <u>Main Social Actors</u>

Modernizing sector of the middle class, with full
support of urban and rural masses <u>versus</u> traditional
patrician elite and consular allies in bourgeoisie
and middle class, particularly their foreign bosses,
partners and supporters.

(3) <u>Modus Operandi</u>

Full employment of the state as an agency of planning,
of entrepreneurship and of control, without suppres-
sion of private sector but with transference to state
agencies and corporations of main economic and
cultural functions, with the orientation and develop-
ment of possible private national entrepreneurship
to supplementary and supporting activities. Strict
regulation of personal incomes, on basically equali-
tarian criteria, with maximum socially endurable
effort of savings, for concentrating resources on
economically and educationally strategic investments.
Highest priority in general and high education.
Maximum efforts for surmounting in shortest possible
time scientific-technological backwardness. Strict
functional-technical criteria in personnel selection
and state management, combined with strict loyalty
to state and nation in strategic functions. Organiza-
tion of Party of Revolution for active mobilization
of urban and rural support for social change and
national development, and resistance to foreign
intervention, conveying rewards to supporters and
leading struggle against reactionary forces. Exer-
cise of power predominantly by forms of authoritarian
cooptation combined with mass plesbiscites. Desi-
rably, early adoption of mechanism providing for
expansion of democratic participation and control
according to increase of general and political
development.

(4) <u>Typical Example and Cases of Applicability</u>

Historically, Mustapha Kemal, in Turkey, and Nasser
in Egypt. Currently applicable, in Latin America,
to Ecuador, Peru (now in the process of implementing
it) and Bolivia (where M.N.R. has tried it).

C. DEVELOPMENTAL SOCIALISM (DS)

(1) Essential Character

Model for surmounting the obstacles to development
brought about by dysfunctional elite, particularly
in coercive inequalitarian societies, through the
revolutionary overthrow of the former elite by the
counter-elite, by the appropriate employment of a
well organized and disciplined party.
Subsequent socialization of the means of production,
through the utilization, in depth, of the state,
to promote revolutionary societal change and natio-
nal development, with the revolutionary support of
the urban and rural masses, in the frame and for
the sake of a socialist and national society, for
enduring the sacrifices, making the contribution
necessary for the accelerated promotion of national
development and fighting against foreign intervention.
Emphasis on revolutionary reforms and national autono-
mous development based on and leading to a rationally
framed social and national revolucionary ethos.

(2) Main Social Actors

The intelligentsia of the counter-elite organized
in a revolutionary, well disciplined party, with
support of party controlled urban and rural masses
and in eventual tactical alliance with disaffected
sectors of the former elite and subelite, versus
the dysfunctional elite, their subelite supporters
and respective repressive apparatus and their foreign
bosses, partners and supporters.

(3) Modus Operandi

Revolution promoted, accelerated and guided by the
party, according to the models of the "Conspiratorial
Revolution", the "Jacobin Revolution", or the "Milita-
ry Mass Insurrection"(x). Once political power is
conquered all the agencies and institutions of poli-
tical, cultural, economic and social action formerly
used by the dysfunctional elite are suppressed or
totally readjusted to new requirements and purposes.

(x) = Cf. Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System,
Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1964.

State, under direction and control of party, is
employed in depth as an agency of planning, of entre-
preneurship and of control for all relevant societal
activities, with as complete as possible socialization
(without indemnization) of means of production. Basic
equalization of incomes and maximum socially endura-
ble effort of savings for concentration of resources
on economically, educationally and difensively stra-
tegic investments. Highest priority in general and
high education.
Maximum efforts for surmounting in shortest possible
time scientific-technological and defense backwardness.
Nationalization of all patents and inventions. Strict
functional-technical criteria in personnel selection
and state management, combined with maximal party
and national loyalty in strategic functions.
Adjustment of revolutionary party, after conquest
of power, to the function of active mobilization
and politicalization of urban and rural masses for
support of revolution and national development, of
new regime and authorities, and of maintenance of
high morale, for prevention and suppression of counter-
revolutionary attempts and for deadly fight against
foreign intervention. Exercise of power by centrali-
zed democracy at party level and hierarchical decision
at level.
Desirably early adoption of mechanisms, as automatic
as possible, to prevent the convertion of functional
centralism in bureaucratic oligarchy, provinding for
the adoption of democratico-electoral practices ac-
cording to the increase of general and political
development.

(4) <u>Typical Example and Cases of Applicability</u>

Historically, Lenin, in Russia and Mao, in China.
Currently applicable, in Latin America, to Central
America and the Caribbe(where Cuba is implementing
it).

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TABLE RONDE DE RIO DE JANEIRO - 27/31 Octobre 1969

RIO DE JANEIRO ROUND TABLE - 27/31 October 1969

POWER ELITES, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT

Rapport / Paper

by Candido Mendes

POWER ELITES, DEMOCRACY, AND DEVELOPMENT

Candido Mendes

The purpose of this paper is to offer a contribution to
the study of the paradigms that hold good for the politi-
cal pattern emergent in Brazil since the crisis of sponta-
neous development that gained impetus in the sixties and
reached a climax in the military movement of 1964. Erupting
like a coup d'état, that movement simmered down to condi-
tions of stability justifying an enquiry into its configura-
bility as a possible political model. Its permanence "in
power" in Brazil since that date enables its fundamentation
to be sought - beyond the intentionality of its immediate
authors - in the correlations between its advent and the spe-
cific condition of the paralysis - and eventual resurgence -
of development, taking place in the most complex social pro-
cess of Latin America. To the same extent that the change
becomes unequivocal in the economic model according to which
the attempt to relaunch the development process, expressed
in the latest Brasilian planning, is effected, the counter-
part of this change on the conformation of the power structu-
res will have to be investigated.
To sum up, with regard to :

a/ Identification of the actor of the present Brasilian
   political system, the latter to be understood as the
   whole of the behaviors linked to the taking and
   institutionalization of the unconditioned decision[1]
   -namely the nuclear element of power - within this
   social process.

b/ The specific features of the system and of the "roles"
   of which it is composed.

c/   The objective interactions between "b", that is, the
      political system, and the others, with which it builds
      up an articulation^2 of social life.

d/   The characteristics of the subjective interactions,
      which are the performances of the political actor -
      expressed by ideologies and social symbols - on those
      same articulations of social life.

AIMS OF THIS STUDY

      In this context, it is intended in this work to investi-
gate and describe the appearance of "power elite" regimes in
which that military intervention would seem to have eventual-
ly configured : rather than an "intermezzo" in the interplay
of the conformations assumed by foregoing models, it looks
as though it has, in fact, woven a new pattern into that
political system. As such, it represents the counterpoint
of impact deadening or paralysing the spontaneous process
of change and consequently of its particular inflow on the
articulations of the social process in which that same
political system is implanted. The manifestation of that
paralysis, and of the anomic conditions of the national poli-
tical process, at the beginning of the sixties, allow heuris-
tically, this paradigm to be formulated and the hypothesis
to be entertained of the immediate, direct incidents of a
military intervention being able to repose on a significant
layer of the social process. Such acts would extract a new
relevance, starting from the objective conformations that
this stage of the social process is likely to establish for
the strict operationality of the political system. The con-
text, then, in which this investigation is inserted is the loss
of the premise that characterized the former framework of
change, or what might be called a trophic process of social
change, characterized by the cumulation of the interactions
between all the system of collective life, in the same sense,
indicated by the increasing functionalization and differentia-
tion of the whole, It may be admitted, as a supposition of
this characterization, that, so long as the spontaneism of
change is maintained, there is likely to be found a really
simultaneous interaction - "trophic" it may be said- of all
those conducts.

In this paradigm, the necessary interdependence would be established between the differentiation and functionalization of the economic machine, together with industrialization and all its correlated phenomena. And in the political subsystems[3], with the expansion of the democratic model.

DENOTATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC MODEL

The democratic model would thus accompany development, by acquiring the features, respectively, of :

a/ Increasing conditioning of the exercise of the decision-making process by the multiplicity of actors emerging from the very specification or differentiation of the social dynamisms brought about by development.

b/ Institutionalization of this conditioning through representation and then by increasing delineation of the party and its progressive differentiation.[4]

c/ Perfect alterity between roles in the system of power (rulers and ruled), expressed by self-government.[5]

d/ Progressive differentiation, in the exercise of unconditioned decision, expressed by institutionalization of the various functions of power.

e/ Control and interdependence in the guaranty of equilibrium between those functions, concomitant to that differentiation.

The study of the correlations between this model and development[6] presupposes its remission to the distinct global paradigms of the social change phenomenon as it appears today in countries like Brazil. Hence it would be necessary, in analysing the suppositions of this investigation, to establish relations of correspondence between :

a/ The trophic paradigm and the democratic model.

b/   The dystrophic paradigm and the emergence of the
      so-called power elite regime, appearing in the country
      after the crisis of spontaneous development in 1964.

The presupposition advanced in this paper is that the col-
lapse of spontaneous development engendered objectively
the conditions for control of the system of power by a dif-
ferent actor from that naturally prescribed by the functions
of differentiation and specification that would call for
strengthening of the democratic model. In fact, this situa-
tion would give rise to seizure of the system by a power
elite : the phenomenon would be situate in the limiting case
of disjunction of the political plane of social behavior from
the other subsystems of social life by which the exercise
of decision - that is, of power - is generally made in
function of "subjacent" actors, the most notorious of which
is the social class. In short, the present hypothesis is
concerned with the designation of a rigorously superstructu-
ral conformation of the exercise of social decision. An
analysis is attempted of the configuration of a model in which
this exceedingly special emergence of it has been institutio-
nalized. Its factual backing is sought in the etiology of
the crisis of spontaneous development. It is located in
the situation of the power vacuum preceding the military
movement of '64 and, thence, of complete paralysis of the
articulations between the political system and its infras-
tructural conditionings, which up till that moment had
remained true to the democratic model for development.

DENOTATION OF THE ELITE OF POWER.

        The concept, then, of the elite of power herein advan-
ced seeks to identify a situation of control of the politi-
cal system by a particular social group, which, in the case
in point, would not encounter any conditioning or determina-
tion stemming from a "subjacency" or from an actor external
to that same political process. In this case, there is rup-
ture of the mechanism of diffusion of decision control, or of
differentiation of representation, which constituted the
counterpart of the far-reaching dynamism of social mobility,
and of expansion and diversification of the producing ap-
paratus, of the trophic stage of development in this sense,
the "elite of power" will take shape in the framework of
development as an individualized actor.[7]

As such, it is the counterpart respectively of :

a/ The para-ideological actors, protagonists of decision, when the exercise of it is taken over by the joint action of various classes and social groups in the change.

b/ The ideological actors, when the identification of the actor results from a univocal relationship between the social infra- and superstructure, in such a way that a class is transformed into an effective "subjacent" subject of the exercise of power.

In these terms, the distinction of the elite of power as an individualized actor is characterized respectively in the handling of a power system by :

a/ The relative neutrality of its decisions with regard to the connections of interest, and the dynamisms derived directly from the economic apparatus of the collectivity.

b/ The compensation of its indetermination, in terms of social subjacency, by a high ideological homogenization, starting from the correct positioning of a dogmatism; of a "constructed" vision of reality.

c/ The necessarily interferent or discrepant connotation of the content of its decision on the prior set of the dynamics of this decisional process. Thus it does not tend to coalesce into the national economy of interests composed by successive pacts, in which a "political" situation is configured. (An interference of this sort, in its disruptive effect on the "situation", might necessarily be reactionary, reformist of revolutionary).

Technocracy would come to be a subspecies of power elite regimes, insofar as it exacerbated connotations corresponding to the characteristics aforesaid, while :

a/ Maximizing the prospect of heutrality or disengagement from the infrastructure on assuming, together with its own "ideology", the cult of rationality. The latter concept, in this case, would begin to fill the role of a permanently reducing instance for the conflicts and strains precisely of the ruling elite, in the proportion

that the proposal of optimizing the performances and
conducts imposed thereby begin, by instrumental deci-
sion, to enter into the content proper of the exercise
of power.

b/ Causing its "interferent" perspective on social reality
to be transformed into a paradigmatic vision of the
course to be set for government action, by means of a
marked a-priorism in the options and choice of models.

IN SEARCH OF THE THEORETICAL PARADIGM OF DENOTATION :

DEMOCRATIC MODEL AND POWER ELITE MODEL.

The purely denotative objective of this analysis is
predicated to a time cut in the trophic sequence of a
global process of change. In the same sense, then, and
by the empiric determination of the loss of the relations
of limiting functionality, of the changes liable to occur
in each of those subsystems or levels, and be conditioned by
their respective interactions, it may be admitted that the
characteristic of the elites of power is fashioned inversely
to those displayed by the democratic model. This leads us
to envisage a theoretical paradigm of denotation, in which
the characteristics of the power elite would be opposed
to those of the democratic model, bearing in mind the various
components of political conduct, taken to mean respectively :

a/ In the exercise of the unconditioned decision itself,
glimpsed from the angle of its active center, in other
words of its inchoation, or of the original determinations
that may receive the movement of its flows, and hence may
be considered respectively :

1. From the angle of determination of the political
system by others, "external" to its specific flow.

2. From the angle of determination of the center itself,
or nucleus of this system, continuously liable to
self-foundation with regard to the determination
mentioned in the foregoing paragraph.

In short, it reveals specifically, from the angle of exercise of the unconditioned decision, starting from the active center, the <u>permanent reserve of initiative</u> it maintains in spite of how it may have ostensibly established the conditioning of the motion between the system of power and the "external" systems.

To sum up, the self-founding capacity, congenital to this conduct in social life, may or may not be exerted in consonance with that first determination, that is, with an originally external inflow.

b/ In the exercise of the unconditioned decision, seen from the angle of the <u>passive periphery</u>, that is, of the cast of conducts, which is the <u>object</u> of the determination of that center, involving respectively :

1. Denotation as to the <u>legitimation</u> of that motion, that is, of its degree of consonance with the pattern of expectations or of constancies, in which it is effectively configured in social life.

2. Denotation as to the <u>homogeneity</u> or <u>heterogeneity</u> with which the motion of the active center gains social complementarity; that is, according as to whether it is counterposed to a single passive periphery or ensures the exercise of unconditioned decision, through various intermediate emissions, each one having, reciprocally, active and passive positions with regard to the units located before of after in the chain of those emissions.

THE PARAMETERS OF INCHOATION AND SELF - FOUNDATION;

From this first point of view, the content of decision may, respectively, correspond to claims <u>external</u> to the political system itself : its motion is determined by attendance to the promotion of the interests of characteristic groups of the social or <u>economic</u> subsystems. In the defined paradigm of democracy, political behavior would be characterized by the conduct of maximization of attention to those contents, in the effective exercise of decision.

The latter, indeed, would necessarily actuate by the
diagrammatic procedure of the resultants, or of a mea-
sure of motion that would seek to attend to those exter-
nal contents to the utmost without effectively merging
with any of them. The sense then, as regards this denota-
tion, of the democratic model, would be given respectively
by the total neutrality of the political subsystem in the
motion of decision and by its capacity of, in fact, present-
ing a univocal correlation between maximizations and equi-
polencies in its decision among all the contents of infras-
tructure. The polarity in a paradigm of this sort would
necessarily be given by the full validity of the phenomenon
of <u>representation,</u> supposing inevitably :

a/ Increasing identification among the differentiated
    groups in the economic and social subsystems, and the
    parties that would represent the fundamental connec-
    tive between those subsystems, and the political subsystem.

b/ Progressive differentiation of those identifications
    and progressions by the phenomena of party sectionism;
    of its progressive "wings" and "fronts".

The <u>opposite</u> polarity would imply investiture, by the <u>poli-
tical</u> subsystem, of the effective motion of unconditioned
decision : it no longer results, by hypothesis, from a
median, or from the direct linkage of a content external to
the political system, but effectively from an inflow that
has therein its own fundamentation. This is what is exem-
plified by planification, as defining the content of deci-
sion — understood to be maximization of national objecti-
ves — and the relationship of mere coincidence, or juxta-
position, to "representation", whereas that is defined as
the possible summation of the spontaneity of the interests
and expectations of the "external" subsystems.

Thus determined, from the very center of the system of power,
this decision tends to integrate with the other subsystems
in a different way from that of the "mediation" of the
political parties : to the polarity of <u>representation</u> (and
of interaction, <u>positively</u> charged from the external subsys-
tem) is opposed that of mobilization, charged from the poli-
tical subsystem itself. All the political proceedings of
conditioning by massing or contagion - for instance, by all

the new "forum-like" or "dialogue" democracies -- contrast
with the classic mechanisms of mediation based on the
establishment of exhaustive correspondences or pyramiding
among groups underlying the political one and the profile
which, as such, they begin to assume on this plane.

It is from this viewpoint that it is possible to appreciate
the behavior endorsed by the center of decisions with
regard to the pattern of expectations in which it is instal-
led, as a limit of engagements and counter-engagements, and
the effective exercise in which it is supposed to behave.

Democratic polarity, in that case, would seem to be iden-
tified with the care taken "not to overstep" that limit in
the effective exercise of power. Apart from the content of
its decision setting itself up as external or internal to the
political system (the hypothesis which was the object of the
preceding denotation), any concrete exercise of decision is
made with regard to the attention paid or not to the cast
of expectations, from the pact of which its effective exer-
cise by the immediate holder of the power arises. In the
polarity, thus democratic, the "tautological" exercise of
decision is situated, exhausting the pact of expectations
and behaving within the range established for its action.
Opposed thereto is to be found the polarity of a continuous
self-foundation of the decisional center, which not only
breaks, on the immediate plane, the configuration of those
expectations, and the pact thereof : it also acts in the
sense of modifying, by the direct action of that decision,
the formations by which those social and economic subsystems
are incorporated and from which they draw the pretention to
conditioning of the political decision. This is what appears
to characterize reformism, as a pole of the exercise of power,
by opposition to the conduct of the latter in the frame of
exhaustion mandated by a pact prior to the performance of the
immediate actor.

Hence, then, necessarily, combining denotations a and b, it
is possible to imagine an exercise of power, with characte-
ristics of mobilization, which is nonreformist. Or likewise,
in the case of identities being established between these
two latter poles, all the variants of "coups within coups" may
ensue, and reformism thereby tends to be sustained in part,
from an active center, by an increasing ideological homogenei-
zation of the immediate holders of the reins of power.

THE PARAMETER OF LEGITIMATION

From the viewpoint of legitimation, the democratic pole would correspond to the perfectly objectivated formalization of the exercise of unconditioned decision in social life. The validity capacity of such decisions would be directly linked to the observance of conducts or rites that in themselves succeed in mediatizing the relations of complementarity between the active center and the passive periphery in a way that is entirely independent of the concrete particularities of their actor or the content of its decision. The validity, then, of power would be dependent solely on the relations of identity, actuated at the start in the instant of access to the exercise of unconditioned decision. At the opposite polarity, "authentication" would counter "formalization" as the determinant of legitimacy.

The former, derived from the determination that the concrete "quid" of the actor may bring to his pretension to the exercise of power, assists and completes the naturally reducing function that it has on the other social subsystems. And it does so through its unified outlook, in the form of projection and configuration of a personal conduct —charismatically inspired — or of its vision of the social whole, in fact, as a process, articulated in its defined contradictions.

In these terms, the interrelationship between the political and the other social subsystems, from the angle of legitimation, regards the determination of the exercise of power as starting from the passive periphery. The phenomenon of "authentication", however, is fundamentally distinct from the latter. It is also ruled by a determination external to the political subsystem. But therein the political conditioning is by definition determinant, and not determined by the other subsystems. It implies a phenomenon of feedback, of return, to the political system, of a consecration of its supremacy, made externally to its own dynamics, and based on the role assumed when confronted with the social whole as a process, or as a context reducible to a will, or to an actor exhaustively personalized. It must be emphasized that, necessarily, it is only from the viewpoint of the passive periphery, from a position of contrast between the active center and its context, that this position can be displayed to legitimate a system of power, transforming into a pole rival to that of mere formalization.

In this register, not only does one meet with charis-
matic conducts in which the fundamentation of the power sys-
tem is effected by an entirely personal mediation between
a given expectation of the collectivity and its concrete
realization. Therein are to be found those acts of "uncon-
ditioned decision" that establish a relationship of identity,
with marked polarities, in the social whole looked upon as
a "process". Especially in the case, for example, of the
developing countries, the linearity of these contradictions
and the opportunity for protagonization they afford amount
to a long step towards "authentication" as a form of legi-
timating the exercise of power. Increasing attention may
be expected to be paid to the protagonization of a latency to
the social subsystem in terms of reference to the whole,
the urge for leadership would be transferred from personal
and historically gratuitous charism to the impersonification
of polarities to which the process of change is globally
articulated : the pole of "nationalism" or "cosmopolitanism";
that of "self-determination" or "dependency".

THE PARAMETER OF "CENTRALIZATION"

Viewed from the pole of the homogeneity or versatility
with which the participants in the political subsystem behave
as "assignees of decision" or its "passive periphery", demo-
cratic polarity is that of pluralism in the formations of
power.[10] It is identified with the notion of increasing
"decentralization". This supposes an exercise of unconditioned
decision through a crescendo of mixed intermediate positions,
simultaneously "passive periphery" of the preceding, and
"active centers" of the subsequent, ones. At the same time,
it is identified with a self-regulation of the political
subsystem whereby the exercise of the unconditioned decision
is found to be socially diffused, indefinitely capable of
being erected as a superstructure of any other subsystem
that is socially configurable. The phenomenon of decentrali-
zation, then, involves both the diffuse conformation of the
exercise of unconditional decision in social life — with
the content of the political order properly so called esta-
blished as a minimum — and the respect of the latter, in
the characteristic democratic pluralism, for the self-or-
ganization, in terms of power, of the corresponding forma-
tions in the other social subsystems. It implies, also,
as regards the exercise of the political order itself
"strictu senso",

the continuous reversal of positions not only in the reci-
procities of roles between the active center and the pas-
sive fringe, but also in the progressive autonomization of
the various degrees at which that "alterity" is established.

At the opposite pole, necessarily, is situated centra-
lization, understood respectively as :

 a/ The establishment of a unidirectional flow of
  decisions : the content of decision at the inter-
  mediate stages only gains implemental and noncoparti-
  cipative determination in its execution;

 b/ The concentration and nondiffusion of the organization
  of power in the social whole. The whole is not arti-
  culated by the line of least intervention of the stric-
  tly political subsystem with regard to the other
  spontaneous forms of political self-organization of
  social life, but rather by the transformation into
  is relevant, progressively, to things political, of
  all to those conducts and consequently of the increa-
  sing exercise of the monopoly of its organization.

In the same way, then, to the development of a social
totality by integrable autonomous spheres, such as the fede-
rative model, for example, centralization responds with a
unitary paradigm of functionalization of the social whole,
the achievement of which is permanently ensured by the abso-
lute monopoly of decision and transformation of the inter-
mediate centers of power only into agents of the same functio-
nalization previously determined.

Aside from the determinations that the political sub-
system (and consequently the democratic model) would receive
from the angle of its first component, that is, from the con-
sideration of the pure flows into which the unconditioned
exercise of social decision breaks down, there should be
added, for its full configuration as a system, that which they
receive, already appreciated in function of the other subsys-
tems, hence of the roles to which it gives rise or of the
subjacent actors with which they are interrelated.

COMPLEMENTARY DETERMINATIONS OF THE PARAMETERS

Thus it is possible to define the complementary elements of configuration of the political system — and therefore of the democratic model — starting precisely from the roles and actors with which each of the aforesaid determinations of the exercise of unconditioned decision is integrated.

From the viewpoint of "inchoation", that is, from the conditioning that the motion of unconditioned decision receive, the roles corresponding to the democratic model become indentified with party mediation [11] and, therein, increasingly with the conducts relative to the work of proselytism and recruitment; of formation of their bases in terms of what is increasingly called a policy of ideology (party recruitment, programmatic identification, specification of the principle of the mandate in representation, systems of collating and reporting to test the electoral bond, etc...)

The mediation of the party tends, on the other hand, to coalesce with subjacent systems, in the form of actors configurated as superstructures of those subsystems, such as especially class associations and trade unions. Social differentiation is paralleled by mediation and, then, by communication, starting from the diffusion power in social life.

From the angle of self-fundamentation of the unconditioned decision, the democratic model would tend toward conditioning of its concrete exercise by means of the configuration of power pacts,[12] exemplified in the operation of the spoils system, in the rules of regional balance, for the composition of cabinets and ministries. The subjacent actor, which would act directly on the interaction of the political system would be increasingly the section of the collectivity mobilized for the electoral process itself, which, in the still valid stages of the colonial structure, would be identified with the "clienteles" and in the regimes really of development, with the "inner groups" of the parties.

From the outlook of legitimation, the democratic model is associated with the various roles that compose the continuity of succession in the formal investiture of the power; but the necessity of it is evident when, in fact, it breaks : it arises in the customary invocation, by coups d'état, of the "immediate convocation" of "new election" or the reformulation of the constitutional pattern, or the typical characterization of governments facing formalization as "intermezzo" governments.

The collectivity is the actor subjacent to this interaction, in the form of the definition of the expectations, and the consequent attention of the "electoral college".

Finally, from the angle of diffusion of concentration of the unconditioned decision, the democratic model is based on the roles relative to the promotion, by intermediate communities, of decision conditioning by movements of protest and social contestation, by the creation of mechanisms of reciprocal conditioning of a regime of power — and retaliation — between spheres that hold, autonomously, their right to self-organization within their own range of conduct.

Subjacently, as actors of this decision, the various communities of interest take place, having arisen spontaneously in the social process, independently of the conformation of the superstructure — the "class associations" — in which they achieve formalization.

THE REFLEX DETERMINATIONS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

On the other hand, the perfect configuration of the political system to serve as a parameter for delineating the power elites, further supposes the denotations it receives from another dimension. In fact, it is not merely articulated objectively with the other subsystems, but carries a reference to the process of social reflection : to its formations in the subjective field of representations of its actions, and of the bonds which it establishes in this way with the continuity of the social process. This amounts to saying that, in this case, it is in the field of second degree references of the political process, and of the role therein played by ideologies and social symbols in their task of compatibilizing the contents raised to the sphere of power, from other subsystems of social life.

In this light, the trophic paradigm of development may be
seen to imply, as regards the reflection process, the
simultaneous projection of the claims of the various social
groups, increasingly experienced in class behavior, insofar
as the functional determinant of the new global social struc-
ture, now emerging, gains effective configuration. A close-
knit harmonizing effect of those contents makes itself felt
through their representation : the level of social expectations
aroused by the pattern of change homogenizes them within the
range of the project and, hence, of a loose allocability of
its objectives, beginning with the standard of increasing
social mobility; the rise in income per capita; the incor-
poration of the subsistence economy in that of the market.
The reflex process, in this case, is identified with the inte-
grating role of the development project at the level of ex-
pedtations raised by the change and fed by the first grant
of "rationales" and programs to control the spontaneous process
of social change.[13] The consequence is necessarily to propi-
tiate the advent of the para-ideologies : representations
of the changing context without, as yet, univocal predication
with a determination of the social class. The subjective
determination of social behavior remains in the common con-
ception of the change as a project directly predicated to
the advent of the whole of the new social structure. It is
counterposed to the validity of the "status quo" and, homo-
genously, to the interest of the roles and contents of inte-
rest likewise directly linked to the old structure, such
as the latifundium producing for export; that of the clientele,
taking the place of the behavior of the middle classes and
the traditional mercantile bourgeoisie, acting merely as an
intermediary in the typical trade systems of the colonial
regime. In this picture, attention must be called, in
speaking of the emergent groups, to a common mainline of
interests, embraced precisely by "para-ideology". None other
is the social function and role in these periods of nationalism
or "developmentism", as unifiers of the continuous reflex in
which the conduct of the actors interested in the change is
operated. With the growing specification, however, of the
development process, that common mainline of interests tends
necessarily to dwindle in view of the increasingly clear cut
outline —— indicative therefore of gathering tension —— in
which the ultimate licitation of each group is made manifest,
as it comes up against the prospects of expansion, in econo-
mic and social terms, of the context actuated by the change.

THE IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTION : COMPATIBILIZATION AND MOBILIZATION

The role, then, of ideology in ensuring the continuity
and unity of the reflex dimension of the actors involved in
the change is, necessarily, that of performing a dual compa-
tibilizing function : (1) homogenization between the global
social expectations and the project of change; (2) harmoniza-
tion between the latter and the definite expectations of
each actor, in accordance with the gradual expansion of the
process of development itself. Thus the function of iddology
is identified with that of compatibilizing growing dissensions.
That is to say, a search, increasingly, of the formal median
of projection of these interests, detachable from the still
undifferentiated social whole and liable to be referred to
it in its diversified stage. And this in the direct ratio in
which the "nationalism" and "developmentism" of the first
moments may have achieved a vision of that "whole", as refe-
rable, in a potentially constant way, to those interests and
at the same time capable of presenting a harmonic gap from each
of these concrete representations. It is in this sense that,
in continuing the trophic process of change, the ideologies
are increasingly fitted to the critical role of ensuring ——
with reflexes of their action on the objective plane of in-
tegration with other subsystems —— the consonance of the
behavior of the actors in the transition. Their reducing
function (compensation, by the continuous nature of the per-
formance, of the dissonances of objective articulation) would
be manifest, in this case, in the compatibilization of the
dissensions of the various social groups, with regard to their
expectancy which is "secant" to the objective content of the
development project. According to the concrete hypothesis
now advanced in this paper, this trend, detected in Brazil,
for instance, precisely by the crisis and evolution of "natio-
nalism" and "developmentism", was thwarted by the collapse
of the trophic paradigm itself. Any contest in which the
relaunching of development began to be entertained no longer
supposed the parameters of consonance between social mobility,
expansion of national income, and mediation between the infra-
and superstructure, for representation and compatibilization
between social expectations and their effective payoff, by the
center of power. It is in this framework that it is necessary
to consider the reducing role of the reflex dimension in the
aforesaid dystrophic paradigms.

As has already been pointed out, with the interruption of that function of mediation as well as the representation of the dynamics of interests of the groups integrating the other social subsystems, the motion of the active center takes on the role of "mobilization". At once, on the reflex plane, it begins to involve a second degree reducing function : the representations of the interests and expectations of each group are replaced directly by that of the project itself, now in the specific field of the symbol. This means that it begins to consist, purely and simply, of the relations of identification between the cast of conducts of what constitutes globally the project and its actor, eminent and undivided, figured by the active center of issue of the social decision.

The reducing function resides, in this case, in the strict definition of the connectives between the two extremes of this relationship : none other is the role of the symbol, consonant with the prospect of mobilization, as the seat of motion between the political subsystem and the other subsystems of social life becomes more clearly defined. In this sense it can be understood how the political actors, who dispense with representation, are necessarily conditioned to integrate with the aforesaid subsystems through the production of social concensuses. In reality, the mid-term of connective which, in this particular case, establishes the relationship between the political actor and the other social subsystems — the social and the economic one — has no other predication than that of the symbol in which the line of conducts or the project unconditionally assumed by the center of power condensed or became liable to immediate recall in the social memory of the collectivity.[14]

THE SYMBOLIC FUNCTION

In the case in point, the exigency of producing a consensus would seem to reveal the truly precarious nature of the inflows between the political system and the other social subsystems, when their respective interactive motion starts from the former — as in the hypothesis. Admittedly, it is bound to the reactions of adhesion or rejection, no longer being able to fall back on the complex reducing work of the first degree, between expectations and the concrete action of power, ensured by the ideology.

In fact, the symbol, as second degree reducing function, sup-
poses a prior web of fluxes and conditioning between the
political actors and the "subjacents" in the other subsystems
of society, What it does ensure, on the aggregate in which
this web is unified, is, hence, the very motion of political
conduct. And it does so by direct connection of the "short
circuits" derived from the articulation of all these and, then,
of linkage of the concrete power decision to the whole set
of conduct summarized in its ruling symbol. Therefrom speci-
fic intolerance is derived for this form of conduct of the
political power with the processes of validity of the national
decision that do not proceed otherwise than by judgments of
pure ascertainment between the decision and the overall pro-
ject : each new manifestation of power comes up against a
global panorama of congruency of previous acts and hence
with a backlog of constant social adhesion. It is in this
way that the consensus exigency is the only form of predica-
tion of decisions arising out of a perspective of mobilization.
Similarly, it will be understood that alone remain within its
reach either the judgments of congruency or incongruency, ex-
pressed in the reiteration of the consensus established up till
that moment in the evocation of former series, or those of their
rejection. In this way, too, it will be understood how mobi-
lization acts directly on the reflex process of social life,
mentioned in the second degree of reducing functions. Forcibly
they are going to be affected by the inexistence of the prior
work of compatibilization performed by the ideologies. It is
true that, theoretically speaking, one may admit of an inter-
active process between the political subsystem and the others
in social life, on a basis of representation that is completed,
once the general volition is defined, by the symbolic functions
that epitomize it and establish the "short circuit" in question
between the concrete motions and the national projects. In
practice, however, if representation exists, bearing in mind
the particular interest of the dynamisms of the infrastructure
in getting rid of political ties and participation, in complian-
ce with the strict pact of expectations of which the "general
volition" traces the perfect isonomic line, the reducing
functions of the second degree tend to avort or wither.

On the other hand, should the action of the political
actor operate through mobilization, the problem is posed of
directly using the second degree, or symbolical, reducing
mechanisms in what is still a rough framework, without compa-
tibilizations, of it.eraction between the political subsystem
and the others.

In practice, the exaction of producing a consensus replaces, in the first degree, the compatibilization work of the ideology in identifying the concrete project and a "planned" conduct of development, subordinated solely to the optimizations of the performances elected for achieving the change, or to the paradigm of behavior chosen by the political actor. It is the purpose of the symbol, actuating in the plenitude of its reducing function, to unite all those conducts in its common objective, to the same extent that the sagacity of the connectives employed between the conducts and the goals ensure this constant evocation of the whole and, for that very reason, the satisfaction of the mechanisms of exhaustive adhesion of the collectivity to the decisions of the active center.

Theoretically it is possible to conceive of a strict superposition between exhaustive planning of the content of the conducts and the intention of mobilizing the consensus by the adequately reducing symbols of this common project. In the same way, within the pattern of mobilization it may be admitted that the incongruities between two degrees - the first "supplied" by the conduct formalized by planning, and appearing to have been "negotiated" by the general will, and the second by the summarized task of the symbol - succeed in being provided by the work of "indoctrination" and propaganda. This would be, in the final analysis, inversely proportional to be belief in the intrinsic rationality of the project and, consequently, in the natural operationality derived therefrom, by the symbols chosen for its effective condensation and social mobilization. It will be seen, moreover, how, within this presupposition, the "technocracies", making a strong appeal to that rationality, tended to abandon the whole process of "indoctrination" or propaganda, to the contrary of other classic regimes of collective "mobilization".[15]

In the sequence of the work - and having identified the parameters for recognizing the power elite regimes - , it would become necessary to establish the denotations that that regime would present, with regard to the model defined as "democratic", and characteristic of simultaneous development.

It should be repeated that opposition between a trophic and dystrophic paradigm of change and univocal reference to the former of the political pattern corresponding to an increasing functionalization of the social whole were admitted as suppositions of this work. Without assuming the presupposition of a necessary symmetrism, it is sought to identify - in the way, yet again, merely of a phenomenology - the characters, in opposition to those of the democratic model, held by those of the power elite, arising as a stable and configurating formation, in the succession of the crisis in the spontaneous process of change.

THE PARAMETER OF INCHOATION

The power elite regime emphasizes the characteristic of the loss of party mediation and conditioning of the political subsystem by actors subjacent to the social system. It was consolidated by the formulation of the "two-party system", characteristic of conditioning of the flows between the political subsystem and the others in social life, starting from a motion decisively situated in the former. That is to say, the restriction of the party role to rigid positions of "situation" and "opposition" necessarily indicates the composition of the dynamics of decision originating in the political subsystem substantivized as the center of social controls, and necessarily reducing the notion of a heterogeneity of conditionings, typical of "representation", to that of "resistance" to the hegemony of that same center.

In an interactive system, in which the motion is seated in the political subsystem itself, the perspective of the "whole" of that interaction would tend towards this "reduction": its reference to totality, in fact, could only be made in terms of coextensivity or noncoextensivity with the other social subsystems. To the second of the two would correspond the minimal condition of institutionalization or objectivation of a regime, based on these presuppositions. This inasmuch as the other would be formally identified with the purely de facto situations of political systems - of naked power - with absolute identification between the formal conditions and the contents of decision. If unwilling to be confused, then, with a hegemonic de facto situation, the systems supplied on mobilization would imply the limiting recognition of that noncoextensivity; this because of the residual admission of the existence of this limiting "non-conditioning", as "resistance" or "opposition".

Hence the "two-party" system of the elites of power has nothing in common with an articulation between the political subsystem and the social and economic systems in which the "party" represents, in fact, a mediation between these articulations. Hence, moreover, in practice, this type of regime cannot act in the pattern of an expectation that conceives of it as a "representative" regime on a reduced or rationalized scale. In point of fact, the function of the opposition party would not be located in the framework of competing for a positive share in decision, conditioning a given "content" of its inflow; participating in legislation, or in direct power of negotiation on the content of decision. Its action would always be exercised under this limiting role of manifesting, by its permanence or self-dissolution, the maintenance of the rule of noncoextensivity between the political subsystem and the others in social life.

It is in this sense that the performance of the two-party doctrine, characteristic of power elites, cannot be sought in the line of an increase in participation of the opposition in the formation of the contents of that decision. Nor, then, in the same way, in that of the valuation of its behaviors by any other role than that of its assenting function that party mediation offers a political regime based on mobilization and not representation. The power-elite regimes, under this aspect, will not have in the two-party system a regime of relative refraction of decision from the active center itself, blended and corrected into a counter-feit of the true representation mechanism. In fact, such regimes, constituted on the basis of mobilization, will be characterized by the increasing role of assent in the apparatuses into which - as in the Congress that gave rise to the movement of '64- the semblance of party mediation crystallizes, when estranged from the dynamism of representation. Should there be a role for this mediation, it would only be assigned to the opposition and, there, only to exhaust or not its role of strict suffrage of that "non-extensivity".[16] This means, of an essentially negative conduct, of invalidation of the limiting role in which it was essentially constituted, of expressing recognition of a center of power substantivized as the issuer of social decision, of a "resistance", or rather of a noncoextensivity of its dynamism to that of the totality of articulations, from which the interplay of power begins to be socially integrated. This amounts to saying that the perfecting of a "two-party system" like that of the present Brazilian regime - still so designated by semantic deficiency and borrowed from political categories based on "representation" and not "mobilization" - would depend

upon the indirect capacity of conditioning the decisions of that center by the constant threat of self-dissolution, of denial of cooperation that could only be afforded in those terms. In other words, mobilization is institutionalized to the extent that it constitutes the opposition as actor and interpreter of the "noncoextensitivity" between the political system whose dynamism it substantivized, and the others in social life, articulatable with it in the specific interaction that characterizes the global configuration of the structure of power.

In the power elite that would seem to characterize the Brazilian political regime set up in '64, these various characteristics are self-evident. It is not merely a question of recognizing the increasingly acquiescent role assumed by Congress - locus of the two-party system - in the inflow it would nominally be called upon to channel to the decision of the Executive : the pertinent legislation shows the minimal prospect of "positive" intervention, that is, of aggregation of the contents of projects of the Executive by the party in power and the opposition. The dynamics of the latter, it is true, should have been made by preconditioning that issue by means of manifestation incident to proposals of self-dissolution and cancellation of the role of institutionalization to which the regime aspired, from the point of view of its inchoation, or rather of the pattern established for the flows between the political system and the other social subsystems, conditioned by mobilization. The countercheck of the essential fragility of this possibility of institutionalization, keeping the two-party system in force, is to be found precisely in its outcome on December 12 and 13 of '68. In the exercise of a decision discrepant from that expected by the active center, the opposition subsumed at the same time that of its self-dissolution. The recess of Congress by decree showed quite clearly the strictly limiting function accorded the two-party system. In a regime of mobilization and power elite, the opposition could only perform or not its legitimating function of "noncoextensitivity", and carry it out, in the case of that withdrawal of cooperation, as a unique, depletive act. In the circumstances in which this latent protagonism eventually arose, self-dissolution did not take the shape of the counterpart of conditioning imposed upon the elite of power, but as an implicit charge associated with the negation of a concrete intention expressed by that same center.

In the facility of this collapse, then, the congenital fragility of the institutionalization of mechanisms of inchoation of political decision, stemming from mobilization and not representation. This is no obstacle, however, to attributing to that outcome the inability of the opposition to perceive its specific role in this articulation, failing to display permanently its strict, exhaustible role in support of the possible institutionalization of this regime, within the fragile range in which it could alone admit recognition of the coextensitivity of its decision to that of the other social subsystems (correlated to its understanding as "resistance" or nonsubordination to the motion originating from the active center). In these terms, then, it may be verified that the conduct of the Brazilian power elite, in the period starting in 1964, is identified with the behavior of the mobilisation. Not only did the two-party system conform to that strictly homologatory role, as evidenced in the lack of any need, in this way it behaved, of disciplining its forces to achieve maximization of performance, in the role either of those in power or in opposition. In this sense, the behavior of the two-party setup, reflecting the dynamism of mobilization and not of representation, would define, in this specific parameter, the profile of a power elite regime, Or rather, of a conduct purely of assent toward the majority in power, significant in terms of opposition only insofar as it shows signs of the exhaustion of its role, by the threat of self-dissolution. Under this aspect, the countercheck of the validity of the power elite regime lies in the recor of the meager share taken by Congress in modification of the content of the proposals of decision originating from the effective center of power; either by the needlessness of any intensification of discipline or of the party machine, or of the specific weight of the "situation" and "opposition" roles in dealing with those proposals; or, and above all, by the radical determination of the active center not to tolerate any conduct that failed to comply with its decisions, liable to express party mediation, that could be articulated by mobilization. The characteristics of the recess of Congress, adopted on December 13, 1968, involved in the same act, with the first refusal of that party mediation to cooperate as specifically expected by the active center (even though on a subject marginal, strictly speaking from legislation), the collapse of that very role, extraordinarily fragile, accepted by party mediation within the political articulation outlined from the moment the power elite took over the reins of government.

THE PARAMETER OF REFORMISM

On the other hand, the validity of the power elite re-
gime is associated with far-reaching intervention in the
socioeconomic reality of a political project not everywhere
compatible with the context of interests and expectations of
groups and actors external to the political system. Such
is the situation, whether from the point of view of a set
objectively discernable in terms of a social group or class,
or in the terms of a discrete pursuit of expectations and
claims, centered on a concrete power pact and a definition,
in terms of reference, of the behavior of the effective holder
of the exercise of power. On these terms. This project
tends, moreover, to be articulated within formal "rationales",
liable, in fact, to alter indistinctively the suppositions of
socioeconomic articulation of those multiple groups and social
classes : furthermore, the conditions of validity of that
project might be established in a ratio inversely proportio-
nal to the resistance that those same articulations are ca-
pable of putting up to it. Its accomplishment would depend,
then, on the vigor and extent of the agreement with which the
materialization of this project was undertaken, with the
simultaneous overthrow of those formations responsible for
the continuance of the status quo.
All of its success would, in fact, depend on the dynamics of
acceleration of the bases of that rational project, concomitant
with the undermining of a given status quo of social expec-
tations and interests. In the same measure that the power
elite is not hampered by a given pact of expectations, linked
to that same constellation it tends to take up a position in
contradiction to the strict inertia of social decisions :
to their exercise, as previously mentioned, attendant on the
expectations of certain classes and groups in the form of
particular concrete engagements, intuitu personae, in which
the exercise of decision is, in fact, the mandated fulfillment
of those engagements according to the terms of reference.
This does not prevent it, however, within its range of action,
supposed inconvertible to inertia in the dynamics of social
decision - or its tautological exercise starting from an
exhaustive expectation, or from the accomplishment of a
predetermined repertory of actions - from coming to a point
in its successive diachronies where the rationalizing action
can in fact attain a level of global contradiction between
the total social structures and the process of change (which
would give it, moreover, a revolutionary perspective).

Thus, the limiting case, in which there is no exclusion of
the compatibility of the power elite with a decision that
will really found a new radical social articulation in all that
it actuates, necessarily emphasizes the understanding of the
most frequent case of reformism, as an opposite polarity to the
exercise of social decision, as a continuous retribution of
a rigid pact of concrete social expectations, that is, defined
from an inert outlook of the party in power with regard to
the social whole. What characterizes it is the unwavering
transcendence of that decision to this inertia, in the part
that indicates the "plus" in which the permanent assumption
of initiative and social control by the holder of the power
would seem to be derived, while contradicting at the same time
a given social expectation, from challenging or weakening the
foundation that supports it.

The decisions of the power elite will always present a
"quid" of tension with the inertia : a given deadening of
the interests composing it, attained by the blow leveled at
the suppositions of that grievance. It is in this same pro-
portion that they will tend to conflict with the formations
integrating the dynamics of the component interests of the
inertia of a given status quo. Its strategy is thus by defi-
nition prospective, for it anticipates a relocation of inte-
rests and objective social suppositions for its realization,
to start with an action that suppresses any satisfaction of
the "grievance", mediatizing it by transforming its supposi-
tion. In this reformism merges with "modernization", the
latter depending always on the extent to which rationalization
tackles the degrees of obseletism or of residual, anachronic
formation of those constellations of interest. The elites of
power in this sense might subjectively assume an intensely
reformist position, despite their validity strategy - supported
by canceling the suppositions - of certain pacts of social
expectation not attaining those structures of effective signi-
ficance for the global process of change.

In the case of the Brazilian regime in power since April
'64, the reformist caragter has been shown by a distinct pat-
tern of modernization, [17] likely to conflict with the expecta-
tions of actors composing the older strata of the status quo,
clearly open to attack owing to the obsolescence of their spe-
cific role, even thoughthey did not contradict the role of the
class to which they belonged.

Thus, for instance, in the domain of agricultural reform, the policy of heavier taxation affected groups traditionally parasitic with regard to the public sector, such as the sugarcane growers. Similarly, a policy of selective credit restriction hampered the industrial groups, that had established their business setup on a basis of predatory cost and extremely low productivity of equipment. Without reaching the level of complete reference of the conducts of forces and groups to the radical plane of the structure in which they were configured, the power elite launched out into an attempt of rationalization, that is, of subordination of those conducts to a given model. The reformism of the Castelo Branco government can thus be gaged by a certain index of modernization, represented by the abolition of a number of archaic or obsolete formations, though not encroaching on the support of its structure : the fundamental record for it to be defined as a global policy of change. Within this framework, for instance, a place would be found for the conducts relative to the stages planned for agricultural reform; for the modification of the systems of fiscal incidence, especially in income tax reform, or the steps taken to counter low productivity or the practice of keeping some of the economic surpluses of the country economically sterile. From the angle of rationalization, the decision of that political system implied a whole group of initiatives designed to compatibilize the conducts relating to factors required for application to a neocapitalist model of development. That is to say, in a system characterized by the expansion of a labor-saving productivity, by the concentration and aggregation of the structure of the industrial setup, backed by a high level of physical indivisibility of producers' goods; by the achievement of the minimum levels of stability of the system, needed to resume its expansion; by the general depression of the remuneration of labor factor, linked to the creation of incentives to concentrate capital.

It is easy to ascertain how the realization of this group of initiatives, which can be predicated at the same time to modernization and rationalization, would necessarily involve a multiple and indeterminate antogonism of the successive interests scattered throughout the pure inert configuration of the status quo. The final validity of the project, in short, appears to derive from the strategy configured by facing those interests, necessarily aroused by the planring and the cumulative effect that its first stages would have in destroying, by canceling the suppositions, the conflictive position they would present, at the outset, with the active center of power.

Up till the end of the first administration based on
the power elite regime, when the Castelo Branco government
was replaced by that of Costa e Silva in '67, it is possible
to measure the success or failure of the undertaking by the
actual outcome of its strategy and by the obstacles it had
to face in its praxis. But, in the same measure, there is
evidence of the integrity of the basic project and, in the
degree of consonance of the neocapitalist model adopted,
of its internal coherence and of the level of modernization
assumed for its establishment, a clearly reformist character
unassimilable to the interest of any subjacent social group
and, therefore, only susceptible to have, as actor, a power
elite in the sense definable by this study. In the same
way, the consonance with this reformist project was perfected
by the internal dynamics of the new political system. In
the proportion that those ties grew effectively stronger, the
nucleus of the active center also disengaged from the first
cluster of expectations that accompanied its rise to power,
after the interruption of the legal continuity of the govern-
ments of the country. It is true that, through a deliberate
strategy, that of the "unused" reserve of discretionary powers,
it succeeded in "purging" the specific actor of the reform,
under an increasing ideological homogeneity, that clarifies
the first effective holder of the power seized by the military
in April'64. The pattern of the "coup within the coup" pro-
ceeded along classically reformist lines, gaining strength
from ideological rigor and an identification increasingly
intense – and necessarily rarefied – with an exhaustive re-
formist program, sponsored by the Ministry of Planning in the
Castelo Branco administration.

THE PATTERN OF LEGITIMACY

As the reformist strategy of the elite of power progres-
sively took shape, it canceled the conditions of adhesion to
the active center for the other social subsystems derived from
an extrinsic title, that is, from the mere formal observance
of the conditions of access to power, or of invocation of the
symbols linked to the same judgments of adhesion. The increa-
sing primacy of the reformist keynote under that of legitimacy
led the elite of power to assume, on the reflex plane, the
rupture of that continuity. It inclined towards a whole sym-
bolic formulation, no longer of its exceptional or provisional
interruption, but, by institutional acts, to self-foundation
of its position of hegemony.

It faced the acceptance, de facto, of a hiatus in the extrinsic
mechanisms of adhesion; in the grant of validity to a given
exercise of social decision.

It is easy to verify, at the same time, how, at the end
of the Castelo Branco period, the loss of impetus of the ori-
ginal reformism, correlated to the symbology of the institu-
tional acts, is increasingly changed for a recrudescence of
formalism, as a pole for the real compliance with the exigency
of legitimation of the whole system of power.

Not merely - especially in the second part of the adminis-
tration - de facto, the system objectivates its own shackles,
confining itself to the self-foundation it had already exerci-
sed, as a unique act, historically exhausted: more and more it
seeks reinforcement in the traditional mechanisms of legiti-
mation. The return to electoral procedure in the conventional
give-and-take of access to power, the strict fulfillment to
schedule of steps in the process of redemocratization, and
especially, with the purpose of establishing at once the perfect
formalization of its program, affected and configured, of re-
formism, a new Constitution, defined a posteriori as the final
pinnacle and possible crystallization, on the plane of legiti-
macy, of the project in which the exercise of power was conden-
sed. From this angle, one may observe, in the Castelo Branco
government, the untimely character of its thirst for formaliza-
tion, correlated to the relative loss of impetus of the ori-
ginal reformism: it would offset the faltering expectations of
success for the original project.

In this sense, formalization, if only by the traditional
return to the polls, would be the first stage considered by
the regime as <u>sufficient</u> to take care of this individual func-
tion in the system in which that administration evolved. But
thereupon, from the moment the lags in the initial reformist
schedule made themselves felt more severely, the government
plunged deeper into formal justification, despite the fact that
the chronological order provided for initiatives came into con-
flict with the natural precedence that would ensue, were the
regime to aim, <u>ob initio</u>, at formal support of full achievement
of a juridical order. This, in fact, would demand, instead
of recomposition of the power apparatus by renewal of the
legislature of November 1960 prior to drawing up the new Consti-
tution, the grant of effective precedence to the new fundamental
statute; therein, the concrete routines of legitimation, such
as electoral procedure, would be subsumed.

Looked at from this angle, the Castelo Branco power elite
departs from the pattern that should characterize it, at the
pole of social authentication. It appears rather as a regime
of tardy formal legitimation, searched, vicariously, contrary
to the natural dynamics it should expect to rely on, from the
viewpoint of this component of power systems. Though refor-
mist, it failed to live up to its model, to the overall vision
of the process: bound by the very determinants of the project to
which that of neocapitalist development adhered, it could not,
however, factually explicitate it, on the level of that ultimate
predication, without running the risk of it being brought up
against the limiting intentionality, inherent in the trophic
paradigm of change. Or rather with the sense of self-determi-
nation. Indeed, "authentication", as a form of legitimation
derived from the subsumption of the concrete contents of the
exercise of power, by its reference to the totality of the
process of which it is a part, presents a necessarily limited
and partial condition. By the very model it assumed - admitted
within a __tactical__ vision of the change, and not in its implica-
tions with the totality - "Castelism" would seem to have been
brought precisely to the pole rejected by "authentication"; it
is situated at the extreme of dependence in a process of change,
up till then figured as being increasingly __self-determined__ and
__national__. There is further to be denoted in this elite of power,
together with the abandon of this explication, that of concern
for any dramatization by which, through intermediate goals and
immediate instrumental conducts, it might succeed in stimulating
mechanisms of adhesion that would configure it in the eyes of
the community in terms of a project in which the social subsys-
tems can share globally. And hence capable of guaranteeing
a self-adhesion of its members, through the revelation of a te-
leogical nexus of those conducts, and of the relevance of each
actor for its attainment.

It is symptomatic, in this sense, that, contrary to what
normally would happen with power elites, the Castelists did
not resort to __propaganda__ or the usual __techniques__ for inducing
that adhesion by means of the well-known machinery of mobiliza-
tion and of iconography of the goals to be reached by the pro-
ject with which collectivity is confronted. The latter, not
having anticipated the reformism of the program, and the
administration overestimating its ability to valorize it in
the eyes of the population, only from recognition of its con-
crete results, no longer succeeded in falling back on processes
of propaganda and indoctrination when, in fact, having lost

the initial agent of the change, it inflected towards the
opposite polarity, and launched out into original formulas
for an inflexible electoral, without any institutional cadre
of framework for its acts, and backed by a last-minute consti-
tutionalism.

The Brazilian outcome, in this sense, deviates from the
road followed by other models also liable to assume the power
elite pattern in the wake of the national example. None other
is the case of the Peruvian regime, which came into power on
October 3, '68. In this case the rupture of legitimacy was
accompanied by exemplary gestures that promoted its authenti-
cation - and immediate popular adhesion - by the steps taken
to nationalize the oil-bearing subsoil of Peru. The erosion
of the democratic model, in this case, was fully compensated
by the nationalistic definition that it operated and its pro-
found consonance with the sense of self-determination postulated
by the paradigm of change - under the circumstances, still
trophic - of the Peruvian social process.

THE PARAMETER OF CENTRALIZATION

Committed to the reformist program and wreathing it in
the aspect of high rationality planning, the Castelist elite
of power soon had to determine its configuration with regard
to the necessary centralization that its exercise of social
decision would present. Indeed, it is possible to establish
a counterpoint between the conditions of implementation reached
by its project and the blows struck at the old federative
structure of the power apparatus of the country, or at the dif-
fuse conformation of that same power, correlated to the self-
organization of the various subsystems into which social life
is constellated. In fact, that implantation came to eliminate,
in practice, the vision of the apparatus of power as equivalent
to a superposition of orders of distinct autonomy, within a loose
and limited pattern of integration, ensured by the distribution
of competences guaranteed by the constitutional norm. They
appeared as correlative to the reformist platform, the aboli-
tion of the two suppositions of autonomy of the constituent
units of the Federation : or rather, the control of their tax
collection and the monopoly of their apparatus of coercion,
which were transferred, by provisions that were to be consolida-
ted in the formal statute of the regime, to the power of the
Union, centralized.

On the other hand, the impossibility of coexistence of the power elite regime with the forms of social diffusion of decision is proved by the absolute annulment of self-organization of the various trade union formations under this regime, even though acting within their specific scope.

The pattern of centralization was evident in the organization of the Ministry of Planning, which tended, in fact, to transform into the exclusive locus of decision, even within the range of competence of the Union and the distribution of the various functional attributions of the different Ministries. These, indeed, were liable to be pressed into a relationship of implementation to that organ, acting increasingly as the substantive center of decisions derived from the rationalization of planning. And not as an agency rationalizing and harmonizing an initiative that still could hover as being diffuse – coming from various origins – despite the high degree attained formally by centralization.

In reality, the tension that could be established for the conquest of full hegemony by the Ministry of Planning did not imperil the principle but only the vehicle of integration : the direct action of rationalization incorporated in the Ministry of Planning would be offset by that of the "region" coordinated in the Ministry of the Interior. What it is important to stress in this connection is above all the irreconcilability of the two perspectives and of any attempt to trace a functional dividing line between the two spheres. Indeed the reason for this lies in the fact that the multiplication of the "regions" within the range of the latter organ of centralization reveals a procedure totally inverse from the induction of a problematics, of a self-organization, of intermediate units of decision, and of idiomatic formulation of their problems. It must be admitted that in all this process of centralization demanded by the power elite the competition between those two agencies failed to bring the issue to a middle term, or meeting-point between two levels of integration of decision, starting from opposite poles, but rather of two veins of the same exclusive dynamism : one calling for the obliteration of the other, or for keeping it in a watertight compartment, so that instead of reducing them, the apparatus maintained two expressions stemming from the same dynamism and from the same trunk conjoining the form of polarity of political decision compatible with a power elite regime.

