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- 2) F.Duchene: The setting of the conference.
- 3) H.Brandon: Domestic change and American foreign policy.
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  - 5) K.birnbaum: The future of the Soviet and American international systems.
  - 6) H.Bull: The scope for super-power agreements.
  - 7) Le prospettive di accordo fra le superpotenze.
  - 8) M.Shulman: The nature of Soviet-American competition.
  - 9) J.N.Chaundhuri: A view from India.
  - 10) K. Wakaizumi: A view from Japan.
- 11) -P.Hassner: The management of European crisis and conflicts.
- 12) W.Grewe: The effect of strategic agreements on European-American Relations.
- 13) J.B.D.Miller:Unlimited competition or spheres of responsibility?
- 14) H.Beeley: The Middle East: a test case.
- 15) C. Herzfeld: Innovation and restraint.
- 16) J.J.Holst:Parity, superiority or sufficiency? Some remarks on the nature and future of the Soviet-american strategic relationship.
- 17) P.Maillard: The effect of China on Soviet-American relations.
- 18) A.Booth: The limitation of military power.
- 19) A.Buchan: Conclusion and envoi.
- 20) R.Lowenthal: Changing Soviet policies and interest.

## The Institute for Strategic Studies

## ELEVENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

## Congresgebouw, The Hague

**September 18th-21st, 1969** 

The Super-Powers: Soviet-American Relations and World Order

3539

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Rochester

Serving Officer, Royal Navy, London Director-Designate, ISS, London Director of Force Planning, NATO International

Staff, Brussels

## **PROGRAMME**

		I ROOMININE
	Thursday, September 18th	Conference Assembles
	1500–1900	
	1900	Dinner  One in head to Chairman Walance bandle State
	2030	Opening by the Chairman. Welcome by the State
		Secretary for Foreign Affairs
		The Setting of the Conference— Mr. François Duchêne
		Mr. François Duchêne
		(Grand Hotel, Scheveningen)
	Friday, September 19th	
	0930–1045	Domestic Change and American Foreign Policy—
	· .	Mr. Henry Brandon
	1045	Coffee
		Changing Soviet Policies and Interests—
	5	Prof. Richard Löwenthal
	1300	Lunch
	1430–1730	Committee Discussions: see details below
	1430-1730	(Tea at 1600)
	1900 1000	
	1800–1900	Reception by Royal Netherlands Government
	1000	at Hotel Wittebrug
	1930	Dinner
	Saturday, September 20th	
	0930-1045 manced / /	The Future of the Soviet and American International
	, 4	Systems—
	_	Dr. Karl Birnbaum
	1045	Coffee
		The Scope for Super-Power Agreements—
	5	Prof. Hedley Bull
	1300	Lunch
	1600–1900	Committee Discussions: see details below
	1000–1900	Commutee Discussions, see details below
	Cunday Contambou 21st	•
	Sunday, September 21st	The Manne of the Court of American Commentation
	1000–1115	The Nature of the Soviet-American Competition—
	444.0	Prof. Marshall Shulman
	1115	Coffee
	1130–1215 7	*Conclusion and Envoi—
	•	Mr. Alastair Buchan
	1300	Lunch
	1400	Conference Disperses
		• •
		Committee Discussions
		Friday Saturday
		1430–1730 1600–1900
	Committee I—Asia and the	A View from India— Q A View from Japan—
,		Gen. J. N. Chaudhuri Prof. Kei Wakaizumi
	Chairman:	•)
	Mr. Michael Howard	<b>,</b>
	Committee II—Europe and	The Management of European The Effect of Strategic
	the Super-Powers	Crises and Conflicts— 11 Agreements on European-
	Chairman:	M. Pierre Hassner American Relations—
	Dr. Curt Gasteyger	Dr. Wilhelm Grewe
	Committee III—The Super-	Unlimited Competition or The Middle East: A Test
	Powers and the Developing 12	G. I of D
		Prof. J. D. B. Miller 3 Sir Harold Beeley
	Chairman:	·
	Prof. Alting von Geusau	
	Committee IV—Strategic 14	Innovation and Restraint— Parity, Superiority or
	Committee It Strategie	Dr. Charles Herzfeld 15 Sufficiency?—
	Chairman:	Mr. Johan Holst
	Brig. Kenneth Hunt	
		The Effect of China on The Limited and Mills
		The Effect of China on The Limitations of Military Soviet-American Relations— 12 Power—
	111 Will I Oldi ily	M. Pierre Maillard Rev. Alan Booth
	Mr. George Ignatieff	AND THE PROPERTY OF THE POPULATION OF THE POPULA



A. E. M. DUYNSTEE Prof. James G. EAYRS Gustav EKHOLM Mostafa EL BEHERY Sükrü ELEKDAG Robert ELLSWORTH C. H. D. EVERETT D. K. FAIRHALL

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Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Zürich

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
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The Hague 1969

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# INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 11th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

## THE SUPER POWERS SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

#### PLENARY SESSION

Thursday, September 18th

Evening

# The Setting of the Conference FRANCOIS DUCHENE

The Institute for Strategic Studies was born of the marriage of two traditions which have been central to the politics and intellectual culture of the twentieth century. One is the desire to strengthen world order now the price of breakdowns has begun to terrify humanity. The ISS was not conceived simply as the international association of a learned society. Its field is not history but policy in the making. In attempting to open new lines of communication between people throughout the world who are actively interested in international security, it has aimed, if only indirectly, to enhance that security. group of Englishmen who, with the support of the Ford Foundation, set up the ISS, included churchmen profoundly concerned with the implications of nuclear strategy as well as personalities such as the present Minister of Defence, an ex-Chief of Staff and some academics who were professionally closer to the field. This concern with world order explains the Institute's emphasis on its world-wide character and interests, reflected in its Council, in its membership, in this Conference today and in its research and publications.

The other tradition which has gone into the making of the ISS is a perception typical of the contemporary scene, of the complexities of deterrence in the missile age. By 1958 when the ISS was formed, the first Sputnik had already shot into space and challenged the American monopoly of nuclear strategic power. Some of those who are present today were already feeling their way to the conceptsof flexible response and assured destruction which became familiar in the McNamara era at the Pentagon. But, as far as public consciousness was concerned, it was still the age of massive retaliation and of CND. The founders of ISS were aware of this difference between the reality, and the public understanding of strategic issues. It was necessary to loosen the appraisal of defence issues from the stranglehold exercised, at one end, by governments which, pleading secrecy, escaped the political control and intellectual stimulus of public criticism and, at the other, by movements of wholesale protest against force and especially nuclear weapons which failed to say much that was useful about the difficulties

or practical consequences of their rejection. This lack of informed discussion threatened to divide the United States, entering a new era of strategic planning, from its allies - a concern natural to them then and now. It was also likely to breed a general climate of mistrust undermining sane international relations. Accordingly, the Institute for Strategic Studies was established not simply to promote what was abstractly desirable but to assess what was possible given the complexity of the world as it is. Much of the value and success of the Institute's work in the past eleven years has lain in the balance, embodied as I see it in Alastair Buchan himself, between a humane sense of overriding goals and precise intelligence in analysing and judging particular situations.

This balance of the desire for world order and the perception of the diversity of the world has also owed something to a shift in attitudes to policy-making which began in the late 1950s. After all, the very name, Institute for Strategic Studies, would have been virtually inconceivable in the immediate postwar period. The aim then was not to study strategy but if possible to outflank it by setting up international bodies repairing the political and economic weaknesses of the prewar system. The traditional concepts of the balance of power were discredited by the disasters from 1914 to 1945. The men who rebuilt the world after the war did not seek to eliminate the balance of power. They could not - there is a balance of power in all societies, just as it exists in all personal relationships. What they did try to do was to change the rules within which the balance operates, and so reduce its destructive potential. In practice, this was seen largely in terms of a kind of economic rationalism. Although the United Nations was originally conceived as a collective security system, the emphasis in much of the postwar diplomacy aiming at greater world order was on international economic planning. Marshall Aid and Point IV on the American side, like prophecies, on the Soviet side, of the ruin of capitalism through slumps, displayed the bias in postwar thinking to economics as the key of politics, either through revolution or through functionalist international agreements. At first, this effort to build new international structures was charmelled into quasi-universal institutions like the IMF, GATT or the World Bank. The willingness of governments since the war to operate a kind of international Keynesianism through these bodies has helped to promote a world rate of growth at least twice the best previous rate in any comparable period. This rapid growth has been as vital to peace as the nuclear stalemate itself. The cold war soon narrowed the first world-wide horizons of the postwar era, but, by restricting the ring to likeminded nations, in some ways enhanced international co-operation. Here again, NATO, the strategic factor, was seen as a guarantee rather than as an active agent of the international order. Behind the shield

which deterred war, the real reforms, those which would matter in the long run, could be undertaken. From Marshall Aid and Point IV to the European Common Market and the Kennedy Round, international co-operation was actively pressed forward. Most of the growth of the non-Communist international system since the war is rooted in this process.

However, the picture has changed in the 1960s. The problems that have come up since the decline of the cold war have not been amenable to techniques of co-operation among like-minded nations. The dialogues of the super-powers, the hopes of detente, however exaggerated, in Europe, the diffusion of power to the Far East, the creation of 80 new nations in the Third World, and the resurgence of nationalism in areas like the Communist bloc or western Europe, from which it was supposed to have been banished, have produced a need for techniques of how to live and let live between nations that are not like-minded and between whom far reaching co-operation is for the most part impossible. These developments have broadened the horizons of the 1950s and created for the first time a truly world system, which is and cannot help but be, highly diverse. Even where international co-operation has progressed furthest among the capitalist industrial powers of western Europe, north America and Japan, it is proving increasingly difficult to push further forward. Its very successes make international decisions impinge more closely on national sovereignty and on deep social differences between nations. All these changes have produced a new perception of international order. The accent is on managing crises, on calculated non-involvement, or on partial involvement, by the superpowers, in regional or local conflicts which might lead to Cuban-type clashes, on keeping options open, on respecting diversity and keeping policies flexible. In the United States especially, a new generation has come to power, brought up in the exercise of super-power politics. It has increasingly seen policies, as great powers will, in terms not of sublimating, but of living with, differences between countries, less in terms of overcoming conflicts than of living through them. conception of how to promote world order returns in new forms to something like the classic diplomacy of managing the balance of power.

How to manage the balance of power is the underlying theme of this year's Annual Conference on the subject of "The Super-powers: Soviet-American Relations and World Order". For at least a decade, the two super-powers have been increasingly concerned to manage the central balance. For at least a decade to come, they will remain in a class by themselves as nuclear powers, so that the techniques they find or fail to find for managing it will dominate the international system. There is a lengthening list of agreements to which they have appended their signatures since the Antarctic Treaty of 1961. There is talk of talks on the Middle East, Berlin and the limitation of strategic weapons. There is a whole new technology and rationale of

communications between them, from hot lines to the deliberate ambiguities of deterrence. Above all, they are becoming used to each other's presence in regional conflicts. Despite the impressive resources they often muster to nullify each other's influence in such areas, they act like rival political patrons rather than nineteenth century great powers heading for crises of the Fashoda type. This restraint is due in part to the nationalism with which any great power now has to contend among clients. Imposed on the great powers or not, it is a step forward, a sign not so much of the "impotence" of the great powers as of the development of a quasi-confederal world in the shadow of the Bomb.

At the same time, the limitations of the super-powers in providing a frame for world order are glaringly evident. Take for instance, arms control. The treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in outer space has been violated in the spirit if not the letter by fractional orbital bombardment systems and space bus bombs. The non-proliferation treaty has awakened rather than stilled ambitions and resentment against the super-powers among near-nuclear states. The SALT talks have been announced but not begun, while it becomes clearer every day that the opportunity is being missed to postpone the introduction of MIRVs which tend to de-stabilise the central balance. While the super-powers are willing enough to sign self-denying ordinances in remote areas like the south pole where there is little to deny, neither is alert enough to accept even tacit commitments which limit the freedom of action where it matters, like the arms race.

They certainly face a dilemma with China in the background. they to keep ahead of third powers in a period when the new technology leads to greater instability without actually adopting the new technology and de-stabilising the central balance? But it is questionable whether the Chinese menace is as urgent as this; and the lack of mutual commitments between the super-powers confirms the assumption that they are ready to limit some of the ill effects of their rivalry but not the rivalry itself. There are even signs that it may soon be pursued under greater pressures than in the past. The increasing turbulence of the Third World, or worlds, could be a factor. A still more likely one is the shift in the centre of tension in the balance of power from Europe to the Pacific. This shift is still only potential, and at the moment one is driven to speculate at the motives of the Soviet Union for choosing to emphasise its border disputes with China. But by the 1980s both China and Japan may be major powers. They will with difficulty be super-powers, China because of its industrial weaknesses, Japan because of its physical limitations, but they will be more than middle powers like West Germany, Britain or France. Understanding between the two super-powers alone has been uncertain enough across the European field of tension inhabited by nations they dwarf. It will become immensely

more difficult to achieve when there are four major, or potentially major, powers each of which lives in the expectation of possible hostile alignments against itself.

At that stage, one will be very near to a revival of the classic concept of powers of the old European system, with the difference that the stage will be the world and the potential power at the command of the partners out of all proportion to anything known up to 1945. It may be that the very enormity of the power at the nations' disposal will inhibit confrontation between them as it does now between the Two. But it will be hard to call this, in any sense except that of rationalisation of the de facto situation, a system. And if the nuclear King's Peace is sufficient to ward off all dangers in itself, as this assumes, it becomes a wonder that so much time and anxiety has to be spent today on SALT, MIRVs, ceps and the other problems of maintaining the central balance on an even keel.

Even if the super-powers give the example of mutual restraints which neutrals like Sweden ask of them, they could hinder the drift to a dangerously competitive power system, they could not necessarily or even probably stop it. This is only to say that the concentration on power factors in relations between states is a necessary but not sufficient approach to the problem of world order. It is becoming more and more difficult to separate conflicts arising from the social process within a country and those affecting relations between states. How does one distinguish between them when Brazilian "urban guerillas" kidnap the American ambassador or Arab freedom fighters highjack a TWA airliner in midflight? This is related to the question spectacularly posed in 1968, in a partly frivolous way by the students, and in a deadly serious one by the occupation of Czechoslovakia, whether it is possible to obtain social change without a violence which could become international violence. The growth of an international radicalism which ignores frontiers makes it more and more difficult to draw a line between national conflict and the international use of force. The same blurring of old demarcation lines operates in quite a different area, that of the transnational corporations. The impact of the oil industry on international conflicts is an old and continuing story. There are other possible ones too. The relations, for instance, of the United States and Japan, could be affected as much, or more, by the resistance of Japan to the establishment on Japanese soil of American companies and of America to the entry of Japanese goods into the United States as by specifically strategic issues such as the security treaty.

In fact, although the willingness of countries to face the social problems of the world of rich and poor and to co-operate to deal with the new problems of the international economy has lately been declining, the need is greater than it ever was. In assessing the problems of the

use of force in the world, one has to embrace a large number of disciplines of which strategy in the military sense is only one. I think Stanley Hoffman was very broadly right when he told another recent conference that he did not believe

"we will get a return to the pure bipolarity of conflict or to a condominium of the super-powers - it's hard to see how it could be established or maintained. Our range of alternatives is narrower. Either the present international system will be perpetuated, in which, unfortunately, since there is very little to choose between partly impotent super-powers and largely impotent smaller states, there will be recurrent crises and overstraining of the super-powers; or there will be an attempt to establish a more structured international milieu with more middle powers, more hierarchies responding to different kinds of power - military, economic, technological, monetary - more regional decentralisation, a world in which competition will continue, but within limits and restraints."

If we do not construct such a milieu, the present signs, it seems to me, point to the increasing instability of the international system. On the present record, the super-powers are neither able to build the framework of a more stable system nor, in practice, primarily concerned with such a general objective. It is no use-relying on them for the future of the system. The smaller powers, especially the wealthier among them, will have to assume more responsibility than they have so far been willing to accept.

# INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 11th ANAUAL CONFERENCE

## THE SUPER LOWERS SOVIET-AUGRICAN FELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

#### PLENARY SESSION

#### Friday 19th September

Morning (1)

# Domestic Change and American Foreign Policy HENRY BRANDON

I

The advent of the Nixon Administration coincided with a turning point in the American outlook on the world. The traumatic effect of the war in Vietnam brought home the limitations of American military power and the social crisis made people aware of the limitations of American economic and financial resources. Consequently, it has become this Administration's historic task to organise the retreat from the high watermark of American global commitments without undermining the security of the West and American interests generally. It is not a heroic task, but it is a delicate and difficult one. The outlines of President Nixon's new approach to the American role in the world are only beginning to take shape. They are still very sketchy, still not much more than a broad outline. But there are certain definite criteria underlying it which make it possible to reach some conclusions as to how thay will affect American policy in general and relations with the Western allies in particular, how they will influence the "special" Super-power relationship with the Soviet Union and whether we are heading into another period of isolationism.

Before leaving Saigon on one of my periodic visits to Vietnam late in 1967, I asked the leading civilian and military in charge whether a reduction in the intensity of the war, a reduction of the cost in men and material. I would not be worth striving for. I thought it might help to induce a more patient and forebearing attitude towards the war on the part of the American

(3)

public, for after all, what the United States needed was to gain time to bolster the military and political strength of the South Vietnamese. Not surprisingly, they all reacted alike. They said that it was not their business to include American domestic opinion in their calculations; that was up to President Johnson. But the President, and even his most loyal lieutenants admit this, completely misjudged American public opinion and his ability to influence it.

But foreign policy begins at home. The fact that President Johnson ignored American public opinion and disregarded the mounting opposition to the war as he fought it, forced him not only into political retirement, it also aroused deep mistrust in government and in the military. The war was seen by many as unnessessary; by others as immoral. It inflamed the already restless youth and created an atmosphere conducive to violence whether on the university campuses or in the black ghettos. The high cost of the war only aggravated the protests against poverty and hunger.

For two decades American foreign policy sailed forth without to pay too much attention to the domestic winds. What propelled it were the cold winds from across the Communist borders. Today, because these winds are not as chilling as they used to be, the domestic turbulence is forcing a re-assessment of American foreign policy.

The war and the President's handling of it has also had a profound effoct on Congress. It gave President Johnson more or less what he wanted until mid-1965 when he decided on a major escalation of the American troop commitments. It endorsed his Tonkin resolution which Mr. Johnson later claimed gave him a free hand to conduct the war whichever way he saw fit. But when he began to abuse it in the eyes of some key Congressional figures, they became hostile, even spiteful. Congress has since expressed this sense of discontent in a rather meaningless "national commitment" resolution whose only significance is that it expresses the prevailing mood of resentment.

But this mood also reflects the changing mood of the electorate, above all its desire to bring the war to an early end. Vietnam brought home the bitter truth that there were limitations to American "omnipotence". "You'd think a country as big and rich as this one could just wipe out a lousy little country like Vietnam and get it over with. When did we ever lose a war?" This earthy kind of remark by a member of Congress reflects the shock many Americans now feel and explains why it has caused so much introspection. Americans began to see their super-power status in a different light; they began to question the wide-range of American foreign commitments. The disappointment with the war also led to a decline of respect for the military, mistrust of their demands and doubt in their competence, which is unique in American history.

Explanation for the changing American outlook on the world. Had it not coincided with something close to theinternal rebellion within the United States, the US most likely would still be trying for victory in Vietnam. What happened really was that the blacks and the students confronted the country with the fact that many of the most cherished American ideals which had been the ruling passion of Americans were hollow. Was it really impossible to provide the Negro with equal educational and job opportunities? And what had happened to that proven old fashioned national gadget, the melting pot, which gradually dissolved national and racial barriers and welded the plethora of immigrants into a great nation? Could it not weld the Negro into the nation too? And what happened to that old shibboleth prosperity which every American used to think was the best prescription to cure all economic ills? Why did poverty and hunger persist? Why did the cities decay? And why did not the Government do something about it all?

Both the Negroes and the young had come to feel that there was something wrong with the system and something wrong with those who had been its upholders and its executives. The New Deal had obviously come to a sputtering end and the unfulfilled promises of the Great Society had a destabilising effect. The

Federal Government did not look like a soul brother to the black or the poor. The liberal, internationalist Eastern Establishment, which had exerted power for so long, was blamed for negligence, and the American political and social system suddenly looked antiquated and obsolescent. Powerful streams of consciousness were on the loose. Some no doubt triggered by a war that seemed too remote and of doubtful national interest, others by the violent desire for the new solutions. The blacks were demanding their equal rights and full recognition as a power group. The aims of the young are still difficult to discern. They seem to have little interest in history. They even tend to reject it and with it the continuity of human experience. They are not influenced by the lessons of World War II or the Cold War, but primarily by hith futility of the war in Vietnam. Such phrases as "collective security" have little meaning to them; they only engender a fear that they mean something the young don't understand. Does it mean storing gas in Okinawa? Or selling jet planes to Feru? Does it mean the risk of being sent to far away war or that they must be afraid of the Soviet Union? They essentially do not recognise that exists a serious security problem in the world, that the US is threatened by the Soviet Union or China. They do not feel threatened except by the vague and ominous existence of nuclear weapons whether they belong to the United States or to anyone else. The old bogey of the Communist world conspiring does not even give them gooseflesh. They do not see the world in terms of a power struggle or ideological conflict. Instead they mistrust the military and the use of power and blame the crisis of the American spirit on the misconception that the United States should be responsible for the rest of the world. The old slogan "Join the Army and see the world" induces no temptation today. The outlook of the young will have its long-term repercussions as they reach the levers of power.

This does not mean that this generation does not have a sense of mission or a hunger for mission. I have a feeling that there is more leadership material, more independent drive among young Americans today than there used to be.

Twenty years ago most young gravitated to the great professional careers;

to grips with social problems. They want to involve themselves with the three challenges of the liberal imagination in the United States: racism, poverty and war. A Gallup survey shows that teaching is the preferred profession among the largest group of college youths, about 29 per cent. Only 8 per cent want to opt for business, 5 for the law and the clergy, 4 per cent for engineering, 2 per cent for medicine.

Maybe it will be necessary for this new generation to "reinvent the wheel", to give it that feeling "By God we did it." Maybe they'll invent something better. But for the present, they are disheartened by the political prospects for the future. They see the Democratic Party burned out, the Humphreys, the Muskies, the Galbraiths, the Schlesingers, even the Harringtons, out of date and tired and incapable of understanding the world as they see it. And they have no great expectations from the Republicans either.

The decay of the cities with all the repercussions for its inhabitants came as a shock, but too late. The complexities of this problem are daunting. There are no easy remedies in sight. One thing, though, is obvious to most people: the need for a drastic change of priorities. It is not only the idea of American military omnipotence that has been swept down the Potomac but also the contention that the United States can afford guns and butter because President Johnson was willing to draft men, but not other vital resources which would have made people aware that the country was engaged in a serious war.

And so the most optimistic nation in the world is going through something of a psychodrama and a far reaching reassessment of its capabilities, its limitations, its failure and of its future role in the world.

under control. This means above all how to bring the war in Vietnam to an end. In a way the situation he was confronted with when he came to power had some similar ities with Mr Harold MacMillan's when he was chosen to succeed Sir Anthony Eden as Prime Minister after the Suez catastrophe. What makes Nixon's task more difficult is that the war is still going on and that the country is not only deeply divided and the public emotionally upset, but that momentous, urgent domestic problems have also raised their ugly head.

The President, therefore, took a basic decision regarding the war: he would slowly disengage the United States from Vietnam whatever the course of the peace talks in Paris. The option he gave Hanoi was between a quick American withdrawal within 12 months, or a slow one stretched over about three years. The latter, he assumes, would give the Saigon government greater political stability and its armed forces more time to get ready to assume the main responsibility for South Vietnam's security. He also ordered the first troop withdrawals to add credibility to his proposals not only in Hanoi, but above all in the United States.

He visited his European allies to reassure them a) that Europe was the centre of gravity of his foreign policy; and b) that the declining American will to fight it out in Vietnam would in no way affect the American commitment to Europe. But inherent in his policy was also the belief that it was no longer up to the United States to provide the military blue-prints; that American forces, with western Europe having largely lost its sense of threat from the Soviet Union, (as was evident after the invasion of Czechoslovakia), were less needed and would gradually be reduced. As the realities of the threat are changing, so is the extent of the American commitment.

He then embarked on a trip to Asia to spread the news of his new Asian policy of limited disengagement. It rests on two basic principles. As the President himself put it, "We must never have another Vietnam by which I mean that the United States must never find itself in a position of furnishing

most of the arms, most of the mone, and most of the men to help another nation defend itself against Communist aggression." The other is that the United States will never get itself into a position where the security of a particular country is more important to the US than to the country itself or to its neighbours. A repetition of the Taylor-Clifford recruiting mission, therefore, would not happen again. As Mr. Clark Clifford described it in his recent article in Foreign Affairs: "It was strikingly apparent to me that the other troop-contributing countries no longer shared our degree of concern about the war in South Vietnam. General Taylor and I urged them to increase their participation. In the main, our plea fell on deaf ears."

What the Nixon doctrine adds up to is an American dis-engagement from the Asian mainland. It will be a slow and gradual process, slowed down by the refusal of the North Vietnamese to negotiate a formal or tacit mutual troop withdrawal. But it will nevertheless continue and the Administration's secret hope is that by 1972, the next presidential election year, most American troops will have left South Vietnam.

Underlying the Nixon doctrine is a very basic change in the American outlook on American interests and capabilities in Asia, and the emphasis on the principle that the US does not want to fight another war on the ground on the Asian mainland. Implicit also-- whether for genuine or expedient reasons-- is the belief that President Eisenhower's "domino theory" no longer carries the same conviction that it used to. There is some real doubt now whether Chinese expansionism in the face of the direct Russian threat to China is still a major ingredient of Chinese Communism: there is still a great deal of scepticism whether the North Vietnamese are really eager to absorb Laos since they are already in control of those infiltration routes that matter to them:- the trails to South Vietnam and to Thailand. Furthermore, there is a growing conviction that the Thai army is now quite capable of dealing with the internal insurgency threat confronting it. There is a new awareness created by the most important

lesson drawn from the war in Vietnam, that the Asian mainland is too far from the American continent and too close to the borders of the Soviet Union and China for the United States to win a conventional war there.

If President Nixon is vague about what he would do in the event of external aggression against Thailand, it is in order to keep his options open, and to avoid the accusation which came to haunt Mr. Dean Acheson when as Secretary of State he excluded Korea from the American strategic defence perimeter in a public speech. The fact that Acheson said in that same speech . that it would be "utter defeatism and utter madness" for the United States to abandon its supjort of South Korea got lost in the political inquest. But essentially Nixon holds the view that Thailand must decide on its own how to deal with its internal communist insurgency problem; the United States is not going to press for specific countermeasures. It will limit itself to saying: "You tell us what you want to do and then we will tell you how we can help you." This does not exclude the aid of American air and naval forces in case of external aggression should the Thais be willing to fight the war on the ground with their own troops. But this is a far cry from the plans of the Johnson Administration which planned to maintain a large American base in Thailand.

The new Asian doctrine has not yet been developed in great detail but the Fresident has said that he would like to see a strong regional grouping in the Facific, anchored in the Western Facific on Indonesia and in the Far East, on Japan. The United States will make a major attempt to promote the great potentialities of Indonesia, in particular, and expects Japan to supplement American economic aid. The American nuclear umbrella will continue as the ultimate protection of the area against attack by a major power. Implicit in all this is also a gradual dismantling of the global network of defence pacts negotiated in the post-World War II period, except for the Japanese security treaty and Anzus. The US can be expected for the foreseeable future to consider the defence of Australia and New Zealand a

"self-interest".

If we look back, it is not unfair to say that as regards Asia President Johnson acted the way John Foster Dulles was talking -- Dulles was prevented from so acting by president Eisenhower-- and now President Nixon is talking the way President Eisenhower acted.

III

How to adapt the Nixon Doctrine to Europe is still in the process of gestation. Western Europe is still considered vital to American interests, NATO remains a binding commitment, and so does the protection of West Berlin. The idea of disengagement therefore is going to take a different, more limited form. There is little hope that the European allies will increase their conventional forces assigned to NATO. President Kennedy tried to impose the McNamara strategy of the "conventional option", but did not succeed; the allies really never accepted it. Fresident Nixon has no intention of imposing a particular military strategy or particular force levels. He will leave these choices to the Europeans. In that sense the Nixon "do-it-yourself" doctrine is already being applied. The allies, in order to avoid having to fall back on the old "massive retaliation" theory, have developed the so-called Healey contingency plan for the immediate or very early uses of tactical nuclear weapons against limited aggression and the plan is viewed with considerable sympathy in Washington. The Nixon Administration, in contrast to Kennedy's or Johnson's, is also inclined to encourage Britain and France to create some sort of a European nuclear deterrent force.

The preparations for SALT (the strategic arms limitation talks) however, have led to a more profound analysis of the nuclear balance between the US and the Soviet Union and its effect on the NATO commitment. The idea of the President making a deliberate decision to risk the destruction of his own nation in order to defend another from aggression will only be taken under extreme circumstances. The legal commitment under NATO, therefore, is likely to become

more limited in practice if not in theory, though hopefully this question will never require an answer as long as both sides are convinced that a balance of nuclear deterrence exists and neither side has a first strike capability. It should, therefore, be of particular importance to the allies to make sure that an integrated military command will continue, for in the Nixon view, I believe its survival will depend on them, not on the United States.

In the economic-political field, President Nixon will watch with detachment the decisions of the Common Market Six. He favours Britain's entry into the Common Market, he prefers a more independent Western Europe, but he will not exert any pressures to that effect. And if the Six decide to change the character of the Common Market and turn it into a free trade area then all the US will do is protect her own economic interests.

IV

The Nixon doctrine is not the result of preconceived ideas—actually this Administration has come into power with fewer plans than most I can remember. It is the result of certain historic trends, of the repercussions of the misguided war in Vietnam and some very serious budgetary, fiscal and monetary dilemas, The needs and the costs of the cure of the social ills at home are skyrocketting, the President's New Family Allowance Plan, if adopted by congress, will add at least another four billion to the budget, and the cost of strategic weapons and space exploration are also going up sharply. All this at a time when the President must fight a seven per cent annual inflation, which is very high by American standards. It is so serious and so much a public issue that everyone within the Nixon Administration genuflects to the idol of deflationary policies.

How is this financial straitjacket going to affect future planning?

For the moment the Administration is holding the line on total expenditures. It has squeezed some 8 billion out of President Johnson's budget.

a politically very painful operation, but the concern with inflation is all absorbing, it is the number one domestic problem. This year's budget surplus will be somewhere between 5 and 6 billion dollars, but the Administration will be forced to sacrifice and spend it. Unlike the Democrats, a Republican Administration cannot live with inflation. It is also unable to fight it in the way, for instance, which President Kennedy did when he made his grandstand play against a price increase for steel. Republicans have too much faith in the market mechanism. The fight against inflation, therefore, requires budgetary surgery.

Real savings can only be carved out of the defence budget and according to the best estimate by the "carvers" it may be possible to whittle it down to about 65 billion dollars by 1972 in terms of "constant dollars" at their 1970 value. This estimate is based on the hope that by then most American troops will have been brought back from Vietnam. Another division will be taken out of South Korea; its withdrawal is overdue. It was delayed first by the Pueblo incident and then by the North Korean attack on an electronic spy plane. It also includes a gradual reduction of forces in Europe, at least one division by 1972, and dispanding the so-called third contingency forces kept in being for a possible "brushfire" war. But it will also affect the other services, especially naval forces now assigned to protect the sea lanes to Europe, and tactical aircraft.

The defence budget has not been more vulnerable since World War II than it is today. The Congress was almost docile in the way it used to approve defence appropriations; but not today. It can afford to be more searching, more stringent because of the general disillusionment with the Vietnam war; the military's reputation for extravagance in spending; and the suspicion their claims and demands now arouse. They have become not only a safe but even a popular target of criticism. Many members of Congress, liberals as well as conservatives, have told me that to step on the toes of the military now wins votes.

This represents a drastic change from the past. I doubt, for instance, whether under different circumstances there would have been such a powerful a resistance to the Anti-ballistic Missile Defense in the Senate. Even the House Armed Services Committee, which traditionally has been the military's "friend in court", is much more searching in its examinations of Pentagon requests and much more daring in rejecting some. Here are some examples of this year's pruning: Army aircraft procurements were halved, funds for an airborne warning and control system were cut by 45 million dollars, the requests for the Navy's advanced air-to-ground missile developments and the Air Force's Air-to-ground missile X-3 were denied. Funds were allowed for research and development of the Advanced Manned Strategic aircraft but authorization for the production of this aircraft was rejected. After the much publicised "over runs" in the cost of new weapons systems, the Committee now generally requires quaterly progress reports on all major weapons systems.

The Nixon budgeteers are now working on their own on new, much more drastic defense budget cuts for next year. They will shrink the Navy's plans for both attack and anti-submarine carrier units which are very costly and have become a very vulnerable weapons system; and they will cut the Tactical Air Forces, which alone cost about seven billion dollars, most probably by half. The idea that they still need two attack planes for every MIG 21 is considered both militarily and financially extravagant.

The problem the European allies will have to consider, as the United States reduces its defense budget, is the "mutuality of security" as it is referred to in Washington. She spends nearly as much on the defence of Europe as the rest of her NATO allies combined. They, for instance, spend together five billion dollars to maintain their Naval forces -- which is as much as the Russians spend on theirs. The United States, however, spends twice as much as everybody else and much of this to maintain the sea lanes to Europe. Will the allies show a greater mutuality and assume a greater share of these costs? Questions like this, coming from influential men in the Nixon

Administration, imply the expectation that unless the Europeans make a greater contribution to "mutuality" as the United States is paring its defence costs, it may in the long term not only affect their security, but also the American outlook toward European security. "The Europeans' inert and passive attitude may do them historically harm. They have often been chiding the Americans that we exaggerate the danger of a Russian initiated conventional attack against NATO. We are now in the process of adjusting our own vietpoint to that of the Europeans". This is not being said in a carping way, but as a warning for the Europeans to rethink their own security problems. In his message about the new domestic welfare President Nixon said the other day that what Americans need is not more welfare, but more "workfare". This idea he appears to be adapting to friends and allies abroad as he will be asking others to carry more of the load.

The prospects for foreign aid will depend on the continued impact of the war in Vietnam on the overall budgetary situation and the extent to which the national growth rate of the American economy will be slowed down. It will also be affected by the extent which to which Congressional opposition and the balance of payments deficit persist.

Some preliminary thought is being given to the so-called Second Development Decade. There is a desire among those principally concerned to develop a new Nixon aid philosophy and not to be simply satisfied with patching together another annual programme. Underlying this philosophy would be the principle that inspires much of his overall foreign policy as well as his domestic welfare programme; the "do-it-yourself" principle. There is a feeling that the United States must shed as much responsibility as possible for deciding what projects should be aided as well as how the aid should be administered. Instead it should be up to the recipient countries to submit their own projects and to make their own estimates of the costs as they now do with projects they submit to the World Bank, for instance.

There is also the growing conviction that the United States should leave the supervision of the project and the exact use of the money to the governments concerned. Much of the large and cumbersome American administrative machine could then be liquidated. The recipient government could ask such organisations as the World Bank, the United Nations and other international organisations for technical help on how best to use the American funds.

Foreign aid is unlikely to increase much beyond its present level even after the war in Vietnam. The idea favoured by the developing countries that the industrial nations ought to devote one per cent of their GNP to foreign aid has no takers in the Nixon Administration. First of all there is the argument that GNP is the wrong yardstick because it includes, for instance, the growth of service industries and secondly there is the declining support for foreign aid in Congress.

The American upper and middle-class used to be strong advocates of foreign aid; they are not any more. They are now much more concerned with the American poor -- more than ever, charity begins at home. With the black man in the American ghettos needing all the support he can get, it is not as logical any more to help the black man in Africa too. Africa, the feeling here is, is historically much more a European responsibility. The British and the French and particularly the Germans, it is argued, ought to increase their aid subsidies. In Asia, it is up to Japan to do more. But the Germans and the Japanese do not really understand the meaning of this contemporary form of the white man's burden. Americans still feel responsible for Asia, where they expect real economic growth, and for Latin America too. The emotional commitment to India has evaporated and the bloom is also off the African rose.

What could raise the overall level of foreign aid would be the need for a rehabilitation fund for Vietnam. But since the overall aid money for the rest of the developing world is likely to remain at about the present level \_\_\_

last year the Johnson Administration asked for \$2,554,200,000 and Congress appropriated \$1,380,600,000; this year the Nixon Administration asked for \$2,205,400,000 but Congress has not yet acted—the United States Government will stress the need to create the kind of conditions that would attract foreign investments and improve international trade.

The prospects for <u>military aid</u> are not much better, except that the President will be able to argue logically that his policy of military withdrawal, especially in Asia, must be balanced by increased military aid. If these nations are expected to look after their own security they must be given the tools.

V

How are these re-assessments of American policy going to affect the super-power relationship with the Soviet Union?

The Nixon Administration began with high hopes of Russian aid in persuading Hanoi to speed up a settlement of the war in Vietnam, with an extraordinary optimism in assessing the outlook for a Middle Eastern settlement and a further detente through the forthcoming strategic arms limitation talks.

But so far there are no signs that the Russians have either the pulling power in Hanoi or in Cairo, or enough will to exert themselves. And the arms limitation talks look far less promising today than a year ago.

President Johnson was eager, even overeager, to arrange for another summit meeting before his demise, and to get talks about the limitation of strategic weapons going as soon as possible, without too many positions frozen in advance in the hope that they can be shaped as the Russians begin to show their own cards.

President Nixon, in contrast, is in no hurry to visit the Soviet Union. He believes much less in atmospherics as the road to a detente with the Soviet Union and he went about preparing his positions for the SALT talks very methodically, taking his time and allowing MIRV tests to proceed to strengthen his own bargaining position.

What seems to motivate President Nixon is not only a more hard-headed, more businesslike approach to American-Soviet relations, but also greater doubts about what can be accomplished. His experts have some very technical studies of the feasibility, the risks and the possible results of an arms limitation agreement and their estimates are not promising. Somehow the negative aspects of such an agreement are now being given greater emphasis than they used to when Mr. McNamara presided over strategic policy.

This change in the American attitude reflects the change of personalities. President Johnson was tempted by the big, flamboyant gesture and Mr. McNamara did not simply reflect the views of the military. President Nixon is a more methodical, more sceptical man and Mr. Laird, his secretary of Defense, more an echo of the military. The Nixon Administration is more concerned about the destabilising effects an agreement to maintain nuclear parity would have on European security; it is more dubious about the prospects of an arms limitation agreement and to what extent it would make war less likely. The risks involved seem to impress the policy makers about as much as the advantages. The contention that such an agreement would permit maintaining a war-preventing deterrent at a lower cost level and help reduce instability weighs in the scales, but not as decisively as one would have expected.

Mr. Nixon no doubt would like to make his contribution to peace and therefore believes in a detente policy with both the Soviet Union and China. What makes him less in a hurry than either Kennedy or Johnson is the belief that the United States finds itself today in less trouble than the Soviet

Union. The hostilities along the Russian-Chinese border, the consequent need for an "all quiet on the western front" in Europe, the political uncertainties among the Warsaw Pact countries, the fact that the Russian economy is in a tight bind, the need therefore to find ways of reducing the costs of the nuclear strategic deterrent -- all this seems to add up to the United States being in a better bargaining position.

The desire to maintain some sort of nuclear superiority is still strong among some of Mr. Nixon's advisers and even though the intelligence reports indicate that it is highly unlikely that the United States could preserve her superiority, whatever this means, the thought of putting his seal to nuclear parity with the Soviet Union, may not be easy for President Nixon to contemplate.

Some therefore would prefer an unwritten agreement to a formal written one. Much will depend on how much interest the Soviet Union will display and to what extent it will force the pace of these negotiations.

In political terms not much change in East-West relations is expected in Europe. The Soviet Union wants to preserve the status quo and is advocating a European security conference to codify the division of Germany and make the present frontiers permanent. The United States is more interested in an agreement with the Russians which would guarantee access to Berlin. Such an agreement would remove the most dangerous, lingering cause for conflict in Europe and would make a nuclear parity agreement between the two super-powers more palatable to the NATO allies. Eastern Germany is bound to see it as an attempt to weaken her but it ought to be possible to find a way to offset that.

The opportunities for super-power diplomacy in Europe therefore, are limited and appear more promising in areas outside Europe: in the Middle East, in improving India-Pakistan relations, in promoting a settlement in

Vietnam and Laos.

The age of the super-powers thus continues even if their dominance is under greater challenge within their respective power blocs. The Soviet Union is resisting this challenge and trying to re-assert her power. The United States, in contrast, is trying to reduce her dominance and her responsibilities.

The desire to see a stronger, more independent Europe, the new sympathy for a European nuclear deterrent, the advocacy of an Asian regional grouping led by Japan, all these imply that Mr. Nixon aims at reducing the risks of direct confrontation with either the Soviet Union or China. The risk this policy entails is that it may promote nuclear proliferation. Up to now the main barrier to proliferation has been the predominance of the United States and the Soviet Union. But once the former loses interest in a dominant position in various parts of the world, the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons by other, lesser powers inevitably will grow. The Non-proliferation Treaty may therefore become a casualty of the American policy of scaling down its own responsibilities.

The Johnson Administration, especially under Mr. Rusk's influence, flirted with the idea of helping the Soviet Union to contain China, at least as long as Peking remains as un-predictable as it now is. The Nixon Administration is also anxious to keep China contained but it is hinting that instead, it would prefer to establish better relations with Peking and persue a more even handed policy, as between the Soviet and China.

VI

What are the implications of the American roll-back? Is the US entering a new period of isolationism?

The American foreign policy power elite is sharply divided today. There are still the old internationalists who firmly believe that the US must continue to exert a strong leadership, that it can continue to bear its current responsibilities and that it also has the means to do so. Their number though is dwindling. They belong mostly to the Eastern Establishment which has been largely responsible for the post-World War II policies. Curiously enough they also have support among conservatives to whom the Communist menace remains more or less what it always has been.

But the larger segment of those who used to help sustain the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson policies now believe that the US has reached the end of an era, that the time has come drastically to review and reduce the American post-war commitments in accordance with the shifts of power that have occured in the meantime. They are basically liberals but they are deeply troubled by the social crises that have become a threat to the inner stability of the United States, and by their own failure not to have grasped these inner pains earlier. They are now trying to make up for their own mistakes and misconceptions. They have become the driving force in the Congress which is seeking to prevent "new Vietnams" and which seeks to impose deep cuts in the military budget to force a reduction, via the purse strings, of American military commitments. They favour far deeper cuts in the armed forces than the Administration is willing to contemplate; they want them to be reduced to about 2 million men. They are also against the Anti-Ballistic Missile system primarily because it will devour funds which they believe are more urgently needed for domestic social purposes. They favour a rapid withdrawal from Vietnam and they oppose any new commitments or bases on the Asian mainland. They essentially advocate that domestic problems be given priority over foreign ones. They are not isolationists in the pre-World War II sense for they recognise American commitments to the defence of Europe, Japan and Australia and they are not chauvinists for they resent the idea of planting the American flag on the moon, but they come close to a new breed of semi-isolationists.

Then there is the broader policy-conscious public. It too has lost the illusions of American "omnipotence", which the success in forcing Soviet missiles out of Cuba rekindled. Instead they are now overly conscious of the limitations of American power. They have lost their belief in the old messianic idea that the US must make the world "safe for democracy". They too feel that the world is too unstable to be policed by the US. They no longer believe, as it used to be said in the days of the Johnson Administration, that the war in Vietnam is in the American "self-interest".

Anti-communism, once a potent ingredient of American foreign policy, has also lost conviction. Its crusading quality is certainly gone as is the compelling idea underlying the Truman Doctrine, and many other subsequent policies, that the United States must oppose Communism wherever it tries to expand over its existing boundaries. If Communism took over in a hither-toonon-communist country the United States would be unlikely to intervene, except possibly in some Latin American countries. The idea that South Vietnam may, in a few years, come under Communist rule, for instance, does not evoke the same shudder it used to only a short while ago. And if, say, a Communist Government came legally to power in Itally tomorrow, the US would not intervene militarily either.


President Nixon needs to gain time for the gradual orderly staging of his disengagement policies. To fight off the growing pressures on him he first attacked the "neo-isolationists" in a stinging speech. This seemed to me a futile and unsuccessful attempt to appeal over the heads of the foreign policy elite to the public. Americans still have pride in American leadership of the world, but in terms of exerting their influence against the "neo-isolationists", these people, which Mr. Nixon during the election campaign called the "Silent Americans" are not people who care enough about foreign policy. The speech also helped to consolidate those against whom it was directed.


The President has been more successful in his attempt to take the wind out of the sails of the "neo-isolationists" by his new concept for an Asian policy. The idea that Asian leaders in the years ahead will have to fight their own internal security wars against Communist subversion, the assurances that the United States will avoid being dragged into another Vietnam and largely limit herself to providing the nuclear umbrella against aggression by a major power, all has appeal to those disenchanted with American foreign policy of the last twenty odd years.

Mr. Nixon can read the writing on the wall. In 1954 he was an interventionist in Indochina, he shared the views of John Foster Dulles and Admiral Radford. Today, he is no longer an interventionist. He is also likely to be very reluctant to assume any new commitments.

The other day in conversation between two leading foreign policy makers, one with a German, the other with a Bostonian accent, the first said to the second: "In the past it was easy. We had nuclear superiority, we had the strongest currency and we were able to use foreign aid as a leverage for our interests. We really did not need a foreign policy. Today it's different. Today we need one."

Whatever this policy will be, at least under the Nixon presidency, it will not be isolationist or neo-isolationist. What Mr. Nixon is in the process of doing is to adjust American policy to the new facts of life: the legacy of the war in Vietnam, the grave domestic problems, or the new challenges of the arms race. He seeks to create a new consensus within the foreign policy power-elite for his own foreign policies which, he promised, will be designed to enable the United States to play a "significant and major" role in the world. But above all he will also try to reduce the extent and the costs of American world commitments in order to prevent the same kind of collapse of power and influence the British and French suffered because they failed to recognise and understand the limits of their resources.





POLITICA ESTERA AMERICANA E CAMBIAMENTI INTERNI

di Henry Brandon

Toward Schauce

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L'Amministrazione Nixon, nei primissimi tempi della sua attività, ha visto il verificarsi di un cambiamento della condotta americana nei confronti del mondo. Il trauma causato dalla guerra nel Vietnam ha reso gli Americani coscienti dei limiti del potere militare del loro Paese e la crisi sociale ha messo a nudo quelli delle risorse economiche e finanziarie. Di conseguenza, il compito primo di questa nuova Amministrazione, è stato arganizzare la deminuzione debli impegni americani sui-vari fronti senza peraltro compromettere la sicurezza del-1ºOccidente e degli interessi americani in genere. Non si tratta di un compito eroico, ma tuttavia delicato e difficoltomo. Soltanto ora sta prendendo forma la nuova linea politica del Presidente Nixon raffigurante il ruolo dell'America sulla scena internazionale. Essa è appena abbozzata e poco più che un generico profilo. Vi sono tuttavia alcuni criteri ben definiti che rendono possibile raggingere determinate conclusioni circa il modo in cui questa nuova linea politica influirà sulla condotta americana in genere, e sui rapporti con gli alleati occidentali in particolare, nonchè quatto influenzerà la relazione "speciale" di Superpotenze con l'Unione Sovietica; tali criteri ci indicheranno se stiamo inoltre per affrontare un nuovo periodo di imolazionismo.

Prima di partire da Saigon in una delle mie visite periodiche nel Vietnam, verso la fine del 1967, chiesi alle autorità civili e militari in carica se non fosse valsa la pena di impegnarsi per ridurre sia l'intensità della guerra che i sacrifici di uomini e materiale. Pensavo che ciò potesse aiutare la

opinione pubblica americana ad assumere un atteggiamento più paziente nei riguardi della guerra, poichè, in fin dei conti, ciò di cui gli Stati Uniti avevano bisogno era guadagnare tempo per sostenere le forze politiche e militari del Sud Vietnam. Come dra prevedibile, essi reagirono dicendo che non era compito loro tenere confo nei programmi delle opinioni degli Americani; ciò toccava al Presidente Johnson. Ma il Presidente, come ammettono anche i collaboratori a lui più vicini, mal giudicava sia l'opinione pubblica, che la sua capatità ad influire su essa.

Mala politica estera prende corpo all'interno della Nazione.

Il fatto che il Presidente Johnson ignorasse l'opinione pubblica americana e non teneksse sufficientemente conto dell'opposisione crescente alla guerra così come era combattuta, lo portò non solo ad un declassamento di natura politica, ma anche a subire la sfiducia del Governo e dell'Esercito. La guerra era vista da molti come una cosa inutile, da altri come immprale.

Essa eccitava gli animi dei giovani già irrequieti, e creava un'atmosgera di violenza sia nelle Università che nei ghetti negri. L'alto costo de la guerra non faceva altro che aggravare le proteste contro la povertà e la fame.

Per due decadi la politica estera americana procedette senza tenere conto delle correnti di opinioni interne. Ciò che le dava forza era la tensione con il mondo comunista. Poichè oggi questa tensione si è attenuata, i fermenti interni stanno imponendo con la forza una stabilizzazione della politica estera americana.

La guerra ed il modo in cui il Presidente l'ha condotta, ha pure avuto un profondo effetto al Congresso. Diede al Presidente Johnson più o meno quello che aveva voluto sino alla metà del 1965, quando decise per una maggiore escalation delle azioni belliche della della parte della truppe americane.

Essa appoggiò la sua decisione di Tonkino che lo stesso Johnson più tardi affermò avergli dato carta bianca per condurre la guerra in qualunque modo egli ritenesse opportuno. Ma allorquanto, a giudizio di alcuni importanti membri del Congresso, cominciò ad abusarne, questi divennero ostili e persino sprezzanti.

Il Congresso ha allora espresso questa sensazione di scontento in una risoluzione sull' "impegno nazionale" piuttosto priva di significato, il cui unico pregio era di esprimete il suo per risentimento in grande maggioranza.

Ma questa atmosffera riflette anche l'umore variabile dell'Elettorato, soprattutto il suo desiderio di finire al più presto la guerra. Il Vietnam aveva fatto amaramente capire che vi erano dei limiti alla "onnipotenza" americana.
"Dovreste pensare che un Paese così grande e ricco come il nostro potrebbe cancellare un Paese piccolo e insignificante come il Vietnam. Quando mai abbiamo perso unas guerra?"
Questa affermazione di tipo gressolano da parte di un membro del Congresso, riflette lo shock che molti Americani ora provano e spiegano perchè ha generato così tanta introspezione.
Gli Americani cominiciarono a vedere sotto una diversa luce la loro condizioni di Super potenza; cominciarono a mettere in dubbio la necessità dei numerosi impegni americani al di fuori del Paese.

Il disappunto per la guerra portò anche a sminuire il rispetto per de Forze Armate, diffidare delle loro richieste e dubitare della loro competenza, cosa che è unica nella Storia americana.

Ma il disinganno provocato dall'avventura nel Vietnam, non è la sola spiegazione del cambiamentto della politica estera americana. Se esso non avesse coinciso con il moto di ribellione all'interno degli Stati Unit, questi molto probabilmente starebbero ancora combattendo alla ricerca della vittoria nel Vietnam. Ciò che in realtà accadde, fu che i negri e gli studenti misero il Paese di fronte al fatto che molti dei più cari ideali che erano stati la passione dominante degli Americani avevano ora perso il loro valoge. In realtà, era impossila bile fornire ai negri opportunità di acquisire un'istruzione ed un certo livello di occupazione? E cosa era successo a quel vecchio e ben collaudato congeggo nazionale, il crogiuolo, che dissolse gradualmente le barriere sia nazionali che razziali e fuse la pletora degli immigranti in una grande nazione? Non poteva fondere in essa anche i negri? E cosa ne era di quella vecchia formula di prosperità che

E cosa ne era di quella vecchia formula di prosperità che ogni Americano considerava la migliore prescrizione per curare tutti i mali economici? Perchè la fame e la povertà persisteva no? Perchè le città andavano in rovina? E perchè il Governo non faceva qualcosa per ovviare a tutto questo?

Sia i negri che i giovani erano giunti alla comlusione che vi era qualcosa di sbagliato nel sistema e qualcosa di sbagliato nei suoi sostenitori ed in coloro che 10 mettevano in opera. Il New Deal era giunto ovviamente ad un fine meschina

e le promesse non mantenute della Great Society ebbero un effetto disorientante. Il Governo Federale nonsi comportava da "fratello" con i negri e con i poveri. L'Eastern Establishment liberale ed internazionalista che aveva esercitato il suo potere fino ad allora fu accusato di negligenza, ed il sistema politico sociale americano apparve improvvisamente antiquato e sorpassato. Si stavano formando forti prese di coschenza. AxxxixA volte generate da una guerra che sembrava troppo lontana e di incerto interesse nazionale, a volte, incece, si formavano spinte da una forte volontà di raggiungere nuove soluzioni. I negri chiedevano la parità dei diritti ed il riconoscimento del loro come un gruppo di potere. Gli scopi dei giovani sono ancora difficili da discernere. Sembrano porre poco interesse nella storia, anzi, a volte sembrano non riconoscerla e con essa la continuità dell'esperienza umana. Essi non sono influenzati dagli insegnamenti della II guerra mondiale o della guerra fredda, ma soprattutto dalla inutilità della guerra nel Vietnam. Frasi come "sicurezza collettiva" hanno per loro ben poco significato; esse fanno solo temere di voler dire qualcosa che i giovani non capiscono. Significano forse riempire di gas Okinawa? O vendere agrei a reazione al Perù? Significa waz correre il rischio diessere mandati a combattere lontano o dovere temere l'Unione Sovietica? Essenzialmente i giovani non riconoscono l'esistenza di ungrave problema di sicurezza nel mondo, nè che gli Stati Uniti sono minacciati mit dall'Unione Sovietica, o dalla Cina. Essi non si sentono minacciati altro che dalla vaga e sinistra esistenza di armi nucleari, siano esse americane o di qualsiasi altra potenza. Il vecchio spauracchio del mondo comunista non fa

venir loro nemmeno la pelle d'éca. Non vedono il mondo nei termini di una lotta per il potere o del di conflitti ideologici. Invece, essi diffidano dei militari e dell'abuso di potere è biasimano la crisi dello spirito americano circa l'idea sbagliata che gli Stati Uniti debbano essere responsabili per il resto del mondo. Il vecchio slogan "arruolatèvi e vedrete il mondo" oggi non induce più in tentazione. Questi punti di vista dei giovani avranno ripercussioni a lungo termine, cioè al momento in cui essi raggiungeranno le leve del potere.

Ciò non significa tuttavia che questa generazione non ha il senso della missione o il desiderio di essa. Ho la sensazione che al giorno d'oggi vi siano più elementi adatti ad alte cariche e con maggiore senso dell'indipendenza di quanti ve ne fossero fra i giovani delle generazioni precedenti. Vent'anni fa la maggiorparte dei giovani propendevano verso le grandi carfiere professionali; oggi teedono più alla vita pubblica, cercano tutte le opportunità per venire alle prese con i pfoblemi sociali. Vogliono occiparsi dei tre punti principali della ideologia liberale negli Stati Uniti: razzismo, povertà guerra. Una inchiesta Gallup mostra come la professione preferita dallapiù alta percentuale degli universitari, circa il 29%, sia l'insegnamento. Solo l'8% sceglie il lavoro, il 5 la legge o il clero, il 4 la tecnica ed il 2% la medicina.

Forse sarà necessario per questa generazione "riinventare la ruota" e darle la sensazione di aver fatto qualcosa di essenziale

e determinante. Forse i giovani inventeranno qualcosa di meglio. Per il momento tuttavia sono sconfortati dalle prospettive politiche per il futuro. Vedono il partito democratico tagliato fuori, i varii Humphrey, Musky, Galbrait, Schlesinger e perfino Harrington, anacronistici e stantti ed incapaci di capire il mondo come lo vedono loro. E neppure possono aspettarsi grandi cose ddi Repubblicani.

La rovina delle città e tutte le ripercussioni per i loro abitanti è stato uno shock, ma giunto troppo in ritardo.

La complessità di questo problema è scoraggiante. Non vi sono rimedi nè facili nè immediati. Una cosa tuttavia è ovvia per molti: la necessità di un cambiamento drastico delle priorità.

Il fatto che il Presidente Johnson fosse intenzionato a sacrificare uomini, ma non altre risorse vitali che avrebbero messo la popolazione a conoscenza che il Paese era impegnato in una guerra seria, ha fatto svanire non solo l'idea della onnipotenza militare americana, ma anche la convinzione che gli Stati Uniti possano permettersi fucili e burro contemporaneamente.

Ed è così che la nazione più ottimista del mondo sta vivendo un dramma e vede molto da lontano una ristabilizzazione delle sue capacità, dei suoi limiti, del suo ruolo futuro nel mondo.

II

Il problema più importante che Nixon sta affrontando è come risolvere questo dramma. Ciò significa, prima di tutto, cercare di porre fine alla guerra del Vietnam. In un certo senso la

situazione a cui Nixon si è trovato di fronte quando è salito al potere ha alcuni punti in comune con quella che dovette affrontare Sir Harold McMillan quando fu scelto come successore di Anthony Eden dopo la catastrofe di Suez. Ciò che rende il compito di Nixon più arduo è il fatto che la guerra continua e che il Paese è non solo profondamente diviso e la popolazione confusa, ma che problemi interni importanti si sono presentati in tutta la loro urgenza.

Il presidente, perciò, ha preso una decisione fondamentale riguardo la guerra: egli avrebbe lentamente disimpegnato gli Stati Uniti dal Vietnam, indipendentemente dai risultati delle trattative di pace in cofso a Parigi. L'alternativa che presentà ad Hanoi consisteva nella scelta fra un rapido ritiro delle truppe americane nel giro di 12 mesi, o un richiamo più lento, della durata di tre anni. Quest'ultimo, afferma, darebbe al Governo di Saigon una maggiore stabilità politica e più tempo alle forze armate per prepararsi ad assumere la responsabilità della sicurezza del Vietnam del Sud. Nello stesso momento ordinava il primo ritiro di truppe per rafferzare le sue proposte non solo nei riguardi di Hana, ma soprattutto degli Stati Uniti.

Nixon si è recato in visita agli alleati europei per rassicurarli che l'Europa era il peraos della sua politica estera,
e che il desiderio degli Americani di por fine ai combattimenti
nel Vietnam non avrebbe intaccata in alcun modo l'impegno dell'America verso l'Europa. Egli era tuttaVia convinto che non fosse
ermai più necessario fornire contingenti militari all'Europa;
la minaccia sovietica nei confronti dell'Europa Occidentale

essendosi fatta più debole (il che era evidente dopo la invasione della Cecoslovacchia) gli aiuti americani erano meno necessari e sarebbero stati quindi gradualmente ridotti. Nella stessa misura in chi cambia la minaccia sovietica, così diminuisce l'impegno americano (in Europa.

Successivamente iniziò un viaggio nell'Asia per diffondere la notizia della sua nuova politica di disempegno verso l'Asia. Questa si basa su due principi fondamentali. Come ha detto testualmente il Presidente Nixon, "Non dobbiamo più avere un altro Vietnam, il che significa che gli Stati Uniti non devono più trovarsi a dover fornire la maggior parte delle armi, del denaro e degli uomini per aiutare un'altra nazione a digendersi contro l'aggressione comunista". L'altro punto è che gli Stati Uniti non dovranno più trovarsi a dover difendere un Paese la cui sicurezza è più importante per loro che per il Paese stesso o# per i suoi≠ vicini. Non si vedrà dunque più il ripetersi di una "missione di reclutamento" come quella di Taylor e Clifford. Come Mr. Clark Clifford ha detto in un suo recente articolo su Foreign Affairs: "Per me era evidente che i Paesi che hanno contribuito al reclutamento di truppe non avevano xxxxxxxxx un interesse uguale al nostro nella guerra del Vietnam. Il Generale Taylor ed io abbiamo invitati ad aumentare la loro partecipazione. Nella maggior parte dei casi la nostra richiesta non è stata ascoltata."

Namezai Ciò che ha di nuovo la dottrina di Nixon, è un disimpegno americano dalla terra Asiatica. Sarà un processo lento e
graduale, rallentato dal rifiuto nord vietnamita di negoziare
un ritiro tacito o formale delle truppe. Ciononostante continuerà e la segreta speranza della Amministrazione è che entro il

il 1972, anno delle prossime elezioni presidenziali, la maggior parte delle truppe americane avranno lasciato il Sud Vietnam.

Un aspetto nascosto della dottrina di Nixon è un cambiamento fondamentale nell'atteggiamento americano nei confronti degli interessi e delle possibilità degli sakux Stati Uniti in Asia, e l'importanza data al fatto che gli Stati Uniti non vogliomo combattere un'altra guerra sakux sul suolo asiatico. E' inoltre implicita - non si sa se spontaneamente o per ragioni di opportunità - la convinzione che la "domino theory" di Eisenhower non ha più la stessa forza di una volta. Ora sono sorti dubbi sul fatto se l'espansionismo cinese rispetto alla manaccia sovietica alla Cina sia ancora un ingrediente importante del comunisme cinese; regna ancora un notevole scetticismo riguardo il fatto se in Nord Vietnamiti siano realmente desiderosi di assorbire il Laos dal momento che essi hanno già il controllo di quelle vie di infiltrazione a loro interessano: i binari per il Sud Vietnam e la Tailandia.

Inoltre, va rafforzandosi la convinzione che l'esercito Eailandese è ora in grado di affrontare la minaccia di una insurrezione interna. Dalla guerra del Vietnam si è tratta la convinzione che la terra asiatica è troppo lontana dal continente americano e troppo vicina ai confini dell'Unione Sovietica, alla Cina, perchè gli Stati Uniti vi possano vincene una guerra convenzionale.

Se il <sup>P</sup>residente <sup>N</sup>ixon è vago circa il suo probabile atteggiamento nel caso di una aggressione esterna contro la Tailandoa, è perchè vuole tenere aperte le sue opzioni ed evitate l'accusa che perseguitò Mr. Dean Acheson quanfo, nella carica di Segretario di Stato, durante un disconso pubblico, escluse la Corea dal perimetro strategico di difesa americano. Il fatto che Acheson, nello stesso discorso, abbia affermato che per gli Stati Uniti sarebbe significato "assoluto disfattismo e assoluta pazzia" abbandonare gli aiuti alla Corea del Sud non fu ricordato nella inchiesta politica. Ma il punto di vista di Nixon è assenzialmente che la Tailandia deve defidere da sola come affrontare il problema dell'insorgenza comunista nelPaese; gli Stati Uniti mon devono forzare una presa di posizione contraria. Si limiteranno a dire: "Ditemi cosa volete fare noi vi diremo come vi possiamo aiutare". Ciò non esclude l'intervento di forze americane navali ed aerze nel caso di un'aggressione esterna, se i Tailandesi fossero disposti a combattere la guerra con le loro truppe. Tutto ciò è molto lontano dai piani dell'Amménistrazione Johnson, che premivedeva una grande base americana in Tailandia

La nuova politica verso l'Asia non è ancora stata elaborata in tutti i suoi particolari, ma il Presidente ha detto che sarebbe propenso ad un forte raggruppamento regionale nel Pacifico ancorato nel Pacifico dell'Ovest vicino all'Indonesia, e nel lontano Est, verso il Giappone. Gli Stati Uniti tenteranno con tutte le loro forze di sviluppare i potenziali dell'Indonesia, in particolare, e si aspettano che il Giappone integri il loro aiuto economico. L'ombrello nucleare americano continuerà ad essere l'estrema protezione di quella zona contro un attacco da parte di una potenza più forte. In tutto ciò è implicito anche il graduale smantellamento della rete di patti di difesa negoziati nel periodo post-bellico della seconda guerra mondiale, eccezion fatta per il trattato sulla sicurezza del Giapponte e per l'Anzub. E' probabile che gli Stati Uniti nel prossimo fu-

turo considereranno la difesa dell'Australia e della Nuova Zelanda un "interese personale".

Se ci gurdiamo indietro, non è sbaglüato dire cheper quanto riguarda l'Asia il Presidente Johnson ha agito nel modo in cui ne
parlò John Foster Dulles - a Dulles fu impedito di agire in questo modo dal Presidente Eisenhower - ed ora il Presidente Nixon
sta parlando nel modo in cui agì il Presidente Eisenhower.

#### III

Come può essere adattata la dottrina di Nixon all'Europa, è ancora da scoprire. L'Europa Occidentale è considerata vitale per gli interessi americani, la Nato rimane un forte legame, e così ilaine l'impegno della protezione di Berlino Vvest. L'idea del disimpegno sta quindi prendendo una forma differente e più limitata. Vi è poca speranza che gli alleati europei possano aumentare le forze convenzionali destinate alla Nato. Il Presidente Kennedy cercò di imporre la strategia di McNamara della "conventional option", ma non vi riuscl; gli alleati non la accettarono mai in pieno. Il Presidente Nixon non ha alcuna intenzione di imporre una particolare strategia militare o par-- ticolari livelli di forza. Lascierà queste scelte agli Europei. In questo senso la dottrina del "fatelo da vdi" di Nixon viene già applicata. Gli alleati, per evitage di ricadere mella vecchia teoria dellama "rappresaglia massiccia", happp elaborato il cosiddetto piano di contingenza Harley per l'immediato o se nah altro prossimo uso di armi nucleari contro l'aggressione limitata, ed il piano a Washington è visto con molta simpatia. L'Amministrazione Nixon, in contrasto con quella di Kennedy o di Johnson, è inoltre propensa ad incoraggiare la Gran Bretagna e la Francia a creare una specia di forza deterrente nucleare europea.

I lavori preparatori della SALT (trattative circa la limitazione di armi strategiche) tuttavia, hanno condotto ad una abalisi più accurata dell'equilibruo nucleare fra gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica, ed i suoi effetti sugli impegni della Nato. L'idea del Presidente di decidere se rischiare di distruggere la propria nazione per la difesa di un'altra da un'aggressione esterna, sarà presa unicamente in circostanze estreme. L'impegno legale sotto la Nato, sta probabilmente diventando più limitato, in pratica, se non in teoria, anche se è sperabile che tale questione non richiede una risposta parce ambedue le parti saranno convinte che esiste un equilibrio del deterrente nucleare e che nessuna delle due parti ha la capacità di attaccare per prima. Davrebbe essere perciò particolarmente importante per gli alleati. l'assicurarsi che continuerà un comando militare integrato poichè, secondo Nixon, credo che la sua sopravvivenza dipenderà da loro, e non dagli Stati Uniti.

Nel campo economico-politico, il Presidente Nixon non interverrà nelle decisioni dei Sei del mercato Comune. E' favorevole
all'entrata della Gran Bretagna nel Mercato Comune, preferisce
un'Europa Occidentale più indipendente, ma non farà alcuna pressione perchè giò avvenga. E se i Sei decideranno di cambiare
il carattere del Mercato Comune, e renderlo una zona di libero
scambio, tutto ciòs che faranno gli Stati Uniti, allora, sarà
proteggere gli interessi economici della zona stessa.

La dottrina di Nixon non è il risultato di idee preconcette - infatti questa Amministrazione è arrivata al potere con così pochi piani, come nessun'altra prima deora. Essa è il risultato di alcune tendenze storiche, delle ripercussioni della cattiva conduzionedella guerra nel Vietnam, ed alcuni gravissmi dilem-J bizogni mi fiscali, finanziari e di bilancio. della cura dei mali sociali interni stanno salendo vertiginosamente, ed il New Family Allowance Faln, se adottate dal Congresso, aggiungerà almeno altri 4 miliardi al bilancio ; 🗱 anche i costi delle armi strategiche e dell'esplorazione dello spaziom stanno raggiungendo punte altissime. Tutto ciò in un periodo in cui il Presidente deve combattere una inflazione del 7% annuo, molto alta per gli standards americani. E' un problema così serio e di interesse così generale che nel-1'Amministrazione Nixon tutti si prostrano davanti all'idolo delle politiche deflazionistiche.

Quanto influirà questa forzata austerità sulla pianificazione futura?

Per il momento l'Ammanistrazione sta tenendo un condotta di forti spese. Ha estorto dirca 8 miliardi dal bilancio del Presidente Johnson, operazione politicamente molto dolorosa, ma il problema dell'inflazione sta assorbendo tutto ed è attualmente la questione interna numero uno. L'eccedenza del bilancio di quest'anno sarà fra i 5 ed i 6 miliardi circa, ma l'Amministrazione sarà costretta a sacrificarlo e spenderLo. Contrariamente ai Democratici, una amministrazione Repubblicana non è compatibile con l'inflazione. Neppure può combatterla nelle stesse modo, per esempio, del Presidente Kennedy, quando ha fatto il gran gesto per combattere l'aumento del prezzo dell'acciaio. I Repubblicani hanno troppa fede pe nel meccanismo di percato. La lotta contro l'inflazione richiede dunque una revisione completa del bilancio.

Un vero risparmio può essere ricavato unicamente dal bilando della difesa e, secondo il migliore preventivo dei realizzatori di tale risparmio, può essere possibile ridurlo a circa 65 miliardi di dollari entro il 1972 in termini di "dollaro costante", valuta del 1970. Questa previsione è basata sulla speranza che la maggiorparte delle truppe americane verranno richiamate dal Vietnam. Un'altra divisione darà richiamata dalla Corea: il suo ritiro è già molto in ritardo. La prima volta è stato rimandato per l'indidente della Pueblo e poi per l'attacco Nord Coreano contro un aereo spia radiocomandato. E' anche prevista una graduale riduzione delle forze in Europa, nella misura di almeno una divisione entro il 1972 e mix una dispersione delle cosiddette terze forze di contingenza tenute in essere per una possibile guerra lampo. Ma riguarderà anche altri servizi, in specialmedo le forze navali destinate ora alla protezione delle ximaxa rotte marittime che portano in Europa e a velizzi tattici.

Dalla II guerra mondiale il bilancio per la difesa non era stato vulnerabile più di quanto non lo sia adesso. Il Congresso apparovava quasi
senza controbattere tutto ciò che veniva destinato alla difesa; ma
non succede così ai giorni nostri. Può permettersi di essere più indagatore,
più severo a causa dello scontento generale per la Guerra del Vietnam
per la reputazione di cui gode il mondo militare per le sue spese stravaganti,

e per il sospetto che suscitano le loto pretese e richieste. Sono diventati un bersa e plio di critiche non solamente sicuro, ma anche popolare. Molti membri, del Conpresso, sià liberali che l'enservatori, mi hanno dello che alfualmente terrestare i hiedi ai militari procura l'uni.

Questo rappresenta un cambiamento drastico dal passato. Dubitom per esempio, se in differenti circostanze ci sarebbe stata una resistenza così forte per la Difesa del Missile AntibalListico al Senato.

Perano il Comitato per i Servizi Armati, che tradizionalmente e considerato il militare "amico in tribunale" e molto più accurato nell'esaminare le richieste del Pentagono ed osa molto di più nel rifiutarne alcune. Ecco alcuni esempi, quest'anno, di 'tagli' economomici: raccolte viveri per l'aviazione militare sono state ridotte della meta, fondi per un sistema aerotrasportato di ammonimento e di controllo sono stati diminuiti di 45 milioni di dollari, le richieste per lo sviluppo del missile aria-Atterra della Marina e per il missile ariaa-terra dell'Aviazione X-3 sono state rifiutate. Sono stati stanziati dei fondi per ricerche e sviluppo per l'aereo Pro-1 k gredito Equipaggiato Strategico, ma l'autorizzazione per la produzione di questo velivolo e stata respinta. Dopo la molta pubblicita data per il costo del nuovo sistema d'armamenti il Comitatorichiede ora normalmente dei rapporti par il progresso di tutti i principali sistemi d'armi. Gli esperti del bilancio preventivo Nixon stanno ora lavorando per proprio conto ad una nuova e molto più drastica diminuzione del bilancio della difesa per il prossimo anno. Ridurranno i progetti della Marina sia per le unita portaerei\sia per quelle d'attacco, entramble molto dispendiose, le quali sono diventate un sistema di armamenti molto vulnerabile; ridurranno anche molt pokabilmente della mela che, da solo, costa 7 miliardi di dollari, L'idea che abbiano bisogno di due aerei d'attacco per ogni MIG 21 e considerato sia militarmente che finanziariamente stravagante.

Il problema che gli Alleati europei dovranno considerare, dato che gli Stati Uniti ridurranno il loro bilancio preventivo di difesa, sara la "mutualita di sicurezza", anche considerato a Washington. Gli Stati Uniti spendono per la difesa dell'Euro-

pa quasi quanto per il rimanente di tutti gli altri Alleati NATO insieme. Per esempio, spendono complessivira miliardi di dollari per mantenere le toro forze navali, ed è la stessa spesa che sostengono i Russi per le loro. Gli Stati Uniti, del resto, Espendono il doppio di mqualsiasi altro per mantenere le rotte marittime in Europa. Gli alleati dimostreranno una maggiore "mutualita" ed sarannoldisposti a dividere maggior-Domande come questa, che aprisono dagli mente questi costi? influendabili uomini dell'Amministrazione Nixon implicano la prospettiva che se gli Europeinon contribuizano maggiormente alla "mutualita" considerando la diminuizione dei costi di difesa che stammo per essere effettuati dagli Stati Uniti, potra influenzare non solo la loro sicurezza, ma anche l'opinione americana verso la sicurezza europea. "L'attitudine europea inerte e passiva puo far loro storicamente del male. sovente rimproverato gli americani che esagerazo il pericolo di un (convenzionale attacco russo istituito contro la NATO. Shamo adesso procedendo ad una revisione del nostro modo di pensare a questo proposito, avvicinadolo a quello europeo." Questo non e stato detto in modo cavilloso, ma come ammonimento per gli europei e ripensare ai propri problemi di si-Nelgsuoto messaggio circa il nuovo benessere domestico il Presidente Nixon ha detto l'altro giorno che, quello di cui gli americani hanno bisogno, non e maggiore benessere, ma un maggiore "work-fare". Sembra che egli cerchi di far comprendere questa idea ad amici ed alleati all'estero in modo da poter chiedere ad altri di caricarsi gran parte di questo peso.

Le prospettive per aiuti stranieri dipenderanno dall'urto continuato della guerra nel Vietnam nella situazione globale del bilancio preventivo ed il limite al quale sara sceso l'aumento del rateo Mazionale nell'economia americana. Sara anche influenzato dal grado della proposizione congressuale e ila kindericit della bilancia dei pagamenti persisteranno.

Qualche progetto eliminare e stato fatto per la così detta Seconda decade dello sviluppo. C'e un desiderio fra le persone maggiormente interessate a sviluppare la nuova filosofia di aiuto Nixon di non limitarsi a mettere insieme un altro programma. Sottolineando questa filosofia, sarebbe quanque il principio che ispira gran parte di questa politica estera globale, unitamente al suo programma nazionale di benessere; il principio del "fallo-da-solo".

L'opinione generale è che gli Stati Uniti debbano difforndere quanta responsabilità e possibile in modo da poter decidere quali progetti debbano essere realizzati e in che modo questotipo di aiuto debba essere amministrato. I relativi paesi repersenta i proprie di proprie stime dei costi, come stanno gia facendo col sottoporre i progetti alla Banca Mondiale, per esempio.

Esiste anche la comvinzione che gli Stati Uniti dovrebbero lasciare la supervisione dei progetti e l'uso esatto del denaro ai governi interessati. Gran parte, quindi, della grande macchina amministrativa americana potrebbe essere così liquidata. Il governo beneficiario potrebbe chie dere a tipi di organizzazioni come la Banca
Mondiale, le Nazioni Unite e tipi simili, un consiglio tecnico per
come usare i fondi americani.

L'aiuto straniero difficilmente aumentera dal suo attuale livello, anche dopo la guerra nel Vietnam. L'idea gradita ai paesi in via
di sviluppo e che le nazioni industrializzate dovrebbero devolvere
l'uno per cento del loro GNP per gli aiuti stranieri non ha trovato
credito nell'Amministrazione Nixon. Prima fra tutte c'e la questione che GNP e la pietra di paragone sbagliata perche include, per

esempio, L'aumento delle industrie di servizio, e secondariamente c'e il congresso.

La classe superiore e media americana erano grandi sostenitrici per gli aiuti stranieri; non lo sono più al momento. Sono molto di piu interessat? a quanto si riferisce all americano povero --- piu che mai. la carita deve iniziare in casa propria. mo di colore nei ghetti americani che ha bisogno di tutto l'aiuto che riesce a trovare, non e più logico aiutare anche l'uomo di colore in Africa. L'idea e che \*\*\* frica e storicamente l'Africa e molto di più una responsabilità europea. Gli inglesi, i francesi e particolarmente i tedeschi, e stato discusso, debbano aumentare i loro aiuti sussidiari. In Asia, e compito del Giappone fare di I tedeschi edi giapponesi non mamis capiscono il significato di questa forma contemporanea di fatto che ha l'uomo bianco. Gli americani si sentono ancora responsabili per l'Asia, dove si aspettano un incremento effettivo economico, ed altrettanto per l'America Latina. Il mandato emotivo peral'India e svanito e la fioritura e finita anche per la rosa africana.

Quello che rialzerebbe il livello globale degli aiuti stranieri sarebbe il bisogno per un fondo di riabilitazione per il
Vietnam. Considerando che l'aiuto complessivo di denaro per il
rimanente del mondo in via di sviluppo rimarra più o meno al livello attuale - L'anno scorso l'Amministrazione Johnson ha chiesto
\$ 2,554,200,000 ed il Congresso approprio \$ 1,380,600,000; questo
anno l'Amministrazione Nixon ha chiesto \$ 2,205,400,000 ma il
Congresso non ha ancora avuto luogo - il Governo degli Stati Uniti

si varra del bisogno per creare il tipo di condizioni che dovrebbe attirare gli investimenti stranieri and migliorare il commercio internazionale.

Le prospettive per <u>l'aiuto militare</u> non sono molto meglio, fatta eccezione del fatto che il Presidente sara in grado di xexi sottolineare logicamente che la sua politica di ritirare le truppe, specialmente in Asia, dovrebbe essere bilanciata
da un aumento dell'aiuto militare. A queste nazioni dalle quali
si aspetta di salvaguardare da sole la propria sicurezza bisogna
fornire gli strumenti adatti.

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In che grado \_ Questi riassestamenti della politica americana riusciranno ad influenzare le relazioni di potere extra con l'Unione Sovietica?

L'Amministrazione Nixon inizia con alte speranze di un aiuto russo nel persuadere Hanoi ad accelerare una intesa per la guerra nel Vietnam, con un ottimismo straordinario per quanto riguarda l'opinione per una messa a punto del Medio Oriente ed un# ulteriore scatto attraverso ile prossime discussioni sulle armi strategiche.

Per ora pero non ci sono segni che i Russi abbiano il potere di far decidere Hanoi o il Cairo, o abbastanza da tentare da soli. E la limitazione sulle discussione di armi e sempre meno promettente di un anno fa.

Il Presidente Johnson era impaziente, anche troppo, di organizzare un'altra riunione di questo tipo prima delle sue dimissioni, e di discutere circa la limitazione delle armi strategiche al più presto possibile, seña troppe posizioni 'congelate' in partenza, nella speranza che si fossero potute definire mentre i russi cominciassero a mettere le proprie carte in tavola.

Il presidente Nixon, invece, non ha fretta di visitare gii scariche il Unione Sovietica. Crede molto meno in unxuima di scariche remi verso uno scoppio con l'Unione Sovietica e si è preparato nelle sue posizioni per i discorsi con il SALT molto metodicamente, prendendo tempo e dando modo alle prove MIRV di procedere al rafforzamento delle sue posizioni di contrattazione,

Quello che sembrame il motivo del Presidente Mixon non seno solamente un sempre più ostinato, più affaristico approccio alle relazioni Americane - Russe, ma anche dei dubbi maggiori su cosa può essere fatto. I suoi esperti hanno fatto alcuni studi molto tecnici sulla fattibilita, i rischi ed i possibili risultati su un accordo di limitazione delle armi, e le loro stime non sono promettenti. In qualche modo gli aspetti negativi di questo accordo e stata ord data una maggiore enfasi superiore a quella che era stata data quando il Sig, McNamara presideva a proposito della politica di strategia.

Questo cambio nell'attitudine americana riflette il cambio de personalità. Il Presidente Johnson era stato attirato dal face de grande, ampio gesto e il Sig. McNamara non rifletteva solamente i punti di vista dei militar. Il Presidente Nixon e un uomo più metodico, più scettico e il Sig. Laird, Suo segretario alla Difesa, un eco maggiore dei militari. L' Amministrazione Nixon

e più interessata ad un accordo per mantenere la parita nucleare in modo che l'Europa non possa essere influenzata negativamente nella sua sicurezza.; è più dubbioso circa le prospettive di un accordo per la limitazione delle armi e fino a che punto questo possa tenere la guerira lontana. I rischi in questo campo sembrano impressionare i fabbricanti della politica tanto quanto i vantaggi relativi. La disputa che un accordo del genere permetterebbe di mantenere il pericolo della guerra, ad un costo più basso ed aiuterebbe i pesi dell'instabilita nei limiti, ma non in modo decisivo come ci si aspetterebbe.

Senza dubbio Il Sig. Nixon vorrebbe portare il suo contributo alla pace e del resto crede in una politica di riposo sia un la foll'Unione Sovietica che la Cina. Quello che lo rende meno frettoloso di Kennedy o Johnsone la convinzione che gli Stati
Uniti si trovino oggi meno nei guai dell'Unione Sovietica. Le ostilità lungo la frontiera russo-cinese, il conseguente bisogno di un "tutto tranquillo sul fronte" occidentale in Europa, le incertezze politiche nei paesi del Patto di Varsavia, il fatto che l'economia russa è legata troppo stretta; il bisogno del resto di trovare sistemi per ridurre i costi dei deterrenti strategici nucleari -- tutto questo sembra dimostrare che gli Stati Uniti sono in posizione favorevole per trattare.

Il desiderio di mantenere una specie di superiorità nucleare è ancora molto forte fra alcuni dei consigliri di Nixon e, sebbene i rapporti del caso indichino che, difficilmente, gli Stati Uniti riciranno a conservare questa superiorita, qualsiasi

cosa essa significhi, il pensiero di mettere il suo sigillo per la parita nucleare con l'Unione Sovietica non sara facile da accettare per il Presidente Nixon.