THE DETONATIONS ARISING FROM THE PROCESS OF REFLECTION

The Castelo power elite is now established in a typical
pattern that enables it to do without "compatibilization of
dissent" and the social function of ideologies.[19] It is im-
portant to stress, however, that in the same way that is can-
celed this plan of the reflection process, it failed to impli-
cate its protagonism in carrying out completely the second de-
gree reducing tasks of that process, represented by symbolic
production. Had it done so, it would have been necessary to
speak about the possible compensation of one **exigency** by another
with the imperatives of reflection inserted in the very entro-
py of the system established by that power elite.

Mention has already been made, however, of the way in
which, as an effect of the extraordinary ideological homoge-
neity that prepared the advent of a "rational decision" at that
stage, the power elite remained, from the point of view of the
reflection process, at the level of pure, raw imposition of that
project. No bond was set up between it and the collectivity
through a motivation or the establishment of an iconography that
would allow of the adhesion and the benefits of expression of
a consensus to carry out that project to a successful conclusion.
In a word, no use was made of the reducing mechanisms by which
correlation would be effected between neutrality of the project
and any specific predication of the subjacent actors. Not only,
however, were no mechanisms created for compatibilization of
dissensions in the induction of a consensual assent to the new
political project, but the "corrective" instance represented
by propaganda and indoctrination was also relinquished.

THE DYSFUNCTIONS OF THE REFLECTION PROCESS

Something must be said in this connection about the
elite of power represented by Castelism as a case of dysfunction
in the exercise of the conducts requested by this system of
power from the process of reflection. Its denotation, from
this point of view, will result from the various frustrated
subsumptions by which the maximal functioning of the mechanisms
compatible with its type of power model was impeded. But, in
their own dysfunction, they only added confirmation to the
generic scheme that, precisely, explains those results and
facilitates a full denotation, from this angle, of that power
elite.

In this sense, the dimension of the reflection process must be understood as being dominated by a high latency that fails to achieve expression in the symbolic paradigm and the possibility, thereby, of transformation into a consensual of the representation and visions of reality displayed by the actors subjecent to the process.

Likewise there is to be observed either a return, on the plane of dissent and its expression, of a charge of representation, dislodged from the conditions of convertibility and mediation of the optimal project, or else an ailing utilization of the symbolic functions of that system of power.[20]

In other words, for instance, the minifestation of dissent, left at the level of a high social latency, acquire the aspect of a confrontation. It is displayed in a liminal attitude of protest, coalescing at levels of maximal social spontaneity, and susceptible of aggregating a large potential of resonance to any event or conduct that, in its own peripety, gains the conditions of expressing, more than a specific rejection, the situation of rupture between the collectivity and the direct actors of the political system, arising out of the very interruption of reflection, or of the objective connectives constituted by the representation, suppositions of any social system.

INVERSION OF ROLES IN THE REFLECTION PROCESS
AN EXAMPLE : THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL IMPUNITY

Furthermore, from this standpoint, the Brazilian power elite of '64 saw this dysfunction - that of dissent expressed at levels only of social massing - accompanied by another, that of a complete reversal among the functions of first and second degree postulation by the reflection process. Indeed it brought into the open the "symbolic" formalization of dissent by giving validity to the roles of social "impunity". The result was that the system of power, so long as they were tracable to certain particular protagonists - the student body above all and, to a certain extent, the clergy - could assume an 'immitigable" role. Their protest would not meet with the lines of resistance of a set of grievances, of a negotiation, of the manipulation of certain limits and trumps, of a given bargaining power. Such actors would enjoy a capacity of indefinite social tolerance for their manifestations, in the same measure that, therein, already "reduced" to the content of a symbol, they would express another social function then that of promoting a given concrete, localized content of interests.

This it would not be enough to establish the correlation between
the advent of "power elites" and the disappearance of "intelli-
gentsias". This while the latter actors would actually express,
in the foreground of ideologies and social mobilizations, the
social dissent existing and capable of being composed or media-
tized by a concrete articulation of the power, but of seeing
this system connexted, by way of a typical dysfunction, to
the exercise of social impunity that substitutes criticism, the
proceedings of self-inlightenment and feedback, between the
given situation and the historic project it aims at. In short,
under those conditions, the political system, from the angle
of the reflection process, contains an unconvertible coefficient
of "non-representation", in which a dynamism of its own on the
symbolic plane is exerted at the cost and outside of its normal
parameters by the vehicle of social dissent : in the midst and
framework of grievances lodged by classic ideological behavior,
they become the protagonists of a strict contestation, immiti-
gable, and relatable to the context of the interests around
them, by compensations already typically symbolical of social
purging or "catharsis". Thus it is not surprising to see how
the impunity of this exercise would indeed represent, in the
expectancy created by the collectivity, the form of abortive
equilibrium in which the latency of social dissent came to be
composed, within this kind of power elite regime. But the con-
figuration of this role would be made, with the expression of
that dissent precisely confined to one or two social conducts
and to a certain type of conduct that they may eventually pursue
within a rigid frame, meticulously restricted. An analysis of
the tacit consensus, given by the government to student and
clerical manifestations in 1968 showed a strict standard of
permissible protest : a clear-out barrier was defined between
the protagonists of "unpunished" protest and those of plain
protest, the latter being immediately and implacably repressed.

THE SUBSUMPTION OF CONSENSUS : NON-REDUCING SYMBOLS

On the other hand, this system of power was characterized
by a utilization of symbols entirely extraneous to the "role"
demanded by the specific project of change, which was constitu-
ted in the concrete content of its decision. Thus, in the
Brazilian case, it is not merely a question or recording the
impossibility of subsumption of social dissensions in reductions
to the plane of the symbol that would be made possible by the
present power elite.

In the specific conformation that this exercise of social
decision assumes with regard to the collectivity, forcibly
the channels of communication are going to require, anyway,
the use of that mediation, since, on principle, the whole ideo-
logical system was canceled by the very historical origins of
this model of power. This amounts to saying that, if the
"representations" suitable for the type of project called for
by that decision - which would denote the functionability of
this behavior - are not found, the communication channels of
the power elite are sure to insist on the exclusive alternative,
and necessarily to arrive at social compatibilization : the
search for consensus through inadequate "non-reducing" repre-
sentations. With the acceptance of the bare identification of
the project in its rationality, the power elite would impose
upon itself the search derived from symbols that would esta-
blish the exigency of a consensus without which it certainly
could not thrive. In the case in point, then, a consensus
dissociated from the "meaning" of its project and bound to it
in a strictly contingent and auxiliary way : in the heterogenous
proposition of the conditions of social adhesion that would en-
sure its rule.

HETERONOMY IN THE SYMBOLIC FUNCTION AND THE POWER ELITE MODEL

In the Brazilian instance, among all the contents that
could be chosen to fulfill the symbolical function of search
of a consensus, there finally struck root the notion of "social
order" immediately, traceable to the pre-protagonism of the
predominantly military elite which seized the power in April'64.
It would seem typically to characterize the content liable
to mediation of the maximum "social distance" as befitted the
extremely rarefied and particular nature of that actor of the
detachable process within a certain social group (the group of
the Higher School of War - Escola Superior de Guerra - within
the National Army). But, at the same time, it involved the
handling of the symbol only partially, in reality, by the go-
vernment. As it stood, the main characteristic of its heteron-
omy would appear to lie in the condominium of its exercise with
the other social actors to which would likewise be entrusted
the handling of the symbols of keeping order, or the legitimacy
of the claim to exercise this conduct. In this case one would
expect to encounter, specifically, in the material vision in
which the order gained representativity, in the Brazilian
context, the Church, for example.

In a word, the validity of the symbol of social order implied, for the holder of the power, the compulsory coparticipation of the other "legitimizers" of the invocation. The symbol in question left the Church as "suffragant actor" in that realization. Or, to express it otherwise, it endowed the latter with the extraordinary power of bargaining, of withdrawing or keeping its "placet" for strengthening the objective condition of consensus, to which the power identified its conditions of adhesion by the collectivity.

In the support of these relations, derived from the aforesaid heteronomy in the use of symbols by power elites and the vital importance they began to have, the validity of this regime gave scope to a series of conducts resulting from this new dynamism of a special kind. Thus, for instance, the enormous formal valorization accorded to the Church, independently of the concrete positions of the economic or political power that present, necessarily, the interplay of transaction and counter-measures in which the suffragant role of this last actor began to be negotiated, in order to maintain that derivative and sickly form of establishment of a social consensus.

It is on this plane that is to be explained the extraordinary gain in relevance acquired, for instance, by the refusal of the Church to accept "decorations" and ostensive signs of prestige from the civil authorities; the significant power of purely verbal negotiation advanced by the Church on the occasion of the periodical conferences on hierarchy; the continuous resumption of the procedure of "penance at Canossa", undertaken by civil and military authorities. In this context, then, and at the other extreme, must be understood the violence of the attacks of the civil authorities in going so far as to incriminate the religious authorities on charges of breaking the peace, with a view to depriving it of that suffragant role and, hence, depriving it of control of this social symbol. Between these extremes, relations are entertained between the two actors in an interaction that is deeply energized by the dynamics of manipulation of a given social symbol and the role that it has come to perform in the exigencies of consensus, to which is added the special conformation assumed, in this case, by the process of social reflection.

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N O T E S

1. The expression "unconditioned decision" is used in this pa-
per with the same meaning as in the pioneer studies of
the "30s that worked for the emancipation of the Sociology
of Law, especially in the specific impact of the Weberian
lesson on thinkers like Timasheff, Gurvitch, Frank and
Horvath. Historically relevant in this line of works is,
for example, "Le Droit, l'Ethique, le Pouvoir", by the first
of these authors, in Archives de Philosophie de Droit et
de Sociologie Juridique, 1936, N.)s 1 & 2, Recueil Sirey.
For the comtemporary evolution of the concept, reference
may be made especially to the experimental studies of
power : Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science, Harper
Torchbooks, 1961, especially "Organizational Dependence and
Organizational Unity of a Whole", pp. 335 et seq.; Dorwin
Cartwright, Studies in Social Power, University of Michigan
Press, Ann Arbor, 1959; James G. March, "The Power of Power"
in Varieties of Political Theory, David Easton (ed.), Pren-
tice Hall, 1966.

2. For an up-to-date review of the concept of articulation in
social life, cf., for example; Anthony Leeds, Some Problems
in the Analysis of Class and the Social Order, especially
in the views he expresses on "Node", "Nexus", "Nodal Boundary
and Nodal Network" and "Situs", N° 65, Offprint Series,
Institute of Latin American Studies, Austin, Texas, 1968,
p. 68.

3. In delimiting the characteristics of the political subsystem
the scope of this study is restricted to its denotation as
the "situs" of the unconditioned decision. In this connec-
tion, it is opportune to mention the recent contributions of
Buchanan & Tullock, and those of Downs and of Mancur Olson Jr.,
to the analysis of the structural determinations of this
"decision". Significance attaches, for instance, to Olson's
work on "The Logic of Collective Action" in Public Goods and
the Theory of Groups, especially on page 43 et seq., where,
introducing the notion of calculation as the determinant of
decision, he delimits the political subsystem by analogy
with the economic one, by the field rather than by the struc-
ture of decision, defining it as characteristic of the "in-
clusive" or "non-market" groups.

From this angle, and accompanying the analogy of decision
in the market field, Olson was led to suggest a taxonomy
of political groups in their equivalence to situations of (1)
pure monopoly, (2) oligopoly, in which the "privileged" and
"intermediate" groups are distinguished, and (3) what he
calls a "latent" group, on a par with situations of "atomis-
tic competition". Olson identifies the actions of these last
groups with emergence of the unconditioned characteristics
of social decision, in the form of what he calls "separate
and selective incentives", in turn either positive or nega-
tive in accordance with the stimuli and sanctions afforded
by power. Elsewhere, Buchanan & Tullock, also with the
intention of defining political decision, by determinations
of the collective calculus, embrace the same analogy of the
"economic subsystem". This will be seen, for example, in
the capter assigned by those authors to "The Time Sequence
of Collective Decision" in The Calculus of Consent. The
processes of what they call "logrolling" would seem to accu-
rately translate the ideal hypothesis of composition of the
political force by its earning value in a barter system.
What is most significant in Buchanan & Tullock's intent is
that this attempt at formal reduction of decision is linked
to the search for the "logical foundations" of the democratic
model of political behavior. Faced with the pervasion of the
political decision by the determinations of the calculus
necessarily identified with that of its economic dimension,
the theoreticians of the so-called formalist school of
"Collective Decision-Making" are necessarily obliged to
appeal to ethics for aid in qualifying the political process.
In this connection, see the sections : "Behavioral Assump-
tions" and "The Ethics of Trade", in Chapter XVIII, pp. 266
et seq., of The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor Paperbacks,
1967.

4. In this connection particularly, cf. Georges Lavau, "Partis,
systemes politiques et fonctions" (Parties, Political Systems
and Functions) in the Canadian Journal of Political Science,
N° 1, March 1969.

5. From this angle, democracy can be measured by the indices originating from the combination of conditions of advent of that regime, as postulated by Downs and Dahl. Or rather, the eight requisites presented by the latter in An economic Theory of Democracy, Harper & Row, New York, 1957, pp. 23-24, and the ten attributes of his "polyarchy" in A Preface to Democratic Theory, University of Chicago Press, 1956, divided into four fundamental periods preelectoral, electoral, postelectoral and interelectoral.

6. Out of the vast litterature on correlations between levels of democracy and those of social and economic development, the following works may be selected for reference :
S.M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy" in The American Political Science Review, March 1959. Philips Cutright, "National Political Development : Its Measurement and Social Correlates" in Politics and Social Life, Robert A. Dentler & Paul A. smith (eds.), Houghton Mifflin C°, Boston, 1963; D.E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy" in The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXI, N° 4 December 1967; Donald J. McCone & Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: a Causal Model" in The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXI, N° 1, March 1967.

7. Cf. Candido Mendes, "Sistemas Politicos e Modelo de Poder no Brasil" (The Political System and Model of Power in Brazil) in Dados, N° 1, 1966, pp. 7 and 41. The present work, in this subsection, reexamines and explicitates the denotations made in that study.

8. The concept of mobilization employed here is akin to that of Olson in "The Logic of Collective Action" (op. cit.), especially pp. 51 et seq. It supposes the existence of a capacity of action in what he calls "latent groups", dynamized by the incentives of social sanction or reward. The category is thus confined to the order of structural determination of political decision. Its use is therefore necessary here in view of the ample conceptualization of Karl Deutsch, in his famous "Social Mobilization and Political Development", in Finkle & Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change, Wiley, 1968.

There it is a question of social mobilization understood
as a macro-process of change "in which measure clusters
of all social economic and psychological commitments are
eroded or broken, and people become available for new
patterns of socialization and behavior".

9. With regard to charisma in the development process, cf.
Wilhelm E. Muhlmann, Messianismes révolutionnaires du
Tiers Monde, nrf, Gallimard, 1968, and Maria Isaura Pereira
de Queiroz, Réforme et Révolution dans les sociétés tradi-
tionnelles, Editions Ahthropos, Paris, 1968.

10. Cf. Harry Eckstein, A. Theory of Stable Democracy, Prince-
ton University Press, 1959; Robert Dahl, Pluralist Demo-
cracy in the United States : Conflict and Consent, Rand
McNally, Chicago, 1967.

11. In the case of developing country, the distinction between
parties and lobbies as forms of conditioning political deci-
sion characteristic of pressure groups would cease to be
relevant when it comes to defining the connective between
the political system and the social sub-systems. In reali-
ty, the organization of the specific interests in the social
infrastructure would likewise indicate the progressive
nucleation of the social class itself : the pressure groups
and lobbies, in this case, would be based on the very axis
of evolution of the formation of the parties and would
tend to identify with them at this moment in the process of
change. Practically, only after this structuration - and,
hence, the consolidation of the ubications between "parties
and classes" - would it be possible to speak of a strain of
differentiation in terms of an "economic subsystem" and a
"political system" that would lie at the origin of the
counterposition between "special interest" and "group
interest", on which would depend the configuration of the
effective stable pluralism of interests identifiable with
a democratic model and the effective creation of the set-
ting for lobbying. Or rather, that of the logrolling de-
vices capable of adjusting the "special interests" to
the "group interests" within the mechanisms of the logic
of collective action in democratic legislatures.

In this respect, reference may be made, in the classification of Mancur Olson Jr., "The Logic of Collective Action", op. cit., to the contributions of what he calls the orthodox theories of pressure groups, such as Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government, Principia Press, Evanston Ill., 1949; John R. Commons, The economics of Collective Action, Macmillan, New York, 1950; Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1952; David B. Truman, The Governmental Process, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1958.

12. Corresponding to these pacts there would be a determined model of coalitions in the organization of the political force, in which the democratic paradigm, according to the concept held of it by William M. Riker, would be equivalent to the creation of a system of equilibrium or, better, of "instability moderations" characterized by increasing domination of the method of "institutional contention". That is to say, the democratic regime would be the one that, in the organization of coalitions of the power system, would tend to find itself "contigented", by the inner logic of the decision process, so that no member of the system may be eliminated or destroyed. Despite the fact that political coalitions imply "zero-sum situations", that democratic model would amount, according to the controls aforesaid, to preventing the rational behavior in such coalitions or interactions, from transforming into a force likely to disrupt social life. Admitting the historic correlation between the democratic model and the "moderations of instability" in coalitions, Riker, in the summary to Chapter VI, dealing with coalition building and extensively criticizing the theories of the balance of power, insists that every dynamic model in such coalitions is "fundamentally and inherently instable" (The Theory of Political Coalitions, Yale University Press, 4th. ed., 1968, p. 186). In these terms, to the theory of the balance of power as a constituent in the political interplay of coalitions, Riker opposes the principle of minimal winning, actuating necessarily in combination with the size principle and with the principle of diffentials in the evaluation of the component members of such political formations. In this connection, a comparison may be drawn between Riker's winning principle and the principle of governmental vote-maximizing in the composition of political coalitions, advanced by Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper & Row, N.Y., 1957, especially pp. 164 et seq.

13. Cf. Candido Mendes, "Prospectiva do Comportamento Ideolo-gico, o Processo de Reflexao na Crise de Desenvolvimento" (Prospects of Ideological Behavior, the Process of Reflec-tion in the Crisis of Development) in Dados, N° 4, 1968, pp. 95 - 132.

14. Cf. Jack Goody, "Consensus and Dissent in Ghana" in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXIII, N° 3, September 1968.

15. Cf. Peter H. Smith, "Social Mobilization, Political Parti-cipation and the Rise of Juan Peron" in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXXIV, N° 1, March 1969.

16. Cf. Candido Mendes, "O Govérno Castelo Branco, Paradigma e Prognose" (The Castelo Branco Government, Paradigm and Prognosis) in Dados, N°s 2 & 3, pp. 63-111.

17. The behavior of the Brazilian power elite in '64, in the framework of a military government, contrasts, in this way, with the thesis of Samuel Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, 1968, in the capter of "Praetorianism and Political Decay", pp.221 et seq. Huntington establishes the following proposition : "As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order". Rather than establish a general proposition of this kind, it seems to us that the problem of the role of the military should be analysed with regard to the political model in which that role is inserted: mediation by the "elite of power", in the Brazilian case, explains the special characteristics of military reformism in a stage of change where, if the Hunting-ton proposition is to hold good, military conduct would be identifiable with the strict maintenance of the "existing order" (pp. 221 et seq., idem).

18. Cf. Candido Mendes, "O Governo Castelo Branco, Paradigma e Prognosis ", op. cit., subjection : "A Oposiçao Consentida" (The Consented Opposition).

19. Cf. L. Festinger, H.W. Riecken & S. Schachter, When Prophecy Fails, Minneapolis, 1956.

20. In this connection and in the specific context of the student protest of May '68 in France, cf. Robert Pagès, "L'analyse psychosociologique et le mouvement de mai 68" (Psychosociological Analysis and the movement of May'68) in Communications, N° 12, 1968, Ed. Seuil.

- O -

DEMOCRATIC AND POWER ELITES MODELS
WITH RESPECT TO SOCIAL REFLECTION

Confrontations   Heteronomies

(Symbolic
Condominium)

Dissent

Regressive
Symbols

1st
Degree

Compatibi-
lizations

1
Ideologies

Consensus

2
Reductive
Symbols

2nd
Degree

Reductions

Exempla-
rities
Icono-
graphies
Behaviours

Return or disfunction from
the reduction level to
the dissent level

DEMOCRATIC AND POWER ELITES MODELS WITH RESPECT TO SOCIAL REFLECTION

Objective articulation

Subjective or reflex articulation

Active Center Parameters

(Dissent im- Confronta-   Heterono-   (Symbolic
personifica-   tions   mies   Condominium
tions)

Inchoation

AC

AC   PP

Political
Sub-
system

Regres
sive
symbols

Dissent

AC   PP

(Decen-
traliza-
tion)

AC   PP

(Representation

Centrali-
zation (Forma-
lization)

Authenti-
cation

1st
Degree

1
Ideolo-
gies

Compatibi-
lizations

Mobilization

Role alternativi-
ty

Legitima-
tion

Passive Periphery
Parameters

Consen-
sus

Econo-
mic Sub
System

Social
Sub-
System

Cultural
Sub-
System

2nd
Degree

2
Reductive
Symbols

Reductions
Exemplari-
ties
Iconogra-
phies
Behaviours

(Power
Pacts
Fulfil-
ment)

Return or disfunction
from
the reduction level
to the dissent level

Self-foundation

Other Social
Sub-system

Reformism

AC = Active Center
PP = Passive Periphery

DENOTATION OF DEMOCRATIC AND ELITES POWER MODELS.

PARAMETERS	DEMOCRATIC MODEL	POWER ELITES MODEL
INCHOATION	REPRESENTATION	MOBILIZATION
SELF-FOUNDATION	POWER PACTS FULFILMENT	REFORMISM
LEGITIMATION	FORMALIZATION	AUTHENTICATION
ROLE ALTERNATIVITY	DECENTRALIZATION	CENTRALIZATION

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RAPPORT / PAPER

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

AND

POLITICAL OPENESS

by Simon SCHWARTZMAN

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL OPENESS (1)

by Simon Schwartzman

1. The Political Sphere

The analysis of political systems and their development as an independent dominion of inquiry faces two types of difficulties in the literature. The first is pointed out by professor Samuel Huntington and comes from the North American lack of experience with political instability. It leads to the notion that a stable and successful political system is a natural consequence of the economic development and the increase in social welfare (1). The other comes from the marxist-like image of the political sphere as a simple and direct consequence of deeper structures of production. Politics is thus seen as not showing a legality of its own.

A conceptual gap is therefore created between specialists on economics and sociology, who see the political process as a simple result of the economic and social facts, and the specialists on government and public administration, who see their field as a purely technical one, completly unrelated with what happens in the rest of the society. It is obvious that things are never as simple as that, but a host of empirical studies about the "political" (meaning social and economic) influences upon the governmental processes, or about the "political" (meaning governmental) influences upon the social and economic life are not enough to avoid the paradoxes of "depoliticized"

political sociology and theories of government. This problem is particularly acute when what is at stake is the political process in a country subjected to severe problems of social and economic development such as Brazil. This paper discusses this problem at the conceptual level, having the Brazilian experience as the basic frame of reference (2).

2. Political Development: institucionalization and conflicts.

Prof. Huntington's conceptualization of political development in terms of institutionalization is an attempt to define a dimension of social change which is specifically political. He defines institutionalization as " the process through which organizations and processes acquire value and stability", and levels of institutionalization are said to be functions of levels of adaptability, complexity, authonomy, and coherence of the institutions (3). Accordingly, a developed political system is the one which is able to adapt itself to new situations, to develop new functions, to incorporate new groups, to play a plurality of functions and to keep, at the same time, a basic level of consensus among the political community. It is a stable system, but not static, and has a legitimity which transcends the circumstancial conveniences of the citizenry and plunges its roots in a historical past of stability, flexibility and legitimity.

One of the determinants of political instability in the under-developed contexts is thus this very instability: the series of interruptions in the continuity of the political institutions in these countries does not allow for the crystallization of those qualities of flexibility, adaptation, complexity, authonomy and coherence which only time can bring. This conception leads, necessarily, to a conservative perspective in the most precise of its meaning, namely the perspective that there are values to preserve in old structures, and relatively high custs in the substitution of one structure by a new one.

But time is not the only independent variable, since institutional decay is also a possibility. A context of rapid changes translated into continuous challenges to the political regime can lead to the hardening and simplification of the political structure which very often interrupt a previous process of maturation and institutionalization. The total lack of tensions seems to lead also to an institutional stagnation which can end up in sclerosis, rigidity and decay. Only a "reasonable" level of conflicts could lead to institutional development in the sense above (4). This "optimal level" of conflicts seems to be far from the rule in underdeveloped countries, and the known outcome is the more or less rapid deterioration of the political institutions which, one way or another, have worked up to the mid sixties. This is true in

Latin America regarding the constitution governments which replaced
for a short period the populist regimes, and seems to hold also for
Africa regarding the governments established after the independence,
which in most cases have been replaced by military regimes. The
general situation in the underdeveloped world is thus of institutional
decay, even if this situation could be a necessary step to place the
power relations in a situation which could - or not - allow for the
continuation of the process of development at a higher degree. This
consideration obviously weakens a theory of gradual institutionalization
as a prediction or a prescription for political development of under-
developed countries, but it does not reduce the relevance of the concept
as an essencial political <u>variable</u>. If we make the theoretical
assumption that there is a long-term process of political development
which is somehow related with the also long-term processes of social
and economic development, it is obvious that the conceptualization of
political development should include other political variables besides
institutionalization.

3. Political openess and institutionalization

A political system which is more institutionalized is in
principle more able to integrate and legitimize new demands of
participation than the more rigid and inmature ones. This legitimation
and absorption of demands is what one can call "openess", and one can
rephrase the above by saying that, the more institutionalized a political
system is, the more open it is. This is close to a truism if we take
"institutionalization" only in terms of adaptability, but it is a substantive
proposition if we bring together the other dimensions of the concept.
Empirical evidence is abundant, ranging from the absorption of the
working class parties in Western Europe to the troubles of performing
the same kind of absorption by the less institutionalized regimes of
Argentina. We should not take, however, "openness" for "democra-
tization".

It was Schattschneider who said that "government by the
people" is a pre-democratic concept, in the sense that its formulation
is previous to the existence of the contemporary democratic regimes
(5). The definition of democracy offered by Schattschneider includes
the competition between leaders and organization, in one hand, and
the presentation of political alternatives for the general public, which
thus participate in the decision process, on the other. A political
system which is able to absorb and process private demands allowing
them to become political, can reach high levels of institutionalization
without becoming democratic. Democracy in the meaning suggested
by Schattschneider begins to appear when the openness becomes
<u>political</u>, and the <u>political</u> demands of participation are accepted and

legitimited as such. Participation is political when it goes above the level of specific issues of given groups, in two senses. First, the specific issues become general. and second specific groups feel themselves in the right to influence and decide on questions previously considered private of others. A "participationist" political system, such as the one tried by Guillermo Borda for Argentina, is anti-democratic not because it seeks the substitution of territorial by functional representation, but because it does not let the functional groups to be concerned with questions of general interest. The territorial representation tends, in its origins, to be also private, given its dependence on stratification systems based on land tenure. If time has made it the highest expression of political representativeness it is because of the growing multi-functionality of the territorial groups.

Two questions follow from what we said above. The first refers to the desirability of the two possible types of institutionalization, the democratic and the participationist, or corporatist-fascist one. It is quite likely that something like "participationism" is what Marx projected for the future society in which "politics" would cease to exist. The inexistence of politics means the inexistence of general problems, and a purely "technical" approach to specific problems of specific groups and sectors in society. Before the disappearance of general problems become real, however (6), the forced suppression of political manifestations can lead to solutions of a technocratic type, in which the technical capacitation veils the fact that the area of bargaining and negotiations is not allowed to grow beyond the sphere of transactions between the group concerned and the governmental sector responsible for its handling. This reduction of area of bargaining can be done either through purely coercive techniques or through ideological mobilization or by some combination of the two. The restriction of issues which would tend to be public to the private and technical sphere can raise a plurality of problems one is the possibility of corrupt practices, due to the low visibility of the decisions (7). Another is the pseudo technification of typically political areas (the suchs assimilation of political with criminal acts, which are thus handled by a technical body - the police - and explained and interpreted by specialists of criminology and social control: "The social problem is a police problem", used to say a Brazilian president of the 20's: The third problem is the "politization" of essencially technical areas, insofar as the control of technical quality becomes less a function of the internal consensus of an institutionalized scientific community and more dependent upon the political approval of the political regime. The advantages of this type of institutionalization for the political regime can be many. In some cases, including the stablishment of a long-range economic policy of high inversions and differed gratifications (as in the USSR), a long-range policy of social repression (as in Portugal, Spain and South Africa) and probably a combination of both, if the costs above are kept within tolerable bounds. The option between these two forms depend, on the one hand, on the

political tradition of the country, and on the level and type of the demands of participation on the other.

When demands of participation tend to be high and of a political type, as in Argentina, the corporatist system does not seem to be possible as an institutionalized concern. The alternative rests between the creation of a system of democratic participation and the continuation of a political system based on high levels of repression and political rigidity.

Thus, we have the second question referred to before, namely the likelihood and stability of the different types of political participation. Part of the answer was given already, namely that the alternatives depend on the process of socio-economic development and the demands of participation in the form of social mobilization which follow from it. The second part of the answer is that the reaction of a given political system to a given level and type of demands is a function of its characteristics as a system, one of which is its level of institutionalization.

4. Socio-economic development and Political development

What the discussion has suggested is that the relations between what happens at the socio-economic level and what happens at the political level is far from direct, starting from the fact that there are at least two important mediations between those two levels. We can speak of four analytical levels of change which deserve independent scrutiny: the levels of economic development, of the changes in the social structure of stratification, of the demands of political participation, and finally of political development. The independence between these processes does not mean that they are not empirically related, but simply that none of them can be completely understood through the others (8).

Economic development refers here to the quantitative increase of per capita income, and what it means in terms of technological change and in the sectorial division of labor. The concept of social development often appears in the literature under the name of "modernization", and refers to the increase in the well being of the populations according to the standards of the modern mass consumption societies – the consumption of industrialized goods, education, increase in life expectancy, newspaper consumption, means of communications, etc. Social development is more than a simple change in behavior and consumption patterns, since it brings with it increases in the scope and intensity of communications, a progressive extension of the scale of social participation from the local to the national levels, and a change

in the values and nature of the system of stratification (9). This general process of social development is often called "mobilization", and has a direct bearing on the political life in terms of an increase in participation.

But since modernization is not a direct outcome of economic development, so political participation is not a direct effect of social modernization and mobilization. The modernization process comes ahead, very often, of the process of economic growth, due not only to the host of phenomena designed by the expression "demonstration effect", but also to the deliberate action of the political centers to create administrative and political centers which work as poles of urbanization and modernization, combined very often with the desaggregation of the more traditional rural economies. These urban centers generate, afterwards, a given level of industrialization which can be completely dependent on them (10).

How is the process of social mobilization translated into demands of participation in public life? It is obvious that there is no simple answer to this question, which depends on two types of variables. The first type refers to the nature of the process of modernization and social mobilization. Starting from the simplest propositions of Lerner, who expected and increase in political participation (measured by elections turn-out) to follow linearly from the process of urbanization and literacy, the more contemporary analysis look fro the roots of variations in participation into the different types of asynchronies and disequilibria in the process of social and economic development. This topic is one of the most frequent in the literature on social development, and it is enough to say here that a situation in which the economic development anteclpates and leads the modernization process will create a political climate which is radically different from those where the process of modernization preceds and is not followed but at distance by the economic growth (11). In the first case political participation would probably tend to be more related to specific demands, leading to a progressive widening of the areas of group authonomy and political participation, while in the second, the conditions would be much more favorable to the emergence of symbolic forms of participation than before.

The second type of variable refers to factors which are more directly related to the political system, including its level of institutionalization. The responses of a political system to demands of participation only partially depends on the process of economic and social change which its society undergoes. The extraordinary fact of the transfer of the Portuguese royal family to Brazil in 1808 gave to this country a degree of institutionalization which was unique in the Latin American context, and which explains much of the country's

territorial integrity and political stability throughout the XIX Century.

The proposition Iwould like to stress here is that the assumption of a causal chain going from the process of economic development up to the structure and changes in the political system is untenable. Attempts to explain variations in the political structure as functions of socio-economic change tend to simplify the political sphere either to the level of mere outcome ("The political system is an instrument of the bourgeois groups") or an obstacle (the traditional power elites do not respond to the resing demands of the population...") to these processess. The final outoome is an extremely simplified perception of the political factors. The alternative is sometimes to take political system as the starting point, but the difficulties here are related to the impossibility of making the long-term processess of change follow from the general characteristics of the political system. It seems to me that both approaches are simultaneously necessary, and that there is much to gain if we take the changes in the economy and in the levels of social and political participation as a process, and combine it with the analysis of the political system as a system (12).

5. Socio-economic development: the demands of participation

The analysis of the processess of social and economic development usually end with alternatives, or degrees of participation. Participation as such depends also on institutional factors, but it is possible to think on demands of participation as generated autonomously by those processess. Without establishing the causal links (a task which would be out of proportion with this paper), I would like to suggest a typology of these demands.

Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba had suggested in the Civic Culture some useful dimensions of analysis, which can be used without danger of contamination with the "political culture" theories (13). These dimensions refer to the basic concerns and identification, at the psycho-sociological level, that are bound to appear in situations of political participation. I shall use three alternatives of political orientation, which gives us eight types. The first alternative, or variable, refers to whether there is a cathexis of the subjects towards the political system, either positive or negative. The second refersto the presence of absence of concern with political imputs, and the last with the presence or absence of concern with political outputs. The typology is as follows:

	expressive participation (cathexis)	concern with Inputs	outputs
1. no participation (Banfield's "familism", "parochial" in Civic Culture)	-	-	-
2. symbolic (Mexicans in Civic Culture)	X	-	-
3. subjects (as in Civic Culture	-	-	X
4. patrimonial	-	X	-
5. populist	X	-	X
6. mobilization	X	X	-
7. detachment, competence (Germans in Civic Culture)	-	X	X
8. "participant"	X	X	X

There are some types, besides those conceptualized or discovered in the Almond and Verba research, that deserve some explanation here. The type 4, which I called "patrimonial", corresponds to a kind of participation in the political structure which is related only with the benefits of this participation insofar as patrimonialistic elements exist in the state organization. The relative absence of political patrimonialism in the Anglo-Saxon countries makes this of participation less frequent in the American literature, but its importance in Latin America is high.

The benefits that the type 5 gets from the State are of a paternalistic kind, and one can imagine that the typical populist state in Latin America would be a combination of type 4 participation for urban middle sectors and of type 5 for lower groups. The type 6, finally, corresponds to the mobilization of populations for input activities through ideological motivations, and is typical of revolutionary regimes.

3. The Political system: types

The types of demands of participation suggested above are not independent from the political system - or, in other words, they do

not follow simply from the characteristics of the socio-economic
structure and process. An independent analysis of the political system
is thus necessary, and we can start stressing a political dimension
which seems to be crucial. This dimension has in one extreme a
political state which seeks to control and direct the maximum of the
society's life: in the other, the state, which tends to abstain as much as
possible from the social and economic life of their citizens. The latter
corresponds to the ideal type of the liberal state, while the former is
closer to the patrimonial mercantilism of Spain and Portugal in the XV
and XVI Century (14).

This is of course a classical dimension in the literature,
and I am referring to it here because its importance for a country like
Brazil has never been quite taken into account. This dimension is
present, among other places, in Bendix's analysis of the entrepreneurial
and mangerial elites in four countries (15). What distinguishes England
and the United States from Russia and Eastern Europe is, says Bendix,
the intervention of the State in the labor relations in the latter two,
which leads to a series of difficulties in the ajustment of the relations
of authority in the economic sphere. David Apter, in a completely
different context, refers to the same idea when he suggests the
distinction between "hierarchical" and "pyramidal" structures of
authority (16). While the "pyramidal" system corresponds to a political
model which has the State as the target for political demands and
pressures, the hierarchical system corresponds rather to the notion of
a tutorial state intervening in the social and economic life and
disestimulating the emergence of autonomous political representation,
either through coertion, or through the cooptation of emerging
leaderships, or both. A hierarchical structure of authority tends to
limit the forms of participation which tend to be political and public,
and to replace them for a combination of private demands and forms of
expressive social mobilization.

An attempt to utilize Apter's conceptualization to the
interpretation of Brazilian politics is found in an article by Antonio
Octávio Cintra and Fabio Wanderley Reis (17). The Brazilian regime
from 1964 is defined as "consociational", that is, pyramidal with a
desideologized, instrumental political culture. The political power in
Brazil is seen in that period as "held, in general, by a traditional elite,
which took its power from the property of land". The relatively little
presence of pressure groups favoring economic development is attributed
to electoral mechanisms which limited the access of new interest and
pressure groups in the Congress. The fact, studied afterwards in detail
by Phillipe Schmitter (18), that pressure groups in Brazil tend to work
preferentially in the area of the executive, does not seem to be so much
more and affect of the electoral system than a consequence of the
continous presence of the Central government as an agent of social and

economic intervention and initiative. There is little doubt that the 1945-64 Republic is, together with the 1889-1930 period, the more "consociational" period in Brazilian political history, but it is not less true that hierarchical structures were the dominant note during the imperial period throughout the XIX Century, the Vargas Regime and after 1964. The concentration of power in the executive branch of the Central government was for Brazil not only one of the main reasons for the poor functioning of the liberal constitutional forms imported from Europe and the United States, but it also explains a high degree of state intervention in the social and economic life of society. This is not a new phenomenon, and it has deep consequences which are still to be explored in detail. The importance of the work of Raymundo Faoro can never be sufficiently stressed in this context (19).

7. Political Systems: determinants.

Which factors lead to the different types of political systems discussed above? It is possible to say, generally speaking, that the way the contemporary states have been solving the political problems of their integration in the modern world will determine their power structure and authority system and style. The political problems of modernization are of two types. One derived from the causal chain which goes from socio-economic development to the demands of political participation. The other is dependent upon the history of the system and the history of its relations with the outside world. The first problems are best analysed in terms of the discussion in parts 4 and 5, but the second ones demand a much more historical and systemic approach. It is impossible to offer here a general approach of this kind, but it is not impossible to find good examples of it in the literature. A first example is given by Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (20). Economic development can start in different ways depending on the timing of its beginning; in England the capitalist accumulation of capital was enough, in Germany a financial capitalism was necessary, and in Russia the State itself had to take the lead. He does not offer a theory on why some countries started their development before others, but in the case of Russia he says that the serfdom was the paramount obstacle to its early development. Barrington Moore starts from factors of this kind, namely the alternatives of modernization in the countryside, as the keys for the prediction of the formation of different systems (21). His theory is too well known to be spelled out here, and it is enough to note how the kind of predictions of fascist vs. democratic vs. socialist outcomes depart so radically from the kind of predictions one could get from the standard correlational analysis which never went much further than Lipset's correlations between democracy and levels of development.

It would be difficult, and out of place, to try to generalize from the insights of Gershenkron and Moore. It is obvious that the situation in Latin America today is radically different from the countries they studied. Bur there seems to be an almost perfect correlation between a descentralized political system in the past, combined with a strong feudal structure, and economic development in the present. Flourishing centralized empires of the past were unable to adapt themselves to the industrial society, wile countries with a relatively smaller and underdeveloped political superstructure were much more able to absorb the more modern and efficient patterns of organization and production. Contrary to what is aften said, feudalism does not seem to be a determinant of underdevelopment, but on the contrary, it is its absence, and the predominance of an overdeveloped state structure, which seems to be at its roots. Coming late to be the industrialized world, these countries can count only with this out of date and oversized political structure to make the jump to the high standards they aspire.

8. The scope of the political community: costs and benefits

We have now the general parameters for the determination of the scope of the political community, understood as the set of persons and groups who actually participate in the political decisions of the country. This scope can be measured in terms of amplitude (how many people participate?), its relevance (which kind of issues are brought to political decision?) and its level of coertion for deviant behavior. These three measures tap a general dimension of political openess, and we can now proceed to a systematic discussion of its consequences in terms of costs and benefits.

This topic was already stetched in part three, in the discussion of the desirability of the more political vs. the more private forms of participation. It is possible to resume this discussion here in terms of the negative relation D. Apter proposes between coertion and information (22). The general idea behind this proposition is that a legitimate, noncoercive political establishment is able to receive a free flow of information that ceases to exist when coercion is exerted and compliance ceases to be voluntary. In our terms, information corres sponds to situations of ample political participation, in which political (allocative) decisions are taken following a more or less complex bargaining process; while coercion corresponds to situations where the structure of political participation is narrow, and decisions are imposed upon the "nonpolitical" spheres of society. The following alternatives seem to correspond to these two poles:

a) intelligence and information: it is not by chance that the highly coercive regimes are those that have to develop the more

elaborated intelligence systems, to compensate for the lack of political information that flows freely in a political community. The data collected through intelligence devices (whether by means of an institutionalized intelligence agency or not) is sufficiently different from the other kind of information to deserve a separate analysis. The object of intelligence observation is defined from the onset in terms of its utility or disutility for the political establishment and its goals, and this leads to a situation in which any bargaining between observer and observed falls necessarily in a zero-sum type of situation. Data gathering through intelligence means implies, thus, a rigidity which is exactly the opposite of the information gathered among partners of a community, where the situation is non-zero-sum and the rights of others are recognized;

b) policy-making and policy-implementation: information, as distinguished from intelligence, can be essential in the process of policy-making, but can be a nuisance in the process of policy-implementation. Since intelligence gathering implies a previous definition of the situation in terms of who are "the others", it is possible to imagine that, the more a political center relies in intelligence data, the less able it will be to change this previous definition. If one considers that policy-making consists, exactly, in decisions that alter somehow the previous patterns of value allocations and distribution, we can assume that, the higher the reliance on intelligence, the lower the capability of policy-making. On the other hand, this data from intelligence is compatible with very effective policy-implementation of some previously defined goals, if all the relevant factors are within the range for governmental action. The other side of the coin is when intelligence is lacking, and the political establishment is entirely open to information, while no intelligence-type of data is considered. This is an indication of lack of autonomy of the political system, for which the constant political bargaining is an essential condition for survival. The basic characteristics of this situation is a combination of sweeping policy-making decisions and little or no policy-implementation. The conclusion seems to be that a political system needs to be autonomous enough to be able to process all information it can get without losing its capability of gathering the intelligence data necessary for its policy-implementation, to avoid falling in an all-intelligence or all-information kind of situation (23);

c) two types of bargaining-political issues and political scope. There are two tipes of bargaining that go on in a political system, one regarding the allocation of specific values, or options about specific social, economic and cultural issues, and the other regarding the scope of the political sphere in itself: who can note, who can be elected, who should be heard for which kind of decisions, etc. Bargaining of the political scope is carried on at the periphery of the

political community, since it concerns exactly the rights of entrance into this community. While bargaining on issues follows some institutionalized patterns (since it occurs within a community where the forms and extent of participation of all parts are accepted by all), bargaining on scope tends to have the aspects of "political crisis" about the rules of the game and the spectrum of political participation.

Schattschneider suggests that the more important strategy in politics is that related to the scope of the conflict in the sense that in any conflict there is always a movement towards increasing the number of persons involved (24). In spite of this, he also notes that the scope of the political community in the United States has remained stationary at the level of about 30% of the potential electorate. The recent emergence of negro and youth minorities in the political community is probably changing this figure, with the well known appearence of political crisis.

The relative weight of either type of bargaining is a function of the actual structures of participation and the levels and types of political emergence at a given point. It is possible to think that bargaining on the political scope tends to be disruptive to other types of bargaining that are inherent in the process of decision-making. It is possible to think that, the higher the gap between the demands and the structure of participation, the more the questions of scope will prevail, leading to the upgrading of problems of security upon policy-making and implementation, a predominance of intelligence upon information, leading in turn to increasing difficulties in political bargaining regarding issues, and so on.

d) Technical vs. political decision-making. The alternative between information and intelligence can be reexamined in terms of the alternative between technical vs. political decision-making already mentionned in part 3. In effect, when the old Brazilian president stated that "the social problem is a police problem" he was denying to a given group the right of participation in the political community. All the governmental policy regarding this group becomes, in consequence, a technical matter which is handled through the respective technical body, namely the police, which uses intelligence data as its normal source of information. This kind of technical treatment was a consequence of the fact that the "social question" was a question referred to the scope of the political system. During the Vargas regime, however, the political community was closed, and the social question was handled through other technical bodies of the Ministry of Labor and the welfare system. It is possible to provide job security, a system of medical assistance, to institutionalize systems of wage bargaining, etc., if two conditions are met. First, if there is a consensus on the qualification and impartiality of the technicians who

make these decisions. Insofar as the Labor Justice is recognized by all parts as neutral and impartial, and its criteria of good and evil are shared by all who make use of it, its decisions will be accepted as technically correct. The second condition is that the conflicting parts do not try to amplify the scope of their conflict from the private to the public area. If these two conditions are not met the only way of keeping the issue within a technical frame is through coertion - and this is when the expression "technocracy" can be properly used: it characterizes a "technical" handling of issues which would tend to be politics, but are contained through some form of coertion.

In which conditions is the depolitization and technification of a given issue a real process, without technocratic connotations? It is important to notice that there is always a continuing process of politization and technification of issues of all kinds - the local administration in the United States tends to become technical nowadays, while issues of foreign affairs are moving rapidly from the technical to the political sphere (25). The essential condition for the technification seems to be the institutionalization of scientific and technical communities, an institutionalization which is, again, a fonction of time and of a "reasonable" level of conflicts which allow them to grow mature without sclerosis, and to acquire value and prestige. The implications of this process of transfer between the technical and the political spheres, with the technocratic alternative, are very signifisant. It has a direct bearing on questions such as the role of the Legislative, the development of bodies of central planning, local and regional government, etc.

Another factor that has influence on this process is of a much more difficult conceptualization. Professor Huntington uses the expression "praetorianism" to characterize societies where all groups try to play a direct political role regarding the distribution of power and status throughout the political system. Praetorianism is the opposite of institutionalization, it is caused, he says, by the absence of political institutions which could mediante between some groups and the rest of the political system (26).

The lack of intermediate groups, the instability and briefness of power and authority taken together puts a high premium in the rapid and direct access to the central power and a low premium in a long-term loyalty to a less sensational but more stable share of responsabilities and institutionalization (27). The consequence seems to be a downhill process of increasing instability and praetorianism for the underdeveloped countries, which could only be stopped by coertion means.

It is again Schattschneider who gives us a hint of an alternative. He makes a brilliant analysis of the contribution of the

American trade unions to the Democratic party, and the conclusion is
that what the party gains with this support is probably less than what it
loses for being identified as the party of "big labor" (28). The conclusion
seems to be that a political party is something more and something
else than the sum of the interest groups which they aggregate. There
is a high cost in the total politization of an interest group, and, in stipe
of the example of Indonesia, growing praetorianism is not a necessary
future for a country like Brazil. But the example of Indonesia is
probably a warning in the sense that, the further this process goes, the
more difficult it will be to stop it, and the more predictable the
technocratic and coercive final outcome will be.

The general conclusion seems to be that at a given level of
political openness, the emphasis on the free flow of informations and
the gradual development and institutionalization of different institutions
are not only an ethical principle but also functional needs without which
no political system can develop properly and play its role in the search
for highest standards of life and social participation in the contemporary
underdeveloped world. There is always the possibility of a coercive
technocratization of the political system aiming at the implementation
of given policies of economic development, combined perhaps with a
long-term promise of political openess. The main a tractiveness of
this alternative its simplicity, but its ethical costs, combined with its
functional difficulties, are big enough to justify a constant effort to
avoid it.

Footnotes

(¹) This is a condened and revised version of "Desenvolvimento e Aber
tura Política", forthooming in Dados 6, 1969. I am indebted to
Bolivar Lamounier, Antonio Octavio Cintra and Peter McDonough for
continous discussions and helpful comments on the paper.

(1) Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 7.

(2) A specific analysis of the Brazilian political process wich benefits
from this discussion is my paper on "Political Participation and
Hierarquical Authority in Brazilian History - An Approach and Some
Data", forthcoming.

(3) Political Order, p. 12.

(4) The functionality of conflicts as a function of their level of intensity
is something which was left outside the classic study of Coser on
Simmel. Cf. Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, Glencoe,
The Free Press, 1956.

(5) E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960.

(6) "Real" here means only that they are not actually contested, that is that these demands are not actually supressed by physical coercion and/or ideological bombardment.

(7) There is a tradition in political sociology to stress the functional aspects of corruptive practices for the workings of the political systems, as far as these practices allow for the institutionalization of some "illegitimate" forms of political participation. This functionality is usually seen as dysfunctional from a technical standpoint, and A. O. Cintra notes that "in the debate between technical and political solutions, the responsibility for corruption is usually attributed to politics". Our discussion shows that the responsibility can also come from the technical side. See, for the functionality of political corruption, the classic example of R. K. Merton in "Latent and Manifest Functions", in Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1957. I am indebted to Antonio Octavio Cintra for drawing my attention to this point.

(8) The difficulty on considering these four levels independently is responsible for many mistakes in the literature on development. Celso Furtado, for instance, in Subdesenvolvimento e Estagnação na América Latina, makes a sophisticated diagnosis of the economic crisis and its difficulties at the political level, but has little to say on the levels of social mobilization and political participation. He refers to the whole process of social development as a process of creation of "massas heterogêneas" (heterogeneous masses), and takes for granted the need and feasibility of an "ideology of development" as the only way out. For more details see my discussion of this book in the Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología, Buenos Aires, 2, 1967.

(9) For insights on the effects of development in the social structure of stratification see David Apter's "Notes on the Theory of Non-Democratic Representation", Berkeley, 1967. See also my "Sôbre a Política do Desenvolvimento", forthcoming in the Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, Belo Horizonte, 1969.

(10) This possibility is the opposite to what Paulo Singer says abouth the Brazilian urbanization. Refering to the two extreme cases of urban growth in the country, Belo Horizonte and São Paulo, he says that "Belo Horizonte developed with a rate only slightly below (São Paulo) - 6.8% - which shows the considerable impulse taken by its industrialization" (the stress is mine). Further on, he tries to explain why São Paulo continued to grow after its industrialization dropped, saying that "the industrial growth brings strong expansion of the tertiary sector of the economy". The implicit theoretical model seems to make

him blind to the fact that, in a place like Belo Horizonte, the dynamic
factors of growth are political and administrative, to which the
industrial activity is secondary and subordinated. This explains also
the crisis of urban hypertrophy which Belo Horizonte is suffering
today. The discrepancies between the processes of industrialization
and urbanization are, in contrast, centrals in the explanations which
Neuma Walker seeks for variations in levels of political mobilization of
Brazilian workers. See Paulo Singer, Desenvolvimento Econômico e
Evolução Urbana, S. Paulo, Companhia Editora Nacional, 1968, and
Neuma Aguiar Walker, The Mobilization and Bureaucratic Cooptation of
Working Class in Brazil, Washington University, Ph. D. Dissertation,
1969. See also my Urbanización y Desarrollo en Brasil, eventual
papers, Fundación Bariloche, 1966.

(11) Analysis of leads and lags in the process of development,
suggested, among others, by Karl F. Deutsch in his classic
article on social mobilization, have been developed independently by
different authors with usually gratifying results. One of these lines is
represented by Rosalind and Ivo K. Feierabend, who develop an index
of "systemic frustration" by the comparison between indicators of
"want formation" (education, mass media, urbanization) and "want
satisfaction" (economic growth). Another, more structural research
line is of the University of Zurich - Fundación Bariloche team,
directed by Peter Heintz and Manuel Mora y Araujo. See Karl W.
Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", in Finke and
Gable (eds), Political Development and Social Change, New York, Wiley,
1966; Rosalind and Ivo K. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behavior Within
Politics, 1948-1962 - A Cross-National Study", Journal of Conflict
Resolution 10, 3, 1966; Peter Heintz, Un Paradigma Sociologico del
Desarrollo, Buenos Aires, forthcoming; Simon Schwartzman and
Manuel Mora y Araujo, "Proyecto sobre Tensiones Sociales y Desarrollo",
Boletin, Departamento de Sociologia de la Fundación Bariloche, 3, 1967;
Manuel Mora y Araujo, Conflicto y Desarrollo: Un analysis comparativo"
Desarrollo Económico 7, 28, 1968; Simon Schwartzman, "International
System and Intra-national Tensions - A Research Report", Bulletin,
Instituto de Sociologia de la Fundación Bariloche and Soziologishes
Institut der Universitaat Zurich, 8, 1968; Ruben Kaztman, Dependency
and Absorption of Social Tensions in Underdeveloped Countries,
Bulletin 4, 1967; Alaor Passos, "Developmental Tensions and Political
Stability", Journal of Peace Research 1, 1968; and different articles
by Heintz, Hoffman-Nowotny, E. Archetti, O. Aguello and others in
different issues of the Bulletin.

(12) We seem to be confronted here with a rather difficult methodologi-
cal question. These two starting points correspond to two
different schools of political analysis, one more historical and institu-
tional and the other more theoretical and sociological. We could

translate these differences, in more modern terms, as the difference between the inductive approach, which uses the coefficient correlation as its main tool, and the more systemic and functional approach. These two approaches have coexisted in the literature without a satisfactory integration, and it is possible to point out some of the differences between them:

a) both approaches work with relations among variables, but while the inductive approach looks for the probability of a given supposed relationship, the systemic analysis look for the probability of maintaining (or not) a given concrete relationship. The systemic analysis uses thus, for a particular case, the generalizations obtained by the inductive analysis;

b) the inductive analysis seeks for variables logically interconnected and empirically associated -- it is colled "theory" -- while the systemic analysis looks for specification of variables in a given empirical setting -- it is what is called a "model", in one of its meanings;

c) theories are thus worked out "from bottom up", as a combination of isolated variables, while models are constructed "from the top down", starting from the concrete system one tries to analyse. The drama of the inductive theory is that it seldom goes above the integration of a handful of variables to the elaboration of more complex theoretical systems. The drama of systemic analysis and model building is that it seldom goes above the generalities, in one case, or the concreteness of an empirical system in the other.

We could think on the analysis of processses and the analysis of systems as extremes of the same continuum, and the difficulty is to go all the way starting from one of the extremes. Why do not try to start in both at once?

(13) The expression "political culture" appears often in the literature to characterize the types and forms of political participation in a given society. The inconvenient of this expression rests in its proximity with the theories of "national character", which sought for regularities of behavior as functions of some characterologics'traits of the nations. This social antropomorfism appears again in the Civic Culture, when the roots of some patterns of behavior are sought for not at the level of the political system or of the processes of socio-economic change, but in the socialization process of the child. Cf. Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond, The Civic Culture, Little Brown & Co., 1965.

(14) Cf. Magali Sarfatti, Spanish Bureaucratic Patrimonialism in America, Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1966. And for Brazil, among others, Antonio

Octavio Cintra, "A Função Política no Brasil Colonial", Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos 18, 1965; and Raymundo Faoro, below.

(15) Reihart Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry, New York: Wiley, 1956.

(16) David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1965.

(17) Antonio Octavio Cintra and Fabio Wanderley Reis, "Política e Desenvolvimento: O caso brasileiro", América Latina 9, 3, 1963.

(18) Umpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1968.

(19) Os Donos do Poder (Pôrto Alegre, Editora Globo, 1956). This thesis is obviously not uncontested. Cintra notes for instance that "D. Pedro and his closer colaborators were completely unable to solve the slaveis problem in spite of their strong desires to do it through decades, because the Lords of coffee in the Paraiba valey simply did not let them". And goes on "Nestor Duarte (A Ordem Privada) and Maria Isaura Pereira de Queirós ("O Mandonismo Local na Vida Política Brasileira", Anhembi 24-26) hold the hypothesis that the whole political system was little more than a tiny political superstructure without much autonomy and dominated by the local bosses. Hence, according to these authors, the discrepancy between ideologies, laws, etc., and the actual structure of power, which was rather disperse and local" (A. O. Cintra, personal communication. See also about the concentration of power in Brazilian executive in recent years the work of N. Leff, Economic Policy-Making in Brazil, New York, Willey, 1969).

(20) Harvard University Press, 1962.

(21) Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship, Boston, Beacon Press, 1967.

(22) The Politics of Modernization, p. 40 and others.

(23) The essential difference between intelligence and other types of information is that political information leads a system to readjust itself to new realities of the environment, while intelligence data is mainly a feed-back of the system on itself. The self-readjustment of a system to new information – the quality that Karl Deutsch calls "autonomy" – depends also on the system's capacity to keep its integrity, which can be a matter of internal resources of other type. To open completely to information, or to rely exclusively on intelligence, seems to be alternative ways of coping with the same problem of little autonomy.

This problem has many bifurcations, that can be further discussed in the terms suggested by K. Deutsch in his Nerves of Government, specially chapters 11 to 14.

An example of the preponderance of intelligence upon information is the many difficulties brought for the American government by its intelligence agency in the area of foreign affairs, of which the Bay of Pigs incident is perhaps the most notorious. The reliance of the American political establishment on intelligence for internal affairs is much smaller, and cannot remain for long when it occasionally occurs. In Latin America, however, internal intelligence seems to be an esential instrument of data gathering of the military regimes. Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, and Peter Heint, "El Problema de la Indecisión Social en el Desarrollo Económico" Anales de la Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, I, 1, 1964. For an application of Heintz'model to Brazil see Alaôr Passos, "Transição e Tensão nos Estados Brasileiros", Dados 5, 1968.

(24) Schattschneider, p. 3.

(25) The depolitization of the international relations issues in the United States of 1958, as related to questions of civil rights, is clearly shown by Miller and Stokes in their article on the "Constituency Influence in Congress". (American Political Science Review 57, 1, March, 1963). The correlations between the perceptions the representatives have of the voters' attitudes and the actual attitudes of the voters was of .63 for civil right issues, but fell to .19 on issues of foreign relations. The correlation between the voters' and the representatives' attitudes on foreign affairs was as low as .06.

(26) Huntington, pages 196.

(27) Huntington, pages 196 and 197.

(28) Schattscheider, p. 50 and ff.

Abstract

Political Development and Political "Openess"

A political system is more open if it absorbs and legitimates more demands for political participation in a given society. The discussion of the concept of political "openess" implies the distinction between the "non-political" participation, which does not go beyond the level of the specific interest of groups and the political participation as such, which is more general. The merely functional and specific participation seems to be a characteristic of the "closed" or "participationist" type of political systems and it causes a series of consequences that are discussed, among which the creation of structural propensities towards technocratization and administrative corruption.

The phenomenon of the political "openess", as a global dimension characterizing the political system of participation is approached through two sets of variables. First such usual variables as economic development, urbanization and increase of social participation. The second set contains the more strickly political variables. Briefly, these relate the level of institutionalization of the political system. At a closer sight, they have to do with the nature of the political system as it derives from solutions historically found by the power system for the problems of socio-economic growth within the society. The first of these processes leads to a specific type of demands for political participation. The author suggests a typology of such demands, in terms of participation in inputs, outputs and cathetic components. The second of the processes is more difficult to conceptualize. The integration of explanations of a historical type (R. Bendix, B. Moore, A. Gerschebkron) seems to provide a more satisfactory perspective. It goes beyond the more reasoning in terms of levels of institutionalization.

After having conceptualized the political "openess" and the two main sets of independent variables, the author turns to a more detailed characterization of the dimensions of the political "openess" and its implications. He discusses the two alternatives existing between "information" and "intelligence" and their implications use to the rigidity of the system. The differences between decisions and policies as well as those between the prevalence of issues of interests and issues of scope are some of other aspects dealt with. In the last place, the author describes the differences between the technical and the political approach as to issues of development and social policy. The social costs of a "closed" political system seem to be high enough to justify en effort in arriving at political solutions that might keep the system "open" and expanding.

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RIO DE JANEIRO ROUND TABLE - 27/31 october 1969

RAPPORT / PAPER

THE "ARGENTINE REVOLUTION of 1966

AND

THE NATIONAL PROJECT

by Dario CANTON

THE "ARGENTINE REVOLUTION" OF 1966 AND THE NATIONAL PROJECT

by Dario Canton (x)

Introduction

It is our intention in this paper to consider two topics interrelated with each other and with the present political situation: first, the reason for the "Argentine Revolution"; secondly, the possibility of structuring and putting into practice what may be called a "national project". In the first part, to acquaint the reader with the state of affairs, we shall give, not only the official version, but also various "off-the-record" versions, expressed by writers with government connections, before proceeding to our own. In the second, our comments will be restricted to an appreciation of the forces and potentialities available.

Since this work, as it stands, was practically finished by the middle of May, 1969, that is to say before things came to a head in the last few days of the month with the successful strike of May 30, a postscript was added on June 20 in guise of self-criticism and to expand upon certain points.

(x) I have to thank Juan Carlos Portantiero, who at first was to be the joint author of this work for his collaboration in the form of intelligent queries and comments.

I. Why the "Argentine Revolution" took place.

It is our opinion, and we shall try to justify it later, that the "Argentine Revolution" up till now has been a counter-revolution that can be examined either in the context of the years that have passed since the fall of Perón, or in the broader one going back to the application of the Saenz Peña law. * In the first case, it may be said that the restricted democratic representation (with proscriptions) that was operative between 1958 and 1966 proved to be unworkable for managing the State and preserving the status quo, bringing dissatisfaction to the ruling groups, and clearly even less workable as regards stisfying the grievances of the middle and working classes, the only ones that might have been able to take advantage of the system, in which, to be sure, they did not believe.

Here it is that a reference to the broader context is pertinent. The sanction of the Saenz Peña law in 1912 and its enforcement signified the fulfillment, at long length, after several decades of mendacity, of the premises on which the Argentine constitutional regime was based. This accomplishment, so stubbornly resisted, was fated to be opposed no less energetically when it was perceived that it might bring about changes in the power situation. Looked upon in this light, the rise of Yrigoyen and subsequently the government of Perón—however modest his "revolutionary" achievements may seem, viewed from a wider angle—are seen to be disgraceful, almost diabolical, instances that must not recur. This vision is coupled, incidentally, to that which may be held of it at the other extreme by the popular sectors. That is to say that if, on the one hand, effective universal suffrage turned out to be a dangerous instrument of change for maintenance of the existing system of power and, as such, it was inadvisable to continue using it, on the other hand, in view of the monopolization of force in key sectors of the social structure, this electoral innovation showed its enormous limitations when it came to bringing about an effective change in the power relationship.

So much for an overall view, by way of introduction. Let us now go on to a few official and off-the-record versions before giving our own in greater detail.

The causes that led to the downfall of the Illia government, according to a summary that is not ours but which seems to us to be adequate, would seem to be [1]:

(1) Lack of an authentic policy incorporating all the representative sectors in the affairs of the nation (rupture of the spiritual unity of the Argentine people);

(2) Insufficiency of authority (rupture of the principle of authority);

(3) Absence of order and discipline;

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* This law instituting universal suffrage and compulsory voting was inspired by Roque Saenz Peña, President of the Republic from 1910 through 1914, and passed in 1912. — Translator

(4) Electioneering that erected the option into a system;

(5) Monetary inflation aggravated by insatiable statism (chronic deterioration of the financial economic life);

(6) International prestige of the country seriously impaired by vacillation and indifference;

(7) Existence of rigid outdated economic and political structure;

(8) Fallacy of a sterile, formal legality.

These are the reasons that emerge from official documents, together with more general proposals: "(1) To fill the power vacuum left by the previous authorities; (2) To ensure national unity; (3) To make general wellbeing possible; (4) To modernize the country by incorporating the new elements of culture, science and technology."[1] Finally, the political objectives would seem, fundamentally, to be two: in the immediate future, to reestablish an authentic representative democracy, and thereafter to rechannel the country along the road to greatness, projecting that greatness abroad.[1]

Unable to evade the fact that, after all, it is a question of a _military_ "revolution", that is to say of a new intervention of the Armed Forces in the political life of the country, some of the unofficial — but officially inspired — accounts give a broader version in the light of a biased interpretation of political history.

The topic of "concord", "unity" and its opposite, "discord", political "crisis" and so on, holds a privileged position. Argentine political history is viewed, either in the last twenty or thirty years, or from the very beginning of our existence as a nation, as a struggle of irreconciliable fractions; these fractions, moreover, never succeed in coming to agreement (and herein lies the "problem" of "noncommunication"), hence the necessity of an intervention of a higher order entrusted, by reason of their strength, organizing capacity and national sentiment, to the Armed Forces. Unitarians and federals, radicals and conservatives, Peronists and anti-Peronists, these are some of the divisions that are said to have always hampered the development of the country and prevented it from scaling the heights of grandeur that are within its reach. Mariano Grondona, for instance, affirms:

> "It is questionable whether the Saenz Peña scheme would have been feasible. It is the sempiternal theme of concord. If the 'aperturist' cause had prospered, conservatives and radicals, patricians and plebeians, would have been able to transform their 'war' — a struggle without rules — into 'competition' — no less a struggle, but rules in common — and the nation would have been integrated more fluidly. But this is not what happened: both sides se themselves up as mutually exclusive 'alternatives' and in doing so, invited force to come on stage."[2]

This is also the opinion of José Manuel Saravia hijo, dealing with an earlier situation:

> "The Peronist experiment is an important stage in the evolution of this endemic crisis. The scission of the country into two irreconciliable factions brought into evidence, with the tragic clarity of a problem with no apparent solution, the fact that we were not simply drifting: we had lost even the possibility of arriving at that minimum of understanding without which the nation disappears and common endeavor ceases to be feasible."[3]

And lastly we have the thesis of José Luis de Imaz, defended in Los que mandan*, where he says that Argentine society is:

> "a society racked with crises of appraisal, divided and split into watertight compartments, and where different sources of legitimacy are propounded — simultaneously and excludingly — by the groups at loggerheads."[4]

In which:

> "the intervention of the Armed Forces in politics has always been a consequence of the crises of legitimacy that have shaken the country periodically, or of cicumstantial power vacuums."[5]

In short, according to these versions, civil "disorder" yields ground to the appearance and intervention of the forces of order. Something like what happens in the street, for example, when a traffic cop intervenes to put a stop to a dispute between two motorists who have had a collision. In both cases, as scientists, we record the intervention of a third instance, without passing any further judgment.

There are other references, however, that will allow us to come a little closer to our subject. Among others, those of this ilk:

> "The Argentine Revolution has dissolved the political parties, for institutional anarchy was provoking a climate favorable to extremist excesses, and creating conditions suitable for a subtle, agressive materialistic penetration into every area of national life."[6]

For this interpretation:

> "The achievement of the democratic process as a way of life is reserved for citizens responsible for whatever decisions they are called upon to make."[6]

And democratic politics:

> "In turn, cannot arrive other than gradually, according as to whether a greater or lesser degree of 'political maturity' comes into play to condition with neither hesitation nor haste the concrete ways of institutional participation of the citizenry."[6]

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* Lit. "Those who command", i.e. the men in power or who wield the power. — Tr.

We may go a step further than this "lack of maturity" and "institutional anarchy... favorable to extremist excesses" and situate the problem more accurately within the frame of the world political situation, as General Osiris G. Villegas did a few years ago. 7 To take this stand, it is important to indicate "some of the principles and techniques of an essentially ideological struggle, applied to subversion, which are extremely interesting in order to understand what is happening in the world, in America, and in our own country", as he says in his Preface. To his way of thinking, it is clear that the world is divided into two antagonistic blocs, and he views with equal lucidity the place allotted to Latin America and Argentina in this schismatic lineup:

> "...it is, therefore, inevitable to wonder, in the face of certain ambiguous assertions of dubious validity, where Latin America stands in the international scene, inasmuch as she won her independence more than a century and a half ago, peopled her territory with European immigration, and built up her culture on western foundations. We can reply, without fear of error, that the Latin American countries are committed to, and form part of, a system that has provided formulas of its own for mutual defence and reciprocal support, and have concluded agreements (bilaterally and multilaterally) which condition national affairs of state to the benefit of the American community of nations. We belong, then, to the Continental Bloc; this is the reality that cannot be concealed behind readymade phrases, and rhetorical declarations or principles that time has outdated." *

This being so, the existence of communism and its intentions of world domination, according to Villegas, pose the following query:

> 'Can democracy stand up to communism with any likelihood of success ? In this case, to what point can this stand be carried without infringing the proceedings and principles that lie at the very base of democracy ? Or, on the contrary, is it necessary to defend freedom by ways of action that are just the opposite of what is preconized by the democratic ideal ?"8

From there he goes on to dwell upon some historical examples:

> "Spain succeeded in overcoming communism by applying an undemocratic regime, after winning a civil war from which it has not yet fully recovered despite the years that have elapsed. Would this example be applicable to other countries of the western bloc ? It seems improbable; in Cuba, the

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* Op. cit.7, p. 123. The last statement in this quotation seems to refer to the principal of non-intervention, also queried by Mariano Grondona, op. cit., p. 25: "Time has gone by, however, and the doctrine of non-intervention, which might protect the communist advance on the continent today, and furthemore create centers of subversion within our frontiers in view of the helplessness of the defensive system of the Americas, continues to be supported by us unchanged...."

internecine fighting to dislodge a tyrannical regime handed
over the power to communism. A timely political economic
plan, intelligently carried out, half-saved, from among the
ruins of the Second World War, the countries of Western
Europe, but they have remained, in their juridical and so-
cial structure, ideologically infiltrated to no mean degree.
Would the same success attend a similar plan in the insuf-
ficiently developed countries of the free world ?"[9]

The last question in this citation is, in our opinion, the
master key in view of the coup d'état of 1966 and the position
held by General Villegas as secretary of the National Security
Council since then.

In a previous work we analyzed the Argentine military inter-
ventions in the course of this century, interrelating them with
the political evolution in the same lapse of time.[10]   It was point-
ed out then that the Armed Forces had attained professional hier-
archy under the oligarchical domination, that popular uprisings
had disappeared with the effective organization of the Army, which
ushered in the era of coups d'état, and that the foundation of the
first Masonic lodges took place during the government of the first
president elected by popular vote (Yrigoyen, 1916-1922). Looked
at from this angle and bearing in mind a very rough division, but
one which actually did sunder Argentine politics, between the pop-
ular parties (the radicalism of Yrigoyen, and Peronism) and the
rest (both the extreme right and the extreme left, which confronted
the former respectively as much in 1928/30 as in 1946/55), the
question we put forward is what would seem to have been the polit-
ical orientation of the military coups d'état and in which cases
were they successful. All this, of course, on the basis of an
interpretation that accorded adequacy to the advent of the process
of increasing popular participation set in motion by the Saenz Pena
law, and that of the growing trade union awareness and of the orga-
nizing capacity brought to the working classes by Peronism. This
means that, taking the latter as a positive, inescapable fact, we
wanted to know what the role of the Armed Forces had been with re-
gard to that process. The following table makes it quite clear:

Orientation and outcome of the military coups d'état in Argentina: 1900 — 1966

Outcome	Military Coups d'Etat			
	For Popular Parties	Against Popular Parties	No Connection	Total
Successful	—	8	2	10
Unsuccessful	11	2	8	21
Total	11	10	10	31

It will be seen that no military revolt in favor of a popular party has ever succeeded (the eleven attempts failed). On the contrary, the majority of the uprisings against popular parties have been successful (in eight cases out of ten).*

This goes to show that the military interventions did not occur at random and that the student should look beyond a mere account of the facts. Or, to return to our earlier example of the parallel between military intervention when a political crisis arises and the behavior of the policeman in the case of an automobile accident, the important point is to find out who gets the best of the intervention (that is, the motorist who is not arrested).

Once again the reply seems to be clear, but it may be still better demonstrated by analysing the relationship between the elections in Argentina since 1912 and the attitude of the Armed Forces. Thus it appears that:

1. In no case have the Armed Forces intervened to redress an electoral injustice, i.e., to support a party that would have been legitimately victorious at the polls (as in April 1931 and March 1962, with radicalism and Peronism respectively).

2. In no case have Armed Forces intervened to cancel elections held fraudulently or with political proscriptions, when the latter injured the popular parties (in the periods from 1931 to 1943 and 1958 to 1965).

3. In no case have Armed Forces intervened to prevent an imminent fraud that would have signified the continuance of the status quo.**

4. The most the Armed Forces have done is to remain neutral and/or tolerate the verdict of the polls when it favored the continuity in office of the government of the people's party when it was already in power (1922 — although radicalism at that time was represented by its right wing; 1928 — with the highest popular vote obtained up till then, by a government that had been defeated two years before; 1951 — but coinciding with the veto of Eva Perón's candidacy for the vice-presidency and the first military uprising under Perón; 1954 — but with two military coups shortly afterwards, the second of which was successful).

To sum up, our interpretation was that the Armed Forces, while not merging into the traditional oligarchy — far from it — or the groups into which it was transforming, had acted throughout this period generally to bolster up the defence of its positions and had even concluded by taking over the leadership from it. In this perspective, Argentine political history in the present cen-

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* The cases of "no connection" belong for the most part to the period of 1955-65, when there was abundant internal dissension.

** A pertinent case was the coup of 1943, which was certainly not designed to give back the power to the radicals by free elections.

tury may be interpreted as a process of increasing assumption by the popular classes of their role in domestic public affairs, achieved through universal suffrage. This growing role conflicted however with the interests of the dominant sectors which endeavored to curb "mobilization" within "adequate" limits. In the light of this interpretation, the Saenz Pena law was a necessary evil for the groups then in power, with which they hoped to gain legitimacy for the system through ratification, by the ruled, of the rulers. It is known that the ruled thought otherwise, and from then on, the activity of the rulers consisted in constant attempts to keep control of the situation. From 1930 to 1943, a first "demobilization" took place, only to be followed by a second "mobilization", carried out with the auspices of the Armed Forces, under the management of Perón. But this movement also turned out to be "dangerous" and we come to a second "demobilization": that which followed the fall of Perón. The Peronist party was proscribed and the other political forces volatilized, but the framework of the popular movement remained intact, strongly anchored to the trade union organization. With the prospect of elections that might return it to power being held in 1967, the need was felt for a third "demobilization" together with a total shutdown of the system and a political eclipse that is likely to last for many years. After that, there is the promise, when "adequate" conditions come about, of being able to return to representative democracy.

This process, described as it were in function of the internal forces, admits of a second rendering. It was also pointed out in that work that the only cases of friction between the Armed Forces (in particular the Army) and the more traditional forces ("oligarchy" in the broad sense) had been brought about by situations of world conflict between forces or powers in opposition, but only within the capitalist field (the cases of World War I and II, fundamentally with Germany on one side and Great Britain and the United States on the other). In this context, the Armed Forces, owing to their pro-German orientation, considered their best guarantee of security from the United States (and certainly from communism) to be the maintenance of the bonds with Germany — which, after all, had never been allied to Russia, except ephemerally. This, among other reasons, was the cause of Argentine neutrality.

But with the unification of the capitalist world as a result of the predominance of the United States, and given our position in the ideological system, there were no longer any "independentist", i.e. isolationist, alternatives that could be claimed, in word or deed.* The neutrality of Argentina, formerly upheld by

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* Cf. Grondona, op. cit,[2], towards the end (p. 247): "For long years, the interests of Latin America and the United States did not come into conflict. Those were the years of development, when Latin American growth consolidated the western alliance, avoiding any risk of communistic subversion. During that period, Latin America was not to fall into useless anti-imperialistic rebellion or tie her hands to hegemonic power, thereby entailing her future. All of those years, Latin America was to do nothing else but: grow."

the Armed Forces with regard to inter-capitalist conflicts, made no sense when what was at stake was the very existence of the system in which it would have to be maintained. Otherwise expressed, this meant that formerly (World Wars I and II) it was a question of struggles that were to decide who would dominate us, in our role as a dependent country, when victory was won. But the contestants were practically identical, though speaking different tongues. Now the issue is not quite the same: another way of life is contemplated, a possibility is extended of leading an existence on other lines than those of the "Western, Christian" model. To this, and to anything that might lead to this, the answer is a categorical "No!". Furthermore, the experience of history teaches caution, and the Armed Forces, being those with the most experience, are those who are entrusted with this vital task.

In the light of this broader interpretation, then, the two developments, internal and external, coincide. The political mobilization of the Argentine nation takes place within the frame of a more or less parallel world evolution and is to be construed together with it. The appearance of communism and its dissemination all over the world implies dangerous changes, the risks of which must be shunned within the country. What is important is to maintain the positions of power, though this imply the negation of the very premises of the system, as well as the negation of the autonomy that gives a meaning to that same system (what kind of nation — in the sense of a sovereign nation — is that ?)*

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* Another interpretation of the military interventions is that of Carlos A Floria, as expressed at an I.D.E.S. conference in 1968, when, while remaining within the more general scheme we have criticized in this paper, he emphasized the internal cohesion of the Armed Forces as being the main motive for those interventions (cf. also "Ideología y modernización" [Ideology and modernization], ch. VIII of Revolución Argentina, op. cit.[1], especially pages 148-9). According to him, the Armed Forces only intervened outside their normal range of action as a means of ensuring unity within their ranks. This interpretation ignores the evidence we have adduced, apart from failing to explain why intervention in the political sphere occurred at some times and not at others, and whither that "unity" tends, once the "divisions" have been overcome. It also supposes a very peculiar institutional reaction, in support of which I do not think there are many examples to be found in other organizations or, if confined to the Armed Forces, in their counterparts in other lands. As regards our country, the succession of events does not seem to have been the same as that suggested in Floria's thesis. In actual fact, the purge of the "colorado" party would seem to have been a prerequisite to open intervention by the Army in 1966 (cf. José N. Saravia, op. cit.[3], p. 29).

What can be retained of this thesis of Floria's, though with quite a different accent, appears to be the connection between the corporative, professional interest of the Armed Forces and the military or non-popular governments, as being more functional for meeting their demands. This can be seen, for instance, in the words of Navy Commander-in-Chief Pedro Gnavi, speaking on Navy Day in Argentina (día de la Armada Argentina), quoted in La Razón of May 17, 1969 on page 1: " ... the Navy ... today has once more become a pioneer in

II. Possibilities of a national project.*

If we define the national project of a country as being one that, backed by the majority of the population, sets out to achieve the greatest possible autonomy in relation to the countries with which it finds itself most significantly in interaction, we cannot say that the "Argentine Revolution" deserves to be considered as such.** To our way of thinking, the aims in view are precisely the opposite, namely, to consolidate the positions of power internally within the frame of a closer dependence, initially, as a possible means of securing support (legitimacy) at some vague future date. From this point of view, due allowance being made for changing circumstance, the project of the "Argentine Revolution" does not seem so far removed from that of the 1880 generation, whose basis of prosperity was the connection with Great Britain and who did not worry much about the legitimacy of the system until the moment that the situation looked like becoming hazardous; now the intention would seem to be to strengthen the ties with the United States, with no change in the concern for legitimacy —it is put off tomorrow, which is the best way of neglecting it today.[1]

Our query in this section will be: What possibilities are there of concretizing a national project of the kind we have roughly described and what will be the results for want of it ? Further,

the immensity of our seas; ... a temptation for strangers who have been stripped of their immunities by the action of vigilance and control that we have imposed with the backing of government decisions. But this task, owing to the age and the wear and tear of the available units, demands great efforts and a high spirit of sacrifice. This situation has not varied fundamentally, but at least we can affirm that the problem has been grasped by the high organs of government, by the military command, and —substantially — by the country itself. ..."

* The discussion which follows is inevitably tentative and general in character. It is based on the role played in Argentine politics by the sectors analysed, in the course of the last few decades, and on the interpretation of recent pertinent materials (official surveys by various agencies, statements published by request in the newspapers, etc.). We have not made a circumstantiated analysis, as might be expected for presentation herein; it is evident that, for greater precision, we should have examined in detail the internal divisions of each of the sectors alluded to, since they are really not homogenous.

** The qualifier national refers to the origin of the project but does not presuppose limitations as regards geographical scope or content — which may imply, precisely, proceeding upon the conviction that any merely "national" action (on the scale of most of the Latin American nations) is almost certainly condemned to failure, given the existing disparity of forces.

who will be able to carry it out and under what conditions ?
First, to define our standpoint, it may be affirmed that the
project can be arrived at, either by a clear ideological aware-
ness in key sectors of the social structure which can, at any
given moment, restructurate the interplay of internal forces, or
by external pressures exercising force upon the situation inter-
nally. Let us see now what that situation is in Argentina, con-
sidering the sectors one by one.

It is the Army, as we have said before, that is in charge
of leadership of the country, following upon a fairly long drawn
out process of evolution, of corporative organization and conse-
quent weight in politics.[12] This process has coincided with the
exhaustion of the traditional political parties and their leading
cadres, and likewise of liberal ideology as a panacea for curing
all the ills that afflict the country. From this angle, the Army
is apparently in a position to support a national project. Never-
theless, this is not so, and fundamentally for two reasons: (a)
a lack of ideological definition of their own; (b) a lack of
suitable indoctrination now and for the future.

The lack of an ideological indoctrination of their own is
related to the fact that the Armed Forces have always operated as
a conservative element in Argentine society, remaining neutral
and only supporting popular movements in the face of international
intercapitalistic conflicts. In this context, they have backed
projects that were more national than those pursued by the "live
forces" of the nation or the majority of representative associa-
tions of trade, industry and farming (and the corresponding major-
ities, at least in terms of economics, within each of them), at
times like those of the first and second world wars, but without
going any further than the characteristic ideological limits of
those same entreprises or management associations.

The most important exception— but always within the range
of our thesis— would seem to be that of the Peronist experiment
at a moment when the Armed Forces were supporting a popular move-
ment just the opposite of the views of important sections of the
traditional economic forces.* Although this seems to me funda-
mental in its significance as a precedent that leads us to specu-
late on its possible repetition, it would be as well to recall the
attendant circumstances and eventual limitations.[13] The setting
was that of an internal political situation in which the Armed
Forces had made a revolution under a political banner contrary to
liberalism, a revolution that, with the downfall of Nazism, saw
its every move countered from without and from within alike. Faced
with this situation, and not without considerable resistance among
themselves, the Armed Forces accepted a way out of the impasse in
the shape of a popular leader from their own ranks to further the
application of a "national" project. But the latter could rely on

* It is not the only exception. There have been other attempts at movements
within the armed forces in support of popular parties, but they have not
been successful.

the support of sectors of great importance to guarantee its feasibility, such as the Church and not inconsiderable groups of the live forces, apart from the fact that postwar economic conditions facilitated a policy of redistribution in favor of the working classes.

It should not be forgotten, however, that all this was done with the object, as Perón himself declared, of keeping the situation under control, as was subsequently to be proved by the dissolution of the Labor Party, which had to a large extent ensured his triumph, and by his verbal revolutionism, which never materialized from words to deeds.*

Even within the Armed Forces, the situation was far from consolidated. Perón himself, in his 1945 speech, mentioned the existence of dissensions, and they were to come into evidence shortly afterwards, either in connection with the increasing role of trade union organizations or on the subject of lesser, more personal aspects, centering on the figure of Eva Perón and her place in the mechanism of government, which were to come to a head with the veto opposed to her candidacy to the Vice-Presidency in 1951, with all that that meant as a definition, now outside the scope of the regime or the limitations within which it evolved (and here we find the Armed Forces once again in the ideological frame previously discussed).**

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* In my own work on Argentine military interventions[10], are to be found the concepts expressed by Perón in 1945, to the effect that it was necessary to keep pace with the times in order to remain in the forefront of processes and not be overwhelmed by them.[14] By verbal revolutionism is meant, as a concrete instance, the phantom of the workers' militias, conjured up threateningly towards the end of his government.

** Let us see what Magdalena Laffónt has to say about it in her autobiography,[15] were she describes a reception at the Military Club in 1946 to celebrate a national holiday ("fecha patria", possibly May 25, Independence Day) "in honor of His Excellency the President and his wife":

"After a while, we decided to repair to the buffet; and on passing through one of the great state-rooms, my attention was drawn to the fact that the guests there, nearly all women, were arrayed in a circle almost backed up against the paneled walls. The middle of the room was quite empty. There were no strains of music to be heard, so I discarded the notion that a ball was going to be given. Stepping a little apart from the others, I emerged from the ring of heads girdling the salon to try and discover the motive of such expectation. ... There, at the other end of the floor, in the center of a huge piece of furniture, the only sofa, sat the wives of the President and the War Minister — by themselves! ... The crowd were watching them with the same misgivings as visitors betray when they look at the lions in the zoo.

"I felt a chill run down my spine. It wasn't possible! It couldn't be true! ... The Club represented our house, and the most elementary rules of courtesy taught one what is simply not done in one's own house. Then I realized that, as usual, when a handful of people decide to do something, the rest follow suit so as not to make themselves conspicuous.

These ideological limits are the reason why the Armed Forces have never put into practice a project of their own that might coincide with a popular one, except to "manage" it, and that within limits like those we have seen. The result is that their "national" project has always been timid, and when events threatened to bring about deeper changes, it was always set aside, allowing them to take refuge in the traditional ideological trenches. While this is true of the past, it describes the present state of affairs no less accurately: the Army is in charge of the situation, but with the support and consent of the great economic sectors, to pursue policies of the latter's contriving. That is to say that the Armed Forces have not implemented a policy of their own, that might possibly bring them into conflict with those sectors.

This is not all; the training of their cadres, always within the same frame of prudence (and coherence) as before, continues to be such that it is difficult for anything different to be achieved for the future, apart from many other reasons that are related to the characteristics of a country like Argentina, making any reform from within the institution unforeseeable.[16] It is more so; in contrast with the setup of 1945, the connection of the military with economic and financial circles seems to have become much closer of recent years, so that groups of significance within the Armed Forces may eventually join the elite envisaged by certain theorists of the present situation.*

". . . I felt sorry for Perón when they were going to find themselves alone together. And for her also, for having squeezed her way into army society through a forbidden door and felt herself treated as an outcast. I felt sorry too for the army people, who, for lack of reflection, had drawn down on themselves the mortal hatred of this woman by offending her, a hate that was going to make serious trouble, the reach of which would be measured by the degree of influence she managed to achieve.

". . . From that moment, she did everything she could to damage the Army and destroy it. . . . And she would have certainly succeeded, had death not barred the way to her intentions."

And on the death of Eva Perón:
"Not even her enemies rejoiced at her death; yet, however this may be, the event dissipated the threatening cloud that loomed over the future; the menace of armed civil militias, created exclusively to bring the army to its knees, and subject it to them, just as in Germany where the great German army had to submit to the Gestapo.

"Those militias were busy training the hordes of incendiaries, extremists, terrorists, communists and delinquents of every kind. . . ."

* Mariano Grondona states in an editorial published in _Primera Plana_ on December 12, 1967, dealing with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: "Under various forms and at various rates, what is emerging and gaining consolidation in these three nations is something quite new: a political, military and business oligarchy, bent on ensuring the industrialization process through great investments in the infrastructure, and therefore inclined to counteract the premature pressure of the popular sectors."[17]

As to the economic forces, whether those directly linked to North American capital and its representatives, or those that depend on agreements with it for their subsistence, as through new products, patents, replacement of equipment, etc., their quantitative weight seems to be greater, and in this sense it is not foreseeable, as indeed it never has been, that they are likely to be in a position to support any "national" project except one that may come to be imposed upon them. The conditions in which they could do so, indeed, and always within the capitalist field, are increasingly limited, to the extent that the independence of the "European" community appears to be an ever more distant dream or else, should it be feasible, a dream in which we have no part.

From this point of view, their role at the present time is one of furnishing ideological and technical backing for a situation that is basically favorable for them and enables them to plan without "political" interference, although their real weight in terms of popular support is probably nil.

Traditionally, with few exceptions, the Church in Argentina has remained aloof from any national project as defined above, stressing its hierarchy in power situations and endeavoring to gain the utmost possible advantage from each of them. This was the situation under the oligarchy, the conflicts with which were for positions seized, but not in the name of a higher legitimacy, as happened with radicalism, a situation that in a certain way marks the forceful return of the church to a realization of its possible weight on the mass of the electorate. Since 1930, in comparison with what happened at the turn of the century, religion, represented in our country by the Roman Catholic Church, has already acquired another value — instrumental, this time. It is to be the strongest guarantee against the diffusion of "extraneous" ideas, foreign to "our Western and Christian tradition". To this order of ideas belong the Eucharistic Congress under President Justo and, together with eminently political reasons, the measures of the 1943 revolution that were to amass initial support for Peronism. But all of them can be figured as political speculations of the Church to hold and increase its positions and prerogatives, only marginally having anything to do with the subjects under discussion in lay society.

It is only in the last few years and since the fall of Peronism, with the deterioration in the condition of the working classes and the decrees of the Ecumenical Council, that there has appeared in the Argentina Church a movement of renewal that has arrived at clear definitions. This movement, however, has apparently won but a modicum of support from the hierarchy which, in any case, goes no further than certain very general planning that preconizes, moreover, a return to the system of political parties.[18]

All of this means that nothing very different is to be expected of the Church, as an institution, from what it has been up till now, since it depends on the status quo which it helps to support. *

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* This is but a summary judgment arising from an overall survey that is inevitably elemental, but strikes me as being basically correct, although no doubt it has been necessary to ignore the finer shades, as well as periods and person-

The Argentine student, mainly the university student, has gained an unwarranted reputation of being a revolutionary, which has served to justify numerous interventions in the University. This has never been the case: neither under Irigoyen, nor with the Reform, nor when Yrigoyen fell from power, nor when Perón acceded to it, nor when he was overthrown. In general, the student was a liberal in the most traditional style, antimilitarist and statist by education. There have been minorities that were able at one time or another to animate rather more definite policies, but they could only rely on the passivity or acquiescence of the masses, without any real support from them. Their lot was always bound up with that of the middle classes, from which most of their members were recruited and whose apprehensions they may be said to have reflected. Their postulates in the worker and student struggle never were more than just that: postulates, and their social mobility, ideological or real, tended to slant upwards and not the contrary. Whether the situation has changed today and anything different is to be expected, in view of the growing pauperization, uselessness and importance of the Argentine professional and the student that strives to become one, it is hard to say. In any case, such elements could only supply the detonator of a situation, or the planners or backers of a <u>national</u> project, but not the men with the power to guide it to fruition. Moreover, the ideological conflict between the most sentient groups runs very high and has led to dispersal and sterility of their endeavors.*

alities that would have made the picture far more complete. It is to be regretted that no political history of the Church has yet been written in Argentina, for such a volume is sadly lacking in our libraries. From the point of view of what I have been maintaining in the text, there is reason to think of the possibility of a change, which at least would need the neutrality of the public power, difficult to obtain in our case at the present time: what would happen if the priests, discontented with the timidity of the hierarchy, schismatized as a means of achieving their "national" cognation and forcing the Vatican to accept their true representativeness ? After all, the public element (the faithful) enters into play at this point, and it is not altogether improbable that in certain communities, the more "reformist" among the priests may have the strong backing of their congregations. The question of whether that would be enough to create new Catholic groups there, or in distant parts of the country, gives food for thought, however remote the possibility may seem. Their concretization would have to face the authority of the state, of course, if the brand of Catholicism were revolutionary or against the status quo, posing problems of conscience that would be acute indeed for those same churchmen, and, worse still, it would come up against the little or no significance attached to religion amongst us as a living thing. Under these conditions, it seems unlikely that a schismatic movement will take shape as a prelude to effective action.

* This is true, above all of Buenos Aires. In the interior, events seem to be taking a different turn — in the case of the Church too.

If, from this rapid survey of certain significant groups, we transfer our interest to broader sections of the population, fundamentally the middle and working classes, we find the following. The middle class, in our opinion, continues to be a faint-hearted defender of the status quo, above all since its experience of Peronism. On principle, it is the reserve from which the traditional political parties (or "liberals") draw their strength and as such it offers no possibilities of a national project. Ideologically, it would support solutions tending to promote "order" and to guarantee the positions acquired, and, by its identification — starting from the rise of Peronism but even going back to the end of Irigoyenism — with the more traditional sectors, it can be an effective counterweight to any national tentative.

It would seem to be from the working class that greater support could be expected for a national project that recognizes the preponderant role it should play in the country. This is actively opposed on the one hand by the present state of affairs in which it finds itself involved, by a lack of clear perception of its interests so that the avowed goal would seem to be a renewal of the Peronist movement, and by certain aspects connected with the history of the labor movement; on the other hand, by the situation of the working class in Argentina. As regards the former obstacles, the tradition of revolt and the organization of anarchism has won few adepts, remaining on the fringe of the labor movement, which has tended to follow an essentially reformist line since the introduction of universal suffrage in 1912. As regards the situation of the working class, however bad it may have been at certain moments, there have been ups and downs and "good" periods, not to mention the fact that, contrary to what is often asserted on the subject of "noncommunication", its goals and ambitions are akin to those of its dominators, which have been doubly effective: both in controlling the dissimination of "deviant" ideologies, and in spreading their own by mass communication media since a very early date.*

We can now cast back to our original queries. On principle, and except in certain isolated intellectual sectors, there does not appear to have been even the germ of an authentic national project to take root. In its absence, what can happen to the "Argentine Revolution"? In the best of cases, always supposing that the initiative remains in the hands of the men who now hold it, there may occur one of two things: (a) moderate economic development; (b) stagnation.** In the first case, we do not think it in the least

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* Speculations as to the formation of a possible "aristocracy" of labor at first with the sectors attached to large-scale industry, mainly backed by foreign capital, have not been confirmed; nor has the hypothesis that those sectors would naturally support the plans of the government. Personally, at least as I see the situation now, I cannot share either supposition.

** In either case, it is doubtful whether the real economic backing, or as much as the United States is willing to provide, will be much more than nominal.

likely that conditions should turn out to be so good as to justify
calmly running the risk of a way out that implies elections, the
results of which would have to be respected (unless they are "elec-
tions" with built-in security, either before or after, which strips
them of their character of authentic elections).

If stagnation ensues, it will bring back instability (even
without the existence of political parties), a probable change in
the economic and ministerial machinery, including the possible re-
course to elections, with a return to some of the variations in
the system of representatives democracy, which have proved useful
in the past for leaving the power in the hands of the military
(fraudulent continuism with Justo; "apolitic" continuism — but
with proscription — in the case of Aramburu). This, in the assump-
tion that the Armed Forces do not decide now to play their trump
card in favor of a project of their own, which might not coincide
with that of the economic ruling classes, with a view to ratifica-
tion by the working class. But this does not seem possible in the
light of recent Argentine history, unless two things intervene: a
more complete assumption, on the part of the Armed Forces, of re-
sponsibility in the various areas of leadership; a determined at-
titude towards those economic groups with regard to policies that
the latter may feel to be threatening and which may trigger a reac-
tion and lead them to attack. The situation as it is at present is
not at all like that. The Armed Forces are the foundation on which
the system is erected, but they have vested their authority in the
president. The president, in turn, has "subcontracted", as it were,
representatives to plot the economic line to be followed by the
government, and therefore naturally a course is plotted, the conse-
quences of which extend beyond the present. A priori, this pre-
vents the military from setting up a policy of their own (for ours
is the era of technocracy) except on rare occasions, and also makes
it impossible for friction or conflict to arise.*

In any case, if they decided to experiment with a project
of their own, it seems certain that they would go no further than
Perón himself intended, and probably by no means as far. This is
not the only project of their own which we can envisage; if the
situation deteriorates, it is no exageration to forecast a tight-
ening of controls and repression, an evolution that might not come
amiss to the economic forces.

To sum up, given the alliance between the Armed Forces and
the great economic groups, if but slight progress were to be made
in the economic situation, three options would be open to the
former: they might remain active defenders of the status quo
(probably with greater repression), or they might stand aside so

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* Except between certain sectors of the economic forces themselves. What hap-
pens is that, even if it could be said that there were certain sectors that
are prejudiced, they would seem to be of lesser relative influence. They are
sectors, moreover, that are apt to view any possible change in the present sit-
uation with more apprehension than the situation itself, which labels them as
elements with little inclination to support any major modifications.

as not to shoulder the "responsibility" (possibly allowing a "lib-
eral" government to emerge, with themselves as guardians of the
"Constitution"), or they might try an equivalent of Peronism,
scarcely imaginable at the present moment, not only for what it
signified, but because it would seem impossible for the concomitant
alliance of classes to be renewed. That is to say that any attempt
at reiteration in this direction would have to go much further than
Peronism, in which case it sould clash with what we have described
as being the present situation.

From the economic groups in general, as from the majority
of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the middle classes and the stu-
dents, it is likewise vain to expect any initiative that would at-
tempt to overpass the traditional bounds of "Argentine solutions".

Only small groups of students, professional people and the
clergy, and of the mass of the working class, or a large part of
it, can hope for the possibility of a national project. But the
latter alone, supposing it should exist, would not be enough in
the absence of significant support from the other social sectors,
because, among other reasons, of the slight organized combative-
ness of the workers.

What has been said so far, nevertheless, is based on a stat-
ic situation, under control, as it seemed to be at the beginning
of 1969, after two and a half years of "Argentine Revolution". The
apparent consent achieved, this passive "legitimacy" of which the
government is so proud, should not blind us to the realization that
if, on the one hand, it may be interpreted as "passive acceptance",
on the other it may take on the aspect of "compulsory resignation"
or "impotence". These terms do not mean the same thing and lead us
to a query that will naturally come to the fore when, and if, the
authorities get around to planning a popular referendum or find
their leadership questioned: What enemies has the government made
since 1966, under cover though they be and not doing — or unable
to do — much ? It is probable that, if they were to be counted,
a surprising figure might be reached, but it must be remembered
that this government probably takes the blame for the mistakes of
immediately preceding administrations and gleans no merit from their
achievements, for these were indeed few and far between. What
would happen if the protests of the populace, the students and other
groups were gathered into one or coincided temporarily ? It may be
admitted that the government, apart from force, is bereft of friends
or support; the "moral" backing upon which it relies can scarcely
develop into anything more than that, and it would enter into the
systems of "re-exchange", were not the agitation so serious. This
is not to be foreseen; rather do the prospects incline towards a
return to situations like those of military deliberation and con-
sultations with politicians and other "representative" figures, a
state of affairs that, despite all that the present leadership an-
nounces, is to my mind far from being a utopia. Prestigious spokes-
men support this, and there is also the precedent of another general,
Uriburu, whose plans were doomed to fail not long after they were
conceived. On the other hand, without delving into the past, we
we are liable to find that the economic interests, assuming they

were against this way out, would not be so monolithic or so decisive as to countenance continuism without running a grave risk; though attempts of this kind are not quite out of the question.

In any case, supposing that the present "consent" were to shatter, the change would be unlikely to lead to immediate structuration of a national project, either because recourse would be had to a "way out" that would ease the circumambient tension without providing any real solutions, or because the latter have not been planned, or sufficient support is not forthcoming to impose them.

We mentioned at the outset, and in closing it is as well to recall it, that there were two ways of arriving at a national project: by exclusively internal evolution, which is what we have discussed up till now, and by internal evolution under the pressure of external forces. The latter aspect is probably the most important for modifying structures of domination that are strongly persistent.[19] Of course, the pressure must be for or against the forces that contend internally for the national project. If, to complicate the description, we take the case of the power on which Argentina is dependent, namely the United States, it is obvious that — short of a revolution in that country — its intervention could scarcely be in favor of an Argentine national project with the characteristics indicated. But its intervention against it can take on various overtones, all of them capable of being put to use with suitable implementation. Thus, for instance, intervention of the United States embassy in the period prior to the first election of Perón was brandished by him as an anti-imperialistic flag and a means of negotiation that in other hands might have made it easier to construct a project of his own. A more recent example is to be found in Cuba's Fidel Castro, pinned between the wall and the rapier by North American pressure. These cases, however, belong to the past. Nowadays, armed intervention is perfectly acceptable for communists and non-communists alike, and, at least in the non-communist camp, the strengthening of the bonds appears to make such intervention unnecessary, since the control acts from within.

This brings us back again to the internal setup and the possible means of proposing and implementing a national project that is feasible. Here we limit ourselves to an expression of confidence, based on the fluidity of the Argentine situation and certain elements not to be ignored that may contribute thereto:

  (a) The relief that dependence may acquire as a detonator;

  (b) The failure of representative democracy as practiced in Argentina;

  (c) The effective centralization existing in the country in a comparatively efficient and complex state.

Postcript

The agitation that shook the interior of the country more especially, and led to the strike of May 20, unsettled the foundations of the government far more than many people, including the

author, expected. The facts revealed, amongst other things, the
following: (a) broad discontent and fighting capacity in the in-
terior; (b) solidarity of practically all of the population.

From the angle of an observer in the capital, the most glar-
ing omissions in my work are a more detailed up-to-date considera-
tion of three sectors: the Church, the students and the labor
movement. Recent events have clearly shown — though in one note
I reserved judgment about what might happen in the interior — that
there is a true movement of renewal which has not yet been matched
in the Federal Capital. The declarations of many priests in the
provinces (Córdoba, Corrientes, Mendoza, Rosario, Tucumán, etc.)
show a great political and social sensitivity and are much more
revolutionary than those of many of our politicians (traditional
and not traditional); it is possible that the outcome of the con-
ciliar deliberations — and the turn of events, as in Brazil —
induce the Argentine hierarchy to adopt a more militant attitude,
without the need of alternatives such as those suggested in a
foregoing note. Student action, where the phenomenon would have
to be examined separately in state and private universities, seems
for the first time to have put into actual practice long-stated
reformist postulates of "worker-student" action that never were
more than clichés. The labor movement, finally, has swept aside
certain false leaders and trampled down the divisions raised by
others, to set forth their grievances as a united whole. All of
this, which implies a clearer ideological awareness and the pos-
sibility of alliances with sectors that pursue identical objec-
tives, has arisen, moreover, at incipient but apparently adequate
levels of organization, which may bear greater fruit.

Government reaction has been inadequate and within the
expected limits. Little has been done beyond blaming extremists
in general for what was not their doing, as other official spoke-
men have recognized, and erecting a protective mechanism of "weak-
ness", such as equivalents of the former law of residence, and
correction — to increase its efficiency — of the anticommunist law.

Events have also served to bring home to the Armed Forces,
to their obvious chagrin, the evidence that they are not identified
with General Onganía as chief of state. This means that, at the
start, with a fair wind astern, the tenuous distinction between the
Armed Forces "installing a ruler and supporting him" but allowing
him to "rule", and occupying a marginal position "in their specif-
ic functions", passed unperceived, and to some extent Onganía's
triumphs were the triumphs of the Armed Forces; but now, with the
new trends of cicumstance, the tables have been turned. The Armed
Forces can no longer accept responsibility for errors and they
must keep their distance. This distinction, however, or Pontius
Pilate attitude, is evidently reduced to a knife-edge and cannot
last long. In this sense, the contradictions indicated remain
unchallenged: General Onganía might perhaps blunder once more
(and be rewarded with popular repudiation) but the Armed Forces
cannot look on as mere spectators, since he is their representative
(and they support him) as authors of the "Argentine Revolution".
Or, as has been said in the text, the Armed Forces (and Onganía)

can passively endorse, in the most favorable of hypotheses, all
that the specialized leaderships have done (in the fields of eco-
nomics, politics, university administration, etc.), on the grounds
that they had nothing to do with this management. That would leave
two courses open to the Armed Forces: General Onganía might be
allowed to strengthen his position in power, "do as he pleased"
and convert himself into a dictator, thereby somewhat watering down
their responsibility, or they might follow the process more closely
and replace General Onganía by some other representative under sim-
ilar conditions. But this would mean doing the same thing, on the
presidential level, as the general himself is now doing on the
ministerial level. It would, however, enable the situation to be
prolonged for a spell, just as the government is prolonging it now
by shifting public servants from one office to another without
making any real change at all. But the inevitability of change
remains unaltered and the time "gained" in the course of almost
three years may unexpectedly turn out to be "lost".

In this sense, the dilemma the Armed Forces are facing —
and not only they, but all the groups involved in the present situ-
ation — is unescapable: either they must devise a way of riding
out the storm (though having to jettison many of their own tenets
and supposing them to be able to do so) or else run the risk of be-
ing overwhelmed. From this point of view, the future appears to
lie in the hands of the authentic forces of renewal, which have
given proof of their existence in recent events. In the possibil-
ity of those forces organizing and succeeding in concretizing a
national program, over and beyond their contradictions, an authen-
tic way out may be disclosed surpassing the prospects extended, on
one or another facade, by the present leadership of the country.

R E F E R E N C E S

[1] Cf. Ernesto J. Miqueo Ferrero in "Leyes fundamentales argentinas" (Basic
Argentine laws), ch. XII of Revolución Argentina (Argentine revolution),
Ed. Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1966, pp. 203-205.

[2] Mariano Grondona, La Argentina en el tiempo y en el mundo (Argentina in
time and in the world), Ed. Primera Plana SRL, Buenos Aires, 1967, p. 76.

[3] José Manuel Saravia hijo, Hacia la salida (Towards the way out), Emecé
Editores, Buenos Aires, 1968, p. 18.

[4] José Luis de Imaz, Los que mandan, Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 1964, p. 52.

[5] Op. cit., p. 51. The same position is reiterated in Nosostros, mañana
(Us, tomorrow), Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 1968, p.65.

[6] Alberto Castells, in "Bases de un futuro régimen político" (Bases of a
future political regime), ch. VI of Revolución Argentina, op. cit.[1], p. 123;
the two second passages will be found on p. 130.

7 General Osiris G. Villegas, Guerra revolucionaria comunista (Communist
   revolutionary warfare). Ed. Plesmar, Buenos Aires, 1963, Preface.

8 Op. cit., p. 165

9 Op. cit., p. 166

10 Cf. Darío Canton, "Las intervenciones militares en la Argentina: 1900-1966"
   (The military interventions in Argentina: 1900-1966), working document of
   the Centro de Investigaciones Sociales (Social Research Center), ITDT,
   Buenos Aires, 1968.

11 Cf. Oscar E. Cornblit, Ezequiel Gallo hijo and Alfredo O'Connell, "La gene-
   ración del 80 y su proyecto: antecedentes e consecuencias" (The generation
   of the '80's and its project: antecedents and consequences), in Argentina,
   sociedad de masas (Argentina, a mass society) compiled by Torcuato S. Di
   Tella, Gino Germani and Jorge Graciarena, Eudeba, 1965. In general, the
   more recent accounts of this project dwell upon its success for the subse-
   quent structuration of Argentina, but forget its social cost and the fact
   that present "ills" are largely derived from those "goods". That is not
   the case of the analysis cited.

12 Cf. Darío Canton, "Notas sobre las Fuerzas Armadas argentinas" (Notes on the
   Argentine Armed Forces) in Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología, 1965, 3.

13 Two works by Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero: "Crecimiento
   industrial y alianza de clases en la Argentina: 1930-1940 (Industrial
   growth and alliance of classes in Argentina: 1930-1940) and "El movimiento
   obrero en los orígenes del peronismo" (The labor movement at the outset
   of Peronism), working documents of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociales
   (Social Research Center), ITDT, Buenos Aires, 1968 and 1969, resp., are
   of great importance in understanding the phenomenon of Peronism. The
   second of these, despite its deceptive title, contains a lengthy critique
   and a synthesis reshaping the concept of "populism", which, to my mind,
   are very apt.

14 The full text of Peron's speech of 1945 is to be found in Luis B. Cerrutti
   Costa, El sindicalismo, las masas y el poder (Trade unionism, the masses
   and the power), ed. Trafac, Buenos Aires, 1957.

15 Magdalena Laffont, La mujer del militar (a soldier's wife), no editor,
   1963, pages unnumbered.

16 In this connection, additional data is supplied by Robert P. Case, "El
   entrenamiento de militares latinoamericanos en los Estados Unidos" (The
   training of Latin American officers in the United States), in Aportes,
   October 1967, especially p. 55.

[17] On the subject of the "business generals", as he calls them, see Rogélio García Lupo, <u>Contra la ocupación extranjera</u> (Against foreign occupation), Ed. Sudestada, Buenos Aires, 1968.

[18] Declarations of Cardinal Caggiano on May 2.

[19] <u>Cf.</u>, for instance, the considerations of Richard Bendix on the consequences of the defeat of Germany and Japan in the last war, in <u>Nation-building and citizenship</u>, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, London & Sidney, 1964.

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RAPPORT /PAPER

EL POPULISMO MILITAR COMO

MODELO DE DESARROLO NATIONAL :

EL CASO PERUANO

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EL POPULISMO MILITAR COMO MODELO DE DESARROLLO NACIONAL : EL CASO PERUANO

por

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(Instituto de Estudios Peruanos)

Las contínuas intervenciones militares en la vida política de
América Latina han sido interpretadas corrientemente como las
respuestas que adoptan los grupos tradicionalmente dominantes de
nuestros países, para impedir la emergencia de los sectores medios
y populares que persiguem la reestructuración del ordenamiento
social. Es en este sentido que las Fuerzas Armadas han sido conside:
radas verdaderas fuerzas de ocupación y que los grupos reformistas
de variada índole las han denominado, en forma peyorativa, como
"los perros guardianes de la oligarquía".

. Sin embargo, las realizaciones que han cumplido los militares
peruanos durante el primer año de su gobierno y las que ofrecen reali_
zar en forma immediata, que se identifican con medidas de un franco
corte reformista, obligan a reformular tal estereotipo y exigen dife-
renciar el caso peruano de las otras intervenciones militares que se
presencian en América Latina.

Para lograr esta distinción y caracterizar el desarrollismo mi-
litar peruano, consideramos necesario establecer, en forma esquemá-

tica, las bases sociales que dan paso a los distintos comportamientos políticos que se observan en nuestras fuerzas armadas.

A raíz de diferentes cambios en la estructura de la producción, de la crisis de la exportación y del proceso de urbanización en marcha, se destaca en América Latina un período histórico, que se inicia en la década de 1930, caracterizado por la emergencia de capas medias y populares urbanas que persiguen incorporarse a la vida política del país. Esta situación dio paso a la formación de movimientos y partidos populistas que coaligan a estos grupos emergentes y que buscan instalar una nueva dinámica social que considere sus intereses (1).

Se ha entendido por populismo, un partido o un movimiento pluri_ clasista, que a través de relaciones de clientela manipula las masas po pulares en proceso de adaptación urbana, por medio de símbolos caris- máticos, a fin de incorporarlas al sistema social existente por la vía del consumo. El ibañismo, peronismo, varquismo y Rojas Pinilla por un lado, y el Apra, Acción Democrática, el PRI y el MNR son los casos más saltantes que se presentan en nuestros países.

Si bien es cierto que, salvo algunas excepciones, estos partidos o movimientos no han formalizado o explicitado un proyecto político, en términos generales se puede afirmar que el populismo persigue el esta blecimiento de una convivencia entre diferentes sectores de la sociedad, ampliando la base de consumo de la población popular a través de una labor de modernización del país. La significativa ampliación de las ba- ses políticas del sistema permitiría relegitimar a su vez, el régimen de dominación existente.

El logro de este proyecto implica la afirmación de las funciones redistributivas del Estado que se establece mediante medidas de carácter segmentario, clientelista, que conlleva la ampliación del empleo en el sector público. Asimismo el reconocimiento de la participación sindical y política de las masas populares aglutinadas por los partidos populistas.

Para dinamizar este proyecto se favorece el desarrollo indus- trial y se exige una mayor participación del Estado de los beneficios de las grandes empresas extranjeras. Estas nuevas condiciones aseguran la posibilidad de ofrecer empleo y servicios a las masas populares y a los sectores medios movilizados, facilitando su identificación con el Estado-protector y con el régimen social existente.

De esta manera la entronización de los partidos y movimientos populistas favorece la legitimación de la movilización política de los sectores populares, al mismo tiempo que ofrece las bases para su par- ticipación en el sistema social.

En resumen, el populismo persigue la incorporación de los sectores movilizados al sistema de dominación existente por la vía de la ocupación y el consumo. En estas condiciones el cuadro de la dependencia y de la dominación interna se modifica, al ampliarse y diversificarse los recursos con que cuenta la sociedad en su conjunto. Pero esta modificación no altera las posiciones de los grupos tradicionalmente dominantes ni el carácter clasista del sistema social.

Es así como un rasgo fundamental de la política populista es la puesta en marcha de una industrialización basada en la sustitución de las importaciones consumidas por las capas medias y altas, sin afectar el mundo rural tradicional, el papel determinante de las relaciones de dependencia, ni los centros financieros que controlan el comercio exterior. De esta suerte, el financiamiento de la industrialización se realiza gracias a la traslación de capitales agrarios o mineros, de subsidios estatales que se originan mayormente de la imposición de dichos sectores y del financiamiento internacional.

Por lo tanto el populismo, al expandir los recursos del sistema de dominación facilita una mayor participación relativa de la población en estado de movilización social y política, favoreciendo su percepción de mejoramiento relativo.

Pero al perder el sector exportador el dinamismo inicial y al agotarse la posibilidad de sustituir importaciones, conjuntamente con el fortalecimiento de las organizaciones sindicales y políticas populistas, estallan las tensiones sociales que se habían canalizado hasta entonces. Es entonces cuando los sindicatos constituidos durante el período de ascenso populista presionan sobre el aparato estatal, añadiendo al problema del endeudamiento externo – debido al papel que jugara en el crecimiento industrial – el de una fuerte presión inflacionaria. Con el estancamiento económico, y por lo tanto de las posibilidades distributivas del Estado, las masas populares y los sectores medios ven cada vez más recortadas sus posibilidades consumatorias, lo que hace que los conflictos sociales se agudicen y depuren, poniendo en crisis al modelo populista.

En los países donde el populismo cobró mayor significación, como en Brasil y Argentina, las Fuerzas Armadas irrumpen a fin de detener la presión popular que comienza a tener visos insurreccionales, persiguiendo desbancar a las fuerzas populares de las posiciones de poder que el populismo favoreció (2). Esta contensión permitiría detener la espiral inflacionista y reorganizar la estructura económica existente, dando posibilidad a la burguesía para adaptarse a las nuevas condiciones, que daría paso a un nuevo ciclo de crecimiento económico y de disponibilidades distributivas.

El caso de la intervención militar en el Perú, aunque persigue propósitos similares, se establece dentro de un cuadro bastante diferente. Efectivamente las Fuerzas Armadas peruanas tomaron el poder ante una situación de crisis derivada de un intento fallido por forjar un régimen populista. Pero, contrariamente a la tradición, el ejército no se ha erigido para mantener el orden tradicional sino para ejecutar las reformas que se podrían haber esperado de los partidos populistas, pero controlando la movilización política de los sectores medios y populares.