Qualcuno, del resto, preferirebbe un accordo ufficioso ad uno ufficiale. Molto dipende dall'interesse che l'Unione Sovietica dimostrera e in che misura questo influenzera l'andamento dei negoziati.

In termini politici non e attresovun cambio sotanziale nelle relazioni nell'est-ovest. L'Unione Sovietica vuole preservare lo status -quo e sta patrocinando una conferenza sulla sicurezza europea per codificare la divisione della Germania e far
diventare permanenti le frontiere attuali. Gli Stati Unit sono
piu interessati ad un accordo con i russi, il quale garantirebbe l'accesso a Berlino. Un accordo del genere rimuoverebbe la
piu pericolosa, Tenta causa di conflitto in Europa e farebbe
diventare unl'accordo di parita nucleare fra le due grandi potenze una cosa pienenze accettabile dagli alleati NATO.
La Germania dell'Est sembra vedere in questo una tendenza ad
indebolirla, ma si deve cercare di trovare il modo per evitarlo.

Le opportunità per una diplomazia di una potenza superiore in Europa del resto sono limitate e sembrano più maggiormente promettenti in area fuori Europa: mel Medio Oriente, nel migliorare le relazioni fra l'India e il Pakistan, nel promuovere una decisone fra Vietnam e Laos.

- Il secolo della super-potenze continua quindi anche se la loro dominazione è sotto la piu grande se provocazione entro i loro rispettivi blocchi di potere. L'Unione Sovietica resiste a questa sfida e cerca di ristabilire il suo potere. Gli Stati Uniti, per contrasto, cercano di ridurre il loro dominio e le loro responsabilita.

Il desiderio di vedere un'Europa più indipendente, più forte, la nuova simpatia per un deterrente nucleare europeo, il patrocimo di un gruppo di regioni asiatiche tenuto dal Giappone, tutto questo implica che il desiderio del Sig,. Nixon è di ridurre i rischi di un diretto confronto sia con l'Unione Sovietica che completa. Il rischio nel quale questa politica pur incorrerre e che puo promuovere la proliferazione nucleare. Fino ad ora la massima barriera alla proliferazione è stata la predominanza degli Stati Uniti e dell'Unione Sovietica. Ma se una delle due perdesse interesse ad una posizione dominante nelle varie parti del mondo, l'incentivovad acquistare armi nucleari daxattri, poteri infreriori comincerebbero ad aumentare.

Il Trattato di Non-proliferazione potrebbe del resto diventare una causale per la politica americana nel membre diminuire le proprie responsabilita.

L'Amministrazione Johnson, specialmente sotto l'influenza del Sig. Rusk, ha contemplato l'idea di aiutare l'Unione Sovietica a real limitare la Cina, almeno sino a quando Pechino rimane un non-prevedibile come é al momento. L'Amministrazione Nixon é anche ansiosa di tenere la Cina nei limiti, ma nello stesso

tempo preferirebbe stabilire dei rapporti migliori con Pechino, e insistere in una politica più semplice, come tra læ'Unione Sovietica e la Cina.

VI

Quali sono le implicazioni di questa riduzione governativa dei prezzi? Gli Stati Uniti stanno entrando in un nuovo periodo di isolazionismo?

Il gruppo costituente il potere per la politica americana straniera e in questi tempi nettamente diviso. Esistono ancora i vecchi nazionalisti che credono fermammente che gli Stati Uniti debbano continuare Mell'adempimento della attuali responsabilità e che hanno anche i mezzi per farlo. Il loro numero, tuttavia, e in diminuzione. Appartengono principalmente all'Eastern Establishment il quale e ampiamente responsabile per le politiche posteriori alla Seconda guerra mondiale. Ed e curioso notare che hanno anche dei sostenitori fra i conservatori, per i quali la minaccia comunista rimane più o meno sempte al livello precedente.

La grande maggioranza di quelli che sostenevano le politiche di Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy e Johnson adesso crede che gli Stati Uniti abbiano raggiunto la fine di un'era, e che sia venuta l'ora di rivedere drasticamente e ridurre l'impegno americano del dopo-guerra in accordo con gli slittamenti del potere avvenuti nel frattempo. Sono principalmente liberali, e doppiamente preoccupati delle crisi sociali che sono diventate un trattato alla massima stabilita degli Stati Unti e dal loro in-

successo per non aver intuito precedentemente questi problemi. Stanno adesso tentando di accomodare i loro stessi sbagli e ma-Sono diventati la forza predominante al Congresso che cerca di prevenire "nuovi Vietnam" e di imporre profondi tagli nel bilancio preventivo militare perforzare una riduzione, attraverso i cordoni della borsa, dell'impegno militare ameri-Sono favorevoli a tagli profondi nelle forze armate più di quanto l'Amministrazione sia pronta a conmembrasiderare: vorrebbero ridurle a circa due milioni di uomini. contro il sistema per il Missile Antihalistico principalmete perche prenderebbe dei fondi che, essi pensano, sono più urgentemente necessari per usi domestici sociali. Sono favorevoli ad una rapida ritirata dal Vietnam e si oppongono ad ogni nuovo impegno o a delle basi in terra asiatica. Patrocinano sopratutto i problemi domestici e voglione che si a data loro la massima prioritá sui problemi esteri. Non sono isolazionisti nella pre-seconda guerra mondiale, dato che riconoscono l'impegno americano per la difesa dell'Europa, Giapponese Australia, e non sono chauvinisti dato che si risentono all'idea di piantare la bandiera americana sulla luna, ma si avvicinano ad una nuova leva di semi-isolazionisti.

Poi c'e il pubblico dalla coscienza politica piu ristretta. Anch'esso ha perso l'illusione dell'"onnipotenza" americana, per la quale il successo di forzare i missili sovietici fuori da Cuba la ha riaccesa. Per esempio sono adesso troppo ansiasi per le limitazioni del potere americano. Hanno perso il loro credo nella vecchia messianica idea che gli Stati Uniti debhano fare il mondo "salvo per la democrazia". Pesano anche che il mondo sia troppo instabile per essere organizzato. Non credonon più, come si usava dire ai tempi dell'Amministrazione Johnson, che la guerra in Vietnam è"l'interesse personale" delll'America.

L'Anti-comunismo, una volta potentex ingrediente della

politica estera americana, ha anch'esso perso di convincimento.

Le sue qualità da crociata sono cmertamente sparite dato che l'idea forzata sottolie ava la Dottrina Truman, e molte altre politiche sucessive, che gli Stati Uniti devono al comunismo in qualsiasi modo cerchi di espandersi oltre gli miniti esistenti. Se il comunismo prendesse piede in un paese non-comunista gli Stati Uniti dovrebbero intervenire, con eccezione forse di alcuni stati dell'America Latina. L'idea che il Sud-Vietnam possa, in pochi anni, adottare una regola comunista, per esempio, non scandalizza finexa come sarebbe successo fino a poco tempo fa. È se, per esempio, un Governo Comunista venisse legalmente al potere in Italia in un domani, gli Stati Uniti non dovrebbero intermenire nemmeno militarmente.

mettre gradualmente ordine nei diversi gradi delle sue politiche dissentrici. Per combattere la pressione dilagante su di lui, ha per prima cosa attaccato gri # neo-isolazionisti" con un discorso stringente. Questo mi sembra un futile ed infruttuoso tentativo per constringere il pubblico ad ascoltarlo, sopra i reversi della politica estera. Gli Americani sono ancora orgoglioso della potenza americana nel mondo, ma nei termini di esercitare la loro influenza contro i "neo-isolazionisti; queste persone, che il Sig. Nixon durante la riezzanza per le elezioni ha chiamato "i si lenti americani" non sono quelli che hanno a cuore i problemi della politica estera. Il discorso riezzanza reconsolidato degli argomenti anche contro quelli al quale era diretto.

Il Presidente haavuto più successo nel suo tentativo di nel tarpare le ali ai"nuovò-isolazionisti" tramite la sua nuova politica asiatica. L'idea che i leaders asiatici negli anni a venire dovranno fare la guerra per la loro sicurezza interna/contro la

sovversione comunista, l'assicurazione che gli Stati Uniti eviteranno di essere trascinati in un altro Vietnam e si limiteranno a fornire le armi nugleari contro le aggressione da parte di una maggiore pot enza, tutto ciò ha fatto colpo a coloro che sono stati disillusi dalla politica estera americana negli ultimi venti anni.

Nixon può leggere le scritte sui muri. Nel 1954 era un interventista in Indocina, condivideva le idee di J. Foster Dulles e dell'Ammiraglio Radford. Oggi non e più un intervendista. Probabilité e anche riluttante ad assumersi nuvvi impegni.

L'altro giorno, mentre conversava con un leader della politica estera, uno con accento tedesco e læ'altro con accento
bostoniano, il promo disse: "In passato era facile." Avevamo
la superiotita nel campo nucleare, avevamo la moneta più forte
e potevamo usufruire dell'aiuto dato ai Paesi stranieri per i
nostri interessi. Non avevamo relamente bisogno di una politica
estera. Oggi e diverso. Ne abbiamo moneta bisogno."

Qualunque sia questa politica, almeno sotto la Presidenza Nixon non sara isolazionista o mano pisolazionista. Vio che Nixon sta facendo e di adeguare la politica americana ai nuovi avvenimenti: la legalita della guerra in Vietnam, i gravi problemi interni, la corsa agli armametinti. Egli cerca di attama ottenre un nuovo consenso da parte delle maggiori potenze stranie re nei riguardi della sua politica estera che, ha promesso, sara organizzata in modo da permettere agli S,U, di recitare un ramitoruolo significativo ed importante nel mondo. Egli cerchera sopratutto di ridurre il liverlo ed i costi degli impegni americani in maniera d'evitare lo stesso genere di crollo al potere e l'influenza che i francesi e gli inglesi hanno sofferto perche fartireme hanno fallito nel riconoscere e capire i limite delle loro risorse.

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# The Future of the Soviet and American International Systems

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The purpose of this lecture is limited to suggesting a possible framework for speculation about the future of the two agglomerations of power and authority which are here called the Soviet and American international systems. I shall first try to assess the nature of the two groupings and the changes that have occurred within them during the last decade or so in an attempt to discern secular trends from more transient developments and phenomena. On the assumption that both formal alliances and ideology are going to become less rather than more relevant in the future I have searched for a description of the whole international system that would enable us to view the two groupings in East and West in a perspective that reaches beyond the limits of such organizing structures or principles. The one I have used here is taken from Harald von Riekhoff's study, "The Atlantic Alliance and the Strategic Equilibrium".x) He has characterized the present international system as a "threetiered multi-dimensional system within a bipolar setting", the first tier consisting of the superpowers, the second of countries with a high level of economic development and industrialization as well as close links with the superpowers and the third of countries with a much lower degree of industrialization and economic development and less immediate interdependence with the superpowers. The crucial factor which would determine whether a given country belongs to one or the other of the two sub-systems of the international system would thus be the degree of strategic and economic dependence on or interdependence with the respective superpower.

This criterion is not without problems. First of all it postulates the nationstates as the main actors on the international scene, a proposition which in the age of the multi-national corporation may seem increasingly debatable. Furthermore, the

x)

in A. Bromke and P. Uren, ed., The Communist States and the West (London: Pall Mall,

interdependence factor may not always be susceptible to measurement in a way that lends itself to meaningful comparison. And finally, in a world of growing interdependence the very act of determining at what level of interaction a given country is to be considered a member of one or the other of the two sub-systems will probably appear more and more arbitrary. Yet, in spite of these shortcomings I think that this criterion can be used for our purpose. It has the advantage of enabling us to place non-allied countries like Switzerland, Israel and Sweden in the American system and also of accommodating the trend towards overlapping of the two systems which, I think, can be demonstrated in the case of Finland, Yugoslavia and perhaps India. The main areas of the two systems as I see them today would, in the case of the Soviet side, be limited to the Soviet Union itself and its East European client-states, and in the case of the American side, to the Western hemisphere, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

Before embarking upon an analysis of the two systems I shall make a few observations on certain aspects of the present state of the international system and the role of the superpowers. It is generally recognized that the 1960s have been characterized by a significant diffusion of power, implying a decline in the over-all influence of the superpowers, the emergence of new centres of ambition and authority, a multiplication of contacts, and changes in the pattern of transactions in many parts of the world. But we may ask the question, in what sense is the influence of the superpowers decressing and the leverage of the others increasing? Clearly, in terms of capacity to do damage, the superpowers have become more superpowerful. They can annihilate the human race more easily than ever. What has declined is their capacity to induce other actors to perform according to their preferences. The rise in the influence of other centres of decision, on the other hand, has been largely limited to greater possibilities for independent initiative in world politics, be it diplomatic overtures in general or vetos and counterproposals in their relations with the superpowers. I think it is important to keep these distinctions in mind, in order to avoid misunderstandings about the implications of the diffusion of power. Among the factors that have brought about these changes an obvious one is the difficulty of translating military power into political influence - a point which other speakers will deal with in greater detail. They have also been related to a decreasing sense of common purpose in the absence of an overriding concern for security and to the decline of ideologies, which, particularly in the East, has tended to erode the authority of the preponderant superpower.

Let us now try to assess what <u>structural changes</u> have taken place in the two groupings in terms of <u>membership</u>, <u>cohesion</u> and <u>distribution of power</u>.

In the Soviet system the changes in "membership" are significant, the most important being the virtual "loss" of China and the much closer links between Moscow and the "progressive" Arab states. In addition, Cuba, in spite of its recalcitrance should probably be considered a member of the Soviet system in view of its close strategic and economic dependence on Moscow. It is a truism to assert that the "losses" very much overshadow the "gains". The Sino-Soviet split is clearly one of the most important single developments of the 1960s, which I would view as a natural trend toward polarization of interest between major actors on the international scene. One obvious and important consequence of these developments (and also of recent events in Eastern Europe) has been the fact that in spite of Moscow's attempts to invoke the concept of "the socialist Community" the Soviet system is increasingly defined in terms of the imperial interests of the Soviet state rather than the community of outlook of a worldwide ideological and political movement. It is in these power political terms that one should interpret Russia's interests in the Middle East and her attempts to establish a presence in the Indian Ocean.

With regard to cohesion and distribution of power I shall limit myself to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as the core area of the system. Here there is reason to distinguish between conditions before and after the invasion of Czechoslovakia last year. Up to that dramatic event the over-all picture was one of decreasing cohesion, demonstrated, for example, in differing attitudes toward the West. To a certain extent the Soviet leaders could continue to count on the voluntary cooperation of the ruling elites in the smaller East European countries, for they shared with them the common concern about the conflicting requirements of rational economic management and effective party rule. On the other hand, the call for reform in Eastern Europe brought forward somewhat different solutions, thereby strengthening the force of nationalism, a powerful undercurrent in most East European states, and making these developments in the core area of the Soviet system less susceptible to Moscow's control. The general trend toward disintegration in the Soviet system, which was promoted by the East-West detente and Bonn's new Ostpolitik, did not stop at the Soviet border itself, and eventually prompted the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. a period of enforced cohesion in the East. But the dissenting views voiced even then not only by Rumania but more cautiously also by Hungary testified to the limited results achieved. While Czechoslovakia has been bullied into submission, it would seem that the basic issues which led to the invasion have/been resolved within the collective leadership in Moscow. These issues are related to means rather than ends: How is Moscow to deal with the inevitable social and political repercussions of modernization without jeopardizing the established principles of authoritarian rule and central

control by a party elite? And what strategy should be adopted in order to counter the rise of nationalism within the Soviet orbit? To me it appears to be an open question, therefore, how successful the Soviet leaders are going to be in their attempts to keep the East European states in a state of subservience.

Any discussion of the distribution of power within the Soviet system must take into account the specific nature and context of inner-state and inter-party relations in the East. In military terms the preponderance of the Soviet Union has, of course, remained unchallenged. What has changed is the bargaining power of the individual East European governments vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and in some cases the extent to which the Soviet leadership can manipulate the political process in certain East European states. Without going into details, I would argue, that the bargaining power available to the East European governments has been primarily related to the Sino-Soviet conflict and the economic relations with the West. The former could be exploited by them most effectively as long as there was some hope of accommodation between Peking and Moscow. The recent exacerbation of the conflict has limited the margin of manoeuvre on this issue, although it has not prevented Rumania from continuing to demonstrate its middle position between the two Communist world powers. There are some indications that the Soviet Union is trying to extend the validity of the WTO to include a possible conflict in the Far East. If this becomes a serious proposition the relative bargaining power of the East European states may again increase although only marginally. Relations with the West are essential for the East European states because they enable them to acquire investment capital and advanced technology, both urgently needed for the growth of their economies. By the same token the expansion of these contacts with West has tended to decrease their dependence on Moscow, especially in those cases, where the Soviet Union has had no other means of direct influence, like a military presence or some political leverage inside the country. The primary examples are, of course, Rumania and Czechoslovakia before the invasion.

As for Soviet leverage in individual East European countries, I am thinking primarily of the East German leaders, for whom Soviet's support remains crucial, and of the situation in Poland, where Moscow has been able to exploit the delicate balance of political forces within the country to ensure the continued loyalty of the governing elite.

In the American system the picture is no less complex. In terms of membership

the only major change that occured in the course of the 1960s was Cuba's accession to the socialist camp. The repercussions of this event were significant, not primarily in terms of a change in the over-all balance of forces - although this was at issue for a short time during the missile crisis of 1962 - but due to its psychological impact on the Western superpower. The extablishment of a socialist state in the Carribean and the announced intention of its leader to spread the gospel of socialism to help the peoples of Latin America aroused strong reactions in the American public. This, in turn, induced the American government to resort to unilateral action - most conspicuously in the course of the upheavals in the Dominican Republic in 1965 - and to announce the doctrine that the United States would not permit the establishment of another communist regime in the Western hemisphere. The impression of an increasing American assertiveness and a predilection for unilateral action was, of course, strengthened by the escalation of hostilities in Vietnam during the second part of the 1960s.

The war in Vietnam has been one of the main factors jeopardizing the cohesion of the American system during part of this period, for a number of reasons. One was the revulsion of large segments of the public in many countries belonging to the American system, including the United States itself, to the way this war was conducted. In Western Europe these feelings were mingled with a fear of a reorientation in American foreign policy in the direction of an "Asia first posture". These feelings and reactions will hopefully soon be of historical interest. What is likely to be of continuing relevance is the fact that the manifestations of a crisis of confidence and the lack of a sense of purpose in the American government also contributed to the disintegration in the American system. Even though there is a new administration in Washington, the notion that a continuing social malaise in America is going to inhibit the freedom of action of United States Government prevails in many parts of the world and is hardly conducive to greater cohesion in the American system. Other factors have operated in the same direction. A trend towards national selfassertion made itself felt not only in Western Europe but also in Latin America and Japan. With regard to European-American relations there has also been the fact that the period of greater West European self-confidence coincided with a stage in the development of nuclear strategy at which central control appeared absolutely essential to American policy makers, while West European governments were less inclined to accept unilateral US decisions in such crucial fields of policy and could afford to express their disagreement without undue risk to their security.

We have been told that the new United States administration is more sympathetic to the idea of a West European independent nuclear deterrent. I think, however, that we would be fooling ourselves if we did not recognize that this attitude is related

to the mounting financial burden involved in any serious West European effort to develop a force that would deserve the name of an independent nuclear deterrent. For one who has never believed in the political and military wisdom of such an undertaking this prospect is not disquieting. But I think we should be clear about it.

As for the distribution of power within the American system there have been some changes but no major shifts. Militarily, economically, and technologically the United States remains the preponderant power in the system. In strategic terms, the United States is less dependent on Western Europe at the end of the 1960s than a decade earlier. In order to maintain a crude balance of power with the Soviet Union - however one chooses to define such a balance - the United States hardly requires the cooperation of West European states. Thus, if the defence of Western Europe will continue to be a primary American interest in the 1970s, for which I think there is a good chance, it will be for economic, psychological, and perhaps sentimental reasons rather than for strategic ones. The situation is not symmetrical. It is true that West European feelings of dependence on America also diminished in the course of the last decade. A crucial factor in this development, however, has been the less aggressive Soviet posture towards the West. Although large-scale Soviet aggression against Western Europe remains a highly improbable contingency under almost any foreseeable circumstances, the sheer size and power potential of the Soviet Union might easily create imbalances on the European continent unless Western Europe can count on some ultimate reassurance from the trans-Atlantic superpower. Conditions in the Pacific and South-East Asia are similar in so far as the rise of China seems to pose a more immediate threat to the security interests of Japan, Australia, New Zealand and India than to those of the United States.

In the economic field the most significant developments have been the mushrooming of the Japanese economy and the consolidation of the European Economic Community. Neither of these two trends suggests a basic shift in the distribution of
power within the American system in the near future, although the rapidly increasing
strength of Japan may bring about such a shift in a not too distant future. For the
time being both developments have provided great opportunities for expansion to
American financial and industrial interests. This point is of course a reminder to
us that at least with regard to advanced industrial societies, the traditional model
for the study of international politics - of nation-states trying to influence conditions outside their borders - is becoming more and more inadequate; that the freedom of choice of individual governments is increasingly determined by the impact of
trans-national forces permeating their own societies, such as the exchange of know-

how, capital movements and migrations. We are only at the beginning of a proper understanding of these forces. But my tentative assessment, would be that the operation of trans-national forces is not likely in the foreseeable future to erode the economic, financial, and technological predominance of the United States within the American system. However, what we mean by the United States will have to be defined more precisely and should not automatically be equated with the Federal government in Washington.

It would be overdoing the point, if one were to consider the development and consolidation of the European Economic Community in the course of the 1960s primarily in terms of growing American influence in Western Europe. The picture is clearly more complex. In a number of instances, especially in connection with the Kennedy-round negotiations, the Community has demonstrated that it can function as a combination countervailing the influence of American business interests. At present, however, I would judge that this countervailing function of the Community is still more potential than real. Whether it will materialize depends not only on the extent to which the present members of the Community are able and willing to coordinate their policies but also on the prospects for the accession of further members, primarily, of course, Britain.

There is another way of looking at the recent changes in the two systems namely by trying to assess the <u>dynamic forces</u> which have impinged upon their structure, both those operating within each of the systems and external forces. This would, of course, require an elaborate study. Let me therefore raise only two questions that seem relevant here:

- (1) To what extent has the prevailing strategic and economic interdependence of main areas within each system been challenged by the opposing superpower?
- (2) To what extent have individual members of the two systems other than the superpowers shown an inclination to change their pattern of interaction with other states or regions in a way that would tend to alter the basic structure of one system or both?

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cf. Karl Kaiser: "The New International Environment of Britain and Germany", in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, ed., <u>Britain and Germany</u>; <u>Changing Societies and the Future of Foreign Policy</u> (forthcoming).

As for the first question, one should distinguish, of course, between purely declaratory stands and action policy. Clearly, in its declarations the Soviet Union has challenged the presence and dominance of American influence in many parts of the world as evidence of the fact that the United States is trying to assume the role of a self-appointed global gendarme. Yet, in terms of actions, such as cooperative agreements, trade or even less consequential steps like state visits, the record is different. If we use these latter criteria, the Soviet Union has challenged the predominance of American influence primarily in Western Europe and to a lesser degree in Japan. The main occasions exploited by Moscow in this connection have been the option open to the members of the North Atlantic Alliance in 1969 to discontinue their association with the alliance and the war in Vietnam. As 1969 passes without any country withdrawing from the alliance and the Vietnamese conflict looses some of its virulence, Soviet hopes for successfully challenging U.S. predominance in some of the core areas of the American system have been disappointed.

In the case of the United States it is similarly justified to speak of an explicit American challenge of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe at least until the mid 1960s which has since then slackened if not disappeared altogether. While the fact that American limited itself to verbal protestations during the Hungarian revolution of 1956 showed the faultiness of the rollback concept, the new approach adopted thereafter implied that the United States would seek to promote an evolutionary process of change in Eastern Europe in the direction of greater national selfassertion by a cautious and selectively applied policy of expanding trade and cultural contacts with individual East European countries. This policy, which could be implemented only in the more relaxed atmosphere of the post-Cuban period, was explicitly designed to encourage " a progressive loosening of external authority over Eastern European countries", as Averell Harriman expressed it in a speech in 1964. Since the mid-1960s this policy has undergone a significant change. I am thinking not so much of the increasing difficulty in eliciting congressional approval of trade liberalization with Communist countries in the period of escalation in Vietnam, but rather of the difference in motivation and purpose. Bridgebuilding and peaceful engagement were now presented as a policy which was in the interests of Americans, Europeans, and Russians alike, aiming at East-West reconciliation and the ultimate creation of a wider community of developed nations. In this context the American government explicitly disavowed any intention of sowing discord between Moscow and the smaller East European countries. The Soviet leadership did not accept this argument. For the Soviet leaders the dement of change in Eastern Europe inherent in the policy of peaceful engagement was the decisive thing: they continued to see Western policy towards Eastern Europe as a challenge of their control over this area. This was, of course, to a large extent due to the increasing

contact between Western and Eastern Europe and the concomitant trend towards an alteration of the basic structure of both the American and the Soviet system.

This brings me to the second question about the dynamics of change in these systems: the forces originating in the lesser countries. By adopting a definition of the whole international system which includes the word "multi-dimensional" I have tried to convey the notion that one of the most conspicious features of the global system is the proliferation of contacts and transactions between most, if not all actors operating in it. What we want to know in our specific context is to what extent this has implied an attempt to forge these patterns of interaction with a view to altering the structure of the two sub-systems, the Soviet and the American. I have partly pre-empted my reply by suggesting that several countries on both sides of the dividing line in Europe entertained such ambitions. The West German concept of an all-European peace order clearly implied modifications of the ties between the allies of both superpowers in Europe. This is even more obvious in the case of President de Gaulle's idea about a "European Europe". In some Eastern European countries as well there were indications - although usually more cautiously formulated that the emergence of new patterns of interaction was seen as a means to transform the existing structures of the two systems in a way that would de-emphasize their hegemonic features. The efforts of the West European integrationists was focused on conditions in the West. Their primary goal was a change in the structure of the Western system by a greater intensity of transactions in Western Europe. But this was generally seen as something that would eventually impinge on conditions in the Soviet system as well.

Similar tendencies can be observed in other parts of the world as well. We have witnessed the efforts of certain Latin-American states to develop economic and cultural ties with Western Europe and Japan. Japan for its part has shown interest in developing trade and technological cooperation both with China and the Soviet Union. Canada too has sought to improve relations with both the Soviet Union and China, and to demonstrate a measure of independence from its main partner on the North American continent. Recently Australia has indicated some sympathy for the Soviet plans to create an Asian security pact - just to mention a few of these trends. None of them suggests as yet a basic reorientation in the pattern of transactions, at least not nearly as much as developments in Europe during the 1960s. Nor do all of them represent a conscious effort on the part of these states to change the structure of their superpower system. In Asia the nature of the system is likely to change mainly as a result of American policy and a reorientation of Australian or Japanese policy may be seen more as an adaptation to these expected developments in the foreign

policy of the United States. Yet, if the growth of new patterns of interaction were to become a reality, it is likely to facilitate future attempts on the part of the lesser powers to change the basic structure of the American system.

The same holds true for the Soviet system in principle. And because the Soviet leaders fear these changes they have shown determination to prevent the emergence of new patterns of interaction in Europe through such instruments as the Warsaw pact, COMECON, and ultimately the Red Army. Their attitude should, of course, be seen in the light of the fact that to a far greater degree than its American counterpart the Soviet system has remained centred on Europe.

The only general conclusion one can draw from this attempt to assess the dynamics in the two systems is to assert the obvious: that the greatest concentration of forces challenging their basic structure in the course of the last decade has been in Europe but there the stakes have been so high and the criss-cross of competing preferences so complex that the result has been an impasse. Whether this situation will undergo a basic change, if the United States de-emphasizes and the Soviet Union asserts its presence in Asia and the Pacific, and if both superpowers desist from challenging each other's predominance in Western Europe and Eastern Europe respectively, can only be a matter of speculation.

It is not easy to sum up this sketchy survey of the situation in the two systems as they have evolved over the last decade in a way to suggest where they are heading. For the Soviet side, the most important developments are the demonstration of Moscow's greater assertiveness in the core area in Eastern Europe and the trend towards an extension of its influence in South Asia and the Middle East due to the conflict with China and the dynamics of the volatile situation in the Arab world. The determination of the present Soviet leadership to enforce its control over Eastern Europe is due not only to the tradition of perceiving Russia's primary security interests vis-à-vis the West in terms of buffer zones but also to the fear lest uncontrollable social processes in adjacent areas erode the power position of the ruling Soviet elite in its more immediate political environment. It is the reappearance of this special kind of interdependence, based on fearfulness that has made the evolution of the Soviet system into something that would begin to resemble a genuine community of nations appear unlikely in the foreseeable future. In view of the powerful forces of change that continue to operate in Eastern Europe, the possibility of new convulsions and repressive Soviet actions must be rated comparatively high, as long as there is no new ordering of political forces and priorities in Russia's top echelons.

The Soviet commitment to the Arab states is of a quite different character with much lower stakes for the Soviet leadership than in Eastern Europe. How Moscow is going to handle these ties depends on a number of factors that I cannot list nor evaluate here. On balance, however, I would judge that the Soviet interest in promoting a less explosive situation in the Middle East is growing. Whether this is best achieved by tighter control and thus a more prominent presence in the area or a modicum of disengagement of both superpowers may not be clear to the Soviet leadership itself. As I consider the Sino-Soviet conflict to be a secular trend I would expect the Soviet search for friends and influence among Asian countries to continue. But I am less certain if this will lead to a degree of interdependence with these countries that would qualify them for "membership" in the Soviet system. So far the Soviet Union has been rather selective in its efforts, and the strain on its resources which will certainly persist would seem to impose obvious limitations.

As for the American system, a summing up that would suggest some long-term trends is complicated by the reassessment of basic priorities and concepts presently being undertaken in the United States in all fields of public policy. This period of review and soul-searching is by no means concluded, but some of its results can be foreseen with a comparatively high degree of confidence. We can reasonably expect a continued increase in preoccupation with "the quality of American life" and thus with domestic rather than foreign policy issues. As a corollary to this and a legacy of Vietnam, there is likely to be a greater reluctance to risk new overseas involvments, and a "tougher" attitude with regard to the many commitments which will undoubtedly remain. What seems to be one of the main problems confronting the Western nations in the coming period is how the devolution of American authority and responsibility can be brought about in a way that will not further erode the sense of common interest and purpose among the nations hitherto belonging to the American system. The continued close cooperation among these highly industrialized societies and mutual confidence is important not only for Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, for whom ties with the United States will continue to be crucial, but also for the Western superpower itself, if it is to resist successfully the temptation to resort to uni-lateral action. After all, this is not only a matter of the mood of the public or the governing elite. To a significant extent the propensity for uni-lateral action is inherent in the structure of the American system.

I have pointed to some basic asymmetries in the strategic interdependence among the members of the American system which have become more pronounced over the last decade. These asymmetries will put special strains on the relations between the members of the system during a period when the leading power has announced its firm intention to devolve burdens and responsibilities on others. The success of this

operation will, of course, to a large extent depend on the international environment in which it takes place.

This brings me to the future of the relations between the superpowers as a major determining factor in the evolution of both systems. First of all, there is the question whether the trend towards tri-polarity in international relations - between Washington, Moscow, and Peking - will persist and if so at what pace. The emergence of a triangular relationship of virtual power may be a contingency of the 1980s or 90s rather than the 1970s even if China's rise to emminence should pick up again. But the outlook as it is going to evolve over the next decade will undoubtedly influence the performance of the two existing superpowers as indeed it does to a significant degree today. How are the Soviet Union and the United States going to deal with China, if it is considered a serious contender for superpower status? Will they cooperate to isolate China and contain her influence? Alternatively, will each of them treat Peking as a potential ally against the other and thus tend to compete for its favours? Or is there some prospect that Washington and Moscow might see it as a common interest to bring about the integration of China into a wider cooperative structure that might limit the risks of major conflicts between the most powerful states? I shall not indulge in a discussion of these questions, as the impact of China on American-Soviet relations is the subject of a separate paper to this conference. Let me merely point out that the alternatives hinted at would make for different priorities in the dealings of the two existing superpowers with the members of their respective systems.

Secondly, there is the future of the relations between the superpowers themselves and their impact on the two systems. While it is reasonable to assume a continued adversary/partner relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the strategic environment in which it is going to evolve will be distinctly different from the one of the last decade. One important difference is that with the Soviet Union acquiring a long-range air-lift and sea-lift capability we will witness for the first time what Zbigniew Brzezinski has called "the presence of two overlapping global military powers". With continued instability and probably growing risks of violent conflict in the Third World, the likelihood of superpower involvments and confrontations may be greater than the present trend towards a contraction of America's overseas presence seems to suggest. If such confrontations and involvments were to occur more frequently they are likely to become divisive issues in both

 $<sup>\</sup>mathbf{x})$ 

systems. Due to the differences between the two systems they will probably be far more visible and virulent on the American side.

The other feature of the strategic environment which is going to distinguish it from conditions in the 1960s is the fact that we seem to be entering a period of relative instability and greater complexity of the strategic balance. Developments in weapons technology, primarily the deployment of ballistic missile defence systems and the adaptation of missile forces with MIRVs will probably make it increasingly difficult to assess the strategic balance at any given moment. While the repercussions will depend on the way in which the new options are exercised by each side, some likely consequences can already be foreseen. (In presenting these consequences I start from the assumption that ruling elites in East and West will show about the same ability as hitherto to resist the pressure for acquiring capabilities that have become technologically feasible - a capability which on the whole I rate low. After all, who will be against "progress"?).

Determent calculations will be more difficult than they have been hitherto and this in turn will make defence planning more complicated, especially if it is to involve decision-makers in several countries. The decrease in confidence that there is a crude balance of military power between East and West is likely to create pressures in some countries including the superpowers themselves for adopting military postures that would have a high insurance-threshold against uncertainty. On the other hand this may conflict with the rationale for arms control measures, either regional, like in Central Europe, where they continue to be desirable for political reasons and may conceivably become more negotiable, or in certain categories of weapon systems, like BMD, where they might appear essential for reasons of economy. In all events it seems likely that these factors will also create difficulties in both systems, although again I would presume they will be greater in the American.

I am at the end of my survey. It has hardly yielded material for courageous predictions about the two systems; hopefully it may facilitate a slightly more orderly thinking about them in the future.

### INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 11th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

# THE SUPER POWERS SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

#### PLENARY SESSION

Saturday 20th September

Morning (II)

### The Scope for Super-Power Agreements

#### PROF. HEDLEY BULL

The United States and the Soviet Union are committed to hold talks on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons. There is no guarantee that these talks will lead to agreements or even to valuable exchanges of ideas. But potentially they are the most important formal arms control negotiations of the postwar years for they raise directly, as between the two super-powers, who alone are able to determine it, the question of the future of the central balance of strategic nuclear power, around which the whole structure of international relationships is built.

This question has underlain all arms control negotiating since the strategic nuclear balance first arose in the mid 1950's, while never having been placed explicitly on the agenda. (In a sense it also underlay the negotiations that preceded the rise of the strategic nuclear balance, inasmuch as the Baruch Plan and early Soviet 'ban the bomb' proposals reflected, respectively, the fear and the hope that such a balance might come into being). The question has sometimes been brought into the foreground in the course of multilateral discussions of radical disarmament schemes: most notably, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee has witnessed the 'Gromyko umbrella' proposal of 1962 for the retention by the two super-powers of an agreed, low (but unspecified) number of nuclear delivery vehicles during 'the disarming process', and the 'Johnson freeze' proposal of 1964 for a dessation of further production and deployment of nuclear delivery vehicles. But the question of the central strategic balance has not yet formed the subject of negotiations that are formal, bilateral and of a Such negotiations, if they occur, will represent not the businesslike nature. beginning of a process of discussion, mutual education and mutual exploration. but the continuation of one. The central balance has been the constant subject of that erratic and still largely mysterious process, 'the strategic dialogue', which has been carried on through such means as the scrutiny by the super-powers

of one another's words and deeds for 'signals' and 'messages', ministerial and diplomatic contacts, negotiations on related subjects, and unofficial or quasiofficial contacts. But they will represent a new form of the strategic dialogue, and may present new opportunities for a more authentic communication of the views held on each side and a more forthright confrontation of the issue.

What is the context of Soviet-American relations in which the talks are likely to take place? What objectives should it be the aim of the talks to promote? And what is the range of proposals which the talks might explore, so as to serve these objectives?

## I. THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS Continuing Strategic Preponderance

Strategic arms limitation talks will take place in a context which includes, first of all, the continuing strategic preponderance of the super-powers.

The vast gap which separates the military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union from that of all other states, and which makes each of them a potential threat to the other of an altogether different order to that which it faces from any other power, remains a central feature of the world scene. This strategic preponderance arose before the advent of strategic nuclear weapons, and still exists independently of them; but the latter are its principal expression. While Britain, France and China have deployed or are developing small strategic forces based on the American and Soviet technology of a decade ago, the super-powers have reasserted their preponderance by moving forward into the era of the larger and more accurate missile, the A.B.M. and the multiple warhead. The bilateral talks on strategic weapons for the first time explicitly recognise this special military position of the super-powers.

This continued polarisation of military power as between the United States and the Soviet Union impels them to maintain a dialogue with each other and to iron out rules of coexistence, especially so as to avoid the risks of a central nuclear war. But it also requires them to maintain a vigilant attitude towards each other, to avoid distraction by conflicts of secondary importance, to keep up their guard rather than lower it, to attend closely to the ratio of power between each other and to eye suspiciously proposals to contain it, or some a spect of it, within the bounds of an international agreement.

The United States and the Soviet Union are less exclusively preoccupied with their relationship with each other than they were in the period of the cold war, and this has contributed to a relaxation of tension. The Soviet-American relationship has ceased to be the major point of friction, i.e. of likelihood of armed conflict, among the great powers: it may be argued that during the 1960's the United States - China relationship has been the major

point of friction, and that as we move towards the 1970's this has given place to the Soviet Union - China relationship. But tension is the product not merely of the likelihood of immediate eruption of a conflict into war, but of the assessments made by each side of the other's basic and long-term capacity to frustrate its objectives, and in this sense the Soviet-American relationship remains, as Stanley Hoffman has expressed it, 'The relationship of major tension'. This being so, any attempt to hammer out an agreement expressing what the military balance between the super-powers should be will remain subject to those classic pressures which have always made the principal rivals in an arms competition unwilling to contemplate agreement and rest in what is pre-eminently the domain of conflict and change, the more so as the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons (unlike the partial banning of nuclear tests, the demilitarisation of Antarctica or the banning of weapons of mass destruction in outer space) touches the balance at its most sensitive point.

#### Declining Political Preponderance

Secondly, the talks will take place against the background of the declining political preponderance of the super-powers. Military force is only one of the dimensions of power in international relations, and despite their continued military pre-eminence the United States and the Soviet Union have suffered a decline in their political position in relation to other major powers during the 1960's, which shows every sign of continuing into the 1970's.

In part this decline reflects the difficulty, in present circumstances, of exploiting military power for political purposes. Strategic nuclear war is a means of last resort which can be used rationally, or threatened credibly, only where issues of the life and death of nations are at stake. powers are inhibited (though not, in the last analysis, precluded) from exploiting their strategic nuclear preponderance in relation to other states by the disproportion between this means and the ends they have so far had in view in their relations with these states; by their fear of becoming embroiled with one another; and by the interests which they have in minimising the explicit role of nuclear weapons in world politics so as to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons to further states, to minimise the likelihood that states who do or will have nuclear weapons will use them, and so to strengthen the foundations of international security. But in part also the political decline of the super-powers reflects the rise of other major centres of power : especially West Germany and Japan, whose position derives from great economic strength and great potential for military power, and France and China, whose political weight rests upon a substantial degree of actual military power, including nuclear weapons, together with the will to devote their energies and resources to the pursuit of diplomatic independence.

This diffusion of power has been accompanied by other basic changes, in relation to which it functions both as a cause and a result: the decline of global ideologies, the disintegration of cold war alliances, the emergence of detente between the super-powers, and the restoration of flexibility and mobility (limited, however, by the continuing strategic preponderance of the super-powers) into the pattern of combination and opposition. So important are these changes that the international system or phase of the international system, into which we now appear to be moving, is as different from that of the cold war period of the 1 to 1940's and 1950's as the latter was from the international system of the period of the Second World War.

The diffusion of power must affect Soviet-American talks on strategic arms in the following ways:

(a) The super-powers, in considering what limitations they might accept on their own strategic armaments must calculate the bearing of these limitations on their military strength relative to that of other parties.

It is not the case, as is sometimes asserted, that the super-powers are bound to seek to preserve a margin of superiority that will protect them against 'the menace of multipolarity'. Their concerns are more about the rising strength of particular powers than about abstract concepts such as 'multipolarity' or 'proliferation', though in the United States, where such concepts play a part in political thinking, the latter are important also. Moreover, their attitudes towards the rise of these powers is more ambivalent than purely negative Both the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, have displayed ambivalence towards the restoration of French and West German diplomatic independence. Nevertheless certain agreements which could in principle be struck between the super-powers would in time augment the relative position of Britain, France, China and certain potential nuclear powers, unless they were followed up by limitations affecting the latter countries also. principal concern of the super-powers is, of course, China, in relation to whom a proportion of American and Soviet strategic weapons are already deployed. The fact of China's power by itself rules out any Soviet-American agreement to make drastic reductions in strategic nuclear forces.

(b) The super-powers are subject to strong pressures from other powers wishing to affect the talks - the timing of them, the scope of the subjects discussed, the outcome - in one direction or another. The United States is subject to pressure from her European allies both to consult closely with them throughout the negotiations (which President Nixon has undertaken to do), and to attend to the bearing of the discussions on the European security problem, the relation between the Soviet MR/IREM force and NATO tactical nuclear forces, which more closely affect West European security than that of the United States.

Both the super-powers are expected by non-nuclear powers that have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty to produce some tangible evidence that they are taking steps to restrict 'vertical' proliferation along with 'horizontal', while both are expected by nations relying upon the super-powers for their security, to maintain the strength necessary to fulfil their pledges to allies.

The consciousness of the super-powers, as they speak to each other, of the bearing of what they say on their relations with the rest of the world, must force them to think about their own special position as the 'great indispensibles' in the management of power relations throughout international The subject-matter of the talks is strictly strategical. But it is widely assumed, both by the supporters of 'collusion between the imperialists and the revisionists' and by opponents of it, that the talks form part of a wider attempt by the super-powers to iron out their differences and to concert their policies at least in some areas of the world. Hopes for such a concerting of policies - on the American side in relation to a Vietnam settlement, and on the Russian side in relation to the Sinn-Soviet border dispute - dc appear to provide part of the motivation for the talks. Moreover, certain of the strategic agreements which might in principle be reached, have definite implications for the political structure of the world: for example, an understanding . that A.B.M. systems would be deployed that were effective against secondary nuclear states but not as between the super-powers, might imply a movement towards joint super-power hegemony, whereas acceptance of a comprehensive limitation and perhaps reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles would entail a rejection of notions of 'high posture' and a policy of working closely with a wider group of powers.

#### Enduring but Limited Political Détente

Enduring but still limited political détente. The United States and the Soviet Union have evolved a modus vivendi which is an established institution and a predictable element in the political framework of the world. Its bases lie in the stake which the two countries acquired in the status quo as a result of their position as victors in the Second World War, which was obscured as the cold war advanced but revealed as it receded; in the persistence throughout the whole postwar period, (before as well as after the rise of the strategic balance) of a rough balance of power which provided them with the option of relaxing the structle for supremacy; in the fear of thermonuclear war, which became a powerful factor in the 1950's; in the consciousness of common antagonists, especially China, which developed during the 1960's; in some experience of cooperation, as nuclear Haves confronting Have Nots with the Non-Proliferation Treety, and as economic Haves resisting the demends of Have Nots at the UNCTAD

meetings; and more latterly, in a certain contracting of their respective objectives, an abandonment of broad and inclusive conceptions of the national interest in favour of narrower and more exclusive ones (reflected in the playing down of ideology and of what used to be called 'the struggle for the Third World'), which has reduced the area of possible collision between them (and, incidentally, the leverage of the 'Third World' over them).

The landmarks in the development of the détente are perhaps the Geneva summit conference of 1955, the Camp David meeting of 1959, the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. The United States and the Soviet Union paid a heavy price, in terms of relations with some of their allies, in the process of arriving at their present understandings. Their investment in the détente is a large one. It has recently survived the strain of the Vietnam crisis of 1965-8 and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Within the two super-powers there are undoubtedly elements favourable to infringing the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty; but these agreements appear as solid as rock. It would be wrong to assume that the détente could not be undone, but only some very great upheaval could bring this about.

Firmly based though the détente may be it is nevertheless built around a very narrow area of common interests perceived by the two countries. They clearly perceive a common interest in the avoidance of nuclear war with each other, and in the course of insulating their relationship against this danger they have avoided all recourse to nuclear weapons; avoided becoming directly involved against each other in an armed conflict; avoided (apart from the Cuban case) direct military interference in one another's principal spheres of influence, Latin America and Eastern Europe; sought to contain conflicts, as in Congo, the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, which threatened to embroil them; and reached a series of understandings in the field of arms control.

It is clear also that the United States and the Soviet Union have become aware of interests they share in resisting the policies of various other states, and have come to practice a degree of collaboration against these states, of an informal, partial and tentative kind. It may be stretching the use of the term to say that they have cooperated in South and South East Asia to contain China; but certainly each is able to recognise that the other's policies are working at least in part to further its own interests. It would be wrong to say that they had cooperated against West Germany, which to the United States appears as a loyal and trusted ally, and to the Soviet Union appears as (at least potentially) an aggressive dissatisfied power bent on revising the map of Eastern Europe; yet the two super-powers undoubtedly have certain common objectives with regard to Western Germany (e.g. that she should not acquire nuclear weapons, and that she should not alter her present frontiers by force)

and while the super-powers have not been willing to acknowledge the fact, much in the policies of each in recent years has had the effect of promoting ends shared with the other (in United States policy, the containment of West Germany within the framework of NATO, the stationing of American forces in Western Germany, the efforts through the M.L.F. and the Nuclear Planning Grouping NATO to provide an alternative to a West German nuclear force; in Soviet policy the maintenance of the Warsaw Pact, as a barrier to revisionism, an attitude of hostility bordering on hysteria towards suggestions that West Germany should acquire a measure of control over nuclear weapons, the strong insistence that West Germany should become a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty).

But it is difficult to find evidence of interests recognised in common between the two countries that would justify speculations that they might agree to establish, or to work towards, some kind of joint hegemony of the globe. These speculations perhaps run together a number of ideas which should be kept separate:

- (a) We should distinguish the idea of a condominium or joint government by the super-powers (something which has existed on a local scale, as in the occupation of Germany, but which is scarcely conceivable on a universal scale) from the idea of a joint management of the world, a concerting together of their political and strategic efforts in the service of an agreed conception of the requirements of order in the world as a whole (something which the founders of the U.N. envisaged that the United States and the Soviet Union would do, in conjunction with other permanent members of the Security Council).
- (b) We should distinguish the proposition that the super-powers should exert a joint hegemony, combining together so as to enforce a common policy all over the globe (as they would need to do, e.g., if they sought to make a reality of the U.N. Charter system of collective security), from the proposition that they should operate a system of twin or parallel hegemonies, a division of labour that would leave each of them supreme over a portion of the globe.
- another the right to a sphere of predominant influence in some portion of the globe, from the notion that they divide the world into spheres not merely of right, but of responsibility to exercise influence in accordance with common objectives. (The United States and the Soviet Union already respect one another's rights to predominant influence in Eastern Europe and Latin America, respectively although they have not explicitly recognised any such rights, and are unwilling to concede each other what used to be described as a 'free hand' in these or any other regions, as witness American protests over Czechoslovakia and Soviet protests over Santo Domingo. But the idea of spheres of responsibility as distinct from spheres of influence an idea implicit in Churchill's schemes for basing world order upon systems of great power regional

predominance, linked together in the framework of the U.N. - cannot be said yet to play any part in their thinking).

- (d) We should distinguish a system of joint management limited to the control of nuclear weapons, and directed only towards preserving the nuclear balance and arresting the spread of nuclear weapons, from a system of comprehensive joint management of the international political process as a whole. (It was the former formula that was advanced by John Strachey in his advocacy of 'condominium', but one of the difficulties of it is that the management by the super-powers of the distribution of nuclear force throughout the world presupposes and entails the management of a great deal else).
- (e) It is necessary, in thinking about any of these ideas of joint management or hegemony, to distinguish between arrangements that include the formal setting out of the rights and duties of the managers (as the U.N. Charter spells out the rights and duties of permanent members of the Security Council) and arrangements that derive from unwritten and perhaps even unspoken understandings.

The United States and the Soviet Union are both great managers of the international political process but they cannot be said to be operating a system of joint hegemony in any of the above senses because of the difficulty of showing that their managerial or hegemonial functions are carried out according to any agreed scheme or plan. There is certainly no formal agreement assigning them responsibilities of this sort: the most we can say is that in respect of, say, the spread of nuclear weapons, the recognition of spheres of influence and the containment of conflict in various parts of the world, they sometimes act as if there is an unstated understanding about their station and its duties.

Their unwillingness to move beyond this towards a system of joint hegemeny derives ultimately from the fact that they are still more anxious about each other powers in the system. For example, they both wish to see China kept in check, but each at the same time values China as a limitation of the power of the other, as the Soviet Union demonstrated in helping to defend China's strategic frontier in North Vietnam, and as the United States is now showing in its policy of neutrality towards the Sino-Soviet border dispute. While the Soviet-American relationship remains 'the relationship of major tension' the materials are not available for an attempt to move from a balance to a concert of power.

Even if the two super-powers were able to sink their differences and present a united front to the rest of the world, their ability jointly to manage world politics would be limited by the diffusion of power that has already taken place. The spread of nuclear weapons, the outbreak of conclicts elsewhere in the world, the disintegration of new states in civil conflicts, they can affect

but not in the last analysis fully control, however closely they concert their efforts.

#### Declining Strategic Stability

A fourth aspect of the background to the talks is the <u>declining stability</u> of the strategic nuclear balance. 'Stability' is a vogue word which in common parlance has become meaningless. By the stability of the strategic nuclear we mean its built-in tendency to persist; and by a strategic nuclear balance balance between two powers we mean a situation in which each possesses strategic nuclear forces that can threaten the other with a degree of destruction sufficient to ensure that a deliberate attack would not be a rational act of policy.

The stability of the balance, in this sense, does not ensure that it will keep the peace, for it does not preclude an attack which is not rational or not an act of policy. The balance, moreover, does not rest on equality as between the forces on one side and the forces on the other, nor does it consist in equality in the amount (or the amount times the degree of probability) of the destruction that can be caused on each side. It lies in the possession by both sides of strategic forces, of whatever is the appropriate size or strength, able to cause destruction of whatever is the appropriate level and with whatever is the appropriate degree of probability, to make deliberate resort to an attack an irrational act for the opponent.

What this level of destruction and degree of certainty are will be determined not by the nature of the strategic forces available to the threatening country but by the judgements of the leaders of the country that is threatened: judgements made, in the light of the beliefs they hold on the day, about the magnitude of the destruction their country would suffer, the will of the opposing country to bring it about, the gains they would make by launching an attack or the losses they would suffer by not launching one, and the elements of uncertainty in each of these calculations.

It is because the appropriate level and degree of certainty of destruction are determined by these psychological and political factors that cannot be precisely determined that the existence or non-existence of various strategic nuclear balances (or the degree of stability attaching to them) is the subject of so much controversy. Arguments as to whether France can deter an attack by the Soviet Union now, whether China will be able to deter one from the United States in the late 1970's, or the United States one by the Soviet Union in certain strategic contingencies, thrive on the impossibility of knowing in advance what judgements governments will make about their situation.

This very uncertainty as to what constitutes an appropriate degree of Assured Destruction may be taken as an argument for maintaining it at a high level, as the United States has done during the 1960's. Mr. McNamara, in his

FY1969 posture statement said that Assured Destruction implied 'an ability to inflict at all times and under all foreseeable conditions an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors - even after absorbing a surprise attack'. He further spelt this out as 'the clear and present ability to destroy the attacker as a viable twentieth century nation, 'and went on to say that in the case of the Soviet Union' a capability on our part to destroy, say, one-fifth to one-fourth of her population and one-half of her industrial capacity would serve as an effective deterrent'. He added that China was still far from being an industrial nation, and that a force able to destroy half of China's urban population and more than half her industrial capacity would serve as a 'major deterrent'.

It would be mistaken to regard the high level of United States strategic nuclear forces in the 1960's as the product simply of this doctrine of the need for a high (but finite) level of Assured Destruction. The force levels are also the product of political and industrial pressures, and bureaucratic compromises, for which the doctrines of Assured Destruction and Damage Limitation have provided a rationale. On the other hand in the highly intellectualised American governmental process, persuasively argued strategic doctrines do have a significant causal force, and service and industrial groups, if they are to be effective, often need to generate strategic doctrines The concept of Assured Destruction, moreover, that serve their purposes. because it implies upper as well as lower limits to the level of destruction contemplated, is an intellectual instrument which can be used (unlike the concept of Damage Limitation) to combat demands for the expansion or improvement of strategic forces, and was so used by Secretary Mc Namara.

The stability of the strategic balance can in principle be upset in two ways: either by the acquisition by one side or both of a disarming capacity, in the sense of a capacity to eliminate or cripple the other side's strategic retaliatory forces, command centres and military communications system; or by the acquisition, by one side or both, of an effective defence of population centres and industrial capacity.

It is doubtful whether the stability of the Soviet-American strategic balance ever has been, or ever could be, absolute; it is maintained only by constant attention to standards of warning, invulnerability, penetration capacity, accuracy, political determination etc., which, if it were not forthcoming would place the balance in jeopardy. The 1960's, in particular, has not been a period of absolute stability: it began with American concern about Soviet first-strike capacity, deriving from an supposed 'missile gap', and leading in the first few years of the decade to the build up of the American force to something close to its present levels. And it is possible also (though we do not know) that as

<sup>\*</sup> Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget (prepared 1/22/68).

this happened the Soviet Union became alarmed about the considerable American disarming capacity that resulted from the missile build-up, and that this played a part in the remarkable build-up of Soviet strategic nuclear forces that appears to have been set in motion after the Cuban missile crisis and to have gathered momentum in the last three years.

However, the middle and late 1960's do appear to have been years of high relative stability. We have had the word of Secretary Mc Namara, in year after year of posture statements, that (as he said in his FY1969 statement), despite American 'superiority' in terms of certain of the measures of strategic nuclear capacity, 'the blunt, inescapable fact remains that the Soviet Union could still effectively destroy the United States, even after absorbing the full weight of an American first strike'. We do not have any evidence comparable to this as to what Soviet estimates have been, but everything about their words and behaviour su gests that they realise the United States could do the same to them.

There seems little doubt that the relative stability of the strategic balance in the middle and late 1960's is giving place to a period of relative instability, probably more serious than that of the early 1960's. This is because of the conjunction of technological developments making both towards the acquisition of a disarming capacity and towards the development of effective defences of population and industry.

The threat of a disarming capacity takes the form principally of the threat represented by missiles of greater accuracy and larger payload, and carrying MIRV's to the vulnerability of fixed, land-based missile sites, command centres and communications links. To this may be added the concerns that are felt in some quarters about the threat of FOBS and of SLEM's fired from close in shore to the vulnerability of bomber bases, and the anxiety that exists in some minds as to whether it will remain beyond the capacity of ASW to pin-point the whereabouts of submarine-based missile forces, especially if a capacity to do this were to be developed in circumstances in which land-based missile and bomber forces had also become vulnerable.

The threat of a defence of population and industrial capacity arises from the AEM system, for while neither the <u>Galosh</u> system deployed around Moscow nor the <u>Safeguard</u> system that is to be deployed by stages in the United States can be said in any sense to undermine the capacity of the other side to create damage that seems bound to be regarded as 'unacceptable', they do set in train a series of developments which could lead to a serious cutting away of Assured Destruction capability, and they have already introduced an atmosphere of questioning and uncertainty about the longterm prospects of Soviet and American deterrent capacity, where previously there was only the confidence that it would endure.

The American ABM debate has produced a great deal of quantitative analysis of the likely effects of these recent technological developments, which I do not propose to summarise here. The debate was remarkable not only for its high technical content but also (with some notable exceptions) for its partisan and doctrinaire character, each side selecting its modes of analysis according to the purpose in view, and both treating the issue simply as one skirmish in a wider campaign for or against the power and policies of the 'military - industrial complex'.

For our present purpose it is important to take note only of what the various parties to the debate held in common, viz. that recent strategic technology has produced de-stabilising tendencies of one kind or another - the anti-ABM lobby tending to stress the de-stabilising consequences of a U.S. ABM deployment (though not always admitting that Soviet AEM deployment called for any adjustment), and the pro-ABM party relying heavily on the de-stabilising effects of a possible future Soviet SS9-MIRV force (while playing down the de-stabilising implications of a United States Poseidon - MIRV or Minuteman III - MIRV deployment). There have been some who have welcomed the de-stabilising effects of ABM deployment, either because like Edward Teller they hope it will lead to a United States strategic preponderance over Russia, or because like Don Brennan and Freeman Dyson they hope it will lead to a system of security based on defence rather than deterrence. But they do not deny the fact that there are destabilising tendencies at work (Brennan and Dyson do deny that the Soviet Union is bound to compensate for the eating away of the Soviet deterrent as the consequence of an American AEM deployment; and they urge that the United States should not seek to compensate by the expansion of offensive forces for the reduction of the American deterrent by Soviet ABM. But they do recognise, indeed emphasise, that Damage Limitation achieved by ABM will undermine Assured Destruction; and they both recognise the disarming potential of MIRV).

It is true that AEM and MIRV, the two most important innovations, are both ambiguous in their effects on stability: an AEM system may function to protect one's own deterrent as well as to undermine the opponent's, and a MIRV deployment may increase the capacity to penetrate enemy defences, while at the same time posing a threat to the survivability of enemy forces. It is true also that these two developments may cancel each other out, if both the super-powers proceed with both AEM and MIRV: this would seem at least as likely as the possibility that one side will combine superiority in both AEM and MIRV in such a way as to upset the balance - which (to oversimplify his testimony) Secretary Laird has envisaged with regard to Russia, and which certain of the anti-AEM lobby fear may be accomplished by the United States. Finally, it is true that no one has been able to show that any strategic weapon or combination of weapons now in the stage of development or deployment is bound to upset the strategic balance.

We can speak only of the existence of destabilising tendencies which, if not corrected, would endanger the strategic balance (whether or not they would therefore endanger international security is a separate question, which is considered below). Such destabilising tendencies occur all the time, and are inherent in the attempt to maintain a balance of power in an age of technological and political change. There is no doubt, however, that (more in this case for technological than political reasons) the Soviet-American strategic balance has entered a period of high relative instability.

#### Emerging Strategic Parity

A fifth feature of the context is the emergence of strategic parity between the super-powers. Parity in the sense of equality in numbers and types of weapons or forces is not and never has been an acceptable measure of the balance of military strength between two countries, at the strategic nuclear or any other For one thing parity can be shown to exist or not to exist only in particular dimensions of military strength - numbers of soldiers, period of service, bore and rate of fire of cannon, number and tonnage displacement of warships etc: it is doubtful whether such a concept as 'overall military strength' is measurable at all. Thus in comparing Soviet and American strategic nuclear forces we can establish whether or not parity exists in e.g. numbers of missile launchers, accuracy, payload and throw-weight of missiles, number and yield of warheads, gross deliverable megatonnage etc. but there is no measure of 'overall strategic nuclear power' that does not beg vital questions. For another thing, even if we could reduce the various dimensions of military power to a common denominator this would not tell us what the outcome of an armed conflict will be, for this will depend on factors of political will, morale, generalship, tactical skill and sheer chance that are generally not understood until the war is over, and then more often misunderstood.

In particular, parity in the various dimensions of strategic nuclear striking power is not necessary for the existence of a strategic nuclear balance, in the sense defined above. It is easy to see that a country inferior, say, in total numbers of deliverable warheads (which Secretary Mc Namara has claimed is the best measure of 'overall strategic effectiveness') can pose a sufficient threat of Assured Destruction to an adversary to make a deliberate attack by him irrational as an act of policy. The Soviet Union has been inferior to the United States in this dimension throughout the period of her possession of a nuclear force, while nevertheless a strategic nuclear balance has obtained as between her and the United States for most of that period. Nor is parity in strategic nuclear striking power sufficient to create a strategic balance (again, in the sense defined above), for one side or both might be incapable of creating a sufficient threat of destruction because its offensive forces are too weak, the opposing defences too strong, or for some other reason.

Nevertheless the existence or non-existence of military parity as between two states may have considerable political significance. Where numbers of men or weapons can be measured and opposing states shown to be equal or unequal in these respects a yardstick exists by reference to which the impression can be created that strategic power has been guaged in a meaningful way.

Such indications of equality or inequality may be significant in the domestic political life of a country, and they may also affect the assessments that are made in the world at large of that country's relative military standing. Secretary Mc Namara, for example, found it worth while to stress year after year, throughout his period of office, the quantitative and qualitative superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear forces. He himself came to stress, especially in his later years in office, the limited meaning of this superiority, inasmuch as the Soviet Union's forces were more than ample to create sufficient damage to make nuclear war unacceptable to the United States. But he was undoubtedly correct in his judgement that the knowledge of America's leed in this field contributed to the sense of security which these forces engendered within the United States, and also to the confidence th t the allies of the United States were willing to place in her guarantees and the awe in which the world generally stood of America's military might.

The Soviet Union is now overtaking the United States in some, though not all, of the ascertainable dimensions in which her superiority in strategic nuclear forces in the past has been based. The Soviet Union, according to Secretary Laird's testimony in March this year, is now reaching or has reached the United States total of 1,054 ICHM launchers. The SS-9 ICBM has a much greater payload than any American ICEM, and the Soviet Union has tested a warhead of much larger yield than any American one. She has developed a landmobile ICEM, whereas the United States has not. She is producing nuclearpowered ballistic missile-firing submarines at a rate which will wear down the American lead, if the United States Polaris/Poseidon force remains stationary at its present ceiling of 41 boats. The Soviet Union has an ABM system deployed, whereas the United States has only just taken a decision on the deployment of Safeguard. She has tested a FOBS or low trajectory ICEM, and is developing an MRV which may possibly be a MIRV.

On the other hand the United States is said to remain superior in some of the qualitative aspects of ICEM technology: her ICEM force is more accurate, and more hardened. Her lead in SLEM's is still very great (656 to about 100 early this year) and she is replacing Polaris with Poseidon. Her long range bomber force is much larger than the Soviet one (646 to 150 in March this year) and its penetration capacity is being strengthened. Although she lags behind the Soviet Union in the deployment of an AEM system, she claims to be ahead in AEM technology, and also in MIRV technology (the Soviet Galosh system resembles

the <u>Nike-Zeus</u> system which the United States discarded in 1959 and MIRV has been successfully tested). It is claimed that the United States remains superior in total number of deliverable war beads. (4,200 to 1,200 in March this year).

Were it not for the emergence of parity in various of these dimensions of strategic nuclear force it is doubtful whether the Soviet Union would have agreed to take part in the strategic arms talks. The fact of American superiority in this field has in the past militated against the holding of negotiations confined to strategic nuclear forces. The emergence of parity, moreover, alters the meaning of some long-standing proposals. The 'Johnson freeze' proposal, at the time it was put forward, would have frozen an American superiority (and also interrupted the development of a secure Soviet second-strike system), but it now appears at least in this respect at least prima facie a more negotiable propo-The 'Gromyko umbrella' proposal for a form of what used to be called 'minimum deterrent' no longer suffers from the disadvantage, from the American point of view, that the Soviet Union had only a 'minimum deterrent' in any case, and that the United States was being asked to disarm down to her level. is no guarantee, however, that the Soviet strategic build-up will taper off with the achievement of 'parity', or that the United States will tolerate the latter as a permanent state of affairs.

#### The Influence of the Military

A Sixth feature of the context of the talks is that in the United States the influence of the military is in decline, whereas in the Soviet Union it appears to be in the ascendancy. The two super-powers are drawn towards the talks, though not necessarily towards the pursuit of an agreement, by a number of factors that affect them both: the continuing need, because of the sheer destructive power they both command, to maintain a dialogue; the hope of securing the other's political cooperation — in the Soviet case, especially in relation to China, in the American case, in relation to Vietnam, and possibly in both cases, in relation to the Middle East; the perennial factor of the hope of reducing the costs of strategic arms competition. But the United States is pushed towards the talks by a powerful domestic factor, or set of related factors, for which there expears no equivalent in the Soviet Union.

The mood of American public and Congressional opinion is one of intense questioning of the influence and sound judgement of the military, the value of military commitments, the case for high military expenditure, the need for military strength and the validity of doctrines that have rationalised it in the past.

This mood of anti-militarism, which American history should have taught us to regard as the norm but which the last twenty years have conditioned us not to expect, has shifted the centre of gravity of the American debate about

strategic nuclear forces away from the unilateral pursuit of superior strength and towards accommodation and the acceptance of parity or, if not parity, 'sufficiency'.

This shifting of the centre of gravity may be traced to the declining attention given by Secretary Mc Namara in his last few years in office, to the concept of Damage Limitation (itself a retreat from earlier notions of meaning-ful victory in strategic nuclear war) as against that of Assured Destruction, and to his increasing preoccupation with the arms control dimension of America's strategic problem, which he spoke of (begging a number of important questions about the dynamics of arms races) as the 'action-reaction phenomenon?.

It is clearly reflected in the development, by the Johnson and Nixon Administration, of policy on the A.B.M. question, over which the United States has possibly displayed more self-conscious awareness of the dimension of arms control than it has in relation to any other strategic decision. Johnson's original January 1967 procurement decision was accompanied by the original invitation to the Soviet Union to join in talks on defensive missiles, and seemed to indicate that a decision to deploy would not be made if a Soviet The September 1967 Sentinel decision was accompanied response were forthcoming. by a reassertion of America's willingness to talk, and a justification of the decision by Secretary Mc Namara that emphasised the anti-Chinese orientation of the system and the dangers that pressures might grow for a thick defence of cities President Nixon's March 1969 Safeguard took the process further. against Russia. Safeguard was said to be an improvement over Sentinel because it placed the emphasis on the defence of retaliatory forces, it involved less risk that it would lead to a heavy, anti-Soviet city defence, and it was to be accompanied by an annual review which made the implementation of each of its stages conditional, among other things, on the progress of strategic arms talks. striking thing about the Congressional hearings on A.B.M. is the way in which both sides argued their case in terms of the stability of the nuclear balance.

It might be wrong to assume that the pursuit of 'superiority' has disappeared from American policy, or that the American negotiating position will reveal itsself to be built around a strict interpretation of 'sufficency', to which President Nixon has given his blessing. Nevertheless these ideas represent a significant departure from those that were central to United States policy only a few years ago, when American official thinking, even in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was built around the proposition (which I do not wish to disparage) that the security of the United States (because the Soviet Union was likely to be the aggressor, or because the United States had wider alliance commitments) required a clear margin of superiority.

In the Soviet Union, by contrast, the military wing of the Communist Party appears to be in the ascendant. The government is carrying through a spectacular expansion of strategic nuclear forces, and must attach great political value to the achievement of parity. It is bound to be thinking in very military terms about its relation with China, which seems likely to dispose it against the acceptance of restraints agreed between itself and the United States. It does not have to justify its decisions to an 'arms control community' anything like as powerful or as sophisticated in its thinking as that which exists in the United States.

While it is easy to envisage the interest the Soviet leadership may feel it has in taking part in talks - so as to influence the decisions which the United States is called upon to make in the strategic weapons field (in which the course of talks is now officially recognised to be an ingredient) to advertise her achievement of parity, to preserve links with the United States and perhaps to sow dissension within the ranks of NATO, and while it is also true that the Soviet negotiating position in these talks, like the North Vietnamese/NLF position in the Vietnam peace talks, will draw strength from the tide of dissent within the United States, it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union has motives to pursue an agreement in this field, remotely as powerful as those that are so evident in the United States.

#### II THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

Given that the context of Soviet-American relations is as it has been described what objectives should the strategic arms talks seek to promote? I propose to examine this question from the perspective of arms control, i.e. with regard to the common interests of all states in international security. This is not the perspective from which the super-powers consider what objectives they should seek in arms control negotiations (and I should argue that it is as well that they do not) though it may sometimes play a part. Governments do not shape their foreign policies only in terms of security, and in so far as they are concerned with the latter, it is with national rather than international security. Because, moreover, by their very nature they are custodians of the interests and aspirations of only a limited portion of mankind they are disqualified as legislators of the universal good.

But the private student of arms control has a different responsibility. He should avoid assuming that he has been vouchsafed some special revelation of the world's needs (the difference between him and his government is not that he can speak for all the world and it for only part, but that it can speak for part of the world and he for none at all), and he should also avoid the error that derives from what might be called 'the arrogance of lack of power', the assumption that he is free, in putting forward his schemes, to rearrange the world at

will, and not bound by the discipline of having to construct proposals with the building blocks that are available. But for him it is more appropriate to raise the question of objectives in a detached way, rather than draw up a position paper for one of the parties in the negotiations.

Arms control arrangements affecting strategic nuclear forces may be thought to advance international security if they serve one or more of the following objectives:

- (a) Reduction of the likelihood of central nuclear war: e.g. by stabilisation of the strategic balance, or by measures to reduce the danger of war by accident or miscalculation.
- (b) Reduction of the severity of a central nuclear war: e.g. by reduction of offensive forces, promotion of defensive forces, promotion of strategies of limited war or agreement on 'rules of war'.
- (c) Containment of 'the arms race': e.g. by agreements limiting manufacture, deployment or testing of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, or some variety of them.
- (d) Promotion of wider goals of arms control: e.g. by discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons, or by establishing and maintaining precedents (like the non-use of nuclear weapons) that will help preserve security in a world of more nuclear powers.

There are a great many arms control arrangements by which these objectives might in principle be furthered. Here it is proposed to concentrate on one idea, or series of related ideas, that lies at the heart of the subject.

#### Stabilisation of the Strategic Balance as the Chief Proximate

#### Goal of Arms Control

For ten years now the discussion of arms control in relation to the Soviet-American relationship has been dominated, at least in the West, by the idea that at least the chief proximate goal should be an agreement, or series of agreements, formal or tacit, that would limit strategic nuclear weapons in such a way as to help stabilise the strategic balance, preferably at lower (lower i.e. than those existing at the time) levels.

The rationale of this idea has been as follows:

- (a) The United States and the Soviet Union certainly will not, probably cannot and possibly should not give up their nuclear weapons, so that the problem is not how to eliminate nuclear weapons but how to control them.
- (b) American and Soviet nuclear weapons are least likely to be used if there exists a strategic balance, in the sense of a situation in which each can threaten the other with 'unacceptable damage', which is stable as against the

challenge to it that would be represented by an effective disarming capacity and/or an effective defence.

- (c) 'The arms race' by itself may sometimes make for stability, sometimes against: a principal object of arms control arrangements should therefore be to strengthen the stabilising tendencies and weaken the de-stabilising ones.
- (d) Stability of the strategic balance should take priority over reduction of the level of armaments at which it is maintained, but if reduction (or even limitation) of this level can be achieved as well, so much the better.

  Reduction might save money, contribute to 'the momentum of arms control' and (if it went far enough) reduce the severity of a nuclear war that took place.

The idea has taken a number of different forms, some of them more sophisticated than others. It is encouraging to think that during the last decade the more sophisticated forms have tended increasingly to predominate over the less sophisticated. We should distinguish:

- (a) The comprehensive from the partial approach. Early thinking tended to envisage a scheme that would embrace all strategic nuclear weapons, (both warheads and delivery vehicles) prescribe numbers and types of weapons on each side that would enhance stability and, leaving no loopholes, contain the activities of the super-powers within these bounds. The argument for a comprehensive approach is that if anything is left out, the agreement will merely stimulate a re-direction of military competition towards the area that the In fact the comprehensive approach is partial agreement has left uncovered. no more workable in relation to the control of strategic nuclear weapons than it is in the wider field of general disarmament. Things always have to be left out. When we speak of strategic nuclear weapons in this context e.g. we are speaking of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and (at most) of emplaced warheads: we are leaving out nuclear stockpiles. Moreover, when we come to define strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (e.g. as long range missiles and bombers) we are bound to have to do this in a way that excludes some of the means by which nuclear weapons can be delivered.
- (b) The formal from the informal approach. It is now widely recognised that among the measures conducive of the stability of the balance, unilateral measures are probably more important than agreements, and tacit agreements more important than formal ones. If there exists some stability in the balance now, this has more to do with the measures that have been taken to ensure invulnerability of retaliatory forces than with any agreement; and more to do with tacit restraints on strategic arms expenditure than it has with the Partial Test Ban Treaty or the Outer Space Treaty.
- (c) The direct from the indirect approach. Much of the early (and some of the current) thinking in the West about stability has revolved around the

notion that the Soviet and American governments must first be persuaded of the validity of the idea of strategic stability, and that they should then proceed to draft an agreement, or to arrive at a series of understandings, that would embody this idea and spell out what it meant for each of them in terms of numbers and types of weapons. The idea is, as it were, that having come to accept the common objective of strategic stability the governments of the superpowers would do the planning of their force levels together, and embody the results in an agreement or series of agreements which would itself proclaim the concept of stability and prescribe its quantitative specifications.

The direct approach, the pursuit of a stabilisation agreement the rationale for which is intrinsic to the agreement, has its origins in the tradition that regards disarmament as an intellectual problem that stands in need of a solution rather than as a process of negotiation that seeks out the basis for a deal or In fact it is difficult to imagine that the direct approach could ever The governments of the super-powers are pursuing their lead to any result. separate strategic interests and objectives, and no approach is likely to work out that conceives strategic arms talks as simply a discussion of how they can maximise a common interest. Each government will plan its own strategic force levels in the light of its own objectives. These may (and in the United States' case evidently do) include the objective of maximising strategic stability. But these processes of planning will take place in each country, and will be reflected in the negotiations and in understandings to which they may lead; they cannot form the crux of the negotiations themselves.

It is more likely that strategic stability will be promoted by the indirect method of concluding agreements that contribute to this goal without proclaiming it. Each government, having made up its own mind as to what force levels it requires and how it might be prepared to modify them in the event of an understanding, proceeds to the negotiation of agreements (a test ban, a missile freeze, a seabed agreement) based perhaps on the rationale of 'maximum reduction and limitation' (which still dominates the public presentation of arms control proposals).

(d) The static from the dynamic approach. Much thinking about this question still fails to allow for political and technological change. An agreement that contributes to strategic stability e.g. by limiting numbers and types of offensive and defensive missiles in such a way as to preserve an Assured Destruction capacity on both sides, in itself merely establishes one fixed element in a situation in which other elements are constantly moving. Changes in military technology not encompassed within the agreement may nullify its force. Changes in the techniques of concealment or of detection may undermine confidence that it is being observed. Changes in the relations of the superpowers with each other or with other countries may require a reassessment of

their relative force levels.

This is one of the reasons why it is difficult to envisage that formal and comprehensive agreements can play much role in the stabilisation of the balance. The stabilisation of the balance is unlikely to be a matter of the conclusion of a once-for-all agreement, but is likely to require continuous negotiation. It is for this reason that much interest attaches to recent suggestions that an aim of the strategic arms talks might be to establish institutions or procedures that would be charged with the business of continuous negotiation.

(e) The radical from the conservative approach. Stabilisation of the balance has sometimes been seen as leading to a 'minimum deterrent' (perhaps 50 or 100 nuclear delivery vehicles on each side, which is possibly about what was envisaged in the ''Gromyko umbrella' proposal); but is nowadays more often thought of as limitation at a high level (one common notion is 1,000 ICHM's on each side, a figure that would have seemed shocking to the arms controllers of 1960), or as involving only abstention from some possible future development such as the deployment of heavy ABM systems or of MIRV's.

The goal of large-scale reductions has been prized on the grounds that it could be regarded as 'making a start' along a road leading to general disarmament; that it might assist attempts to combat the spread of nuclear weapons; and that it might reduce damage in an actual nuclear war (though this would depend on many other variables besides numbers of delivery vehicles).

The main reason for preferring the conservative approach is no doubt that it has some prospect of getting off the ground. It may also be argued that low numbers of delivery vehicles are likely to detract from stability, by reducing the level of Assured Destruction, increasing the risks in the event of violation or abrogation of the Treaty, and raising the requirements of verification beyond the limits of tolerance (this again, however, would not follow from the mere fact of low equal numbers but would depend on other variables).

Moreover, in thinking about the level of forces on each side we have to take into account not only the relation of the super-powers to each other but also their role in world politics as a whole. It is not the case that anti-proliferation measures would be best assisted by the maximum reduction of the strategic forces of the super-powers. The relation between the nuclear policies of the super-powers and the intentions of the leading non-nuclear powers with regard to proliferation is much more subtle and complex than this, and certainly includes the fact that for some potential nuclear powers abstention from the acquisition of their own nuclear weapons is conditional upon their continuing ability to rely on the nuclear strength of a super-power ally or protector.

Apart from the proliferation question, moreover, the whole structure of power relationships in the world rests upon the strategic preponderance of the This is not to say that world order would be served by a Soviet-American understanding to maintain 'joint high posture' in relation to China, and other rising powers, e.g. by retaining high offensive force levels, and developing A.B.M. chiefly in relation to secondary nuclear powers. doctrine is open to the objection that (certainly if it were publicly proclaimed, but even if it were not) it would stimulate antagonism in places where at present there is a willingness to accept Soviet or American leadership, and that in the long run it is probably the destiny of the super-powers to have to share the management of the world's affairs more widely. But those who advocate the reduction of Soviet and American strategic forces to very low levels have the onus of showing what the principles of world order would be in the situation that such a reduction would bring about, or of showing how China and other powers affected could be brought to make parallel reductions that would preserve the hegemony of the super-powers.

#### Deterrence vs Defence as the Basis of International Security

In what I have called its more sophisticated forms I believe that the idea of strategic stability remains valid as a general objective of strategic and arms control policy. But it is not possible to reassert this doctrine without taking account of the challenge to it that has been delivered by Don Brennan and Freeman Dyson (the views of these two writers on the subject are not identical, and it is more Brennan's views with which I propose to deal. But there is a general similarity in their positions).

The views of Brennan and Dyson have been stated in connection with their support of an American A.B.M. deployment. Unlike most recent advocates of this policy they base their ideas specifically on the desirability of a thick defence of cities and population against Russia (thus placing themselves, as noted above, outside the mainstream of the American debate) rather than on the need for defence against China or the need to defend the American strategic force against a Soviet disarming strike. Moreover, whereas it is perhaps fair to say that the bulk of support for the Sentinel and Safeguard programme has come from persons concerned that the United States may fail to maintain its strength relative to the Soviet Union and China Brennan and Dyson base their argument squarely on considerations of arms control.

These are (to paraphrase their case, and I hope do justice to it) that a system of general security can be more efficiently (and, Dyson at least would add, with better moral justification) based on effective defence than on effective determine. The balance of mutual determine is after all at best a makeshift arrangement on which to found the hopes of mankind for survival in the nuclear age. It depends on the continued willingness of the super-powers to

behave 'rationally', and it does not (at least of itself) make provision against the dangers of war by accident or miscalculation. It is open to the objection (that strategists have stated at length against strategies, as distinct from arms control arrangements, based on ideas of 'finite deterrence' or 'deterrence only') that it does not provide for damage limitation in the event that war Because it consists essentially of an exchange of threats to create massive destruction of life and property it inherently runs counter to longterm prospects of placing the relations between the super-powers on a basis of trust If there were no prospect of an effective defence of and mutual confidence. populations against strategic nuclear attack by a super-power, there would still be a case for it: but this is not so. 'From the mid-1950's to the mid-1960's.' Brennan has written, 'the strategic postures of the super-powers were dominated by the logic that, since we could not defend, we had to deter. This position. for which there was originally ample justification, now seems to be interpreted in some minds - chiefly certain American ones - to mean that since we must deter. we cannot defend. This should count as the non sequitur of the decade .\*

A feature of Brennan's and Dyson's thinking is their high confidence that defence of cities and population can in the long run be made effective against strategic nuclear attack, at a tolerable cost. However, they wish to assist the process by devising arms control arrangements that will help to ensure the effectiveness of defence. Brennan holds that improving defences will not necessarily provoke compensatory expansion of offensive forces, and that in time offensive forces might be limited and later reduced by agreement, leaving the United States and the Soviet Union chiefly dependent on defensive forces for their security.

I do not agree with this line of thought but I believe it deserves to be taken more seriously than (so far as I can judge) it has been. Apart from anything else it is most salutary that the doctrine of mutual deterrence should be subject to attack in this way, and that an antidote be thus provided to the tendency to regard the idea as sacrosanct. Much strategic analysis at the present time proceeds as if the idea of deterrence was the proven master key to the problem of the control of force, rather than a makeshift device and a grim hope with which we happen to have stumbled through the last twenty or so years. We have even had a study by a present member of the White House staff which makes out that the Second World War occurred because this master key was not discovered in time.

<sup>\*</sup> Foreign Affairs, April 1969

Moreover, some of the points made by these critics draw attention to weaknesses in the idea of the stabilisation of the balance, at least as it is sometimes formulated. In the first place, there are clearly gaping weaknesses in
the notion that AEM deployment by one of the super-powers is bound in the nature
of things to cause a compensatory or offsetting increase in offensive forces by
the other side. This notion of the 'action-reaction phenomenon' underlay
Secretary McNamara's view of the AEM question, and reflects a model of the 'arms
race' that has long been a central element in the outlook of advocates of arms
control.

Such a model assumes not merely that the countries concerned are determined to maintain a capacity for Assured Destruction but also that they will be concerned to maintain a particular level of destruction. Brennan and others have been able to point out that the Russians do not appear to think in terms of Assured Destruction, and indeed that they have given no indication that they feel provoked by the <u>Sentinel</u> and <u>Safeguard</u> decisions. It has been pointed out also that although United States policy has for a long time been based on the idea (though it has not been described for long by the name) of Assured Destruction, it is not the case that America has always been able to threaten the particular level of destruction which Secretary McNemara has held Assured Destruction to require (and he himself has admitted that there is no precise way of determining what it should be).