De esta suerte, mientras la intervención en Argentina y Brasil responde a la crisis resultante del desarrollo populista, en el caso peruano pareciera al contrario, preludiar su inicio, aunque dentro de una variante caracterizada por el control de la movilización popular.

Es así como el caso peruano puede ser indicio del establecimiento de una modalidad del desarrollo populista que podría instalarse en los países de "desarrollo intermedio" que no han tenido experiencia populista (3). Para comprender este modelo es necesario presentar sintéticamente las peculiares condiciones de la emergencia y crisis del populismo en el Perú, los cambios en la estructura social que acompañaron esta trayectoria y las modificaciones que en ese lapso sufrieron las Fuerzas Armadas (4).

El populismo en el Perú

Los rasgos fundamentales de la formación contemporánea del Perú se erigieron a partir de fines del siglo pasado, cuando las inversiones extranjeras interesadas en la explotación minera y agrícola hicieron su ingreso masivo en el norte y centro del país, constituyendo verdaderas enclaves económicas. A raíz de esta nueva modalidad de la incorporación económica del Perú al mercado internacional, se produjo el primer proceso de modernización del país, no sólo en sus aspectos tecnológicos sino sociales y políticos.

La formación de estas enclaves trajo una importante traslación de población, proletarización de campesinos independientes, de siervos y aparceros, desplazamiento de antiguas aristocracias regionales y de medianos terratenientes; en suma la eliminación de lo que tentativamente podríamos denominar una clase media tradicional (5). Por otro lado, esta nueva situación favoreció un crecimiento urbano y el inicio de la instalación de manufacturas para el consumo interno. En las zonas rurales en las que no incursionó el capital extranjero, se produjo una intensificación de la explotación campesina, mediante relaciones sociales de tipo servil, a fin de satisfacer las crecientes demandas urbanas (6).

Todo este proceso de reordenamiento social se asoció con la primera efectiva centralización política del país, alrededor de una coalición que comprendía a los terratenientes y "gamonales" acoplados a la explotación agrícola y minera extranjera. Estos terratenientes y gamonales - origen de la "oligarquía" - se encargaban de marginar a la población campesina de los recursos políticos; población que constituía la inmensa mayoría del país.

Es en este cuadro que insurgen durante la segunda década del siglo los primeros partidos políticos populares de masas, el comunista, que tiene un papel muy secundario en la vida política del país y el aprista, que es un caso típico de populismo en Latinoamérica. El partido aprista, uno de los principales protagonistas de la historia contemporánea del país, fue formado por una dirigencia originada de las desplazadas por el proceso de modernización, especialmente de la aristocracia regional del norte y de su clase media rural (7), que aglutinó al proletariado agrícola y minero en formación.

Frente a las restricciones políticas de la oligarquía, formada y sustentada por las inversiones extranjeras, y al modelo de desarrollo abierto que ella postulaba, el Apra planteó el cuadro propio del modelo populista al que hemos hecho referencia anteriormente.

La crisis de los años 30 y la emergencia aprista no provocaron como en los países del cono sur y Brasil, la instauración de un régimen populista, debido al reducido número de la población urbana y de sus sectores medios y populares. Pero de toda suerte, esta emergencia colocó en situación de crisis al sistema político existente, a raíz del desafío que sometía la movilización política de las masas populares que el Apra arrastraba especialmente en los centros azucareros y mineros. Es así como la burguesía oligarquizante, que nunca en la historia del país, con excepción de la década pasada, había logrado constituirse políticamente en clase dirigente y hegemónica, tuvo que recurrir al Ejército para mantener el régimen social existente, propiciándose su papel tutelar del sistema social.

De esta suerte se selló el enfrentamiento del Apra con el Ejército, en tanto representante de la oligarquía. A esto se añade que dicho enfrentamiento significó que el Apra interfiriera y buscara socavar los cimientos institucionales del Ejército en proceso de consolidación, de donde se originaría el veto político del Ejército que hasta hoy pesa sobre el Apra (8). Es así como la década de los años 30 significó una dura represión para el naciente movimiento populista en el país y la consolidación de la alianza de la oligarquía con el Ejército, a la par que el mantenimiento de los rasgos fundamentales del sistema político instaurado en los años 20.

Pasada la guerra y debido a la movilización política urbana y del nuevo espíritu de libertades cívicas, el Apra pudo hacer su ingreso en la vida política del país, intentando instaurar el proyecto que sustentaba. Para ello propició una serie de medidas redistributivas muy restringidas: educación, salubridad, cominicaciones; a la par que propiciaba la organización sindical urbana, pero - y en esto seguía las pautas populistas - sin atentar contra ninguno de los intereses oligárquicos ni del capital extranjero. De allí que la creciente movilización política popular que favorecía, determinó un rápido impasse político que se manifestó por la paralización de la vida parlamentaria. Asimismo, ante las presiones populares, sin que éstas se acompañaran de medidas redistributivas universales, que aumentaran la producción y la capacidad de consumo de la población, se establecería el desenlace típico del sistema, manifiesto en el problema de balanza de pagos y de inflación. De esta suerte, el aprismo falló en incorporar en forma masiva a la población marginada en el consumo y en las medidas distributivas que se podrían esperar de él, especialmente al no provocar un corte en la política económica tradicional y consecuentemente al no implementar una política industrialista. Ante esta situación, el ejecutivo se resolvió por establecer controles de precios de los artículos alimenticios, de las importaciones y de cambios que atentaban contra los intereses oligárquicos.

Frente a estos hechos la oligarquía exportadora propició el golpe de Odría. Además, en 1948 se había entrado en el ámbito internacional en la guerra fría y en diferentes países latinoamericanos se favorecían salidas similares que detuvieran los procesos de emergencia popular.

El período de la dictadura odriísta significó el desmantelamiento de las organizaciones sindicales, estudiantiles y del partido aprista. Pero, paralelamente y a fin de neutralizar el papel del aprismo, el gobierno iría concediendo una serie de ventajas parciales a la población urbana: voto femenino a la población alfabeta, participación de las utilidades de las empresas - que se cumplió en forma muy irregular - salario dominical, ampliación del seguro social, y se recurrió a una política de construcción de obras públicas.

A raíz de la expansión norteamericana, la reconstrucción europea y la guerra con Corea, las exportaciones peruanas cobraron un auge muy significativo que permitió al gobierno contar con fondos en cantidades crecientes, que fueron destinados a obras de infraestructura urbana y que favorecieron el rápido proceso de urbanización en curso.

Es así como en la década de los años 50 se vería, conjuntamente con un crecimiento urbano muy importante, la expansión de un mercado interno de consumo y los inicios de las modificaciones de las relaciones urbano-rurales, que fueron atentando las bases del sistema rural

tradicional hasta llevarlo en poco tiempo al borde de la bancarrota. Este complejo proceso de ampliación y diversificación urbana y de declinación de las bases de dominación en el mundo rural, favoreció una segunda ola de movilización política, constituida por nuevos sectores medios, técnicos y profesionales y una nueva base popular constituida por la población obrera en crecimiento, la campesina de las áreas tradicionales, y la "marginal" de las ciudades. Esta combinación de factores obligó a la dictadura a la convocatoria de elecciones.

El cambio de gobierno en 1956 constituye un momento clave en la medida que se instaura el primer intento de conciliación de los sectores sociales que agrupa el Apra con el de una burguesía urbana que no se encuentra conectada directamente con las inversiones extranjeras. Esta burguesía, que resiente el desplazamiento a que la somete el capital extranjero, busca a través de su participación política acomodarse a ella y a la oligarquía a fin de ampliar su participación en los beneficios que dicho capital genere y de esta manera no verse eliminada del panorama nacional.

La convivencia política tuvo los mismos rasgos que hemos repetido: medidas distributivas de corte segmentario, es decir que perseguían satisfacer aspiraciones inmediatas de sectores específicos de la población a fin de clientelizarlos políticamente, y cuya mejor expresión serían luego las "leyes con nombre propio". Todo esto se realizaba paralelamente a medidas igualmente segmentarias en favor de los distintos sectores de la burguesía, en trance de diversificación, sin atentar contra ninguna de sus bases de poder. Como en anteriores oportunidades, la inflación y el problema de la balanza de pagos se volvería a presentar llevando a situaciones de reordenamiento a fin de ajustarse el modelo abierto planteado por la oligarquía exportadora.

La diversificación de la burguesía con la formación de sectores empresariales, la inflación, que penalizaba fuertemente a los gamonales, y el proceso de urbanización, fueron desgastando los recursos de los que se podía valer el sistema de poder oligárquico. Además de esto, la movilización campesina y urbana in crescendo a la que el Apra daba la espalda, debido a su reciente asociación con la burguesía, favoreció la constitución de nuevas organizaciones políticas de corte reformista, competitivas del Apra y que lograron aglutinar a la nueva población políticamente activa.

El año de 1962 - poco después de la Revolución Cubana - se enfrentaron las dos organizaciones populistas, Apra y Acción Popular, compitiendo por el favor de la población electoral, cada una de las cuales buscaba presentarse como la más radicalizada. El Apra participaba aislada en la contienda electoral, sin recurrir a la protección

de los grupos políticos tradicionales, a pesar del veto que pesaba sobre ella de parte de las Fuerzas Armadas desde los años 30. El triunfo ajustado del Apra significó, como era de esperarse, la intervención militar; pero ésta, a diferencia de las anteriores, preludia el comportamiento del actual gobierno peruano a través del intento de realizar reformas estructurales a fin de detener y neutralizar la movilización política.

Pero debido a problemas de carácter integrativo e ideológico en el seno del Ejército y de las crecientes presiones populares, la Junta Militar convocó a nuevas elecciones ofreciendo su apoyo a Acción Popular. La base de este apoyo consistía en el hecho que este partido podía, a través de los "cambios estructurales" que buscaba, detener la emergencia aprista. En segundo lugar, los líderes de esta agrupación no tenían, como en el caso del Apra, una experiencia organizativa de masas y, lo que es más importante, no pretendían obtener apoyo popular para subordinar al Ejército a un aparato político que ellos dominaran.

En buena parte debido a este apoyo, Belaúnde y su partido lograron el triunfo electoral, pero sin llegar a controlar el parlamento. En estas condiciones, el Apra y su antiguo "carnicero", Odría, constituyeron una Coalición que dominó el parlamento restringiendo la iniciativa del Ejecutivo, el que se negaba a recurrir a la movilización política a fin de neutralizar dicha coalición.

Es a partir de este momento que comienza la crisis del proyecto populista. El parlamento, convertido en "primer poder", se dedicó sistemáticamente a realizar las medidas que favorecieran el clientelismo político a través de una política desfinanciadora. Las medidas de redistribución universal solicitadas por el Ejecutivo eran bloqueadas, especialmente la reforma agraria y del sistema tributario. Ante esta situación, el Ejecutivo en vez de recurrir a presiones políticas de masas a fin de conseguir los propósitos requeridos, buscó fuentes de financiamiento externo a fin de realizar las obras públicas que sustituirían las reformas, con la ampliación del mercado.

Esta política del parlamento y del Ejecutivo, se basó en el crecimiento de las exportaciones, de un ingreso masivo de inversiones extranjeras destinadas a la producción de rubros de consumo urbano y financiamiento externo. Cuando estos factores se agotaron, el constante problema de la devaluación y de la balanza de pagos y la falta de las reformas ofrecidas arrolló todos los esquemas y esperanzas desatadas por los partidos políticos. Conjuntamente con este hecho se desató una ola de escándalos de contrabando en la que se encontraban comprometidos altos personajes del gobierno, de las Fuerzas Armadas y personas próximas al Presidente.

La precariedad de la situación servió para que un sector del partido del Presidente, asociado a las inversiones extranjeras con destino urbano, propiciara una alianza con el Apra. Este partido aceptó este compromiso, puesto que de lo contrario era segura la intervención militar para poner fin al "desorden". Esta intervención a su vez impediria las elecciones de 1969, en las que el Apra tenía puestas sus esperanzas de triunfo, gracias a la debacle del gobierno que había favorecido.

Es así como se constituyó el primer gabinete realmente populista, que asociaba a distintos sectores sociales modernizantes. El gabinete de los "sensenta días" obtuvo plenos poderes del parlamento que le permitió reorganizar las finanzas públicas, detener el desfinanciamiento público y refinanciar la deuda pública ascendiente a 800 millones de dólares, reorganizar parcialmente el sistema tributario y crear las bases para el ingreso masivo de nuevas inversiones extranjeras en la explotación minera. Toda esta reorganización resolvería los problemas del momento e instalaría un nuevo ciclo de crecimiento de las exportaciones, que aseguraría la base de las inversiones industriales, repitiéndose a 30 años de distancia, la situación de los otros países que habían tenido experiencia populista.

Sin embargo, para lograr que las empresas extranjeras interesadas en la explotación minera consiguieran el financiamiento de los organismos internacionales, auspiciados por el gobierno norteamericano, se hacía necesario resolver el problema de la International Petroleum Company que atenazaba a Belaúnde desde el inicio de su gobierno. En efecto, desde la década pasada los nuevos sectores reformistas habían enarbolado la cuestión de la recuperación de los pozos que ilegalmente explotaba esta compañía, subsidiaria de la Standard Oil, y el pago de los impuestos que adeudaba. Ante la amenaza de represalias del gobierno norteamericano, Belaúnde desistió en tomar alguna acción al respecto, deteniéndose la ayuda gubernamental norteamericana, hasta tanto no se resolviera esta situación.

En el momento que el gabinete plenamente populista se enfrentó a esta situación, se realizó con mucha rapidez y ligereza un acuerdo del gobierno y la IPC. El acuerdo consistía en que esta empresa hacía entrega de dichos pozos a cambio de la anulación de la deuda que tenía con el gobierno, y que luego se avaluaría en 690 millones de dólares, del reconocimiento de la propiedad irrestricta de la refinaría de Talara, la entrega de un millón de hectáreas de la selva y, por último, la venta obligatoria de todo el petróleo producido por esos pozos a la refinería. Además de esta escandalosa entrega, a poco de la firma del Acta de Talara, el gerente de la Empresa Petrolera Fiscal declararía que faltaba una de las páginas del contrato, en la que se especificaban los precios de venta del petróleo a la IPC.

Esto terminó por liquidar la precaria legitimidad del régimen y dio a las Fuerzas Armadas motivo para constituir un gobierno que las representara - de allí el título de Gobierno Revolucionario de las Fuerzas Armadas - a fin de resolver los problemas que la movilización política imprimía cada vez con mayor fuerza.

Efectivamente, al constituirse el gabinete que coaligaba el Apra con uno de los sectores de Acción Popular, sería descartado Odría como aliado aprista, así como las Fuerzas Armadas que constituían un apoyo tácito de Acción Popular. Ante esta coyuntura, el Ejército, en cuyo seno se venían dando cambios ideológicos de importancia optó por tomar el poder, a fin de resolver dos problemas simultaneamente: la modernización del régimen social y la contensión de la movilización política del Apra y los otros sectores reformistas, así como de la anticipada emergencia de corte revolucionario.

Esta decisión de las Fuerzas Armadas de intervenir directamen te en el proceso político se basaba en la perspectiva que, de proseguir esta nueva coalición, existía una alta probabilidad de un triunfo electoral del Apra. Esta posibilidad significaba para el Ejército el peligro que este partido buscara, desde el Ejecutivo, interferir en la vida institucional y descartar su papel tutelar del sistema social, subordinándolo al poder político. Tal como se dijera anteriormente, ésta vendría a ser la razón básica del veto que pesa sobre el Apra desde 1930.

En segundo lugar, existía en el seno de la institución castrense el convencimiento que el Apra, debido a los compromisos políticos que había adquirido y a las adaptaciones ideológicas que resultaban de dichos compromisos, no estaría en condiciones de realizar las reformas sociales que el país necesitaba a fin de resolver los problemas del mantenimiento del sistema social.

En una palabra, se trataba de virar en redondo e instalar en el Perú el proyecto populista, pero propugnando la desmovilización de las masas populares y de los sectores medios, por medio de las medidas redistributivas que permitirían la modernización del país.

El populismo militar

El populismo militar se caracteriza por constituir un esfuerzo de las Fuerzas Armadas por relegitimar el sistema social, a través de una política de modernización. Pero la realización de este esfuerzo supone desechar, parcialmente, algunos de los elementos originales del proyecto populista. Si en él se postula la convivencia pacífica entre todos los sectores de la sociedad en el populismo militar se parte de la premisa que la modernización sólo puede lograrse con la destrucción de su contrario, es decir, del espectro oligárquico - tradicional y de la

reformulación de las relaciones internacionales a un nivel más equitativo. De esta manera y sólo así se lograría la homogenización social a niveles más avanzados del sistema capitalista que al hacer posible el crecimiento económico permitiría una progresiva redistribución social.

En forma concreta, esto supone la ampliación sustentiva de las funciones del aparato estatal - y por onde, de las Fuerzas Armadas - como gestor y fiscalizador de la vida social, conformándose una efectiva centralización política que enmarque los intereses particulares para la construcción de un sistema capitalista moderno.

El segundo rasgo del populismo militar consiste en el rechazo de la movilización política como recurso para concretizar esta modernización y más bien la contensión y neutralización de todo movimiento que no se adecúe a los trazos, ritmo y momento del tipo de modernización propuestos desde el gobierno. En el caso peruano esto último es relativamente factible debido a que el reciente y limitado desarrollo industrial del país, así como la desmovilización de las bases sindicales del Apra durante su participación en el poder, a fin que no colocaran a este partido en situaciones difíciles con sus asociados de la burguesía, sitúan a dicha movilización en un nivel muy bajo si se le compara, por ejemplo, con el sindicalismo argentino. Pero esta perspectiva no significa desinterés por la participación popular en el proceso de trasformación y modernización del país. Muy al contrario, el populismo militar persigue la identificación del pueble con las Fuerzas Armadas, dentro del formato que éstas plantean, con lo que se mantiene el estilo manipulativo del populismo.

Es así como los dos ejes del modelo populista militar constituen la modernización del sistema capitalista y la neutralización de la movilización política.

El sustrato ideológico de las Fuerzas Armadas que dirige esta política es que el subdesarrollo genera la dependencia que además de suprimir la soberanía nacional, factor de por sí sensible en el seno de las Fuerzas Armadas, asegura la permanencia de dicho estadio. Si bien esta situación satisfacía históricamente los requerimientos de las minorías dominantes, en la actualidad y debido a la movilización social en marcha, no hace sino crear justificadas frustraciones que pueden plasmarse en intentos de subvertir la seguridad interna y con ella la seguridad internacional. De allí que la modernización y la modificación de las relaciones internacionales sea conveniente para asegurar no sólo la paz social interna de cada país, sino la de las relaciones internacionales. Es en este sentido como el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del Perú se refirió ante la reunión plenaria de las Naciones Unidas, el mes de setiembre de 1969, al justificar el cambio de gobierno y la nueva política del mismo.

"... Independencia y trasformación de las estructuras consti-
tuyen las vigas maestras del pensamiento revolucionario y estas
dos ideas integran de hecho un binomio emocional <u>donde el
desarrollo se torna el sinónimo más perfecto de la paz
social...</u>" (x)

"... Con todo el mundo en desarrollo nuestras aproximaciones
son coincidentes y podemos esperar de ellas una nueva dimensión
creadora en provecho de la paz y del bienestar. En cambio
nuestros vínculos con el campo del poder mundial dentro del cual
nos movemos no tienen siempre la misma alentadora perspectiva.
Conviven en esa relación convergencias y oposiciones que entra-
ban, cuando no anulan, las posibilidades más fecundas de colabo-
ración. <u>Esto perjudica gravemente la marcha ascendente y
armoniosa hacia el progreso y compromete la propia seguridad
internacional, ya que la frustración de la legítima aspiración de
un pueblo al desarrollo crea en su espíritu una peligrosa distor-
sión.</u> Y es que en realidad, tomando como base de análisis una
sociedad como la peruana, por ejemplo, tendríamos que partir
del esquema muy simple de que para ella sólo la realización en
su seno de algo positivo y duradero en función del bienestar,
podría merecer el esfuerzo y <u>dar sentido a la seguridad nacional
y con mayor razón aún, hacerla sentirse parte de un sistema de
seguridad colectiva a nivel internacional. Los conceptos de
bienestar, desarrollo y seguridad están pues estrecha y perma-
nentemente ligados ya que la pobreza y la explotación que se
encuentran en la base de las naciones subdesarrolladas, agudizan
una situación explosiva cuyas proyecciones no quisiera dramati-
zar acá con palabras excesivas...</u>"

"... Los estados industrializados tienen que aceptar el hecho de
que hoy la pobreza en cualquier rincón del mundo es una amenaza
a su manera de vivir, y consecuentemente sus responsabilidades
económicas y sociales no se pueden detener en las fronteras
nacionales.

La actitud de los grandes países respecto a la existencia humana
no puede reducirse únicamente a mantener la paz y a proteger o
fomentar limitados intereses nacionales. Esta actitud no corres-
ponde al mundo de hoy, cada vez más interdependiente, como
resultado de los adelantos de la ciencia, la tecnología y las comu-
nicaciones. La verdadera seguridad, las verdaderas garantías
de vida, de libertad y de lo que se suele aceptar como felicidad
requiere un compromiso mucho más responsable con el resto del

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(x) El subrayado es del autor.

mundo: compromiso que significa cooperar con otros para construir nuevas instituciones económicas y sociales, nuevos canales para una más justa y equitativa distribución de la riqueza y para eliminar la injusticia, trasformando el clima de incertidumbre en una atmósfera de confianza y estabilidad..." (9)

Esta posición de las Fuerzas Armadas supone un cambio muy importante en las relaciones de la institución castrense con la oligarquía. Si bien el Ejército se inicia directamente identificado con dicho sector de la burguesía, en su evolución se ha separado hasta el punto de convertirse en su sepulturera. Este cambio se puede explicar en función de la diversificación social y la creciente movilización política ocurrida en el país durante las últimas dos décadas, y el nuevo carácter profesional del Ejército.

El ejército peruano inicia su proceso de consolidación institucional en los años 30, como fuerza represiva de la movilización política que el Apra favorecía. En estas condiciones, los débiles sectores medios urbanos y rurales se encontraban fuertemente asociados e identificados con una burguesía que se confundía con la oligarquía. Por último, al reclutarse la oficialidad entre los medianos terratenientes de las áreas tradicionales, la fusión Ejército-oligarquía se encontraba asegurada.

A raíz de los cambios que diversificaron la sociedad peruana, especialmente a partir de la década del 50, y que irían situando a los terratenientes en posiciones cada vez más marginales, se produciría, en parte debido a la ampliación y diversificación en los sectores medios, una autonomización política de éstos en relación de la oligarquía.

Igualmente, se podría arguir la hipótesis del radicalismo que presentan los sectores medios en proceso de desplazamiento. En la medida que los pequeños terratenientes, que parecen constituir el núcleo principal de donde provienen los oficiales del Ejército, se encuentran en un proceso de desplazamiento por los cambios urbanos, los lazos de unión entre estos terratenientes y la oligarquía se verían recortados. De esta manera, estos sectores medios irían obteniendo una mayor independencia de los sectores dominantes tradicionales del país e irían adquiriendo un comportamiento que respondiera a su nueva situación de inseguridad.

A partir de 1952 y debido al Tratado Bilateral de Ayuda Militar que cada uno de noestros países firmara con Estados Unidos, la oficialidad peruana tendió a entrenarse en dicho país en los aspectos organizativos y propiamente militares. Simultáneamente en Lima se abría un curso para los mandos superiores, coroneles y generales, en el Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM), en el que se consideraban los problemas de la defensa nacional, y que comprendían además de los de

índole tradicional, los aspectos de crecimiento económico y estructura social, ofrecido por algunos destacados civiles desarrollistas.

De esta experiencia, que daría nacimiento al desarrollismo militar, los mandos militares llegarían a la conclusión que la estructura económico-social del país no estaba adecuada para suportar el potencial bélico del país y que asegurara su soberanía contra posibles acechanzas externas. De allí nació el interés por el desarrollo económico y social y la planificación del crecimiento.

Luego, y a raíz de la participación del Ejército en la represión del movimiento campesino que durante los años 1955-65 se extendiera por todo el país, al impacto de la Revolución Cubana, la emergencia política universitaria y el fallido intento de crear focos guerrilleros, las Fuerzas Armadas del Perú aprenderían la teoría y la técnica de "counter-insurgency". Si el ejército peruano desde muy temprano se dedicó a las tareas cívico-militares, no por eso descuidó el examen de las condiciones estructurales de la insurrección popular y de las formas de reprimirlas. Es así como el trabajo iniciado en el CAEM se combinaría con la teoría del "counter-insurgency", trasladándose al Servicio de Inteligencia la tarea de esgrimir una estrategia global que resolviera los problemas de la movilización política en curso.

Es así como los mandos militares asociados con estas labores llegaron a la conclusión que dependencia, subdesarrollo, precariedad de la soberanía nacional y de la seguridad interna, eran todos ellos factores que se complementaban.

De esta manera la autonomización de las Fuerzas Armadas de la declinante oligarquía y una nueva y más generalizada ola de movilización política, se asoció con el cambio ideológico en las Fuerzas Armadas.

La modernización que propone el populismo militar supone, en primer lugar, afianzar el papel del Estado como canalizador y fiscalizador de la vida social del país. Esto se manifiesta por el ataque frontal a los sectores arcaicos de la burguesía, es decir de la oligarquía, y la búsqueda por instalar una nueva tasa de intercambio con las empresas extranjeras, en una palabra, ampliar la participación del Estado en el beneficio que éstas obtienen de la explotación minera.

En cuanto a lo primero, este ataque se manifiesta por la reforma agraria que se ha iniciado con la intervención de las plantaciones azucareras que constituían el núcleo de dicho sector. A esta intervención se ha seguido la de haciendas en el sur y centro del país, allí donde se habían dado las más grandes movilizaciones campesinas y los fallidos intentos guerrilleros. Paralelamente a la intervención de la reforma agraria se modificó la ley de aguas, que favoreció la formación de la

gran propiedad costeña. La formación de cooperativas que remplacen a las plantaciones azucareras, el robustecimiento de las comunidades campesinas y la de una clase media rural de medianos propietarios, constituye el propósito de estas dos medidas complementarias (10).

En el campo urbano se ha dado una ley que contempla la expropiación de las tierras de expansión urbana, cortando así la posibilidad de proseguir en la especulación de tierras agrícolas próximas a la ciudad. Esta ley favorecería la posibilidad de expansión de los barrios marginales hoy denominados "pueblos jóvenes". En este mismo sentido, el gobierno ha creado la Oficina de Pueblos Jóvenes que se dedicará a resolver los problemas de toda índole que contemplen las barriadas.

En términos de política económica general, el Banco Central de Reserva ha sido estatizado, puesto que su directorio estará constituido por funcionarios públicos, a diferencia de lo que sucedía anteriormente cuando dicho directorio se componía de los delegados de la banca privada. Una política industrialista muy enérgica que se encuentra vinculada a la integración andina ha sido instrumentalizada, cerrándose el mercado de importaciones de bienes de consumo, instalándose en este aspecto una política de sustitución de importaciones. Por otro lado, los bonos que reciban los propietarios afectados por la reforma agraria tienen la posibilidad de su conversión sólo para trasladarse a la actividad industrial. Es así como el Banco Industrial aceptará estos bonos por el 100% de su valor nominal, con la condición que éstos constituyan el 50% del valor de las instalaciones industriales, que deberán adecuarse a una programación que diseñe el Estado.

Pero la industrialización del país, para absorber la mano de obra marginal de las ciudades y asimismo para lograr un carácter auto-dinamizador deberá regirse por intereses que no se refieran exclusivamente al consumo de los sectores medios. Esto quiere decir, en boca de uno de los oficiales que colabora en establecer la política económica, la instalación de industrias petroquímicas, acerías y de metal mecánica, que se complementarían con un incremento del proceso de refinación de los minerales explotados por las grandes compañías extranjeras.

Estas industrias básicas para ceñirse a los intereses nacionales deberían estar controladas por el Estado. De esta manera, paralelamente a una ampliación del mercado de bienes de consumo en el campo, se instalarían tres líneas de carácter industrial: las industrias básicas, que el Estado dirigiría y que se proyectaría convertir en las propulsoras del desarrollo hacia dentro; las de consumo, en que tendría cabida principal la burguesía nacional que se fortalecería gracias a los cambios en marcha y que podría asociarse con el capital extranjero; y por último, la gran minería, basada en las inversiones del capital extranjero. Este último sector surtiría de ahorro interno para la dinamización del sistema,

hasta tanto el proceso de industrializacion se consolidara, con lo que se asimila a los proyectos de las organizaciones populistas.

La ejecución y pasos adelantados de estas reformas han favorecido el segundo rasgo que define al populismo militar: la neutralización y posible desmovilización política. Este tipo de medidas, que los sectores reformistas a partir del Apra en los años 30 habían perseguido, favorece que estos sectores le otorguen apoyo y que incluso en el seno del Apra se esboce una tendencia simpatizante al gobierno. Los campesinos movilizados políticamente obtienen la propiedad de la tierra reclamada. Los pobladores marginales se encuentran a la expectativa de los trabajos públicos que les ofrezcan mejores condiciones de existencia a la par que obtienen un reconocimiento político de su situación precaria. Los sectores industriales por primera vez encuentran sus aspiraciones interpretadas en el gobierno, y en general la burguesía peruana en trance de desplazamiento por las inversiones extranjeras, recibe un firme respaldo y seguridad de su expansión por el gobierno militar.

Si a todo esto se suma la audacia y determinación de la política exterior del Perú frente a Estados Unidos, que encandiló el sentimiento nacionalista de los sectores urbanos, es comprensible la existencia de una nueva percepción de legitimidad del gobierno en todos los sectores de la sociedad, que se manifestara en expresiones masivas nunca antes vistas de " Arriba Perú!. ", ante un triunfo deportivo.

Simultáneamente a esta estratégia es necesario subrayar el hecho que el gobierno no pretende enfrentarse a la población movilizada políticamente sino al contrario asimilarla en su seno. Es así como con excepción de algunos grupos dispuestos a dedicarse a la guerrilla urbana, todos los grupos políticos gozan de libertades, relativas, para expresarse incluso contrariamente a la actuación del gobierno.

Es más, el gobierno en su afán modernizador dictó una ley universitaria que recortó drásticamente la autonomía universitaria y la participación estudiantil. A raíz de las protestas que esta medida acarreó, el gobierno ha dictado dos reformas a la ley, persiguiendo no enfrentarse a la Universidad y, al contrario, ganarse su favor.

Algunos sectores asalariados, mineros y bancarios, han conseguido aumentos salariales parciales, a pesar de la reluctancia gubernamental de favorecer estas reivindicaciones que podrían, de ampliarse, arrastrar el país a una nueva situación inflacionaria.

Es así como el gobierno populista militar logra aglutinar alrededor suyo a los grupos reformistas de los sectores medios y

populares, al mismo tiempo que arranca las banderas del Apra y le ofrece una nueva perspectiva a la débil burguesía urbana industrial.

Pero además de las realizaciones que atacan los viejos reductos rurales del sector oligárquico de la burguesía, el gobierno ha sugerido su intención de "democratizar" el control de los recursos que esta y las inversiones extranjeras manipulan, a fin de asegurar el crecimiento distributivo y eliminar la posibilidad que la concentración de dichos recursos conlleve a una depuración y agudización de los conflictos sociales, al mismo tiempo eliminar la posibilidad que se puedan constituir en un poder competitivo del Estado.

Pero esta intención reformista, asociada con las medidas de estabilización económica de corte tradicional del gobierno militar, ha producido una paralización de la actividad económica que se expresa en la falta de inversiones y en el creciente malestar general. Esta situación coloca en graves aprietos al gobierno en tanto compromete el apoyo que persigue de diferentes sectores, esquivando todo enfrentamiento que ponga en duda su legitimidad.

Así es como el gobierno ha indicado su intención de reformar el sector de la pesca - cuyas exportaciones han tenido un crecimiento vertiginoso - y que podría tomar rasgos cooperativos o de distribución de cuotas de producción a fin de romper el poder monopólico que se habría creado en este ramo de la producción; también de la banca, que además de la "peruanización" a la que ha sido sometida - consistente en que hasta el 25% de su capital puede ser extranjero - podría considerar una distribución compulsiva del crédito por sectores económicos y por cuotas entre los grandes, medianos y pequeños empresarios, así como la posibilidad que la banca estatal pueda recibir depósitos privados. El sistema tributario también sería afectado, en el que se revertiría la imposición existente en la actualidad, cargándose la mayor proporción a la de carácter directo; igualmente, la reforma de la empresa - que tal vez sea la que más preocupación acarrea - en que el "participacionismo" obrero o ciertas formas de "capitalismo popular" serían instaurados por medio de la distribución de acciones entre los trabajadores, que incidiría en la gestión empresarial. Por último, la modificación de la política minera que podría considerar un aumento de la tributación, la constitución de sociedad mixtas, o ambas a la vez.

De esta suerte, mientras por un lado los nuevos sectores empresariales de la burguesía se encuentran apoyados por un gobierno desarrollista, por el otro anticipan amenazas no explicitadas por parte del gobierno, que los lleva en asociación con los otros factores mencionados, a paralizar sus actividades, hasta tanto no se aclare el panorama. Al mismo tiempo, el apoyo que ofrecen a las nuevas medidas del gobierno adquieren una connotación ambivalente.

A esto se añade que las inversiones extranjeras se han detenido en seco. Esta situación ha sido motivada por las medidas nacionalistas adoptadas por el gobierno peruano tales como la reivindicación del complejo petrolero que controlaba la IPC, y la reacción de la Cancillería frente a las amenazas de represalias del gobierno norteamericano, asimismo, de los problemas surgidos con Estados Unidos, en la defensa de las 200 millas marítimas a fin de resguardar los recursos ictiológicos de la costa peruana de la depredación californiana. Por último, por la exigencia peruana de instaurar una nueva política minera que supone un aumento significativo de la participación del Estado en los beneficios de la explotación de los nuevos yacimientos y el aumento del valor agregado de las exportaciones mineras.

Pero a raíz del ultimatum formulado por el gobierno, en el sentido que las concesiones obtenidas debían ser explotadas a partir del próximo año o revertir al Estado, a la par que las reiteradas manifestaciones de seguridad al capital extranjero que se adecúe a las nuevas concesiones, pareciera ir modificando esta retracción.

De esta suerte resultan varias situaciones paradójicas. El gobierno militar peruano pretende realizar el proyecto de modernización del sistema social, otorgándole el papel dinamizador al ímpetu que proporciona el sector exportador minero y la burguesía industrial que formaría. Pero al mismo tiempo ataca viejos privilegios de la oligarquía y avisa que tomará medidas que afectarán a la burguesía y al capital extranjero, pero sin especificar las modalidades concretas que tendrían las mismas.

En resumen, el gobierno exige la asimilación de la burguesía y del capital extranjero a las reglas que él persigue imponer, después de haber modificado las que éstos habían instaurado, pero sin especificar las nuevas reglas que propone.

El resultado es obvio. Los empresarios nativos y extranjeros se retraen de hacer nuevas inversiones, en parte debido a la recesión económica desatada por el gobierno, pero muy en especial en espera de la presentación de las nuevas reglas que ofrece imponer el gobierno. Pero al mismo tiempo con esta espera, que puede enfrentar al gobierno con la población asalariada, los inversionistas presionan para hacerse oir, instalando una nueva relación con el gobierno y de esta manera lograr la postergación sine dei de algunas reformas, o en todo caso rebajar sus características reformistas.

Esta situación pareciera irse plasmando. No es de otra manera que se entiende que después de los enérgicos enunciados reformistas del Presidente con motivo del aniversario patrio, éste hiciera entrever que

algunas reformas, como de la empresa por ejemplo, "eran a largo plazo". Asimismo, la reforma de la banca y de la pesca han sido pospuestas en varias oportunidades, a la espera de nuevos estudios.

Es así como pareciera que el país estuviera en vísperas del establecimiento de una nueva forma de relación del Estado y la burguesía por un lado y de aquél con los inversionistas mineros. Este nuevo tipo de relaciones, que independizaría, relativamente, al poder político del económico, permitiría una nueva modalidad de interacción institucional de carácter más distributivo y autónomo entre las diferentes esferas de la sociedad, que permitiría el reordenamiento social y la consolidación de la legitimidad del modelo populista, dirigido por las Fuerzas Armadas.

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RAPPORT / PAPER

TABLE RONDE DE RIO DE JANEIRO - 27/31 octobre 1969
RIO DE JANEIRO ROUND TABLE - 27/31 october 1969

DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONOMICO SEM DESENVOLVIMENTO
POLITICO NA ESFERA DO PODER LOCAL

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DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONOMICO SEM DESENVOLVIMENTO POLITICO NA ESFERA DO PODER LOCAL

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Sumário : 1. Significação dos estudos de poder local. 2. A determinação do grau de desenvolvimento politico. 3. Estudo de caso concreto: analise de comportamento politico. 4. O processo eleitoral - agremiações e candidaturas. 5. Caracteristicas do desenvolvimento politico. 6. Conclusões.

1. Significação dos estudos de poder local

Dentro da vasta bibliografia já acumulada em tôrno do problema do desenvolvimento politico dos paises latino-americanos, nestes ultimos anos, e dentro da variada tematica que o assunto comporta, alguns estudiosos têm dedicado atençao ao estudo dos problemas do poder local e das transformações que a estrutura do mesmo vem sofrendo, em consequência das modificações de natureza socio-econômica provocadas pelo processo de modernizaçao e urbanizaçao.

Os estudos de comunidade, como sao denominados frequentemente, permitem concentrar o foco da analise nas peculiaridades dos processos sociais que têm lugar em escala bastante reduzida e, através de um estudo em profundidade e do recurso às modernas técnicas de pesquisa social, permitem cohecer,

com razoável margem de certeza, a tendência geral dos fenôme-
nos recentemente manifestados e concluir pela sua significação
no âmbito de um contexto mais amplo.

A análise da estrutura do poder local inclui questões
tais como as bases de legitimidade dêsse poder, sua competên
cia e suas limitações, suas relações com o poder estadual   e
nacional, sua composição social e suas ligações com o   poder
econômico, o exame da atuação e da influência das diferentes
correntes político-partidárias que lhe servem de base, as ideo
logias que lhe norteiam a ação, o papel das lideranças políti
cas.

No caso do Brasil, por exemplo, em sua atual fase de
desenvolvimento político-social, o poder local assume um   pa
pel mais importante, uma vez que a legislação em vigor   confe
re ao município atribuições e responsabilidades bem maiores,
além de recursos financeiros mais, substanciais, que permitem
proceder a um planejamento a longo prazo, através da elabora-
ção de um Plano Diretor, exigência imposta para a obtenção de
verbas federais.

Há outros aspectos importantes a assinalar: dentro da
realidade político-social dos países latino-americanos,   uma
das características foi, por muito tempo, o centralismo exces
sivo do poder central, o contrôle estreito sôbre as decisões
dos órgãos do poder local e as disponibilidades muito escas-
sas com que contava êste último para a realização de   progra
mas de maior vulto. Autonomia municipal nao significava, qua
se nunca, autonomia financeira, daí a dificuldade de pôr   em
execução quaisquer planos um pouco mais arrojados.

Por outro lado, verificou-se em numerosos países dês
te Continente, nas décadas que se seguiram ao termino da   2ª
Guerra Mundial, um ritmo de crescimento econômico às vezes re
lativamente grande, o que conduziu a uma diversificação da ati
vidade econômica, à transformação da produção predominatemen-
te agrícola em produção agro-industrial, ao lado da expansão
considerável do setor terciário e a um grau mais elevado   de
diferenciação social, ao surgimento de inúmeras ocupações   no
vas. No que se refere à estrutura social aquêles processo le
vou à ampliação de camadas sociais ainda recentes, o que ele-
vou de maneira muito significativa o papel desempenhado pelas
camadas médias na vida política nacional.

Todos êsses fenômenos passaram a merecer, do cientis
ta político, exame acurado e verificação empírica cuidadosa,
a fim de detectar a sua real significação, a dinâmica de sua
evolução, se se deseja definir a tendência do seu desenvolvi-
mento posterior e influir, de alguma forma e na medida do pos
sível, na ação por êles exercida.

2. A determinação do grau de desenvolvimento político

O problema da correlação existente entre o desenvolvi

desenvolvimento econômico e o desenvolvimento político tem me
recido a atenção de numerosos cientistas políticos e as posi
ções têm variado, conforme a própria conceituação do fenômeno
em questão. Encarado o desenvolvimento como processo global
e que só para efeitos metodológicos pode ser estudado separa
damente em seus aspéctos econômico, social, cultural e políti
co, é fácil compreender a estreita interdependência que exis
te entre todos êsses aspetos, a influência recíproca de um sô
bre outro.

As posições variam, antes de mais nada, em relação aos
indicadores a serem utilisados, quando se trata de "medir" o
desenvolvimento político. Êste tem sido medido como "democra
cia estável", calculado por meio do funcionamento normal do
regime, à base de normas constitucionais. A isso se acrescen
ta a liberdade na realização de eleições e o respeito pelos
seus resultados, a existência de uma oposição e a amplitude
desta no Parlamento (índice de Cutright).

A correlação entre desenvolvimento político e rique
za, examinada por Lipset e por outros autores, é talvez, den
tro da temática, aquêle aspeto que constitui área mais ou me
nos comum, embora variem os índices que medem essa "riqueza".
Needler (1) mede desenvolvimento político por um índice não
composto radicalmente simplificado, baseado no número de anos
em que o país foi governado constitucionalmente. Define "um
ano constitucional" como aquêle em que pelo menos por seis
meses o país foi governado por um govêrno escolhido em elei-
ções mais ou menos livres e no qual o govêrno em conjunto res
peitou procedimentos constitucionais e liberdades civis indi
viduais e ainda durante o qual não houve mudanças de govêrno
extra-constitucionais.

Outro conceito importante é o de mobilização social ,
de Deutch, segundo o qual existe uma relação causal entre a
mesma e o desenvolvimento social, considerado êste como obten
ção de funcionamento constitucional estável. Muito embora se
deva fazer a ressolva de que dentro da realidade latino-ameri
cana a estabilidade constitucional não passe, muitas vêzes ,
de mera fachada para uso externo, encobrindo uma situação real
de falta total de democracia.

Sendo, pois, o ponto de partida para o estudo do grau
de desenvolvimento político, o desenvolvimento econômico, se
nos limitarmos ao âmbito do poder local, deveremos iniciar
qualquer estudo que se proponha a medir o grau de desenvolvi-
mento político a partir da análise das principais modifica-
ções ocorridas na esfera sócio-econômica e daí passar para o

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Political Science Review, vol. LXII nº 3, sept./1968, pp.889-
897

exame do reflexo dessas modificações para o campo do comporta
mento político.

Dentre os aspetos significativos que devem ser ressal
tados, consideramos que os mais importantes seriam: índices
de crescimento econômico, taxa de crescimento demográfico, am
pliação do mercado de trabalho e estrutura ocupacional, eleva
ção do nível educacional, índices de urbanização e industria
lização. No campo específico da ação política, seria preciso
examinar as alterações ocorridas no que se refere aos índices
de participação das várias camadas populacionais na decisão
dos problemas da vida política. Isso poderia ser medido atra
vés do estudo da evolução do colégio eleitoral, do grau de re
novação das lideranças políticas (do ponto de vista de idade,
origem social, categoria profissional, representatividade po
lítico-partidária, filiação ideológica). A definição dos índi
ces de participação das massas populares poderia ser então
tentada através do grau de representação das diferentes cama
das e dos variados setôres profissionais, nos órgãos dos pode
res executivo e legislativo.

3. Estudo de caso concreto: análise de comportamento político

A hipótese que buscamos testar poderia ser formulada
da seguinte maneira: o processo de industrialização e urbani
zação, acompanhado da diversificação da atividade econômica
(traduzida no surgimento de novos ramos industriais e trans
formação da atividade agrária de tipo rotineiro e tradicional
até então existente na região), ampliação do mercado de traba
lho, construção de novas usinas dotadas de maquinário moderno,
elevação geral do nível de ensino (criação de várias escolas
superiores e técnicas de nível médio), concentração de servi-
ços públicos de escalão estadual e federal, crescimento eco
nômico traduzido em aumento constante da arrecadação e do mo
vimento financeiro – tal processo deveria ter intensificado o
ritmo de diferenciação social e ocupacional e provocado, no
plano político, o surgimento de novas lideranças e novos gru
pos, novas atitudes mais racionais, em relação ao poder, dife
rentes daquelas consideradas típicas e tradicionais na vida
política do país, até a década de 50, pelo menos.

Foi escolhido como objeto de estudo um município per
tencente a uma região econômica importante do estado de São
Paulo, Araraquara – justamente um daqueles que apresenta ele
vados índices de urbanização e industrialização. Trata-se de
município colocado entre os 16 mais populosos do Estado em
questão (possui cêrca de 100 mil habitantes em 1969), em que
o valor da produção industrial (31/12/1967) era oito vêzes
maior do que o valor da produção agrícola. Figura entre as
15 mais importantes praças comerciais do Estado, e seu movi
mento bancário é considerado um dos mais importantes do país:
possui 21 agências bancárias, além de 3 da Caixa Econômica
Estadual e 1 da Federal. De excelente localização geográfica

servido por uma rêde rodoviária e ferroviária de primeira qua
lidade, apresentou, por outro lado, avanços muito expressivos
no setor do ensino, graças à criaçao, nos últimos dez anos,de
quatro escolas de nível superior, além de outra que existe há
mais de vinte anos e ampliaçao considerável das escolas de ní
vel médio. As características da vida urbana fazem dêsse mu
nicípio um dos que oferecem melhores condiçoes a seus habiten
tes, no que se refere a prestaçao de serviços públicos (água,
pavimentaçao, transportes coletivos, assistência médica, rêde
escolar etc).

Entre 1965 e 1968 a receita do município mais do que
quadruplicou (NCr$), tendo registrado de 1967 para 1968 um no
tável saldo positivo. Foi a receita estadual aquela que re
gistrou o maior aumento - quase seis vêzes, no período mencio
nado.

No parque industrial de São Paulo, o Município se in
clui entre os 15 mais importantes, com uma atividade econômi
ca baseada na indústria de produtos alimentares (69,3%), segui
da de têxtil (9.2%), química (5,0%) e de bebidas (6.8%). A
produçao de açúcar e álcool está em segundo lugar, quanto ao
valor, em seguida à de leite em pó e condensado (Nestlé). Tra
ta-se de importante regiao açucareira, que atrai, para o pe
ríodo da safra, trabalhadorès de lugares bastante distantes ,
inclusive do nordeste. Mas é mão de obra sasonal, que nao en
contra trabalho na regiao, uma vez terminada a colheita da ca
na-de-açucar (ela constitui 60,1 por centos do valor da produ
çao agrícola do município e possui várias usinas modernas).

Nos períodos de safra, o número de trabalhadores, uti
lizados no corte da cana, chega a dobrar, mas sao pessoas con
tratadas por empreiteiros e nao diretamente pelas usinas, ou
seja sem qualquer cínculo empregatício com estas. A falta de
uma indústria mais desenvolvida e de planos de edificaçao de
obras públicas nao permite utilizar essa mao-de-obra ociosa ,
constituida, aliás em sua totalidade, de trabalhadores sem
qualquer qualificaçao.

Para uma populaçao estimada em 93 mil habitantes, em
1968, o pessoal ocupado na indústria de transformaçao ia a pou
co mais de cinco mil, distribuidos por cêrca de 300 estabele
cimentos, alguns com mais de 500 operários. A populaçao urba
na cresceu três vêzes, entre 1940 e 1968, enquanto a popula-
çao rural via-se reduzida, nesse mesmo período, quase à meta
de.

Recorrendo à utilizaçao da variados métodos e técni
cas de pesquisa começamos pelo estudo histórico-comparativo
das diferentes fases da evoluçao histórica do município, bus
cando as razoes que poderiam explicar determinados surtos de
desenvolvimento mais intenso, de estagnaçao ou até mesmo re
trocesso. Nesse sentido, analisamos a formaçao e atuaçao dos
diferentes partidos políticos, a partir de 1947 (data da rea
lizaçao das primeiras eleiçoes diretas, no Município) e seu
destino após a dissoluçao dos partidos, em consequência do
golpe de Estado de 1964.

O exame da composição do eleitorado, levou-nos à obten ção de dados relativos ao sexo, idade, profissão e estado ci vil dos eleitores, e à sua posterior classificação em catego rias de status social. A observação direta do comportamento político da comunidade em aprêço conduziu-nos a uma participa ção ativa no desenrolar do processo eleitoral com vistas à re novação dos poderes executivo e legislativo. Tal processo in cluiu a realização das convenções partidárias, indicação dos candidatos aos postos eletivos, propaganda das plataformas , análise da utilização de técnicas usadas pelos candidatos jun to aos eleitores, visita a distritos rurais e conversa com os eleitores das mais diferentes camadas populacionais e setôres profissionais.

No que se refere a métodos e técnicas utilizados, a parte principal coube a uma amostra de mil eleitores, sortea dos entre os trinta e quatro mil que constituíam o colégio e leitoral, à base de uma tabela de números casuais. Entre aquê les mil eleitores foi aplicado um questionário contendo per guntas referentes a problemas da administração pública munici pal e estadual: ensino, saúde, assistência médica e hospita lar, financiamento para construção da casa própria, transpor tes coletivos, sistema de arrecadação de impostos, taxas co bradas pelo asfaltamento das ruas etc.

A fim de testar a constância do voto, buscou-se saber em que havia o eleitor votado nas eleições anteriores, para o executivo e o legislativo locais, para a Assembléia Legislati va Estadual, Câmara de Deputados e Senado Federal. Interessa va-nos saber se o voto atribuído a determinado candidato de corria de uma escolha partidária ou era de natureza puramente pessoal, e ainda, se a atuação do candidato, uma vez eleito, havia correspondido às expectativas do eleitor. Finalmente, quais os candidatos que mereceriam o seu apoio nas eleições vindouras (15/XI/68) e a indicação dos motivos que o levavam a dar aquêle apoio. As opções oferecidas eram as seguintes : a) retribuição de favores; b) simpatia pessoal; c) capacidade administrativa; d) experiência anterior; e) amizade pessoal; f) parentesco; g) outros.

Numa tentativa de correlacionar plataformas eleito rais e programas de govêrno com expectativas do eleitorado, in dagamos no questionário "quais as medidas que o eleitor gosta ria fôssem adotadas pelo futuro prefeito". Tais medidas deve riam ser indicadas por ordem de prioridade, de modo a serem posteriormente classificadas e codificadas.

A pesquisa junto aos candidatos aos podêres executivo e legislativo visava a conhecer os antecedentes políticos de cada um: sua filiação partidária anterior a 1964, o exercício de cargos políticos até aquela data, a participação em campa nhas eleitorais, o apoio de líderes estaduais e nacionais, o grau de obediência à orientação partidária. No intuito de ava liar o grau de conhecimento dos problemas políticos e adminis trativos, por parte dos candidatos, pedimos a opinião de cada um a respeito dos principais inconvenientes da vida pública

municipal nos últimos 20 anos - tais dados nos permitiriam a
valiar o nível de conscientização dos problemas políticos, de
identificação com as questões cruciais do município.

Em relação às candidaturas, buscamos saber como   ha
viam sido indicadas (quais os critérios empregados em cada ca
so), as bases eleitorais com que contava cada candidato (suas
ligações com os diferentes grupos profissionais e camadas po
pulacionais); seus antecedentes políticos, o apoio que   lhe
era prestado pelos govêrnos local e estadual, ou por líderes
políticos, individualmente; os motivos que levaram cada candi
dato a aceitar sua candidatura, a plataforma eleitoral com que
se apresentariam aos eleitores.

Nosso objetivo principal era medir o grau de "renova
ção das lideranças políticas", na esfera do poder local, o que
significaria, fundamentalmente, conhecer a estrutura dêsse po
der, do ponto de vista de classes e camadas sociais nêle   re
presentadas, de suas ligações com os grupos econômicos domin
nates na regiao e as características de suas atividades, o ti
po de lideranças político-partidárias exercidas ao longo   do
período por nós considerado e a influência das diferentes cor
rentes ideológicas.

Finalmente, tentaríamos concluir pela correlação   en
tre desenvolvimento econômico e desenvolvimento político,   ou
seja, buscar no comportamento político da comunidade estudada,
motivações de natureza mais racional, a substituição de técni
cas rotineiras e tradicionais por outras mais modernas -   no
que se refere à propaganda política junto ao eleitorado e   à
conquista de novos adeptos - a participação mais ampla,   nos
órgaos do poder, dos novos setôres ocupacionais e de novas ca
madas sociais.

4. O processo eleitoral - agremiações e candidaturas

Uma primeira constatação: o sistema bipartidário   im
plantado no Brasil a partir de 1964 não conseguiu   sensibili
zar a opinião pública de modo a fazer com que o pleito eleito
ral se travasse fundamentalmente em tôrno de legendas. Os e
leitores continuam a agir em função dos partidos   anteriormen
te existentes e de antigos compromissos políticos. Predomina
de maneira evidente, sôbre razoes de natureza ideológica,   a
pessoa do candidato, independentemente de a qual dos dois par
tidos está êle filiado o é muito comum a prática de um   elei
tor votar em candidatos de partidos diferentes. Constatou-se
ser muito forte a influência exercida por líderes partidários
e parlamentares, membros de órgaos representativos, estaduais
e federais, sôbre o pleito na área do poder local.

Isso significa que a liderança pessoal de um chefe po
lítico continua a ser a tônica e é ela que impõe a disciplina
partidária, muito mais do que a consciência de que esta   deve
existir para dar coesao e unidade à agremiação. Aliás, seria
artificial falar-se em coesao e unidade partidárias, uma vez

que o pleito municipal considerado mostrou que as três suble
gendas em que se dividiram os dois partidos oficiais (ARENA e
MDB), permitidos pela legislação, eram formadas por elementos
que defendiam interêsses diametralmente opostos, muitas vêzes,
inimigos tradicionais. Tais sublegendas constituiram a "solu
ção" encontrada pelo atual govêrno para conciliar os interes
ses das diferentes correntes políticas anteriormente existen
tes.

Do ponto-de-vista da composição social, os diretórios
municipais de ambas as agremiações possuiam o mesmo tipo de
representação: eram constituidas por profissionais liberais ,
funcionários públicos, comerciantes e industriais, em propor
ções muito semelhantes. Predominavam os funcionários públicos,
característica essa, aliás, válida para um número muito eleva
do de municípios brasileiros, como tem sido evidenciado em
pesquisas semelhantes já realizadas. Isso acontece também em
relação aos candidatos eleitos para o poder legislativo, fenô
meno explicado, em parte pelo fato de que são os funcionários
do serviço público - em todos os seus escalões (municipal, es
tadual e federal) aquêles elementos da comunidade mais fami
liarizados com os problemas da administração pública, que pos
suem, em geral, um nível intelectual um pouco mais elevado do
que os demais setôres da população.

Não houve coincidência entre o número de votos obti
dos pelos candidatos e o número de votos atribuídos às legen
das, o que confirmou também que a opção se faz em tôrno de
nomes. Por outro lado, uma outra verificação foi a de que a
eleição para o poder executivo - prefeito municipal - desper
ta um interêsse muito maior por parte dos eleitores, do que a
votação para os membros da Câmara Municipal. O número de vo
tos atribuídos aos candidatos à chefia do executivo era bas
tante maior do que o total de votos obtidos por cada partido
para a indicação dos seus vereadores. Aliás, essa constatação
também já foi feita, relativamente a eleições anteriores, no
Brasil, para cargos correspondentes, nas esferas estadual (As
sembléia Legislativa e Governador) e federal (Congresso Nacio
nal e Presidência da República). O que demonstra que o poder
executivo exerce uma atração bem maior sôbre o eleitor, do
que o legislativo.

O elemento determinante para a constituição das suble
gendas e suas respectivas listas de candidatos foi a indica
ção feita por determinados líderes políticos estaduais - que
refletiam algumas vêzes a influência de líderes nacionais-que
se sempre representantes da Câmara Federal ou no Senado. Ou
tro elemento muito importante na decisão do pleito: a posição
assumida, em caráter oficial ou oficioso, mas sempre do domí
nio público, pelo ocupante atual do cargo, ou seja, pelo pre
feito em exercício. O apoio do prefeito ao candidato à sua
sucessão constitui fator decisivo para a decisão do eleitora
do. No caso, tal decisão foi a de apoio ao candidato, cujo
nome foi sufragado nas urnas e se consagrou vitorioso e a ex
plicação para o fato foi a de que a administração que vinha
sendo realizada satisfazia a parcelas ponderáveis da popula

ção, as quais desejam vêla continuada.

A campanha eleitoral travada na esfera do poder local caracterizou-se pela utilização de métodos e técnicas extrema mente incipientes e rotineiros. A propaganda, escrita e oral, através de material especialmente impresso ou da imprensa diá ria, das estações de rádio (em programas dedicados ao assunto) nao apresentou nenhum sinal de originalidade. De modo geral, a opiniao dos candidatos é de que o meio mais eficiente, do ponto-de-vista de obter votor (que é, em última análise, o ob jetivo fundamental) é o do convencimento direto, através do contato pessoal com o possível eleitor, através da conversa, da visita à casa do mesmo, da reuniao de um número relativa mente reduzido de pessoas

Os comícios públicos, tão importantes nos grandes cen tros urbanos, revelaram-se de pequena significação no munici pio, pois os candidatos preferiram as formas de persuasao di reta. Realizou-se apenas um único comício, do partido situa cionista, de encerramento da campanha, o qual foi assistido por pouco mais de duas dezenas de pessoas, sem qualquer entu-siasmo evidente. O partido da oposição nao chegou sequer a fazer isso.