The notion of 'action-reaction' describes only one element in the relationship between American and Soviet armaments decisions. Decisions on both sides are caused in part by wholly non-rational factors, such as the power structure within a bureaucracy. In so far as they derive from rational considerations, these may relate to internal political or economic considerations, such as the need to placate the military, to sustain some section of the armaments industry or to find funds for some other project. In so far as rational considerations relate to foreign policy, they may relate less to the other super-power than to a third party, as China is now an essential element in the calculations of both super-powers about ABM policy. In so far as the calculations of the superpowers are a response to one another's decisions, these may reflect not 'compensation' or 'offset' for the reduction of Assured Destruction capacity, so much as emulation ('If they have X we must have it!). To the extent that each side does believe that its deterrent capacity has to be maintained, it does not follow that this will be thought about in a quantitative way.

This draws attention to a more basic flaw in a great deal of contemporary strategic analysis, viz. the attempt, in interpreting the actions of countries, to substitute the question 'what would it be rational for them to do', answered in terms of some hypothetical Strategic Man (drawn from American experience, as Economic Man in the classical economics was drawn from English experience).

for the question 'what do they do?', answered in terms of historical and political observation.

In the second place, Brennan draws attention to the fact that schemes for stabilised mutual deterrence do not by themselves provide an answer to the problem of limiting nuclear war if it occurs. Part of the case for AEM deployment as it has been made out by the Johnson and Nixon Administrations is of course simply in terms of Damage Limitation, in the event of contingencies such as an 'accidental' Soviet launch or a future Chinese attack. It is not the case that advocates of the stabilisation of the strategic balance are committed to the 'mined city' doctrine of which Brennan speaks so disparagingly. But it is true that an arrangement for stabilising the balance which precluded AEM deployment would leave nations without security against an actual nuclear attack; and that such an arrangement would need to be supplemented by other measures designed to limit war if it occurred.

However, it appears to me that Brennan and Dyson are ahead of (or behind) Their critique of deterrence theories is valid as a protest against their time. the seriousness with which these theories are sometimes token, and against the excessive literalness and spurious precision with which they are sometimes But it remains the case that the United States and the Soviet Union do discipline one another's behaviour with the threat of nuclear war, and that if, in the present political context of this relationship, their ability to create unacceptable damage were placed in question, policies which now do not enter into their thinking might come to seem attractive. While 'compensation' or 'offset' in increase of offensive forces is not the necessary consequence of any measure of AEM deployment, and while this is no reason to assume a proportionate response following from attachment to some given level of Assured Destruction, it does seem unlikely that even the Soviet Union, let alone the United States, would stand idly by while their ability to deter was removed. other radical philosophies, Brennan's and Dyson's programme assumes that enough other people can be converted to the cause to make it a reality.

A very central element in their doctrine is, of course, the proposition that the defence of cities against a massed strategic attack by a super-power can really be made to work. I have nothing to say about the issues that divide the technical experts on the likely future effect of AFM technology. Two points, however, are in order. If the technical state of the offense-defence competition changes as much over the next, say, fifty years as it appears to have done in the last five, we are not in a good position to say what the long-term prospects of city defence may be. Moreover, the Brennan-Dyson position assumes not only that city defence can be made effective, but also that the governments of the super-powers will be sufficiently confident of its effectiveness to allow their deterrents to be eaten away, and indeed to limit and reduce their offensive

forces. In other words, they are talking about a state of affairs which is very remote from the present one.

There is another aspect of this problem which (to judge from those of their pronouncements I have seen) Brennan and Dyson do not seem to have considered. What relationship subsists between the two super-powers, made impregnable to attack by effective defences, and the rest of the world? Is it supposed that (in a kind of inversion of the situation that they will be in when <u>Galosh</u> is confronted by <u>Safeguard</u>) they will retain enough offensive forces to threaten the rest of the world, but not enough to impair the defences they have set up against each other? Or are the two super-powers to renounce all attempts to influence the course of events outside their borders, with strategic nuclear forces? The doctrine of 'defensive forces only' implies the impotence of a Maginot Line strategy with regard to the relationship of forces elsewhere in the world.

#### III. THE RANGE OF PROPOSALS

I do not propose to canvass any particular proposal, nor to present any detailed analysis of possible schemes. I do not believe that there is any proposal which by itself could be counted upon to promote the objectives that have been outlined, but there are a number of possible agreements that might do so, depending on the context: the intellectual 'spin-off' and communication that results from the process of negotiating them, the unilateral restraints they might serve to promote or to symbolise, the way in which the 'arms race' would be redirected as the result of the conclusion of them, the effects upon them of future technological and political change.

It is possible that the strategic arms talks will follow the previous pattern of discussions of this subject in that one or both sides will present proposals that are clearly not negotiable by the other: that, e.g. the Americans will advance a proposal (like the 'Johnson freeze') implying a high degree of intrusive inspection, and that the Russians will advance a proposal for radical disarmament. In this event worthwhile exchanges of ideas might still take place, but an opportunity will have been lost for discussions directed towards some attainable goal. Such discussions might take one or more of the following forms:

#### The Exchange of Strategic Ideas

A possible goal for the two governments might be simply the exchange of ideas about strategy and arms control, in the hope of achieving better understanding of one another's ideas, reducing the elements of misunderstanding and uncertainty that play a role in the strategic arms competition, and contributing to a process of mutual education. Questions such as those discussed in the early part of this paper might form part of the agenda of such discussions: the proper

objectives of arms control discussions; concepts of stability, deterrence and defence; measures to deal with war by accident or miscalculation; notions of damage limitation and the limitation of war; the role of super-power nuclear policy in relation to proliferation.

There can be no doubt of the need in which the United States and the Soviet Union still stand of more effective communication in this specialist and quasitechnical area. It has often been remarked that the chief value of past disarmament discussions has lain in the communication of this sort that has been achieved 'on the side'. But effective communication has perhaps not yet been made the subject of a concerted effort directed specifically at this end. It has been treated as a secondary objective, a by-product of disarmament conferences or the business of non-official groups, rather than treated as a major task in its own right.

It may be doubted, however, whether a series of talks could be realistically confined to such a goal. Talks which command so much public attention as these will be expected to be concerned with some more tangible objective..

#### The Negotiation of Substantive Agreements

It is probably inevitable that proposals will be advanced for a formal agreement or agreements on questions of substance. If these proposals are at all realistic they will involve neither substantial disarmament nor formal inspection procedures. Some of the possible talking points are:

(a) A freeze on further deployment of strategic nuclear weapons. This would refer to ICEM's, SLEM's and long range bombers: a moot point would be whether to include the Soviet IR/MREM force (if it were included, the Soviet Union would be bound to raise questions about NATO tactical nuclear weapons; if it were not, the United States would be in difficulty with its European allies). Unilateral verification, at least of some dimensions of the freeze (approximate number and size of delivery vehicles, but not number of warheads per delivery vehicle, yield of warhead, etc.), might be adequate. Replacement of existing weapons might be allowed for but not improvement of them.

Such an agreement would formalise the various equalities and inequalities in the strategic balance discussed above. It would ratify a rough parity, preclude the development of a heavy ABM system, and preclude (if it were accompanied by a MIRV test ban) the deployment of an effective MIRV component. Because (like all other possible proposals) it leaves many variables out of account and does not of itself allow for change, it does not represent a self-sufficient solution to the problem of stabilising the balance. It requires the super-powers to abandon many cherished schemes in midstream and is unlikely to be more than a talking point.

(b) A fixed limit on numbers (and perhaps size) of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. This might allow further building up to the fixed limits, and/or imply some disarmament. The distribution as between missiles and bombers, offensive and defensive weapons, land-based and sea-based, might be left open or specified. An example of this type of proposal is the one put forward by Harold Brown, \* which envisages specifying the numbers to be retained of both offensive and defensive missiles.

Some very simple proposal culled in this field - e.g. a limitation of ICEM's at 1,000 a side, might offer a possible basis for agreement. Such a limitation would be meaningless as an index of 'parity' or of 'stability', but it is in any case impossible to define a comprehensive agreement. Complicated and ingenious proposals to provide the super-powers with the correct number and mix of missiles and warheads to preserve the balance, protect themselves against China, etc., are not feasible as a negotiating proposition and are in any case no more self-sufficient than the simple proposal I have mentioned as a means of attaining the goal of stability.

- (c) Schemes for limiting offensive forces only, as proposed by Don Brennan, or for limiting defensive forces only. Whatever their merits, these are not negotiable at present as both run counter to strong attachments in both countries to the retention of both offensive and defensive forces.
- (d) A MIRV test ban. The argument here is that if this were introduced quickly enough, it would interrupt the development of effective MIRV's on either side; and that because intrusive inspection would be a requirement to determine whether MIRV's are deployed in the nose cones of missiles, a ban of tests, which can be adequately verified, is the best approach. The arguments of those who are concerned about MIRV's are perhaps too subtle and ambiguous to be presented effectively in a negotiation.
- (e) Proposals for restricting the use of nuclear weapons (e.g. no use, no first use, no use against non-nuclear powers, etc.) This is well-worn territory as far as the Russians are concerned, and my own view is that the United States should be more sympathetic to proposals in this area than it has been.
- (f) There are some signs that the Soviet Union may wish to raise the question of limitation of expenditures on strategic forces.

### Institutional or Procedural Agreements

An interesting current suggestion is that the United States and the Soviet Union should seek an agreement to institutionalise the strategic arms talks, certainly as well as and possibly rather than seeking for substantive agreements.

<sup>\*</sup> Foreign Affairs, April 1969.

There might be agreement e.g. to meet at regular intervals and perhaps establish machinery to review the strategic relationship between the two countries and to examine existing agreements in the light of political and technological changes, suspected violations, etc.

This proposal might appear to represent an attempt to dodge a problem by creating an organisation. This, however, would be a short-sighted view. A major problem of any agreement in this field is adaption to change, and an institution of the sort suggested may serve to deal with it. It may also help to create the kind of expertise necessary for the purpose of improving mutual understanding in this field. However, it would undoubtedly be viewed elsewhere in the world as tantamount to the formation of a new alliance (it has already been suggested that the institution might work in some respects like NATO) or as the beginnings of an attempt to formalise a super-power condominium.

## LE PROSPETTIVE DI ACCORDO FRA LE SUPERPOTENZE

Gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica sono impegnati a tenere colloqui sulla limitazione delle armi nucleari strategiche. Non c'è alcuna garanzia che questi colloqui condurranno ad accordi o anche a importanti scambi di diee; ma potenzialmente sono i più importanti negoziati formali degli anni del dopoguerra, poichè sollevano direttamente, sebbene fra le due superpotenze che sono le sole in grado di risolverla, la questione del futuro dell'equilibrio, della potenza nucleare strategica, intorno a cui è costruita l'intera struttura delle relazioni internazionali.

esplicitamente all'ordine del giorno, è stato alla base di tutti i negoziati sul controllo degli armamenti da quando per la prima volta si pose il problema dell'equilibrio nue cleare strategico, verso la metà degli anni '50. (In un certo senso questo problema costituiva lo sfondo dei negoziati che precedettero il sorgere dell'equilibrio nucleare strategico, in quanto che il piano Baruch e le successive proposte sovietiche sul "bando della bomba", riflettevano le paure e le speranze che poteva venire a crearsi un tale equilibrio). Qualche volta il problema è stato pontato in primo piano nel corso di discussioni multipaterali di progetti radicali di disarmo: più specificatamente, al Comita to delle Diciotto Nazioni sul Disarmo è stata presentata u na proposta nel 1962 detta "Gromiko umbrella" per la limi-

tazione da parte delle due superpotenze ad un concordato e basso (non specificato) numero di vettori strategici du rante il "processo di progressivo disarmo"; e la proposta, detta "Jhonson freeze", del 1964 per la cessazione della ulteriore produzione e spiegamento di vettori strategici. Ma la questione dell'equilibrio nucleare non è ancora sta ta fatta oggetto di negoziati formali, bilaterali e di na tura contrattuale. Tali negoziati, se dovessero esserci, potranno rappresentare non l'inizio ma la continuazione di un processo di discussione, di reciproca informazione e esplorazione. L'equilibrio strategico è stato il costante oggetto di quel processo dizzarro ed ancora largamente misterioso, il "dialogo strategico", che è stato portato avanti con sistemi che vanno dall'esame accurato da parte delle superpotenze delle reciproche parole, all'interpretazione di "segni" e di "messaggi", dai contatti ministeriali e diplomatici, ai negoziati su argomenti consimili, e ai contatti non-ufficiali o quasi-ufficiali. Ma questi possono rappresentare una nuova forma del dialogo strategico, e possono offrire nuove opportunità per comunicare più autenticamente i punti di vista delle parti e per un confronto più franco sui termini del problema. 🦈

Quale è il contesto delle relazioni sovieticoamericane nel quale è probabile che i colloqui si svolgeranno? Quali obiettivi dovrebbero essere promossi dai colloqui? E quale è la serie di proposte che i colloqui potrebbero esplorare per raggiungere questi obiettivi?

#### I. IL CONTESTO DELLE RELAZIONI SOVIETICO-AMERICANE

### Continuazione del predominio strategico

I colloqui sulla limitazione delle armi strategi che potrebbero aver luogo in un contesto che preveda, innanzitutto la continuazione del predominio strategico delle due superpotenze. L'enorme vuoto che separa la forza militare degli Stati Uniti, e dell'Unione Sovietica da quella degli altri Stati, e che rende ciascuna di esse una potenziale minaccia per l'altra di un ordine del tutto diverso da quello che essa fronteggia da ogni altra potenza, rimane la caratteristica centrale della scena mondiale. Questo predominio strategico si è andato creando prima del l'avvento delle armi nucleari strategiche, ed esiste ancora indipendentemente da esse sebbene queste ultime ne sia no la principale espressione. Mentre l'Inghilterra, la Francia e la Cina hanno costruito o stanno costruendo pi<u>c</u> cole forze strategiche basate sulla tecnologia americana e sovietica di dieci anni or sono, le superpotenze hanno riconfermato il loro predominio avanzando nell'era di mis sili più grandi e perfezionati dell'ABM, e delle testate multiple. I colloqui bilateralei sulle armi strategiche per la prima volta riconoscono esplicitamente questa speciale posizione militare delle superpotenze.

Questa continua polarizzazione della potenza militare fra gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica, spinge questi a mantenere un dialogo ed a creare regole di coes<u>i</u> stenza, in particolare per evitare i rischi di una guerra nucleare. Ma ciò richiede loro di mantenere anche un atteggiamento vigile nei confronti dell'altro, di evitare pericolose disattenzioni a causa di conflitti di secondaria importanza, di alzare la loro guardia piuttosto che abbassarla, di attenersi strettamente al rapporto di potenza e di guardare con sospetto le proposte per contenerlo nei termini di un accordo internazionale.

Gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica sono preoccupati delle loro relazioni in modo meno esclusivo di quan to lo erano nel periodo della guerra fredda, e ciò ha co<u>n</u> tribuito ad un rimassamento della tensione. Le relazioni sovietico-americane hanno cessato di essere il principale punto di attrito, cioè di probabilità di conflitto armato, fra le grandi potenze; si può dire che durante gli anni '60 le relazioni fra la Cina e gli Stati Uniti, siano st<u>a</u> te il principale punto di attrito, e che con l'approssimar**s**i degli anni '70 punti di attrito sono subentrati ne<u>l</u> le relazioni fra Cina e Unione Sovietica. Ma la tensione non è semplicemente il prodotto della probabilità dell'im mediato sconfinamento di un conflitto in una guerra,bansì della valutazione fatta da ciascuna parte sulla capacità immediata e a lungo termine della controparte di frustrare i suoi obiettivi; in tal senso le relazioni sovieticoamericane rimangono, come Stanley Hoffman le ha definite, le "relazioni di principale tensione". Stando così le cose, ogni tentativo di formulare un accordo che esprima

quale dovrebbe essere l'equilibrio militare fra le superpotenze, sarà soggetto a quelle classiche pressioni che
hanno reso i principali rivali, in una competizione negli
armamenti, poco propensi a considerare accordi e pause in
quello che è essenzialmente la sfera dei conflitti e dei
mutamenti; tanto più che la limitazione delle armi nuclea
ri strategiche (a differenza del bando parziale degli esperimenti nucleari, della demilitarizzazione dell'Autartico o della messa al bando, di armi di distruzione massiccia nello spazio) tocca l'equilibrio nel suo punto più
sensibile.

## Declino del predominio politico

In secondo luogo, i colloqui possono tenersi per limitare il declino del predominio politico delle superpotenze. La forza militare è soltanto una delle dimensio ni del potere nelle relazioni internazionali, e nonostante la loro continua preminenza gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica hanno subito un declino delle loro posizioni politiche nei riguardi di altre potenze importanti durante gli anni 60, declino che ha tutta l'aria di continuare anche durante gli anni 70.

In parte questo declino riflette, nelle attuali circostanze, la difficoltà di utilizzare la potenza militare per fini politici. La guerra nucleare strategica è un mezzo estremo che può essere usato razionalmente, o mi nacciato credibilmente, soltanto dove è in gioco la vita o la morte di nazioni. Le superpotenze sono trattenute (sebbene in ultima analisi non impedite) dall'utilizzare il loro predominio strategico sugli altri stati, a causa della sproporzione fra questi mezzi e i fini cui sono stati così a lungo pensati nelle relazioni con questi stati; a causa della paura di rimanerne coinvolti: ed a causa dell'interesse che le superpotenze hanno di minimizzare il ruolo esplicito delle armi nucleari nella politica mon diale, come pure di scoraggiare la diffusione delle armi nucleari ad altri stati, per diminuire la probabilità che gli stati che hanno o possono avere armi nucleari le usino, e per rafforzare così le fondamenta della sicurezza internazionale. Ma in parte il declino politico delle due superpotenze deriva anche dal sorgere di altri importanti centri di potenza : in particolare la Germania Occidentale e il Giappone, la cui posizione deriva dalla grande forza economica delle grandi potenzialità militari; nonchè la Francia e la Cina il cui peso politico dipende in modo s<u>o</u> stanziale dalla potenza militare, ivi comprese le armi nucleari, insieme alla volontà di impiegare le loro energie e risorse nel perseguimento dell'indipendenza diploma tica.

Questa "diffusione della potenza" è stata accompagnata da altri importanti cambiamenti in relazione ai
quali essa agisce sia come causa che come effetto: il de
clino delle ideologie globali, la disintegrazione delle
alleanze della guerra fredda, l'avvento della distensione

fra le superpotenze, e la restaurazione della flessibilità e della mobilità (sebbene limitata dal continuo predo minio strategico delle superpotenze) in una situazione più articolata e contraddittoria. Così importanti sono questi mutamenti che il sistema internazionale o la fase del sistema internazionale, verso cui sembra ci stiamo muovendo, è tanto differente da quello del periodo della guerra fredda dell'ultima parte degli anni '40 e degli anni '50 quanto quest'ultimo dal sistema internazionale nel periodo della seconda guerra mondiale.

La diffusione della potenza dovrebbe interessare i colloqui sovietico-americani sugli armamenti strategici, nei seguenti modi:

(a) Le superpotenze, nel considerare quali limitazioni accettare, sui loro armamenti strategici, devono calcolare l'incidenza di queste limitazioni sulla loro forza strategica in relazione a quella di altre parti.

Non è questo il caso, come talvolta si asserisce, in cui le superpotenze si uniscono per cercare di prescrivere un margine di superiorità come protezione della "minaccia di multipolarità". Le loro preoccupazioni sono più che altro rivolte alla crescente forza di particolari potenze, piuttosto che ad astratti concetti come "multipolarità" o "proliferazione" (sebbene negli Stati Uniti, do ve tali concetti hanno un ruolo nell'opinione politica, in particolare l'ultimo concetto riveste una certa importan-

- Inoltre il loro atteggiamento nei confronti del sor gere di queste potenze è più che altro ambivalente che semplicemente negativo o ostile. Sia gli Stati Uniti che l'Unione Sovietica, per esempio, hanno mostrato ambivalen za nei confronti del ristabilimento dell'indipendenza diplomatica francese e tedesco-occidentale. Nonostante ciò certi accordi, che potrebbero in via di principio essere rotti dalle superpotenze, potrebbero col tempo aumentare la relativa posizione dell'Inghilterra, della Francia, della Cina e di certi potenziali paesi nucleari, se non fossero seguiti anche da limitazioni riguardanti questi La principale preoccupazione delle superpotenze è, naturalmente, la Cina, verso cui una parte delle armi strategiche americane e sovietiche è già diretta. Il solo fatto dell'esistenza della potenza cinese esclude ogni ac cordo di riduzioni radicali delle forze nucleari strategi che.
- (b) Le superpotenze sono soggette a forti pressioni di altre potenze desiderose di influenzare in una direzione o in un'altra i colloqui (i tempi, l'ampiezza degli argo menti da discutere, i risultati). Gli alleati europei esercitano pressioni sguli Stati Uniti sia per essere consultati più strettamente durante i negoziati (in tal sen so il Presidente Nixon ha preso un preciso impegno), sia per presenziare all'andamento delle discussioni sul problema della sicurezza europea e sulla relazione fra la

forza sovietica di MR/IRBM e le forze nucleari tattiche della NATO, che riguardano più da vicino la sicurezza dell'Europa Occidentale di quella degli Stati Uniti. Le potenze non-nucleari di aspettano che ambedue le superpotenze sottoscrivono il trattato sulla non proliferazione per dare qualche dimostrazione tangibile che stanno intraprendendo passi per limitare la proliferazione "verticale" insieme a quella "orizzontale"; mentre quelle nazioni che contano sulle superpotenze per la loro sicurezza si aspettano da queste il mantenimento della forza necessaria per adempiere ai loro impegni di alleanza.

(c) La consapevolezza delle superpotenze, quando si parlano, della portata di ciò che dicono sulle loro relazioni col resto del mondo, deve spingerle a pensare alla loro speciale posizione di "grandi indispensabili" nella direzione delle relazioni di potenza su ogni aspetto delle
società internazionali. L'argomento dei colloqui è essenzialmente strategico. Ma si suppone da più parti, sia
dai sostenitori della "collusione fra gli imperialisti e
i revisionisti" che dagli oppositori), che i colloqui costituiscono una parte di un più ampio tentativo delle superpotenze di eliminare le loro divergenze e di concertare le loro politiche almeno in qualche area del mondo.
Le speranze per un tale avvicinamento di politiche - da
parte americana in relazione ad una sistemazione del
Vietnam, e da parte sovietica in relazione alla disputa

di frontiera con la Cina - possono già fornire parte delle motivazioni dei colloqui. D'altra parte, alcuni accordi strategici che possono essere raggiunti in via di prin
cipio, hanno precise implicazioni per la struttura politi
ca del mondo: per esempio, una intesa in base alla quale
i sistemi ABM installati, siano efficaci contro stati nucleari minori ma non contro le superpotenze, potrebbe implicare una azione per una egemonia congiunta; mentre la
accettazione di una limitazione di vasta portata, e forse
la riduzione dei vettori di lancio nucleari, implicherebbe
un rifiuto della nozione di "high posture" ed una politica più stretta collaborazione con un più ampio gruppo di
potenze.

## Continuazione di una limitata distensione politica

Questo ci porta ad una terza caratteristica dell'ambiente in cui si svolgono i colloqui, la continua ma
ancora limitata distensione politica. Gli Stati Uniti e
l'Unione Sovietica sono arrivati ad un modus vivendi, che
è una istituzione consolidata e un imprescindibile elemen
to del quadro politico mondiale. Le sue basi poggiano
sul fatto che i due paesi hanno raggiunto lo status quo
come risultato della loro posizione di vincitori della se
conda guerra mondiale, posizione che è stata oscurata
quanto subentrò la guerra fredda e rivelatasi appena que
sta è finita; nella persistenza, durante tutto il periodo

post-bellico (prima e dopo il sorgeré dell'equilibrio stra tegico), di un rozzo equilibrio di potenza che ha fornito loro la possibilità di allentare la lotta per la supremazia; nel timore di una guerra termo-nucleare, che divenne un potente fattore negli anni '50; nella consapevolezza di avere antagonisti comuni, particolarmente la Cina, rivelatisi durante gli anni '60; in alcune esperienze di cooperazione, come i paesi nucleari che si confrontino con quelli non-nucleari nel trattato sulla non-proliferazione, e i paesi sviluppati che si oppongono alle richieste di quelli sottosviluppati negli incontri dell'UNCTAD; e più recentemente in una certa contrazione dei loro rispettivi obiettivi, un abbandono di concezioni ampie e inclusive dell'interesse nazionale in favore di quelle più strette e più esclusive (riflesse nella scarsa importanza data alle ideologie e di ciò che si usa chiamare "la lotta per il Terzo Mondo"); che ha ridotto l'area di possibile collisione fra loro (e, incidentalmente, l'influenza del "Terzo Mondo" su di loro).

I punti salienti nello sviluppo della distensione sono forse la conferenza al vertice di Ginevra nel 1955, l'incontro di Camp David del 1959, il trattato sulla interdizione parziale degli esperimenti nucleari del 1963 e il trattato sulla non-proliferazione del 1968. Gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica pagano un alto prezzo, per quanto riguarda le relazioni con alcuni dei loro alleati, nel perseguire le loro attuali intese. Il loro in-

vestimento nella distensione è grosso; recentemente è sopravvissuta al colpo della crisi nel Vietnam del 1965-8 e
della invasione della Cecoslovacchia del 1968. All'inter
no delle superpotenze ci sono indubbiamente elementi favo
revoli ad infrangere il trattato sull'interdizione parzia
le degli esperimenti e il trattato sullo spazio; ma questi
grandi accordi appaiono solidi come una roccia. Sarebbe
errato credere che la distensione non potrebbe interrompersi, ma soltanto qualche grosso sconvolgimento potrebbe
fario.

Per quanto solide possano essere le basi della distensione, ciò nonostante essa è costruita su un'area molto ristretta di interessi comuni. Le superpotenze chiaramente hanno un comune interesse di evitare una guer ra nucleare e, isolando la loro relazione da questo pericolo, di evitare ogni ricorso alle armi nucleari, di evitare di rimanere direttamente coinvolti l'uno contro l'al tro in un conflitto armato; di evitare (a parte il caso di Cuba) l'interferenza militare diretta nelle rispettive principali sfere di influenza, come l'America Latina e l'Europa Orientale; di mirare a contenere i conflitti come nel Congo, nel Medio Oriente e nel sub-continente indiano, che hanno minacciato di coinvolgerle; e raggiunge re una serie di intese nel campo del controllo degli armamenti.

E' altresi chiaro che gli State Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica sono diventati consapevoli dell'interesse che hanno di opporsi alle politiche di vari altri stati, e so no andati praticando un grado di collaborazione contro questi stati di tipo informale, parziale e sperimentale. Si può estendere l'uso del termine per dire che hanno col laborato nel sud e nel sud-est dell'Asia per contenere la Cina: ma certamente ognuno è in grado di riconoscere che le rispettive politiche sono dirette almeno in parte a fa vorice i loro interessi. Sarebbe errato dire che essi han no collaborato contro la Germania Occidentale, che per Stati Uniti costituisce un leale e credibile alleato, e all'Unione Sovietica appare come (almeno potenzialmente) una potenza aggressiva e insoddisfatta tendente a rivedere la mappa dell'Europa Orientale; le superpotenze indubbiamente hanno ancora certi obiettivi comuni per quanto riguarda la Germania Occidentale (cioè che non deve acquisi re armi nucleari, e non deve alterare con la forza le attuali frontiere) e sebbene non abbiano voluto riconoscerlo, molta parte delle politiche di ambedue degli anni recenti ha avuto l'effetto di promuovere i fini condivisi con l'altra (nella politica degli Stati Uniti il contenimento della Germania Occidentale nel quadro della NATO. lo stanziamento di forze americane nella Germania Occiden tale, gli sforzi attraverso la MLF e il Gruppo di Pianifi cazione Nucleare della NATO di fornire una alternativa ad una forza nucleare della Germania Occidentale; nella poli tica sovietica il mantenimento del Patto di Varsavia, come una barriera al revisionismo, un atteggiamento di osti

lità confinante nell'isterismo verso le voci secondo cui la Germania Occidentale potrebbe acquisire una forma di controllo sulle armi nucleari, la forte pressione sulla Germania Occidentale per sottoscrivere il trattato di non-proliferazione).

Ma è difficile trovare una prova che dimostri la esistenza fra i due paesi di interessi riconosciuti comuni e che potrebbe giustificare certe speculazioni sulla possibilità di un accordo nello stabilire qualche specie di egemonia, congiunta del mondo. Queste speculazioni forse derivano da una certa quantità di idee che dovrebbero essere considerate separatamente.

- (a) Dobbiamo distinguere l'idea di un condominio o governo congiunto da parte delle superpotenze (qualcosa che
  è già esistito su scala locale durante l'occupazione della Germania ma che è scarsamente concepibile su scala mon
  diale), dall'idea di un "menagement" congiunto del mondo,
  cioè di una unione concertata degli sforzi politici e
  strategici al servizio di una concezione concordata delle
  esigenze di ordine nel mondo intero (qualcosa che i fondatori delle Nazioni Unite ritenevano che gli Stati Uniti e
  l'Unione Sovietica potrebbero fare, insieme ad altri membri permanenti del Consiglio di Sicurezza).
- (b) Dobbiamo distinguere l'asserzione che le superpotenze eserciterebbero una egemonia congiunta, combinando in-

sieme i loro sforzi per una politicacomune su tutto il mon-do (come potrebbero aver bisogno di fare, se mirassero a dare realtà al sistema di sicurezza collettiva della Carta delle Nazioni Unite), dall'asserzione che esse si servirebbero di un sistema di egemone doppie o parallele, cioè una divisione del lavoro che lascerebbe ciascuna di esse padrona di una porzione del mondo.

(c) Dobbiamo separare l'idea che le superpotenze si concederebbero l'un l'altra il diritto ad una sfera di influenza predominante in qualche parte del globo, dalla no zione che essi dividono il mondo in sfere, non semplicemente di diritto ma di responsabilità nell'esercitare la influenza concordemente ad oblettivi comuni. (Gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Savietica già rispettano i reciproci diritti ad una influenza predominante nell'Europa Orientale e nell'America Latina rispettivamente - sebbene non abbiano riconosciuto esplicitamente nessuno di tali diritti, e sono, poco propense a concedere l'una all'altra la "mano libera" in queste o altre regioni, come testimonia la pro testa americana per la Cecoslovacchia e la protesta sovie tica per Santo Domingo. Ma l'idea di sfere di responsabilità distinta da sfere di influenza - una idea implicita nella visione di Churchill di basare l'ordine mondiale su un sistema di grande potere di predominio regionale, visto nel quadro delle Nazioni Unite - non si può dire anco ra che abbia qualche ruolo nelle loro concezioni).

- (d) Dobbiamo distinguere un sistema di "menagement" congiunto limitato al controllo delle armi nucleari e diretto soltanto a preservare l'equilibrio nucleare e ad arrestare la diffusione delle armi nucleari, da un sistema di
  "menagement" esteso congiunto dell'intero processo politi
  co internazionale. (La precedente formula è stata avanzata da John Strachey nella sua proposta di "condominio",
  ma una delle difficoltà che presenta è che l'amministrazione da parte delle superpotenze della distribuzione del
  le forze nucleari in ogni parte del mondo presuppone ed
  impone altresì il raggiungimento di un grosso accordo).
- (e) E' necessario, pensando a ciascuna di queste idee di menagement o egemonia congiunta, distinguere fra intese che includono la definizione formale dei diritti e dei doveri delle potenze (come la Carta delle Nazioni Uni te definisce i diritti e i doveri dei membri permanenti del Consiglio di Sicurezza) da accordi derivanti da intese non scritte e persino non dette.

Gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica sono senz'al tro i maggiori responsabili del processo politico interna zionale ma non si può dire che operino in un sistema di e gemonia congiunta nel significato sopradetto, a causa del la difficoltà di far vedere che le loro funzioni egemoniche o direttive sono realizzate conformemente ad uno sche ma o piano concordato. Non esiste certamente alcun accordo formale che prevede responsabilità di questo genere: il

più che possiamo dire è che, nella diffusione delle armi nucleari, nel riconoscimento di sfere di influenza e nel contenimento dei conflitti in varie parti del mondo, esse talvolta agiscono come se ci fosse una intesa non stabil<u>i</u> ta sulla loro posizione e sui loro doveri.

La loro scarsa volontà di dare l'avvio ad un sistema di egemonia congiunta deriva in ultima analisi dal fatto che sono ancora più preoccupate delle rispettive po tenze nel sistema. Per esempio, ambedue auspicano un arresto della Cina, ma ognuna nello stesso tempo considera la Cina come una limitazione al potere dell'altra, come ha dimostrato l'Unione Sovietica aiutando a difendere la frontiera strategica della Cina nel Nord Vietnam, e come stan no mostrando ora gli Stati Uniti nella loro politica di neutralità nei confronti della disputa di frontiera cinoesovietica. Finchè le relazioni sovietico-americane restano "le relazioni di principale tensione" non è possibile operare un tentativo di passare da un equilibrio di potenza ad un concetto di potenza.

Anche se le superpotenze fossero in grado di met tere da parte le loro differenze e di presentare un fronte unito al resto del mondo, la loro capacità di condurre insieme la politica mondiale sarebbe limitata dalla diffusione del potere che sta già avvenendo. La diffusione delle armi nucleari, l'esplosione di conflitti in ogni parte del mondo, la disintegrazione di nuovi stati nei conflitti civili, fatti questi di cui potrebbero interessarsi ma che in ultima analisi non possono controllare completamente, per quanto possono concertare strettamente i lo ro sforzi.

### Declino della stabilità strategica

Un quarto aspetto dello sfondo in cui si svolgerebbero i colloqui è il declino della stabilità dell'equilibrio nucleare strategico "Stabilità" è un termine di moda che nel linguaggio comune è diventato privo di significato. Per stabilità dell'equilibrio nucleare strategico intendiamo la sua tendenza a persistere come tale; e per equilibrio nucleare strategico fra due superpotenze intendiamo una situazione in cui ciascuna possiede una forza nucleare strategica che può minacciare l'altra con un grado di distensione sufficiente ad assicurare che un attacco deliberato non sarebbe un atto politico razionale.

La stabilità dell'equilibrio, in tal senso, non garantisce la pace, per quanto non esclude la possibilità di un attacco che non sia razionale o non sia un atto politico. L'equilibrio inoltre, non riposa sull'eguaglianza delle forze da una parte e dall'altra, nè consiste nell'eguaglianza quantitativa della distruzione che può essere inflitta asciascuna parte. Deriva dal possesso di ambo le parti di forze strategiche, qualunque sia il particolare tipo ed entità, in grado di distruggere qualunque particolare livello di forze e con qualunque particolare grado di

probabilità, tale da rendere un deliberato ricorso dell'a<u>v</u> versario ad un attacco un atto irrazionale.

Quali siano il livello di distruzione edil grado di certezza di questa distruzione sarà determinato non dalla natura delle forze strategiche disponibili del paese che intende attuare la minaccia, ma dal giudizio dei gover nanti del paese che è minacciato: sulle valutazioni fatte dell'entità delle distruzioni che il loro paese soffrirebbe, sulla volontà del paese avversario di causarle, sui vantaggi che otterrebbero lanciando un attacco o sulle per dite che subirebbero non lanciandolo, e sugli elementi di incertezza in ciascuno di questi calcoli.

E' perchè il particolare livello e grado di certezza della distruzione è determinato da questi fattori po litici e psicologici che non possono essere stabiliti, che l'esistenza o non-esistenza di vari equilibri nucleari strategici (o il grado di stabilità attribuito loro) è l'oggetto di tanta controversia. Argomentazioni come quelle che la Francia può ora dissuadere un attacco da parte dell'Unione Sovietica, che la Cina potrebbe essere in grado di dissuadere un attacco dagli Stati Uniti verso la fine degli anni '70, o gli Stati Uniti un attacco dall'Unione Sovietica in certe contingenze strategiche, derivano dalla impossibilità di conoscere in anticipo quali giudizi daran no i governi sulla loro situazione.

Questa stessa incertezza su quello che può esse-

re un adeguato grado di Distruzione Assicurata, può essere. preso come un argomento per mantenere questa ad un alto li vello, come hanno fatto gli Stati Uniti durante gli anni McNamara, nel discorso di presentazione dell'anno fi scale 1969 (\*) dice che la Distruzione Assicurata implica "una capacità di infliggere in ogni circostanza ed innogni prevedibile condizione un grado inaccettabile di danni ed ogni singolo aggressore, o insieme di aggressori - anche dopo aver subito un attacco di sorpresa". Eglò inoltre sottolinea "l'attuale e indiscussa capacità di distrug gere l'attaccante come una vitale nazione del ventesimo secolo", e passa a dire che nel caso dell'Unione Sovietica" potrebbe costituire un efficace deterrente una capac<u>i</u> tà da parte nostra di distruggere 1/5 o 1/4 della sua popo lazione e 1/2 della sua capacità industriale". Egli aggiun ge che la Cina è ancora lontana dall'essere una nazione in dustrializzata e che una forza capace di distruggere la me tà della popolazioneurbana cinese e più della metà della sua capacità industriale potrebbe servire come "principale deterrente".

Sarebbe sbagliato pensare che l'alto livello del le forze nucleari strategiche mantenuto dagli Stati Uniti negli anni '60 sia il semplice prodotto di questa dottrina

<sup>(\*) -</sup> First Year 1969-73 Diense Program and 1969 Defense-Budget (preparato 22 gennaio 1968).

che prevede la necessità di un alto (ma determinato) livello di Distruzione Assicurata. L'entità delle forze è anche il prodotto di pressioni dei gruppi politici e industriali e di compromessi burocratici, ai quali le dottrine della Di struzione Assicurata e della Limitazione dei Danni hanno fornito una giustificazione. D'altra parte nell'impostazio ne fortemente intellettualizzata del governo americano, dot trine strategiche presentate persuasivamente hanno una ma teriale forza causale, e i gruppi industriali e dihitari, se sono efficienti, spesso hanno bisogno di dottrine stra tegiche che servono ai loro scopi. Inoltre, poichè il con cetto di Distruzione Assicurata implica limiti superiori e inferiori al previsto livello di distruzione, esso diventa uno strumento intellettuale di cui ci si può servire (contrariamente al concetto di Limitazione dei Danni) per com battere le richieste di ampliamento o di miglioramento del le forze strategiche - in questo modo è stato usato dal Segretario McNamara.

La stabilità dell'equilibrio strategico può, in via di principio, essere compromessa in due modi : sia con la acquisizione di una capacità di disarmo, nel senso di una capacità di eliminare o danneggiare considerevolmente le forze strategiche di rappresaglia, i centri di comando e i sistemi di comunicazioni militari dell'altra parte; sia con l'acquisizione di una efficiente difesa dei centri urbani e industriali.

E' dubbio che la stabilità dell'equilibrio strate gico sovietico-americano sia stata mai, o potrà mai essere, assoluta; è mantenuta soltanto da una costante attenzione, alle misure di allarme, di invulnerabilità, di capacità di

penetrazione, di precisione, di determinazione politica, ecc., che, se non fossero approntate metterebbero a repentaglio l'equilibrio. Gli anni '60, in particolare, non sono stati un periodo di assoluta stabilità: sono cominciati con la preoccupazione da parte degli Stati Uniti per la ca pacità sovietica di primo colpo (derivata da un ipotetico "missile gap"), che ha portato nei primi anni del decennio allo sviluppo della forza americana un livello non molto diverso da quello attuale; ed è anche possibile (sebbene non siamo in grado di saperio che non appena questo è avve nuto, l'Unione Sovietica si è allarmata della considerevole capacità americana di disarmare derivata dagli sviluppi nel settore missilistico, e che ciò abbia giocato un ruolo notevole nella realizzazione delle forze nucleari strategiche sovietiche messa in modo dopo la crisi di Cuba e accelerata negli ultimi tre'anni.

Tuttavia, la metà e l'ultima parte degli anni '60 sembrano essere stati anni di relativa stabilità. Ci sono state le parole del Segretario McNamara nelle dichiarazioni fatte anno per anno sulla situazione strategica, secondo cui (come disse nella dichiarazione per l'Anno Fiscale 1969) nonostante la "superiorità" americana, "rimane il fatto puro e semplice che l'Unione Sovietica può ancora distruggere efficacemente gli Stati Uniti dopo aver assorbito il peso di un primo colpo americano". Noi non abbiamo nessuna analoga valutazione da parte dei sovietici, ma ogni loro parola e comportamento senza pensare che si ren-

dono conto che gli Stati Uniti possono fare altrettanto a loro.

Non c'è molto da dubitare sul fatto che la relativa stabilità dell'equilibrio strategico nella metà e nella fine degli anni '60 sta cedendo il posto ad un periodo di relativa instabilità, probabilmente più seria di quella dell'inizio degli anni '60. Questo perchè i paralleli sviluppi tecnologici hanno portato ambedue le superpotenze all'acquisizione di una capacità di disarmo e allo sviluppo di efficaci difese per la popolazione e l'industria.

La minaccia di una capacità di disarmo è essenzialmente la minaccia rappresentata da missili di maggiore precisione e di più grande capacità distruttiva, e dalla possibilità di sganciare MIRV contro centri di comando figati, centri di comunicazioni, e postazioni terrestri di missili. A questo si possono aggiungere le preoccupazioni espresse da certi ambienti sulla minaccia dei FOBS e degli SLBM lanciati in vicinanza delle coste contro le basi di bombardieri, e le preoccupazioni che hanno alcuni sul fatto che i mezzi della ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) di localizzare esattamente la posizione dei missili lanciati dai sottomarini, particolarmente se ciò dovesse avvenire in circostanze in cui anche i missili terrestri e le forze di bombardieri sono diventati vulnerabili.

La minaccia derivata dalla difesa della popolazione e della capacità industriale proviene dal sistema ABM e per quanto nè il sistema <u>Galosh</u> costruito intorno Mosca, nèil sistema <u>Safeguard</u> che sta per essere realizzato a stadi successivi negli Stati Uniti, possono essere considerati in grado di insidiare in qualche modo la capacità dell'altra parte di infliggere danni "inaccettabili", tuttavia essi hanno messo in moto una serie di sviluppi che potrebbero portare ad una grave riduzione della capacità di Distruzione Assicurata; inoltre tali sistemi hanno già creato una atmosfera di dubbi e incertezze sulle prospettive a lungo termine della capacità di dissuasione dei sovietici e degli americani, che in precedenza era la sola cosa su cui si poteva fare affidamento.

Il dibattito americano sull'ABM ha prodotto un gran numero di analisi quantitative dei probabili effetti di questi recenti sviluppi tecnologici. Tale dibattito è stato notevole non soltanto per il suo contenuto tecnico elevato, ma anche (con poche eccezioni) per il suo caratte re settario e dottrinale, nel senso che ogni parte si è scelta i mezzi di analisi secondo quello che voleva dimostrare, e che ambedue hanno trattato l'argomento come una schermaglia di una campagna più ampia pro o contro il potere e l'atteggiamento del "military-industrial complex".

Per i nostri scopi è importante prendere nota soltanto di ciò che le varie parti del dibattito hanno in comune, vale a dire del fatto che i recenti sviluppi tecno logici nel settore strategico hanno prodotto tendenze destabilizzatrici di un senso o in un altro - gli oppositori dell'ABM tendono a sottolineare le conseguenze destabiliz-

zatrici di un sistema ABM USA (sebbene non sempre ammettono che il sistema ABM sovietico sia citato per qualche ret tifica), mentre i sostenitori dell'ABM si basano principal mente sugli effetti destabilizzatrici di una possibile futura forza di SS9-MIRV sovietici (sebbene sottovalutano le implicazioni destabilizzatrici dello spiegamento da parte americana dei Poseidan-MIRV e Minnteman-III-MIRV). Ci sono stati alcuni che hanno accolto con favore gli effetti destabilizzatrici dei sistemi ABM, o perchè, come Edward Teller, sperano che questi porteranno ad un predominio strategico degli Stati Uniti sulla Russia, operchè, come Donald Brennan e Freemon Dyson, sperano che questi porteranno ad un sistema di sicurezza basato sulla difesa invece che sulla deterrenza. Ma essi non negano il fatto che sono in atto delle tendenze destabilizzatrici (Brennon e Dyson non negano che l'Unione Sovietica è costretta a compensare la corrosione del suo deterrente come conseguenza di un s<u>i</u> stema ABM americano; e consigliamo che gli Stati Uniti non dovrebbero cercare di compensare con una espansione delle forze offensive la riduzione del potere deterrente america no dovuta agli ABM sovietici. Ma essi riconoscono, anzi mettono in rilievo, che la limitazione dei Danni raggiunta con gli ABM potrebbe minare la Distruzione Assicurata, e ăm beduerriconoscono il potenziale disarmante dei MIRV).

E\* vero che l'ABM e i MIRV, le due più importanti innovazioni, sono ambedue ambigui nei loro effetti sulla stabilità: un sistema ABM può funzionare per proteggere

il proprio deterrente come pure per indebolire quello dell'avversario, mentre lo spiegamento dei MIRV può aumentare la capacità di penetrare le difese nemiche, e nello stesso tempo costituire una minaccia per le forze nemiche. E' vero anche che questi due sviluppi possono annullarsi reciprocamente, se ambedue le superpotenze decidono di procede re con lo spiegamento dei MIRV e degli ABM: ciò sembrerebbe almeno oltremodo probabile quanto la possibilità che una parte pessa combinare la superiorità sia in ABM che in MIRV in modo da alterare l'equilibrio - possibilità que sta che il Segretario Laird semplificando la sua testimonianza ha attribuito alla Russia, e che alcuni oppositori degli ABM temono possa essere fatto dagli Stati Uniti. Infine, è vero che nessupo è stato capace di dimostrare che ogni arma o combinazione di armi strategiche ora in fase di sviluppo o di spiegamento possa portare al rovesciamento dell'equilibrio strategico. Possiamo parlare soltanto dell'esistenza di tendenze destabilizzatrici che, se non corrette, potrebbero mettere in pericolo l'equilibrio strategico (sia che con ciò mettono o meno in pericolo la sicurezza internazionale, è un problema separato, che sarà considerato in seguito) - tali tendenze destabilizzatrici possono presentarsi in ogni momento e derivano dal tentativo di mantenere un equilibrio di potenza in una era di mutamenti politici e tecnologici. Non c'è alcun dubbio, tuttavia, che (in questo caso per ragioni più tecnologiche che politiche) l'equilibrio strategico USA-URSS è entrato in un periodo di forte instabilità.

## Avvenuto della parità strategica

Un quinto fatto di rilievo è l'avvento della parità strategica fra le superpotenze. La parità nel senso di eguaglianza numerica e qualitativa di armi o di forze non è mai stata una misura indiscutibile dell'equilibrio delle forze militari di due paesi sul piano nucleare stra tegico od altro genere. Da una parte si può dimostrare che la parità esiste, o non esiste, soltanto in particolari settori del potenziale militare - numero di soldati, periodo di servizio, gittata e calibro dei cannoni, numero e stazza delle navi da guerra ecc.; è dubbio se un simile concetto di "forza militare blobale" sia completamente verificabile. Pertanto nel paragonare le forze nucleari strategiche sovietiche e americane dobbiamo stabilire se esiste o meno la parità del numero di postazioni di lancio per missili, nella precisione, nel carico portante e nella gittata dei missili stessi, nel numero e nella potenze del le testate, nel numero di megatoni sganciabili ecc.; ma non esiste alcuna misura della "potenza nucleare strategica globale". la quale non ponga questioni essenziali. Da un'altra parte, anche se noi potessimo ridurre le varie di mensioni della potenza militare ad un comun denominatore questo non ci direbbe quale potrebbe essere l'esito di un conflitto armato; questo dipenderà da fattori di volontà politica, di morale, di abilità militare, di destrezza tattica e di semplice fortuna, di cui generalmente non ci si rende conto fino a quando la guerra scoppia, e anche al

lora spesso non sono capiti.

In particolare, la parità nei vari settori di un potenziale nucleare strategico di attacco non è necessaria per l'esistenza di un equilibrio nucleare strategico, nel significato sopra definito. E' facile vedere che un paese per esempio, che abbia un numero inferiore di testate sgan ciabili (che il Segretario McNamara ha dichiarato che è la migliore misura della "efficacia strategica globale"), può costituire una minaccia sufficiente di Distruzione Assicurata contro un avversario, tale da rendere un attacco deli berato da parte di questo un atto di politica irrazionale. Nè la parità, nel potenziale nucleare strategico di attacco, è sufficiente a creare un equilibrio strategico (ancora nel significato sopra definito); per una parte o per am bedue potrebbe essere incapace di costituire una minaccia sufficiente di distruzione perchè le forze offensive sono troppo deboli, le difese opposte troppo forti, o per qualche altra ragione.

Nonostante ciò l'esistenza o non-esistenza della parità militare fra due stati può avere un considerevole significato politico. Dove possono essere misurate le quantità di uomini o di armi e dove si può mostrare che gli stati avversari sono eguali o differenti in base a ciò, esiste una pietra di paragone con cui si può avere l'impressione che la potenza strategica è stata misurata in un modo eloquente.

Tali indicazioni sulla eguaglianza o non-egu<u>a</u>

glianza possono aver un significato nella vita politica in terna di un paese, e possono altresì interessare le valuta zioni che vengono fatte in generale nel mondo sulla situazione militare di quel paese. Il Segretario McNamara, per esempio, ha ritenuto che valeva la pena sottolineare anno per anno, per tutto il periodo del suo mandato, la superiorità quantitativa e qualitativa degli Stati Uniti sulle forze strategiche dell'Unione Sovietica. Egli stesso sottolineò, specialmente negli ultimi anni del suo mandato, il significato limitato di questa superiorità, in quanto le forze dell'Unione Sovietica erano più che sufficienti a creare danni tali da rendere inaccettabile la guerra nucleare per gli Stati Uniti. Ma egli era indubbiamente nel giusto dicendo che la consapevolezza che l'America era avanti in questo campo contribuiva al senso di sicurezza che queste forze davano agli Stati Uniti, alla fiducia nelle garancie che volevano gli Alleati degli Stati Uniti e al rispetto che in generale il mondo ha della potenza militare americana.

L'Unione Sovietica sta superando gli Stati Uniti in alcuni, sebbene non tutti, settori accertabili sui quali la loro superiorità nelle forze nucleari strategiche si era basata nel passato. L'Unione Sovietica, secondo quanto ha detto il Segretario Larrd nel marzo di quest'an no, sta ora raggiungendo, o ha raggiunto, il totale di 1.054/CMB degli Stati Uniti. Gli ICBM ss-g hanno un carico portante maggiore degli ICBM americani, e l'Unione So-

vietica ha sperimentato testate di potenza molto maggiore di quelle americane. Ha sviluppato ICBM mobili che gli Stati Uniti non hanno. Sta producendo sommergibili nucleari, che possono lanciare missili balistici, con un ritmo che toglierà la preminenza agli Stati Uniti, se la forza di sommergibile Polaris-Poseidan rimarrà stazionaria al suo attuale livello di 41 unità. L'Unione Sovietica ha in stallato un sistema ABM, mentre gli Stati Uniti hanno preso la decisione di costruire il <u>Safeguard</u>; ha sperimentato i FOBS, o ICBM a bassa traiettoria, e sta sviluppando i MRV che possono diventare MIRV.

D'altra parte si dice che gli Stati Uniti riman gono superiori in taluni aspetti qualitativi della tecnologia degli ICBM: la forza di ICBM è più perfezionata, e più protetta. La preminenza in SLBM è ancora molto grande (656 contro 100) e si stanno rimpiazzando i Polario con i Poseidon. La forza di bombardieri a lungo raggio è molto più grande di quella dell'Unione Sovietica (646 contro 150) e la sua capacità di penetrazione è stata rafforzata. Sebbene gli Stati Uniti vengono dopo l'Unione Sovietica nella installazione di ABM, tuttavia si dice che sono molto più avanzati nella relativa tecnologia ed anche nella tecnologia dei MIRV (il sistema ABM sovietivo <u>Galosh</u> assomiglia al sistema Nike-Zeus che gli Stati Uniti, hanno scartato nel 1959, mentre i MIRV sono stati già sperimentati con successo). Si dice infine che gli Stati Uniti mantengono la superiorità nel numero totale di testate sganciabili (4.200 a 1.200).

Fosse o meno per la parità in alcuni di questi settori della forza strategica nucleare, è dubbio che l'Unione Sovietica sia d'accordo nel prendere parte a colloqui sugli armamenti strategici. La superiorità americana in questo campo si è opposta nel passato dell'inizio di negoziati limitati alle forze nucleari strategiche. L'avvento della parità, inoltre, altera il significato di alcu ne proposte a lunga portata. La proposta "Johnson freeze", al tempo in cui fu avanzata, avrebbe congelato la superio rità americana (ed anche interrato lo sviluppo di un sicu ro sistema sovietico di secondo colpo), ma ora sembra almeno prima facie una proposta più negoziabile. La proposta "Gromiko umbrella", detta enche del "deterrente minimo" non presenta più quegli svantaggi, secondo il punto di vista americano, per cui, avendo in ogni caso l'Unione Sovietica un "deterrente minimo", agli Stati Uniti veniva ri chiesto di disarmarsi a quel livello. Non c'è garanzia alcuna, tuttavia, che l'arsenale strategico sovietico finirà col raggiungere la "parità", o che gli Stati Uniti tollereranno questo fatto permanentemente.

# L'influenza dei militari

Un sesto fatto di rilievo che va inserito nel contesto dei colloqui è che <u>negli Stati Uniti l'influenza</u> dei militari è in declino, mentre nell'Unione Sovietica sembra essere in ascesa. Le due superpotenze sono spinte

ad intraprendere colloqui, sebbene non necessariamente a raggiungere un accordo, da un numero di fattori che interessano ambedue: la continua necessità di mantenere un dialogo, a causa della semplice potenza distruttiva che ambedue comandano, la speranza di assicurarsi la collaborazione politica dell'altra parte (nel caso sovietico specialmente in relazione alla Cina, nel caso americano in relazione al Vietnam, e possibilmente in ambedue i casi in relazione al Medio Oriente); il perenne desiderio di ridurre i costi della competizione negli armamenti strategici. Ma gli Stati Uniti sono spinti verso i colloqui da un potente fattore interno, o insieme di fattori, di cui non sembra esistere un equivalente nell'Unione Sovietica.

Lo stato d'animo dell'opinione pubblica americana e del Congresso è di intensa preoccupazione per l'influenza e per i giudizi dei militari, per il valore degli
impegni militari, per le alte spese militari, per la neces
sità della forza militare e per la validità di certe conce
zioni che hanno dato una base razionale alle decisioni del
passato.

Questo stato d'animo anti-militarista, che la storia americana ci dovrebbe aver insegnato a ritenere come normale, ma chegli ultimi venti anni non ce lo facevano prevedere, ha spostato il centro di gravità del dibattito americano sulle forze nucleari strategiche dal perseguimento unilaterale di una forza superiore, 'all'adattamento e all'accettazione della parità o, se non proprioparità,

#### "sufficienza".

Questo spostamento del centro di gravità può esser derivato dalla diminuita attenzione prestata dal Segre
taroo McNamara, negli ultimi anni del suo mandato, al concetto di Limitazione dei Danni (che è una ritrattazione
delle precedenti nazioni di vittoria in una guerra nuclea
re strategica) contro quello di Distruzione Assicurata, e
alla sua crescente preoccupazione per il problema del con
trollo degli armamenti, che egli chiama (sollevanto una
quantità di domande sulla dinamica della corsa agli armamenti) "fenomeno di azione-reazione".

Questo fatto è chiaramente riflesso, dalla amministrazione Johnson e Nixon, nell'evolversi della politica sui sistemi ABM, su cui gli Stati Uniti hanno dimostrato una consapevolezza del problema del controllo degli armamenti molto maggiore che in relazione ad ogni altra decisione strategica. La decisione originale del Presidente Jhonson, nel gennaio 1967, fu accompagnata dall'invito al l'Unione Sovietica di dare avvio a colloqui sugli armamen ti difensivi, e sembrava indicare che la decisione di installare gli ABM non sarebbe stata presa se fosse seguita una risposta sovietica. La decisione del <u>Sentinel</u>, nel settembre 1967, fu accompagnata da una riconferma della volontà dell'America di intraprendere colloqui, e da una giustificazione della decisione stessa, da parte del Segretario McNamara, che metteva in rilievo l'orientazione anti-cinese del sistema e il pericolo che sarebbero potuti

aumentare le pressioni per una difesa pesante delle città contro la Russia. Il Presidente Nixon preparando il <u>Safeguard</u>, nel marzo del 1969, è andato più avanti. Il <u>Safeguard</u> è stato definito un importante miglioramento del <u>Sentinel</u> perchè pone l'accento sulla difesa delle forze di rappresaglia, implica meno rischi di un ampliamento per la difesa delle città in funzione anti-sozietica; deve essere accompagnato da una revisione annuale che seguirà il completamento di ciascuna delle sue fasi, condizionate, fra le al tre cose, dal progresso dei colloqui sugli armamenti strategici.

La cosa che più colpisce nelle udienze del Congresso dedicate agli ABM è il modo con cui <u>ambedue</u> le parti sostenevano la loro posizione in termini di stabilità dell'equilibrio nucleare.

Sarebbe sbagliato supporre che il perseguimento della "superiorità" è scomparso dalla politica americana, o che la posizione negoziale americana si rivelerà essere costruita intorno ad una stretta interpretazione del termine "sufficienza", alla quale il Presidente Nixon ha dato la sua approvazione. Ciò nonostante queste idee rappresentano unaprogresso significativo da quelle idee che erano al centro della politica degli Stati Uniti soltanto pochi anni or sono, quando il pensiero ufficiale americano, anche nella Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, era costruito intorno aliconcetto (che non voglio disprezzare) che la sicurezza degli Stati Uniti (sia perchè l'Unione Sovietica era il pro

babile aggressore, sia perchè gli Stati Uniti avevano impegni di alleanza più ampi) richiedeva un netto margine di superiorità.

Nell'Unione Sovietica, per contrasto, l'ala militare del Partito Comunista sembra essere in ascesa. Il governo sta portando a termine uno spettacolare ampliamento delle forze nucleari strategiche, e deve attribuire un grosso valore politico al raggiungimento della parità; è obbligato a pensare alla Cina in termini prettamente militari e probabilmente metterà questa come scusa contro l'accet tazione di limitazioni concordate con gli Stati Uniti; non deve giustificare le sue decisioni con niente di convincente o sofisticato, ad una "arms control community", che esiste negli Stati Uniti.

Sebbene sia facile immaginare l'interesse che può provare la leadership sovietica nel prendere parte ai collo qui come influenzare le decisioni che gli Stati Uniti sono chiamati a prendere nel campo delle armi strategiche (in cui l'andamento dei colloqui è ora ufficialmente riconosciuto come un ingrediente), fare propaganda della raggiun ta superiorità, preservare i legami con gli Stati Uniti e forse seminare discordia nei ranghi della NATO - e sebbene è anche vero che la posizione negoziale sovietica in questi colloqui, come la posizione Nord-Vietnam/FLN nei colloqui di pare vietnamiti, trarrà forza dell'ondata di dissen so negli Stati Uniti, sembra tuttavia improbabile che l'Unione Bovietica abbia dei motivi tanto potenti quanto quel

li che sono evidenti negli Stati Uniti, per raggiungere un accordo in questo campo.

### 11. GLI OBIETTIVI DEI NEGOZIATI

Dato che il contesto delle relazioni sovietico-<u>a</u> mericane è quello descritto, quali obiettivi dovrebbero ce<u>r</u> care di perseguire i colloqui sugli armamenti strategici? lo propongo di esaminare la questione secondo la prospettiva del controllo degli armamenti, cioè, in riferimento ai comuni interessi di tutti gli stati per la sicurezza inter nazionale. Questa non è la prospettiva da cui le superpotenze considerano gli obiettivi da raggiungere nei negozia ti sul controllo degli armamenti (e devo provare che è anche questo quello che non cercano), quantunque possa rivestire una certa importanza. I governi non regolano le loro politiche soltanto in termini di sicurezza, e qualora sono interessati a questa, pensano alla sicurezza nazionale piuttosto che a quella internazionale. Inoltre per la loro stessa natura sono custodi degli interessi e delle aspirazioni soltanto di una limitata porzione dell'umanità, pertanto sono poco qualificati come legislatori del bene universale.

Ma lo studioso dei problemi del controllo degli armamenti ha una diversa responsabilità. Egli deve evitare di credere che gli è stata beneficiato di qualche speciale rivelazione sulle necessità del mondo (la differenza fra

lui e il suo governo non è che egli può:parlare per una parte del mondo ed egli per nessuna), e deve altresì evita re l'errore derivante da quella che potrebbe essere chiamata "l'arroganza della mancanza di potere", la presunzione che egli è libero, nel tirar fuori i suoi schemi, di siste mare il mondo a volontà, e che non è legato dalla discipli na di dover edificare proposte con le pietre che sono disponibili. E' più appropriato che egli sollevi la questione degli obiettivi in un modo distaccato, piuttosto che redigere un documento per una delle parti del negoziato.

Gli accordi sul controllo degli armamenti riguar danti le forze nucleari strategiche possono essere ritenuti in grado di migliorare la sicurezza internazionale se si propongono uno o più dei seguenti obiettivi:

- (a) Riduzione della probabilità di una guerra nucleare, attraverso la stabilizzazione dell'equilibrio strategico, o con misure atte a ridurre il pericolo di guerra per incidente o per errore.
- (b) Riduzione della violenza di una guerra nucleare, con la riduzione delle forze offensive, l'ampliamento di quelle difensive, lo sviluppo di strategie di guerra limitata o accordi su "regole di guerra".
- (c) Contenimento della "corsa agli armamenti", con accordi che limitino la costruzione, spiegamento e sperimenta-zione di veicoli di lancio strategicò o simili.

(d) Promozione di traguardi più ampi dal controllo degli ar mamenti, scoraggiando la diffusione delle armi nucleari o stabilendo e mantenendo precedenti (come il non-uso delle armi nucleari) che possono aiutare a preserva re la sicurezza in un mondo con un numero maggiore di potenze nucleare.

Ci sono una grande quantità di accordi sul controllo degli armamenti attraverso i quali questi obiettivi possono, in via di principio, essere assecondati. Qui si propone di concentrarsi su una idea, o serie di idee correlate, che si trova al centro del problema.

# Stabilizzazione dell'equilibrio strategico come principale, immediato obiettivo del controllo degli armamenti.

Per dieci anni la discussione sul controllo degli armamenti è stata dominata, almeno in Occidente, dall'idea che il principale immediato obiettivo deve essere un accordo o serie di accordi, formali o taciti, che potrebbero limitare le armi nucleari strategiche in modo da contribuire a stabilizzare l'equilibrio strategico, preferibilmente a livelli più bassi (più bassi cioè di quelli che esistevano al lora).

- Il fondamento di questa idea è da ricercarsi nel fatto che:
- (a) Gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica certamente vogliono, probabilmente non possono e possibilmente non do-

vrebbero cedere le loro armi nucleari; cosicchè il problema non è come eliminare queste armi, bensì come controllarle.

- (b) E' meno probabile che le armi nucleari sovietiche e ame ricane possono venir usate se esiste un equilibrio strategico (nel senso di una situazione in cui ciascuno può minacciare l'altro con "danni inaccettabili") che sia stabile contro la sfida a ciò che potrebbe essere rappresentato da una effettiva capacità di distruzione e/o da una difesa efficace.
- (c) La "corsa agli armamenti" in se stessa può talvolta gio care sia a favore della stabilità che contro il principale oggetto degli accordi sul controllo degli armamenti dovrebbe pertanto essere quello del rafforzamento delle tendenze stabilizzatrici e dell'indebolimento di quelle destabilizzatrici.
- (d) La stabilità dell'equilibrio strategico dovrebbe avere la priorità sulla riduzione del livello degli armamenti, ma se può essere raggiunto un accordo sulla riduzione (o anche sulla limitazione) di questo livello, tanto meglio. La riduzione potrebbe costituire un risparmio di denaro, contribuire alla "rapidità del controllo degli armamenti" e (se si arriva abbastanza lontano) a ridurre la violenza di una eventuale guerra nucleare.

L'idea cui si faceva riferimento all'inizio ha assunto differenti aspetti, alcuni di essi più sofisticati di

altri. E' incoraggiante pensare che durante l'ultimo decennio le forme più sofisticate hanno teso sempre di più a prg dominare sulle meno sofisticate. In tal senso dobbiamo distinguere:

(a) L'approccio totale de quello parziale. Recentemente si tendo a considerare un progetto che potrebbe abbracciare tutte le armi nucleari strategiche (sia testate che vettori), prescrivere de embo le perti il numero e il ti po di ermi che potrebbero accrescere La stabilità e, sen za lasciere aperta scappatoie, contenere l'attività del le superpotenze in questi limiti. Gli argomenti per un approccio globale derivano della considerazione che se qualche cosa viene lasciata fuori, gli accordi stimolerenno semplicemente une diversione della competizione militare verso l'area che l'accordo parziale ha lasciato scoperta. Infatti l'approscio globale nel campo del controllo delle armi nucleari strategiche non è più fat tibile di guento lo sia nel campo più vasto del disermo generale. Alcune cose devono sempre essere l'asciete fuo ri. Quando parliamo di armi nucleari atrategiche in questo contesto, noi stiamo parlando di vettori strategici di lancio e (al massimo) delle relative testate, lascian do da parte gli arsenali nucleari, inoltre quando andiamo a definire i vettori strategici di lancio (cioè missili a lunga gittata e bombardieri) siamo contretti a doverlo fare in un modo che esclude elcuni dei mezzi con cui le armi nucleari possono essere sganciate.

- (b) L'approccio formale da quello informale, Ora è ampiamente riconosciuto che fra le misure che possono portare al la stabilità dell'equilibrio, quelle unilaterali probabilmente sono più importanti degli accordi, e gli accordi taciti più importanti di quelli formali. Se ora esiste una certa stabilità nell'equilibrio, ciò è dovuto più che altro alle misure che sono state prese per assicurare l'invulnerabilità delle forze di rappresaglia, che a qualche accordo; ed è stato fatto di più con limitazioni tacite sulle spese di armi strategiche di quanto è stato fatto col trattato sulla interdizione parzia le degli esperimenti e il trattato sullo spazio.
- (c) L'approccio diretto da quello indiretto. In Occidente inoltre alcune opinioni recenti sul problema della stabilità hanno girato intorno all'idea che i governi americano e sovietico devono innanzitutto persuadersi della validità del concetto di stabilità strategica, e che pertanto devono procedere ad abbozzare un accordo, o ad arrivare ad una serie di intese, che includono questo concetto, nonchè a definire che cosa questo significa per ciascuno di essi in termini di quantità e tipo di armi. L'idea è che, essendo arrivati ad accettare l'obiettivo comune della stabilità strategica, i governi delle superpotenze potrebbero pianificare insieme i loro livelli di forza ed incoronare i risultati in un accordo o serie di accordi che da sè metterebbero in evidenza il concetto di stabilità e definire la sua de-

scrizione quantitativa.

L'approccio diretto, cioè il raggiungimento di un accordo di stabilizzazione il cui fondamento è intrinse co nell'accordo, ha le sue origini nella tradizione che pensa il disarmo come un problema intellettuale che si posa sulla necessità di una soluzione, piuttosto che un processo di negoziazione che cerca le basi per una contrattazione o un patto. E' difficile immaginare che l'approccio diretto possa mai portare a qualche risulta to. I governi delle due superpotenze stanno perseguendo separatamente i loro interessi e obiettivi strategici, ed è improbabile un approccio che concepisca i colloqui sugli armamenti strategici come una semplice discussione sul come ei può massimizzare un comune interesse. Ogni governo programmerà i livelli di forza alla luce dei prò . pri obiettivi. Questi possono includere (come nel caso degli Stati Uniti) l'obiettivo di massimizzare la sta) bilità strategica. Ma questi processi di pianificazione avranno luogo in ciascun paese e sananno riflessi nei negoziati e nelle intese a cui porteranno; essi non pos sono costituire il punto cruciale dei negoziati stessi.

E' più probabile che la stabilità strategica sia perseguita col metodo indiretto di concludere accordi, contribuendo al raggiungimento di questa meta senza proclamarla. Ogni governo, avendo in mente quali sono i livelli di forze di cui ha bisogno e come potrebbe esse re pronto a modificarli in caso di intesa, procede alla

negoziazione di accordi (una messa al bando degli esperimenti, un congelamento dei missili, un accordo sul fondo degli oceani) basati forse sulla "massima riduzione e limitazione" (che ancora domina la presentazione pubblica delle proposte di controllo degli armamenti).

(d) L'approccio statico da quello dinamico. Molte opinioni su tale questione trascurano di tener conto dei mutamen ti politici e tecnologici. Un accordo che contribuisca alla strategica, limitando il numero e i tipi dei missili offensivi e difensivi in modo da lasciare ad ambo le parti una capacità di Distruzione Assicurata, in sè introduce semplicemente un elemento fisso in una situazione in cui altri elementi sono costantemente in movi mento. I mutamenti nella tecnologia militare non racchiusi in accordi possono annullare le forze di questi. I cambiamenti nelle relazioni delle superpotenze, fra loro o con altri paesi, possono richiedere un riassestamento dei loro relativi livelli di forze.

Queste sono alcune ragioni del perchè è difficile prevedere che accordi formali e globali possono avere un ruolo di rilievo nella stabilizzazione dell'equilibrio. E' improbabile che la stabilizzazione dell'equilibrio possa derivare dalla conclusione di un accordo definitivo, mentre invece è probabile che siano richiesti continui negoziati. E' per questa ragione che si attribuisce molto interesse ai recenti suggerimenti che una fine dei colloqui sulle armi strategiche potrebbe

essere quello di stabilire istituzioni o procedura inca ricate del compito di condurre negoziati continui.

(e) L'approccio radicale da quello conservativo. La stabilizzazione dell'equilibrio è stata vista talvolta come un insieme di misure dirette a stabilire un "deterrente minimo" (forse 50 o 100 vettori nucleari per parte, quanto approssimativamente è stato previsto nella proposta di Gromiko); ma oggi si pensa più frequentemente ad una limitazione ad un livello più alto (1.000 ICBM per parte), o alla sola astensione da alcuni possibili sviluppi futuri, come: lo spiegamento di sistemi ABM pesanti o di MIRV.

La meta di riduzioni su larga scala è stata valutata "punto di partenza" lungo la strada che porta al
disarmo generale. Potrebbe inoltre aiutare i tentativi
di combattere la diffusione delle armianucleari e potrebbe abbonare il grado di danni di una guerra nucleare (sebbene ciò dipende da molte altre variabili oltre
al numero dei vettori di lancio).

La principale ragione per preferire l'approccio conservativo è senza dubbio nel fatto che questo ha qualche prospettiva di riuscire. Si può anche provare che probabilmente un basso numero di vettori andrebbe a scapito della stabilità, riducendo il livello di Distruzione Assicurata, aumentando i rischi in caso di violazione o abrogazione del trattato, e sollevando ri chieste dimerifiche che possono andare al di là dei li-

miti tollerabili (ciò, tuttavia, non deriverebbe dal semplice fatto di un numero egualmente basso, ma dipen derebbe da altre variabili).

Inoltre, nelle opinioni che si hanno sul livello di forze di ambedue, abbitamo preso in considerazione non soltanto la relazione fra le superpotenze ma anche il loro modo nell'intera politica mondiale. Nonnè un caso che le misure contro la proliferazione potrebbaro essere meglio favo rite dalla massima riduzione delle forze delle superpotenze. Le relazioni fra le politiche nucleari delle superpotenze e le intenzioni delle principali potenze non-nucleari nei riguardi della proliferazione è molto più sottile e complessa, e certamente include che per alcuni paese potenzialmente nucleari l'astensione dell'acquisizione di armi nucleari proprie è condizionata dalla continua capacità di fare affidamento sulla forza nucleare della superpotenza alleata o nemica.

A parte il puchlema della proliferazione, l'intera struttura delle relazioni di potenza nel mondo riposa sul predominio strategico delle superpotenze. Con ciò non si vuole dire che l'ordine mondiale sarebbe favorito da una intesa sovietico-americana di mantenere una "Joint high posture" nei confronti della Cina, o di altre potenze che stanno sorgendo, attraverso il mantenimento di alti livelli di forze offensive e attraverso lo sviluppo dei sistemi ABM principalmente in relazione a potenze nucleari minori. Tale dottrina è aperta all'obiezione secondo cui (certamente se

fosse provlamata pubblicamente, ma anche se non lo fosse)
potrebbe stimolare l'antagonismo in zone dove attualmente
c'è la volontà di accettare la leadership sovietica o americana, e secondo cui a lungo andare probabilmente sarà il
destino delle superpotenze di dover partecipare sempre di
più alla gestione degli affari mondiali. Ma quelli che chig
dono la riduzione a livelli molto bassi delle forze strategiche sovietiche e americane hanno il dovere di mostrare
quali principi dell'ordine mondiale sarebbero nella situazione di poter richiedere una tale riduzione, o di mostrare
come la Cina ed altre potenze interessate potrebbero essere
persuase a fare parallele riduzioni che preserverebbero
l'egemonia delle superpotenze.

## Deterrenza contro la difesa come base della sicurezza internazionale

In quelle che ho chiamato forme più sofistificate credo che il concetto di stabilità strategica resta valido come un obiettivo generale della politica strategica e
del controllo degli armamenti. Ma non è possibile riaffermare questa dottrina senza tenere conto della sfida che le è
stata fatta da Donald Brennan e Freeman Dyson (i punti di
vista di questi due scrittori sull'argomento non sono identici, e più che altro propongo di considerare il punto di
vista di Brennan; ma in generale c'è una somiglianza nelle
loro posizioni).

Le opinioni di Brennan e Dyson sono state espresse in relazione al loro appoggio alla costruzione di un sistema ABM da parte degli Stati Uniti. Diversamente dai più recenti oppositori di questa politica, essi basano le loro idee specificatamente sulla desiderabilità di una difesa pesante del le città e della popolazione contro la Russia (ponendo per-) tanto se stessi, come ho detto sopra, fuori della principale corrente del dibattito americano), piuttosto che sulla necessità di una difesa dalla Cina o sulla necessità di difendere la forza strategica americana da un attacco sovietico. Inoltre, mentre è giusto dire che la maggior parte delle tesi in appoggio ai programmi Sentinel e Safeguard è venuta da persone preoccupate che la forza degli Stati Uniti nei confronti dell'Unione Sovietica e della Cina potrebbe venir meno, Brennan e Dyson basano le loro argomentazioni partendo da considerazioni relative al controllo degli armamenti.

Queste argomentazioni (prarafrasando le loro parole, e sperendo di fare loro giustizia) affermano che un sistema generale di sicurezza può essere basato più efficientemente (e Dyson almeno aggiungerebbe, con una migliore giustificazione morale) su una efficace difesa che su una efficace deterrenza. Dopotutto la mutua deterrenza è al massimo un espediente su cui fondare le speranze di sopravvivenza dell'umanità nell'era nucleare. Essa dipende dalla continua volontà delle superpotenze di comportarsi "razionalmente", e non preserva dai pericoli di guerra per incidente o per errore. E' aperta all'obiezione (che gli stu-

diosi di problemi strategici hanno a lungo fatto contro le strategie basate sulle concezioni di "deterrenza limitata" o "solo deterrenza") secondo cui non fornisce alcuna limita zione dei danni nel caso dovesse scoppiare una guerra. Poichè la deterrenza consiste essenzialmente in uno scambio di minacce di causare la distruzione massiccia di vite e di beni, va contro le prospettive a lungo termine di porre le relazioni fra le due superpotenze su una base di reciproca fiducia. Se non ci fosse alcuna prospettiva per una efficace difesa della popolazione contro un attacco nucleare strategico di una superpotenza la deterrenza potrebbe essere ancora desiderabile: ma non è così. "Dalla metà degli anni 50 alle metà degli anni '60", ha scritto Brennan, "la politica strategica delle due superpotenze era dominata dalla logica che, dal momento che non ci si può difendere, si deve dissua dere. Questa posizione, che originariamente poteva essere ampiamente giustificata, ora sembra essere interpretata da alcuni - principalmente certi americani - in questo modo: dal momento che dobbiamo dissuadere, non possiamo difenderci. Questo dovrebbe essere annoverato come il non seguitur del decennio"

Una caratteristica del pensiero di Brennan e Dyson è la loro grande fiducia che la difesa delle città e della popolazione a lungo andare possa essere resa efficace contro un attacco nucleare strategico, ad un costo tollerabile.

Tuttavia, essi desiderano assistere il processo auspicando accordi sul controllo degli armamenti che aiuteranno a garantire l'efficacia della difesa. Brennan ritiene che il

na espansione compensatoria delle forze offensive, e che col tempo le forze offensive potranno essere limitate a poi ridotte per mezzo di accordi, lastiando gli Stati Untti e l'Unione Sovietica dipendenti principalmente dalle forze di fensive per la loro sicurezza.

Non sono d'accordo con questa linea di pensiero, ma credo che merita di essere considerata più seriamente di quanto non lo sia stata. A parte ogni altra cosa è molto salutare che la dottrina della mutua deterrenza sia soggetta ad attacchi di questo genere, e che sia fornito in questo modo un antidoto alla tendenza di guardare l'idea come sacrosanta. Molte analisi strategiche oggi vengono fatte come se il concetto di deterrenza fosse la sperimentata chiave maestra al problema del controllo della forza, piuttosto che un espediente ed una sinistra speranza con cui ci è toc cato di imbattersi negli ultimi venti anni o quasi. C'è stato anche uno studio dagli attuali membri dell'entourage del la Casa Bianca nel quale si dice che la seconda guerra mondiale è scoppiata perchè questa chiave maestra non era stata scoperta in tempo.

inoltre, alcuni degli appunti fatti da questi critici pongono l'accento sulla debolezza dell'idea della stabilizzazione dell'equilibrio, almeno così come è stata talvolta formulata. Al primo posto c'è chiaramente l'aperta debolezza della asserzione che lo spiegamento di un sistema ABM da parte di una delle superpotenze causerà necessariamen

te un aumento compensativo o un controbilanciamento delle forze offensive dall'altra parte. Questo concetto del "fenomeno azione-reazione" è alla base della posizione del Segre tario McNamara sulla questione dell'ABM, e riflette un modello di "corsa agli armamenti" che è stato per molto tempo l'elemento centrale del modo di vedere dei sostenitori del controllo degli armamenti.

Un tale modello non suppone semplicemente che i paesi interessati sono determinati a mantenere una capacità di Distruzione Assicurata, ma anche che possono essere interessati a mantenere un particolare livello di distruzione. Brennan ed altri sono stati in grado di porre in rilievo il fatto che i russi non sembrano pensare in termini di Distruzione Assicurata, e che non hanno dato alcuna indicazione di sentirsi provocati dalle decisioni sul <u>Sentinel</u> e il Safeguard. E' stato sottolineato anche she sebbene la politica degli Stati Uniti si è basata per lungo tempo sul concetto di Distruzione Assicurata, non è il caso che l'America debba essere sempre in grado di minacciare il particolare livello di distruzione, che il Segretario McNamara ha ritenuto richiedesse la Distruzione Assicurata (ed egli stes so ha ammesso che non c'è alcun modopreciso per stabilire che cosa dovrebbe essere).

La nozione di "azione-reazione" descrive soltanto un elemento nelle relazioni fra gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica per quanto riguarda le decisioni sugli armamenti. In parte le decisioni di ambo le parti sono causate da fattori non del tutto razionali come la struttura del potere in una burocrazia.

In quanto derivano da considerazioni razionali (queste possono riferirsi a considerazioni economiche o di po litica interna) come la necessità di placare i militare, di sostenere qualche settore dell'industria degli armamenti o di reperire fondi per qualche altro progetto. In quanto sono considerazioni razionali che si riferiscono alla politica estera, possono aver meno attinenza con l'altra superpotenza che con terze parti, come la Cina che attualmente è un elemento essenziale nei calcoli delle superpotenze sulla politica dell'A.B.M. In quanto i calcoli di una delle superpotenze sono una risposta alla decisione dell'altra, questi possono non prevedere "compensazione" o "controbilanciamento" alla riduzione della capacità di Distruzione Assicurata, tanto quanto l'emulazione ("Se essi hanno X, anche noi dobbiamo averto"). Nella misura in cui ciascuna parte crede che la propria capacità deterrente debba essere mantenuta, non ne consegue che ciò sia pensato in modo quantitativo.

Questo sposta l'attenzione su un difetto basilare in una grande quantità di analisi strategiche contemporanee, vale a dire sul tentativo, nel date una integrazione alle azioni dei paesi, di sostituire la domanda di "che cosa sarebbe razionale fare da paete loro", cui si risponde in termini di qualche ipotetico Uomo Strategico (tratto dall'esperienza americana, come l'Uomo Economico nell'economia classica fu tratto dall'esperienza inglese), con la domanda di

"che cosa fanno?", cui si risponde in termini di osservazione storica e politica.

In secondo luogo Brennan attira l'attenzione sul fatto che gli schemi di mutua deterrenza stabilizzata non forniscono in se stessi una risposta al problema di limitare una guerra nucleare se dovesse scoppiare. Parte dell'appoggio allo spiegamento di un sistema ABM, come è stato interpretato dalle amministrazioni Johnson e Nixon, deriva natu ralmente da semplici considerazioni di Limitazione dei Danni, qualora si dovesse verificare un lancio "accidentale" dei sovietici o un futuro attacco cinese. Non è un caso che i sostenitori della stabilizzazione dell'equilibrio strate gico si affidano alla dottrina della "città minata" di cui Brennan parla in modo così denigratorio. Ma è vero che un ac corso sulla stabilizzazione dell'equilibrio che precluda lo spiegamento di ABM lascerebbe le nozioni senza sicurezza con tro un attacco nucleare e che un tale accordo avrebbe bisoquo di essere corredato da altre misure tendenti a contenere una guerra se dovesse scoppiare.

Tuttavia, mi sembra che Brennan e Dyson sono avanti (o dietro) il loro tempo. La loro critica alle teorie della deterrenza è valida come una protesta contro l'accessiva letteralità e illegittima scrupolosità di cui talvolta esse sono investite. Ma resta il fatto che gli Stati Uniti o l'Unione Sovietica disciplinano il proprio comportamento con la minaccia di una guerra nucleare e che, se nell'attuale contesto politico di queste relazioni, la loro capacità

di creare danni inaccettabili fosse messa in questione, le politiche che ora non entrano nelle loro concezioni potrebbe ro apparire meno attraenti. Sebbene la "compensazione" o il "controbilanciamento" all'aumento delle forze offensive non è necessariamente una conseguenza di qualche misura relativa al sistema ABM, e sebbene non c'è alcuna ragione di supporre una risposta adeguata derivata dall'attaccamento a un dato livello di Distruzione Assicurata, sembra poco probabile che l'Unione Sovietica, lasciando da parte gli Stati Uniti, se ne starebbe con le mani in mano mentre la sua capacità di dissuadere viene messa in fase. Come altre concezioni radicali, il programma di Brennan e Dyson suppone che altra gente possa essere convertita per rendere questo programma una realtà.

Un elemento molto importante nella loro dottrina è naturalmente l'affermazione che la difesa delle città contro un attacco strategico massiccio da parte di una superpotenza possa funzionare realmente. Non ho nulla da dire sugli argomenti che dividono gli esperti tecnici sui probabili effetti futuri della tecnologia dell'ABM. Tuttavia due punti sono all'ordine. Se la situazione tecnica della competizione offesa-difesa cambiasse molto nei prossimi cinquanta anni, come sembra aver fatto negli ultimi cinque, noi non siamo in una buona posizione per dire quali prospettive a lungo termine possono esserci nella difesa delle città. Inol tre la posizione Brennan-Dyson suppone non soltanto che la difesa delle città può essere resa efficace, ma anche che i

governi delle superpotenze saranno sufficientemente fiducio si della sua efficacia da permettere ai loro deterrenti di essere corrosi, invece di limitare e ridurre le loro forze offensive. In altre parole essi parlano di una situazione che è assai lontana da quella attuale.

C'è un altro aspetto del problema che (a giudicare da quelle dichiarazioni che ho esaminato) Brennan e Dyson
non sembrano aver considerato. Quali relazioni continueranno ad esserci fra le superpotenze, rese inespugnabili ad un
attacco con difese efficaci, e il resto del mondo? Si è considerato il fatto che esse manterranno abbastanza forze offensive per minacciare il resto del mondo, ma non abbastanza da indebolire le difese che hanno apprestato l'una contro l'altra? O le due superpotenze stanno per rinunciare
ad ogni tentativo di influenzare il corso degli eventi al
di fuori dei loro confini, con forze nucleari strategiche?
La dottrina delle "sole forze difensive" implica l'impotenza di una strategia da Linea Maginat riguardo alle forze
delle altre parti nel mondo.

### III L'AMPIEZZA DELLE PROPOSTE

Non propongo di discutere qualche particolare proposta, nè qualche analksi dettagliata dei possibili progetti. Non credo che ci sia alcuna proposta su cui si possa contare per promuovere gli obiettivi che sono stati precedentemente messi inrilievo, ma ci sono un numero di possibili accordi che possonofarlo, dipendendo dal contesto, cioè: dello "spinoff" intellettuale e delle forme di comunicazione che si stabiliscono attraverso il loro processo di negoziazione, dalle limitazioni unilaterali che essi possono servire a promuovere dal modo in cui la "corsa agli armamenti", verrebbe riindirizzata come risultato della loro conclusione dagli effetti su di essi dei futuri mutamenti tecnologici e politici.

E' possibile che i colloqui sugli armamenti strate gici seguiranno i precedenti modelli di discussioni su questo argomento, in cui una o ambedue le parti presenteranno proposte chiaramente non negoziabili per l'aitra: che, cioè gli americani avanzaranno proposte (come il "Johson freeze") che implicano un alto grado di ispezioni importune, e che i russi avanzeranno proposte per un disarmo radicale. In simili circostanze possono aver luogo scambi significativi di idee, ma si perderebbe l'opportunità di discussioni dirette su alcune mete attendibili. Tali discussioni potrebbero prendere una o più delle seguenti forme:

### Scambio di idea su questioni strategiche

Una possibile meta per i due governi potrebbe esse re semplicemente lo scambio di idee su problemi strategici e sul controllo degli armamenti, nella speranza di comprendere meglio le idee dell'altro, riducendo gli elementi di incomprensione e di incertezza che hanno un ruolo di rilievo nella competizione sugli armamenti strategici, e contribuendo ad un processo di mutua educazione. Problemi come quelli

trattati nella prima parte di questo scritto potrebbero occupare una parte dell'ordine del giorno di questa discussioni: gli esatti obiettivi delle discussioni sul controllo de
gli armamenti; i concetti di stabilità, deterrenza e difesa; le misure per fronteggiare una guerra per incidente o
per errore; i concetti di limitazione dei danni e di limita
zione della guerra; il ruolo della politica nucleare delle
superpotenze nei confronti della proliferazione.

Può non esserci alcun dubbio sulla necessità che gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica hanno di instaurare sistemi più efficaci di comunicazioni in questo settore specializzato e quasi tecnico. E' stato spesso fatto osservare che il principale valore delle passate discussioni sul disarmo è stato in comunicazioni di questa specie. Ma forse il problema di stabilire le comunicazioni efficaci non è stato fatto oggetto di uno sforzo unitario diretto specificatamente a questo fine. E' stato trattato come un obiettivo secondario, un sotto-prodotto delle conferenze sul disarmo o il compito di gruppi non-ufficiali, piuttosto che essere trattato in un ambito più vasto nel suo stesso diritto.

Si può dubitare, tuttavia, che una serie di collo qui possa essere realisticamente confinata a questi compiti. Da colloqui come questi che attraggono così tanto l'attenzione pubblica ci si aspetta che siano trattati obietti vi più tangibili.

### Negoziazione di accordi sostanziali

E' probabilmente inevitabole che saranno avanza te proposte per accordi formali o accordi su questioni di sostanza. Se queste proposte sono abbastanza realistiche, possono non implicare un disarmo sostanziale nè procedure di ispezioni formali. Alcuni dei possibili argomenti di discussione possono essere :

(a) Un congelamento dell'ulteriore sviluppo di armi nuclea ri strategiche. Ciò si riferirebbe agli ICBM e SLBM ed ai bombardieri a lunga gittata : un dubbio potrebbe sorgere sul fatto di includere la forza sovietica di MR/IRBM (qualora fosse inclusa, l'Unione Sovietica sa rebbe costretta a sollevare la questione delle armi nucleari tattiche della NATO; se non lo fosse, gli Stati Uniti si troverebbero in difficoltà con i loro alleati europei). Sarebbero sufficienti verifiche uni laterali, almeno in alcuni aspetti del congelamento (numero e misura approssimativa dei vettori, ma non numero delle testate per vettore, potenza delle testa te ecc.). Potrebbe essere permessa la sostituzione delle armi esistenti ma non il loro perfezionamento.

Un simile accordo potrebbe formalizzare le varie eguagiianze o ineguaglianze nell'equilibrio strategico trattate precedentemente. Potrebbe ratificare una parità approssimativa, precludere lo sviluppo di sistemi ABM pesanti, eprecludere (se fosse accompagnato

dalla interdizione degli esperimenti con i MIRV) lo spiegamento dei MIRV. Poichè (come altre proposte possibili) lascia fuori molte variabili e non considera eventuali cambiamenti, un accordo di questo genere non rappresenta una soluzione sufficiente al problema della stabilizzazione dell'equilibrio. Richiede alle superpotenze di abbandonare a mezza strada molti progetti desiderabili ed è improbabile che questo sia qualco sa di più di un argomento di discussione.

(b) Determinazione di un limite quantitativo (e forse qualitativo) delle armi nucleari strategiche dispiegate.

Ciò potrebbe consentire ulteriori sviluppi nei limiti prefissati, e/o implicare qualche forma di disarmo.

La distribuzione di questi limiti fra missili e bombardieri, fra armi difensive e offensive, terrestri e marine può essere lasciata aperta o specificata. Un esempiodi questo tipo di proposte è quello fatto da Harold Brown (\*) che prevede la definizione del numero di missili offensivi e difensivi.

Qualche proposta molto semplice in questo campo, per esempio una limitazione a 1.000 ICBM per parte potrebbe offrire una possibile base di accordo. Una simile limitazione potrebbe dare un indice significa-

<sup>(</sup>t) - Foreign Affairs, Aprile 1969

tivo parità" o di "stabilità", ma in ogni caso è impossibile definire un accordo completo in tal senso. Proposte complicate e ingegnose per concordare fra le superpotenze un giusto numero e tipo di missili e di testate al fine di preservare l'equilibrio, protegger si contro la Cina, ecc., non sono fattibili come proposte negoziali e non sono in ogni caso più autosufficienti della semplice proposta che ho citato come un possibile mezzo per raggiungere l'obiettivo della stabilità.

- (c) Progetti di limitazione per le sole forze offensive, come ha proposto Donald Brennan, pppure per limitare soltanto le forze difensive. Qualunque siano i loro meriti, questi progetti attualmente non sono negoziabili poichè vanno contro il forte attaccamento di ambedue i paesi nel conservare sia le forze offensive che quelle difensive.
- (d) Bando degli esperimenti sui MIRV. Qui il problema è che se questo bando fosse introdotto abbastanza rapidamente, interromperebbe lo sviluppo dei MIRV da ambo le parti; e che, poichè sarebbero richieste ispezioni importune per determinare se i MIRV sono stati installati nelle ogive dei missili, un bando degli esperimenti che possa essere adeguatamente verificato sarebbe un buon approccio. Tuttavia gli argomenti di coloro che sono preoccupati degli sviluppi MIRV sono forse troppo sottili e ambigui per essere presentati

effettivamente in un negoziato.

- (e) Proposte per limitare l'uso di armi nucleari (non-uso, non-primo-uso, non-uso contro potenze non-nucleari, ecc.). Questo è il trito argomento su cui da lungo so-no interessati i sovietici e, secondo la mia opinione, gli Stati Uniti dovrebbero dimostrarsi più comprensivi a proposte di questo genere di quanto non lo siano stati in passato.
- (f) Ci sono alcuni segni secondo cui l'Unione Sovietica po trebbe sollevare la questione della limitazione delle spese per le forze strategiche.

### Accordi procedurali e istituzionali

Un suggerimento di un certo interesse fatto attualmente è cheggli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica dovrebbero cercare un accordo per istituzionalizzare i colloqui sulle armi strategiche, piuttosto che cercare accordi sostanziali.

Ci si potrebbe accordare per incontri ad intervalli regolari e forse dar vita ad un meccanismo per passare in rassegna le relazioni strategiche fra i due paesi ed esaminare gli accordi esistenti alla luce dei cambiamenti politici e tecnologici, di violazioni sospette, ecc.

Questa proposta sembrerebbe rappresentare un ten tativo per sfuggire il problema centrale attraverso la creazione di un organismo. Questa, tuttavia potrebbe essere una interpretazione possibile. Un grosso problema di ogni accordo in questo campo è l'adattamente ai mutamenti ed una istituzione del tipo suggerito potrebbe servire ad affrontario. Potrebbe anche contribuire a creare il tipo di competenza necessaria allo scopo di migliorare le mutue intese in questo campo. Tuttavia, potrebbe indubbiamente essere vista del resto del mondo come un equivalente alla formazione di una nuova alleansa (è stato già suggerito che tale istituzione potrebbe funzionare, in un certo senso, come la NATO), o come l'inizio di un tentativo di formalizzare il condominio delle superpotenze.

### Lista delle abbreviazioni.

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile

FOBS Fractional Orbit Ballistic System

ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile

MIRV: Multiple Indipendently-targeted Re-entry Vehicle

MR/IRBM Medium Range/Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile

MRV Multiple Re-entry Vehicle

SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

## INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 11th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

## • THE SUPER POWERS SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

#### PLENARY SESSION

Sunday 21st September

Morning (I)

# The Nature of Soviet-American Competition PROF. MARSHALL SHULMAN

Politics delights in surprises, and predictions about anything so complex as the adversary relationship between the Soviet Union and the United  $S_{tates}$  are probably best written in ink that is guaranteed to fade almost immediately.

Nevertheless, the exercise of trying to anticipate what form the Soviet-American competition may take in the 1970's can be useful. It obliges us to order our thoughts about the changes in international politics that will affect this relationship. It compels us to come to some at least tentative conclusions about the nature of the two political and economic systems and how they are evolving. And if we believe it is important to moderate the conflict and move it in the direction of cooperation — as all reasonable men must believe — a clear-eyed view of how it now seems to be moving is a good place to begin.

It would be well to make explicit at the outset a point that may be subject to some difference of opinion. What is the essential nature of the conflict? Our approach is that since the Second World War, the Soviet-American relationship has been mainly a nation-state rivalry for military power and political influence, complicated by differences in political culture and ideology. It has also been complicated by some facts of international life: these two countries became world powers at a time when former power relationships were dissolving and new lines of influence were being drawn on a starkly bipolar map of the world. Coincidentally, the arrival of nuclear weapons led each country to see its vital security as threatened by the power of the other.

Some will argue that this approach does not give sufficient emphasis to the factor of ideology, either as an explanation of Soviet motivation or of the role of the class struggle in American politics. This is a matter of belief, difficult to prove or disprove given the present state of our knowledge, and the force of this belief is to make many of the problems discussed here a good deal more intractable than they appear to be if ideology is understood to be a secondary and transitional factor rather than a primary and permanent one.

We begin with some conditions of change in international politics which seem likely to affect the background against which the Soviet-American relationship will operate in the 1970's:

## 1) The accelerating pace of technological innovation This would include:

- a) the rapid introduction of qualitative and quantitative changes in strategic weapons systems. After a period of relative stability and an approach to approximate parity, the strategic weapons balance is being affected by the introduction of new systems of greater complexity and higher performance. If this trend is not deflected by conscious effort on the part of the two countries, the effects will be to increase costs, uncertainties, and consequently tensions. It is also likely to increase the influence of soldiers and military interest groups on the decision-making process within the two countries.
- b) the rapid introduction of new industrial technology. The advanced industrial countries, including not only the United States and the Soviet Union but also Japan and Western Europe, are experiencing a new phase of industrialization, involving the accelerated introduction of technological innovation. If this trend continues, it will change the relative economic power relationships among the industrial nations. It will also widen the gap between the industrialized and the developing countries. Equally important, it is already beginning to have profound social and political consequences within the industrial countries.

#### 2) Changes in the relations of power among nations.

Partly as a consequence of the foregoing, while the strategic military power of the United States and the Soviet Union may increase relative to all other states, the relative power of China, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany — in terms of their capacity to influence events — is also increasing, while that of the United Kingdom is continuing to decline. Whether in this sense Western Europe will emerge as a power factor during this period remains an uncertain possibility.

### 3) Changes in the structure of the World power system.

Again following from the preceding trends, and on the assumption that the perceived threat of general nuclear war is not appreciably increased, the trend toward diminishing bipolarity can be expected to continue. What this is likely to mean in practice is that, given the limited capacity of strategic power to influence political developments, and given the continuing force of nationalism in the present period, the capability of the super-powers to maintain hegemonic relationships, and perhaps even to influence political developments, will diminish. Although other forms of power (economic and

conventional military) remain at the disposal of the super-powers, they are likely to be of dimishing effect in conferring political control over other areas.

- 4) The continuing rise of the North-South problems as a source of international tension. The continued growth of the industrial countries, and the incapacity of the developing countries to cope with the food-population balance and the problems of nation-building, as well as the innumerable potential sources of conflict throughout the developing areas, are likely during the coming decade to provide sources of tension which will cut across the Soviet-American competition, exacerbating it in some cases but involving common interests in others.
- 5) The intensification of social and political upheaval within the industrialized countries. Domestic forces, perhaps as a consequence of advancing industrialization, are becoming a principal source of political dynamism in the present period and are likely to have increasing effects upon international politics in ways that are difficult to forecast. This is reflected in the rejection of traditional values by a young generation in search of new values and new political formulations, in the shifting coalitions of political power in many major countries, in the effort to adapt political institutions to the changing requirements of modern technology. One consequence is an increasing domestic preoccupation within the industrialized countries, and the relatively greater role of domestic factors in the determination of foreign Although as we shall see in a moment this affects both the United States and the Soviet Union, it is also a significant trend in other industrialized countries.

III

We turn now to a brief consideration of some trends within the United States and the Soviet Union that may be expected to affect their relationship during the coming decade.

The situation in the United States is characterized by a polarization in political life. The rise of domestic tensions, reflected in student activism, militancy in the civil rights movement, protests concerning poverty and urban problems and a generalized mood of irascibility and anger, has begotten a backlash movement of ascending strength. The consequence appears to be a pendular swing toward conservatism in domestic politics.

The economy also reflects contrasting developments. It continues to exhibit extraordinary growth in advanced technology and a widening involvement in economic operations abroad through the remarkable expansion of multinational corporations. But at the same time, the United States has been experimenting with monetary controls in an effort to check a persistent inflationary trend

during a period of decline in the rate of growth of the gross national product, seeking to avert a recession and an increase in unemployment. In the event of a recession the tide of domestic politics might be reversed.

In foreign policy, the Vietnam issue has stimulated general disaffection and specific pressures against foreign commitments and against the military establishment. These have tended to reinforce interest in domestic problems at the expense of foreign policy, foreign aid programs and military expendi-The debate over the proposed anti-ballistic missile system, in addition to expressing cumulative resistance to military authority, served an educational function in creating a wider understanding of the implication of the new phase of the strategic weapons race. The prospect for parity with the Soviet Union is beginning to gain some public acceptance, and talks with the Russians on strategic weapons would be well received as a general proposition, but progress toward specific arms limitation will require further development in national opinion about the nature of security under present conditions. Traditionally, the professional military interests, together with that part of the business community directly involved as military suppliers and the small circle in the Congress with special interests in military affairs, have had a relatively free hand in determining military procurement policies. but a countervailing force has been developing in American political life which cuts across the political spectrum. This coalition draws strength not only from liberal anti-military sentiments, reacting to Vietnam and concern about domestic priorities, but also from conservative opposition to the expansion of the federal budget and the level of taxation. Despite the conservative tide in politics, therefore, the balance between these contending pressures appears to be fairly even, but it is sensitive to international developments, such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia. (It is indicative of the attitude of a large part of the business community that the stock-market, in the midst of a general decline, has bounded upward with every rumor of progress toward peace in Vietnam.) If events raise the level of apprehension about Soviet capabilities or intentions, conservative support for higher military capabilities would undoubtedly weigh more heavily in the balance. In the absence of hard evidence, however, manipulation of the "Soviet threat" is more sceptically received than it was in the past.

Unlike the situation of two decades ago, there appears to be no tendency to displace domestic tensions upon foreign objects. The "cold war" has little emotional appeal, but it can also be observed that the movements of radical protest are not attracted to the Soviet cause. Except for the Vietnam issue, foreign policy is not in the forefront of American politics, but the mood of retrenchment abroad does not call into question the basic principle of the commitment to the defense of Western Europe. Moreover, the effort of the Administration to define a post-Vietnam policy for Asia which will continue

to maintain an American presence in that area while avoiding involvement in internal disputes has met with general support. There is also general support for the steps advanced by the Administration for the gradual improvement of relations with China, but there is no widespread inclination to try to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

In sum, given the domestic preoccupations, the conservative tide in politics, and the balance of pressures around military issues, the United States is capable of moving cautiously over time toward a reduction of tensions with the Soviet Union and away from a commitment to overwhelming superiority if no shocks intervene to change these balances, but past events, including Czechoslovakia, have left a residual scepticism about any revival of the "Spirit of Camp David."

If it is hazardous to generalize so broadly and so impressionistically about the United States, how much more so is it in the case of the Coviet Union! Nevertheless, it is necessary to make the best judgments we can on trends in the Soviet situation that may have a bearing on its relations with the United States in the coming decade.

Beginning with the domestic economic side, we can observe that while the Soviet economy has overcome the decline in its growth rate which set in during the early 1960's, it is not showing the buoyant growth of the 1950's and faces some institutional problems likely to be of mounting concern. Soviet statistics claim an overall growth rate of a little over seven per cent. Western analysists believe the figure is between five and six per cent, which is still impressive by international standards.

The general improvement in material conditions for Soviet citizens appears to be continuing its upward course, for recent Soviet investment policies have favored the consumer and the military sectors at the expense of production growth. Nevertheless, although Soviet consumers have more money to spend, they have experienced difficulty in finding goods and services on which to spend it, and they have particularly felt the effects of shortcomings in agriculture, which are reflected in shortages in meat, fresh fruit and vegetables.

In addition to the agricultural sector, Seviet analysts have been frank to acknowledge some persistent difficulties in labor productivity, capital investment and construction.

Of more fundamental concern to Soviet planners, however, have been the problems of technological innovation and management administration. Despite the fact that the Ministry of Instrumentation, Automation and Guidance Systems has been registering the highest growth rate of the entire industrial sector, and that scientific research and development has been greatly enlarged and

reorganized (most of which, however, has been directed at military and space activities), Soviet authorities have indicated their serious preoccupation with the vital problem of improving the process by which new technologies emerge from research and development and are applied to industry, along with accompanying improvements in modern management. On this score, the Soviet Union has not kept pace with the technological revolution which has been manifest in Western Europe, Japan and the United States, except in the military and space fields and in certain limited sectors of metallurgy and machinery.

This sector of the economy, of evident importance to the future industrial power of the Soviet Union, raises problems fundamental to the political system.

The Soviet political leadership, most of whome were born shortly after the beginning of the century, is perhaps better equipped to deal with the early stages of industrialization than with the more complex technology now emerging. To an outside observer, the most significant aspect of Soviet political life is the interplay between two tendencies: one, to adapt the system and its policies to the requirements of modern technology and management; and the other, to preserve as a matter of the highest priority the leading role of the Communist Party bureaucracy.\* The latter tendency, which appears to be in the ascendancy at the present time, relies upon exhortation and ccercion to maintain its position. It has been intensifying its campaigns for ideological conformity; has narrowed the latitudes within which intellectuals and nationality groups may express themselves; and has narrowed politics and policymaking to the small circle at the top of the Party hierarchy. Union is not lacking in talented scientists, technicians and economic administrators, but their efforts to modernize the system would require a more flexible -- and perhaps younger -- political leadership in order to be effec-Both in Eastern Europe and at home, economic experimentation has been held within narrow limits by the political leadership, lest it lead to a weakening of the present forms of political control.

There is evidence of many impulses toward modernizing the archaic impedances to social progress. Within recent years, sociological studies have begun to deal more realistically with the attitudes and desires of the work force. Theorists have been cautiously re-working the standard ideological

<sup>\*</sup> These are tendencies, not necessarily represented in factional groups; these conflicting considerations may at times contend within a single mind. Further, this gross analysis does not attempt to deal with the many more narrowly defined interests operating in the Soviet Union as in any other complex society.

formulations to bring them closer to a realistic appreciation of the scientific and technological revolution in the world, and the nature of contemporary capitalism. Scientific research has sought to overcome its isolation from the experience of other countries in such matters as automation, the applications of advanced technology, including computer techniques, and administrative theory and practice. Until now, however, it appears that these impulses may not have their full expression until a younger and less orthodox political leadership is prepared to accept greater resiliency in its mode of governance. Given the age of the present leadership and its accumulation of problems, a change in the near future seems probable, but the next half-generation of leaders may not necessarily prove to be less orthodox. Moreover, the mode by which the transition will be accomplished, whether by uneventful evolution or turbulently, is difficult to foretell in the absence of constitutional procedures governing succession.

The character of the political leadership has an obvious bearing upon Soviet choices in the field of foreign policy. In Eastern Europe, the "doctrine of the Socialist community," as interpreted by the present Soviet leadership, has brought it after twenty-five years to a contradiction between pressures to modernize the economies of the area and tight Party, military The dilemma this presents is that while coercion could and police control. at one time impose crude industrialization, it cannot now raise productivity, create a modern economy capable of competing on world markets, or win the allegiance of a people. This dilemma is illustrated by the neuralgic reaction of the Soviet leadership to "bridge-building" as "perfidious subversion," while having to respond to Eastern European pressures for new technology and investment funds from Western Europe. So long as the Soviet leadership opts for political orthodoxy instead of a less restrictive policy for the Comecon community's trade and other contacts with the rest of the world, it will continue to contend with instability in Eastern Europe.

The mark of Party orthodoxy is also evident in Soviet relations with the foreign Communist Parties. The compulsive urge to elicit some kind of endorsement, however hedged, from a gathering of Party representatives proved irrestible; the "Basic Document" approved by the June conference in Moscow illustrates the dilemma of trying at the same time to create a symbolic show of Communist unity against the Chinese while having to omit any reference to China; to organize a broad-front rally against "American imperialism" while holding the Communist Parties to a narrow ideological path.

The crisis in Soviet relations with China has reenforced the tendency toward orthodoxy in several ways: by providing a justification for a tighter mobilization of the society; and -- so long as China poses a militant challenge to Soviet leadership of the international communist movement -- by stimulating

a show of at least verbal militancy from Moscow, such as the "anti-imperialist" campaign and the protestations of fidelity to revolutionary goals.

The high level of tension on its border with China affects Soviet foreign policy in several contradictory directions. It imposes a requirement for a partial quietus in the West, in order not to have to face active fronts in several directions at once and to inhibit the United States from taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict. It also raises the prospect for a considerable expansion of Soviet influence in Asia, which is perhaps seen as a necessity in order to assure Soviet security in the East. This has not only raised the possibility of military action on the Sino-Soviet frontier, but also, the tentative notion of a collective security system in Asia, which seems intended to contain China and also to replace the anticipated reduction in the American presence in Asia. The Soviet Union has not yet made it clear whether it intends to work toward a regional collective security arrangement in Asia, or whether it will proceed through a network of bilateral agreements. Increased Soviet maritime activity in the Indian Ocean and intensified diplomatic. economic and cultural bilateral contacts with nations of the southern periphery of China are steps that have already been set in motion. as well as a systematic drive for increased influence in Japan, whose growing industrial strength is seen as a major factor in any new power configuration The effect of this strategy will be to pit Soviet support for existing governments in Asia against Chinese support for revolutionary movements, and the effectiveness of the strategy may depend upon the level of resources the Soviet Union is able and willing to invest in this effort, and upon the extent to which the United States does in fact reduce its presence in this area. So long as Soviet political strategy continues to move in this direction, its efforts will be competitive but in a parallel direction with American interests in stabilizing existing governments in this area, with the exception of Vietnam, which is regarded as a symbol of Soviet support for "national liberation movements."

Relations with the United States, perhaps more than any other aspect of Soviet foreign policy, reflect the interplay of opposing tendencies. From the point of view of those who see the strengthening and modernization of the Soviet economy as the primary requirement for Soviet power in the future, the present need is to reduce the drain on resources from military expenditures and to increase trade and scientific contacts with the West. This pragmatic judgment has been expressed in statements of interest in strategic arms talks with the United States and a policy of reduced tension.

On the other hand, from the point of view of the orthodox wing of the Party bureaucracy, any slackening of opposition to the United States presents

serious operational difficulties. Times of reduced tension and increased contacts with the West invariably complicate matters for the Party orthodoxy by encouraging non-conformist thought among intellectuals, artists, scientists, economists and the youth, not only at home but also in Eastern Europe. This apprehension is reflected in drumfire campaigns by the Party in liaison with the police against "bourgeois ideology" and "subversive ideas from the West". It is also reflected in campaigns in liaison with some sections of the military leadersip to trumpet the threat of "agressive American imperialism" preparing for another world war, to express resistance to arms limitations and support for further military appropriations. (The tactic has its analogue in the United States.) There is no doubt that the intensification of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam after 1964 contributed greatly to strengthening this view of American intentions.

What this suggests is that any effort to project the future state of Soviet-American relations must take account of the uncertainty as to which tendency is likely to prevail in the Soviet Union, for each is accompanied by different perceptions of the United States and of Soviet interests. So long as Farty orthodoxy remains the dominant consideration, the Soviet Union is likely to accept higher economic and political strains rather than to exercise restraints against its military interest groups; to push naval and conventional forces in the anticipation of contests for influence in remote areas; to accept relatively higher risks in the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the hope of gaining a dominant influence in the Arab world. Also, it would be more likely to heighten the political rivalry by means of an "anti-imperialist" campaign to contest U.S. influence around the world; to push a European Security Conference proposal to reduce United States influence in Western Europe and gain a freer hand for a Soviet sphere of control in Eastern Europe.

If however this policy direction proves unsuccessful and the view comes to prevail that Soviet interests will be best advanced over the long run by the enhanced power of a strengthened and modernized economy, restraint in the arms race and in the political rivalry may go so far as to allow for some measures of limited cooperation. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that the workings of Soviet internal politics may be influenced in some degree by developments in the United States; trends toward moderation in Soviet policy could be inhibited equally by bellicosity and an unrestrained military spiral in the United States, or by a collapse of strength and will.

Putting these external and internal trends together, what can be anticipated for the Soviet-American relationship in the 1970's?

The first and most important question is: what are the prospects for the strategic military rivalry between the two super-powers? There seems little doubt that the security of the Soviet Union and of the United States would be no less, and probably would be considerably improved, if the level of effort now being devoted by the two countries to strategic weapons were half of what it now is. And yet the probabilities appear to be that the upward spiral of the strategic arms race will continue, at least in the near future. As of this writing (September, 1969), the two countries have indicated their intention of entering into talks for the purpose of limiting the strategic weapons competition. However, even if these talks do begin in the near future, it is not likely that they will begin to show significant effects for several years, at best. Among the reasons for this projection are the following:

- 1) The sheer complexity of the subject -- infinitely greater than the partial test ban, for example. Although the margins of safety in the present deterrent balance would be ample to sustain a simple freeze, at least as a temporary first step, the legacy of mistrust on both sides is likely to mire down even the simplest freeze proposal in intricate discussions of the equivalency of weapons systems with widely different performance characteristics.
- 2) The powerful upward tug of technological innovations. If research and development continues at high levels (and they may even be increased as a result of arms limitation talks), it is likely that further innovations will make their appearance, each generating new pressures for deployment, which could only be aborted by very strong resistance from civilian authorities. Moreover, some of the qualitative improvements now emerging may have the effect of increasing counterforce capabilities -- a further source of anxieties regarding adversary doctrines and intentions, and therefore a source of instability.
- 3) The present Soviet leadership does not seem likely to exercise forceful restraint against pressures from its military community, nor does it appear prepared to surmount its ideologically rooted mistrust of American intentions.
- 4) Public opinion in the United States does not yet appear to be prepared to accept the parity in strategic relations which would be required by Soviet negotiators. The level of residual mistrust of the Soviet Union, the consequent commitment to security through superiority, and the strength of military and associated pressure groups are limiting factors in the American approach to negotiations.

- 5) Large areas of uncertainty in the perception by each side of the intentions, strategic doctrines and hidden potential capabilities of the other, combined with conservative planning against worst possible contingencies, plus the long lead-times required for planning, all tend to provide dynamic energy for the upward spiral.
- 6) Time lags in the reaction cycle have generally required several years for strategic conceptions to penetrate the bureaucracies and become reflected in actions visible to the other side.

There are, however, a number of factors which in time can be expected to work in favor of moderating the strategic arms race:

- 1) Both countries are experiencing budgetary pressures against the high and increasing costs of new strategic weapons systems. In the Soviet Union, the drain of personnel, research facilities and specialized resources to military research and procurement directly limits progress in industrial technology. The atmosphere generated by the onset of arms limitation talks, if entered into with evident seriousness, may be expected to strengthen the political effectiveness of budget reduction pressures in both countries.
- 2) Improvement in missile accuracy and yield may in the foreseeable future lead the two powers to reduce their reliance upon fixed-site land based missiles in favor of submarine-based retaliatory forces, which could contribute to a stable balance of deterrents at moderate levels.
- 3) Both countries have come to accept as a matter of course satellite reconnaissance, which increases the possibility for verification with less political intrusiveness and contributes to stability by reducing areas of uncertainty. If this were not the case, the arms race would be even more virulent than it is.
- 4) The preparation by each government for the talks is itself a useful educational exercise and this, plus the exchange of positions, once it passes the propaganda phase, could help to widen understanding of the process of interaction which makes an anachronism of former concepts of security through weapons superiority.

What this balance of considerations suggests is that the strategic arms race may continue to move upward for perhaps several years, after which the counter-pressures and the experience of living with the new systems may help to establish a new equilibrium at a higher level than has prevailed over the past decade. Even in the absence of a formal agreement, conditions may then favor informal understandings or tacit and reciprocated measures of restraint. In the meantime, however, the political climate may be adversely affected by the uncertainties, costs and strains of the weapons race, as well as by a discouraged reaction on the part of those who had expected quick and dramatic

results from the arms limitation talks.

Progress in some secondary aspects of the military competition, such as non-proliferation and the sea-bed, may help to mitigate the effects of the strategic spiral, and the extension of tacit restraints in those local conflict situations where parallel interests exist (as, for example, in southern Asia) are likely to prevent a rise of tension to 1948 levels. If, however, the Soviet Union becomes involved in large-scale military operations on its Chinese border, or even limited military actions in Eastern Europe, the effect upon general tensions would be powerful because of the questions it would raise about the rationality of the Soviet decision-making process.

The second major group of questions for the future is: what level of political rivalry between the two countries can be expected in the 1970's? Would a movement toward talks on the strategic competition, even if not immediately productive, moderate the political rivalry? If on the other hand the political competition continues unabated, will it be confined geographically to Europe, the Middle East and parts of Asia, or will it ramify throughout the developing world?

A popular impression persists that the symbolic effect of the Big Two meeting to discuss the strategic arms competition would inevitably be taken to signify a spheres-of-influence political agreement, and this prospect for a condominium of the super-powers has been faced with alarm by some Europeans, and with nervousness by the Russians.

There are a number of reasons why this is not likely to be the case. One is that the strategic arms limitation talks, if our preceding analysis is correct, are more likely to have their effects over a number of years rather than to produce early and dramatic results. Another is that it is becoming more widely appreciated that the nuclear-missile weapons systems have limited political applications, and for all practical political purposes, a gross deterrent balance between the super-powers has the same political effect whether it operates at a high, medium or low level -- providing only that it does not approach the point at which the probabilities of general nuclear war appear to be substantially increased. Therefore, although strategic weapons are of course not without symbolic political effect, they can vary through a fairly wide middle range more-or-less independently from the course of the political competition. There is, of course, some flow of influence in the opposite direction: a certain confidence is required for successful negotiations on strategic weapons, and this confidence would be impaired by grevously provocative actions on the political front. Short of this, however, it is not likely that the curves of military and political competition will move in close congruence. Both countries have been at pains to resssure their respective allies that the political interests of other countries will not be

disposed on the backs of envelopes in the two-power talks. Moreover, the disposition of the present Soviet leadership is to circumscribe the talks to the narrow subject of strategic weapons, and not to extend the scope or effect of the talks to a general détente in the political rivalry with the United States. If the Sino-Soviet conflict remains at more-or-less the same level as it has been in the recent past, it can be expected to inhibit any Soviet tendencies toward a general détente with the United States, but at the same time to keep tensions in this relationship within moderate limits. For these various reasons, no dramatic easement in the political rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States seems likely in the near future.

In Europe, the near-term prospect is for a continued moderate-level rivalry, although there are reasons for anticipating a more productive relationship toward the middle of thedecade. The problem faced by the Soviet leadership in Eastern Europe of reconciling tight Party control with local nationalist sentiment and the needs for economic reform is likely to be a continuing source of tension and suspicion; Soviet sensitivities to the political effects of Western influences in Eastern Europe will probably keep the expansion of economic contacts between this area and the West to moderate levels. In Western Europe, the reshuffling of center-left coalitions will continue to encourage Soviet efforts to stimulate neutralist trends by an expansion of bilateral relations. Particularly in the case of the Federal Republic, the Soviet Union can be expected to continue vacillating between two approaches: one which offers the hope of improved relations in exchange for moves in a neutralist direction (i.e., a less close tie to Washington), and intimidatory charges of revenchism, militarism and neo-fascism intended to isolate Bonn and restrain its growth of influence in Europe.

At the popular level in Western and Northern Europe, there has been some responsiveness to the Soviet proposal for a European Security Conference, and it seems likely that such a conference may be held in the early 1970's. What form it will take, and whether it will achieve the effects intended for it by the Soviet Union (the reduction of U.S. influence in Europe and stabilization of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe) is hard to predict. Western Europe will have its own reasons for wanting such a conference, and the Eastern European countries will also find in it a greater freedom of maneuver. It seems possible that such a conference or series of conferences, by multiplying the number of contacts between East and West Europe, may move Europe toward a defacto softening of its dividing line. This movement would be accelerated if by this time there has been a shift in the Soviet leadership toward a more pragmatic interest in Western contacts to strengthen Soviet technological development, or if European politics drifts in a neutralist direction.

It does not seem likely, however, that this movement toward practical accommodation will take the form of a spheres of influence agreement, much as the Soviet leadership would like to have a formal recognition of its primary interests in Eastern Europe. Even if the United States and Western Europe were disposed to try to stabilize the situation by such an agreement — which they are not likely to be — a Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe is not likely to be stable or productive, for reasons which have been cited earlier. What seems more probable is a general acceptance of a modified spheres understanding: an unchallenged recognition of Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe (which already exists), without however sanctioning Soviet political hegemony over the area. An implicit condification of this distinction would permit an enlargement of political, economic and cultural contacts between East and West Europe, and would offer the practical advantages to the Soviet Union of stability and productivity which might seem attractive to a more flexible leadership.

Outside of Europe, the political rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union may be expected to operate with cautious restraint for longterm gains, with the possible exception of the Middle East, where the prospect of gaining decisive influence in the Arab world would encourage the Soviet leadership to accept the risk of loss of control over a possible conflict situation. Even here, however, the Soviet leadership has not been wholly negative in joint efforts with the United States to seek a diplomatic settlement, and in making clear its desire to avoid direct involvement in any conflict that may ensue. The interest of the Soviet navy in offsetting the U.S. naval supremacy in the Mediterranean will surely continue to mount, as will its interest in opening up the Suez route to the Indian Ocean, but although this competition is aimed at valuable political prizes, it is being managed with tacit restraint on both sides. As we have seen, the political and economic competition in Asia is becoming more intense, partly in response to the Sino-Soviet conflict and partly in anticipation of a contraction of United States influence in the area, but the essential characteristic of this competition is that both sides are seeking to increase their influence with established governments, and therefore some parallelism of interest, as in the Tashkent episode, may keep the rivalry within accepted norms of international behavior. The main hazard in this area, as in Africa and Latin America, is that unpredictable revolutionary developments could bring forward claiments to the title of "national liberation movements," whom the Soviet Union would feel compelled to support to demonstrate its fidelity to revolutionary goals, and given the fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States have since 1965 greatly increased their capabilities for intervening in local conflict situations, the potentiality exists for explosive encounters despite the

evident reluctance of either power to become involved. The United States is clearly in no mood to repeat its Vietnam experience elsewhere, and the Soviet Union has made plain its desire to increase its influence with established national governments in the developing world rather than to work for the revolutionary overthrow of these governments. The factor of chance, however, cannot be discounted, nor the risk that local conflict in some remote and unanticipated area might develop independently of the will or the control of the super-powers.

Perhaps man's irrepressible optimism inevitably exposes him to the danger of wishful thinking, but the compensation for this danger is that it also encourages him to see the possibilities for improving his lot. Over a somewhat longer time perspective — that is, toward the end of the decade of the 1970's — it seems reasonable to believe that the logic of the situation would work toward an amelioration of this conflict relationship.

We have seen that the trends in international politics are toward the rise of other political forces, whose effect is to relieve the stark bipolarity of this competition. Middle and smaller powers have found their voices, and are not content to accept the will of the super-powers. The Soviet-American competition no longer holds the center of the stage, except as the level of tension might rise to the point where nuclear war is thought to be a possibility. Even here, the prospect that other nations may within this time period have some military nuclear capabilities serves to fragment the political map of the world, and to cause common concern to Moscow and Washington. The inexorable rise of the North-South division of the world will put the Soviet Union and the United States, along with other industrialized countries, back-to-back against a breaking storm of poverty, hunger — too many people for too little food — and violent despair. These common interests may not dissolve the differences that now drive the Soviet-American competition, but they may in time come to make these differences seem less important.

Advancing technology is certain to exert long-term effects upon this relationship in a number of ways. As we have suggested, it may have modifying effects upon the Soviet system. It seems likely that the evolution of the Soviet system will depend upon the unintended consequences of efforts by several generations of Soviet leaders to adapt the system to the requirements of advanced industrialization, and that this may make for greater pragmatism and flexibility. (Who knows whether over a very long period of time the effect of technology may not bring both societies to resemble Kafkaesque bureaucratic nightmares?) For the less distant future, advanced industrial societies will face many problems in common: the pollution of the environment, the congestion of cities, life with the computer, the exploration of the universe. These

present opportunities, if not the necessity, for cooperation. It may be that if the Soviet Union and the United States can learn to moderate the hazards of nuclear war as a first step, and to conduct their political competition with restraint as a second step, they may be prepared to advance to the third step of beginning to cooperate to make the earth's environment habitable for the human race. That this will come about is offered as a firm prediction, because the alternative is too hard to imagine.



# INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 11th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

# THE SUPER POWERS SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

### COMMITTEE I

### Friday 19th September

## A View From India

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Previous to Indian independence in 1947, while the Government of India had a foreign policy manufactured in Whitehall, Indians themselves had no formed views on foreign affairs, just as they had no views whatsoever on military policy, so much part of foreign policy. This was the pattern of colonial government and looked at in that context, not unreasonable. Certainly a few individual Indians and particularly Mr. Nehru, who as Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and undisputed head of the then all powerful, all pervading, ruling Congress Party, was to formulate much of India's official opinion on world affairs for 17 years, had their own thoughts on what an independent India's foreign policy should be. But these thoughts were naturally based on theoretical and even untried ideological considerations rather than on hard political, economic and domestic necessity.

Till World War I Whitehall always felt that the greatest danger to the old undivided Indian Empire, the brightest and possibly/only jewel in Britain's crown, lay from the North West. Russia ruled by the Czars was the main enemy and the defences of India were designed to protect the sub-continent from Russian subversian and incursion. A decadent China, nominally still independent but totally impotent both economically and militarily, was held to be of no account. Tibet, with a British Resident at Ihasa, was virtually a protectorate of British India. The tribal areas along the north east border with Tibet and Burma, the Nagas, the Mizos and the many other tribal groups comprising the North East Frontier Agency or NEFA, together with Sikkim and Bhutan, were either administered in a semibiblical manner by Baptist missionaries with a minimum of governmental supervision or else left alone to exist quietly in their ancient feudal ways. A seaborne threat of any kind was discounted. The rise of Japan since its military victory over Russia in 1904 had naturally been registered but it was felt that the Royal Navy, the distance and the bastion of Singapore could safely hold such a threat.

After World War I, with the defeat of Russia by Germany and the subsequent slow but definite rise of the Soviet regime, in the view of the Indian Government the North West Frontier still continued to be considered the vulnerable area. This view was partially induced by tradition, but certainly no other part of India had more accessibility from the West, even though the West as we now understand it was strategically still some distance away. The growing strength and importance of the United States had certainly been noted but the US itself, with its reluctance to join the League of Nations and its withdrawal into a semi-isolationist foreign policy, seemed to make little impact on the Indian viewpoint, either official or non-official. The Indian nationalist, when thinking about foreign affairs, was probably more interested events in Russia than any other foreign country, for here the revolution, though internal, was construed as a nation fighting for freedom and throwing off Czarist colonial rule. There was also some sympathy for China, long linked to India by cultural ties and considered to be under multi-colonial domination.

In the 21 years between the two world wars, India's main preoccupation lay within the country itself. Unofficial India was falsifying the Machiavellian adage which said, "Thus it comes about that all armed prophets have conquered while unarmed ones have failed."

Gandhi, with his non-violent, unarmed revolution was making it clear that Indian independence was no longer a vision: it was a reality. Official India, as represented by the Governments in London and Delhi, bewildered by this unorthodox attack were reacting clumsily, though in retrospect it is difficult to analyse what the correct reaction should have been. The impact of World War II speeded up events and in 1947, somewhat to its own surprise, the Indian sub-continent found itself politically independent. I use the phrase "surprised sub-continent" as both the timing and form of this independence was not what those involved on either side of the struggle had really anticipated. Freedom came before the new leaders who were to assume power had an opportunity to plan for it while the creation of India and Pakistan unfortunately divided the old British India into two countries, each with a built-in antipathy for the other and consequently with very differing views as to what their foreign policy should be and how their external alliances should operate. Independence not only surprised India, it equally surprised Britain who naturally then had the greatest influence on the two newly formed States. Britain found herself without a carefully thought out policy towards India and Pakistan, and so in introducing these two new countries into international circles she based her actions on not wholly accurate presumptions and perhaps on

not wholly accurate prejudices. Just to give one example, Britain was quite certain that Pakistan and India would be far more dependent on her for guidance and assistance in all matters concerning foreign and military policy than in fact was the case. Equally the success of the independence movement, largely Hindu inspired, made many Indians feel that in dealing with their country, some of Britain's attitudes were neither wholly justified nor logical.

Earlier on I mentioned that while the independence movement was gaining strength and success, only a few Indians, though among these few was certainly Mr. Nehru, ever considered in detail what an independent India's foreign policy might be. The doctrine of non-alignment, a doctrine which was meant to achieve considerable independence of action internationally, was possibly the first principle of foreign policy formulated in Indian minds. This principle continues to be the main theme in India's enunciation of foreign policy today, a theme which appears to be getting more attractive to a number of other nations. Paradoxically, whether that freedom of action which India expected through non-alignment still exists to the degree anticipated is doubtful. Apart from its international aspect, the policy of non-alignment was also expected to cut costs at home. Surely a non-aligned country with no territorial ambitions would be able to economise on its budget for defence and the money so saved would go to development.

Some of the problems that would face a newly independent nation were also not fully understood in the days preceding and in the first few years following independence. For example the emergence of new and hostile frontiers with the need to defend them was not clearly visualised. Under the British, apart from skirmishes on the north west Frontier, looked upon by many as useful in keeping an otherwise idle military exercised and occupied, India really had no frontier problem. Tibet was still autonomous and friendly. Along the actual borders, whether it was the more developed western border or the totally undeveloped northern and eastern borders, there was peace. With the coming of independence to the new States in the area and the subsequent re-occupation of Tibet by an increasingly hostile China, the frontiers of India got smaller and in the process came alive. With these live frontiers the tribal areas along the north and north-east could now no longer be left in isolated hibernation. They also had to be administered, modernised, put on a tax paying basis and defended. This created problems of its own. Further, with Britain's influence declining and the growing rise of the USA, the Soviet Union and, at a somewhat slower rate, China, all Indian foreign policy, both political and strategic, inevitably started to become pentagonal, with a small 'p'

of course. Every foreign policy problem had to consider in some degree or the other not only the action Delhi wanted but also the reactions of Rawalpindi, Peking, Moscow and Washington. This is still the case.

India's policy of non-alignment was officially enunciated shortly after Independence. Following this enunciation Mr. Nehru, British educated, but by inclination a socialist influenced by Marxism, started to take the initiative in the development of contacts and co-operation with the outside world. He was convinced that the old historical concept of a Russian military takeover was fallacious and said so despite Stalin's action in Central and Eastern Europe and particularly his attempt to establish a communist regime in Iranian Azerbaijan. There was little reaction from Stalin who still seemed to regard India as a British colony. Nehru's open opposition to the use of napalm in Korea, to the crossing of the 38th Parallel and his suggestion that a negotiated settlement in Korea was essential, were all statements unfavourable to the USA, then the Soviet Union's greatest rival. Stalin remained uninterested. Even after China had moved into Tibet and also made some very inaccurate and unfortunate remarks against both India and Nehru personally, the Soviet Union remained cool. One reason for this may have been that Moscow, despite Nehru's socialistic statements and what appeared to be a growing criticism of US policy, felt that India's political thought had not wholly matured. After all, there did exist in India's political consciousness and at that time only political party, two equally strong groups, one pro-West and socialist in name only and the other only a little more left wing. Another reason for lack of interest may have been that with its own resources somewhat limited and considering India as yet unripe for any kind of serious friendship or alliance, the Soviet Union was taking its time in coming to a decision.

After Stalin's death, changes in Soviet policy soon became visible. The first major move was economic; an offer to assist India in the construction of a steel plant. The second move was more dramatic. Khrushchev visited India and later Afghanistan in the winter of 1955 and during this visit made an unscheduled trip to Kashmir. Here, siding with India on the Kashmir issue, he 'declaimed' that the Indians had but to shout across the hills and the Soviet Union would come to their help. This Soviet support of India's stand on Kashmir is still most important to Indo-Soviet relationships. In Afghanistan Khrushchev unequivocally upheld the demand for an independent 'Pashtunistan', a statement not favourable to Pakistan. How much this change of policy towards India was influenced by a realization that the deteriorating relationship between the Soviet Union and China was about to be openly and seriously ruptured is difficult

to assess. The growing differences in Soviet-Sino friendship were by this time quite apparent to the less privileged observer if not to the world as a whole. In 1956 I found myself leading an Armed Forces delegation to China. Before leaving for Peking, I had a long interview with Mr. Nehru and sensed serious disillusionment in his views of continuing Sino-Indian cordiality. This was understandable, for his troubles with Chou-en-Lai over the border question were intensifying. In China itself, where for 6 weeks our delegation saw a good deal of the coastal and old Manchurian provinces, we were received with the greatest cordiality. However, whenever we met any of the Eastern European diplomats accredited to Peking, it was easy to sense a feeling of unhappiness and dislike. Most of them openly told us that a rupture between the Eastern European bloc and China was close at hand, while the numerous bare bill boards on railway stations and factories showed how many signs proclaiming perpetual Sino-Soviet friendship had recently come down.

The growing warmth of the Soviet Union's relationship with India and Khrushchev's wish to associate India with great power summitry, must have been offensive to the Chinese leaders. Peking would have found it incompatible with her long-term interests that India would compete with China in the councils of the world. This was made fairly clear in 1958 when, at the time of the West Asian crisis in 1958, Khrushchev proposed that India be invited to participate with the great powers in discussions. China disagreed and the proposal was dropped. Of course, shortly after Indian independence and with the growing strength of the Maoist régime, there was much talk of eternal friendship between India and China. This eternity was to be brief. Early on there were the usual exchange of visits and laudatory statements, but then a coolness set in. When sanctuary was given to the Dalai Lama and those who followed him after China's armed reoccupation of Tibet, acrimony increased. A border demarcation question, something that seemed settled and if not settled could have been settled by discussion, was raised by China. Bland on the surface but turbulent below, relationships worsened and in the autumn of 1962, Chinese and Indian troops came into serious conflict. The results were a major political and a minor military success for the Chinese. Both were heightened by China's unilateral decision to withdraw to the old disputed boundary after having pushed India back to a boundary that China claimed as correct. Many explanations have been sought of China's probe in strength and her subsequent withdrawal. Was it intended to throw India off balance economically? Was it a first step to the communization of India from within by stirring up the border tribes? Was it a lesson to other Asian countries not to ignore

China's strength? Was it to prove that India lacked the strength to be an important member of international councils, or was it merely to distract attention and claims from the Sinkiang road? It is difficult to give a categorical answer. Whatever it was, it successfully managed to accomplish a number of possible aims.

This brief military encounter with China had a number of side effects. With the exception of the United States and Britain, the former with many more resources than the latter, no-one, not even the Soviet Union, came to India's immediate assistance either materially or morally. Shaken out of her complacency, India started to re-arm, modernise and re-structure her armed forces, finding in the process, as we all know, that the speedy acquisition of military equipment from abroad is neither easy nor cheap. A British-American assistance programme supplied some deficiencies of unsophisticated small arms and communications equipment. For anything more sophisticated, direct purchase by foreign currency in short supply was the only alternative. Even purchases from the Soviet Union, ready to supply what she thought advisable, had to be negotiated on a basis of so much down and so much to follow within a stipulated period.

This arms aid from the USA to India, small though it was, seemed to cool US-PAK relationships and Pakistan, looking for a counter-weight in the area, started to neglect CENTO and SEATO in order to develop stronger ties with China. China busily continued to strengthen her border with India, more by the improvement of road communications and the building up of supplies

than by the induction of more troops. She also settled along some parts of this border virile Chinese groups from central China, ousting the nomadic Tibetans. A little while later stories started emanating from various sources that China was shortly to have an atomic weapon. These statements were not explicit about the date or type of fusion but when on the 16 October 1964 China exploded her first atomic warhead, there was alarm in India. This alarm still continues.

In India's dealings with the USA after her independence, while there was a democratic basis of understanding on both sides and a commonly understood language, somehow among those who mattered there was initially a lack of harmony. The Indian Prime Minister's early visit to the USA was not the great success everyone had hoped for, while John Foster Dulles' view that non-alignment was immoral hardly helped cordial relationships. While on the economic side India received a generous quota of aid; in accordance with her policy of non-alignment she refused arms aid, when it was suggested and pointed out the dangers of supplying Pakistan from 1953 onwards

with military equipment of a type and for a purpose that made little military sense. However, relationships between New Delhi and Washington began to improve after the death of Dulles. The USA became less critical towards the policy of non-alignment and when President Eisenhower visited India in 1959, it seemed to be an affirmation of America's support to the continuing democratic pattern of government in India. As the United States began to take a more sympathetic view of Indian policy, it seemed logical that Pakistan would start to look away from the US and that the Soviet Union in their turn would take the opportunity to be more friendly to Rawalpindi. In 1961 the Soviet Union agreed to provide technical assistance to Pakistan with its oil exploration programme, a major step forward in Soviet-Pak friendship.

Four years later, in 1965, perhaps fearful of India's growing military strength, perhaps through political necessity and perhaps over-confident of their own military prowess but probably through a combination of all three factors, Pakistan tried to assert by force her claims to the Rann of Kutch. This confrontation died down, but after a brief lull, a three weeks war developed between the two countries. Obviously horrified at the use to which their military aid had been put, Washington immediately terminated all military supplies to both Pakistan and India. This cessation hurt Pakistan much more than India for the former had obtained all their military supplies for the last 12 years from the USA. India was less concerned as she had only been at the receiving end of a very limited military assistance programme since the winter of 1962. Internationally, although the cease fire was arranged by the Security Council, Moscow seized an initiative for which the Soviet Union must obviously have been looking and Kosygin offered mediation at Tashkent. Both sides accepted this offer without demur and indeed complimented Moscow on it. One implication of this acceptance which may not have been entirely clear to either India or Pakistan at the time, was that Moscow in trying to strengthen her relationships in this area would increase all types of aid to the belligerents. Within this aid would certainly be the offer of arms sales to both sides, arms already available in limited quantities to India. During the brief war China had taken no positive action to assist Pakistan beyond issuing strong ultimatums to India and threatening invasion along the north-eastern border. Immediately after the cease fire, with the abrupt termination of military supplies from Washington, China moved in fast with an offer of military equipment to replace Pakistani losses. The offer was accepted even though Pakistan had never handled this type of equipment before. The equipment was, of course, Soviet in design and origin.

In mid 1966, India's external relationships with the two super powers and the other two points of the Pentagon, Pakistan and China, presented an interesting picture and certainly the beginning of some new thinking for Jawaharlal Nehru had died two years previously and his tremendous impact on India's and perhaps also Asia's foreign policy had now disappeared. His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, a great little man in so many ways, had suddenly died just after signing the Tashkent declaration. Perhaps it is relevant to wonder whether had he lived. the aspirations of the declaration/have moved faster to fruition instead of stopping at the bare withdrawal of troops back to their original positions I tend to believe they might have. Shastri's successor was now Nehru's daughter, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, certainly not new to politics but finding her way about the office of Prime Minister and the tremendous power that it could wield. The economic effects of the 1965 war, effects which in Pakistan were to contribute to President Ayub's downfall in 1969, were starting to be felt. The devaluation of the Indian rupee, a controversial piece of legislation at home, had become a fact. Bad monsoons had reduced the quantity of home grown food available, while industry needed immediate help. Substantial aid from abroad was essential. Though better organized and equipped militarily, China's entry into the nuclear field had created some alarm and there was a strong demand from various groups within the country that India should also manufacture and arm herself with nuclear weapons, whatever the cost may Fortunately the tribal areas along the north and north-eastern borders of India were in many ways quieter than they had been for some time previously. This was the picture at home.

Looking outward from Delhi, the increasing consultation and collaboration between the USA and the Soviet Union was not being regarded either with apprehension or elation. There were too many points of difference for these two powers to come totally together, while India's relationship with each had a distinct form built up since independence; a form developed through historical association and geographical proximity rather than identity of viewpoints. Greater or lesser collaboration between the two powers themselves was unlikely to change that form. Any change would have to be bilateral not triangular. Individually, despite the inconclusive and unpopular war in Vietnam, despite integrational problems within the US itself and despite a belief that the then American President was using economic aid to achieve his political ends, US economic assistance was essential for deveof American policy safely, and particularly those aspects Therefore while it was possible to criticise some aspects/ which a large section of Americans were criticising themselves, other comment was muted. There was also a feeling, not publicly expressed, that US involvement in Vietnam could conceivably be a protective pattern against

possible hostile action from China, for American foreign policy at that time meant total involvement in South and South-east Asia in the event of communist aggression.

Relationships with the Soviet Union were increasingly cordial in many areas. Militarily, with Washington now unwilling and Britain, a traditional source, unable to assist in the modernisation and updating of India's defence particularly in naval equipment, Moscow was becoming the main source of foreign military equipment in addition to being a substantial and growing source of economic assistance. However, India's claim that she had a special relationship with the Soviet Union, a claim that the Soviet Union neither accepted nor repudiated, was no longer entirely valid, even though the offer of arms aid to Pakistan had not yet been openly put forward. The growing Sino-Soviet divergence was regarded as another possible protective factor against China, though at the time of the Sino-Indian clash in 1962 the Soviet Union had not supported either claim.

Indian's relationship with China, despite the continuance of diplomatic missions in each other's capitals, had not improved either. India had more than once reiterated a wish to resume talks, a wish that had been totally ignored. It was Pakistan now who was the eternal friend, to be aided and assisted in any way that was advantageous to China. Against another conventional Chinese attack along the Himalayas, India was much better prepared and confident that it could be held. Against a nuclear attack, if indeed at that time such a nuclear attack on India was possible or probable, there was no defence. Statesmen, scientists and soldiers were all considering, individually and collectively, the implications of China's nuclear capacity and counting the political and economic cost of countering it by developing an indigenous nuclear weapon. No clear answer had yet emerged and there was also no guarantee that the super powers would come to India's assistance if China did use a nuclear weapon against India. However, taking into consideration growing internal troubles within China, her increasing rupture with the Soviet Union, an obviously still minute stockpile of nuclear weapons with an undeveloped delivery system, no substantial improvement in the long road communications to the Indian border, India's improved military capacity and no particularly political reason for the renewal of hostilities in the near or semi-distant future, there was a general feeling that while Indo-Chinese relationships would continue strained, there would be no actual physical breach.

Nearer home in the west, despite the hopes placed on the Tashkent meeting, relationships with Pakistan had not improved. While the threat of another war in the near future had almost completely receded. Pakistan was re-arming

herself by gifts from China, loans from her Islamic neighbours and purchases from abroad utilising these loans. India was offering to talk with Pakistan on all controversial subjects but with the clear understanding that Kashmir was not negotiable. Pakistan's invariable reply was that the first question to be settled was the future of Kashmir, after which all other topics would be easier of solution. A new disagreement was developing on the distribution of river waters between India and Pakistan. Oddly enough, while previously it had been the United States which had counselled patience and understanding on both sides, it was now the Soviet Union which was offering this counsel. Washington, perhaps having exhausted herself or having come to the conclusion that such counsel was without value, was silent on the subject. On the eastern border, the steady influx of Chinese into northern Burma, the re-arming of some tribal rebels by Pakistan and the possibility of them also being re-armed by China was of concern, although actual relationships with the Burmese Government had improved considerably which made policing the border a good deal easier. One further possible development in the economic and strategic future was also being talked about though in a somewhat nebulous form. This was a suggestion that for the development and defence of South East Asia, a triangular relationship between Australia, Japan and India should be developed. The economic aspect of this suggestion was easier to understand than the strategic aspect. Even on the economic side, a prosperous India in the export business would be Japan's competitor in the area.

In looking at the scene from Delhi today, that is to say three years later, a number of changes have taken place, including the installation of a Republican President in the United States and a re-assertion of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe. Within India itself, there has been a genuine and substantial breakthrough on the food front with hopes of self-sufficiency by 1972. The export of manufactured goods has also risen considerably in the last two years while the population control programme has started to show some results. I mention these domestic factors as looking at anything with a fuller stomach and a heavier pocket tends to give one a greater feeling of confidence. However, unless these successes are maintained the future must be difficult. So far as the outlook on and relationships with the super powers are concerned, there have also been changes in viewpoint. India would certainly be happy to see the USA and Soviet Union come closer together in the hope that a détente will lead to disarmament and disarmament will lead to funds being available for increased aid. Unfortunately, despite better understanding in a number of areas, it seems that the two super powers far from disarming are re-arming. The effect of this re-armament makes an increase of aid to developing countries almost impossible and, in fact, cuts into

domestic development in the USA and reduces the space programme in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless however close or distant these super powers may be to each other, short of a nuclear war, India's relationships with each of them remain basically bilateral and not triangular.

In considering the USA, the election of President Nixon, his re-assessment of American policy in Asia and the personal contacts made by him during his brief visit to Delhi recently, give India the impression that a clearer Asian policy than was previously available will now be formulated. Yet this policy is not wholly clear by any means and a New York Times cartoon showing the President in front of a blackboard headed "Asian Policy" with two arrows, both pointing in opposite directions, has some validity. Delhi believes that the USA will remain a Pacific power for reasons of her own self-interest. While President Nixon's assurance that Washington will not get involved in any future Vietnams indicates movement away from military pacts, there is uncertainty in understanding how he proposes to help combat internal subversion, a form of assistance that has been promised in very general terms. Even the phasing out of present US military commitments will obviously take some considerable time. Well before he got to Delhi. President Nixon made clear his opposition to an Indian suggestion that some big powers should jointly guarantee the security of Asian countries. The Indian suggestion itself was unclear. It apparently envisaged a joint big power guarantee for the protection of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the countries of South and South East Asia against external attack. The guarantee itself was to be an interim measure till the countries protected became stronger. The big powers were the US, Russia, Britain, France and China. The US President's opposition was understandable in view of two developments. First, there appears to be a gradual shift in the US attitude towards China. A fresh view, which has now been expressed more than once, is that China should not continue to be wholly isolated and that opportunities could arise for a more friendly relationship in the future. India herself is seeking a settlement of her differences with China and therefore a warmer Sino-American relationship, however small the actual rise in temperature might be, is more a plus than a minus for India. Secondly, the interest of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area, an interest reinforced by a growing physical presence, obviously requires some form of counter-weight by Washington's strategists. A big power guarantee or even a joint US-Soviet guarantee which had been suggested by the Jha mission in 1967, can hardly provide that counterweight. In Delhi there was a difference of opinion between India and the USA over America's intention to retain bases in the Indian Ocean, but President Nixon did not seem to

take the Indian objections too seriously. India also categorically denied statements that the Soviet Union has asked for and received bases in the Indian Ocean and these denials appear to be in keeping with Delhi's expressed hope that neither of the super powers should fill the so-called vacuum produced by the withdrawal of Britain from this area.

In defining his new policy, it was interesting to find the US President adopting an argument used by some Asian nations for many years, the argument that Asians should solve Asian problems. Does one detect the Presidential tongue wedged just a little into the Presidential cheek? He however accepted the force of nationalism in Asia and acknowledged India's significance and interest in regional arrangements. In view of Washington's continuing interest in Asia, both as a Pacific power and as a super power, the President did recognise the fact that an American involvement in Asia could be a possibility in extraordinary circumstances. Such extraordinary circumstances seem to be an attack by a nuclear power on a non-nuclear country and the military crossing of internationally recognised frontiers by a major power. Against whom is the warning directed, and are the terms, if correctly quoted, as precise as they should be?

Delhi is fully aware that Washington's new policy in Asia still leaves many questions unanswered. Both clarity and implementation will take time and be conditioned by events in Vietnam and the surrounding areas. A further round of inter-governmental talks are due in October and these may give a clearer vision for the future.

There was already some divergence of policies and interests between India and the Soviet Union showing in the late fifties but since mid 1966. according to many Indians, this divergence of interest has become increasingly more explicit. They quote the Soviet decision to provide military aid to Pakistan, a decision obviously well and long thought over before it was publicly announced in 1969, as one of the highlights of this process of change. Moscow has repeatedly assured New Delhi that it is not interested in upsetting either the present position in Kashmir or the military balance in the sub-continent. The Soviet Union also indicates that its military aid to Pakistan is intended to reduce US and Chinese influence in that country while an increase of Soviet influence in Rawalpindi will not hurt India. In fact, it might even be helpful as then the Soviets would be in a better position to work for/reduction of tension and a normalisation of relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, including accusations by some critics of a complete sell out to Moscow. India continues to deprecate in the strongest terms possible in diplomacy Moscow's decision in this respect.

It is unlikely that the Indian Government has any real doubts about declared Russian policy, though they may not agree wholly with the view that increased Soviet influence in Pakistan will make for any short term or dramatic change in that country's present outlook. They are aware that in historical perspective there have really been few changes in the traditional elements of Russian interest southwards and eastwards. India is also aware that the Soviet Union has been trying to extend its influence not only among the two Islamic members of CENTO, Turkey and Iran, but also throughout the entire Islamic world. Taking this into consideration and considering its growing interest in the Indian Ocean area, friendly relationships with Pakistan assume considerable importance for the Soviet Union. In addition Moscow has a stake in the viability of Indian defence because of its own rapidly increasing border complications with China. Washington, in its new appraisal of Asian problems, also does not seem to show any positive distaste for present Russian policy in the South Asian area. Very recently the Indian Foreign Minister visited Moscow. Here he said "We would welcome guarantees from the US, Soviet Union, Britain, France and China that they would not use force to change existing borders or interfere with the internal affairs of Asian countries". This was apparently what had been said to President Nixon earlier and so far has elicited no reply. Mr. Dinesh Singh also commented on the so called Brezhnev plan put forward in June for collective Asian security. He explained that the plan was a collective agreement to renounce force in the settlement of disputes and not a military pact. This was in line with India's own view according to Mr. Singh and so unobjectionable. In the economic field, India is now heavily committed to the Soviet Union, so heavily committed in fact that the Soviet Union for the first time last year, expressed in some very blunt words its concern about insufficient utilisation of the capacity of some completed joint projects and the slow pace in the completion of new joint projects.

On the increasing Sino-Soviet border problem, Indians feel that in the clashes that have taken place so far, all indications show that China has come off second best. They also consider that in her dealings with China in this matter, Russia will offer no provocation but will resist any armed intrusion with strength. While there have been some suggestions that the Soviet Union may by atomic attack or by conventional force destroy Lop Nor, in India's opinion this seems improbable. For one thing the Chinese are now estimated to have some retaliatory nuclear capacity, perhaps not strong enough to reach Moscow but possibly able to reach out to the Urals. For another the Soviet Union, similarly to a number of other countries, are awaiting the change of policy that they feel must follow the death of

Mao-tse-Tung. There is an Indian view that the Soviets still have a number of friends in the PLA, friends whose influence can re-assert itself at the appropriate time. Again, this time in Moscow, Mr. Dinesh Singh is reported as saying that just as India wishes for normalisation of relationships with China, they would welcome the improvement of Sino-Soviet relationships.

Going to the other two points of the Pentagon, in the view from India, while the wish is certainly there, a rapid change for the better in relationships with Pakistan is difficult to see. The basic differences are too well known to require either repetition or over emphasis in this paper and to these basic differences has been added the problem of the distribution of river waters in the east. Nevertheless, the boundary demarcation along the Rann of Kutch is going smoothly and in its Annual Report for 1967-68, the Indian Ministry of Defence said "the Chinese danger poses to be a long term one while the danger from Pakistan centres on certain problems and has certain elements which do not give it such a long term character." Militarily, another war with Pakistan seems unlikely and pointless when armaments, international pressures and the political problem on each side are considered. Nevertheless, India is disturbed at a suggestion that the US is considering the resumption of arms aid to Pakistan. The benefits to Pakistan would be considerably more than any benefits to India. On the other hand, would there be any political benefit to the USA?

Pakistan, in foreign affairs, continues to follow its policy of equidistance from the two super powers and China, a policy which came into operation in the late 1960s. This policy is perhaps best described in the words of the last President, Mohammad Ayub Khan. In his book, "Friends Not Masters", he says, "We should endeavour to set up bilateral equations with each one of them, with the clear understanding that the nature and complexion of the equation should be such as to promote our mutual interests without adversely affecting the legitimate interests of third parties..... No bilateral equation could be established in isolation; other equations would influence its level. In the end each equation would be determined by the limits of tolerance of third parties. So each equation would have to be acceptable to third parties with whom we might be able to establish bilateral relations of mutual benefit. This is where all the difficulties and complications would arise. It would be like walking on a triangular tightrope." Placed as it is and despite a brief violent political flare up at home, this break-away from an open and unequivocal alliance with the West, was the same President's policy till July 1960, deserves a certain degree of respect from the unbiased observer. Pakistan's ability to walk the triangular tightrope with confidence, deserves even more respect.

The view outwards towards China has also not changed substantially though there are two factors of which India has taken increasing note. Firstly, there is the growing increase in tension between the Soviet Union and China regarding the demarcation of borders, the same type of problem which originally set off the brief Sino-Indian war. As I have said before, it seems unlikely that this tension will lead to war but it will certainly cause border clashes and contain a large number of troops, both Russian and Chinese, which will mean a reduction of forces on other borders. The second reason, of course, is the growing increase in China's nuclear capacity which, though not clearly defined today, will get stronger. Whether China will actually use a nuclear weapon against India is a matter of considerable doubt, despite what many Indians may think. As we all know, the possession of nuclear weapons by China automatically sharpens its conflicts with and changes its relation to the super powers more than just affecting a nonnuclear neighbour. I have even heard it mentioned that with China's present nuclear capacity and foreign policy, the first Chinese bomb may well be dropped in China itself as a deterrent to invasion rather than dropped in a foreign country as an aggressive act. To China, which is at the bottom of the nuclear scale today, this view that her first military target will be defensive rather than offensive seems to be both interesting and have some authenticity.

China's nuclear capacity has, as I have said before, alarmed a certain section of the Indian public and there has been much clamour, some of it undoubtedly for political purposes only, that India also become militarily a nuclear nation. The Government of India have, from the beginning, reiterated their disinclination to go militarily nuclear, though by refusing to sign the non-proliferation treaty in its present form they keep to themselves the right to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. This same view about freedom of choice in using nuclear power for peaceful purposes has been taken by a number of other nations and India is not unique in its view.

On the question of India -despite her denials to the contrary -becoming a nuclear force, it is difficult for me to define the probabilities. Firstly, there are the repeated political statements that India will not develop a nuclear weapon. These political statements are undoubtedly accentuated by the fact that a nuclear explosion by India, military or non-military, may well lead to a severe curtailment in the aid programme now being received from abroad. At this particular point of time, when an agricultural and economic take-off seems to be on the point of achievement, the cessation of aid would make progress and development immensely more difficult. These difficulties would, in their turn, have political repercussions within the

country; political repercussions which would probably be stronger than the advantage to be gained by having a few nuclear weapons. From the technical aspect, it may be possible that within a short time India could produce a "nuclear bang" rather than a nuclear bomb. There is a substantial difference between the two and the targets open to India if it did have a nuclear weapon would be more difficult to pinpoint than the targets open to China. There has also been some speculation in India as to whether China would arm Pakistan with nuclear weapons for use against India. To me it seems doubtful for a number of reasons that such a step would be taken by China or accepted by Pakistan. The creation of Pakistan into a small nuclear power would fundamentally alter the present relationships between Pakistan and the super powers, a change whose value would be very doubtful so far as Pakistan is concerned.

Briefly summing up an Indian view on the relationship between the super powers and India's relationship to them, both relationships must also be relevant to the domestic political situation within India itself. therefore seems as if such relationships would continue to be bilateral rather than triangular. This pattern would seem to be of more value to India in its present state of development than any other linkage. So far as spheres of influence by the super powers in the world as a whole are concerned, in the Indian view it is doubtful whether the USA or the Soviet Union themselves are clear as to what exactly they want at the present moment except that they do not want a nuclear war between each other. In the long term future, by which I mean about 20 years from now, depending largely on what policies China will follow after Mao is no more and working on the assumption that the comparitive balance between nations is approximately the same as it is today, is it possible to envisage a broad understanding between the super powers as to where their influence should be predominant and where such influence could overlap and co-exist? Could this eventual pattern be that the Soviet sphere of influence would extend largely over Eastern Europe, Western Asia, Northern Africa and Southern Asia including India and West Pakistan: that the US sphere of influence would extend over North America, Latin America and Southern Africa: that a joint US-Soviet sphere of influence would cover Western Europe and Central Africa, while a joint Sino-American sphere of influence would cover South-East Asia with its most westerly point in East Pakistan?

# INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 11th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

## THE SUPER POWERS SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

### COMMITTEE I

Saturday 20th September

### A View from Japan

### PROF. KEI WAKAIZUMI

Since June 1969, we have witnessed two major international developments which might be a prelude to a significant revamping of the political scene in Asia. One of these developments is the statement made by Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Communist Party at the International Conference of Communist Parties last June, in which he suggested that "establishment of a collective security system is in order in Asia." The other development, of course, is President Richard M. Nixon's Southeast Asian trip conducted from late July to early August in the first act of "Apollo diplomacy." The fundamental currents of international politics of the present decade are to be epitomized by a shift from the "cold war" to "peaceful coexistence" between the two Superpowers -- the United States and the Soviet Union. Most of the Japanese agree that, in a broader sense of the word, the balance of power in Asia is now entering a period of dynamic readjustment, although it might remain as tense and uncertain as ever for the time being.

During the coming decade at least, a great deal of political relations within Asia will be swayed by four major powers, comprised of two non-Asiatic Superpowers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- and two Asian powers -- China and Japan. And when we try to project policies of these nations, we should probably consider the following factors at least, which I believe are of prime importance:

- (1) The serious effect the conclusion of the Vietnam War and its lessons may have on American policies toward Asia in general:
- (2) An accelerated growth of Russian interest in and influence upon Asia in political, economic and military aspects;
- (3). The effect on China's policies in Asia of, first the new internal situation following the Great Cultural Revolution and, secondly, the development of a nuclear capability:

(4) The increasing interest of the Japanese in their own foreign policy, particularly toward Asia, as a result of a rapid growth in the economic and international self-consciousness.

Thoever reviews these factors should try to put them in a proper perspective considering the complexity of the traditional Asian picture. The following points will have to be noted among others. In Asia there are still a variety of collective security organizations. Some of them have little substance -- such as SEATO, CENTO and the Sino-Soviet military alliance. The United States, now pressed by a national clamor for "No More Vietnams", opts for gradual military disengagement from Asia. However, it maintains bilateral mutual assistance agreements with nations such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China and the Philippines in addition to a multilateral commitment to SEATO member nations. Its China policy still savors of "containment without isolation" The indications are that Sino-Soviet relations are deteriorating and that the Soviet Union is vigorously trying to make headway in Asia. This has been having a significant impact upon the basic power structure in this area. The Soviet Union and China now appear to be fatal enemies in each other's eyes, and in fact the Chinese seem to assign the highest foreign policy priority to their policy of smashing "the anti-Chinese siege, a conspiracy between the two Superpowers." On the other hand, in the Korean Peninsula the Soviets and the Chinese are bound together with North Korea in their respective military alliance, confronting the American and Korean troops to the south across the 38th parallel. By the end of 1971, the British are scheduled to pull out from the regions east of Suez, although the Japanese do not seem to be very conscious of it, and the impending British withdrawal will create a certain imbalance of power, possibly for a limited duration, in Asia.

While it is subject to a global political dynamism, the situation in Asia is compounded by an array of internal problems which beset the individual nations within the region as well as by the complexity, difficulty and diversity of relations among these countries.

First, all the nations in Asia, perhaps with the exception of Japan, are trying to build modern nation-states and in this process face a number of serious problems. They range from an inefficient administrative structure, insufficient communications between the central government and rural regions, and a heavy concentration of the elite in the military-bureaucratic apparatus (which even bears a semblance to what had happened in Japan before World War II).

A number of countries in Asia have a serious minority ethnic problem, and often suffer critical conditions arising from race riots and religious conflicts. The general level of education is still low and the rate of illiteracy very high. Many of these problems are not entirely free from the semi-colonial or colonial past which had shackled most of the Asian nations hither to. In summing up, they still seem to lack a sufficient foundation for viable nation-states, that is to say, the middle class and the middle-level managerial personnel.

Second, many nations in Asia are economically fragile, still unable to develop national policies that are best suited for their environment and conditions. There are few countries, if any, which have succeeded in attaining a proper balance between economic growth and population expansion, industry and agriculture, or a heavy industrial sector and a light industry (i.e. producer goods vs. consumer goods). In general, however, the countries in Asia are being awakened to the great importance of the economic aspects of nation-building. Nations like India and Indonesia, which indulged in extravagant diplomatic shows during the 1950's, now appear to devote all of their resources to national economic construction, although it remains to be seen whether or not they have proper orientations and perspectives. Neither can we be too optimistic about their future. In particular, countries such as China, India, Pakistan and Indonesia lack an economic and political capacity to feed their enormous population. This poses a major problem for the future stability of Asia.

In view of all these regional characteristics, it is not possible to discuss political dynamics at work in Asia within the same context as the European situation. Take for example the latter half of the 19th century, when the concept of balance of power used to function in a most typical way. It was then that the European powers -- Germany, France, Austria, Italy and Russia -were all bound by "alliances", creating a effective parity among themselves with the British acting as a stabilizing force. In Asia today, however, there is such a great imbalance among nations in terms of their sheer size and power that it is extremely difficult to grasp or evaluate it. Furthermore, the Asians differ from one another in many more aspects -- history, race, culture, religion and in other institutions. The system of communications and transportation, which is partly hindered by a number of geographic barriers, is inferior. In terms of population, China is the first with over 700 million people, followed by India with 500 million; Pakistan, Indonesia and Japan have about 100 million people each, while some of the other countries have about one third as many. Malaysia and Taiwan have about 10 million each. Furthermore, in Asia there are three divided nations -- China, Korea and Vietnam -- in addition to a number of states

which are at odds with one another on territorial or border issues (China vs. India, India vs. Pakistan, and Malaysia vs. the Philippines etc.)

Thus in the past, the maintenance of balance of power in Asia as a whole rested, as much by necessity as by historical coincidence, upon non-Asiatic states, notably the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as Britain and France. Yet it is not easy for one to tell the degree to which their presence has contributed to peace and stability within this region. As we all know, the two Superpowers did assume a great weight, both direct and indirect, on the two major contingencies in Asia since World War II, that is to say, the Korean War in the 1950's and the war in Vietnam. It is to be noted, of course, that for all these years the two Superpowers have managed their affairs largely within the basic framework of peaceful coexistence as an alternative to the Cold War. And they will certainly continue to live in peace together, in so far as the present balance of power -- a balance maintained by mutual deterrence which is made possible by the development of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems -- does not collapse in any drastic manner. And the present indications, viewed from Japan, are that despite an ABM and MIRV race it probably will not. Now that the two Superpowers seem to be preoccupied with China, it appears all the more likely that, as was suggested above, they will choose to coexist in peace.

II

When one discusses "Asia and the Superpowers", one should first perhaps give prime consideration to the future of China's foreign policy. Especially for Japan, this policy has great implications in a political, diplomatic, and psychological and military sense. Throughout their long history Japan and China have been in close cultural contact with each other, so that there is now the feeling among the Japanese that the two peoples are of the same race sharing the same script.

Second, China champions today the most dogmatic form of ideology within the international communist movement. The Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party seems to have put an end, at last, to the Great Cultural Revolution, which had plunged the entire nation into great turmoil. It now seems that the hegemony of the Mao-Lin group will be further consolidated in the short run at least. As I will observe later, China seems too preoccupied with internal instability to promote the rigid "revolutionary diplomacy" that she spearheaded in the past. As the internal situation settles down, however, it seems quite likely that she will once again wage a rigid diplomatic offensive and challenge the United States and the Soviet Union.

Third, China will continue with her efforts to develop her own nuclear capability, although her progress in this field appears to be handicapped by the Great Cultural Revolution.

Last, it must be noted that, in a legal sense at least, Japan has not yet concluded the state of war with mainland China. Although Japan does maintain formal diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government on Taiwan, she has developed a limited area of practical relations with the mainland, abiding by the principle that "politics and economics are separate". In Japan there is a powerful opposition strength which calls for an immediate rapprochement with China, a step that would lead to the severence of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This whole question poses a serious roadblock to a national consensus on foreign policy among the Japanese people.

Today the Japanese are concerned primarily with reversion of Okinawa as well as a decision to be made in 1970 on whether or not the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will be maintained. The ruling Liberal Democrats and the opposition parties alike share the view that once Okinawa is settled they ought to tackle the problem of China. Although the Japanese do not seem to have reached an agreement on the future relations with mainland China, the majority would certainly agree with Prime Minister Disaku Sato, when he observed: "As I look ahead at the future situation in Asia, I feel that our greatest problem must be our relations with mainland China." With the exception of some extreme leftwing elements incidentally, the Japan Communist Party is now at odds with the Chinese Communists -- all the Japanese hope that China will some day assume a posture of peaceful coexistence, based upon the principle of conciliation and cooperation with all the nations in the world, her Asian neighbours in particular. In fact, the Liberal Democratic Administration hopes that China will make all these desirable changes, and it is in this hope that it has been adopting an "open door" policy vis-a-vis Peking, which is designed to widen the various contacts on the principle that "politics and economics are separable."