O debate dos grandes problemas políticos nacionais,ou pelo menos, daqueles que estao nas manchetes da grande impren sa do país ou merecem destaque especial nas suas páginas, nao chega a encontrar eco na vida do município. Este continua vol tado para os seus problemas do dia a dia, miúdos e limitados, mas que se constituem na grande preocupação de governantes e governados: água, energia elétrica, assistência médica, trans porte coletivo, escolas, abastecimento, taxas e impostos.

Tais problemas constituem o centro das preocupações de partidos políticos, da imprensa local, das organizações so ciais e de classe. Em meio à campanha eleitoral, foi realiza da uma Mesa-Redonda com os candidatos ao poder executivo, sen do êles solicitados a indicar os problemas mais urgentes a se rem enfrentados pelos novos órgaos dos poderes executivo e le gislativo. As numerosas sugestões apresentadas puderam ser classificadas em quatro itens referentes a: a) educação (bol sas de estudo para alunos necessitados), parques infantis, creches e escolas primárias, escolas técnicas e superiores ; b) serviços públicos - construção de museu, biblioteca, tea tro, garage publica etc. c) implantação de novas industrias, através da concessao de incentivos especiais d) saúde - ins talação de farmácias, assistência gratuita etc.

Se considerarmos a circunstância de que tiveram lugar no cenário político brasileiro modificações de caráter bastan te profundo, no período considerado, teremos que concluir que tais modificações embora afetem diretamente a vida política local, pois esta é atingida por leis e regulamentos e por de cisoes de caráter geral, nao chegam a sensibilizar a opiniao pública e nao merecem sequer destaque nas páginas da imprensa local.

5. Características do desenvolvimento político

A análise dos dados obtidos a respeito do processo e leitoral no Município permitiram-nos fixar alguns traços da vida política local, que poderíamos considerar como suas ca racterísticas mais marcantes, dentro da atual realidade polí tico-social brasileira:

1 - Um acentuado conservadorismo, que se manifesta pe la preferência àqueles candidatos cujas idéias e atitudes já são bem conhecidas, o que leva a uma atitude de desconfiança em relação àqueles que se propõe a realizar reformas mais pro fundas ou que se apresentam sob a bandeira da "renovação".

Êsse conservadorismo, reconhecido e admitido em geral na cidade, manifesta-se não só no comportamento eleitoral,mas inclusive nas manifestações culturais e artísticas, na estru turação de uma opinião pública muitas vêzes hostil a atitu des diferentes daquelas tradicionais aceitas. Grande parte do empresariado local é de origem européia, predominantemente i taliana, ao passo que no comércio se destaca a presença dos sírios-libaneses. Os primeiros tornaram-se os mais influentes e atuantes na vida política municipal e é possível que tal fa to tenha contribuído de alguma forma para imprimir à cidade êsse carater tão conservador e "fechado" à mudança.

2 - A utilização de formas tradicionais de apêlo aos eleitores, à base do convencimento pessoal o direto e do ceti cismo em relação a manifestações públicas capazes de atingira grande massas.

Os métodos de propaganda, escrita e oral, são extrema mente rotineiros e atrasados, sem a utilização de técnicas mais modernas de comunicação de massas.

3 - A persistência das antigas legendas partidárias e da influência dos velhos líderes políticos, a despeito da mu dança radical sofrida pela estrutura partidária após 1964. A nova agrimiação partidária funciona, na prática, como uma co ligação que reune duas ou mais das antigas legendas e os com promissos são firmados às vésperas do pleito, em função dos interêsses específicos e imediatos de cada corrente.

4 - A dependência estreita do poder estadual,decorren te da necessidade de assegurar a obtenção normal de recursos financeiros para o município. Isso significa que o governante local deve sujeitar-se, se quiser dispor de verbas suficientes para a execução das obras que se propõe realizar, a um certo número de imposições de natureza política, de interêsse do govêrno estadual, inclusive quanto à indicação de candidatu - ras a cargos eletivos locais. Nêsse sentido, é muito importan te o papel desempenhado pelos deputados estaduais e federais que têm seu reduto eleitoral no município, pois êles atuam co mo intermediários entre o poder local e o estadual, uma vez que têm acesso aos órgãos dêste último, maior experiência po lítica e maior margem de manobras.

5 - Um grau extremamente reduzido de renovação de li
deranças políticas. Nas cúpulas partidárias, continuam em pri
meiro plano antigos dirigentes, alguns dos quais se mantêm à
frente da política municipal há vinte anos.

No que se refere aos candidatos a prefeito, a renova
ção, do ponto-de-vista etário, pelo menos, pràticamente não
houve, pois a idade média foi de 50 anos e um único estava na
casa dos 30. Se levarmos em conta que na carreira política o
cargo de prefeito municipal constitui o primeiro degrau, por
assim dizer, podemos verificar que o grau de renovação de ge
rações é ainda muito baixo. O argumento invocado pelo candida
to de 30 anos, de que a cidade precisava do dinamismo de um
jovem, não chegou a sensibilizar o eleitorado.

Na área do poder legislativo, ainda com referência a
idade, a faixa etária que apresentava maior índice percentual
de vereadores eleitos (33,3%) foi a de 28 a 38 anos, para o
partido da oposição e de 38 a 48 anos, para o partido situa
cionista (também 33,3%). Abaixo de 30 anos, o que seria nor
mal para o início da carreira política na Câmara Municipal, a
penas um candidato eleito (6,7% do total). Daí se conclui,que
a renovação é insignificante. O índice de reeleição foi de 31%,
ou seja, um terço da Câmara se manteve.

Também insignificante é a renovação dos setôres ocupa
cionais. Continuou a predominar na nova legislatura recém-elei
ta a mesma composição profissional do período anterior (1963/
1968): a enorme proporção de funcionários públicos chegou a
aumentar de 42,1 para 46,7%. Em seguida, aparecem representan
tes das áreas da indústria e dos serviços, que tiveram sua
participação reduzida de 15,8% (ambos os setôres, em 1963/68)
para 6,6%. Tal decréscimo beneficiou os elementos das profis
sões liberais, que na atual legislatura constituem 26,7%, en
quanto na anterior não iam além de 10,5%. Os novos setôres
ocupacionais e certas categorias importantes, como os operá
rios industriais e os trabalhadores rurais, bancários, técni
cos não elegeram um só representante. Isso se explica, talvez,
pelo baixo índice de sindicalização no Município - basta men
cionar o fato de que a maior empreêsa industrial, têxtil,cuja
produção é exportada para numerosos países, com cêrca de 700
trabalhadores, não possue um único membro de sindicato.

Poder-se-ia talvez concluir, à vista de tais dados,
que a expansão da rêde de ensino em todos os seus graus e a
instalação de escolas de nível superior teria contribuido pa
ra a formação de maior número de profissionais liberais e sua
incorporação à vida pública. O mesmo ocorre com a rápida ex
pansão do terciário, mediante instalação e funcionamento de
numerosos serviços, consequência da urbanização intensa, am
pliação da rêde de transportes coletivos, do comércio etc.

6 - A falta de planejamento a longo prazo, o que im
prime um caráter de improvização à ação desenvolvida pelo go
vêrno local, a qual não ultrapassa, na maioria das vêzes, a
esfera das medidas de curto alcance ou transitórias, relacio
nadas com a rotina diária.

A exigência de um Plano Diretor, para cada município
brasileiro, continua a ser uma meta não muito fácil de ser a
tingida, em virtude do nível geralmente baixo de qualificação
que caracteriza o poder público na esfera local. Aliás, come
ça a ganhar corpo a consciência de que essa é realmente uma
deficiência a ser corrigida, pelas futuras administrações mu
nicipais. Foi o caso verificado durante a mesa-redonda reali
zada com os candidatos a prefeito, ocasião em que todos êles
se declararam favoráveis à criação de uma assessoria tecnica
junto ao poder executivo, da organização de depratamentos es
pecializados a fim de acelerar a dinamização da vida pública.

7 - São ainda muito incipientes as manifestações de
novas motivações, que conduziriam a um comportamento político
de caráter mais racional. O que se verifica é que no plano
do poder local, continuam a predominar as atitudes políticas
baseadas em motivações de natureza emocional, estritamente pes
soal, os compromissos políticos firmados à base de troca dire
ta de favores, em tôrno de nomes e cargos e não de legendas
partidárias ou plataformas ideológicas.

No nosso caso, constatamos uma proporção muito eleva
da de eleitores que optaram por um dos candidatos ao poder
executivo (aquêle vitorioso nas urnas), sob a alegação de que
o mesmo possuia "capacidade administrativa". Isso significa
que o indivíduo, que se revelara na atividade privada eficien
te dono de uma emprêsa de transportes coletivos, era encarado
como pessoa capaz de realizar uma administração pública igual
mente eficiente, embora reconhecidamente homem de pouca ins
trução e de nenhuma experiência anterior de direção da vida
pública. Acontece, porém, que se tratava do candidato oficio
samente aopoiado pelo prefeito em exercício e sua propaganda
foi toda feita à base do slogan da "continuidade administrati
va", isto é, da promessa de dar prosseguimento às obras já i
niciadas e não produzir alterações sensíveis na vida do muni
cípio. Logo, seria incorreto tirar a conclusão de que pelo fa
to de que uma proporção considerável do eleitorado votou em
função da "capacidade administrativa" do candidato proposto,
isso já seria indício de "motivações mais racionais".

8 - A participação na vida política, medida em têrmos
de percentagem da população que vota nas eleições revela índi
ces ainda pouco satisfatórios. No nosso caso, corresponde a
cêrca de 38% (o colégio eleitoral, em novembro de 1968, ano
da realização das últimas eleições municipais, era de 34.710
eleitores). Por outro lado, se quisermos medir aquela partici
pação efetiva em termos de abstenção, no dia do pleito, veri
ficaremos que os índices também não são desprezíveis: 12,06%
(que se reduziria, aliás, se fôssem deduzidos os eleitores que
transferiram sua residência, os falecidos, inválidos etc).

Acontece, porém, que não se pode medir "participação"
apenas em caráter esporádico, ou seja, aquela que se concreti
za apenas de quatro em quatro ou de cinco em cinco anos, às
vésperas de uma disputa eleitoral. Mas sim daquela institucio

nalizada, que se faz sentir através da ação contínua, nos vá-
rios setores da vida pública. No plano das instituições, já
mencionamos alguns aspetos de inoperância dos partidos políti
cos, dentro da atual realidade política brasileira, a qual, se
já é tão notória no plano da política nacional e estadual,tor
na-se ainda bem maior em escala municipal, onde as agremia-
ções partidárias pràticamente não funcionam (nem sequer pos-
suem sedes ou locais para um funcionamento regular e contínuo).

A nova legislação referente aos partidos políticos,
atualmente em vigor no Brasil e que se propôs como objetivo
reformular a atividade partidária, a partir da constituição
dos órgãos mais elementares - os diretórios municipais - não
chegou a introduzir modificações mais profundas, no que se re
fere a um grau maior de representatividade social ou ocupacio
nal. No nosso caso, verificou-se que do ponto-de-vista de
distribuição profissional, nos diretórios de ambos os parti-
dos hoje permitidos, o do govêrno e da oposição, as propor-
ções são bastante semelhantes e ambos apresentam, em índices
mais elevados, representantes das profissões liberais (30% e
20%, respectivamente) e funcionários públicos (25% e 20%).
Muito embora, na direção partidária a diferenciação seja bem
maior do que na Câmara Municipal, pois aparecem representan-
tes de um número bem maior de setores: estudantes, ferroviá-
rios, comerciantes, empresários e outros.

No que se refere a uma ação política efetiva atra-
vés dos grupos de pressão ou de outras formas de ação insti-
tucionalizada através de organizações sociais de vário tipo,
poder-se-ia afirmar que se trata de uma ação bastante difusa,
embora persistente, no sentido de que tais organizações, embo
ra sejam, em sua maioria, de caráter beneficiente ou recreati
vo, e consignem em seus estatutos, quase sempre, o seu cará-
ter "estritamente apolítico", servem como degrau para proje-
tar social e polìticamente os seus dirigentes - é o caso do
Lions Clube, Rotary Clube e tantos outros muito difundidos pe
los municípios do Estado de São Paulo.

9 - A vida política municipal ainda é determinada,
em última análise, pela atuação de grupos econômicos, dominan
tes, os quais norteiam os rumos da ação política, em função
de seus interêsses restritos. No caso nosso, a comprovação
de tal assertiva é muito fácil e foi considerada, pelos can-
didatos ao poder legislativo como um dos mais sérios obstácu-
los ao mais rápido desenvolvimento do município. Uma prova
evidente está no fato de que o ex-prefeito, que já exerceu o
cargo por duas vêzes, é proprietário da maior empresa indus-
trial da cidade e vem sendo acusado de impor tôda sorte de im
pecilhos à instalação de novas indústrias, pois não deseja
concorrência no tocante ao custo de mão-de-obra, entre outras
razões.

Êsses grupos econômicos, que estão à frente da po-
lítica local há mais de vinte anos, representam, de qualquer

modo, no plano político, uma renovação em face dos antigos grupos de fazendeiros do café, que dominaram a vida local até o fim do século passado. Depois disso, por um período incrivelmente prolongado - vinte e dois anos (de 1908 até 1930) exerce a chefia do executivo no município de Araraquara, uma mesma pessoa: chega a ser reeleita por quatro períodos consecutivos, o que evidencia o extraordinário grau de conservadorismo ou de resistência à renovação.

Um detalhe que mostra como o poder econômico tem sido o fator determinante na vida política do município, é o fato de que já foram indicados para o executivo dois imigrantes estrangeiros: um italiano e um português, que enriqueceram na região. Por outro lado, uma explicação para a diferenciação social que se verifica entre os membros das várias legislaturas da Câmara Municipal está em que numerosos "doutores" casaram com filhas de fazendeiros, principalmente a partir do começo do século e assim, passam a ter acesso à vida política. Entre 1902 e 1904, a Câmara de Araraquara contava 3 advogados, num total de 7 vereadores.

O que se verifica é a substituição de grupos econômicos tradicionais, ligados à atividade agrícola ou agro-pecuária, por grupos empresariais da indústria, ou da agro-indústria (é o caso das usinas de açúcar). No poder executivo, até a década de 40, predominaram os fazendeiros e os advogados. Depois de 1947, ano da realização das eleições municipais diretas, novas camadas da população começaram a ter acesso, mas à frente do executivo jamais esteve um representante de uma das novas camadas médias baixas, em oposição aos grupos econômicos dominantes. No legislativo, deu-se a queda dos fazendeiros, que em 1947 contavam com 5 representantes na Câmara Municipal, e em 1959 com um único; a partir de 1963 já não mais elegeram nenhum. Enquanto aumentava o número de representantes da indústria, comércio e do funcionalismo público. Mas também aí, como já vimos, as camadas menos favorecidas economicamente, não têm acesso.

10 - A expansão da rêde de ensino não tem contribuído para impulsionar o desenvolvimento econômico e político, mas apenas para manter o prestígio e a influência social de certos grupos dominantes. As camadas mais baixas não são favorecidas por uma mobilidade social propiciada pela educação e a criação de novas escolas de nível superior mantém a velha tradição acadêmica e humanística: trata-se de Faculdades de Direito, Economia e Administração, Filosofia, ou seja, visa atender apenas aos anseios de status social, de determinados grupos ou camadas sociais.

6. Conclusões -

No contexto do poder local, o desenvolvimento eco-

nômico não acarreta necessàriamente o desenvolvimento políti-
co, quer se encare êste último como um grau maior de partici-
pação de novas camadas sociais e novos setôres ocupacionais,
a manifestação mais frequente de atitudes racionais ou o fun-
cionamento regular das instituições democráticas.

No caso do Brasil, os estudos de comunidade, reali-
zados naquelas regiões em que os índices de desenvolvimento
econômico foram mais significativos, têm revelado que o modê-
lo de desenvolvimento político não se libertou ainda de mui-
tos aspetos característicos dos moldes tradicionais; o centro
de decisões políticas ainda não se deslocou para o município
e a autonomia dôste, no sentido de poder realizar um planeja-
mento a longo prazo, capaz de assegurar ritmos mais elevados
de desenvolvimento, continua a ser uma meta a atingir.

Uma conclusão parece evidente: é preciso que haja
um interêsse intencional, por parte do poder central, em pro-
vocar o desenvolvimento político. Isso se faria mediante a
adoção de medidas tendentes a elevar o nível de consciência
política das massas populares, nos municípios, de modo a con-
duzir a uma dinamização maior da vida política local, através
do funcionamento regular das instituições políticas, antes de
tudo, os partidos políticos e os órgãos de representação po-
pular.

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THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL ELITE CAN THEY DEVELOP A NEW DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL ?

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CAN THEY DEVELOP A NEW DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL?

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York at Albany (x).

Almost anyone who has followed Latin American politics for some time or who has studied the topic is familiar with the crucial role played by the military establishment in most of the countries' politics. Peru is no exception; indeed, it could be cited as one of the best (or worst, as the case may be) example. From 1821, when it became independent, until 1968, the presidency of Peru (or its equivalent) has been held by 77 individuals; 51 of them were military men who led the country for 86 years. More than half of the civilians achieved the presidency through the use of force, and thus depended on the military to remain in power. The first civilian president who was allowed to serve his term earned the right to occupy the post in 1872 by winning an election, but his followers had to defeat a coup led by four brothers, illiterate colonels, who could not bear the sight of a Peruvian president who was not a military man (1).

It should be clear that as institution which has provided most of Peru's presidents cannot be considered simply a pressure group, unless the definition of "pressure group" were to be radically altered. It is also clear that, even if the Peruvian military tried at any one time to act as a traditional pressure group, Peruvian history would indicate that the type of pressure the military can apply far outweights the ability of the government to resist. Furthermore, the success which the armed forces usually have in associating their interests with those of the nation often makes their "pressure" all the more irresistible. This role of the armed forces as a power factor is only now being discussed, in the literature on Latin American politics; until recently they were lumped together with institutions such as labor unions or the chamber of commerce (2). In countries, such as Peru, where the rules of the political game are not precisely defined and seem to admit the use of violence, those who have a quasi-monopoly of it and have shown their willingness to use it, have placed themselves above the category of pressure groups. This is not simply a question of terminology; true pressure groups are powerless to counterbalance the influence of a power factor, such as the armed forces, when there is wide agreement within the officer corps regarding the achievement of certain objectives. Pluralism cannot, and does not operate effectively in such a case.

Peruvian Militarism in Historical Perspective. The figures presented at the beginning of this chapter, expressive as they are in reference to the political role of the military in the country, do not have the same significance through time. The domestic struggle for power which ensued after Peru's independence made the line between the national armed forces and the personal troops of various caudillos very difficult to draw. Very few of the members of the officer corps ware "career officers", and this expression only meant that they were willing to remain in the armed forces for a long period of time. As it was true elsewhere, politicians and men with ambitions and power became generals (often self-appointed), and officers who had achieved their personal objectives withdrew, sometimes to administer their newly-acquired land or business. The national army happened to be that army whose caudillo was in control of the capital city and, therefore, had access to the national treasury. Soldiers and non-commissioned officers joined because there was nothing better to do, or because they were forcefully drafted. In brief, throughout the nineteenth century, the country had armed groups, but not a national army as the expression is now understood. Occasionally, a prestigious caudillo (such as Ramón Castilla) would achieve a certain degree of stability through agreements with other caudillos and the traditional upper class and try to unify the armed forces into a national institution; but these attempts produced only temporary positive results, because they were based on the caudillo's personal power and skill (3).

It has been emphasized that the military caudillos were not members of the traditional upper class, particularly immediately after independence. Victor Villanueva points out that,

> The civilians subordinated themselves peacefully and pleasure to the generals-made-caudillos. The landlord somewhat impoverished as a consequence of the war, prefers to withdraw to the hacienda to rebuild it and to improve his damaged economy; he does not see the military caudillo, who relieves him of acting in politics and gives him guarantees defending his property, in a bad light... (4)

Evidence of this alliance, or at least agreement of interests, can be found in the various measures which in fact reinstated slavery (partially outlawed by the Argentine General San Martín in 1821) until a mestizo dictator, the above-mentioned Castilla, abolished it thirty-three years later. There is general agreement that during this time the officer corps was open to all those with courage and a strong desire to move upward in the socio-economic scale. While the nineteenth century Peruvian military were willing to risk (and sometimes to lose) their lives to improve their individual status, nobody, not even Castilla, took steps to alter the status quo or to take power away from the traditional upper class. It would seem that a tacit accord developed early in Peruvian history between creoles who replaced the Spaniards and the military officers; its main objective and result was the preservation of the structure left by the Spaniards. In exchange, the upper class provided ample economic rewards and relatively easy admission into the "good families" for those military officers who distinguished themselves in preserving the status quo; the upper class also provided military regimes with a certain degree of legitimacy. Needless to say, disagreements occasionally developed between some caudillos and certain upper class cliques; however, the military were forced to surround themselves with upper class civilians, since the latter were the only ones adequately trained to administer the country (5).

Certain steps, taken in the 1850's and 1960's, such as the ending of the guano concessions, upset the relationship between the upper class and the military, and the Partido Civil took the presidency away from caudillos in 1872. Once in derect control of the government, the coastal uper class proceed to counterbalance the influence of the military by creating a National Guard and various military schools which were to unify and professionalize the armed forces. Now in direct control of the governmental machinery, the traditional upper class developed in interest in subordinating the armed forces to the civilian authorities (itself) and in converting them into an effective and reliable fighting force. These actions were only partially successful; the defeat in the war of the Pacific and the inability of the upper class to provide effective national leadership brought the military back to power, although this time they were less

willing to be guided and advised by the traditional upper class. And yet, there was no attempt to modify the traditional sources of power, and particularly the ownership of land.

It seems apparent that the military officers wanted to join the upper class and share its privileges; they had no intention of introducing changes in the socio-political structure. In any case, the abuses and the lawlessness which ensued in the process of building up personal fortunes at the expense of the public treasure caused a reaction against the military caudillos; this reaction materialized in the coalition between the upper class Partido Civilista and the Partido Demócrata, a conglomeration of lower and middle class elements led by the charismatic leader Nicolás de Piérola. In 1895, after what could be considered a popular uprising, the army was defeated by bands of civilians which put Piérola in the presidential palace. And, as it has done with the military before, the coastal upper class influenced the attempts of the Partido Civilista to control and improve the armed forces. He hired a French military mission in 1896, created the Military School at Chorrillos, and training centers for non-commissioned officers, pushed a Law of Obligatory Military Service, and rationalized somewhat the system of promotions. The net result was a higher degree of professionalism in the armed forces and a loss of popularity, which led to more or less effective civilian control.

These developments altered the political thinking of the military officers, who apparently realized that they lacked enough power to successfully oppose a popular leader who was backed by the upper class, or more specifically by the coastal plutocracy. But the presidential election of 1912 showed the beginning of a split between the upper class and the Partido Demócrata. Steps taken by the latter's winning candidate (particularly his willingness to go along with the eight-hour working day and his reduction of the military share of the national budget from 24.75 percent to 21.60 percent) (6) widened the split and developed an obvious community of interest between the upper class and the armed forces. The Lima garrison revolted in February of 1914 and Colonel Oscar R. Benavides captured the presidency; he was escorted by the Prado brothers, his "civilian advisors". This event appears to mark the beginning of a period of effective mutual assistance between the military establishment and the coastal sector of the traditional upper class, with the apparent approval of the Sierra landowners.

It has been claimed by many that the 1914 coup which overthrew President Billinghurst marks the moment when the military became the defenders and protectors of the upper class. This may have been the case, as later revolts against dictator Augusto B. Leguía and President José Luis Bustamante y Rivero tend to show; Leguía enjoyed strong popular support, particularly in the urban areas, and Bustamante y Rivero obtained a significant electoral majority after a deal with the

then outlawed APRA. This argument, however, cannot be considered the whole case; the military had come to realize that the traditional upper class could, when allied with a popular movement, subject them to civilian control or, at least, deprive them of the legitimacy provided by the approval of the "good families" and the "distinguished citizens". They also knew that there was no reason to believe that a government who challanged the interests of the upper class would be more responsive to the budgetary needs of the armed forces than a government who had attained office as a consequence of a coup, particularly if it was led by a military man or the military establishment participated in it. It cannot be ignored that, while former dictator Leguía had been encouraging the development of a competing industrial base at the expense of the traditional upper class, he also gave military commissions and rapid promotions to his followers, created a Civil Guard, and bought expensive military equipment for the navy and air force to counterbalance the political power of the army; this redistribution of military funds becomes particularly important if it is remembered that, although he increased the military share of the national budget to 22.1 percent in his first year in office, it had dropped to 17.6 percent when he was overthrown. And it should also be pointed out that President José Pardo, who preceded Leguía and was the candidate of the Partido Civilista elected in 1915 with military backing, was overthrown in 1919, after he had reduced the military share of the national budget from 25.2 percent to 17.9 percent.

The different reasons which pushed the upper class and the armed forces toward each other were made clear by their spokesmen in 1914. The proclamation issued by the coup's military leadership emphasizes the poverty which exists in the military establishment, the ragged appearance of the troops, their lack summer uniforms in the month of February"(7). On the other hand, in a banquet in honor of the Prado brothers, (considered the "political commisars" of the revolt) (8) organized by their peers of th coastal upper class, the keynote speaker concluded that the military revolt had been fundamentally directed "against the irreverent, isolent, and demolishing audacity of the lower classes, which had almost eclipsed the ruling class" (9).

Other coups d'état carried out in this century further demonstrate the existence of this community of interests. Dictator Leguía was overthrown by Colonel Sánchez Cerro, a cholo from the Sierra region, classic product of the dependent middle class. But the Colonel was rapidly coopted by the traditional upper class, which "makes Sánchez Cerro dizzy with the glamour of its gatherings, swells him with pride with its flattery, seduce him with the 'love' of some of its ladies and places the commander totally at its service" (10).

Sánchez Cerro also raised the military share of the budget to 24.1 percent, at the expense of other sectors, had himself elected

President in 1931, and was killed in 1933. His place was taken by now General Oscar Benavides, who had shown his responsiveness to the wishes of the traditional upper class. A number of revolts were attempted in the 30's and early 40's, many of them sponsored by APRA, but they failed. In process, APRA made the mistake of appealing to the non-commissioned officers and the soldiers against the officer corps; in the Trujillo revolt of 1932, organized by Aprista elements, most of the officers were executed, and two years later a "conspiracy of the sergeants", again under APRA sponsorship, was discovered in Lima. APRA became, particularly after the Trujillo revolt, unacceptable to the armed forces and, because of its reformist ideology, it was also unacceptable to the traditional upper class. Thus, at least until the 1950's, the desire to keep APRA out of power reinforced the community of interests between the military establishment and the upper class (11).

The successful coup d'état of 1948 shows a similar pattern. President Bustamante y Rivero, a middle class provincial intellectual with strong Catholic leanings, was elected in 1945 with APRA votes, in exchange for APRA's participation in the legislature and in patronage appointments. But the alliance was extremely shaky: Bustamante y Rivero got along neither with APRA nor with the traditional upper class, and his own popular support vanished when Peru suffered post-war economic dislocations. APRA attempted numerous conspiracies and made contacts with young officers and non-commissioned officers. It did not appear to have been successful with the officers, but elements of the Peruvian Navy revolted on October 3, 1948, with mostly non-commissioned officers leading the movement; the revolt ended in failure, and triggered a reaction on the part of the traditional upper class which, fearful of APRA's victory, had already joined forces with senior Army officers. The result of these efforts was the overthrow of Bustamante y Rivero on October 27, 1948 (12).

Once more, the community of interests appeared to be functioning. The military establishment feared the inability and/or unwillingness of the President to handle APRA, which had broken relations with Bustamante y Rivero and was plotting to overthrow him. Whether or not these fears were justified is open to question, since in the last month of his administration the President outlawed APRA, jailed many of its leaders, and moved tanks into San Marcos University to control Aprista Students. On the other hand, it may be that those moves were made under pressure from the army and the traditional upper class, and in order to gain their support. The Proclamation of the military regime which overthrew Bustamante y Rivero also mentions, somewhat vaguely, attempts to "weaken the power, diminish the prestige, and destroy the unity of the Armed Forces", and accuses the Bustamante y Rivero administration of "not having built even one military base", of refusing to purchase "weapons, materials, equipment, and even elements which are needed

for military training", and of having adopted "the inconceivable project
of reducing the military forces by one-third, for economic reasons" (13).
In reality, the military share of the national budget had descended from
25. 6 percent to 19.9 percent during the three years of the Bustamante y
Rivero administration.

The grievances of the traditional upper class, and particularly of
its coastal sector, were equally important. APRA was still a revisionist
party with large popular support; it wanted to alter the nation's structure
radically. It had been willing to use violence before and it was plotting
again, particularly among non-commissioned officers. But there were
other reasons for being unhappy with Bustamante y Rivero: he had
enforced exchange controls, which in fact were a tax on exports, a tax
which could not be passed on to the buyers, because of competition from
other countries. And the money (particularly the hard currencies) thus
obtained by the government was being used to subsidize industrial
development.

Evidence of the connection between these grievances and the coup
d'état is provided by the key measures taken by General Odría shortly
after assuming leadership of the new military regime: he persecuted the
Apristas ruthlessly; he increased the military share of the budget to 23
percent and gave the officers opportunity to engage in business operations
(legal or otherwise), of buying automobiles at special prices, and
awarded them sizeable bonuses upon retirement; and last but not least, he
eliminated the exchange control system, thus more that doubling the net
profits of Peru's exporters (14).

Weakening of the community of interests. Perhaps because
history repeats itself, the foundations of joint actions by the armed forces
and the upper class to eliminate governments which were insensitive to
their respective interests came to an end sometime in the 1950's. It may
have been the abuses and the growing unpopularity of the Odría regime,
his attempts to develop a more permanent political base, or his
application of repressive legislation (originally directed toward the
Apristas) against individual members of the coastal upper class with
whom he did not get along.

Furthermore, the alliance became less and less necessary when
the revisionist party lost its reformist zeal, and turned its energies to
fighting Communism. After all, it is always more impressive, both at
home and abroad to control the government through an "honest" electoral
victory than through military action. And it may very well be that the
approximation between APRA and the coastal sector of the traditional
upper class caused an unfavorable reaction within the military
establishment, particularly after it had been encouraged by the latter to
persecute the former. By 1955 the break between the Odría government

and the coastal sector of the traditional upper class, which "guided" him to power, was total. The newspaper La Prensa attacked the regime constantly and most of those close to it were leading the opposition. Their candidate, Manuel Prado, received the APRA vote and defeated Hernando de Lavalle, who was preferred by Odría, in an election supervised by the armed forces. It may perhaps be more accurate to speak of a break in relations between Odría's military clique and members of the traditional upper class, led by La Prensa's director Pedro Beltrán, with the armed forces left in the middle; their role did not please anyone, and least of all the officer corps itself.

It was clear that the events prior to the 1956 election implied the repetition of the late 1890's coalition between the traditional upper class and Piérola's Partido Demócrata, with a "domesticated" APRA providing popular backing. It was also clear to the officer corps that one of the objectives of this coalition had to be the settlement of scores with the military establishment: the coastal sector of the upper class might not have been prepared to forget the closing of La Prensa, the police action against the Club Nacional, and other affronts; and APRA certainly would not forget the killing, torture, imprisonment, and exile of most of its leaders and many of its followers (beginning with the five years which Haya de la Torre spent in embassy asylum). (15). While both APRA and the upper class reassured the armed forces, the military establishment started a profound reexamination of its role in Peruvian society and politics.

The Center of High Military Studies. One of the key elements of the reexamination which went on after 1956 within the military establishment was the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM). Created in 1958 to prepare the high military command for national defense, the Center became a military school of public affairs (16). The faculty, mostly civilians, represented almost all politictical views and, at least at one time, included one individual who was considered to be a Communist (17). In any case, it is clear that the Center concentrated on the study of social, political, and economic problems, in Peru. At the same time, the attendance of younger officers to the universities increased, and its is logical to think that contacts developed between them and civilian students. The military attending CAEM concentrated on studies of the problems faced by the country, and on the prospects for the future. Their findings were quite distressing and displeased a good number of officers; these intellectual pursuits were reflected in the articles published by the Revista Militar del Perú, the journal of the officer corps of the Peruvian army. A comparison of articles published in the years 1949-51 with those included in the early 1960's shows that approximately one-sixth of those published in the latter issues deal with national development or with the country's socio-political problems. No reference to these topics can be found in the earlier issues. The general

thesis of the articles indicated that.

> ... the new military ideology proposes the improvement of
> social and economic conditions so that the grievances on the
> basis of which revolutionary groups can obtain support will be
> eliminated. If the new perspective toward development is a
> nationalistic one which includes purely military aims, it also
> includes a modern economy and social structure as the
> necessary supports of a modern military organization (18).

The interests of CAEM faculty and students in socio-economic problems was not received favorably by the traditional upper class. In the 1950's the curriculum of the Center called for a ten-month course, with seven of them dedicated to social, political, and economic matters, and only three to military subjects. In 1950, when Pedro Beltrán became premier in the Prado administration, it was changed to nine months of military and one month of non-military topics (19). This sensitivity of the traditional upper class to the activities of the Center may have been prompted by the anti-aristocratic sentiment which apparently was developing among the officer corps under the realization that they had been "used" by the traditional upper class, without being given and adequate share of the benefits (20).

This feeling was undoubtedly encouraged by the social origin of the majority of the officer corps. While the Peruvian armed forces have been completely opposed to allowing any kind of survey or data-collecting activity within any portion of the military establishment, all available information indicates that the majority of the officers come from the middle class, with an apparent over-representation of the interior over the capital city. In fact, all observers agree with this view, which is also partially reinforced by the data collected in other Latin American countries where the armed forces have been willing to release this type of information, and by the author's informal observations in Peru (21).

But there is a common sense explanation for the social background of the Peruvian military officers. Military life is simply too regimented and disciplined for the youngsters of the upper class, who already have at their fingertips almost all of the rewards which a successful military career counld bring them; and, obviously, only a minority reach the highest ranks. The same reasoning may be applied to a large portion of the upper middle class, which is found for the most part in the large urban areas. On the other hand, practically all those who belong to the lower class are excluded because they are unable to meet the formal educational requirements of the Peruvian military academies, and to pass their admission examinations. These factors practically reserve the military academies for the middle class. However, Lima and the other large cities offer other educational and business alternatives, which often are

more pleasant and comfortable, at least in the short run. Those opportunities are scarce in the small towns, and the abundance of scholarships at the service academies (this is not the case at the universities) further attracts those who have financial difficulties.

This common sense argument seems to be corroborated by the results of a survey of the occupational preferences of high school students throughout Peru. After interviewing students in exclusive private schools (upper class) and public institutions (almost solidly middle class) the author reports that,

> It is interesting to note the substantial popularity of military careers among the students of public schools. The military career has, for some time, made ivailable the means for social mobility to those who do not find favorable opportunities in other fields (22).

Nevertheless, it would seem that the significance of the social background of the military has been exaggerated. There appears to be something mysteriously powerful about the forbidden data. Most writers in the field accept the idea that given a certain social origin, only one kind of political behavior will take place, at least among the officer corps of the Latin American armed forces (23). This deterministic cause-effect relationship simply does not exist in Peruvian politics. If the middle class origin of the overwhelming majority of the military officers is accepted, and it has to be until the military themselves are willing to release data which proves otherwise, it does not explain the changes in political behavior and the cleaveges which have existed and exist in the Peruvian armed forces. It would seem that the issue is not in what class the officers were born, but whom do they represent, whose values do they share, and what view of the ideal Peruvian society do they hold. If the problem is seen in these terms, then it can be said that the country's armed forces reflect some of the contradictions of its middle class, but heavily mediated by the institutional interest of the military establishment itself (24).

The military establishment constitutes, then, the most solid and cohersive of all organizations of middle class origin, much more so than the few white collar workers' unions and the small businessmen organizations; and the officers are not brought together by a common economic interest, although the protection of the institution's economic well-being is an important factor in their political actions. The future officers ender the military schools at the ages between 16 and 18 and, from that point on, their contacts with the civilian world are kept to a minimum. While this is probably very good from the professional point of view, since it icreases the specific socialization process, it greatly reduces the officers' ability to deal with civilian matters, particularly in the field of

politics. The ultimate goal of the process of military socialization is the development of a strictly military outlook, which sets the military establishment apart and above the rest of the national society, equating it with the "sacred interests of the fatherland". All available evidence tends to corroborate in regard to Peru Jacques Lambert's dictum that in the last forty years the military officer corps has been "as distant from the aristocracy as from the masses"(25).

A further element of potential discord between the military establishment and Peru's traditional upper class is the image the military officers have of the Peruvian armed forces as a fighting force. Placed between the extremes of Argentina or Brazil on the one hand, whose armed forces consider themselves (rightly or wrongly) capable of carrying out the traditional mission of protecting their country's security from almost any type of aggression, and El Salvador or Honduras on the other, whose armies cannot possibly believe that they can withstand any serious attack, the Peruvian military would seem to have been torn between their needs for domestically manufactured supplies and the traditional upper class's reluctance to encourage industrialization. Thus, if the Peruvian military officers consider themselves closer to their Argentine or Brazilian counterparts, and personal observation tends to indicate that they do, they are forced to move in the direction of becoming industrial promoters, regardless of the social, economic, and political consequences which rapid industrialization usually brings about. On the other hand, there are signs that the traditional upper class is quite aware of the consequences of rapid industrialization (e.g., in Argentina), and has shown unwillingness to allow the military or anybody else to promote it. This discord has been reflected in the studies conducted at CAEM and in the program changes introduced in it by Primer Minister Beltrán. It acquired overt political manifestations in the 1962 and 1968 coups d'état.

The 1962 Military Revolt and its aftermath. In exchange for the electoral support given to Manuel Prado in 1956, APRA was permitted to participate fully and without limitations in the elections of 1962. Its traditional caudillo and founder of the party, Haya de la Torre, became once again its presidential candidate. Former dictator Odría was Unión Nacional Odriista's hopeful, and Fernando Belaúnde Terry led the Acción Popular ticket. There were four other candidates from minor parties, of whom only Hector Cornejo Cháves, of the Christian Democrats, was running in earnest. The military was frankly unhappy about the organization of the election and divided about the candidates. There was almost total rejection of Haya de la Torre, and numerous remarks were made before the election to the effect that he was not going to be allowed to consummate his expected victory. Beyond this virtual veto, the military appeared to have been divided in their pre-election preferences. The officers active in CAEM favored Belaúnde Terry, those who had benefited under the previous Odría administration were naturally inclined

toward him, and a large number seemed to have doubted the whole process and remained undecided.

It would be too long to detail here the armed forces' involvement in the electoral process. It began with their investigation of irregularities in voter registration, included electoral surveys and ended with the rejection of the results and the overthrow of the Prado government, which had accepted them. The military takeover took place on July 18, 1962, ten days before Prado was to have turned the presidency over to the victorious candidate; obviously the coup was not directed against Prado, but against his successor who, according to an agreement reached the day before, between APRA and the Odriista Party was going to be Odría. Owing to the fact that none of the candidates had been able to obtain one-third of all valid votes cast, as required by Article 138 of the Peruvian constitution, the election was to have been decided by Congress, which has the constitutional authority to choose the president from among the three candidates with the largest number of votes. As Tables I and II indicate, no single party enjoyed a majority in the newly-elected congress, a fact which was compounded by the armed forces' veto of Haya de la Torre, APRA's leader, who had obtained the largest number of votes and controlled the largest bloc in both chambers. The veto was made explicit at the beginning of July (Haya himself announced it on July 4) and, after conversations between the three leading candidates, the leader of APRA instructed the party senators and representatives to vote for former dictator Odría, a decision which would have insured the latter's election (26).

It was (and is) clear that General Odría was the candidate most acceptable to the traditional upper class, in spite of his difficulties with some of its members in the mid-1950's. After an unsuccessful attempt by some of them to organize their own electoral machine (the National Independent Movement), the large landlords distributed their support between Odría and Haya de la Torre. However, it seems evident that they were aware of the military's position regarding a possible victory by the latter, and that, when the veto materialized, they were essential in getting APRA to support former dictator Odría, who had persecuted the party ruthlessly until the mid-1950's. As one writer put it,

> The coup d'état finally took place. It took place regardless of the understanding between Haya and Odría. There are those who believe that it would have taken place in any case, even if the understanding had been reached sooner. It took place, above all, against Odría, who at noon of July 17 virtually was President-elect... (27).

It was (and is) also evident that the only candidate acceptable to the officers who carried out the coup was Belaúnde Terry, whose

electoral tactics parallel those of the military. Even before the election he had openly recognized the military's role as election arbitrator by stating that he would accept defeat at the polls only if the armed forces accepted the result (28). Since it was apparent that his main competitor was Haya de la Torre and that APRA's victory was not going to be accepted by the military establishment, Belaúnde Terry was in fact counting on the military to extricate him from an electoral defeat, as well as to guarantee him victory. This is what actually happened (29). The day after the election, Belaúnde Terry, on the basis of early returns, went on radio and television to thank the Peruvian population for their votes and the National Electoral Jury and other authorities for having conducted a clean election. As later returns changed the picture, he denounced the electoral process and openly encouraged the military to intervene. His invitations grew louder after the understanding between APRA and Odría became likely (30). Whether Belaúnde Terry led the military or simply announced publicly bits of political gossip is extremely difficult to establish. But the coup d'état took place, Odría did not become president, and Belaúnde Terry was given a new opportunity in 1963, which he did not waste.

Table I

Results of the 1962 Presidential Election

Party	Votes for Presidential Candidate	Percentage
APRA	557,047	32.94
AP	544,180	2.19
UNO	480,798	28.44
DC	48,792	2.89
Others	59,801	3.54
Total of valid vote	1,690,618	100.00

Source: Prepared by the author from published election returns.

Table II

Distribution of Congressional Seats - 1962 Election

Party	Senate Seats	Senate Percentage	House Seats	House Percentage
APRA	26	47.3	83	44.7
AP	17	30.9	64	34.6
UNO	11	20.0	33	17.9
Others	1	1.8	5	2.8
Total	55	100.0	185	100.0

Source: Prepared by the author from published election returns.

The New Military in power. From the moment the 200 Peruvian rangers (counterguerrilla troops) took over the Presidential Place, it was evident that there were important breaks with traditional military revolts. While the army was still the more important of the three services, true collective leadership existed in the junta; four co-presidents, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the three branches, acted jointly on all policy decisions, with the chairman (General Pérez Godoy) acting as Chief of State. No individual caudillo appeared and, when Pérez Godo showed an inclination to become one, he was abruptly dismissed from the junta, and his ceremonial responsibilities were transferred to General Lindley, the Army commander (31).

Another break with tradition was the unusual effort made by the three services to consult the officer corps, and their desire to show total unity, or at least a facade of unity, in the military establishment. In the three or four months prior to the coup numerous steps were taken by the military leadership to familiarize itself with the views of officers at all levels in regard to the developing political situation: gatherings of officers with direct command of troops, tours of the commanders-in-chief to all bases and units, and even a written questionnaire of the objective type, which all officers had an opportunity to answer anonymously. Evidently, the military leadership used this information to select a course of action satisfactory to the great majority of the officers in active service. In this sense, it can be affirmed that the 1962 coup d'etat was institutional in its inception and in the policies it produced, at least in the first few months. The military had no popular backing, and did not pretend that they had it; but popular support against the coup could not be mustered either. An attempt by APRA to call a general strike elicited almost no response, although the party controlled most of the unions, or at least their leadership (32).

It seems apparent that the members of the military _junta_ and their backers, particularly at the level of the colonels and majors, had either been involved in CAEM or influenced by its activities. During the first few months of their administration there was no represseon individuals or ideologies and, perhaps owing to outside pressure, fair elections were promised within a year. Although their declared objective was to invalidate the 1962 election, the military decided to try to solve some of the problems identified as most pressing according to the files developed at CAEM. Some of the objectives were an agrarian reform, a better distribution of wealth, and improvement of the educational system, and a reduction in the price of foodstuffs and basic items (33).

From July until December, 1962, the military government avoided practically any measure which would violate individual rights. The opposition attempted by APRA and a few minor parties during the first few days was handled quite effectively; delegations representing most unions were invited to visit the presidential palace and meet with key officers and on August 21 a decree-law ordered pay increases and other benefits for white and blue collar workers in industry, commerce, and service. This action pacified discontented union members. Other workers were promised a minimum salary statute, as soon as studies were completed. A new plan to reduce illiteracy was devised, and 1963 was decreed "Literacy Year". Taxes on corporations, income, and the fishing industry were enacted, and there was talk on the part of the Minister of Government. General Bossio, regarding the annulment of the oil concessions located in La Brea and Pariñas.

However, as time went on, the measures announced or enacted by the _junta_ were either forgotten or altered. In the last weeks of 1962 and the beginning of 1963 the compromising attitude was abandoned and a large number of left-of-center elements, some of them involved in the articulation of miners' and peasants' interest, were summarily imprisoned; it is no accident that these groups had not yet received the salary raises and other improvements promised earlier by the military rulers. The educational reforms which were to be carried out during the "Literacy Year" were somehow shelved after the expression was printed in all official correspondence; only the equivalent of $400,000 was appropriated to get the program under way.

The new taxes were unanimously opposed by commercial, industrial, and landowners organizations, and by newspapers who articulated their views; the revenue measures were either reversed or substantially altered for the benefit of the prospective contributors. Finally, General Bossio, who publicly had announced his intention to propose the annulment of the foreign oil concessions resigned in mid-October "for reasons of health" but the text of his resignation was never made public.

The imprisonment of left-of-center politicians and labor leaders was particularly indicative of the changing mood of those running the military government, and of the success of the traditional upper class which, after disagreeing with the coup d'état, challenged the legitimacy of the government and demanded that it prove itself by taking measures which CAEM consideres necessary. In the area of labor policy, the newspaper La Prensa emphasized the danger of a Communist takeover of the labor movement and the fact that, things being what they are in Peru, since the labor organizations are going to be involved in partisan politics anyway, they may as well be led by men of "democratic tendencies"; inasmuch as the power struggles within the labor movement had been and were between APRA and the Communists, it was clear La Prensa was asking the military to assist APRA in ousting the Communists. General Bossio, who represented CAEM thinking within the military government, left his cabinet post after having been opposed by La Prensa particularly on the significance of a peasants' movement in the Cuzco area; following his departure, the newspaper continued its denunciations of Communist involvement in both labor and peasants' organizations, and of proposed deficit spending by the junta (34). The exhortations were finally heeded by the military leaders, who moved forcefully, first against the peasants and later against the miners and other workers who had gone on strike. After the suspension of constitutional guarantees, the junta conducted a widespread dragnet in the first week of 1963, which netted close to 2,000 political prisoners who were accused of planning sabotage, subversive activities, and the violent overthrow of the government. The prisoners were slowly released, and, as far as can be ascertained, not even one of them was ever found guilty of these charges by either a civilian or a military court; in fact, only 62 were brought to trial before a military court in highly irregular proceedings, with the junta unable to provide the evidence it said it had (35).

However, the military leaders achieved with this action a number of objectives. First, they satisfied what probably enjoyed first priority among the demands being made by the traditional upper class; the repressive measures greatly diminished the effectiveness of organizations which articulated lower class interest, particularly in the rural areas, where the peaceful occupation of haciendas was threatening the landowners' economic base. Secondly, powers derived from the suspension guarantees were directed against the National Liberation Fron and other left-of-center minor parties and non-partisan organizations; their voting strength was small and diffused (approximately 50,000 votes, according to Table I) but in the absence of participation by these parties and organizations, most of those votes would have to go to Belaúnde Terry, the candidate acceptable to the majority of the officers in control and the least repugnant to the left-of-center voters. In view of the results of the 1962 election, these votes could have made the difference. Finally, the junta quieted the annoyance of powerful foreign investors (particularly oil companies and

mining enterprises) for the nationalistic tone prevalent in some CAEM studies, which were publicly articulated during the first three months by General Bossio; at a time when the United States government was quite cold toward military coups, this demonstration of "anti-Communist zeal" could and did help in improving relations.

While managing these and other changes and counter-changes, the military did not forget their economic interest. The Prado Administration had, approximately a month before it was overthrown, decreed salary increases for the military, with the provision that they go into effect in 1963. The military junta, however, ordered that the increases go into effect immediately, but they were not made applicable to retired officers, as had been legally mandated heretofore; furthermore, it took away from retired officers a number of privileges, including free medical treatment at the military hospitals and the opportunity to purchase liw-price, duty-free goods at military stores. This change of policy regarding retired officers provides one more evidence of the wide differences between those who carried out the 1962 coup d'état and the previous military leadership.

One promise that the military did fulfill was the holding of free elections within a year of its takeover. The voting registration procedure was improved and the number of registered voters dropped, thus indicating that at least some of the irregularities denounced before, during, and after the 1962 election, may in fact have existed. A new electoral law was passed, and the total number of senate and house seats was reduced, with some redistribution among departments. But unquestionably the most important electoral event was the agreement reached between the Popular Action and the Christian Democratic parties: in exchange for some congressional slots in safe districts, the latter agreed to vote for the former's presidential candidate, Fernando Belaúnde Terry. This coalition, together with the decision by minority, left-of-center parties to back the above mentioned candidate, gave him the presidency, as indicated in Table III.

The military turned power over to Belaúnde Terry, who had been able to put together a majority coalition and attract most of the left-of-centre votes. But it should be recognized that the individuals who participated in the transfer of power of July 28, 1963 had moved away substantially from the mandate which produced the 1962 coup d'état, even if some of the top political offices were occupied by the same individuals. The reformist zeal pushed by the CAEM alumni and particularly by the so-called "nasserites" had not been linked to the only civilian political groups which could have popularized it among the population, always suspicious and resentful of men in uniform. This inability of the reformist military officers to carry out any of the proposed reform programs was not an accident; it was the consequence of an outstanding campaign of division, and psychological warfare which brought enough

Table III

Results of the 1963 Presidential Election

Party	Votes for Presidential Candidate	Percentage
AP-DC	708, 662	39.05
APRA	623, 501	34.36
UNO	463, 085	25.52
Others	19, 320	1.07
Total	1,814, 568	100.00

Source: Prepared by the author from data released by tye Peruvian
National Electoral Tribunal.

Table IV

Distribution of Congressional Seats - 1963 Election

Party	Senate		House	
	Seats	Percentage	Seats	Percentage
AP-DC	20	44.4	50	35.7
APRA	18	40.0	58	41.4
UNO	7	15.6	27	19.3
Others	0	0.0	5	3.6
Total	45	100.0	140	100.0

Source: Prepared by the author from data released by the Peruvian
National Electoral Tribunal.

key officers around to the traditional upper class'point of view and drove
a wedge between the military establishment and the civilian reformists.

The military under the Belaunde Administration. Since Belaunde
Terry was the most popular (or the least distasteful, as the case may be)
of all presidential hopefuls, his electoral victory in 1963, in an election
which none of the leading participants challenged, appeared to have
satisfied the political disi es of the military. Apparently, they returned
to their bases and surrendered the governing to what many Peruvians
considered the country's new modernizing elite. In reality, however,

they were involved in the decision-making process, not only in those matters related to national defense, but on every major political move made by the Belaúnde Terry administration. And although it is apparent that the President expected, probably on the basis of the 1962 events, that the military were going to assist him in having his proposed reforms approved by the legislative branch, dominated by a conservative APRA-UNO alliance, in fact the opposite happened. The traditional upper class, which had effectively divided the military establishment and backed the group which shared its view of Peruvian society, continued its repprochement with the military leadership by signaling a new community of interests: the danger of a Castro-Communist take-over, which was said to be starting in the Sierra region as an outgrowth of the occupation of landholdings being carried out by the peasants' organizations. There was enough truth in the claim to make it believable, particularly to a Peruvian military establishment which could not forget the way Castro handled the Cuban officer corps (36).

A combination of police repression, poor organization, and a weak and confusing land reform act pushed some of those involved in the peasants' organizations into guerrilla warfare. Early guerrilla attempts, in Juaja, Puerto Maldonado, and La Convención valley in the years 1962-63, had been easily handled by the various police organizations, and did not require the intervention of the military establishment. Apparently the guerrillas learned their lesson, and after widespread advertisement, they went into operation in June 1965 in La Convención valley, Junín, and Piura. This time, however, the rural constabulary was no match for them; fairly well equipped and organized, they acted ruthlessly in their operations, wiped out entire patrols of the Guardia Civil and forced the armed forces to take upon themselves the responsibility of handling the situation (37).

Some of Belaúnde Terry's advisors were reluctant to publicly acknowledge the existence of guerrillas; it was felt that the presence of guerrillas would convey an impression of widespread dissatisfaction with the administration, particularly in the rural areas, and to acknow-ledge them would be tantamount to a recognition of Belaúnde Terry's failure as a reformer. The Aprista and Odriista opposition, on the other hand, felt that it was possible to diminish the administration's popularity and damage the President's image by exaggerating the threat posed by the guerrilla bands; the newspapers which articulated the point of view of the traditional upper class also exaggerated the significance of the bands, hoping to enroll the military establishment in a comprehensive clean-up operation which would eliminate the peasants organizations as well as the guerrillas. Senator Martinelli Tizon, who represented one of the departments of the Sierra region, stated,

> Let the "rangers", the Army, and the Air Force go after the
> guerrillas! We shall back them, because we cannot allow

that the constitutional regime suffer sabotage, subversion; we cannot allow it to fall into the hands of the reds. Half-measures are out of place. (38).

Even pro-Belaúnde Terry publications felt the pressure of the events and advanced the idea that the guerrillas were "a challenge to the efficiency of the armed forces", and that "if they were not bloodily repressed by the Peruvian Army - the revolt may provoke in the long run an ominous intervention of the United States armed forces" (39). The military soon came around to see it that way too and, as François Bourricaud put it, "made the liquidation of the guerrillas a point of honor" (40). In July of 1965 the Joint General Staff presented an ultimatum to the Belaúnde government, demanding that all constitutional guarantees be suspended and that they be put in charge of the repression with authorization to do whatever they considered necessary. At the same time, General Oscar Benavides Jr., son of the leader of the 1914 coup d'état and former president during the period 1933-39 (already mentioned earlier in this paper) was put in charge of the Intelligence Service and mentioned in military circles as Belaúnde Terry's replacement, if a change was considered necessary.

The emergency measures were happily approved by the APRA-UNO congressional majority and reluctantly signed by the President. Anti-guerrilla units, reportedly advised by members of the U.S. Special Forces, went into action and after a few months of fighting, badly mauled the guerrillas and killed or captured practically all its leaders. The effectiveness of the military was underwritten by the traditional upper class, which rapidly bought million soles (approximately $8,000,000) of government bonds especially authorized by Congress at the end of August to fince counter-guerrilla operations ; Pedro Beltran, owner of the newspaper La Prensa, is reported to have contributed one million soles ($40,000). By early 1966 the guerrillas had been almost completely wiped out, although a few groupes had not been accounted for in the military communiqués; probably for this reason an armed forces report closed with the warning, "the struggle is not over. The danger remains" (41).

The appearance of guerrilla which constituted a threat to the established order, guerrillas whose objective was to bring about the Peruvian version of the Cuban revolution, conveyed the impression that a new link between the traditional upper class and the military establishment had been provided. The equation that developed in 1965-66 was, at best, highly unstable, because the traditional upper class felt that it needed (or at least it wanted to keep) both its understanding with APRA and its community of interest with the military. However, while it is true that all members share in their opposition to Communism and Castroism, and that the Apristas had been the strongest backers of the

military's anti-guerrilla operations, providing them with a certain measure of popular support, it is evident that the military did not make gestures indicating acceptance of Aprista support or even implied that they were ready to forget the "Trujillo massacre". The instablity of the situation has been reflected in reports which indicate that the Peruvian military leadership", ... lump with the same sharp repugnance the largest party, Acción Popular; its weak ally, the Christian Democrats (now divided); and certainly the right wing forces: Haya de la Torre's APRA and former dictator Odría's UNO". (42) The end product was the overthrow of the Belaúnde Terry administration in October, 1968.

The Unfolding of the 1968 Coup d'État. Vague threats of forthcoming coups d'état, or at least rumors to that effect, had been widespread in Peru at least since 1965, when the guerrilla bands went into action. They intensified both in number and in believability during 1967 and 1968. Most of the time the rumors centered on the Army and, within it, on the intermediate ranks of the officer corps. Besides the political preferences of the colonels and their view of the Belaúnde Terry regime, two factors seem to have annoyed them. In the first place, military promotions were actually subject to some congressional control, thus forcing military officers to deal with legislators, and particularly with the Apristas. It is no accident that Colonel Gonzalo Briceño, who led the takeover of the presidential palace in the 1962 coup d'état, was still a colonel when he led a remarkably similar operation on October 3, 1968.