A more detached look at China's foreign policy might convince one that these Japanese wishes will not easily be realised. Before the Ninth Party Congress Lin Piao said: "We firmly pledge that we are determined to fulfil our proletarian internationalist duty and, together with it, carry through to the end the great struggle against imperialism, modern revisionism and all reactionaries". As amply suggested by Lin Piao, American imperialism and Soviet revisionism comprise the principal enemy of the Chinese. Inasmuch as the U.S. and the USSR are interested in the maintenance of the status quo through peaceful coexistence, China emerges as the major force of status quo ante,

blatantly opposed to the "post-Yalta order." Observing the Chinese scene at a closer range from Tokyo, however, one has the feeling that, despite all her hostile pronouncements, she simply does not have a sufficient capacity to wage an effective diplomatic offensive against either of the two Superpowers. now has a number of difficult internal problems -- rivalry between the old leaders and the new, strife for leadership within the Revolutionary Committees, and the need to consolidate the Party and administrative machinery which has been seriously damaged. The present regime is also searching rather desperately for an effective alternative for the pragmatic economic policies that were advanced by the so-called realists. It has to replace a number of expert diplomats who were thrown out of their positions during the Cultural Revolution. In a "New Directive" addressed to the Ninth Congress, Chairman Mao Tse-tung said, "We are hoping that this Congress will become an assembly of solidarity and of victory, and that a greater victory will be won after this Congress is over." Judging from these developments, one would assume that it will still take sometime before the Peking regime can establish sufficient internal order to be ready to embark on active diplomatic offensives.

Furthermore, the international outlook is by no means favorable for China. In his political report to the Ninth Congress, Lin Piao mentioned only the Albanian Party of Labor as "a genúine. fraternal Marxist-Leninist" organisation, indicating in effect that the Chinese are very much alone in the international communist movement. In one of the three foreign policy principles, China commits itself to support revolutionary struggle by all the oppressed peoples and races." But the fact is that wherever a war of national liberation drags on indefinitely and becomes highly intensified, as in the case of Vietnam or perhaps even North Korea, the indigenous leaders of the revolution turn invariably to the Soviet Union for military and economic assistance. Here seems to be a Chinese dilemma. These considerations, in addition to some others, lead many Japanese to feel that eventually China will have to go back to that foreign policy line which was once promoted by the dethroned realists. It even seems highly likely that, within the next decade or so, China may decide to adopt a flexible policy of peaceful coexistence as she actually did during a brief period in the mid-1950's.

In the eyes of Peking at least, the Asian policies of the U.S. and the USSR are seen as an attempt gradually to tighten the containment of China. Consequently, China feels seriously that it must defy the two Superpowers so that it can extricate itself from this siege. The first conceivable step China might take would be to step up the development and deployment of strategic nuclear missiles. However, China's progress in this respect tends to be slow and it may even be

sometime after 1975 that she can actually deploy operational ICBMs in a quantity that ismilitarily significant. More specifically, in view of the economic and technological level of China today, it seems extremely difficult for her to acquire a second-strike capability and to become a third nuclear power in the U.S.-USSR power equation. Even if it were possible she would probably need 15 or even 20 years. Yet the Chinese leadership already committed itself to the production of nuclear weapons even at the expense of "trousers and soup." So long as it sticks to its original intention — an effective role in a three-power nuclear game — China would try even harder to develop her own nuclear capability regardless of the amount of time she may need.

The second possible step for China would be to extend continued support for wars of national liberation, which are designed to achieve Mao's grand strategy to "reach out for cities from rural bases." This too appears to have some inhibiting factors. Not only is China's ability to extend economic aid limited, but also her support for communist guerrillas in various Asian countries is creating suspicions about her conduct among the people in Thailand. Malaysia. Burma and India. She is driving these nations closer to the United States and the Soviet Union. The most typical case in point, no doubt, is her debacle in Indonesia. It is quite true that the war in Vietnam has taught a number of bitter lessons to the United States. However, we should duly appreciate the fact that the war did give the non-Communist nations in Asia an opportunity to develop a realistic capability to deal with guerrilla activities and the so-called war of national liberation. Although it pledges itself to a noble cause, a war of national liberation has so often forced people into a miserable quagmire of endless fighting, and has provoked a chain reaction which exacerbates international tension, and thus endangers world peace. There are now many people in Asia who are clearly aware of this. Given the hard reality of the present situation, both domestic and international, China will find it increasingly difficult to extend encouragement to the war of national liberation in other lands.

This leaves China -- for the present and the immediate future -- with the third alternative, which seems to be more realistic, effective and feasible than the other two. This step would call for her to approach the allies of the two Superpowers and the uncommitted nations with an overture of friendship and peaceful coexistence, to drive a wedge between the U.S. and the USSR, to undermine the foundation of the present international order, and, eventually, to break through the siege wherever it is penetrable. Within the last few years, China's foreign policy under the pressure of the Cultural Revolution has been virtually non-existent. She has lost ground in various Asian countries -- Indonesia, Burma, India, Nepal and Ceylon -- where a series of incidents have taken place.

ranging from oppression of overseas Chinese population and anti-Chinese riots to border disputes. One might therefore conclude that the third alternative would not be an easy path for China either. Yet she will certainly approach Pakistan, for example, which is now walking the tightrope among the three giant nations. According to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan, Premier Chou En-lai agreed to visit his country. Which Chinese leader will pay a visit? If so, when? What will be accomplished? All these questions warrant very close attention.

#### III

In Eastern Europe the Soviet Union appears to have managed so far to consolidate its foothold, by sending troops to Czechoslovakia in order to check the wave of liberalization. It has also sponsored the International Conference of Communist Parties, a cherished dream since the days of Khrushchev. And now the Kremlin having China very much in mind, seems to be turning its eyes beyond the Middle East, ready to launch a major step in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia. In so doing, the Soviet Union is obviously encouraged by the diplomatic success it scored on the Indian subcontinent in 1966, when it acted as a mediator in the Indian-Pakistani dispute through the Tashkent Declaration. It must have taken encouragement from another diplomatic accomplishment: maintaining friendly relations with both Afghanistan and Iran. Within the last two or three years, the Soviet Union has entered into diplomatic relations with Malaysia and Singapore, established trade relations with the Philippines, and has extended a substantial amount of aid to Indonesia aside from the military assistance for North Vietnam. The Soviet Government is also offering to contribute to the Asian Development Bank. What then is it trying to accomplish in Southeast Asia, one of the most unstable regions in the world?

Last June, the Kremlin recalled its ambassadors home from some 30 key posts around the world -- Asian countries around the periphery of China, major Western capitals such as Washington, London and Paris, and the East European satellites -- for an overall review of the global picture so as to map out a new diplomatic strategy. It is believed that at that meeting they discussed a policy toward China, with which the Kremlin has serious conflicts over the border issue. There is no question, of course, that another imminent item for them was the Brezhnev proposal to create a new collective security system in Asia. This sudden shift of very strong Russian interest from South Asia to Southeast Asia should be assessed as a new, significant direction in the Kremlin's diplomatic strategy.

In the opinion of some observers in Japan, the Soviet Union is trying hard to step up its strategic nuclear force and conventional armament, especially the naval

strength and the long-range airborne capability. They also feel that the Soviets are intending to build a military capability commensurate with a global Superpower, fully equipped to exercise sufficient military influence anywhere around the world on nuclear as well as conventional levels. In other words, the Soviet Union as a full-fledged global power is trying to build a military capability, which would be self-conclusive in its own right, complementing its nuclear and land forces, which constitute the core of the Russian military might. If this assumption is valid, it follows then that the Soviet Union now looks upon the vast ear of South-Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean as the most vulnerable region with a great potential for its own interests. One would assume that the Soviet Union is looking beyond the sphere of its traditional interests (the Middle-Near East and South Asia) with an intention of expanding its influence and hegemony over Southeast Asia and, if possible, even the Far East and East Asia. This assumption will explain the possible reason for the Russian interest in the Indian'Ocean as an important link between its Pacific and Atlantic fleets. It is to be noted, however, that despite its recent expansion the Russian naval strength does not compare to the American, largely because the Soviets do not have sufficient overseas logistical bases and also because the lack of aircraft carriers leaves them only with an inferior air cover capability. Therefore, a global deployment of the Russian naval strength would not be sufficient in itself to match the physical force of the United States, and could only hope to have the effect, at best, of diverting American actions.

When the Russians turn their eyes to Asia, they seem to be capitalizing quite tactfully, upon a somewhat fluctuating condition of "vacuum" and balance of power in Asia and the Indian Ocean. This particular climate is the result of several factors, which I will enumerate as follows: (1) the gradual withdrawal of the U.S. from Vietnam and a disengagement, to an extent that is possible, from East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific region; (2) British withdrawal from the regions east of Suez by 1971; (3) China's diplomatic inactivity since the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution; and (4) the collapse of the Indonesian Communist Party. (In the PKI's heyday, all the neighboring countries -- Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and, in a certain sense, Australia -- displayed very acute symptons of anti-communist "allergy:") Many Japanese observers agree that these recent moves of the Kremlin are to be construed as an integral link in its long-range, macroscopic political-military strategem, which is geared primarily to restrain China from expanding its sphere of influence. Addressing the Supreme Soviet on July 10, Foreign Minister Gromyko observed as follows:

"The situation in Asia and the other parts of the world depends, to a considerable degree, upon the purposes and foreign policy China pursues... Even the most felonious enemy of ours has never resorted to such a nasty means as the

Chinese leaders are now employing in their attempt to undermine the prestige of the activities and peaceful diplomany of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. The foreign policy of China has subverted the proletariat internationalism and has lost its socialistic class consciousness."

Gromyko's remarks reminded Japanese students of public affairs of the deep-rooted hatred and animosity that the Russians obviously entertain against the Chinese, and of the fact that the Kremlin's policy in Asia is aimed quite unequivocally at China.

We in Japan, are not sure of what Brezhnev really meant last June when he said: "In view of the development of affairs, we believe that the establishment of a collective security system is in order in Asia." It appears that Brezhnev had in mind something different from the Kremlin's earlier proposal for European collective security. His remarks do not indicate that the Russians have now drawn up a concrete master plan for Asia, but rather that they were intended as a trial balloon. At any rate, Brezhnev's concept is said to encompass India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia and Singapore, and, as was stated by Radio Moscow on July 8, does not necessarily exclude China. On her part, China has already expressed a highly bellicose opposition, which promises little possibility that she will be a partner in this arrangement. Given the present tide of nationalism and the political dircumstances of the present day, the Asian nations including Japan would not be able to give their wholehearted blessing to the Brezhnev proposal. It seems that the Asian response has been fairly critical one.

Let us first assume, as we have observed, that if and when they come into Asia the Russians will operate within the general framework of peaceful coexistence between the Superpowers, and secondly that they will look upon China as a primary strategic target. In the eyes of the United States, then, such a Russian policy would amount simply to a "necessary evil;" a situation one has to live with but not endorse. There has been a great deal of speculation about President Nixon's tour of Asia and Rumania. Many people wonder what led the U.S. President to assume a flexible attitude -- more flexible at least than his previous position -- toward China. Also, what led him to make some of those subtle remarks about Peking, and why he chose to visit Rumania which has more or less. friendly relations with Peking. A part of the reason may be that, although he tacitly approved of the Russian interest, President Nixon wished to make sure that the Soviet Union does not go too far in Asia. One might say that he was sophistcated enough to get this message across to the Kremlin by suggesting the possibility of improving relations with the Chinese. Many Japanese are somewhat cautious of the Russian moves, but seem prepared to tolerate them so long as they are not

detrimental to the peace and stability in Asia.

The Sino-Soviet confrontation is becoming more real and serious, exploding into ideological disagreements, clashes of national interests, and even emotionalized quarrels among leaders. The border dispute has further deteriorated since the Damansky Island incident of last March. It has now spread to Sinkiang, and reached the point where Soviet troops are said to be moving into the border zone, adding to their missiles in Outer Mongolia. All these developments seem to be building up tensions of an unprecedented magnitude throughout the border region. Although gravely concerned about these developments, Japanese do not believe that they would be escalated into a large-scale dispute or full-fledged conflagration. A number of them also feel that so long as their two neighbors are pitted against each other, they would perhaps gain rather than lose. In view of the particular political climate in Japan, however, the most popular line one could take is to declare: "Our ideals decree that we be on friendly terms with every other country in the World." Consequently few Japanese -- except perhaps those who are familiar with the reality of international power politics -- seem to suggest openly that they ought to take full advantage of the present conflict between the Soviets and the Chinese.

In this connection, it should be pointed out first that so long as their two neighbors are at odds with each other, the North Koreans would find it extremely difficult to launch a full-scale attack on South Korea, which would have very serious security implications for Japan. Secondly, the Soviets — and even the Chinese — may make active approaches to Japan and woo her friendship. (In a number of instances, the Soviets have already done so.) Thirdly, the Soviet Union will find it imperative to endorse even more firmly thepolicy of peaceful coexistence with the United States, upon which the future of the entire world so heavily depends. Specifically, this is a point which was clearly upheld in Gromyko's statement as well as by the very warm response shown by the U.S. Government.

As the Sino-Soviet conflict grows in intensity, some observers refer to the possibility of a detente or conciliation between the United States and China. They further suggest that this assumption was borne out by the various statements President Nixon had made about China during his trip to Asia, followed by the statements of Secretary of State Rogers later, However, the American-Chinese conflict has had so much to do with the entire history of the communist regime on mainland China. In addition, they fought each other in the Korean War, and are divided not only by an ideological outlook but also by a host of extremely difficult and concrete issues such as future relations with the Nationalist Government on Taiwan. It is therefore believed that a U.S. recognition of China

would be almost inconveivable for the foreseeable future, unless the leaders in Peking make tactical changes in their attitude and policy.

Within recent years, the Japanese seem gradually to have assumed a more friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union except on one major issue: reversion of the "nothern territory" to Japan. Otherwise, the Japanese basically support the peaceful coexistence and friendship between the two Superpowers, hoping that the Soviet Union will continue to maintain a relatively moderate foreign policy. Japan is endeavoring to further improve its relations with the Soviets in trade, economic development (e.g. Siberian development), and cultural exchanges. Many Japanese particularly welcome the following remarks by Gromyko:

"We very much emphasize our relationship with Japan, our neighbor in the Far East. She is taking a line that is different from the Soviet Union, and we hope to further enhance our ties with her. ... That is more important than our difference in some of the international issues are the common factors that unite us together -- our common interest in peace, particularly our interest in the pace in the Pacific area."

Japanese also agree that, except for obvious need for mutual friendship and good neighborly relations, they do not share a community of really vital interests with the Soviet Union, but would certainly endeavor to enhance their relations within the broader framework of U.S.-USSR and Sino-Soviet relations.

IV

One cannot really project the future Asian policy of the United States without considering the development and the final result of the Vietnam War, including the negotiations on peace. One must also consider the lessons the United States must have learned from its experience in Vietnam and the serious reaction they may set off among the American people. A noted American scholar observed:

"In 1968, the American people seem to have learned two important lessons from their bitter experience in Vietnam. One of these lessons is that their ability to manage the situation in the developing nations through military means is much smaller than it was thought to be before.

...The other, and more important one is that none of the foreign powers can really control these nations in any effective way."

Assuming that his observations are accepted by the Americans, then it is likely that American policy will become more domestically-oriented and more cautious of "military intervention" than in the past, thus avoiding deep entanglement with Asian problems.

In fact, this seems to be the basic orientation of President Nixon st "bost-Vietnam policy imasia", which was fairly well delinested during his .vdript to:Asian - One awould studioup the highlights of manhew American policy dn Asia Tas follows: "Hirst pastar Pacifile nation (the Univerlibrates would pontinue to A play an important role in this area. But it will no longer have a direct unilateral involvment, either in a military or political sense, in the socalled problem areas or any individual country within Asia. It would probably agree to undertake a lesser role of helping, in an indirect manner, only those nations in Asia which are willing to help themselves. Secondly, the United States would continue to honor various treaty commitments and obligations it has with countries in Asia. However, short of nuclear blackmail by any one major power (e.g. China), the U.S. would expect the Asians primarily to deal with conventional aggression, not to speak of domestic insurgency. Therefore, it will not involve itself in any major military undertaking of such a dimension as the war in Vietnam. Thirdly, the United States would hope that the free nations in Asia will be able to create, within the next five or ten years, an effective regional military security system, because it recognizes that ... they could not do so in the immediate future. Fourth, U.S. assistance and cooperation with the Asian nations would be designed to help them in their economic and technological life. Then in the economic and programs, however, it the United States would admit that past performance has not necessarily at watched the amount of aid it has given to Asia, and would call for serious selfthelpsefforts among the recipient nations of The United States would extend aid " only to those nations capable of helping themselves. Even in these cases, it would stress a multilateral aid formula, without becoming too deeply involved in economic-political relations with any individual nation.

Newspapers in Japan are carrying detailed accounts of a serious division of opinion among the Americans. One recent article says: "It is quite true that the glory of Apollo did help boost American confidence and national prestige, at least for the moment. Once we turn our eyes to life here on earth, we will know that the Americans lack a real consensus of opinion, except for the common hope that they want to bring an early end to the Vietnam Jar. Otherwise, they are divided and polarized on every other issue, ranging from ABM to even pornography." The frustration over Vietnam has led some American intellectuals and students, it is reported, to a critical reappraisal of the established system of values on man and his society. We arealso told that behind the student movement in the United States, which is attracting a great deal of Japanese attention, there are two major issues -- Vietnam and the race and and the free problem. Indeed, the presence of these problems comprises both the cause and effect of serious American assisted and reflection of serious American assisted and the acceptance of a wide range and the student was accounted to a monotonegated both and a serious and the range and the student was accounted to a monotonegated both and are more than the student and accounted that are student as a serious and accounted that are accounted to a monotonegated both are more than and the range and the student accounted that are accounted to a monotonegated both are more than and the range and the student accounted to a monotonegated both and accounted that the student and the student accounted to a monotonegated both and accounted that the student accounted to a monotonegated both accounted that accounted that the student accounted that accounted the student accounted to a monotonegated both accounted that the student accounted that the student accounted that accounted the student accounted that the student accounted the student accounted that the student accounted the student accounted that the student account

of questions such as their national purposes and global policy.

It is with a mixed feeling of uncertainty and perplexity that many Japanese are responding to these American problems. Ever since she was defeated in the Pacific War, Japan has always maintained the most amicable relations with the United States, once the major enemy in war. If it had not been for the powerful military shield as well as the economic assistance provided by the U.S. and the huge American market which has been available for Japanese commodities, we certainly would not have been able to achieve the present level of national strength, symbolized by the fact that we now rank as the third world power in terms of GNP. In the eyes of the post-war Japanese, the United States has always been the most powerful nation of a formidable proportion. Such a view of the United States has led some of us to respond to its foreign policy with a critical sentiment of inferiority and fear. Not a small number of Japanese found various signs of "arrogance of power" in the U.S. policy in Vietnam. After all, the United States has failed to conduct the war in Vietnam in an effective way, although it has spent as much as \$30 billion a year, sending over half a million troops there. Despite the glorious achievement in space, the Americans would not be able to recover so easily from the serious impact of Vietnam; and the Japanese too have been quite disturbed since the United States image has deteriorated in Japan. For many of us have thought very highly -- even more so perhaps than some Americans have -- of the military and economic strength of the United States. This Japanese experience is not entirely irrelevant to the recent clamor for "autonomous diplomacy" and "autonomous defense," which is inspired by emerging nationalism and selfconfidence in Japan.

Many thinking intellectuals in Japan have a relatively good understanding about these new trends in American policy toward Asia. At the same time, they are fearful of a massive and too rapid an American withdrawal from Asia, and in fact may even be strongly opposed to it. Thoughtful Japanese know very well, for one thing, that 99 per cent of the petroleum they consume comes from overseas markets through a seaway that is virtually protected by the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Should the U.S. decide to pull it out from this area, it may pose many serious problems for Japan because a Soviet Russian naval fleet will most certainly move into the Indian Ocean. Specifically, this is a point the Japanese businessmen are most seriously concerned about. The Japanese people also seem to have a relatively tolerant attitude — at least more so than Americansor West European — toward communism, and are less sensitive to its threat. However, a very few of them really believe that peace, stability and prosperity would be greatly enchanced in Asia if and when the Soviet Union

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or China moves in, taking over the American presence and commitments. Nor does any right-minded Japanese seem to be convinced that regional peace and security can be maintained by the Asians themselves to the total exclusion of the two Superpowers, especially the United States.

In the field of foreign policy, the Japanese are now preoccupied primarily with two major issues: Okinawa and the revision of the Japanese-American Treaty. When Japan regained independence in 1951, the administrative rights she had over Okinawa -- which is a territory of Japan -- were transferred to the United States, thus limiting her power to "residual sovereignty." The U.S. put it under military control, and has constructed a huge military base which is known as "the keystone of the Pacific." At the heart of this issue then is the question of the timing of reversion as well as the status of military installations after the island is returned to Japan. On the other hand, the question of 1970 has to do with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which was originally concluded in 1951 and revised later in 1960, providing that it may be terminated with a year of advance notice by one of the two parties.

As exemplified in these two issues, our major foreign policy concern throughout the post-war years has always been the United States. Undoubtedly in the years ahead, too, our relations with the U.S. will remain as vital as ever. Just as the United States seems to have drawn a lesson from the war in Vietnam (which I attempted to outline above), so Japan learned its own costly lesson from the Pacific War. The most relevant point was than an "oceanic power" such as Japan, which is heavily dependent on foreign trade for national survival, will find it both unwise and eventually self-destroying to wage a war with another oceanic nation so powerful as the United States. It is this realization then that has led the post-war Japanese government to devote a full measure of its efforts to enhance friendly, cooperative relations with the United States. It is most likely that the Japanese government will continue to do so.

Notwithstanding this general prospect, one cannot deny the fact that the two nations are now approaching a historic turning point in their mutual relations. They seem to be drifting toward that point, influenced by two factors: (1) a rising Japanese aspiration for "independence," spurred by the rapid growth of nationalism, and (2) a growing American expectation of the role and responsibility to be assumed by Japan in Asia. Aside from the Okinawa question, there is yet another important issue which has recently manifested itself in the trade relations between the two countries. Traditionally the American market has absorbed approximately one third of Japan's total trade. Throughout most of the post-war years, Japan used to run a deficit in her trade with the United States, but in 1965 there was a shift for Japan to a bilateral surplus position, which

grew rapidly, amounting to over \$1 billion in 1968. On the other hand, the U.S. balance of payments position is deteriorating, which seems to reflect, to a considerable degree, the deficit it has with Japan. Against this background, the United States requests Japan, first to assume a fair share of responsibility, commensurate with a major world power, in its own national defense and foreign assistance programs, thereby playing a greater political role in the maintenance of peace and stability within the whole region. Secondly, it expects Japan to observe the principle of reciprocity in trade and economic activities. Meanwhile, the United States is expressing a strong desire for Japan to ease the existing restrictions on trade and capital transactions. So depending upon the policy of the Japanese government, American sentiments towards Japan may be seriously affected.

As Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi observed, "The friendly, cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States is not only important to enhance the peace and prosperity of our own nation, but is also essential for the conditions of peace and prosperity throughout Asia." In the light of this truth, it would be imperative for the two nations to establish, upon a long-range perspective, a new relationship of cooperation that is constructive and durable. If we are to fail in this endeavour, the whole of Asia -- its balance of power, stability, peace and prosperity -- will suffer a damaging effect. Indeed many Japanese are now fully awakened to what it means. It is this consideration, then, that makes it even more imperative for the two nations to reach a solution on Okinawa, at the earliest possible date, which would be acceptable to both of them.

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Many Japanese desire most strongly that the two Superpowers maintain a reliable relationship of durable coexistence in Asia — which will still remain unstable and tense — and that they will cooperate to the maximum degree in contributing to real stability, prosperity and development in a tumultuous Asia. At the same time Japanese hope the Superpowers will control their pursuit of "egoistic self-interest." In Japanese eyes, howeverm the two Superpowers appear to be greatly different from each other. As already discussed, the Japanese have a different kind of image, understanding, interest and policy toward the United States and toward the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we share the common hope and desire that the two giant nations will exercise sufficient self-restraint in assuming their respective role and responsibility in the world as a whole, fn Asia in particular.

One may wonder what sort of relationship will evolve between the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the whole region of Asia in the 1970s. In my view, the basic pattern of their relations may be expressed in terms of a function deriving from a series of independent variables, which comprise among other things their outlook of the world, their national strength, their geopolitical location, and the historical experience of the two Super-powers as well as of the nations of Asia.

Put in a simplified perspective, the first conceivable pattern of Soviet-American relations in the coming decade might amount in effect to what China calls a two-power conspiracy designed to "dominate the entire world". The United States and the Soviet Union might then brandish policies of "Big Power egoism", exerting their sheer physical strength in an attempt to force their wills on the Asians.

Secondly, the two Super-powers might agree, either explicitly or implicitly, upon a certain formula of <u>divide and control</u>, and share the sphere of their influence throughout Asia. For example, the Soviet Union might want to take control of South Asia, with the United States taking over East Asia and the Western Pacific, leaving the whole of Southeast Asia as a battleground for expansionistic manoeuvres which would be very much reminiscent of what happened to the Balkan Peninsula.

The third possible pattern is a Soviet-American juxtaposition in a cold war. Again reminiscent of the Cold War era, the two Super-powers might brandish their ideological banners, and bring themselves to the brink of a head-on collision of the kind which developed over Germany, Korea and Cuba.

Fourth, one may conceive of a situation which is to be defined as cold peace. Although they share a discreet common interest in avoiding a frontal confrontation which might threaten to trigger off a full-scale nuclear exchange, the two Super-powers are in disagreement over their interests and their concept of a world order. Therefore, they are likely to continue to live in harsh conflict and competition with each other in Asia.

Of these four possible patterns of Soviet-American relations, I would feel that the first three are most unlikely to take place. Since the Cuban crisis, peaceful coexistence has become, as if it were, an established order between the United States and the Soviet Union through specific accomplishments such as the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nevertheless, it is an order which is founded almost completely on a balance of terror of incalculable destructive capacity.

In fact, there are far more divisive than uniting elements between the two Super-powers. Indeed, peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union is a unique phenomenon in that it encompasses so many divisive factors as opposed to the single over-riding unifying force. I would assume therefore that the fourth pattern which I have suggested above will provide a basic framework for Soviet-American relations in the 1970's in Asia.

Here let us examine the present state of affairs in Asia, and try to assess them de novo from an Asian point of view. In Asia most independent nations have been treading a very difficult path since they extricated themselves from the shackles of colonialism and semi-colonialism which had been imposed on them by the industrialized powers. Over these recent years they have faced a number of difficult problems, with new ones piling up before the old ones have been successfully brought under control. The so-called North-South problem is becoming even more serious as the gap continues to expand between the two worlds. For the Asians to become their own masters—a goal that is so self-evident but so difficult to reach—they must be able to help themselves and, at the same time, to contribute to the regional development in this area. The countries in Asia are in urgent need of effective assistance and co-operation from the advanced nations. It is therefore the common desire of the Asians as a whole that the two Superpowers bring the fourth pattern I suggested above to a yet higher dimension.

What is required is a new dimension of <u>co-operation</u> between the Americans and the Soviets under a relationship of orderly coexistence. Fully awakened to their mission and responsibility as Super-powers, they must be ready to co-operate effectively, contribute to peace and stability, to the reduction of tensions, and to economic development throughout Asia.

In the eyes of the Asians, this is the most desirable pattern of American-Soviet relations in the coming years. In Asia the two Super-powers will be judged in terms of what contribution they may make to supplementing the self-help efforts by the Asians. In other words, it is the two Super-powers themselves who hold the key to determining the validity of their new Asian policies as well as the future of peace and stability in Asia. For they are the ones to prove whether or not they can show an effective response to the specific political climate which will emerge in Asia in this age of polarization. In so far as the two Super-powers are fully able to exercise sufficient discretion and self-restraint in assuming their role and responsibility in the world, the 1970's will augur well for the whole of Asia.

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Today Japan no longer has the ambition she used to cherish before World War II, when she endeavoured to build a "rich nation with a powerful army" in an attempt to compete with the major military powers around the world. Neither does she intend to expand the sphere of her political or military influence, for she no longer has the ability or intention to embark on any such undertaking. During the last quarter of a century since World War II, Japan has championed no specific foreign policy position except what is known as "a low posture policy" or "economic diplomacy". We believe that such a policy has been the most effective and valid one that we could have taken in the specific political climate which has prevailed in and out of Japan. Now that Japan has accomplished a high level of economic development and national power, she has also improved her position in the eyes of the world. A corollary of her growth is a rising national self-consciousness, and a concern with the proper role and responsibility she should assume in the world. It is this question that is attracting more and more attention in and out of Japan today. In due course, or at least by the latter half of the 1970's, Japan's national goals and policies will take a clearer shape and will be founded upon a broader basis. Looking at the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States today, a number of Japanese cannot escape feeling that the position of the former is subservient to the latter. In due course, however, this Treaty will become subject to reappraisal, for Japan requires a better definition of her independence in the world as a series of new developments continue to take place in the world's political scene. By the latter half of the 1970's, the present Treaty might well be replaced by a Japanese-American Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, which would emphasize the political and economic significance of Japan's role. Among the Japanese today there is a mounting demand for an independent foreign policy and autonomous national defense. In my view, this is a desirable tendency in so far as these sentiments do not lead to chauvinism or isolationism.

Needless to say, Japan hopes very sincerely that political stability and peace will be firmly rooted in the Asian countries, and realizes very well that a stable and peaceful Asia would promote, in turn, her own national interests. Inhibited as she is from a military build-up or from expansion of this sphere of her activities (by the Constitution, by the domestic political climate, by national sentiment, and by cautious neighbours), Japan will find it extremely difficult to make any direct contribution to military security within Asia. For the foreseeable future, therefore, she will have to confine most of her actions to economic and diplomatic

undertakings. In her eyes, then, Asia looms ahead with all its economic and political implications. She will find a fairly large area for her activity in Asia, where there is a growing active interest in regional cooperation in addition to self-help efforts, as is already exemplified by ASPAC, the Ministerial Conference for the Development of Southeast Asia and the Asian Development Bank, etc. It is, then, the common hope of the Japanese at least for the time being that, through active expansion of these programmes, they will be able to make a maximum contribution to political stability and peace throughout Asia.



# INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 11th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

# THE SUPER POWERS SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

#### COMMITTEE II

### Friday 19th September

# The Management of European Crises and Conflicts PIERRE HASSNER

### I. The European System: an Enduring Structure?

Seen as a partial international system, Europe presents (and will continue to present in the next coming years) the same central characteristic from the military and diplomatic point of view as the international system at large, only in a more striking form. This characteristic is the co-existence and potential contradiction between various levels or trends: bipolarity and polycentrism, hostility and co-operation. The basic structure is the bipolar one of the two alliances. But at the same time the two basic trends which were thought to provide alternatives to bipolarity and to the Cold War - convergence and polycentrism - centinue to be felt, and they produce new ties, new conflicts and new alignments which do not suppress the old ones even though they may clash with them.

Both in the types of conflicts and in the types of reactions of the super powers, while the commanding structure is still the East-West one, new clashes of national interests and new solidarities transcending the two alliances are likely to make themselves felt. Besider the classical East-West crises, of which Berlin remains the most readily available European possibility, one sees more and more the possibility of traditional, national or inter-state conflicts, and of a new type of political-legal crisis.

In the first case (clashing of national interest), if one distinguishes between allies and neutrals (or non-aligned), and, within alliances, between the two super powers and other powers, one has eight possible relations which might provide the starting-point of bilateral and multilateral conflicts. While conflicts between states belonging to the two opposing alliances are likely to be presented by these alliances themselves, possibilities exist in the West for a conflict between two

states belonging to the alliance (Greece and Turkey); in the East this type of conflict is likely to be prevented by the lesser independents or the smaller members, but an attack by the leading super power against a reluctant ally like Rumania is a possibility. Another, though less likely, possibility is an attack on a non-aligned country, Yugoslavia, or a neutral in a special position, like Finland.

The other type of crisis would be likely to be newer, not only in its causes but also in its evolution and management. Examples would be the international crisis created by a potential nuclear power renouncing the non-proliferation treaty, or by the Soviet Union accusing Germany of not abiding by it, etc. If arms-control agreements tend to produce a new security structure, of which the basis would be the common interest of the super powers, this would collide with the alliance structure and would probably, like the European system as a whole, combine the three aspects with emphasis varying from case to case. The task for a new - partly informal, partly institutional - security structure for Europe would be precisely to try to harmonize these conflicting national alliance and trans-alliance interests.

### II. European Society: a New Instability?

But perhaps the key to future European conflicts and crises lies in the interaction of the military and diplomatic with a third level, namely that of transnational social and ideological trends and influences, leading to domestic strains, evolutions and revolutions in countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain. What the Czechoslovak and the French spring of 1968 have shown and confirmed above all has been that the deepest cause which made both the hostile status quo of the Cold War and the co-operative status quo of the détente impossible, which created both the erosion of the alliances and their forceful reassertion, the pressures towards rapprochement and the reactions against it, was the domestic instability and fragility both of developed Western societies and of totalitarian communist régimes. For the first time since 1948 (with the exception of the 1956 'unexpected revolution' in Hungary and Poland) it has been shown that countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain could face events which, in recent years, had seemed to be the lot of underdeveloped countries.

The comparative stability enjoyed by Europe since the war by contrast with other continents is due primarily to the direct presence of the two super powers, which (at the cost of keeping unsatisfactory situations)

prevents violent conflict by controlling its potential initiators and deters it by making its escalation very likely, particularly since the stationing of nuclear weapons. But it has also been due so far to the comparative domestic acceptance of the various political régimes (whether through economic satisfaction, ideological indoctrination or police terror). Basically the issue of communism being adopted by a NATO state or abandoned by a Warsaw Pact state did not have to be considered.

Today, with the super powers and the alliance systems still present but with the domestic stability and the ideological allegiance of member states possibly called into question, the problem of the compatibility and interaction between the two aspects of the European system (the unchanged power and security structure and the needs of domestic and ideological change) is probably the main potential source of conflicts and crises. It raises the question of the definition and limits of blocs, alliances, spheres of domination, of influence, of responsibility or of security. One may object that the problem is raised artificially because in the West it does not really arise and in the East it has already been answered. On both sides the international status quo has been reinforced in the short run: in France the striking feature was both the preference of all foreign powers and certainly the two super powers, in spite of American difficulties with de Gaulle and of Soviet theoretical commitment to the advancement of communism, for the avoidance of revolution, and the fact that they did not have to contribute actively to it. In the East, the Soviet Union by acting preventively, in spite of the assurance of the Czechoslovak leadership that they would keep their international commitments, showed that it would take no chances whatsoever.

Yet phenomena like the disaffection of intellectual youth with the existing social system, like the dissatisfaction of ethnic minority groups, like the gap between existing institutions, political style and political personnel and the magnitude of the problems faced by societies, continue to plague both West and East, although in different ways. The international effect may be more likely in the West to constitute a reinforcement of the status quo by channeling the attention and strength of its potential challengers towards domestic problems, while in the East the existing order may be maintained only at the cost of repeated violent confrontations. Broadly speaking it remains true, as André Fontaine has written, that 'the two systems which have divided the world between themselves and are every day a little more reconciled to it, have a very

hard time protecting each other against the contagion of their own ideas. (1)
Even though they want to avoid competitive interference, they may be
forced into it by evolution or revolution in given European countries
within or outside their respective systems.

While the established national and international structures have, so far, withstood the forces of domestic and transnational change, their challenge continues to appear more serious than that of diplomatic polycentrism. An era of limited but perhaps growing incertitude on the stability and orientation of European countries and on the nature and degree of the presence, the objectives and the commitments of the super powers does seem to have set in.

To this extent the years 1968-69 may bear a certain resemblance to the years 1947-48. Of course, the crucial differences on the European scene proper are that where it matters most, i.e. in Germany, these questions seem to have been answered. The repetition of the 1948 Berlin crisis took place in 1958-1962; the non-crisis of 1969 seems to confirm an essentially different situation, where at least the two Germanies are stabilized both in their domestic régime and in their foreign orientation through their economic successes and their military alliances. The deterrents against starting a crisis are strong, as the Soviet Union is checked both by the military balance and by her need for peace with the West for domestic reasons and because of China, and the DDR is controlled in any decisive respect by the Soviet Union.

Yet even here, the trend may be towards domestic instability and ideological erosion and produce at least new possibilities for crises and conflict either between East and West or between Germany and the super powers. In West Germany the Toward for an prosperity and the alliance, is there. In East Germany, the loneliness of the arrogant hard-liner, while accepted and successfully used by the Ulbricht regime, nevertheless creates increasing tension within the population, especially the young, who resent being either, like in the intervention in Czechoslovakia, cast as the most faithful follower of the oppressor, of as in the case of Soviet and Polish overtures to West Germany, as the only opponents to a universal desire for detente. In spite of economic success and of a certain acceptance of the regime and self-identification with DDR as such, the spectre of a new June 17 cannot be laid to rest.

<sup>(1)</sup> André Fontaine La Guerre Civile Froide, Paris, Fayard, 1969, p.50.

But the new phenomena of youth/dissatisfaction, student unrest and extra-parliamentary opposition in West Germany, especially in West Berlin, offer new parallel changes or opportunities of crisis. It is not altogether impossible to imagine a June 17th in reverse, i.e. grave disorders in West Berlin, with prolonged violence between the police and the followers of a Rudi. Dutschke or with a Paris-type barricade situation. The question may be asked whether this would offer opportunities for an East German action (against the atrocities of West Berlin policy) less restrained than West German reaction in 1953 and 1961, or whether it would bring about the intervention of the occupation powers.

In West Germany at large, the dialectics of extremism, by enabling the NPD to appear as the defenders of law and order, may legitimize rightwing radicalism which in turn contributes to de-legitimiz/German political life in the eyes of foreign countries. Here again, one may imagine a more dramatic but most unlikely situation, that of a Weimar-type pre-civil war situation where rival extremist factions would affront each other openly and threaten violent takeover. In this case the presence of the occupation powers, the residual limitations on German sovereignty, the Russian readiness to claim any basis, however exotic, to intervene in West German affairs, and a development of the incipient American temptation to joint super-power control over West Germany, might develop. But it is more plausible, yet disturbing enough, to think of a situation which, without getting out of hand and developing into a major crisis, might yet contribute to the victous circle of isolation and resentment and keep the German problem alive in a way politically harmful for the Federal Republic's international status, for Western unity and for European reconciliation.

Finally, more moderate and positive evolutions in both Germanies may not be without international implications either. Indeed, they may constitute the only real challenge to the status quo and hence the only real possible source of a major Soviet-initiated future crisis. One cannot exclude for the longer run a kind of "convergence of left-wing nationalisms": a liberalizing East-German régime would seek more independence from the Soviet Union by a rapprochement with Bonn and would find a responsive echo in a West German government, itself responsive to a new generation's search for ways out of the sterility of the Federal Republic's domestic order and international alignments. The attitude of the other powers, especially of the Soviet Union, would then become decisive as to whether this would be the time of the gravest Soviet intervention yet or the first real attempt at a German and European settlement.

Beyond Germany, it is our contention that in Europe, in spite of the resilience of the nation-state in the West and of <u>risorgimento</u> nationalism being far from spent in the less settled nations of the Centre and the South-East, inter-state conflicts are also likely to be caused less by traditional clashes of national interests and ambitions between small and middle states than either by social and ideological factors bringing about a breakdown of law and order or a realignment in the East-West opposition or by the intervention of the super powers, or by both.

In this respect, while it is correct to notice that the loosening up of alliances produces in South-East Europe a resurgence of national quarrels over disputed territories or over the fate of ethnic minorities, traditional fears about these quarrels erupting into violent conflict may be misguided. It is interesting that after all a war between Greece and Turkey was not only the only immediate threat of its kind in the Balkans since the second World War, but also, in 1921-23, the only Balkan war between the two World Wars. (2) Transylvania and Macedonia have changed hands according to the decisions of the great powers, at the outset or at the end of the World Wars, without the losing countries undertaking to undo their losses in the subsequent periods.

It is particularly interesting to note that the two countries which ended up on the losing side in 1918 and in 1945, the revisionists of the interwar period and the potential revisionists of the post Cold War one, are precisely Hungary and Bulgaria, i.e. the two countries who, today, are most tied to the Soviet Union and least able to have an independent foreign policy. If these are the dissatisfied states which might initiate a conflict, the chances of such a conflict hinge upon the evolution of these countries. One can safely assert that neither Hungary nor Bulgaria would have the freedom of action to start a conflict on their own, that it is highly unlikely that they would have the desire and power to embroil the Soviet Union in one against her will. On the other hand, there is a good chance that a Balkan war proper would presuppose a drastic change in the dispositions of the régimes themselves. Given the balance of forces with Yugoslavia and with Rumania, they would have to be very bellicose and adventurous indeed to start a conflict on their own, and in this respect, while the twenty five years since the war have not eradicated old hostilities, the common experience and the

<sup>(2)</sup> See David Wood Conflict in the Twentieth Century, Adelphi Faper No.48, June 1968.

shared enemy have certainly left their mark.

The situation may be different, however, if the balance and the opportunities are changed through a major crisis in a major country of the area. Now here again, just as in 1945-47 the crises were centred on Yugoslav ambitions and the Greek civil war, the least unlikely conflict we might speculate about might arise from the domestic evolution of Yugoslavia and Greece.

Yugoslavia is the biggest, the most centrally located and the most nationally and culturally heterogeneous country of the region. This, along with her pride of independent victory, has contributed to Yugoslavia being the only country which actually did nourish imperialist designs between 1945 and 1948. Tomorrow the idea of reuniting the Yugoslav Macedonians and the Bulgarian ones, the Kossuth region and Albania, could arise from the opposite direction: through the break-up of Yugoslav unity by the centrifugal pull of its republics which might then tempt its neighbours to reunite with their ethnic brethren and the Soviet Union to settle accounts with its earliest rebel.

This is not presented here as a likely contingency. Yet the stresses on Yugoslav unity certainly are powerful. At any rate, it may be worth speculating on what possible international implications of Yugoslavia becoming the sick man of the Balkans would be, especially since both geography and ideology make it likely that a conflict around Yugoslavia would involve the other communist heretics, Rumania and Albania, even if they may have no wish to be involved.

On the other side of the East-West division, the speculation around Greece might go somewhat on similar lines. After the 1964 and 1967 crises, the trend seems to be towards a greater autonomy in relationSwithin Cyprus; the prospect both of Enosis and of Turkish intervention have receded since the arrival of the Greek colonels into power and their more than conciliatory behaviour during the 1967 crisis. If a post-Makarios Cyprus became communist, what would be the attitude of Greece and of Turkey? And what would be that of the great powers? Conversely, if the present Greek régime was overthrown, would a new government not want to underline its national feelings or its independence from the United States by resurrecting the campaign for Enosis? One may also imagine the military régime trying to gain popularity by mobilizing the anti-Americanism which has been so much increased by the suspicion of itsbeing put into power or tolerated by the United States, and adopt a Nasser-like or Peru-like stance.

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More plausibly and more interestingly for our purpose, one can imagine the communist party emerging again as a serious force. The civil war in Greece actually did happen, and did constitute a striking exception to the pattern of civil and international life in non-communist Europe. Its recurrence must be counted as a tragic possibility, given the little disposition shown by the military rulers to imitate their Turkish colleagues by paving the way to a civilian régime, their probably increasing lack of popular acceptance, and their increasingly harsh methods. What makes this possibility particularly relevant for us is the crucial importance of international factors in the first two Greek civil wars. Their very fate was determined by Bulgarian and Yugoslav support for the communists and by British, then American, troops fighting on the government side. Would the difference be that this time the contending Greek factions would be left much more on their own? Both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria seem to have found no difficulty in adjusting to the present regime. But the crucial difference, of course, is Greece's membership of NATO, and the crucial question is the attitude of the United States. If, as we have argued, the European situation may come to resemble more that of 1947 on the one hand, that of other continents on the other, the idea of American troops intervening in a civil war to prevent a communist victory supported by communist neighbours is bound to be suggested; the nearest equivalents to Greece 1947 are Vietnam and Santo Domingo.

But, of course, Europe 1969 remains different both from Europe 1947 and from Asia and Latin America, and post-Vietnam United States is certainly less intervention-prone than in recent years, not more. This may indeed be the crucial equation for the European future: some of the same factors which operating in Europe might create situations which would, by past standards, call for an active American policy, might also, by operating in the United States, make this active policy less likely.

#### III. The Super-Powers and European Conflicts: Firemen or Arsonists?

The variety of conflicts and of contradictory trends which we have observed indicates the basic ambiguity of the role of the super powers to which corresponds a basic ambiguity in the very notion of crises and conflicts. Obviously a common feature of their behaviour in any conflict would be the desire to avoid war, the desire to improve or not to worsen their relative position vis-à-vis each other, and the desire to do the same vis-à-vis their respective allies. But the priorities between these

three goals are not necessarily the same for the two super powers.

Moreover each of these goals can be given a short-range and a long-range interpretation, and a more or less ambitious one.

In the short run, the best way to keep the peace and the balance may be for each super power to keep a strict control of its respective alliances; in the longer run a more flexible and multilateral approach to the status quo may serve both goals better. Most important of all, the problem of the relations between the international balance and social change is reflected in the attitude towards the domestic régimes of the smaller powers. Does the military stalemate, the impossibility of conquest or of 'possession goals', impose the attempt to influence the domestic régimes and the international orientation of the smaller countries through indirect intervention? Or is it precisely this competitive interference which creates the danger of embroilement and escalation, and does the maintenance of the balance or of the military and territorial status quo imply the maintenance of the social and ideological status quo? Or, finally, does the only solution for European and international security lie in a more modest and limited definition of security, of status quo, and of super-power authority, a definition which, while keeping the military balance and the possibility for the super powers of managing it and hence limiting the external freedom of action of their allies, would preserve the rights of independence and the chances of peaceful change in social and ideological affairs? Obviously the answers to these questions do not look alike when seen from the prospective of the super powers and from that of other nations. While for the super powers the prevention of conflicts and crises calls for the preservation of the structure which happens to put them at the top, for their challengers it is this very structure which creates the greatest dangers by conflicting with national and popular aspirations. For the super powers it may be necessary to create a crisis or a conflict by constraining those whose very existence may challenge the structure and hence jeopardise the best instrument for preventing future conflicts. We have then the paradox of the peaceful unwitting revisionist and of the aggressive conservative.

But precisely the definition of what constitutes revisionism and what constitutes aggression is not given by the structure of the international system and the positions of the super powers as such; it is largely dependent on their ideology and on the domestic facts which shape their attitudes and may drive them to intransigence or to tolerance, to expansion or to passivity. In particular their reaction to the conflict between

the international balance and social and ideological change abroad is affected by the way this same conflict is played within their own societies. The main problem of European security, the main difficulty in managing conflicts and crises, lies in the differences in outlook and in direction produced by the possibly divergent outcome of the same basic conflicts within the societies and the rulinggroups of the various powers. More specifically, the main source of crisis and conflict may lie in the increasing gap between the evolution, the crises, the larguage and the action of the Soviet Union and those both of the United States and of the European countries.

This basic asymmetry does not prevent a successful management of crises and control of conflicts either when the direct contact of the two super powers is involved or when their interests are not directly involved. It creates great difficulties and dangers when we move from there to the relations between a super power and a smaller state with whom the other super power is not credibly identified —a neutral or an ally of the first, and when from normal diplomatic relations one moves to issues involving security in the broader sense and legitimacy, hence the nature of the political order itself.

In the first two cases, the super powers have by and large worked rather successfully in the past to deter and limit conflicts. On the other hand their control over these, in the case of the two German states and the two Berlins, is strong enough militarily to make an adventure on their part unthinkable. The super powers have tried to prevent their allies from entering into conflict with each other and from engaging in adventures on dangerous ground. By and large, they have succeeded in Europe. In the Soviet camp, potential national conflicts of this type were deterred ipso facto by the lack of independence of the satellites. With the exception of Germany, all NATO allies have a freedom of military action without equivalent in the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, Soviet control may, by the use to which it is put by the Kremlin, sow the seeds of future inter-state conflicts.

This type of conflict, then, shows, along with some of the convergence elements in the attitude of the super powers which we have seen emerging on direct East-West conflicts, some elements of asymmetry like the much more decentralized character of the Atlantic Alliance, the much freedom of action for the smaller Western allies and the much lesser degree of control available to the United States. If this trend is increasing, it follows again that United States action may be both more difficult and

more necessary than before. To avoid conflict between two of its allies becoming a conflict between it and one or both of them, it must find ways of not acting alone. While on the first type of conflict the natural partner was the Soviet Union and the alliance framework ran the risk of being neglected, here the natural and preferred partners seem to be the other members of the alliance; yet it is not impossible that the more useful, if only because of its nuisance value, should be the Soviet Union.

Alastair Buchan has suggested that the structure of the NATO forces should have to provide for stamping out, defending and containing local conflicts, a task in which the American contingent given greater mobility should specialize. (3) While certainly valid for the purposes of deterrence, it remains to be seen whether this idea can, once a crisis has broken out, meet the objections raised against its predecessors (e.g. the idea of a NATO force for Cyprus) in terms of acceptance by the other parties involved. Would it fight against one or the two conflicting allies and against the preference of some of the others? One finds here all the difficulties of using a security pact and organization for intra-regional conflict.

The newer, and for our purposes most interesting, role is that of the other super power. She would have at least a negative role - of making things more difficult for a NATO or United States intervention: we might here have the beginning of a pattern which can be considered as dangerous or as promising and is probably both - that of the super powers neutralizing each other not only in zones of direct contact, but also, to a lesser extent, in grey areas and, even, to a still lesser but still real extent, within their own spheres or alliances.

On the other hand, to the extent that the priority of preventing violent conflict, even outside one's own sphere is increasing as compared with / the desire of exploiting contradictions in the opposite camp, a certain amount of tacit collaboration between the super powers may be possible and in order. If the trend was strengthened it may result in a formal collaboration on interposition and peace-keeping activities, through a shift back within the United Nations towards the use of the Security Council and of its enforcement powers. Ideally, the security structure of a region like Europe would be best equipped to manage interestate conflicts if it combined the vertical links of the two alliances and the

<sup>(3)</sup> Alastair Buchan NATO and European Security, Orbis, Spring 1969, p.74.

horizontal links between super powers and between small states, within an overall organization which should make it easier for all powers to conduct, on an informal basis, the transversal relations (super powers with small states of the other alliance, middle powers with both, non-aligned powers with everybody) which would be impossible in a strict two-bloc system and dangerously unpredictable in an alliance-less world.

This whole range of problems is both more intractable and more. unpredictable when conflicts involve direct intervention against anarchy, revolution or reversal of alliances. The unpredictability is twofold: it can be due to the ambiguous natures of such conflicts, which make a clear definition of objectives, of means, and of their area of application harder than in any other case; and it can also be due to domestic evolution, debate, and discord within the super power itself, which make it dangerous to rely on precedents for predicting its behaviour. In both respects, the United States has been, so far, much the more unpredictable of the two super powers. While the Soviet Union has no moral or political compunctions about using any methods where it is in a situation of clear superiority, yet is very cautious whenever it does not possess direct control, the United States has been both more tolerant of diversity and less afraid of overextension. It is striking that since 1945 the United States has intervened militarily much more frequently than the Soviet Union, but tolerates much more easily that its allies criticize it, attack it, or abandon the military organizations it is leading. The Soviet Union has intervened militarily only three times. but each time in its own sphere. The United States withdraws its troops from France upon a mere request but does not hesitate to bomb North Vietnam, an ally of the Soviet Union. The result, in both cases, is paradoxical: the United States seems more ready to accept gracefully being expelled from crucial and once closely allied areas than from marginal ones had never been its own to lose; the Soviet Union, faithful to the principle that 'peaceful co-existence applies only to relations between states with different social systems: (4) has a strange taste for using its weapons only against its allies.

The explanation is that while the borders of the communist camp, bloc or commonwealth are imprecise (do they for instance include North Vietnam?) they are still much less so than those of the zone encompassed by American military activity. Since, before and after Khrushchev, the Soviet Union uses essentially the cushion of direct physical control,

it does not recognize many intermediate steps between 'us' and 'them'.

<sup>(4)</sup> O. Pavlov in International Affairs Moscow, October 1968.

between a bloc which wants to be much more than an alliance and the outer kingdom of darkness. The United States, which recognizes many more degrees between total identification and total hostility, has tended to be more tolerant towards its allies and more adventurous in the rest of the world, because its objectives were, in the first case, more limited than those of the Soviet Union and because it believed, often wrongly, that its possibilities were less limited in the second case.

Today, if the crises were of real revolution or alienation, if Europe underwent a process of Latino-Americanisation where unstable governments were held in check by their students and overthrown by their/armies these American inhibitions towards the European allies might cease to operate; but on the other hand the fate of other interventions and the evolution of domestic public opinion may strongly deter the United States from any intervention at all.

Conversely the Soviet empire was always ultimately based on the implicit threat of force; but today, not only do the solidarities which tie the Western world together not exist in the East but the strains are such that force has to be actually used; this in turn provokes counter-reactions, an increasing mutual suspicion between the Soviet Union and its allies, an increasing harshness in its methods, an escalation in its ideological justification, a tendency to apply it to areas which are not under its direct control, including Yugoslavia and China, an increasing militarization of Soviet society itself. On the other hand, the military means available tend to be more global in geographic scope.

The Soviet Union and the United States may thus be following two opposite paths. The crisis of their empires or alliance systems and, even more that of their domestic systems, may make them less responsive to each other and hence less competitive: but the alliance of conservative Soviet power and a new isolationist United States to solve their own problems could lead to an even more dangerous situation than their global struggle if unpredictable violence on one side was met by a too predictable passiuity on the other.

#### The Soviet Union: the Arsonist as Fireman

The best way to characterize the present state of the Soviet Union's relations with its satellites is, as Denis Healey has put it, in terms of a decolonization crisis; but, given the power and ideology of the Soviet rulers as compared to the last rulers of the European colonial empires, it is in her case that Khrisha Menon's remark about colonialism as a permanent aggression finds its real application.

I have repeated this somewhat dramatic formulation of the dilemna between force and change in order to oppose a certain complacent view of the spheres of influence problem which, if adopted, probably constitutes the greatest obstacle towards a useful dialogue with the Soviet Union on the prevention and limitation of this type of conflict. The first fallacy is that we all know what a sphere of influence, a security zone or bloc. a hegemony, are and that these are one basic reality which has the same meaning in the West and in the East. But obviously there is all the difference in the world between a great power's claim that her smaller should not harbour bases for rockets pointed at her and that their neighbours domestic regime should be imposed and operated by her, between Finlandization and Communization, between an alliance which can be renounced and a monolithic bloc which is supposed to be irreversible etc. It means both forced homogenization within and the interdiction of contacts with the outside world, hence the complete negation of the two powerful tendencies towards polycentrism or national independence, and towards convergence or transnational influences which characterize the present evolution of Europe. It can only, then, lead to further conflict.

The margin between adjusting the methods of the super power and spheres of influence system to the requirements of diversity and communication and changing it into another more multilateral or multi-dimensional one cannot be defined in the abstract, nor is it all-important. Three points are essential, once one has recognized the necessities of a dialogue:

(1) That the two dialogues between/super powers and between each of them and its respective allies cannot be isolated from each other. They must constitute the basis of a consensus and convergence in which other middle and non-aligned powers must participate.

(2) The essential feature of the dialogue is not made of semantic discussions but of the actual bargaining and manoeuvering, moves of resistance, defiance, commitment etc. out of which hopefully may emerge both a multilateral balance and a process of mutual education.

(3) However, in order to bridge the gaps between the types of alliances or spheres, it is essential to bridge the gap between realities and rhetoric. There exists a solidarity between the cynicism of super-power dominance and the idealism of collective security, of the "complete equality of all states, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, dissolving of blocs" etc.: both assume an all-or-nothing approach to "blocs" and to inequality, either to accept them as such or to pretend that ringing declarations for universal independence and equality will make the super powers go away.

The second fallacy is to believe that greater predictability exists now in the relations of the Soviet Union with her allies or satellites. After every attempt by an East European country to achieve more autonomy or independence, and after every reaction by the Soviet Union, everyone is busy trying to establish criteria for Soviet toleration. But all these have a strong flavour of generalization based on one case or of prophecy after the event. It would be wrong, for instance, to say that while the Soviet Union did not tolerate the evolution of Czechoslovakia she had tolerated that of Yugoslavia, Albania, China, Rumania. In each of these cases she found here if in front of an evolution which she disliked and which she attempted to stop. In each case she tried, at various times and in varying degrees, containment through institutions, persuasion, intimidation, division of the ruling group, domestic revolts, murder, economic sanctions, ideological excommunication. In some cases these means may have achieved their purpose (as perhaps in Bulgaria in 1965) or led to a compromise (as in Poland in 1956); in most. they failed. In the majority of cases the Soviet Union seems to have reluctantly reconciled herself to this failure, at least in the short run; in East Berlin after a few hours, in Budapest after a few days, in Prague after a few months, she resorted to military action. Does the difference lie in the conditions of the local balance or of the global one, in the character of the evolution in the given country, or in the general situation of Soviet authority, in the possibilities of guerrilla resistance or of American reaction? We cannot really answer these questions; but they force us to go beyond the bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe into the even more unpredictable global dimension of the triangular relationship between the Soviet Union, the United States and China.

We might find some guidance in the double character, both geographical and ideological, both regional and dynamic, of the notion of "commonwealth" or "community" of socialist states which plays an increasing role in the Soviet position. It is situated at the crossroads between two trends towards regionalization: prevented by the United States, by China, and by regional

diversities from dominating either the whole of the international system or of the world communist system, the Soviet Union attaches an ever higher price to Eastern Europe, both the symbol and the condition of whatever domination and legitimacy she has left.

The most serious challenges/which can have a visible bearing either on the international structure of which the Soviet Union is one of the pillars (and in Europe this means the Soviet-American-German triangle) or on Soviet society itself. This has perhaps best been shown by Soviet relations with Socialist countries in the "northern tier". Yet it is in the south, in relations with Rumania, Yugoslavia and Albania, that the most ominous questions about the offensive dynamics of the "socialist community" idea are raised. All three are or have been associated one way or the other with the Warsaw Pact. Yet all three are rebels in various degrees; moreover all are still considered as communists by the Soviet Union who obviously refuses to consider them as outside the range of the Brezhnev doctrine. In spite of their differing legal situations and differing attitudes which might induce the Soviet Union to justify an invasion on differing grounds, they share a basic predicament: to be more exposed than other countries.

If the decisive criteria for Soviet intervention are on the one hand the existence of a balance and the risk of resistance and generalisation in case it intervenes and, on the other hand, the gravity of the danger and the risk of contagion in case it does not act, the countries of the socialist commonwealth are both those against whom it is least dangerous to use force, since they are not protected by powerful allies, and those against whom it may be most dangerous/to do so, since their evolution may be the most dangerous for the whole of the empire and for the Soviet Union itself. It would seem that alliance lines, just as the distinction between offensive and defensive moves, are blurred by the dynamics of Soviet resistance to those other dynamics of modern society - affluence and nationalism -which have as little respect for the borders of empires as the atomic bomb, according to Khrushchev, had for the class principle.

This is why it is a fallacy - our third one - to believe that outside passivity is enough to insulate the conflicts of the Soviet Union with other communist states. There is an inner dynamism to the ideologically motivated use of force which might very well, but for the passive resistance of the Czechoslovak population and President Johnson's warning at San Antonio, have led the Soviet Union to intervene in Rumania, and perhaps in Yugoslavia, and to adopt a more aggressive policy towards West Germany. Intervention against the three southern communist countries would mean an advance of the

Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, which would have to involve countermeasures on the Western side, and an attack against a non-aligned country,
which would raise the problem of the security of all neutral European countries
bordering on the Soviet camp.

The problem of neutral countries, or of the "grey areas", emerges as a major problem of European Security in a way which is familiar from the experience of other periods and other continents but which has never arisen in this way in Europe because of the physical contiguity of the two alliances and of the physical presence of the two super powers: one was used to thinking of Europe in terms of two camps divided by a line, forgetting that along this line there were several countries with various degrees of neutrality or nonalignment. So far these countries have seemed somehow to follow the general fate; during the acute phase of the Cold War they seemed implicitly included in the protection provided by American superiority; during the period of détente this protection seemed less important. After August 21, one saw that certain neutrals, like Austria and Finland, had both less freedom of action and less security than the NATO allies, that the direct protection provided by the physical presence of American troops gave to the latter a feeling of security which was not broken by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, while the small neutral and non-aligned countries on the border of the Soviet empire experienced a period of anxiety and of insecurity. Hence the United States and NATO have the new task of helping to prevent the general damage to European security and to the psychological, political and military balance which would come from an extension of the Soviet sphere to the neutral countries, or from a Soviet use of force to coerce its non-aligned socialist brothers back into obedience.

But the same conditions which create the problem make its solution difficult. The neutrals are less protected because of the greater degree of balance and co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, the real validity of the American guarantee lies in the serious risk of its having to be honoured, even if the United States no longer feels it in its interest to do so; the element of automaticity implicit in the presence of troops and nuclear weapons as hostages is the substitute for a credible first strike. Hence the difference between allies and neutrals tends to widen. The result is a trend towards a more strict delimitation of spheres of protection, which may lead to a more explicit recognition of spheres of influence and to leaving countries which belong to neither to the mercy of that super power which will take the initiative by being the first to commit itself. The other super power will not risk nuclear war, nor even jeopardise its bilateral co-operation with the first. But this very co-operation, if it is considered by both sides as desirable

but not irreversible, can be an indirect deterrent to the extent that it can be jeopardized by brutal action or irrational reaction. But, above all, small powers who have tasted independence and change, polycentrism and pluralism, non-alignment and neutrality, will today put up a resistance which, if it lasts for a while, can produce an echo within the two alliances and the two super powers themselves. They can organize what General Beaufre has called a moral deterrence. This can in turn be supplemented by an active policy of flexible - both graduated and ambiguous - involvement or commitment by the United States, which indicates that the conflict started by Soviet action, that Rumanian or Yugoslav resistance might be difficult to isolate or to contain and that it might lead to unforeseeable consequences. Bernard Brodie has spoken of the de-escalation effect of the threat of escalation, so the only way to reduce the likely unpredictability of Soviet actions is to introduce some unpredictability in American reaction. The only way of isolating an eventual conflict within the Soviet aphere or a crisis between the Soviet Union and a neutral is to keep the behaviour of the two sides within bounds which make this insulation possible; and the only way to do that is by some external involvement.

Spheres of responsibility is a meaningless word if one does not define the scope of responsibility and if there are no sanctions against its abuse. To the geographical threshhold, which cannot be absolute, must be added a measure of agreement, tacit or explicit, on what kind of threshholds cannot be crossed by one or the other without producing what kind of reactions from the outside world. Given the rising unpredictability of Soviet and East European developments, the actions it may produce must be contained and made more predictable by a mixture of agreement (hence of predictability) arising out of discussions, and of planned or controlled unpredictability arising if not from a threat, at least from an involvement, which leaves something to chance. The question is if on the other side, on that of the United States and of the West, domestic unplanned and uncontrolled unpredictability may not make the controlled one of crisis management and diplomacy increasingly difficult.

#### The United States: the Fireman as Arsonist

At a time when deterrence has more and more to do with crisis management and when the distinctions between negotiation, bargaining and coercion are increasingly elusive, the United States faces in all its foreign activities the same dilemma as in the type of conflict involving the Soviet sphere and the neutrals: the gap between the requirements of the international environment and the trends of domestic society.

This is less serious when deterrence relies on physical presence and has an element of automaticity; the essential decision being made by the other side, the security structure can continue to function in spite of being on the wrong side of the generation gap. The problem arises more and more in considering the question: to intervene, or not to intervene.

In Europe at least, neither the goals nor the means of intervention have been or are likely to be the imposition of ideological conformity or of direct control, if necessary by military force; the question, with the exception of Greece, has indeed never arisen. But Europe can, more than before, be caught in the general cycle of excessive interventionism and excessive withdrawal which has sometimes made the United States intervene spectacularly during crises and then be excessively passive or indifferent once some kind of normalcy has been re-established.

This could occur especially if two contradictory trends, towards economic and social interdependence and towards political disinterest or separation, which we see currently at work combine to produce a situation relatively new in American-European relations. On the one hand the presence on the continent of American interests and a broader American influence is constantly growing; on the other hand, increasing "domesticism" and "bloc-fatigue"/Tend to take over from Vietnam in drawing American attention away from Europe. If the trends are confirmed, we may have a situation somewhat reminiscent of Latin America until recently, where United States influence and interest were considerably yet political attention on the part of top policy-makers was scarce. In that case, while interdependence makes a real disengagement impossible, lack of attention makes a long-range policy unlikely.

More than ever, the course events would be likely to take would depend on the particular circumstances of the various competing crises within and outside the American government, the "problem country" and the international context. We shall only make two general remarks, on the inhibition against military intervention against domestic threats of anarchy or communism, and on the scope for collective action or collective legitimation of unilateral action.

In the first respect, the question perhaps worth speculating about is that of the patterns of variation, not only in time but also in space, of American readiness to intervene in the domestic evolution of countries threatened by the breakdown of law and order, or by communist access to power, and the readiness within an active policy to resort to the sending of troops.

Within the greater inhibition (as compared to the Soviet Union) attached to the system as such, one may surmise that if actual policy has been more faithful to it in Europe than in other parts of the world this is because (a) the danger seemed less acute; (b) other methods, diplomatic or economic, were available; (c) a certain intangible respect for the political process of Western democratic countries may have played a part. In the contingencies we are discussing (anarchy and the threat of communism in, say, Greece or Italy), the first condition would disappear by definition. It is likely that while the United States would use whatever non-military measures it could to prevent unfavourable outcomes, the threshhold for the use of military force would be very high. While indirect demonstrations might occur, the actual dispatch of troops to the threatened country itself would be extremely unlikely unless immediate strategic risks were involved; and once a change of regime giving the appearance of stability had taken place, open United States intervention to overthrow it could, even according to non-European precedents, be almost totally ruled out.

If, on the other hand, a situation of prolonged anarchy or civil disorder existed, the American attitude in respect of perception of that country
as being somehow more intangible than other countries in other areas would begin
to be modified. In this unlikely contingency, would not the United States
not prefer the NATO framework to a unilateral intervention? It seems however
that of all contingencies, that of intervention in internal disorder is the
one for which an organization like NATO is least adaptable. This does not
mean that it is not preferable for the United States not to act alone. But
it means that the role of European states would be either beyond American
intervention or before it.

Beyond: what the United States cannot, in the eyes of smaller and middle European countries, do legitimately, and what its public opinion may no longer want it to do, might more naturally be the concern of a political Europe. For the foreseeable future the United States will still, while encouraging the building of an alternative European structure, have to take immediate decisions and to take them unilaterally. But it should take them on the basis of as much preliminary understanding as possible both with its allies and with the other super power, in the full knowledge that while responsibility must imply some control, decision cannot mean dictation. Just as much as the beginnings of a European structure for the future, the operation of a European dialogue (both Western and East-West) is essential if the management of conflicts and crises are not to

mean an increase in trends towards more or less paternalistic super-power dominance and more or less anarchistic resistance from the other countries.

Beyond dialogue and instutions, the idea of pacification through interpenetration and mutual neutralisation can be applied to arms control agreements. If the forces of the super powers would neutralise each other even within their respective alliances, if the American and the Soviet fleets make intervention more difficult for each other in the Mediterranean, if the United States, through President Nixon's visit, inhibits Soviet action vis-avis Rumania and the Soviet fleet in Cuba does the same for American-Cuban relations, if limiting the freedom of action of the Soviet Union in its sphere limits the freedom of action of the United States in its area too, this is a price certainly worth paying. While the general increase of domesticism may be one of the greatest dangers to successful crisis management in the future, it may have the advantage of underlining that security is only a means for the reciprocal protection of peaceful change against violent interference.



# INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 11th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

# THE SUPER POWERS SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

### COMMITTEE II

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The Effect of Strategic Agreements on European-American Relations

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### Introduction

For the time being, it is still uncertain whether agreements will be concluded between the two super-powers on the limitation of their offensive and defensive nuclear weapons potential. A fortiori, all assumptions on the probable content of such agreements are, at the moment, bound to be mere speculation. In spite of all manifestations of the two sides of their readiness to talk, it is at the present time impossible to predict with certainty that talks and negotiations will be held at all in the near future.

But despite these three forms of uncertainty, there are some indications which permit a more detailed definition of the type of strategic agreements which can be expected if SALT take a favourable course. A precise delimitation of the subject of this paper requires furthermore a clear definition of the meaning of "European-American relations" for the purpose of this presentation. Does this term refer to the relations between the United States and

- their European NATO allies?
- the whole of non-communist Europe?
- or all European peoples with the exception of the Soviet Union?

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This analysis will begin with this latter question (I) and will then proceed to answer the question which types of strategic agreements have to be taken into consideration (II).

In order to be able to assess their possible repercussions on European-American relations, one will have to include the question what subjective intentions are being pursued by the two sides and what are their motives and their objectives (III).

After having first discussed these three preliminary questions we will turn to the main question: what will be the possible or probable implications of strategic agreements on European-American relations? (IV).

Figally, we should examine a last question: what can be done to counterbalance, to mitigate or to obviate any negative effects of SALT and strategic agreements?(V):

# I. What is meant by "European-American relations"?

- 1. Soviet-American strategic agreements would primarily, but not exclusively, affect the European allies of the United States.
- 2. An indirect effect would be caused on the <u>neutral and</u> non-aligned nations of Europe who have always benefited from the existence of NATO's defence system and the American nuclear umbrella.
- Junion would also be directly affected, although to a lesser degree than the Western allies of the United States because the Sovietbloc system is not so much a defensive alliance with a nuclear guarantee against an outside aggressor, but as was clearly shown last year primarily an instrument of Soviet domination and a means to safeguard Communist rule and its social system in Eastern Europe.

What the Soviet Union's partners in the Warsaw Pact probably fear as a result of strategic agreements is therefore not so much a weakening of the Soviet nuclear umbrella over Eastern Europe but rather a general strengthening of Moscow's world position, a confirmation of the inviolability of its sphere of influence and thus a tightening of discipline with the communist bloc.

4. Obviously something could be said about all three kinds of American-European relations under the aspect of the effects of

SALT and strategic agreements.

It seems, however, to be more in line with the subject of this discussion to concentrate on the relations of the United States with its European NATO allies. At any rate, this is the most important, the most interesting and the most profitable subject in connection with SALT and strategic agreements.

### II. What kinds of "strategic agreements" could be expected?

It can be assumed that "strategic agreements", if they were to come about, would comply with the following criteria. They would be:

1. Partial arrangements between the two super-powers
limited to the field of strategic nuclear weapons,
i.e. no general political accommodation, no disappearance of the
East-West conflict or the power-political rivalry between the
Soviet Union and the United States.

There is no indication that the two super-powers aim at a far-reaching political accommodation. The leaders in the Kremlin who organized the invasion of Czechoslovakia are not the appropriate partners for a comprehensive understanding with President Nixon.

The power-political rivalry is clearly illuminated by the active naval presence of the Soviet Union in all oceans of the world and especially in the Mediterranean.

As has already been the case with the Test Ban Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a number of other agreements, it is consequently a matter of arrangements in limited fields which do not fundamentally change the political constellation of the world. The East-West conflict remains, the power-political rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States continues and will - as in South-East Asia, in the Middle East, in Central Europe - continue to make itself felt in all international trouble spots. This fundamental situation will probably not even be radically altered by the increasing aggravation of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

2. Arms control arrangements, no substantive disarmament agreement, let alone "general and complete disarmament" or even first steps in that direction.

"General and complete disarmament" is a propaganda slogan to the realization of which the world has not got nearer by one inch in the past 25 years.

Up to now, the two super-powers have only seen their way to those arms control arrangements which were mainly at the expense of third countries and which, at any rate, substantively do not represent any "disarmament" or reduction of armaments.

Since disarmament is inconceivable without the diminution of political conflicts and tensions, no great progress in the direction of "general and complete disarmament" is to be expected in the foreseeable future.

The content of the agreement would thus not be the "reduction" but the "freezing" or "limitation" of certain weapons systems, (primarily those which are not yet operational).

"Reduction" means the fixing of armaments at a lower level than at the time of the signing of the treaty.

"Freezing" means the quantitative and qualitative fixing of armaments at the level attained at the time of the agreement.

"Limitation" means fixing of armaments at a level which has not yet been reached; it is a general term which, on the one hand, permits the interruption of the arms race but, on the other hand, allows a combination of various measures having a different range, thus, for example, the qualitative development or "sophistication" of weapons systems within a specific framework which has been qualitatively determined.

3. <u>Bilateral arrangements</u> between the two super-powers. The inclusion of nuclear "third states" (such as China, France, the United Kingdom) would, if contemplated at all, be of secondary importance and be reserved for a later stage.

Apart from the question whether these third states are interested or not in such inclusion - there are no indications of any desire on the part of the two super-powers to extend the bilateral talks planned by them and to include nuclear third states into the negotiations.

The trend towards an exclusive bilateral relationship with the United States has always been visible on the Soviet side, even in periods of acute tension. There is no reason to suppose that this has changed in any way.

However, this does not exclude the possibility that the nuclear potentials of the third states may be included in the calculations on which SALT will be based, and that the Soviet Union might insist that account should be taken of the British and French SLBMs - especially if the United States were to raise the problem of the Soviet MRBMs. Even if the United Kingdom and France should be prepared to enter into commitments of this kind, this would not change the basic character of the strategic agreements: they would essentially remain a bilateral understanding between the two super-powers.

- 4. It is difficult to make any predictions as to the <u>legal</u> form, the substantive extent and the duration of theagreement which is to be expected. The two sides taking part in SALT could choose from among a wide range of possibilities, such as
- comprehensive agreements,
- strictly limited agreements,
- moratoria preceding a more comprehensive agreement,
- tacit understandings with unilateral verification.

# 5. "Balanced" arrangements

There is no doubt that the only kind of agreement which is negotiable would be one which does not cause any side to fear that its position in the nuclear stalemate would be weakened.

However, it is hardly possible to find any objective criteria to determine the "balanced" nature of a strategic agreement. There are too many uncertain and even irrational factors that would have to be considered. In the final analysis, only the two powers taking part in the negotiations can themselves decide what they regard as "balanced". In view of the lack of symmetry of the nuclear armaments of the two sides, it will not be easy to agree on this. Up to now, no convincing quid pro quo has emerged.

### 6. Agreements providing for verifi able commitments

Neither of the two sides will be content with paper commitments by the other side. Both sides want to be sure that the other side in fact respects the limitations which have been agreed and that one does not unilaterally renounce important advantages in the field of armaments.

Verification - the crucial problem in all arms control and disarmament talks - is once again an exceedingly difficult matter which limits the prospects of success of SALT. It is true that there are weapons systems which can be verified by unilateral methods, namely by satellite observation. However, weapons technology is already on the threshold of new developments where verification by this means is no longer feasible and it is specifically these developments which constitute the greatest danger of continuing the arms race and of de-stabilizing the nuclear equilibrium: mobile missile carriers and the equipment of land-land and sealand missiles with MIRV.

So far the Soviets have never agreed to any on-site inspections, and it is highly unlikely that they will do so in the framework of SALT.

### III. Motives, Intentions and Objectives behind SALT

### A. The underlying situation:

The intentions pursued by the two super powers in SALT and the motives for their willingness to talk should be seen against the background of a situation which has evolved in the past few years and which is marked by four characteristic features:

- 1. The relative strengths of the two sides have balanced themselves out on the basis of a de-facto parity which is due to the fact that both sides possess a safe second-strike capability in spite of the numerical or qualitrative superiority of one or the other side in certain fields (such as the numerical superiority of the United States as far as SLBM and strategic bombers are concerned and their qualitative superiority concerning the accuracy of their ICBM, and on the other hand their inferiority in deliverable megatonnage). The stability of mutual deterrence is based on a "balance of guaranteed vulnerability" (or "assured destruction capability".)
  - 2: There is a possibility that this stable balance will in future be jeopardised by new weapons systems with unknown effect (ABM, MIRV, FOBS, mobile missile carriers) which are, for the most part, still in the research and development stage.
  - 3. The Chinese nuclear potential which is being suspiciously watched by both sides - is being progressively built up.

4. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been signed and will enter into force in the foreseeable future. This treaty, on the one hand, renders more difficult the emergence of new nuclear powers but, on the other hand, imposes upon the super-powers the obligation "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament".

It was this situation which made SALT and any resulting arrangements appear possible as well as desirable. Should this situation change again (for example because one of the two sides believes that it can obtain a significant lead over the other side in the near future), the prospects of SALT may become less favourable again. In general, it should be borne in mind that rapid progress can hardly be expected in any case. Negotiations about the Test Ban Agreement took five years (from 1958 to 1963) and those about the Non-Proliferation Treaty six years until it was signed. Most observers feel that the first results of SALT cannot be expected before three or four years have expired.

The prospects of SALT producing any substantive result would already worsen if both sides should begin to test MIRV warheads in the near future. Since there is no effective and reliable method to verify MIRV warheads, any relevant agreement is uncontrollable. It is therefore quite possible that the time for such agreements will soon expire.

### B. A Catalogue of possible Motives for strategic Agreements

1. The motives which might cause the two super-powers to enter into talks about strategic agreements are, naturally enough, difficult to identify and can only be the subject of speculation. But it can be assumed that there are a number of motives common to both super-powers while others which affect only one side or the other.

The following enumeration is not necessarily complete; it may also be that this or that motive attributed to one side or the other does not exist. Nevertheless, it seems to be useful to elaborate a comprehensive spectrum of possible motives and to keep them in mind.

2. Motives which are common to both sides, to the United States as well as to the Soviet Union, are probably the following:

- Maintenance of the stable balance based on guaranteed vulnerability;
- especially for this purpose: the prevention of destabilising weapons developments (which would involve risks to both sides);
- cost reduction and the avoidance of a new cost escalation (remember the expenditure caused to the super-powers by the maintenance of a "continental" air defence system against strategic bombers).
- 3. Additional motives which may play a part on the American side:
- The attempt to prevent the Soviet Union from catching up with the US or overtaking them;
- for this purpose: a controlled slowing-down of the arms race until a new, stable ceiling has been reached in the mid-1970's which offers both super-powers simultaneously adequate protection against China's nuclear potential as it can be expected to develop until then.
- reduction of tension between the super-powers in order to limit the danger of nuclear war in the long run also in order to improve the general political climate and to create a basis of minimum confidence on which the solution of political issues can be tackled.
- 4. Motives which may govern the attitude of the Soviet side:
- A "codification of parity" i.e. the formal confirmation of nuclear equality which may enhance Soviet prestige;
- shifting the arms race to non-nuclear armaments (where the Soviet side would always have an advantage);
- undermining alliance confidence within NATO (which the Soviets could afford to be less afraid of in the Warsaw Pact because their dominating position in the Soviet bloc is not based on their nuclear assistance guarantee);
- relaxation of tension with the West in view of a further aggravation of the conflict with China.

5. Finally, there may be motives which, at first sight, seem to be common to both sides but which, on closer examination, reveal some differences, such as the freezing of the political status quo in the world.

The Soviet concept of the status quo has always been fundamentally different from that of the West. As Krushchev explained to Walter Lippmann many years ago, the continuation of the anti-colonial revolution, together with the "national wars of liberation" required for this purpose, form part of the "status quo", as the Soviets understand it. It is only in Europe that the Soviets try to uphold a status quo which is devoid of all dynamism and which excludes even internal reforms as they were attempted in Czechoslovakia.

On the other hand, it is not the aim of American policy to petrify the political status quo in Europe for all time and to block all possibilities for a peaceful change.

## IV <u>Possible Effects of strategic Agreements on the European</u> Allies of the <u>United States</u>

1. At the last Ministerial Meeting in Washington, the NATO allies of the United States welcomed the opening of SALT without exception. They did this in a language (para. 7 of the Communique) which - at least to those who can read between the lines - clearly indicates that they were faced with a mixture of hope and concern. Paragraph 7 of the Washington Communique reads as follows:

The political solidarity of the Alliance constitutes an essential element while approaching a period of expanding East-West contacts and possible negotiations. This solidarity can best be maintained by strict adherence to the principle of full consultation in the Council both before and during any negotiations that might affect the interests of the Alliance or any of its members. On this understanding, the Allied Governments welcome the intention of the United States to engage the USSR in discussion of limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms.

- 2. It is not difficult to imagine which hopes on the one hand and which concerns on the other hand were involved. They relate to
  - some problems raised exclusively by SALT and any resulting strategic agreements, and
  - some other problems which exist anyhow in European-American relations and which are thus not caused but influenced

by strategic agreements, be it that they are aggravated or mitigated.

With a few exceptions there are no problems affecting European-American relations which would be created by SALT alone. However, SALT might accentuate, sharpen, deepen and make more urgent a number of existing problems.

3. This, however, does not mean that the European NATO allies would watch the course taken by SALT more or less indifferently or disinterestedly - or that they could afford to adopt such an attitude.

The indirect effects of SALT in intensifying existing problems could be so significant that they might, in the end, by far exceed those of the NPT.

- 4. There are only very few problems of the first category those which are exclusively due to SALT and strategic agreements. They are the following:
- SALT might manifest the intention of the super-powers to meet their obligations under the NPT for a cessation of the arms race and a limitation of nuclear armaments; to this extent, they are liable to make a positive impression on the non-nuclear European allies.
- On the other hand, however, SALT might likewise quickly reveal that the super-powers do not seriously intend to limit their nuclear armament as provided for in the NPT which would be bound to have a negative effect. In particular, if SALT failed, this could be taken to mean that the super-powers are not willing to agree to arms control measures as soon as their own armament is involved.
- A confidential, bilateral negotiating atmosphere between the super-powers might be particularly conducive to the creation of suspicion among the allies.
- Strategic agreements might cause some doubts as to the future technological lead of the United States.
- On the other hand, they might provide the European armaments technology in some fields with a chance of catching up at least to some extent with the technological lead of the United States which sometimes appears to be immense, and thus to narrow

the technological gap in relative terms.

- At any rate, a quantitative or qualitative freezing of the present strategic armaments of the United States and the Soviet Union especially of the defensive weapons systems would benefit the strategic forces of the smaller nuclear powers whose effectiveness might otherwise increasingly decline. (An ABM shield which, although orientated towards China, could at the same time largely neutralize the French force de frappe and the British strategic nuclear potential.)
- 5. More important are those effects of SALT and strategic agreements which may have a positive or negative influence on problems that already exist.

The problems involved may be those which

- (a) directly affect the security and defence of Europe, or
- (b) those of a general political and psychological nature affecting the prestige, the credibility and the leadership of the United States, and mutual confidence between the allies.
- 6. As far as the security and defence of Europe are concerned, there is the fundamental question of how SALT and strategic agreements would affect the credibility of the timely and effective use of American nuclear weapons in fulfilment of the assistance guarantee given in Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

If SALT is going to raise concerns one may suspect that they relate to

- which are a reduction of the coverage of Soviet MRBMS targeted on Europe by American ICBMS stationed in the United States;
- reduced deterrence by diminished fear of escalation on the part of the Soviets;
- shifting of the emphasis of NATO defence to conventional forces, while these forces may at the same time be reduced as a result of a euphoria of détente favoured by SALT;
- a moral and possibly organizational <u>weakening of the cohesion</u> within the NATO Alliance as a result of these fears.
- 7. All these concerns are primarily a matter of <u>psychologi-cal effects</u> which are, for the most part, <u>not justified by objective military reasons</u>.

As long as the United States agrees only to "balanced"

arrangements, i.e. which do not change the ratio of nuclear strength to their detriment (on which they must obviously insist for the elementary reason of their own self-preservation), there is no valid reason to justify the fear that such an arrangement would result in Soviet conventional superiority being given greater weight. The deterrence against an attack by the Soviet Union on NATO Europe is primarily based on the ability and willingness of the United States to respond to a conventional attack, if necessary, by nuclear weapons, in the last resort even by strategic nuclear weapons, and to do so under any conceivable circumstances. If this deterrence has been credible in the past in spite of the nuclear stalemate - or, in other words, the mutual second-strike overkill capability - then it has not been due to the numerical superiority of American weapons. Therefore, neither the capability nor the credibility of this deterrence can be affected by a strategic agreement on the basis of rough parity of the means of deterrence. The balance of mutual deterrence would only be seriously endangered if the United States were to deprive itself of its assured second-strike capability - which is inconceivable.

- 8. However, it should be borne in mind that in nuclear strategy factors which are not supported by objective military facts also play a part. This raises the question whether the Soviets might be more willing to incur risks because they might take an American willingness to enter into strategic agreements as a sign of reluctance to use this potential. We can only hope that such naive irrationality does not prevail on the Soviet side.
- 9. It is also conceivable that another psychological sideeffect is caused by SALT: doubts concerning the ability of the
  United States to assert its military superiority. Does not the
  fact that the United States has not only agreed to SALT, but has
  recently encouraged this project, permit the conclusion, in the
  eyes of the world, that any delay in these talks would be to
  the disadvantage of the United States, i.e. that the continuation
  of the present situation without SALT would benefit the Soviet
  Union? Has not the international public opinion already been
  shocked by the publication of Congressional Hearings on the
  subject of ABM and relevant comments in the press when it became
  apparent that

- the Soviets will reach numerical superiority in one field of strategic weapons deployment that of ICBM before the end of this year;
- only the Soviets possess ABM and IR/MRBM;
- the growing accuracy of Soviet offensive missiles may endanger the American retaliatory potential, and
- in all other fields the Soviets are about to draw at least equal with the United States numerically and qualitatively.

In these circumstances it may be that the European public will not allow itself to be comforted by the assurance that economically, and in terms of production technology, the United States is able to overtake the Soviets again at least numerically in the field of strategic armaments. The public might rather feel that an unstable parity has been reached in the field of strategic armaments and that therefore the American superiority, which had already been neutralized by the nuclear stalemate, has now given way to a phase in which the United States can only attempt to prevent a Soviet superiority. Such damage to the American image might have worldwide consequences even though they could not be proved in each instance.

10. The general political and psychological effects of SALT and strategic agreements may also have positive as well as negative aspects. Among the positive aspects, there are:

#### - the hope for consolidation of world peace;

The further escalation of the arms race between the superpowers is considered dangerous and ruinous, the stabilization
of the mutual deterrence is regarded as desirable and even
urgently necessary in the interest of preventing a nuclear war.
There are fewer reservations in this case than in the case of
the Test Ben Agreement and the NPT because SALT does not lead
to any unilateral burdening or even discrimination of the nonnuclear powers but, on the contrary, to the nuclear powers
assuming commitments and limitations themselves.

- the hope of overcoming the political immobilisme, in particular with respect to the unfortunate status quo in central Europe (symbolized by the Berlin wall and recently illustrated by the renewed subjugation of Czechoslovakia) which is only conceivable if there is a profound change in the political climate.

This does not mean a concept of "linkage" between SALT and the political problems of a divided Europe. But many Europeans believe that an American-Soviet effort to reach an understanding in the strategic field might have a political spin-off, that — in other words — the present <u>fata morgana</u> of detente might assume more concrete shape as a side-effect of SALT. In the long run, they feel, this might help to improve the prospects of a European peace settlement.

ll. On the other hand, there are fears related to certain possibly negative consequences of SALT and strategic agreements. There is also a certain skepticism among the European allies as to a favourable political fall-out effect of SALT and strategic agreements. Previous experience with agreements initiated bilaterally by Washington and Moscow (the Test Ban Agreement, the Space Treaty, the NPT) and with the American and Soviet co-chairmanship at the ENDC (or CCD) in Geneva appears to indicate that it is not only possible but even probable that the antagonistic superpowers will continue to isolate negotiable problems in order to deal with them, apart from their overall political relationship.

It is true that SALT has been delayed by one year owing to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, there is reason to suppose that these talks will now take place if not in a political vacuum, then at least in a politically thinned-out atmosphere which will be determined by objective considerations and expert advice and will be kept apart as far as possible from political developments.

that, instead of causing a relaxation of the status quo, SALT and strategic agreements may lead to its hardening. There is nothing new about speculations that the super-powers may mo e toward the creation of a bi-polar world order on the basis of the status quo. Previous discussions within ISS have often been concentrated on this problem. During the Czechoslovak crisis in August of last year the United States had to defend herself many times against the openly expressed suspicion that she had entered into a kind of tacit agreement with the Soviets to respect mutual spheres of influence in Europe. It would certainly be short-sighted to overlook that such a bi-polar world order established on the basis of some degree of co-operation between the super-powers would also have positive aspects. In the world

of today, there are problems, conflicts and crises which cannot be solved without their co-operation - such as the Middle East conflict. Nevertheless, it is in the nature of things that a stronger trend towards bi-polarism - if it should really come about - would be bound to cause misgivings in both of the camps which are led by the two super-powers. Within NATO, these misgivings are reflected in para. 7 of the Washington Final Communiqué (quoted above) in words which do not make the task of reading between the lines a test of the reader's talents.

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13. To complete the picture, some further disagreable perspectives must be mentioned, which one can only hope are the product of an all too sinister imagination. They concern the psychological effects which SALT may have on the general mood of the western public.

Last spring, when President Nixon explained to the allies his concept of negotiating with the East, he called attention to the danger of unjustified euphoria. This danger is undoubtedly very real, and the warning was therefore entirely justified. This applies to the European as well as to the American public. If, under the impression of SALT, the Europeans were to indulge in a feeling of euphora and relax their defence efforts, they would not only weaken the negotiating position of the United States but damage their own security interests in a suicidal manner. For, if the super-powers should come to an understanding and if a nuclear arms standstill should be the result, conventional defence will be more important than ever.

Just as bad would be a euphoria of détente in the American public. It might lead to a situation in which the United States government is put under the pressure by its public opinion and feels the need to make concessions at the end of the negotiations - concessions which might go beyond the limits of a responsible flexibility, and might even be at the expense of the allies. Particularly imaginative pessimists even paint the picture of a situation where the American government would be compelled to pay for the successful conclusion of the negotiations with additional political prices (be it in the field of NATO defence policy or that of its European or German policies).

#### V. What can be done to obviate negative consequences?

1. Most concrete of all are those European fears which relate to the field of security and defence policy.

These fears might have a variety of effects which can, once again, only be the subject of speculation.

In the most favourable case, a crisis of confidence in NATO might paradoxically have a positive effect on the Europan allies. This would be the case if the concerns in the field of security and defence would give a new impetus to the efforts to unify Europe. If, therefore, SALT had the effect of making the West European countries become more aware of their present precarious position of fragmentation, weakness and dependence, and if they drew from this realization energetic conclusions for the joint exploitation of West European economic, technological, strategic and thus also political potential, its effect could be valuable.

Incidentally, such a development should be just as much welcomed by the United States in her own interest as the already identifiable beginnings of defining a European identity. An example of this is the "Eurogroup" composed of Western European NATO countries.

- 2. But in the most unfavourable case, such a crisis of confidence could also lead to people getting tired with the Alliance, to a resignation in the field of defence and to general political neutralism.
- 3. Since one can never be certain that developments will follow a favourable course it is better to consider how one can obviate any possible unfavourable effects of SALT and strategic agreements.
- (a) It is of fundamental importance that the European allies should understand the American objectives and the arrangements envisaged as a result of the negotiations. This means that <u>information</u> and <u>consultation</u> are more important than ever.

The initial phase of consultations in the NATO Council in July was encouraging for all concerned, and one can only hope that this style of consultation will be maintained also when the United States delegation enters the stormier waters of direct talks with the Soviet Union.

- (b) What should be avoided at all costs are arrangements which seemingly or in reality have specific implications for the security of the allies, such as the direct or indirect reduction of nuclear weapons assigned to SACEUR, or stationed in Europe, or arrangements reducing the American coverage of Soviet MRBM.
- (c) Since the European NATO allies are bound to measure all arrangements by the yardstick of whether they offer greater latitude to the Soviet Union for the use of force with conventional weapons, the American defence policy should leave no doubt that any such conventional action gives rise to the danger of the tactical and strategic employment of nuclear weapons. European security rests essentially on the Soviets' fear of escalation.
- (d) In conducting the negotiations, care should be taken to see to it that the image of the United States as the militarily and technologically leading nuclear power is not affected. In spite of the rough parity of the two super-powers which must be largely accepted as a <u>de-facto</u> situation, the principle of parity should not be formally agreed as a basis for negotiation. Especially, erroneous concepts and miscalculations concerning any actual or future nuclear superiority of the Soviet Union should be obviated.

Confidence in the technological lead of the United States is an important psychological element of the feeling of security on the part of the allies. As far as possible, care should be taken to ensure that SALT does not undermine confidence in this lead.

- (e) In this respect, the tactics and style of the American conduct of negotiations are of great importance. If the United States were to create the impression that she is anxious to obtain a rapid result through SALT or that she is interested in a result even if the Soviet side does not indicate an equivalent interest in a balanced agreement, then such a proceeding would be particularly liable to cause or to reinforce doubts as to the relative nuclear strengths and the status of the technological competition. In other words, the American government should not allow itself to be put in the situation of being the "demandeur", for this might have the dangerous result of influencing the Soviet calculation risks.
- (f) The American conduct of the negotiations should disassociate itself sufficiently from those theories which proceed from

the assumption that a nuclear arrangement between the two superpowers is of such vital importance for world peace that it should be brought into being irrespective of all other political conflicts and developments (the theory of "de-coupling").

Apart from the fact that, if the United States were to embrace this theory, it would weaken her negotiating position, would free the Soviets from any burdensome doubts as to the wisdom of obnoxious acts of force à la Prague, and might, thus, even have a counter-productive effect, this theory is particularly alarming for the Europeans since it might cause the Soviets to have doubts as to the willingness of the United States to employ nuclear weapons if and when a casus foederis should arise.

Again this does not refer to any linkage between SALT and general political problems. The Germans, too, have understood that SALT is not a suitable means for the solution of the German and Berlin question. Just as unrealistic, however, would be the idea that a nuclear arrangement could be isolated from any and all political developments and be brought into existence in a vacuum.

(g) The United States should not create the impression that they are giving priority to the American-Soviet bilateralism over Alliance solidarity.

This applies to the <u>substance</u> as well as to the <u>procedure</u>. It is harmful for the climate of confidence in the Alliance if Soviet reactions are awaited patiently for many months, while the allies are being urged to make known their position on important questions in a matter of days. It is, naturally, even more delicate to expect the allies to sacrifice certain interests in order to bring about agreement with the Soviets.

SALT forms part of a policy which Raymond Aron some years ago called the policy of an "alliance entre ennemis". It is obvious that such a policy is delicate and will face the allies time and again with difficult questions of confidence. SALT should not produce the feeling that the other super-power is regarded by the most important ally more as a partner than as a potential enemy of the Alliance. "Plus d'ennemi, plus d'alliance": the time has not yet come when the Alliance is no longer necessary because there is no potential enemy.

### INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 11th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

### THE SUPER-POWERS SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

#### COMMITTEE III

#### Friday 19th September

# Unlimited Competition or Spheres of Responsibility? PROF. J.D.B. MILLER

This is a paper about the popular feeling that the super powers are going to get closer together in the next few years. The questions I have been given to answer include the following: are the super-powers losing interest in excluding each other from positions of influence in the developing world of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East? Is there a sort of asymmetrical quality about the situation, in that the Soviet Union is expanding its interest while those of the United States are contracting? If this is so - or, indeed, even if it is not so - will growing Soviet involvement with countries such as those around the Indian Ocean force the United States to reconsider what many people regard as its retreat from the affairs of Africa and Asia, following its failure to win the war in Vietnam? If the super-powers do continue to compete in the so-called Third World, what will lie behind the competition: a traditional contest for power, such as Britain and France pursued in the non-European countries of the 18th and 19th centuries; or an ideological conflict? If, on the other hand, they develop separate spheres of responsibility, will they use the United Nations more to avoid conflict between themselves, or try to run the world as a duumvirate? Are unlimited competition and spheres of responsibility the only alternatives for them, as my title suggests, or is there a third alternative - one which might be called limited or reluctant co-operation?

Asking and answering questions like these means painting with a broad brush. One is tempted to find regularities of behaviour even when they are not there. The material is so vast and chaotic, and the principal actors have so much to say about what they are supposed to be doing, that it is easy to believe what they say rather than look at the

confusion which often seems the clearest aspect of their mutual relations. It is important, then, to set out some guiding points abouth the developing countries and the way the super-powers have behaved towards them.

The Third World is Not uniform. It includes a great many countries which vary, not only in size, population and wealth, but also in historical background. When trying to define Third World countries some years ago I wrote that they had three main characteristics: they were non-European, non Communits and poor. Even then I left out Latin America, on account of the length of time that had elapsed since Spain and Portugal gave up their empires, the predominantly Latin culture of South and Central America, and the special role which the United States had played there. For the purposes of this paper it seems wrong to leave out Latin America, yet if it is included one has to fall back on that term 'developing countries', which may include Communist states like China, Cuba, North Vietnam and North Korea, and which is an economic description in a situation in which politics is an especially volatile element.

The best one can do, perhaps, is to regard the Third World of this paper as made up of those countries which have low standards of living and are outside the normal circle of association with either the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and which might be the object of competitive influence by any of those three. China is included because of its obvious importance as an attempted rival to the two super-powers; it is not a super-power of the moment. 'Third World', of course, becomes a misnomer if one admits the possibility of China's having a world of its own; but it is an accepted cant phrase, and I shall continue to use it, in the hope that everyone will recognise how loose the usage is.

Even when we confine ourselves to this sort of definition, it is clear that there has been no unity of approach to world politics of these Third World states, in spite of declamation at Bandung, at the UN and at successive non-alignment conferences. Some have stuck together for certain periods and certain purposes, with the Arab states, in spite of their bitter differences with one another, as the prime example in their joint animosity towards Israel. Most have indulged in rhetoric about major international issues while interesting themselves primarily in their relations with their near neighbours. Most have experienced sudden changes of government which have turned their foreign policies upside-down, as in Ghana, or modified them considerably, as in Indonesia. Most have a heightened political atmosphere, occasioned by traditions of coup d'etat or a struggle

J.D.B. Miller, The Politics of the Third World (London, 1966; New York 1967) p.xi.

for independence or both, which puts a premium on striking attitudes about sovereignty and proper relations with great powers. Most are involved in various forms of regionalism, but more as show than as earnest endeavour. Those which have gained their independence in the past twenty years or so have encountered economic problems far greater than their leaders anticipated, and many seem to have given up after pursuing the will-on-the-wisp of economic growth. Largely dependent on primary production, against which their theoreticians rebel, they have reluctantly turned back to improving the land after failing to produce the industrial goods that were to give them a lift into higher spheres. Some are in alliances, but most, while they have armies, are more concerned about the opposition at home or across the border than with conceivably unacceptable demands from super-powers, which are regarded largeley as cows to be milked or demons to be exorcised, and sometimes as both. This is not true of countries with a highly developed sense of foreign policy, such as India, but there are not many Third World countries like that.

Thus, they are not uniform, but one can see some broad lines of similarity in some of their circumstances. It is important to recognise that the super-powers' policies towards them have not been uniform either. It would be useful if one could persuade oneself that Russian and American policy-makers start by saying 'Our Third World policy is such-and-such and therefore our policy towards Egypt or India or Mali will be as follows'; but it is not so. The spokesmen of the super-powers frequently assert that they have consistent approaches towards the developing countries, but in practice their policies are not uniform or consistent, whether one views them in economic or military terms. When one gets down to examining what a super-power does about a particular Third World State; cone sees the desire to make good in a local situation even if this does violence to general principles. Usually, a super-power's policies in a particular area are largely decided by its previous practices there, by the network of customs and obligations which have been built up over the years. There may be occasions when a super-power changes its position abruptly, but these are not the typical cases. More often, even in the newer states, a pattern of connection has been established and tends to continue, whatever may be said about things in general. Just as each of the Third World states has a particularity about its own politics and its sense of its interests, so each super-power develops policies which become particular for the state in question. Sometimes there may be apparent uniformity for a while, arising from the super-powers' previous ignorance of the area and absence of longstanding

ties: this was true of both super-powers in Africa around 1960, but it is much less true now.

Nonetheless there are attempts at general principles by the superpowers, and it is advisable to know something of them. They are the major premises which super-power diplomats would like to apply if the opportunity arose.

These general principles are partly concerned with the Third World states and partly with the super-powers themselves. The Soviet Union has the clearer set of principles, because it is supposed to rest on an ideological base and its politicians feel more obliged to cast their statements in abstract form. Soviet attitudes towards the Third World have moved from the position characteristic of the 1920s and 1930s, when it was a matter of dogma that only through revolutions led by Communist parties could the countries under imperialist rule be liberated, to an uneasy stage in the 1940s and 1950s when this older attitude was fighting against actual experience in Asia and Africa and the need to find accommodation there with newly independent governments not under Communist control. They are now characterised by the pragmatism of the 1960s, in which, while a few Third World states may be given special mention as 'national democratic states', because of their readiness to co-operate with the Soviet Union, that super-power will come to cordial terms with any Third World regime if it thinks that it can thereby prevent the United States and China from obtaining influence. Third World states like any other states in a Soviet view, are behaving well and displaying their independence when they vote with the Soviet Union at the UN, provide opportunities for Soviet trade and ports for Soviet ships, send students to Moscow, and when they do the right thing with Soviet aid. Otherwise they are subject to neo-colonialism or governed by reactionaries. Only in the latter cases will the Soviet Union pay public attention to how they treat their Communist parties, or whether they have any at all. Even then, the Soviet Union will strike bargains with them if Soviet interests will thereby be served. The ideological element has thus largely become muted in Soviet behaviour towards the Third World, leaving more obvious the considerations of power and influence which were always there (as in the Soviet treatment of Persia in the early 1920s) but were obscured during the period of successful European imperialism.

The Soviet position on the United States, shortly stated, is that in theory the United States is the significant element in a Leninist interpretation of present-day imperialism, representing as it does the last stage of capitalism, but that, because of nuclear weapons, the rivalry of China,

and the disinclination of the Soviet Union to engage in wars, it is another super-power with which the Soviet Union must take terms. What constitutes these terms, and how far they go, are matters of time and place, not fixed judgments meant to last. The Soviet Union does not seem to have any particular attitude towards association with the United States in the Third World at large, except to the extent that it does not want an occasion for war to develop and yet dees not want to let go its own hold wherever it has or might have one. Rather, the Soviet Union, against the faded background of its old dogmas, appears to think largely in regional terms. It is more interested in the Middle East and South Asia than in Africa and Latin America; but within each of those regions its approach will vary, depending upon the position of the United States there, the degree of rivalry from China, and its own past connections and geopolitical interest in the area.

In geopolitical terms, the Soviet Union has abiding interests in the countries of the Himalya area and of the Far East. It is also concerned to prevent its opponents from obtaining strategic positions around its borders: its policies towards Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Japan in the last year or so are evidence of the care it takes in this respect. The addition of China to its opponents in the past decade has meant a greater concentration on long-standing considerations affecting the Russo-Chinese border; it has also given the Soviet Navy an opportunity to press its case for more ships and for more ports and facilities for them in the Indian Ocean, and, if possible, the Pacific also. In pursuit of these aims, the Soviet Union has shown recently a more generalised interest in Asian countries; giving it a wider sphere of bilateral contacts within the Third World. So far, this has not led to any notable clash with the United States, which has accepted with equanimity the loss of its previous monopoly of influence in such states as Iran and Pakistan. The Chinese factor seems to be the most important in both the Russian expansion and the American acceptance.

The American postion, which is necessarily less unified and less ideological, because of the differences between the American and Soviet political systems, has gone through certain changes since, say, 1947. One can argue that at the beginning of this period the American approach was, in its way, as theoretical as the Russian, being based upon similar ignorance about the local circumstances of Third World countries (except those in Latin America), and upon a somewhat similar conception of the iniquity of old-fashioned imperialism. President Roosevelt was the archetype of this attitude, which has bobbed up many times since his death.

It is apparently unsinkable, although it is not so important as it once was. Such an emotional indentification with the anti-colonial cause led naturally to a belief that newly independent countries would wish to adopt the ideals of the United States, !the first new nation', or at least to recognise a communion of interests with it. This naive hope was doomed to failure in any case, but its demise was accelerated by another element in American thinking, the wish to use strategic territories for the advantage of the United States, regardless of the desires of their inhabitants. This wish, so strikingly demonstrated in 1945 in the acquisition of strategic trust territories in the Pacific and since then in the continuance of the American hold on Okinawa, became mingled with the attitude of anti-colonialism, to the extent that the United States in the 1950's tried to get as many Third World states as possible into its alliance system, so as to ring the Soviet Union and China with American and allied power. SEATO, CENTO and the alliance with Japan represented such a combination, but very much to the detriment of that image of America which Roosevelt and others - including John Foster Dulles himself wished to impose on the new states. The United States appeared primarily. militarist rather than civilian, grasping rather than generous, and absorbed in cold war strategy instead of concerned to improve the lot of Third World peoples. Such an image was, of course, distorted, and the fact was recognised by many shrewd people in Third World regimes; but it was common (and still is) in much of the journalism, political rhetoric and so-called 'progressive' thinking of the developing countries, and, while it owes a certain amount of emphasis to the propaganda efforts of the Soviet Union, China and their friends, it was primarily due to the actions of the United States itself. Foreign aid has been unable to dispel the bad effects, especially since foreign aid as such, whether coming from the United States, the Soviet Union, or anywhere else, has generally been a disappointment to those receiving it as well as to those giving. The more relaxed attitude towards Third World countries which became part of American policy once President Kennedy took office, and which still continues. in spite of the Vietnam war, has been something of an antidote, but not a complete one. If there is such a thing as a representative Third World view, it is that 'America is promises', no doubt, but that each promise has to be scanned with a sceptical eye.

American attitudes towards the Soviet Union in the Third World context have been as one might expect. Twenty years ago, when the Soviet Union still appeared to be in charge of the world's Communist

parties and to use them to further its policies wherever it wished. the United States identified Communism everywhere with the Soviet Union. The intervening years have seen the Communist parties separate out into those following the Soviet line, those following the Chinese line, and those with a considerable degree of independence. Whereas in the late 1940's one could plausibly argue that an upsurge of Communist activity in Southeast Asia or Latin America was in direct response to Soviet demands, this can no longer be done. Communism is not now the apparent menace to Third World stability that it was then, except in certain selected areas in which Communist parties still have some significance. From an American standpoint, the dangerous regimes in the Third World are those in such states as Syria and Algeria, where radical colonels or intellectuals, insecurely clutching the reins of government, are likely to make concessions to the Soviet Union in order to consolidate their own positions. Power and influence, rather than ideology, are the distinguishing marks of American interest, as they are of Soviet interest. The United States, like the Soviet Union, wishes to avoid a nuclear war; but, again like the Soviet Union, it wants the best deal it can get wherever it can get it, though some areas seem more crucial to it than others.

It is not sufficient, however, to say that both super-powers are seeking the best deal they can get in various parts of the Third World. A critic can legitimately ask what this 'best deal' consists of. just the wish to exercise power and influence; is it just a matter of each heading off the other; are they trying to advance their respective ideologies; are they concerned with material interests in the shape of markets and raw materials; or are they simply extending their security zones far beyond their own territory? I confess to a real difficulty in answering this. My impression of a Great Power's foreign policy is that one can sometimes separate out these factors when examining that policy towards a particular country or in a particular situation, but that there is normally a considerable unity of intention about the policy at large. The factors merge into each other and reinforce each other; policy-makers are not aware of what is uppermost as often as they say they are. I find such metaphors as drive, momentum and the like helpful in describing how a power such as the United States or the Soviet Union goes about making policý towards lesser states. So when I say that power and influence, rather than ideology, characterise the American and Soviet policy drives in the Third World, I do not mean that ideology has disappeared or that

power and influence have been deliverately adopted as aims. I mean rather that in the collection of motives which seem to be at work, the sense of contest is uppermost, and that the language in which it is expressed and the framework of policy in which it operates are not now so ideological as they used to be. But they might be so again; it is not impossible.

Standing back from these large-scale attitudes of the super-powers. and keeping in mind what we know about the Third World countries, we can say that when we investigate how some local situation in Asia, Africa, the Middle East or Latin America may develop, we should expect to see in operation, for each super-power, the following. First, the desire not to stumble into a quarrel with the other that might lead to war; second, the desire to outwit the other, if this should not prove too costly; third, the desire to make the best use of local circumstances in acquiring influence; and fourth, some doubt - often considerable - about how far the other might be prepared to go. We might find these thoughts uppermost in the minds of the American ambassadors in Djakarta, Cairo, New Delhi, Teheran and Dares-Salaam. There would, however, be local nuances everywhere, and in Latin American capitals there would be a further decisive element: the fact that this is an area in which the United States regards itself as paramount, and in which, as the-Cuba missile crisis of 1962 showed, it is quite prepared to go to the brink of war.

There is one other attitude of mind which we might expect both to find in some areas: apprehension about the influence of China and, in certain cases, Cuba, both of which may be felt, with varying degrees of intensity, to be working against the interests of the super-powers. Thus we must add almost another dimension to the uneasy relationship between the super-powers in the Third World: mutual dislike of intruders, recognised to be hostile to both super-powers, but recognised also perhaps as capable of doing one's own job for one without meaning to. That is to say, the Soviet Union no doubt dislikes the cockiness with which Castro's Cuba assumes the role of revolutionary leader in Latin America, but is aware that, while Cuba's activities may work against Soviet interests, they may work even more effectively against those of the United States. Similarly, the United States may dislike the attempted extension of Chinese influence into African and Asian states, but be aware of how this may set local radicals against the Soviet Union, and so nullify some of the local influence which the Soviet Union attemnts to acquire by other means.

The general situation, then, is by no means clear. Both superpowers have enough contrary influences at work on them to make them appear arbitrary and confused in their approach to Third World countries, even when one leaves out of account the domestic influences upon them. When one adds in those domestic influences, the situation looks even more tentative. Both super-powers are subject to continual internal pressure to use resources for home development and not for apparently fruitless use abroad, whether as economic or military aid. The 'bottle of milk for every Hottentot', for advocating which Henry Wallace was so strongly attacked in the United States during World War II. is just as unpopular with certain ministries in the Soviet Union as it is at present in the United States Senate. Similarly, both are under pressure not to engage in military adventures which may prove either unproductive or the cause of further dispute with the other. We know all about the objections in the United States to the Vietnam war and to commitments to such countries as Thailand; but we may be sure that, while they do not get so much publicity, doubts have been expressed by important people in the Soviet Union about implied commitments to India and Egypt, since these might lead to dangers which the Soviet Union would not wish to face.

So we ought to be sceptical about large statements by the superpowers on what they will do to or for the developing countries (or what they will not do). There are many constraints on them which are not readily apparent or readily capable of being generalised for the Third World as a whole, but which nonetheless exist. In the same way, we ought to be sceptical about the likelihood of clearcut agreed arrangements between the super-powers for the Third World as a whole or any part of it. The relationship between the two is not itself clearcut: it is continually shifting with circumstances and with the assessment which each makes periodically of how it stands in respect of the other's weapons and will. Even if either wants to co-operate, it is inhibited by uncertainty about what the other intends, and suspicion of whether the other would keep its word. Moreover, even if both were sincere (and each was convinced that the other was sincere) about a particular agreed policy in the Third World, the varied and volatile character of the Third World states would make that policy hard to put into effect, and disappointing in its results - whether it involved military alliances, or economic development, or trade liberalisation, or simply joint persuasion that the Chinese ought not to be listened to. Good intentions here, as elsewhere, are one thing in the abstract and another in the

concrete. I am not suggesting that the Soviet Union and the United States are incapable of either defining precisely their roles in the Third World or of envisaging some kind of agreement. I am suggesting, however, that the scope for this kind of planned activity is strictly limited by their own situations and those of the states with which they are concerned.

These preliminaries over, we can consider the questions I listed at the beginning.

First, are the super-powers losing interest in excluding each other from positions of influence in the Third World? I think that, on the whole, they are. One can say that their attitudes have been changing from vague formulations of general intent to particular interest in given areas. This is largely due to gaining greater knowledge of the Third World through experience of alliances, economic aid, arms aid and the like. It is also due to the super-powers' changed relationship in the world at large: they are less inclined to stress the ideological differences between them, less disturbed about security considerations, and more knowledgeable about one another.

As so often in Third World matters, India is something of a paradigm case. From the days when the United States was liable to swell with indignation at Mr. Krishna Menon's statements at the U.N., and the Soviet Union viewed India as an unmanageable place which had to be wooed but was west-inclined at heart, because of its bourgeois regime, things have become much more practical. The United States no longer objects to non-alignment, accepts the current Indian version of it (sometimes called 'co-alignment'), no longer tries to keep up an exclusive connection with Pakistan, continues its economic aid, retains lines of communication with the right wign of Indian politics, but - and this is the point that matters - does not object to the growing attachment of India to the Soviet Union, because it is plain that, for India, the Soviet Union is a more congenial partner against China than the United States itself. The Soviet Union accepts this role in a cautious way, not committing itself to either a specific guarantee of Indian territorial integrity or hostility towards Pakistan, but providing the sinews of war and aiding Indian diplomacy wherever this works against the interests of China. Neither super-power fully trusts the other, neither is entirely satisfied with what the other is doing, but neither is prepared to try to thrust the other out of close association with India. This sort of mutual recognition of joint roles is a particular

situation, of which India is the most significant example, is found also to some extent in Burma and in parts of Africa. Perhaps it is also developing in Iran and Turkey. It is not, however, universal.

There are some areas of the Third World in which the influence on one of the super-powers is so great that the other would not try to dislodge. it. Latin America at large is like this, although the Cuban complication makes it awkward. Russian interference is very largely limited to mild propaganda. As Brzezinski points out, 'In Latin America current Soviet policy bears a striking resemblance to American policy in Eastern Europe: a region where one must tread lightly, speak softly, carrying not a "big stick" but only gifts'. Similarly, the United States has its clients in Asia - South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines - with which the Soviet Union does not interfere directly. The Soviet Union itself has clients, thought they are not always reliable. Indonesia proved a disapointment; the militant Arab states may prove less so, although the Soviet Union has again refrained from specific commitments and has kept to economic and military aid, along with diplomatic help. The degree of clienthood involved here is less than in the American cases just mentioned, and it is reasonable to expect that, if and when the Israel issue ever becomes settled, the United States will try to improve its position amongst the Arabs. It will be a rather mild effort, however, comparable to that which the Soviet Union has recently been making in such west-inclined countries as Malaysia and the Philippines.

There is room for useful speculation abouth whether these areas in which the one or other of the super-powers has a recognised sphere of interest can also be called spheres of responsibility. In the first case it would mean that the super-powers had agreed to keep out of each other's way. In the second we could assume that they had gone further and agreed on some common aim, and had split the responsibility for achieving it. There are signs that they may be recognising each other's faits accomplis in the shape of spheres of interest and converting these into something like spheres of responsibility - in the relaxation of U.S. propaganda about Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, and some similar relaxation on the Soviet side about Latin America - but I should hesitate to take the idea further. I find it hard to envisage a deliberate sharing-out of areas such as East or West Africa or the Maghreb. Much depends on how far one thinks a sphere of responsibility would go,

<sup>1</sup>Z. Brzezinski, 'Peace and Power', Encounter, Nov. 1968, p.7.

especially on the extent to which the other super-power would be expected to keep out. Here, as elsewhere, the decisive factor may prove to be the influence of China. Where China is a threat, the super-powers are more likely to come to an arrangement than elsewhere. Whether it is a recognition of spheres of responsibility, or some ad hoc arrangement such as they have come to in India, would depend very much on the local situation. In the meantime, they will probably continue to accept one another's faits accomplis.

Outside the special arrangements and spheres of influence there is much more uncertainty. Particularly in black Africa, neither superpower seems to wish to oust the other, although each is watchful of any increase in the other's influence. Both seem to consider that their excitement about Africa when it burst on the world as a cluster of newly independent states around 1960 was premature, and that black Africa at least does not matter so much to them as they thought. There has been no strong effort by either to exclude the other from positions already taken up. The United States, for example, has not become disturbed about the influence the Soviet Union now exerts in Nigeria through the arms shipments it has provided during the civil war. The contrast with the febrile atmosphere of the Congo period is a marked one. It appears that both will refrain from very active policies in Africa unless China manages to gain some significant position there. If they thought otherwise, we might have expected South Africa or Rhodesia to have become the occasion for something like the confrontation, at one remove, which we now experience in the Middle East. Neither super-power has been sufficient advantage to itself in actively backing the side which one would expect it to favour. This is partly because of the special circumstances of southern Africa, but it is also because Africa has not been brought into the super-power contest, presumably because of some degree of collaboration.

The answer, then, to the first question is that, compared with ten years ago, both super-powers show relatively little interest in excluding each other from positions of influence in the Third World, although they watch each other carefully and neither gives up its general propaganda position or its use of aid for purposes of advantage. There are cases of apparent collaboration - which the Chinese would call collusion - brought about by a recognition that the two have some interests in common. The situation varies from area to area, and there is a considerable ad hoc air about it. One can see, however, that neither

power views the Third World with the same sense of urgency as it did earlier.

This brings us to the second question, whether there is an asymmetrical quality about their activities, through the Soviet Union's expanding its activities while those of the United States are contracting. To some extent this is true, but it does not seem to be true enough to warrant the conclusion that the Soviet Union will overtake the United States, or that it is showing more overall determination to influence Third World countries. One must remember that the Soviet Union started later that the United States, at this particular game, and that the area of its operations is still not so . large as the American. Its attention has been directed rather more specifically to trade and military advantages in a few selected areas than to general 'Third World' policies. Approaches to Malaysia and Singapore, and general benevolence to African and Latin American countries (with a relatively slight amount of aid) do not constitute a large-scale policy capable of overhauling the American lead. Where the Russian policy is distinctive is in its heavy investment of economic and military aid in a few key places, of which the Arab states are the most obvious and Egypt the most notable. There is little sign that the Russians contemplate large-scale activities in Africa or Latin America. While they are seeking ports and facilities round the Indian Ocean and in neighbouring seas, this seems to be an attempt at a naval presence to counteract Chinese pretensions. At the same time, it is worth reiterating the point already made, that the Soviet Union wishes to do the best it can wherever it can, and that it will continue to try to embarrass the United States in areas which, unlike India, show little likelihood of Chinese penetration. I therefore opt for symmetry rather than asymmetry in any projection of how the efforts of the two superpowers are likely to compare in the next few years - especially since I think that any apparent American disengagement is disengagement from the particular difficulties of particular places in the Third World (especially Indo-China), rather than a generalised determination to go back home and stay there.

The third question, closely connected with this point, was whether the growing Soviet involvement in certain areas notably the Indian Ocean, would cause the United States to reconsider what many people regard as its retreat from Asia and Africa. My difficulty here is that I do not think the United States is in fact retreating. The idea that it is

arises from observation of three things: the American disillusionment over Vietnam; the hostile attitude of American Senators towards foreign aid and further commitments of a Vietnam type; and the clear wish of significant sections of the American people that more government money should be spent at home. I would not deny that any of these was important, but I would place against them the simple fact that the United States is a super-power and that the people who run it are aware that this is so. Whatever the United States does or does not do in particular situations, it cannot escape acting like a super-power in the world at large. Its role cannot be played solely in terms of the threat of nuclear warfare, since this is a threat which it will not put into effect unless something very close to nuclear attach is made on itself. If its rivals, the Soviet Union and China, were able to do what they liked in the Third World - especially in East Asia, long regarded as an area of special American interest - American prestige would shrink, American credibility in Europe, Australia and elsewhere would be greatly reduced, and large numbers of the American people would begin to complain that their country was not occupying its rightful place in the world. It is one thing to give up an impossible task in Vietnam, which should never have been undertaken in the first place; it is quite another to say that the United States will not try to exert influence in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, especially when the Soviet Union is doing so.

To suggest this is certainly unfashionable, and requires some explanation. American isolationism in its full flower was a product of the years between the two World Wars, of the special character of the first of those wars in its impact on the ethnic composition which the United States had experienced as a result of its immigration of the preceding thirty years, and of the circumstances of Europe during the 1920's and 1930's. The present time has little or nothing in common with that time. The American people are now a different mixture with a different dominant view of their place in the world. The impatience which they have shown since the Vietnam war went wrong is impatience with that kind of war and the policies which led to it not with the notion of the U.S. as a super-power. It is true that the recent successful agitation for an ABM system has something of a 'Festung Amerika' note about it, and that opposition to the U.N. and to foreign aid are at present strong. But we have seen these in

operation previously in the past twenty years; I do not expect they will be more successful this time in turning America's back on the world. What we can expect, however, is a contraction of the kind of American presence represented by troops on the gound in small states with dubious regimes, and a concentration less upon those forms of aid which call for large numbers of Americans on the spot than on those which have more to do with planning, currency and trade. An era is passing, but this does not mean wholesale retreat from the aims and ideals of that era; it may mean only a change of methods in a more relaxed atmosphere.

To bring the matter down to the Indian Ocean, the area mentioned in the question, I do not think the United States will give up its efforts in India, that it will fail to aid Indonesia, that it will be indifferent to what the British or the Australians do in Malaysia, or that it will regard what happens in the Arab lands as unimportant. Rather, it will continue to operate in each of these areas, sometimes with the appearance of an understanding with the Soviet Union, sometimes in mild competition with it. An American government which did otherwise is very difficult to imagine.

If I am right in this, it follows that we should not regard Vietnam as too much of a portent, but rather as the final bankruptcy of the policy of implicating the United States in local quarrels on the ground, instead of allowing it to keep its eye on the main problem, that of relations with the Soviet Union and China. The United States may be expected in the next few years not to pay so much attention to changes of regime in small Asian states and not to be bemused by domino conceptions, but to attempt to exert steady prolonged influence over whatever Asian regimes exist - even those which are Communist in origin. It is not impossible that the governments of North Vietnam and even North Korea might achieve with the United States a modus vivendi which enabled them to get something from it, and it to cease worrying about them.

Such a situation would mean more, not less competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in particular areas. The answer to the fourth question, what would lie behind the competition, is that both ideology and power would be involved, as they are in any major international struggle. The exact proportions are never discoverable, although we can sometimes say which seems to be decisive. On the whole

I regard this kind of enquiry as unproductive, in the sense that an exact answer is impossible. Each of the two super-powers will use ideological and power considerations as it thinks fit. Neither regards the two as entirely separable. Both will accommodate themselves to a situation in which one or the other is more decisive. Moreover, the states with which they will be concerned in the Third World will not make the separation either. To them the approach of a greater power is largely a unified one, whatever its proportions of ideological and power intent: the toad beneath the harrow is concerned with the harrow, not with whether it is powered by oil or steam. Third World states do not believe in anyone's ideological purity. There is a drive about a great power which develops as it grows in strength and confidence, and as wider areas of operation become apparent to its leaders. Do we need to make much distinction between the components in this drive? It is more important to see how strong it is, where it is going, and what the likely results will be.

This, of course, is the answer of a positivist, one who, while he sees that ideology is often a genuine form of motivation for political action, is depressingly aware of how often the simple search for material advantage - in spheres such as security as well as those in which money figures - is clothed in ideas which decorate and dignify that search, but do not prompt it in the first place. Yet men will often do for ideologies what they will not do for anything else; and it is a never-ending task to discover just when these occasions arise. The task is especially difficult in international politics because of the extent to which the contest with other countries brings out the distinctive nationalism of each state, partly spontaneous and partly cultivated with deliberation, but certainly an ideology so flexible that it can cloak almost any action of a national government in a righteous appearance and justify it by its effect on the interests of foreigners. The ideologies of the Soviet Union and China are largely of this sort, though they have a strong Communist stiffening.

The next question, about the United Nations, I find very difficult to answer. My general view is that major powers use the United Nations either when they cannot avoid some confrontation there or when they think that there are merits in multilateralism in a particular situation. The U.N. has not been especially prominent in the discussions about nuclear control, the area in which the two super-powers have been most successful in attempting some sort of agreed approach. I do not know whether this would be the same .r differenct if we get some convergence of policy towards the Third World: quite possibly it would, but it is worth noting that Third

World countries themselves have usually preferred bilateral negotiations when these seemed likely to be beneficial to them individually, and have fallen back on the U.N. when they have had general declarations to deliver and when they have been unable to raise enough united force amongst themselves to subdue an enemy like South Africa, Portugal or Rhodesia. This one, to me, is largely an open question.

That leaves the final question, foreshadowed in my title: are unlimited competition and spheres of responsibility the only alternatives for the super-powers, or is there a third, limited or reluctant co-operation? My answer should be apparent from what I have said already. I do not think the two are engaged now in unlimited competition, and I do not think they will be so engaged in the future. Unlimited competition would have meant war in the Middle East and possibly in several other places. They do not want unlimited competition because it would suit neither of them. But they do and will compete, since neither trusts the other fully, and each is pushed forward by the compulsions of a great power anxious to make its position secure and its strength known. They will not, however, operate a duumvirate, except perhaps in a few extreme cases. India is the most likely, but even there my guess is that one will take the lead and the other lag behind. Apart from any other consideration, it would be intolerable for any Third World state of any size to agree to joint operation of its affairs by to great powers, like the New Hebrides condominium. The discreet influence of one, yes; the overt dictation of both, no. It is not likely that either of the super-powers, even the Soviet Union, would attempt this kind of open management of other people's affairs. It is quite possible that spheres of influence will grow, and that various Third World states will look primarily to the United States and the Soviet Union. But some will look to France and a few to Britain. The Third World will continue to display a chequered appearance, rather than a simple division.

What of limited co-operation? We see this now in India, but it does not go very far. Wherever the Chinese look like a real threat, the two super-powers are likely to collogue and collude, in order to prevent the Chinese from getting too much of a grip. But elsewhere co-operation between them is more likely to be ragged, arbitrary and uncertain: much as it is now, but rather calmer in operation, rather less urgent and conceivably growing more methodical with time. It may, of course, be more ambitious than this analysis would suggest. They have precedents in their attempts to persuade the developing countries to sign the non-proliferation treaty,

and in the Geneva accords on Indo-China. They have also taken similar lines at UNCTAD. It is fair to say that where they recognise a common danger they will try to agree on how to meet it. But China is the main one they will meet in the Third World; and the areas in which China can credibly operate are relatively few.

#### NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION



## INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 11th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

## THE SUPER POWERS SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

#### COMMITTEE III

Saturday 20th September

The Middle East: A Test Case
SIR HAROLD BEELEY

The relations of the two Super Powers with the Middle East are far from symmetrical. To begin with, Soviet policy in this area has a long historical background in which forces were at play which are still relevant today. The great expansion of the Russian empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, access southwards to the sea became a pressing problem. The assured passage of merchant shipping from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and the power to deny entry into the Black Sea to the warships of non-riparian powers, were for a long time among the basic aims of imperial Russian policy. Later, as Russia's maritime power grew in relative importance, more emphasis was placed on freedom of egress through the Straits into the Mediterranean and beyond.

Another, vaguer, aspect of the drive towards warm water was the attempt to secure a preponderant influence in Persia. Here again a Tsarist policy was taken over by the Soviet régime, obedient to the same pressures of national interest but providing them with a new ideological justification - as when a Soviet writer in 1918 described Persia as "the Suez Canal of the revolution", meaning that its accession to the revolution would open the way to the doctrinal invasion of the Indian Ocean.

In the Second World War the Soviet Government showed that these traditional objectives had lost none of their appeal. Their hopes, their war aims if the phrase is appropriate to a period when they were not taking part in the war, were first expressed in the course of negotiations with Nazi Germany.

In the post-war world the Russians wanted bases on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, with which they could take into their own hands the keys to the Black sea and the passageway to the Rediterranean. And they asked also for recognition of the area between their borders and the Persian Gulf as a zone of Soviet influence. Later, when the Soviet Union became a belligerent in association with the other side, the same ambitions were steadily pursued. In 1946 the well-known and abortive claim was made for direct Soviet participation in the defence of the Straits. And at the same time the attempt, equally abortive, was made to establish autonomous republics under Communist control in Azerbaijan and Iranian Kurdistan.

These moves were unsuccessful. But already the new rulers of Russia, their confidence immensely increased by the part they had played in the allied victory, were looking beyond the limits of the traditional Russian policy and seeking to exert an influence in areas not territorially contiguous with the USBR. Negotiations on the disposal of the former Italian colonies found them ready to assume the responsibility of trusteeship in Tripolitania and in Lritrea, thus declaring an interest both in the Western Mediterranean and in Africa south of Suez.

Simultaneously with this widening of Soviet horizons, changes were taking place in the Arab world which were to make this geopolitical entity an object of more urgent attention than in the past to the policy-makers in the Kremlin. Between the wars the Arab countries were, with the exception of Libya, within the spheres of influence of Britain and France. in which Syria and Lebanon attained their independence in 1945 seemed to point the way to a decline in these influences, and the surrender of Britain's responsibility for Palestine three years later was a further significant step in the retreat of the formerly dominant power. The fact that the Soviet Union voted for the creation of Israel, and was almost as quick as the United States to recognise the new State, has been explained as a machiavellian move to create conditions in which a growing estrangement between the arabs and the Western Powers would be inevitable. It is possible that the policy was conceived with this degree of foresight. It seemed at the time that the Soviet

Delegation in New York was pursuing the simple aim of shaking Palestine loose from British control and thus further reducing the territorial base for Western influence in the Middle East.

However that may have been, the creation of an Israeli State had profound effects on the attitudes of the arabs to external Powers, effects which became clearer and more significant as the United States moved into the position of principal Western influence in the region.

Before the Second World War, American influence in the Middle East had largely taken educational, missionary and cultural forms. The American Universities in Beirut and Cairo. and Robert College in Istanbul, are a monument to this phase in the relationship. The steps by which the United States came to be a major political influence in the area, and the area a major preoccupation of American policy, are reasonably familiar. The process was a striking illustration of what may be called the vacuum theory of international relations. \*\* \*\*merican influence was drawn into the Middle East by the declining capacity of Britain to defend her interests there and the growing pressure of the Soviet Union. The process began in 1947 with President Truman's decision to accept the responsibilities Britain could no longer maintain in Greece and Turkey, and his declaration that the preservation of Greek and Turkish independence was vital to the security of the United States. Both countries became members of NATO shortly afterwards, and an attempt was then made to organise a similar military alliance which would extend the western system of alliances to the Arab world and so prolong in a more modern form the essential elements of the Anglo-Egyptian relationship. This project foundered on the refusal of Egypt to participate; and in 1953 Mr. John Foster Dulles concluded from this setback that the only way to protect the Arab countries constituting the "soft under-belly" of the Middle East was to organise a defensive shield between these countries and the Soviet Union, incorporating Iran as well as Turkey into a military system dependent in the last resort on the United States. In the pursuit of this policy there seemed to be no reason, however, to discard the British assets in two of the Arab countries, Iraq and Jordan. The former indeed

became one of the formative influences in the creation of the Central Treaty Organisation, familiarly known in its early years as the Baghdad Pact.

It is evident, therefore, that the United States was not, like Russia, adapting and developing a traditional policy in changed circumstances but was improvising a new strategy in response to those new circumstances and to the responsibility it had assumed for containing the spread of communism. It is true that during the same period the United States was also acquiring a wholly new economic interest in the Middle East through the great expansion of petroleum production and the role of the major American oil companies in this development. But I believe this was a secondary factor in determining the evolution of American policy towards the Middle East. The primary objective was the containment of Soviet influence for reasons which would still have seemed compelling if the American oil interest had been of negligible importance. (This is not to say, of course, that Washington's bilateral relations with the oil producing countries were not substantially affected by this factor.)

There was another major element in American policy which could be represented as harmonising with and contributing to the main objective but which in fact tended to cut across and complicate it. This was the unwritten commitment to underwrite the existence and security of Israel. From the point of view of American interests the argument was advanced that Israel was a democracy of the western type, that despite the political dominance of its socialist party it was no more likely to be tempted out of its western allegiance than was Norway or Denmark, and that its strength and influence in the region was a measure of the West's ability to withstand Soviet pressures This argument has a certain intrinsic validity, but it is not the explanation of the American attitude to Israel. This is to be found partly in the natural sympathy evoked among non-Jews as well as Jews in the United States by a nation growing from the work of immigrant pioneers and developing through the absorption of communities of diverse ori ins into a homogeneous people. Hore potent saill, however, was the influence on the american political scene of a Jewish community which even

now is more than twice as numerous as the Jewish population of Israel itself. The concentration of a large part of this powerful Jewish community in New York and other key positions, and the strength of its representation in the publicity media, gave it an influence more than proportionate to its numbers. Here was a leverage which Israel's leaders were able to use in order to ensure that policy decisions were taken in Washington in the light of the interests of Israel as well as, and sometimes in preference to, those of the United States. And in fact nothing has done more to facilitate the growth of Soviet influences in the Arab countries, and thus to defeat the basic purpose of American policy there, than the Arab conviction that the United States is irrevocably committed to the defence of Israeli interests. Thus, paradoxically, a supposed instrument of resistance to Soviet penetration has become one of its major assets.

American politicians and diplomats have not of course been blind to this dilemma and have sought in various ways to mitigate its consequences. Once indeed, in 1956, an American Administration took a decisive stand against Israel. This was possible, I think, only because in that crisis Israel was acting in concert with France and the United Kingdom, and the Administration could count on suspicion of the former colonial powers, and irritation at their failure to inform or consult their American ally, to neutralise the normal reaction in favour of Israel. It was also apparent that, unless the United States acted quickly and effectively, the Soviet Union was on the brink of an immense diplomatic triumph.

It is instructive to compare the crises of 1956 and 1967, from the point of view of American and Russian rivalry in the Middle East. In the former the Russians had everything to gain and the Americans a great deal to lose. American relations with Egypt itself had suffered severely from the withdrawal of support for the projected high dam at Assuan, but the damage was not irreparable. Muri Pasha was still in power in Baghdad, and to outward appearance at least the omens for American influence in the Arab world generally were relatively favourable.

No surprise was caused, therefore, when President Eisenhouer brushed aside a proposal from Moscow for joint action. The importance of the Soviet threat to Britain and France was overestimated in some quarters, but it must have been evident to all

the interested Governments that the restoration of the status quo in the winter of 1956-57 was the result essentially of American action.

Eleven years later, much had changed. The revolution in Iraq, the winding but in general leftward course of Syrian politics, the independence of Algeria, and finally the revolution in Yemen had provided Soviet diplomacy with points of entry into the Arab world other than that through Egypt. It was still Egypt, or the United Arab Republic as we must call it from 1958 onwards, that constituted the centrepiece of Soviet Russia's grand design in the Middle East. The supply of arms. which had started in 1955 and which was followed in due course by military advisers and technical instructors in increasing numbers, was the first effective bond between the two countries. It was preceded by a western refusal to supply the quantities of material the Egyptians were seeking. In the same way the withdrawal by the western powers of their support for the Assuan Dam not only precipitated the Suez crisis but also opened the door to the second major Soviet undertaking in Egypt - the design and construction of the High Dam with its power station, transmission lines and other ancillary works. This impressive monument to Russo-Egyptian collaboration was formally inaugurated by President Nasser and Mr. Kruchchev in May, 1964. work is almost finished, and Soviet technicians are playing a similar part in the expansion of Egypt's iron and steel industry and in other projects. Egypt has acquired a new function as the show-window of Soviet aid for developing economies.

After and partly as a consequence of the events of 1956, therefore, the political orientation of large parts of the Arab world was transformed. Conditions were created in which the freedom of transit through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles which the Russian fleet enjoyed under the existing régime of the Straits could be exploited with important political effects. Harbours in Syria, the United Arab Republic and Algeria were open to Soviet warships and provided the facilities they required. The Soviet fleet which is now maintained in the Mediterranean is no match for the American Sixth Fleet, but its presence has an undoubted nullifying effect on the latter's influence. It is very doubtful for instance whether the

American and British Governments would again contemplate the kind of military action they took in the Lebanon and Jordan in July 1958.

In contrast with the forward policy of the Soviet Union, the United States Government, increasingly absorbed by the conflict in Vietnam and no doubt disillusioned by the meagre return from past efforts in the Middle East, had ceased to take initiatives in that area and was apparently hoping that the situation could be held in some sort of equilibrium for a few years.

The upshot of these changes was that, in the crisis of 1967, the Soviet Union had as much to lose as the United States and was presented with equally complex choices. (It was symptomatic of the transformation which had taken place over the eleven years between the two crises that this time it was the Russians who brushed aside a proposal, made by the French and acceptable to the Americans, for four-power consultations at the end of May, 1967.)

Both super-powers tried to avert the hostilities towards which the Israelis and the Arabs were by that time plainly heading. The Americans concentrated on President Nasser's blockade of the Gulf of Agaba, but were unable to deal with this problem effectively in time to influence the Israeli regulion to The Russians apparently urged President Nasser not to initiate hostilities, and perhaps played a part in determining the way in which the war actually began. It is generally thought that they over-estimated the capacity of the Americans to exercise a parallel restraint on Israel, and so misled the Egyptians into under-estimating the risk of an Israeli attack. I doubt if this is the whole story, since it does not account for the transfer of the Soviet Ambassador from Cairo three months after the June War. But it is certain that the outbreak of war was a disaster for the Soviet Government, and they must have tried to prevent it.

When the fighting began, the first thought in Moscow and Washington was to avoid any risk that one super-power might take action requiring a hostile response from the other and thus beginning a slide towards involvement; assurances were exchanged that there would be no intervention from one side if there was none from the other.

There was thus parallel, though not concerted, action to prevent the outbreak of war, and agreement not to become involved in it. Thirdly, on the 22nd of November, both the American and the boviet representative in the Security Council cast positive votes for a British resolution which aimed in essence at the restoration of the territories conquered by Israel, coupled with the acceptance by the Arabs of Israel's existence as a sovereign state entitled to live in peace. In other words, both powers were backing the effort to reach, through the United Nations, a lasting political settlement.

Throughout 1968 this effort was pursued, primarily by Dr. Gunrar Jarring as special representative of the Secretary General, without noticeable progress and without any major supporting action by the Powers. They were in fact tending to revert to their pre-war role as advocates of the Arab and the Israeli case respectively, in the new context provided by the conflicting interpretations put upon the November resolution by the two parties. It was not until the end of the year that the Soviet Union circulated to the American, French and British Governments draft proposals for putting the resolution into effect. More or less simultaneously the French suggestion for four-power consultation was renewed, and talks began in New York. Inevitably, the four-power meetings were before long supplemented by bilateral Russo-American conversations.

This the position today. Does it justify the title which Mr. Walter Laqueur has given to a chapter of his book on the six-day war: "The Impotence of Power"?

It is not uncommon, in relationships between a powerful State and a small one, for the junior partner to extract the greater advantage from the association, or at least to oblige the senior partner to pay a higher price for its participation than was originally foreseen. This is conspicuously the case in the two partnerships we are looking at here. If the Soviet Union were to decide that its first priority was an agreement with the United States, and consequently to work for a compromise of a kind which involved jettisoning major Arab objectives, its interests in the Middle East would be gravely jeopardised. A refusal by the Arabs to comply would not leave them in a diplomatic cul de sac. It would take time to mend their

relations with the West, but there is no insuperable obstacle to this. And if a move in this direction was thought unlikely to be too unpopular, there is always the Chinese card to play. Israel does not have the same freedom of manocuvre, but also does not need it. The difficulty the U.S. Government would run into, if it worked for a solution unacceptable to Israel, would involve not diplomatic but internal political consequences. It is true, as many Arabs say, that the United States has massive means of pressure on Israel; but it is also true (as they do not always forget) that Israel also has well organised means of pressure on any American Administration. There is here a balance of power of an unusual kind.

In short, good relations with certain Arab countries have become a major Soviet interest. Good relations with Israel, while not an important American interest in terms of <u>realpolitik</u>, are domestically indispensable. There are thus severe limits to the flexibility which the two super-Powers are able to display in their search for a solution.

There are certain possibilities, at least in theory, which might soften this harsh outline. If the super-Powers were engaged in a promising negotiation on strategic arms limitation, and if they were also able to envisage a mutually satisfactory end to the war in Vietnam, the incentive to agree on the termsof an Arab-Israeli settlement would be immensely strengthened. And in these circumstances the presence of France and Britain at the negotiating table would become a factor of greater importance than it is today. They have little capacity to promote a settlement if the super-Powers have not decided to give a high priority to its conclusion; but if once that decision were taken in Washington and Moscow they could do much to facilitate agreement and to provide a justification of its terms which the clients of the super-Powers could be asked to accept.

It would be unrealistic to imagine that the four Powers, if they were to agree on the means of giving effect to the resolution of November 1967, and embodied their agreement in a further resolution of the Security Council, would then be prepared to impose it by force on the parties. On the other hand the parties would probably decide that their advantage lay in accepting the unanimous judgement of the Powers.

There is some evidence for this assertion in the decisive part played by maerican pressure in bringing about the withdrawal of Israeli forces from sinai and Gaza in the winter of 1956-57. It is true that on that occasion the problem faced by the United States was not complicated by any significant divergence between American and Russian policies; a situation in which the United States is regarded as the champion of Israeli interests is rather different. Mevertheless, if we assume that an agreement had been reached with the Russians, and that the Russians were putting similar pressure on the Arab States, it seems probable that Israel would finally accept the proposed settlement. And there are two good reasons for supposing that the arabs would similarly acquiesce. First, it must be presumed that any agreement reached by the two or the four Fowers would be based on the November resolution and would therefore in its visible outcome be substantially in favour of the Arabs (the gains of Israel being, though important, less tangible). And secondly, the relationship of Arab Governments to Arab public opinion is such that concessions which they (or some of them) would not be unwilling to make would be impossible without the excuse of strong external pressure in which the Soviet Union was partic-If the pressures were exerted, and especially if the Powers were also prepared to accept some responsibility for the future maintenance of the settlement, I believe it could be brought about.

The solution of this problem, therefore, does not appear to be intrinsically beyond the capacity of the major Powers acting in combination. What is in doubt is their will to act together in an area where their interests are discordant and their fears of one another acute. The steps taken hitherto in Moscow and Washington indicate that both Governments are anxious to limit their own involvement. Beyond that, there is some doubt as to whether the Russians are as concerned as the Americans are to promote stability in the area. So far as relations between Israel and the United arab Republic are concerned, the aims of the two super-Powers are probably not far apart, the very much stronger desire of the Russians to bring about the re-opening of the Suez Canal counter-balancing their smaller interest in peaceful Arab-Israeli relations. But in general they have to

strike a balance between the advantage of maintaining tensions which work against the interests of the Western Powers on the one hand, and on the other the risk that these tensions will result in a repetition of the dilemma in which the Soviet Union found itself in June, 1967. These uncertainties about long-term Soviet intentions must be an important negative factor in the current negotiations.

If there is no settlement - and this seems increasingly likely - both super-Powers will face certain disagreeable consequences: the Americans the continuing erosion of their influence in Arab countries; and the Russians the physical difficulty of access to South Arabia and the Gulf, where the latest phase of the British withdrawal is creating new problems, dangers and opportunities.

Whether there is a settlement of this problem or not, the area will not again become a Western preserve but equally will not become a Soviet preserve. Only three weeks ago the revolution in Libya seemed likely to result in a further diminution of Western influence, though not necessarily an increase in Soviet influence. For some time to come the two great Powers are likely to remain in what has been aptly described as a "limited adversary relationship", each advancing its interests as opportunity offers while avoiding actions which might precipitate a direct confrontation. This is a framework within which the regional Governments will retain a considerable freedom of action, limited however by the knowledge that in certain not precisely calculable contingencies the great Powers will give priority to the requirements of their own bilateral relationship over their regional associations and commitments.

### INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 11th ANNUAL CONFERENCE .

# THE SUPER POWERS SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

COMMITTEE: 1V

Fuday 197h.

Innovation and Restraint
DR. CHARLES HERZFELD

#### 1. THE PROBLEM

One of the most important and most difficult questions of modern times is the following: Is innovation good or bad, helpful or dangerous? This question arises in almost every walk of life and it is, of course, not a new question. It arises forcibly whenever widely different cultures interact. The question is particularly important in the context of foreign and military policy, arms control, and defense. The usual tendency is to state the answer in extremes, to say that innovation is dangerous and always bad, or else to say the opposite, that innovation is essential and always good. Real life however seems to be more complicated, and it seems to me that one has to look at concrete problems and concrete examples to be able to give reasonable answers to the question.

In this paper I will try to analyze several types of innovation, look at several types of restraint and see how these two interact. The interaction will be shown to be largely determined by our view about the world we live in-

The subject is a rather concrete one and we must constantly try to give defense and ballistic missile examples. I will occasionally give examples from the fields of pallistic missile / offense, but these are by no means the only areas where this problem arises.

The basic question is this: Can one control the forces generated by research and development? I believe one can by: a) understanding innovation and R&D, by b) understanding restraint and its uses and dangers, and c) by having a policy which makes <u>innovation help restraint</u>. However, I believe the greatest need is for a calm overall perspective. This is not a doomsday problem and extravigant rhetoric does not help. But neither is it an easy problem to solve. It needs careful thought and hard work, including meaningful dialogue between the major actors on the international scene.

Naturally, we are speaking in the context of this Conference, the "Super Powers", the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. We shall see later that our problem cannot be discussed adequately in this bi-polar context, and that other, so-called

3rd countries need to be considered. These might be Britain, Communist China, or Japan, or France, and so on. I will, of course, discuss the problem from an American point of view. This may appear to some to be too biased and narrow, though I have striven seriously to be objective.

#### 11. INNOVATION

There are two broad classes of innovation which we must consider. One is usually called R&D (research and development), the other involves innovation in policy, in strategy and in military doctrine. Both types are equally important, though it is more fashionable to talk about R&D than about the other. I will follow this fashion to some extent, because I have thought more about R&D and its impact, but will not limit myself to it. At any rate I give you this warning early on.

- 1. Let us first look at R&D. It is useful to distinguish several kinds of R&D to avoid confusion in our considerations. In addition, it is useful to get a feeling for the variety of activities through which innovation has an impact on our subject. ( I will use here the different categories for R&D used by the US Department of Defense. This a useful though not unique breakdown, but it clarifies the point well enough.) I will also attempt to give examples of the sort which are relevant to our problem of innovation and restraint, but many other examples could easily be given.
- A) Research/is an attempt to look for new basic phenomena or for new understanding, where the motivation is this new knowledge. Thus, one might study the physics of lasers (a new and exciting way of generating intense beams of radiation, which promises to change our understanding of many details of the properties of matter).
- B) Exploratory Development. This is an activity where one looks primaridy for useful effects or for interesting engineering techniques. An example would be the study of the physics of the entry of very fast objects into the atmosphere. One might/to study this because one wants to return astronauts from the moon, or else because one wants to build an ABM system, or because one wants to find a way to penetrate someone else's ABM system with missiles.
- C) Advanced Development. In this phase of development one wishes to achieve the ability to do pratical things, such as the ability to distinguish incoming missiles from decoys and other objects, in the case of ABM, or to learn how to build high powered lasers for some pratical applications.
- D) Engineering Development. This consists of building and testing prototypes of hardware such as radars, interceptor aircraft, tanks, etc. The motivation is to test the hardware so that, if it passes the tests, one could go into production with it.

E) Test and Evaluation. One must make sure that operational hardware works the way it is supposed to. Testing activities designed to insure this come under this activity. It is an important and often difficult activity, and it is essential to achieve a proven operational capability. Because of this, it may be important in arms control considerations.

One can define additional types of R&D, but I believe that for our purposes the above distinct types describe the spectrum of R&D well enough.

2. Policy, Strategy and Doctrine. One way to look at innovation in this area is to ask whether the change comes from a new viewpoint, or from new requirements, or from new jobs to be done. (Often these so-called new viewpoints turn out to be re-incarnations of tested and venerable ideas.)

For example, the policy (or strategy) of "controlled response", when it was proposed in 1960 had a distinctive new ring to it, yet, I suppose, it was really rather an old policy which found its time of applicability again. It was proposed to achieve the capability to answer small threats with small responses, and bigger threats with bigger responses, and so on, rather than to have to threaten nuclear war in the face of any danger or provocation, no matter how large or small. Related to this strategy is the notion of non-nuclear options, namely the ability to do a military job, perhaps even a large one, using only non-nuclear armaments.

Another example: In recent years it has been fashionable, at least in the United States, to argue that only strategic offensive weapons were "good" and contributed to stability and world safety, that all defensive weapons would undermine the certainty of the deterrent, and therefore were threats to safety. (This of course, is one of the arguments which has been used extensively against any ABM deployment.) There is however, a new (or very old) notion coming to the fore which says that perhaps a rather large amount of defense makes sense, and that one really ought to try to limit damage if one possibly could. What is involved here, of course, is a challenge to the deterrence model of stability, about which more below.

Still another notion, again not altogether new, is being proposed, at least in the United States, with some degree of seriousness by a few students of our subject, and that is the notion that the United States might well consider the posture of launching its ballistic missiles merely on the basis of warning of an enemy attack. I give this example not because I think that it is particularly sensible, but principally to show the range of possible "innovations". (In point of fact, I can hardly think of a more destabilizing and dangerous posture than this.)

Innovation also arises when new jobs are either recognized or accepted as having to be done. Among these might be the following: One may wish to design a defensive system which provides a defense only against one possible

enemy but not against another. A concrete example of such a system would be a so-called thin area ABM ("thin" because it provides protection only against relatively few missiles, and "area", because it provides protection for practically the whole country though it is based in relatively few points in the country), which is designed to absorb an attack by Communist China but to fail under an attack by the Soviet Union.

3. There is another type of innovation, which one should perhaps call accidental innovation, at least it is accidental from the point of view of our study. We are talking here about innovations which have principally a civilian goal or which had an important civilian phase, but which have now some military impact which was not originally recognised. Again, it is easy to give examples. Consider for example the super tanker. This development was started principally to lower the cost of transporting petroleum and its product, but has since been so successful that it may have made the strategic question of the Suez Canal irrelevant, or at least relatively unimportant.

Another example is the electronic computer. This was developed initially for a military application ( the calculation of the trajectories of shells of large guns ) in World War II. After this, the electronic computer was essentially taken over by the civilian economy, at least in the United States. We find now however, that electronic computers have a large military impact, much greater than anyone would have guessed either in 1945, or even in 1955.

Another interesting example of such interwoven motivations is the jet transport. This began in the United States as a military product, a tanker by re-fuelling the bombers aircraft designed to extend the range of bombers/in the air (the KCl35). Fundamentally the same type of aircraft (the 707) became a great commercial success and within a decade it and other transports of the same type had revolutionized civilian air transport. The new generation of super jet transports such as the Boeing 747 and Lockheed C-5 which are just coming into test programs (not the supersonic aircraft but the very large subsonic jets) will undoubtedly have very major strategic implications because of the possibility they will afford to move large numbers of troops, with their equipment, over very large distances.

This interaction of civil motivation and military pay-off, or the reverse, military motivation and civilian pay-off, is at the very heart of our subject.

4. It may be useful to list here rather briefly some of the forces which put pressure on decision makers either in favour of innovation or opposed to it.

Among the pressures for innovation, one of the most important is the desire for individual or national prestige. Every program manager of a development program, every national leader, would like "his" team to come

up with the most fancy and sophisticated solution that is feasible. The inherent drive toward sophistication in gadgets, whether this sophistication is needed or not, seeme nearly universal and nearly overwhelming. In the United States we call this disease (to which we are very prone) "gold plating". Large amounts of time and money, and what is most important, creative human labor are spent on totally un-needed and perhaps even harmful complications of technical products. Only the most severe discipline avoiding anything that is not absolutely required can counter this trend.

Another pressure for innovation is surely the fear of uncertainty, and the fear that the "enemy" is "getting ahead". The reasonable desire to stay even, coupled with serious uncertainty, may sometimes cause us to race our own shadows, to keep up with an imagined capability or intention of the other side. It must however be said that the lack of information, which is often the consequence of deliberate government policy, aggravates this problem.

Another reason and perhaps the most healthy reason for innovation is that some types of restraint require innovation. This is most important, and I will return to this subject later.

It is part of the conventional wisdom of today to say that business interests generate pressure for military innovation, for business reasons and regardless of the good of society. I rather discount this reason, because defense business, at least in the United States, is, on the average, never as profitable as doing business in the civilian sector.

The pressures against innovation are also important. Pressures against innovation will be discussed under the heading of restraint in the next section, but let us list some of them here. Foremost I would say is the desire for economy. Another important pressure is the fear of getting into a qualitative arms race. A third pressure is the vague fear that it would be "too horrible" to develop such and such a device or system. And finally, we must face up to the fact that plain lack of imagination often inhibits innovation, sometimes when this innovation is badly needed.

#### 111. SEVERAL TYPES OF RESTRAINTS

We shall examine in this section several ways in which restraint can be practised. All of them are important for our subject. We shall also examine some of the common pressures for or against restraint.

1. A common and indeed a crucial type of restraint has to do with the <u>developing</u> of a particular military system. When restraint is exercised, and the system is not developed, there are usually several reasons at work. One of these, almost always, is economy. It is often said that military programs have no financial problems, but only by those who have never had to find the funds for such programs. The effect of budget limitations is very considerable (as it should be), and forces, in a well managed defense establishment, the making of serious croices about the development of major systems.

Another reason why a particular system might not be developed can be the conviction that it is undesireble to start a major competition or arms race with another country in this area. In the United States the decision was made some time ago not to develop nuclear weapons of very large yield (say of 50 or 100 megatons). This decision was taken, I believe, in large measure, because it was thought pointless and perhaps positively harmful to start a competition in very large yield weapons.

Finally, there is always the vague fear, particularly with radically new systems, that to develop them will "open Pandora's box", that one never knows exactly or completely what may come out of a major breakthrough, and it naturally more comfortable to stay with the known.

2. Restraint can be exercised in deciding whether to deploy a particular military system. Again, one of the overriding and common reasons for this restraint is economy. In modern defense management this takes often the form of a low estimate of effectiveness for the cost; i.e., a judgement that a particular system is an inefficient one which costs a lot to achieve a given task, or which achieves too little for the cost. This was surely one of the reasons why the Nike Zeus ABM of 1958 - 1962 was not deployed and why the Nike X, the large, heavy, city defense ABM of 1962 - 1967 was not deployed. It also played a role in the decision not to deploy the B-70, a large supersonic bomber. The kind of economic analysis which yields a judgement about "cost effectiveness", or the effectiveness for a given cost, is often called systems analysis, particularly in the United States. The systematic introduction of this type of analysis into the making of deployment decisions was one of Robert McNamara's great contributions to the management of the U.S. defense establishment. Critics of this approach have claimed (and occasionally perhaps with justification) that systems analysis was sometimes used only to justify decisions made on other grounds. Such critics also expected that "Systems Analysis" would disappear from the Defense Department at the recent of administrations. This has, of course, not happened, nor could/reasonably have been expected to happen. Systems analysis is here to stay because it is not only useful but essential. The faces may change, the name may change, even the way in which systems analysis is used in decision making may change, but I do not believe that we will ever go back to intuition unaided by an economic type of analysis.

Another reason why restraint is practised is to avoid getting into an arms race, that is to carry out a policy of arms control. This happens more most often than people realize, at least in a tacit way and without any fanfare or publicity. We all hope, however, that we are rapidly approaching an era where this kind of restraint can be carried out under mutually satisfactory explicit agreements. Again we find restraint when one country limits the supplies of a military item desired by one of its allies. Sometimes this is done in an attempt to limit the chance of the outbreak of a major war in some area of the world. Examples of this abound; limitations on armaments being exported from the U.S.S.R. to Egypt, or from the United States to Pakistan or India, come to mind.

3. The third and most important kind of restraint arises from deliberate policies or strategic decisions. A very important example is the proposal by Mr. McNamara of 1962 to persuade all parties concerned, (particularly the Soviet Union), that it would make sense for all nuclear powers to avoid striking at civilian targets, i.e., cities, should they find themselves in a nuclear war. The fact that the proposal has not been universally understood or accepted does not detract from its great significance. It may become a viable policy in future years.

Another, very pratical, task for the serious military planner is to solve military problems arising from the need to take care of a threat from "third countries" without aggravating the relations with the "second country". A very concrete and important example is the need, strongly felt by some in the United States, to build a thin area ABM system which would protect the United States in the middle and late 1970s from an ICBM attack from Communist China. At the same time one should design this defense in such a way that it can not be interpreted by the Soviet Union as being directed against them. I believe the problem is soluble in ways which I have pointed out elsewhere. ( I would think that the Soviet Union is confronted by exactly the same military planning problem; i.e., to build a defense against a possible Chinese attack, but in such a way that it could not be interpreted in the United States as an "anti-U.S. move".)

. 4. Last, but not least, we must mention the important category of restraints in readiness posture. These restraints have to do with such things as the standing down of troop formations from a high readiness posture, the absence of airborne bomber alert formations, etc. This is a large topic, important for crisis control, but somewhat off the target for our paper.

Let me turn now to the pressures against restraint. Some we have discussed above under innovation. Let us repeat them briefly here. They are fear of the "enemy", fear of uncertainty concerning the other side's capabilities and

intentions, and broadly speaking, the inventive spirit, pushed along by the "gold-plating" habit.

6. The pressures for restmaint are primarily the desire for economy, the desire to do arms control, and vague, often simplistic, misgivings about lack of restraint.

briefly

We need to examine here why one would seriously wish to do arms control. The principal reasons are:

- (1) To make war less likely.
- (2) To make war less damaging if it occurs, and
- (3) To reduce the burdens of the arms race.

I believe there is general agreement that points (1) and (3) are essential goals of an arms control policy. There is, however, considerable disagreement about point (2). The notion is not shared universally that it is desirable to make war less damaging if it occurs. Some say that war must be made so horrible that it simply cannot occur. This kind of approach leads to a policy which depends only on deterrence, and where everyone is a hostage to everyone else. It has the grave danger that it leads to a situation which is extremely vulnerable to accidents or to the actions of minor mischief makers. On the other hand if it is deemed to be useful and important to make war less damaging if it occurs, then a posture of pure deterrence or of pure exchange of mutual hostages is inadequate. In that case, at least some types of active defenses and of civil defense become important.

#### IV. OUR VIEW OF THE WORLD AND RESTRAINT

1. Before we can make a meaningful connection between innovation and restraint, that is, before we can decide which of these forces deserves support and which of them needs to be checked we must make up our minds about the nature of the world we live in. To decide what restraint means in concrete circumstances one needs a model or a theory of the concrete situation. It is quite obvious that one gets widely differing descriptions of restraint (living in a world which is largely dominated by two major powers) if one thinks that the "other" is basically hostile, or if one thinks that the "other" is basically friendly, or third, if one thinks that both are potentially partly hostile and partly friendly, depending on the detailed circumstances and the detailed issues.

In the first case one is led to a simple policy of "arm as fast as you can", in other words of trying to run the arms race as rapidly and efficiently as possible. Restraint would be difficult to define seriously here. In the second kind of world one is led to a rather straightforward disarmament policy where the biggest premium is getting rid of as rapidly as possible. The

third case is, in my view, the most realistic and the most important one. It will lead to a relatively complex, gradually evolving policy of restraint which is bound to be mixed with real intransigence on certain key matters. Such a policy is not easy to develop, is not easy to explain, but is rather easy to attack from either of the two extremes that say you are going too slow, or you are going too fast. In a sense such a policy is like a work of art which is vulnerable to misunderstanding and attack by critics who are uninformed or have poor taste.

Once one is clear about the world in which we live one can then the meaning of concretely. Aiter some grappling with definitions it has proceed to interpret/restraint/to mean approximately the same as prodence traint does in classical philosophy; i.e., the proper, that is, moral, humane, efficient choice of means to achieve one's objective. This objective should be, in my view, to move gradually toward a world in which arms control, both formal and tacit, is a living reality, and to do so without sacrificing the essential ability of the U.S. to deal with the external threats to which it is exposed. The detailed description of such a policy does not belong in this paper. It is important to remember that prudence and, hence restraint, is not only a matter of "dont's" but also of "do's". It must be construed as an active policy.

2. Next we must address the question of the stability of the strategic balance and the stability of the arms race, and we must understand how this stability, such as it is, can be upset by innovation.

First let us ask what we mean by stability of the strategic situation. This is a complex question which has often been confused by lack od accuracy in statements both by students of the subject and by political leaders. The common understanding of the term strategic stability is that neither has a first strike capability. By this is meant that neither side side/can reliably disarm the other by striking all-out first. It is very likely that at this time and also in the foreseeable future no country has a genuine reliable first strike capability as defined above. In that sense the present situation is stable. But there is another type of stability which is important, perhaps more important than the type just mentioned. One must go on to ask oneself whether there exists a first strike bonus for either side. A first strike/is defined as follows: If one of two adversaries is sure that war will come, and that if war comes he will suffer greatly, and if he believes that if he strikes first he will suffer much less than if he did not, then there is a great incentive for him to strike first. He will be better off striking first than second. (Remember we are assuming that he is sure that war will break out). First strike bonus is the lessening of his losses if he strikes first. A large bonus will increase the temptation or pressure to strike first, and thus will make war more likely. There is an important example of this kind of bonus to be seen at the outbreak of World War 1. At that time most large military powers on the European continent were sure

that by mobilizing first they would have great local advantages of strength. When some of them were sure that war was bound to come they took this bonus, thus accelerating the coming of World War 1 very greatly. Now it is possible that both the Soviet Union and the USA have some measure of first strike bonus as explained above; i.e., might "be better off" striking first, if they were sure that war would break out. This is dangerous, because if either of these two countries was convinced that war was inevitable, they might believe it to be in their interest to strike first and thus make sure that war came. In this sense the strategic balance is not as stable as it might be. A very important goal of any sensible arms control effort must be to reduce the first strike bonus as soon as possible and in as symmetric a way (that is, equally for both sides) as possible.

Next, let us look at the stability of the arms race. A useful definition of stability of an arms race would be that the military postures of both sides change slowly enough that neither side can increase its first strike bonus in a major way or very suddenly. On both sides innovation goes on and some force increases or improvements go on. This changes the balance. As long as there are significant changes on one side, the other side can be expected to try to keep up with them. It is, however, important for stability that both sides' changes be made in such a way that they do not provide either side with a large first strike bonus. An important contemporary example of this process is the following: If the Soviet Union continues its deployment of its SS-9 missile, and if it takes advantage of the improvements in multiple warhead technology which seem readily at hand, then the United States must hedge in some way against the threatened imbalance. The United States has chosen to do this by defending its Minuteman Missile system by a so-called hard point defense AEM, rather than by adding to the number of deployed Minuteman missiles.

Let us ask again how stable is the strategic balance, how stable is the arms race? Clearly one might get three types of answers. The situation might either seem completely static, or it might seem totally uncontrolled and unbounded, or one might come to the conclusion that the race is moving slowly and that the strategic balance is fairly stable. Depending on the judgment one makes here one will come out again with different policy choices. Again, in my view, the third alternative describes present reality best.

In the evaluation of this question there enter a large number of uncertainties. The planners on each side must make such an evaluation on the basis of incomplete information. First of all, it is surprisingly difficult to find out where one's own side stands with any great accuracy, simply because there is so much that needs to be considered and because there are so many intricate relations between different aspects of a modern military

posture. But is certainly much more difficult to understand what the other side is doing and what its posture is. I think that both sides know a good deal about the other, but there exists an important asymmetry between the United States and the Soviet Union. In general it is much easier to find out what goes on in military matters in the U.S. than it is to find out what goes on in the Soviet Union. There are many military developments in the Soviet Union which are not well known or well understood, or whose meaning is not clear to foreign observers. In addition, policy is made and argued largely in public in the United States. Various power groups emerge quite openly, and positions are freely debated in public and reasonably well reported in the press. As a consequence it is relatively easy to find out what the basis for an American military decision. The recent ABM debate is an important example. Literally thousands of pages of testimony before Congress by various experts within and without the Government were made available to the public. This is as it should be, at least from the point of view of a free society, but it is clear that it gives a less open society an important advantage. Most of this type of debate (which undoubtedly also goes on in the Soviet Union) is hidden from western observers, and therefore our understanding of what goes on in the Soviet Union is often uncertain. This kind of uncertainty does affect stability; lack of information makes for lower stability. (Secrecy can hide weakness, and this may have been important in the past. In an era of approximate parity in strength this motivation for extreme secrecy no longer makes sense.)