Another contributing factor, as so many times before, was the military share of the national budget; perhaps it would be more accurate to say the distribution of the military share of the budget among the three services. In fact, the Armed Forces were receiving approximately 23 percent of total governmental expenditures, a figure which normally would place a civilian government safely above the dangerous mark. However, the apportionment of the military budget was being questioned because the 23 percent was divided as follows: the Army, with more than 70 percent of all men in uniform, received 9 percent; the Air Force received the same percentage; and the Navy was allocated 5 percent (43). Needless to say, this type of distribution was considered detrimental by most Army officers, while Air Force and Navy personnel felt satisfied and, as it will be shown, unwilling to act against the Belaúnde Terry Administration.

The plotting was reported to have been conducted by a generally unidentified group of colonels, who in the early hours of the morning of October 3 met at Lima's International Airport to settle the final details and a few hours later pulled Belaúnde Terry out of bed, took him to the headquarters of the tank division and from there to the airport, where he was put aboard a Peruvian Airline jet which had been commandeered during the colonels's previous visit to the airport. These events have led

to widespread speculation regarding the possibility of the coup being engineered and spearheaded by the dissatisfied army colonels with the passive acceptance of the senior officers. If this version is correct, the senior Army officers actively joined the coup and took over leadership of the government when it became evident that they could not prevent it from taking place.

On the other hand, it is clear that such pressure was not present within the Air Force and Navy; neither service participated in the overthrow. On the contrary, General Gagliardi, Air Force Minister, joined the other members of the last cabinet named by Belaúnde Terry in a show of defiance after the civilian government's overthrow: the Navy Minister, Vice-Admiral Luna Ferrecio, was reported to have joined "the Naval forces which were loyal to the Belaúnde government" (44). The existence of disagreements between the Army and the other two services became apparent when the military cabinet was announced: the Army received the presidency and five ministries, including the premiership; the Navy was awarded two seats and the Air Force three. The new ministries created almost two months after the coup added two more Navy representatives and another Army officer. This distribution is substantially different from that which took place after the 1962 coup, in which the three services shared the presidency. Finally, it has been widely reported that the swearing-in ceremony, held approximately fifteen hours after Belaúnde Terry was overthrown, was attended almost exclusively by Army officers, with only two or three Navy and Air Force officers present. It is extremely likely that:

> Only at noon Wednesday, the high commands of the Navy and the Air Force joined the coup, after tense deliberations. A number of high Air Force officers are said to have backed the constitutionalist attitude of the Air Force Minister José Gagliardi. And in the Navy, where a cordial feeling toward Belaúnde was always visible, agreement was obtained after some hours of debate (45).

The disputes between the services have not ceased. The Navy Chief of Staff, Vice-Ademiral Mario Castro de Mendoza, was ignored in the appointment of the new service minister, despite the fact that, according to the proclamation of the leaders of the revolt, he was entitled to that position. Two days later it was announced that he had resigned, without indicating his reasons. Another unexplained resignation made public shortly after the new government took office was that of the Army Chief of Staff, General Alejandro Sánchez Salazar who at tht end of October flew to Spain to take up the position of military attaché. Again, no reasons were given, although his son-in-law acknowledged the existence of disagreements (46). Another significant change occurred three weeks after the military government was installed: the Chief of

Staff of the Air Force, who also occupied that service's ministry, Lt. General Alberto López Causillas, resigned without explanation and was temporarily replaced by another Air Force officer already serving as Minister of Public Health. Three other officers of higher rank in active service were thus ignored (47). The new military leadership seems to be willing to pay a relatively high price to achieve the consensus so easily developed in the "institutional" coup of 1962.

The Policies and Performance of the 1968 Military Regime. If the researcher accepts the hypothesis that he is dealing in this case with a coup d'état inspired and executed by the Army, and if it is remembered that, in a survey of 36 army generals, 29 rejected the agreement reached with the International Petroleum Company, it was easy to predict that the first important action of the military government was going to be in relations to this matter. Furthermore, the new government was faced with the opposition of most political parties and almost total apathy on the part of the population. It was clear that it needed an issue which could rally most Peruvians to the new government. For a long time the question of the La Brea and Pariñas oil fields has been such an issue, deeply felt not only by the middle and lower classes, but by the nationalist military officers as well. Consequently, within a week of the coup, its leader and new President of Peru, General Juan Velasco Alvarado announced the military takeover of the oil fields in question and of the Talara refinery, while army troops occupied the facilities. The government also cancelled the agreement reached by the Belaúnde Terry Administration two months earlier. Two sympathetic observers put it quite well:

> With the full reivindication of La Brea and Pariñas, with the authentic recuperation of our Talara oil, the overthrow of a government which did not know how to respond to the requirements of its historic moment is thus justified.
>
> And the starting point of the great embrace between the People and the Armed Forces, united in an exalted nationalistic and revolutionary ideal, has been the expropriation of the oil wealth which, against all reason, in violation of our sovereignty and in outrage to our national dignity, was held by rapacious foreign enterprises (48).

The desired effect appears to have been achieved. After the spectacular takeover it was difficult to find Peruvians who were willing to express reservations in regard to this action. Approval came from such contradictory sources as Cardinal Landazurri and Peru's National Liberation Front; and it was not difficult for the military government to convert support for the takeover of the disputed oil fields into a short-term legitimation of its existence. Riding on the popularity gained by the swift action, it closed newspapers, magazines, and radio stations which

had been critical of the military (49). The new government suddenly enjoyed at least the qualified approval of nearly every political party in Peru.

In reality the original takeover, though spectacular, was limited. It did not include the other oil fields explited by the IPC or its distribution services although they were taken over later. It was also announced that all concessions granted, both to extract oil and to refine it, will be respected. The first reaction of the company and of the United States Government could be considered mild; the former in fact did not sabotage the take-over and asked its staff to continue working, which they did. The latter recognized the military government within a short time and made only mild representations regarding adequate compensation. It would appear that take-over of the La Brea and Pariñas oil fields has been considered by all interested parties as a necessary move, in order to strengthen and popularize the new authorities, as well as to satisfy the demands of the supposedly "nasserite" colonels, who are credited with setting events in motion. In view of the association which many observers saw between the Peruvian military leaders and their Argentine conterparts, which took over the government in 1966, the writer wonders if this was not _originally_ another attempt at creating a natinnalistic facade for domestic consumption, without essentially altering American penetration under the protection of just such a facade.

The military's original attitude toward such a basic issue as land reform was at the beginning quite cautious and unclear. The first Minister of Agriculture, General Oscar Benavides, Jr., stated that,

> It is understandable that the difficulties met in the process of Agrarian Reform be natural and explainable owing to the matter's complexity and the limited experience in it. In accordance with reality based on the fiscal possibilities, it is the intention of the Revolutionary Government to define the actions which it is going to carry out in the process of Agrarian Reform, in order to clear up the uncertainty of those affected and benefited by it, and to dedicate the greatest effort of the Public Agrarian Sector to the technical and economic assistance of the small farmers. In spite of the restrictions imposed by the scarcity of financial resources, the Government wishes to make the Agrarian Reform process more agile... (50)

It should be noted, however, that General Benavides resigned as Minister of Agriculture during the second week of June, 1969, and was replaced by General Jorge Barandiarán Pagador, a former student and later member of the faculty at CAEM. During the last week of June, the revamped government did proclaim a new Land Reform Art and ordered

the occupation of some large landholdings, particularly those located in the coastal region and owned by foreigners.

In the area of taxation, also essential to structural change, the military regime announced that, in view of the economic situation it faced, the government was forced to utilize existing taxes; thus, badly needed reforms had to be postponed. In fact in outlining the government's priorities, it was stated that the military government's efforts would be directed toward refinancing Peru's foreign debt, guaranteeing the existing foreign exchange system, and balancing the budget (51). In order to negotiate the refinancing of the foreign debt, the military selected Fernando Berckemeyer, one of the most distinguished members of the traditional upper class. The choice was lauded in international financial circles, although not among Peruvian nationalists. Mr. Berckemeyer appears to have been successful in his mission: a month after his appointment, the International Monetary Fund approved the stand-by credit arrangement badly needed by the new Peruvian authorities (52).

Little seemed to have changed in the treatment of peasants who engage in disputes with landlords, in spite of the much-publicized new Land Reform Act. Prior to the appearance of the new legislation, an alleged attempt to invade a landholding in the Sierra region was prevented by the police and the landlord, who killed seven peasants and injured fifteen more; according to the peasants, the landlord also burned fifty of their huts. As a magazine relatively friendly to the military regime pointed out, "the government reported the event repeating the event repeating the same impassive, cold, insensitive arguments used by all the previous governments" (53). This episode gave some substance to reports of increasingly closer contacts between certain members of the military government and elements of the traditional upper class (54). The appointment of followers of former dictator Odría and individuals close to Pedro Beltrán to important positions also appeared to confirm these bits of political gossip. These events may explain the original attitude of La Prensa which, after indicating its disagreement with the route taken by the army officers, quoted from its own editorial commenting on the 1962 coup d'état, and went on to subscribe to most of the objectives made public by the military leaders (55).

It is also interesting to point out that such reliable (from the point of view of the traditional upper class sources as Odría and some of the interest groups which supported his regime at first came out in favor of the military take-over. Furthermore, the list of requests presented by the Secretary General of the Confederation of Peruvian Workers two days after Belaúnde Terry was replaced received no reply from the new regime; the petitioner was called in by the military officer in charge of the city of Lima, a colonel, a few days after he made the presentation, and was apparently told in no uncertain terms that nothing would be done in the

immediate future. It is not surprising that three days after the coup La Prensa editorialists began considering Belaúnde Terry responsible for this own overthrow and three weeks later the same newspaper applauded the economic and fiscal policy announced by the Minister of Commerce and Finance, General Angel Valdivia Morriberón (56). Even those originally in favor of the coup d'état were prompt to point out the presence of representatives of the traditional upper class in the presidential palace, the existence of pressures that were blunting the reformist zeal of the new authorities, the close ties between individuals close to former President Prado and some members of the government, and the lack of direct reference to the problem of the distribution of wealth (57).

Finally, the "moralizing campaign", which promised to denounce and prosecute those who had profited illegally while holding public office, bogged down to a general denunciation of legislators for taking junkets at public expense and putting relatives on the government's payroll. The findings of a committee which had investigated smuggling were not fully utilized when it became evident that some high-ranking military officers could be involved; reference to this campaign was made when opposition newspapers, radios, and magazines were closed; the actions were justified under this label (58).

The Role of the Military in Peruvian Society. Once again, since October, 1968, the Peruvian armed forces have formally taken over their country's government. This time, they have tried to present themselves Peru's developmental elite, implying (and occasionally saying) that no civilian group was qualified for the task. It may be too early to assess their performance in the new role, but it seems warranted and useful to analyze the previous roles the military elite has played or tried to play in Peruvian politics.

It is becoming apparent that, although the military were happy to show their ability and fighting spirit in defeating the guerrillas, as well as to save the nation from Communism and to protect the survival of their institution in the process, they are not looking forward toward forther demonstrations of this kind. The self-image developed by the Peruvian officer corps is that of a traditional military establishment responsible for the safety of national boundaries; it is clear that the armed forces have accepted responsibility for internal security (to what extent this acceptance has been the product of outside influences is an open and extremely attractive question), but it is obvious that they are not looking forward to intervening every time a group of individuals decides to go outside "normal channels" in their search for political power. Politically, the military would like to be recognized as the arbiter of political disputes, and to a certain extent it is justified by Article 213 of the Peruvian Constitution, which entrusts the armed forces with "the protection of the rights of the Republic, the enforcement of the Constitution and the laws

and the maintenance of public order". What is perhaps more important, if this role of the military has not been recognized as something that ought to be, it has certainly been recognized as something that is ; and in the attitude of many, as the only way it can be. Consequently, only a handful of those who participate actively in politics question the principle of the military as referees of political disputes; what different people question at different times is the choice the military make. But, by the same token, there are always political figures (not necessarily the same ones) who benefit from the military's involvement and therefore praise it. Belaúnde Terry following this course; APRA, UNO, and the traditional upper class cheered the military in 1965-66; the left-wind faction of the Popular Action party welcomed the 1968 coup.

On the other hand, although the armed forces would like to arbitrate disputes only when there is total agreement within, it is difficult to see how they would go about keeping national controversies from taking hold inside the military. While unquestionably a cardcarrying member of the Communis Party would not be able to remain in the officer corps (control is quite strict, with at least one representative of the intelligence service in every unit), the fact if that even at the height of the military hate for the Apristas, in the period 1930-50, there were seven attempted revolts by military units tied to Aprista elements. And the replacement of General Pérez Godoy on the military junta in early 1963 shows that not even the 1962 coup d'état (often cited as the example of an "institutional move") constituted a perfect compromise of the different political philosophies within the military. At any rate the temporary agreement within the military which made the overthrow of the Prado regime possible broke down soon thereafter, and the different positions reflecte the cleavages existing in the country at large, and particularly between the different groupes of Peru's middle class. As already indicated, even deeper cleavages have appeared after Belaúnde Terry's overthrow (59). It would seem then that the current political role of the Peruvian armed forces does not fit any of the traditional patterns, as outlines by most scholars (60). In a country with the deepest political cleavages, not only country-wide, but along class lines as well, the military seem to have set themselves apart (and, from their point of view, on top) of the domestic political struggle. With an overwhelming superiority in the management of violence which they do not hesitate to employ in the political arena, they have been in a position to lend their support to the ever changing groupes trying to influence national policy. Successful political involvements by the military have had the solicited or unsolicited becking of different sectors at different times: the coastal sector of the traditional upper class in 1948, most Belaúnde Terry partisans in 1962, and the termocéfalos (left wing of Popular Action) in 1968. This "adaptability" of the military establishment has not been overlooked by any political group, and in many cases even those temporarily victimized by a given military involvement in politics are reluctant to criticize the Armed

Forces publicly, at least too strongly, in the hope of benefiting the next time around. Even Apristas and Communists, which would be expected to have lost all hopes along these lines, cannot be said to be consistently critical of the military (31). And the truth is that, at one time or another and with varying success, almost all politically active groups have "knocked at the door of the military bases" to ask them to replace the government of the day. Consequently, on most occasions one finds an unusual ananimity in praising the military, which, together with the natural admiration of the Latin American masses for the true macho (strong and fearless man), has made possible the existence of a "civilian militarism" which leads people to distinguish between the action of certain military officers in the political realm (when they disapprove) and the military institution, which is always blameless.

Furthermore, the military officers of the more important South American military establishments tend to think of themselves, rightly or wrongly, as members of an organization which is capable of carrying out the duties traditionally assigned to the military: namely, the defense of the national territory against external aggresion. While they recognize the necessity of engaging in counterinsurgency when guerrilla movements threaten the established order, they tend to look down upon that aspect of their responsibility, which used to be within the realm of the police or of quasimilitary units. The Peruvian military officers now in power are no exception. Many were involved in the operations against the guerrillas in 1965. Some of them seem to feel that, under different conditions and with better leadership and equipment, the fight might have turned out differently, and they cannot fail to remember what happened to the officer corps after the Castro movement triumphed in Cuba. Therefore, many of these officers believe that it is in the interest of the military establishment to effect basic social, economic, and political changes which will diminish the likelihood of future guerrilla movement or, at least, will insure their isolation from the population at large. Such a policy would make it unnecessary for the military to engage in new counterinsurgency efforts and would transfer whatever popular support the reforms may produce to the armed forces themselves.

Since the officer corps of the Peruvian armed forces see themselves as regular members of the military profession, they cannot fail to be unhappy about their dependency on foreign weapons. At the same time, they recognize that national sources can only appear as a by-product of a widespread industrialization program which, they feel, only they are in a position to lead. But industrial development is closely tied to basic structural changes which previous Peruvian governments have been unwilling or unable to make. Therefore, if the Peruvian military stablishment is to acquire a greater degree of independence from outside sources, its officers will have to lead the country in its road toward industrialization (62).

The political role played by the Peruvian military appears to have been tacitly legitimated, at least in political circles and probably by default. Obviously, this role is heavily influenced by the interests of the military establishment itself, as defined and identified by its leadership. To what extent the identification of those interests is the product of inputs from the lower levels or the consequence of forceful consensus backed by strict military discipline is something that is quite difficult to accurately ascertain because of security regulations, in any case, it probably changes with time. Regardless of the type of decision-making process in existence within the armed forces, they continue to be the most influential political party, the most effective labor union, and probably the key power elite in Peruvian politics; all available evidence tends to show that nothing within the political system offers a realistic possibility of altering that fact. In spite of doubts and contradictions, they may be on their way to become their country's developmental elite. If this is so, they may very well alter radically their role and, by their example, that of other Latin American military establishments.

(1) See Victor Villanueva, El militarismo en el Peru(Lima:Empresa Grafica T.Scheuch,19 62),p.25. Agood historical description of the political activities of the military can be found in Leonidas Castro Bastos, Geohistoria del Peru(Lima:Editorial Liberia e Imprenta " D.Miranda ",1962) chapter 10.

(2) For adiscussion of the place occupied by the military in the Peruvian political system,and its interplay with other elites,see my forthcoming book, Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics . (Ithaca,N.Y.:Cornell University Press,1969).

(3) Villanueva,op.cit. ,chapter I;Liisa North, Givil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile and Peru (Berkeley:University of California, 1966),pp.8-10.

(4) Ibid.,p.19.

(5) On this point,see François Bourricaud, "Remarques sur l'Oligarchie Peruvienne", Revu e Française de Science Politique, 14:694-5. Also see North, op.cit.,p.9. It would not be an exaggeration to say that education was monopolized by the upper class.

(6) For accurate accounts of these events,see César Lévano, La Verdadera Historia de las 8 Horas,(Lima:N.pub.,n.d.)passim; Villanueva,op cit., pp.40-50;and Leonidas Castro Bastos, Golpismo, (Lima:Editorial Libreria e Imprenta "D.Miaranda",1962),pp. 40-46.

(7) José Urdanivia Ginés, Una RevolucionModelo del Ejercito Peruano, (Lima:Editorial Castrillon Silva,1954),p.17. The author was one of the leaders of the 1914 revolt.

(8) Villanueva, op. cit. ,p.45.

(9) Urdanivia Ginés, op. cit. ,p.65.

(10) Villanueva, op. cit. ,p.66.

(11) The revolts of this period are described by Castro Bastos, op. cit. ; part I; Villanueva, op. cit., chapters II,III,IV,and V;and Jorge Basadre, Historia de la Republica del Peru (Lima:Ediciones "Historia", 1961-4), vols.8 and 9.

(12) For further details on the 1945-48 political maneuvering,see Oscar Bueno Tovar, Las Fuerzas Armadas y el Apra ,(Lima:I.M.P.,1963) passim; Victor Villanueva, El Militarismo en el Peru, chapters V and VI; Victor Villanueva, La Tragedia de un Pueblo y un Partido(Santiago de Chile:Ediciones Renovacion,1954), passim; José Luis Bustamante y Rivero,Tres Anos de Lucha por la Democracia eñ el Peru(Buenos Aires:

Bartolomé U. Chiesino, 1949), passim; Harry Kantor, El Movimiento Aprista Peruano (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Pleamar, 1964), Chapter II; and Enrique Chirinos Soto, El Perú Frente a Junio de 1962 (Lima: Ediciones del Sol, 1962), chapter I. For details of the coup d'état which overthrew Bustamante y Rivero, see the New York Times, October 28, 1948, pp. 1, 4; October 29, 1948, p. 18; October 30, 1948, pp. 1, 5; and October 31, 1948, p. 38.

(13) El Comercio, October 29, 1948, p. 1.

(14) Enrique Chirinos Soto, op. cit., pp. 75-86; Víctor Villanueva, El Militarismo en el Perú, pp. 121-9.

(15) Haya de la Torre entered the Colombian embassy in Lima en January 3, 1949, and asked for political asylum; the Colombian government granted the request and petitioned the Odría regime for a safe-conduct, so that the Aprista leader could leave the country. The safe-conduct was denied for more than five years and caused international frictions and a case in the International Court of Justice. The safe-conduct was finally granted and Haya left the country on April 6, 1954. Of the numerous accounts of this controversy, see Haya's article, "My Five-Year Exile in my Own Country," Life, 36:152-156. For an analysis of the legal aspects, see Amalia Zavala Álvarez, "La Corte Internacional de Justicia y el Asilo Diplomático", (unpublished thesis), National University of Mexico.

(16) In a conversation with the author, one of the members of the CAEM faculty (a civilian), pointed out that it was "the only school of political science in Peru". The curriculum, while not too sophisticated by American standards, was quite advanced for Peru and for many other Latin American countries, where political science is only beginning to exist as an independent discipline.

(17) The faculty member in question was Gregorio Garayar, and the point was made by an Aprista leader, Andrés Townsend Ezcurra in his article, "Frente a la Ley, los Tanques", Panoramas, March-April, 1963, p. 59.

(18) Liisa North, op. cit., p. 53. Also see Villanueva, El Militarismo en el Perú, pp. 174-169. For specific examples of military writing in this field, see José R. Calderón M., "El Comandante y la Comunidad", Revista Militar del Perú, May-June, 1962, pp. 33-5; and Lisandro Mejía Zagastizábal, "Acción Cívica en el Campo Laboral", Revista Militar del Perú, January-February, 1964, pp. 100-11.

(19) Reported by William F. Whyte, La Mano de Obra de Alto Nivel en el Perú (Lima: Editorial Senati, 1964), 51-2.

(20) Richard Patch, "The Peruvian Elections of 1962 and Their Annulment", American Universities Field Staff Service Reports; West Coast of South America Series, vol. IX, N° 2 (September, 1962), p. 16.

(21) In a number of visits to Peru the author was able to come into contact with military officers, mostly at the intermediate ranks. Depending on the situation, discreet inquiries into the personal background of the officers were made. While the results cannot be considered reliable scientific evidence, a pattern of dependent middle class background clearly develops, weighted in favor of the cities and towns of the Sierra region. This pattern was corroborated by the fact that most of the officers contacted appear to belong to the mestizo group, from the ethnical point of view. These findings were ratified by the President of the military junta which replaced Belaúnde Terry, who stated that the military officers were part of the middle class and claimed that they were at the time trying to articulate its interest (El Comercio, October 29, 1968, p. 4). For testimony on this point, see Aníbal Ismodes, "La Conducta Política de los Militares", Panoramas, March-April, 1963, pp. 61-70; Jacques Lambert, América Latina; Estructuras Sociales e Instituciones Políticas, (Barcelona: Ediciones Ariel, 1964), pp. 358-62; John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, Calif.; University Press, 1964), p. 105; José Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup", in Institute of International Studies, Trends in Social Science Research in Latin American Studies: A Conference Report, pp. 55-99; Leónidas Castro Bastos, Geohistoria del Perú: Ensayo Económico, Político, Social (Lima: Editorial Librería e Imprenta "D. Miranda", 1962), pp. 148-54; Liisa North, op. cit., p. 51 and Jorge Basadre, História de la República del Perú, vol. 10, pp. 4735-43. For comparative data on the Argentine and Brazilian armed forces, see José Luis de Imás, Los que Mandan (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria, 1964), pp. 45-84; and Mario Afonso Carneiro, "Opinião Militar", Cadernos Brasileiros, 8:17-28.

(22) William F. Whyte, La Mano de Obra de Alto Nivel en el Perú, p. 56 (emphasis added).

(23) This oversimplified interpretation of Marx can be found, among others; in S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 40. For a documented criticism of this abusive employment of social background data, see Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodoligal Inquiry", The American Political Science Review, 61:428-45, June 1967.

(24) This point is also made, in reference to other Latin American countries, by Nun, op. cit., p. 86.

(25) Jacques Lambert, América Latina; Estructuras Sociales e Insticiones Políticas, p. 359.

(26) There are numerous accounts of these events. To cite only a few,
Humberto Ugulotti Dansay, Las Elecciones de 1963 y la Lección del
62 (Lima: Tipografía Peruana, 1963); Enrique Chirinos Soto, Cuenta y
Balance de las Elecciones de 1962 (Lima: Ediciones Perú, 1962); M.
Guillermo Ramírez y Berrios, Examen Spectral de las Elecciones del 9
de Junio de 1963 (Lima: N. pub., 1963); Leónidas Castro Bastos,
Golpismo; Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 25-36; Oscar Bueno Tovar, Las Fuerzas Armadas
y el APRA; Exposición Televisada (Lima: L. M. P., 1963; Luis Humberto
Delgado, Drama del Perú (Lima: Ariel Editores, 1963); Luis Antonio
Eguiguren, La Fuerza Armada y el Proceso Electoral de 1962; William
Obelson, Funerales del APRA; el Fraude Electoral y Fiscal (Lima: N.
pub., 1962); Aníbal Ismodes, "La Conducta Política de los Militares",
Panoramas, March-April, 1963, pp. 61-70; and Andrés Townsend
Ezcurra, "Frente a la Ley, los Tanques", Panoramas, March-April,
1963, pp. 51-60.

(27) Chirinos Soto, op. cit., p. 77.

(28) Ibid., pp. 63-4.

(29) See Ramírez y Berrios, op. cit., pp. 51-3.

(30) Belaúnde's erratic behavior was widely reported in the daily press;
he went so far as to barricade himself with a few youngsters in the
center of his home town, Arequipa, while announcing that he was beginning
the movement to overthrow the Prado government and annul the elections.
The government ignored him and, without any armed forces reaction, he
gave up and went home.

(31) The overthrow of Pérez Godoy and his replacement by Lindley
appeared to have been a consequence of the cleavages within the armed
forces, cleavages which materialized after the military took over. The
institutional agreement which existed at the time of the overthrow of the
Prado regime was certainly not present in Pérez Godoy's replacement.
It would appear that the coastal sector of the traditional upper class
benefited from a reduction in certain taxes imposed by the junta on
income, corporations, and fish production. The tax reductions were
decreed within three weeks after Pérez Godoy was ousted. For a detailed
discussion of these events, see Víctor Villanueva, Un Año bajo el Sable
(Lima: Empresa Gráfica T. Scheuch, 1963), chapter 8.

(32) On this question, see James L. Payne, Labor and Politics in Peru;
the System of Political Bargaining (New Haven, Conn: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1965), chapters 6 and 8; also my book, chapters 5 and 9.

(33) The writer has seen some of the files, which are also mentioned by
     Justo Piernes, "Democracia Directa", Leoplan, August 15, 1962,
pp. 12-5. Mr. Piernes even warned his readers that "nasserites" had
taken over a Latin American country.

(34) It would be fruitless to identify any one editorial, or any one speech
     made by junta members. Almost every day, from July 19, 1962 on,
La Prensa had something to say on these subjects. On the "Communist
menace" see particulary the editorials and the first page news in the
period December 21-29, 1962, just before the dragnet.

(35) The best description of events in this period can be found in
     Villanueva, Un Ano bajo el Sable, chapters 6 and 7; for an account of
repression by one of those jailed, see Genaro Ledesma Izqueta, Complot
(Lima: Talleres Tipograficos Editorial "Thesis", 1964), passim.

(36) A solid report on the land invasions can be found in Hugo Neira,
     Cuzco: Tierra y Muerte (Lima: Problemas de Hoy, 1964). On the
peasants organizations, see Anibal Quijano O., "El movimiento Campesino
del Peru y sus Lideres", América Latina, 8:43-64, October-December,
1965. The increasing community of views between the traditional upper
class and the military leadership was confirmed by the forced retirement
of General Bossio in 1964; see Caretas, January, 1965, pp. 24-6.

(37) Accounts of the guerrilla operations can be found in Rogger Mercado,
     Las Guerrillas del Peru el MIR: De la Predica Ideologica a la Accion
Armada (Lima: Fondo de Cultura Popular, 1967); Gonzalo Ani Castillo,
Historia Secreta de las Guerrillas (Lima: Ediciones "Mas Alla", 1967);
and Americo Pumaruna, "Peru: Revolucion: Insurreccion: Guerrillas",
Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico, April-May, 1968, pp. 62-86. Interesting
December, 1965. As reported in the New York Times, September 12,
1965, p. 1. the military authorities closed the "war zones" to outsiders
and arrested and expelled foreign and Peruvian newsmen who did not obey
their orders.

(38) Quoted in Pumaruna, op. cit., P. 73.

(39) Oiga, July 0, 1965, pp. 1 and 8, respectively.

(40) François Bourricaud, "Les Règles du Jeu en Situation d'Anomie: le
     Cas Péruvien", Sociologie du Travail, 9:348, July-September, 1967.

(41) Confirmado, Nov. 17; 1966, p. 40. It appears that the military
     rapidly identified and captured all peasants who were acting as con-
tacts between the guerrillas. After getting substantial information out of
the contacts, they moved against the guerrilla bands with artillery and
air strikes, including napalm (Pumaruna, op. cit., pp. 74-80; New York

Times, September 12, 1965, p. 1, and October 11, 1965, p. 14; Política, Nov. 15, 1965, p. 32). Simultaneously, the secret police and the intelligence service jailed actual and potential urban contacts, including the wives of guerrilla leaders (Oiga, July 23, 1965, p. 6). Beltrán's contribution was reported in Confirmado, September 8, 1966, p. 30.

(42) Primera Plana, August 1, 1967, p. 32.

(43) The percentage of men in the Peruvian army comes from Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Military Elites", in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari, Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 154. The budgetary breakdown, which refers to the 1968 budget, appeared in La Prensa (Lima), October 29, 1968, p. 2. The matter of promotions is mentioned in Oiga, October 25, 1968, p. 8.

(44) Siete Días de Perú y del Mundo, supplement of La Prensa (Lima), October 6, 1968, p. 14. The events and the role of the colonels have been described in Oiga, October 4, 1968, pp. 4-6; La Prensa, October 3, 1968, pp. 1-4, and October 4, 1968, pp. 1-5; Primera Plana, October 8, 1968, pp. 25-27; and El Comercio, October 3, 1968, p. 1, and October 4, 1968, p. 1.

(45) Siete Días de Perú y del Mundo, October 6, 1968, p. 5.

(46) See La Prensa, October 31, 1968, p. 2.

(47) See La Prensa, October 27, 1968, p. 1; and Primera Plana, October 29, 1968, p. 28. It has been rumored that the resignation of López Causillas was the consequence of disagreements with President Velasco Alvarado over promotions in the Air Force, based on the desire of each of them to promote those officers whom he considered loyal to him; see Siete Días del Perú y del Mundo, October 27, 1968, p. 7.

(48) Francisco Igartúa in Oiga, October 11, 1968, p. 3; and Francisco Bendezu in ibid., p. 3, respectively.

(49) See, Oiga, November 4, 1968, pp. 8-10 and 36; and La Prensa, November 1, 1968, pp. 1-2.

(50) La Prensa, November 4, 1968, p. 4. General Benavides also announced that the government was going to proceed with the expropriation of cattle ranches of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, a step already decreed by the Belaúnde Terry Administration, but whose implementation had been delayed, apparently for lack of funds. It should be pointed out that the mining corporation had indicated its willingness to divest itself of the land. It has also been reported that the corporation was awarded and oil concession in the Selva region, covering 53 million acres; see El Comercio, November 12, 1968, p. 1, quoting

the Washington Post of November 10, 1968.

(51) See Junta Communiqué N⁰ 10, reproduced by La Prensa, October 6, 1968, p. 1.

(52) International Monetary Fund Press Release N⁰ 708, dated November 8, 1968, and reproduced in International Financial News Survey, 20:381, November 15, 1968.

(53) Oiga, November 4, 1968, p. 36. The events were also reported by La Prensa, October 31, 1968, p. 1.

(54) An example of this type of contact was reported in El Mundo (Lima), June 2, 1969, pp. 16-19.

(55) La Prensa, October 4, 1968, p. 11.

(56) La Prensa, October 6, 1968, p. 15, and October 27, 1968, p. 13. It should be noted that Valdivia, a fiscal conservative, was later forced out of the Government.

(57) Oiga, October 11, 1968, p. 6, October 18, 1968, p. 6, October 25, 1968, p. 16, and November 29, 1968, p. 9.

(58) See section 3 of Junta Communiqué N⁰ 14, reproduced by La Prensa, November 1, 1968, p. 1.

(59) Along the lines suggested by José Nun, "A Latin American Phenomenon: The Middle Class Military Coup," Institute of International Studies, Trends in Social Science Research in Latin American Studies: A Conference Report, pp. 55-99.

(60) Such as L. N. McAlister in his "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America", Journal of Inter-American Studies, 3:341-50, July, 1961, reprinted in Peter G. Snow (ed.), Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), pp. 277-85.

(61) The Apristas provide the best example of this military idolatry, which molds the outlook of the population. See, for instance, Luis Alberto Sánchez, El Perú: Retrato de un País Adolescente (Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 1963), pp. 141-7, and the statement made by the Aprista leader Silva Solís in Caretas, January, 1965, p. 16.

(62) The speech made by the Minister of Finance, General Francisco Morales Bermúdez, at the Second National Congress of Manufacturing Industries, held in Lima from February 11 to 14, 1969, illustrates this

point of view. See Francisco Morales Belmúdez, "La Industria y la Defensa National" (Lima: Sociedad Nacional de Industrias, 1969), mimeo.

8

N° II - 3

RAPPORT / PAPER

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

IN

CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS

by Helio JAGUARIBE

- IUPERJ -

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS

by Helio Jaguaribe

- IUPERJ -

Three aspects of Political Participation

The question of political participation, as most other questions of political science, has been deeply affected by the more behavioral tendency of the discipline in the three last decades. Even if a soberer reappraisal of the classics and of the political thought of the 19th and earlier 20th century would significantly reduce certain present criticism concerning their normativistic bias (cf. Friedrich, 1963), it seems fair to acknowledge as a contribution of our time the definitive conversion of political science into an observational and analytical (instead of speculative) discipline of political behaviors.

The study of political participation is one of those in which the new approach and the new methods of research have brought more fruitful results. If we consider the way that question was treated in the past and we single out three of the most characteristic moments of political thougt - Classic Greece, the Renaissance and 18th and 19th century liberalism - we will see that the process of political participation was predominantly contemplated in function of certain involved values rather than in view of describing and explaining its own patterns. For Classic Greek thought what was relevant was to determine what extent and form of participation was good for the

polis (1). For the Renaissance writers what was important was to find out, in the process of political participation, which were the foundations of authority and legitimacy, in the interaction between people, ruler and - insofar as considered operant - the will of God (2). And for the 18th and 19th century liberals, who accepted an immanent understanding of human liberty as the factual and normative foundation of political participation, what they were concerned with were the ways of determining the volonté générale and adjusting one's liberty to the liberty of all (3).

These three major questions (1), what sort and extent of participation is good for the polity (2), what, in the participational interaction, confers legitimacy to the rulers and their decisions and the duty of compliance to the ruled, and (3) how can individual liberty and social regulation be mutually compatible, keep all their relevancy today. But, whatever the answers that can be given and the extent of ascertainability these answers may contain, contemporary political science will stress the necessity, before proposing such questions, to

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(1) For both Plato and Aristotle, education, with an emphasis on civic and political education, was a pre-requisite of participation. See, for Plato, The Republic, particularly Books V to VII; The Statesman, particularly 287b to 311c; The Laws, Book VI (cf Platon, Oeuvres Completes, Société d'Edition Belles Lettres, Paris). For Aristotle, see Politics, particularly Books IV and VIII (cf Aristotle, Politique, ed. M. Thurot, Firmin Didot, Paris, 1824).

(2) Although the political analysts of the 16th century were generally concerned with the foundations of power and authority, there is a great difference of approach and concern between Italian and French authors. The Italian Renaissance writers, such as Machiavelli and Guicciardini, were primarily concerned with problems of political strategy: how power can be acquired, preserved and expanded. The French Monarchomachs, from the author of Vindiciae contra Tyrannos to Jean Bodin, were primarily interested in analyzing the foundations of legitimacy, in the ruler ruled relationship.

(3) That problem is particularly central for Rousseau, Kant and J. S. Mill. See, for Rousseau, in "Du Contract Social" (1762) particularly Book I, Ch. VI and Book II (cf J. J. Rousseau, Oeuvres Completes, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, 1964, pp330 and fls and pp 338 and fls). For Kant, see The First Methaphysical Foundations of the Theory of Law, particularly § 47 (Cf Ernst Cassirer, Kant, pp 433,- 435, Fondo de Cultura Econ, Mexico, 1948; cf also Carl Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective, Ch XIV, Univ. of Chicago (2d ed.) 1965. For John Stuart Mill see particularly On Liberty, notably I and IV.

approach in a different way the problem of political participation. The scientific (instead of philosophical) inquiry about political participation will be oriented to distinct sorts of questions which could be also expressed in three points: (i) in what consists the process of political participation, which are the main involved variables and how can they be studied and measured? (ii) how do the ostensible rules and principles regulating political participation (nominal participation), such as constitutional and legal norms, ideological principles and political programs, relate to the effective practices (real participation) of a given society? (iii) what sort of political participation, and how much, can be actually processed by a political system, in function of its operational variables (see Table I, following) and its main environmental conditions - the human and natural ressources of the concerned society, the level of technology and the international system?

What is political participation?

In a general way modern writers understand by political participation the processes and the form by which members of a society are involved in its political system. What is relevant in political participation, observes Almond (1936 p 35), is having a part in the decision making of the system. And that involvement, as it is stressed by Milbrath (1965 pp 9 and fls) will present a large spectrum of possibilities, from active leadership to passive submissiveness.

Political participation is a concept close to three other ones: political mobilization, political integration and political representation. As it so often occurs in political science, because of the still insufficient development of its taxonomy, there is not yet a definitional consensus concerning what should be precisely meant by each of those concepts. From that results in their current use a certain interchangeability and overlapping between the meanings, on the one hand, of political participation and political mobilization and, on the other hand, of the former and political representation.

It would be alien to the purposes of the present study to attempt to clarify this subject. I will just mention that in the present text (as in my current use) I understand by participation, in its broadest sense, one of the three sets of the macrovariables of a political system, and in its narrow meaning, one of the variables of the Political Mobilization macrovariable. For rendering possible the understanding of the concerned categories and their interrelations and subdivisions, two taxonomic tables will be presented in continuation.

Table 1

Macrovariables of the political system

Sets	Macrovariables
1. Operational Variables	A. Rational Orientation
	B. Structural Differentiation
	C. Level of Capability
2. Participational Variables	D. Political Mobilization
	E. Political Integration
	F. Political Representation
3. Directional Variables	G. Political Superordination
	H. Development Orientation

Whereas the first set of macrovariables, the Operational Variables, indicates the extent of modernization of a system and the last set, Directional Variables, indicates its political orientation (reactionary or progressive), the second set, of the Participational Variables, indicates the extent of institutionalization of the system. This set contains the following macrovariables and corresponding variables:

Table 2

Participational Variables

Macrovariables and variables	Description and indicators
D. Political Mobilization	
1. Social Mobilization	– Grade and accuracy of members' social awareness (Socialization)
2. Political socialization	Grade, accuracy and congruence of members' participation in the political culture (Politicalization)
3. Political participation	Extent of membership and grade of participation (Participation)
4. Political franchise	Extent, scope and freedom of franchise (Political Equality)

5. Political engagement   Grade of commitment to current or alternative regime or authorities (Political Commitment)

E. Political Integration

  1. To the society (nation)   Grade of societal (national) integration of discrete groups (Social or National Integration)

  2. To the political system   Grade of compatibility, mutually and with system, of political commitments (Value Integration)

  3. To the social order   Grade of support to the social order (Mass-Elite Integration)

F. Political Representation

  1. Representativeness   Grade of actual correspondence between authorities and policies and the will of the members of the polity (Legitimacy of Authorities)

  2. Stability   Grade of non-coercive compatibility of current political processes with system and regime (Legitimacy of Regime)

  3. Civility   Grade of unenforced socialization and internalization of system, regime and policies (Legitimacy of System)

As it can be seen above, I suggest that participation in its broadest meaning corresponds to a set of macrovariables including Political Mobilization, Political Integration and Political representation. In its narrow meaning, political participation corresponds to one of the variables of the macrovariable Political Mobilization: the one concerning the extent of membership and grade of participation in the system, i.e., of involvement in decisions concerning its inputs and outputs.

In the current practice of political analysis "political participation", when used loosely, ordinarily refers to one or more of the macrovariables of the participational group, particularly the macrovariable Political Mobilization. When used in a more restrict and precise way, "political participation" presents the meaning given in the

table above to variable 3, of macrovariable D, Political Mobilization.

It is predominantly in that last and strict meaning (although with some conceptual overlapping on political integration and political representation) that Milbrath has made his well known analysis of the process of political participation, discriminating it in function of (1) the form of activity, (2) the inputs to the systems and (3) the outtakes from the system (cf op. cit. Figure 1, p 14).

The form of participation of individual groups in the political system is determined by certain identifiable general conditions; which constitute a set of defineable and, to a large extent, admeasurable, variables. Among other possible ways of classifying these variables (cf Milbrath's four functions) I suggest a tripartite approach differentiation: (1) the structural conditions resulting from the proper structure of the polity and its society, in function of the prevailing regime of participation; (2) the conditions resulting from the personality of the individuals and from their immediate group settings, such as family, pair group and similar ones; (3) the conditions of an aleatory or circumstancial character, in relation to the two former ones, varying from such macroevents as wars and revolutions to micro-occurrences as all sort of individual happenings.

Socio-politically, the first set of conditions is the most important. Given the structure of a political system and its society and the regime of participation there in prevailing one has the basic frame of the possibilities of participation occurring in such polity and society. If we consider, in accordance with Almond's classification of political systems (1933 p 217) the distinction among primitive, traditional and modern systems, and their various classes and, according to Apter (1965), the differences between reconciliation systems and mobilization systems, we will see that each of these systems, independently of the personality of the actors and the circumstancial events, stablish certain rather stable and strict parameters of participation. These parameters will reflect, on the one hand, the structural differentiation existing in the concerned society and, on the other hand, will express the prevailing regime of participation, which establishes what strata and groups have access to what sort of functions, in what sort of conditions.

Personality conditions and circumstancial conditions, on the other hand, will determine how, within the framework of the structural conditions, individuals and groups are likely to exert their participational possibilities, including the changes in the structure of the society and its regime of participation resulting from the social interaction.

Nominal and effective participation

In all, except some primitive societies, there is always a difference between nominal and effective political participation. Such lack of correspondence is due to two distinct reasons: (1) discrepancy between rule or principle and effective practice, due to power oligopolization and (2) discrepancy between admitted and effective participation, due to powel aloofness.

The discrepancy between rule or principle and effective practice, due to power oligopolization, expresses the difference between the regime of power and the political regime of all non-primitive systems (cf Jaguaribe, 1968 Ch 5 and 6). The regime of power consists in the actual structures and practices effectively regulating who rules or shall rule and how. The political regime consists in the consuetudinary and legal norms that establish who supposedly should rule and how. The gap between the two regimes includes such facts as overt and covert practices of violence and fraud and various forms of ascriptive privileges and restrictive practices. The regime of power expresses the regime of participation which actually prevails in a society, whatever its legal or ideological claims. The political regime expresses the form by which a society tries to adjust its regime of participation to its regime of values. Insofar as the regimes of participation and of values are more or less compatible, the gap between them, smaller or larger, will be functionally tolerable for the concerned society.

Considered in terms of political development, such gaps tend to follow a certain correlation with the stages of development of the concerned polity and its society. Traditional societies are likely to have a smaller distance between their regime of power and their political regime because the ascriptive contents of the regime of participation tend to be sanctioned by the regime of values (such as privileges of nobles or notables and underprivileges of slaves, peasants and manual workers). Well developed societies, on the other hand, tend to successfully overcome most of the usual ascriptiveness of pre-industrial societies and, therefore, to conform their regime of participation more closely to their regime of values. It is in the period of transition, which corresponds in our time to the several phases of the process of industrialization (cf Organski, 1965) that tend to occur the most severe contradictions between the regime of participation, keeping the ascriptivenesses of pre-industrial societies, and the regime of values, already expressing, by the influence of the more advanced societies, high expectations of secularity, liberty, equality and social welfare. In such period the gap between the regime of power and the political regime tends to be so large that their compatibilization may become impossible. So is the

case of the "societas sceleris" society (as Batista's Cuba), in which the whole political regime is a pure legal pretence in a society actually governed by political gangsters, with the large cumplicity of the most influencing groups. And it is also the case (as in some other Latin American countries) of societies that cannot maintain any endurable and internally consistent political regime, and are compelled, to preserve their actual regime of participation, to introduce constant institutional changes in their rules, usually in violation of their own rules of change.

The other kind of discrepancy, formerly referred to, between admitted and effective participation, due to power aloofness (cf Milbrath, op. cit. ch. VI), expresses the difference between the ideological and legal claims of a society and the actual use given to them. What is involved, in that kind of discrepancy, is not a difference between rule and practice in the formerly considered sence, i.e., that officially admitted rights would no be actually implementable. What is involved is the difference between certain perfectly implementable political expectations of a society, duly sancioned by its political regime and accepted by its regime of power, and the actual use given to these expectations. It is, in other words, the deliberate no use of political faculties and capabilities, in spite of their effective availability, by the lack of interest, by certain social groups and sectore, of exercising their rights and powers, because of power aloofness. Although there are several forms of, and reasons for, such power aloofness (of which a typical case is electoral abstention), they always ultimately express the lack of relevancy of many aspects of the political life for the private individual and groupal interests of certain actors. Such irrelevancy, in its turn, is due to the fact that the current and expected relationship between the private universe of these people and those aspects of the political life are for them either too remote to be worth trying to influence, or too stable to be likely to be negatively affected by their apathy.

The study and better understanding of the two above referred forms of discrepancy between nominal and effective participation have brought important changes into the theory of political representation, in general, and of democracy, in particular. To treat very briefly that question I will just mention its quantitative and qualitative aspects.

Quantitatively (cf Milbrath, op. cit. ch. VI), appropriate observation brought evidence to the fact that high political participation does not correlate with effective democracy and is not necessary for it, although actual openess (albeit little used) to participation is a necessary condition for a democratic regime. High political participation, moreover, is compatible with little, or none, political representation, as in the cases of nazism and communism. And there is still the problem of the relationship between political openess to participation and the

privatization (i. e. non openess to participation) of other relevant sectors
of social life, such as the economic ones, which haunts the capitalist
democracies in the present age of super and multinational corporations
(cf Bachrach, 1967).

Qualitatively, it came to be understood that there are
several forms of democracy, as a political type, and not only the liberal
model and its ancestral form of the Athenian democracy. Opposing
elite controlled democracy (with more civil freedom and narrower
participation and social benefits) to mass democracy (with less civil
freedom and broader participation and social concern), Burdeau (1956)
speaks of "démocratie gouvernée" and "démocratie gouvernante". More
recently and analytically, Dahl (1933) differentiates three models: (1)
Madisonian democracy, (2) Populistic democracy and (3) Polyarchal
democracy. Similarly, Macpherson (1966) distinguishes three types:
(a) Liberal democracy, (b) Third World democracy and (c) Communist
democracy. The discussion of these typologies became a necessary and
most relevant part of the new approach to the study of democracy.

Participation and structural conditions

The introduction of systems analysis in political science and
the studies of such scholars as Easton (1965a, 1965b) and Parsons,
particularly the latter's more recent works (cf An Outline of the Social
System, in Talcott Parsons et al., eds. 1961 and The Political Aspect
of Social Structure and Process, in David Easton, ed. 1966) have brought
a new light to the relationship between political participation and the
political system. Very briefly, it could be said that, given the
environmental conditions of a polity and its internal structures, there is
a certain "equilibrium level" for the extent and form of participation
that such polity is able to process. On the other hand, the actual extent
and form of participation occurring in a polity is a direct expression of
its regime of participation.

As it is well known, systems analysis has shown that a
political system, as any other self-adjustable system, depends for its
conservation on the maintenance of an internal equilibrium between its
inputs and outputs and on an external equilibrium in its exchanges with
the environment. A crucial aspect of the system's general equilibrium
is the maintenance of an appropriate balance between participational
inputs and, on the one hand, the system's capability and, on the other
hand, the available resources and other relevant conditions of the
environment.

The political equilibrium theory has had the relevant merit
of permitting the possibility of a factual (instead of moral) approach to

the question of political participation and, therefore of allowing (but not assuring) objective analyses, admeasurements and comparisons. One of the results of such approach has been the identification, description and explanation, with possibilities of forecast, of the phenomenon of political stress. Political stress, in a general way, is the effect of a demand to the political system that surpasses its processing capabilities, its available resources, or its current allocational rules or policies. Participation stress results from more demands of participation than can be processed by the political system, given its internal structure and its available resources.

It is widely acknowledged by now, however, that equilibrium theory, particularly in its homeostatic version, has brought too far the "mechanical" aspects of participation stress. The equilibrium level for participation demands, besides depending of the capabilities of the system and the availability of its resources, is directly dependent of the prevailing regime of participation. For similar levels of capability and of resources availability we will find, comparing distinct political systems, very different equilibrium levels for political participation. Equilibrium levels and stress levels, therefore, depend as well of structural conditions (including the regime of power), and material resources, as of the character of the regime of participation and the inhibitions and incentives extorted by the regime of values. The problem of "excessive" participation can neither be discussed without taking into account the prevailing regime of participation, nor be treated with exclusion of the socially interfering values.

The adoption of that more complex and refined approach introduces another element which is conspicuously absent in the original forms of the equilibrium theory: the grade of development of the concerned system. The capabilities of a polity and its society and the characteristics of its regime of participation and sanctioning regime of values will vary according to their grade of development (cf Organski, 1965).

As it has been stressed by the recent literature on political development (cf particularly Deutsch, 1963; Eisenstadt, 1966; Almond, 1966; Apter, 1965) the process of political development involves a growing modernization and institutionalization of a polity and its society. Modernization increases the Operational Variables and institutionalization increases the Participational Variables (cf Table 1).

These two sets of variables and their respective growth processes are interrelated and mutually conditioned. The level of modernization of a society and a polity conditions and establishes certain limits for its level of institutionalization. Traditional societies - with low rational orientation, little structural differentiation and low

level of capability - are not able to present high levels of political mobilization, political integration and political representation. Reciprocally, however, the level of institutionalization conditions the level of modernization and establishes certain limits for the grade and growth of the Operational Variables.

Here we have, therefore, another of the many social examples of a process of circular causation. It is true, as it had been anticipated by the equilibrium theory, that a political system cannot absorb, without being driven to disruptive effects, more political participation than it can process, according to its capability level and its resources availability. The actual level of participation, however, is determined by the prevailing regime of participation, which fixes who has access to what and how. And because of the circular interrelation between a system's Operational and Participational variables, it occurs that if the regime of participation restricts too much below the possibilities of its Operational Variables the actual extent of participation, the system will be affected by rigidities that will prevent its further development and will ultimately loose its capacity of survival, as an independent system, within its environment. Typical example of that is the perverse circular causation that, in several Latin American countries, relates stagnation and insufficient industrialization to social marginality. The rigidities of the regime of participation prevent the appropriate incorporation of the great masses to above subsistence levels of participation and the resulting marginalization of the masses prevents the expansion of the domestic market, creating unsurmountable obstacles to the industrial and general development of the concerned countries. So we have that while participation stress affects the static equilibrium of a political system and its society, driving them to disruptive effects, participation rigidity affects their dynamic equilibrium, bringing about stagnation and decay.

The Latin American case

The preceding discussion on participation stress and participation rigidity brings out an enlightening contribution for the understanding of the Latin American political process and the occurrences of the last decades. Seen in that perspective, indeed, it can be suggested that, besides other factors, a perverse and self-reinforcing alternation of participation stresses and participation rigidities has prevented the political and the overall societal development of most of the Latin American countries and is now menacing their own historical survival as nationally independent systems.

Participation rigidities accumulated during the Colonial and Semicolonial stages of Latin America (respectively, until mid 19th century and until 1930) have prevented the area from following the pace of the industrial revolution and therefore from promoting its modernization until the first third of this century. This state of affairs has been broken by the middle class revolution that, through various waves and ways, from the late 19th century to the crisis of the Great Depression, has finally overcome or sensibly reduced the power oligopoly of the patrician elite.

Very rapidly, however, the new regime of participation established by the middle class has been challenged by the growing pressures of the urban masses, followed by the awakening of the peasantry. The masses' demands of increasing participation have found their instrument of expression and struggle in the populist movements, of which Peron and Vargas have been the most typical and outstanding leaders. The new political regimes established by the populist democracies, or at least adjusted by them and used in depth for their ends, soon came into conflict with the regime of participation representative of the interests of the middle class and with the regime of power that supported, and the regime of values that sanctioned, such regime of participation. Given the still modest level of modernization up to them reached by most of these countries, their limited available resources and the characteristics and evolution of the international system (with the power vacuum left by the decline of the British Empire being occupied and ampassed by the international expansion of the United States), the populist challenge became intolerable to the middle class. In the resulting confrontation, the same factor that had formerly assured the predominance of the middle class over the landed patriciate the middle class composition of the army and the army's practical monopoly of organized means of coercion and action – brought about the fast, relatively easy and complete defeat of the populist movements.

In the fatal pendular alternation between participation rigidity and participation stress, a new phase of rigidity came about in Latin America, with few exceptions – Chile, Venezuela and now perhaps Peru – in the course of the sixties. What gives a particularly dramatic character to the rigidities of today, however, is the fact that, contrarily to what had occurred in the Colonial and Semicolonial stages, today's Latin American middle class, in general, and their military leaders in particular, are modernizing oriented. But as they fail to see the correlation existing between political modernization and political institutionalization, or they do not want to pay the corresponding price, it occurs that the inevitable consequence of the new participation rigidities is the proper strangling of the factors of modernization. And so, to the risk of political disruption that has been arisen by the populist democracies' too fast expansion of participation, in the

structural conditions (including the regime of power) of the preceding
decade, most of the Latin American countries are now confronted with
the risk of stagnation and national decay. The gravest consequence of
such propensity, for the Latin American countries, is the fast and
irreversible exhaustion of their potentialities for national viability.
Situated in an international system submitted to the primacy of the
United States, the increasing links of dependency of the Latin American
countries to the former are steadly driving them to become more
subsystems of an American centered multinational system.

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RAPPORT/ PAPER

MODELS FOR THE DIAGNOSIS OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM

THE CASE OF VENEZUELA

by José A. SILVA MICHELENA
CENDES - U.C.V.

MODELS FOR THE DIAGNOSIS OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM:

THE CASE OF VENEZUELA (x)

by José A. Silva Michelena

CENDES - UCV

The central objective of the research program that CENDES started work on in 1962 was to design a series of alternative strategies of economic development, estimating the political feasibility of those strategies and their probable impact on the distribution of the population, with special reference to the problems of urbanization. This volume is another contribution to the execution of this program. In volume II, Frank Bonilla made great strides in the evaluation of the political capacity of Venezuelan society. In that work, a study was made of power relations at a higher level of the structure, inasmuch as the decisions of the men interviewed were extremely likely to influence the national society; in the present study, on the other hand, an attempt has been made to gage the political capacity of that society as a whole. Nonetheless, it is premature to form an opinion as to whether the original purposes of the research program have been fulfilled, since there remains the task of synthesizing the results of these two studies with those of the economic simulations and the urbanization study.

(x) This is Chapter 9, "Synthesis", of the book shortly to be published under the title of "La Crisis de la Democracia" (The Crisis of Democracy), Vol. III, Cambio Politico en Venezuela (Political Change in Venezuela), Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo (Center of Development Studies), Universidad Central de Venezuela.

This prospect obliges us to proceed to an overall evaluation of the dozens of conclusions we have reached in the various chapters of this book. The vision of Venezuelan society that emerges from those results is that we are dealing with a complex social structure in which there are forces of change distinctive in nature that operate permanently on the different groups of the population in so many and varying ways that the work of summarizing those results should obviously be entrusted to a team of social scientists. Though faced with the need of making a thorough appreciation of Venezuelan society, based on the information in this work, we have decided to present twe syntheses - each founded on the same set of data, but using different analytical media in each case. The following summary relies on the analytical capaccity of ADMINS (a data analysis technique), whereas the other synthesis seeks to overcome the principal limitation of the former - which is derived rather from the nature of the data (synchronic) than from the limitations of the instrument used, since the data are examined from a dynamic angle. It is hoped that the two syntheses complete one another and enable an overall diagnosis of the Venezuelan political system to be effected.

First Syntheses : The Structure

In Chapter 4, it was shown that, even though Venezuelan society has changed amazingly in the last 40 years, the social structure, insofar as it has been altered, has tended toward greater economic and social inequality. In Chapter 6, however, it was observed that the majority of Venezuelans felt optimistic as regards the future, and were comparatively satisfied with what they had achieved. Yet it was also established that social local-ization and experience of change were positively related to auton-omous mental states. In Chapter 5 the evidence showed that many of the members of the medium and higher status groups had already acquired a pattern of orientations that, in the light of the cri-teria laid down in Chapter 1, might be held to be compatible with development. Nevertheless, it was also established conclusively that there was wide cultural heterogeneity both in the groups and in the social classes themselves. The highest grade of cultural heterogencity was found among the lower middle class and other middle class status groups, while it was the groups of workers, inhabitants of "ranchos", and peasants that displayed the lowest degree of cultural heterogencity.