Let me end this part of the discussion by raising the moral dimension. Prudence is one of the virtues recognized a long time ago. Restraint in our field of endeavor is surely also a virtue. We know of the long history in Vestern culture to try to make war more humane by attempting concrete limitations on warfare, such as the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. This effort had only mixed success, and it sometimes failed miserably, but surely it also reduced real suffering in history. Today some consider the effort to make war more humane if possible, an absurd enterprise. In fact some would like to make war more terrible in order to make it less likely. A proper treatment of this aspect of the problem of restraint would take us too far afield for this paper, but the subject deserves serious attention.

### V. SOME REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTRAINT

1. It is very important to be clear that restraint (as well as arms control, which is so closely related to restraint) is not primarily a matter of trust or of faith. Many public and private discussions of this subject are confused by lack of attention to this point. If we look back at the question, what kind of world do we live in?; and also at my personal answer - that it is a world which is a mixture of cooperation and of conflict - then we must

say that trust and faith are limitaed to precisely the point that there are in fact some areas of common interest between the great powers today, and that their interaction is not a matter of conflict alone.

It is much more fruitful, I am convinced, to agree that restraint as well as arms control can only function because there are some common interests which are deliberately shared between the great powers. Furthermore, one has to limit oneself to agreements (explicit or tacit) which do not force any of the great powers to surrender matters really considered essential by them.

Next, it is clear that whatever agreements are made must be subject to a reasonable amount of verification, primarily verification by national means only. (It is important to realize here that interesting verification schemes are perhaps possible which go beyond unilateral national means but stop chort of the fully intrusive kind of inspection. Such schemes involve the so-called "black boxes" which have sometimes been discussed in the context of nuclear test ban treaties. The same techniques are perhaps applicable to other areas.) Finally each participant in a major arms control agreement will wish quite naturally to protect himself against evasions or sudden abrogation by the of various sort. This program of safeguards other side, by carrying out a program of safeguards/should be an explicit or implicit part of the agreement.

An instructive example of these conditions is the nuclear test ban treaty of 1963, which forbids nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space and under water. This treaty came about because the signatories shared an interest to eliminate testing in the three forbidden media, and because none of the signatories thought that they were giving up a capability essential to their national survival. The treaty is rather well policed by reasonable verification methods depending on national means, and the United States at least, has taken a number of protective steps, fully consonant with the treaty, to reduce the consequences of abrogation by anyone else. I am convinced that further progress in arms control, and in restraint, will depend on careful attention being given to the features of successful agreements.

2. Restraint is no longer a bi-polar problem, if it ever was such. Restraint is easier in bi-polar world, because there the uncertainties are fewer and perhaps less important. But if the world is a multi-polar one, and particularly if more than two countries have significant nuclear stock piles (this includes surely Great Britain, France and Communist China) then one must be much more careful about the impact of alliances, and of mischief makers being able to catalyze moves by the two super powers in the direction of conflict. I would conjecture that a multi-polar world becomes more like the old world of power politics in this particular sense.

I predict that in a multi-polar world we will find more and more that the

weapons systems of super powers will be tailored more explicitly to achieve missions against either the super power or against a "third" country but not both. I have already given the example of the thin area ABM, which should be useless against a super power but effective against third countries. Other examples come to mind, such as old ICBM's with large yield and low accuracy, which are probably useless in a war with Communist China because their only function is to attack cities, and perhaps not enough Chinese live in large cities that their deaths would decide a war.

3. Restraint in a tactical sense requires also a number of things such as a survivable command and control system, the hardening of missile silos to reduce effects of an enemy first strike, the ability to retarget one's missiles from one set of targets to another, perhaps hard point deferse ABM to protect missile silos, and perhaps thin area ABM to be able to ride out small attacks.

Restraint also requires good intelligence and accurate warning of the beginning of an attack. To be able to behave in a restrained way a super power needs to know accurately who is attacking whom as early in the attack phase as possible, and it needs to be able to tell that its own cities are not under attack if it is to be willing to avoid attacking the opponent's cities. Thus we see that accurate early warning is an important requirement of restraint that needs considerable innovation to make the restraints just cited fully practicable.

Another requirement for restraint during peace time is adequate intelligence, adequate information about the way other powers are behaving in the arms race. Here is a clear case where improved intelligence makes for stability in the arms race, and in fact is necessary to run the arms race slowly; i.e., with restraint.

4. Restraint requires some innovations, and I have indicated some of the areas above where better understanding is needed. Another area where better understanding is needed to make restarint possible is in the area of human behavior: We need better answers to such questions as: What is the meaning of deterrence? Is "assured destruction" an essential factor

of deterrence? How do different countries with different cultures look at war and deterrence? How do they behave at different levels of stress? Is uncertainty or certainty better for stability? These are difficult problems and admit of no easy solutions, but any improvement in the reliability of the answers will make restraint easier.

5. I would like now to give three current examples where technological advances have involved some restraint. Let us first discuss MIRV (Multiple Individually-targetable Independently/Re-entry Vehicles). The U.S. is developing MIRV and will in all liklihood deploy them to some extent. The U.S.S.R. is testing something

like MIRV and presumably will deploy them. The danger of MIRV is that it could look as if its owner wants to get a first strike capacity, and some analysts have used MIRV as a prime example of innovation that is "bad" and dangerous. The full controversy is more complicated, and somewhat off our subject. I would like to point out, however, some of the elements of restraint in the American plans for MIRV. First of all it is planned that not all Minuteman missiles are to be converted to MIRV, and not all Polaris submarines are to be converted to MIRV. Thus we have a quantitive restraint of considerable proportion. In addition, the U.S. MIRV employs warheads of comparatively small yields and of reasonably high accuracy. This would make restraint in war fighting feasible. It would allow the destruction of military targets with a minimum of collateral damage to civilian areas, and hence would make possible the avoidance of large fatalities.

Another prominent example of recent technological advances is ABM. The U.S. has decided to proceed with an ABM system that has three functions:

1) To protect the Minuteman missile silos against attacks. This is to be achieved by a hard point defense. 2) To provide a thin cover for all of the U.S. against a missile attack by Communist China (or other third countries), and 3) To reduce the importance of accidental launches of ICBM's at the U.S. The first mission exhibits restraint of a very important kind. It would probably have been faster and cheaper to increase the number of surviving Minuteman missiles under a heavy Soviet attack by adding more Minuteman missiles in new silos. It has however been fairly generally agreed that the same objective can be achieved in a less threatening and more peaceful way by active defense (ABM) rather than by proliferating Minuteman.

The second and third missions involve restraint in the thickness with which the ABM is deployed; i.e., the number of radars and missiles deployed. This thickness is adjusted to be effective only against attack by a third power, or accidental launches of a few missiles.

#### V1. THE FUTURE

- l. Restraint in the arms race will happen, I am reasonably sure of that. There are lots of pressures for restraint operating on the large powers. The U.S. certainly wishes to restrain the arms race and has taken important steps in that direction. The Soviet Union has clearly announced that it wishes to restrain the arms race, though it seems to me that it must show more clearly what it intends to do. The forthcoming arms limitation talks will indicate the intent of the super powers more clearly. I believe that the super powers want restraint; I do not believe that either of them wishes to go to war with the other, though lesser conflicts between them may remain unresolved. Another powerful motivation operating surely on both sides, is the need for economy and the increased priority given to the well-being of the citizens of each country.
- 2. The most important need for the future is perhaps a clearer perspective. We must be clearer about our own views of what kind of world we live in, and about the dynamics of the arms race. We must be realistic about the problems ahead and deal with them as concrete issues rather than look for a magical solution.
- 3. Lastly and most importantly there are requirements for action. The super powers must get together and discuss possible arms limitations seriously. They must start a constructive dialogue about arms limitation, its reasons and its pitfalls. At the same time we must expect both super powers to take steps which they consider essential to protect their populations and to protect their deterrent forces.

We must learn to live with dynamic stability. This is analogous to living with evolution. In both, we must learn to solve the short range problems in such a way as to affect the long range prospects in ways which are desireable and in ways which reduce risks.

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Parity, Superiority or Sufficiency? Some Remarks on the Nature and Future of the Soviet-American Strategic Relationship.

by Johan Jörgen Holst

#### The Policy Context

The policy issues associated with strategic weapons procurement are once again receiving a substantial amount of public and expert attention. So many of the stability issues which we apparently had solved, at least in the intellectual sense, and which Mr. McNamara converted into programs and policy in Washington while the policy-makers in Moscow watched and, so we were hoping, learnt their "lesson", are with us again. The technology is changing and the complexities are compounding. We have had a painful reminder that the task of providing deterrence and insuring against preemptive instabilities is a permanent task. Periods of stability will be succeeded by periods of uncertainty where adjustments and rethinking are required.

The great debate in the United States over the ballistic missile defense (BMD) deployment decisions have demonstrated amply if we were in need of proof, how conventional wisdom and the truth of yesterday can become the intellectual straitjackets of today. Untested theories about defense-offense arms race interactions have been pronounced as high-confidence predictions. The alleged concerns of the Russians have been advanced with fervor by the American opponents of BMD while the Russians themselves said or did nothing which could indicate that they were about to change their minds about their long-standing preference for a strong defensive emphasis in their strategic posture. For many, BMD came to represent a symbolic evil which had to be resisted at any price even if the price included a launch-on-warning (LOW) policy to avoid a counterforce strike, or the multiplication of Minuteman, Polaris and Poseidon vehicles in order to guarantee the survival of a given second strike force. There were, of course, a great many reasonable arguments on both sides in the controversy to but the debate as a whole was frequently far from reasonable.

The most reasonable pro and con positions are presented in the following two volumes respectively: Johan Jörgen Holst & William Schneider Jr. (eds), Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy Pergamon Press, Elmsford, NY, 1969 and Abram Chayes & Jerome B. Wiesner (eds). ABM. An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System, Harper & Row, New York, 1969.

It would have been useful if the debate about BMD had provided an occasion for a reexamination of some of the basic assumptions of the theory of deterrence. That theory was, of course, developed during a period when there was no cost-effective alternative to an offensive emphasis. Thus we came to associate deterrence with sufficiency criteria like the notion of "assured destruction". It would not have been out-of-place had the emergence of reasonably cost-effective BMD options (over a significant spectrum of alternatives) led to some doctrinal reexamination. The intellectual resistance to this kind of exercise did, however, prove to be quite massive. 2) In the long run that kind of reexamination is probably inevitable and it is not too unlikely that the forthcoming Soviet-American strategic arms talks will provide the necessary incentives.

The focus of the present discussion will be on the structure of the problems which are associated with one of the three acronyms which presently top the arms control agenda, viz. SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) (The others are NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) and BFR (Balanced Force Reductions). It is quite clear that these talks, when they finally get under way, may very well become the most important exercise in arms management in the post-war era. There is a fairly wide consensus in regard to this evaluation. A similar consensus is not available in regard to the likely or desirable outcomes. The endpoints have, at least in the public discussion, been described in terms of ambiguous labels such as "superiority", "parity" or "sufficiency". It is clear that it is very hard to operationalize these overall designations in terms of hardware requirements and relative postures and capabilities. We cannot propose to present a set of calculations which will demonstrate the relative utilities of the three options. Let us, however, look at some of the objectives which the strategic postures may be designed to promote.

There are, it seems to us, four basic arms control objectives which ought to have some scaling impact on the composition and size of the strategic forces: I) Reduce the chance of war; II) Limit the scope and intensity of damage if war occurs; III) Facilitate a satisfactory war termination; and IV) Reduce the scope, costs and burdens of the arms race. The objective of reducing the chance of war includes the need to reduce the chance of war occurring as a result of accidents, misperceptions or misinterpretation. But it encompasses also the need to reduce the incentives for deliberate initiation of war by reducing the advantage of a first strike and minimizing the likelihood of large changes in the number of armaments. In this area we can settle nothing without extensive quantitative analysis of various first strike scenarios with reasonable input values for such parameters as missile accuracy, silo hardness, weapons yield, active defense effectiveness as well as the choice of tactics for the offence and the defense; such as shoot-look-shoot tactics, pin-down

2) For some "honourable" exceptions see the chapters by D.G. Brennan and Raymond D. Gastil in <u>Why ABM? op.cit.</u> and D.G. Brennan & Johan Jörgen Holst, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Two Views", <u>Adelphi Papers</u>, 43, 1967.

attacks, precurser attacks, preferential defense, etc.

Some people see the second objective as being in important ways inconsistent with the first which they deem more important. Thus many argued that BMD deployments were likely to decrease the inhibitions against going to war by making the outcome less ghastly. (They did argue at the same time, however, that the BMD systems "would not work"). There is very little chance that any of the two super powers would ever get into a position where the damage they would suffer in a nuclear exchange would be less than abhorrent. Damage limitation is, we would argue, an important and morally impeccable objective as long as núclear conflict remains The same is true of the third objective which is really an extension of the second. The fourth objective may also at some levels be inconsistent with the first. For example the efforts to preserve a credible and reliable second strike force are likely to be in some conflict with the objective of minimizing the economic costs associated with maintaining strategic forces. It is arguable also that the arms race incentives are very sensitive to the absolute level of forces - from a marginal utility point of view - so that the cheapest short term solution may be the least stable over time. Furthermore, there is some historical evidence to support the proposition that one way to deter an arms race is to demonstrate the intention of staying ahead of the opponent by a given margin (cfr. British policy in the naval races in the 19th century).

We should want to broaden the perspective of our considerations by suggesting that the way the super powers resolve the strategic force issues will have a very basic impact on the structure of the international system and the process of politics in that system. The most important parameter here is the role of nuclear weapons and, particularly, strategic nuclear weapons in world politics. Most of the advocates of superiority make an implicit assumption about the convertibility of strategic nuclear power into politically useful currency. Sometimes the notion of superiority which is calculated in terms of the Soviet-American arms competition is associated also with the notion of a high posture vis-a-vis potential nuclear powers. The high posture in this connection emphasizes the distance others have to go in order to qualify for the "big league" - keeping it large for purposes of dissuasion. It may also include defensive measures, such as BMD, which are designed to provide protection against the consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to support various extended deterrence commitments to allies or non-nuclear weapon states under a general system of guarantees. We should note, however, that the notions of "superiority" and "high posture" are not synonymous and that one does not necessarily imply the other. It is indeed arguable that from the perspective of proliferation management it would be desirable for the super powers to minimize the impact of nuclear weapons on the outcome of the political process in the international arena so as to reduce the incentives of other powers to acquire nuclear weapons. One of the clear and present dangers of the current frustrations in the United States with the Vietnamese quagmire 3) is the temptation to transfer once again to the strategic

3) A lot of the frustration stems from the fact that US strategy and tactics have been very far from successful. For some reasonable suggestions for improvements see: Herman Kahn et alias, Can We Win in Vietnam? Praeger, NY, 1968 and Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam, David McKay Co., NY, 1969.

forces most of the burden of upholding the peace. Such a policy would very clearly have considerable impact on the kind of strategic arms limitation agreement which would be acceptable to Washington. Should the US revert to a kind of "New look" massive retaliation posture, a considerable amount of self-deterrence is likely to prevent actions in situations where at least the possibility of great-power intervention might otherwise serve as a stabilizing mechanism for an imperfect world order.

There are, of course, other perspectives which point in somewhat different directions. The following quote is illustrative.

"We must retain and <u>increase</u> our superiority, not lose it. We must have the ability to <u>win</u>, not merely to punish. The Soviet Union is currently waging a war throughout the entire spectrum of power. An essential key to their strategy is nuclear blackmail. The only way we can defeat its effectiveness is by incorporating in our diplomacy our own superior nuclear capability". 4)

A strategy of nuclear deemphasis, which seems essential for purposes of minimizing incentives for nuclear proliferation, is clearly inconsistent with "incorporating" nuclear superiority in American diplomacy. It would seem important for the super powers to communicate by their actions and procurements that to most conflicts outside the context of the direct confrontation of the giants, or the initiation of nuclear warfare by any other nuclear power, nuclear weapons are just not very relevant. logical consequence of a nuclear deemphasis policy would be a no-first use (NFU) convention - possibly with some built-in exceptions such as a Soviet attack against the Federal Republic of Germany. Both Chinese and Russian government spokesmen are on the record in support of such a convention, and we should note that it constitutes an explicit policy and has for some time - of the American Government that the purpose of maintaining strategic forces is to deter "a deliberate nuclear attack (emphasis added) on the United States or its allies". 5) It would seem quite reasonable that the super powers could within the context of SALT discuss limitations on the use of strategic arms, such as a NFU convention.

Before we proceed further with an analysis of possible limitation regimes and the relevance of such concepts as "superiority", "parity" and "sufficiency", it seems useful to examine briefly the capabilities and outlooks which are discernible in the Unitèd States and the Soviet Union.

#### The Soviet Position

The Soviet Union has emerged for the first time in the post war period as a genuine global power with the strategic prowess to sustain policies in the exclusive arena of the super powers. The proximity emphasis which characterized the structure of Soviet strategic forces during the fifties

- 4) Melvin R. Laird, <u>A House Devided: America's Strategy Gap</u>, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1962, p. 75.
- 5) Secretary of Defense, Clark M. Clifford, <u>The 1970 Defense Budget and Defense Program for Fiscal Years 1970-74</u>, January 15th, 1969, p. 47.

and early sixties has given way to intercontinental capabilities which are at least equal to those of the United States.

The current build-up of the Soviet ICBM force started some time in the mid-sixties and may reflect a series of decisions which were made in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis and the subsequent leadership struggle which produced the ouster of Nikita Khrushtchev. The Soviet build-up was concentrated around the liquid-fuel ICBM's SS-9 ("Scarp") and SS-11. The SS-11 is reminiscent of Minuteman and carries a warhead of approximately 1 megaton (MT), while the SS-9 is a much larger vehicle capable of carrying a 20 + MT warhead. The mid-sixties inventory of ICBM's included some 200 of the earlier generation missiles SS-6 ("Sapwood"), SS-7 ("Saddler") and SS-8 ("Sasin"). The Soviet ICBM force reportedly numbered 340 in October 1966, 720 in October 1967 and 900 in October 1968. Some time in early 1968 Moscow evidently slowed down the pace of the SS-11 deployment and stopped the deployment of SS-9's only to resume silo construction in December. At the same time, however, deployment of the first solid fuel ICBM, SS-13 ("Savage"), was continued. This missile carries a warhead in the same range as the SS-11. A two-stage version of the SS-13, the SS-14 ("Scapegoat") missile, is part of the mobile IRBM system "Scamp". The Soviet MRBM/IRBM force has not grown numerically over the last years. It has remained fairly stable around 750 since the mid sixties (SS-3 ("Shyster") - now obsolete - , SS-4 ("Sandal") and SS-5 ("Skean")). There is another longer-range mobile missile system, the SS-XZ "Scrooge" which is still not operational. The present Soviet ICBM force comprises some 1050 - 1250 missiles, including 600 - 800 SS-11's, 250 SS-9's and 25 SS-13's.

The Russians have been testing a triplet multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) system with the SS-9 booster. It is not known whether the Soviet system is a real MIRV (multiple indepentently targeted reentry vehicle) but there are reports that the reentry vehicles are equipped with a terminal correction mechanism. According to John S. Foster 6) "the guidance and control system employed in the SS-9 tests has capabilities much greater than that required to implement a simple MRV. The things we do know about this mechanization are completely compatible with MIRV, even though they do not prove MIRV capability" 7). It is suggested, furthermore, that from shot to shot the Russians have varied the time at which one reentry vehicle was released compared to another. 8) There is some inherent MIRV advantage in the heavy payload capability of the SS-9. For a given guidance accuracy, the Russians could have sufficiently high yields in multiple warheads to be able to make multiple silo kills with one booster.

The SS-9 has also been used in testing a so-called fractional orbital bombardment system, FOBS. A missile which is fired in the FOBS mode

- 6) Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR+E), US, Department of Defense.
- 7) <u>Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead Missiles</u>, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969. (Statement made August 5th, 1969) p. 244.
- 8) <u>Ibid</u>., p. 280.

is fired in a low orbit about one hundred miles above the earth (the apogee of a normal ICBM trajectory is about eight hundred miles). At a given point a rocket engine is fired to deorbit the reentry vehicle and set it on its course towards its target. By coming in so low it would avoid detection by the BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Early Warning System). There are some severe penalties associated with this mode of attack in terms of reduced accuracy and weapons payload. It might, however, constitute a fairly effective first strike system against airfields and command centers.

Until recently the Soviet Union did not have an operational system comparable to the US Polaris SLBM. A 700 mile missile, "Sark", was first shown in 1962 and the 1.000 mile "Serb", allegedly capable of underwater launch, in 1964. They were emplaced in diesel-powered submarines. Twenty-five "G"-class submarines with three missiles each and ten "Z"-class submarines each carrying two missiles were constructed for this purpose. The force was subsequently augmented by ten "H"-class nuclear-powered submarines, each with three missile firing tubes. A third generation SLBM, "Sawfly", was first shown in 1967. It is currently being emplaced in the new "Y"-class nuclear-powered submarines which carry sixteen missiles. Eight or nine of these vessels have been launched and the current production program is presumably geared towards turning out seven-eight new "Y"-class submarines per year. 9) The Soviet SLBM force presently numbers some 150 missiles.

In November 1966 Mr. McNamara announced that the Soviet Union had initiated deployment of a BMD system around Moscow based on the "Galosh" missile. The "Galosh"-deployment rate has slowed down over the last year and presently consists of sixty-seven anti-missile launchers. The "Galosh" missile has exoatmospheric range and carries a multi-megaton warhead. In its original configuration the radars were deployed against US strategic attacks only but recently the radars have been directed also toward Communist China. The slowdown in the deployment which occurred in 1968 was followed by the reconfiguration of the radars and by tests of an improved interceptor missile which reportedly has a "loiter" capability, which means that it is able to coast for a short period after it has been fired until it has selected a target, at which time it will be restarted and maneuvered to the target. 10) The Russians are, furthermore, evidently in the process of constructing a new large ABM radar. 11).

- 9) Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM systems, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate. 91st Congress 1st Session. Part I, 1969, p. 173 and Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System. Hearings before Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, pp. 9-10 (Testimonies by Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird).
- 10) Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, Hearings, op.cit, pp. 10-11.
- 11) <u>Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead Missiles</u>, Hearings, <u>op.cit.</u> p. 249.

At the same time as the "Galosh" deployment was started the Russians initiated employment of a new advanced anti-aircraft system, the so-called Tallinn-system, based on the endoatmospheric SA-5 "Griffon" interceptor. This was the last of a series of Soviet anti-aircraft systems, which started with the SA-1 "Guild" around Moscow in 1956, and was followed by the SA-2 "Guideline" which since 1958 has been widely deployed and undergone significant improvements. A short-range interceptor against low-altitude attack. SA-3 "Goa" was first shown in 1964. Two mobile systems SA-4 "Ganef" and SA-6 "Gainful" complete the inventory. The SA-5 is smaller than the "Galosh" missile. It is, however, quite large and it is being fielded in substantial numbers. While the system is, by general consensus, thought to be an anti-aircraft system there is considerable concern about the possibility of upgrading SA-5's and SA-2's to performing ABM roles, particularly if they be commanded by the large ABM radars.

The Russians have consistently held to the view that active defenses, including BMD, constitute a desirable element in the strategic posture. They have refrained from criticising the American BMD deployment decision with references to the dangers of a defense-offense arms race spiral. The arms race implications have been viewed rather as stemming from the alleged concessions to the American "military-industrial complex". 12) Soviet military writings do not reflect any concern lest the introduction of BMD upset the strategic balance and the statements concerning the technological possibilities are optimistic: "... the task of warding off strikes of enemy missiles has become quite possible." 13).

It is worth noting in connection with an examination of the doctrinal aspects of alternative strategic arms control regimes that the Russians have never explicitly formulated a theory of deterrence in terms of assured destruction and population hostages. While Russian strategists and officials resisted American attempts at formulating a no-cities doctrine as an arms control understanding, Soviet statements on targeting have consistently indicated a combination of a counterforce, a counter industry and counter administration focus. 14).

The Soviet Union is reportedly outspending the US in the ratio of three to two converted to dollar equivalents on strategic offensive forces which means that they are spending on the order of \$ 10.5 billion annually. The Russians have spent two and a half times what the US has spent on active defense since World War II, or the equivalent of \$ 125 billion. The current level of expenditures is estimated to be on the order of seven to eight billion dollars per annum. Thus the total Soviet strategic arms budget is on the order of \$ 18 billion which is in the range of 25-35% of the total Soviet defense budget. 15). The SS-9 missile alone is estimated to cost in the region of \$ 25-30 million per vehicle.

12) For a detailed analysis see the relevant section of my chapter "Missile Defense, the Soviet Union and the Arms Race" in Why ABM? - op.cit. pp. 156-161. The only instance of a flat assertion that the US deployment is provocative I have found was a note - not a major article - by a Yu. Yur'ev entitled "Novaya' sistema protivoraketnoy oborony SSHA", "Mezdunarodnaya Zhizn", 16 (7) 1969, pp. 151-52.

13) V.D. Sokolovskij (ed), <u>Voennava Strategiva</u> (3rd ed.), Voenizdat, Moscow, 1968, p. 361.

14) See e.g. the two most authoritative current analyses of strategic issues: V.D. Sokolovskij (ed), <u>Voennava Strategiya</u>, <u>op.cit</u> and N.Yu. Sushko & T.R. Kondratkov, <u>Metodologicheskiye Problemy Voennoy Teorii i Praktiki</u>, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1967, p. 147.

15) For an explanation of the calculations see pp. 169-173 of Why ABM?-

op.cit.

It is not possible to project Soviet ambitions in the realm of strategic forces with any substantial degree of certainty. Hence we shall not pass judgment on whether the recent build-up of the Soviet ICBM/SLBM-force constitutes a deliberate attempt to outrun the Americans in a race for "superiority" or whether ambitions are more moderate. We should beware also of attributing to the Soviet decision-making system a higher degree of consistent and explicit purpose than does indeed prevail. Our information about the nature of Soviet decision-making in regard to strategic force procurements is very inadequate, but it seems reasonable to interpret the substance of Soviet decision-making with some reference to the nature of the decision-making system which produces the substance.

For purposes of analysis we could distinguish among several alternative hypotheses concerning the nature of Soviet budget decisions in regard to the composition and size of the strategic forces. Such hypotheses are, of course, basic to any theory about the nature of the arms race:

I) The reactive hypothesis

II) The institutional hypothesis

III) The pragmatic hypothesis

IV) The fashion hypothesis

V) The blueprint hypothesis.

The reactive hypothesis could, furthermore, distinguish between <u>imitative</u> reactions and <u>off-set</u> reactions. According to the <u>off-set</u> reaction theory Soviet central war planners are likely to respond, for example, to American defenses by augmenting the offensive force arsenal so as to reestablish <u>status quo ante</u> in terms of assured destruction potentials. The imitative hypothesis views Soviet procurements largely as an exercise in mirrorimaging the American force posture. The major trouble with the off-set theory is that it is very hard to mobilize any evidence on its behalf in the recent past, for example with reference to the Soviet reaction to US bomber defenses. There may be somewhat more substance to the imitative theory but the Russians have shown a fairly consistent propensity for producing peculiarly Russian solutions.

The institutional hypothesis views the Soviet strategic force posture as the peculiar outcome of the particular traditions, outlook, concerns, and distribution of bargaining power which prevail in the Soviet decision-making system. The pragmatic theory assumes that Soviet decision-making in this realm constitutes an adaptation to and exploitation of the constraints and opportunities which prevail in any particular period. These may be rooted in economic conditions, political developments, technological inventions, etc. The fashion hypothesis indicates that decisions for force procurements reflect a Soviet reading of what does at any particular time constitute the paraphernalia of a serious power, what is the "in-thing" to be doing. Finally, the blueprint hypothesis is in many ways the counterpart to the pragmatic theory as it assumes Soviet long term objectives to be fixed and force procurements to reflect, for example, an irrevocable commitment to the pursuit of regional or global domination and strategic "superiority".

We shall not attempt to evaluate the alternative theories now. There is, we should note, a great amount of empirical work to be done in analysing past interaction patterns before we should venture predictions based on experience.

#### The American Situation

%23.5 20.8

Contrary to popular perceptions the American expenditures on strategic forces have not reflected an ever-spiraling arms race:

Table: US Strategic Force Budgets 1962-1970 (total obligational authority)

14.3

18.2

(in current \$ billions and as % of total defense expenditures) 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 **\$ 11.** 3 10.4 .9.36.8 6.5 6.5 7.6 9.1 8.0

11.7

During the late fifties the US was spending some \$ 15 billion annually on strategic forces 16) and measured in constant dollars the FY 1970 strategic force budget is about one half of the sum which was spent in 1959-60.

9.. 7

11.6

10.5

9.2

The numerical targets for the US strategic missile forces has remained stable for quite a number of years. The force comprises 1.000 Minuteman IB and II missiles, 54 Titan II's and 656 Polaris A-2 and A-3's in 41 submarines. It is apparent that American decision—makers have for some time considered it an important arms control objective to keep the number of delivery vehicles stable. Much of the effort went into protecting the force and insuring its operational efficiency in a post-attack environment.

Some significant developments in guidance and propulsion technology in the sixties promised substantial improvements in missile accuracies. Such a development was particularly important in the context of a counter-force, no-cities strategy. However, by 1965 official US defense doctrine seemed to move away from a counter-force emphasis, and deterrence was now discussed in terms of "assured destruction" and "damage limitation" with emphasis on the former. Paraliel to the research and development (R&D) effort on BMD a major effort went into the development of penetration aids to defeat potential enemy defenses. One to two billion dollars - depending on how one allocates costs - have been spent on R&D in this realm. The Mk-1 chaff system for area penetration was developed for Minuteman II and a follow-on variation, Mk-1A, would give improved capability against sophisticated radars. Similarly, various terminal decoys have been developed to improve penetration against terminal defenses. The efficacy of such deception techniques is very sensitive to the details of Soviet defenses and hence constitute a somewhat limited confidence measure. A higher confidence approach involves multiple reentry vehicles provided each of the RV's be engaged separately by the defense. The US has developed a MRV triplet which has been deployed an Polaris A-3 missiles. Multiple warhead configurations had become possible because of some important advances in nuclear weapons designs involving improved yield-to-weight ratios and light ablative shields for reentry protection. The Polaris multiples would, however, arrive in a fairly narrow "footprint", i.e. fairly close to each other. The deployment of the multimegation: "Galosh"

16) Strategy and Science: Toward a National Security Policy for the 1970's. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, p. 142. Testimony of Herman Kahn.

ABM raised the possibility of one interceptor destroying more than one incoming warhead.

The next step was then the development of MIRV's. The American MIRV concept involved a contraption called a "bus" which is capable of some post-boost phase maneuvering to sequentially dispense its several RV's on their respective trajectories. Such a system would, of course, in addition to improving the penetration capabilities of US missiles also expand their target coverage. The Mk-12 MIRV system has been developed for Minuteman III. It contains three 200 Kiloton(KT) warheads. Poseidon C-3 will be equipped with the Mk-3 reentry system which contains some ten 50 KT warheads. 17) The test-program is scheduled to be completed by May-June 1970.

An alternative MIRV concept to the "bus" variety is one in which each individual warhead contains its own inertial guidance and where the separation mechanism is quite simple. Such solutions involving self-contained guidance which would operate all the way to the target and thus correct for errors in the early trajectory as well as for atmospheric perturbations in the reentry phase could conceivably produce significant improvements in accuracy. Furthermore, development of maneuverable reentry systems such as BGRV (Boost Glide Reentry Vehicle) and MBRV (Maneuvering Ballistic Reentry Vehicle) may produce post-boost vehicles for the next generation ICM's (Improved Capability Missiles).

According to current plans 500 Minuteman III will eventually constitute one half of the landbased ICBM force, while the SLBM force will consist of 496 Poseidon C-3 on 31 boats and 160 Polaris A-3 on 10 boats. Some initial studies have been undertaken on a system called ULMS (Underseas Long Range Missile System) as a hedge against future Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. The system involves a longer range missile and a new, quieter Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarine. It should be noted that by splitting up the payload of the Minuteman, Polaris and Poseidon boosters the total deliverable megatonnage is reduced rather significantly. There appears to have been some deliberate efforts made to avoid systems which by the combination of weapons yield and accuracy could constitute a serious first strike capability. Thus the Mk-17 reentry vehicle program for Minuteman which would have had provided a "big-bang" single reentry warhead war cancelled in 1968. The current Minutemen force is credited with a CEP of .8 -. 5 n. miles while that of Minuteman III and Poseidon C-3 would be 25 n. miles and 5 n. miles respectively. Such accuracies are not sufficient to provide a serious first strike threat against hardened Soviet ICBM's given the size of the warheads. We should note, however, that since the general counterforce effectiveness of a missile force could be described by the quantity (K) =  $\sum \frac{\text{yield}^{4/3}}{\text{CEP}^{-2}}$ , the vulnerability of a de-

terrent force is very sensitive to improvements in accuracy. Roughly speaking improving accuracy by a factor of two is equivalent to increasing bomb-yield tenfold and serves to offset a tenfold increase in overpressure resistance.

The emergence of the SS-9, which has high accuracy and a multiple warhead package of three five MT warheads, has raised once again the scepter of a first-strike threat due to attack ratios favouring the attacker. Thus it has been calculated that if we allow a degradation factor based on a 20 failure rate, four hundred twenty SS-9 missiles, each equipped with three 5MT reentry vehicles, would be required to attack one thousand Minuteman silos (currently hardened to withstand on overpressure of 300 psi), if we assume retargeting capability, that is, the ability to reprogram missiles to make up for failures. Such a force would have about a 95 probability of destroying the silos (apparently assuming 5 n. miles CEP), so that only 50 Minutemen missiles would survive the attack. (Note that the SS-11 and SS-13 vehicles are not included in the calculations).

The threat to the survivability of the SAC bomber force from the "Sawfly" SLBM, which has an estimated range of 1.500 n. miles may, become serious in the seventies particularly if

17) Washington Post, June 22, 1969.

they be flown in a depressed trajectory mode. There might be some problems in coordinating an attack on the Minuteman and SAC bomber bases, but by diverting some SBM's to the Minuteman fields the missiles may be forced to remain inside their hardened silos until the arrival of the SS-9's in order not to be exposed to the effects of nuclear detonations during their vulnerable launch phase. Thus the US deterrent might come to rest very heavily on the Polaris/Poseidon force. It has for some time been thought imprudent to base deterrence on only one kind of weapon system which like all systems will have its particular defects. Soviet ASW capabilities have been expanding with the introduction of new attack submarines ("C", "V", and "B" classes plus some new types which are not yet determined to be class constructions) and the ASW equipped helicopter carrie: "Moskva". It is known that the Russians are also experimenting with surveillance systems. 19) While these developments do not threaten the Polaris/Poseidon system at present it may be prudent to hedge against future augmentations in the threat. As Robert C. Sprague has observed: "...it is not inconcei vable to imagine developing a system to destroy essential underwater communication from the main land by introducing artificial static at the wave lengths used or as needed in the event of a crisis situation. Nor does it seem entirely impossible, with adequate effort, to develop a capability of tracking our Polaris submarines to their designated underwater stations. And in a crisis situation to destroy them or render them ineffective." 20)

We need not construct bizzarre first strike horror scenaries in order to demonstrate that there may be a problem to which it is necessary to find an appropriate response. The problem of insuring a credible and reliable second strike force is not one which we have not faced before, and it is somewhat amazing to note how many analysts are presently demonstrating the same kind of resistance to taking the problem seriously as did so many analysts and decision-makers in the fifties when we had to learn about the wilnerabilities of bomber forces.

21) The American administration found that deployment of the SAFEGUARD BMD system would be the most appropriate countermeasure in the present situation, thus reorienting the SENTINEL program of the Johnson administration by giving greater emphasis to active defense of the US deterrent.

The history of the US BMD program is now sufficiently well known not to warrant any repetition here. The SENTINEL system was optimized against a Chinese IBCM attack in the 1970's and it possessed obvious vulnerabilities even to modest Soviet attacks. Some of these vulnerabilities may have been by deliberate design in order to convey the message that the system was not meant to be the first installment of alarger anti-Soviet BMD program such as the \$ 10 billion Posture A or the \$ 20 billion Posture B program which Mr. Mc.Namara had considered. Thus all the PAR (Perimeter Acquisition Radar) units had only north-looking faces and most of the MSR (Missile Site Radar) units did not have four faces leaving the system vulnerable to Soviet SLBM attacks. The SAFEGUARD deployment is explicitly oriented also towards a Soviet threat, particulierly a Soviet threat to the

- 18) Address by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. Director, DDR&E, before the Aviation/Space Writers' Association, Sheraton-Dayton Hotel, Dayton, Ohio, May 12th, 1969. DOD News Release No 381-69, p. 5. We have been treated to an intensive numbers battle where the combatants have arrived at different results for the simple reason that they employed different assumptions and inpat values. Albert Wohlstilfer points it all out in his chapter in Why ABM...op.cit. particularly pp. 129-142.
- Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Fiscal Year 1970, and Reserve Strength, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Part 2, 1969, p. 1791 (Statement by Dr. John S. Foster).
- 20) Ibid p. 1414.
- 21) The "classical" studies here are those of Albert Wohlstetter. See: A.J. Wohlstetter, F.S. Hoffman, R.J. Lutz and H.S. Rowen, <u>Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases</u>, R-266, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Cal., 1954 (second declassified printing 1962) and A.J. Wohlstetter, F.S. Hoffmann and H.S. Rowen, <u>Protecting US Power to Strike Back in the 1950's and 1960's</u>. R-290, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Cal., 1956.

US deterant. The system will be deployed in two phases. The first phase will include the deployment of a one-face PAR and one four-face-MSR unit as well as long range Spartan and short range Sprint interceptors around the Minuteman fields at Grand Forks (North Dakota) and Malmstrom (Montana) Air Force Bases. The specific number of interceptors involved is not known, but it is understood that some 200 Spartan and Sprint missiles will be deployed at the two sites. 22).

The first ABM site is scheduled to become operational in January 1974 and that at Malmstrom AF base in July 1974. Present plans provide for three Phase 2 options: The first option is designed to counter an increase in the Soviet counterforce threat and would involve the additional deployment of two PAR/MSR and Spartan/Sprint sites at two other Minutman bases in addition to increasing the number of Sprint missiles at the existing batteries. It would also involve the installation of a site at Washington D.C. for the protection of the National Command Authorities. The second option would provide protection to the US bomber force against a growing Soviet SLBM threat. A total of 12 sites would be installed. The third option could be exercised to counter a Chinese ICBM threat. Under this option the deployment would reflect an emphasis on area coverage with the procurement of additional Spartan missiles. The total 12 site Safeguard program would cost \$ 10,3 billion, including R & D costs (\$ 2,5 billion) and AEC costs (\$ 1,2 billion). The annual operating costs for a fully deployed system are estimated to be about \$ 350 million.

The flexibility which is built into the deployment program is designed to permit decisions to reflect changes in the environment both in terms of the nature of the threat and the outcome and status of the SALT exercise.

The future development of BMD technology involve possible changes in the interceptors to counter chaff designed to conceal the attacking reentry vihicles by implementing guidance and propulsion system improvements, (Remote Sprint and Improved Spartan). Other ways of combatting chaff would involve improved radar resolution and range resolution. Another alternative involves midcourse interception systems designed to counter a MIRV Among such concepts we may mention SABMIS (Seaborne Anti-Ballistic Missile Intercept System) which would include interceptors and radars mounted on surface vessels. There is also a similar concept which is called ABMIS (Airborne Ballistic Missile Intercept System) which envisions the installation of radars and interceptors on aircraft such as the C-5 A ("Galaxy"). Such a system might be particularly useful against low trajectory attacks from SLBM's. The two mobile systems would, in addition, have the advantage that they may be moved around to counter threats which might arise and which might require the United States to implement guarantees to allies or non-nuclear weapon states under a non-proliferation Another suggested alternative would enable Minuteman III to perform both offensive and defensive functions by fitting the missile with a maneuverable postboost vehicle. Spacebased systems have been studied for missile interception in the launch phase when the offensive missile in most vulnerable. An example is the BAMBI (Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept System) concept which would involve the use of randomly deployed satellites in 250-300 mile high circular orbits. An auternative scheme would have an interceptor release thousands of steel pellets at extremely high velocities to destroy

22) The New York Times, August 8, 1969. For a general description of the American BMD effort and program see the chapter by William Schneider, Jr. in Why ABM? op.cit., pp 3-13.

the offensive warheads. There is also the experiments with high acceleration interceptors and the possibility that with improved terminal guidance BMD interceptors may be equipped with non-nuclear warheads.

Several alternatives to Safeguard have been suggested as preferable responses to a growing Soviet counterforce threat. We have already alluded to the retrograde suggestion of adopting a launch-on-warring policy. Some critics suggested that the number of Minuteman missiles be increased. Such a step could, however, increase the US first strike threat to the Soviet Union which might then respond by increasing its offensive force. With the accuracies of the 1960's stability in offense-offense races was possible at fairly moderate force levels. With the predicted improvements in accuracy which will materialize in the 1970's it becomes very much harder to reach an equilibrium position in such a race except at very high force levels. Hence it would seem preferable to opt instead for stabilizing programs such as BMD or super-hardening, which would not add to the offensive first strike capability. Furthermore, doubling the Minuteman force and keeping B-52's constantly in the air in numbers equal to the present ground alert is estimated to cost as much as \$ 20 billion on a five year basis. 23).

Another alternative which was considered was to deploy the Minuteman missiles in superhard, Hard Rock Silos (HRS) designed to resist a static overpressure of 3.000 psi. Such a system would cost almost as much as a BMD system - viz. \$ 5 billion and it would have the further defect, as we have noted above, of being offset by reductions in the accuracy of the opponents missiles. Land-mobile ICBM's or the deployment of missile dummies are other possibilities for improving force survivability. Mobility is again likely to be very expensive and the missiles may still become vulnerable to identification and targeting by satellites. They might furthermore complicate the verification of a missile limitation agreement. Deceptive deployments might produce the same augmentations in the Soviet forces as a multiplication of the Minuteman force and in a competitive deception race the US seems bound to be at a disadvantage, due to basic differences in the socio-political systems of the two super powers.

The Safeguard deployment was approved only with the thinnest of margins in the US Senate and the great debate is indicative also of the attitudes of alienation, mistrust of the "Establishment" and the "System", "domestic needs first", and general frustration which are likely to determine in large measure and circumscribe the decisions which Washing will make in the realm of strategic force postures.

23) Albert Wohlstetter, "Good Guys, Bad Guys and the ABM", Los Angeles Times, August 3, 1969.

#### The Super Power Interaction

We now revert to the interactions of the Soviet and American postures, outlooks and beliefs; and we have to consider the notions of "superiority", "parity" and "sufficiency" in terms of possible arms control arrangements. One of the major problems with the labels is definitional. How much more of what quantitative or qualititative aspects of the strategic forces are needed to consider one side "superior" to the other? On this level we are confronted also with a measurement problem: How do we compare two forces of different hardware compositions, which reflect divergent plans and doctrines, attitudes and beliefs as well as degrees of information? Furthermore, there is the question of what it is all for! When does "superiority" really matter in terms of influence on political and military outcomes? How stark does it have to be to be meaningful? What are the costs and dangers involved in pursuing "superiority"? Is it attainable in a meaningful sense and within acceptable costs given the absolute level of the effort of the opponent? Many of the same definitional problems apply to the notion of 'parity" which is also a comparative notion. tent to which stabilization at "parity" would affect the process of political events is clearly related to an issue we addressed earlier, viz the role which the super powers choose to let nuclear weapons, and strategic nuclear weapons in particular, play in world politics. The Russians appear to be verbally committed to a notion of superiority, but it is far from clear that they have any operational theory or program for how to attain it. The Americanshave during the mid-sixties been, perhaps deliberately, ambiguous. Thus Mr. McNamara would couple his assertion that meaningful superiority was unattainable with a commitment to maintain a three or four to one numerical superiority over the Soviet Union in effective deliverable warheads. Perhaps the ambiguity is rooted in language so that we have to distinguish between "stark superiority" in the sense of being able to initiate a central war with impunity - this is clearly unattainable and "relative superiority", which applies to relative war outcomes and the expectation of being able to keep the damage suffered in a central war below the level which would be inflicted on the opponent. "Superiority" in this sense may have some important impact on both pre-war and intra-war deterrence, while its convertibility into valid currency for peace time political bargaining is much more problematical.

The notion of "sufficiency" would at first sight appear to constitute an absolute rather then a comparative notion. It would appear to indicate the existence of stable cut-off points for strategic arms procurements which are to an important degree independent of the opponent's level of effort. In the real world there will always be some interaction since the definition of what is required to accomplish a certain level of damage is sensitive to the counterforce as well as the active and passive defence capabilities of the adversary.

The criterion of sufficiency which have structured American strategic force planning over the last years has been the concept of "assured destruction". The concept was useful for structuering some of the force planning issues and it permitted some quantification. Thus Mr. McNamara estimated that a second-strike capability to destroy one-fourth to one-third of the Soviet population and two-thirds of the Soviet industrial capability would constitute a sufficient assured destruction

potential for purposes of deterrence. 24). By 1968 he had lowered his requirements to include one-fifth to one-fourth of the population and one-half of the industrial capacity. 25).

The concept of "assured destruction" may also have served a useful political function in terms of providing an identifiable barrier against internal American pressures for greater offensive forces. It provided a standard of sufficiency which could be defended against pressures for "more". However, in the present predicament the concept may have become dysfunctional by suggesting that the necessary response to the external pressures from Soviet BMD deployments includes offsetting augmentations and improvements of the offensive forces so as to restore the assured destruction capacity which prevailed prior to the introduction of BMD. Hence, in an environment in which BMD is reasonably price-competitive with offensive weapons, a persuasive case can be made for some doctrinal reexamination. Surely there is nothing finite about the relationship between the American ability to destroy Russian lives and property on the one hand and deterrence on the other.

Some difference of opinion prevails in regard to when BMD is cost competitive with offensive forces. As far as the SAFEGUARD defense of the Minutman force is concerned, calculations show that it would cost the Russians more than twice as much to increase their offensive counterforce threat as it would cost the United States to add on offsetting number of Sprint missiles, allowing for their proportional share of the MSR expense. The picture is more complicated when we consider population defense against substantial Soviet attacks. However, the numbers which Mr. McNamara did release suggested that the cost-exchange ratio would favour defense over a considerable range of damage denial. (The cost/exchange ratio denotes here the incremental cost which the defense must spend to reduce fatalities a given amount, divided by the cost to the offense of inflicting these fatalities). The equilibrium point , i.e the point when the exchange ratio is 1:1 will for the United States be at a point when around 70% of the American population may be expected to survive, 26). Thus the US would by the deplyment of BMD be able to reduce the level of fatalities from 120 to 60 millions even in a situation when we make the pessimistic assumption that the Russians would react to improvements in American

<sup>24)</sup> Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, <u>The Fiscal Year 1966-70</u> <u>Defense Program and 1966 Defense Budget</u>, January, 1965, p 39.

<sup>25)</sup> Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, <u>The Fiscal Year 1969-73</u>
<u>Defense and Program and 1969 Defense Budget</u>, January 1968, p 50

<sup>26)</sup> Daniel J. Fink, "Strategic Warfare", Science and Technology (82) October 1968, pp 58, 63.

defenses by augmenting their offense up to the level where their incremental costs would equal the American incremental costs on defense. Current BMD technology is not able to guarantee very high survival levels - e.g 90 + % against a sophisticated opponent like the Soviet Union if the latter is intent on retgining a larger portion of US hostages. We do not know, however, how the Russians perceive their strategic requirements in this realm.

Against a limited nuclear power like China in the 1970's the effectiveness og the SAFEGUARD Phase 2 option which is optimized against a Chimesethreat may be expected to be good. Thus a 30 ICBM force by 1976 could inflict 15 million American fatalities in the non-defense case, while the fatalities could be held to less than I million with the above defense deployment. The fatality level could be kept below one million evenif the Chinese force number as many as 75 ICBM's. 27).

An alternative criterion for sufficiency to "assured destruction" might focus on relative war outcomes rather then absolute levels of damage and stipulate that the United States should be able to inflict at least as much damage on the Soviet Union in a central war as the Soviet Union is able to inflict on the United States. Such a formulation would permit the implementation of greater defensive emphasis without associated requirements for off-set offensive force augmentations.

A strategic arms limitation agreement might focus on one or more of the following parameters:

- Number of delivery vehicles Number of warheads
- Total megatonnage (or alternatively NY  $^{2/3}$  where N is the number of delivery vehicles and Y is the yield of each individual weapon. (We focus on the blast area which scales as the yield to the two-thirds power).
- Total deliverable payload
- Peacetime operating practices
- Information Exchange
- Targeting

There are a series of complex technical issues involved in the choice of parameters in terms of the projected stability of the arrangement. There is also the issue of what constitutes a basis for politically acceptable regimes. A limitation on the number of delivery vehicles only could, for example, lead to the procurement of high-yield weapons which could produce preemptive instabilities due to the first strike capabilities of powerful and accurate missiles. The whole issue of verification involves the assessment of how much information can be obtained via normal intelligence channels, and the capabilities of various high-altitude photography techniques. The limitations on hardware which the parties might agree to would have to be translatable into verifiable criteria such as, for example, silo size and missile payload (throw weight).

Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, Hearings... op.cit. p 28.

Thus we could imagine a series of alternative regimes such as

- A) Offensive force inventories (to be specified).

  Limited to a certain total payload (throw weight) plus no limitation on defensive forces.
- B) Offensive force inventories (to be specified) limited to a certain number and with no vehicles permitted exceeding a certain payload capability plus no limitation on defensive forces.
- C) An agreement imposing numerical constraints on certain kinds of missiles such as SS-9 as well as certain qualitative restrictions on, for example, guidance systems in American missiles in order to prevent preemptive instabilities stemming from first strike capabilities.
- D) All strategic forces (to be specified) to be limited according to A) and B).
- E) Qualitative restrictions barring certain kinds of weapons and weapon tests (land-mobile ICBM's, MIRV's, ABM's, FOBS, etc.).
- F) Some budget limitations combined with other limitations or as on independent constraint.
- G) Some warfighting understandings, including, for example, (capital) cities as santuaries, (some) command and control centers as sanctuaries, no trageting of communications systems, no first-strike against cities.
- H) Some institutionalized dialogue about the traffic rules for the arms race.

It is very unlikely that either of the two super powers would accept an arrangement which prohibited all BMD deployments. Their interests in protection against the threat from third nuclear powers in the international system is likely to be non-negotiable. We have suggested, furthermore, that BMD constitutes a desirable component in the total posture as assurance against preemptive instabilities as well as a contribution to a general defensive emphasis in the strategic confrontation and to a nuclear deemphasis in the process of world politics. MIRV's involve a very wide spectrum of complications. A ban on MIRV deployment would require some form of on-site inspection which may be considered too intrusive by both parties. A MIRV test ban is also likely to prove difficult to inspect, particularly if we assume a MIRV system based on self-contained guidance in each reentry vhicle rather than the "bus". The former system could probably be tested by launching only one reentry vehicle on each test. There is also the issue whether flight testing have now gone so far that, for example, the SS-9 triple could be deployed with extensive groundtests only. A more fundamental issue is whether the appropriate response to MIRV is counter-deployment of MIRV. It is again possible that BMD would constitute a more appropriate response both from the point of view of keeping a lid on the arms and of introducing some desirable practices and patterns in the international system.



## INSTITUTE FOR STRATIGIC STUDIES 11th ARRNUAL CONFERENCE

## THE SUPER-POVERS SOVIET-MERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

### COMMITTEE V

#### Friday 19th September

#### The Effect of China on Soviet-American Relations

#### PIERRE MAILLARD

Ι

One first question has to be answered before we can discuss the impact of China on Soviet-American relations. Is the Sino-Soviet conflict of a lasting or of a temporary nature? This question is important because it obviously influences the attitude of the Soviet Union as well as the chances of a dialogue with the United States and furthermore it influences American policy towards China and even towards the USSR.

One has first to admit that a great number of arguments point to an unhealable breach between Moscow and Peking on which nearly all the experts of Russian and Chinese affairs now agree, after having doubted it for a long time. First, there is the ideological opposition, though experience has shown that nothing is more flexible than an idealogical attitude (as was proven again by the current shift of Chinese policies towards Yugoslavia). It is nevertheless difficult to imagine, at least in the short term, the two countries finding their way back to a common stand. China, with her ancient traditions and jealous pride, benefits so much by her doctrinal stance and claims that she can not lightly renounce them. On the other hand, the evolution of Russian communism towards a sort of social democracy is based so much on objective factors (the increasingly bourgeais attitudes of the people and especially of the leading group, the rise in the standard of living, the desire for peace) that the regime cannot easily return to a new revolutionary fervour. Above all, there are other motives involved, which make the conflict really serious. Because of a different development Russia has become a wealthy power whilst China has remained a proletarian one. This is a source of constant friction. The withdrawal of Russian technicians in 1960 aggravated this conflict, the more so as China suffered from it considerably. Finally it is hard to imagine that two

countries, one of which has made territorial claims against the other, can be reconciled. In this respect it is rather more difficult for China to make a deal with the USSR than with the United States. The latter obviously backs Formosa but she did not annex the island. This territorial conflict which, actually in the case of Sinkiang, has real strategic significance, is rendered all the more acute by the frustrations and humiliations of China's colonial past. Everything therefore, leads to the conclusion that this conflict is of a lasting nature and that it will become ever more serious as China builds up her economic and military potential, thus acquiring the true status of a great Power.

Things have gone so far that the question arises whether the present situation does not imply the risk of a real war between the two countries. Obviously such a hypothesis cannot be discarded, either as a consequence of some implied move by China, or, a possibility which appears still more likely, as a preventive action by Russia. Considering the acute rivalry which has developed between the two countries, it may be tempting for the more powerful one to try to break the weaker, either to eliminate the threat before it becomes intolerable, or (which comes to much the same thing) to promote the accession to power of more friendly leaders.

Events in Czechoslovakia give a certain credibility to such a hypothesis though it would imply in the case of China considerably greater risks for Russia.

Nevertheless the possibility of a reconciliation, or at least of an acceptable modus vivendi between the two countries cannot be ruled out. After all such a change would be the aim, and could be the initial consequence of a successful military operation by the USSR. Even failing such a violent change, a similar political process could already have taken place had the cultural revolution in China failed and more traditionally minded leaders bent on maintaining friendship with the USSR come to power. Conversely, internal changes in Russia, a new international situation, and even the fear of isolation in the face of a rapprochement between China and the United States could make it advisable for the Russian leadership to review their policy and to restore the foundations of common action with China. None of these hypotheses can be excluded given the way in which conflicts within the Communist world are developing, and the major changes which might result.

In the long run there is even more uncertainty. If one admits that Marxism will continue to be the ideological basis of both countries, there is a possibility that the actual rift, which seems to be deep but which

Leninist doctrine has always considered to be a superstructural residue of the past, will be replaced by a new phenomenon of convergence between the two systems. Thus a rise in its standard of living could oblige China to follow the Soviet example. The same applies, paradoxically, to the fact that China, having acquired the means of mass destruction, will have to conduct a more prudent and responsible policy, which in turn could favour a rapprochement with the USSR. All these factors indicate that the relationship between China and the USSR is more subtle than one might expect of a classical confrontation between great powers. Even if today's conflict is real and must be considered fundamental, this may not be the last word. In its turn Such a lot of things could give relations between the Soviet Union and the United States for a long time to come, a very specific and particularly complex pattern. Both of them, and the United States in particular have to introduce in their political calculations a factor of contingency which did not exist before, and which would not exist in future were it not for the uncertainties of China's future policy.

#### II

On the basis of these preliminary remarks, one must first ask what are the immediate consequences of this Sino-Soviet opposition for the foreign policy of the USSR, especially with regard to the United States.

To start with, there is one positive consequence for the Soviet Union. Since the USSR. vis-a-vis China, figures as a restrained power. that is to say, in Chinese terms, as a "revisionist" one, she becomes increasingly a valid partner in the eyes of the United States. certainly a logical link between the cooling-off of Sino-Soviet relations since the spring of 1958 and particularly since the crisis over the Straits of Formosa, and the initatives which led to the renewal of the Soviet-American dialogue. It seems to be quite natural even if there were no other reason, such as the desire to limit the arms race or to gain a diplomatic advantage, for the USSR to exploit this new situation in her relations with her main partner and with the other countries of the West. This is evidenced most clearly by the unusual step taken by Soviet diplomacy in informing the Western capitals and even Bonn of the serious frontier incident on the Ussuri River in the spring of this year. Washington cannot but take account of this new situation and give credit to the Soviet Union, regardless of the real motives behind this move, for the new interest shown by Moscow in the theory of peaceful coexistence.

There are, however, less positive aspects. China's hostility, if

valuable in some respects, does considerably weaken the USSR in others, A case in point is ideology. This is important for a country which was not so long ago committed to world-wide revolution and owes much of its prestige in the Third World, as with the people of Europe, to this commitment. By its force and its military and economic potential, the USSR will certainly remain a very great power but it will lose much of its attraction and influence in the world, that is, much more than would be the case with the United States, whose means of influence are primarily economic. If this loss is relative and might appear negligible from a realistic point of view, it is nevertheless not without significance. Soviet diplomacy is aware of this and that is why the USSR seizes every occasion to confront and counteract China on the ideological level. The recent conference of communist parties in Moscow shows that these efforts have not been completely successful.

The Soviet Union's effects to discipline its satellites oblige it to take an even more passive attitude towards that part of the world which is outside its own sphere of influence. Being threatened in the East and recognising, of course, that this threat is becoming ever more serious, the Soviet Union must pursue a sort of "appeasement" in the West. Less than ever before can it envisage bold action in the American sphere of influence. There is reason to believe that a crisis such as that over Cuba is today even less conceivable than it was seven years ago. This is an important change from the times of the Cold War. Apart from some initiatives without real results, the new relationship with China obliges the Soviet Union to concede practically all liberty of action to the American giant in his own sphere of influence, and to allow him to strengthen his position, with the obvious consequence that, by doing so, the Russians give substance to Chinese accusations of revisionism and complicity.

One can really ask the question if an extended conflict with China notably in the military sphere would not bring about even more radical changes in Soviet policy. What would happen if the USSR had to sustain an armed conflict along a very vulner. he frontier in the face of an enemy, who enjoys a great superiority in numbers? Would the USSR be obliged to transfer an important part of her conventional forces to the Far East and Central Asia? In this case, her means of action in the West would suffer and the tendency of her satellites towards greater autonomy would become more outspoken. There can be little doubt that the Czech crisis, even if it was not a direct result of the Sino-Soviet conflict, has indirectly been encouraged by this conflict. The case in point is even more obvious with regard to Rumania, since Mr Ceaucescu has consistently refused to condemn

the Chinese system and to break the links with China. The timid but significant rapprochement between Yugoslavia and China is another example of this. Russia has certainly succeeded up to now in closing the breaches and done so the more brutally and energetically in proportion to her sense of the threat to herself. In this respect, the Sino-Soviet conflict constitutes for Eastern Europe not only an element of liberalisation but also a reason for the hardening of the Russian line. The Soviet Union for instance rallied to her or use a number of the communist parties which were supposed to be less docile at the recent Moscow conference. It could be, however, that this exploit would be only a Pyrrhie victory were the danger in the Far East still to increase. In that case, it is to be foreseen that new and more serious tensions would arise inside the communist bloc.

Could this weakening of Russia's overall position incite American diplomacy to try to profit from its position of advantage and return to the doctrine of "roll-back" cherished by John Foster Dulles? Theoretically. such a development cannot be excluded as a matter of fact, it could be tempting for the American leaders to aggravate the conflict up to the point where the USSR, having to fight on two fronts, wouldbe obliged to make a deal with its most dangerous rival. Until then Washington could allow events to run their course, whilst sparing China in a certain way and refraining from any action which might hinder the development of Chinese power. Such a policy would not be anything but the application to the present situation of the old proverb "divide and to rule", and it is obviously feared in Moscow, as is shown by the close attention paid there to the evolution of Sino-American relations. There is no evidence however, at least for the time being, that American diplomacy wants to follow this path. Tempting as it might be, it would require an offensive attitude which, if favoured by some circles, is not shared by the majority of the population. After years of intervention on the world scene Washington seems rather to be in a mood of withdrawal to the Western Hemisphere. This is not yet isolationism but it points in that direction. This general trend has been illustrated by the drawbacks in Vietnam and in other parts of the world and motivated by overriding economic problems, by the fear of inflation, and above all by preoccupations with internal questions such as the racial problem and the unrest of the young generation. Such a trend is scarcely consistent with a systematic exploitation of Russian difficulties and of the Sino-Soviet conflict. In so far as these problems make the Soviet partner more accomodating, they rather incite the American administration to continue the dialogue with Moscow in order to give substance as soon as possible to the famous concept of "coexistence", if not to the partition

of the world which is justified by the technological strength of the two countries and which in the view of some Americans would safeguard the peace of the world for a long time to come.

American foreign policy is further engaged in this course because of the hope of avoiding the risks inherent in the alternative. As already mentioned a rapprochement between the USSR and China is unlikely but nevertheless not to be excluded. A really aggressive attitude on the part of the United States could just bring about such an eventuality, if only by bringing to power in the USSR new people less favourably disposed towards a dialogue with the USA and tempted to justify their harder line by the "imperialist danger". Given the interest of keeping the Communist world divided, American policy cannot wish to throw the USSR back into the arms of China. It is obvious that a policy of prudent moderation may furnish the Soviet leaders with an alibi which also lies in the real interest of the United States. For the majority of American decision-makers this course seems to be a better calculation, the more so as it appeals to their spontaneous idealism.

From this point of view, the Sino-Soviet conflict, which leads to a notable modification of the balance of forces and perhaps to important changes in the Soviet sphere of influence, seems more likely to strengthen the dialogue of the two Super-Powers than to hinder it. The Soviet Union is as much interested in this dialogue as the United States, provided that the latter does not exploit too much the diplomatic advantage which she posesses. The closer the Soviet-American relationship becomes, the easier it will be for the Soviet Union to prevent the much feared dialogue between America and China.

Two questions remain nevertheless to be answered at this stage:

(1) Is China able to prevent or really obstruct this bi-polar dialogue? The direct answer seems to be No, in spite of sporadic contacts between Washington and Peking. These contacts will remain limited, at least for the time being. China cannot easily contemplate a reversal of her policies because of her general attitude and her world wide propaganda, and also because of the problem of Formosa and the continuing conflict in Vietnam. As any physical action against the USSR would be counterproductive, China can only rely on her propaganda to prevent the Russians from talking with the Americans. Since propaganda has a limited effect, except of course in the long run, all China can do is to slow down the dialogue, but she cannot really break it up.

In fact, the more China is weakening the Soviet Union, the more it pushes the latter to make a deal with a partner believed to be friendly. The question arises then why acts China in this way? Probably this is because if the operation does not pay off in material terms, it will pay off in moral and diplomatic terms, which are more important to China, for it may give her the leadership of the communist world and maybe of the Third World too.

(2) Are there other developments in the American or in the Soviet spheres of influence which could disturb this process of dialogue? The answer to this has to be much more qualified. Without any doubt, such factors do exist in the communist world, and it is there that the Sino-Soviet opposition could have the greatest short-term consequences. A speeding-up of the dislocation process among the popular democracies would inevitably affect the dialogue between the two great powers, since the latter is based upon a certain parity. The motives with which I have credited the Soviet leaders might thus be partially invalidated. Such a disintegration could furthermore induce the Soviet leaders not only to strengthen their grip on Eastern Europe - which again would affect their relationship with the United States - but above all to envisage a preventive war against China, a hypothesis already considered, which would completely upset the conditions of the diplomatic game.

In the Western camp, substantial modification cannot be excluded either. These changes do not wholly depend on the Sino-Soviet conflict; they result from the internal contradictions of the capitalist world, from opposing interests and from economic and financial problems. Nevertheless, the Chinese factor plays a certain role. First, it influences the attitude of local communist parties, even if this influence is still very small (the evolution of the Italian communist party is evidence of this.) But the weakening of the USSR provoked by the conflict with China tends to bring out even more clearly the phenomena of disassociation and rivalry, which was masked in the countries of Europe, if not entirely suppressed at the time when everybody was afraid of the Soviet danger. This new situation might hasten some developments which are not necessarily beneficial to the United States, for instance, if Germany were to gain new possibilities of more independent action. The freedom of action of the United States on the world scene might be affected by this, either by weakening the American position or by committing the United States to more offensive attitudes. This in turn might be an additional reason for Washington to engage rapidly, and to conclude, a dialogue with the USSR in the hope of strengthening this status-quo before it is put into doubt by new and

unforeseeable developments.

#### III.

Apart from the strictly bilateral relationship between the two great powers the question of how the Chinese factor affects the policies of the two super-powers in the Third World and particularly in Asia should now be examined.

Their stable mutual relationship does not exclude their rivalry in the so-called marginal countries. In this sphere, China has priviledged means of action, above all in Asia. In this continent quite apart from the problem of Siberia, the two great powers will have to expect (in the years to come,) renewed and intensified Chinese activity. For a decade, China has been active in Asian countries, but to cultural revolution somewhat hindered her activities. Such activities, can have very different consequences. At first sight, they most harm the interest and the influenced of the United States, for in this region the Americans have a far bigger stake than the Soviet Union. The Vietnam war, which in fact is a war by proxy, fought against China, is clear evidence of this, as are, too, the rapprochement between the United States and India, the American attitude towards Laos, the American backing of Formosa and Japan and also the events in Indonesia. But, this Chinese interference also threatens Russian interests, although in a more indirect way: it does so primarily on the ideological level by winning new friends and support for China at Russia's for China expense but also materially, because a greater role and influence/is owing to its proximity, seen as a direct threat by the Soviet Union. That is why the USSR began providing India with assistance as her own conflict with China developed and tried on every occasion, though more discretely to find compromise solutions in the Vietnam war.

In this respect, too, Chinese policies tend to promote a certain solidarity between the USSR and the United States, though this is less apparent and more circumstantial. In some ways, the USSR might hope to profit from the weakening of American power in Asia. For this reason, Russia backed North Vietnam. But it did so only up to the point where the conflict could serve its own interests, and affect those of the USA, consolidating thereby its bargaining position. The situation would change completely if the conflict were to lead to a Sino-American modus vivendi from which the Soviets themselves were excluded, a development which would be still more objectionable if a wider agreement were concluded. A too obvious return of the Americans to isolationism in the wake of their with-

drawal from Vietnam would of course make this hypothesis more plausible. The USSR would thus be placed in an uncomfortable position, because an agreement between the United States and China could strengthen the Chinese position by way of an Asian Yalta. It is in order to prevent this, that the Soviet Union recently canvassed the idea of a mutual security pact for South-East Asia, with the evident aim of again playing a role in this region by limiting both Chinese and American progress from the start.

In another region, Chinese policies could turn out to be even more dangerous for the USSR, and that is Japan. Until now, all but trading relations between China and Japan have been of a rather sporadic nature. The deliberately pro-American policy of Japan has stood in the way of improving these relations. This might change however, either the Japanese-American Security Pact comes up for re-negotiation in 1970, or later, because of the needs of the expanding Japanese economy which cannot for ever depend on the American market. China will then have important assets and there is reason to believe that she will not hesitate to use of them and that Japan will be ready to profit thereby. This is, however, not an immediate prospect and, given the social structure of Japan, it is hard to imagine that this country will pass into the Chinese orbit in the near future. Nevertheless a special form of solidarity between them might come about, favoured by a common view of Asianism and of mutual economic interest. This would affect the interests of the United States, but even more those of the neighbouring power, the Soviet Union. For this reason, the Soviet Union has been trying actively for some time, to improve relations with Japan and to persuade the Japanese to take a share in the development of Siberia.

The uncertainties which result from this complex game for the two partners are obviously less important in other parts of the world than Asia, since the Chinese are less active there and do not seriously influence the bi-plar relationship. Therefore everything indicates that their rivalry there will not be diminished but rather increased by the Chinese factor, for the USSR is evidently interested in keeping her position as the champion of anti-colonialism and of socialism everywhere she can and in reaping the benefits of this in the absence of a competitor. This is the game in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean, and she might do so in Africa too. In pursuing this policy, the Soviet Union is of course always intent on keeping it under control in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the United States, an attitude which was obvious in the Middle East crisis. In these regions, therefore, the Chinese factor will only operate in the long run, though the trend is already established, particularly in Palestine.

The Soviet Union cannot always bet on all the horses and might over the short or long run have to take difficult options, given the aspirations of the forces of liberation and social antagonisms. China will thus win new assets, but for the moment this point has been reached neither in Africa nor in Latin America. The Soviet Union posseses material means much superior to anything China can muster. As regards the Third World in general and with the exception of South-East Asia it can therefore be said that the Chinese factor will remain feeble and indirect and will come into play in a rather "destabilizing" manner, contrasting with its effect on Europe and Asia. This conclusion however presupposes that Chinese morale and material however will not accelerate too rapidly in the coming years. If it did Soviet policy would have to be revised.

#### IV

Will the growth of Chinese power affect not only to political relationships between the two super-powers but also the military balance between them?

Its impact seems at first right to be substantial. Nobody can underestimate the Chinese military effort, which according to Chinese statements to the Australian journalist Francis James published in the Sunday Times of June 15th, 1969, would amount to about 15 - 20% of the Gross National Product of China. Even if this figure has to be reduced to approximately 10% it still remains very considerable. There can be no doubt either about rapid and surprising progress on nuclear explosives and maybe missiles. In this case, the Chinese might be able to build up rapidly a real deterrent power and even, considering the territorial dimensions of China, a second-strike capability. Such a development in a country with its known ideological position and territorial claims must necessarily create some anxiety among its partners, and here again for Russia more than for the USA.

The question is, however, to what degree the Chinese military effort really does affect the military balance of the super-powers? As far as nuclear armaments are concerned, the reasoning to be applied has to be different from that which is valid for conventional armaments. It is indeed inconceivable that tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, China will be able to launch a nuclear surprise attack against Russia and even less against the United States with the aim of regaining such and such piece of territory. This would be pure suicide since the two powers have an overwhelming superiority over China. The real danger lies elsewhere. It

derives from the relative immunity which China, because of her possession of nuclear arms, will enjoy against reprisals for conventional attacks by her own forces. From the moment when China is capable of inflicting substantial damage on one of the super-powers, and still more if she can inflict unacceptable damage, she is in a position to destroy the balance existing between them. China thus acquires an assured deterrence position and a sort of protection, permitting her to launch conventional operations much more freely and in places of her own choice. China's nuclear armament does not therefore modify the actual two-power balance, but because of the fact that it can modify it, if China thinks fit to do so, it may exercise a considerable influence on the two-power game.

This influence could be brought to bear in another way, since China can push the two powers, and partucularly the USSR, to increase their conventional armaments at the expense of their global military capabilities. To the extent that the Russian nuclear arsenal loses its power to intimidate, because Russia could not strike Chinese territory without risking retaliation, which in turn would put her into a position of serious inferiority vis-a-vis the United States, Russia might feel obliged to increase her conventional forces in order to avoid escalation and to protect her frontiers. Thus she may have to furnish the same effort as the Americans in Vietnam (although for different purposes), with the financial burden it would imply, not to mention the political consequences it could have in other parts of the Russian Empire, and especially in the West. From this angle too, therefore, China thanks to its nuclear arsenal, is able to influence indirectly but considerably Soviet foreign and defence policies.

In which way may this new situation modify possible talks of the two big powers on the limitation of anti-missile defence systems? Theoretically, it would seem bound to have certain consequences on their attitude especially on the Russians who, as the most threatened, might consider the setting up of an ABM network necessary if only to diminish the deterrent power of China. A deeper analysis of the problem will however produce a different result. If the Americans and the Russians strongly desire these strategic arms limitation talks and consider enlarging tem to include strategic missiles, they have many reasons for this, one of them being financial. But the real motive is that neither of them believe these systems to be effective. In spite of all polemics, both countries fear much more that the antagonist might improve his offensive weapons, as has already happened with the development of multiple warheads. True, it could be said that, if an ABM system is ineffective against a massive attack of sophisticated Russian or American weapons, it could at least prove effective in the case of an attack by less developed weapons, for instance - Chinese missiles.

This is possible but has not been proved. One would have to know the characteristics of Chinese nuclear weaponry and to assess to what degree one thermo-nuclear device exploded at a certain distance from the surface will immediately neutralise even the most developed radar system. That is why until new developments occur it seems that deterrence depends much more on offensive than defensive capabilities. Under these circumstances, the Chinese factor might well be an alibi in order to retard and postpone SALT, but not the real reason for the talks bogging down.

Going even further, one could argue that Russians and Americans both have an interest in establishing a modus vivendi to the degree that they really fear the development of a Chinese nuclear arsenal and that this modus vivendi is the more welcome as both of them have long since passed the stage of mutual "overkill". Why should they go on with a ruinous arms race when it is in their interest to combine their efforts in order to prevent nuclear proliferation and jointly put pressure on third countries, especially China? This eventuality is precisely what the Chinese fear and is the reason they constantly denounce the "collusion" between the USSR and the United States on all levels. Only by a rapprochement between China and the USSR, which I consider to be possible but not very likely in the short term, or on the other hand by a conflict between the USA and the USSR. Whatever its cause might be, could this situation be modified.

V

This leads us to the last question of assessing whether the progressive change from a bi-polar to a tri-polar world is compatible with the continuing state of minimal balance and stability. It can be argued that this is not a new situation, since in both camps there are factors of dissolution and that there are not two, but five, nuclear powers. But the resulting destabilization can only lead to a real imbalance if it affects a really independent power, which is not the case with secondary non-nuclear powers and not even with France and Great Britain because these countries continue to have links with one of the two camps. The position of China is obviously quite different. China is not yet a great world power in the economic sense but there can be no doubt that its entry into the nuclear interplay, the unpredictable character of its behaviour, the size of its population are liable to complicate considerably the nuclear balance as maintained by the two great powers. As we have seen, China's nuclear capability, would not only permit her to play a much

more active role in the Third World, by assuring her a greater protection against intimidating manoeuvres, but enable her at any time to modify the conditions on which the relationship of the two big powers are based simply by making use of the deterrence mechanism. If one argues that China does not yet possess a sufficiently powerful arsenal for matching that of her rivals which is perfectly true from a purely quantative point of view, one should not however forget the fact that the real question lies elsewhere. It lies with the balance which her two rivals want to maintain, and are obliged to keep in their mutual relationship. It is this balance that can be destroyed by one atomic blow of China, supposing of course she would have the appropriate missiles and delivery systems. The moment she has these, China will not need to be really in the same category of power as the United States or Soviet Union to have more or less the capacity of a 3rd World power.

Eventually the perspective of a general negociation between the United States, Russia and China will have to be considered as the final stage of this process. Probably a minimal stability can only be assured by such a negociation, which for both of the actual big powers, and especially for Russia, is the only way of guaranteeing their security and in any case, a much more efficient means than the development of ABM systems. If such a course is not open in the immediate future, it is because the two big powers, first have not reached agreement, and second, because China under present conditions could only lose in such a bargain and thus must want to gain time. However, there seems to be no other way in which the USBR and the USA could in the future safeguard their mutual interests and above all, avoid a catastrophic proliferation of nuclear arms. One day they will therefore have to pay the price, even if it is a high one, to China.

Doubtless, the Americans are already considering such a prospect, which is in any case encouraged by the current trend of American policy in South-East Asia. The American interest in this region might suffer but the United States should nevertheless pursue this course, all the more since the Chinese factor enables them to deal more easily with the USSR in this region as in others. Soviet Russia, too, should resign herself to this, despite her actual dislike of such a formula, because the alternative to it would be a preventive war against China, for which the moment seems to have passed and which could only put her on the losing side vis-a-vis the United States. For Russia, there would be only one escape from this dilemma - a new rapprochement with China. That however, would require substantial concessions in all fields of Soviet policy.

To conclude, the following observations can be made as to the role which the Chinese factor is playing in the relationship between the two great powers.

- (1) It appears that even at present China possesses solid assets which allow her to influence considerably this relationship without determining it entirely (since it is also governed by other imperatives). On the whole, it can be said that Chinese action accelerates the rapprochement between the two-powers without, of course, eliminating all their conflicts. Dialectically speaking, its effect can thus be described as revealing and precipitating the contradictions inherent in the forces now conflicting all over the world, without of course preventing China from having talks either with the United States or even with the USSR. We here find a real application of the basic Marxist concept, extended on world-wide scale and backed up by nuclear weapons, as an instrument of power and deterrence.
- (2) The USSR as well as the United States cannot prevent this dialectic action and she will be even less able to do so once the Chinese weapons have been perfected. She will consequently have to pay the price which, if heavy for the United States (notably in South-East Asia and in the case of a reversal of the Japanese alliance) will be even heavier for the Soviet Union since she attaches great importance to the ideological factor, is a neighbour of China, and is weakened by the rivalry with her.
- (3) Theoretically, the United States could gain a number of advantages from this situation, but it seems doubtful that she will exploit these advantages in an aggressive and systematic way. Nevertheless, such an exploitation cannot be excluded, given the impulse of the last American successes in space research. This could take the form of renewed pressure in areas of conflict with the USSR, notably in the Third World and, maybe, of prudent but clear interventions in the Russian sphere of influence (President Nixon's trip to Rumania might be interpreted in this way).
- (4) These hypothetical prospects depend however on a number of important factors, not to mention that a tri-polar interplay is more complex than a bi-polar one. Furthermore, the particular features of Chinese psychology and the obvious profit derived from an extreme ideological stand might induce China to wait for the hour of concessions, and even to take risks which could be serious not only for one or the other of their partners, but for world peace. Because of this, all prognosts must be cautious, the more so as great power rivalries remain acute in the Third World and even in Europe (particularly Eastern Europe) are far from srabillised.

#### NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION



# INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 11th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

# THE SUPER POWERS SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

#### COMMITTEE V

Saturday 20th September

#### The Limitations of Military Power

#### Rev. ALAN BOOTH

It is attractive to the humane mind to ponder whether perhaps human history is at last moving out of the period - long, terrible and offensive to all our susceptibilities - which might be called the military period. I mean by that the condition in which military power was accepted as the final arbiter in political conflicts, the ultimate means of ensuring that national governments preserve for themselves a tolerable freedom to pursue their own purposes and maintain some ability to exert their wills among their neighbours. The capacity to do so was felt to depend on their visible willingness and power if necessary to back policy with physical force. The arguments for thinking that a decisive change in this respect has taken place have been deployed by a number of writers who see in the movement from feudal societies to the modern condition of industrialised nations a real watershed in history. New inhibitions on the utility of military power, never before experienced, are clearly visible. We need do no more than list some of them briefly.

Those who contemplated military adventures in the past could do so in the knowledge that the cost in human terms would be borne chiefly by that great bulk of the population who had no say in the making of policy, and who regarded the suffering to which they were subjected as part of the order of nature, no different in kind and just as unavoidable as the disasters of nature – famine, plague, flood – which they believed to be part of the human lot. Industrialisation, leading to education and the growth of democratic aspirations along with rising living standards, made cannon-fodder harder to come by and less willingly supplied. The costs of war could not be so light-heartedly incurred.

Along with these changes has gone the demand that industrialised societies accept an obligation to promote human welfare within themselves. And this in turn has established new priorities in the minds of men of a humane kind who find the brutalities of violencerepugnant. I would myself

add another aspect of the case. Industrial societies depend for their very existence on a highly sophisticated network of co-operative activity which is vulnerable in a quite new way to fatal disruption if they lose their fundamental coherence. So we are all trained to put high value on the arts of achieving and maintaining a wide measure of consent in working the industrial complex. This tends to lower our appetite for seeking solutions to conflicts by the simple exertion of brute force.

There are even wider considerations which I shall refer to shortly leading to the conclusion that the use of military force in the modern world is subject to limitations of a kind new to human experience. But first let us look at the counter argument.

This is put by those who believe that underneath all the changes of our revolutionary century certain constants remain, and are likely to do so indefinitely. They point out that the two great super powers who have emerged on the world stage each has a propensity for believing that their arrival heralds a new dawn of human opportunity, a break with history, which they may well be tempted to exaggerate. For, whatever the changes may be in human desires and aspirations, the plain fact remains that so long as there are autonomous nations, there must be the ultimate capacity to defend, and as far as it is necessary and possible, to impose policies and purposes and one's own power position, by recourse to physical power, to back one's will by force or the threat of it. Moreover, some would add that precisely because our world is embarked on a period of open ended development and radical evolution, it will be seen to be impossible to effect the necessary structural and institutional alterations without the use of force capable of overcoming the natural inertia of established systems. In the communities in which my own work lies it is a notable feature of the last twenty years that the emphasis has shifted substantially in this respect. Whereas it used to be the accepted slogan that peace must be the over-riding Christian objective in international affairs, that wars settle nothing, and that in the end solutions will have to be found around the conference table, now the loudest voices sing a different tune. There is a more sophisticated understanding of the realities of power, and its dominant role even around the conference table, and a readiness to believe that there are elements of latent violence in our world, associated with unjust and oppressive international and internal relations, which can be challenged only by a readiness to resort to arms.

My purpose is not, in this paper, to reflect in general terms on these opposing views, alt ough as a theologian and a clergyman, the temptation to do so is admittedly present. Rather I want to explore the middle ground between them,

strictly in respect of the two great super powers whose conduct and relationship now and in the 1970's is the subject of this conference. We know, without too detailed an analysis that there is a curious impotence of power, and inability to gain real freedom of policy-making today on the international scene, by the deployment of sheer military might. What we have to ask is what are the reasons for it, is it a stable or even increasing inhibition, and will it bear fruit in the field of disarmament and the establishing of reliable and permanent means of resolving or reducing conflicts by other means.

The earliest explanation of this impotence of power, which both the United States and the Soviet Union have gradually recognised in the last twenty years, did not delve deeply into the historical changes brought about by the passage from a peasant feudal society to the urbanised industrialised communities of the modern world. It concentrated rather with horrified fascination on the newly discovered nuclear threat. For, with the experience of two total wars fresh in the mind, the prospect that any new trial of strength between them involving military engagement could be controlled seemed highly debatable. Once each side had acquired the capacity to penetrate the others defences with strategic nuclear weapons, the appalling danger of escalation inhibited even the lowest levels of military activity. Neither side had any experience to go on as to what would really happen if war broke out between them, even on an apparently limited and strictly circumscribed scale. And all the war games so far invented have failed to provide the kind of reassurances men have previously sought by reference to similar situations in past history. There were no such situations to refer to. George Ball has written: "The bomb has injected an additional and ominous unknown into the already complex equation of our international relations - the vivid symbol of mankind's ancient preoccupation; the concept of last things, finality, the end of the world. It has been this force, this fact with all its awful implications, the existence of weapons controlled by a small group of men capable of ultimate destruction, that has surcharged the world's business with uncertitude, with corrosive doubt as to the solidarity of all that has come before, that has compelled men to end all confident assertions with a question-mark, implicitly echoing Winston Churchill's sad speculation that "The Stone Age may return on the gleaming wings of science." One might add that it is this uncertainty which has raised to a new level doubts as to the utility of military force at any level between the great nuclear powers.

But then came Vietnam and a quite different discovery of inhibitions. While the two super-powers had morosely accepted their inability to use their military power against each other, they had not felt obliged to write off the

use of their weapons in situations where they were not confronting each other directly. They had tentatively explored the ground of brinkmanship to test their importence viz-á-viz each other - in and around Berlin, and in the Cuba crisis. The outcome evidently had a powerful influence in persuading them to reach tacit understandings and practical devices - hot lines, test bans, non-proliferation agreements - intended to reinforce the safeguards against an ultimate trial of strength. One such tacit understanding was that elsewhere in the world, if one intervened in a local conflict the other would not directly challenge it. So the Soviet Union had a relatively free-hand in Hungary and now recently in Czechoslovakia while she avoided a head-on collision with the United States when the latter intervened in Korea and then in Vietnam. But now a new set of doubts arose as to whether even in these areas military power had lost its utility. Is Vietnam a special case or a portent? Is it, in de Gaulles' military assessment, just "rotten country", a terrain from which you cannot draw lessons applicable, for instance, to such regions as the Veldt country of Southern Africa? No doubt this is an important factor. But my own view is that it is a portent of the future and that for a number of underlying reasons.

One is that we appreciate in a new way the smallness of our planet while also discovering that the minds of men in it are no longer susceptible to the control or disregard which a great power could indulge in in the past. Even the greatest super-power has to learn to live in this restricted space with the rest of mankind, and the advance of education, information and human awareness has made mankind harder to live with in this respect. One cannot permanently offend the sensibilities of the rest of the world without seriously damaging one's own future freedom of action. When non-lethal gases were used in Vietnam Michael Stewart protested in Viestminster "I am in fact, asking your government - to quote your own Declaration of Independence - to display a decent respect for the opinions of mankind". He could be charged with moral indulgence from the side lines. But as Klaus Knorr has pointed out in some detail the self-interest even of a super-power is today very deeply engaged in preserving a reputation for humaneness.

This calculation is no doubt reinforced by the element of evangelical zeal inherited in the ideologies of the two super-powers. Each had a gospel to proclaim, just as before them Britain shouldered the white man's burden. Each therefore was sensitive to the reactions of the congregation to whom they preached their rival sermons. It is true that this is a declining obsession on both sides. The result is that each is less and less possessed of a conviction about its civilising mission in the world, and its duty to offer mankind a replica of its own success. It would be fascinating to examine the causes of

this decline in evangelistic fervour but one suspects a major element is the discovery that those whom you thus liberate have a tiresome propensity to use their liberty to think for themselves. The great powers have learned what perhaps the Vatican has yet to learn that Development is not another name for Peace, though it is the pre-requisite for abundant life with all its turmoil. The upshot of all this experience has been, perversely, that even if the sermons have declined in forcefulness and confidence, the favourable reactions of the congregation have been of necessity more ardently solicited. The super-powers discover that they need the consent of the wills of others, however reluctant, in achieving what they want for themselves.

Moreover, there is present today on a universal scale what Europe learned the hard way in its own small corner across the centuries - that military victory is never the end of the story but only the beginning. Neighbours with whom you and your children must live next door interminably, if they cannot be liquidated, have to be liveable with. Everywhere is next door now on this earth, so that beyond military victory looms always the task of political reconstruction. And Vietnam has underlined that military means are selfdefeating which are not intimately linked to political ends. This is a limitation on military power which revolutionary and resistance movements everywhere have been the first to grasp - no doubt in part because lack of hardware wonderfully concentrates the mind. But it tends to upset the balance of technological superiority in weapons. The most advanced weaponry also tends to be the most negative in political consequence. And conversely there has grown up an expertise in the use of home-made weapons, and a whole philosophy of underground warfare closely related to political objectives which can substantially reduce the effectiveness of a complex military machine. thirty short years, we have moved from the Maquis through the jungles of S.E. Asia, to Belfast, and have discovered that in certain respects urban areas are as impenetrable as jungles to the forces of a great power, which is alien to the inhabitants, impenetrable both in physical terms, and even more perhaps in terms of political leadership.

Perhaps one other, more elusive, factor is at work. I must not succumb to the parsonical tendency to make vague and broad reflections on the human condition. But evidently the human person has acquired in theory at least, a new significance in the minds of men, and there is an increasing repugnance to be associated overtly with what looks like the cynical and brutal treatment of man himself. There is here, I believe, a deep change in human self-consciousness on a very wide scale, comparable to the change which took place among the European élite at the time of the Renaissance. I have sufficient respect for Marxism to suspect that the effective instrument in this

change has been the change in the means of production, with all its proliferating consequences. But the change itself is of a far deeper kind and touches on our awareness of ourselves, and of others as selves entitled to respect and dignity. It does not prevent men fighting each other. But it operates as a significant norm among the audience of the world as they watch the performance on the world's stage of the two chief actors. And now the audience does actually watch, through television and the other mass-media, on a scale never before conceived. It is complained that as they watch, they apply standard which are far higher than they aspire to or achieve themselves. But remember that this is the only defence which the relatively weak have against the strong - the public demand that their strength be exercised according to high standards of humanity and responsibility. It is a proper demand, even if it seems one-sided.

But all this is not the whole picture as we know. The brute fact of Czechoslovakia seems at once to call in question any simple assumption that today military power is relatively unusable to secure political ends, or that the cost in terms of world opinion is too high to pay. That operation in August 1968 can be argued both ways. To be sure, it can be used to prove the utility of massive military power. On the other hand the Soviet Union has still to meet all the political debts it then incurred, and it is a nice question whether the conceivable circumstances of its repetition will now be seen to/very limited. Geographical proximity, the deployment of such overwhelming force as was capable of achieving an almost bloodless coup, the assessment that what was at stake was perhaps the security of the régime and security of Russia herself, and then the long patient slow process needed to reap even such political harvest as has so far been brought in - all these together represent factors in judging what are the real limits of military power. For evidently there was and is a keen sense that the use of Russian planes and tanks on this scale requires also an immense propaganda and political cover if it is not to backfire dangerously to the permanent disadvantage of Russia. It is clear that Russia must care about something bigger than mere control of the Northern tier of the Warsaw pact area. She is forced to pay attention in some important degree to what men think, and not only to the means of compelling then to obey. And it is not at all clear yet how she will come to estimate her Czechoslovak adventure in that respect.

We might conclude from all this that the military power of the two superpowers, in its present monstrous and inflated dimensions, will be estimated as for strategic use only, and this in terms of mutual deterrence, principally to ensure the basic security of the homeland. The Nixon policy of trying to

withdraw from involvement in the internal affairs of Asia is, on this analysis, not the result of temporary war-weariness, but a permanent alteration of stance, with a concentration on the security of the outposts of the United States in the Pacific and Europe. If we follow the same argument in the case of Russia, we will regard her programme of developing mobility, and her capacity for interventions across the seas, as a vestige of an old and outworn doctrine which is likely to wither away as Russia appreciates fully the real import of the change of American strategic thinking. No doubt both nations will value the means to show the flag in many parts of the world, and presumably this will be a permanent feature of the naval forces of both sides. But it is clear that the enormous capacity of the United States for actual large scale military interventions across the oceans is likely, after Vietnam, to suffer considerable reduction, and it is quite conceivable that this in turn will be mirrored by a slowing down of Russian competitive build-up in this form of military power. Both will tend to rely more upon less overt interventions through the supply of arms to allies and through the covert operations of political and propaganda warfare - to achieve their purposes outside the area which they consider vital to their own security.

Do the inhibitions on the use of military power, however, work evenly on both sides? Are we not perhaps optimistic in imagining that a ruthless dictatorship cannot free itself from them, to an extent which compels its opposite number to maintain full precautions? We must analyse the assymmetry carefully. Certainly it is true that public opinion in the United States controls government policy in quite a different degree from the situation in Russia - indeed that the thing we call public opinion is an animal which does not exist in the same form in Russia. Certainly also American public opinion is more susceptible to influence from the rest of the world, and feels less confined by the strait-jacket of responsible power than is a government. official. We have seen vividly how this phenomenon has operated in the case of American policy in Vietnam. And we can compare it with the courageous impotence of a few intellectuals in Russia to make any impact on Russian policy in Czechoslovakia. But before we rush to conclusions we must also remember that public opinion can on occasion be roused to crusading zeal just as readily as to anti-war protests. And when it is so roused, it may be more difficult for governments to maintain a rational control of policy. And of course we know that an ingredient in the forces striving to mould public opinion is the vested interest in the development of military hardware. So we have to be careful about putting too much weight on this inhibiting factor. More pertinent is perhaps the reflection that an affluent society has no taste for personal involvement in military expeditions. It will pay heavily for its own security,

so long as that can be attained by clever technology and a small professional military establishment, made up of people who like that sort of thing. But blood and guts are not part of the general American ambition.

Another way of saying the same thing is that Western society is becoming more civilian in style, no longer susceptible to the disciplines and heroisms (or heroics) of war. It is argued by Klaus Knorr and others that, social leadership being no longer recruited from an élite caste, even "military leaders tend to be professional specialists ... less wedded to the traditional values of the warrior and aristocrat". It is not perhaps that we have overcome in the West an appetite for violence but that even here we prefer private enterprise and the banding of social groups and individuals by common consent to do and dare at the barricades, rather than the docile enlistment in a military service to carry out operations and policies with which we may have little personal identification. This reserved position is admirably expressed in the claims of selective conscientious objection. I fight only those wars I approve of.

On the other side of the divide, I am not sufficient of a Kremlinologist to assess how far the military pressures are effective in influencing Russian policy. But certainly we have a more disciplined, more docile society where it is possible apparently to call on patriotic zeal and some degree of military pride, associated with the names of great commanders enjoying the sort of prestige which a Montgomery or a MacArthur possessed in a past era in the West. All the same, such myths and symbols were not quite enough to ensure the reliability of young Russian troops in Prague last year, and we witnessed a certain nervousness and a concern to transpose units and insulate them from the populace, which would suggest a fear of the effects of civilian infection. Taking all that into account, one can still conclude that the hierarchical and tightly controlled society in Russian lends itself more easily to military expeditions at the behest of government than the United States. The Pentagon deals with altogether more recalcitrant material.

Be that as it may, there is a sense in which in Russia the national will (perhaps the Russian analogy of American public opinion) does set limits to what a government in the Kremlin will contemplate in military terms. American exuberance in exploring in all five continents is contrasted with a certain inveterate caution in the Russian mind. George Ball amusingly describes the former in these terms "Foregoing the luxury of introspection we have walked without blinking our eyes too much into the full glare of the Klieg lights - amid, of course, both hisses and applause. We have moved centre stage so quickly, it is no wonder we have occasionally behaved more exuberantly than the part has required, with the breathless energy of the understudy called

suddenly to perform when fame and whiskey have finally done in the old star". In comparison Russia seems often filled with introspection and earnestness, she remains the home of Chekov. She appears constitionally enclosed - with all the typical psychological features of a land power, sensitive about the defence of frontiers, defensive in posture, and with neither the appetite nor the facility for large-scale movement into far-away lands. And in-so-far as her present Marxist theology retains elements of its original orthodoxy her government is bound to look for spontaneous combustion in other lands, at the moment ripe for revolution, rather than for her own costly intervention, to create an international world in which she feels comfortable.

We might conclude from these considerations that the apparent assymetry in the influence of public opinion in the two great powers, does not of itself invalidate a prediction that both will tend more and more to allow what was called a power vacuum to develop in large areas of the world, so long as they retain the capacity to ensure their own security and integrity. They will no doubt manoeuvre aplenty in the vacuum area by all means short of visible military pressure, but they will at least be relieved of the necessity to maintain a capacity for military intervention on the existing American scale.

This military posture, it should be realised, is possible because of military preponderance. So long as the two powers are evidently and clearly in a military class of their own, altogether unreachable by anyone else, they can afford to sleep peacefully even when a lot of the things going on in the rest of the world are not entirely in accordance with their own desires.

Now if this broad picture is accurate we are left with two uses of military power by Russia and America which must be the main focus of their physical strength. One is to maintain a sufficient preponderance in the world to permit a measure of disengagement from its turmoils. The other is to confront each other. One can see the possibility that in the confrontation game, played by the rules of co-existence, there is a strong economic and strategic incentive to get control of technological escalation, and incentive applicable to both though no doubt in different degrees. The joker in the pack in this respect is China - not because she is yet in a position to alter the rules of the confrontation but because of two other factors which inter-twine. They are the fact of China's size and potentiality, allied to the failure so far to engage her in the international dialogue in ways which promise the development of tacit agreements and understandings. So the conversation of the two great powers is constantly diverted by looking over their shoulders to see how the new member of the family is growing up, and shaping.

I say this to introduce the final question - how far the objective limitation of military power as an instrument of American and Soviet policies lends hope to the work of disarmament. Where the two great powers confront one another in Europe most directly, the chances of a reduction of forces leading to a more tolerable sort of European security arrangement, depend not a little on finding a way to reduce the potential threat of the Russian army. But this can scarcely be envisaged so long as Russia's borders with China are under potential threat, to the extent that she cannot afford a serious reduction of her main military establishment. What she needs, or thinks she may need, against China can always be switched at a moment when the political climate makes it desirable. And so the United States is obliged to maintain an equivalent potential for Europe, even if it is not maintained in Europe.

This leads to one or two general conclusions on the prospects for arms control between the two super-powers, in the light of the limitations on military power we have been analysing. First there is substantial logic in their seeking mutual agreements to check the progress of technological escalation, with all its limitless expense. In the strategic field in partic-·ular they must realise that they are simply beggaring themselves. These agreements could be formalised agreements openly arrived, at, in public conference. But in the sphere of non-nuclear conventional armament it seems more probable that a slow attrition could be hoped for, in the post-Vietnam phase, imposed more by the Bureau of the Budget and its Russian equivalent than by any formal agreement - and in respect of those forces at present assigned to duties which are not directly related to the central security system. In the case of Russia this may mean rather a slowing down of the programme of building an intervention capacity, than a reversal of it. But it is hard to see in the immediate future any real reduction of the massive forces of conventional and nuclear capability which sustain the balance between the two super-powers themselves. No doubt each will aim to improve their mobility so that they can be deployed either in the European or the Asian confrontation. But until the Chinese have somehow been brought fully into the conversation, it is difficult to foresee either of the super-powers feeling free to demobilise in any degree this central core of their military power. I am not, I believe, either fitted or required to assess what the consequences might be of a serious development of a European Defence Community. But all I would say is that this is still too notional to be taken into account in determining the prospects for great power disarmament.

Where does all this leave the rest of mankind which seeks escape from the dominance of the powerful while simultaneously looking to them to use their strength in such a way that freedom and economic development can be enlarged

without constant threats of warfare? These are contradictory requirements in principle and the question is which way the balance will tilt. My conclusion is that in the next period the concept of establishing some sort of world order will suffer serious neglect. The limitations we have perceived in the political utility and practical effectiveness of large military operations by the super-powers outside the area of their own confrontation suggest that they will relinquish for the time being any notion of a role as world policemen. That does not mean that they can afford a total detachment from the turmoil of the rest of the world. But it does suggest that they will rely on an indirect use of their power to protect and promote their interests. possess enough influence on the supply of arms, particularly the sophisticated and heavier varieties, to play a large part, which avoids direct commitment of their own personnel. No doubt the covert influence exercised by the CIA and its opposite numbers will remain, without, however, the ultimate backing of direct military interventions. And, of course, the levers of economic power remain. But all of these together will serve the ends, less of world order, than of restraining disorder within certain limits and those limits set in the interests of the super-powers conceived in no very grandiose terms.

Perhaps the decline in the dream of creating a world order is incvitable. It is surely a product of the imperial age. Moreover, in a world where there is so widespread an appreciation of the possibilities of rapid change and new perspectives, we are not at a point in time when order can yet be designed so as to fit the surging community of mankind. There is not yet in sight a tolerable answer to the question "Who's order?" And the super-powers themselves are less and less convinced that the order they each hoped humanity would embrace is in fact going to be welcomed on any great scale.

Something of the same disenchantment rubs off on the United Nations. But here at least any international peace-keeping projects are subject to debate in the public arena of the Assembly or Security Council, and are therefore less tainted with imperial infection. I believe that a modest peace-keeping role will remain and should be available on request in areas of the world where the super-powers desire to keep in the background or the parties to the conflict are particularly anxious to exclude them. But the problems of paying for such operations, in itself by no means a gigantic undertaking, remains politically formidable. For there are not many political plums to be plucked from this tree, and there are great political risks. And at best, such operations are never again likely to reach the military proportions of the Congo operation, much less that in Korea, both of which were in some degree cloaks for big power intervention.

I am therefore led to the conclusion that such order in the third world as it itself requires will increasingly have to be sought by the development of regional systems of security. This is a daunting prospect when we appreciate the fragile and disparate foundations on which such systems have to be constructed in Asia and Africa. But perhaps the Russian initiative towards as Asian regional system is an indication of the way things must go, however falteringly. And perhaps some of the dreams of Nkrumah for Africa will have to be realised one day if Swedes and Germans, Russians and French, British and Portuguese are not to get themselves involved in every African conflict, as they are today in Nigeria, making it harder than ever to resolve. But this opens up another whole chapter about the role and use of military forces in the new nations which happily I am not required to explore.

#### INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

#### 11th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

### THE SUPER POWERS! SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

#### PLENARY SESSION

Sunday 21st September

Morning (II)

# Conclusion and Envoi

You do not need me to tell you that this has been a conference of great interest and significance, and I am proud that my final performance should conclude so valuable an occasion. The subject was well chosen - I had suggested a completely different one for this year and furtunately was overruled by the ISS Council - for the care, feeding and education of the two super powers is one of the central aspects of modern strategic studies. In my view, though we are moving away from bipolarity, there will not be any other super powers in our lifetime though there may be other nuclear powers: Japan does not have the necessary geographical advantages, China will not have the economic resources, or Western Europe the internal cohesion with which the United States and the Soviet Union are still endowed; so it is important that we concentrate our minds upon the relationships of these two particular countries, even though the sources of conflict in the world no longer spring merely from their own competition.

But I think you will also agree that the Conference has produced few surprises, something that is no reflection on the quality of the papers of the participants. For we have been labouring, for the most part, in the well-tilled vineyard of inter-governmental relations, dealing with familiar subjects such as super-power interests and influence, arms control, and strategic balance, where objectives and relationships change only slowly, despite the growing polarization of domestic politics in many countries of East and West to which Marshall Shulman has referred. We have not been concerned in any detail with those more obscure but perhaps more explosive forces which may be gathering strength beneath the surface of formal international relations and which might bring what is left of Western civilization and what is left of the Soviet empire crashing down in anarchy within the next decade. What the Conference has most usefully done is to confirm and clarify a number of political impressions that many of us have subjectively arrived at over the past year or so.

One popular myth, moreover, has been usefully dispelled. It is that we are on the verge of a new Yalta, that a mixture of Chinese intransigence and the fear of the cost of the strategic arms race are driving the Soviet Union and the United States into each other's arms, or that they now nourish a private ambition to establish some sort of nuclear condominium before the middle powers of the world grow too powerful or the small ones too unruly. Almost all the Plenary speakers have emphasized that we are going to see modifications in the policy and behaviour of the two super powers, but no-one has suggested the likelihood of radical change in their relationship, or the sudden burying of antipathies and antagonisms which are now two generations old; none have suggested any renversement des alliances. And the discussions have confirmed this sense of continuity in the formal structure of the international system. Consequently, it needs no extended comment from me.

I think this Conference illustrates the value of studying a problem from a number of different angles and by observers stationed in different quarters of the globe. On our first morning we were presented with a striking contrast, in the lucid analyses of Henry Brandon and Rix Lowenthal, of a United States on the one hand which was engaged in a process of disengagement the better to cope with gnawing domestic problems from a period of over-extended and over-ambitious commitments; of a Soviet Union on the other hand where "we are watching the successful outward expansion of an internally declining régime". Neither paper suggested domestic change; but placed in juxtaposition, as they were, they might have signalled " a more radical transformation of the international scene than the picture that in fact emerged from a closer study of different facets of the question; for, as Karl Birnbaum reminded us in his analysis, what we are witnessing is not a decline in the power of the Soviet Union and the United States but in their relative influence upon the international system. Politics, including international politics, is a game in which both sides can lose, and not only in a war.

This and several other points seem to me to have emerged rather clearly from the discussions on Asia, in Plenary and committee. The first, put forward by Bruce Miller, is that American disengagement there and indeed from the affairs of the third world in general, will be relative rather than absolute; Vietnam may not be the portent which many have assumed. He is right I think in arguing that there is no overriding reason to think that the Soviet Union will be sucked into South East Asia by the diminution of American and British power there, though surely she will take her opportunities where she can. Nothing bedevils international relations more than the attempt to describe it by analogies drawn from the natural sciences.

such as talk about powers moving in to fill vacuums left by others; the laws and compulsions of politics are not those of physics. The second point is related to this. namely that within limits there are certain parallel Soviet and American interests in promoting the stability of parts of Asia, the Indian sub-continent for instance, even if they never take the form of joint action. The third which emerges both from General Chaudhuri's and Professor Wakaizumi's paper is that Asia as a whole is losing its extreme fear of China as the limitations of Chinese power become more evident, which means, I think, that the Asian powers may feel more independent in the future. The fourth is that, despite Mr. Brezhnev's mysterious reference to an Asian security system, we are not likely to see any major international structures arise in Asia; it seems more probable that the super powers will, for the most part, deal bilaterally with their friends, while their friends, India and the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States, will each try to avoid an exclusive or too dependent relationship with one super power. The search for an independent Japanese foreign policy may well take much of the next decade, unless there is a debacle between one of the super powers and China, for this would rapidly accelerate decisions in Tokyo.

verve and insight Rix Lowenthal and Marshall Shulman have analysed with/the nature of the dilemmas confronting the Soviet Union, and Mr. Arbatov has commented upon our Western speculations. I am no Kremlinologist so there is little that I can add to this except to offer one Westerner's opinion on an aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute. It is simply this: that we in the non-communist world derive little pleasure and some apprehension from the spectacle of the two great communist powers in a state of high hostility and mutual abuse. Though the Sino-Soviet alliance in its heyday in the 1950's represented too large an aggregation of power for a healthy international order, I would judge that the rather naive Western view of ten years ago that hostility between the Soviet Union and China might make the former more amenable to a settlement in Europe, or later, in the Middle East, now has few supporters. For we know enough about social and political behaviour to know that militancy on one frontier may simply increase it on others; it was, after all, a great Soviet diplomat who said that "Peace is indivisible".

I know that people in Moscow are haunted by the prospect of the United States moving into alliance with China; this seems to me to have little political reality. But our Soviet friends must recognize that many people in many countries of the West have an uneasy conscience about China, and

agree with the Soviet Union that relations with her should be normalised, that she should be drawn out of her isolation, before she becomes powerful enough to wreck an international system whose operation she does not fully understand or respect. Moreover, there can be no doubt that if the Soviet Union decided upon any form of punitive action against China the latter might well begin to regain sympathy and support, diplomatically isolated though she still is.

In Asia we have come to expect both domestic violence and external conflict. European conflict has for the most part been anaesthetized because she has been the fulcrum of the central balance for the past quarter century. As Francois Duchène pointed out at the beginning, this point of balance may be shifting from Europe to Asia. So we must take serious account of the possibility that, as domestic radicalism increases in the West, as the dominance of Soviet orthodoxy in the East becomes more unbearable, there will be European crises which might have wide international repercussions. We shall be confronted with Pierre Hassner's question. Are the super powers and especially the Soviet Union going to behave as firemen or as arsonists in Europe?

The commitment of the United States to the deterrence of a certain kind of conflict in Europe is permanent - or as permanent as anything we can foresee - and subject only to modifications on the level of American forces there. The point the United States must bear in mind, in dealing with this permanent commitment which history has imposed upon her - namely the maintenance of the subsidiary European balance - is that she has so dominated NATO, intellectually and physically, that she can only alter her level of military support very gradually. Henry Brandon has mentioned the desire to devolve greater strategic authority on Europe, in marked contrast the previous era of American policy which insisted on the centralisation of strategic authority. But the enthusiasm of the European powers to assume a greater share of the total burden is not something that can be turned on and off like a tap. And a more coherent organization of the defence of Western Europe will now in fact proceed on a timetable largely laid down in Europe, not in Washington. The same is true also of the American desire to devolve responsibility on Japan: the Japanese debate will proceed according to its own logic.

If the future of super-power influence and control of possible European conflicts looks dubious, how much more is this true of the Middle East where - so the discussion in Harold Beeley's paper suggests - the Soviet Union is now in a most difficult position. She has helped in the erosion of Western influence there, but has gained as yet no advantage in terms of

improved communications with Asia and stands in permanent danger of becoming involved, through action over which she has little control, in confrontation with the United States.

Finally, the strategic relationship. Again, this is not the time for any comprehensive statement, but for marginal comments only. We have just heard a wise analysis from Marshall Shulman of some of the inherent problems of the Soviet-American relationship and Mr. Arbatov's most interesting comments on it. We have had Hedley Bull's close analysis of the problems involved in negotiating an arms control agreement; Dr. Grewe's evaluation of both the benefits and the risks of such an agreement for Europe; Johan Holst's statement of the case for mixing active defence systems with deterrence and Charles Herzfeld's view that technological innovation is neutral and can even contribute to restraint.

They are detailed exposes which need careful thought and digestion, and I will make only certain comments from a different angle of vision. The first is to suggest that the future historian may find it very strange that the super powers, having acquired the priceless asset of an assured destruction capability vis-à-vis each other, allowed anything - technological innovation, over-building of certain kinds of retaliatory force, failure of intellectual communication - to put it in question. This is an aspect of a much larger question which will dominate much of the late 20th century, as it should have dominated much of the earlier, namely how to make technological change serve human ends, something which affects our town planning or our agriculture as much as our security.

My second comment is to reinforce the point made by Monsieur Maillard that if China is used as a rationale for the failure of SAIT, - with all the uncertainties and complications this will create - then China will have been used by both parties much more by way of excuse than as a legitimate reason.

The third is to remind you of the profound difference between a strategic posture based on assured destruction capabilities on both sides and one that contemplates the active defence of the territories of the super-powers in terms of a relationship of confidence with allies. At the present we are all equally vulnerable in a nuclear war, or to a nuclear threat whether we are citizens of New York or Moscow, London or Paris or Tokyo or Hamburg or Warsaw. If the super powers retire behind active defences of their own while the rest of us are protected merely by a necessarily equivocal strategy of deterrence, then the European-American, the Japanese-American and the Soviet East-European relationship will gradually erode and one day will snap altogether.

I know the difficulties in SALT: I am dubious whether it can now avert a period of great instability in super-power relations. Both Moscow and Washington are to blame for this dilettante approach to a great issue, though Moscow must bear the greater blame for she still lacks even a rudimentary organization to study the politico-military problems involved in arms control. But I cannot over-emphasize the political risks, let alone the strategic ones, that both capitals run if they let these obstacles defeat them. Let me quote the recent words of a very hardheaded and un-sentimental American, McGeorge Bundy:

"The neglected truth about the present strategic arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union is that in terms of international political behaviour that race has now become almost completely irrelevant. The new weapons which are being developed by each of the two great powers will provide neither protection nor opportunity in any serious political sense."

(Foreign Affairs, October 1969)

More than this I do not believe that either Moscow or Washington appreciates the sense of alienation between them and their friends if the strategic arms race persists indefinitely, if every ingenuity of technology is exploited to its full. I think I speak for most Englishmen, Frenchmen, Italians, Germans, Indians, Japanese and Canadians and other middle and smaller countries in this Conference, in saying that if they become two vast agglomerations of strategic power which they are unable to put to any constructive use we the middle powers will come to regard them - despite our ties of history or interest or affection - as the adolescent children of a broken home regard their parents: occasionally useful but neither to be trusted nor to be honoured.

This, the Americans and Russians may say in unison merely reflects the ambivalence of the middle powers who seem to fear both Soviet-American agreement and continued Soviet-American competition. But, in fact, it is another way of saying that the middle powers and smaller powers can not proceed with any confidence in a situation in which the super powers have lost all conception of world order; that if they define their interests narrowly this will lead the middle powers to ape as many characteristic of the super powers as they are economically and technologically capable of doing.

The time has now arrived when I hand over the Direction of this Institute to my friend Francois Duchêne, and exchange the role of impresario for that of pedagogue. I have no profound conclusions to offer you by way of a farewell address so I will not detain you long, nor waste your time with rhetoric. Let me offer instead, a few brief conclusions of

my own on three subjects, on the events of the past decade, on the development of strategic studies, and on the position and future of this Institute.

ISS has been in existence for just under eleven years and at last year's Annual Conference we were discussing, among other things, the increase in the intellectual resources devoted to the study of conflict and strategy, to the analysis of the implications of alternative policies or weapons systems, analogous to the great expansion in economic studies which the financial and economic crises of the 1930s gave rise to.

But what have we got to show for all the books and the monographs, the confidential reports and the earnest Ph.D theses, or the outpourings of the systems analysts? What evidence is there that governments, or the political process by which decisions are evolved, is affected by this new field of scholarship. Do not Presidents and Praesidiums and Cabinets still largely operate by intuition or in accordance with personal prejudices or popular pressure? What influence did new techniques of analysis have on the Soviet decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia? What influence did the work of the early 1960s in the West on revolutionary warfare have on the various snap decisions which successively embroiled the United States so deeply in Vietnam? Does the kind of objective analysis we have been attempting this weekend have anything like the same influence on longer-range governmental decisions, the security policies of the European powers, for instance, so much as simple calculations about what the Treasury will bear or the public will wear? Do not strategic analysts themselves largely arrive at their conclusions intuitively and then run the figures through the computer to suit their arguments?

Moreover, is there any discernible improvement in the security of our environment, or the stability of international society as a consequence of our efforts? Ten or eleven years ago, for instance, we were deeply concerned about the implications of the long-range missile for the stability of the central balance and felt that we were heading for a period of considerable confusion and uncertainty in the relations of the major powers. And the Cuban and the Berlin crises of a few years later justified this sense of apprehension. Now we know, having assimilated one technological revolution, that we are on the threshold of another, that super-power relations are about to enter a very similar period of instability. Ten years ago we were concerned at the violence associated with the process of de-colonization: now we are concerned, in impotent

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distress for the most part, at the violence that the new states themselves are engendering. The United Nations has had its brief day as an effective agent of international security, largely under the stimulus of our Chairman and the brilliant leadership of Dag Hammarskold, and has sunk back into obscurity again. If anything we are further from any valid concept of world order than we were at the height of the Cold War - when at least we had two coherent conceptions of it even if wholly conflicting - as the super powers become primarily concerned with a narrower conception of their national interest. The industrial powers have if anything become more callous about conflict in the developing world as their interests are decreasingly affected by it. Communications, they say, are creating a transnational political community in which we all become more involved in each others affairs; but one aspect of communications is simply to make the ordinary public blase as it sees burning villages in Biafra or barricades in Belfast or tanks in Prague or riots in Calcutta or Detroit on the television screen week after week.

I ask you, because I often ask myself, whether these years of labour have been worth it, for I did not get into this field of study for the fun of it. I sometimes ask myself whether there are not brutalizing forces at work both within societies and in their relations with each other which it is beyond the power of any of us to control.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to end upon a note of unrelieved gloom for there is some progress to record. In the first place, we have had no major war, and 1969 is three years further from 1945 than 1939 was from 1918. Already, I think, C.P. Snow's foolish prophecy has been falsified, that if nuclear weapons were not immediately eliminated "within ten years some of them are going off, that is the certainty". And the longer time goes on from Hiroshima and Nagasaki without a nuclear weapon being used in anger, the more catastrophic - mad, risky, offbeat, outre-choose your own word - it appears to any government to consider using one. This creates its own problems in terms of the credibility of nuclear guarantees by nuclear powers to their allies, but that is a minor drawback to an immense gain - though not a gain for which you and I, so much as the size of the risks involved, can take the credit.

Second, we have come to understand better what is involved in the control of armaments. The abandonment of unrealizable objectives like General and Complete Disarmament and its replacement by the concept of arms control is a great step forward and one which had not been accepted by governments or even by more than a handful of pioneer thinkers a decade ago.

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Nevertheless progress has been modest, having only the Outer Space Treaty and the partial Test Ban to its credit as a serious and significant step in the relations of the major powers, and the treaty on the denuclearization of Latin America among the relations of regional powers. I do not myself now rate very high the prospect for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, partly for the reason Henry Brandon suggested on Thursday. In fact I think the nuclear powers have bungled the whole issue of proliferation, and this may be an illustration of the fact that you cannot solve one aspect of world order in isolation, without tackling broader issues as well.

And we leave this Conference with the strong fear that SAIT is not going to be productive in the sense of having much bearing on the deployment of the technology now under test. Given the lengthy and difficult process of negotiation against a background of rapidly advancing technology success for the most part is only probable with the control of systems whose deployment lies some distance ahead.

Moreover we still suffer from the sin of grandiosity in thinking of arms control. Though I am not sure that I agree with Hedley Bull that tacit agreements between the super powers are as important or as significant as formal ones particularly since their dialogue is so fragmentary and especially if they wish to retain any authority in a restless and increasingly polycentric world, it remains true that these two countries can possibly control their strategic confrontation by parallel action following some rough and ready mutual understanding. But an overemphasis on negotiations like SAIT may mean that the opportunity is missed to get less glamorous but equally intractable problems under control - the competitive arms trade between the industrial powers in the developing world, for instance, or to develop a new convention to regulate the behaviour of external powers towards a country undergoing the agony of civil war.

One of the more encouraging aspects of arms control is to see the smaller countries getting active not only in the intellectual study of its problems but in the formulation of proposals. The British or French governments could usefully take a leaf out of the book of Denmark or of tiny Malta.

The third field in which some headway has been made is in the management of crises. The difference between the blundering actions of the super powers in the Suez crisis of 1956 and their relative calm in the third Arab-Israel war of 1967 was striking. The internal techniques of crisis management, both within large governments such as

the American and, I judge, the Soviet, and also within alliances is also considerably approved. This is an aspect of the increase in civilian control of military policy and the reduction in the number of independent centres of decision-making. Whether these techniques will stand the strain of the period of confusion in super-power relations which the next round of technological advance is certain to produce, coupled as it will be with a tense relationship between Peking and both Moscow and Washington, I am in no position to predict. I would suggest it as a good subject for an ISS conference of five years hence, except that such a proposal would have a fallacious logic; for if the techniques of crisis control should have proved inadequate then none of us will be here.

Finally, I see in this past decade a more certain advance in our understanding of the modern international system and how it operates; the difference between the form and the reality of legal sovereignty; the purposes which armed force can and cannot accomplish, as Alan Booth has explored with considerable insight in his paper; what is required in legal, political and military terms to make a guarantee to another power effective; what kinds of conflict are likely to spread or escalate and what are not; the effect of violence in one area upon the prospects of it in another.

This has not prevented gross blunders in the 1960s on the part of the major powers; the American embroilment in Vietnam: the Soviet encouragement to Egyptian and Syrian bellicosity in 1967: the British belief that Rhodesia could be coerced by economic means alone; de Gaulle's fantasy that a European balance could be constructed between France and the Soviet Union. But these for the most part have redounded on their own heads, and they have had the salutory effect of making the professionals more modest about the dependability of the techniques of analysis and prediction which they have used.

But there is a reverse side to this coin also. Though we may now have a constituency in all the significant countries which has a clearer understanding of the role of force, and a more unified constituency at that, in which the soldier accepts political reality and the diplomat has had to understand the soldier's business, a situation in which the practitioners have become more "sophisticated" (curious use of a word that/"adulterated" or "intellectually corrupt") is also one to which nations feel readier to engage in brinkmanship. The heads of governments in 1914, in Potsdam and Vienna, Paris and St. Petersberg and London thought that they understood their own international system perfectly.

Now let me say a brief word about the subject of strategic studies as a field of concern and study that bridges the gap between theory and policy. For one of the greatest advances I have detected is in the methodology of the subject, in sorting out conflict studies which are concerned with those social and psychological factors which produce animosity between men and nations and how they may be mitigated, and peace studies which are concerned with the feasibility of a more ideal international order, from strategic studies which accept the reality of current force, violence and technological change and sets out to analyse how force may be balanced and change controlled. And then in sorting out strategic studies, which is an international subject concerned with the world at large, from defence studies which are concerned with the security of an individual country, or how armed force, or the lack of it, may advance or retard its national interests. Ten years ago there was complete confusion among scholars and officials alike, with the consequence that there was a dialogue des sourds between the pacifist and the militarist, the policy-maker and the analyst. Moreover a great many propositions and indeed policies were then advanced as if they were of universal validity whereas in fact they have been only rationalizations in universal terms of a particular national interest.

This is no time for me to read you any homily on this subject, and I would simply echo what my successor said on Thursday evening, namely that the scope of strategic and political studies must now be considerably broadened and brought into a close rapport with conflict and sociological studies if it is to have any significance in calrifying the much more complex forms of violence that are developing throughout the world. The war in Vietnam, after all, was lost not in Cochin China but on the playing fields of Groton. Let me impress upon you my own strong belief that strategic studies should not be regarded as the province of the major powers alone nor as a discipline in their own right: they are simply an aspect of politics, and any country that is engaged in international politics is engaged in strategy. One of the particular reasons why this Institute exists, is that strategic theory cast in terms of the national interest of a country like the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain or France may be quite irrelevant to the preoccupations of most other countries.

Let me close with a word about this Institute. As our President and Chairman said on Thursday night it has two essential functions: one is to act as an international centre of communication and the other is to act as an independent focus of research. I am very proud of what it has

achieved in both fields. We have succeeded in breaking down the national boundaries of the subject as well as the barriers between governments and scholars, although I recognize how very difficult it is to think in international terms in this of all fields - for I myself have often been guilty of projecting my own national perspective as if it were naturally those of other countries as well. From a tiny handful of non-Americans who were competent in this field of study ten years ago, there is now a great diversity in the middle and smaller powers of the world - as this Conference exemplifies. Our own Research Associates! programme - we have had some forty in number from a dozen countries - has played a useful part in this, though we must share any laurels that may be going with the Harvard Center. the Geneva Institute and several other bodies. And from making American thinking intelligible, which was our prime concern in the early years, we have been able in recent years to break new ground, particularly in European and Asian security questions, from a number of different national viewpoints.

But as I said last year this has been no single-handed achievement. I personally owe an immense debt of gratitude first of all to my colleagues and staff at Adam Street who carry a load of responsibility and work which most academic centres would not for a moment contemplate; to other institutes in many countries including my colleague Louis Jaquet of the Netherlands Institute who have helped us, given us an entrée to their own élites, sought our services and generally encouraged us; to the Council of the Institute drawn as it is from fifteen countries in five continents, and particularly to its Chairman, which has provided me with great support on many thorny issues; to the foundations in several countries which have supported us without interfering with our independence and have indicated their continuing support for the future; and finally, to you, the members, for it is you, and your 800 colleagues who are not present here, who by your own individual initiatives in seeking membership, have created this remarkable international community of serious interest and scholarship, a community which now extends far beyond the industrial world and will I am sure, within the next decade, include members from the Soviet Union and from Eastern Europe and perhaps even from China.

Finally, I would like to express my great confidence in my successor who has also been a personal friend for many years. He takes over at a time when the internal structure of the Institute is stronger than it has ever been, even though it may face difficult problems of finance in the 1970s. But Francois Duchêne could hardly have succeeded me at a more

at least, with a period of relative stability in the central balance, when the principal task was to assess to what constructive ends the power that already existed in the world could be addressed and how other forms of conflict than those between the great powers could be mitigated. Francois must pilot this Institute through a period of accelerating trouble in the relations of all the significant nations, super, middle and small in the world, springing as often from domestic as from external causes. Moreover, because of the decline of the authority of the super powers - a situation which gives more scope and influence to the middle and smaller powers - the responsibilities of an international institute like this will be even greater in the 1970s than in the 1960s. The mixture of firmness of character and flexibility and lucidity of thought which I know of old in Francois Duchêne makes me certain that he is more than equal to the challenge.



# INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES 11th ANNUAL CONFERENCE

## THE SUPER POWERS SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER

#### PLENARY SESSION

Friday, 19th September

Morning (11)

### Changing Soviet Policies and Interests

#### Prof. RICHARD LOWENTHAL

It is now almost five years since N.S. Khrushchev was overthrown by the present "collective leadership" of party oligarchs. In the face of numerous Western predictions that the new team would prove both indecisive and highly unstable, its members have held together without public conflict for longer than the earlier collectives that took over after the death of Lenin and that of Stalin. Moreover, though they started with the dual handicap of the legacy of defeat in the Cuban missile crisis and of the conflict with Communist China that had turned Russia's major ally into a potential enemy, they have managed considerably to improve the Soviet Union's position as a world power, by edging closer to United States' military strength in both strategic nuclear weapons and the long-range mobility of their conventional forces, and by extending the areas under predominant Soviet influence.

However, the student who seeks to analyse this successful performance is struck by a number of puzzling, and in part contradictory, new features. First, the new men have on the whole tended to be cautious rather than adventurous in their methods - to avoid the rocket-rattling practised by Krushchev between 1960 and 1962, and to preserve and develop the techniques of bilateral "crisis management" that had grown out of the Cuban confrontation; but they have made no serious effort to maintain the climate of "East-West détente" created in Krushchev's final years. Second, they started the improvement of Russia's imperial position by combining a quiet but steady increase in armaments with the exploitation of a number of diplomatic windfalls, achieved with a remarkable economy of visible military effort; but as the wind turned and the international constellation became more difficult from 1967 onwards, they have tended to slide into policies leading to a growing overextension of their military resources. Third, they have shown virtually no active concern with the ideological objective of "world revolution" in the sense of promoting the conquest of power by Communist parties outside their power sphere; but they have been increasingly worried about their "ideological security" in the sense of seeking to preserve control over the social development of Russia and Eastern Europe by maintaining

ideological uniformity. Finally, the marked expansion of Soviet diplomatic and military influence in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and lately in South and Southwest Asia towards the Indian Ocean contrasts with the growing symptoms of the leaders' defensiveness in the face of the aspirations of various groups of their own society - their growing inability to enforce intellectual conformity or even bureaucratic discipline despite the increasing use of police repression: we are watching the successful outward expansion of an internally declining regime. Nothing indeed is more characteristic for the paradox of the situation than the extreme contrast between the general appreciations of its performance given by well-informed Western students of Soviet affairs: some of those who focus on internal Soviet developments speak of "political degeneration" or even of a "pre-revolutionary situation", while others who are preoccupied solely with Soviet foreign and military policy stress its remarkable rationality!

In seeking to understand the new features of Soviet foreign policy and its conflicting tendencies by relating them to the underlying changes in Soviet interests, we must therefore bear in mind that the manner in which the leaders of a Great Power perceive its interests is always the outcome of two broad sets of factors: the realities of the international constellation with its power relations and common or conflicting objectives on one side, and the character of the domestic political framework in which the leaders operate and the way in which its pressures combine with their own outlook on the other. As the international constellation has undergone a number of changes in the course of the last five years, while the post-Khrushchevian regime has remained unchanged in its basic characteristics, we shall do well to start with the influence of this comparatively stable background on the perception of Soviet interests by the leadership.

#### A Post-Revolutionary Oligarchy

The collective leadership that replaced Khrushchev may be described as a post-revolutionary oligarchy, authoritarian and conservative in outlook and bureaucratic in method. It is an oligarchy because it has risen from the common determination of its members no longer to accept the risks of dynamic, but frequently erratic one-man rule, and has actually managed so far to prevent its return by maintaining a high degree of collective discipline in public. It is post-revolutionary because it has abandoned the attempt to transform the structure of Soviet society in accordance with ideological blueprints, as Stalin repeatedly did by the massive use of political force and as Khrushchev vainly attempted up to 1961 by party campaigns without such use of force: while still paying lip service to the goal of the "higher stage" of communism, it envisages its achievement not by further revolutionary transformations, but as a by-product of a steady, evolutionary increase in productivity and the standard of living. It is authoritarian and conservative because, while committed to economic progress and willing to experiment with limited economic reforms for that purpose, it

seeks to preserve the one-party monopoly which forms the basis of its rule and to prevent the aspirations of social groups from finding expression in a plurality of independent organisations and organs of opinion: it thus finds itself permanently on the defensive against an increasingly modern and differentiated society which it is no longer able to press into a preconceived ideological mould, but which it remains unwilling to let form its own representative organs. It is bureaucratic not only in relying on the bureaucracy for the execution of policy, as does every modern state, but in admitting the various sectors of the bureaucracy - party: machine economic administration, army, police, as the only legitimate participants in the formation of policy, including a limited right of advancing their views in public: the party leadership, i.e. in practice the politburo, now regards itself as supreme arbiter between the bureaucratic sectors.

For a post-revolutionary, authoritarian oligarchy of this type, the central domestic problem is the legitimation of its monopoly of power. If the ruling party leadership can no longer present itself as possessing the "correct" Marxist blueprint for reshaping the structure of society, if it is frankly concerned with administering the results of the revolution rather than continuing its upheavals, it is hardly obvious why it must maintain its dictatorship: the growth of productivity and welfare in a modern industrial society can evidently be promoted at least as easily by a pluralistic democracy. In an effort to ward off the pressures for the formation of independent interest groups and organs of opinion, post-revolutionary Communist regimes thus tend to fall back on the need for national unity in a hostile world: that explains the increasing role of nationalist and indeed chauvinistic indoctrination as a means of maintaining national and social discipline not only in the Soviet Union, but also in other Communist states at a similar stage of development. But while the use of nationalism as a "substitute ideology" may be effective for a time in defending an authoritarian regime against demands for liberalisation, it offers no specific justification for the primacy of the party over other sectors of the bureaucracy. On the contrary, it tends to increase the prestige and influence of the military leaders, and ultimately to undermine their readiness to accept without question the decisions of the political leadership where the latter affect their own interests. In 1966, for the first time in the history of the CPSU, an army unit was called upon to march, with band playing and banners flying, into the hall where the 23rd party congress Three years later, the party leaders took the equally unprecedented step of cancelling the traditional Mayday parade - amid signs that if it had taken place, they might not have been able to control the speech of their Minister of Defense!

To justify the primacy of the party, the post-revolutionary regime must thus supplement its emphasis on "military-patriotic" education and chauvinistic propaganda by ever new calls for "ideological struggle" to defend the official Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy against "bourgeois ideological subversion" - even though

that orthodoxy has long lost all concrete relevance for either the actual problems of the evolution of Soviet seciety at home or the orientation of Soviet foreign policy.

For just as the collective leadership is at home concerned with selfpreservation and economic growth rather than with the revolutionary transformation of society, so in foreign affairs it looks after Russian security and imperial power rather than promoting the spread of Communist revolutions. In this, their outlook is closer to that of Stalin, who favoured such revolutions only where they came about by the direct extension of Russia's power sphere and regarded independent Communist revolutions as both unlikely and undesirable, than to that of Khrushohev, who at first viewed the harmonious parallel advance of such independent revolutions under Soviet leadership as possible. Since then, experience both under and after Khrushchev has shown that Communist states emerging from independent revolutions cannot be effectively controlled in the Soviet interest, and that they may prove at best difficult and costly allies like Cuba, and at worst dangerous rivals and potential enemies like China. Conversely, the increase of Soviet power since Stalin's time has enlarged the geographical range within which even states under non-Communist regimes may be effectively incorporated in the Soviet sphere of influence by a combination of the traditional methods of power politics with the exploitation of a broad ideological affinity with the "anti-imperialist" outlook of their governments.

But just as the lack of relevance of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine for the present stage of the evolution of Soviet society does not prevent the ruling oligarchy from using it for purposes of legitimation at home, so their lack of interest in independent Communist revolutions does not prevent them from continuing to use, or at any rate to wish to use, the Communist parties and front organisations abroad as auxiliaries of Soviet diplomacy in seeling to influence or hamper the actions of non-Communist governments. In this, they are following the example of Stalin, with the important difference that they cannot rely on the automatic obedience of all Communist parties to the Moscow centre, but only on a broad pro-Soviet sympathy of the majority of them, which gives them the chance to win their support on specific issues as occasion arises. Thus, the exclusive concentration of the 1969 Moscow "world conference" of Communist parties on unity of action against "imperialism" was not only due to the increasing political and theoretical independence of the major Western Communist parties from Moscow, but also to the Soviet leaders' own conscious preference for a broad if loose cooperation against the United States and its allies rather than a stricter but narrower agreement on irrelevant doctrines and impracticable revolutionary strategies. The resulting "main document" has been remarkable not only for the well-nigh incredibly platitudinous emptiness of its "analysis" of the world situation, but also for the lack of those strategic pointers for the road to

power for Communist parties which formed the central theme of all previous international Communist documents: it is specific only in the slogans that are directly useful to Soviet foreign policy.

#### The "Security" of a World Power.

But if the interests underlying that foreign policy are not in any serious sense revolutionary, what are they? The traditional answer of those who have always denied the revolutionary character of Soviet foreign policy is that its main objective is the same as with any other sovereign state - "national security". The difficulty is that "security" in the modern world, and for the Soviet Union in particular, can have a variety of meanings.

The most traditional meaning is, of course, <u>territorial</u> security - the security of a country's frontiers from attack, which in the case of Great Powers frequently is interpreted to include a glacier or buffer zone beyond the state frontiers. In the case of the Soviet Union, this means that one primary objective of its foreign policy, now as at any time after 1945, has been the preservation of the East European <u>status quo</u>. Recently, it has acquired the additional meaning of the security of Russia's highly vulnerable Eastern frontier with China.

A second, more modern meaning is security against <u>nuclear</u> attack. This is a cause of both conflicting and common interests with the United States - of the strategic arms race on one side, of the common interest in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, in "crisis management" to avoid nuclear war, and if possible in limiting or stopping the race itself, on the other. The common interest in nuclear non-proliferation and in "crisis management" has been clearly recognised both by Khrushchev and his successors over since the Cuban confrontation. The attitude to the strategic arms race itself has been more ambiguous, depending on a shifting balance of several other factors.

Third, there is in the Soviet case the new concept of "ideological security", underlying the intervention in Czechoslovakia and its justification by the "Brezhnev doctrine". Behind the absurdities of the talk about "ideological subversion" and the "counter-revolutionary danger" there were two hard facts. One is the domestic defensiveness of the present Soviet oligarchy - its determination to continue ruling a closed scoiety. The other is the fact that its East European buffer zone has been founded on the rule of like-minded Communist parties governing by basically similar methods, so that any major change in the internal system of one of the member states is viewed in Moscow as a threat to ultimate Soviet territorial control both there and elsewhere in the bloc. The case illustrates the point that a "defensive" ideological doctrine, if seriously held, is as liable to generate international conflict as an "offensive" one.

Finally, in the case of a world power, the real crux of the matter lies in a fourth meaning - relative security: national security may be regarded as a precarious so long as a rival power, or alliance of powers, is stronger in any type of armed force or any region of the world that has potential strategic or economic importance in case of war. Because this relative concept of security has no inherent limit, it has formed the classical justification for the imperialist policies (in the historical rather than the Marxist-Leninist sense of the term) of Great Powers - for the race for spheres of influence as well as for the armaments race. It is true that this kind of imperialist power politics differs from "ideological" power politics in that it may be limited by agreements among the powers concerned: non-ideological Great Powers normally take the existence of rival powers for granted and do not start by assuming that only one type of "system" will survive in the end. To that extent, the waning of the belief in "world revolution" among the Soviet leaders and its replacement by "secular" power politics have opened the possibility of limiting and eventually settling \_ existing conflicts - but only the possibility. Its actual chances depend, on the Soviet side, on the interpretation of "relative security" in a given international constellation.

In fact, Soviet foreign and defence policies in recent years have been dominated by the triangular constellation of world affairs - by the existence, that is, of two major potential enemies, the United States and China. (Secondary powers, like West Germany or Japan, are only seriously considered as dangerous in conjunction with one of the primary potential enemies - so far principally with the United States.) On this basis, if actual Soviet policies are any guide, the minimum requirements of Soviet relative security may be taken to include "parity" in long-range nuclear weapons with the United States, preservation of control over Russia's East European power sphere, the acquisition of similar power spheres on other sections of the periphery surrounding the Eurasian "heart-land", and mobile conventional strength sufficient to protent them. Optimum requirements would include the removal of the American presence from the European continent and the breakup of the present Chinese regime. Finally, an overriding diplomatic objective is the prevention of an understanding between the two major potential enemies - America and China.

#### The Course of Soviet Tolicy: Some Basic Decisions.

If we turn now to the actual evolution of the foreign policy of the post-Khrushchev leadership, we may assume that the new team took a few months to form its basic estimate of the international situation - the constellation of forces, the relative strength of Russia and her potential enemies, the dangers and opportunities of the moment. In some ways, the results of this first survey must have been rather grim. The early contacts with Peking confirmed that the overthrow of Khrushchev would make no difference to the fanatic hostility of China

to the Soviet "revisionist clique" so long as Mao Tse-tung and his faction were in control. Moreover, the lesson of Khrushchev's Cuban defeat - the inadequacy of Soviet armaments compared with those of the United States, both in strategic nuclear weapons and in long-range conventional mobility - was soon to be rubbed in by the massive military intervention of the U.S. in distant Vietnam. At the same time, there was no acute danger to Soviet security from either opponent. China, despite the explosion of her first nuclear device, was still far too weak to risk a direct attack. The United States were not only as determined as the Soviets to maintain "peaceful coexistence" in the minimum sense of avoiding nuclear world war, but were being increasingly diverted from their conflict with the Soviets over the European balance of power by their preoccupation with China and their growing involvement in Vietnam.

The first decision taken by the Kremlin in response to this situation was clearly to continue and intensify the long-term effort to improve Soviet absolute and relative strength in both nuclear and conventional armaments that had been begun in Khrushchev's last years. There is no point for me, as a layman in military matters, in going into detail on this subject in front of an expert audience. Suffice it to say that this drive has continued steadily ever since and has succeeded in improving Soviet strength relative to that of the U.S. to a remarkable extent, particularly in the fields of strategic nuclear weapons and of naval forces; but that it has all the time remained a long-term effort, geared to the improvement of Soviet "relative security" rather than to plans for a critical showdown at a particular moment. The Soviets, in short, have been steadily "catching up" with their main antagonist - without regard for maintaining the "détente" but without plans for a specific crisis.

The other basic decision was to give, for the time being, priority to the political conflict in the West - with U.S. influence in Europe and the Mediterranean, and with Nato as its organised expression - over the new contest with China. As far as we can judge, this was not based on any fear that the danger from the West was more acute, nor on any hope that China might cease to be a potential enemy. On the contrary, the Soviets must have realised by then that even after the demise of Mao, China would remain a major independent power with interests partly conflicting with those of her Russian neighbour, and therefore a potential opponent - even if perhaps a more pragmatic and less fanatical one; and as their ideological perception of the world had outlived their ideological commitment to revolution, they probably viewed "socialist" China despite Mao's "errors" as a rising power and the "capitalist" West as destined for inevitable decline. But they seem to have considered that the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam as well as other tensions in the ranks of the Western alliance would offer them special opportunities for consolidating their own position in Europe while promoting the possible total; or at least partial

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dissolution of Nato by 1969, and that achievement of their major objectives in the West in the coming years would thus enable them later to face the growingthreat in the East from a much more secure position.

#### 1965/6: Initiative and Luck.

The decision to give priority to Western antagonists and European issues did not, of course, mean that the new Soviet leaders could ignore the sontest with China in their first years; but they dealt with it by limited preparatory measures rather than seeking a major political confrontation. On the frontier, they played down border incidents and sent no substantial reinforcements, contenting themselves with intensified paramilitary training of the young in these areas. In inter-party relations, they adjourned after the unsuccessful "preparatory" conference of March 1965 the effort to push for a world conference which might condemn the Chinese heresy, and concentrated instead on solidarity with the fighting Vietnamese Communists: by resuming deliveries of modern weapons in an area from which Khrushchev had virtually withdrawn, they reaped the double advantage of increasing American difficulties with a much smaller expenditure and of competing successfully with Peking for the role of champion in aiding an antiimperialist revolution. Within a year, their offers to cooperate with Peking in the organisation of aid to Vietnam and Peking's persistent refusal had the effect of turning the Vietnamese, Korean and Japanese Communists from supporters of the Chinese viewpoint to a position of independent neutrality in the inter-Communist dispute. Together with the virtual destruction of the Peking-oriented Indonesian Communist party in the massacre that followed the failure of a Communist-supported coup in the autumn of 1965, this led to the disintegration of all the major elements of what had previously seemed a rather formidable Asian Communist camp under Peking's leadership.

The other preparatory effort of the Soviets on the Chinese "front" was devoted to the improvement of their relations with the major non-Communist states in Asia. A rapprochement with Japan was promoted chiefly in the economic field. But the major occasion for Soviet initiative arose as a result of the hostilities between India and Pakistan, and of the Chinese threat of a renewed frontier conflict with India while the former were in progress. It seems plausible that Soviet as well as American communications to Peking may have helped to prevent the execution of the threat at this critical moment: at any rate, the Soviets and the United States were as clearly on the same side against China in India as the Soviets and China were on the same side against the U.S. in Vietnam - a striking illustration of the fluidity inherent in the triangular constellation of world affairs. What is certain, however, is that the failure of Chinese military action to materialise was a severe disappointment to Pakistan; and only this disappointment created the preconditions for Pakistans willingness to accept Soviet mediation at Tashkent in early 1966. While this mediation did not produce a solution to the

Kashmirdispute, it greatly increased Soviet prestige in Asia and constituted a clear defeat for Feking which, having been unable to intervene in the conflict against Soviet opposition, was effectively excluded from its further course. Together with the progressive elimination of Sukarno's power in Indonesia after the abortive pro-Communist coup, this amounted to the dismantling of the main non-Communist pillars of the Peking-Karachi-Pnom Penh-Djakarta regional axis that China had been endeavouring to build up for some years; and that in turn combined with the indefinite adjournment of the Algiers Afro-Asian conference, which China had hoped to turn into an anti-Soviet as well as anti-American demonstration, to produce an impression of all-round Chinese policy failures that preceded the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution and may indeed have helped to precipitate it by sharpening conflicts within the Chinese leadership.

Meanwhile in the West, the first care of the new Soviet leaders was to improve cooperation within the bloc by patiently reducing tensions rather than by pressure. The Rumanians were assured that Khrushchev's attempt to bully them into economic integration would not be repeated, and the adjournment of plans for a world conference combined with the offers to cooperate with China also helped to soften their defiance. East European leaders attracted by the chance of improved Western contacts offered by the détente were not stopped, but greatly encouraged to turn to Paris rather than to Washington, and seriously warned only against closer relation with the West German "revanchists"; in fact, the Kremlin now tried with considerable skill to exploit the increasingly visible differences within the Western alliance in order to maintain unity within its own. The slowness of the Federal Republic in adapting its diplomacy to the climate of the détente, in particular, enabled the Soviet leaders to use the German danger as an argument both for tightening diplomatic discipline in the bloc and for strengthening military cooperation within the Warsaw Pact.

At the same time, the new men turned smoothly from Khrushchev's concentration on détente with the United States as leader of the West to a deliberate effort to widen the rifts in the Western camp to a point where the continuation of the Nato alliance beyond 1969 would be placed in jeopardy - an effort facilitated by U.S. preoccupation with Vietnam as well as by French ambition and West German rigidity. To the objection that a campaign for the dissolution of Nato had little plausibility if conducted simultaneously with the strengthening of the Warsaw Pact - an objection voiced not only by the Western powers in public, but also by the Rumanians in private - they replied with a bold manoeuver: the proposal for a "European Security system" that would replace both alliances and thus end the military partition of Europe, but would be committed to protect the status quo including the partition of Germany. In detail, the proposal as adopted at the Bucarest conference of the Warsaw Pact in July, 1966, had many obvious pitfalls, from the continued existence of the network of bilateral alliances among the Warsaw Pact countries to the demand for American withdrawal

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from Europe and for West German acceptance of West Berlin as an "independent entity"; its adoption as proposed would have made Russia the predominant power in Europe, and was never seriously considered by any Western government. But in its broad outline, the plan was well calculated to appeal to the wide-spread European desire that the détente should be used for an effort to end the division of the continent rather than cement it by a Russo-American understanding, to encourage General de Gaulle's idea of an independent European diplomacy, and to make the Americans appear as outsiders and the West Germans as obstacles to a European settlement. It thus marked Russia's recovery of the diplomatic initiative in Europe.

The third aspect of Soviet "Western" policy, besides the efforts to consolidate the Soviet bloc and to foster the disinterative tendencies within Nato, was an intensified activity in the Middle East and Mediterranean. This was facilitated by the perennial conflicts over Cyprus and included patient diplomatic work to improve relations with both Turkey and Iran; altogether, the Middle East was for some years the only area in which the Soviets assumed substantial new commitment for both economic and military aid at a time when they were generally cutting down on the legacy of Khrushchev's "globalism". But the core and center of the new Soviet initiative in this region was the attempt to form a "bloc of progressive Arab states" closely linked to the "Socialist Community", proclaimed by premier Kosygin in his address to the Egyptian National Assembly in Cairo in the spring of 1965. — in contrast to Khrushchev's traditional policy of backing individual Arab states in their conflicts with "imperialism and zionism" but of opposing "Panarabism".

The occasion for this move seems to have been the seizure of power in Syria by the Left wing of the Baath party and the entry of two Communists into the Syrian government in February: given the close relations established by Khrushchev with Nasser's Egypt and with Algeria (then still governed by Ben Bella), some coordination must by then have seemed to be called for. Nevertheless froclamation of the "progressive Arab bloc" slogan was more than an automatic response to increased opportunities: it amounted to the transition from a strategy of denial of this region to Western control to the attempt to establish a positive sphere of Soviet influence there, and the Kremlin must have been aware that this meant a vast increase in its political and military commitments, not only in its economic ones. In fact, they showed their awareness by the steady expansion of their Mediterranean fleet that followed - an expansion clearly/predicated on the use of airfields in the littoral states in case of war. We must thus assume that the Soviets increased their commitments in the Middle East as part of a long-range move for acquiring a capacity to threaten Europe's oil supplies and Nato's southern flank, and thus to combine pressure on its southern member states with the lure of the "European Security system" in order to speed its dissolution.

Yet we may well doubt that the Soviet leaders fully understood the precise political implications of their commitment to this new sphere of influence. For their hold on the "progressive Arab states" depended on supporting their hostility towards Israel while avoiding the risks of war; and the increase of their Mediterranean naval presence was liable to weaken the credibility of their appeal for a dissolution of military alliances. The question remains whether this aspect of Soviet "Western" policy was fully coordinated with the oi'ers, or whether it represented a first symptom of an uneasy compromise between different concepts within the collective leadership.

## 1967/8: The Unforeseen Crises

By the spring of 1967, the risks inherent in the Soviets' new Middle Eastern policy became apparent. The Syrian leftist government, Soviet-backed but by no means fully Soviet- controlled, had actively and publicly supported guerrilla raids against Israel from its territory. When Israel finally inflicted a major "retaliatory raid" and it proved helpless, its ability to maintain itself in power seemed seriously in doubt. The Soviets, rather than risking the collapse of their clients, announced an alleged Israeli plan to invade Syria in order to overthrow them, and prevailed on Nasser to mobilise in solidarity with them. But Nasser, finding his mobilisation enthusiastically echoed in all the Arab states bordering Israel went beyond it to send home the U.N. border units and announce the blockade of the straits of Tiran - and the Soviets, who had not been asked in advance, had to back him in public. Apparently the Kremlin leaders still hoped at this stage that the United States, overcommitted in Vietnam and anxious to avoid further conflagrations, could prevail on Israel to swallow the loss of the only lasting gain of the 1956 war without a fight: they seem to have been surprised both by the outbreak of the Six Days War and by its outcome.

Soviet-American crisis management had been unable to prevent the outbreak because of the limited influence of both superpowers on their local allies. It succeeded easily in confining the war to local proportions by the abstention of both from direct intervention, but again failed to produce a settlement because of the conflict of their interests. Faced with the loss of their military equipment, the resentment of the defeated Arabs at their failure to intervene directly, and the risk of a downfall of the governments which had relied on them and on which they had relied, the Soviet collective leadership decided to continue its unsuccessful policy but raise the stakes - to back most of the Arabs' political demands, to reequip them massively and send large numbers of training personnel, and to advise against another round of war. In its immediate effect, this bold stubbornness achieved its objective: the pro- Soviet Arab governments were stabilised, their military potential was restored, and the machinery of Soviet influence in their countries was greatly strengthened. But as effective Soviet control over their foreign policies and military actions was not, and indeed could not be, attained, the new Soviet power sphere remained burdened with the risk of yet another unwanted war.

Meanwhile a new situation was developing in a region of far more vital importance to the Soviets: the new government of the German Federal Republic, formed at the end of 1966, recognised that an East-West detente offered the most favorable chances for freer conditions in East Germany and easier contacts between Germans in both parts of the divided nation, and determined to work actively for normal relations with the Communist states of Eastern Europe.

The moment Bonn abandoned its accustomed regidity, the attraction of its economic and technological potency proved stronger than the traditional fear of German revanchism for most of the East European leaders: Rumania immediately established full diplomatic relations, while Hungary, Bulgaria and even Czechoslovakia manifested serious interest. For Russia, the loss of the bogey they had used to maintain diplomatic discipline in the bloc and the danger of the increasing isolation of East Germany, her most exposed, most valuable and most loyal client state in the area, seemed serious enough to put her back on the defensive: together with the Polish leaders, who traditionally considered fear and distrust of Germany as a major factor of stability for their domestic control, and with the worried East Germans, the Soviet leaders hurried to stop their other allies from exchanging diplomatic missions with Bonn and to commit them by new twenty-year treaties to the political and military support of East The loss of initiative also manifested itself in the fact that it was now the West Germans who offered negotiations on a mutual renunciation of force to the Soviets and all their allies, and the Soviets who hesitated and repeatedly interrupted the diplomatic talks by public denunciations - just as the West Germans who now showed eagerness to negotiate with the East German government on a whole catalogue of subjects while the East Germans dug themselves in behind a wall of preconditions.

Perhaps the most striking symptom of the change was that Soviet propaganda for a replacement of both military alliances in Europe virtually stopped in the course of 1967: Moscow's concern for maintaining the cohesion of its own East European system had once again begun to outweigh its hopes for an early dissolution of Nato. And indeed, a number of factors were now working to reduce the tensions within the Western alliance — not only the belated alignment of Bonn with the East-West bridgebuilding favoured by its leading allies, but the growing concern of the Nato powers in general and of France in particular at Russia's buildup in the Mediterranean, the gradual disappointment of President de Gaulle at the lack of Soviet cooperation in his European schemes, and from the spring of 1968 onward the beginning of a turn of the United States to the search for a negotiated solution of the Vietnam conflict as manifested in the partial bombing stop.

It was thus a Soviet leadership no longer favoured by luck, but involved in unforeseen complications in the Middle East and driven back on the diplomatic defensive in Europe that had to face the Czechoslovak developments of 1968. The Novotny regime, compromised by its reluctant attitude to destalinisation, discredited by its economic ineffectiveness and increasingly under attack for its rigid cultural policy and its negative attitude to the demands of the Slovaks, had been backed by Moscow up to the end of 1967 without

enthusiasm, because it was there and was reliable in bloc cooperation; when the majority of the Central Committee finally turned against it, Brezhnev had not tried to veto its decision. Within a few months of the installation of the new Dubcek leadership, however, the Soviets as well as their East German and Polish allies were thoroughly alarmed at its experimental spirit at the frank criticism of the past including the role of Russia, the rehabilitation of Czech democratic traditions, the loosening of the control of opinions, the attempt to create a new model of a Communist regime without opposition parties but with considerable scope for a plurality of opinions and interests, the opening of windows to non-Communist Europe including Western Germany. Though Dubcek and his team left no doubt of their determination to respect the limits of reform established by Khrushchev at the time of the Hungarian revolt of 1956 - to maintain single-party rule and to remain loyal to the Warsaw Pact alliance - , and though they could point to the calm in the country and the immense popularity of their party as proof of their ability to keep the experiment under control, the Soviets and their hard-line allies were not reassured: for behind their implausible warnings of the risk of "counterrevolution" and defection from the "socialist community" was the much more realistic fear of its infection with the new spirit of liberalisation of the encouragement of pressures for greater national autonomy and greater freedom of Western contacts throughout the bloc, and for greater internal freedom even in Russia itself.

The April plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was dominated by this fear of "ideological subversion": it marked the point where the domestic rigidity and defensiveness of the post-revolutionary oligarchy, by stimulating a concern for "ideological security", began to make a major impact on its concept of the national interests of the Soviet Union. There followed three months of massive pressures on the Czech leaders, ranging from press attacks and economic threats to manoeuvers on their soil, in order to make them reverse their course; and when all this proved unavailing, the "Warsaw letter", adopted by the five orthodox bloc members in mid-July, virtually threatened them with armed By then, the Soviet leaders had clearly made up their mind that intervention. the damage such intervention would do to their relations with the non-Communist world and to the chances of the Communist parties operating there was a lesser risk compared with the consequences of the successful pursuit of the Czech experiment for the cohesion of the bloc and the stability of their authoritarian The only risk they remained unwilling to accept was that of regime at home. an armed uprising that might spread to other countries - hence the efforts made to commit the Czech leaders, at Cierna and Bratislava, to a formula that could be used to split them and to have intervention legitimated by a reversed majority of their party presidium and Central Committee. In the event, the attempt to

reverse the majority at the moment of invasion and to have it welcomed by the legitimate party organs failed, but the risk of armed resistance was avoided all the same - and the dangerous experiment was crushed by the Soviet cocupation of Czechoslovakia on August 20/21, 1968.

Given the nature of the Soviet regime in its present phase and the rank order of interests determined by it, the occupation of Czechoslovakia was based on a realistic calculation of its consequences and achieved its immediate objectives; despite the blunders of detail in its execution, it has proved successful in this limited sense. Faced with a choice of evils, the collective leadership has shown its ability to take hard decisions. But the fact that it was faced with this choice also showed the weaknesses of its long-term policies for the consolidation of its most vital power sphere in Eastern Europe. So long as it was favoured by windfalls outside its control, it had been able to reap the fruits with considerable tactical skill. But the basic narrowness of its outlook greatly reduced its flexibility as soon as the winds of fortune turned.

Only in relation to China, the Soviets luck held throughout 1967/8: the "Cultural Revolution", begun in August 1966, led to a virtual paralysis of Chinese foreign policy and temporarily dispensed the Soviets from the need to have an active policy for dealing with China. This greatly eased the situation of Russian diplomacy when the United States began seriously to seek a negotiated solution of the war in Vietnam, and appealed to Moscow's good offices to bring its allies to the negotiating table. Quite apart from the immense intrinsic difficulties of such a negotiation it is doubtful whether the Soviets are interested in its success: they have profited greatly from the strain on American resources and the damage to American moral prestige caused by the war, and must wish to maintain the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia as a cause of tension between their two major potential enemies, America and China. they are interested, it would appear, both in reducing the scale of the fighting and in proving useful to Communist North Vietnam - and they are also interested in keeping the Americans dependent on their goodwill in this area at no cost to themselves, so as to secure American goodwill in crises nearer home. Accordingly, the Soviets have continued fully to back the demands of the Vietnamese Communists, but have at the same time advised Hanoi that an attempt to press them at the negotiating table is worthwhile. This tactic appears to have been successful in producing tension between Hanoi and Peking and winning American gratitude by starting the negotiations - without so far bringing agreement on an end to hostilities appreciably nearer.

#### 1969: A Shift of Priorities?

The 12th plenum of the Chinese Communist party's Central Committee in late 1968, and its 9th party congress in April, 1969, announced the end of the Gultural Revolution, the consolidation of the rule of Mao Tse-tung's faction with a prominent part played by military leaders, and the impending return of China as an active force on the world stage - with an undiminished attitude of fanatical hostility towards the Soviet Union. The first result, was an increase in the scale of frontier incidents and the publicity given to them by both sides, beginning with the clashes in the Ussuri river in March and repeated since in other areas.

While it is impossible for the outsider to judge from the contradictory Soviet and Chinese accounts who is the "aggressor", political analysis suggests that the Chinese have more to gain and the Soviets more to lose from a multiplication of frontier troubles. Domestically, these incidents help Mao and his supporters to maintain ideological fervour against "revisionist social-imperialism" represented by "the new Czars" after the end of the Cultural Revolution. Diplomatically, they keep the Chinese claim for frontier revision, and as a first stage for Soviet recognition that existing frontiers are based on imperialist "unequal treaties", on the agenda, while the Soviets see themselves as defenders of the status quo and should like to close the books on past history. Militarily, the Chinese may be assumed, for all their brave talk, to understand perfectly that they cannot afford a nuclear war but shifting border warfare favours their experience in guerilla tactics and their superior numbers. The Soviets, on the other hand, may have been tempted for some years to destroy China's fledgling nuclear installations by a preventive strike. But having failed to do so at an early stage, they must be aware that by now the cost in destruction of their own Far Eastern regions would be quite heavy, quite apart from the unforeseeable outcome of a subsequent all-out land war against the Chinese masses. The Kremlin is thus faced with the nightmare of unending border fighting on an enormous frontier, kept up by the Chinese without the need to force a decision and in conditions which offer little scope for the use of Soviet superiority in weapons technology.

In the circumstances, the Soviet leadership must have felt the need to reconsider its priorities, and to draw up a provisional balance sheet of its achievements in the West. Seen from Moscow, the conclusion must have been that the maximum objective of a dissolution of Nato and an American withdrawal from Europe is out of reach for the time being, but that thanks to the occupation of Czechoslovakia, progress towards the minimum objective of a

concern for Soviet "relative security" in relation to China - for preempting the danger of Chinese expansion to the Southwest after a possible American withdrawal from continental Southeast Asia and a completed British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. And if it does develop, it will mean that the Soviet Empire is committed to the defence and political organisation of buffer zones surrounding its central land mass on three sides - in Europe, in the Middle East and in South Asia - as well as to the defence of its direct frontier with China.

#### Concluding Remarks.

Our survey of the foreign policies of the oligarchic leadership of the Soviet Union that succeeded the Khrushchevian era has confirmed that its methods have not been adventurous, but that its commitments have become increasingly ambitious in course of time. On two occasions, it has been involved in major unforeseen crises, and there is no guarantee whatever that with the present policies similar crises may not arise again - particularly in the Middle East, but possibly also elsewhere.

This growing tendency to the overextension of Soviet resources, dangerous both to the Soviet Union and to the outside world, is not in the main due to a sense of a worldwide, revolutionary mission, such as appeared still to animate Khrushchev before his Caribbean Damascus. Nor can it be ascribed to the overweening power drive of any single individual, which would soon be checked under the present oligarchic arrangements. What then, are its causes?

They are, of course, complex, but I submit that they may be conveniently grouped under four headings. The first are the realities of the situation of a world power in the present international constellation. The problem of "relative security" is real. Even between two superpowers determined to be rational and responsible, its solution by agreement is immensely difficult one only has to think of the issue of strategic arms limitation between two powers that are both capable of rapid technological progress. With China in her present phase, negotiation of any security agreement seems impossible; with the United States, an opponent could well have doubted its possibility at the time, only a few years ago, when the Johnson administration seemed at the height of its "illusion of omnipotence."

The second group of causes are precisely illusions of this type - the imperial syndrome of the overestimation of the role of military force. For a power combining an awe-inspiring nuclear arsenal with large land forces and growing mobility on the oceans, it is easy to delude itself that for the effective control of regions in which it has an important interest a military

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presence is a necessary and sufficient condition - whereas with a skilful policy it is frequently unnecessary, and without it may prove insufficient. In the special case of the Soviet Union, this syndrome is reinforced by the remnants of ideology - the dogma that the class enemy will always use force, the belief that force is sufficient to bring about social transformations and through them changes of political attitude, above all the belief that the historically established limits of imperial power do not apply to a "socialist" state. The Soviet leaders understand perfectly well why colonialism cannot last - but they are surprised every time when small countries in their power sphere refuse to do their bidding.

The third group of causes arises from the inner relations within the oligarchy. It is possible, but difficult for such a body to make very hard decisions about priorities: the temptation to compromise by trying to do too much, is ever present. In economics this leads to inflation - in foreign affairs to overextension. This is reinforced by the tendency to use chauvinism as a means of preserving domestic discipline, and by the growing prestige of the military that goes with it: military leaders are by no means necessarily inclined to adventures, but they do tend to give an extensive interpretation of security needs!

Finally, the last factor is the conservative, authoritarian character of the present collective - its fear of spontaneous change anywhere within the Soviet orbit. This was the direct cause of intervention in Czechoslovakia and may still cause more serious international conflicts in the future.

Permit me to conclude by reminding you that this catalogue of causes favouring the excessive striving for and use of military power contains many factors that are <u>not</u> specific to the Soviet Union, and no suggestion that any or all of them are necessarily insuperable. It is offered neither in a spirit of self-righteousness nor of fatalism - only as an attempt to understand how a group of cautious, sober and very powerful men may come to overextend their resources to an increasingly dangerous degree.

consolidation of the East European power sphere has been considerable.

On one side, the long-expected 1969 deadline has arrived without bringing a single notice of withdrawal from the North Atlantic alliance; and the Soviets, having invaded Czechoslovakia and visibly strengthened their naval forces in both the Mediterranean and the Arctic, can hardly have been surprised by that outcome. They may, of course, continue propaganda attacks on Nato as well as more serious pressure on exposed countries like Turkey and Norway. But Brezhnev himself, in his speech at the Communist world conference in June, was almost as sober and realistic about the continued vitality of the alliance as about that of the "capitalist system" in the advanced Western countries.

On the other hand, the Soviets appear to be fairly confident that their intervention in Czechoslovakia, and particularly its political consummation with the belated overthrow of Dubcek in April, 1969 has "stopped the rot" in their own alliance, and has made the Western powers, including even the German "revanchists", more inclined to resign themselves to the status quo after the initial shock had worm off. One sign of this new confidence is Moscow's greater readiness for "businesslike" dealings with Bonn without constant public attacks so as to encourage the "realistic" elements there, and even its toleration of the interest in better relations with the Federal Republic lately shown by the Polish leaders.

A related, but more general indication of the change is the resumption of the "European Security" campaign that had been dropped during the Czechoslovak crisis - but with an important difference. The replacement of the two opposing alliances by a "European Security system" is now barely mentioned as a distant aim, while practical emphasis is concentrated on the early holding of a "European Security conference". The subjects to be treated at such a conference are left deliberately vague. All the more precise is the insistence that all interested European states must participate in such a conference on a basis of equality. The point is not to exclude the United States and Canada, both of which the Soviets seem prepared to admit as a "concession" to the wishes of the West Europeans, but to have East Germany accepted as a full partner before the conference opens - as indeed seems inevitable if such a conference is to meet at all. In this way, instead of demanding the diplomatic recognition of East Berlin as a formal precondition, the Soviets seem to be proposing to achieve de facto recognition of the status quo simply by its participation in the conference. The onus of raising preconditions - for instance concerning the future of West Berlin - and of raising subjects for discussion at the conference itself is thus left to the Western side.

While the conference project is hardly attractive in its present form, it does mark a change in Soviet policy compared with the pre-Czechoslovakia phase:

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it is <u>not</u> a thinly disguised bid for Soviet domination of Europe, but an attempt to achieve consolidation of the <u>status quo</u> of European partition, preferably with some additional gains for the Soviets (e.g. in West Berlin), but on the basis of the existing alliances. The underlying hope may well be that, with agreement once achieved on the basis of the <u>status quo</u>, the pressures for an American withdrawal will arise of themselves. But the underlying desire is also to get a provisional settlement in the West on the best terms that can be obtained <u>now</u> rather than to wait for better ones. The conclusion seems plausible that the Soviets are now getting interested in the partial and reciprocal withdrawal of troops which the West has been proposing for some years - because their priorities are shifting.

In fact, there are now two visible signs at least of the beginning of such a shift. One is, of course, the first really substantial reinforcement of Soviet garrisons in the Siberian and Central Asian regions bordering China. The other is what must be regarded as a bid for establishing a safe sphere of influence on the other side of the adjoining Southern borders of the Soviet Union, in South and Southwest Asia. I am not referring to Brezhnev's somewhat shadowy slogan of a "collective security system for sia", which may well turn out to be little more than a propaganda manoeuver for offering China to join some all-round pact of non-aggression, but to Kosygin's recent proposal for a system of regional cooperation embracing India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan along with the Soviet Union and Iran.

As it stands, this proposal is non-military: its immediate aim is to overcome the obstacles to the transit of Soviet and other goods created by Pakistan's unsolved conflicts with India on one side and Afghanistan on the other, and thus to continue the work of regional reconciliation begun at Tashkent. It is also clear from the first Pakistani reactions that the path of the project will be anything but smooth. But it is precisely here that the serious aspect of the Soviet project begins: its political purpose is to end, as soon as possible, the situation where Peking could at any moment exploit Pakistan's territorial grievances for regaining a political foothold in the neighbourhood of both Russia and India. It is because of that danger that the Soviets have apparently decided that they must commit themselves as an organising power in South and Southwest Asia, just as they committed themselves in the Arab Middle East four years ago. Moreover, while Kosygin's proposal has no direct military aspects, the potential military importance of Russian land transit to the Indian Ocean, combined with the growing Soviet naval presence in that ocean, is obvious enough.

The new Soviet bid for a South Asian power sphere may still fail at an early stage, or it may develop much more slowly than did the power sphere in the Middle East. But the design is recognisable. It seems prompted by