The enquiry that was made into the outlook these different sample groups had of the world disclosed two clearly defined pat-terns: the first, shared by the more privilegad groups, covered the perception mainly of family problems, and those connected with education, politics, the Church and social conduct such people showed themselves highly critical of the political system and anxious for the interests of the political parties to be de-fined more in terms of broad social aggregates than on the basis of the interests of restricted groups. Evaluators of this type declared that they were opposed to the military playing any role in politics and quite frequently recommended measures of a social or political order to solve the problems of the contry. The

priorities of the distinct groups that made up this type of evaluators tended to be heterogenous with regard to the broader social objectives such as the maintenance of the democratic system, redistribution of wealth and speeding up economic development. Nevertheless, substantial agreement was evidenced on the subject of development policies, the majority according top priority to the creation of new industries and improvement of the quality of education and relegating consolidation of the electoral system to the bottom of the scale. In general, this type of evaluator tends to favor policies that presumably would benefit the population, but in the long run. Such policies, of course, have a conservative slant. Finally, these individuals, despite their high political ability, signal out the government as being mainly responsible for putting the projects they prefer into execution, though it is true that there is a minority (about 30 per cent) that place this responsibility squarely on the shoulders of all the Venezuelans. A good summary of the degree to which each group shares in this pattern of evaluation can be appreciated in Table 9.1, where the positive sign (+) indicates the groups in which there is a "high" proportion that follows this trend.

The second pattern of evaluation, bearing the negative sign (-) in Table 9.1,* was far more frequent among individuals of low status, with a limited experience of change (localization and experience), whose normative orientations are not consonant with development and generally feel themselves psychologically less autonomous (intermediary dispositions). Nevertheless, it is remarkable to find among the groups of peasants, workers and "rancho" dwellers, a high potentiality for change which is expressed in the relatively high proportion of advanced elements. Thus, in general, this type of man will more often grasp problems in the economic and community environmental areas (combination A) than in any other social system (combination B). Consequently, the steps they recommend to solve such problems are of an economic nature. Similarly, when asked to grade a series of political alternatives, they are likely to prefer measures such as "give more housing to the poor" or, in general, policies designed to improve the standard of living immediately, which is indicated by their inclination to choose any alternative tending to meet their present requirements rather than those of the future population (long term). And yet, in spite of this immediatist view of what should be done, very few of them criticize the government or the political system in general. On the contrary, they are inclined to consider both the government and the political system satisfactory, or just have no opinion at all on the matter. This does not prevent them from being in favor of the intervention of the military in politics. A high percentage of these individuals would accept such intervention even when there is no apparent justification for it. What is more, many of them believe that political parties should respond to more restricted interests (political crisis). Coherent with this attitude, only very few

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* To make it easier for the reader to confront our interpretations with the results of Table 9.1, the head of the column referred to is given in brackets.

Table 9.1

CHARACTERISTICS AND EVALUATIONS OF VENEZUELAN GROUPS *

GROUPS	Localization & experience	Intermediate dispositions	Ensemble B	Roles	Political crises	Socio-polit. measures	All	Political capacity	Government	Ensemble A	Economic measures
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
High govt. officials ..	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	-
Univ. professors	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	0	0	0
Oil industry executives	+	+	+	0	+	+	0	+	-	-	-
Industrial executives .	+	0	0	0	0	+	0	0	0	0	0
Business executives ...	+	+	+	-	0	+	0	0	0	0	0
Livestock farmers	-	0	0	0	-	+	0	0	+	0	0
Farming enterprisers ..	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+	0	+
Govt. technologists ...	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	0	-	-
Sec. school teachers ..	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	0
Parish priests	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	-	-
Student leaders	-	+	+	-	+	0	0	+	-	0	0
Town councillors	0	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	+	0	+
Small manufacturers ...	0	-	0	0	-	0	+	-	+	0	+
Small traders	0	-	0	0	-	-	0	-	0	0	+
Grade school teachers .	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	+	0	+
Govt. office workers ..	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0
Trade union leaders ...	0	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	-	0	0
Business office workers	-	-	0	-	0	0	-	-	0	0	0
Oil industry workers ..	-	-	0	+	-	0	-	0	0	0	-
Industrial workers	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	0	0	0
"Rancho" dwellers	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	0	+	0
Farm laborers	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	0	0
Small farmers	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	+	0
Peasants in I.A.N. settlements	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	0	+	0
Means	.39	.40	.48	.29	.29	.33	.23	.51	.69	.27	.41

* The sign + means that the corresponding percentage is 1.96 standard errors above the intergroup mean; the sign - indicates that the percentage is 1.96 standard errors below the mean.

of them mention the great agglomerations of the population, such
as "all families" or "everybody", as being responsible for putting
into practice the measures that they themselves recommend to solve
the problems they perceive (all). This, however, does not mean
that they attribute the responsibility to other agencies, for the
majority, as in the case of the other type of evaluators mentioned
above, consider the government the principal agent responsible
(government). Finally, even though this type of evaluator has
political ability of a much lower level, 'e is no more likely
than the other type to live in neighborhoods or work in places
where any cooperative relationship subsists.

Between these two types of evaluators, there are some indi-
viduals that share the characteristics of both types. These am-
bivalent or "mixed" types are more likely to be found in the
following groups: industrial executives, high status rural groups,
lower middle class, town councillors, grade schoolteachers, gov-
ernment office workers, office workers in large businesses and
workers in the oil industry (See Table 9.1).

The Tau coefficients in Table 9.2 show that there is a
high degree of coherence within each of these patterns and that,
when considered in relation to the social structure as a whole,
they tend to be mutually exclusive. The only variables that clear-
ly do not belong to either of the two patterns identified above,
are the evaluation of the social roles, the perception of the gov-
ernment as the instrumental agent par excellence and, as pointed
out before, the entertaining of cooperative relations with the
neighbors or fellow workers. Hence, we can but interpret these
phenomena, like the widespread optimism to which we have already
referred, as generalized cultural vestiges, to which certain his-
torical experiences in common converge.

Perhaps a simpler way of presenting the results of this
study is that of Figure 9.1., in which, as the reader will real-
ize, the analytic schedule presented in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.2)
is closely followed. This new representation adds a very impor-
tant element to the foregoing: the interconnection between the
characteristics of the groups, their evaluation patterns and their
capacity to change the world they live in. Nevertheless, as is
suggested by the broken lines, this is more an interpretation of
the facts than the factual evidence itself. In reality, the so-
cial scientist still has to invent a method that is more than
merely interpretative in order systematically to interrelate the
results of a survey with the secondary data relative to institu-
tional processes. Thus it seems fair enough to conclude that
the increasing social and economic inequality emerging from our
analysis of the social localization and experience of change of
the Venezuelan groups (Chapter 4) is a consequence of the greater
political ability of the high status groups, which, as has been
shown, have a vision of the world quite different from that of the
groups of workers, "rancho" dwellers and peasants, as will be
evident from their replies to the questions: "What is wrong ?",
"What is to be done about it ?" and "Who should do it ?". In other

Table 9.2

INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN CHARACTERISTICS AND EVALUATIONS

	Political Capacity	Government	All	Economic Measures	Socio-polit. Measures	Political Crises	Roles	Ensemble A	Ensemble B	Intermediate Dispos.
	Tau P	Tau P	Tau P	Tau P	Tau P	Tau P	Tau P	Tau P	Tau P	Tau P
Government .	.17 (.26)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
All	.46 (.00)	.14 (.35)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Economic measures .	.10 (.50)	.31 (.04)	.10 (.50)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Socio-political measures .	.59 (.00)	.07 (.62)	.53 (.00)	.32 (.03)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Political crises ...	.69 (.00)	.00 (.99)	.59 (.00)	.29 (.04)	.67 (.00)	–	–	–	–	–
Roles	.03 (.85)	.12 (.40)	.03 (.85)	.02 (.91)	.09 (.51)	.18 (.21)	–	–	–	–
Ensemble A .	.60 (.00)	.18 (.21)	.54 (.00)	.37 (.01)	.74 (.00)	.81 (.00)	.14 (.34)	–	–	–
Ensemble B .	.22 (.14)	.11 (.46)	.46 (.00)	.28 (.06)	.46 (.00)	.47 (.00)	.19 (.20)	.51 (.00)	–	–
Intermediate dispositions	.80 (.00)	.11 (.46)	.57 (.00)	.20 (.17)	.67 (.00)	.82 (.00)	.06 (.69)	.76 (.00)	.45 (.00)	–
Localization & Experience	.40 (.01)	.13 (.36)	.59 (.00)	.12 (.42)	.66 (.00)	.51 (.00)	.11 (.44)	.57 (.00)	.44 (.00)	.52 (.00)

Figure 9-1
VENEZUELAN POLITICAL STRUCTURE

BENEFITS OF DEVELOPMENT

CHANGES IN THE SOCIETY

HIGH

UPPER GROUPS

Socio-economic status

Experience of change

Ethos & psychological autonomy POSITIVE

PERCEIVES family
educational
political
religious
social behavior PROBLEMS

EVALUATION foreign influence
OF POLICY national crisis
irritated with government
military out of government
wire open parties

STEPS TO political
BE TAKEN social
long term (conservative)

AGENCY everyone
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
government

HIGH POLITICAL CAPACITY

LOW

LOWER GROUPS

Socio-economic status

Experience of change

Ethos & psychological autonomy NEGATIVE

STEPS TO economic
BE TAKEN community work
short term

EVALUATION no foreign influence
OF POLICY no national crisis
not irritated with government
military intervention
attached to interests

PERCEIVES community work
economic PROBLEMS

LOW POLITICAL CAPACITY

words, the world that the high status groups are striving to bring about is a world distinct from what the workers, "rancho" dwellers and peasants want. But as these rural and urban groups of low status likewise have a low political ability, the only alternatives that apparently remain to them are to hope that a military caudillo will come along to meet their requirements immediately (populism) through a consumist policy (consumption goods and housing), wait for a representative democratic government to do so, or realize the need for a revolutionary change in the existing political structure.

It is true that the worker and peasant organizations are quite strong in Venezuela and that therefore they can steady the balance of power. It is known, moreover, that these organizations not only perform the functions of intermediaries in transmitting the needs of the more passive citizens more or less actively to the high levels of power, i.e. the government or the employer, but also that they attach them to party structure and rivalry.

However, it is permissible to doubt the efficiency, if not the goodwill, with which the labor leaders perform these intermediary functions, when we learn, as is clear from Table 9.1, that their outlook on the world, at least for a very high percentage, actually resembles closely that of the high status groups, some of which are their own employers, than that of the people they represent.

Thus there is no doubt but what the present structure only offers the more passive citizens, who constitute numerically the immense majority of the population, the faint hope that something of what the active do may eventually filter through to them even though it only be drop by drop. In the light of the evidence gathered up to date, it may be concluded that the Venezuelan social structure has a strong ingrained conservative trend that, in the course of the last 40 years, has widened the gap between the poor and the rich in spite of, or perhaps owing to, the far-reaching and intensive experience of change that most Venezuelans have had in this lapse of time.

It might be argued, along the classic lines of the elitist theories, that the end product will be a more acceptable society because the privileged groups that ride the crest of the waves of change, have a normative orientation more conducive to development and also feel themselves psychologically more autonomous. Further, as we have seen, not only is their appreciation of the situation more refined, but their priorities are of the type that, as some economists maintain, probably encourages growth. But apart from the time element (long term) that this vision implies, there are other factors that make us sceptical of the possible beneficial effects of this way of development.

It has been seen that the first chapter refers to the conditions of cultural heterogeneity that have been found to prevail in the privileged layers. The only groups that have a striking proportion of citizens with advanced views are the high government

officials, university professors, and student and labor leaders.
In any of these groups are to be encountered 70 per cent or more
individuals that have a positive normative orientation and an
autonomous outlook, while among oil, industrial or commercial
executives the figures fluctuate between 40 and 60 per cent. In
this aspect they are more like medium status groups, with the ex-
ception of grade school teachers where the incidence of the phe-
nomenon is not above 37%. In the remaining groups, it is impos-
sible to find more than one-third of the individuals with the
positive ethos and autonomous state of mind of the politically
more active groups. Hence it may be concluded that the necessary
predispositions for it to be likely that the influence a group
can exert on the development process will prove significant,
have penetrated but slightly into the middle status groups and
only exist embryonically in the rest of the population (low status
rural and urban groups). Thus among the groups of the entrepre-
neurial middle class (oil, industrial and commercial executives,
crop- and stock-farming enterprisers), groups that are supposed
to play a key role in economic development, not more than 60%
are to be found that can be classified on a par with the high
government servants and university professors.

Therefore, any progressive strategy of economic develop-
ment would probably meet with indecisions, doubts, apprehensions,
internal dissent, if not with open opposition, from the lower
and upper business middle class. In consequence it may be fairly
safely said that the effective contribution these entrepreneurial
groups can make to development is comparatively limited. None-
theless, the high government officials, university professors and
student and labor leaders might be expected to group together
solidly to carry out these development policies, but paradoxically
recent experience shows that in reality just the opposite occurs.
It is precisely among these groups that, for various reasons, in-
ternal struggles have broken out the most frequently in the last
ten years. Why has this happened ?

In the first volume it was shown that the high government
servants had no wish to give up bureaucracy on account of the
multiple psychological conflicts they had to face.[1] One of these
conflicts was ideological. The data listed in Table 9.3 suggests
that sources of internal conflict among the most advanced groups
may well be ideological too. In Chapter V, it was stated that
the highest proportions of leftwingers are to be found among
student leaders, labor leaders and university professors. The
data figuring on Table 9.3 indicate that the leftists, in fact,
tend to have different evaluation patterns from the rightists.
Hence, as nearly all the members of these groups (90% or more)
are politically active, it may be inferred that the key factor
lying at the root of these frequent conflicts is that of ideolog-
ical heterogeneity, and furthermore of irreconcilable ideologies.

Thus we may conclude that any action from above that these
groups may exert—i.e., a sufficiently radical action to over-
come the conservative tendency incrusted in the social structure—

will probably be blocked by the opposition of the groups that
make up the higher and middle middle classes, which are rightist;
the indifference of the masses, which is passive; if not by the
conflicts on ideological grounds that are likely to arise within
these advance groups.

We realize that the synthesis presented may not have taken
into account some of the logical inferences that may be made from
all the conclusions arrived at in preceding chapters. The scientif-
ically minded-may consider that the author has introduced ill-founded
judgments of value. The experiments made with VENUTOPIA, described
in the following section, offer us an alternative synthesis, which
may be open to various objections, but certainly not the two men-
tioned.

Table 9.3

IDEOLOGY, CHARACTERISTICS AND EVALUATIONS

	RIGHT		LEFT	
	Tau	P	Tau	P
Localization and experience	.68	(.00)	-.66	(.00)
Intermediate dispositions	.42	(.00)	-.39	(.01)
Ensemble A	-.51	(.00)	.51	(.00)
Ensemble B	.53	(.00)	-.57	(.00)
Roles	-.12	(.42)	.12	(.43)
Political crisis	.41	(.00)	.44	(.00)
Sociopolitical measures	.60	(.00)	-.57	(.00)
Political capacity	.29	(.05)	-.25	(.09)

Second Synthesis: The Dynamics

The experiments which are now to be described consist in
changing certain values of the variables of the model exogenously
so that those changes may be the expression of a given policy.
the model is then allowed to "run" for a specified number of cy-
cles and a set of conclusions is then obtained.[2] But before pro-
ceeding to a description of the experiments made, it is necessary
to give a clear explanation of some of the suppositions upon which
the propositions set forth previously were founded; these supposi-
tions refer to the relationship between policy implementation and
conflicts.

A basic postulate of the general theory of planning is that
the efficiency of any policy depends as much on its realism as on

its feasibility. But, contrary to what some planners would like to believe, realism and feasibility usually carry with them a strong political bias. An example may make this clear. Towards the middle of 1967, the Venezuelan government unexpectedly introduced two bills to the National Congress. The purpose of one of them was to increase fiscal returns by certain income tax reforms; the other proposed amendments to the education act. Both bills immediately met with fierce opposition, not only in Congress where the Government coalition held a majority and was sure of winning, but also in the domain of public opinion. This opposition came from a number of different sectors. The Government soon realized that, even though it might have been able to ram the bills through Congress, it could not have carried its projects of reform very far, because of the lack of support in the population, which made it risky to apply them. Moreover, it proved to be evident that the political parties belonging to the coalition Government (AD and URD) were not strong enough to mobilize the people in favor of their proposals. In short the Government planners were unaware of the political impact or had miscalculated their available political resources (e.g. political support), nor did they have the political capacity they expected to muster the necessary support. We may say, then, that, in general, the efficiency of a plan depends to a large extent on its political realism and feasibility. If the level of these characteristics is low, it is very probable that the efficiency of the policies will also be low or inexistent, that is to say they will never be really carried out.

One of the most crucial and difficult problems in social planning is, then, to determine the possible consequences of an ensemble of policies, whether they be economic, social or strictly political. As politics is, amongst other things, the art of handling conflicts, it would seem to be advisable to evaluate the political realism and feasibility of any program through its impact on the socio-political conflicts. This supposes that if the conflict anticipated or declared oversteps certain limits, both the political realism and the political feasibility tend to diminish. It must, however, be made quite clear that we do not consider the conflict, as such, either harmful or beneficial. Nor do we wish to imply that every conflict stands in the way of decision-making processes and policy implementation. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence in Latin America that, without conflict, certain progressive policies could never have been successfully carried out.[3] All that we are suggesting is that when the conflict reaches a certain level — that may vary from one area to the next — it usually impairs the efficiency of a given policy, for it raises the cost beyond the limits tolerable for any of the parties implicated.

The technique of numerical experimentation, as Varsavsky has expressly stated, enables models to be constructed in which those presuppositions become explicit.[4] In fact, the UTOPIA model,

the first of this type to be constructed, even though emphasis was laid mainly on methodological aspects, was specially designed to take these provisos into account.[5]

The structure of the VENUTOPIA model may be summarized briefly as follows. The model has 28 actors that are the groups which have been used throughout this study. Each of these groups is described by a series of characteristics: social localization, experience of change, normative orientations, psychological studies and political capacity. Besides, each group evaluates seven social systems and thirteen important roles. The description of these variables is given in Appendix 1-A to Chapter 1 of this volume. For each of these characteristics and evaluations there exists a law of behavior that determines the amount of change that will be experienced by the dependent variable under consideration, with each unit of change in the other independent variables. Furthermore, to make these empirical laws more representative of reality, they were calculated for groups of the population that were more or less homogenous (see Chapter 1). Thus, for instance, the law that calculates the variations in the standard of peasant education differs from that of the low status urban groups and both in turn differ from the law of high status rural groups.

In all, the model comprises more than 200 equations of this type. Moreover, other laws of a logical nature, and therefore more qualitative, are incorporated therein, regulating more global variations as much as the conduct of the various social groups. For example, it is known that social conflicts currently only arise in relation to a single social system and, only on very rare occasions, which are designated very properly by the name of revolutionary crises, does the conflict affect many systems and roles simultaneously.[6] The law in VENUTOPIA that determines the variation of the conflict in the different systems and roles runs as follows:

> Variation in Area of Conflict: The weight (P_i) of an area of conflict will increase for a certain part (i) — whether system or role — if the most antagonistic groups evaluate it at a magnitude of given difference. An area of conflict is defined and accentuated only if the degree of general social conflict is high.[7]

There are other laws like this one that calculate the variations in the heterogeneity of the groups, the antagonisms, the polarizations and the actions of the government. To describe these laws, however, would be to repeat what has already been gone into elsewhere.[7] It is hoped that what is said here will be enough to make the meaning of the experiments quite clear.

The first of these experiments is, in terms of the planner, a prognosis. That is to say, it is supposed that the society will continue as up till now, i.e. the model is allowed to "run" with the initial value without introducing any variation exogenously. The second experiment supposes that the government applies a con-

servative policy and the third represents the application of a
progressive policy. Table 9.4 sets out, in detail and compara-
tively, the policy ensembles experimented.

Table 9.4

POLICY ENSEMBLES THAT GUIDED THE VENUTOPIA EXPERIMENTS

CONSERVATIVE POLICY	PROGRESSIVE POLICY
1. Non-nationalist rightists in power.	1. Moderate leftists in power.
2. Censorship of information to give it a rightist orientation.	2. Control of information with an ideological campaign to attract the masses.
3. Economic policy favorable to the domestic and foreign upper middle class. Alliance of the government with the upper middle class.	3. Announcement of the application of political, economic and international relations programs designed to favor the popular masses.
4. Centralization of power. Diminution of political participation.	4. Reform of the police and the army, which become less repressive on the masses.
5. Reinforcement of the police and the army, which become more repressive.	5. Education is expanded so as to accord priority to the more plebeian sectors. Low status groups have a larger share in politics.
6. Educational policy tending to benefit the elite.	

Of course, more detailed policy ensembles could have been
prepared and immediately introduced into the model at any cycle.
However those given here are enough for our purposes.

Owing to the fairly extensive volume of information pro-
duced by these experiments,[8] we shall have to proceed to a selec-
tion of the data we consider the most pertinent. In Table 9.5, we
have tried to express the more important global data concisely:

1. General level of conflict around systems and roles that are
    calculated on the basis of the corresponding matrices of an-
    tagonisms.[9]

2. Degree of conflict around each system and each role.

3. Degree of congruence between ingress, occupation and occupa-
    tional prestige levels (status congruence).

A glance at Table 9.5 enables us to observe that:
1. There are certain areas in which the conflict is concentrated; these areas, however, vary according to the alternative considered (systems are capitalized, roles in lower case):

STATUS QUO	CONSERVATIVE	PROGRESSIVE
CHURCH	EDUCATION	POLITICS
Government	FOREIGN RELATIONS	ECONOMICS
Newspapermen	Government	FOREIGN RELATIONS
Clergy	Army	Government
Police	Police	

2. The highest degree of conflict is obtained if the status quo is preserved; however it is interesting to note that most of those conflicts are established around roles and not systems, as in the case of the progressive alternative.

Let us see now the impact on the conflicts between groups: The status quo begins with the opposition of the students and university professors who demand improvements in the political economic and educational systems; the government proceeds to a few reforms, but very soon (cycle 2) begins to repress them. As a consequence the positions polarize. On the one hand, the student leaders count on the support of the university professors, the workers and the labor leaders, "rancho" inhabitants and peasants. On the other, the oil industry executives spearpoint a coalition made up of the government, the middle class and the upper middle class. Students and professors continue to be repressed. In the second cycle, the livestock farmers take over the management of the anti-student movement and, on account of the greater similarity of their characteristics, attract to their conditions the workers, "rancho" inhabitant and peasants, leaving the students and professors on their own. Later, the oil executives again seize the reins of leadership, but this time with the sole opposition of the students and professors. This is followed by an interim when there is no polarization, though students and professors continue to be repressed. Finally, cycle 8, the parish priests launch a broad coalition against the students and professors, who consequently remain the only active opposition in the ring.

The conservative alternative resembles the foregoing in that its 10-cycle period develops with the permanent opposition of the students and university professors, who are habitually repressed. But in this case they fail to obtain support from any other group, since the government, by that very pressure on the professors and students, makes a few tentative reforms which attract the potential allies of the opposition to their ranks.

The progressive policy promotes the most complex reactions on the part of the population. The first to protest are the groups belonging to the lower and upper middle class (oil industry executives and employees, small traders and manufacturers, upper rural class, industrial executives and priests). The government accedes to some of their demands, but they insist on protesting

Table 9.4

EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN THREE HYPOTHESES OF SOCIAL POLICY

SYSTEMS AND ROLES EVALUATED	DEGREE OF CONFLICT (P1)						
	Status quo			Conservative		Progressive	
	Cycle 1*	Cycle 5	Cycle 9	Cycle 5	Cycle 9	Cycle 5	Cycle 9
Systems :							
Family	.025	.000	.000	.000	.000	.017	.019
Community	.000	.000	.000	.006	..168	.000	.000
Education	.055	.032	.031	.379	.313	.042	.040
Politics	.140	.082	.082	.022	.023	.494	.504
Economics	.157	.047	.047	.221	.150	.498	.484
Church	.267	.374	.373	.153	.154	.074	.070
Foreign relations .	.410	.208	.207	.318	.318	.532	.526
All systems	1.053	5.016	5.015	1.060	.989	4.025	4.057
Roles :							
Entrepreneurs	.044	.066	.066	.143	.174	.012	.011
Peasants	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Labor leaders	.045	.000	.000	.012	.013	.059	.063
Government servants	.464	.394	.393	.502	.520	.433	.442
Judges	.069	.067	.067	.090	.096	.038	.037
Politicians	.156	.135	.135	.069	.072	.106	.117
Teachers	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Priests	.334	.420	.422	.228	.230	.075	.080
Students	.076	.143	.142	.039	.033	.025	.026
Army	.279	.340	.339	.406	.411	.039	.038
Police	.444	.442	.443	.384	.395	.063	.069
Citizens	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Radio announcers ..	.268	.341	.340	.180	.183	.042	.037
All roles	.972	11.842	11.719	.859	.892	.428	.428
Status congruence ...	6.187	6.290	6.171	6.218	6.174	6.216	6.518

* Cycle 1 is the same for all alternatives.

and are repressed. This brings us to cycle 6 when the position are polarized. On the one hand, the university professors lead a coalition in which workers, peasants, students and educators, "rancho" dwellers, small manufacturers and office workers are enrolled. This coalition has the support of the government. On the other hand, the oil industry executives head a coalition which groups the oil workers, commercial and industrial executives, rural middle class and small traders. This situation continues until in cycle 8 the university professors are left alone with the support of the teachers, the labor leaders and the government, while the oil workers lead the remaining groups.

The most general interpretation that can be given to these "runs" is that, with this sociopolitical structure, it turns out to be much easier to pursue a conservative policy successfully than a progressive one, but the worst is to maintain the status quo, which is the course that generates the most conflicts (see Table 9.5). In consequence, if no structural changes are made, the probabilities are that the government will become more and more conservative, since that is the alternative that structurally enables it to minimize the conflicts. It is presumed that this is a process going on consciously and unconsciously, with advances and recessions, but showing a clear-cut, lasting trend toward greater conservatism.

Naturally, these conclusions are only applicable to Venezuela to the extent that this model reflects the sociopolitical structure and dynamics of the country. We ourselves only accord it an experimental value; attention, however, cannot fail to be drawn to the similarity between the results of the model and the analytical conclusions derived more intuitively, but based on the same data. Both syntheses lead to the conclusion that Venezuelan society has a strong conservative element deeply ingrained in its political and social structure and that, unless changes are made that alter the rules of the game (i.e., changes in the economic, political and social machinery determining the way in which the benefits of development are now being redistributed, as well as the orientation of development itself), it is very probable that the future development process, whatever the form of government may be (taken to be one of the two experienced in the past: representative democracy or military dictatorship), will follow the same conservative trend. Therefore, on the grounds of the evidence presented in this book, it may be said that progressive governments setting out to substantially improve the condition of the masses, reduce social inequality and, in short, bring the benefits of development within closer reach of the workers, "rancho" inhabitants and peasants, must be prepared to carry out, with the active assistance of those same masses, deep structural changes which will undoubtedly meet with strong internal and external opposition, even among the more advanced elements of the bourgeoisie. If not, they will have to openly admit that their programs are no more than mere scrip without any real content, the propositions therein revealing a lack of feasibility.

General Conclusions

To conclude, in the light of the analyses contained in the three volumes that represent the product of this research, it will be advisable, for us to re-evaluate the future options available to the country, which were postulated in the opening hypotheses and have been redefined in Chapter 3 as the outcome of the historical analysis of Venezuelan development. The reader will recall that in that chapter the hazard was admitted that in the 1980s a new revolutionary crisis may come to a head in the country. The reasons put forward were multiple and complex, but nevertheless we shall try to summarize them succinctly.

In the first place, the possibility was predicated that by that time the euphoric stage of import substitution will have been exhausted, though not perhaps the possibility itself of continuing to do so. Either of those two alternatives implied that in previous years efficient industrialization must have been carried out so as, in the first place, to have been able to undertake the complex tasks of creating an intermediate or heavy industry, in order, once the possibility of continuing to substitute imports had been fully exploited, to be in a position to go on growing "outwards". If not, the specter looms of prolonged economic stagnation, as in the case of Argentina and Chile.

Our historical analysis showed that, in Venezuela, this type of economic crisis has always been accompanied by violent political upheaval. In the coming eventuality, the possibility of a repetition of this kind of upheaval is strengthened by the fact that, in 1983, the principal oil concessions will lapse and, in all certainty, given the ideological heterogeneity existing within each important group in the country, bitter conflicts will erupt. These conflicts will undoubtedly be stimulated by the very dynamism of the aforesaid processes, since either alternative implies a greater degree of interference on the part of the United States in the economy and politics of the country. Our analysis of the relations between the United States and Latin America brings us to the conclusion that the United States government, through a maze of channels and agencies, has always intervened actively in Latin American affairs at moments of crisis, with the object of tilting the balance towards the most conservative option in view. This possibility of intervention in

18.

Venezuela tends to wax rather than wane, primarily because the internal trend of North American policy lies toward a type of neo-fascism that will certainly accentuate and strengthen the mechanisms of domination over counties which, like those of Latin America, are on the way to satellization. On the other hand, the extensive economic interests of North American corporations in Venezuela will tend to increase rather than remain as they are or diminish. We shall be told that it is precisely the substitution of imports that will enable the Venezuelan economy to gradually break free from the tyranny of the oil industry. That may be true, but what certain does not follow is that it will also promote greater national autonomy toward the United States, for the simple reason that, if present trends continue, in all probability the end result will be a greater denationalization of the economy. There are important reasons, of course, to explain the phenomenon; among others, we may cite, as being the most outstanding, the increase in technological dependence and management control in industry.

The foregoing analysis highlights one of the sociocultural factors that go to explain why this denationalization is taking place. As will be recalled, the Venezuelan upper middle class (industrial and commercial executives, farming enterprisers and stockraisers) do not have the business acumen it requires to tackle the complex task of creating an intermediate industry. Their abilities to run risks and forego gratification, like their degree of nationalism, are so meager that they will probably prefer to invest their capital in speculative deals, leaving the North American or "mixed" concerns free to proceed with industrialization on a denationalized basis.

Furthermore, we pointed out in Chapter 3 that this satellization of the economy tends to be reinforced by increasing dependence and the application of cultural and military plans. The term "ideological offensive", coined to embrace these plans of satellization, is no mere figure of speech but corresponds lucidly to the growing tendency of supermilitarization in United States foreign policy. The end in view of this mercantile, cultural and military combine is the creation of an economic background and dispositions in the population that will allow of the materialization of what is now but a leaning towards satellization.[10] The results presented by Bonilla in Chapter 9 of Volume II show clearly how the process works, and are worth recapitulating here in a summary from the pen of Frank Bonilla himself:

> What is most impressive in the material on the military and on what I ended up by calling the American community is the extent to which the processes of socialization have passed

into the control of the Americans. In the Army, the penetration
is complete, and includes troop orientation. The selection and
training of individuals on the management level is an operation
in itself, extended to all university graduates who have earned
their degree whether at home or abroad. The mobilization of the
community of resident Americans for the purpose of bettering the
relations between the United States and Venezuela rests on the
basis of anti-communism at its most primitive, and, in alliance
with the local enterprisers and executives, trained by them and
enrolled in religious groups, an ambitious thorough-going scheme
has been formed to clean up education at all levels. At the same
time, the situation is complicated for leftist groups by the fact
that the masses are not aroused by the revolutionary message and,
although on the cultural plane there is some awareness of what is
happening, no attempt is made to analyse the thought of those
groups or the flaws that prevent more efficient communication
with them.[11]

Whether this tendency is to materialize depends to a large
extent on the ability of the Venezuelans to face the issue. The
first task is to spread awareness of the denationalizing currents
we have disclosed, so as to enable the potentiality for change of the
Venezuelan population to be tapped in order to neutralize the
present denationalizing influence by promoting the development of
a more equitable social structure and a political system that
does not discriminate against the popular sectors.

The central question that comes to the fore, then, is:
Does the present system allow these ends to be attained ? The
leading conclusion emerging from the preliminary analyses set
forth in Volume 1 clearly evidence the problem:

> The preliminary analyses presented here reveal the extreme fluidity
> of the Venezuela situation. The ubiquity of the changes and the
> willingness shown by most individuals to accept them, are beyond
> the present capacity of the political system to direct such trans-
> formations and particularly to project them further than the natu-
> ral limits they are able to reach spontaneously.[12]

The analyses and syntheses made in this volume confirm
this conclusion and significantly expand it. On the one hand,
they reveal the complex threads interwoven in the social fabric
and exerting a steady pull toward increasing conservatism, while,
on the other, they make it clear that in the populace itself there
lies the incipient ability to rectify the situation. Consequently,
to spin the wheel and redirect in depth the present trends of na-
tional development, it is necessary to take advantage of the whole
potentiality of the masses, for that is practically the only pos-
sibility there is of overcoming the satellizing tendencies re-
ferred to above.

The defenders of elitist theories will tell us, no doubt,
that our conclusions go beyond what is warranted by the data,
since the latter are based on the consideration of groups which,
though important within the national political setup, fail to

embrace the true elite, that is to say those men whose decisions really affect the country as a whole; from there they will go on to argue that those powerful figures would have the necessary capability to channel the potentialities of change in the masses toward the erection of a juster social framework. Nonetheless, the conclusions reached by Bonilla in Volume II reject this possibility.

In Chapter 8 of his book,[13] Bonilla examines the ideology of the Brazilian elite with regard to the masses and finds that there are two main currents of thought. To the first belong those who hold that the masses are the victims of an injust social structure. In their view, the state of ignorance, indigence and exploitation in which the majority of the Venezuelan people (peasants, "rancho" dwellers and workers) live, is the outcome of this framework of social injustice, and therefore the measures they generally propose are of a structural nature: land reform, industrialization and the like. A substantial portion of the adepts of this ideology esteem that it is necessary to make a radical change, but the majority are in favor of structural reforms, which, moreover, they think should be spread over a range of 5 to 20 years in the belief that, even though the country may be able to afford such ventures, it is always necessary to build up new resources. However, they point out that the major responsibility for the advancement of those reforms should be lodged with the government or with a reliable elite.

The second ideological current is a remodernization of the pessimistic outlook of one school of Latin American sociologists. Such thinkers consider the masses as deadweight because they are uneducated, brutal and primitive, and hence it is necessary, before anything else, to educate them, inculcate "decent" family habits, control the population lest it expand too fast, in short, to bring them to heel. The password of those who share this ideology is "Look out!" for at any moment these masses may overflow and everything will be chaos. Of course such individuals only expect evolutionary reforms to be carried out in a term of more than 20 years, and shift the burden of making the changes to the entrepreneurs.

What is curious is that both conceptions of the masses, either as a victim or as a deadweight, lead in practice to the necessity of managing them, i.e. working _for_ the masses and not _with_ the masses. Only a handful of interviewees realized that the masses had their own potentiality to free themselves.

Now then, how are the members of the elite distributed in accordance with these ideologies ? Obviously the left tends to favor the ideology that looks on the masses as a victim, while the right clings to the deadweight theory. Yet, it is significant that within each ideological group, a certain proportion of "dissidents" is to be found. This heterogeneity becomes more evident from an examination of the distribution by institutional sector

(economic, political or cultural), by political parties or by level of power. Each of these aggregates displays a substantial proportion of individuals of either ideology. This means, no more, no less, that the Venezuelan elite — in terms of attainment of the objectives of national independence and achievement of a more equitable society with the participation of the masses — is at an impasse, and that is why the continuance of the status quo, as Bonilla himself put it, is socially the most costly of all possible alternatives.

REFERENCES

[1] CVP, EAS, chap. 4

[2] The model that will be used here is a more refined version of VENUTOPIA I, as described in Volume I (CPV, EAS). However, the changes introduced have made it necessary to recalculate the parameters of some of the empirical laws, improve the printed outputs and make other changes of this kind in which in no way alter the structure of VENUTOPIA I. This being so, there would seem to be no need to repeat the description, which the reader can find by turning to Chapter 12 (CVP, EAS).

[3] Albert O. Hirschmann, Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1963.

[4] Oscar Varsavsky, "La Experimentación Numérica", in Ciencia y Investigación, XIX, 10 October 1963, pp. 340-347. Oscar Varsavsky, "Los Modelos Matemáticos Numéricos como Herramientas de Decisión en Problemas Difícilmente Cuantificables". (Numerical mathematical models as decision tools in problems difficult to quantify), introduction to an Economic Model prepared by Arturo O'Connell and Oscar Varsavsky with the collaboration of N. Lugo, M. Malajovich, H. Paulero, J. Sábato and V. Yohai; in Boletín Interno of the Instituto de Cálculo, Grupo de Economía de la Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, Nº 1, August 1965.

[5] Carlos Domingo and Oscar Varsavsky, op. cit., passim.

[6] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, op. cit. pp. 479-437.

[7] CPV, EAS, p. 347

[8] For each cycle of each experiment the model produces a vector of conflict values for each system and role; a matrix of characteristics, 28 x 27 and 28 x 20, showing the variations in characteristics and evaluations. Several lists are also produced that resemble newspaper heads announcing, if that is the case, the changes that have been made in the systems, the groups that have been repressed, and which groups are negotiating on what topics. When polarization occurs, messages are printed indicating the leaders and groups forming opposing coalitions. Finally, the global conflict values in relation to systems and roles are printed, as well as a global congruence status measurement.

[9] In Chapter 2, a description of the antagonism between groups is to be found, but a more complete version is given in CPV, EAS.

[10] Helio Jaguaribe, Dependência e Autonomia na América Latina, mimeographed, Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro, August 1968, passim.

11 Frank Bonilla in a letter dated April 8, 1969.

12 CPV, EAS, p. 521.

13 CPV, Vol. II, Chap. 8

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RAPPORT/ PAPER

LA ARGENTINA - UN CASO DE PARTICIPACION POLITICA TRAUMÁTICA

por José Luiz de IMAZ

LA ARGENTINA, UN CASO DE PARTICIPACION

POLITICA TRAUMATICA

por José Luis de Imaz

En el presente documento me voy a limitar al caso de un pais latinoamericano, caracterizado por sus discontinuidades, las contradicciones entre sus niveles de desarrollo, y su incongruencia entre una participación nominal generalizada y una muy baja adhesión al esquema formal.

Este documento de trabajo es descriptivo, y solo esboza un primer intento de interpretación. Tras señalar las incongruencias entre diversos niveles, pretende abrir una via de exploración - presun tamente rica - para el análisis de los elementos informales de la participación. Y supone que esa via exploratoria podría resultar importante si se la aplica a los países latinoamericanos, tan caracterizados por las relaciones primarias y particularistas en buena parte de sus procesos politicos.

1. Desarrollo histórico de la participación electoral en la Argentina (1916-1966).

En 1914 se sancionó en ese pais la ley de voto universal, secreto y obligatorio. Sus disposiciones alcanzaron a todo varón, mayor de 18 años de edad, alfabeto e analfabeto, ciudadano nativo o

naturalizado, radicado en la Capital o en las provincias. Solo muy escasos individuos varones (miembros de órdenes religiosas, suboficiales de ejército, autores de delitos infamantes) quedaban excluídos.

La ley determinó que en el empadronamiento debían inscribirse todos, obligatoriamente, como obligatoria fué la concurrencia a las elecciones. Y se establecieron sanciones para quienes sin grave impedimento, dejaren de votar. Estas sanciones eran menores, pero mayores para los empleados públicos.

La ley, siguiendo algunos casos "modelo" (Bismarck, Disraeli) fué sancionada por los conservadores, obedeciendo a presiones internas y al deseo de asemejarse a los patrones externos. Pero a la inversa de los dos casos clásicos, la movilización popular que sobrevino aparejó el definitivo desplazamiento del poder - por la vía electoral pura - de los conservadores.

La ley comenzó a aplicarse en 1913. En ese año el Partido Radical conquistó el poder. Era éste una expresión de la clase media emergente, e intérprete emocional de los sectores rurales de todo nivel. 1916 significó, en los términos que ahora nos interesa, el pasaje de un sistema de "democracia restringida" a otro de "democracia ampliada". (1)

En 1951 se extendió el voto a todos los argentinos sin distinción de sexo, ni exclusión alguna por razón de oficio o residencia. La incorporación electoral de las mujeres se realizó en forma masiva, y se aplicaron los mismos criterios en cuanto a la obligatoriedad de inscripción, y obligatoriedad de voto. Persistieron las sanciones por inasistencia electoral, y no se estableció restricción alguna porque el elector fuera analfabeto (por entonces eran el 11% de los inscriptos).

Gobernaba en 1951 un régimen popular. Si bien sus hombres eran de extracción media, la representatividad que se les había acordado provenía fundamentalmente de la adhesión masiva de los estratos inferiores. Y el régimen gobernante (Perón) había instaurado una especie de "democracia de masas".

La aplicación de esta ley significó - dentro de nuestros términos - el pasaje de la "democracia ampliada" a otro de "participación total". El gobierno entonces instaurado había provocado una movilización generalizada contando con el cuasi-monopolio de los medios de comunicación de masas más eficientes de la época, y con una especie de delegación de poderes en un líder carismático. La ley venía entonces a dar una "forma" a una situación de hecho pre-existente, y una garantía a los opositores igualmente movilizados.

Esta disposición legal de 1951 nunca fué modificada. Es decir, en términos legales, no se dió marcha atrás a lo hecho.

Sin embargo, en el lapso 1916-1966, múltiples hechos ter giversaron ambas participación y movilización "ampliada" o "total". Podríamos agrupar esos hechos en 5 grandes categorías:

REVOLUCIONES (gobiernos militares de facto)	ELECCIONES ANULADAS (a causa de sus resultados.)	PROSCRIPCIONES LEGALES (a algún contendiente)
1930 a 1932	1932	1932 a 1935
1943 a 1946	1962	1958 a 1962
1955 a 1958		1963
1962 a 1963		
1966 a ...		

FRAUDES ELECTORALES MANIFIESTOS (durante las elecciones)	RESTRICCIONES A LIBERTADES PRE-ELECTORALES
1932 a 1945	1948 a 1955

Estos cinco grupos clasificatorios expresan las distintas formas de alteración del principio de la participación electoral universal y obligatoria. Y si bien los gobiernos surgidos de las intervenciones militares son - desde el punto de vista formal - la situación límite, los cuatro grupos clasificatorios subsiguientes no le van en zaga. En dos ocasiones se anularon elecciones por haber vencido los enemigos de la situación política del momento. Las "proscripciones legales" fueron a su vez aplicadas a los rivales políticos, vencidos la víspera (por una intervención militar) y no por un triunfo electoral. El "fraude patriótico" fué utilizado como recurso por los conservadores para retener el poder tergiversando de facto, pero no "de iure" la ley electoral que ellos habían sancionado. Y las "restricciones a las liber. tades pre-electorales" fueron las que impuso el peronismo a sus contendientes, dejando a salvo el acto electoral, pero restringiéndoles la libertad de comunicación política.

Expresado en momentos históricos, y en grandes corrientes de opinión, estos grupos clasificatorios podrían a su vez se redefi nidos de este modo:

- desde 1916 a 1930 las reglas de juego fueron respetadas (pero los contendientes no divergían en el fondo, la Argentina tenía un alto PBN y un elevado ingreso per capita, en un país despoblado, y cuyo esquema de vida agro-importador no estaba puesto en cuestion por los partidos, el país se modernizaba rápidamente y su desarrollo, aunque unilateral y distorsionado, era autosostenido).

- desde 1930 a 1966 (período ampliamente conflictivo en cuanto a los términos anteriores), en cambio:

Mientras los conservadores retuvieron el poder (1930-1943) restringieron la capacidad de acción política de sus rivales libe_rales (Unión Cívida Radical).

Cuando los nacionalistas-populistas (peronistas) estuvieron en el poder (1945-1955) restringieron las posibilidades de acción política de los conservadores y los liberales.

Desde 1955 a 1963, cuando los liberales y los conservadores estuvieron en el poder, restringieron la capacidad de acción de los nacionalistas-populistas. A partir de 1963 pareció que se iban a respetar las reglas de juego para todos los contendientes. Pero en 1966 hube una revolución (una de cuyas razones era el inevitable resultado de las reglas de juego).

2. Participación formal y "participación sentida".

Experiencia internalizada y correlación de niveles.

a) el esquema legal (political regime) está institucionalizado. En ningún momento fué discutido. La Constitución Argentina data de 1853. El peronismo le introdujo algunas modificaciones que no afectaron los aspectos formales del "liberalismo político". La consulta electoral es pues la única fuente de poder legal.

Y la socilización política se ha impartido en principio en la misma dirección. El sistema escolar y los valores de "cultura cívica" impartidos en todas las instancias educacionales, invariablemente se han referido al esquema de poder formal. Inclusive como marco de referencia implícita durante algunos gobiernos militares, y explícita en un caso (1955/58, gobierno militar que depuso al peronismo). En ese caso - situación límite - se trató de un gobierno militar que expresamente se instituía para restaurar la "plena vigencia del liberalismo político".

b) La Argentina llevó al extremo su participación electoral formal. Desde el punto de vista legal, el voto fué reputado a la vez un derecho que un deber. Pero una visión impresionista nos permitiría suponer que para buena parte de la población resultó más un "deber" que un "derecho". Como la abstención electoral era pasible de sanciones, el acto electoral, al nivel de la experiencia sensible de los sectores socialmente más deprimidos, de los menos educados, como de los más despolitizados, vino a resultar un acto constreñido. Y así lo demostró alguna investigación empírica. (2)

c) Al mismo tiempo, las alteraciones al principio de la universalidad y obligatoriedad del voto a que aludimos en 1. terminó por crear una brecha entre el "political regime" y el "regime of power". Y esta brecha está institucionalizada, e implícitamente admitida por todos los sectores y grupos.

Y todo ello sin que el esquema formal de la democracia se viera conculcado, ya que las alteraciones al principio, no generaron un "anti-valor".

d) Este carácter cíclico de alternancias y exclusiones, de aplicación y violación del principio absoluto, terminó por desarrollar entre los argentinos de los últimos años, un determinado tipo de personalidad política colectiva. En forma muy provisoria podríamos definir a este tipo de personalidad colectiva, como la compuesta por una ambivalencia de actitudes. Actitudes dispuestas a invocar las reglas de la democracia por un lado, pero sin el íntimo convencimiento de aplicarlas en cuanto el resultado fuere adverso.

Este produjo un desfasaje: el de las reglas de juego nominalmente aceptadas, pero íntimamente no internalizadas. Y una incongruencia: el de la socialización política transmitida como valor por el sistema educacional, y el de la socialización política discontinua, vivida como experiencia sensible.

e) Sobre esta base terminó por generalizarse un gran escepticismo primero, y a desarrollarse lentamente una "reificación" de la idea pura de participación electoral.

En efecto, una contienda política planteada a lo largo de siglo y medio en términos de amigo-enemigo, y una cultura política tendiente a valorar los outputs del sistema en función de ventaja-desventaja personal, no resultaba las más propicias para aceptar la impersonalidad de la participación global. Sobretodo cuando la participación global era la que abría en una elección de Presidente, las puertas del gobierno constitucional.

Por esa vía una buena parte de los argentinos - y solo una investigación en profundidad podría determinar su porcentaje - una buena parte concluyó por interpretar a "participación" solo en términos de la participación del propio grupo en el poder (con la exclusión del resto).

3. Asincronías en el desarrollo, y participación "informal".

Como es público - y casi no vale la pena repetirlo aquí - la Argentina (y también el Uruguay) resulta en varios aspectos a-típica con respecto a la mayoría de los países de América Latina. Fundamentalmente por sus incongruencias en el proceso de desarrollo. Estas incongruencias, y las asincronías, en forma sintética podrían expresarse así:

a) una modernización (desarrollo social global) no sustentada en un desarrollo económico consiguiente. Y por onde incapaz de garantir adecuadamente su continuidad. Lo mismo, pero en forma superlativa para el Uruguay.

b) Una clase media - presuntamente mayoritaria en términos de estratificación social - pero que impulsada por su vocación redistribuicionista es incapaz de permanecer en el poder cada vez que lo conquista electoralmente (no así en el Uruguay donde las intervenciones militares hasta ahora han sido excepcionales en lo que va del siglo).

c) Una modernización política (voto universal y obligatorio, 1914, que incluye a analfabetos) prematura, con un aparato político formal (el de la democracia liberal) manejado con un alto grado de ineficacia.

d) Una población que adhiere (nivel cognitivo tan solo) a los mecanismos participatorios de la democracia formal, pero sin íntima adhesión emocional (nivel afectivo), y con un gran ascepticismo en cuanto a la calidad de los outputs del sistema (nivel de evaluación). En el Uruguay actual pareciera haber una correlación positiva solo de los dos primeros niveles.

En efecto, una experiencia traumática de 50 años pareciera orientar la acción política de los argentinos en dos direcciones convergentes:

1) un cierto escepticismo con respecto al mandato que
confieren por la vía electoral. Vale decir, en cuanto al fiel cumpli-
miento que los representantes darán al mandato conferido por los re-
presentados. Y sobretodo, vista la falta de mecanismos de control so
bre el cumplimiento de mandato;

2) a la inversa, una cierta certeza intuitiva de la discon
tinuidad de todo esfuerzo electoral, o mejor dicho, de la real proye-
cción futura dentro del esquema de poder de ese acto electoral al que
se ven compelidos a participar.

Y además, la elección debía realizarse entre opciones par
tidarias, y las estructuras partidarias no siempre aparecían como las
más aptas para articular primero, e incorporar después, valores, in-
tereses, ideas, ideologías y cosmovisiones al sistema todo. Entonces,
por falencia de los partidos, y ocasionalmente de los actos electorales,
eses valores, intereses, ideas, ideologías y cosmovisiones tendieron
a buscar otras vías funcionalmente más aptas que garantieran su arti-
culación siempre, y su incorporación en cuanto fuera posible.

De todo lo anterior surge que - para el caso analizado -
resulta indispensable intentar una nueva vía analítica, que sin excluir
la electoral, la reduzca a sus justos términos, y la complemente allí
donde y a través de lo que "se participe". Porque resultaría impensa
ble imaginar que un pueblo medianamente maduro no tuviera voces ni
canales legitimados.

Y ahora viene el momento de una aclaración "para el caso",
Todo este proceso ha acompañado a una frustración colectiva - la dife
rencia que va entre el rol y el prestigio que se esperaba que la Argen-
tina tuviera y los que realmente posee - que tiene una curiosa vía de
escape. En efecto, los comprendidos "en el caso" suelen demostrar
una curiosa proclividad hacia los líderes personalistas, y más si es-
tos son hombres de armas, pero con tal que les ofrezcan el paraíso
de la salida frustrativa. Luego, cíclicamente, los habitantes de ese
país parecen tentados por ofrecer un "cheque en blanco" a un hombre
fuerte, y a renunciar en su favor al derecho electoral.

Por eso creo necesario buscar las "reales" vías participa-
torias por otros lados. No por una razón de principio, sino por una
exigida por el caso. Y no porque olvide que la participación política
por antonomasia es aquella en que los habitantes eligen a quienes ha-
brán de adoptar las decisiones, sino porque cree que lo que realmente
cuenta es la "participación sentida" por la población. Es decir, aque-
lla a través de la cual ellos sean convencidos de que sea la que les
articule y les incorpore verdaderamente sus intereses, valores, ideas
a ideologías.

Comprendo que esto acarrea muchas dificultades metodológicas, simplificadas por las cifras electorales, y que un tema de investigación así se emparentaría con el de los grupos de presión, o el de la representatibilidad de las elites en función de los grupos etc. pero creo que es una vía.

Y aún trascendiendo el "caso". Pues aunque este se limite a un solo país latinoamericano, es obvio que podría involucrar situaciones similares de otros países del área.

Ahora, vistas las características peculiares de las "culturas políticas" de los países de América Latina, me parece que un análisis sobre la participación de los grupos, no podría detenerse tampoco en los solos aspectos formales. Y que habría que analizar la participación "informal" tan característica de sociedades en las que las relaciones particularistas y primarias cuentan más que las universalistas e impersonales.

4. Participación por representación en la toma de las decisiones.

Me importa recordar aquí cómo alguno de los autores americanos de la escuela funcionalista, ha realizado un análisis autocrítico con respecto a lo anteriormente trabajado sobre participación electoral, cultura cívica, pautas de cultura cívica y desarrollo político. Y como el mismo Sidney Verba ha recordado que participación significa fundamentalmente los actos de aquellos no formalmente responsables en la toma de las decisiones, para influenciar la conducta de aquellos que tienen el poder. (3)

Así pues, a partir de este segundo aspecto, complementario de lo anterior, piense que lo que habría que evaluar sería:

- la acción participativa de los grupos

- en función de sus costos y motivaciones

- dentro de una determinada cultura política

- según la coyuntura

- que usa canales formales, informales y personalistas,

- para obtener sanciones acordes con los puntos de vista articulados,

De este modo, en esta segunda parte del documento, participación "real" será aquella que se produzca por delegación sucesiva de responsabilidades e instituciones, grupos y líderes capaces de incorporar. Y que entonces lo que tendría que interesarnos sería la acción de instituciones, grupos y líderes incorporativos, en la elaboración, adjudicación y aplicación de las decisiones que les afecten a nivel de la "experiencia sensible". Y por esta vía, asimismo, quiénes son los que pueden participar, y cuáles instituciones, grupos y presuntos líderes no pueden participar, todo según las cambiantes coyunturas. Y además otro aspecto que importa, el cuantum, es decir hasta qué margen las decisiones se aproximen o alejen del proyecto viable presente en la estrategia de los grupos.

Y no se me oculta que todo esto será por "representación". Representación que podrá ser expresa o tácita, como en el caso de los líderes cuya influencia excede a grupos e instituciones. Pero por representación se expresa también la participación electoral una vez que se terminó de votar.

Por eso en lo que sigue voy a elaborar un esquema provisorio de participación en la toma de las decisiones por categorías socioprofesionales y para el lapso 1951-1966. El cuadro que sigue reconoce como apoyatura una investigación previa. (4)

1. Participación por representación en la toma de decisiones, según categorías socio profesionales y grado de formalización (1951-1966).

Categorías Profesionales	TIPOS DE PARTICIPACION			
	FORMAL (instituc.)	INFORMAL instituc.	grupal	líderes
Altos empresarios	x	x	x	x
Altos propiet. rurales	x	x	x	
Empresarios medianos	x	x		
Propiet. rurales median.	x	x		
Técnicos y profesionales	x	x		
Altos empleados	x	x		
Clase media sindicalizada	x	x		
Obreros sindicalizados	x	x	x	x
Obreros no sindicalizados				x
Peones rurales				
Estudiantes universit.	x		x	
Jubilados	x			
Amas de casa				
Clero	x	x	x	x
Militares	x	x		x

Se ha marcado con "x" las participaciones mínimamente exitosas, sean formalizadas e informales. Los blancos indicarían los intereses o no bien articulados, o que no logran ser incorporados.

Este esquema cubre, como dijimos, el lapso 1951-1965. Desde 1966 ha sufrido algunas transformaciones: los universitarios quedaron sin participación formal institucionalizada. Los sindicatos - de empleados u obreros - disminuyeron su participación formal pero mantuvieron la informal de grupos y sobretodo de líderes. Pero en este caso - no obstante la interacción - las decisiones de la autoridad no correspondieron a las demandas sindicales. Se trataría entonces de una participación no-exitosa. Lo mismo cabría decir para los secto res rurales (pospuestos igual que los asalariados por un programa que se centra en la estabilización económica) y controlados, los estudiantes, por un régimen que hace del orden un valor.

Las transformaciones experimentadas en la Iglesia, y espe cialmente las divisiones de una parte de su clero en dos grupos, han terminado por modificar "desde" la Iglesia sus niveles tradicionales de participación.

Luego, a partir de este esquema provisorio, se podrían establecer niveles, adjuntando al éxito o fracaso de la participación, los criterios formales o informales acumulados para "hacerse pre- sente".

Así podríamos confeccionar una escala de 6 niveles, de los cuales solo los 4 primeros podrían computarse como de participa- ción exitosa.

nivel 1. Cuando las decisiones generalmente fueren aproxima das a las expectativas de los grupos, y elaboradas como resultado de una participación concurrente:

INSTITUCIONAL formal.
INSTITUCIONAL informal.
GRUPAL informal.
"de líderes" informal.

nivel 2. Id. pero como resultado de tres combinaciones, por ej.

INSTITUCIONAL formal.
INSTITUCIONAL informal.
GRUPAL informal.

nivel 3. Id. pero a través de dos combinaciones, por ej.

> INSTITUCIONAL informal.
> "de líderes" informal.

nivel 4. Id. pero como resultado de un solo tipo de participación, por ej.

> "de líderes" informal.

nivel 5. Cuando las decisiones fueren prevalentemente adversas a las expectativas de los grupos (cualesquiera fuere el nivel en que se haya participado).

nivel 6. Cuando no hubiere participación alguna formal ni informal (y por ende no importe la calidad de las decisiones que les concierna).

De acuerdo con esta escala, los empresarios por ej. (1951-1969) se habrían desempeñado al nivel 1. Y los sindicatos habrían ido cambiando de niveles según la coyuntura política. Nivel 1 en la época de Perón, y alternando entre 2., 3., o 4. y 5. según los años y regímenes. Los militantes universitarios de izquierda tradicionalmente ubicados al nivel 3. (dos combinaciones, y decisiones universitarias no muy distantes de sus expectativas) actualmente estarían en 5. o en 6. Las autoridades de la Iglesia normalmente han estado en 1. Los militares en 2. dado el no reconocimiento institucional de grupos internos, como no fuera que a cada arma y a los efectos clasificatorios se la reputara "un grupo", en cuyo caso sería nivel 1. Los jubilados están en 5., las amas de casa y los peones rurales siempre en 6.

A los efectos de este esquema se ha entendido por "participación formal institucionalizada" aquella realizada a través de las estructuras vigentes en cada situación, llámense comisiones asesoras, consejos, o el nombre que adopten.

En cambio, en todos los casos, por "participación informal" se ha entendido las relaciones particularistas. En contexto latinoamericano este tipo de relaciones es permanente, cualesquiera fueren las cambiantes situaciones políticas. Por eso es que incluímos a los "líderes" en el esquema, éstos suelen tener un "peso político" que trasciende a sus instituciones, y que les confiere mucha eficacia. De ahí que a veces tipifiquen situaciones en que la "representación" sea una delegación de confianza de quienes así subjetivamente se sienten partícipes.

5. Participación regional.

En la Argentina, y por razones históricas, económicas, de concentración urbana etc. que no es del caso explicar pero que las cifras estadísticas lo evidencian hasta el agotamiento, hay una muy desigual "participación regional" en las decisiones colectivas de carácter nacional.

Y esta desigual participación regional podría explicarse en principio - esto es muy provisorio y esquemático - en función de círculos concéntricos a partir de la ciudad Capital.

En efecto, tentativamente podrían señalarse tres círculos concéntricos. A partir de la megalópolis de Buenos Aires - capital política, económica, industrial y militar - los círculos concéntricos irían indicando la relación entre la "tierra central" y las "zonas marginales", entre una metrópoli desarrollada, modernizada e industrial, y la periferia subdesarrollada, en parte deshabitada y productora de materia prima.

Dije que tentativamente podrían dibujarse 3 círculos.

El círculo concéntrico 1. correspondería a la ciudad de Buenos Aires, los primeros 50 kilómetros de radio subsiguientes, y alguna ciudad satélite (Mar del Plata).

El círculo 2. a partir del 1. y hasta provisoriamente los 600 kilómetros de radio a partir de Buenos Aires.

El círculo 3. toda la zona que no es "tierra central", que comprenda tanto zonas desarrolladas a medias, sub desarrolladas, áreas inhabitadas etc. (con la excepción de alguna ciudad que hubiera correspondido a 2. aunque entre en éste).

De ahí entonces que en términos nacionales, haya que correlacionar niveles sectoriales de participación con niveles regionales de participación. Y que a través de un juego de combinaciones podrían plantearse nuevos cuadros, en los que lo que se tendría en cuenta sería la posibilidad primero, y la eficacia luego, de participar en la elaboración de las decisiones nacionales. (Ya que a los efectos de las regionales o locales cada cual participaría según una escala como la propuesta de niveles de 1. a 6. según los casos).

Las combinaciones posibles, sectoriales y regionales; serían entonces las de los 6 niveles sectoriales de participación, cruzados con los 3 niveles regionales de participación en la elaboración de las decisiones nacionales.

Así, entonces:

NIVELES DE PAR- TICIPACION SEC - TORIAL	PARTICIPACION REGIONAL en decisio- nes nacionales (por círculos concéntricos desde la "metrópoli" a la periferia).
	1a. 2a. 3a.
nivel 1.	
nivel 2.	
nivel 3.	
nivel 4.	
nivel 5.	
nivel 6.	

Pueden darse así diferentes tipos de combinaciones. Y podrían ocurrir hasta toda clase de "participaciones alienantes". Así por ej. la de sectores que subjetivamente estén convencidos de que la participación es global, por el hecho de que ellos gocen del nivel 1, en zona 1. Y que a la inversa haya sectores, y grupos regionales que no se visualicen dentro de un sistema de participación cuasi-global aún cuando así lo fuera. Y que en cambio se sintiera excluídos. Tal sería el caso del nivel 5 (los que participando formal e informalmente no obtienen satisfacciones en sus demandas).

Pero también estaría el caso de grupos y sectores ubicados en el tercer círculo concéntrico, sin peso ni participación alguna en el orden nacional, aunque tengan niveles 1. y 2. pero en el local.

Esta conciencia de "no participar" sectorial o regionalmente, puede madurar al constatar como otros participan (sectorial o geográficamente). Ahora, cuando esa conciencia se despierta los grupos buscan alianzas tácticas que si encuentran cerrados los canales de participación, se convierten en movimientos de "contestación".

Tal sería lo que ocurrió por ej. en un momento de este año: una combinación de niveles sectoriales 5. y 6. con área 3. En este caso puede resultar una participación "contestataria" al margen del sistema y contra el sistema. La participación "contestataria" no está legitimada, al contrario, convertida en tumulto o en motín, tiene las características de una forma anómica. Pero, por la vá de protesta - aunque no sean satisfechas sus expectativas - pueden hasta generar hechos nuevos. E incluso la institucionalización de algunas de esas demandas de participación.

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(1) Sobre las etapas en el proceso de democratización, en los países de América Latina y particularmente la Artentina, véase G. Germani, Política y Sociedad en una época de transición, Paidós, Bs. Aires, edic. varias.

(2) J. L. de Imaz, Motivación Electoral, Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Social, Boenos Aires 1962. Es una investigación realizada sobre una muestra estadística presuntamente representativa de los distintos estratos sociales de los electores de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1962.

(3) S. Verba, "Democratic Participation" en The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. II, Nº 373, Philadelphia. septiembre 1967.

(4) J. L. de Imaz, Los que Mandan, EUDEBA, Buenos Aires, edic. varias.

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TABLE RONDE DE RIO DE JANEIRO - 27/31 Octobre 1969
RIO DE JANEIRO ROUND TABLE   - 27/31 October 1969

CONDICOES SOCIO-ESTRUTURAIS E PARTICIPACAO POLITICA NA AMAZONIA

Rapport / Paper

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CONDICOES SÓCIO-ESTRUTURAIS E
PARTICIPACÃO POLÍTICA NA AMAZÔNIA

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sidade Federal do Pará e do IDESP-
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INTRODUÇÃO

O presente documento constitui-se de um conjunto, de hipoteses de trabalho ensaiando, compreender as condições sócio-estruturais da participação politica e as formas basicas dessa participação na mais extensa região do Brasil, a Amazônia, que tambem e uma das mais despovoadas do país (1).

Assim, ao invés de focalizar, o tema da participação politica sob a otica de um pais da América Latina, ou sob a otica global do processo político latino-americano, como o faz Jaguaribe em seu documento (2), o presente texto opta por uma abordagem regional.

O autor est. consciente das limitações implicitas nês te tipo de abordagem e mesmo dos aspectos discutiveis nêle contidos. Alem daquilo que pode existir de movediço na propria coneituação teórica ou prática de região (3), é usual que nas estruturas politicas atuais, como as da América Latina, as sub-unidades incluidas em um Estado (regiões, estados-membros, etc) comumente não, detemham competência constitucional para manipular as variaveis basicas do regime político ou da policy econômica (4). Destarte, sob êste prisma, deficil mente as regiões podem ser vistas como "sistemas" politicos

passíveis de tratamento autônomo.

Em compensação, há perspectivas sob as quais pode ser vantajosa uma abordagem regional. Quando se trata, por exemplo, de identificar e caracterizar os gaps ocorrentes entre o nominal e o real, o enfoque regional pode permitir compreensões mais detalhistas que melhor representem as diferenciações vigentes em um sistema global — e consequentemente proporcionem melhor diagnóstico do próprio sistema, inclusive para efeitos pragmáticos.

O estudo da participação política é certamente um caso em que a abordagem regional pode oferecer vantagens, pois focaliza um tipo de fenômeno extremamente sujeito a ostentar hiatos entre o nominal e o real (5). Isto parece tanto mais verdadeiro quando se discute o tema da participação política em relação a áreas como a América Latina ou a países como o Brasil, cujas respectivas realidades mostram ou escondem profundas heterogeneidades regionais e onde, além disso, os diagnósticos ainda se encontram deveras incompletos. Em consequência, admite-se por êste lado que a abordagem regional do presente texto não seja de todo inoportuna.

Por outro lado, caso as hipóteses de trabalho lançadas no texto com base na Amazônia Brasileira possam ter valor interpretativo em relação à Pan-Amazônia, é possível que a importância potencial desta Grande Amazônia dentro da América do Sul possa ser um fator a mais para justificar a abordagem, pois então êste documento diria respeito a uma área de tamanho equivalente ou maior à de expressivos países latino-americanos (6) e que, se se tem em mente as recentes téses sôbre a alternativa "interiorizadora" (7) como uma das saídas do atual impasse do desenvolvimento da América Latina, mereceria ser estudada mais de perto.

Entendendo participação política no sentido restrito expresso por Jaguaribe em seu documento-guia, segundo o qual ela corresponderia à terceira variável da macrovariável "mobilização política" (8), o documento deter-se-á no exâme das formas de participação política enquanto emergem das "condições estruturais resultantes da própria estrutura da comunidade política e sua sociedade, em função do regime de participação prevalecente", (9) no caso da Amazônia. Embora focalize as formas de participação política sob o ponto de vista dessa primeira variável, que Jaguaribe considera "a mais importante" sob o prisma sócio-político, o documento eventualmente utilizará na análise as duas outras variáveis apontadas pelo mesmo autor (10).

Destarte, a primeira parte do texto ensaia construir uma formulação teórica sôbre as condições estruturais da sociedade amazônica que circunscrevem o quadro dentro do qual as formas efetivas de participação política emergem e produzem consequências práticas. Já a segunda parte examina as

próprias formas típicas de participação política vigentes na Região.

Na montagem do documento surgiu um problema especial: o de como esboçar um texto ao mesmo tempo sintético e passível de ser adequadamente entendido nas suas referências a fatos regionais. O problema existe em virtude de ser a Amazônia ainda pouco conhecida a não ser quanto às generalidades, mesmo no Brasil. Como não se julgou aconselhável tumultuar o texto interrompendo-o com excessivas explicações sôbre fatos e aspectos amazônicos, optou-se por fornecer algumas sumárias informações regionais em notas de rodapé, geralmente usando a palavra de intérpretes da Região para poder ao mesmo tempo alinhar uma bibliografia básica sôbre os assuntos. Esta a razão de serem tais notas relativamente numerosas.

Cabe, por último, um esclarecimento sôbre a condição preliminar do documento. Montado em curtíssimo prazo e teorizando sôbre uma Região carente de pesquisas suficientes, o presente documento não tem pretensões. É, em verdade, um conjunto de hipóteses de trabalho a aperfeiçoar sob o estímulo da crítica e a verificar mais exaustivamente.

UMA INTERPRETAÇÃO SÓCIO-ESTRUTURAL DA AMAZÔNIA

A Amazônia pode ser apresentada como um caso de sociedade tradicional dispersa, cujas condições estruturais refletem essa dispersão e na qual os componentes se acham em variadas situações de isolamento social.

Êste perfil da Amazônia deverá ser detalhado na parte final dêste capítulo, mas o seu adequado entendimento depende de alguns esclarecimentos de natureza histórica que, sinteticamente, serão alinhados a seguir.

O Surgimento das Condições Estruturais Atuais

A ação inicial dos colonizadores portuguêses e luso-brasileiros procurou dêsde o século XVII, ao que se presume, concentrar em algumas cidades, juntamente com os alienígenas, os grandes contingentes indígenas que se achavam disseminados em muitas tribos (11). Tais cidades, contudo, até a segunda metade do século XIX jamais puderam dispor de populações expressivas. De um lado, porque a pobreza econômica da Região (12), a decadência do império português que praticamente coincidiu com o início da colonização amazônica (13) e a debilidade demográfica de Portugal (14) pouco contribuíram para atrair migrantes para a Amazônia. De outro lado, porque a política de concentrar indígenas em cidades teria provocado um verdadeiro surto dizimatório das populações autóctones que mudavam de habitat (15). Assim, a cidade de Belém, o berço da civili

ção amazônica e até hoje o maior conglomerado populacional
da Região, não possuia 20.000 habitantes em 1850 (16).

A ocupação humana expressiva da Região sómente come
çou no quarto final do século XIX, impulsionada por um fato
extraordinário: o ciclo econômico da borracha (17).

Embora conhecida na Amazônia desde os primórdios da
colonização, a borracha não chegara a ter qualquer significa-
do econômico maior, até então, a não ser para algumas ativida-
des artesanais regionais. Alguns produtos da borracha chega-
ram a ser exportados em pequenas quantidades para a Europa e
os Estados Unidos, mas sem alcançar volumes notáveis (18).Foi
a descoberta dos processos tecnológicos de vulcanização   da
borracha e de fabricação de pneumáticos (19) - e o consequen-
te emprêgo em escala crescente da borracha como matéria prima
industrial - o fato que veio abrir um grande mercado ao produ
to. Como a Amazônia dispunha de situação monopolística em   re
lação à oferta de borracha, somente ela podia atender à deman
da industrial crescente. Eis porque investimentos foram fei-
tos para produzí-la em quantidades cada vez maiores. Eis por
que, talvez porque o regime de produção projetava inelastici-
dades na oferta, mesmo na situação monopolística, os   preços
se elevaram vertiginosamente. Eis porque um forte pólo centrí
peto se instalou na Região (20), capaz de atrair amplos   con-
tingentes populacionais que as insidiosas sêcas expeliam   do
Nordeste Brasileiro. Estima-se que o ciclo da borracha acarre
tou a entrada de volume superior a 300.000 nordestinos na Ama
zônia (21). E a população regional, que no início do século
XIX estava em tôrno de 100.000 habitantes, pode alcançar cêr-
ca de 700.000 habitantes no final do século - enquanto uma ci
dade como Belém, entre 1850 e 1900, aumentava sua população
de cêrca de 20.000 para cerca de 100.000 pessoas (22).

Se o ciclo da borracha serviu para povoar a Amazô-
nia um pouco mais ou bastante em relação a todo o período an-
terior - serviu também para fixar e consolidar na Região   os
principais componentes sócio-econômicos estruturais que conti
nuam vigorando até hoje, embora em alguns casos, sobretudo nas
três últimas décadas, com feições bastante alteradas.

Como a produção da borracha e sua comercialização
com o resto do mundo transformaram-se em atividades que virtu
almente monopolizaram todos os esforços regionais (23),algumas
características dos empreendimentos gomíferos acabaram   por
projetar sôbre a sociedade global influências peculiares   e
duradouras.

Tratando da questão de modo talvez analítico demais,
pode-se afirmar que seis eram as características principais
da emprêsa produtora de borracha (24). Ela era extrativista ,
fragmentada, extensa, isolada, mono-extrativista dependente e
exportadora.

Ela era extrativista, isto é, limitava-se a manipu-
lar o _latex_ extraido de árvores pré-existentes na floresta -e
não investia em plantio ou hevea cultura (25). Exatamente per
ser extrativista nas condições da floresta amazônica, que   é
uma das mais heterogêneas do mundo em virtude do grande núme-
ro de espécies botânicas encontráveis em um único hectare(26),
a empresa produtora de borracha era fragmentada: possuia nor
malmente muitas sub-unidades praticamente idênticas dentro de
si e cada qual em situação de isolamento virtual em relação
às outras (27). Essa empresa também era extensa, isto é, dia
tribuia-se por um amplo território, capaz de conter dentro de
si um número rentável de árvores produtoras (28). Justamente
por sua grande extensão que só permitia às empresas visinhas
ficarem a grande distância, cada unidade produtora era isola-
da das demais e cada nova unidade tinha que se instalar em lu
gares cada vez mais distantes das cidades (29). A empresa era
mono-extrativista, isto é, praticamente se dedicava apenas à
produção de borracha, cujos preços eram altos e   compensado
res, razão pela qual constituia uma unidade em regime de de-
pendência em relação ao abastecimento externo para a totalida
de ou quase totalidade dos bens que consumia ou insumia (30).
Por fim, como o mercado consumidor da borracha era totalmente
externo, a empresa era exportadora - mas sua condição isolada
exigia que cidades-entrepostos, sobretudo Belém e Manaus, in
termediassem a comercialização do produto com o resto do mun-
do e a consecussão dos volumosos créditos necessários à produ
ção (31).

Uma Teoria Sôbre as Condições Estruturais Atuais

Estas características constituiram os fatores   que
se associaram a outros para justificar a implantação e a con
solidação, na Amazônia, de uma estrutura-tipo de relações, co
mumente chamada de "sistema de aviamento" (32), que se trans-
formou no que se presume ser o mais importante componente es
trutural do conjunto sócio-econômico-político da Região (33).

Em sentido econômico restrito e como "tipo empírico"
o "sistema de aviamento" é o conjunto de dois fluxos qualifi-
cados amazônicamente por algumas peculiaridades. O primeiro
fluxo, das cidades em direção ao interior, abastece as unida-
des de produção com os bens indispensáveis. O segundo fluxo ,
do interior em direção às cidades, opera o escoamento da pro-
dução. As peculiaridades desses fluxos seriam:

a) funcionarem como operações de um sistema de cré-
dito informal, pois o primeiro fluxo representaria o financia
mento, enquanto o segundo representaria o ressarcimento, re-
sultando dos mesmos uma economia virtualmente de escambo(34);

b) exigirem, em virtude da dispersão das unidades
produtoras no vasto espaço regional, uma extensa cadeia de ope

radores-intermediários, cuja interveniência evidentemente one
ra o custo de cada fluxo, tanto mais porque, sendo a maioria
das relações informais e não jurídicamente comprovadas, cada
intermediário deve cobrar taxas adicionais como risco de cré
dito (35);

c) originarem alguns padrões de relações que refor
çariam o próprio sistema, seja porque assegurariam a êste a
proteção das instituições (36),seja porque sublimariam uma si
tuação tencional de dependência (37).

Em sentido amplo e ainda como "tipo empírico", o
"sistema de aviamento" seria a via normal para os processos
de comunicação e relacionamentos macro-sociais na Amazônia. A
importância dêsse canal, face ao seu estratégico papel condi
cionador das relações que por êle se processam, permitiria a
firmar-se até mesmo que o sistema é o elo fundamental da so
ciedade amazônica ou o seu mecanismo "integrador" (38).Um ar-
gumento a contrario sensu poderia corroborar a afirmativa: ca
so o "sistema de aviamento" deixasse de funcionar em um dado
setor isolado da sociedade amazônica, êste setor tenderia a
perder a condição de parte da sociedade regional; se os habi-
tantes dêsse setor não emigrassem, tenderiam a regredir ao es
tado indígena - pois a mingua de bens e relações "civilisadas"
forçaria a constituição de uma espécie de autarquia índia. Em
outras palavras: carente do elo articulador do sistema, o se
tor se "desintegraria" do conjunto amazônico (39).

Consolidado na Amazônia durante o ciclo da borracha,
o "sistema de aviamento" não se extinguiu no momento em que
aquêle ciclo se extinguiu. Provavelmente duas ordens de fato-
res serviram para sustentar a estrutura social que se havia
montado.

De um lado, a sociedade articulada pelo "sistema de
aviamento" havia criado um modêlo de distribuição de renda e
de poder que privilegiava evidentemente as camadas urbanas e
mercantís da Região (40); admite-se que estas procuraram ar-
mar, mesmo inconscientemente, uma sequência de decisões mante
nedoras do sistema que as beneficiava.

De outro lado, exibiam características semelhantes
às dos empreendimentos da borracha algumas das mais importan-
tes alternativas que a Região encontrou para evitar que sua
renda caísse ainda mais (41) - e o sistema pôde continuar a
ter vigência, inclusive porque outros suportes o apoiavam.

É claro que a fisionomia do "sistema de aviamento"
e sua vigência não permaneceram tal e qual existiam durante o
ciclo da borracha, isto é, conceitualmente próximas do "tipo
empírico" formulado.

Em algumas áreas a vigência teve continuidade com o

sistema obedecendo a novas feições: na área da castanha, na da balata, nas de alguns setôres pecuários, nas de alguns produtos da agricultura de subsistência. Algumas destas novas feições já poderiam ser descritas caso êste documento devesse ter dimensões casuísticas; em relação a outras, talvez à maioria mesmo, melhores verificações empíricas precisariam ser efetuadas para que uma caracterização nítida pudesse ficar traçada.

Em outras áreas, como no interior dos meios efetivamente urbanos, a vigência do sistema tornou-se minoritária ou mesmo nula, sob o impacto de outros mecanismos concorrentes articuladores de relações, como os de mercado competitivo. Vale ressaltar, contudo, que o "sistema de aviamento" provavelmente permaneceu funcionando, embora com novas feições, nos relacionamentos dêsses meios urbanos com o hinterland.

Importa ter presente que sobretudo nas duas últimas décadas a implantação de alguns componentes novos ou adicionais na sociedade regional, como agências bancárias no interior, rodovias, campos de pouso, escolas radiofônicas, cooperativas, terá acarretado impactos modificadores cujo alcance, contudo, não se encontra devidamente levantado.

Assim, em resumo, poder-se-ia simplificadamente sistematizar o quadro estrutural da sociedade amazônica de hoje em têrmos de um "continuum" social, cujos agrupamentos polares seriam a) o macro-núcleo urbano (Belém) e b) o menor ou mais simples micro-núcleo extrativista - ambos definidos por uma série de atributos (42) que eventualmente permitiriam sua identificação prática, bem como dos demais agrupamentos situados entre êles. A articulação dêsses componentes todos far-se-ia através do "sistema de aviamento - considerado êste o seu significado amplo. Nesse espaço "continuum" social, a vigência do "sistema de aviamento" apresentaria intensidade diferencial segundo a situação e a categoria dos agrupamentos. Quanto mais êles fossem similares e próximos do macro-núcleo urbano menos teriam o "sistema de aviamento" típico dentro de si. Evidentemente a vigência do "sistema" aumentaria à medida que, no "continuum", os agrupamentos ficassem mais similares as micro-núcleo extrativista.

FORMAS DE PARTICIPAÇÃO POLÍTICA NA AMAZÔNIA

O quadro sócio-estrutural esboçado no caítulo anterior permite sistematizar (43), ainda como hipóteses de trabalho, as formas de participação política vigentes na Região como pertencentes a 4 categorias básicas. Possivelmente as três formas primeiramente descritas podem ser agrupadas sob uma rubrica geral, que poderia ser chamada de "participação reflexa" (44). A última poderia ser designada por "participação protagonística".

A primeira forma de participação política seria peculiar sobretudo às faixas mais isoladas do "continuum", onde os agrupamentos estariam sujeitos de maneira praticamente integral à articulação interna e externa por parte do "sistema de aviamento" típico. A situação dos indivíduos e grupos, nessa faixa, seria de intensa dependência quanto aos canais aviadores para fornecer inputs ao sistema político global ou dêste receber outputs, como influxos e frutos da participação. Nessas condições, tais indivíduos e grupos podem ser facilmente controlados e orientados pelo agente aviador atuante numa dada faixa que, por si ou por, delegados, tende portanto a monopolizar a extensão, a definição e a expressão da participação acaso ocorrente na área dada.

Os volumes de participação não podem ser elevados nessas faixas, não somente em virtude dos baixos níveis culturais e padrões de vida nelas vigorantes, mas em função dos pequenos graus de interêsse (45) pela comunidade política.

É possível até mesmo afirmar que os volumes de participação, nessas áreas, teriam relação direta com o interêsse geral do agente-aviador pela comunidade política ou com o seu interêsse específico no que concerne à participação em uma dada decisão. Sob êste prisma, as participações mais comuns diriam respeito às competições eleitorais, ocasiões em que o agente-aviador ou seu delegado recebe um estímulo especial para participar na condição de "cabo eleitoral" - frequentemente em troca de vantagens ou promessas de vantagens específicas.

A segunda forma de participação política seria própria sobretudo às faixas do "continuum" que, relativamente próximas do macro ou dos médio núcleos urbanos, ainda estão sujeitas à articulação interna e externa do "sistema de aviamento", embora êste já apresente alí novas feições.

Um pouco diversa do caso anterior seria a situação dos indivíduos e grupos dessa faixa, pois a cadeia aviadora já não mais constituiria o canal exclusivo de sua articulação com a sociedade envolvente ou com a comunidade política. Outros agentes-aviadores funcionariam nas vizinhanças, até mesmo travando concorrencia entre sí. Por outro lado, agentes extraordinários exógenos podem visitar os agrupamentos quando têm interêsse especial em fomentar casos de participação que se julgam em condições de estimular, chegando mesmo a deixar agentes delegados, também extraordinários, trabalhando na coletividade em prol daquela participação.

Se a situação dêsses agrupamentos mostra a possibilidade de uma pluralidade de contatos aparentemente poder en

sombrecer a função dos agentes aviadores da visinhança, cumpre notar que uma análise mais detida não chegaria a evidenciar que os processos de participação ocorrentes nessas coletividades cheguem a ser autônomos em relação ao "sistema de aviamento" como um todo.

Essa análise mais detida enfatizaria que a articulação dessas faixas com o restante do "continuum" se processa através de agentes "normais" e "extraordinários".

Os primeiros já pertencem aos circuitos do "sistema de aviamento". Se há concorrencia entre êles, esta pode incentivar maiores graus de participação na visinhança, inclusive até mesmo mais "liberalizada", mas se trata de uma concorrência naturalmente sujeita a pelo menos um limite: a de não colocar conscientemente em risco a primazia do "sistema de aviamento" em sí.

Os agentes "extraordinários" merecem um exame mais minucioso. Podem êles ser classificados em "extraordinários externos" e extraordinários internos, como já foi visto, pois os primeiros são de fóra das faixas e as visitam, enquanto os segundos pertencem às faixas, embora sejam delegados dos primeiros. O problema dos agentes "extraordinários externos" poderia ser resumido sobretudo nas motivações e nos recursos de que necessitam para conseguir "agentes"extraordinários internos", conserva-los atuantes na comunidade e equipá-los para a concorrencia com os agentes normais do "sistema de aviamento". Mas é precisamente nêste ponto que aparecem as melhores chances do "sistema de aviamento" como um todo. Não somente êste possui arraigadas motivações para constituir agentes extraordinários externos, pois tem uma posição a defender; mas possui também as melhores possibilidades de reunir e aplicar recursos, sendo, como é, partícipe do setor mais favorecido na distribuição da renda e do poder.

Neste caso, agentes normais e extraordinários tenderiam a apresentar vinculações com o "sistema de aviamento" e nessas faixas do "continuum" as formas de participação política tenderiam a beneficiar a mesma situação estrutural global, apenas que através de instrumentos diversos.

É claro que, face à maior abertura dessas faixas aos influxos externos, elas podem e devem estar registrando mudanças rápidas em seu perfil participacional.

A terceira forma de participação política, dentro do "continuum", seria ocorrente sobretudo nos médios núcleos urbanos e na periferia do macro-núcleo urbano, onde a vigência do "sistema de aviamento" já teria papel de articulação interna praticamente nulo - embora certamente continue constatável quando se trata das articulações dêsses agrupamentos ou par

tes de agrupamentos com o restante do "continuum".

A característica relevante dos indivíduos e grupos destas faixas, onde condições aglomerativas facilitariam a inter-influenciação, seria a disponibilidade ou pré-disposição para a participação, sujeitos que estão êles a influxos de instrumentos de mass communication ou à ação de variados tipos de lideranças, fatores estes capazes de aumentar-lhes o interesse pelo que se passa na comunidade política. Entre êsse estado de disponibilidade ou de interêsse difuso e uma real atividade participatória existiria, evidentemente, uma distância variável em função de diversos fatôres motivacionais e operacionais.

Sendo neste caso a situação bastante mais complexa do que nas faixas anteriormente focalizadas, é claro que mais a pesquisa empírica precisaria identificar tais elencos de fatôres - para que se pudesse falar com segurança sôbre o processo que transforma a simples disponibilidade/interêsse em reais inputs para o sitema. Na falta dessas pesquisas suficientes, vale formular algumas hipóteses oriundas de observações assistemáticas.

Provavelmente é oportuno ter em mente que o processo de formação social da Amazônia em geral marginalizou as populações autóctones da vida política, impedindo ou dificultando que nelas se implantassem tradições e experiências participatórias. O caso mais comum era o de tais populações constituírem os estratos inferiores sujeitos à alternativa de um "conformismo" que já impressionou vários autores.

Este é um dado relevante, se se leva em conta que as faixas ora focalizadas parecem se constituir sobretudo de membros das classes média-baixa e inferiores, isto é, de camadas onde provavelmente a maioria descende daquelas populações marginalizadas. Se é verdade que nessas faixas há carência de tradições e experiências participatórias, torna-se admissível que sua participação normalmente dependa de incentivos/provocações especiais - que poderiam ser representadas por situações desusadamente mobilizadoras ou por lideranças efetivamente ativas. Mas a possibilidade que se acredita mais realista é a de que os graus de participação nessas faixas dependem mais da ação das lideranças do que de outros fatôres.

Evidentemente as considerações feitas sôbre a segunda forma de participação podem ter aplicação a esta, ou seja, é possível que as lideranças vinculadas ao "sistema de aviamento", por seus montantes elevados de motivações e recursos, possam beneficiar-se das condições estruturais para mobilizar a participação, nestas faixas, a seu favor.

A quarta forma de participação política vigoraria

sobretudo no centro do macro-núcleo urbano e seria propriamen
te a participação "protagonística" capaz de ser exercida den-
tro do "continuum". Aqui já se poderia falar de uma participa
ção típica de um "estrato político" (Dahl), que se caracteri-
zaria pelos traços comuns e peculiares ao estrato, tais como:
graus normalmente elevados de interesse, preocupação, informa
ção e atividade; associativismo de fins políticos específicos;
filiação partidária; uso de medidas pressionadoras ou consti-
tuição de grupos de pressão; candidaturas a postos cooptáveis
dentro dos partidos ou a postos eletivos governamentais; man-
datos políticos; procura competitiva e uso de influência "car
torial" para os atendimentos "clientelísticos"; profissiona-
lismo ou semi-profissionalismo político; etc.

Além das atividades individuais difíceis de sistema
tizar à luz de tipificações participacionais, existiriam nes
sa faixa grupos atuantes de diferentes naturezas, evidentemen
te sujeitos à dinâmica normal que faz seus limiares sofrerem
mutanções constantes.

A identificação e a caracterização dêsses grupos
ainda não foi efetuada através da pesquisa empírica, quanto
à Região. Existe inclusive o problema de como estabelecer os
critérios para classificá-los.

Para utilizar um critério classificatório já mani-
pulado em trabalho anterior (46) - e com a ressalva de esta
não é a única tipificação válida - tais grupos poderiam ser
identificados e caracterizados segundo suas vinculações com
os setores sócio-econômicos. Neste caso ter-se-ia grupos vin
culados ao setor primário, ao setor secundário e ao setor
terciário para utilizar a divisão tradicional sem as inova -
ções recentes.

Especificamente quanto à Amazônia, o diagnóstico
não é difícil de realizar quando se trata de saber qual dos
setores possui maior participação protagonística, pois há um
consenso já estabelecido em alguns observadores regionais ad
mitindo que o terciário é êsse setor dominante. Detalhar o
diagnóstico, isto é, saber os componentes do terciário que
tem atividade participatória dominante, já não é tão simples.
Em trabalho anterior o autor admitiu que se tratava do "ter-
ciário-comercial"; mas no citado trabalho, cuja finalidade
não era examinar as formas de participação, não foi caracte-
rizado o que se entendia sob essa denominação.

Provavelmente será correto dizer que êsse "terciá-
rio-comercial" abrange grupos do comércio, dos serviços, dos
transportes e comunicações, da intermediação financeira e dos
aluguéis, afirmando mais que, sob a liderança do comércio ,
êles se fundem para constituir o caput regional do " sistema
de aviamento" e, através dêste, controlar as demais formas
de participação.

Há porém alguns problemas nestas afirmativas. Em primeiro lugar, elas parecem estáticas porque tudo indica não incorporam a concorrência à liderança do comércio que, nos úl timos tempos, grupos do setor primário "concentrado-indepen dente" (47) e do setor secundário vem fazendo. Tal concorrên cia deve estar produzindo, como resultados, que grupos dos ser viços, dos transportes e comunicações e dos aluguéis possivel mente acusam ambiguidades nas suas participações ou mesmo já apresentam atuação fragmentária. Em segundo lugar, as afirma tivas parecem estáticas porque não intruduzem modificações que em algumas áreas se estão processando nas relações do co mércio com o setor "primário disperso dependente". Tais rela ções, conforme já foi observado, resultavam em que o poder po lítico dos comerciantes era extraordináriamente grande, entre outras razões, porque incorporava a participação do setor pri mário, uma vez que este era controlado pelo comércio através do aviamento. Ocorre que essas relações registram sinais de mudanças, sob o impacto dos compnentes novos ou adicionais in troduzidos à sociedade regional (V.cap.anterior), bem como em consequência da competição que começa a ser travada entre o comércio e sobretudo o setor secundário, principalmente em função da participação eleitoral.

Assim, é indubitável que mais dados empíricos pre cisam ser recolhidos para que as presentes hipóteses sôbre a participação protagonística possam ser aperfeiçoadas e se pos sa levar em conta as variáveis mais dinâmicas no processo.

Não obstante, a direção dêsse dinamismo mostra que a tendência é declinar a preponderância da influência comer cial. E, evidentemente, isto terá implicações sôbre as moda lidades de vigência do "sistema de aviamento".

13.

N O T A S

(1) A chamada Amazônia Clássica, que corresponde à Região Norte da
divisão fisiográfica do Brasil, possui 3.581.180 km² (inclusive águas
interiores) e uma população estimada oficialmente para 1969 em
3.403.000 habitantes, o que perfaz a densidade de 0,95 hab/km². Mas
existem outros conceitos de Amazônia, entre os quais um dos mais impor
tantes é o de Amazônia Legal, área de operação da SUDAM (Superinten-
dência do Desenvolvimento da Amazônia). Sôbre outros conceitos de
Amazônia ver MOREIRA, Eidorfe, Amazônia - O conceito e a Paisagem,
ed. SPVEA, Rio, 1960. V. tb. nota 6, adiante. Sôbre o problema do va-
zio demográfico e uma recolocação do problema, v. TUPIASSU, Amilcar
A., O Ecúmeno da Amazônia, doc. apres. ao Grupo de Coordenação Nor-
te para o Plano Decenal do Ministério do Planejamento, Reunião de Ma-
naus, 1966.

(2) JAGUARIBE, Helio, Political Participation in Contemporary Condi-
tions, IUPERJ, Rio, 1969, datil.

(3) Cf. por exemplo: FRIEDMANN, John & ALONSO, William (ed) Regio-
nal Development and Planning, The MIT Press, Mass., 1964;
FRIEDMANN, John, Regional Development Policy - A Case Study of Vene-
ziela, The MIT Press, Mass. 1966, esp. chap. 3; ISARD, Walter et alii,
Methods of Regional Analysis: an Introduction to Regional Science, MIT,
Mass., 1960. Sôbre a delimitação regional do Brasil e alguns de seus
problemas: ROCHEFORT, Michel, O Problema da Regionalização no Bra-
sil, EPEA, Rio, set-1967, mim.

(4) Uma interessante avaliação factual sôbre o assunto para o Brasil fo-
calizando instrumentos de política econômica, mas com incursões
inevitáveis em aspectos políticos, encontra-se em "O Planejamento Es-
tadual no Brasil", elaboração e edição do Centro de Desenvolvimento Eco
nômico CEPAL/BNDE, Rio, 1965.

(5) "In all, except some primitive societies, there is always a difference
between nominal and effective political participation" - JAGUARIBE,
Helio, op. cit., p. 8.

(6) "A Pan-Amazônia compreende os territórios totais ou parciais de
nove países, somando cêrca de 7,8 milhões de quilômetros quadra-
dos. Corresponde a 44% da superfície terrestre da América do Sul e é
abrangida por bandeiras nacionais que cobrem 77% do mesmo território".
"Contrastando com êsse panorama, a população da Pan-Amazônia é escas
sa, significando em têrmos médios menos de um habitante por quilôme-
tro quadrado. Ao todo, a Pan-Amazônia é povoada por cêrca de 4,5% da
população total da América do Sul. A população total dos países amazô-
nicos representa, porém, cêrca de 78% da continental" - Cf. PARAENSE

TRANSPORTES AÉREOS, Rêde de Integração Pan-Amazônica - Definição de uma Política de Transportes Aéreos para a Amazônia Continental, Belém, 1968.

(7) Ver "Polêmica sobre el Desarrollo del Interior de America Latina", ILPES, set-1967, onde se encontram documentos sôbre a tése.

(8) "In its narrow meaning, political participation corresponds to one of the variables of the macrovariable Political Mobilization: the one concerning the extent of membership and grade of participation in the system, i.e., of involvement in decisions concerning its inputs and outputs" - Cf. JAGUARIBA, Helio, op.cit., p. 6.

(9) Cf. JAGUARIBA, Helio, op.cit., p. 6.

(10) As duas outras variáveis assim são apresentadas: "2) the conditions resulting from the personality of the individuals and from their immediate group setting, such as family, pair group and similar ones; 3) the conditions of an aleatory or circunstancial character, in relation to the two former ones, varying from such macroevents as wars and revolutions to micro-occurences as all sort of individual happenings" - JAGUARIBE, Helio, op.cit., p. 7.

(11) Tal ação suscitou a implantação de dois tipos de agrupamentos: as cidades "civilisadas" propriamente ditas (onde habitavam colonos-leigos, missionários e indios na maioria escravos) e os "aldeamentos" (onde índios de várias tribos eram concentrados para viver sob a virtual tutela de alguns missionários) - V. bibliografia geral s/história amazônica e sobretudo: FERREIRA REIS, Arthur Cezar, Síntese de História do Pará, Belém, 1942; IDEM, O Seringal e o Seringueiro, Serv. Inf. Agr., Rio, 1953. Sob o ponto de vista do processo de formação social, dois distintos "modelos de contato" se firmaram nas relações indígenas-alienígenas a partir da diferenciação de agrupamentos; o "modêlo integrador escravocrata" e o "modêlo de segregação relativa", ambos contribuindo, embora de formas diversas, para que os padrões sócio-culturais indígenas tivessem primazia na sociedade resultante do processo formador - Cf. TUPIASSU, Amilcar A. & SANTOS, Roberto A. Oliveira, Curso de Introdução ao Estudo Sociológico e Econômico do Pará, Fac. Filos. Ci. Let. Univ. Fed. Pará, Belem, 1967, mim.

(12) As esperanças, nutridas por certas lendas que corriam na Europa sôbre a Amazônia, não foram atendidas. O ouro não foi descoberto - Cf. AZEVEDO, J. Lúcio, Os Jesuitas no Grão Pará, Tavares Cardoso & Irmão, Lisboa, 1901, cap. VI -. A canela ficou apenas como um dos itens da produção extrativista. O primeiro ciclo econômico regional foi o das "drogas do sertão", mas, segundo Simonsen, a exportação de cacau, especiarias e várias drogas, durante a época colonial teria alcan-

çado apenas 0, 65% de todas as exportações brasileiras. Falando da segunda metade do século XVII, Simonsen afirma que "a pobreza e o desentendimento chegaram a tal ponto que os próprios moradores achavam dificuldades em promover entradas pelo sergão..." - Cf. SIMONSEN, Roberto C., História Econômica do Brasil, Cia. Ed. Nac., S. Paulo, 1962 (4a. ed.), p. 317. V. tb. bibliografia citada na nota 11.

(13) A união pessoal dos Reinos de Espanha e Portugal, entre 1580 e 1640, acarretou para Portugal as investidas dos inimigos tradicionais da Espanha, tendo sido esta uma das mais fortes razões para que ataques a colônias portuguesas surgissem em vários pontos do Império. Quando os holandeses ocuparam o Nordeste Brasileiro, diminuiu uma das mais fortes motivações para a ocupação da Amazônia, que fôra a de proteger os empreendimentos açucareiros do Nordeste.

(14) "Não se conhece com exatidão a população lusitana àquela altura, nem tampouco as variáveis demográficas indispensáveis para uma avaliação das suas taxas de incremento populacional. As estimativas de Rebelo Silva, citadas por Gilberto Freyre, indicam que a população 'talvez no século XV não passasse de 1.010.000' habitantes. A informação é vaga, pois não se refere a um ano específico. Supondo porém que a população portuguesa tivesse alcançado 1.200.000 pessoas no início do século XVII, teríamos em têrmos gerais que haveria uma população ativa masculina não superior a 350.000 pessoas - utilizáveis praticamente em todas as tarefas metropolitanas e coloniais" - Cf. TUPIASSU, A.A. & SANTOS, R.A.O., op. cit.

(15) "Ao invés de aproveitar êsse contingente humano (o indígena) como força propulsora da sua colonização, o português submeteu-o a um processo ora sistemático e violento, ora involuntário e lento de eliminação. Distinguimos três modalidades de eliminação do indígena: a) diretamente; b) pela contaminação de doenças; c) através da escravidão" - Cf. TEIXEIRA DA COSTA, Orlando, O Povoamento da Amazônia, Rev. Bras. Est. Politicos, Univ. Min. Gerais, n. 27, jul-1969. Posteriormente à conferência que o prof. Costa transformou no artigo acima, tivemos oportunidade de indicar mais um tipo de dizimação - "a eliminação indireta, por meio da estimulação de guerras inter-tribais" - bem como um outro fator redutor da população indígena - "a prática da exportação de escravos índios, da Amazônia para outras partes do Brasil" - Cf. TUPIASSU, A., O Processo Demográfico da Amazônia. In: "Problemática da Amazônia", ed. Casa Estudante do Brasil, Rio, 1969.

(16) Cf. TUPIASSU, Amilcar Alves, A Área Metropolitana de Belém, ed. IDESP (Inst. Desenv. Econ. Soc. do Pará). Belém, 1968, pp. 23 e 75.

(17) Cf. TUPIASSU, A., O Processo Demográfico da Amazônia, loc. cit.

(18) Ver TOCANTINS, Leandro, Amazônia - Natureza, Homem e Tempo.
Ed. Conquista, Rio, 1960, cap. V.

(19) "Com a descoberta do processo de vulcanização da borracha, em
1839, e, logo depois, do pneumático, aumenta, intensivamente, a
procura pelas indústrias da Europa e da América e inicia-se um proces-
so de alta de preços que transformou a atividade coletora em aventura"
- Cf. BRASTEC (Soc. Bras. de Serv. Técnicos), Desenvolvimento Eco-
nômico da Amazônia, ed. Univ. Fed. Pará, Belém, 1966, p. 195. V. tb.
TOCANTINS, Leandro, op. cit.

(20) "Quando a borracha passou a representar metade e às vezes dois
terços do valor total da exportação, chegara-se à época do impor-
tante crescimento que se iria verificar até à primeira década do século
XX. O cacau e a castanha completavam a pauta, com alguns produtos de
menor relevância. Nos 40 anos que vão de 1849 a 1889, o valor global
das exportações paraenses subiu de 1 157%. No período de 51, 5 anos,
que vai de 1849/50 a 1901, êle cresceu de 160.000 libras-ouro a 4 058 000,
a uma taxa geométrica anual de 6, 4%. Se adotarmos provisòriamente a
hipótese de que a renda evoluiu ao mesmo ritmo das exportações, sabido
que a população aumentou de 165 mil em 1850 para 445 mil em 1900 (2, 1%
anuais), concluiremos que a renda per capita deve ter crescido à razão
de 4, 3% ao ano. A essa taxa ela terá subido para uns 254 dólares no fim
do século XIX, em comparação com os 29 dólares de 1849/50. Na mes-
ma época, o Brasil como um todo alcançava apenas 106 dólares de renda
per capita, cuja taxa de crescimento na segunda metade do século fôra
somente de 1, 5% - Cf. SANTOS, Roberto, Um Século de Economia Paraen
se (1800-1900), Rev. Pará-Desenvolvimento (ed. IDESP), n. 4/5, set. -
dez. 1968.

(21) "... Resultou um deslocamento populacional que ainda carece de
maiores estudos. Celso Furtado estima a 'transumância' em cêrca
de 500.000 pessoas (Formação Econômica do Brasil, F. Cult. Econ.,
Rio, 1960). Os estudos de Samuel Benchimol (O Cearense na Amazônia,
ed. SPVEA, Rio, 1965) permitem que avaliemos em cêrca de 200.000 os
contingentes imigrantes para um dado período. Provavelmente a estima
de Furtado é exagerada, mas o estado das informações não permite, no
momento, comprovar o exagêro. Admitimos que seja lícito avaliar a
contribuição nordestina em nível acima dos 300.000 habitantes, "ao me-
nos durante o ciclo da borracha" - Cf. TUPIASSU, A., O Processo De-
mográfico da Amazônia, loc. cit.

(22) Cf. TUPIASSU, A., O Processo Demográfico da Amazônia e A
Área Metropolitana de Belém. Vale salientar que, entre 1900 e
1920 a população regional duplicou, pois subiu para cêrca de 1.400.000
habitantes. Mesmo que o Censo de 1920 tenha sido superestimador, o
crescimento terá sido expressivo.

(23) "Prendendo o seringueiro às tarefas exclusivas do corte, a planta
como que exigiu da sociedade novas técnicas para garantir o susten-
to físico do homem e sua movimentação no espaço geográfico. É o caso
da crise de alimentos naturais que, de modo agudo, se fez sentir em to-
dos os seringais, ao lado de lenha para a fornalha dos gaiolas" - Cf.
TOCANTINS, Leandro, op. cit. p. 175.

(24) Na terminologia regional, a emprêsa produtora de borracha tem o
nome de "seringal", enquanto a árvore de onde é extraída a goma
(Hevea brasiliensis) é conhecida como "seringueira". O empresário é o
"seringalista", enquanto o trabalhador é designado pelo têrmo "seringuei
ro". Leandro Tocantins explica a origem dêsses têrmos (v. op. cit.,
cap. VI).

(25) A emprêsa extrativista dedica-se à coleta de produtos naturais da
floresta e claramente subordina o homem à disponibilidade de árvo-
res produtoras no espaço. Temos dividido o extrativismo amazônico em
dois tipos básicos: o extrativismo de feitoria e o extrativismo expedicio-
nário. No primeiro caso, o extrator instala uma base de operações na
própria área onde se situam as árvores produtoras. No segundo caso, a
moradia do extrator fica em outra área, seguindo êle para a área produ-
tora apenas em determinadas épocas. O extrativismo da borracha perten-
ce ao tipo de feitoria. Já o de castanha do Pará (Brazil Nuts") é expedi-
cionário, mas em alguns casos está se transformando em extrativismo de
feitoria. Sôbre êste último caso, cf. TUPIASSU, Amilcar A. & OLIVEIRA,
N.V.C., A Castanha do Pará - Estudos Preliminares, ed. IDESP, Belém,
1967.

(26) "A realidade, porém, é que as matas espontâneas da Amazônia são
altamente heterogêneas, contando com um número excessivo de es-
pécies arbóreas..." - Cf. DUBOIS, Jean, Desenvolvimento de uma Eco-
nomia Florestal na Amazônia, ed. SPVEA, Rio, s/d. - "A floresta equa-
torial amazônica se individualiza pela sua riqueza botânica, manifestada
pela extraordinária multiplicidade de espécies, donde sua notável densi-
dade..." (...) "Na Amazônia já se contaram mais de 4 000 espécies ar-
borescentes, enquanto a Europa tôda conta com menos de 200, e cada ex-
ploração no Amazonas identifica novas espécies" - Cf. SOARES, Lucio de
Castro, Amazônia, ed. CNG, Rio, 1963.

(27) "Um seringal... vale não pela extensão das terras que apresenta,
mas pela riqueza em árvores que oferece ao corte. Sabido que es-
sas árvores não se distribuem na floresta com a densidade desejável, mas
distanciadas umas das outras... até duzentos metros, é mistér discipli-
nar o trato com elas. Abrem-se então 'estradas', que são caminhos na
selva, verdadeiros trilhos indígenas, ora em forma circular, ora em for-
ma retilínea e não caminhos largos, seguros, por onde possa transitar
um veículo qualquer. Por êles passa apenas o seringueiro ou a tropa que,

periodicamente, deve abastecê-lo. Cada estrada tem entre 100 e 200 árvores em condições de produção. (...) Preparada a estrada, o seringueiro que deve explorá-la é conduzido ao ponto julgado mais conveniente para sua localização. De preferência, onde há água. Levantam-lhe o 'tapiri' para moradia e o 'tapiri' para os trabalhos de confecção da borracha" - Cf. FERREIRA REIS, A. C., O Seringal e o Seringueiro, pp. 96 ss.

(28) "Um seringal médio, de trezentas estradas de seringueiras, corresponde a cêrca de vinte léguas quadradas, ou seja, 720 quilômetros quadrados. E normalmente, em tôda essa vasta extensão de terra não trabalham mais do que 150 homens, espalhados pelas barracas à proximidade das quais encontram-se as bocas das estradas" - Cf. TEIXEIRA DA COSTA, O., op. cit.

(29) "Os seringais organizaram-se, primeiro, nas cercanias de Belém e no Baixo Tocantins. A procura mais persistente da árvore de leite forçou as levas humanas a descerem aquêle rio, e a penetrarem na Região de Breves e Anajás, na Ilha de Marajó. (...) Saturada a capacidade de ocupação de terras, em virtude do alargamento excessivo dos latifúndios, a geografia da seringueira iria deslocar-se para outros rios, como o Jari, o Xingu, o Tapajós, o Madeira, o Purus, o Juruá..." - TOCANTINS, L., op. cit. pp. 172 ss.

(30) Ver nota 23. - "Tudo girava em tôrno da borracha"- TOCANTINS, Leandro, O Rio Comanda a Vida, ed. Civil. Bras., Rio, 1961, p. 178. - "... Entre todos os danos causados pelo ciclo do ouro negro, nenhum se compara ao que resultou do desaparecimento das lavouras" - Cf. MOOG, Vianna, O Ciclo do Ouro Negro. In: "Obras Completas de Vianna Moog", ed. Delta, Rio, 1966, v. 6, p. 36.

(31) "Essa prosperidade criou poderosos processos e mecanismos comerciais centralizados em Belém e Manaus, com ramificações em todos os rios da planície, numa teia de interêsses que prendia desde o seringueiro, em sua barraca na floresta, ao patrão, nos barracões da beira, às Casas Aviadoras, nas capitais, que, por sua vez, se jungiam aos exportadores" - TOCANTINS, Leandro, O Rio Comanda a Vida, p. 178.

(32) A expressão "sistema de aviamento" deriva da operação de "aviar", isto é, da operação de fornecer mercadorias a crédito ou a dinheiro (fornecer um "aviamento" - segundo significados conhecidos e empregados no linguajar do Nordeste e da Amazônia. Quem fornece as mercadorias se chama "aviador", enquanto se denomina "aviado" aquêle que as recebe.

(33) A concepção que atribui ao "sistema de aviamento" essa relevância sócio-estrutural na Amazônia foi formulada pelo autor a partir de

1963 e, de 1965 em diante sobretudo, tem sido exposta e escrita em várias oportunidades, não obstante sua formulação definitiva ainda não tenha sido traduzida em um documento inteiramente sistematizado. A exposição mais completa encontra-se no "Curso de Introdução ao Estudo Sociológico e Econômico do Pará" (op. cit.). É claro que, no presente documento, apenas uma versão sumária e geral pode ser apresentada.

(34) O "sistema de aviamento" como modalidade de crédito informal e como "principal relação de produção do setor primário" acha-se estudado em dois artigos do professor de Economia Política da Faculdade de Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Pará. - V. SANTOS, Roberto, O Equilíbrio da Firma Aviadora e a Significação Econômico-Institucional do Aviamento", Rev. Pará Desenvolvimento (ed. IDESP); n. 3, jun-1968; SANTOS, Roberto, Um Século de Economia Paraense, loc. cit. Ver tb. TUPIASSU, A. & SANTOS, R., op. cit.

(35) Cf. TUPIASSU, A. & SANTOS, R., op. cit.; SANTOS, R., O Equilíbrio da Firma Aviadora... loc. cit.

(36) Teríamos um exemplo dêste caso no fato de os intermediários tenderem a se tornar, por si ou por delegados, "cabos eleitorais" e a deter praticamente as únicas parcelas de poder político formal na comunidade ou na "visinhança" - Ver TUPIASSU, A., Condições Políticas (Relações de Poder) na Sociedade Paraense e Aspectos Sociológicos - A Sociedade Paraense; In: "O Pará, a Igreja e o Desenvolvimento", obra coletiva apresentada em 1966 à Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil, que publicou a síntese introdutória sob o mesmo título. V. tb. TUPIASSU, Amilcar, As Eleições Paraenses de 1966, Rev. Bras. Est. Políticos, Univ. Min. Gerais, ns. 23/24, 1967/1968, cap. 5.2.

(37) Um exemplo do caso seria o seguinte: as cadeias de intermediários do aviamento parecem contar com uma cadeia paralela de compadrio entre êles e seus "aviados", o que transformaria o relacionamanamento econômico também em um relacionamento "doméstico" e certamente evitaria a abertura ou exacerbação dos têrmos de eventuais conflitos - Cf. TUPIASSU, A. & SANTOS, R., op. cit.

(38) TUPIASSU, A. & SANTOS, R., op. cit.

(39) Idem, ibidem.

(40) Não se encontra estudado factualmente êsse modêlo em relação à época da crise da borracha. Contudo alguns dados sôbre o Pará recente podem fornecer indicações sôbre o que seria aproximativamente a situação àquela altura. Já escrevemos sôbre o Pará recente: "Englobando o comércio, os serviços, os transportes e comunicações, os intermediários financeiros, os alugueis e o govêrno - o setor terciário tem sido

o mais expressivo do complexo sócio-econômico paraense e, sem embargo do declínio relativo que tem registrado suas cifras, ainda é provavelmente o setor que absorve a maior parcela da renda interna do Pará. Atingia 62% em 1948 a participação do setor terciário na renda interna do Pará; aumentara para 64% em 1952; diminuíra para 60% em 1955; declinara para 54% em 1960; mas se admite que o percentual persista acima do nível dos 50%. - A principal rubrica responsável pela preeminência do setor terciário no Pará tem sido o comércio. Absorvendo 21% da renda interna em 1950, acusou decorridos 10 anos apenas leve diminuição, pois em 1960 ainda detinha 20%. Vale salientar que essa participação era idêntica à do setor secundário e somente um pouco inferior à do setor primário (êste com 26%, convindo notar todavia que 10% devidos à agricultura, 8% à produção animal e derivados e 8% à produção extrativa vegetal). - É possível explicar a amplitude da significação do comércio no Pará, seja por via da extensão geográfica do ecúmeno paraense, seja através do 'sistema de aviamento' entendido como suporte social básico da estrutura sócio-econômica estadual" - Cf. TUPIASSU, A., As Eleições Paraenses de 1966, loc. cit. Quanto ao modêlo de distribuição do poder, igualmente nada se encontra estudado no tocante ao início do século. Pode-se, contudo, admitir que as considerações emitidas no artigo acima sôbre o Pará recente podem analogicamente ser aplicadas à Amazônia do fim do ciclo da borracha, acentuando-se, naturalmente, a fôrça do terciário-comercial urbano.

(41) Tais alternativas foram sobretudo a produção extrativista de bens como a castanha, as madeiras, a essência de pau rosa e outros; a produção agrícola de subsistência (mandioca, arroz e outros); a pecuária; a pesca artesanal; alguns itens de extração mineral. É certo que nem todas as características dos empreendimentos da borracha estão presentes nestas alternativas, mas as que significam suportes ao "sistema de aviamento" em geral podem ser constatados, direta ou indiretamente.

(42) "Os principais atributos, com relação aos quais por definição Belém deteria os valores máximos em têrmos absolutos, seriam os seguintes (ressalvadas futuras complementações): a) população total; b) população urbana; c) densidade demográfica "ecumênica" (isto é, do espaço efetivamente incorporado à existência social); d) grau de divisão social do trabalho; e) funcionalidade grupal; f) grau de industrialização; g) estoque de infra-estruturas econômico-sociais; h) dimensões do setor terciário; i) inverso do produto médio por pessoa efetivamente ocupada no extrativismo vegetal" - Cf. TUPIASSU, A. & SANTOS, R., op. cit. - Tal formulação dos atributos era meramente tentativa e ainda não foi destacada em nenhuma pesquisa empírica.

(41) As hipóteses de trabalho formuladas neste capítulo, não obstante em alguns casos já terem sido focalizadas pelo autor em outros trabalhos, não haviam até agora sido sistematizadas à luz de uma tentativa de

interpretação das formas de participação política na Amazônia. Carecem, portanto, de uma elaboração melhor que, por motivos circunstanciais, não pôde ser efetuada para o presente paper.

(44) A denominação é provisória. Precisariam ser examinadas outras alternativas, como "participação provocada", "participação submissa", etc.

(45) Cf. DAHL, Robert A., A Moderna Análise Política, Lidador, Rio, 1966.

(46) TUPIASSU, A., As Eleições Paraenses de 1966, loc. cit.

(47) O primário "concentrado-independente" seria composto de atividades sujeitas a processos de oligopolização e por empresários pertencentes ou estreitamente vinculados ao centro do macro-núcleo urbano do "continuum". Já o primário "disperso-dependente" seria constituido de pequenos lavradores trabalhando em regime de agricultura extensiva, sobretudo de subsistência. Ver TUPIASSU, A., As Eleições Paraenses de 1966, loc. cit.